REPORTED 

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND 

No. 2198 

September Term, 2014 

_________________________ 

JEFFREY MICHAEL SHIFLETT 

v. 

STATE OF MARYLAND 

_________________________ 

Nazarian,

Reed, 

Zarnoch, Robert A.

(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), 

JJ.

_________________________ 

Opinion by Nazarian, J.

_________________________ 

 Filed: September 28, 2016 
After Katie Hadel was found stabbed to death in the bathtub of her apartment on 

February 5, 2013, Jeffrey Shiflett was charged with first-degree murder, first-degree 

assault, first-degree burglary, third-degree burglary, carrying a weapon openly with intent 

to injure, and two counts of second-degree assault. At trial in the Circuit Court for 

Baltimore County, Mr. Shiflett conceded that he killed her, and the contested issue was 

whether Mr. Shiflett, who has been diagnosed with multiple psychiatric disorders, was 

guilty of first- or second-degree murder. Ultimately, evidence of Mr. Shifflet’s disorders 

was not permitted, and Mr. Shifflet was deemed competent after a mid-trial competency 

hearing. But because of Mr. Shiflett’s disruptive behavior in and around the courtroom, 

the court ordered him restrained with a stun cuff during the proceedings, and when he 

refused, excluded him from the courtroom unless he agreed to wear it. As a result, much 

of the trial was conducted in his absence. 

On appeal, Mr. Shiflett claims the circuit court abused its discretion by ordering him 

to wear a stun cuff as a condition of being present in the courtroom. In addition, he argues 

that the court erred by failing to strike the State’s notice of intent to seek a sentence of life 

without parole; by excluding evidence of Mr. Shiflett’s psychological profile; by 

concluding that Mr. Shiflett was competent to stand trial; and by denying his motion to 

dismiss the burglary count. We affirm his convictions. 

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Shiflett and Ms. Hadel were childhood friends who became romantically 

involved in 2007. At that time, both Mr. Shiflett and Ms. Hadel used heroin and, as we 

will explain in more detail below, Mr. Shiflett suffered from several untreated mental 
2

illnesses. After Mr. Shiflett and Ms. Hadel participated in a robbery and Ms. Hadel was 

caught on a security camera using a stolen credit card, both were placed on probation. Mr. 

Shiflett later violated probation and was imprisoned for the full five-year sentence. 

While in prison, and until his release in 2012, Mr. Shiflett frequently wrote 

threatening letters to Ms. Hadel, Ms. Hadel’s mother, and Ms. Hadel’s husband, Craig 

Gordon. In one letter, dated May 25, 2009 and addressed to Ms. Hadel, Mr. Shiflett 

threatened her with a graphically violent death if she didn’t comply with his wishes: 

I’m in prison and not a day goes buy [sic] to where I don’t think 

about you putting me hear [sic] in this place. It[’]s all good 

why because they can’t keep me forever one day I will leave 

this place. When I do I will come looking for you and I will 

find you. Where ever you might be I won’t give up until I find 

you . . . You better hope you are telling me things I want to 

hear. If not I will loose [sic] my mind and cut your fucking 

head off. 

Another letter, dated March 10, 2010, addressed Ms. Hadel as “Dear Whore” and stated, 

“Nobody sends me to prison and gets away with it. It’s not going to be hard to find you.” 

 When he was released in December 2012, Mr. Shiflett moved in with his father in 

Annapolis. Mr. Shiflett’s father testified that he believed his son’s mental condition had 

worsened in prison, where he’d spent a year-and-a-half in solitary confinement. He 

described his son’s demeanor at the time as highly anxious, that he was unable to sleep or 

eat and was obsessed with Ms. Hadel. Mr. Shiflett continued to place phone calls to Ms. 

Hadel and her mother, as well as to write about Ms. Hadel on his Facebook page. 

Mr. Shiflett disappeared from his father’s house around February 1, 2013. And he 

followed through with his threat to find Ms. Hadel: he walked from Annapolis to 
3

Reisterstown and, by February 3, 2013, was camped out in the woods behind her apartment, 

waiting for her husband, Mr. Gordon, to leave. On the night of February 5, Mr. Shiflett 

broke into Ms. Hadel’s apartment and he encountered Mr. Gordon’s twelve-year old 

daughter, D,1

 lying in bed with her laptop. He screamed “Where the F is Katie?” at D, then 

dragged her down the hall toward Ms. Hadel’s bedroom. He let go once he spotted Ms. 

Hadel near the bathroom, and he pulled out a knife. D escaped to a neighbor’s house to 

get help, but by the time police arrived, Ms. Hadel had been stabbed sixteen times and was 

lying face down, “lifeless,” in the bathtub. Two other children, a one-year-old and a threeyear-old, were found in the apartment when police arrived; both were unharmed. 

Mr. Shiflett was charged with first-degree murder, first-degree assault, first-degree 

burglary, third-degree burglary, carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure, and two 

counts of second-degree assault. He conceded that he was responsible for Ms. Hadel’s 

murder, but disputed that the murder was premeditated. To that end, the defense attempted 

to introduce evidence of Mr. Shiflett’s untreated mental illnesses to rebut the State’s 

contention that he premeditated Ms. Hadel’s murder, and when that failed, to demonstrate 

that Mr. Shiflett was not competent to stand trial. After a mid-trial hearing, the circuit court 

found him competent. 

Before and throughout trial, Mr. Shiflett behaved in a disruptive and threatening 

manner. He directed his displeasure primarily, although not exclusively, toward the judge 

and the prosecutor; he addressed both using profane adaptations of their names. He was 

 

1 We use only her first initial to protect her privacy. 
4

permitted to sit in the courtroom unrestrained during jury selection, but after Mr. Shiflett 

tried to force his way into the judge’s chambers, the court ordered him to wear a stun cuff,2

a device worn around the ankle that administers an electric shock, if he wanted to remain 

in the courtroom for the trial. He refused to wear it, and the trial continued while he 

remained in the courthouse lock-up, with a video and audio hook-up that allowed him to 

see and hear the proceedings. 

The jury convicted Mr. Shiflett of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree 

felony murder, and the remaining counts, except for one count of second-degree assault. 

At the sentencing hearing, he moved for jury sentencing, but the court denied his motion 

and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. This timely appeal 

followed. We will provide more facts as appropriate to the discussion below. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Mr. Shiflett presents five questions on appeal, which we address in a slightly 

different order.3 First, he argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by ordering him 

 

2

 The Baltimore County Sheriff’s Office maintains a protocol for the use of a stun cuff, 

which defines it as “[a] conducted energy device that is secured to a subject’s ankle and 

deployed remotely.” The Sheriff goes on to describe the stun cuff as an electronic control 

device, that is, a “non-lethal device that emits an electronic energy charge, which causes 

electro-muscular disruption, which affects the sensory and motor functions of the central 

nervous system.” 

3 Mr. Shiflett phrased the questions as follows in his brief: 

1. Must Mr. Shiflett’s life without parole sentence be vacated? 

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused to 

permit defense counsel to introduce expert testimony about 

Mr. Shiflett’s psychological profile, when such testimony 
5

to wear a stun cuff, then by proceeding with trial in his absence when he refused to wear 

it. Second, he argues that he was entitled to have a jury determine whether he should be 

sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, and that his life sentence, administered 

by the court rather than by the jury, is unconstitutional. Third, Mr. Shiflett argues that the 

trial court erred by refusing to admit testimony regarding his psychological profile, and 

fourth, in its decision that he was competent to stand trial. Finally, Mr. Shiflett argues that 

the court erred by refusing to dismiss the first-degree burglary count. 

A. The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Requiring Mr. 

Shiflett To Wear A Stun Cuff To Remain In The Courtroom. 

Mr. Shiflett argues first that the circuit court erred by ordering him to wear a stun 

cuff as a condition of remaining in the courtroom, then by allowing the trial to proceed in 

his absence when he refused to wear it. In-court physical restraints are inherently 

prejudicial to criminal defendants in that they can diminish the accused’s ability to mount 

a meaningful defense as well as his ability to communicate with his lawyer, Deck v. 

 

was relevant to his ability to premeditate and form the 

requisite intent?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ordered Mr. 

Shiflett to wear a stun cuff and when it thereafter permitted 

trial to proceed in his absence after he refused to wear the 

cuff? 

4. Did the trial court err when it determined after a mid-trial 

competency hearing that Mr. Shiflett was competent to 

stand trial?

5. Did the trial court err when it denied defense counsel’s 

motion to dismiss the burglary count? 
6

Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 631 (2005), and no reported Maryland decision has considered 

whether and under what circumstances a stun cuff can serve as a courtroom restraint during 

a jury trial. We begin, then, with a closer look at Mr. Shiflett’s behavior, the range of 

options available to the trial court, and the court’s responses.

Mr. Shiflett’s statements and conduct had raised serious security concerns for the 

court long before trial. In the weeks leading up to jury selection, he’d taken to writing the 

presiding judge letters that he sent to her home. We decline to memorialize the text of 

those letters in the Maryland Appellate Reports—trust us when we say that their contents 

were thoroughly inappropriate and venomously vulgar. 

It was the Sheriff who first recommended placing Mr. Shiflett in a stun cuff after 

listening to a phone call Mr. Shiflett placed to his father from prison. In that particular call, 

Mr. Shiflett reacted to the court’s ruling that he would not be permitted to introduce 

psychiatric testimony; the call contained “a tremendous amount of profanity and some 

rather horrific statements” about Ms. Hadel. Defense counsel objected to the Sheriff’s 

recommendation, and after learning that Mr. Shiflett had not made any direct threats against 

the court or the prosecutor, the court declined to order Mr. Shiflett to wear the stun cuff in 

the courtroom: 

As counsel knows in this case, Mr. Shiflett has written to me 

on many occasions. Even though I keep writing back to him 

telling him not to write to me, he continues to write to me. And 

in many of his letters, there was never a direct threat against 

me or the Prosecutor—or either Prosecutor, but certainly 

language that this Court would consider to be highly 

inappropriate, vulgar and heated in terms [you would] describe 

a letter as heated. And this Court never felt in any way that 

there was a threat against her cause if I did, I would have 
7

brought that to the attention frankly—of the Sheriff’s office 

and of the State and decisions would have been made based on 

that.

 So considering the factors, being aware of the security 

necessary for this trial . . . I’m not going to order that the ankle 

cuff be put in. I appreciate why the Sheriff’s office wanted to 

put it in. I think in this particular case, I don’t believe it will 

[be] necessary. If at any time I feel that it becomes necessary, 

then I will modify my order. 

Jury selection then went forward as scheduled, and Mr. Shiflett was disruptive 

throughout that process. He made “constant remarks, often time inappropriate remarks, 

often vulgar remarks, often obscene remarks, for which the Court either tolerated . . . or 

admonished him to stop speaking.” Still, jury selection continued, and at that point the 

court elected not to revise its ruling on the stun cuff. But the next morning, before the 

courtroom day got under way, Mr. Shiflett attempted to break free from the guards and 

enter the judge’s chambers. A scuffle ensued as sheriffs tried to restrain him; they were 

eventually able to move him away from the judge, but not before he spit in a sheriff’s face:

This morning at ten to ten as Mr. Shiflett . . . was being 

brought to begin the trial, he attempted to—I was in chambers 

and I heard him call out my name, my first name, several times, 

and saying [the Judge’s name], which is my first name, and 

then he attempted to enter my chambers. At that point, the 

sheriffs—and there was three or four of them I believe that 

were with him at that time—moved him away from my 

chambers, put him up against the wall and attempted to calm 

him down and deter him from trying to enter my chambers in 

what appeared to be his effort to want to talk to me.

 They then moved him over into the courtroom and tried 

to get him to sit down. A scuffle occurred, and they were 

unable to really secure him, continued to become more agitated 

and resistive in his behavior. After that the sheriffs then took 
8

him back into the lockup, and I believe [defense counsel] came 

around as well in an effort to calm down Mr. Shiflett. 

 I subsequently had a chambers conference with counsel, 

indicated my concern for courtroom security. I also had an 

opportunity to talk to the sheriffs since I did not witness all of 

the behavior of Mr. Shiflett. I only heard him screaming out 

and calling my first name. In further talking to the sheriffs, 

they indicated to me not only were they hav[ing] difficulty 

securing him, but that he also spit at one of the sheriffs. And 

then they attempted again to push him down the hallway to try 

and secure his attendance into the courtroom.

 I told counsel in chambers based on his behavior this 

morning, that it was this Court’s intent and concern for 

courtroom security and his highly agitated state that I was 

going to order the sheriffs to place a cuff on him that would 

administer a shock if he acted up. And that was this Court’s 

decision. It was decided at that time to put all this on the 

record, and then go back to talk to Mr. Shiflett. 

The court went on to explain that she wanted to place Mr. Shiflett in a stun cuff because 

she thought “his rights are more secure and the appearance to the jury would be less 

intrusive with the cuff than with six sheriffs standing around him.” 

The judge and counsel then proceeded to Mr. Shiflett’s holding cell, where the court 

(with a court reporter present) gave Mr. Shiflett the opportunity to return to the courtroom 

if he agreed to wear the stun cuff:

THE COURT: The purpose of this hearing, Mr. Shiflett . . . —

we are in lockup, this hearing is being held in lockup—is based 

on your behavior this morning. 

* * * 

 So based on your behavior, I have determined that the 

only way to maintain courtroom security, which is my job, is 

to have the cuff on you.
9

 Now, you can choose not to use the cuff, not to wear the 

cuff. And if you choose to do that, then you will be waiving 

your right to be in the courtroom. You have an absolute right 

to be in the courtroom and participate in the proceedings. I 

have the absolute right as the Judge to determine courtroom 

security. 

 It is my decision, based on your conduct this morning, 

that you wear the cuff. 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: All right— 

THE COURT: By not complying with my order, you are 

waiving your right under [Md. Rule] 4-231. So I wanted to 

advise you of your right to be present[.] 

 Amidst the confusion that followed, Mr. Shiflett responded that “I’m not going to 

wear that fucking cuff,” and the court explained the implications of his decision: 

THE COURT: So as a result of your refusal to comply with my 

order, and I’m doing this based on your behavior this morning 

and this Court’s concern about courtroom security, then you 

will be waiving your right to be present at trial, and the trial 

will continue— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: And I am not waiving my right to be 

present at trial. Put the microphone right here. I am not 

waiving my right to be present at the trial today. I want to be 

in the courtroom, but I’m not going to be treated like I’m some 

fucking kind of animal. Thank you. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Now, let me say something about this 

bracelet. 

THE COURT: So the trial—you understand the trial will 

continue without your presence.

[MR. SHIFLETT]: I don’t really care about that. That’s fine. 

* * * 
10

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So I’m going to leave you in 

your cell, and every time we have a break, I’m going to revisit 

this issue with you. So you will continue to have the right to 

consult with a lawyer. I am not going to have you sent back to 

the jail. We will continue to explore the option for you to come 

back into court. 

From there, the trial continued in Mr. Shiflett’s absence. During the luncheon recess 

that same day, the judge, the prosecutor, and defense counsel returned to Mr. Shiflett’s cell, 

and Mr. Shiflett maintained his refusal to wear the stun cuff in the courtroom: 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: I ain’t seeing that nasty bitch. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We’re about to go on the record. 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Woo-hoo. 

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Shiflett, we are back— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Hey— 

THE COURT: We are back— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: —baby [Judge][4] Hey, babe. 

THE COURT: We are back on the record— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Hey babe. 

THE COURT: I am Judge [last name], Mr. Shiflett. 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: You’re baby [Judge] to me. 

THE COURT: (Inaudible) address me in that way. 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: You’re baby [Judge]. 

THE COURT: We are back on the record— 

 

4 We refer in the block quotes to the identity of the person being addressed rather than 

reproducing Mr. Shiflett’s names for them. 
11

[MR. SHIFLETT]: I have to think up a nickname for 

(inaudible).

THE COURT: —in the State of Maryland versus Jeffrey 

Shiflett, case Number K-13-1295. 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Is [Prosecutor] for the State? 

THE COURT: We are now present—I am present, [defense 

counsel and the State] are here as well— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Oh, shit. 

THE COURT: —along with my court clerk. 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Oh, shit. 

THE COURT: I’m here to advise you of where we are in the 

proceeding and of your right to go back into the court if you 

choose to. We have concluded with three or four witnesses— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: And I should have been there so I can 

fucking hear what they have to say about me, and so I could 

have told me [sic] attorney some fucking questions to ask them 

that I might thought that was relevant to this case, and I was 

denied my constitutional right, but we all know they don’t give 

a fuck about people’s rights around here. 

THE COURT: So, Mr.— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Ain’t that right [Prosecutor]? 

THE COURT: Mr.— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Yes, ma’am. 

THE COURT: —Shiflett— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Hey, babe. 

* * * 
12

THE COURT: I’m giving you the opportunity to come to the 

courtroom.

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Does it look like I want to come back to the 

courtroom?

THE COURT: Sir— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: All right. Hold on. I want to come back—

I’m going to say one thing, okay, for this record here. For this 

record, I—I got to make it known, okay, that I do suffer from 

a mood disorder, okay? 

Another thing I do have to make a note for the record is 

at night, I don’t get a chance to go to sleep because I go back 

to my cell and I constantly think about this case, and I just stay 

up all night with my mind’s spinning in circles, okay? And 

when I don’t get any sleep, I get very moody and I get very 

agitated very easily, especially when asshole police officers try 

to put their hands on me for no unapparent reason, okay?

Just so everybody knows that stuff. You know, I like to 

make sure that everybody understands. 

THE COURT: Thank you for sharing that with us. 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Hey, baby, I’ll share anything with you. 

What about you share with me? That’s what I want to know. 

* * * 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Jeff, do you want to come into the 

courtroom or not?

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Fuck, no, I ain’t coming into that mother. 

You’re going to put that fucking bracelet on me and treat me 

like a fucking animal, you think I’m going—another thing I 

want to say about that. One thing I can tell you about that 

bracelet okay? It’s inhumane to fucking have me wear that, 

okay? 

THE COURT: Go ahead. 
13

[MR. SHIFLETT]: There’s enough sheriffs here to fucking 

have 20 sheriffs in that courtroom to where if I acted up, you 

could have 20 sheriffs do something to me. I don’t need a 

fucking bracelet on my fucking leg to treat me like I’m a 

fucking cow and you’re going to use a cattle prod on me and 

tame me. 

THE COURT: Go ahead. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So what— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Are you fucking crazy? 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So what you’re saying is that you 

don’t want to come to the courtroom now? 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: I don’t waive no rights. I want to fucking 

come into the courtroom. But I’m not wearing a fucking 

bracelet and being treated like an animal. 

THE COURT: The only way you’re coming into my 

courtroom, sir, is with that bracelet— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Oh, well. 

THE COURT: —that’s it. 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: (Inaudible) highly agitated? Let’s fuck so 

I can release some of my stress, baby. Hey [Prosecutor], you’re 

a faggot. You take it up the ass (inaudible) you faggot, you 

queer, you homosexual. I love you baby [Judge]. 

 The trial continued in Mr. Shiflett’s absence. But later that day, the court was forced 

to excuse the jury when the Sheriff discovered that Mr. Shiflett had created another 

disturbance: 

THE SHERIFF: We got a situation that he—we got a situation 

that he shitted in a—in a cell. 

THE COURT: He’s— 
14

THE SHERIFF: He’s shitted in the cell on the floor. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

* * * 

THE SHERIFF: My sergeant—sergeant is going down to get a 

shield because we don’t know what’s going to happen once we 

go in, if he’s going to throw it or not. 

THE COURT: If he’s going to? 

THE SHERIFF: Throw it. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Throw something. 

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So do you know what is 

currently in the cell at this point in time other than toilet paper? 

There’s no— 

THE SHERIFF: Feces. 

THE COURT: I’m sorry, feces? 

THE SHERIFF: Feces that he did on the floor. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

THE SHERIFF: Right in front of the door. 

THE COURT: In front of the door. Okay. So—and I 

appreciate you bring[ing] it to our attention, and you want to 

deal with it now. So what do you want to do specifically? 

THE SHERIFF: Basically just want to take him back to the—

to the jail.

* * * 

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So you—you—you now have 

permission to go ahead and remove him and take him back to 

the Detention Center.
15

 It was not my plan to talk with him again today. I’ve 

already talked to him twice today, and I will talk with him 

again tomorrow. But my plan, frankly, is not—unless things 

dramatically change, I planned to speak with him once a day, 

perhaps twice, but I’m not going to speak with him on every 

break. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. 

THE COURT: I don’t feel there’s any reason to do that. I will 

once again continue to reiterate to him when I do have the 

opportunity to speak to him about his right to be present and 

how he can be present in order to comply with this Court’s 

order. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, it is a fluid situation. 

THE COURT: Uh-huh. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And at—at some point if he indicates 

to me— 

THE COURT: Uh-huh. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: —that he decides to be in the 

courtroom, I will bring that to the Court’s attention.

The next morning, a video monitor was set up in the courtroom so that Mr. Shiflett 

could see and hear what was transpiring in the courtroom from the detention center. The 

court reviewed the sheriff’s stun cuff protocol with Mr. Shiflett, and also gave him another 

opportunity to return to the courtroom: 

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Shiflett, we are on record. I’ve 

called your case and your attorneys are present. I wanted to 

put a couple of things on the record. 

 I have provided your attorney with the protocol for the 

use of the stun cuff that is dated September the 1st, 2011, and—

and I wanted a court exhibit that will now become part of the 
16

record. Have you had an opportunity to review that with your 

attorney? 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: (Inaudible). 

THE COURT: Okay, did he talk to you about it? 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: No. He just told me that you gave him 

some paperwork for me. That’s all. 

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I’m going to review it with you 

now. So this is an order that is—was developed by the sheriff’s 

office that gives the protocol for when the stun cuff can be 

used. Specifically it says under Paragraph 3-B, that it can be 

used to control violent or potentially violent prisoners when a 

member, which is a sheriff, reasonably believes that the 

following conditions exist: Number one, lethal force does not 

appear to be justifiable and/or necessary, attempts to subdue 

the individual by conventional tactics will likely cause injury 

to the individual members, c[o]urt personnel or citizens, and 

then there will be a reasonable expectation that will be unsafe 

for members to be approaching the individual within contact 

range.

Those are the—the criteria for use of a stun cuff, which 

also includes persons that are trained to use it, where they affix 

it which is in your—at your ankle level, and the—the proper 

use of it, and the—the only criteria, which are the ones I just 

described. 

 Do you understand? 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Basically you’re trying to treat me like a 

fucking animal. 

THE COURT: No, sir. 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: (Inaudible). 

THE COURT: It is this Court’s job to insure courtroom 

security. Based on your actions yesterday, you have 

demonstrated to the Court that you will not comply with this 

Court’s position that you must—your conduct must comply 
17

with proper courtroom decorum. This Court has concerns, 

based [on your] conduct yesterday, of both safety of the 

courtroom personnel, myself, other members of the courtroom 

staff, and for those reasons, I find that you are a security risk, 

that you have exhibited violent behavior and threatening 

behavior in your conduct yesterday, and that is the reason that 

I have ordered the—the cuff to be placed. 

You can return to the courtroom if you can— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: (Inaudible). 

THE COURT: Let me just—just listen to me. You can 

return— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: It doesn’t matter. 

THE COURT: You can return— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: (Inaudible). 

THE COURT: All right. So you can return to the courtroom if 

you promise that you will comply with the rules of civility and 

act appropriately and behave in a proper manner. 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: I don’t know how to live civilized. 

THE COURT: I’m sorry? 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: I don’t know how to live civilized. 

THE COURT: You don’t know how to live civilized, is that 

what you[] said? 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Yes, ma’am. 

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So I have offered you the right 

to come in. You have indicated you are unable to comply and 

live civilized and comply with it. I’ve also indicated to you 

that you can come in with the—the cuff, and you have 

indicated that you are unwilling to do that, is that correct? 
18

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Yes, because Amendment Number Eight 

says that prohibits (inaudible) cruel and unusual punishment. 

You’re not going to treat me like an animal. You have more 

than enough officers (inaudible) in the courtroom. And I’m not 

wearing that cuff so people on the jury can see me and see that 

you people are treating me like an animal. 

THE COURT: All right. Just to be clear, Mr. Shiflett, the cuff 

is not visible. It is under your pant leg. It can only be 

administered by the sheriff who is trained in it— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: And what happens if the jury sees you drop 

me and people shock me? 

THE COURT: You would not—well, first off, they could 

not— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: (Inaudible) they couldn’t see that either? 

THE COURT: They would not see the cuff. And— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: (Inaudible) get out of here with this dumb 

shit.

THE COURT: And the shock can only be administered under 

those three very limited areas that I described.

[MR. SHIFLETT]: Well, tell [Prosecutor] I want to shock his 

balls. 

THE COURT: So I understand that you are refusing to comply 

with my order, that you will not come into the courtroom and 

act in a civilized manner and— 

[MR. SHIFLETT]: No. 

THE COURT: —I have—I have offered that to you, to 

participate. You can change your mind at anytime, and I will 

continue to offer you[] that option during the day. If at any 

time you change your mind, you can let the sheriff know . . . 
19

 On at least one occasion every day through the conclusion of trial, the court met 

with Mr. Shiflett, on the record and with counsel present, and offered him the opportunity 

to return to the courtroom with the stun cuff on. Each time, he refused. 

1. The court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that 

restraints were necessary.

Mr. Shiflett argues that, as a preliminary matter, the court’s decision to order 

restraints of any kind was an abuse of discretion. Visible physical restraints during trial 

are inherently prejudicial to criminal defendants because they “highlight the need to 

separate the defendant from the community at large,” and undermine the presumption of 

innocence and the fairness of the fact-finding process. Wagner v. State, 213 Md. App. 419, 

476-77 (2013) (quoting Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 409 (1990)); see also Deck, 544 U.S. 

at 630 (2007), People v. Allen, 856 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ill. 2006) (“The presumption of 

innocence is central to our administration of justice. In the absence of exceptional 

circumstances, an accused has the right to stand trial with the appearance, dignity, and selfrespect of a free and innocent man.”) (citations omitted). For that reason, the Due Process 

Clause “prohibits the use of physical restraints visible to a jury absent a trial court 

determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest 

specific to a particular trial.” Deck, 544 U.S. at 629. This applies to both the guilt and 

sentencing phases of trial. Id. at 633. 

 Even so, three essential state interests “may justify physically restraining a 

defendant: Preventing the defendant’s escape, protecting those in the courtroom, and 

maintaining order in the courtroom.” Wagner, 213 Md. App. at 477 (quoting Holbrook v. 
20

Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569 (1986)). “Where a defendant is ‘disruptive, contumacious, 

stubbornly defiant’ in a manner that interferes with the dignity, order, and decorum of the 

courtroom, the trial court has the discretion to order ‘constitutionally permissible’ 

accommodations.” In re D.M., 228 Md. App. 451, 455 (2016) (citing Illinois v. Allen, 337 

U.S. 343-44 (1970)). So restraints aren’t per se unconstitutional—the issue in each case is 

whether the restraint “was so inherently prejudicial that [Mr. Shiflett] was thereby denied 

his constitutional right to a fair trial. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 567, 570. “The prejudice posed 

by security measures, and whether a compelling state interest outweighs that prejudice, 

must be measured on a case-by-case basis.” Hunt, 321 Md. at 410. And ultimately, 

restraints are appropriate if, after making an individual evaluation, the court decides that 

the need for the restraint outweighs the potential prejudice, and ensures that the record 

reflects the need for extraordinary security measures. Id.

Mr. Shiflett acknowledges, as he must, that physical restraints may be appropriate 

when the court makes a particularized finding on the record that a compelling interest 

outweighs the prejudice to the defendant. Instead, he argues that his behavior at trial did 

not justify restraining him in the manner the court ordered here. By Mr. Shiflett’s account, 

he simply tried to enter the presiding judge’s chambers in an attempt to talk to her. 

Although his actions undoubtedly were inappropriate, he argues, they failed to demonstrate 

any concrete threat, and did not support a finding that restraints were necessary. This 

argument isn’t borne out by the transcript though, which reveals that Mr. Shiflett screamed 

the judge’s name from outside her chambers until he was forcibly restrained, which 

resulted in a fracas during which Mr. Shiflett spit in a sheriff’s face. By the time this 
21

incident occurred, Mr. Shiflett had already sent the presiding judge inappropriate, vulgar 

letters at her home address, and the sheriff had already recommended that the court order 

Mr. Shiflett to wear the stun cuff in light of his phone calls from prison. The incident 

formed the basis for the court’s on-record, particularized finding that Mr. Shiflett posed a 

threat to courtroom security, and we discern no abuse of discretion in that finding, and Mr. 

Shiflett’s subsequent demeanor and behavior only confirmed the correctness of the court’s 

assessment. And as such, the court did not err when it ordered Mr. Shiflett restrained, so 

long as the need to protect courtroom order and security outweighed any prejudice to Mr. 

Shiflett that might result from the restraint imposed.

2. The court’s compelling interest in maintaining security and 

order outweighed any prejudice to Mr. Shiflett. 

Assuming that we would disagree with his contention that no restraints were 

required, Mr. Shiflett argues next that the security measures imposed by the court—an 

ultimatum to wear the stun cuff or be excluded from the court room—was unreasonable. 

He contends that the cuff would have put him at risk of injury, and would have unfairly 

prejudiced him by interfering with his ability to participate in his own defense and to 

consult with counsel. He asks us to hold that the court abused its discretion in ordering 

him to wear the cuff when other (in his view, less prejudicial) options were available, such 

as leg irons or ordering additional sheriffs to guard him in the courtroom. 

His argument flows, however, from the faulty premise that judges are required to 

employ the least restrictive alternative, as judged by twenty-twenty hindsight. The 

standard is in fact more realistic. “Trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, 
22

stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances 

of each case.” Allen, 397 U.S. at 344. And therefore, judges have “broad discretion in 

maintaining courtroom security,” and we review a trial judge’s decision regarding the 

manner of restraint for abuse of discretion. Hunt, 321 Md. at 408. We need not determine 

“whether less stringent security measures were available to the trial court, but whether the 

measures applied were reasonable, and whether they posed an unacceptable risk of 

prejudice to the defendant.” Id. Instead, we assess the methods the court actually used—

the requirement that Mr. Shiflett wear the stun cuff as a condition of remaining in the 

courtroom—in the context of the security and behavioral threats he posed. 

First, we hold that the court’s decision to exclude Mr. Shiflett from the courtroom 

was reasonable under the circumstances. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant 

the right to be present at every stage of his trial, but a defendant “who engages in conduct 

that justifies exclusion from the courtroom” waives that right. Md. Rule 4-231(c)(1)-(2). 

The Supreme Court held in Illinois v. Allen that a trial judge confronted with a disruptive 

defendant can “(1) bind and gag the defendant, thereby [keeping the defendant in the 

courtroom]; (2) cite [the defendant] for contempt; or (3) take him out of the courtroom until 

he promises to conduct himself properly.” 397 U.S. at 344. Those possible alternatives 

aren’t exhaustive, though; courts faced with similarly recalcitrant defendants have 

employed these security methods, and others, to varying degrees of success, and the 

“appropriateness and lawfulness of any action taken in a given case will depend naturally 

on the facts of each case.” Smith v. State, 382 Md. 329, 343-45 (2004) (approving the trial 

court’s decision to cite a disruptive defendant for contempt three times throughout his trial);
23

see also Bruce v. State, 318 Md. 706, 720 (1990) (upholding the trial court’s decision to 

post four plainclothes marshals in addition to two bailiffs as a security measure); Bowers 

v. State, 306 Md. 120, 138 (1986) (finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

decision, at the recommendation of the sheriff’s office, to order the defendant to wear leg 

irons during trial); Wagner, 213 Md. App. at 481 (observing that no prejudice resulted from 

placing the defendant in shackles for the jury’s verdict announcement, because the shackles 

were hidden by the defendant’s suit coat, while his leg irons were obscured because he was 

standing up). However, “trial in absentia should be the extraordinary case, ‘undertaken 

only after the exercise of a careful discretion by the trial court.” Biglari v. State, 156 Md. 

App. 657, 674 (2004) (quoting Pinkney v. State, 350 Md. 201, 221 (1998)). 

Mr. Shiflett did not simply speak out of turn or make the occasional outburst. He 

consistently used angry, vulgar, and violent language with the court. He repeatedly 

threatened the judge and the prosecutor. And he defecated on the floor of his cell in a 

temporarily successful effort to prevent the trial from proceeding. Faced with this 

magnitude of disruption to the proceedings and to the safety and security of everyone 

involved, the court chose Allen’s third option, i.e., to remove Mr. Shiflett from the 

courtroom until he agreed to conduct himself appropriately. See 397 U.S. at 344. The court 

offered Mr. Shiflett numerous opportunities to return and behave, and he refused all of 

them. Mr. Shiflett’s Sixth Amendment rights did not entitle him to thwart his trial, and the 

court was well within its discretion to exclude him rather than binding and gagging him 

(which might have created even more prejudice than excluding him altogether), citing him 

for contempt (which would have been pointless in this case), or trying other methods of 
24

restraining him, such as adding further shackles or other physical restraints or increasing 

the number of security personnel in the room. Smith, 382 Md. at 343; Wagner, 213 Md. 

App. at 481. 

Second, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to condition Mr. 

Shiflett’s reentry to the courtroom upon agreement to wear the stun cuff. The constitutional 

right to be tried without physical restraint, once lost, “can, of course, be reclaimed as soon 

as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respect 

inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings.” Allen, 397 U.S. at 343. To that 

end, a court “that removes the defendant from the courtroom must advise him of the 

opportunity to return if he promises to behave.” Biglari, 156 Md. App. at 671. But at each 

of the court’s post-removal meetings with him, and we count at least four, Mr. Shiflett 

emphatically declined this opportunity. Each time the court consulted with Mr. Shiflett in 

lockup, he refused unequivocally to promise that he would behave, choosing instead to 

continue flinging profanity and sexually explicit insults at the judge and prosecutor. 

Because his erratic behavior continued and escalated as the trial progressed, even 

after his removal, the court was entirely justified in removing Mr. Shiflett from the court 

room and in setting conditions for his return. We agree as well that requiring him to wear 

the stun cuff was a reasonable condition. Mr. Shiflett complains that the cuff would have 

put him at risk of injury in the event he became immobilized and fell when a shock was 

delivered,5and that its chilling effect might have impaired his ability to participate in his 

 

5

 The sheriff’s protocol for using the stun cuff describes it as “designed for temporary 

immobilization of a subject [that] should not cause any significant injury.” However, the 
25

own defense. Those risks are real, and we do not seek to diminish them, although Mr. 

Shiflett’s categorical refusal even to try it on6 leaves us no record on which to evaluate the 

likelihood or extent of the risk he faced. Even so, and assuming that the risks were as Mr. 

Shiflett contends, they were outweighed by court’s compelling interests in order, safety, 

and security. And we also see no abuse of discretion in the court’s assessment that 

alternatives, such as binding or gagging or shackling or surrounding Mr. Shiflett with an 

entourage of law enforcement personnel, would have risked causing at least as much 

prejudice before the jury as the stun cuff. 

By his own reckoning, Mr. Shiflett behaved as he did in order to prevent his trial 

from proceeding. His conduct, and no one else’s, created the problems the court was forced 

to solve. He complains now that the court abused its discretion in restraining him, but “our 

courts, palladiums of liberty as they are, cannot be treated disrespectfully with impunity.” 

Allen, 397 U.S. at 346. Mr. Shiflett put the court to a delicate balancing challenge. He 

faced serious charges, and obviously has important constitutional rights that the court was 

obliged to recognize and protect. At the same time, Mr. Shiflett was not in control of the 

process, and the court was equally not obliged to let him disrupt the trial and threaten court

personnel. 

 

protocol warns that “a subject may receive secondary injuries as a result of falling when 

the subject is immobilized.” 

6 We note as well that at no point, in the circuit court or here, did Mr. Shiflett or counsel 

propose, let alone agree to, any alternative form of restraint. 
26

Because Mr. Shiflett never wore the stun cuff or attempted to discover its impacts 

or limits, this case affords us no opportunity to rule broadly on its uses or limitations as a 

restraint. We recognize that stun cuffs are a potentially severe form of restraint, one that 

could be calibrated or applied improperly, and there is something viscerally disturbing 

about a device that administers electric shocks to another human being. That all said, Mr. 

Shiflett left the court with no choice—he was determined to thwart his trial, and his 

aggressive refusal even to attempt to conduct himself appropriately waived his right to be 

present in the courtroom for trial. We see no abuse of discretion in the court’s patient 

efforts to find a way for Mr. Shiflett to return and participate in his trial, or in its decision 

to condition his return on an agreement to wear the stun cuff. 

B. The Trial Court Correctly Denied the Motion For Jury 

Sentencing. 

Second, Mr. Shiflett argues that because the State filed a notice of intention to seek 

a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, he was entitled to elect sentencing by 

jury, and the circuit court erred in denying his motion for sentencing by jury. His argument 

is primarily a statutory one—that the language the General Assembly left behind in Md. 

Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2015 Supp.), § 2-304(b) of the Criminal Law Article (“CR”), 

after removing the parts relating to the death penalty,7

extended to defendants facing life 

 

7 CR § 2-304, as amended, provides in subsection (a) that a court should conduct the 

sentencing proceeding in life without parole cases, but in subsection (b) provides for jury 

sentencing. We reproduce the applicable sections below, providing emphasis to indicate 

the references to the jury upon which Mr. Shiflett relies:

(a) In general. – If the State gave notice under § 2-203(1) of 

this title, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing 
27

without parole the sentencing by jury procedures previously reserved for capital 

defendants. He argues as well that once Maryland repealed its death penalty, a sentence of 

life without the possibility of parole is more than an enhanced sentence—it is “the harshest 

sentence that can be imposed on a defendant in this State,” to which the constitutional 

protections accorded previously to defendants facing life sentences now attach. 

 In the time since the briefs were filed in this case, however, we had occasion to 

address and reject the same arguments in Bellard v. State, __ Md. App. __ No. 1281, Sept. 

Term 2014 (filed August 31, 2016). As the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence 

has long recognized, the death penalty is different, and the unique permanence of capital 

punishment compels procedural safeguards that other punishments do not—even 

punishments, such as life imprisonment without parole, that are meant to be permanent. 

 

proceeding as soon as practicable after the defendant is found 

guilty of murder in the first degree to determine whether the 

defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without 

the possibility of parole or to imprisonment for life. 

(b) Findings. – (1) A determination by a jury to impose a 

sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility of 

parole must be unanimous. 

(2) If the jury finds that a sentence of imprisonment for life 

without the possibility of parole shall be imposed, the court 

shall impose a sentence of imprisonment of life without the 

possibility of parole. 

(3) If, within a reasonable time, the jury is unable to agree to 

imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for life without the 

possibility of parole, the court shall impose a sentence of 

imprisonment for life.

(Emphases added.) 
28

Bellard, slip op. at 11-12. Although the legislation repealing Maryland’s death penalty 

did, through apparent clerical inadvertence, create some ambiguity in the statute governing 

sentencing procedures in life without parole cases, see id. at 14-17, the structure and 

legislative history left no doubt that the purpose of that legislation was to repeal the death 

penalty, not to alter the sentencing procedures or create new rights for defendants where 

the State seeks life without parole:

But we need not dig deeply into Senate Bill 276 to find its 

purpose. The bill’s Preamble says in so many words that its 

purpose was “repealing the death penalty,” and the Fiscal and 

Policy Note states that the bill “repeals the death penalty and 

all provisions relating to it.” Fiscal and Policy Note Revised, 

S.B. 276 Md. at 1. Neither mentions other alterations to the 

sentencing authority or procedures for first-degree murder, and 

the provisions of the bill itself simply removed portions of the 

Maryland Code relating to the death penalty and replaced 

references to repealed language. This obviously was a 

complicated task, and details can—and apparently did—get 

overlooked. But our two alternatives are to acknowledge that 

subsection (b) of CR § 2-304 has become purely vestigial, or 

to interpolate an intention on the part of the General Assembly 

to create jury sentencing rights that previously didn’t exist in 

non-capital first-degree murder cases. We see nothing in the 

purpose or language of the legislation itself that suggests any 

intent to expand jury sentencing to defendants facing life 

without parole. And although we could have stopped there, we 

reviewed the legislative history as well, and it too supports a 

conclusion that the purpose of the legislation was to repeal the 

death penalty, rather than alter sentencing procedures in noncapital murder cases.

Id. at 18. 

In rejecting Mr. Shiflett’s contention that Section 2-304 unambiguously requires 

that a life without parole sentence be imposed by a jury, we must also reject his request 

that we apply the rule of lenity. The rule, which would require that we construe in favor 
29

of the defendant any ambiguity in a criminal penal statute, applies only when a “statute is 

open to more than one interpretation and the court is otherwise unable to determine which 

interpretation is intended by the Legislature.” Oglesby v. State, 441 Md. 673, 676 (2015) 

(emphasis added). But the tools of statutory construction have not failed us here: the 

legislature intended to repeal the death penalty, not to create a right to jury sentencing in 

life without parole cases. 

Our opinion in Bellard also rejected the other arguments that Mr. Shiflett raises 

here: that the absence of jury sentencing guidelines or restrictions on prosecutorial 

discretion rendered the life without parole sentencing process unconstitutionally vague, 

Slip Op. at 19 (citing Woods v. State, 315 Md. 591, 602-08 (1989)), and that the elimination 

of the death penalty elevated life without parole to the status of an “enhanced sentence” 

that requires proof of additional facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 20-21 (citing 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)). And again, to reach any of these 

conclusions we would need to hold, in the in the face of long-standing (and controlling) 

precedent to the contrary, that death was not, in fact, different, or that life without parole 

became “different” once the death penalty was repealed. 

C. The Court Did Not Err In Excluding Evidence Of Mr. Shiflett’s 

Psychological Profile. 

Mr. Shiflett argues third that the circuit court erred by refusing to let the defense 

introduce expert testimony describing his “psychological profile,” a term he uses to 

describe the constellation of mental illnesses from which he claims he suffers. In its casein-chief, the State introduced threatening letters Mr. Shiflett had written to Ms. Hadel as 
30

evidence of his premeditation and intent to kill her. Mr. Shiflett argues that he should have 

been allowed to rebut these with evidence of his psychological profile because, he believes, 

this evidence would have demonstrated that the letters were the product of his mental 

illness. And he contends that the testimony would have proven that he was unable to form 

the mens rea defined in CR § 2-201 for the charge of first-degree murder, that is, a 

deliberate, premeditated, and willful killing. 

The State disputes the factual bases of Mr. Shiflett’s proposed psychological profile 

testimony, but argues in any event that his obsession with Ms. Hadel had no bearing on 

whether he acted with premeditation and deliberation or his ability to form the specific 

intent to kill. The State characterizes the testimony as an effort by Mr. Shiflett to offer a 

“diminished capacity” defense, i.e., that he was less capable than a normal person of 

forming the required mens rea, that is unavailable under Maryland law. 

At a motions hearing on August 6, 2014, Mr. Shiflett offered testimony from Dr. 

Joanna Brandt, who diagnosed Mr. Shiflett with specified bipolar disorder, obsessive 

compulsive disorder, and borderline personality disorder: 

[T]he combination of illnesses is particularly malignant 

for him and is—are very impairing and have significant impact 

on his thinking and behavior. The first illness that I diagnosed 

was other specified bipolar disorder . . . . 

These symptoms that he has of elevated mood and 

expansive and irritable mood when—when he has a manic 

episode, decreased need for sleep, pressured speech, increased 

talkativeness, racing thoughts, distractibility, agitation and 

impulsivity, and he describes that he has felt like his head is 

exploding on numerous occasion. He also clearly has episodes 

of depressed mood where he has hypersomnia and sleeps a lot, 

low energy, poor concentration, feelings of worthlessness and 
31

suicidal ideation. The records and his father corroborate that

he has had these symptoms since childhood. 

* * * 

The second illness I diagnosed him with was obsessive 

compulsive disorder. This was diagnosed in him at age 7 or 8. 

Obsessions are recurrent and persistent thoughts, urges or 

images that are experienced as intrusive or unwanted and cased 

marked anxiety or distress. Individuals with obsessions 

attempt to ignore, suppress them or they attempt to neutralize 

them with a thought or action[,] that is by performing a 

compulsion which is a behavior. . . . 

Compulsions are repetitive behaviors such as hand 

washing, ordering or counting or other mental acts or physical 

acts that the individual feels driven to perform in response to 

an obsession. 

* * * 

And to complicate matters further, he—he really has a 

severe permanent disorder which is characterized by borderline 

paranoid and antisocial traits. . . . He becomes extremely angry 

very quick. He—he had unstable interpersonal relationships. 

He’s severely sensitive to being abandoned by others. He 

becomes very, very angry, and he acts in a very impulsive way. 

He has paranoid thoughts that are part of his personality. 

Later, Dr. Brandt explained Mr. Shiflett’s thought processes and the limitations on 

his ability to control himself: 

So in—in anger and with increasing frustration, he 

threatened the victim for years. But at the same time, he was 

constantly thinking about trying to avoid acting on his impulse, 

and he was repeatedly failing at this. He tried to think of ways 

that he could get her to talk to him by threatening to bring civil 

action on her or have various agencies come in and stop her 

food stamps or get her husband in trouble. He wrote her letters 

saying, Please talk to me. He tried to contact her through 

Facebook, he had a friend call, and he—he recognized how out 

of control he was. He has for many years recognized this, but 
32

he has that inability to stop himself and not act over and over 

again. 

(Emphasis added). 

 The court excluded Dr. Brandt’s testimony after concluding that there was no nexus 

between Mr. Shiflett’s psychological profile and the specific intent required to prove firstdegree murder. The court compared this situation to those in Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 

558 (1992) and Bryant v. State, 163 Md. App. 451 (2005), and found that the testimony 

lacked an adequate factual basis, and had no relevance to any material issue or defense in 

the case. The testimony, the court ruled, fell short of what Md. Rule 5-702 required for the 

admission of expert testimony and would only confuse the jury. We agree. 

 The State must prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, 

including intent. Generally, therefore, defense evidence that could prove that the intent 

element of the crime did not exist, whether due to mental impairment or some other reason, 

is admissible. Hoey v. State, 311 Md. 473, 494 (1988). Mr. Shiflett sought here to 

demonstrate the absence of intent through expert testimony from a psychiatrist, and 

“[e]xpert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the court 

determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 

determine a fact in issue.” Md. Rule 5-702. But expert testimony is admissible only if it is 

relevant, i.e., “if the jury will find the testimony helpful in resolving the issues in the case.” 

Bryant, 163 Md. App. at 473. And for expert testimony about Mr. Shiflett’s psychological 

profile to be helpful to the jury in determining whether he formed the mens rea for firstdegree murder, the testimony must bear a “rational nexus to the issues of premeditation 
33

and intent.” Hartless, 327 Md. at 577. Whether that rational nexus exists, and whether 

there is a sufficient factual basis to support the expert’s testimony, is a matter committed 

to the sound discretion of the trial court, and a “court’s action in admitting or excluding 

such testimony seldom constitutes grounds for reversal.” Bryant, 163 Md. App. at 472. 

 Because psychiatrists are no more clairvoyant than any other witness, and lack the 

ability to reconstruct the emotions of a person at a specific time, they ordinarily are not 

competent to express an opinion as to the belief or intent a person harbored at a particular 

time. Hartless, 327 Md. at 573. A trial court may allow an expert to testify (as long as the 

testimony meets the requirements of Md. Rule 5-702) about a defendant’s psychological 

profile if that testimony allows the jury to infer that the defendant was suffering from the 

symptoms of that psychiatric disorder on the date in question. See Simmons v. State, 313 

Md. 33, 48 (1988), Bryant v. State, 163 Md. App. at 476. But as we see from the cases in 

which defendants have tried this approach before, there must be a direct connection 

between the fact and symptoms of the asserted mental illness and the specific mental state 

at issue—experts cannot simply identify an illness or symptom and opine generally on what 

the defendant might or might not have been able to do at the time. 

On one hand, in Simmons, the defendant was accused of murder and, to support his 

defense of imperfect self-defense, sought to introduce testimony from a psychiatrist to 

confirm his subjective belief that he was in danger. 313 Md. at 48. The Court of Appeals 

concluded that the psychiatrist’s testimony was “relevan[t] in that consistency between the 

specific subjective belief testified to by Simmons and Simmons’s psychological profile 

tend[ed] to make it more likely that Simmons in fact held that subjective belief . . .,” id. at 
34

39, because it went directly to the defendant’s claim of self-defense. In Hartless, on the 

other hand, the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s decision not to admit psychological 

profile testimony for a defendant who had stabbed and killed a clerk during the course of 

robbing a store because the testimony, which would have explained that the defendant “was 

under a tremendous amount of stress from his father,” bore no rational nexus to the relevant 

issues of premeditation and intent. 327 Md. at 575. The Court noted that a psychological 

profile is admissible only if it carries significance beyond “a simple recitation of the 

defendant’s background,” that the profile had to explain how the defendant did not intend 

to commit murder, or how the murder was not deliberate and premediated, or else it would 

not be helpful to the jury. Id. at 575-77. 

Finally, in Bryant, a defendant charged with the first-degree murder of his ex-wife 

sought to rebut the State’s claim that the murder was premeditated with psychiatric 

testimony that he suffered from an impulse control disorder. 163 Md. App. at 463. We 

affirmed the trial court’s decision not to admit that testimony,8

 noting the objective 

evidence that the defendant acted with premeditation by pacing near the victim’s residence 

for hours, asking neighbors about who lived in the victim’s residence, and cutting the phone 

cords in the victim’s house, and that even with the disorder, the defendant was sometimes 

able to control his impulses. Id. Nothing connected his disorder to the criminal act itself: 

“The doctor’s testimony would merely have presented evidence that appellant suffered 

 

8

 We also held in Bryant that there could be no rational nexus between the proffered 

testimony and the particular facts of this case because the defendant denied ever 

committing the crime. Id. at 480-81. 
35

from an impulse control disorder, which sometimes prevented him from controlling his 

aggressive impulses. There was simply no evidence that Ms. Martin’s murder was the 

result of an impulsive act.” Id. at 482. 

This case and the testimony Mr. Shiflett sought to introduce are much more like 

Hartless and Bryant than Simmons. Dr. Brandt’s testimony that Mr. Shiflett obsessed over 

Ms. Hadel, threatened her, acted with an intent to evoke a response from her, and had 

difficulty controlling his impulses would have borne no rational nexus to his ability to plan 

and carry out Ms. Hadel’s murder. To the contrary, Dr. Brandt conceded that Mr. Shiflett 

had thought about killing Ms. Hadel for years, but had managed to avoid acting on that 

impulse in the past. She also would have offered no evidentiary basis to support Mr. 

Shiflett’s claim that his mental illnesses prevented him from premeditating Ms. Hadel’s 

murder. And as in Bryant, the evidence demonstrates that the murder was deliberate and 

premeditated: Mr. Shiflett walked from Annapolis to Reisterstown, staked out Ms. Hadel’s 

apartment for two full days, then waited until her husband was gone before he killed her. 

Without some direct connection between Mr. Shiflett’s disorders and his ability to plan and 

carry out this murder, Dr. Brandt’s testimony would have invited the jury to speculate about 

what was or wasn’t in his mind at the time, and was therefore properly excluded. 

D. Mr. Shiflett Was Competent To Stand Trial. 

Fourth, Mr. Shiflett argues that the circuit court erred in finding him competent to 

stand trial. At the conclusion of the third day of trial, the court ordered a competency 

evaluation in response to Mr. Shiflett’s request to discharge his counsel. Over the next two 

days, the court heard testimony from Doctors Stephen Siebert, Christiane Tellefsen, and 
36

Joanna Brandt; Dr. Siebert9 and Dr. Tellefsen ultimately concluded that Mr. Shiflett was

competent, and Dr. Brandt testified that he was not. After hearing all the testimony, the 

court ruled Mr. Shiflett competent: 

I find that not only does he understand the nature and object of 

the proceeding, but that he is absolutely able to assist in his 

defense, has assisted in his defense, shows a high level of 

insight into the nature of the case, the witnesses presented. 

And although he has shown a—a dissatisfaction with counsel . 

. . that is not the standard. And this Court feels that h[e] is able 

to control his actions when it suits him, and understands how 

this case is proceeding and can assist in his defense. 

A criminal defendant has a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right not to be tried 

while incompetent, and this prohibition “is fundamental to an adversary system of justice.” 

Sibug v. State, 445 Md. 265, 301 (2015) (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 167, 172 

(1975)). A defendant is incompetent if he or she is unable to understand the nature or 

object of the proceeding, or to assist in [his or her] defense. Md. Code (2001, 2008 Repl. 

Vol.), § 3-101(f) of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”); Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 

84-85 (1993). If the defendant’s competency is in doubt, whether the question is raised by 

counsel or the court decides to pursue the matter sua sponte, the court must conduct a 

hearing to determine “whether [the accused] has sufficient present ability to consult with 

his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and whether he has a rational 

 

9

 In his initial testimony, offered September 18, 2014, Dr. Siebert concluded that Mr. 

Shiflett was not competent and would be unable to follow the proceedings or meaningfully 

answer questions, citing his concern that Mr. Shiflett was unable to explain what he was 

charged with during his competency evaluation. However, after reviewing video 

recordings of Mr. Shiflett at the detention center and listening to recorded telephone 

conversations between Mr. Shiflett and his father, Dr. Siebert changed his opinion and 

testified that he believed Mr. Shiflett was competent. 
37

as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Sibug, 445 Md. at 300-

01 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)). 

A court may consider competency at any time before or during trial, and must 

undertake a competency review if the defendant appears to be incompetent or alleges 

incompetence. Peaks v. State, 419 Md. 239, 252 (2011). The court starts with a 

presumption of competence and must determine, based on the record, that the defendant is 

competent to stand trial beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 251-52; CP § 3-104(a). The 

inquiry is highly fact-specific, and we review competency decisions for clear error. Id. at 

252. 

Mr. Shiflett contends that the court’s conclusion that he was competent, which 

rested on Mr. Shiflett’s alleged ability to control his actions, was not supported by the 

doctors’ testimony. We disagree, and find that the doctors’ testimony provided ample 

evidence to support the court’s conclusion. For example, Dr. Tellefsen testified that Mr. 

Shiflett not only was competent, but had a fairly sophisticated level of knowledge about 

the trial and the defenses available to him. In her opinion, Mr. Shiflett could control his 

behavior, particularly when he believed it was to his advantage to do so, and his disruptive 

behavior in the court room flowed from his desire to “impress everyone that he’s mentally 

ill.” Similarly, Dr. Siebert concluded that Mr. Shiflett was competent to stand trial, 

notwithstanding his erratic behavior, after listening to a recorded phone call between Mr. 

Shiflett and his father after the first day of trial in which Mr. Shiflett made specific 

statements about his capacity to regulate his own behavior: 
38

For example, he said that he—if anybody tried to put a 

shock bracelet on him, that he was going to swing on them. He 

even said that he told the—the sheriffs that . . . I have been 

giving none of you problems up at this—up to this point, but if 

they try to put that shock bracelet on—on me, I will swing at 

them. 

At the very end of the phone call he said to the father, 

he said the following: I have been giving them a raft of hell and 

they know it. And I believe he was referring to the—this trial. 

In other words, I—I believe that he was referring in that 

telephone call to the fact that . . . his disruptive behavior has 

been disruptive to the flow of this criminal trial up to the 

present time. 

Mr. Shiflett responds by pointing to Dr. Brandt’s findings that he was unable to 

control his behavior when agitated, and would be unable to testify in his own defense in a 

relevant manner. He attacks Dr. Tellefsen’s conclusions, saying that she conceded he was 

out of control at times and unable to communicate with his attorney, and argues that Dr. 

Siebert was wrong to rely on a phone call he made the first day of trial because his mental 

state deteriorated as the trial went on. But although the experts reached conflicting 

conclusions, the standard doesn’t require unanimity, and the trial court’s finding that Mr. 

Shiflett was competent was supported by ample evidence. Both Dr. Tellefsen and Dr. 

Siebert concluded that Mr. Shiflett was, for the most part, able to control his behavior, and 

demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of the proceedings against him and his 

defenses, and both doctors found that Mr. Shiflett was aware that emphasizing his mental 

illness would work to his advantage. “Weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving 

any conflicts in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder,” Pinkney, 151 Md. App. 
39

at 326 (quoting State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750 (1998)), and we see no error in the 

court’s decision to credit Dr. Tellefsen’s and Dr. Siebert’s conclusions over Dr. Brandt’s. 

E. The Burglary Charge Is Not Duplicative. 

Finally, Mr. Shiflett argues that the circuit court erred by refusing to dismiss his 

first-degree burglary charge. Count Three of Mr. Shiflett’s indictment alleged that: 

on or about 2/5/2013, in Baltimore County, did unlawfully 

break and enter the dwelling of Katie Ann Hadel-Gordon, 

located at [victim’s address], in violation of Criminal Law 

Article 6-202 of the Annotated Code of Maryland; against the 

peace government and dignity of the State. 

 A person commits first degree burglary under CR § 6-202 by “break[ing] and 

enter[ing] the dwelling of another with the intent to commit theft or a crime of violence.” 

(Emphasis added.) Mr. Shiflett appears to argue that the indictment, by simply referencing 

CR § 6-202 rather than specifying whether the alleged burglary was committed with the 

intent to commit theft or the intent to commit a crime of violence, in effect charges him 

with more than one substantive offense in a single count. The State counters that the 

language in the indictment tracks precisely the language of CR § 6-210, which provides 

that a charging document for burglary is sufficient “if it substantially states: ‘(name of 

defendant) on (date) in (county) did break and enter (describe property) or (describe other 

crime) in violation of (section violated) against the peace, government, and dignity of the 

State.’” We agree with the State. 

 The charging document is meant to fulfill the constitutional requirement of Article 

21 of the Declaration of Rights that each person charged with a crime have notice of the 

accusations. Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323, 336 (1985). Thus, the charging document must 
40

allege the essential elements of the offense charged, and only one offense may be charged 

in a single count. Ayre v. State, 21 Md. App. 61, 64 (1974). Mr. Shiflett points to Thanos 

v. State, in which the Court of Appeals held that when a statute forbids several separate 

actions and states those actions disjunctively—with an “or”—simply referring to the statute 

in a single count of the indictment to allege that the defendant committed one of those 

actions “will be defective as indefinite, since the disjunctive renders it uncertain which 

alternative is intended.” 282 Md. at 716-17. In Thanos, the State prosecuted a shoplifter, 

and the charging document stated that she had removed the tag from a garment for sale in 

a Towson department store. Id. at 710. The court explained that had the charging 

document duplicated the language of the shoplifting statute exactly, and charged the 

defendant with “alter[ing], remov[ing], or otherwise disfigur[ing] a price tag,” rather than 

removal, it would have been defective for uncertainty. Id. at 717 (internal quotations 

omitted) (emphasis added). 

 Since Thanos, however, both this Court and the Court of Appeals have confirmed 

that the charging document need not set forth all essential elements of the crime, and that 

some elements may be implied. Jones, 303 Md. at 337. For example, in Whitehead v. 

State, this Court found that the simply citing the statute number was essentially 

“incorporation by reference,” having the same effect as if the text of the statute had been 

set forth in full. 54 Md. App. 428, 445 (1983). Thus, we held that the language of an 

indictment was not duplicitous when it charged the defendant with theft “in violation of 

Art. 27, § 342 of the Annotated Code of Maryland.” Id. at 441. Although the statute listed, 

in the disjunctive, five different ways in which the crime of theft can be perpetrated, we 
41

found that the reference to theft by using the short form § 342 in effect charged the 

defendant conjunctively with any or all of the five methods. Id. at 442; see also Jones, 303 

Md. at 338 (confirming that the Court of Appeals “share[s] the views so well expressed in 

Whitehead”).

 By citing to CR § 6-202, the indictment charged Mr. Shiflett with committing 

burglary by “any or all” of the requisite intents listed. The State volunteered, at a hearing 

five months prior to trial, that it would proceed on the theory that Mr. Shiflett broke into 

the victim’s home with the intent to commit a crime of violence. If Mr. Shiflett required 

more notice of what he was being charged with, he could have requested a bill of 

particulars, but he didn’t, nor does he dispute that the indictment complied with the 

language required by CR § 6-210. 

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 

FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED. 

COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.