NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0090n.06 No. 08-5945 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. MI CHAEL

SAL I SBURY, De fe nd a nt- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI ST R I CT COURT FOR THE WES TERN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKY

B e fo re : SU HR HE I

NR I CH , SU TT ON a nd

CO OK , Ci rc uit

Judg e s. SUTTON, Circuit J udg e. Micha el Salisbury appeal s his conviction and sentenc e for two counts of misdemea

nor tax evasion. We affir m.
I
. Fr om 1997 to 2002, Michael Sali s b u ry helped Ow sley

Br own Fr azier asse mble one of the nation’s fore most c ollections of antique fire arms. Salisbury beg an by scouring the country

for guns for F razier to buy

and eve ntually

beca me pre sident of a museum F razier f ounded to ho use the collection. In 2002, howeve r, Salisbury left the museum under

suspicion of false dealing s.
Th e g ov e rn me nt foll ow e d u p in 20 07 wi th c ri min a l c ha

rg e s o f w ir e fr a

ud , c on sp ir a c y

to commit wire fr aud, money launder ing, c onspiracy

to commit money

launder ing a

nd four c ounts ofNo. 08-5945

Un ite d S tat es v . S ali sb ur y

- 2 - tax evasion. The charg es all related t o profits Salisbury had made from selli ng g uns to Fra zier for more than he had paid f

or them. The g overnme nt said that Salisbury “con[ned]” Fr azier about the price s, R.256 at 16, while S alisbury said he took the s ame markup that any deale r would have taken for f inding a nd selling a

ntiques g iven Fr azier’s sug g estion to “take c are of y ourself,” id. at 19.
Sa lis bury ma de larg e pr of

its fr om the se tr a ns a c tio ns bu t fa ile d to pa y a ll of the ta xes o n th e m. I n th e y e a rs fo r w hic h h e wa s c on vic te d, 20 00 a nd 20 02 , h e re po rt e d n o r e le va nt i nc ome in t

he fi rs t y ear , and $247,888 in “se ller p re m i u m s ” (l isted under c apital g ains) in the sec ond. R.182 at 105. Af te r t he c on tr ov e rs y

wi th F ra zie r a

nd the mus e um a

ro se , Sa lis bury

fi le d amende d tax retur

ns to
acc ount for some, thoug h not all, of the additional income f rom his gun sa les. I n th o se ame nded returns he included an a dditional $16,500 in income in 2000 and $71,036 in 2002, both accompa nied by the explanation that “Taxpay er thoug ht items were not to be r epor t ed as i ncome until sold.” R.182 at 83, 110.
Acc ording to the g overnmen t , even a fter Salisbury amende d his returns he still had understate d his income by $298,749 in 2000 a

nd by $622,372 in 2002, meaning that he should have paid an a dditional $119,896 and $241,581, respe ctively
. Salisbury ’s expert, Wil liam J essee , used a diffe rent a ccounting method in concluding that Salisbury understate d his income by just $12,574 in 2000 and by

$813,109 in 2002, corre sponding to tax liabili ties of $3,787 and $399,129. The jury acquitted Salisbury

of eve ry char g e in the indictment but found him guilty of two lesser- included counts of willful f ailure to pay

taxes for 2000 and 2002. See 26 U.S.C. § 7203. AtNo. 08-5945

Un ite d S tat es v . S ali sb ur y

- 3 - sentenc ing, the court found that the tax l oss was a little over $1 million once inter est and pena lties
we re inc lud e d, g ivi ngSa lis bury a ba se of fe ns e le ve l of

22 a nd a g uid e lin e s ra

ng e of 41 to 51 mon ths
. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2T1.1, 2T4.1. Be cause the statute cappe d the sentenc e at twelve months for ea ch count, the d i s t ri ct co u rt sentenc ed him to 24 months of incarc eration plus one y ear of super vised rele ase a nd a $25,000 fine

. II. Salisbury argues t hat t he dis trict court abused its discretion by limit ing his e x pert witness’s testimony —by forbidding Wil liam J essee to testify not only about Salisbury ’s lack of willfulness but
a ls o a b o u t o th e r

“ p r e d ic a te matt e r s ” f

r o m w h ic h the jury could i n f e r a la c k o f w il lf u ln e s s . We disag ree . Rule 704(b) of the Fe dera l Rules of Evidence bars e x perts fr om testify ing directly to the “ultimate issue” of

a cr iminal defenda

nt’s s tate of mind, which w ould include Salisbury ’s
w i l l f u l n e s s . B u t

i td o e s n o tb a r

e xp e rt s f r o m t e s t i f y i n gt o f a c t s th a t relate to state of mind. See Un ite d S tat es v . F ro st , 125 F.3d 346, 383–84 ( 6th Cir. 1997). As Salisbury sees it, the district cour

t sh ou ld h a ve pe rm itt e d e xpe rt te sti mony

that, f or ins tanc e , Sa lisbu ry

did no t un de rs tand

c e rt a in regulations and ac counting principles. This arg umen t , h o we v er , m i s ch ar ac t er i z es t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s ru l i n g. W h i l e t h e c o urt reje cted some parts of J essee ’s proposed testimony on Rule 704(b) grounds, that was not the g round on which the cour t premised the r

ulings that Salisbury targ ets here
. As to these, the c ourt was c oncer ned thatNo. 08-5945

Un ite d S tat es v . S ali sb ur y

- 4 - the proposed te stimony

went beyond J essee ’s knowledg e and expertise, all Rule 701 problems, not that it went to Salisbury ’s intent, a Rule 704 issue.
Con te xt co nf

ir ms the po int . Sa lis bury

ini tia lly sa id t hat J ess ee wo uld

te sti fy that “ the re is
s i gn i fi ca n tev i d en ce t h at M i k e [ S al i s b u ry ] d i d n o t i n t en d t o ev ad e ta x es i n t ax y ea rs 1 9 9 9 t h ro u gh 2002.” R.232-1 at 2. The g overnme nt objected on Rule 704(b) gr ounds. The court sustained the objection as to “the defe ndant’s intent,” but said it would still allow testi mony “that Van Ta lley [S alisbury ’s tax-prepar er] was c onfused or that the I RS was confused.” R.233 at 5. Salisbury moved for c larification of the order , making an ar g ument simil ar to the one he make s h er e. W h i l e the mot ion did no t in c lud e a

pr of fe r, it n ote d:
For example, Mr. J essee should be allowed to opine on w hether Mr. Salisbury u n d er s t o o d

t h e ap p l i cab l e IRS re gu l at i o n s an d re p o rt i n g p ro ce d u re s , h i s kn o wl ed ge of re porting re q u i re ments under Sche dule C, the proper way to consider gun inv e nto ry a nd sa le s in c ome, wheth e r M r. Ta lle y pr ov ide d in c or

re c t a dv ic e wi th reg ard t o t hose issues, whethe r Mr. Salisbury ’s books and re cords r evea led any attempt to conce al income or falsify rec ords, and r elated issues.
R.163 at 2 n.1. The court acknow ledg ed Salisbury ’s ar g ument but found Rule 704(b) inapplica ble. The propose d subject, it e x plained, was “not a predic ate issue beca use [i t] is not the ultimate issue. . . . [T] he ultimate issue is not whether Mr . Salisbury was a []
. . . tax ac counting expert.” R.235 at 24.
The c ourt neve rtheless e x cluded much of the proposed te stimony , finding that it would be lay te s ti mo n y , n o t e xp e rt te s ti mo n y , a n d f in d in g th a t Je s s e e d id n o t h a v e f ir s th a n d kn o w ledg e ofNo. 08-5945

Un ite d S tat es v . S ali sb ur y

- 5 - whether Salisbury

had misunderstood the re g ulation s or whethe r Salisbury mistakenly

relied on advice from Van Talley
. The court there fore ruled that J essee could not testify about “what advice Mr. Talley

provided, but . . . can spe ak to whethe r or not the r eturns that we re pr epar ed by Mr. Talley
wer e in his view cor

rec t.” Id. at 31. Salisbury in the end mi s p l ace s his challeng e to the ruling . His appellate briefs make no argument that the district court err ed by treating Jessee’s te stimony as lay testimony

or by reje cting it for lack of

first-hand know ledg e. And that may well be for good reason: I t is difficult to see how J essee , who was not on the sc ene at the t ime of S alisbury ’s 2000 and 2002 tax filings, could be an appropr iate fa ct witness about Salisbury ’s under standing of the re g ulations or of Talley ’s advice
. No re versible e rror

occur red.
III
. Sa lis bury ne xt c omp la ins that, e ve n tho ug h the dis tr ic t c ourt lim ite d the te sti mony of h is
e xpe rt wi tne ss, it a llo we d I RS a g e nt De bo ra h Wolf e to te sti fy a

bo ut pr e dicate m att e rs and the ult imate iss ue of

his wi llf uln e ss. B e c a

us e the de fe ns e inv ite d the state me nts in q ue sti on or fa ile d to ob je c t to the m, o r b oth , th e se c la ims fa il a s w e ll.
Ms. Wol fe’ s short direct e x amination addre ssed her calc ulation of Salisbury ’s tax defic iencies, not his state of mind. The de fense , howeve r, cr oss-examined her not only about her calcu l ations but also about Salisbury ’s intent. Not surprising ly , as a r esult, she answe red the defe nse’s que stions by

talking a bout infere nces that could be dra wn about his state of mind.No. 08-5945

Un ite d S tat es v . S ali sb ur y

- 6 - Th e de fe ns e did

no t ob je c t to mos t of

the se a ns we rs . F or

e xamp le , a ft e r a sk ing , “ no t on ly did Mike not put down income on the g uns that he sold and had in his inventory , he also didn’t put do wn the e xpe ns e s, did he ? ” the de fe ns e ma de no ob je c tio n wh e n sh e re sp on de d, “ [n]o, he did n’ t. I t . . . w ou ld hav e defe ate d the purp os e of hid ingthe inc ome .” R.2 85 a t 11 . T hat ans we r, wh ile
a pp ro a c hin g the lin e of

fo rb idd e n s ta te -o f- min d te sti mony , w a s n ot s o c le a rl y ov e r t he lin e —o r s o pr e jud ic ia l—t

hat th e dis tr ic t c ourt

c omm itt e d p la in e rr or

by no t stri kin g it su a s

po nte . The de fense not only failed to obje ct to some answe rs but it also invit ed other s. For e x ample, the def ense a sked her , “[y ]ou t hink may be he w asn’t telling the truth ab o ut that as well? ” and she
a ns we re d “ [w]e ll, it’ s b e e n my e xpe ri e nc e , if

they ’re decept ive in o ne a re a , th e y ’r e de c e pti ve in another , y es.” Id. at 12. That a nswer ma y well be le

ss v io lati v e o f Ru le 7 0 4 ( b ) th a n th e answ er contemplated by

the question. Salisbury complains about her testimony that “y ou’ve g ot to show that there are indications that [S alisbury ] m eant to def raud, a nd he obviously

did.” R.284 at 24. While Salis bury prese rved
a n o bje c tio n to thi s te sti mony , th e te sti mony ’s fu ll c on te xt put s it in a dif fe re nt l ig ht: [Defense counsel]: My question is, do y ou have any evidenc e that [Salisbury ] was not making a

g ood faith attempt to corr ect de ficienc ies in his o rig inally filed tax re tur ns , e vid e nc e , ma ’a

m? A. I can’ t rea d his mind. Q. I didn’t ask y ou to be a mind re ader . Iasked if you— A
. H o w c o u l d

Ip o s s i b l y ? Q. —had e vidence
.No. 08-5945

Un ite d S tat es v . S ali sb ur y

- 7 - A
. H o w c o u l d

a n y o n e ? Q
. T h e n th e a n s w e r

i s n o , i s n ’ ti t ? A. Then the —he shows all the indications of fraud but— Q. Now— A. —like I

said, unless y ou rea d his mind— MR. SONN E TT: Your Honor , that’s unre sponsive and I ask that it be stricken. THE COURT: I ’m not g oing to strike the tes t i m o n y . You nee d to let the witness finish her a

nswers, Mr . Sonnett. A. Even w hat y ou—what y ou showed be fore about showin g i n t en t o f fr aud, y ou ’r e —it ’s such a—y ou kn ow , w hat is the burd e n o f p ro of the re ? Yo u’ ve g ot t o show that there are indications that he mea nt to defra

ud, and he obviously

did. The amende d return, the —putting money into his wife’s name, the unreported—he didn’ t un re port. He unde rre ported. You se e how he put $18,000 of hobby income and y et— Q. Ms. Wolfe—Ms. W olfe, y ou’re not answer ing my question. A. I thought I was.
Id. at 2 4

– 2 5
. Al t h o u gh t h e q u es t i o n , “d o y o uh av e a n y ev i d en ce t h at [ S al i s b u ry ] wa s n o tm ak i n g a g ood faith attempt to c orre ct defic iencies? ” technica lly “ca ll[ s] for a y es or no a nswer[],” id. at 24, 26, it is hardly

surprising that a witness would answe r t he question by descr ibing the e vidence rathe r than mere ly s ay i n g i t ex i sts. And, of course , even if the district court ha d forc ed Wolfe to g ive a

“ y e s” or “ no ” a ns we r a

nd le a ve it at that, the g ov e rn me nt s ur e ly wo uld have be e n p e rm itt e d to a sk her to e laborate why on redire ct. I t a lso is no surprise that the witness would leap f rom “e vidence ” that Salisbury failed to make a “g ood-fa ith attempt” to a conclusion that he did no t make a

g oo d- fa ith
a tte mpt . T he dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

fi nd ingthat th e de fe ns e “ re a p[e d] w hat it ” sowed whe n it asked these que stions and in ulti mately permitting this testimony
. Id. at 25.No. 08-5945

Un ite d S tat es v . S ali sb ur y

- 8 -

I V.
Salisbu ry next protests t he district cour t’s ref usal to g ive his proposed “ g ood faith” instruction. “[I ]f Mr. Salisbury actua lly believed that what he wa s doing w as in ac cord w ith the tax statutes,” the pr oposed instruction provided in par t, “he c annot be said to ha

ve had the cr iminal intent to willfully

evade pay

ment of his taxes.” R.124 at 32. We may reve rse the district c ourt’s re fusal to give this inst ruction only if the instruction is “(1) c orre ct, (2) not s ubstantially cover ed by

the actua l jury

char g e, and (3) so important that failure to g ive i t substantially impairs the def endant’ s defe nse.” Un ite d S

tat es v . H e ath , 525 F.3d 451, 456 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
T h e r e a r e t w o w a ys o f

l o o k i n g a t t h i s a r g u m e n t , n e i t h e r o n e o f w h i c h i s h e l p f u l t o S a l i s b u r

y. To the e xten t the pr op os e d ins tr uc tio n me re ly de sc ri be s the wi llf uln e ss re qu ir e me nt in mor e de ta il, the cha lleng e fa ils be cause the district court’s a ctual cha rg e substantially

(and a ccur ately

) cove red the law on willfulness, stating that willfulness require s “the voluntary and intentional violation of a known duty , in other words, acting with the s pecif ic i ntent to avoid paying a tax i mposed by

the income tax laws, and with the knowledg e that there was a leg al duty to pay that tax.” R.167 at 21;

se e Un ite d S

tat es v . P om

po nio , 429 U.S. 10, 12–13 (1976) (pe r cur iam) (“ The trial judg e . . . ad eq u at el y

instructed the jury

on willfulness. An additional instruction on g ood faith wa s
un ne c e ssa

ry .” ); United States v. Tarwater , 308 F.3d 494, 510 ( 6th Cir. 2002).No. 08-5945

Un ite d S tat es v . S ali sb ur y

- 9 - To the e xten t th e pr op os e d in str uc tio n wo uld have a dd e d s ome thi ngmor e to t he wi llf uln e ss require ment, that does not help him either. His proposa l also would have added that “Mr. Salisbury woul d n o t b e ‘w i l l ful ly ’ doing wrongif . . . he in g ood faith consulted a n attorney or tax prepar er wh om h e c on sid e re d c omp e te nt, ma de a fu ll a nd a c c ur a te re po rt

to t hat pe rs on

of a ll m a te ri a l f

a c ts . . . and then a cted strictly

in acc ordanc e with the advic e g iven by that person.” R.124 at 32–33. T he problem with this arg ument, as the district c ourt noted, is that Salisbury did not lay a foundation for it. Cf. Tarwat er , 308 F.3d at 510 (“w e question whether Tarw ater prese nted any

evidenc e to support his good faith defe nse”)
. Salisbury did not testify , so he could not explain what he be lieved about his tax es or whe ther he made a full and ac curate re port to his tax prepa rer . Whil e his tax prepare r did te sti fy , h e re c a lle d li ttl e a bo ut w he the r h e ha d a

ny c on te mpo ra

ne ou s c om mu ni cat ions w ith Salisbury about g un commissions. Even his attempts to amend his r eturns afte r the fac t would not sh owthat he ma de a

fu ll a nd a c c ur a te re po rt

of a ll m a te ri a l f

a c ts t o h is t a x pre pa

re r, a nd c e rt a inl y not that he did so at the time of filing
. Salisbury leans he avily

on U n i t e d S t a t e s v . M o rris , 20 F.3d 1111 ( 11th Cir. 1994), but the
case d o es n o t s u p p ort him. There , y es, the c ourt reve rsed a conviction for f

ailure to g ive a “ g ood faith” instruc tion, but due only to the inadequa cy

of the instruction the district cour t ga ve, not due to a re quirement that a

n additional g ood faith instruction is require d. I n trut h , the “g ood faith” instruction the defe ndant proposed wa s fairly close to the instruction the c ourt g ave he re. Id. at 1116 (“ Th e g ov e rn me nt .
. . mus t pr ov e that e a c h o f t he de fe nd a nts kn e w that th e law p la c e d a du ty on him and that he voluntar ily

and intentionally

violated that duty .”).No. 08-5945

Un ite d S tat es v . S ali sb ur y

- 10 -

V. Salisbury also contests the suff

iciency of the evidenc e ag ainst him. He does not dispute the defic iency of t he tax pay

ments, just the element of willfulness. The g overnme nt never proved, he
say s, that he wi llf

ull y c ho se no t to re po rt his pr of its in the y e a rs of the tr a ns a c tio ns a s opp os e d to the y ear s when he clea

red out a ll of his gun inventor y . Sa lis bury c ome s c los e to fo rf

e iti ng thi s c la im fo r fa ili ng to inc lud e a “ state me nt of the fa c ts relev ant to the issue[] submitted for reviewwith appr o p riate r efe renc es to the re cord,” as the Appellate Rules r equire . Fe d. R. App. P. 28(a) (7) ( emphasis adde d). At trial, it is true, a de fenda nt may sit on his hands and ref use to ac knowledg e the e vidence ag ainst him. Bu t o n ap p eal, the defe ndant has lost the presumption of innocenc e and must e x plain what evide nce e x isted and why it does not suffice. See H errera v . Colli ns , 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993 ). S alisbury ’s fa ct statement de sc ri be s in

g re a t de ta il the fa c ts r e le va nt t o th e c ha

rg e s of which he was acquitted. B ut i t si mpl y does not de al with the fac ts r eleva nt to the c harg es of whic h he wa s convicted, save to note without elabor ation that he was convicted of failing to pa y taxes. That does not c omply with t h e Feder al Rules.
The a rg ument, in any

event, f ails on the merits. Salisbury argued that he could have thoug ht he had to pa

y taxes only

on cash flow , n ot p ro fi ts that ha d b e e n p low e d b a c k in to i nv e nto ry (t hat is , g un s) . B e c a

us e Sa lis bury

ke pt a c c umu la tin g g un s duri ng thi s pe ri od , th e a rgume nt g oe s, he c ou ld have be lieved he did not have to pay any thing until he ca shed out.No. 08-5945

Un ite d S tat es v . S ali sb ur y

- 11 - B ut t he jur y ha d ampl e ba se s to re

je c t th is a

rgume nt. F or

on e , Sal is bu ry

re po rt e d s ome income for

g un sales in 1999 and 2002, which sug g ests he knew he had to r eport this income in the y e a rs it w a s e a rn e d. F or

a no the r, the jur

y fa ir ly c ou ld h a ve vie we d h is a c c umu la tio n o f gun s a s a persona l collection, not inventory , in which case S alisbury would have known he had to report the income he use d to buy

the g uns. That wo uld expl ain why his gun c ollection kept g rowing by the amount it did, which is more in the nature of a pe rsonal collec tion than an inventory
. For still another rea son, Salisbury , who i ndeed kept some of hi s profits in the form of more
wea pons, re c e iv e d s o me o f h is p r o f it s in mo r e li qu id f

o r m, s u c h a s a n e xp li c it c o mm is s io n of $150,000 fo r one transac tion that never showe d up in his tax es for the re levant y ear . And he
rec eived c hecks f

rom a pa inter who sold ar t to Fra zier and the museum, and the se we nt unreporte d as well. Salisbury ’s counsel tried to arg ue he r einvested muc h of this money in more g uns, but the jur y wa s f re e no t to c re dit

thi s argume nt. I f t

he jur y dis be lie ve d it , f

a ili ngto r e po rt

liq uid inc ome of t his siz e would cre ate an infere nce of willfulness. Se e Un ite d S tat es v . La v oie , 433 F.3d 95, 98 (1st Cir. 2005).
For still another

rea son, the mag nitude of Salisbury ’s under repor ting—ev en by

his own
e xpe rt ’s a na ly sis , o ve r $ 80 0, 00 0 in inc ome a nd

$4 00 ,0 00 in t a xes i n th e tw o y e a rs —s up po rt s a willfulness finding. Salisbury argued that his tax prepare r told him i n late 2002 not to pay taxes on g un s f or wh ic h th e re wa s any

dis pu te ov e r t itl e (h e a nd the Mu se um h a d b e e n b a ttl ingov e r h is private c ollection afte r he w as fire d), which c ould have ex plained the unde rre porting . But the jury did no t hav e to dr a w that in fe re nc e . A nd the nu mbe rs before amendment look w orse. The jury wasNo. 08-5945

Un ite d S tat es v . S ali sb ur y

- 12 - fre e to treat his attempts to amend as evidenc e of his good f aith (as he tried to argue), or as evide nce that he knew

he wa s in trouble (as the g overnme nt arg ued).
F o r a f i n a l r e a s o n , o t h e r a s p e c t s o f S a l i s b u r y’ s t r a n s a c t i o n s c r e a t e a

n i n f e r e n c e o f d i s h o n e s t y. He a ppear s to have lied a

bout the extent of his gun sale s during a depositi on in his divorce c ase. H e had many of his ear nings from the Fr azier transa ctions sent throug h his girlf riend’s a ccount r ather than his own, appa

rently for the pur

pose of hiding i t fr o m h i s s oon-to-be e x -wife . I n the final analy sis, sufficient evide nce suppor ts the jury ’s willfulness finding
.

V I. Salisbury raises two c halleng es to his sentence , both unavailing
. A.
He first argues that the re levant sente ncing g uidelines violate Cong ress’s r ecommendation
a g a ins t in c a rc e ratio n f

or fi rs t- tim e , n on -v iol e nt, no n- se ri ou s o ff e nd e rs . T he g uid e lin e s, he no te s,
us e d to tr e a t f

e lony ta x e va sio n (§ 720 1) dif

fe re ntl y fr om misd e me a no r fa ilure to p a y (§ 72 03 ), un til in 1993 the S entenc ing Comm ission deleted former U.S.S.G. § 2T1.2 and consolidate d both crimes
u n d e r § 2T1.1. S

ee U.S.S.G. app. C., amend. 491. Unde r the latter g uideline, fe lony

and misdemeanor c onvictions derive their base of fense level from the amount of tax loss, a s calc ulated under the tax t able in § 2T4.1. The table reco m m en d s p ri s on terms for e ven first-time of fende rs when losses e x cee d $5,000. See U. S.S. G. § 2 T4 .1 (C ); id. Sent’g Table, c h. 5, pt. A.No. 08-5945

Un ite d S tat es v . S ali sb ur y

- 13 - I t is true that the C ommissi on’s enabling statute instruc ts the Commi ssion to “insure that the g uid e lin e s r e fl e c t th e g e ne ra l a pp ro pr ia te nes s of impo sin g a se nte nc e oth e r t

ha n im pr iso nme nt i n
case s in which the def

endant is a fi rs t -t i m e off ender who has not bee n convicted of a cr ime of violence or

an other wise ser ious of

fe n s e.” 28 U .S.C. § 994(j). But another part of that section instructs the Commis sion to “insure that the Guide lines ref lect the fact that, in many case s, curr ent sentenc es do not ac curately ref lect the seriousness of the offe nse.” 28 U .S.C. § 994(m). And “[o] ne of the centr al rea sons f

or cre ating the sentenc ing g uidelines was to e nsure stiffer pe nalties for w hitecollar c rimes.” Un ite d S

tat e s v . D av is , 537 F.3d 611, 617 ( 6th Cir. 2008). More, the la

ng uag e of the enabling statute, beg inning “The Com mission s hall insure that the g uidelines ref

lect the g ener al appr opriatene ss of . . . ,” 28 U.S.C. § 99 4 (j ), d o es n o t establish an imperative that demands rig orous judicial policing
. The Commi ssion e njoy s “sig nificant discr etion in formulating g uidelines,” Un ite d S tat es v . LaBo nte , 520 U.S. 751, 75 7 (1997) ( quotation marks omitted), and we cannot sa y that it ex cee ded that discretion here
. One may debate whether

a prison term should kick in at $5,000 or $50,000 dollars, but wher e the loss is over a milli on dollars, as he re, it is hard to arg ue the Commission went too far.
B. Salisbury also argues that t h e d i s t ri ct court c lear ly err ed whe n it treated him as a collector rathe r than a

deale r in computing the tax los s. The re ason the de aler /collector distinction c ou ld have mattere d is that a dea ler c an use a ccr ual ac counting instead of c ash ac counting , which allows theNo. 08-5945

Un ite d S tat es v . S ali sb ur y

- 14 - de a le r to a c c ount fo r his inv e nto ry a nd the inv e nto ry ’s c ha

ng ingva lue . A nd

thi s c ou ld have meant a lower tax deficiency

and thus a lower of

fense level under

the g uidelines. But a ll o f t his c ome s to naug ht beca

use Salisbury

would have r ece ived the same sentenc e either way . The district cour

t con s i dere d both the defe nse’s number s (ca lculated by J essee on an i n v e n t o r y b a s i s ) a n d t h e g o v e r

n m e n t ’ s n u m b e r s ( c a l c u l a t e d b y I R S a g e n t Je f f S a g r e c y o n a

c a sh basis) and f

ound that both scena

rios g ave Salisbury

an off ense le vel of 22 a

nd a ra ng e o f 41 to 51
m o n t h s. The cour

t, to be sure, r ejec ted Salisbury ’s proposed write-downs o n h is in v e n to r y . But Salisbury does not appe al that ruling , and in any event it would have taken more than an 80% writedown to bring the guidelines ra ng e below the statutory

maxi mum. See U. S.S. G. § 2 T4 .1 (F ), (G ); see als o R.237 at 53 (“[I ]t doesn’t see m to me that it makes much di ffe renc e whether we’re at 22 or 20. I t’ s still wa

y ov e r the 24 mon ths .” ); id. at 69 (“I don’t know that the hump is pa rticularly important here beca use the maximum he could g et would be 24 months.”).
V II.
F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.