### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00282- CV

Ja m e s Ha r t, App e lla nt

v. Debra We bster, Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF BASTRO P COUNTY , 335TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 24,611 , HO NORAB LE REVA TOW SLEE CORB ETT, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Jame s H a rt

a pp e a ls the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt, a ft e r a be nc h tr ia l, d e nyinghis su it to e s ta b li s h p a te r

n it y o f th e c h il d C. W. H e c o n te n d s th a t th e d is tr ic t c o u rt a b u s e d its discretion beca use the e vidence was insuffic ient to support findings that (1) he was ne ver ma rried to C.W.’s mot he r D e br a Web ste r, (2 ) he is not the pr e su me d fa the r of C.W. , a nd (3 ) i t is in C .W. ’s be st i nte re st to deny Har t’s reque st f

or court-or dere d possession of C.W
. We hold there is insufficient evidenc e to support the district court’s finding that no marria g e existed betwee n Har t and Webster.
BACK GR OUND Har t and Webster beg an dating in 1991. Webster beca me pre g nant, and the two moved into a home boug ht by Har t dur i n g t h e p re g nancy . Har t believed himself to be the fathe r,Har t testified t hat he was ini tially “under the i mpression that there wasn’t any name on the 1 birth cer tificate.” He discove red that Sloan was listed as the father ove r a y ear later w hen Webster “filed f or assistance ” cla iming Sloan as the f ather
. At t ri al , t h e di s t ri ct co u rt as k ed W eb s t er t o o b t ai n a co p y o f he r 19 9 3 d i v o rc e de cr e e . It 2 appea rs that this document, which may contain a de termination as to the pate rnity of C .W., was not produce d or introduce d into evidence
. See Tex. F am. Code Ann. § 6.406 (West 1998) (ma ndatory joinder of suit aff

ecting pare nt-child relationship t o suit for dissoluti on of marr iag e). 2 pr e su min g a n e a rl ie r v a se c tom y to have be e n in e ff

e c tiv e . H e a tte nd e d p re nata l a pp oin tme nts wi th Webster and wa s prese nt at the birth of C.W. in May 1992. Har

t and Webster lived tog ether for the first eig ht y ear s of C .W.’s life, and C.W
. knew only Har t as his fathe r. Duringthat time, Webster and Ha rt ref err ed t o ea ch o t her a s husband and wif e, took family

Christmas photos, filed joint income tax returns, and even wore wedding bands. A neig hbor testified at trial that he believe d the two to have be en mar

ried. Ha rt introduced se vera l f

ather ’s day

car ds he re ceive d from Webster a nd C.W
. B oth

Ha rt a nd Web ste r w e re mar ri ed to oth e r p e op le a t th e be g inn ingof the ir relationship. Hart testified t hat W ebster assisted him in g etting a di vorce around the time C.W . was born. Webster’s former husband is refe rre d to in the rec ord as “ Mr. Sloan,” and he is list ed as the fa t h er o n C
. W
. ’s b i rt h ce r t i f

i ca t e. W eb s t er

an d S l o an we re d i v o rc edi n 1 9 9 3
. At t h e h ea ri n g, 1 2 Webster’s attorne y

informed the c ourt that another man, Ray Anti, ha d been de termined to be C.W.’s bio log ic a l f

ath e r t hr ou g h g e ne tic te sti nga nd that “ the re is a

pr oc e e din g in [] c ourt

a t th is p oin t to have him dec lare d the biologic al father.”

By 1996, the relationship betwe en Har t a nd Webster beg an to de teriorat e a n d Har t discovere d that it was medically impossibl e for

him to be C.W .’s biologic al father. How ever , Har tOn cr oss-examination, Hart admitted making a notation on a corne r of the front pa g e of the 3 do c ume nt. He de nie d c omp le tin g the fo rm him self, e xpla ini ngthat th e fo rm ha d b e e n ma ile d to Webster for he r to fill out after he had bee n admitted to the hospital. 3 testified that this discovery did not chang e his relationship wit h C
. W . and that he still considere d C.W
. to be his son. Har

t a nd Webster eve ntually

separ ated in 2000. C.W. visi ted with Har t often,
a nd Ha rt c on tin ue d to tr e a t C.W. as his so n, pr ov idi ng ins ur a nc e , pa y ingC.W. ’s tui tio n f or pr ivate school, and paying child support to Webster
. Har t, a veter an of the Vietnam War, wa s hospitaliz ed for post traumatic stress disorder in 2001. I n connec tion with Hart’s hospitalization, W ebster completed a

“F amily I nformation Supplement” f orm , l i sting C.W. as Hart’ s child and her self as H a rt’ s “ e x- w if

e
— c o mm o n la

w . ” B y 2 0 0 3 , We b s te r

h a d b e c o me e n g a g e d

to a n o th e r

ma n , a n d C. W. 3 visited Hart less frequently . Eventually , Webster informed C.W. that Hart wa s not his biol og ical fathe r and pr ohibited visit ation.

Har t filed suit in April 2003 seekingto establish his paternity and rig ht to possession. After bench tr ial in which only Har t and a ne ighbor

testified, t h e dis trict court r uled in favor

of Webster findi ng that Har

t and W ebster were never marrie d, that Har t is not the fathe r of C.W., and that it was in the best intere st of the child to deny possession.
DI SCU SSIO N Har t arg ues t h at h e i s t h e p re s u m edfa t h er o f C
. W
. p u rs u an tt o t wo s ep ar at e p ro v i s i o ns of the fa mil y c od e . H e c on te nd s that un de r se c tio n 16 0. 20 4( a )( 3) , he is t he pr e su me d f

a the r b e c a us eT h is s e c ti o n o f th e f a mi ly c o d e w a s a me n ded in 2003. S ee Act ef fec tive September 1, 4 2003, 78th L eg ., R.S., ch. 1248, § 6, 2003 Tex. Gen. L aws 3537. The amended code provides that a per son is presumed the f ather of a c hild if, “during the first two y ear s o f a ch i l d ’s life, he continuously

resided in the house hold in which the child resided and he repr esente d to others that the child was his own.” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.204(a) (5) (West Supp. 2005). I t appea rs that H a rt wo uld qu a lif y a s a pr e su me d fa the r und e r t

his a me ndme nt, bu t th e pr ov isi on a pp lie s o nly t o suits filed after

September 1, 2003. See A c t e f f e c ti v e Se p te mb e r

1 , 2 0 0 3 , 7 8 th

L e g . , R. S., ch.1248, § 6, 2003 Te x . Gen. L aws 3537, 3538. Ha rt’s suit was filed in Apr il 2003. Be cause Har

t relies on other

code pr ovisions that are unchang ed, we will refe r to the cur rent c o d e f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f c l a r i t y. 4 he and Webster

wer e mar ried at the time of C.W.’s birth. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.204(a)( 3) (West Supp. 2005). Alternatively , Har t asserts that pate rnity is presumed be cause he and Webster 4
we re marr ie d a ft e r C .W. ’s bir th, he vo lun tari ly

a sse rt e d p a te rn ity , a

nd he prom is e d in

a re c or d to support C.W . as his own. Se e id . § 160.2 0 4 (a )( 4 )( C ). These c ontentions were defe ated by the district court’s finding that “no mar riag e, common law or

otherwise, e x isted bet we en J AMES HART, Petitioner, and DEB RA WEBSTER, Respondent.”

A tria l c o u rt’ s o r d e r in a s u it a f f e c ti n g th e p a r e n t- c h il d r e lati o n s h ip w il l not be disturbed on appeal unl ess t he complaining party can showa cle ar a

buse of discr etion. Gillespie v. Gi lle sp ie , 6 44 S.W. 2d 44 9, 45 1 (T e x. 19 82 ); Echols v. Olivare z , 8 5 S. W. 3 d

4 7 5 , 4 7 7 ( T e x. App.—Austin 2002, no pet
. ). W e conduct a two-prong ed inquiry : (1) whe ther the tria l court had
su ff ic ie nt i nf or ma tio n on whi c h to e xer c ise its dis c re tio n; a nd (2 ) w he the r t

he tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in its application of discr etion. Ec ho ls , 85 S.W .3d at 477-78. The tra ditional sufficienc y of the e vidence revie w comes into play with reg ard to the first question. Id . I f there is sufficient evide nce to support5

the judg ment, we then de termine whether, based on the elicited evidenc e, the tria l court’s de cision was other wise ar bitrary or unre asonable
. Id
. Com m on Law Marr iage

There i s n o co ntention that Hart a nd Webster wer e eve r for mally marrie d; Hart
co n t en d s t h at t h ey

we re i n fo rm al l y

m arri edan d

ch al l en ges t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s fi n d i n g o f n o m arri age
a s uns up po rt e d b y le g a lly su ff ic ie nt ev ide nc e . I n c on du c tin g a le g a l- su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w, we c re dit fa vo ra ble e vid e nc e if

a re a so na ble fa c t- fi nd e r c ou ld a

nd we dis re g a rd

c on tr a ry e vid e nc e un le ss a
rea sonable fact-f

inder could not. City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 827-28 (Te x . 2005). The test for lega l s u f

f ic ie n c y is w h e th e r

th e e v id e n c e w o u ld

e n a b le r e a s o n a

b le p e o p le to r e a c h the judgme nt being revie wed. Id
.

To establish an informal or common law marria g e, there must be proof that ( 1) the parties a g ree d to be marr ied, (2) lived toge ther afte r the ag ree ment and (3) repr esente d to others that the y we re marr ie d. Te x. F a m Code Ann. § 2.4 01 (a )( 2) (We st Su pp . 2 00 5) ; Mi lls v . M

est , 94 S.W .3d 72, 73 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) . Under the standar d of re view for leg al sufficie ncy , Har

t must demonstrate that no rea sonable fa ct-finde r could have conc luded that he wa s not married to Webster.

I t is clear that Har

t and Webster could not have been ma rried at the time of C.W.’s birth beca use both wer e mar

ried to other pe ople. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 2.401(d) (“A pe rson
may no t be a pa rt y to a n in fo rm a l ma

rr ia g e . . . if the pe rs on is p re se ntl y marr ie d. ” ). Ho we ve r, bo th6

Har t and Webster we re divorc ed fr om their prior spouses soon a fter C.W
. ’s bi rth. Har t’s uncontested te stimony

at trial wa s that he and Webster lived toge ther a

nd re p re s en t ed themselve s
as marr ied from 1991 throug h 2000. Although the re is no dire ct ev i d en ce o f an agr eeme nt to be marrie d, a tacit ag ree ment to be married may be infe rre d from cir cumstantial evidenc e. Se e Ru sse ll

v . R us se ll , 8 65 S.W. 2d

92 9, 93 3 ( Te x. 19 93 ); Mi lls , 94 S.W .3d at 74. Quoting a n article descr ibing the 1989 amendments to the statute g overning common law marria g e, the supreme c ourt discussed t h e qu a l i t y o f

e v i d e n c e t h a tw o u l d

e s t a b l i s h a n a g r e e m e n tt o m a r r y:
As the st atute now stands, an occasional uncontradicted refe renc e to a coha bitant as “my wife” or “my

husband” or

“mine” w ill not prove a tac it ag ree ment to be marr ied without corrobor ation. Such a r ef er en ce by the contesta

nt of the union will, of c ours e , b e str on g e r e vid e nc e of a n a g re e me nt t

ha n s uc h a state me nt by the pr op on e nt. The non-soc ial context of the contestant’s refe renc e to the propone nt as his “wife ” or her “husband” will also rece ive closer s cr u t i n y . I f the statement is made in a self-se rving context, the fact-f inder may

be expected to dis b elieve the truth of the statement. A forthrig ht assertion of mar riag e with the conse quence of liability (as when a n alleg ed spouse seeks admission of the other to a hospital) may , on the other hand be f ar more probative of

a tac it ag ree ment to be marr ied.
Ru sse ll , 865 S.W .2d at 932 (quoting J oseph W. McNig ht, Family L aw: Husba

nd and Wife, 44 S.W .L .J . 1, 2-3 (1990) ).

Har t’s uncontra dicted testimony established much more than an occ asional re fer ence to Webster as his wife. The two consistently ref err ed to ea ch other

as marr ied for a

period of e ight y ear s. After

both were divorce d from their pr ior spouses, Har t and Webster exchang ed we dding ba nd s. A ne ig hb or te sti fi e d tha t, wh ile he wa s visi tin g a t the c ou ple ’s ho me , “[H a rt ] did

n’ t ha ve his7

ring on and [W ebster] was g iving him a hard time a bout not wear ing his ring .” Webster c ompleted
a f o r m a d mi tt in g H a rt to a

V A h o s p it a l i n w h ic h We b s te r id e n ti f ie d h e r s e lf a s H a rt’ s “ e xwife—c ommon law,” listed the date s of the marriag e from 1992-2000, and named C.W. as Hart’s
c hil d. Ad dit ion a lly , Ha

rt te sti fi e d th a t th e y

fi le d jo int

fe de ra l in c ome ta x re tur

ns . T his is p re c ise ly the kin d o f e vid e nc e ide nti fi e d b y the su pr e me c ourt

a s uniqu ely

pr ob a tiv e of

a ta c it a g re e me nt t o marry . Se e id
. I mportantly , we find no evidenc e in the re cord that contradic ts these re prese ntations
or is i nc on sis te nt w itha n a g re e me nt to be marr ie d. Al tho ug h pr e se nt in t he c ourt ro om, Web ste r d id not testify to deny the marria g e. Nor was there any indication that either pa

rty intended to dec eive the public about the true nature of their r elationship.

Vi e wi ng the re c or d a s a wh ole , g ivi ng c re dit to a ll e vid e nc e in fa vo r of the ve rd ic t,
w e f in d th a t n o r e a s o n a

b le f a c t- f in d e r c o u ld h a v e ig n o r e d th e u n c o n te s te d e v id e n c e tha t Hart a nd Webster l ived t og ether and represe nted t hemselves as marrie d. Moreove r, no re asonable fac t-finder could have deter

mined that Har

t and Webster did not implicitl y ag ree to be marrie d afte r the two had div or c e d th e ir

pr ior sp ou se s and

e xch a ng e d w e dd ingri ng s. Ac c or din g ly , w e ho ld that the re is leg ally insufficient e vidence to support the district court’s finding that there was no mar riag e.
P resum ed F ather

Having held t hat the evide nce c onclusively established that Ha

rt and Webster w ere marrie d at some point afte r t he birth of C .W., we nex t consider Hart’s claim that there is insufficient evidenc e supporting the district court’s f inding that Ha

rt may not be considere d the pre sumed fathe r8

under se ction 160.204(a) (4)( C ) of the f amily code. U nder that section, a pe rson is the presume d fathe r o f a

c hil d if he (1 ) m a rr ie s th e c hil d’ s moth er aft er the c hil d is bo rn , ( 2) vo lun tari ly a sse rt s pater nity , and (3) promises in a rec ord to suppor t the child as his ow n. Tex. F am. C o d e A n n. § 160.204(a) (4)( C). Be cause of its finding that Hart a nd Webster wer e neve r marr ied, the district court did not rea ch the other elements unde r sec tion 160.204(a)( 4)(C). We will not imply that the district court made unnece ssary finding s that Har t failed to establish the other e lements of sec tion 160.2 0 4 (a )(4) (C). Ac cording ly , we r emand the c ase f or fur ther proc eeding s to allow the district
c o u rtt o m a k e a

f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n a s t o p a t e r

n i t y.
Be stInt e r e stof t he Chi ld

We a c kn o w le d g e th a t t

h e d is tr ic t c o u rt a ls o f

o u n d th a t it is in th e b e s t in te r e s t o f C. W. that Har t have no c ourt-orde red posse ssion. However, this finding was made on the basis of a finding that Har

t is not C.W .’s father. Be cause we have held that a marria g e existed betwee n Har t and Webster, a subsequent finding t hat Hart is C.W .’s father is now pos sible. I n the eve nt the district
c ourt de te rm ine s th a t H a rt

is p re su me d to be the fa

the r und e r the statut e , the c ourt wi ll ha ve to r e vis it this issue of the best interest of the child in de ciding whether that presumption has b ee n re b u tted. See I n re Je susa V. , 8 5 P. 3d 2, 14 (Ca l. 2 00 4) ; N.A.H. v. S.L.S. , 9 P.3d 354, 363-64 (Colo. 2000); G. D. K. v . S

tat e , 9 2 P. 3d

83 4, 83 7- 38 (Wyo. 20 04 ); c f. Te x. F a m. Cod e Ann. § 1 53 .0 01 (a )( 1) (We st 2002) (“ The public policy of the state is to assure that children w ill have fre quent and c ontinuing contac t with parents who ha ve shown the a

bility to act in the best intere st of the child.”)
.The district cour t may also consider

whether equitable e stoppel preve nts W ebst er from 5 denying H art’s paternity
. See In re Shoc kley , 123 S.W .3d 642, 652 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pe t.) . ( “ Es top pe l is ba se d on the pu bli c po lic y that chi ldr e n s ho uld be se c ur e in k

no wi ngwh o th e ir pare nts are. I f a pe rson has a cted a s the pare nt and bonded with the c hild, the child should not be require d to suffer

the potentially

damag ing tr auma that may come from being told that the father she has known a ll her life is not in fac t her father .”). We apply equitable e stoppel in paternity actions to achieve fairne ss by

holding pa

rents to their prior conduct r eg ardingthe pater nity of a c hild. Id .; se e als o F ish v . B e he rs , 741 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. 1999) ( “Unde r ce rtain circ umstances, a person mig ht be estoppe d from cha lleng ing paternity wher e that person has by his or her conduct acce pted a g iven person as t h e fa t h er of the c hild.”). We impose equitable e stoppel only in the best interest of the child, to protect the status of a child in an alre ady rec og nized and operative pare nt-child relationship. In re Shoc kley , 12 3 S. W.3 d at 65 2; Fi sh , 7 41 A. 2d

a t 72 4; Sa ra S. v . J

am es T. , 299 A.D.2d 785, 785 (N.Y.A .D. 3 Dept. 2002)
. 9 CO NC LU SION We sustain Hart’s issues challeng ing the suffic iency of the e vidence supporting the district court’s j u d gm en t an d hold that the district court abuse d its discretion by denying H art’s claims on this rec ord. Be cause the di strict court did not rea ch all of t he is sues necessar y to determine whether Har t may be leg ally rec og nized as C.W .’s father, we reve rse the judg ment and re mand the
c a se fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s. 5

Be a Ann Smith, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P atterson a nd Pury ear Reverse d and Remande d Filed: June 23, 2006