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FILED 

OCTOBER 17, 2017 

In the Office of the Clerk of Court 

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

DIVISION THREE 

In the Matter of the Custody of 

H.A.R.,t 

Child. 

PAMELA and THEODORE 

SUCHLAND, 

Appellants, 

and 

AMANDA MARIE SUCHLAND and 

JEREMY JOHN REYNOLDS, 

Respondents. 

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No. 33013-3-111 

UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

t To protect the privacy interests ofH.A.R., a minor, we use her initials throughout 

this opinion. General Order of Division III, In Re the Use of Initials or Pseudonyms for 

Child Victims or Child Witnesses (Wash. Ct. App. June 18, 2012), 

http://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate _ trial_ courts/?fa=atc.genordets _ orddisp&ordnumber= 

2012 OOl&div=III. 
No. 33013-3-111 

In re Custody of H.A.R. 

PENNELL, J. - Theodore and Pamela Suchland appeal the dismissal of the de facto 

parentage action and nonparental custody petition they filed to gain custody of their 

granddaughter, H.A.R. We affirm. 

FACTS 

The facts are known to the parties and need not be recounted in detail. Jeremy 

Reynolds and Amanda Suchland are H.A.R.'s biological parents. They have never been 

married. When H.A.R. was approximately two and one-half years old, Mr. Reynolds and 

Ms. Suchland separated and H.A.R. began living with her mother and her maternal 

grandparents. Shortly after the separation, Mr. Reynolds brought a parentage action 

seeking a residential schedule for H.A.R. After some legal disputes, Mr. Reynolds began 

visitation in 2013. 

Throughout 2013, Mr. Reynolds exercised most of his visitation rights. Not long 

after visitation commenced, H.A.R. 'smother abandoned her. This left H.A.R. in the 

exclusive care of her grandparents. Mr. Reynolds was not made aware of this 

development. 

During this same timeframe, the Suchlands grew concerned that H.A.R. had been 

physically abused. Child Protective Services became involved and the Suchlands filed a 

dependency petition in January 2014, based on the mother's abandonment and Mr. 

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In re Custody of HA.R. 

Reynolds's alleged abuse. Mr. Reynolds denied any abuse and the dependency action 

was ultimately dismissed. 

Not having found relief through the dependency, in August 2014 the Suchlands 

filed a nonparental custody petition for H.A.R., later amending it to allege de facto 

parentage. The court found adequate cause to proceed to trial on the nonparental custody 

petition but not on the de facto parentage claim. At trial, the court heard from several 

witnesses. The testimony regarding whether H.A.R. had been physically abused was 

mixed. The Suchlands presented testimony suggesting H.A.R. had been abused. Mr. 

Reynolds testified and denied any abuse. He also called witnesses to support his claims. 

At the end of trial, the court determined the Suchlands had not proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Reynolds was an unfit parent or that he had 

abused H.A.R. The court found several of the Suchlands' witnesses not credible. In 

addition, the court did not consider photographs of H.A.R.' s bruising indicative of abuse. 

Although the court found H.A.R. was happy with her grandparents and thrived in their 

home, the court explained that the "best interest of the child" standard did not apply to a 

nonparental custody proceeding. Clerk's Papers at 541, 543. The court then dismissed 

the nonparental custody petition. The Suchlands appeal. 

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No. 33013-3-111 

In re Custody of HA.R. 

ANALYSIS 

Adequate cause for de facto parentage 

The Suchlands contend the trial court should not have dismissed their de facto 

parentage action because they presented evidence Mr. Reynolds fostered the Suchlands' 

parent-like relationship with H.A.R. The Suchlands point to: (1) Mr. Reynolds's delay in 

obtaining visitation, and (2) his nonpayment of child support. This court reviews a ruling 

concerning the placement of a child for abuse of discretion. In re Parentage of J.A.B., 

146 Wn. App. 417,422, 191 P.3d 71 (2008). 

"[A] de facto parent stands in legal parity with an otherwise legal parent." In re 

Parentage of L.B., 155 Wn.2d 679, 708, 122 P.3d 161 (2005). A person petitioning for 

de facto parentage must show the following: 

"(1) the natural or legal parent consented to and fostered the parent-like 

relationship, (2) the petitioner and the child lived together in the same 

household, (3) the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood without 

expectation of financial compensation, and ( 4) the petitioner has been in a 

parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the 

child a bonded, dependent relationship, parental in nature." 

J.A.B., 146 Wn. App. at 427 (quoting L.B., 155 Wn.2d at 708). 

The trial court properly held that the Suchlands failed to establish the first element 

of de facto parentage. While Mr. Reynolds could have done more to be with H.A.R. and 

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In re Custody of HA.R. 

provide financial support, 1 he never abandoned his daughter. Nor is there any evidence 

Mr. Reynolds consented to the Suchlands taking over the role of H.A.R. 's parents. To the 

contrary, it was the efforts of Mr. Reynolds to exercise his rights as H.A.R.'s father that 

placed him in conflict with the Suchlands. The evidence presented by the Suchlands did 

not meet the rigorous standards required for establishing de facto parentage. Cf In re 

Parentage of J.B.R., 184 Wn. App. 203, 205-07, 214, 336 P.3d 648 (2014) (father's 

failure to seek relationship with daughter for more than 10 years evidenced consent to 

de facto parentage). 

Nonparental custody petition 

Chapter 26.10 RCW permits a third party nonparent to petition a court for custody 

of a child. Because such a request necessarily implicates the parent's fundamental right 

to raise his or her children without state interference, this court affords a parent 

considerable deference when balancing the parent's rights against both the interests of 

third parties and children's rights. In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wn.2d 1, 15, 969 P.2d 21 

(1998), ajf'd sub nom. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 

(2000); In re Custody of J.E., 189 Wn. App. 175, 183-84, 356 P.3d 233 (2015). A court 

1 While Mr. Reynolds failed to pay child support, he did provide insurance 

coverage for H.A.R. The fact that the Suchlands did not want to use Mr. Reynolds's 

insurance cannot be said to be his fault. 

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In re Custody of HA.R. 

will only grant the third party's petition when the nonparent establishes by clear and 

convincing evidence that "either the parent is unfit or custody with the parent would 

result in 'actual detriment to the child's growth and development."' J.E., 189 Wn. App. 

at 184 (internal quotation marks omitted) ( quoting In re Custody of B.MH., 179 Wn.2d 

224,235, 315 P.3d 470 (2013)); In re Custody ofC.C.M, 149 Wn. App. 184, 205-06, 202 

P.3d 971 (2009). 

The Suchlands correctly point out that the trial court used the wrong standard of 

proof in assessing their nonparental custody petition. Instead of employing a 

preponderance standard, the court should have utilized the more stringent clear and 

convincing standard. But this error does not benefit the Suchlands. By finding the 

Suchlands failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Reynolds was an 

unfit parent or dangerous to H.A.R., the trial court necessarily also found the Suchlands 

had failed to satisfy their burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. Although the 

Suchlands did present some evidence of abuse and parental unfitness at trial, the evidence 

was not so overwhelming to compel a decision in their favor. The trial court's findings in 

favor of Mr. Reynolds have evidentiary support and therefore withstand scrutiny on 

appeal. 

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CONCLUSION 

The trial court's orders dismissing the de facto parentage action and nonparental 

custody petition are affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

Pennell, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

Siddoway, J. 

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