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i 

75–150 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–139] 

THE FUTURE OF U.S. SPECIAL 

OPERATIONS FORCES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS 

AND CAPABILITIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 11, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

PETER VILLANO, Professional Staff Member 

MARK LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

JAMES MAZOL, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, July 11, 2012, The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces ........ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, July 11, 2012 ....................................................................................... 27 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 2012 

THE FUTURE OF U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................... 1 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ............................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Davis, Dr. Jacquelyn K., Executive Vice President, Institute for Foreign Policy 

Analysis ................................................................................................................. 8 

Lamb, Dr. Christopher J., Distinguished Research Fellow, Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense 

University ............................................................................................................. 6 

Robinson, Linda, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations ............. 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Davis, Dr. Jacquelyn K. ................................................................................... 74 

Lamb, Dr. Christopher J. ................................................................................. 41 

Langevin, Hon. James R. ................................................................................. 32 

Robinson, Linda ................................................................................................ 33 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac ...................................................................................... 31 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 85 

(1) 

THE FUTURE OF U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 11, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:09 p.m. in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. THORNBERRY. The hearing will come to order. We greatly appreciate all your patience. The bad news is we made you wait. The 

good news is we won’t be interrupted any further by votes, but I 

very much appreciate you bearing with us. 

First, I would ask unanimous consent that nonsubcommittee 

members, if any, be allowed to participate in today’s hearing after 

all subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. 

Is there objection? 

Without objection, it is so ordered. 

In the interest of time, I am going to also ask unanimous consent 

that my opening statement be submitted as part of the record and 

that the full written testimony of all our witnesses be submitted as 

part of the record, but let me also say I really appreciate the written statements that each of you prepared. They were very helpful 

with lots of perspective but also concrete, specific thoughts about 

what we need to watch for, and that is exactly what we wanted to 

talk about in this hearing, so I appreciate the excellent written 

statements that you all have provided. 

I would yield to Mr. Langevin for any comments he would like 

to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the 

Appendix on page 31.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our witnesses today for testifying before us today. Our Special Operations 

Forces are some of the most capable personnel in high demand 

throughout our military, as we all know. For a fraction of the Department of Defense’s total budget, SOF [Special Operations 

Forces] provides an outsized return on our investment. 
2 

For the last decade, the bulk of the capabilities have been greatly 

absorbed by necessities in Iraq and Afghanistan, but now with our 

combat troops out of Iraq and our drawdown in Afghanistan well 

underway, it seems appropriate to consider what the future holds 

for SOF. 

While SOF has been an integral part of conflicts in the 

CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] area of responsibility, I think 

it is fair to say that some of the other combatant commands have 

had to accept compromises in their SOF support for some time 

now. As Admiral McRaven at U.S. Special Operations Command 

and the rest of the Department of Defense goes through a rebalancing process, I believe it is critical for those of us in Congress 

to make sure SOF is properly manned, trained, and resourced for 

future demands. 

This is particularly important because Special Operations Forces 

are perhaps best known for their direct action missions, the bin 

Laden raid being a prime example. But their broad set of missions 

range from unconventional warfare to foreign internal defense to 

civil affairs and information operations, among others, and in recent years, some of those skills may have been atrophied. Put another way, our Special Operations Forces are critical to our efforts 

to build the capacity of our partners around the globe, enabling 

those partners to apply local solutions to local security problems 

long before they become a regional or global issue. 

So we have many issues to consider to ensure that our Special 

Operations Forces maintain their historic reputation as agile and 

highly effective national security assets, and I certainly look forward to hearing our witnesses’ views on how to ensure that we continue to populate our Special Operations Forces with superior quality men and women who are highly trained, properly equipped, and 

granted authorities needed to continue their stellar contributions to 

our national security, particularly given the highly uncertain 

threat landscape of the future. 

So I agree with the chairman. 

I appreciate the statements that each of you have prepared. I 

look forward to your testimony and look forward to getting to questions. 

But, Mr. Chairman, I especially want to thank you for holding 

this hearing, and I certainly look forward to an interesting discussion. 

With that, I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the Appendix on page 32.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentleman. 

We now turn to our witnesses, Ms. Linda Robinson, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; Dr. Christopher Lamb, 

Distinguished Research Fellow at National Defense University; and 

Dr. Jacqueline Davis, Executive Vice President for the Institute for 

Foreign Policy Analysis. 

Again, as I mentioned, your full statement will be made a part 

of the record. We would invite you all to summarize as you see fit. 

We will run the clock, you know, we are not going to cut anybody 

off, but just as a guide for your summary, and then we will turn 

to questions. 
3 

So, Ms. Robinson, thank you for being here. Please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF LINDA ROBINSON, ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW, 

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Ms. ROBINSON. Thank you very much, Chairman Thornberry, 

Ranking Member Langevin, members of the subcommittee, thank 

you very much for the opportunity to appear before this distinguished panel. 

The purpose of my testimony, of course, is to provide my 

thoughts on the future of Special Operations Forces. You have my 

full bio, but just to note, I have spent 27 years researching various 

conflicts, and the last 13, much of that on Special Operations 

Forces, both in the field and at headquarters. I am currently at the 

Council on Foreign Relations conducting a study on the future of 

Special Operations Forces and also writing a book on SOF in Afghanistan. I spent about 22 weeks of the last 2 years in Afghanistan, and the particular focus of my research has been the Village 

Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police initiative, which is, as you 

may know, the largest SOF initiative anywhere that is currently 

under way. 

I will address three topics: The balance between the direct and 

indirect approaches; the needed changes in authorities, resourcing 

and force structure; and other changes to U.S. Special Operations 

Command and the interagency process. 

As noted, in the past decade, Special Operations Forces have developed a world-class capability in the direct approach or surgical 

strike capability. I see two areas in which improvement might be 

considered in terms of balancing the direct and the indirect. At the 

policy level, consideration could be given for an established standard procedure for balancing the direct and indirect and, in particular, ensuring that all second- and third-order consequences are 

weighed in the application of the direct approach. 

I would note that both the current and former commanders of 

U.S. Special Operations Command have repeatedly said in testimony before this committee and elsewhere that the direct approach 

only buys time for the indirect approach to work. So this is a suggestion of actual mechanisms that can be considered to achieve 

that appropriate balance. 

The second consideration that I would offer is that intra-SOF 

unity of command offers yet another mechanism for achieving that 

balance between direct and indirect, and I would note that in Afghanistan at this time, there is a Special Operations Joint Task 

Force, called the SOJTF, that is taking command of all SOF elements for the first time in the war, so we have a very important 

milestone for this intra-SOF unity of command that I think will 

yield valuable lessons. And one of the hoped-for outcomes is that 

there will be more synergy achieved in the efforts of the various 

SOF, so-called SOF tribes. 

I would now like to turn to the indirect approach. I think that 

is the area in which, that should be the primary area of focus for 

improvements at this time. In my assessment, the indirect approach is still suboptimized and the forces primarily charged with 

carrying it out are not properly resourced, organized, or supported, 

so I will just note briefly that there are five improvements that I 
4 

would recommend to optimize the indirect approach. They are detailed at length in my testimony, but I will just outline them briefly here. 

First, I think greater clarity is needed as to what the indirect approach is and part of the lack of clarity inherent in the vagueness 

of the term indirect approach. It also is, at its core, in my opinion, 

partnered operations. And SOF uses a variety of partners, and it 

conducts a variety of operations, a variety of activities as part of 

the indirect approach. So I think a great deal of effort is needed 

to clarify this rather complex term and what is meant by it. Doctrine, education, and outreach are all components of clarifying 

what the indirect approach is and how it is applied. 

Secondly, there is a need to create first-class Theater Special Operations Commands, which are currently the subunified command 

of the Geographic Combatant Commands. These commands, in my 

view, have not been optimized, and they require highly qualified 

regional expertise. They require human and technical intelligence 

specialists, expert planners, and SOF operators, who serve extended tours there and receive career incentives for serving at 

TSOCs [Theater Special Operations Commands]. The TSOCs are 

by doctrine the C2 [command-and-control] node that is charged 

with carrying out SOF operations in-theater and advising the Geographic Combatant Commander. That doctrinal role is currently 

not being fulfilled to its fullest, and in my view, the TSOCs should 

be the epicenter for SOF operations, should be seen as the most desirable assignment, and it doesn’t necessarily mean numbers of 

personnel, although I have provided you the breakdown for SOF 

personnel assigned to the TSOCs. It is quite below other headquarter elements at present, but I would like to foot-stomp the idea 

is the quality; you need the right expertise there and your top quality people there. 

Thirdly, and this is very important, I believe that SOCOM needs 

to reorient to prioritize support for the TSOCs and the indirect approach in general, and this includes making a priority out of 

resourcing, coordinating, and support for and during SOF campaigns. There is an advocacy role. There is a role for them to assist 

in the design and implementation of SOF campaigns. SOCOM’s 

[U.S. Special Operations Command] own J-code staff section should 

prioritize the requirements, planning, and resource support. There 

may be a call for a dedicated organization within SOCOM headquarters to do this, but I would caution that you don’t want it to 

become an ancillary appendage. I see this as very much a primary 

role that SOCOM at large should play. 

Finally, SOCOM might even consider detailing some of its own 

personnel, which is now 2,606. It is a very large command. Some 

of those might be temporarily or permanently assigned to TSOCs. 

Fourth, funding authorities for SOF to carry out sustained indirect campaigns. This is a very essential, if complex, area. Indirect 

campaigns can only be implemented over a number of years if they 

are supported by predictable funding, and the three hallmarks I 

think of what is needed in funding authorities is multiyear funding, funding for SOF training beyond just military forces, and assistance that goes beyond counterterrorism to cover a range of security and stabilization missions. 
5 

The State Department’s role has been embraced by SOCOM. 

They have the duty to ensure that all security assistance is in line 

with U.S. foreign policy goals, and of course, in the authorities, 

their reporting requirements, oversight, and Chief of Mission approval are already provided. What I think is missing is sufficient 

agility in the review and approval processing. Oftentimes that can 

take up to 2 years, and that is a very long lead time for the SOF 

campaign to get under way. 

Finally, I think what is needed in the fifth category is more flexible combinations of Special Operations and conventional forces so 

that they can carry out indirect campaigns both in a small footprint format in more places but also for the occasional large-scale 

operation that may be needed, and to wit, in Afghanistan now, 

there are two infantry battalions assigned to SOF to carry out the 

Village Stability Operations, and that is I think one useful example. But what is needed for some of these small footprint campaigns is even smaller units or even individuals, and that is very 

difficult under the current force generation models for the Army, 

in particular, to supply those needed capabilities. I would note, 

however, that people are at work on trying to provide more flexible 

combinations and also considering a blended command that may be 

useful as a standing structure. 

Finally, I would like to offer my view of some of the principles 

that I think should guide assessment of the current SOCOM proposals that are under discussion now. As you can tell, I am a very 

strong advocate that SOCOM should become much more aggressive 

about supporting the Theater Special Operations Commands, and 

I believe that should be one of the guidelines. 

The second guideline is that the Geographic Combatant Commands should become more rather than less inclined to use the 

TSOC, whatever solution is applied. So with those two principles 

in mind, I note that Admiral McRaven has deemed that having the 

TSOCs assigned to SOCOM will provide him more authority to 

build that first-class TSOC. My question is, is COCOM [Combatant 

Command], is this assignment of COCOM to Special Operations 

Command necessary in order for them to fill that resourcing function? Admiral McRaven has made clear repeatedly that he intends 

for operational control to remain with the Geographic Combatant 

Commander, and if that is acceptable to the Geographic Combatant 

Commanders and if that is the only way that SOCOM can be permanently oriented to provide that support to TSOCs, then that 

would be the appropriate course of action. 

In regard to the other SOCOM proposals, which are that it be 

assigned a global area of responsibility, that it be able to initiate 

requests for forces and that, via a global employment order, it be 

able to shift assets among theaters, I would like to note in a broad 

way that any decisionmaking process I think has to be both consultative and agile. And there are such mechanisms that do exist 

via secure video teleconferences that gather all of the stakeholders 

around the table and make the decisions. And I think that is one 

modus operandi that has developed over the past years that might 

be applied more broadly for decisionmaking. But I think that anything that cuts out a key stakeholder is bound to engender frequent conflicts. 
6 

Now, as to the operational role of SOCOM, global threats today 

do have components that are both global and local in nature. The 

local aspects are under the purview of the Geographic Combatant 

Commanders, and I think that the task here and a further study 

is warranted to see how the two commands’ purviews could be 

blended to find a new decision making mechanism. What is clear 

to me is that SOCOM should do a much better job than it has been 

on the institutional side. To me that is where long-term strategic 

impact comes. SOCOM and SOF, they have accomplished amazing 

things over the past decade, and indeed for much of their history, 

but there has been something of an operator mentality. The focus 

has been on tactical proficiency and raising that to the highest 

level possible. I think it is now time for SOF to rebalance from this 

largely tactical and operational focus to concern itself with the institutional development of SOF that will become more strategic in 

its thinking and more strategic in its development of leaderships. 

So to that end, I think that SOCOM has a full plate and a full 

charter to do more in developing doctrine and strategy, managing 

the careers and education of its SOF personnel, and providing strategic leaders not only to the community but who are viable candidates for the interagency and joint community. And I would note 

to end that SOCOM has formed or is in the process of forming a 

force management directorate that I think is a very important and 

welcome step in the direction of that institutional development. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Robinson can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Dr. Lamb. 

STATEMENT OF DR. CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB, DISTINGUISHED 

RESEARCH FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH, 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, NATIONAL 

DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

Dr. LAMB. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, it is an 

honor to be here. I appreciate the opportunity to share my views 

on the future of U.S. Special Operations Forces. I will summarize 

my written statement with just three observations. 

First, concerning SOF resources, SOF have been generously 

resourced this past decade, and I believe they will likely be protected from the kind of budget cuts affecting the rest of the Department of Defense. That said, I think fiscal austerity will affect SOF. 

The SOF leadership must make difficult choices about what capabilities it will allow to diminish, which capabilities it will retain 

and, in some cases, which capabilities need to be reinvigorated. For 

example, SOF may have to get along with less of the specialized 

intelligence support that it has grown accustomed to in the past 

decade, which might require SOF to partner more closely with host 

nation personnel. That would be a good thing. 

In my prepared remarks, I try to identify other areas where hard 

resource choices must be made by Special Operations Forces. 

The second point concerns the division of labor between SOF and 

General Purpose Forces and within SOF. The key to SOF’s strategic value in my estimation is distinguishing between SOF and 
7 

General Purpose Forces missions and capabilities and between 

SOF direct and indirect approaches and capabilities. Put differently, we cannot preserve and properly employ SOF unique capabilities without first identifying them. 

Some people believe these distinctions are academic or old news. 

I disagree. I believe they are the difference between success and 

failure, and they continue to be issues of major import. For example, when SOF missions are conducted by conventional forces or 

with units hastily assembled from conventional forces, the risk of 

failure is much higher. 

Of course, we saw this in the iconic case in the 1979 attempt to 

rescue hostages in Iran, but the problem persists. In 2002, in Afghanistan, and a year later in 2003, in Iraq, we lost momentum 

and dug a huge hole for ourselves by allowing General Purpose 

Forces to take the lead on what were really irregular warfare 

threats. By the time General Purpose Forces recognized the irregular challenges and retrained and retooled for what were inherently SOF missions, the problems had metastasized, and we were 

on the defensive. 

In addition, some forces recently designated as SOF have proven 

ill-prepared for actual Special Operations. 

Similarly, when we use SOF’s direct approach to solve problems 

that would be better addressed indirectly or when SOF is not used 

to approach it in a complementary fashion, we risk failure. I believe the 1993 SOF operations in Mogadishu, Somalia, illustrate 

this point, but so do recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

For example, SOF Special Mission Units pursuing direct action 

in Iraq were not able to make a strategic contribution until their 

efforts were better integrated with those forces conducting counterinsurgency through an indirect approach. As Admiral Olson once 

commented when he was commander of USSOCOM, SOF direct 

and indirect approaches, ‘‘must be conducted in balance, and that 

is the challenge.’’ SOF leaders must keep these two compatible but 

different approaches, skill sets, and cultures equally robust and 

working in harmony and must prevent either one from dominating 

or distorting the other. 

Thirdly, the SOF interagency collaboration requirement. Most irregular challenges cannot be defeated or managed successfully by 

military means alone. I think that is well accepted. What this 

means is that SOF capabilities must be well integrated with other 

elements of national power. SOF progress on interagency collaboration is one of the great success stories of the past decade, but it 

is more costly, more fragile, and more evident in SOF direct action 

than it is in other SOF mission areas. So as a matter of high priority, I think we ought to make such collaboration easier, more routine, and more widely applied. 

These three general observations summarize my testimony. In 

closing, I would just like to note that when Congress institutionalized SOF capabilities in the late 1980s, it recognized that building 

SOF proficiency was a long-term endeavor. SOF capabilities, like 

any military capability, are subject to erosion. It takes continued 

vigilance to ensure their preservation. In that regard, I think it is 

altogether laudable that this subcommittee is interested in this 
8 

topic, and I greatly appreciate the opportunity to offer my views to 

you on that subject. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lamb can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Dr. Davis. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JACQUELYN K. DAVIS, EXECUTIVE VICE 

PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS 

Dr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, 

for allowing me to express my views on the future of SOF and 

SOCOM. As you know, U.S. SOF has always been deployed for 

both direct actions and nonkinetic engagement missions, but over 

the last several years in particular, preventive SOF deployments 

aimed at building partner capacities and shaping regional environments have emerged as particularly important mission sets for U.S. 

Special Operations Forces and for SOCOM. Building and nurturing 

partner security forces is often the price of admission for U.S. access to countries or key regional theaters. Moreover, as more and 

more nations object to the presence of large American forces deployed in their countries, SOF units with their small footprints are 

oftentimes a more acceptable option. 

For this reason, U.S. SOF indirect action engagements are likely 

to become even more important going forward as budgets become 

tighter and the imperative to operate jointly is matched by the 

growing requirement to work with partners, be they from the 

United States interagency or from outside the U.S. Government. 

With this in mind, I would like to offer six specific points for your 

consideration. 

First, SOF’s efforts in building global SOF partnerships and global SOF networks will, I believe, facilitate American efforts to build 

partner capacities and therein our efforts to leverage allied partner 

SOF and other security forces for common purposes. It will also 

contribute very importantly to SOF interoperability and provide 

the United States with an opportunity to address globally network 

challenges and threats hopefully before a crisis emerges. 

Second, the nature of the challenges ahead and the outlines of 

the emerging security setting require us to be proactive, to anticipate challenges and threats, and to do preventive planning. This 

demands a new emphasis on indirect action engagements without, 

however, dulling the spear of U.S. SOF’s direct action core competencies. That said, and as has been pointed out earlier in the two 

previous presentations, many of SOF’s direct action core competencies are well suited to support SOF’s indirect action taskings, 

but a better definition of what indirect action engagements means 

needs to be considered. 

Third, with the force slated to grow to about 71,000 troops, 

USSOCOM will have the resources to implement these two lines of 

operation, but to do so as effectively as possible, the commander of 

SOCOM, I believe, will need enhanced authorities, both from the 

Department of Defense and from Congress to manage his force 

globally. With respect to the Department of Defense, the SOCOM 

commander needs to be given authority to move forces in peacetime 
9 

across regional Combatant Command areas of responsibility to 

meet emerging needs or to fulfill indirect action taskings. 

Related to this, and this is the fourth point, is the broader need 

for you in Congress to revisit Goldwater-Nichols. In particular, in 

my view, what needs to be done is a reassessment in the way that 

the legislation treated functional versus regional Combatant Commands. In particular, the SOCOM commander, I believe, should 

have authority over the TSOCs and all U.S. SOF units based in 

CONUS [Continental United States] and overseas. Right now he 

does not, and except for individual ad hoc arrangements, he has no 

role in TSOC resourcing, training, or peacetime planning, and that 

impinges on his ability to manage his force globally to meet globally networked threats. Giving SOCOM COCOM over the TSOCs 

and all forward-based U.S. SOF units will address resourcing and 

training shortfalls, and it will allow the redeployment of SOF units 

from one theater to another, including from CONUS to forward regions, as needs dictate. Global force management of U.S. SOF is a 

necessity, not a luxury in the current strategic environment. 

Fifth, to support SOCOM indirect action strategies, I also believe 

that Congress must address funding authorities. Here it seems to 

me, and as Linda pointed out, that some of the legislation in place 

is certainly useful, 1206 funding, for example, but much of this 

funding is tied to specific counterterrorism contingencies or to 

funding for Department of State-led initiatives which often take 

time to get into place and contain too many obstacles for timely action. What is needed is multiyear authority, I believe, to support 

a broader array of indirect action engagement strategies, including 

minor MILCON [Military Construction] projects with partner SOFs 

and other security forces. 

And finally, SOCOM’s vision of regional SOF coordination centers should be encouraged, I believe, and implemented. While 

SOCOM commands the greatest SOF capabilities in the world, 

global problems require global partners and constructs. And one 

approach to achieving U.S. national security objectives in this regard is via the establishment of the regional SOF coordination centers along the lines of the NATO SOF Headquarters that is now, 

has been stood up since March 2010. Based on a coalition of the 

willing nations, the NSHQ, the NATO SOF Headquarters, has created a professional education program for NATO SOF. It has 

reached out to non-NATO partners, including for example Australia 

and Jordan. And it has developed a collaborative relationship with 

interagency partners. The DNI [Director of National Intelligence], 

for example, is one of its biggest supporters, having provided funds 

to develop an intelligence sharing and fusion capability. 

While the establishment of the NSHQ was related to the broader 

NATO umbrella, it is, as I pointed out a moment ago, a voluntary 

MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] organization whose construct can be a loose model for RSCC [Regional SOF Coordination 

Center] development in other regions. The purpose, again, would be 

to foster the idea of multilateral engagement and to build interoperability among like-minded security partners. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will close, and I am willing to 

take questions. Thank you. 
10 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Davis can be found in the Appendix on page 74.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, thank you. 

And again, thank you all. 

I was struck as I read your written testimony and again today 

how much agreement there is on so many points actually among 

the three of you, which I think is significant, given your different 

backgrounds and perspectives and so forth, which tells me a lot. 

One of the things, it seems, that you all agree on is that the indirect approach needs more attention, and so that leads me—and you 

have touched on it somewhat, but my question is, what are the key 

elements that will make for success in the indirect approach as we 

move ahead? What are the things that we need to keep our eye on 

to ensure that the indirect approach gets more attention and is successful in moving ahead around the world? 

Dr. Robinson. 

And I will just go down the line. 

Ms. ROBINSON. I did address and I do think my package of five, 

I would hate to have to choose among the five because I think they 

are all important, but I would add that in general the U.S. political 

system shies away from proactive engagement, and this indirect 

approach requires getting SOF operators out there on the ground 

to understand the environment and develop the relationships and 

access. It also requires persistence, and that is another thing the 

U.S. political system is not good at. We use the examples of Colombia and the Philippines as very important success stories, but they 

did take a decade. So that kind of strategic patience, I think, is 

really vital, and for people to begin to see that it is really a very 

worthwhile investment, and it can happen overall at a much lower 

cost than the large-scale, large military operations that we have 

been involved in, in the past. And then also as I say, I would footstomp that the Theater Special Operations Command is the primary node through which you are going to be implementing the direct—the indirect approach and achieving balance with the direct 

approach. 

Dr. LAMB. I would just briefly add a couple of points. I would 

agree with my colleagues that multiyear funding is incredibly important for any security assistance endeavor. In this regard, perhaps USASOC [U.S. Army Special Operations Command] could be 

given more authority. I am also very intrigued by the possibility of 

assigning USASOC, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the 

responsibility for the Army’s Human Terrain Teams, which provide 

additional insight on social networks and cultural attributes of regions around the world, and it would pair up nicely I think in some 

respects with our Special Forces. 

I think we need to look at a reset of Special Forces. Over the past 

decade, the expansion of Special Forces and employment in Afghanistan and Iraq arguably has inclined some of the units more 

toward direct action than their traditional bread and butter competencies and indirect action. I think that is something that the 

committee should be interested in, and I have the impression that 

USASOC is interested in this as well. 

I think that our long-term interests are well served by improving 

our psychological operations, now called Military Information Sup-
11 

port capabilities. They dovetail nicely with security assistance and 

the indirect approach. I think they have long been the least beneficiary of all the SOF elements, if you will. They have been somewhat neglected. The selection and the training criteria are not 

nearly as rigorous for those forces as they are for the other SOF 

elements. I think some attention to that would be useful. 

Over the long term, I have to say I am on record as one of those 

people who thinks that if we can’t rebalance in this respect, we 

need to look at the possibility of a separate command. I mean, we 

have looked at new commands for other functional areas, and this 

may be something that the committee over the longer term would 

want to consider as well. 

Dr. DAVIS. Much of what I have thought about in this area has 

already been said, but there are two specific things that I would 

like to add or three specific things. The first is in terms of the 

training and SOF education programs, I think we need to start elevating the importance of the indirect approach so that people don’t 

believe it is a second-class set of missions relative to the direct action missions, and I do know that Admiral McRaven is very interested in trying to get a handle on this in his own command. But 

I think it is a broader issue for the U.S. Government and the interagency. 

And one of the issues that I think Congress needs to grapple 

with is the whole notion of security cooperation, who has the lead? 

Does State have the lead, or does DOD [Department of Defense] 

have the lead? And if DOD by default is given the mission because 

it has the resources, then what does it need for interagency collaboration in a specific key regional theater? These are issues that I believe need further study, and I believe, particularly since SOCOM 

was given the responsibility in the Department of Defense for security force assistance synchronization, it is something that impacts 

SOCOM very directly, so I think this is one area that Congress can 

be very directive and ask for further consideration, both from the 

Joint Staff, from OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], from the 

interagency, and from perhaps even a private assessment from outside of government to do a little red teaming. 

Finally, to make the indirect approach I think perceived to be of 

equal importance with the direct approach in SOCOM planning, I 

agree with what Chris was just suggesting a moment ago, and that 

is perhaps the development of another three-star command, a subunified command under SOCOM, which is the command for irregular warfare or whatever or unconventional warfare, whatever you 

want to call it, on a par with JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] and resourced as JSOC is currently resourced. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Interesting. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

If we could continue discussing the authorities, Dr. Robinson, you 

have commented on this most directly, but here in the subcommittee, we have heard about SOCOM’s desire for additional authorities, and can you elaborate on your opinions? Is it SOCOM or 

the regional Combatant Commanders who are best positioned to 

understand the needs of SOF, the capabilities of SOF, and the best 

way to utilize SOF versus other assets? 
12 

Ms. ROBINSON. Well, first, I would like to say there are a plethora of authorities that Congress has granted, and the Theater Special Operations Command routinely combine a number of them to 

try to put together what they would consider an enduring campaign, not just the 1200 series, but JCETs [Joint Combined Exchange Training], counternarcotics authorities, and in my extensive 

interviews, a number of people who have wrestled through this feel 

that there could be some rationalization to cause them to have to 

go through less of that cobbling together for a campaign, but I 

think that a touchstone really is to continue with a Chief of Mission approval, consider what the State Department equities are, 

but ensure that that process works rapidly. 

As far as whether SOCOM or the GCC [Geographic Combatant 

Command] should take the lead, you know, this is I think a very 

complicated issue, and from my standpoint, I would just like to 

point out that SOCOM is currently providing, if you take both the 

regular funding and the OCO [Overseas Contingency Operation] 

funding, they are providing roughly half of the funding for the 

TSOC, so they clearly under the current arrangement have some 

ability to fund and support the TSOCs. The question is, will they 

become much more aggressive and coherent in their approach to 

the programming and budgeting process if they are granted the 

COCOM authority? They have stated, Admiral McRaven has stated 

that the GCCs would retain the OPCON [Operational Control], but 

I think that is really the crux of the issue, to ensure that the GCC 

continues to see the TSOC as its arm and its primary mechanism 

for conducting SOF operations. If they were to see it as a SOCOM 

entity, they would be less likely to employ it in the field, and the 

net outcome would be worse, in my opinion. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Dr. Lamb or Dr. Davis, do you care to comment? 

Dr. LAMB. I would just briefly add one point to that. I think that 

an effective long-term indirect approach in a country, say, like 

Yemen or any other country with which we want to develop better 

relations and a commonality of interests in counterterrorism is dependent upon the interagency approach, so without knowing the 

specific details of Admiral McRaven’s proposal, which I understand 

are still under development, my inclination would be to favor them 

or look on them with favor if they were going to be implemented 

through the local embassy special assistance package or a team, an 

interagency team that was overseeing that process. To me, that 

would make more sense than trying to manage that effort globally 

from USSOCOM headquarters. 

Dr. DAVIS. I would just add to that point that it is all situation 

dependent, and it depends on what is going on in the region. For 

example, if this is something that is really speaking to the 

counterterrorism set of mission areas that SOCOM is interested in, 

then it might be appropriate for SOCOM to take the lead, but I believe that Admiral McRaven has always emphasized that what he 

would do in theater would come under the Chief of Mission’s authority. Operationally the regional Combatant Commander would 

have control. It would all be in consultation. What he is really concerned about is placing the right resources, in the right place, in 

a timely fashion, and then allowing his TSOCs to exercise with 

partner forces and not just SOF counterpart forces, but Ministry of 
13 

the Interior forces, Drug Enforcement Agency forces, whatever is 

relevant and specific in a particular theater in a specific context. 

He wants to have the freedom to be able to develop a program of 

outreach to those agencies with whom he would be working on the 

larger global network challenges, and he continues to want to support the regional COCOM’s priorities, but oftentimes the regional 

COCOM’s priorities are different priorities than the global functional command’s priorities, and he is trying to bridge that gap I 

believe in some of these proposals he is grappling with. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. My time has expired. I hope we will 

get to a second round of questions. With that, I yield back and 

thank you for your answers. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. West. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member. 

And thanks for the panel for being here. 

And, you know, maybe I am a little outdated because I did retire 

8 years ago, but I am trying to go back and just close my eyes and 

think about the line and block charts that you all are talking about 

and the dash—dotted lines all over the place because, you know, 

one of the key things that they taught us was unity of command 

and unity of effort, and so as I listen to you talk about TSOCs, and, 

you know, them getting in the area of operations, area of responsibility for theater commander, you know, how will some of these 

things that we are talking about, when we start to have a functional commander that is over here, you know, headquartered in 

Tampa, you know, being involved with the theater operations that 

let’s say that General Allen is specifically tasked with doing, what 

really is the relationship that we are talking about here because 

having been a commander in a combat zone, the last thing I wanted was, you know, cowboys in my area of operations operating, you 

know, independently without my understanding, and I don’t want 

to see us, you know, having that happen, you know. 

I hear you talk about interagency and other things with coalitions, so when you talk about this TSOC, I remember we used to 

have SOCCEs [Special Operations Command and Control Element] 

and every combatant command had a Special Operations Command 

and Control Element that was supposed to be that liaison with 

those Special Operations Forces. Are we bypassing the SOCCEs 

now with these TSOCs? Or are we making the SOCCEs irrelevant 

even? 

Ms. ROBINSON. I would first answer that the SOCCE is more of 

an operational and temporary construct, and the TSOC is an enduring subunified command of the Geographic Combatant Command. And I would say that the concern that you have expressed 

is certainly one that has been heard and has been voiced, and I 

would underline, I think it is critical that there be, with any such 

change, a clearly enumerated permanent assignment of operational 

control to the Geographic Combatant Commander so that that principle of unity of command does continue to be observed, and I think 

that the confusion—— 

Mr. WEST. And unity of effort. 

Ms. ROBINSON. And unity of effort, yes, and through the Chief of 

Mission approval that is in many of these authorities that I think 

recognizes a very critical part of getting interagency unity of effort. 
14 

But I would like to add I think that some of these concerns expressed around a global area of responsibility for SOCOM as a 

functional command has created some concern that there would be 

SOCOM moves to move forces in and out of Combatant, Geographic 

Combatant Commanders’ areas without their approval, not just 

their coordination. So it comes down to who has the vote. And in 

my view, this has got to be a collaborative process or it is not going 

to work. Any attempt by SOCOM to override or trump the GCC is 

going to issue an endless bureaucratic battle. So I think the process 

needs to be very clear. And while I recognize that many of these 

global threats transcend the geographic combatant command 

boundaries, you cannot have SOCOM sitting atop the Geographic 

Combatant Commander system. Thank you. 

Dr. DAVIS. Congressman, I don’t believe that anything Admiral 

McRaven is considering would do that. I believe he is really thinking about his peacetime authorities and the flexibility to move 

forces to meet prospective needs or looming threats on the environment and to do the exercise and training that he believes necessary 

to keep those units current in terms of capabilities and understanding. I do not believe he is talking about going over a regional 

COCOM’s head. He is talking about doing things together in a cooperative, collaborative fashion. 

Mr. WEST. And I will wholeheartedly agree with you because one 

of the things that you all did bring up, when I was a battalion commander in Iraq, we did four different missions in support of Delta, 

and I think that, you know, there was a lot of discovery learning 

on the fly, but we were able to, you know, execute and provide the 

external cordon for them, but there was rehearsals and, you know, 

getting down to TTP [tactics, techniques, and procedures], so, you 

know, that aspect I understand. And I wholeheartedly agree that 

on this side, we should have more of those, you know, type of operations where we are training together, we are learning, and there 

should not be this distinction between, you know, the Special Operation type forces to include the PSYOP [Psychological Operations] 

forces and others and our conventional forces, so, you know, that 

I support. But, you know, when you start talking about on the 

ground in the combat zone, you know, we have got to be very careful about the line and block charts. 

Dr. DAVIS. And he definitely is not talking about combat zone. 

He is talking about those ambiguous environments where there is 

activity. 

Mr. WEST. We don’t have ambiguous environments. 

Dr. DAVIS. Not at all. 

Mr. WEST. All right. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Ms. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you all for being here. I guess one of the things I would say 

about your presentation, and I really appreciate the hard work that 

you all have been doing for so many years is, you know, we have 

come a long way. I am not sure I would add baby at the end, but 

we have come a long way, and I remember, and I know the chairman knows this, sort of kind of the shock and great concern that 

we had when it was obvious that people were playing at their jobs, 

particularly as it related to trying to do some interagency collabo-
15 

rative work when people really didn’t have the depth or the training to do that, and so we have tried hard to understand that better. 

One of the concerns that I remember, though, and you can share 

with me if this is just not true today, is that one of the reasons 

that the military obviously had a leg up, if you will, on all of this 

is that they had a deep bench, and that when we tried to do more 

cross-training and tried to bring along folks who were involved, 

whether it was the State Department or USAID [U.S. Agency for 

International Development] if that was appropriate, whatever it 

was, Agriculture or Commerce, we didn’t have the people to really 

be available to do the training and to meet together. I know that 

the Defense University had that problem. There were plenty of individuals in the Services to come forward, but we couldn’t spare as 

many people to do that. Is that still an issue and a problem? Because as you talk about many of these areas, it does depend on 

having people available to take the time to do that kind of collaborative training together if, in fact, we are talking about far more 

than theater operations. Has that problem gone away? I doubt it 

because I don’t think the resources are there. 

Dr. LAMB. No, I would respond to that by saying that actually 

particularly the Department of State, some of the smaller elements 

in the national security system do have a problem meeting interagency collaboration requirements, particularly given the way we 

do it now, which is very labor-intensive. It is a volunteer activity. 

You have to get all the people in the same room on a sustained 

basis, so it is labor-intensive. It is not very efficient, frankly, and 

in that sense, the military definitely has an advantage. It can put 

manpower on the task when it wants to. It is actually I think a 

great compliment to past Special Operations commanders over this 

past decade that they have been willing to allocate even very scarce 

military talent to effect interagency collaboration. So that is all to 

the good. But that is an ongoing problem. 

However, that said, I think that there are greater problems, 

greater impediments to interagency collaboration than just not 

being able to put the manpower forward to work on these small 

teams. It doesn’t take that many people working together in a room 

to effect interagency collaboration if the conditions are set for success. Typically in the current system, we don’t have those conditions set for success. So I can elaborate on that if you like. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Please, if you would. The other question I would like to put into this discussion because my time is so 

limited is really the women’s role in SOF. What is that? I mean, 

in terms of training and integrating women into that. I know the 

work of the FETs in Afghanistan, the Female Engagement Teams, 

and it is a significant role. Unfortunately, they are being pulled out 

in a lot of areas, not because they are not doing a good job but because their units are leaving. And so how—where does that fit? Because I think that actually we have seen what a difference their 

role can make, and I am wondering if that is kind of a missing 

piece when we look at this. 

Dr. DAVIS. Well, certainly the current commander and the previous commander of U.S. SOCOM has appreciated the potential 

contribution that many women in the force are making, can make, 

and will make into the future to support SOCOM and SOF oper-
16 

ations, and combined SOF and General Purpose Force operations, 

both in operational settings but much more importantly in this set 

of indirect action mission areas, where women I think will increasingly be able to bring to bear their capabilities. Certainly in Afghanistan, we have seen how important in the Village Stability 

Programs that the introduction of women in the forces has been, 

and the utilization and leveraging of our particular assets as part 

of the female gender. 

Admiral McRaven, I believe, recognizes that and certainly all of 

the components—Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force of SOF, of building SOF forces—have valued their female operators, whether they 

are intelligence personnel or whatever, MOS [Military Occupational Speciality] they have. And I think in the future as the numbers go up in SOF to 71,000, around 71,000 people in the force, I 

think you will see a larger percentage of women in operational settings as well as in the headquarters in the United States as well 

as in the TSOC organizations. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

I hope, Dr. Lamb, you can follow up in another minute about 

some of those other obstacles. Thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Barber, this may be our first subcommittee meeting since you have joined the subcommittee. We are 

glad to have you. 

Let me ask about a couple of other things. Then absolutely any 

other member who would like to pursue other things may definitely 

do that. 

Here is what worries me—one of the things that worries me— 

a tremendous amount of publicity has been given to Special Operations, especially since the Osama bin Laden raid. And that has a 

danger in and of itself as the enemy learns what we do and how 

we do it. But the rest of the story is now everybody knows how 

good these folks are, and the temptation is to have them do everything because they can do whatever they put their mind to so well. 

And so the question is: How do we ensure Special Operations 

stays special? And especially in the situation where it looks like in 

Afghanistan we are moving towards a situation where Special Operations is going to run the country, from a military standpoint, 

how does that work? And as we think about the temptation to use 

Special Operations for everything and giving them a whole country 

to run, does that threaten some critical capabilities that nobody 

else can do? That is what is going on in my mind, and I would appreciate your all thoughts on that. 

Ms. ROBINSON. I think that is one of the concerns upper most in 

the mind of the SOF leadership, and the danger of overstretch is 

real. The way I see it, the mission in Afghanistan, as we go toward 

a FID/CT [Foreign Internal Defense/Counterterrorism] mission, is 

one that is appropriate for SOF, but it will not be able to handle 

it alone. So it is, I think, imperative that the mission be defined 

with some precision, and then a blended command setup that 

draws heavily on the conventional forces. And they have many particular skills that do not exist in the Special Forces, Special Operations Forces, including provost marshals, a lot of the enablers, a 

lot of these special subsets. 
17 

So my general view is that blended SOF conventional force combinations extend the reach of SOF and help them avoid overstretch. 

Also, I would like to underline what Jacquelyn said regarding 

SOF partners. This is a very important way of also extending 

SOF’s reach. I think it is very little covered in this country that 

NATO SOF and other coalition SOF are helping in Afghanistan, 

particularly with the Provincial Response Company training effort, 

but there are also Middle East partners there helping, and these 

are very important force multipliers, if you will. 

And I think, looking around the world, a lot of those missions, 

those indirect missions, are very small, a few teams required per 

country. But I think it will require a constant evaluation of the priorities. And within Afghanistan, they have to make, I think, some 

hard decisions about where geographically to focus. And my view 

is they should focus very clearly on the insurgent belt, the south 

and the east, rather than trying to make it a countrywide effort. 

Thank you. 

Dr. LAMB. I would just say that I think historically your concerns 

are validated by experience. Not long after 9/11, there were cases 

of Special Operations Forces being used for what I considered inappropriate missions, such as site or personal body protection missions that were not the best use of our Special Operations Forces. 

Under the circumstances, it was perhaps understandable that they 

were used for that purpose around this town and elsewhere. But 

I think that has basically declined. 

Another area where I think this might be a problem was the 

shift after 9/11 from security assistance being a collateral mission 

to being a core mission. That has an advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage is that SOCOM now has the lead responsibility for recommending whether General Purpose Forces or Special 

Operations Forces conduct a security assistance mission. So that is 

a good thing in general. But if it invites the Services, the General 

Purpose Forces, to back away from security assistance and forces 

SOCOM to carry more of that load itself, I would consider that a 

poor use of our Special Operations Forces talent. 

I must say, though, in this area, there is a problem within 

SOCOM, I think, and it gets to the question of what is the scale 

of our direct action missions. I mean, many of these missions can 

be looked at as elective, if you will. We are doing some of these 

missions on an industrial scale, if you will. And that has had the 

effect of pulling in not just our special mission units but pulling in 

the ODAs [Operational Detachment Alphas] and everybody else to 

get involved in that to a certain extent. 

So there it is kind of a SOCOM management issue as to are we 

really doing what we need to do with direct action. It is quite possible, in fact, I believe it is probably the case that our direct action 

missions could be executed with far greater discrimination, taking 

into account the political effects of those missions. It is an incredible capability. It doesn’t have to be used on the scale it is, I think, 

to achieve the political effects that we would desire from that. 

So, in that sense, some rebalancing within SOCOM could limit 

the workload in that regard and make sure that they are used to 

good effect. 
18 

Dr. DAVIS. Just one final thought along the lines of Afghanistan. 

I have thought that what came out of the Chicago summit was not 

precise enough in terms of defining what it is actually that our 

forces are going to be doing after 2014. 

There is the assumption that much of the burden of what will 

occur after 2014 will fall to Special Operations Forces. And, indeed, 

we have created a new command and control structure for Afghanistan to facilitate the post-2014 period. 

But understanding exactly what the training mission is, in 

quotes, I think, needs to be spelled out much more precisely. And 

then, the second part of that, understanding which allies are going 

to be with us to perform that mission is not at all clear in my 

mind. We made certain assumptions, for example, about the 

French. The French have had a change in government. Mr. 

Hollande made some pretty ambiguous statements in Chicago. I 

have heard my German friends make statements about 2014. That 

is just it. My Italian friends have made similar statements. In Poland, they have created a SOCOM-like organization to promote 

SOCOM and to keep its commitment in Afghanistan. But now, 

with the government change in Poland and the tensions between 

the president and the prime minister, they are now reconsidering 

whether or not those units should be pulled back in under the 

Army just to perform direct action missions and not do the training 

and direct engagement missions that would be required in Afghanistan. 

So, to my mind, there is a lot of uncertainty, and that uncertainty, called Afghanistan post-2014, impinges quite fully upon the 

future of SOF and SOCOM planning, I believe. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I don’t think it would be at all controversial to assert that modern warfare is extremely complex and growing even more so, and 

that any future conflicts will have cyber dimensions as the domain 

continues to grow in importance. So with that, to what extent is 

SOCOM training and resourcing able to operate both in the cyber 

domain and in the nexus of the cyber domain and the physical domain? 

For example, advanced analytics to identify and exploit networks, counterthreat capabilities and advanced offensive and defensive network tools? 

Dr. DAVIS. That is one area that I was going to suggest if I had 

a question about what should the missions be or are there any missions that SOCOM could shed for fear of getting into a situation 

where this is a force of first choice that we go to in every instance. 

I believe SOCOM and SOF should be playing much more intensively in the cyber area, but we might conflate its activities in the 

cyber area with computer network operations, information operations, strategic messaging, and even perhaps psychological operations. There might be a way of putting together these disparate 

pieces of a larger puzzle with a greater emphasis on the cyber 

piece, which if you are looking at networked global challenges, obviously the cyber piece becomes very, very important. 

I think that is one area that SOCOM needs to address much 

more fully as we go into the future, in both planning, ensuring it 
19 

has the correct personnel with the right competencies, and also 

with respect to operationalizing cyber as a piece of SOCOM planning. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Ms. Robinson, do you have any comments? 

Ms. ROBINSON. My view is that some portions of the Special Operations Community have been extremely effective in leveraging 

other capabilities elsewhere in the Government. And with the 

stand up of Cyber Command, I would hope that that same kind of 

synergy could be employed rather than trying to create a wholly 

new center of excellence, if you will, under the SOCOM umbrella. 

Of course, there are very proficient tactical units at the field level. 

For example, SOT–A [Special Operations Team Alpha], is very valuable to those teams out in the field. But I would think at the 

higher level, it is really a question of increased interagency collaboration and formation of these interagency task forces to get after 

the combined threat. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Dr. Lamb. 

Dr. LAMB. I was thinking about what I can say about this in an 

unclassified venue, but I would just say that I support SOCOM’s 

involvement in information operations and also in counter proliferation. Those are two missions it has added over the past couple 

of decades, and I think they do have a very discrete but well-defined role in those missions that they need to be prepared for, and 

as far as I know are prepared for. So I don’t see that as undue expansion on their part. 

Just to agree with my colleagues here, one of the big challenges 

in any complex mission area, including cyber security, but also 

counterinsurgency, counter proliferation, et cetera, is that we have 

simply got to learn to work across organizational boundaries. So 

you are not going to have everything in a nice, neat package. 

SOCOM won’t have the alpha and omega responsibilities for cyber 

security or information operations, or even for counterinsurgency. 

Or for very little that it does, actually, which is why we really need 

to take seriously the requirement to improve our interagency collaboration skills. These missions have to be tackled on that basis. 

And that goes for collaboration with the Geographic Combatant 

Commands and SOCOM as well. 

The other big challenge we have, in addition to cross-organizational collaboration, I think, is decentralizing to get the problem 

solvers closer to the problem, which is going back to a point that 

was made earlier. I would like to see—I agree that the Theater 

SOCs need to be muscled up, but I don’t think the tension should 

be between the Geographic Combatant Commands and SOCOM for 

control of those security assistance missions. It should be managed 

through the embassy and the interagency team on the front lines 

that are going to work the problem day in and day out on a persistent basis. 

So if the decisionmaking is done closer to the problem, as would 

be the case, for example, on JIATF–South [Joint Interagency Task 

Force–South], and you just get general supervision by SOUTHCOM 

[U.S. Southern Command] or the respective combatant commands, 

I think we would have less of a problem. So decentralization and 
20 

working across organizational boundaries, these are two things 

that we have to get better at. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. West. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. 

I wholeheartedly agree with what the chairman just said, because, you know, I remember back when we created the Green 

Beret, a very specific, a very narrow mission set that we had them 

do. And even when we created the Special Forces as a branch when 

I was a young captain, once again, very specific mission set. 

But when you sit down and you look at Act of Valor and all of 

these things, all of a sudden it becomes the shiny little toy. And 

everyone is running and saying, well, the Special Operations guys 

can do it; the Special Operations guys can do it. Not only are we 

overextending them, also we are underutilizing the other aspects of 

our military. 

When I was down at Camp Lejeune, I did a 3-year Joint assignment. What I saw was the MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit] program. I think that is something that we need to look at how we 

can develop with our conventional forces because you take a Marine infantry battalion and you separate out to be a Marine Expeditionary Unit, a MEU, but it has to go through specific training and 

some of that specific training is on a series of Special Operations 

capable missions, so they get that tag line MEU SOC [Special Operations Capable]. 

So I think what we need to start looking at, when I look at this 

list, direct action, special reconnaissance, security force assistance, 

unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil operations 

operations, counterterrorism, military information support operations, counter proliferation and weapons of mass destruction, and 

information operations, I get exhausted just reading that list. 

One thing that we are not talking about here, we still have this 

thing out there called sequestration. So we really need to start 

looking at how do we take and narrowly focus these missions? Because one of the things we said in the military, if everything is a 

priority, nothing is a priority. So how do you properly train people 

on this litany of 10 or so different tasks? They are not going to do 

it very well. 

And I am very concerned about the fact that we are going to try 

to turn over Afghanistan to the special operators. That is not what 

they were intended to be. There is something that you can go back 

to your think tanks and talk about. Let us look at that MEU SOC 

model of how we can maybe alleviate some of these missions from 

the ‘‘Special Operations Community’’ and look at how—you know, 

we have Rangers out there. I mean, Rangers should be able to do 

some of these operations, like a direct action mission. They are 

highly specialized infantry. That is what we need to start looking 

at. That is my little 2 cents worth. 

Dr. DAVIS. Congressman, if I may, if you take that list that you 

just articulated and you look at it, you realize that some of them 

are activities and some of them are missions. And some of the activities might be core competencies of SOF, or they might be core 

competencies of General Purpose Forces, or they both might oper-
21 

ate together. But I think we do need to reassess what it is we want 

U.S. SOF to do. Absolutely. I couldn’t agree with you more. 

Ms. ROBINSON. I think that one of the ways to avoid this overstretch problem is to recall that SOF really are supposed to be used 

in hostile, denied, or sensitive environments. I think that is one 

way to quickly delimit some of this. 

If we are talking about security force assistance in a benign environment, that should be largely seen as a conventional force responsibility, unless it is SOF training SOF or SOF-like forces. 

Also the list of nine, I have always had a problem with that because it is kind of a mishmash, and I think the draft Army doctrinal publication forthcoming has a binning of surgical strike and 

special warfare, which I think provides some intellectual clarity 

about what we are talking about. I think they get trained on those 

subset missions really as part of those two categories. 

Finally, I would say, in Afghanistan, it is very important to clarify the mission. If it is just behind-the-wire training, yes, I think 

that can be not only a conventional force mission but probably Afghans will be very quickly able to do much or all of that themselves. But for continued counterterrorism, combat advising and if 

there is an ongoing effort to support the village stability ops and 

the Afghan Local Police, I think that is clearly, we have those 

small teams out in those very wild and woolly places, that is a SOF 

mission. 

Mr. WEST. That fits within their mission statement. That goes 

back to Vietnam when we had the Strategic Hamlet Program. That 

is the mission set. But you are right, if it is just to be there to train 

ANA [Afghanistan National Army], you don’t need special operators to train the ANA. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Dr. Lamb, just continuing, I think 

you were talking—really, what gets in the way? 

Dr. LAMB. Of interagency collaboration? 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Yes. And we know, we have had 

those discussions before in terms of people looking only in their 

own silos, but what is it? 

Dr. LAMB. Well, I think the main obstacle to interagency collaboration is the very structure of our system. We have built very powerful, functional departments and agencies. And this makes a lot 

of sense. It gives us a great reservoir of support and all of the relevant elements of national power. So there is a lot of advantage to 

that. 

But if you compare those strengths against the cross organizational collaborative constructs we have, they are all very weak. So 

our ability to actually integrate those functional capabilities to good 

effect is very poor. 

And to bring it down to earth and really to my own personal experience, I have had some examples that I can attest to in this regard, but if you are sent to serve on an interagency group, you immediately have a great tension. On the one hand, you are trying 

to represent your agency correctly and protect its organizational equities and its preferred position; on the other hand, you have the 

sense that you are suppose to help the whole group accomplish the 
22 

mission well. This is a tension that the system does not send clear 

demand signals on. 

Many times those of us who have worked in bureaucracy will be 

sent to these kind of groups with the overriding mandate to make 

sure that the organization’s preferred position comes out in the 

end. Or if not, to ensure that it is not sacrificed, which means that 

the thinking gets watered down, the products get watered down, et 

cetera; the clarity gets watered down, et cetera. 

So my view of this is that, absent some kind of intervention 

from—I actually believe and have written on this subject—from 

Congress to give the President the authority to delegate his authority for integrating across the Cabinet level departments and agencies, we are going to continue to find that this capability is very, 

very fragile. 

Again, I think SOF really has to be congratulated as one of the 

few elements of the national security system that have taken this 

requirement seriously. I think they backed into it, realizing that 

they were not going to get actionable intelligence to go after the 

bad guys without interagency collaboration. And they built that 

level of collaboration up. They then looked at their operations and 

said, we are still not getting strategic effect. They started bringing 

in other things, like political talent and information operations talent, and they started performing at a much higher level, our special mission units. I think that is a great success. 

We need to do the same thing on the indirect side. But this is 

a pocket of expertise and success that is not replicated as a general 

rule across the system. 

There are other big problems. We have a penchant for taking all 

of our complex national security missions and dividing responsibility up among different entities. So we will have someone work 

the policies, someone work the planning component. Someone will 

work the actual operations. Someone will assess it. Nobody manages the mission end-to-end, as a typical rule. 

In all of the cases that I have studied where we have had socalled black swans of interagency collaboration, those that have 

performed really well, they do find a way to manage the mission 

end-to-end. That is one of their distinguishing characteristics. But 

typically, our national—— 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Do we really study that to understand what leadership is doing that is different in those situations? 

Dr. LAMB. Well, I am actually shocked by the lack of serious, rigorous research on this subject. I would have assumed, given all of 

the attention paid to it, rhetorically, that we would have a lot of 

dedicated research. But when you think about it, it is not so 

strange. None of our departments and agencies is inclined to spend 

a lot of research dollars on this because they are not assigned that 

responsibility. If you look at the National Security Council, staff is 

actually relatively small with a relatively limited budget, and they 

typically have their nose deeply in the inbox. So there is not really 

anyone with a vested interest in looking at this other than the Congress or the President, I suppose. 

But what research we have done on this indicates that there are 

some overarching requirements for success. There are some things 

to avoid, et cetera. And to promote our research a little bit at Na-
23 

tional Defense University, we are doing a series of case studies on 

this designed to find some general lessons learned. And we do have 

support of some people in the Special Operations Community for 

that purpose, which I am very grateful for. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. But you seem to be suggesting as 

well that Congress has a role and perhaps there are some authorities or opportunities to make this easier or to encourage more partnerships? 

Dr. LAMB. Yes, we do. We actually have a study and a report on 

that very subject, and we recommended that Congress pass legislation that would give the President the authority to delegate his 

presumptive authority, integrate the departments and agencies 

through what we called mission managers. So we can certainly provide that information to the committee staff, if you would like. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Okay. Thank you very much. My 

time has expired. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. It is an important problem. It is hard for Congress to grapple with as well. 

But the gentlelady knows, and I feel strongly, like she does, that 

we have to grapple with it. 

Let me ask a couple of organizational issues. There has been tremendous growth in Special Operations over the last decade. Admiral Olson used to always come and talk about his concern that as 

we increase the number of people, we maintain the quality of the 

people that are coming in. But from an organizational standpoint, 

U.S. Special Operations Command was created by Congress to be 

agile and given special procurement authorities so they could buy 

and acquire what was needed right away and get it done. Has 

SOCOM become too big? Has it lost some of its agility as far as 

procurement or other hopes when it was created? 

Dr. DAVIS. It has not become so big; it is in danger, perhaps, of 

doing so. But what has happened is, because of its sustained operational tempos over the last several years in particular, it has come 

to depend much more on the Services to enable many operations. 

And in many cases, the Services, looking at their own budgets, understanding the environments we are in, are cutting those 

enablers, for example, that are necessary for SOCOM and SOF to 

perform its missions in forward areas. 

So I think there is a danger of getting too large because you lose 

your special nature, and you don’t have the specialized skill sets 

and core competencies of people you will need. But more importantly, in this environment that we are in, with each of the Services contracting, force structure and looking at recruiting bases for 

people in competition with SOCOM now, increasingly, that I think 

there is a danger as we go forward of finding the right people for 

the command and certainly having the Services support the commands with the enablers that they need. 

Helicopters is an area in particular in which SOCOM really 

needs the air mobility piece to enhance its forward operations, and 

the Services just don’t have the capabilities to bring forward in this 

regard. 

Dr. LAMB. I would add just a couple of quick points. I think it 

is a mixed picture. I mean, I would be the first to say that SOF, 

especially in the direct action area, is much more agile today than 
24 

it was 10 or 15 years ago, not only because of the resources that 

they have been given but because of the experience they developed 

and because of the interagency collaborative protocols and organizations they have pioneered. They do things routinely today that 

were very difficult, you couldn’t even imagine them. I mean, somebody pointed out to me, a colleague in the Pentagon that I was 

talking about this testimony with, he pointed out that it took us 

13 years to identify the bombers of Pan Am 103. Our forensic capabilities today are much, much, much more refined than that. We 

have unbelievable agility in some respects in our Special Operations Forces today. It is awe-inspiring. 

On the other hand, in the indirect areas, I think we have atrophied a bit. You know, we have with 80 to 90 percent of the force 

in just two theaters, and so the language and cultural skills in the 

context there have atrophied. In that sense, we are less agile. 

But one other thing that I have heard that I pass on to you is 

that the abundance of technology that has been made available has 

perhaps eroded some of the creative SOF problem-solving skills. 

There was a certain pride—not unlike the Marine Corps in certain 

respects—but certain pride in SOF about being able to do very creative things with very little resources. Certainly being able to go 

into a complex situation, assess what resources you have, operate 

within those boundaries and still solve the problems. Some people 

in the community think maybe that has atrophied with the sort of 

direct action capabilities that have been provided. 

Ms. ROBINSON. I would like to add a few points. I think SOCOM 

and its subordinate elements are not too big, but I do think some 

rebalancing toward the indirect capabilities is needed and perhaps 

relooking what the headquarters is doing. Some redundant functions are there perhaps. 

What is very clear to me is that these enablers are critical for 

SOF to operate. The distributed operations require a lot of lift and 

a lot of support. And out there in Afghanistan, as you know, these 

rigors are working 24–7. All of these people that have to supply the 

SOF teams out there in the hinterlands, and SOF have been building more support forces. That is the last part of the build for the 

expansion, and I think it is very critical that they get that but also 

continue to have access to conventional enablers. And that is part 

of this SOF Force Generation process that they are working 

through. 

Finally, though, if budgetary requirements come to bear, I think 

it is very important to remember that SOF truth that says quality 

is more important than quantity, and I think the command will 

protect that at all costs. The operatives have to meet that standard 

in order to be able to perform their assigned missions. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. A similar question on the civilian side. We 

have an Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. Any changes ought to be made there? Or do you think 

that kind of counterpart within the Secretary of Defense’s Office is 

okay for now? 

Dr. DAVIS. Looking at it from afar, I don’t think that that office 

has been particularly helpful to SOCOM until quite recently. In the 

building, it has been rather lost in policy debates. The ASD, Assistant Secretary of Defense, for SO/LIC [Special Operation/Low Inten-
25 

sity Conflict] has been able to articulate requirements, but I think 

going forward, working together, and I know this is certainly the 

plan of Mike Sheehan and Admiral McRaven, to make sure that 

they are in sync so that Mike can articulate in policy forums the 

requirements for SOCOM but also, very importantly, to say no, 

that is not a SOCOM mission and you don’t need SOCOM forces. 

When considering global force employments, I think that is particularly important. So I think the relationship needs to be much tighter than it has been. 

Now I know it was very tight when you were there, Chris. 

But I think in the policy world in the Pentagon, the ASD SO/LIC 

needs to be much more proactive than he traditionally has been in 

inserting SOF equities, SOF issues into policy debates but also protecting SOF interests. 

Dr. LAMB. I would add one quick comment. 

We were chuckling because we were talking about this very issue 

a little earlier. I have not worked in that organization for over 15 

years, but I still know people in it, and I would not want to make 

a—I don’t know that there are any structural changes that need to 

be made there. 

But I would say one thing to Members of Congress about the creation of the ASD SO/LIC; I think it was a good move. 

Just to give you one example, if you chart some of the issues that 

are now standard thinking in Special Operations Command, like 

the distinction between a direct and indirect approach or what are 

the key elements that make Special Operations special, et cetera, 

you can track them all of the way back to early 1990s when a 

group of special operators and people in ASD SO/LIC sat down to 

create something called the Long-Range Planning Document for 

SOF. And so I do think the organization has had an effect, and a 

positive effect. 

That said, there have been times when people in the building, 

and I have worked in other offices in the Pentagon, have asked 

whether they really need to hear the Assistant Secretary’s view because it is not likely to be at all different or interesting compared 

to U.S. SOCOM’s view. And so I think there is something that 

needs to be looked at there. 

If an incoming Assistant Secretary asked my advice, one thing I 

would say to them is that you need deep Special Operations expertise on your staff, but you also need multifunctional expertise on 

your staff as well. Just like SOF has to work with other skill sets 

to be effective against the complex missions that we face, that staff 

needs to, in its oversight role, needs to have a multifunctional base, 

and that might be something to look at. 

Ms. ROBINSON. May I add two points? 

I think that the Office of SO/LIC should focus full time and exclusively on SOF. And I think historically they have been burdened 

with other additional responsibilities. And to me, this is too critical 

a portfolio to have other issues also under that ASD. I know there 

is some concern in the building there if they were to reorganize in 

that way, they might lose bodies. But I think it is very important 

that ASD SO/LIC be focused on SOF. 

Secondly, I think its oversight role does require some degree of 

independence. Yes, to support SOCOM, but I think it is very impor-
26 

tant that the USDP, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, be 

able to turn to ASD and say, be my honest broker here, tell me 

what you think, give me your own opinion. Thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Any other questions? 

I think that is it for now. Thank you all again for your testimony 

and for answering our questions and for all of the work that you 

have done in this area. We look forward I am sure to further communication with you as we grapple with what we can do to help 

make sure that Special Operations is as well positioned as possible 

in the future to help protect our country. 

Again, thank you for being here. 

With that, the hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JULY 11, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 11, 2012 

(31) 

Statement of Hon. Mac Thornberry 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 

Capabilities 

Hearing on 

The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces 

July 11, 2012 

Today we gather to examine the future of Special Operations 

Forces. The accomplishments of SOF over the past decade in fighting terrorists have been remarkable. While I believe too much information about what they do and how they do it has been publicized, the American people generally and especially those of us 

charged with more detailed oversight stand in awe of their professionalism and dedication. 

But none of us can afford to rest on our past accomplishments. 

The world changes and threats continue to evolve. The days and 

years ahead will see new challenges and tight budgets. So it is appropriate to examine how Special Operations should evolve to ensure that our Nation’s security is protected. Congress has a key 

role to play in that evolution, and I know that members of both 

sides of the aisle are committed to playing a constructive role in 

shaping those changes. 
32 

Statement of Hon. James R. Langevin 

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 

Capabilities 

Hearing on 

The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces 

July 11, 2012 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses for 

appearing before us today. Our Special Operations Forces are some 

of the most capable personnel in high demand throughout our military. For a fraction of the Department of Defense’s total budget, 

SOF provides an outsized return on our investment. For the last 

decade, the bulk of their capabilities have been rightly absorbed by 

necessities in Iraq and Afghanistan. But now, with our combat 

troops out of Iraq and our drawdown in Afghanistan well under 

way, it seems appropriate to consider what the future holds for 

SOF. 

While SOF have been an integral part of conflicts in the 

CENTCOM area of responsibility, I think it’s fair to say that some 

of the other combatant commands have had to accept compromises 

in their SOF support for some time. As Admiral McRaven at U.S. 

Special Operations Command and the rest of the Department of 

Defense goes through a rebalancing process, it is critical for those 

of us in Congress to make sure SOF is properly manned, trained, 

and resourced for future demands. This is particularly important 

because special operations forces are perhaps best known for their 

direct action missions—the bin Laden raid being a prime example. 

But their broad set of missions range from unconventional warfare 

and foreign internal defense to civil affairs and information operations, among others, and in recent years some of those skills may 

have atrophied. Put another way, our special operations forces are 

critical to our efforts to build the capacity of our partners around 

the globe, enabling those partners to apply local solutions to local 

security problems long before they become a regional or global 

issue. 

We have many issues to consider to ensure that our special operations forces maintain their historic reputation as agile and highly 

effective national security assets. I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ views on how to ensure that we continue to populate our 

Special Operations Forces with superior quality men and women 

who are highly trained, properly equipped, and granted the authorities needed to continue their stellar contribution to our national security, particularly given the highly uncertain threat landscape of the future. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this 

hearing, and I look forward to an interesting discussion. 
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 11, 2012 

(85) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 1) How do we deconflict and coordinate such capabilities within 

SOF from existing or nascent capabilities elsewhere in the Department of Defense 

and the intelligence community, and ensure proper oversight? 

Ms. ROBINSON. There is a pressing need for a classified analysis of the mission, 

size and expenditure of organizations with overlapping missions to determine 

whether their roles and missions are clearly delineated, properly coordinated or at 

least deconflicted, and to some degree redundant. Such an analysis would look at 

potential redundancies as well as synergies between SOF and the CIA’s Special Activities Division and DIA’s DCS and CIA’s NCS. 

As established by law, the intelligence committees conduct oversight of intelligence activities and covert activities for which a presidential finding has been 

issued under Title 50, while the armed services committees conduct oversight of 

military activities and activities conducted by the military that are not covered by 

a Title 50 finding. Because the subject involves both military and intelligence entities, ideally such a study would have joint sponsorship by the HPSCI and HASC. 

In addition, members who sit on both committees have a unique ability to assess 

this issue comprehensively on an ongoing basis, and this membership might be harnessed in a more systematic fashion. 

Historically, the main body of the CIA has believed its core mission is to collect 

intelligence rather than to conduct covert action. In practice, there seems to be a 

need for some resident covert action capability at CIA. The question is whether the 

missions and needed capability and capacity of the paramilitary SAD should be 

more clearly delineated. My observation from the field, while limited and anecdotal, 

is that coordination and unity of effort among the SAD and military units can be 

improved. While individual tactical units may work well together, there is no mechanism to ensure deconfliction at a minimum, or harmonization of effects, or even 

synergistic operations in the context of an overall campaign plan or strategy. SOF 

theater and national mission forces have taken an important step by establishing 

their first unified SOF command in Afghanistan, but the CIA’s counterterrorism 

mission occurs in close proximity to SOF’s without any similar coordinating construct. The CIA, of course, is not in the military chain of command. 

On the military side, the armed services committees should and presumably are 

exercising their oversight responsibilities fully with regard to special access programs that do not fall under Title 50. The intelligence responsibilities of the military under Title 50 are quite extensive and oversight of these activities will presumably increase with the creation and expansion of the DCS at DIA. The degree to 

which redundancies between DCS and CIA’s NCS may be created is an issue that 

should be examined. Battlefield or military intelligence requirements vice national 

or strategic intelligence requirements provide a starting point for deconfliction, but 

in practice this line can be difficult to draw. The past decade has demonstrated the 

effectiveness of closer collaboration between intelligence collectors and analysts and 

special operations forces. SOF operators are to some degree collectors, and operational preparation of the environment is a necessary part of special operations. 

Steps have been taken to deconflict the human source management issue, but this 

is only one aspect of the increasing overlap between special operations and intelligence activities. A comprehensive independent evaluation would help policymakers 

and legislators assess the requirements and organizational implications. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 2) Is SOCOM properly resourced to meet its current demands? In 

what ways will we need to adjust this resourcing as forces draw down in Afghanistan and begin to meet other demand signals for SOF capabilities? 

Ms. ROBINSON. The current USSOCOM budget request for FY2013 of $10.4 billion 

represented a slight decrease from the FY2012 $10.4 billion spending level. While 

some additional savings may be found at the margins, the likely high ongoing demand for SOF to meet irregular threats in a cost-effective manner warrants maintaining the approximate current budget level. 

However, a rebalancing of resources within the USSOCOM budget is advisable. 

My preliminary conclusion from the past 12 months of my Future of SOF study is 

that a resource shift of at least 25% will be required, as well as organizational reori-
86 

entation, to fully optimize what USSOCOM commanders have called ‘‘the indirect 

approach.’’ Rebalancing existing USSOCOM resources to achieve this optimization, 

rather than providing additional resources, is the preferred option given the current 

fiscal constraints. While overall force levels in Afghanistan are declining, the requirement for SOF in Afghanistan is still unknown, pending specific decisions by 

U.S. policymakers and the government of Afghanistan pursuant to the Strategic 

Partnership Agreement announced in May. If SOF are to continue a foreign internal 

defense mission in addition to a counterterrorism mission, the levels of SOF required in Afghanistan could remain in the 7,000 range for some years. The unified 

SOF command (SOJTF) should be migrated to lower echelons to eliminate separate 

SOF commands; in addition the pooling of SOF lift and ISR represents a more costeffective employment of SOF assets. 

The demand signal for unilateral surgical strike missions will likely decline in the 

years ahead, but is likely to be more than matched by demand for employment of 

SOF in indirect or special warfare missions. (ADM McRaven has noted in testimony 

to Congress that there is unmet demand from other AORs as CENTCOM has absorbed up to 85% of deployed SOF in the past decade.) Savings from reduced surgical strike missions are required to address shortfalls in intellectual capital, organizational structure and personnel development to employ SOF in an indirect manner 

for sustained effect. USSOCOM and TSOC organizations and personnel can be reassigned and/or replaced with quality personnel, enablers, resources, and intellectual 

capital out of existing resources to fully optimize the indirect approach. In particular, the deputy commander of USSOCOM (who is to be designated as the lead 

for the indirect approach and TSOC optimization) may require significant organizational structure to provide the needed USSOCOM support and oversight to TSOCs 

as they grow and enhance their capability to perform their doctrinal duties of planning and conducting special operations and providing effective advice to the geographic combatant commander. Here is a brief list of what DCOM USSOCOM may 

need: USSOCOM should create a robust structure under the DCOM to support the 

indirect approach with campaign planning support, resource coordination, and advocacy and interface at the policy and interagency level and with the geographic combatant commands and country teams to ensure SOF are used in sustained campaigns for maximum impact rather than tactical and episodic effect. This should be 

accomplished by repurposing current manpower and funding. However, since only 

28% of USSOCOM have the requisite special operations expertise, the number of 

active and retired SOF should be increased and key positions coded for SOF experts. 

Furthermore, additional USSOCOM personnel should be permanently assigned to 

TSOCs. 

Finally, the SOCOM NCR structure would seem to fall most appropriately into 

this organizational restructuring. As I understand the plan, USSOCOM IATF personnel will be shifted to the SOCOM NCR over time at no net increase in expense 

or staff. These Washington-based USSOCOM personnel can collaborate with interagency partners in developing proposals and plans and monitoring execution but 

should not be seen as supplanting the policy deliberation and decisionmaking process, which falls under the purview of the civilian policy structure at OASD SOLIC 

and the IPC, DC, PC interagency process. Ongoing interagency coordination may be 

more easily accomplished in Washington than in Tampa, but USSOCOM should 

scrub its organizational plan to ensure efficiency and eliminate redundancy. The 

JIATF–NCR and SOCOM–NCR with its SID might be integrated into one streamlined organization tasked to support the full range of special operations missions. 

An additional potential redundancy could be the MARSOC plan to develop organic 

CS/CSS capability. While lift is always in short supply for theater SOF, most of the 

‘‘enabler’’ needs should be met by the conventional forces. They have been traditionally reluctant to split off small elements of enablers to support SOF distributed operations, but the fiscal imperatives and the likely future high demand for small-footprint operations makes it essential for all conventional forces to build in the flexibility to produce scalable support for the full range of SOF missions. This is one 

subset of the larger issue of integrating SOF and conventional force operations that 

might be a subject of future hearing to provide Congress with greater insight into 

both the demand for and the difficulties encountered in providing ‘‘enablers’’ such 

as lift and ISR, ‘‘thickeners’’ such as additional infantry, and blended SOF-conventional commands to conduct large-scale or hybrid irregular campaigns. SOF cannot 

operate without conventional support, and many of the demands for small-footprint 

missions can best be met by a combination of SOF and conventional forces. At a 

minimum, Congress should follow this issue closely to ensure that critically needed 

advances in SOF-conventional integration occur. 
87 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 3) How do we deconflict and coordinate such capabilities within 

SOF from existing or nascent capabilities elsewhere in the Department of Defense 

and the intelligence community, and ensure proper oversight? 

Dr. LAMB. Complex counterterrorism missions require deconfliction, coordination 

and oversight, but none of these requirements is easily achieved. Some observers 

are concerned that military units are conducting classified missions usually carried 

out by civilian intelligence organizations without the benefit of well-established 

oversight mechanisms, and also that civilian intelligence organizations are trying to 

conduct paramilitary operations without the clear chain of command and support 

necessary for success. Operating under current system constraints, a case-by-case 

approach is the best way to deconflict defense and intelligence capabilities. We need 

a collaborative interagency process for mission analysis that accurately identifies 

the capabilities required for mission success. If both the intelligence and defense 

communities share information and decisionmaking processes for this purpose it 

should be possible to determine whether the mission is best pursued using covert 

tradecraft that is the specialty of the intelligence community, or direct action capabilities (i.e. traveling quickly to and from a target and neutralizing all opposition 

to that effort) that are the specialty of the defense community, or some combination 

of both. Once it is clear whether mission requirements are predominantly intelligence or defense-based, a lead organization can be assigned responsibility and 

other organizations can support the effort. Congress can examine whether or not 

this collaborative mission analysis and assignment process is happening, and if so, 

whether it is happening frequently enough. 

If the mission requires a combination of covert tradecraft and military action, as 

many counterterrorist missions do, it is preferable that the two communities work 

closely together. Reportedly much progress in defense and intelligence cooperation 

has been achieved since 9/11, but the standing presumption should be that both the 

intelligence and defense communities will be tempted to ‘‘go it alone’’ even when the 

mission arguably requires capabilities from both communities. Each community also 

may be inclined to duplicate capabilities resident in the other, thereby generating 

risks that can compromise mission success. Trying to build resident capabilities that 

are not consistent with an organization’s core mission can dilute the focus on core 

competencies and, over time, degrade them. For example, some are concerned that 

covert tradecraft has diminished in the intelligence community since 9/11 as the 

CIA emphasizes paramilitary operations. Relying on more accessible but hastily assembled and less proficient secondary capabilities can compromise mission success. 

For example, in the past some military units have tried to conduct intelligence operations without sufficient expertise and achieved poor results. 

Oversight of deconfliction and coordination efforts is admittedly difficult in current circumstances. The United States government does not have an authoritative 

process for command and control of missions requiring the combined efforts of multiple departments and agencies of the executive branch. Only the President has the 

authority to integrate the efforts of departments and agencies, and he does not have 

the time to do so. At the risk of flippancy, the President is ‘‘commander-in-brief.’’ 

His management of any given national security mission is seldom sustained and 

never comprehensive. It is virtually impossible on a day-to-day basis for the President to control how departments and agencies cooperate or fail to do so, so responsibility for any given mission often remains ambiguous. Interagency committees and 

other bureaucratic ‘‘confederations’’ cannot be held accountable for results because 

they have no authority to direct departments and agencies to take action. Mission 

critical cooperative action can be spurned and later justified as beyond the mandate 

of any given department or agency. Alternatively, under loosely defined ‘‘lead agency’’ norms, it might be possible for operators in the field to take actions with the 

presumption that a combination of legal authorities granted to different agencies 

permits it. Such cooperation is laudable and can be effective, but it also can obscure 

clear identification of the decision chain that authorized the actions. Either way, 

oversight and accountability can be weakened. The absence of a mechanism for the 

President to delegate his executive authority for integrating the efforts of departments and agencies on priority missions is a major shortcoming in the way our national security system functions. If Congress passed legislation that gave the President authority to formally delegate his integration powers, it would improve transparency, accountability and oversight for complex, high-priority interagency missions. 

Congress also should collaborate across organizational boundaries in order to provide effective oversight of complex counterterrorism missions. In the same way the 

departments and agencies of the executive branch must assess mission requirements to assign mission leads, the House and Senate Intelligence Committees and 

House and Senate Armed Services Committees should collaborate to assign over-
88 

sight of those missions and to decide whether in certain cases it makes sense to exercise congressional oversight jointly. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 4) The Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF–South) is frequently mentioned as a blueprint for how agencies across the U.S. Government and 

partner nations can work together to facilitate security objectives. Could this be replicated and used as a model for theater special operations forces, particularly those 

units engaged in long-term missions to build partner capacity? 

Dr. LAMB. I believe theater special operations forces (SOF) can apply some aspects 

of the JIATF–South model to improve interagency cooperation in pursuit of longterm missions to build and exercise partner capacity to defeat unconventional 

threats. Historically our security assistance partnerships with other nations have 

been compromised by unrealistic assessments of what the host nation can absorb; 

inadequate interagency coordination of the effort; unwillingness to tolerate the lesser degree of control such an indirect strategy dictates; poor supporting coordination 

at the regional level; and inadequate long-term commitment. The stellar model of 

interagency cooperation pioneered by JIATF–South would be more likely to address 

these challenges effectively. Interagency security assistance teams with embedded 

theater SOF personnel could, I believe, achieve better results at significantly less 

cost than our current approach. 

However, this assertion requires a few caveats. The results the security assistance 

teams could achieve while working primarily through host nation forces would likely 

be less immediate and more ambiguous than the results achieved by JIATF–South’s 

interdiction of drug smuggling. The teams also would be smaller and less enduring 

than the JIATF–South model. They might more closely resemble the small interagency train and equip program used in the Balkans in the mid-1990s, which effectively operated out of Washington but had elements working in country as well. 

They would ramp up and actively partner with the host nation until it was effectively engaging the irregular challenge and then ramp down and eventually stand 

down. They would not need to be large permanent structures like JIATF South or 

the National Counterterrorism Center. 

To work well, they would require some of the benefits JIATF–South has, to 

include: 

 A mandate from senior authorities that gives a high priority to the interagency mission and organization; 

 An end-to-end approach to mission management that focuses on outcomes, not 

inputs; 

 A long-term commitment from national command authorities that is bipartisan and consistent; 

 A deep appreciation for and sensitivity to the missions and equities of 

partnering organizations; and 

 A clear source of resources, with steady provision being more important than 

absolute levels. 

Moreover, the Department of State would have to support the team the way 

SOUTHCOM supports JIATF South, which would allow the interagency security 

team semi-autonomy to pursue its mission as it saw best while operating under the 

country team’s broad supervision. If these conditions were met, I believe we could 

expect better results with smaller overall efforts, along the lines of what SOF, working with other agencies, was able to achieve in Colombia prior to the terror attacks 

on 9/11 and more recently by working closely with the Philippine government. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 5) Is SOCOM properly resourced to meet its current demands? In 

what ways will we need to adjust this resourcing as forces draw down in Afghanistan and begin to meet other demand signals for SOF capabilities? 

Dr. LAMB. Overall, I believe USSOCOM has been well resourced to meet its responsibilities. Even though U.S. forces have withdrawn from Iraq and are set to 

ramp down in Afghanistan, SOF will continue to be heavily engaged. For this reason we should safeguard the overall level of resources provided to SOF for the immediate future. However, as requirements evolve, the distribution of those resources 

should as well. As many sources, including SOF leadership, have argued, in the future we should expect SOF to focus more on an indirect approach to tackling irregular threats. Accordingly, distribution of resources to SOF programs should demonstrate a shift in emphasis to indirect capabilities. In particular, more resources 

should be shifted to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. It is responsible 

for Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Military Information Support forces, among other 

things. All of these units can play critical roles when SOF adopt an indirect approach where they working with and through host-nation forces to accomplish their 

missions. 
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Here are some ways resources could be redirected to improve indirect capabilities: 

 Resource Theater Special Operations Commands so they can better facilitate 

interagency collaboration; for example, by absorbing the costs of database integration and shared intelligence. 

 Accept reductions in some of the specialized hardware and intelligence support that enables theater SOF to track enemy movement. Instead, invest 

these resources in security assistance activities that would allow Special 

Forces to partner more closely with host nation personnel. 

 Invest in rebuilding Special Forces language and cross-cultural skill sets applicable to parts of the world other than Iraq and Afghanistan. 

 Consider standing down some of the fourth battalions added to Special Forces 

Groups and using the personnel for other purposes. Instead of deploying more 

as Special Forces teams the personnel could enter longer periods of training 

where they would have more family time but also could regain eroded skill 

sets. They also could be assigned to the Special Forces Regional Support Detachments where they would be available for special assignments in embassies and in support of other activities that better enable SOF indirect action. 

 Improve the ability of military information support forces (which used to be 

called psychological operations forces), to support SOF indirect approaches. 

Military information operations require mastering persuasive communications 

skills as well as in-depth knowledge of indigenous attitudes and motivations. 

USSCOM needs to work on better selection and training for these valuable 

personnel. 

 Transfer responsibility for the Human Terrain System from the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 

which should then invest in improvements to ensure Human Terrain Teams 

are able to support indirect approaches with socio-cultural knowledge. 

Redirecting resources within USSOCOM to better balance SOF direct and indirect 

approaches will help ensure these two compatible but different SOF approaches, 

skills sets and cultures are equally robust and can work together in harmony without one dominating and distorting the other. At the same time it will be important 

to ensure SOF does not expend resources on capabilities and missions that are better performed by General Purpose Forces. One possible concern in this regard is the 

movement of security assistance from a collateral SOF mission, which was true before 9/11, to a core mission following 9/11. USSOCOM is now the designated joint 

proponent for Security Force Assistance, a development that requires monitoring. 

On the positive side, by Joint Doctrine, USSOCOM recommends the most appropriate forces for a security force assistance mission. On the down side, the 

USSOCOM lead might become an excuse for General Purpose Forces to ignore the 

security assistance mission, which would be quite disadvantageous. SOF will need 

to continue partnering with General Purpose Forces on security assistance or it 

could easily be overwhelmed by the mission and its resource implications. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 6) How do we deconflict and coordinate such capabilities within 

SOF from existing or nascent capabilities elsewhere in the Department of Defense 

and the intelligence community, and ensure proper oversight? 

Dr. DAVIS. Going forward, after the tremendous successes that U.S. SOF have 

achieved in operational settings over the years, there is great danger that SOF will 

emerge as the ‘‘go to’’ force for military tasks that could be undertaken by General 

Purposes Forces (GPFs) or even other capabilities in the Interagency tool kit. To ensure that SOF remain ‘‘Special’’ it will be necessary to refine their core competencies 

and perhaps reduce their ‘‘roles and missions.’’ In looking at the list of SOF core 

activities, it is apparent that activities to support missions are conflated with mission-tasking themselves. Moreover, this list was generated before the events of 9/ 

11 and, therefore, needs to be reassessed to meet the requirements of a vastly different security-planning environment. For example, of the SOF core activities listed, 

at least five are missions that can be performed by SOF as well as GPFs. These 

five include: 

 Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations; 

 Counter-Proliferation or Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (C/WMD); 

 Counter-Terrorism (CT); 

 Civil Affairs (CA); and 

 Information Operations (IO). 
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The seven remaining core activities are SOF competencies but might be conceived 

differently to meet new planning requirements. Accordingly, they might be considered as: 

 Direct Action (DA); 

 Special Reconnaissance (SR); 

 Military Information Support Operations (MISO), to include PsyOps, Strategic Communications and some aspects of Cyber warfare and Computer Network Operations; 

 Building Partner Capacities (BPC), which could include Foreign Internal Defense (FID), aspects of Unconventional Warfare (UW) and Security Force Assistance (SFA); 

 Stability Operations, which could include CA; 

 Support to GPF Operations in conventional theaters; and 

 Specialized Missions as tasked by the National Command Authority (NCA). 

In terms of mission deconfliction two areas need further clarification. The first is 

that of Security Force Assistance and Security Assistance, which is also a function 

of Security Cooperation and is a shared mission objective across the Interagency. 

The tools for implementing Security Cooperation activities are many and varied, 

coming from different agencies as well as from across the military forces. So far as 

the Department of Defense (DOD) is concerned, security cooperation is the essence 

of preventive planning, and yet it is among the first of the GPF accounts to be cut 

in difficult budget environments. Moreover, to be effective, security cooperation requires sustained engagement with partner forces, and that is oftentimes a luxury 

that the GPFs do not have, particularly in the current setting as our overseas basing infrastructure contracts and at a time in which the GPFs are predicating much 

of their planning on rotational engagements and periodic exercises. In some instances, the engagement strategies of the Services are comprised of exercises and 

training that have long been on the books and which embody episodic activities. As 

a result, they are not the kind of persistent activities that U.S. SOCOM has long 

sponsored and implemented through its Joint Combined Exchange and Training 

(JCET) exercises—which originally were created to train U.S. SOF, but have been 

‘‘hijacked’’ by the Combatant Commanders as a critical aspect of their engagement 

strategies because, in part, DOD and State are at odds over who ‘‘owns’’ the security 

assistance role. DOS has the lead, but more often than not has had to depend on 

DOD to perform the missions because it has the resources, training, and personnel 

to do these things. Thus, in my view, especially as SOCOM emphasizes the greater 

importance of Indirect Lines of Operation in its global force planning, the military 

should be given the authority to lead, especially in the train and equip and building 

partner capacity mission sets. To facilitate this, however, SOCOM would need, as 

the designated lead to synchronize the SFA missions in DOD, multiyear authority 

that allows SOF to train partner security forces and to implement minor MILCON 

projects, as appropriate and feasible to support this general mission tasking. 

Moreover, because the emerging strategic environment features global, networked 

threats, SOF will have to operate between GCC seams and with an ability to 

deconflict national mission force employments with those of theater SOF and GPFs. 

This implies the need for greater and enhanced intelligence fusion, technologies to 

deconflict disparate battlefield activities and an ability to operate with partners— 

traditional SOF allies and nontraditional partners, which may include nonmilitary 

security forces and international organizations. NATO SOF has created a technology 

called BICES—the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System, 

which operates with firewalls to keep U.S. intelligence classified, but enables partner forces to act on time sensitive information. Perhaps BICES should be considered 

for use outside of NATO. There is a precedent for this as it is currently being used 

by ISAF in Afghanistan and with non-NATO partners. 

The second area of mission deconfliction that needs further thought is that between SOCOM and CIA activities. Traditionally, CIA forces are postured for covert 

missions, while SOF conduct clandestine and other missions for which deniability 

is not an issue. This is not a bad formula in my view. Both need to operate 

seamlessly in specific theaters and they will need to synchronize planning and 

deconflict force employments when focused on a particular theater or engagement. 

Thus, there is a need to work together, train together, and operate synergistically 

based on common procedures and techniques, which can only be achieved if SOF 

and CIA forces collaborate closely to achieve common ends and endeavor to understand each other’s cultures. In this context, SOCOM’s efforts to assign SOF to Interagency partners is important and with the CIA, in particular, the need to share and 

fuse intelligence is critical to operational success. Beyond this, a new assessment of 

our 1947 national security structure surely is long overdue. The world has changed 
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since it was put into effect and the nature of the challenges that we face require 

cross-Agency, whole-of-government approaches. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 7) Similarly, NATO Special Operations Headquarters is a potential 

model for future engagement. Are its benefits replicable in other regions, and if so, 

are there regions suitable for similar centers in the near- to mid-term? What lessons 

from NSHQ partner capacity activities can SOCOM apply globally? 

Dr. DAVIS. I definitely believe many of the lessons the NSHQ has learned are applicable to Admiral McRaven’s Regional SOF Coordination Center (RSCC) construct. 

That said, obviously, there are a handful of ‘‘lessons-learned’’ that are unique to the 

NSHQ as it operates in the NATO environment, and working initiatives through the 

NATO process. The NATO SOF HQs has benefited the United States in several 

ways. First, and very importantly, it is a force multiplier that allows NATO SOF 

(in ISAF) to assume tasks that U.S. SOF would have had to implement had they 

not been deployed. Second, the NSHQ, with its Professional Military Education 

(PME) programs and development of NATO SOF doctrine, tactics, and procedures, 

has contributed to building partner capacity in and for NATO and in this way has 

promoted interoperability, allowing alliance and partner forces to operate seamlessly 

in Afghanistan. Third, the point about fostering partner relationships is very important, as the NSHQ has relationships with NATO SOF and non-NATO partner countries, such as Jordan and Australia, as I noted in my opening remarks. Fourth, with 

its creation of the BICES network, the NSHQ has facilitated the sharing of information, which has led to intelligence fusion in support of operational units in Afghanistan. And, finally, the NSHQ is reaching out to Interagency and other partners to 

foster a comprehensive—or what we call a whole-of-government—approach to security planning. Indeed, General Clapper is one of the godfathers of the BICES network and outside of the Alliance, the European Union (EU), Interpol, and the U.S. 

Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) have participated in some NSHQ classes or 

activities. 

The answer to your second question is yes. I believe that the NSHQ construct, 

even absent a NATO-like Alliance umbrella, can be used in other regions to promote 

U.S.-regional partner SOF collaboration, to build partner capacities, and to develop 

a basis for allied/partner interoperability, including in multilateral settings. The priorities from my perspective are: the Asia-Pacific region, Africa, the Americas, (to include U.S. NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM), and the Middle East. As to your third 

question, what lessons can be applied from the NSHQ experience to other regional 

theaters, a number of specific ideas come to mind. First, among the most valuable 

attributes of the NSHQ is its capacity to facilitate networking among Special Operations Forces. This, in turn, contributes to building trust and confidence and in so 

doing demolishes obstacles that often get in the way of national bilateral or multilateral military planning. The experience of the NSHQ in this regard transcends the 

NATO alliance and it is shared between NATO allies and non-NATO partners. 

Using the Regional SOF Coordination Center (RSCC) construct, the NSHQ experience can be replicated in other theaters, even without a NATO-like umbrella. In 

many countries, SOF organizations face similar challenges—resourcing, for example—and the capacity to interact with similar organizations experiencing similar 

issues is a source of support that can go a long way toward building, refining, and 

honing SOF capabilities and planning. The RSCC construct would also support and 

facilitate SOF interaction with nonmilitary security forces and with national and 

transnational intelligence organizations, which in turn, can and would support operational planning. 

A second lesson that can be universally applied is that the NSHQ has become a 

repository for cumulative knowledge and lessons-learned from operational experiences. Everyone brings his own unique experiences to an endeavor, and the ability 

to understand and appreciate that experience means that SOF can build multiple 

options to achieve their own asymmetric advantage over enemies. It also means that 

SOF can look at alternative courses of action to address everything from training, 

meeting, mentoring, or assessing engagements. The value of multicultural understanding is increased when one exists in a multicultural environment. A third area 

in which the NSHQ has excelled and which should be replicated in other theaters 

is the development of a data bank of capabilities and skill sets that can be tapped 

as situations dictate. Nations possess some unique skill sets or unique ‘‘kit’’ that 

may be unknown to its U.S. counterparts until engaged in multinational forums. 

For instance, the NSHQ recently hosted a SOF medical conference that led to a 

greater understanding of another nation’s medical breakthrough, and ultimately access to that capability for the benefit of U.S. deployed forces. Finally, the NSHQoffered Staff Officer courses in the classroom environment allow nations to discuss 

lessons learned from operations—and also how to maximize effects from limited assets. What this really means is that a course of instruction allows for the sharing 
92 

of best practices for employing aviation or ISR assets, sharing data (computers, 

phone data, other material) obtained on an objective, and mapping relations through 

a database (which is ultimately accessible to others). Notable in this regard, the 

NSHQ spearheaded the introduction of biometric enrollment and ‘‘technical exploitation operations’’ into NATO SOF training (and ultimately employment), and the 

information and intelligence collected on an objective is now introduced into a common database, accessible to all U.S. forces and agencies. Ultimately, troop success, 

force protection, and speed of operations are significantly enhanced, but data is also 

available to U.S. and other nation law enforcement agencies, thereby increasing the 

level of protection afforded citizens of those nations. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 8) Is SOCOM properly resourced to meet its current demands? In 

what ways will we need to adjust this resourcing as forces draw down in Afghanistan and begin to meet other demand signals for SOF capabilities? 

Dr. DAVIS. Going forward, resourcing for SOCOM is highly dependent on U.S. 

strategic guidance, the level of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan after 2014, and the 

extent to which changes are made to SOCOM’s global posture. If the United States 

retains a force presence in Afghanistan after 2014, much of that commitment will 

likely come in the form of SOF deployments. This will mean the need to continue 

to resource SOF deployments in that theater, as well as resourcing SOF operations 

in areas of instability, such as Mali, Yemen, and in Southeast Asia, not to mention 

in areas of emerging ‘‘threats’’ and to counter looming challenges. Without sequestration, SOCOM’s budget requests for the next fiscal year and beyond in the FYDP 

should be adequate to oversee the rebalancing of Indirect Action Missions with Direct Action capabilities, the redeployment of CONUS-based SOF overseas, and the 

development of the RSCC concept in key regional theaters. If sequestration kicks 

in, then all bets are off, and SOCOM, like the other Combatant Commands and 

DOD more generally will have to make difficult choices and assign priorities. This 

could, conceivably, take a toll on the Admiral’s desire to augment Indirect Action 

strategies and lines of operation. It might also impact professional military education (PME) and the quality of life of SOF personnel, as rotational deployments are 

more likely to be relied on to meet mission taskings. The minor MILCON funding 

that SOCOM is requesting to implement the RSCC vision and to support other regional needs would probably be at risk in such an environment, and this would also 

hamper the Commander’s ability to support national taskings in situations/environments that are not considered crucial to U.S. national interests at the moment. 

Again, depending on what the U.S. does with respect to Afghanistan after 2014, 

SOCOM may experience capability gaps in the forms of critical mission enablers in 

areas outside of Afghanistan. The most significant of these are likely to be helicopters and ISR capabilities. I fear that this will become an even more difficult 

shortfall as the Services downsize and make economies in their force postures. As 

for SOCOM’s assumption of combatant command authority over the Theater Special 

Operations Commands (TSOCs) in peacetime, SOCOM would not need, nor is requesting additional funding. (Moreover, the Commander does not want to take Executive Agency (EA) for the TSOCs. This would be a burden that the Command could 

not handle. EA authority has been and should remain the responsibility of a Service, which has the resources, base support, and money, etc. to perform this tasking.) 

What would be helpful would be SOCOM’s ability to fund the MFP–11 aspects of 

the TSOC—something that now is not being done. This is a question of authorities 

and interpretation, not of additional resourcing per se. Here, as I noted in my testimony, multiyear funding for 1208 Train and Equip activities would be helpful, as 

it would for 1206 and 1207 accounts more generally. Most of the authorities under 

which U.S. SOCOM operates are focused on the counterterrorism mission set. Funding for short, episodic engagement that does not provide the persistent presence required to build SOF partner units capable of handling regional issues without significant U.S. support will not work well for the Indirect Strategy envisioned by 

SOCOM. This is why Congress should consider very seriously Legislative Proposal 

308. Legislative Proposal 308 would enable SOF partner building, empower the 

TSOCs, and provide SOCOM with the authority to manage resources across AORs. 

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