IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

May 13, 2009 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. STEVE CARL KING

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Giles County

No. 12504 Robert L. Jones, Judge

No. M2008-01251-CCA-R3-CD - Filed April 9, 2010

A Giles County jury convicted the Defendant, Steve Carl King, of attempted first degree

murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department

of Correction. On appeal the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to

support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted statements the Defendant

gave to Illinois police; (3) the trial court erred when it allowed two witnesses to testify

although the State had failed to disclose their existence in accordance with Tennessee Rule

of Criminal Procedure 16; and (4) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s

petition for a writ of error coram nobis based on the victim’s recanted testimony. After a

thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES

and ALAN E. GLENN, JJ., joined.

Manuel B. Russ, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Steve Carl King.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General;

Renee W. Turner, Assistant Attorney General; Patrick Butler and Richard Dunavant, District

Attorneys General; Jeff Burks, Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State

of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts

This case arises from the Defendant stabbing his girlfriend, Gloria McCormick, and

running over her while driving his tractor-trailer at a rest stop in Giles County, Tennessee. In
February 2006, a Giles County grand jury indicted the Defendant for attempted first degree

murder based on this event. In April 2006, before the Defendant’s trial on this charge, the

Defendant engaged in a physical altercation with the victim’s brother, David Edwards, in a bar

in Chicago, Illinois. Illinois police officers arrived to investigate the altercation, and, in the

course of the investigation, the Defendant made several statements about his conduct in the

events surrounding the November 2005 attempted first degree murder charge.

The Defendant’s trial was set for November 6, 2006. On September 19, 2006, the State

provided the Defendant with its initial list of witnesses who would testify at the Defendant’s

trial. On October 30, 2006, the State supplemented its original witness list to include one of

the Illinois police officers who witnessed the Defendant’s April 2006 statements. The

Defendant moved before trial to suppress these statements, and the trial court took the matter

under advisement.

At trial, the following evidence was presented: Gloria McCormick (“the victim”), who

lived in Chicago at the time of trial, testified the Defendant had been her boyfriend for eleven

years at the time of this attack. He was a commercial truck driver, and the victim sometimes

accompanied him on his “runs.” She was accompanying the Defendant on a run from

Jacksonville, Florida, to Chicago when she received the injuries that were the basis of this

prosecution. She recalled that on the day of the incident, November 4, 2005, she and the

Defendant stopped in northern Alabama and gained permission to park the truck overnight in

the parking lot of a Harley-Davidson shop.

After parking, they walked to a nearby Hooters where they shared three pitchers of beer.

The victim estimated she consumed two mugs of beer from each pitcher. While at Hooters,

the Defendant began to tell the victim she was a “whore,” and that she was “fat” and

“uneducated.” The victim explained “[t]hat’s just the way [the Defendant] gets when he

drinks: He just starts calling me a whore.” The name-calling escalated into an argument, and

the pair left Hooters and returned to the truck. When she returned to the truck, the victim took

their dog, a pit-bull, for a walk. When she returned to the truck, she and the Defendant

resumed the arguing and “name-calling.” The pair decided to continue driving rather than

sleep at the Harley-Davidson shop, and they continued arguing as they drove.

At some point while they drove toward Tennessee, the Defendant reached behind the

victim and retrieved a black-handled knife from a cabinet behind the victim’s seat. She

testified the Defendant had no set place he stored this knife, alternately carrying the knife in

his jeans or storing it in various areas of the truck. The victim identified a knife police

retrieved from the truck as the knife the Defendant retrieved. With the knife in hand, the

Defendant then asked the victim if she “wanted to see how sharp his knife [was].” He then

opened the knife and began to swing it at the victim, in the area between the passenger and

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driver seats. The Defendant continued to swing the knife for several minutes while repeating

his question, and the victim scooted as far away from the Defendant as she could, turning her

back to the Defendant and clinging to the passenger door. The victim, at some point, raised

her left hand to protect herself, and the knife sliced her ring and middle fingers. She began

bleeding profusely and asked the Defendant to get her medical attention, but the Defendant

initially refused, saying he knew she would have him arrested if she got medical attention. The

victim got a cloth from the back of the cab and wrapped the cloth around her fingers. She then

hung her hand out the passenger window to avoid bleeding in the truck because she did not

want the Defendant “to get in trouble.” The Defendant eventually agreed to stop at a rest area

in order for the victim to get help.

The Defendant exited the highway at the Ardmore Welcome Center in Giles County and

pulled up beside the sidewalk in front of the Welcome Center. The back portion of the truck’s

cab contained a top and bottom bunk, and the victim stored her clothes and medication beneath

the bottom bunk’s mattress in a storage compartment. When the Defendant pulled up to the

sidewalk, the victim went to the back of the truck’s cab to retrieve medication she needed for

her multiple sclerosis. As she raised the mattress to access the storage compartment, the

Defendant struck the victim in the back of the head, causing her to drop the mattress and fall

onto the bed. The victim lost consciousness briefly and, consequently, could not clearly recall

the details of what next occurred. She remembered seeing the Defendant standing over her,

at which point she tried to rise from the bed, but the Defendant fought with her. She struck at

the Defendant while he pulled her hair and screamed at her, continuing to call her a “whore,”

and tell her she was “fat” and “uneducated.”

The Defendant eventually sat back down in the driver’s seat. When the victim was

finally able to rise from the bed, she retrieved the plastic bags that contained her medication.

Carrying the bags, she returned to the front of the cab, opened the passenger door, and stepped

down to the sidewalk. As she exited the vehicle, she saw the Defendant’s knife on the

dashboard. The pit-bull exited the truck with the victim.

On the sidewalk, the victim realized her legs and shorts were covered in blood. The

victim could tell that blood was flowing “down [her] legs” and into her socks and shoes, but

she did not realize she had been cut and could not identify from where she was bleeding. At

trial, the victim identified a pair of jean shorts with several slashes in the back and crotch as

the shorts she wore the night she was run over. The victim said the shorts were brand new and

had no cuts or tears when she put them on before these events.

The victim saw a man behind the trailer, so she began to walk toward the man to ask

him for help. The victim testified that, as she walked, she stopped and stared at the truck for

reasons she could not recall: “I was walking and I stopped, and I stared at the truck. And I

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don’t know what I was thinking about. I don’t know why I stopped. I just stopped.” The

Defendant then moved the truck forward, turning so that its rear tires came onto the curb of the

sidewalk. The moving trailer hit the victim’s shoulders, knocking her to the ground. The

victim said she landed on either her side or buttocks and was unable to rise before the trailer’s

back tires began to roll over her body. The Defendant continued to drive the truck forward

over her body, even as a man yelled for him to stop. She recalled that the trailer kept moving

forward after it ran over her body.

The victim then began to pass in and out of consciousness. She next recalled seeing a

man standing over her talking into a cell phone and requesting an airlift team immediately.

Her last memory is of hearing the Defendant say, “Oh, baby, I can’t believe this; I’ve never

seen anybody’s body like this.” She woke up a month-and-a-half later in a hospital.

On cross-examination, the victim recalled that the passenger seat belt was broken and

had been replaced with a bolt and screw. She explained that the latch had been taken out and

that, in order to fasten the seat belt, she inserted a bolt through a hole in the belt and fastened

the bolt to a screw attached to the seat below her left buttock.

The victim testified she could not recall when she and the Defendant left Jacksonville,

the name of the city in Georgia where they stopped along the way to Tennessee, the name of

the city in Alabama where they stopped to visit the Harley-Davidson shop and the Hooters, or

the time they arrived in the Alabama city. She did recall that they drove between two and three

hours before reaching the city in Georgia where they stopped and that the Harley-Davidson

shop was closing when they arrived. She explained her disorientation was due to the fact that,

although she had accompanied the Defendant several times on the Chicago-Jacksonville run,

the Defendant took a new route every time. She also testified the Defendant took his

prescribed Valium on the day of the incident, as he “always” did.

The victim recalled there was still daylight outside when she and the Defendant entered

Hooters. She estimated she consumed six twelve-ounce mugs of beer, and the Defendant

consumed almost twice as much as she did at Hooters. She denied she was drunk when she

and the Defendant left Hooters around 10:00 p.m. but admitted she felt “buzzed.” She said she

and the Defendant only lay in bed for a short time while the trailer was parked at the HarleyDavidson shop, while they continued to argue. The victim conceded she cursed and called the

Defendant names in response to his yelling. Approximately forty-five minutes after leaving

Hooters, the Defendant returned to the driver’s seat and drove the truck back onto the

interstate, despite their plans to spend the night in the parking lot.

When the Defendant began driving again, the victim returned to her place in the

passenger seat and fastened her seat belt with the bolt and screw. She recalled they had been

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driving approximately thirty to forty-five minutes when the Defendant began swinging his

knife at her. She struggled to free herself from her crude seat belt as he held onto the steering

wheel and leaned toward her, continuing to swing the knife at her. She explained his knife cut

her hand when she reached down to shield her legs from his swings. The victim recalled that

blood immediately began to “pulsate” out of her fingers, but she denied waving her hand

around the truck in a way that would spread blood throughout the cab. She also denied placing

her hand in a cooler between the passenger and driver seat, insisting she would never put an

open wound in a cooler that contained food. She said she finished freeing herself from the seat

belt and hung her hand out the window for less than a minute until the pain became unbearable,

at which point she went to the back of the cab to wrap a cloth she found on the floor around

her fingers. She spent only a few seconds in the back of the cab and returned to the passenger

seat where she remained until the Defendant exited the highway and parked at the Welcome

Center one or two minutes later. She recalled it was around 10:30 p.m. at this point, so it was

dark when they pulled off the highway.

The victim testified that when the Defendant stopped the truck in front of the Welcome

Center, her wrapped hand was bleeding less. She then rose and entered the back of the cab.

She recalled that, seconds after she entered the back of the cab, something struck her in the

back of the head, knocking her to the lower bunk. The victim reiterated that she did not see

the Defendant hit her, but she emphasized that she was facing the back of cab, away from the

Defendant, when she was hit. She testified that she did not “really remember being . . .

knocked out,” saying, “[I]t’s just because it all happened so fast. I dropped the bunk, and I fell

onto the bed. And the next thing I know, I was getting up out of the bed. So I must have been

knocked out or blacked out, . . . I don’t know.” The victim recalled fighting with the

Defendant in the back of the cab, and she testified that at some point she hit the Defendant’s

face with her fist. The victim fell out of consciousness again, and when she regained

consciousness, she saw the Defendant seated in the driver’s seat. She testified that, when she

woke up, she did not feel any pain, even in her hand, and that she did not notice any injury to

her vaginal area, her buttocks, or her stomach.

The victim rose from the bunk and lifted the mattress again to retrieve her medication,

which was inside one or more plastic grocery bags. She grabbed the bags against her chest

because she could not find their handles and passed through the front of the truck’s cab to exit

the truck. She agreed that this placed her easily within the Defendant’s reach and that the

Defendant did not physically or verbally attempt to keep her from leaving the truck, despite his

opportunity to do so. She agreed that the Defendant was still intoxicated when they arrived

at the Welcome Center.

The victim reiterated that when she exited the truck she did not realize she was bleeding

from anywhere other than her hand. She saw a public telephone, which she thought of using

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to summon help because her cell phone battery was almost dead. Instead, having noticed a

man standing behind the truck, she began to walk toward the man, traveling on the sidewalk

along the side of the truck. At trial, the victim could not recall whether Michael Soloman, who

testified he witnessed the victim being run over, was the man she saw. She estimated that she

was half-way down the truck when she stopped and stared at the trailer. As she stared she

heard someone tell the Defendant he could not park by the sidewalk, and then the trailer moved

forward and knocked her to ground. The victim recalled that she screamed for the Defendant

to stop moving the truck because she was lying on the ground beneath the trailer, in the path

of the back tires. The truck continued moving, however, and the back tires ran over the

victim’s body. Emergency responders later discovered several wounds in her groin and

abdominal area. She testified she did not recall how she received these wounds.

On redirect examination, the victim recalled that the Defendant, although he was

intoxicated, did not have any difficulty operating the tractor-trailer after they left Hooters. She

also recalled that the truck had come to a complete stop in front of the Welcome Center when

she went to the back of the truck’s cab and was hit in the head from behind.

Special Agent Michael J. Little, a forensic scientist supervisor with the Tennessee

Bureau of Investigation was certified by the trial court as an expert in the area of toxicology.

He testified he received blood samples taken from the victim at 3:00 a.m. and from the

Defendant at 1:45 a.m. From these samples, he determined the Defendant’s blood alcohol

concentration (“BAC”) was .05, and the victim’s BAC was .06. On cross-examination, he

explained that, after a person stops ingesting alcohol, his BAC level dissipates at a rate of

between .01 and .02 per hour. Therefore, Agent Little explained, the victim and the

Defendant’s BAC levels could have been higher around 10:30 p.m.

Jeffery Dale Crews, a Special Agent Forensic Scientist with the TBI Crime Laboratory

in Nashville and certified as an expert in the area of analytical toxicology, testified he received

a blood sample from the Defendant and the victim. From the Defendant’s blood sample, he

identified diazepam, which is a tranquilizer. He identified amitrptyline, an anti-depressant, and

nortriptyline in the victim’s sample.

Michael Solomon, a maintenance worker at the Ardmore Welcome Center, testified

he was working at the Welcome Center the night of the incident. Around 11:15 p.m., from

inside the Welcome Center, he saw the Defendant’s tractor-trailer pull up and park beside the

sidewalk. Because the Defendant was blocking traffic as he was parked, Solomon walked

outside to tell the Defendant to move. Outside, he saw the couple’s dog walking around the

ground near the trailer portion of the truck, and he saw the victim getting out of the cab. The

victim turned around and grabbed three small shopping bags from the truck after she got out.

Solomon described what he saw next:

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[S]he just held the bags in her arms, and turned and walked down the side of

the trailer. And about halfway down the trailer, she stopped, turned, facing the

trailer. And the driver, in the meantime, put the truck in gear and started to

pull over on the shoulder, off the ramp. And the trailer knocked her over, and

the wheels ran over her mid-section.

He recalled that the truck continued moving after it ran over the victim, so he ran in front of

the truck, flagging down the Defendant. The Defendant finally stopped when he was out of

the lane of traffic. When the Defendant stopped, Solomon walked to the driver side of the cab

and told the Defendant he had run over a lady. The Defendant said, “[N]o, I didn’t,” so

Solomon told the Defendant to get out and come see the victim. Solomon and the Defendant

approached the victim who lay near the curb on an area that was “more or less gravel.” He

said trucks commonly passed through this portion of the road and, when they did so, the tires

of their trailers went over the curb, which had gradually worn away the grass from the area

in which the victim lay.

Solomon recalled that the victim was unconscious and portions of her intestines were

lying outside her body. Solomon called 9-1-1 on his cell phone and went inside the Welcome

Center to get a flashlight. When he emerged from the Welcome Center, he found the

Defendant kneeling over the victim and trying to give her water. Soon thereafter, emergency

personnel responded.

On cross-examination, Solomon clarified that, because it was dark outside when he saw

the victim climb down from the truck, he could not tell whether she was bleeding. He recalled

that the victim spoke with the Defendant for less than a minute when she got out of the truck.

Solomon said that the victim was walking in the gutter when she turned and began to walk to

the end of the trailer. He explained that, although the Defendant kept moving the truck

forward after he ran over the victim, he was not sure whether the Defendant was trying to

drive back onto the interstate or to park the truck in a spot outside the parking lot. He further

noted that many other truck drivers parked outside the lot when the parking lot was full, but

Solomon could not recall whether the parking lot was full at the time of this incident. He

recalled that, when he later found the Defendant kneeling beside the victim, he did not hear

the victim say that the Defendant had cut her.

On further cross-examination, Solomon clarified that the victim spoke with the

Defendant for two or three minutes after she descended from the truck. He also said that, in

the two or three hours he spent at the Welcome Center after the accident, he did not notice any

blood where the victim stood beside the passenger door while she spoke with the Defendant.

Solomon said that, from where he stood, approximately thirty yards away, he did not notice

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that the victim had any difficulty walking when she went from the door toward the back of

the truck.

Maria Garrett, a Giles County Ambulance Service paramedic, testified she responded

to the Welcome Center to attend to the victim on the night in question. She confirmed

Solomon’s testimony that the victim lay on her back eviscerated on the grass beside the curb

when Garrett arrived. Garrett also recalled that the Defendant was kneeling by the victim’s

head, holding her hand, and telling the victim everything would be all right. She also

observed that the victim suffered “crushing” trauma to her pelvic area and legs. She testified

she removed the victim’s shorts by cutting the material along the left side of the zipper and

down through the legs areas. The State introduced the shorts into evidence, and Garrett

agreed that the back of the shorts bore tears and cuts that Garrett did not make. She recalled

that she attended to the victim until a Med-Flight team arrived to fly the victim to the Level

I Trauma Center of Maine Hospital in Huntsville, Alabama.

Dr. James Flatt, certified as a medical expert in the field of urology, testified he was

on call the night the victim was transported to Huntsville Maine Hospital. When he reported

to the victim’s surgery room, he found two tears in the victim’s bladder, which left eighty

percent of the front and top of the victim’s bladder torn open. He testified that the tears were

“straight cut[s]” that only a sharp instrument, such as a knife, could make. Dr. Flatt closed

the victim’s bladder and placed a tube in the victim’s bladder so it would drain properly. He

estimated this repair took thirty minutes. On cross-examination, Dr. Flatt said the State had

never asked him to view either the knife seized from the Defendant’s truck or the

underpinnings of the truck.

Dr. Rony Najjar, a trauma surgeon at Huntsville Maine Hospital and certified as an

expert in the area of trauma surgery, testified he treated the victim immediately after she

arrived at Huntsville Maine Hospital. He was the attending surgeon in the victim’s surgery

room. Dr. Najjar recalled that the victim, in physiological shock, was in extremely critical

condition when she entered the surgery room. Dr. Najjar learned the victim suffered her

injuries from being run over by a truck. The doctor observed that the victim had multiple

lacerations around her genital, pelvic, and buttock area. He testified one cut ran from the front

right hip into her groin, another ran across her abdomen where the bladder would be, another

ran across the left side of the groin area, and yet another ran on the backside of the right thigh

and buttock. Dr. Najjar confirmed that the cuts on the victim’s shorts coincided with the cuts

he observed on her abdomen and groin. Also, the doctor observed that the victim’s intestines

were protruding from her perineum, the area between her legs. Reviewing her medical

records, he confirmed that the victim had two lacerations on the fingers of her left hand. The

victim’s injuries made surgery immediately necessary.

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Describing the emergency surgery performed on the victim, Dr. Najjar said that when

he entered the victim’s abdomen, he immediately noticed that the bladder bore two large cuts

in the back and front that “lined up in a line.” He recalled that the victim’s intestines had

protruded through the cuts in her bladder. The doctor explained that crushing or blunt force

trauma causes a “very destructive type of pattern to the tissues,” usually in the form of a

“gaping hole”rather than the smooth cuts he found on the victim’s bladder. Because the cuts

on the bladder were long, linear, and smooth, allowing the intestines to pass through, Dr.

Najjar believed something sharp like a piece of glass or a knife caused the cuts in the front

and back of the bladder. He testified that the lacerations to the victim’s bladder could

“potentially” have caused her to lose consciousness “in a very short period of time.”

On cross-examination, Dr. Najjar confirmed that the victim’s medical recordsreflected

that neither he nor any other doctor present noticed any obvious laceration or bruise to the

victim’s head or oral cavity. He confirmed that he asked Dr. William J. McFeeley to examine

the victim and that Dr. McFeeley found the victim’s head showed no signs of struggle, such

as bruises around the eyes or behind the ears. He also reiterated that, while he could testify

that a knife probably caused the cuts to the victim’s bladder, he could not state with absolute

certainty that a knife caused the cuts. Dr. Najjar confirmed that the State never asked him to

examine the knife seized in this case or the underpinnings of the Defendant’s truck.

On redirect examination, the State showed Dr. Najjar the knife seized from the

Defendant’s truck, and the doctor testified that the knife could have been used to make the

lacerations in the victim’s bladder.

On recross examination, Dr. Najjar reiterated that he could notstate with “100 percent”

certainty that the knife seized from the Defendant caused the cuts to the victim’s bladder.

Also, the doctor agreed that a person could receive both penetrating and blunt trauma injuries

from an automobile accident.

Trooper Allan Brenneis, a trooper with the Tennessee Highway Patrol’s Critical

Response Team, testified that his team reconstructs crash crime scenes. He recalled that he

reported to the Welcome Center in Giles County on the night in question. He testified that,

when he arrived, he realized that the injury could not have occurred where the victim’s body

lay and the truck stood because the ground bore little blood. Wishing to investigate this

discrepancy, he entered the cab of the truck and found it covered with blood.

Trooper Brenneis used a computer program to create a “Situation Map” documenting

his observations about the scene of the accident. The map reflected that Trooper Brenneis

found the victim’s blood beside the area of the curb worn down by trucks passing over the

protruding portion of the curb.

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The trooper then reviewed a series of photographs he took the night of the accident and

explained what they depicted. Several photographs show patches of blood on the grass, near

the protruding portion of the curb where several witnesses testified the victim lay after she

was run over. The trooper testified this picture also showed tire tracks running over the curb.

One photograph showed blood spattered on the back rear tire. Another photograph showed

a blood-spattered calender attached to the interior of the upper portion of the driver’s side

door. Another showed that the passenger window contained a large amount of blood on both

its interior and its exterior. The next photograph showed the outside of the passenger’s door.

The door contained blood spatter rather than a dripped line of blood, which indicated that the

blood struck the door at a high velocity. Another photograph showed blood spattered on the

front corner of the trailer immediately behind the truck cab, spattered from mid-way up the

corner of the trailer to the top of the trailer’s corner, and spattered above the passenger

window.

The Defendant told Trooper Brenneis that, after the victim opened her door at the

Welcome Center, their dog jumped out, the victim got out to follow him, and the Defendant

then accidentally ran over the victim. After viewing the truck’s cab, the trooper was confused

about why the interior of the cab was bloody, so he asked the Defendant to explain the blood.

The Defendant told the trooper that he had cut his finger that morning, but the trooper noted

that this cut could not have been the source of all the blood in the truck’s cab. Trooper

Brenneis also reviewed several photographs he took of the Defendant. In these, the

Defendant’s legs and shorts appear bloody, but his hands appear clean.

On cross-examination, Trooper Brenneis explained that the TBI took over the

investigation of the accident a short time after he arrived on the scene and that the TBI only

asked him to create the Situation Map and did not request further accident reconstruction.

Also, neither the TBI nor his superior officers within the Highway Patrol asked him to

examine the truck’s underpinnings. He testified that he ordinarily would have examined the

underpinnings in order to determine whether they bore human matter. The trooper also

acknowledged that he did not determine how deep the blood on the curb where the victim lay

had soaked into the ground.

Trooper Brenneis confirmed that the truck’s windshield was cracked and that a low

impact force from within the truck’s cab appeared to have caused the crack. He testified,

however, that he found no hair or blood from the victim near the windshield to suggest that

the victim’s body collided with the windshield.

Trooper Jason Kelley of the Tennessee Highway Patrol testified he reported to the

Ardmore Welcome Center and saw a tractor-trailer sitting in the emergency lane where it had

exited the Welcome Center parking lot. When he arrived, emergency responders and

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Ardmore police officers were already present. The officers pointed him toward the victim,

and he saw the Defendant sitting at the victim’s head, giving her water. When he asked the

Defendant what happened, the Defendant said that the victim had opened the door to let the

dog out to urinate, the dog jumped out, and the victim jumped out after the dog. The

Defendant said that when she jumped out, he “r[a]n her over.” The trooper asked the

Defendant to get his paperwork and log book from his truck, and the Defendant complied.

Trooper Kelley filled out paperwork and informed another officer that a vehicular homicide

may have occurred.

The trooper recalled that, while he spoke with the Defendant, he noticed the Defendant

had blood on his hands and clothing. He described the Defendant as “very emotional–about

half-crying. He would cry a little bit, you know, stop. Just seem[ed] very emotional.”

Trooper Kelley then entered the truck’s cab. Inside, he found a cooler half-full of

bloody water. He also noticed blood stains covering the inside of the cab, on the glass, the

windows, the dash, and the floor. He recalled that the cab was “disarranged,” with “stuff

thrown around.”

On cross-examination, Trooper Kelley confirmed that, because his observations led

him to believe the Defendant was intoxicated, he arrested the Defendant on suspicion of

driving under the influence (“DUI”) and later charged him with DUI. The Trooper did not

find blood outside the truck anywhere other than where the victim’s body lay. He testified he

shut down the Welcome Center’s exit lane so that no one could leave without being

interviewed. He recalled that no one had noticed that the victim had received a knife-wound

before she was run over. The trooper testified he never received any information that the

victim had placed her bleeding hand inside the cooler. Finally, Trooper Kelley confirmed that

the Defendant appeared distraught the night of the accident and persistently asked to be

allowed to go to Huntsville Maine Hospital to be with the victim.

On redirect examination, Trooper Kelley testified he did not see anything in the

underpinnings of the truck that was sharp or jagged that could have cut the victim. On recross

examination, the trooper acknowledged he did not crawl beneath the truck to examine its

underpinnings. He confirmed that a photograph of the Defendant’s truck showed a protrusion

common to such trucks: a piece of metal behind the rear wheel used to slide the tandems on

the rear axles. Trooper Kelley testified that no blood appeared on the protrusion he identified

in the photograph.

Scott Brandon testified he was a Special Agent for the Criminal Investigation Division

of the Tennessee Highway Patrol at the time of the accident but had since retired. Brandon

arrived at the Welcome Center shortly after midnight, and the victim had already been

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transported to the hospital by the time he arrived. Brandon recalled that the Defendant’s truck

was still sitting in the exit ramp of the Welcome Center, and the Defendant was speaking with

an officer. He testified he explained to the Defendant his rights under Miranda v. Arizona and

questioned him inside the Welcome Center.

Brandon testified the Defendant first described his and the victim’s Chicago to

Jacksonville “run” and then told Brandon he had inadvertently run over the victim when she

got out of the truck at the Welcome Center to chase their dog. The Defendant’s statement was

reduced to writing, and Brandon read the Defendant’s statement into evidence. The

Defendant’s statementset forth the following account of what occurred after he and the victim

left Jacksonville to return to Chicago:

We then went to Blakely, Georgia, and picked up a load of peanuts. We left

there, yesterday, around 11 or 12 a.m. We stopped in Birmingham, Alabama,

and had a couple of beers. We went to part of Dixey, Harley Davidson store.

We bought some t-shirts. And we slept about four hours in the truck. We

argued about getting her son a t-shirt. It was just a little argument. I didn’t

have enough money.

We left Birmingham and stopped at the Welcome Center in Tennessee. We

slept maybe a couple of hours. We did not get out. We went to leave. As we

went to leave, and the dog started playing, I stopped at the drive while they

were going out. Gloria [the victim] opened the door and the dog jumped out.

Gloria went after the dog. I pulled up to get out of the drive, a man came up,

yelling, Stop, stop; I think you have run her over. I went back to Gloria and

she was bleeding bad. I put the dog in the truck and ran back to her. The guy

called 911.

The Defendant did not explain to Brandon why the truck’s cab was covered in blood, and he

did not mention the victim being cut. The Defendant’s hands were not bloody when Brandon

interviewed him, and Brandon did not recall the Defendant’s clothing being bloody. Brandon

recalled seeing a small “nick” on the Defendant’s hand, but the Defendant did not explain

what caused the nick.

On cross-examination, Brandon confirmed that a photograph of the back of the

Defendant’s right hand showed the small “red mark” or “scratch” that he recalled seeing

during the interview.

Investigator Brad Elliot, a Special Agent, Criminal Investigator II with the TBI,

received a call at 3:30 a.m. from District Attorney Mike Bottoms on the night of the accident.

12
General Bottoms requested Investigator Elliot go to the Welcome Center. The investigator

arrived at 4:45 a.m. and requested all traffic through the Welcome Center be stopped and

everyone interviewed for information regarding the incident.

Investigator Elliot saw the Defendant seated on a bench outside the Welcome Center,

so he introduced himself and took the Defendant inside the Welcome Center to an office.

After he Mirandized the Defendant, the Defendant invoked his right to speak with an attorney,

so the investigator ceased the interview and allowed the Defendant to use the restroom and

sit outside. He instructed the Defendant he was not free to leave the scene.

As the Defendant waited inside, Investigator Elliot continued his investigation. He

observed the blood spatters where the victim lay, outside the passenger door, and inside the

truck’s cab. The investigator entered the cab through the driver’s side to retrieve the

Defendant’s medication for him and noticed blood spatter in the cab. As the investigator

entered, he noticed a “large folding knife” lying on the driver’s side corner of the dash. He

testified the knife had a reddish brown blood stain. Having observed the blood splatters

within the cab and the bloody knife, Investigator Elliot determined that a struggle likely

occurred inside the truck’s cab rather than outside. Consequently, he confined his

investigation to inside the truck’s cab and did not request additional agents to search the area

surrounding the truck for discarded weapons.

Investigator Elliot confirmed that as daylight returned he took several photographs,

which were shown to the jury, of the truck after his unit had the truck towed. One photograph

showed the steering wheel and the instrumentation and controls on the dashboard and blood

splattered across the steering wheel. Another photograph showed an open red and white

cooler between the driver and passenger seats. The cooler had blood splatter on its sides and

the top rims of the sides, and inside the cooler was a red liquid and soft drink cans. A final

photograph showed the disarray of the compartment area in the front area of the cab.

The investigator recalled that, the day following the incident, General Bottoms charged

the Defendant with attempted first degree murder, and the Defendant was transported to Giles

County jail in Pulaski, Tennessee. At the jail, Investigator Elliot and Deputy Scott Nations

prepared to serve the charging instrument upon the Defendant in a holding area of the jail.

The investigator, Deputy Nations, and the Defendant gathered at a desk in the holding area,

and the Defendant was read a copy of the warrant and the official charge. At this point, the

Defendant told Investigator Elliot he needed to “tell [him] something.” The investigator

reminded the Defendant that he could not ask the Defendant any questions because the

Defendant had requested an attorney, but the Defendant insisted on speaking with the

investigator in private.

13
Investigator Elliot then escorted the Defendant into a small office near the holding area

and said, “What [is it you] want to tell me[?]” Investigator Elliot described the version of the

accident the Defendant then gave him:

[The Defendant] replied that he could explain all the blood inside the cab of

that truck: That they were riding down the road. That [the victim] had his

knife out playing with it. That she had cut two fingers on her left hand, and

had been waving her hand around inside the cab.

[The Defendant] further told me that they had gotten band-aids out,

applied band-aids to the cuts. That they had arrived at the Welcome Center.

He was not sure when the cutting had occurred.

He had further stated, they arrived at the Welcome Center. They had

slept for approximately two hours at the entrance of the Welcome Center. And

that, as they were proceeding to leave, because they felt like she needed

medical attention for stitches for the cuts, that the dog needed to get out to use

the restroom, so they’re stopped in the exit lane, exiting the Welcome Center.

And that, he was going to get out and go around to let the dog out, and

somehow the dog got out. And after the dog [got] out, he pulled forward to

pull over and park. And as he was doing that, the man ran up and was banging

on his door and told him that he run over somebody. And that, he had stopped

[his] truck, went back to check on [the victim].

And the last statement he made to me was that, he could not have done

what he saw her condition to be in. I did ask [the Defendant] if he wanted to

tell me the truth at that point. He said, I am telling you the truth. And I ended

the conversation at that point, and told [the Defendant] I had other things to

take care of.

The investigator and the Defendant then left the office, the Defendant went back to the

holding area, and the investigator collected the clothes the Defendant wore the night of the

accident. All the clothes were bloody, including the Defendant’s socks. The investigator

understood that the Defendant’s clothes were bloody because he was attending to the victim,

but the investigator did not believe that this would explain why his socks were bloody.

Investigator Elliot identified the victim’s bloody shorts, socks, and tennis shoe as items he

received from the Emergency Medical Services. He also identified a bloody pillow case he

recovered from the scene.

On cross-examination, Investigator Elliot recalled that, when he arrived on the scene,

14
officers had neither stopped traffic from traveling through the Welcome Center nor marked

off the area surrounding the truck with crime scene tape. Investigator Elliot accordingly

stopped traffic and marked off the area surrounding the truck in order to secure the scene.

Also, he seized and secured the two “deadly weapons” used by the Defendant: the knife and

the tractor-trailer. Investigator Elliot said he did not ask Trooper Brennais to make a

complete accident reconstruction map because he was more concerned with what had

occurred inside the truck’s cab than what had occurred outside the truck. He explained that,

because Solomon witnessed the truck run over the victim, he felt he should focus his

investigation on the struggle inside the truck’s cab, which no independent bystander

witnessed.

The investigator estimated that the truck’s driver and passenger seats were two feet

apart. The investigator agreed that if both the passenger and driver were seated upright in

the center of each seat, the passenger and driver could reach out and touch the other. He

agreed that a person could not exit the rear portion of the cab without passing through the

area between the passenger and driver seats.

Investigator Elliot testified he did not become aware of the victim’s lacerated bladder

until after the night in issue. Because he was unaware of this injury, he did not ask the TBI

to search for uric acid, which would leak from a perforated bladder, on the knife or in the

truck’s cab and the area around the truck. The investigator agreed that, because he did not

request these tests, he possessed no proof that the victim’s uric acid leaked onto the knife or

into the truck’s cab or onto the ground surrounding the truck. Investigator Elliot testified he

observed blood on the rear right tire and its mudflap, but he did not closely examine the area

between the tire and the mudflap. As a result, the investigator conceded he could not

conclusively say no blood and tissue were trapped between the tire and the mudflap.

The investigator recalled that the Defendant did not make any statement that indicated

he knew that the victim’s bladder was lacerated. Although the Defendant was arrested in the

early morning hours of the day following the incident, he was not charged with attempted

first degree murder until later that day.

On redirect-examination, Investigator Elliot said he was not aware of a test the TBI

performed to detect uric acid.

Robert E. McFadden, a Special Agent Forensic Scientist with the TBI in Nashville,

testified he and Investigator Charles Hardy examined the truck cab, photographed the cab,

and collected several items from the cab for analysis at the TBI laboratory. One of the items

collected was the Defendant’s knife, which they found on the dashboard of the truck, and

upon which Agent McFadden was unable to find identifiable prints. The agent collected a

15
partial finger print and a partial palm print from the passenger window. He testified he did

not compare these prints with any known individual’s prints.

Linda Littlejohn, a scientist in the Nashville TBI Crime Laboratory, was certified by

the trial court as an expert in area of fiber analysis. She testified she was asked to analyze

the knife collected in this case and the shorts the victim wore when she was run over.

Littlejohn prepared a report of her findings that reflect that she found fibers on the knife and

that she compared these fibers to the shorts’ fibers by mounting fibers from the shorts on a

slide. Physical and microscopic examination of these fibers revealed both fibers to be

constructed of blue and white cotton fibers.

On cross-examination, Littlejohn testified the blue and white fibers “could be” from

denim blue jean material. She explained she could not determine whether the fibers from the

knife were exactly similar to the fibers from the shorts, saying that “there’s not a lot that you

can say about cotton fibers.” She testified that knives commonly have blue and white cotton

fibers because they are commonly carried inside blue jean pockets.

Charles Hardy, a Special Agent of the Serology and DNA Analysis Unit of the

Nashville TBI Crime Laboratory, was certified by the court as an expert in the area of DNA

analysis and comparison process. The agent explained that, in general, he examines physical

evidence for body fluids and genetically compares these body fluids to those of a known

individual by constructing a DNA profile of each sample. Agent Hardy recalled that he

and Agent McFadden examined and inventoried the truck and collected the knife and several

other items from the truck. These items included a piece of mattress from the lower bunk

bed in the truck cab, a cigarette butt from the ashtray, and a stained envelope from above the

driver’s visor. He also collected swab samples from reddish brown stains they observed

inside the truck. These reddish brown stains appeared on the gear shift lever, the outside

surface of the passenger window, the passenger side of the driver’s seat, the driver’s side

windshield, the passenger’s side of the windshield, the passenger side hand-hold at the rear

of the cab, the calendar above the driver’s seat, the blade and handle of the knife on the

dashboard, and the top middle surface of the dashboard. The agent also analyzed the

Defendant’s socks as well as a grocery bag found within a black duffel bag in the truck cab.

Agent Hardy identified a “blood swatch card” he created to profile the Defendant.

Agent Hardy created this card by placing the Defendant’s blood on a piece of paper and

letting it air-dry. This was the standard he used in his DNA analysis. He also collected

finger nail scrapings and oral swabs from the victim.

Agent Hardy described the results of his DNA analysis stating that all of the samples

16
taken from the reddish brown stains both inside the truck and on the rear passenger side of

the trailer contained the victim’s blood. Also, he determined that the victim’s nails scrapings

did not contain another person’s DNA and that the victim’s socks contained her own blood.

Finally, both the blade and the handle of the knife contained the victim’s blood.

On cross-examination, Agent Hardy explained that a different department of the TBI

laboratory is responsible for testing samples for uric acid. He said that he did not receive a

request to test the samples in this case for uric acid but that, if he had, he would have sent the

samples to the appropriate department.

On recross-examination, the agent said he did not see body tissue on the bloody knife

that he collected from the truck, saying that, had he found such tissue, he would have

performed DNA analysis upon it. Upon further direct examination, Agent Hardy testified

that, in his experience, knives used in cuttings do not always contain body tissue.

Michael Tomaso, a Chicago, Illinois, police officer, testified he and his partner,

Christina Pena, were assigned to a “battery-in-progress” in Chicago in April 2006. When

they arrived, a man they later identified as Thomas Edwards approached them and said he

had fought with a man they later identified as the Defendant. Officer Tomaso found the

Defendant and began to interview him, and Officer Pena interviewed Thomas Edwards.

Because the Defendant was highly intoxicated and belligerent, the officers handcuffed him.

Officer Tomaso recalled the Defendant then said, “This is f---ing bullshit because he’s mad

because what I did to his sister.”

Having determined that Edwards wasthe victim in this altercation with the Defendant,

the officers began to place the Defendant in the back seat of their squad car. The Defendant

continued to grumble about why Edwards was upset, and then the Defendant said, “I wish

I had done it right the first time.”

On cross-examination, Officer Tomaso acknowledged that he did not record the

Defendant’s statements in the report of the battery he prepared the night of the battery. He

explained he did not believe doing so was necessary because he was merely investigating the

battery, not the attempted murder. He emphasized that he had no knowledge of the

circumstances surrounding the Defendant’s case in Tennessee involving the victim. Officer

Tomaso did not testify in the Defendant’s trial on the charge that resulted from his altercation

with Edwards.

Officer Tomaso did not clearly recall speaking with the Defendant’s attorney one

week before trial. According to the officer, his supervisor had instructed him not to speak

with attorneys.

17
Officer Christina Pena, Officer Michael Tomaso’s partner, explained that the address

to which they responded to the battery-in-progress was a bar. She recalled that, after she and

her partner separated the parties, she interviewed Edwards and encouraged him to calm

down. Edwards calmed down and stood peacefully by his vehicle. She confirmed that the

Defendant was highly intoxicated and that she and her partner handcuffed him for their

safety. She recalled they asked the Defendant to sit in the back of their patrol car so they

could ascertain the nature of the dispute. She testified that, when she opened the patrol car

door, the Defendant said, “[T]his is bullshit; I should have did things right the first time.”

Officer Pena placed the Defendant in the vehicle, and then walked around and sat in the

driver’s seat. She and Officer Tomaso conducted an initial field interview of the Defendant.

She explained that, during a field interview, a subject is not in custody but rather is only

detained for a moment while the officers verify the subject has no outstanding warrants.

During this interview, the Defendant told the officers that he had been charged in Tennessee

with attempting to kill Edwards’s sister.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted the Defendant of attempted first

degree murder, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-two years in the

Tennessee Department of Correction.

The Defendant timely filed a petition for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis, stating that

after trial the victim gave several oral and written statements recanting her trial testimony.

The court held a hearing to dispose of this and other post-trial motions. At this hearing, the

victim testified that, at trial, she had falsely testified that the Defendant knocked her

unconscious and stabbed her lower body. She said that her family had encouraged her to lie

because they were angry with the Defendant and that she lied at trial in order to punish the

Defendant. The victim testified that she still loved and missed the Defendant, that he was

a “good person,” and that, because the Defendant “was always there for [her],” she “need[ed]

him so much more, now.” She said that the Defendant only cut her fingers during their

argument on the highway and that he never stabbed her anywhere else on her body. She

insisted that she never lost consciousness and that the Defendant never attacked her while

they were stopped at the rest stop.

The trial court rejected the victim’s recanted testimony, noting that the victim never

actually testified at trial that the Defendant had stabbed her anywhere other than her hand.

Instead, the victim testified only thatshe remembered being knocked unconscious,struggling

with the Defendant, and noticing blood running down her legs as she got out of the truck.

The trial court explained that the Defendant’s guilty verdict was based on the multiple

wounds to the victim’s pelvic region and the physicians’ testimony that a sharp instrument

caused the lacerations to the victim’s bladder. The trial court also noted that, because the

18
Defendant testified neither at his trial nor the coram nobis hearing, he failed to provide an

alternative version of how the victim sustained her injuries. Given the inconsistencies and

weaknesses in the victim’s new testimony, the trial court explained it was not reasonably

satisfied that the victim’s trial testimony was unreliable and that her recantations were true.

As such, the trial court denied the Defendant’s petition for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted statementsthe Defendant gave to Illinois

police; (3) the trial court erred when it allowed two witnesses to testify although the State had

failed to disclose their existence in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure

16; and (4) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s petition for a writ of error

coram nobis based on the victim’s recanted testimony.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The Defendant contends the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to establish

his guilt of attempted first degree murder. Specifically, he contends the evidence does not

support a finding of premeditation, because the record fails to show he procured a weapon,

concealed evidence, or was particularly cruel. Also, he argues that any stabbing that

occurred inside the truck’s cab did not establish “continuous deliberation” and that his efforts

to comfort and aid the victim show he was not “calm” after his actions. The Defendant also

contends that the State’s evidence fails to conform to several evidentiary standards to which

he argues circumstantial evidence must conform in order to support a finding of

premeditation. See State v. Gentry, 881 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). Finally, he

argues that his struggle with the victim in the truck’s cab shows he was not free from the

“excitement and passion” a defendant must lack in order to commit attempted first degree

murder. See T.C.A. § 39-13-202(d) (2006). As to the jury’s finding that he ran over the

victim with the intention of killing her, the Defendant argues that his intoxication

incapacitated him from forming the intent to kill the victim.

The State responds that the evidence shows that the Defendant cut the victim’s fingers

and stabbed her, lacerating her bladder, before he intentionally ran over her with his tractortrailer. Consequently, the State argues, the evidence shows that the Defendant spent

considerable time contemplating the harm he would cause the victim, thus supporting the

jury’s conclusion that the Defendant premeditated the victim’s death.

When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court’s standard of

review is whether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,

19
“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see Tenn. R.App. P.

13(e); State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn. 2004) (citing State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d

247, 276 (Tenn. 2002)). This rule applies to findings of guilt based upon direct evidence,

circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both direct and circumstantial evidence. State

v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W .3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court should not re-weigh or

re-evaluate the evidence. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).

Nor may this Court substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from the

evidence. State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tenn. 1999); Liakas v. State, 286 S.W.2d

856, 859 (Tenn. 1956). “Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight

and value of the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by

the trier of fact.” State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997); Liakas, 286 S.W.2d at

859. “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the

witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.” State

v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn.

1973). The Tennessee Supreme Court stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the jury see the

witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their demeanor on the stand. Thus

the trial judge and jury are the primary instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and

credibility to be given to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human

atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a written record in this

Court. Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d

523 (Tenn. 1963)). This Court must afford the State of Tennessee the strongest legitimate

view of the evidence contained in the record, as well as all reasonable inferences which may

be drawn from the evidence. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d at 775 (citing State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d

274, 279 (Tenn. 2000)). Because a verdict of guilt against a defendant removes the

presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the convicted criminal defendant

bears the burden of showing that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty

verdict. State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 2000). Importantly, the

credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the reconciliation of

conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted exclusively to the jury as the trier of fact.

Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651 at 659.

In this case, the Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder. Tennessee

Code Annotated section 39-12-101(a) states:

A person commits criminal attempt who, acting with the kind of culpability

20
otherwise required for the offense:

(1) Intentionally engages in action or causes a result that would constitute an

offense if the circumstances surrounding the conduct were as the person

believes them to be;

(2) Acts with intent to cause a result that is an element of the offense, and

believes the conduct will cause the result without further conduct on the

person’s part; or

(3) Acts with intent to complete a course of action or cause a result that would

constitute the offense, under the circumstances surrounding the conduct as the

person believes them to be, and the conduct constitutes a substantial step

towards the commission of the offense.

T.C.A. § 39-12-101(a)(1)-(3) (2006).

First degree murder is the intentional and premeditated killing of another. T.C.A. §

39-13-202(a)(1) (2006). An “intentional” killing is one committed by a person “who acts

intentionally with respect . . . to a result of the conduct when it is the person’s conscious

objective or desire to . . . cause the result.” T.C.A. § 39-11-302(a) (2006).

“Premeditation” is defined as “an act done after the exercise of reflection and

judgment” and committed after the accused “was sufficiently free from excitement and

passion as to be capable of premeditation.” T.C.A. § 39-13-202(d) (2006). This is a question

of fact for the jury to determine, and it may be proven by circumstantial evidence, including

evidence of: “the use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim; the particular cruelty of

the killing; declarations by the defendant of an intent to kill; evidence of procurement of a

weapon; preparations before the killing for concealment of the crime; and calmness

immediately after the killing.” Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 660. In general, circumstantial

evidence of premeditation should tend to show planning activity by the Defendant, motive

to cause the victim’s death, and “facts about the nature of the killing from which it may be

inferred that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that the Defendant must

have intentionally killed according to preconceived design.” See Gentry, 881 S.W.2d at 4-5

(quoting 2 W. LaFave and A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 7.7 (1986).

In the case under submission, the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable

to the State proved that, while the Defendant and victim argued as they drove from Alabama

to Tennessee, the Defendant swung his knife at the victim, slicing her fingers. The couple

then stopped at the Ardmore Welcome Center to get medical attention for the victim’s injury

21
to her hand. After the Defendant pulled the tractor-trailer up to the curb in front of the

Welcome Center and the victim turned around to retrieve medication from the back of the

truck’s cab, he attacked the victim from behind, striking her in the back of the head. The

victim fell on a bed in the rear of the cab and began to go in and out of consciousness. She

and the Defendant struggled in the back of the cab until the Defendant relented and sat back

down in the driver’s seat.

After the Defendant returned to the driver’s seat, the victim gathered her things and

got out of the truck. When she got out, she realized blood was rushing down her legs and

pooling into her socks and shoes. Medical examination later revealed that the victim’s

bladder was lacerated by a knife-like object and that her pelvic region bore several slice

marks. Also, the interior of the truck’s cab was covered in blood, and blood had spilled into

a cooler inside the truck. Both the nature of the victim’s wounds and the large amount of

blood inside the truck indicate that the Defendant had stabbed the victim several times as

they struggled in the back of the cab.

Having seen a man standing near the rear of the truck, the victim began to walk

toward the man to ask him to help her get medical attention. As she walked alongside the

truck, someone instructed the Defendant to move the truck from where it was parked in front

of the Welcome Center. The truck began to move, and the trailer knocked the victim to the

ground and into the path of its passenger-side rear tire. The truck continued moving and ran

over the victim’s body. Although her initial prognosis was grim, the victim survived her

injuries, which included disembowelment, a crushed pelvis, a lacerated bladder, and multiple

cuts to her pelvic region.

First, we conclude that the evidence establishes that the Defendant stabbed and cut

the victim while they were parked in front of the Welcome Center. The stab wounds inflicted

by the Defendant upon the victim’s abdominal and pelvic region were severe enough to be

life-threatening. This conduct alone supportsthe jury’s finding that the Defendant acted with

the intention to cause the victim’s death. This act also supports the jury’s inference that the

Defendant acted with premeditation when he later drove his tractor-trailer over her body. As

the Defendant argues, the record may lack proof that the Defendant procured a weapon or

concealed evidence. The record does include, however, circumstantial proof that the

Defendant planned to kill the victim and had a motive to kill the victim in the particularly

cruel manner of running over her body: The Defendant stabbed the victim, who was

unarmed, several times on her hand. The Defendant then refused to stop to get medical

attention for the victim’s hand, because he did not want her to report his behavior. Although

the Defendant ultimately stopped ostensibly to get medical help, his fear of being discovered

colors his later act of running over the victim. After he stopped the truck, the Defendant

attacked the victim, stabbing her in her abdominal and pelvic region. The record supports

22
the reasonable inference that, after having severely injured the victim, the Defendant allowed

her to get out of the truck so that he could mask her stab wounds by “accidentally” running

over her. As the victim walked toward the back of the truck, the Defendant, a seasoned

commercial truck driver, drove his truck so that it knocked the victim to the ground and then

rolled over her body. The Defendant then displayed a somewhat calm demeanor by

responding in disbelief rather than alarm when Solomon informed him he had run over the

victim.

The Defendant’s argument that his altercation with the victim caused him to be

excited and passionate in a way that prevented him from acting with premeditation is not

supported by the victim’s testimony that the Defendant took his driver’s seat after they

struggled and sat calmly while she got out of the vehicle. The record sufficiently supports

the jury’s determination that the Defendant exercised reflection and judgment before running

over the victim and that no “excitement or passion” prompted him to run over the victim.

See T.C.A. § 39-13-202(d).

Also, we conclude the evidence supports the jury’s inference that the Defendant

intentionally ran over the victim. As we discussed above, the Defendant was a seasoned

truck driver, his assertion that he accidentally ran over the victim strikes this Court as

disingenuous. Further, the statement to Illinois police that he “should have done it right the

first time” is a bare acknowledgment that he intended to kill the victim rather than only

accidentally run over the victim. Finally, the record does not demonstrate that the

Defendant’s intoxication was serious enough to incapacitate him from forming the intent to

kill the victim. See Harrell v. State, 593 S.W.2d 664, 672 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979) (“Proof

of intoxication alone is not a defense to a charge of committing a specific intent crime . . .

there must be evidence that the intoxication deprived the accused of the mental capacity to

form specific intent.”). As the victim testified, the Defendant navigated his tractor-trailer on

the highway without difficulty and no responding officers recalled that the Defendant was

highly intoxicated. As such, we conclude the evidence supports the jury’s determination that

the Defendant intended to kill the victim when he ran over her with his truck.

In summary, a rational jury could conclude that the Defendant premeditated killing

the victim, that he intended to kill the victim when he drove the truck forward, and that he

believed running over the victim would cause the victim’s death without further conduct on

his part. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that the Defendant was guilty of attempted first degree murder. The

Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

B. Admissibility of the Defendant’s Statements to Chicago Police Officers

23
The Defendant contendsthe trial court violated his constitutional rightsto counsel and

against involuntary self-incrimination when it admitted the statements the Defendant gave

to Illinois police officers. He argues he gave the incriminating statements while he was in

police custody in response to police interrogation, which was initiated without

Miranda warnings. The State concedes that the Defendant was in police custody at the time

of the statements, but it argues that he made his statements spontaneously and not in

response to any question posed by Illinois police officers.

The statementsto which the Defendant objects occurred in the course of Illinois police

officers’ response to a battery-in-progress involving the Defendant and David Edwards, the

victim’s brother. Soon after the officers arrived, they determined that the Defendant should

be handcuffed because he was intoxicated and belligerent. As Officer Tomaso was

handcuffing the Defendant, the Defendant said, “This is f---ing bullshit because he’s mad

because what I did to his sister.” The officers then began to place the Defendant in the back

of their squad car in order to question him about his altercation with Edwards. While he was

being placed in the car, the Defendant said, “I wish I had done it right the first time.” The

officersthen began to interview the Defendant about hisfight with Edwards, and he informed

them he had been charged in Tennessee with attempting to murder Edwards’s sister. Police

were unaware of this pending charge at the time the Defendant made statements regarding

the victim.

In disposing of the Defendant’s motion to suppress his statements to Illinois police,

the trial court found first that, because the officers handcuffed the Defendant, the Defendant

was in custody and, thus, his Miranda rights had attached when he made his statements. The

trial court went on to find, however, that his statements were not taken in violation of

Miranda because they were not given in response to interrogation within the meaning of

Miranda. The trial court explained that Officers Pena and Tomosa were not Tennessee

officials and had no independent knowledge of the charges in this case. Thus, the officers

could not have intended to question the Defendant about this case when they asked the

Defendant to explain why he was fighting with Edwards. As a consequence, the court

concluded, admission of the Defendant’sstatements would not violate the Defendant’srights

to counsel and against involuntary self-incrimination.

In Tennessee, when a defendant brings a claim that hisstatementshould be suppressed

due to its not being knowingly and voluntarily given, this Court reviews the facts while

giving great deference to the suppression hearing judge. State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 423

(Tenn. 2000). The application of law to fact is reviewed de novo. State v. Bridges, 963

S.W.2d 487 (Tenn. 1997). The findings of the trial court will be upheld unless the evidence

preponderates otherwise. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996).

24
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that “no

person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S.

Const. amend. V. Similarly, article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution states that “in

all criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall not be compelled to give evidence against

himself.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. The United States Supreme Court has held that the

protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment require that precautions be taken before

statements obtained through custodial interrogation are allowed as evidence against an

accused. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1964). Generally, when statements made

by an accused are the product of a custodial interrogation by law enforcement officers, the

statements may not be admitted into evidence unless the accused is:

Warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that

anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right

to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will

be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

Id. Only when the suspect is informed of his rights via the Miranda warnings may a suspect

be deemed to knowingly and intelligently waive the right to remain silent and the right to an

attorney. Id. Moreover, any statement obtained after a waiver of this right must be voluntary

and not be extracted by “any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied

promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.” Bram v. United

States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1987).

The protections provided under Miranda do not apply in every instance where a police

officer questions a suspect; rather, these protections only apply “when the defendant is in

custody and is subjected to questioning or its functional equivalent.” Walton, 41 S.W.3d at

82. Miranda warnings are required only when a person is subject to custodial interrogation

by law enforcement. “Custodial” means that the subject of questioning is in “custody or

otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way.” Miranda, 384

U.S. at 479. “Interrogation” has been interpreted to refer to questions that law enforcement

officers should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Rhode Island

v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). In order for Miranda to apply, the suspect’s statements

must be in response to interrogation by law enforcement personnel, or the suspect must know

that he is being interrogated by an agent of the State. State v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 318, 321

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1983); see Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296-97 (1990). “Absent

either one of these prerequisites, the requirements of Miranda are not implicated.” Id. For

instance, on-the-scene questioning does not require Miranda warnings. Miranda, 384 U.S.

25
at 477; State v. Goss, 995 S.W.2d 617, 629 (Tenn. Crim. App.1998).

1

We agree with the trial court that the Defendant’s statements were not admitted in

violation of his rights to counsel and against involuntary self-incrimination. We agree that,

at the time of the Defendant’s statements, he was in custody. The Defendant was handcuffed

and then placed in the backseat of a police cruiser in the course of making the statements at

issue. Thus, the Defendant was “deprived of his freedom” by Illinois police. See Miranda,

384 U.S. at 479. Given this, we conclude the Defendant was in custody when he made the

statements at issue.

Fatal to the Defendant’s objection, however, is the fact that he was not being

interrogated when he made the statements introduced at trial. Officers Tomosa and Pena

were Illinois police officers investigating a battery-in-progress outside a Chicago bar. These

officers knew nothing about the Tennessee charge against the Defendant. As such, they

could not have intended to elicit incriminating responses about this charge when they asked

the Defendant why he and Edwards had fought. See Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 321. The police

officers’ inquiries were “on-the-scene questioning” limited to the altercation between the

Defendant and Edwards. Further, the Defendant made several of his statements

spontaneously, not in response to any question posed by the officers. None of the

Defendant’s statements to Illinois police were given in response to interrogation within the

meaning of Miranda. Their admission, therefore, did not violate the Defendant’s rights to

counsel and against self-incrimination. He is not entitled to relief on this issue.

C. State Compliance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it allowed Officers Pena and

Tomosa to testify about the Defendant’s statements in Illinois. The Defendant argues first

that, because the officers are not listed on the Defendant’s indictment, their testimony

In Miranda, the Supreme Court stated: 1

When an individual is in custody on probable cause, the police may, of

course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at trial against him. Such

investigation may include inquiry of persons not under restraint. General

on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general

questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our

holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give

whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement. In such

situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody

interrogation is not necessarily present. 

Id. at 477-78. 

26
violates Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-17-106, which instructs the State to list

witnesses that will testify at trial on the indictment. To this, the State responds that this

section is only directory and, as such, does not require exclusion of the testimony of omitted

witnesses, citing State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 69 (Tenn. 1992).

Next, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to

supplement its witness list with the officers’ names one week before trial, which violated

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(A), the state disclosure rule. He argues this

late addition prevented him from traveling to Chicago to interview the officers before they

testified at trial and gave him insufficient time to prepare to raise the Miranda issues

involved in the officers’ testimony. The State responds that it complied in good faith with

Rule 16’s disclosure rule because it disclosed the officers’ testimony as soon as it had

contact information. Furthermore, the State argues, the Defendant fails to show bad faith,

undue hardship, or prejudice from the late disclosure. Finally, the State argues that, as Rule

16 does not authorize disclosure of the address of a State witness, the Defendant’s inability

to contact the officers has no bearing on his Rule 16 claim.

In addressing the Defendant’s claim that the officers’ testimony violated Tennessee

Code Annotated section 40-17-106, we note that our Supreme Court has observed that it is

“well settled” that this section is “merely directory,” not mandatory. State v. Dellinger, 79

S.W.3d 458, 489 (Tenn. 2002). As such, section 40-17-106 does not necessarily disqualify

from testifying a witness whose name does not appear on the indictment. Id.; State v. Harris,

839 S.W.2d 54, 69 (Tenn. 1992). Rather, the purpose of this section is to avoid surprising

the defendant, thereby providing the defendant with an adequate basis upon which to prepare

a defense. In Harris, our Supreme Court held that section 40-17-106 did not bar testimony

from a witness disclosed to the defense only four days before trial because the State notified

the defense as soon as it became aware of the witness and because defense counsel

interviewed the witness before trial. Id. In this case, the State did not intentionally omit

Officers Pena and Tomaso from the indictment; rather, the State disclosed their identities and

their potential testimony to the defendant soon after the State itself became aware of their

potential testimony. Because the State did not act in bad faith when it failed to list the

officers’ names on the Defendant’s indictment, we conclude that the State did not violate

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-17-106.

The Defendant’s second objection is that the State’s supplementation of its witness

list was improper because the State did not comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule

16. Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 describes the procedure for the State’s

disclosure of evidence:

(a) Disclosure of Evidence by the State.

27
(1) Information Subject to Disclosure.

(A) Defendant’s Oral Statement. Upon a defendant’s request,

the state shall disclose to the defendant the substance of any of

the defendant’s oral statements made before or after arrest in

response to interrogation by any person the defendant knew was

a law-enforcement officer if the state intends to offer the

statement in evidence at the trial;

. . . .

(2) Information not Subject to Disclosure. Except as provided in paragraphs

(A), (B), (E), and (G) of subdivision (a)(1), this rule does not authorize the

discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal state

documents made by the district attorney general or other state agents or law

enforcement officers in connection with investigating or prosecuting the case.

Nor does this rule authorize discovery of statements made by state witnesses

or prospective state witnesses.

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(a).

To enforce this rule, Rule 16(d)(2) provides that if there has been noncompliance, the

trial court may order the offending party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a

continuance, prohibit the introduction of the evidence not disclosed or enter such other order

as the court deems just under the circumstances. See State v. Leon Goins, No.

W1999-01681-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 1531111, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Dec.

27, 1999), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 17, 2000). Whether a defendant has been

prejudiced by the State's failure to disclose information is a significant factor in determining

an appropriate remedy. State v. Smith, 926 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). The

Defendant bears the burden of showing “the degree to which the impediments to discovery

hindered trial preparation and defense at trial.” State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tenn.

1993). The determination of whether to allow the witness to testify is left to the sound

discretion of the trial judge, which is exercised upon examination of the circumstances

presented in that particular case. State v. Underwood, 669 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1984) (citing McBee v. State, 372 S.W.2d 173 (Tenn. 1963)). “Thus, it is clear that the

court has wide discretion to fashion a remedy that is appropriate for the circumstances of

each case and the sanction must fit the circumstances of that case.” Id. (citations omitted);

see State v. James, 688 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984).

The Defendant moved before trial for either a continuance or exclusion of the officers’

28
testimony based on the State’s non-compliance with Rule 16. During the hearing on that

motion, the State and the defense counsel described the chronology of the State’s discovery

and disclosure of the officers’ statements: The Illinois officers observed the Defendant’s

statements in April 2006. In mid-September, the State became aware that the Defendant

made statements about this case during his Illinois arrest. On September 19, 2006, the State

provided a Witness List and Discovery of Disclosures to the defense. Although this list did

not include Officers Pena and Tomaso, it included a note that the Defendant had given

statements to arresting officers when he was detained in Illinois. After furnishing the witness

list, the State began to contact Illinois officials in order to identify and locate the officers.

On October 23, 2006, the State obtained the officers’ names and badge numbers and

provided these to defense counsel, and began to search for the officers’ contact information.

On October 30, 2006, the State obtained this contact information and furnished it to defense

counsel. Trial began on November 6, 2006.

The trial court denied the Defendant’s request to exclude the officers’ testimony and

for a continuance. It found that the State timely communicated and disclosed information

to defense counsel. The trial court further found that the Defendant suffered no prejudice

from receiving the officers’ names and contact information only one week before trial.

Although it denied the Defendant’s motion, the trial court clearly communicated its

willingness to grant a continuance in the event the Defendant came upon new information

about the Defendant’s statements and requested more time to investigate this information.

First, we note that Rule 16's application to the disclosure of the statements at issue is

not altogether clear. As reproduced above, the language of Rule 16(a)(1)(A) requires

disclosure of only defendant statements “made in response to interrogation.” As we have

discussed, the Defendant did not make his statements in response to police interrogation.

Rule 16 did not obligate the State to disclose the statement at issue before trial. To be

thorough, however, we will assume Rule 16(a)(1)(A) applies to the statements at issue.

Rule 16 requires the State to disclose the substance of a defendant’s statements before

trial, if defense counsel requests such disclosure. Here, the defense requested the State to

disclose its witnesses and information it had about the Defendant’s statements, and the State

complied. It provided a list of witnesses, which included a note that Illinois police may have

observed the Defendant make incriminating statements about this case. Asthe State gathered

more information about what these officers observed, it communicated such information to

the Defendant. The State gave defense counsel the officers’ names and badge numbers the

same day it obtained them, and it disclosed the officers’ private cell phone numbers to the

defense on October 30, also the same day it obtained the phone numbers. The State promptly

informed defense counsel of the officers’ potential testimony and, later, of the officers’

contact information. The State, therefore, did not in bad faith provide the defense with the

29
officers’ contact information only one week before trial; instead, the State in good faith

provided defense counsel with information about the officers as it received the information.

Further, the Defendant failsto demonstrate how hislate receipt of the officers’ contact

information “hindered trial preparation and defense at trial.” See Brown, 836 S.W.2d at 560.

Although defense counselstated that, had he been given more advance notice, he would have

traveled to Chicago to interview the officers, Officer Tomaso testified his supervisor

instructed him not to speak about investigations with attorneys. Therefore, the extent to

which a trip to Chicago would have produced valuable information is unclear. Further, the

trial court said it would allow a continuance if at any point during trial defense counsel

requested time to obtain specific evidence in connection to the officers’ testimony. Because

defense counsel never made such a request, defense counsel does not appear to have come

across any new evidence with which to impeach the officers’ accounts of his client’s

statements. As such, we do not perceive the timing of the disclosure of the officers’ contact

information to have deprived the Defendant of the ability to thoroughly prepare for the

officers’ testimony. Smith, 926 S.W.2d at 270. Because the Defendant has failed to

demonstrate either bad faith non-compliance with Rule 16 or prejudice, we conclude that the

trial court properly allowed the officers to testify. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A); Brown 836

S.W.2d at 560. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

D. Writ of Error Coram Nobis

The Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a writ of

error coram nobis based on the victim’s recantation of her trial testimony. He argues that the

evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the victim’s new testimony was

unreliable. The Defendant argues the record at trial and at the coram nobis hearing

established that the victim’s anger with the Defendant motivated her trial testimony and that

this intent to falsely implicate the Defendant explains her convenient failure to recall what

happened between the time when she supposedly lost consciousness and the time when she

left the truck. The Defendant further argues that the victim’s desire to falsely implicate the

Defendant also explains why no medical record referenced or testifying medical expert

observed an injury to the victim’s head consistent the victim’s testimony that she was struck

from behind.

In response to the Defendant’s arguments, the State largely adopts the coram nobis

court’s reasoning, arguing that the victim’s trial testimony did not actually contain an

assertion as to the cause of her pelvic and abdominal injuries and that evidence independent

of the victim’s trial testimony supported the Defendant’s guilty verdict.

A proceeding in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis is available to convicted

30
defendants in criminal cases. T.C.A.. § 40-26-105(a) (2006). Whether to grant or deny a

petition for writ of error coram nobis on its merits rests within the sound discretion of the

trial court. State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 527-28 (Tenn. 2007). It is well-established

that the writ of error coram nobis “is an extraordinary procedural remedy . . . [that] fills only

a slight gap into which few cases fall.” State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 672 (Tenn. 1999).

In fact, newly discovered recanted trial testimony may serve as the basis for a new trial only

where: “(1) the trial court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by the material

witness was false and the new testimony is true; (2) the defendant was reasonably diligent

in discovering the new evidence, or was surprised by the false testimony, or was unable to

know of the falsity of the testimony until after the trial; and (3) the jury might have reached

a different conclusion had the truth been told.” State v. Ratliff, 71 S.W.3d 291, 298 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 2001) (citing Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 673 n.17); see T.C.A. § 40-26-105(b).

In the case at hand, we agree with the trial court that the Defendant did not meet his

burden of establishing his eligibility for a new trial under Ratliff and Mixon. In essence, the

Defendant has failed to establish the unreliability of the victim’s trial testimony and, in turn,

the veracity of the victim’s testimony at the coram nobis hearing. We agree with the trial

court that the victim’s testimony at the coram nobis hearing that she did not recall the

Defendant stabbing her while they struggled in the back of the cab does not actually conflict

with her trial testimony that she could not recall what happened in the back of the cab

because she lost consciousness. Because the victim never claimed to remember that the

Defendant stabbed her and because the victim does not claim to have lied about losing

consciousness, her most recent testimony is not inconsistent with her trial testimony. As

such, the record does not preponderate against the coram nobis court’s finding that “the

testimony given by the material witness was false and the new testimony is true.” See Ratliff,

71 S.W.3d at 298.

Further, the Defendant fails to establish that the jury might have reached a different

conclusion “had the truth been told.” Id. At trial, several physicians that attended to the

victim testified that the lacerations to her bladder and abdominal region were straight line

lacerations, likely caused by a sharp, penetrating object such as a knife. Also, the victim

testified that blood was running down her legs and into her shoes when she got out of the

truck. The victim’s bloody shoes were introduced at trial to support this detail of the victim’s

story. The trial record, therefore, contains adequate evidence of the cause of the victim’s

abdominal and pelvic injuries to support the jury’s finding that the Defendant stabbed the

victim while they struggled in the cab. The record does not preponderate against the trial

court’s finding that the jury would not have reached a different result even assuming the

veracity of the victim’s new testimony. Because the Defendant fails to establish both the

veracity of the victim’s new testimony and the likelihood of a different verdict given this

testimony, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the

31
Defendant’s coram nobis petition. He is not entitled to relief on this issue.

III. Conclusion

After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the

evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction; that the trial court properly

allowed Illinois police officers to testify about the Defendant’s statements to them; and that

the trial court properly denied the Defendant’s motion for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis. As

such, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

_________________________________

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE

32