Residential Security


in Multi-Family Housing


Instructor's Guide


HUD-0050645

u.s. Department of Housing and Urban Development

Office of Policy Development and Research

Residential Security

in Multi-Family

Housing

Instructor's Guide I

Hu D

1
Residential Security

. in Multi-Family

Housing .

Instructor-'S-Guide -\

February, 19791
_4 __ ';;". 

The research forming the basis for this workshop was conducted 

pursuant to Grant #H-2225G between the U.S. Department of Housing and 

Urban Development and Temple University. Statements and information 

contained in this workshop are those of the grantee who assumes sole 

responsibility for its accuracy and completeness. 
FOREWORD 

This instructor's guide is one of eighteen in a housing-management 

curriculum developed by HUD in conjunction with Temple University. 

The guide reprints all the material in the participant's workbook. 

but gives more detailed information where necessary and answers the 

test questions. 

Our hope is that with your help. the workshops using this 

curriculum will advance professionalism in the field of housing 

management. The lack of professionalism -- that is. the lack of 

uniform standards which allows people of varying knowledge and 

abilities to manage HUD-assisted and privately financed housing -­ has contributed to some serious problems: high default rates. 

abandonments, and vandalism. To correct such problems is important. 

We are glad to have you working with us. 

Donna E. Shalala 

Assistant Secretary for 

Policy Development and Research /' 
PREFACE 

Each workbook in this series presents a number of learning 

objectives targetted to a selected area of management. Successful 

completion of the learning objectives presented in each workbook provides 

a series of building blocks to buttress the spectrum of skills required of a housing manager. . 

In preparing these workbooks, an attempt has been made to incorporate 

the range of knowledge that housing managers might be required to draw 

upon. Likewise, an attempt has been made to reflect the present state-ofthe-art of housing management. Inevitably, whatever is captured in print 

reflects a body of knowledge and practice up to the point of publication. 

Therefore, the students and instructors making use of these workbooks 

will want to keep alert to new developments that should be integrated into the workbook material. Furthermore, like any attempt to codify 

knowledge in a particular field, the material presented in these workbooks 

is open to differences of interpretation and emphasis. We are aware that 

there may be some techniques and procedures described in these workbooks 

with which some experts in the field might disagree. The best test of 

such procedures and techniques will come when they are applied in the 

field by housing management practitioners. Through this process, the 

state-of-the-art will continue to be improved. Instructors in the future 

will undoubtedly want to incorporate such acknowledged improvements into their 

delivery of the workbook material. 

One final point is worth mentioning. An initial impetus for these 

workbooks was the need to upgrade management skills in HUD-related housing. 

However, many of the principles presented should be viewed by students and 

instructors as applicable to multifamily housing management practices in 

the private sector. 

....•...".;; 
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:'\CN'lOHLEDGfJENTS


PROJECT STAFF 

Seymour J. Rosenthal, Director 

Center for Social Policy and Community Development 

Archibald Allen, III, Director


Housing Management Institute


Alex	 Urbanski, Curriculum Snecialist


Housing ~~anagement Staff


Center for Social Policy and 

Community Development 

School of Social Administration 

Temple University 

of the


Commonwealth System of Higher Education


Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122

- 3 -

TABLE OF CONTENTS

RESIDENTIAL SECURITY IN MULTI-FAMILY HOUSING

Paae

PART I - OVERVIEW OF CURRICULUM

1. INTRODUCTION 5

II. LEARNING OBJECTIVES 7

III. WORKSHOP CONTENT SUMMARY 10

IV. METHODOLOGY 13

V. RESOURCES 13

VI. EVALUATION 14

VI I. MODULE SUMMARIES 15

PART II - CURRICULUM MODULES

MODULE I:

MODULE II:

PLANNING AND ADMINISTERING A SECURITY PROGRAM

1. Developing an Operational Definition of Security 2. Assessing Security Needs

3. Utilizing Community Resources

4. Developing Security Program Strategies

5. Focusing Management's Role in Security Actions

6. Evaluating Security Programs

7. Obtaining Funds for Security Programs SECURITY DEFINED

22

24

25

27

28

29

30

32

35

1. Traditional Definition 36

2. Comprehensive Definition (Two-Track Approach} 36

MODULE III: HARDWARE (TRACK "At!) COMPONENTS OF A COMPREHENS IVE 40

SECUR ITY SYSTEM

1. Protective Devices 42

2. Technological Detection Devices 45

3. Municipal Police Personnel 46

4. Security Personnel 48
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MODULE IV:	 SOFTWARE (TRACK "B") COMPONENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE 58


SECURITY SYSTEM


1.	 Individual Self Protection 59


2.	 Resident Attitudes and Standards 61


3.	 Relations Between Residents and Police/Security 63


Personnel


4.	 Involving the Resident Organizations 63


5.	 Economic Opportunities for Residents 64


6.	 Youth Programs 64


7. Occupancy	 Policies and Procedures 64


Security System


8.	 Community Assistance in a Comprehensive 65


MODULE V:	 DEFENSIBLE SPACE 68


1. Creatinq Territorial Areas	 69


2.	 Defining Zones of Transition 70


3.	 Locating Amenities 70


4.	 Creating Surveillance Opportunities 71


5.	 Controlling the Grounds 71


6.	 Controlling Interior Public Spaces in Multi­ 71 

Family Dwellings 

MODULE VI:	 TURF RECLAMATION 74


1.	 Establishing Neighborhood Values 75


2.	 Setting Community Standards 76


3.	 Resolving Security Problems 76


4.	 Enacting a Comprehensive Security Program 77

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I. INTRODUCTION 

Traditionally the connotation of the word "security" has been "insecurity," 

focusing generally on criminals and crime. However, security concerns itself 

more than with the effective deterrence of criminal acts, and a security 

system built simply on deterrence cannot be successful. Security involves 

more than plannin9 for and developing a system whereby perpetrators of 

criminal acts are apprehended. Successful security systems rlan and develop 

strategies which address both the individual·s right to be free from criminal 

victimization and his or her psychological need to feel secure. 

Criminal victimization involves the actual perpetration of a criminal 

act against person or property. It can be analyzed, evaluated, and documented 

bec~use it is objectively measurable (burglaries, murders, assaults, rapes, 

ard acts of vandalism are quantifiable}. 

The ~sychological need of the individual to "feel l' secure or free from 

fear for safety or insecurity is much more difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, it is just as important as the more quantifiable aspects of security 

to the success of a security program. 

Taken together, these elements encompass the "two-t rack'l approach to 

the development of a total security system. Track "A" is concerned with 

deterring criminal victimization. Track "B" is concerned with creating and 

maintaining a sense of safety through widespread community involvement in 

planning and implementing a security pr09ram. 

This workshop focuses on such a two-track approach to security systems. 

Module I of the workshop curriculum exoands on traditional notions of security. 

Modul es II and II I di scuss Track "A" and Track "B" of a comprehens i ve security 
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system in detuil. Module IV explores the concepts behind the notion of 

"defensible space" - the interrelationships between the layout of physical 

environment and security. Module V discusses "Turf Reclamation," an 

aporoach to security which is based on strengthening a neighborhood's sense 

of cohesion to enable community members to actively and effectively participate in a security program. Module VI suggests strategies managers can 

employ in planning and administering security programs. Taken together, 

these modules provide the skills and knowledge which housing managers need 

to effectively address security problems. 
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II. LEARNING OBJECTIVES 

Participants will be able to demonstrate orally and/or in writing 

both theoretical and practical competencies related to security in multifamily housing identified by the following workshop objectives: 

Module I 

1.	 Participants will be able to operationally define security. 

2.	 Participants will list the five steps involved in planning 

and administering a comprehensive security system. 

3.	 Participants will identify ten variables which must be 

examined in analyzing the facts about security in a community. 

4.	 Participants will define qoals, objectives, and tasks as 

they relate to developing' program strategies. 

5.	 Participants will describe II check,1I IItreat,1I and II cure ll


security actions and define management's differing role


in implementing such actions.


6.	 Participants will list the five categories of program evaluation. 

7. Participants will define the ten major elements of a proposal. 

Module II 

1.	 Participants will be able to differentiate between the elements 

of a traditional definition of security and the elements of a 

more comprehensive definition. 

2.	 Participants will be able to define and measure criminal 

victimization. 

3.	 Participants will be able to differentiate between actual 

criminal victimization and fear of criminal victimization. 
- 8 -

Modul e II I

1. Participants will list the three major components of Track "A"

of a comprehensive security system.

2. Participants will be able to suggest adequate protective

devices for ten of the twenty most vulnerable areas of a

multi-family residence.

3. Participants will list the advantages and disadvantages of

three technological detection devices.

4. Participants will outline the four major steps involved in

obtaining adequate security services from local law

enforcement agencies.

5. Participants will describe the three major functions of

supplemental security personnel.

6. Participants will describe three alternate strategies for

organizing supplemental security personnel.

Module IV

1. Participants will list five types of self-protective

measures which residents can take to lessen their

vulnerability to crime.

2. Participants will cite four factors which tend to prevent

residents from speaking out against crime in their

community.

3. Participants will suggest ten community agencies which

can assist in a comprehensive security program.

Module V

1. Participants ""ill define the terms "territorial area" and

"zone of transition."

2. Participants will suggest three alternate strategies for

creating surveillance opportunities.

3. Participants will suggest two ways of controlling public grounds.

4. Participants will suggest four ways of controlling interior

public spaces in multi-family dwellings.
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Module VI 

1.	 Participants will list the four major elements of the 

process of turf reclamation. 

2.	 Participants will suggest three relevant objectives for 

a security program based on the principles of turf 

reclamation. 

3.	 Participants will suggest four strategies for developing 

a positive relationship between law enforcement agencies 

and residents. 

4.	 Participants will suggest five strategies for facilitating 

mutual assistance among community members. 
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III. WORKSHOP CONTENT SUMMARY

The material contained in this workshop guide has been organized in

modular form around specific topics related to security in multi-family

housing. The focus is on those skill and knowledge areas which will enable

the housing manager to identify needs, understand and foresee problems, and

appropriately modify and adopt practices in order to provide quality management services in the area of security.

Each module contains an introduction and lists objectives, content,

methodology, and resources. Modules can be used either separately or in

combination to flexibly arrange courses and workshops. Due to the interrelationship of the material contained in the modules, it is advisable to

present them in sequence, either at one workshop, or at sessions that follow

one another closely.

Some format suggestions for workshops utilizing the following modules

are seen below:

Module I Planning and Administering a Security Program

Module II Security Defined

Module III Hardware (Track "A") Components of a

Comprehensive Security System

r~odu 1e IV Software (Track "B") Components of a

Comprehensive Security System

Module V Defensible Space

~'odul e VI Turf Reclamation

Workshop Format I:

Two consecutive one-day sessions

Day I: 9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. ~lodul es I , II, III

Day II: 9:00 a.rr.. 5:00 p.m.

t10du 1es IV, V, VI
- 11 ­


Workshop Format II: 

Two one-day sessions, one week apart 

Day I: 9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.
 Modules I, II, III


Day II: 9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.
 Modules IV, V, VI


Workshop Format III: 

Four consecutive half-day sessions 

Day I: (9:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.) or (1 :00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.) ~1odule I 

Day II: (9:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.) or (1 :00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.) Modules II and III 

Day III: (9:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.) or (1:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.) Module IV 

Day IV: (9:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.) or (1 :00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.) Modules V and VI 
WORKSHOP FORMAT ALTERNATIVES

FORMAT DAY TIt~E MODULE NUMBER CONTENT

I Day 1 9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. I, II, III Planning and Administering a Security

Program; Security Defined; Hardware

Day 2 9:00 a.m. -5 :00 p.m. IV, V, VI Software; Defensible Space; Turf

Reclamation

-

II Day 1 9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. I, II, III Planning and Administering a Security

Program; Security Defined; Hardware

Day 2 9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. IV, V, VI Software; Defensible Space; Turf

(one week Reclamation

later)

III Day 1 9:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m. I Planning and Administering a Security

or Program

Day 2 1:00 p.m.-5:00 p.m. II, III Security Defined; Hardware

Day 3 each day IV Software

Day 4 V, VI Defensible Space, Turf Reclamation

I

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IV.	 METHODOLOGY 

The specific instructional methods recommended for this workshop are 

described following the content outline of each module. These methods 

include: 

1.	 Short lecture presentations by workshop staff or guest lecturers. 

2.	 Film and slide presentations. 

3.	 Group discussions. 

4.	 Role plays. 

5.	 Case studies. 

6.	 Field visits. 

V.	 RESOURCES 

1.	 Specific bibliographic and audio-visual resources are listed 

following each curriculum module. 

2.	 Guides to Audio-Visual Resources 

Films in the Behavioral Sciences: An Annotated Catalogue, John M. 

Schneeder, Barnett Addis, and Marsha Addis, 2nd Edition, 

Behavioral Sciences Media Laboratory, Department of Psychiatry 

and Behavioral Sciences, University of Oklahoma Medical Center, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 73104, August, 1970, $4.00, 225 pp. 

Guides	 to Educational Media, 3rd Edition, M. I. Rufsvold and C. 

Guss, Chicago: American Library Association, 1971. 

Guide to Government-Loan Film (16 mm), Serina Press, 70 Kennedy Street, Alexandria, Virginia, 22305, 1969, $4.95, 130 pp. 

Guide to State-Loan Film (16 mm~, Serina Press, 70 Kennedy Street, 

Alexandria, Virginia, 22305, 969, $2.95, 56 pp. 

Index to 35 mm Educational Filmstrirs, 2nd Edition. National 

Information Center for Educationa Media, University of Southern 

California, University Park, Los Angeles, California, 90007. 

Index to 16 mm Educational Films, National Information Center for 

Educational Media, University of Southern California, University 

Park, Los Angeles, California, 90007. 

Librar~ of Congress Catalog: Motion Pictures and Filmstrips, Wash,ngton, D. C., 1953 to date. 
- 14 ­


VI. EVALUATION 

It is recommended that participants be evaluated on their ability 

to demonstrate competency in each of the knowledge and skill areas 

outlined in the workshop objectives. Competency can be measured by 

oral or written examination, by class participation, and/or by 

completion of assignments. 
- 15 -

MODULE SUMMARIES
MODULE I: PLANNING AND ADMINISTERING A SECURITY PROGRAM
MODULE II: SECURITY DEFINED

OBJECTIVE

1. Participants will be able

to differentiate between

elements of a traditional

definition of security

and those of a more comprehensive definition.

2. Participants will be able

to define and measure

criminal victimization.

3. Participants will be able

to differentiate between

actual criminal victimization and fear of

criminal victimization.

CONTENT

1. Definitions

1. Definition

2. Measuring criteria

1. Definitions

2. Distinction

VII MODULE SlJNMARY

METHODOLOGY

1. Lecture presentation

1. Lecture presentation 2. Group discussion

1. Lecture presentation

2. Group discussion

RESOURCES

1. Workshop staff

1. Workshop staff

1. Workshop staff
MODULE III: HARDWARE (TRACK "A") COMPONENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY SYSTEM

OBJECTIVE CONTENT METHODOLOGY RESOURCES

l. Participants will list the l. Elements of the "A" l. Lecture presentation 1. Workshop Staff three major components of Track

Track "A" of a comprehensive security system.

2. Participants will be able l. Vulnerable areas l. Lecture presentation l. Workshop staff to suggest adequate pro- 2. Relevant protective 2. Group discussion 2. Technical Resource tective devices for ten devices 3. Audio-visual presentation (optional) of the twenty most vulner- (opti ona l) able areas of a multifamily residence.

3. Participants will list the l. Definition of tech- l. Lecture presentation l. Workshop staff advantages and disadvan- nological detective 2. Group discussion 2. Technical Resource tages of three technolo- devices 3. Audio-visual presentation (optional) gical detective devices. 2. Advantages (optional) 3. Disadvantages

4. Participants will outline l. Description and dis- l. lecture presentation l. Workshop staff the four major steps in- cussion of steps 2. Group discussion 2. Technical Resource volved in obtaining adequate involved 3. Role play (optional) security services from

local law enforcement

agencies.

5. Participants will describe l. Role of supplemental 1. Lecture presentation l. Workshop staff the three major functions personnel 2. Technical Resource of supplemental security 2. Scope of functions (optional) personnel.

6. Participants will describe l. Alternate strategies l. Lecture presentation l. Workshop staff three alternate strategies 2. Administering, train- 2. Group discussion 2. Technical Resource co for organizing supplemental ing, and equipping 3. Role play (optional) security personnel.
MODULE IV: SOFTWARE (TRACK 118 11 ) COMPONENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY SYSTEM

OBJECTIVE CONTENT ~1ETHODOLOGY RESOURCES

l. Participants will list l. Self-protective l. Lecture presentation l. Workshop staff five types of self- measures 2. Group discussion 2. Technical Resource protective measures which 3. Audio-visual presentation (opti ona1) residents can take to (opt iona1) lessen their vulnerability

to crime.

2. Participants will cite l. Resident attitudes l. Lecture presentation l. Workshop staff four factors which tend 2. Resident standards 2. Group discussion 2. Technical Resource to prevent residents from (opti ona1) speaking out against crime

in their conmunity.

3. Participants will suggest l. Importance of social l. Lecture presentation l. Workshop staff ten community agencies service support to 2. Group discussion 2. Technical Resource which can assist in a a comprehensive (opti ona 1) comprehensive security security program.

program. 2. List and description

of agency types and

functions.

3. Strategies for coordinating with community agencies.
MODULE V: DEFENSIBLE SPACE

OBJECTIVE CONTENT METHODOLOGY RESOURCES

l. Participants will define l. Definitions l. Lecture 1. Workshop staff the terms II territori a1 2. Group discussion

area ll and II zone of

transition. II

2. Participants will suggest l. Definition l. Lecture l. Workshop staff three alternate strategies 2. Strategies 2. Group discussion 2. Technical Resource for creating surveillance (optional) opportunities.

3. Participants will suggest l. Definition 1. Lecture l. Workshop staff two ways of controlling 2. Strategies 2. Group discussion 2. Technical Resource public grounds. (optional)

4. Participants will suggest 1. Definition 1. Lecture 1. Workshop staff four ways of controlling 2. Strategies 2. Group discussion 2. Technical Resource interior public spaces (optional) in multi-family dwellings.

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MODULE VI: TURF RECLAMATION

OBJECTI VE CONTENT ~lETHOOOLOGY RESOURCES -------~-------I--------I--------

l. Participants will list l. Overall concept l. Lecture presentation l. Workshop staff the four major elements 2. Elements 2. Group discussion 2. Technical Resource of the process of turf (opti ona l) reclamation.

2. Participants will suggest l. Program description l. Lecture presentation l. Workshop staff three relevant objectives 2. Goals 2. Group discussion 2. Technical Resource for a security program 3. Objectives (optional) based on the principles 4. Tasks

of turf reclamation.

3. Participants will suggest l. Meetings l. Lecture presentation l. Workshop staff four strategies for 2. Involvement in social 2. Group discussion 2. Technical Resource developing a positive activities (optiona l) relationship between law 3. Police department enforcement agencies and community services

residents. 4. Clarification of

scope of police

department function

4. Participants will suggest l. Increasing concern l. Lecture presentation l. Workshop staff five strategies for 2. Working with older 2. Group discussion 2. Technical Resource facilitating mutual community agencies (optional) assistance among 3. Integrating social

community members. activities

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MODULE I

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MODULE I: PLANNING AND ADMINISTERING A SECURITY PROGRAM 

A.	 Introducti on 

Management's role in security must operate within a comprehensive framework -- one which seeks to address all the problems stemming from crime and 

vandalism and which takes account of the complex interrelationships between 

problems and remedies. The residents of public housing have a wide range of 

security needs. The competent housing manager is both sensitive to this fact 

and is committed to the success of the social service program within his or 

her development. A manager needs several skills to implement a successful 

security program: the ability to accurately determine security needs within 

a development, the ability to locate and effectively utilize community resources to help meet those needs, the ability to develop program strategies 

to meet needs which cannot be met by outside resources, the ability to 

evaluate the effectiveness of the security program, and the ability to obtain 

funds for the security program. 

B.	 Objectives 

1.	 Participants will be able to operationally define security. 

2.	 Participants will list the five steps involved in planning and


administering a comprehensive security system.


3.	 Participants will identify ten variables which must be examined


in analyzing the facts about security in a community.


4.	 Participants will define goals, objectives, and tasks as they


relate to developing program strategies.


5.	 Participants will describe "check," "treat," and "cure" security


actions and define management's differing role in implementing


such actions.


6.	 Participants will list the five categories of program evaluation. 

7.	 Participants will define the ten major elements of a proposal. 
- 24 ­


c. Conten~

1. Developing an Operational Definition of Security 

Before planning a comprehensive security program to meet resident's security needs t it is important to develop an operational 

definition of security. 

In developing an operational definition of securitYt management t 

residents t and other key interests should determine for themselves the 

scope of their residential security concerns. The following considerations should be taken into account when formulating a working definition: 

Types of Offenses - Residential security implies the absence of 

vandalism t assault t homicide t mail theft t rape/sex offenses t 

arson t burglarYt robberYt automobile theft t purse snatching t 

and drug abuse. 

Location - Managers are generally concerned only with security 

problems that arise within project boundaries. However, some 

offenses within the project may not be viewed as security problems t 

while others beyond project boundaries may be considered residential 

in nature. CommonlYt residential security focuses more on crimes 

between strangers rather than on crimes between acquaintances. 

Opinions often vary as to the extent to which crimes of fraud t 

victimless crimes t minor disturbances of the peace t and parking 

violations should be treated as security problems. On the other 

hand t crimes on adjacent or nearby streets may be seen as so 

closely associated with the residential environment as to merit 

treatment as security problems of the project itself. 
- 25 ­


Illegal Access - While protection of the individual dwelling unit 

against illegal entry is a basic requirement for good security, 

residents' security cannot be defined solely in such terms. It 

is often difficult to strictly limit access to common interior 

and exterior areas. 

The Subjective Sense of Security - Fear of crime (or sometimes 

the absence of such fear) itself constitutes a serious security 

problem. Such fears must be dealt with, even when the actual 

danger of becoming a victim of crime is remote. 

A good security program will reduce the exaggerated fears of 

those who act unreasonably fearful and also build a healthy respect 

for personal safety among those who are inappropriately fearless. 

2.	 Assessing Security Needs 

a.	 Making a Preliminary Estimate - At the outset of planning, management should make a preliminary estimate or rough appraisal of 

problems, constraints, goals, remedial measures, and further planning tasks. The preliminary appraisal should include problem 

analysis by management staff, policy input from administrative 

officials, and input from residents. 

b.	 Obtaining and Analyzing the Facts - The fullest possible investigation should be made of the facts bearing upon security problems, 

resources, and constraints. Questions which should ordinarily be 

answered in detail include the following: 

- vlhat is the history of crime in the project? 

- What are the relevant characteristics of offenders and victims? 
- 26 ­


- What are the probable future trends of crime and vandalism 

within the project? 

- What are the relevant characteristics of the surrounding 

neighborhood? 

- What are the social forces at work in the larger community 

which impact project security? 

- What characteristics of the project's residents contribute 

to the encouragement or deterrence of crime and vandalism? 

- What is the nature and degree of residents' fear of crime? 

- What specific physical characteristics of the project's 

buildings and grounds contribute to the encouragement or 

deterrence of crime and vandalism? 

- What is the nature and quality of police department services 

to the project and its residents? 

- What is the nature and quality of other protective services 

within the project? 

- How do general management policies and practices affect 

security? 

- What is the potential of the residents' organization for 

assisting with a security program? 

- To what extent does management have in-house technical 

capabilities in security? 

What additional technical assistance is needed and how can 

it be obtained? 

- What are the options for additional hardware and software 

measures? 

What are the residents· views on various security measures? 

- How does security relate to the project's finances? 

- To what extent can new security measures be financed from 

sources other than the regular operating budget? 

- What social services are needed in connection with project 

securi ty? 

- How do Federal, State, and local laws and regulations 

affect project security? 
- 27 ­


3. Utilizing Community Resources 

Once a list of residents' security needs has been developed and 

prioritized, the next step in implementing a successful security 

program is to locate resources available in the community at large 

which can help meet those needs. After such agencies are located, 

the manager must then establish an effective working relationship 

and coordinating mechanism with them. (Methods for working with 

local law enforcement agencies are discussed in Module II; methods 

for working with supportive social agencies are discussed in 

Module III). 

Most communities have social services available which alleviate 

problems that cause some residents to become involved in crime. 

Information about such services is available through the local 

Health and Welfare Council, supported by the local United Way. 

The mission of the Health and vJelfare Council is to provide information and referral; to promote community planning, coordination and development; and to support and carry out research. As 

part of the information and referral service, most Health and 

Welfare Councils publish a Directory of Community Services. This 

Directory lists all the agencies providing social services to the 

local community and indexes them according to type of service 

provided. 

The Housing Manager will find it useful to compile such information into a list of social services available which would compliment a security program. Such a list should indicate area of 

need, resource, services provided, eligibility requirements, and 

method of contact. 
- 28 ­


4. Developing Security Program Strategies 

Once local law enforcement agencies are effectively being 

utilized, the manager must then note where gaps in security 

lie. Such gaps will occur where local law enforcement agencies 

are unable to meet residents ' security needs either because 

appropriate services do not exist or, as is more often the case, 

because their service capacity is limited. In such cases the 

manager will have to develop and implement supplemental security 

services within the housing developme~t.

There are several steps involved in developing a program 

strategy for new security services to meet the needs of residents 

that cannot be met by local law enforcement agencies. Often 

managers find it helpful to consult with planning specialists in 

this process. The first step is to establish program priorities. 

This includes determining priorities among problem areas, formulating hypotheses about probable causes, outlining possible 

solutions, and deciding on which solutions to implement in each 

problem area. Throughout this process, the manager should be 

clear about the facts and values which influence the development 

of priorities and choice of preferred solutions. 

The next step in developing a program strategy is to set overall 

program goals, and specific objectives and tasks. In moving from 

goals to objectives to tasks, the program planner becomes increasingly specific about how to implement a program strategy. 

Each program strategy generally will have several goals. Goals 
- 29 ­

are general statements of overall program aims. They provide a 

framework for overall program activity which reflects planning 

priorities. Each goal in turn should have several objectives. 

Objectives are specific statements of strategies for solving 

problems and implementing goals. Objectives should be measurable 

and tell who is going to do what to whom. Each objective in turn 

should have several tasks. Tasks are the specific activities which 

must be performed to meet an objective. 

Any comprehensive approach to security requires three types of 

action: 

"Check" - actions which directly deter or control the problem, 

such as locks and security guards. 

"Treat" - actions which address the surface causes of problems, 

such as diverting youthful energy from vandalism to sports 

activities. 

"Cure" - actions which address the root causes of problems, 

such as improving economic and educational opportunities. 

Comprehensive security actions must be directed to each of these 

three levels simultaneously, with the goal of decreasing check 

actions over time, while increasing treat and cure actions. However, check actions tend to be prerequisite to substantial progress 

at the other two levels. 

5.	 Focusing Management's Role in Security Actions 

1.	 Management's role in "check" actions should focus on direct 

protective measures which are fundamental requirements of good 

security and which can be implemented relatively quickly. 
- 30 ­


2.	 /·1anagement's role in "treat" actions should be of a secondary 

focus. Outside resources and coordination with other key 

participants are of more importance in managing treat actions. 

3.	 Management's role in "cure" actions in most instances will lie 

in coordinating the efforts of local social service agencies in 

providing programs such as job training and placement, educational opportunities, family counseling, offender rehabilitation, 

health care, and help for the emotionally disturbed. However, 

management can and should take a very strong direct role in one 

vital "cure" action - improving residents' attitudes and helping 

them develop enforcement standards. (See materials on turf 

reclamation). Although "cure" actions require long-term efforts 

to be successful, they offer the best chance for satisfactorily 

solving the problems of crime and vandalism. 

6.	 Evaluating Security Programs 

After goals, objectives, and tasks are set, and before program 

strategies are actually implemented, the manager must develop plans 

for evaluation. Evaluations are done to discover whether and how 

well objectives are being met. Good evaluations should: 

(1)	 identify goals/objectives to be evaluated. 

(2)	 measure the degree of change which results from


program activity.


(3)	 determine the cause of observed changes, and 

(4)	 indicate the durability of effects. 
- 31 ­


Edward A. Suchman has categorized evaluations according to the type 

of program effects they attempt to measure. 

(1)	 Effort evaluations look at the quantity ar~ quaZity of activity~

assessing the input of energy rather than output. They look 

at what was done and to what extent it was done. 

(2)	 Performance evaluations measure the results of effort rather 

than the effort itself. They look at amounts of service 

given rather than attempts to serve. 

(3) Adequacy	 evaluations measure how adequate performance is relative 

to total need. Although intensive programs are often highly successful with small numbers of clients, they may be thoroughly 

inadequate for meeting total need. 

(4)	 Efficiency evaluations look at cost/benefits and attempt to 

determine if there are less costly ways of meeting objectives. 

(5)	 Process evaluations look at the whys and wherefores of 

program success in an attempt to make sense from program results. 

For more information about these categories, see Suchman's book, 

Evaluative Research, (Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1967). 

A good program evaluation will include all five types. This will 

insure that the way in which services were provided was the most costeffective way of providing meaningful services of high quality in an 

amount adequate to meet total need. 

Generally, outside consultants are less biased in evaluating programs. However, they are more costly. Whoever performs the evaluation 

will need a clear statement of program objectives, and a pre-measure 

to insure that measured effects were the result of the program being 

evaluated and not some other factor. The pre-measure/post-measure 

evaluation measures for intended effects both before and after a service 

is given and then compares the results. 
- 32 ­


7. Obtaining Funds for Security Programs 

Once program strategies have been fully developed and once plans 

for evaluation and coordination have been completed, the planning 

phase of a program is complete. In those cases where funds are 

not available, a proposal must be written to obtain the necessary 

program funds. Often it is the manager who is responsible for 

developing such a proposal. 

Although different funding sources have specific requirements 

for proposals, most proposals generally include the following 

sections: 

(1)	 Introduction - a background description about the


development's history, goals, and objectives.


(2)	 Problem Statement - a description of the purpose of the 

proposed program and the problem or problems it will 

address. 

(3)	 Program Goal - the overall goals the proposed program 

will effect. 

(4)	 Program Objectives - quantified statements about what the 

proposed program will accomplish. 

(5)	 Docu~entation of Need - statistical backup information that 

indicates that there is a need for the proposed program. 

(6)	 Program Strategies - a description of specific activities 

and tasks which will be included in the program. 

(7)	 Monitoring and Evaluation - a plan for keeping track of 

program progress and/or looking at the program at its 

completion to see if the objectives have been met. 

(8)	 Work Schedule - a time line indicating when major tasks 

will start and finish. 

(9)	 PersonneZ - a description of what staff will be needed 

to operate the program. 

(10)	 Budget - how much money each part of the program will cost. 

Program costs usually include: direct labor costs, including 

fringe benefits; overhead or rent; work materials, such as 

duplication and office supplies; travel; and consultation. 
- 33 ­


D.	 Methodology 

1.	 Lecture 

a.	 Assessing Security Needs 

b.	 Util izing Community Resources 

c.	 Developing Program Strategies 

d.	 Evaluating Security Programs 

e.	 Obtaining funds for Security Programs 

2.	 Group Discussion 

a.	 Elements of an operational definition of comprehensive security. 

b.	 Applications of security planning to participants l own communities. 

3.	 Planning exercise in which participants plan a security system for 

a hypothetical community or for their own communities. 

E.	 Resources 

Fielding, Byron, "Safety and Security in Multiple Family Complexes: 

How to achieve it, How to maintain it," Journal of Housing, (June 1971) 

Newman, Oscar, Architectural Design for Crime Prevention, National 

Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Washington, D.C., 

1973. 

Hiblett, Jack, IlHow to Set Up a Building Security Program," College and 

University Business, (August, 1971), pp. 33-34. 

Suchman,	 Edward A., Evaluative Research, Russell Sage Foundation, New 

York, 1967. 

F.	 Film Sources 

Architecture and Engineering Division, U. S. Department of Housing and 

Urban Development, Washington, D. C., 20410. 

Telephone: 1-202-755-5718. 

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), Audio Visual Communications Division, U. S. Department of Justice, 633 Indiana Avenue, 

N.W., Washington, D. C., 20531. 

Telephone: 1-202-376-3663. 
- 34 -

National Audio Visual Center, General Services Administration,

Reference Section, Washington, D.C., 20409.

Telephone: 1-301-763-1896.

University of Illinois, Visual Aid Service, 1325 S. Oak, Champaign,

Illinois, 61820.

Telephone: 1-217-333-1361.
- 35 ­


MODULE II

- 36 ­


MODULE II: SECURITY DEFINED 

A.	 Introducti on 

An effective security program requires the integration of varied 

approaches to solving security problems. This module expands on traditional 

notions of security to develop an operational definition. The importance 

of each element of the comprehensive definition must be understood before 

security problems in multi-family housing can be effectively addressed. 

B.	 Objectives 

1.	 Participants will be able to differentiate between the elements of 

a traditional definition of security and the elements of a more 

comprehensive definition. 

2.	 Participants will be able to define and measure criminal


victimization.


3.	 Participants will be able to differentiate between actual


criminal victimization and fear of criminal victimization .


. C. Content 

1.	 Traditional Definition 

Traditional definitions of security involve systems which concern 

themselves with apprehending criminals. These systems utilize 

police and security forces, technological detection devices, and 

residential protection devices. 

2.	 Comprehensive Definition 

A comprehensive definition of security addresses the individual's 

right to be free from criminal victimization and his or her 

right to feel secure, in addition to the need for apprehending 

criminals. 
- 37 -

(a) Criminal victimization is the actual perpetration of a

criminal act against person or property. It can be

objectively measured through measures of crime rates.

(b) The psychological need of people to feel secure, although

much more difficult to quantify, is just as important to

the success of a security program. Such psychological

needs must be dealt with extensively in a comprehensive

security system.

ELEMENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE

APPROACH TO SECURITY

TRACK "All HARm~ARE

(checking crime)

- Police Personnel

TRACK "Btl SOFTWARE

(creating an atmosphere which deters

crime)

- Utilization of Community

Personnel - security guards - volunteer

- paid

- Technological Detection Devices

- walkie-talkie

- television surveillance

equipment

- Hardware

- locks

- bolts

- Turf Reclamation

- establishing neighborhood values

- setting neighborhood

standards

- establishing alternatives to negative

behavior

- creating neighborhood

satisfaction

- Defensible Space

- ground/structure

modification
- 38 -

D. Methodology

1. Lecture presentation to differentiate between traditional and

comprehensive definitions of security.

2. Group discussion.

a. Factors leading to fear of criminal victimization.

b. Reasons why differing approaches to security emerged.

c. Pros and cons with the traditional definition.

d. The psychological fear of criminal victimization.

3. Visual aids from local libraries and/or police department presentations depicting the types of crime that can take place when

security precautions are not in effect.

E. Resources

Revised Curriculum Module for Security in Multi-Family Housing, Center

for Social Policy and Community Development, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa., April, 1973.

Fielding, Byron, "Safety and Security in Multiple Family Complexes:

How to ach i eve it, How to ma i nta in it," Journa1 of Housi ng,

(June, 1971), pp. 277-281.

Post, Richard, "Security Takes ~lore Than Locks and Cops," College

and University Business, (August, 1971), pp. 33-4.

F. Film Sources

Architecture and Engineering Division, U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., 20410.

Telephone: 1-202-755-5718.

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), Audio Visual Communications Division, U. S. Department of Justice, 633 Indiana Avenue,

N.W., Washington, D.C., 20531.

Telephone: 1-202-376-3663.
- 39 -

National Audio Visual Center, General Services Administration

Reference Section, Washington, D.C., 20409.

Telephone: 1-301-763-1896.

University of Illinois, Visual Aid Service, 1325 S. Oak, Champaign,

Illinois, 61820.

Telephone: 1-217-333-1361.
- 40 -

MODULE III
- 41 ­


MODULE III:	 HARDWARE (TRACK "A") COMPONENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE 

SECURITY SYSTEM 

A.	 Introduction 

Hardware ranges from simple deadlock bolts to elaborate closedcircuit television systems with cameras costing as much as $18)000 each. 

Not all hardware is equally effective) and hardware alone cannot offer 

complete protection against criminal victimization. Hardware is helpful) 

however) inasmuch as it can prevent crime by keeping criminals out) can discourage crime by making it too difficult or risky) or can be used to call for 

help once a crime takes place. 

B.	 Objectives 

1.	 Participants will 1ist the three major components of Track "A"


of a comprehensive security system.


2.	 Participants will be able to suggest adequate protective devices


for ten of the twenty most vulnerable areas of a multi-family


residence.


3.	 Participants will list the advantages and disadvantages of


three technological detection devices.


4.	 Participants will outline the four major steps involved in


obtaining adequate security services from local law


enforcement agencies.


5.	 Participants will describe the three major functions of


supplemental security personnel.


6.	 Participants will describe three alternate strategies for


organizing supplemental security personnel.


C.	 Content 

The Two-Track approach toward developing a total security system is 

a systems approach which aims both at deterring criminal victimization 

and at creating and maintaining a sense of safety. 
- 42 ­


To deter criminal victimization, the system must include residential 

protection devices, technological detection devices, and effective police 

and security personnel. 

1.	 Protective Devices 

Such devices include locks, bolts, lights, grills, and screens. In 

a housing complex, different areas are vulnerable to different kinds of 

crime and must be protected with different devices. Core facilities such 

as the heating plant, cooling system, water system, and electrical system 

are especially vulnerable to vandalism. Apartment units are prone to 

burglary and need good unit protective devices. Common areas such as 

lobbies, halls, and laundry rooms are subject to outside intruders. The 

following items list how to maximally protect various areas within a 

housing project. 

(a) Supplies, Meters, Boilers	 - Meters and supplies should be 

locked. Keys to those areas should be controlled. Items 

should be marked for easy identification. 

(b)	 Roof - Skylights should be secured by tamper-proof grills 

or bars. Fire exits should open only from the inside and 

should be equipped with a device which sounds an alarm 

if opened. 

(c)	 Basement - Access from the basement should only be to the 

ground floor. Exits from the basement to the rest of the 

building should be kept locked from the outside. 

(d)	 Elevators - Elevators are generally considered to be the 

hardest area to protect. They should be provided with 24­

hour vandal-resistant lighting; a convex mirror in an upper 
- 43 ­

back corner; an audio-intercom or CCTV, recessed against 

vandalism; and a heavy plastic shield for indicator lights. 

In	 addition, the elevator waiting areas should be full'y 

visible from the lobby or beyond, with no blind corners. 

A guard should be able to stop the elevator if an intruder 

pushes in. Finally, if local codes permit, the emergency 

stop button should be eliminated. 

(e)	 Stairwells - Stairwells should be provided with 24-hour, 

vandal-resistant lighting. Entry from the stairwell to 

the upper halls should be restricted. 

(f)	 Fire Doors - Fire doors should be equipped with panic hardware, 

such as a vertical bolt or crash bar inside, and an automatic 

closing mechanism. An alarm should sound when the door is 

opened. 

(g)	 Entry Door - There preferably should be only one entry door. 

There should also be an intercom system with a buzzer to enable 

residents to control access to the building. All secondary 

doors should be as well protected as the main door and monitored 

in the same way. 

(h)	 Doors - Doors should be least 1-3/4 inch thick, preferably 

metal or metal sheathed or at least of solid core wood. Doors 

should be flush to the wall and be equipped with a wide-angle 

lens peephole. If doors are made of sliding glass, they should 

be break resistant and lock from the inside. 
- 44 -

(i) Door Frames - Door frames should be heavy duty, preferably

metal; solid; flush with the wall; and have tamper-resistant

connectors.

(j) Door Hinges - Door hinges should be heavy duty and placed on

the inside of the door.

(k) Locks - Locks should be well made one-inch dead latches, with

a six-pin brass cylinder. The best lock for security purposes

is the double-keyed type which requires a key to lock and unlock

both sides. Spring latches are not recommended. Locks should

be changed for each new tenant.

(1) Windows - Windows need locks, preferably of a key type. Ground

level windows and windows on fire escapes or over ledges and

balconies need security screens, grills, or bars, (removable

from the inside).

(m) Alarms - Alarms can be either local or central (connected to

police or other security persons). Alarms are useless unless

someone hears and responds to them.

(n) Lobby - Lobbies should be provided with 24-hour, vandalresistant lighting. There should be no dark corners or hiding

places. Access to the lobby should be controlled and doors

should open out.

(0) Mailboxes - Mailboxes should be constructed of heavy-gauge

metal, without perforations. Cylinder locks should be used.

Access to mailboxes should be controlled.
- 45 ­

(p)	 Laundry Rooms/Social Areas - Such areas should be near the 

lobby, not in basements. They should preferably have some 

sort of monitoring system. Tokens should be used for laundry 

machines instead of cash. There should be a separate area 

for teenage socializing. 

(q) Storage	 Rooms - Storage areas should contain extra strong 

locks and doors; access to such areas should be controlled. 

(r)	 Office - The office should be visible from the lobby. Its 

safe should be bolted to the floor. Collection windows should 

be equipped with grills or bars and provided with an alarm. 

There should be a special locked cabinet for master keys and 

other valuables. 

(s) Parking	 Lot - Parking lots need good lighting and some kind of 

monitoring system. They should be in a highly visible area 

and access to them should be restricted. 

(t)	 Fire Escapes - The lowest f:re escape ladder should normally 

be 12 feet from the ground. Fire escapes should be visible 

from the ground underneath. 

2.	 Technological Detection Devices 

(a)	 Communication devices, most commonly walkie-talkies, playa 

key role in any security system. Call boxes are another 

communications option and are less expensive. 

(b) Vehicles,	 especially motor scooters, are useful if a project 

is large or has numerous winding paths and streets. 

(1) Vehicles, however,	 decrease personal contact between 

guards and residents. 
- 46 ­


(2) Vehicles also discourage guards from patrolling the 

interiors of high-rises. 

(c) Closed-circuit television monitors can be effective but 

expensive. 

3. Municipal Police Personnel 

(a) The Role of the Police Department 

(1)	 The primary responsibility for police services in all 

public housing complexes rests with the local police 

department. 

(2)	 Maximum reliance on local police avoids wasting resources 

and conflicts in operations due to fragmentation of the 

development's security system from police services. 

(3)	 Reliance on other security personnel should be made only 

when it clearly promises to better provide needed protection for the project and its residents. 

(b)	 The Importance of Deterrence 

(1)	 Although effective as a deterrent, arrests are an inadequate 

measure of police success. Police Department strategy should 

also stress deterrence - a strategy which will either discourage attempts at crime or detect and stop them before they 

can be committed. 

(2)	 A highly visible police presence is necessary for maximum 

deterrence. Police ~atrols should not be limited to public 

streets. Foot patrols should also be encouraged. 
- 47 ­

(c) Obtaining Police Department Services 

Management's ultimate objective should be to obtain all the 

policing services needed for the property and its residents from 

the police department. If additional services or changes in 

existing services are needed, the following steps are recommended: 

(1) Preparation	 - Demands for additional and/or different services 

must be justified. Before requesting additional police 

services, management should be able to demonstrate having made 

reasonable efforts to remedy security problems through other 

measures. 

(2) Requesting	 Additional/Different Services - Management should 

be forceful in pressing its demands. However, the best 

initial approach is one of amicable persuasion, with promise 

of full cooperation on the part of management and the resident 

organization. In meeting with police officials, management 

should be represented by executive level personnel. Consultants should be employed if needed. 

(3) Appeals	 to Other Local Officials - If, because of funding 

constraints or other reasons, the police cannot or will not 

satisfy the need for additional or different services, management should make a vigorous appeal to appropriate officials 

in the local government. While it is highly desirable that 

management and police cooperate to the fullest, if there is 

a disagreement, management should press its case. In either 

event, the support of residents and the wider community can 

greatly strengthen management's case. 
- 48 ­

(4)	 Continuing Efforts - If adequate police protection cannot 

be obtained, management may be required to utilize security 

personnel. Even after such measures are instituted, however, 

management should continue to try to obtain needed police 

services with the aim of reducing the need for security 

personnel. 

4.	 Security Personnel 

To the extent that adequate police services cannot be obtained from 

the local police department, management should consider the use of 

security personnel. 

(a) Planning for Security Personnel	 - Management should proceed 

slowly in establishing a security force. In fact, the need 

for careful planning increases with the degree of unmet 

policing needs. A list of basic questions for planning a 

security force follows: 

(1)	 What are the total policing needs which cannot be met 

by the police department? 

(2)	 What should be the scope of function for security personnel? 

(3)	 What specific types of security personnel should be used? 

(4)	 How should security personnel be organized? 

(5)	 What kind of administration, training and equipment will the 

security personnel require? 

(6)	 How will funding con$iderations affect the choice of options? 

(b)	 Scope of Security Personnel Function - The fundamental issue in 

determining the scope of security personnel function is whether 
- 49 ­


they will be utilized to supplant or to supplement police 

department services. Some large housing authorities have 

organized their own security forces with functions and powers 

tantamount to those of regular police departments, but with 

jurisdiction limited to specific projects. Such forces handle 

all policing services, including patrolling, guarding, apprehension, arrest and investigation. Such operations require enabling 

legislation and/or an agreement with the local governing body, 

and are suitable only for very large housing operations. 

For most projects, large-scale operations of a broad scope 

are neither feasible nor suitable. Most security personnel are 

used to supplement the services of the regular police and to 

provide services which the local police cannot. Security forces 

discussed in this workshop are of this nature. 

Whether a supplemental security force consists of a single 

nightwatchman or a sizeable force of patrolmen and stationary 

guards, its emphasis should be on non-forceful deterrence, with 

the objective of dissuading potential offenders from attempting 

crimes before they can be committed. Such security forces 

should rely upon municipal police backup for apprehension and 

arrest. 

While the visibility of a security presence is important, 

the credibility of security personnel is dependent upon their 

actual and perceived ability to bring force to bear if 

necessary. Therefore they must be able to obtain prompt police 
- 50 -

department intervention. Security personnel themselves should

also have some capacity for using force in emergency situations

even if only for self-defense. It is preferable that their use

of force be minimal.

(c) Types of Functions of Security Personnel - Security personnel

can perform three basic types of operational functions: patrolling, stationary guarding, and monitoring electronic alarm and

surveillance systems.

(1) Patrolling-Patrolling makes maximum use of manpower in

relatively large areas. Patrolling can range from using a

single nightwatchman to using a sizeable 24-hour patrol

force. However, patrolling is neither more nor less superior

to other operational methods. Generally, it does extend a

persona1 securi ty presence over a wi despread area. "Verti ca1

patrolling" in lobbies,elevators, hallways, and fire stairwells is just as important as patrolling exterior public

spaces.

(2) Stationary Guarding - Stationary guards, either as doormen

or lobby monitors, are often used to provide security at

lobby entrances. They may screen entries, perform general

surveillance, and provide incidental assistance to residents.

The same technique can be applied at other strategic points

within buildings and on project grounds. A guard positioned

at an outdoor station which commands the main exterior

approaches, recreational areas, and parking lots may be more
- 51 -

cost-effective than a number of patrolmen. Protective

hardware devices can have a crucial impact on the effectiveness of stationary guards. For example, the presence

of unsecured secondary access doors largely defeats the

effectiveness of lobby guards.

(3) Monitoring Electronic Alarm and Surveillance Systems ­

Monitors of such systems must be able to secure the prompt

dispatch of police officers or security patrol personnel to

the scene of an emergency. Stationary guards may also

double as monitors of surveillance systems.

(d) Ways of Organizing Security Personnel

There are three basic ways of organizing security forces:

management-controlled forces, resident patrols, and contracted

guard services.

(1) Management Controlled Forces - Such forces are an integral

part of management's overall organizational structure. Their

members are directly paid by management, which has ultimate

authority in hiring, supervising, and firing. The major

advantage of such a force is its manageability. Such forces

can vary considerably both in scope of function and in type

of function.

(2) Resident/Tenant Patrols - In their purest form, such patrols

are wholly comprised of volunteer residents of the project.

They may work independently or under the auspices of the

residents' association. Management sometimes pays for uniforms
- 52 ­

and	 equipment and, in some cases, pays patrol supervisors 

for	 their services. The degree of management control will 

depend largely upon its financial support. 

Resident patrols have achieved positive results in a 

number of instances, both in patrolling and in stationary 

guard functions. Usually the impetus for establishing a 

resident patrol comes from residents themselves; however, 

if management discerns a potential receptivity among residents, it should take the lead in encouraging and guiding 

resident participation of this type. 

Resident security patrols can serve as valuable adjuncts 

to police or paid security personnel efforts. Nevertheless, 

they do have potential drawbacks. Lacking effective control, 

management may find its objectives and strategies in conflict 

with those of the security patrol. 

(3)	 Contract Guard Services - These services may be purchased 

by management from commercial agencies. Since such personnel 

are employees of the agency, management's basis for supervision is apt to be tenuous, and its only recourse for poor 

performance may be terminating the contract. It is advisable 

to thoroughly investigate an agency before contract negotiation. 

(e) Administering, Training, and Eguipping Security Forces 

(1)	 Management control over the security force should be strictly 

maintained, with clearly defined lines of accountability. 
- 53 ­

(2) Strong supervision	 is crucial, particularly for large 

security forces. This involves analyzing current security 

conditions and planning operations. The supervisor should 

assure that personnel stay on the job and perform their 

assigned tasks. Sanctions for infractions must be invoked 

firmly, fairly and promptly. Supervisors should inspect 

and brief patrolmen and guards before each shift and should 

make frequent spot-checks during each shift. 

(3) Qualifications for supervisors should	 be especially high 

with respect to training, experience, and temperment. The 

ideal supervisor has had professional police training and 

experience, is able to exercise discipline, has a broad 

understanding of social dynamics, and shows some degree of 

sensitivity. The chief supervisor must be able to command 

respect and work closely with other management personnel, 

residents, the police department, and local social service 

agencies. Although such individuals can be expected to 

command high salaries, it is false economy to seriously compromise these standards. 

(4)	 Personnel selection standards should be stringent, and applicants should be carefully screened. Security personnel must 

be able to inspire general confidence and respect, as well 

as perform the specific tasks assigned to them. Screening 

should emphasize eliminating applicants who seem emotionally 

unfit or who seem likely to abuse their authority. 
- 54 ­


(5)	 Employment of residents for security forces has generally 

brought favorable results. A prime advantage is that 

residents know the project and other residents and tend 

to become strongly committed to their jobs. A possible 

disadvantage is that residents may be subject to undue 

pressures by their neighbors. 

(6)	 Performance standards should be clearly defined and 

thoroughly understood by all security personnel. 

(7) Training	 is essential for all security personnel. A formal 

course of some duration is generally recommended. Training 

should be conducted by qualified professionals and should 

cover: general management structure and operations; physical 

and social characteristics of the project; policing techniques and equipment; social aspects of the security guard's 

role; and the purpose, organization, and specific functions 

of the security force. Regular police officers, social 

service professionals, and leaders of the residents' organization, as well as management officers, should participate 

in training sessions. Special attention should be given to 

instructions in the proper use of firearms if they are to 

be issued to security personnel. 

(8)	 The number of security personnel needed for a particular 

project is subject to too many variables to permit use of a 

general formula for manpower estimates. In practice, ratios 

range from between 160 person hours and 80 person hours per 
- 55	 ­

week	 for each 1,000 residents. A single lobby guard 

cannot be expected to provide screening for more than 

about 200 apartment units. 

(9) Scheduling.	 Maximizing effectiveness of security personnel requires a thorough analysis of the chronological 

pattern of the project's security problems. Concentration 

of services during highest crime hours is the best use of 

costly security manpower. Characteristics and life styles 

of residents are important elements to consider, and 

patterns for elderly projects are apt to differ greatly from 

those for family projects. In some projects, a special 

factor is added on days when social security and welfare 

checks are delivered, bringing an increase in mugging and 

mail thefts. 

(10)	 Costs of security personnel are high. Although salary and 

benefits take the largest part of overall costs, equipment 

can require substantial expenditures. Salaries will vary 

according to local wage rates, and the qualifications and the 

duties expected of workers. To obtain personnel with qualifications which are similar to those of municipal police, 

relatively high rates of compensation must be paid. 

(11) Uniforms,	 when worn by patrolmen and stationary guards, 

achieve a highly visible security presence and instill pride 

and confidence. Uniforms may be similar to those usually 

worn by municipal pol ice or may be of a more "civil ian" 
- 56	 ­


design if such a design will create a better rapport with 

the	 community. In either case, uniforms should be both 

professional and distinctive. Personnel should be required 

to maintain their uniforms and the off-duty wearing of 

uniforms should be prohibited. 

(12)	 Individual equipment should include reliable two-way communication units, and self-defensive weapons, if desired. 

Firearms are the most controversial type of equipment. They 

should be issued only to responsible and well-trained individuals when considered necessary for self-defense. 

(13)	 Legal considerations should be checked out in advance by 

management's attorney. State and local laws may impose 

strict requirements for security personnel, and licensing 

may be required. Certain types of communications networks 

are subject to federal regulation. In some cases, management can be held liable for the acts or omissions of 

security personnel. 

D. Methodology 

1. Lecture presentations 

a. The components of the Two-Track Approach. 

b. The role of Protective Devices. 

c. The role of Security Personnel. 

d. Benefits of Resident Patrols in Security Deterrence. 

2. Group discussion 

a. The benefits of protective devices in security deterrence. 

b. The disadvantages of protective devices. 
- 57 ­

c. The advantages of security personnel in multi-family housing. 

d. The disadvantages of security personnel. 

3. Role Play Scenarios: 

a. Manager asking local authorities for more police protection. 

b. Security personnel encountering various resident problem situations. 

c. Manager supervising security personnel. 

E. Resources 

Liechenstein, Michael I., Reducing Crime in Apartment Dwellings: A


Methodology for Comparing Security Alternatives, Rand Institute


New York, New York, 1971.


Loth, David, "Are You Inviting Burglars?" American Legion fo1aqazine,


(July 1969), pp. 16-20.


Moo1man, Valerie, Practical Ways to Prevent Burglary and Illegal Entry, 

New York, Simon and Schuster, 1970. 

Newman, Oscar, Architectural Design for Crime Prevention, National 

Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Washington, D.C., 

1973. 

Post, Ri chard, "Securi ty Takes ~10re Than Locks and Cops," Co 11 ege and 

University Business, (August 1971), pp. 33-4. 

F. Film Sources 

Architecture and Engineering Division, U. S. Department of Housing and 

Urban Development, Washington, D.C., 20410. 

Telephone: 1-202-755-5718. 

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), Audio Visual Communications Division, U. S. Department of Justice, 633 Indiana Avenue, 

N.W., Washington, D.C., 20531. 

Telephone: 1-202-376-3663. 

National Audio Visual Center, General Services Administration,


Reference Section, Washington, D. C., 20409.


Telephone: 1-301-763-1896.


University of Illinois, Visual Aid Service, 1325 S. Oak, Champaign,


Illinois, 61820.


Telephone: 1-217-333-1361.

- 58 -

MODULE IV
- 59 ­


~~ODULE I V:	 SOFTWARE (TRACK II BI') COMPONENTS OF A CO~1PREHENS IVE SECURITY 

SYSTEM 

A.	 Introduction 

No security program can succeed without the support of a large majority 

of a community's residents. Their role begins with individual responsibility 

for self-protection, and for the individual's observance of the law and other 

community standards. A major dimension of residents' role is the potential of residen1 

organizations to participate in planning and implementing a security program. 

Management should take the lead in bringing residents into a productive 

relationship with the police, social agencies, and management itself in the 

security program. Gradually, residents can assume a greater degree of 

initiative and responsibility for security with management's continuing 

support and guidance. 

B.	 Objectives 

1.	 Participants will list five types of self-protective measures which


residents can take to lessen their vulnerability to crime.


2.	 Participants will cite four factors which tend to prevent resi­


dents from speaking out against crime in their community.


3.	 Participants will suggest ten community agencies which can assist


in a comprehensive security program.


C.	 Content 

1.	 Individual Self-Protection 

The	 following types of ~elf-protective measures for residents should 

be stressed	 in any security program. 

(a)	 Informal resident surveillance, linked to a well-understood


system which will produce a ready response by the police or


security personnel.

---- ------

- 60 ­

(b) Reporting procedures	 for reporting crime, vandalism, or suspicious behavior should be clearly understood by the residents. 

Primary reliance should not be placed upon security personnel 

or other management staff to respond with force or to relay 

reports to the police. 

(c) Locking doors	 is commonly neglected by residents and is a 

significant security problem. 

(d)	 Residents' temporary absences render their dwellings highly 

vulnerable to burglary and vandalism. Residents should take 

measures to lessen the appearance that they are away. Only 

management and a few trusted neighbors should be informed of 

an absence. 

(e)	 Cash and checks should be kept around only to the extent 

necessary. 

(f)	 Admission of strangers calls for extreme caution on the part of 

residents. When lobby doors are kept locked, residents should 

not open the door for persons whom they cannot identify as legitimate callers. Peepholes or chain locks should always be used 

before opening the door of the dwelling unit. Keys to doors 

should be carefully controlled. When keys are lost, locks 

should be changed. 

(g)	 Movement outside, particularly at night, requires due caution, 

especially for women, the elderly, and the disabled. Such residents should be aware of the locations and times of greatest 

danger. Arrangements for escorts may be the best solution. 
- 61 ­


(h)	 Confrontation with criminals should be avoided by residents.


The safest reaction is usually to yield valuables without a


struggle. While self-defense may be warranted in some situa­


tions, aggressiveness may provoke bodily harm.


(i)	 Identification of property, especially items which are the most


attractive targets for theft, facilitates police investigation.


Minimally, residents should maintain a list of valuable items,


including descriptions and serial numbers.


(j)	 Mutual assistance among neighbors can significantly contribute


to security. A resident who is home all day can watch the


dwellings of working neighbors; younger residents can accompany


elderly persons on shopping trips.


(k)	 Conduct of guests is the responsibility of resident hosts, who


should make sure that guests both understand and observe


security procedures and project rules and regulations.


(1) Supervision of children	 is the responsibility of individual


parents. Parents should make certain that children observe


security procedures and project rules and regulations.


2.	 Resident Attitudes and Standards 

To the extent that residents are apathetic about security or are prone 

to condone or commit crime and vandalism, the foundation of the residential security program is imperiled. Efforts to build a positive 

security climate among residents, though often the most difficult 

aspect of a security program, should take high priority. 

It is important to build a sense of community among residents. Every­ • 

thing which contributes to community cohesion, even ordinary social 
- 62 ­


gatherings, is directly related to security. Anonymity is an 

obstacle to security and one of the prime aims of a security 

program should be to encourage residents to become acquainted 

with their neighbors. Positive peer group pressures should be 

encouraged. Even when only a small number of community-minded 

residents exist, they can be encouraged to form the cadre of a 

beginning resident leadership. 

(a) Apathy,	 often the product of resignation, should be broken by 

demonstrating that residents' lives can be significantly improved. Such a demonstration in an area other than security 

may serve as an initial catalyst for developing resident 

concern and involvement. 

(b)	 Self-interest is the most powerful motivation for positive 

resident attitudes and standards. Residents ' own interests 

should be the primary theme of any security education program 

for residents. 

(c)	 Fear of crime may be well-founded, but can seriously impair 

resident participation in a security program. The best approach 

to dealing with such fear is to impart a clear understanding of 

what the actual threat is and the degree of caution which is 

realistically warranted. As various elements of a security 

program are successfully implemented, residents should be made 

aware of them to reverse the cycle of fear and build community 

morale. Both management and the residents' organization should 

systematically combat inaccurate rumors about crime and vandalism. 
- 63 ­


(d)	 Fear of retaliation can significantly hinder resident cooperation, especially in large projects with a high degree of 

anonymity. Such fear may be well justified. Management must 

provide effective protection against retaliation. Although 

residents may be unwilling to report incidents to the police, 

generally they wi11 report them to management if their anonymity is assured 

3. Relations Between Residents and Police/Security Personnel 

If and when relations between residents and police or security 

personnel are poor, a comprehensive security program should work 

at building mutual respect and cooperation. Residents, management, 

• and police officials should meet to identify the causes of the 

problem and plan a course of action to resolve it. It is essential 

that police/security personnel understand residents and their 

problems and explain their own functions, limitations, and probl~~s

to residents. 

4.	 Involving the Resident Organizations 

Security should be one of the principle concerns of the resident organization. The resident organization can participate in 

the following ways: 

(a) Planning the security program. 

(b) Developing and conducting resident education programs. 

(c)	 Setting standards for resident conduct. 

(d) Developing a potential for volunteer resident services. 

(e) Supporting management efforts to obtain municipal services. 
- 64 -

5. Economic Opportunities for Residents

A security program can create economic opportunities for residents, both in the sense of full-time jobs within the program itself,

and in the sense of training for advancement into other jobs. Such

opportunities can enhance residents' interest in, and commitment to,

the security program.

6. Youth Program

Most crime and vandalism is committed by young people between the

ages of 15 and 25. An effective security program must give prime

attention to this age group. A comprehensive security program should

stress:

(a) Parental responsibility for supervising children.

(b) Young residents· participation in planning and carrying out

a security program.

(c) Cultivating lines of communication between management and

youth.

(d) Job opportunities for youth.

(e) Recreational opportunities for youth.

(f) Programs aimed at controlling drug abuse.

(g) Cultivating youth leadership to participate in the

security program.

7. Occupancy Policies and Procedures

It is both permissable and advisable for management to adopt

and enforce policies aimed at excluding those individuals or

families who pose a threat of crime or vandalism, either by evicting

existing residents or by rejecting applications for admission. Such
- 65 ­

policies are legal so long as they do not automatically exclude 

a particular class of persons, such as welfare recipients or 

persons -with criminal records. Whatever policies are adopted 

should be clearly explained to applicants and existing residents. 

8. Co~munity Assistance in the Comprehensive Security Program 

A residential security program should be closely tied to the 

social service programs of local governmental and non-governmental 

agencies. Such services can help alleviate some of the conditions 

which cause security problems. Management should maintain links 

with appropriate community agencies so that their resources can 

be brought to bear when project staff identifies a resident need. 

A staff member should be designated to compile current information 

on social services, to keep residents informed about those services, 

and to make individual referrals as needed. 

(a) Types of Security Related Social Services 

(1) Drug Abuse Programs 

(2) Alcohol Abuse Programs 

(3) Employment Services 

(4) Recreational and Cultural Programs 

(5) Child Care Services 

(6) Family Counseling Services 

(7) Physical and Mental Health Services 

(8) Offender Rehabilitation Services 

(9) Shopping Assistance Programs 

(10) Special Services for the Elderly 

(11) Educational Programs 

(12) Special Banking Services 
- 66 ­

(b)	 Community Planning and Action Committees 

(1)	 Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCCs) 

(2)	 Other Community Organizations 

(3)	 Associations of Owners and Managers 

D.	 Methodology 

1.	 Lecture 

a.	 Factors contributing to resident apathy in controlling 

criminal activity. 

b.	 Role of management in educating residents in security deterrence. 

c.	 Factors leading to better relations between residents and 

security personnel. 

d.	 Basic components of the software approach. 

2.	 Group Discussion 

a.	 Factors which may contribute to criminal activity in public 

housing developments. 

b.	 The traditional role of management in security. 

c.	 Factors leading to resident apathy. 

d.	 Ways of overcoming resident apathy. 

e.	 Methods for improving the relationship between residents and 

police. 

f.	 Roles the community can play in improving security. 

3.	 Interpersonal skills exercises to improve skills in working


with residents and with resident organizations.

- 67 ­


E. Resources 

Giles, John Warren, "The Law Says You Are Responsible for Many Acts 

of Your Children," New Home Guide, (58), pp. 94, 1974. 

Hair, Robert A., and Baker, Sam S., How to Protect Yourself Today, 

Stein and Day, New York, 1970. 

E. Film Sources 

Architecture and Engineering Division, U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., 20410. 

Telephone: 1-202-755-5718. 

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), Audio Visual Communications Division, U. S. Department of Justice, 633 Indiana Avenue, 

N.W., Washington, D. C., 20531. 

Telephone: 1-202-376-3663. 

National Audio Visual Center, General Services Administration,


Reference Section, Washington, D.C., 20409.


Telephone: 1-301-763-1896.


University of Illinois, Visual Aid Service, 1325 S. Oak, Champaign, 

III i no is, 61820. 

Telephone: 1-217-333-1361. 
- 68 ­


MODULE V

- 69 ­


~OOULE V: DEFENSIBLE SPACE 

A.	 Introduction 

The concept of defensible space, developed by Oscar Newman, is based 

upon the premise that physical design characteristics can maximize resident 

control of behavior and that residents will maintain a greater sense of 

security if they are better able to define their immediate surroundings as 

belonging to them for more exclusive use. A residential environment defined 

under defensible space guidelines clearly defines all areas as public, semiprivate or private. This is done by modifying grounds and structures with 

fences, landscaping, and redirecting the utilization of space. 

Provisicn of defensible space mechanisms is best achieved in a project's 

inception; however, a variety of techniques can be used to create defensible 

space in existing residential areas. Defensible space generally emphasizes 

psychological or "symbolic" barriers. 

B.	 Objectives 

1.	 Participants l",i11 define the terms "territorial area" and "zone


of transition."


2.	 Participants will suggest three alternate strategies for creating 

surveillance opportunities. 

3.	 Participants will suggest two ways of controlling public grounds. 

4.	 Participants will suggest four ways of controlling interior


public spaces in multi-family dwellings.


C.	 Content 

l.	 Creating Territorial Areas - A project's site should be subdivided 

so that all areas of it are related to particular buildings or clusters 

of buildings. No area should be unassigned or left "public.;' Grounds 
- 70 -

should be aliocated to spec~fic buildings or clusters of buildings.

Creating territorial areas can have the effect of assigning responsibility for maintenance and security to certain residents.

2. Definina Zones of Transition •

Boundaries can be real or symbolic. Symbolic barriers do not physically prevent intrusion, but indicate to an entrant that he is entering

into a restricted space. Such boundaries can occur in moving from the

public street to more semi-private lobby to the corridors of each floer

in a high-rise. \ Physical features like low Wei is, shrubs, and changing

surface textures are indicators of transition zcnes. Because they

indicate to an outsider that he is intruding into a private domain,

they aid in restricting behav~or to that which residents find acceptable.

3. Locatino Amenities

Design and location of recreational and open-space areas shculd follow

the needs, capabilities, and expectations of their projected users.

When outdoor activities are located in areas adjacent to homes, residents tend to assume a further realm of territory and further responsibility. Children one to five years in age are mo~t comfortable playing

in areas i~mediately adjacent to their buildings. Play areas for

children five to t~eive years of age should be large enough to accommodate more active play and sufficiently secarated from dwellings to

reduce noise. They should, however, remain in view of most dwellings.

Play areas for twelve to eighteen year olds should not be located

immediately adjacent to homes, but should not be iocated in isolated

areas. If they are too distant from dwellings they become neglecte~,

vandalized, or under-used. They are best bordered on three or four
- 71 ­

sides by dwelling units. Green areas unencumbered by play facilities 

are favored by older residents, but are generally souaht after by 

seven to fifteen year olds for use as playgrounds. Such areas should 

therefore be protected by judicious placement of trees and shrubs. 

The best guarantee that these areas will be protected is through the 

provision of sufficient play areas and equipment. 

4.	 Creating Surveillance Opportunities 

Surveillance is a major crime deterrent and contributor to the image 

of a safe environment. By allowing residents to monitor activities in 

those areas adjacent to their dwellings, surveillance opportunities 

allow them to feel more secure in those areas and deter potential 

criminals. Access from public streets to units should be as direct as 

possible. Residents should also be able to scan an area before entering. 

5.	 Controlling the Grounds 

Fencing can be an effective means of 1imiting access to secondary 

exits and to vulnerable ground level dwellings. Fencing acts as a 

control by requiring entry through a single, limited, highly visible 

area. Even low fences, more symbolic than preventive, can be valuable 

by making any intrusion into the fenced area highly visible. 

6.	 Controlling Interior Public Space in Multi-family Dwellings 

The most vulnerable locations in multi-family buildings are interior 

public spaces -- lobbies, elevators, stairways and corridors. The 

reason is that they are open to the public, but lack the surveillance 

given a public street by police and passersby. Access to those spaces 

should be limited through the use of a doorman or intercom/door leek 

system. Lobbies can be made more secure by increasing visibility. 
- 72 ­

Residents should be able to see what is happening in the lobby from 

the outside. Hidden nooks and blind curves provide perfect hiding 

spaces. When such features cannot be removed structurally, the use 

of mirrors and improved lighting can ease the situation. Mailboxes 

should be located in highly protected lobby areas. It is generally 

good to establish a lounge area in lobbies of buildings with high 

proportions of elderly. Such lounges tend to increase security by 

creating additional opportunities for surveillance. Fire exits should 

not permit entry from the outside. Fire doors should exit to areas 

less convenient or desirable than the area outside the main exit. 

D.	 Methodology 

1.	 Lecture 

a.	 Characteristics of defensible space. 

b.	 Methods of improving defensible space in multi-family housing. 

c.	 Role of residents in establishing natural surveillance. 

d.	 Disadvantages of relying solely on defensible space. 

e.	 Advantages of defensible space. 

2.	 Group Discussion 

a.	 How poor architectural design can foster criminal activity. 

b.	 The effects of design on how people adapt to their environment. 

c.	 How design can be improved to improve security. 

3.	 Resource speakers from architectural firms. 

4.	 Audio-visual aids demonstrating the effectiveness of defensible


space.

- 73 -

E. Resources

Fried, i'1arc, and Geicher, Peggy, "Some Sources of Residential Satisfaction in an Urban Slum," Journal of the American Institute of Planners,

(Volume 27), 1961, pp. 305-15.

Jacobs t Jane, The Death and Life of Great Americar. Cities, Vintage

Books, New York, 1961.

Newman, Oscar, Defensible Space: Crime prevention through urban design,

MacMillan, New York, 1973.

Pawley, Martin, Architecture Versus Housing, Praeger, New York, 1971.

Rainwater, Lee, "Fear and the House-as-Haven in the lower Class,"

Journal of the American Institute of Planners, (Volume 22), 1966,

pp. 23-37.

F. Film Sources

Architecture and Engineering Division, U. S. Department of Housing and

Urban Development, Washington, D.C., 20410.

Telephone: 1-202-755-5718.

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), Audio Visual Communications Division, U. S. Department of Justice, 633 Indiana Avenue,

N.W., Washington, D. C.• 20531.

Telephone: 1-202-376-3663.

National Audio Visual Center, General Services Administration,

Reference Section, Washington, D.C., 20409.

Telephone: 1-301-763-1896.

University of Illinois, Visual Aid Service, 1325 S. Oak, Champaign.

Illinois. 61820.

Telephone: 1-217-333-1361.
- 74 -

t'lODULE VI
- 75 -

MODULE VI: TURF RECLAMATION

A. Introduction

Turf reclamation is an approach to security taken in response to a

community's feelings of insecurity and fear which result when people give

up the control of their neighborhood to others over whom they have little

or no social control. This approach emphasizes making consistent and continuous attempts to strengthen a neighborhood's sense of self by organizing

community members to actively participate in security programs to regain

control of their neighborhood.

B. Objectives

1. Participants will list the four major elements of the process

of turf reclamation.

2. Participants will suggest three relevant objectives for a

security program based on the principles of turf reclamation.

3. Participants will suggest four strategies for developing a

positive relationship between law enforcement agencies and

residents.

4. Participants will suggest five strategies for facilitating

mutual assistance among community members.

C. Content

l. Establishina Neiahborhood ofValues

Too often, value standards of behavior in neighborhoods are set by a

minority of non-law-abiding residents. One reason this occurs is

that residents fear retaliation or conflict if they report or speak

out against the crimes they see. This fear of taking action alone

can be reduced or eliminated if one does not work in isolation from

neighbors or friends. Thus, the process of turf reclamation must

begin witr. sharing one's concern ivith one's neighbor, who more often
- 76 ­


than not shares the same feelings but has been reluctant to express 

them. 

2.	 Setting Community Standards 

The nex~ step in the process of "reclaiming one's turf" is a bit 

more difficult. Residents must agree to take action and to set 

standards for the neighborhood. The major problem is deciding on 

whose values to accept. This issue has both class and racial 

dimensions. Are middle class people going to tell working class 

people how to act? Are black people going to tell white people how 

to act? Faced with the necessity of deali~g with such issues before 

articulating what neighborhood standards should be, most people are 

reluctant to say anything. The process of turf reclamation requires 

that people talk with their neighbors about what kinds of values they 

hold and how to respond when common conditions occur. Most people 

will agree on a number of behaviors which are unacceptable, ranging 

from physical assaults to breaking bottles in the street. The important point is to decide upon values which most, if not all, neighbors will agree to uphold. 

3.	 Resoiving Security Problems 

Security in a community is essentially a product of internal resolve. 

In brief, two important elements are required for a successful grip 

on community security and safety. One is perscnnel who have the 

training and experience to organize a community. The othel' is an 

organized community. The community organizer functions to give residents the feeling that the larger social system can work, that they 

will be protected, that they will be rewarded, and that things can 

• 
- 77 ­


happen as expected. The key to security lies in its definition. 

is not just a problem of locks and bolts; it is intimately related to 

people and the need to provide acceptable alternatives both to tolerating and to engaging in anti-social behavior. 

4.	 Enacting a Comprehensive Security Program 

One strategy for the implementation of turf reclamation as a human 

alce,'!iative to oppressive security techniques is the use of Community 

Security Organizers (CSOs). A pilot security program based en the 

premises of turf reclamation has worked successfully in Pittsburgh. 

Its four principal objectives include: 

(a; To crganize residents as a human security system to increase 

their awareness of community safety problems and to seek their 

assistance in improving community safety. 

(b)	 To serve as a liaison and facilitate co~munication between


resicents and police.


(c)	 To open communications and develop a relationship bet'o'leen


residents, the police, and other crime-prevention agencies.


(d)	 To mobilize other community resources, thereby encouraging


mutual assistance among agencies and building neighborhood


identity.


The heart of the pilot program was a group of "Community Security 

Organizers" (C50s). Their function was not to guard entrances or 

to make arrests. Rather they served as a focal point for organizing 

the community to solve its own security problems. They organized 

hall captains to be in charge of security on each floor in high-rise 
- 78 -

buildings and developed youth patrols to escort women and older

adults when needed. They relayed and acted on complaints and kept

records of who obeyed rules and who did not. They made themselves

visible and accessible, visited around, and encouraged others to

do the same. In essence, the CSO's got residents involved.

(a) Goals and Objectives of a Turf Reclamaticn Program - The immediate

goals should be: to get residents concerned about the security

problem; to establish a rapport with residents by listening to

complaints and acting on valid suggestions; and to formulate preliminary rules and schedules for community facilities.

The mid-term goals should be: to organize meetings among

residents; to establish residents' councils; to appoint or elect

patrol captains and plan for a patrol organization; to try to

find potential leaders among residents; to install proper locks

and instruct residents in their use; to hold planning sessions

to plan for proper ground use (defensible space) and other improvements; to institute a liaison between management and residents in

order to improve the handling of complaints; to acquaint residents

with some of the more difficult problems confronting management;

to recruit, hire, and train C50s; to institute standards that can

be agreed upon and enforced by residents; to improve the quality

of maintenance.

Long-term goals should include: to establish on-going organizations; to establish an on-going liaison mechanism to direct

the focus of security measures; to create an atmosphere of neighborliness; to foster peer support; to establish regularly scheduled
- 79 ­


security patrols; to conduct social activities on a continuing 

basis; to establish security measures for particularly vulnerable 

areas like mailrooms and elevators; to gain the cooperation of 

residents in the eviction of disruptive residents; to encourage 

the cooperation of residents with outside agencies, particularly 

the	 police; to complete installation of appropriate hardware. 

(b) Implementing	 Program Goals/Objectives - To organize and educate 

residents and to encourage them to participate in community 

safety efforts, the following tasks must be performed: 

(1)	 Group activities should be organized to give residents a 

feeling of security and competence. Small successes at 

the outset of the program will increase resident participation in later stages and build confidence. 

(2) Responsibility should	 be delegated to individual residents. 

Benefits gained from the increased protection of personal 

property will contribute to the confidence of residents in 

the CSO program. 

(3)	 The variety of social programs and the involvement of 

adolescents in security programs should be increased to gain 

support from heads of households. Participation in community 

activities will build family cohesion. 

(4)	 A community in which residents can take pride should be 

developed to encourage resident participation in programs 

designed to expand and strengthen neighborhood identity. 
- 80 -

(5) Personal difficulties should be alleviated through the

assistance of neighbors, supported by the CSO program.

(6) Possibilities of employment within the CSO program should

be developed for residents to increase their support of

turf building efforts.

(7) Residents' councils should be organized to assist in

increasing the awareness of fellow residents.

(c) To develop the liaison capabilities of the CSO between residents

and management, the following tasks should be implemented:

(1) Resident access to management should be improved.

(2) Frequent meetings between resident groups and representatives

of the housing authority management should be arranged to give

residents the opportunity to air complaints, present suggestions, and make management sensitive to the concerns of residents.

(3) Resident complaints should be promptly investigated to demonstrate management interest in safety of residents. Rapid management response to any sort of communication from residents will

generally improve the resident/management relationship.

(4) Those groups who have special security needs should be helped.

These include the elderly and families with small children.

Management should consider residents' input in policy decisions

to gain resident support of those decisions. Input may be made

through public hearings, community meetings and resident councils.
- 81 ­


(d)	 To develop a positive relationship between law enforcement 

agencies and residents, the following tasks should be 

implemented: 

(1) Regular meetings	 between resident councils and police 

department representatives should be established to 

discuss problems of security within the development. 

(2)	 Law enforcement personnel should be involved in neighborhood social activities, such as recreational programs for 

youth. 

(3)	 Residents should be made aware of community services


offered by the police department.


(4)	 The police department should be represented as only one of 

the many components of a community-operated security system. 

This will reduce the tendency of housing development residents to view the police as an oppressive entity. 

(e)	 Te facilitate mutual assistance among community members and to 

increase the level of communication between these agencies and 

residents, the following tasks should be implemented: 

(1)	 The increased level of concern among public housing residents for the safety of their neighborhood should be made 

known to the larger community. It may be useful to contact 

community newspapers to assist in this effort. 

(2)	 Other community agencies should be invited to use development 

facilities, such as playgrounds, recreational rooms and 

meeting areas, in order to increase community exposure to the 

activities of residents of the housing development and to 
- 82 ­

decrease the isolation of the development from the larger 

community. 

(3)	 Residents should consult with other community agencies to 

see how these agencies have dealt with security problems. 

(4)	 Social activities should include both residents of the 

development and other community groups. 

(5)	 Residents should be mace aware of the range of services 

available to them through other agencies. 

(6)	 Residents and/or CSOls should visit community agencies to 

become more aware of available services and to utilize 

them as needed. 

D.	 Methodology 

l.	 Lecture 

a.	 Elements of turf reclamation. 

b.	 Goals and objectives of a turf reclamation program. 

c.	 Implementing a turf reclamation program. 

d.	 Developing a good relationship between residents and management. 

e.	 Developing a good relationship between residents and law 

enforcement officials. 

2.	 Group Discussion 

a.	 Difficulties in getting residents to organize strategies for 

organizing around co~mon issues. 

b.	 Implications of turf reclamation to participants' own ccmmunities. 
-----

------

------

-----

- 85 ­

SELF -EVALUATI O~l

1. Match the following items with their definitions: 

a. Traditional definition	 Addresses the indiviof	 security dual's right to be free 

from criminal victimization and to feel 

b.	 Criminal victimization secure~ in addition to 

the need for epprehending 

criminals. 

c.	 Track "A" 

Involves systems which ------ concern themselves with 

d. Comprehensive definition	 apprehending criminals. 

of	 security 

The actual perpetration 

of a criminal act against 

e. Track "B"	 person or p~operty.

Police personnel technological detection devices~ hardware. 

Utilization of Community 

Personnel Turf Reclama­ tion~ Defensible Space. 
- 86 ­


2. Match the following vulnerable areas of multi-family housing units 

with the appropriate protective device. 

a. Supplies, meters, boil ers Should be visible from the 

ground underneath; the lowest ----

b. Sky1 i ghts ladder should be 

from the ground. 

twelve feet 

c. Basement ____ Individual areas should cond. Elevators tain extra strong locks and 

doors; access should be 

e. Stairwells controlled. 

f. Fire doors ____ Should be constructed of heavy 

gauge metal without perforag. Entry doors tions; access should be limited 

to such areas; should be proh. Doors tected by cylinder locks. 

i. Door frames Can be either local or central; ---- useless unless someone hears 

j. Door hinges and responds to them. 

k. Locks Should be heavy duty and placed ---- on the inside of the door. 

1. \~i ndows ____ Should be equipped with panic 

m. ~.larms hardware and an automatic 

closing mechanism; an alarm 

n. Lobby should sound if s~ch doors are 

opened. 

o. t~a i 1boxes _____ Should preferably only be one 

p. Laundry rooms such door. All such secondary 

q. Storage rooms 

doors should be protected and 

monitored just like the main 

door. 

r. Offi ce 

Should be visible from the ----- s. Parking lot lobby; its safe should be bolted 

to the floor. Collection 

t. Fire escapes windows should be equipped with 

grills or bars and provided ....'i th an a1arm. 

Ge~erally ---- the hardest area to 

protect - should have vandal 

resistant lighting, an alarm 

button, and an audio-intercom. 
----

----

------

----

- 87 ­


Access to this area should be 

only to the ground floor. 

Exits to the rest of the 

bUilding should be locked 

from the outside. 

Such items should be locked; ------- keys to such areas should be 

carefully controlled. 

_______ Should be provided with 24­

hour, vandal resistant lighting; entry to such areas 

from upper halls should be 

restricted. 

Should be secured by tamper­ ------- proof grills or bars. 

Should be heavy duty, prefer­ ------ ably metal; solid; flush with 

the wall; and have tamperresistant connectors. 

_______ Those on ground level or over 

ledges, balconies, or fire 

escapes need security screens, 

grills or bars which are 

removable from the inside. 

Should preferably be made of ------ metal, flush to the wall. and 

equipped with a wide-angle 

lens peephole. 

Should be changed for each 

nevi res ident. 

Such areas should have no 

dark corners or hiding places; 

access should be monitored. 

Such areas should be near the 

lobby; tokens should be used 

for machines instead of coins. 

_____ Should be highly visible, well 

lit, and not used for teenage socializing. 
---------

- 89 ­


4.	 Answer True or False to the following items. 

a. Primary reliance for community surveillance should be --------- made on residents themselves. 

b. Failure of residents to lock their doors is a significant --------- security problem. 

_________ c.	 Residents should inform management and a few trusted 

neighbors of temporary absences. 

--------- d.	 Residents should not readily accede to the demands of 

muggers to hand over valuables. 

e.	 Residents cannot be held accountable for the actions of 

their guests. 

f. Residents cannot be held accountable for the actions of --------- their children. 

--------- g.	 To the extent that residents are apathetic about security 

or are prone to condone or commit crime or vandalism, 

the very foundation of a residential security program is 

imperil ed. 

h.	 Apathy about security problems among residents can be ---------	 broken by demonstrating that residents lives can be


improved.


--------- i.	 Residents I own self-interest should be the primary theme 

of any security educational program for residents. 

--------- j.	 Fear of victimization and of retaliation on the part of 

residents can seriously impair resident participation 

in a security program. 

--------- k.	 Most crime and vandalism is committed by middle-age males. 

. _________ l.	 The social service programs of local community agencies 

are an important part of any security program in that they 

can help alleviate some of the conditions which cause 

security problems. 
- 90 ­


5.	 Fi 11 in each blank with one word. 

a.	 The concept of is based on the 

premise that physical design characteristics can maximize 

resident control over behavior. 

b.	 Creating areas can have the effect of assigning 

responsibility for maintenance and security for certain areas 

to particular residents. 

c.	 Zones of t either real or symbolic t do not physically 

prevent intrusion t but indicate to an entrant that he or she is 

entering into a restricted space. 

d.	 Creating opportunities for allows residents to 

monitor activities in those areas adjacent to their dwellings 

and thus both feel more secure and deter potential criminals. 

e.	 can be an effective means of limiting access to 

vulnerable ground-level dwellings. It acts as a control by 

requiring entry through a singlet limited t highly visible area. 
- 94 ­


4. a. True 

b. True 

c. True 

d.	 False Confrontation with criminals should be avoided; 

aggressiveness may provoke bodily harm 

e.	 False Management should hold residents accountable for 

the actions of their guests 

f.	 Fa 1se Management should hold residents accountable for 

the actions of their children 

g. True 

h. True 

i . True 

j. True 

k.	 False Most crime and vandalism is co~mitted by young 

people between the ages of 15 and 25 

5. a. defensible	 space 

b. territori a1 

c. trans iti on 

d. surveillance 

e. fencing 

6. a. Turf reclamation 

b. minority 

c. acceptable/unacceptable 

7. a. True 

b. Faise	 The first step should be to assess security needs 

c.	 False The local Health and Welfare Council maintains a 

comprehensive inventory 

d.	 False Program goals and objectives should be as specific 

as possible; objectives should also be mc.lsu}'ab 1e 

e. True