COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Senior Judge Overton

JOHN HARGROVE MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record Nos. 2317- 05-1 and PER CURIAM 2318-05-1 MARCH 21, 2006
CITY OF HAMPTON DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON Wilford Taylor, Jr., Judge (M. Woodrow Griffin, Jr., on brief), for appellant. (Rachel Allen, Assistant City Attorney; Thomas A. Burcher, Guardian ad litem for the minor child; Hawk ins, Burcher & Boester, PC, on brief), for appellee.
John Hargrove, appellant, appeals decisions of the circuit court te rminating his residual parental rights to his daughter and approving an amendment of the foster care plan to authorize her adoption. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude these appeals are without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affi rm the decisions of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
BACKGROUND The daughter was born on De cember 19, 1993, to appellant and Prisc illa Hargrove, who is deceased. In 2003, the State of Georgia charged appellant with se ven counts of felony sexual abuse of his daughter. A jury convicted him of all seven offenses on Augu st 24, 2005. Appellant received an active sentence of twenty years.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - On June 11, 2004, th e Hampton Department of Social Se rvices removed the daughter from the custody of her maternal aunt because of physical abuse and placed her in a foster home. Initially, the goal of the fo ster care service plan was to return the daughter to her home or to place her with a relative. On May 31, 2005, the Department petitioned fo r termination of appellant’s parental rights based upon Code § 16.1- 283(E)(iii) and (iv). On July 26, 2005, the juveni le and domestic relations district court terminated appellant’s parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(E)(iv). On appeal of the district court’s termination order, the ci rcuit court heard evidence regarding appellant’s August 24, 2005 convicti ons of sexual abuse of his daught er. The circuit court terminated appellant’s residual parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(E)(iii) and appr oved a change in the foster care service plan to a go al of adoption for the daughter.
DISCUSSION
I. When considering termination of a parent’s residual rights to a ch ild, “the paramount consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests. ” Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). On review, “[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the ev idence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the ch ild’s best interests.” Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1990). “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard

ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless pl ainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (quoting Peple v. Peple , 5 Va. App. 414, 422, 364 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1988)). Appellant contends the evidence failed to support a terminati on pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(E)(iii). Appellant concedes he was convi cted of sexually abusi ng his daughter as set- 3 - forth in Code § 16.1-283(E)(iii), but he argues that his convictions co uld not support a Code § 16.1-283(E)(iii) termination becau se he had not been convicted of the offenses when the termination petition was filed on May 31, 2005. The Department invoked the jurisdiction of the district court by filing a petition requesting the termination of appellant’s parent al rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(E)(iii) and (iv). The district court ordered termination purs uant to Code § 16.1-283(E)(i v). It did not base its termination decision upon Code § 16.1-283(E)(iii), which allows termination of a parent’s rights to a child where “the parent has been co nvicted of an offense und er the laws of this Commonwealth or a substantially similar law of a ny other state . . . that constitutes . . . felony sexual assault, if the victim of the offense was a ch ild of the parent . . . .” However, on appeal to the circuit court, the court en tered a termination order pursuan t to Code § 16.1-283(E)(iii). In Fairfax County Dep’t of Family Servs. v. D.N. , 29 Va. App. 400, 512 S.E.2d 830 (1999), the district court entere d an order finding a child “abus ed or neglected” within the meaning of Code § 16.1-228(4). On appeal of th at decision, the circuit court refused to admit evidence proving the child was “abused or neglected” as defined by Code § 16.1-228(1), a different subsection of the statute. D.N. , 29 Va. App. at 404, 512 S.E.2d at 832. While noting that the circuit court’s jurisdicti on was derivative upon appeal from th e juvenile court, we held as follows: [A]n appeal from the juve nile court must be heard de novo by the circuit court. Code § 16.1-136. “‘A de novo hearing means a trial anew , with the burden of proof remaining upon the party with whom it rested in the juvenile court.’” Parish v. Spaulding , 20 Va. App. 130, 132, 455 S.E.2d 728, 729 (1995) (quoting Box v. Talley , 1 Va. App. 289, 292, 338 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1986)). A trial de novo in the circuit court “annuls the judgment of the [juvenile court] as completely as if there had been no previous trial . . . and . . . grants to a litigant every advantage which would have been [available to the litigant] had the ca se been tried originally in [the circuit] court.” Walker v. Dept. of Public Welfare , 223 Va. 557, 563, 290 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1982) (citations omitted), quoted in- 4 - Parish , 20 Va. App. at 132, 455 S.E.2d at 729. “‘A court which hears a case de novo , which disregards the judgment of the court below, which hears evidence anew and new evidence, and which makes final disposition of the case, acts not as a court of appeals but as one exercising original jurisdiction.’” Addison [v. Salyer 

### ], 185 Va. [644,] 650, 40 S.E.2d [260,] 263 [(1946)] (quoting Gemmell, Inc. v. Svea Fire and Life Insurance , 166 Va. 95, 98, 184 S.E. 457, 458 (1936)). It follows from these principles that, at a trial de novo in the circuit court, the parties are not re stricted to the evidence presented before the juvenile court. The circuit court must consider all relevant evidence, even if such evidence had not been considered by the juvenile court. D.N. , 29 Va. App. at 406, 512 S.E.2d at 832-33. Because the circuit court had refused to admit evidence proving the child was abused and neglec ted under a different subsection of the statute upon which the juvenile court had made its finding, we reversed the judgment. Id. at 407, 512 S.E.2d at 833. Applying the holding in D.N. to this case, we conclude that the Department was not limited to the evidence and arguments presente d in the district court. In the appeal de novo , the Department was entitled to every advantage it would have had availabl e to it had the case originated in the circuit court. See D.N. , 29 Va. App. at 406, 512 S.E.2d at 832. Thus, the Department was entitled to prove, and the circuit court had the authority to find, that appellant’s parental rights should be terminated pursua nt to Code § 16.1-283(E )(iii). The record undisputably established that appellant had been convicted of the sexual offenses against his daughter when the circuit court was considering de novo the termination petition.
II. Appellant also contends the circuit court erred in changing the goal of the foster care service plan to adoption. “Our d ecision to affirm the termination order necessarily subsumes this aspect of his appeal because a preponderanc e-of-the-evidence standard governs judicial- 5 - modifications of foster care plans.” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 46 Va. App. 257, 265 n.3, 616 S.E.2d 765, 769 n.3 (2005).
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we hold that appe llant’s appeals are without merit, and we summarily affirm the decisions. Affirmed.