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75–389PDF 2012

THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S CENTER FOR

STRATEGIC COUNTERTERRORISM

COMMUNICATIONS: MISSION, OPERATIONS

AND IMPACT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

AUGUST 2, 2012

Serial No. 112–164

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable Alberto Fernandez, Coordinator, Center for Strategic 

Counterterrorism Communications, U.S. Department of State ....................... 6

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade: Prepared statement ................................................... 3

The Honorable Alberto Fernandez: Prepared statement ...................................... 9

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 28

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 29

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 31

The Honorable Edward R. Royce: 

Letter from the Honorable Edward R. Royce to the Honorable Alberto 

Fernandez dated August 14, 2012 .................................................................. 32

Letter from the United States Department of State to the Honorable Edward R. Royce received August 30, 2012 ........................................................ 34

Written responses from the Honorable Alberto Fernandez to questions submitted for the record by: ......................................................................................

The Honorable Edward R. Royce ........................................................................ 36

The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of South Carolina .............................................................................................. 44

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THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S CENTER FOR 

STRATEGIC COUNTERTERRORISM COMMUNICATIONS: MISSION, OPERATIONS AND IMPACT 

THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing of the subcommittee will come to order. 

Today we examine the State Department’s Center for Strategic 

Counterterrorism Communications. Terrorist organizations, as we 

know, use the Internet. They use it to propagandize, and they use 

it to recruit, and they use it all over the globe. So prevalent are 

these extremist Web sites today that they have been described as 

a ‘‘virtual caliphate’’ in cyberspace. Several witnesses appearing before this subcommittee in the past have urged a more vigorous U.S. 

effort to combat terrorist use of the Internet. 

And to go back to recent hearings on this, one cited ‘‘the absence 

of an effective campaign to counter al-Qaeda’s extremist ideology’’ 

and made the point that that is a central challenge, an ongoing 

challenge. Another witness said that our efforts up until now have 

been ‘‘anemic.’’ Stepping into this void is the Center for Strategic 

Counterterrorism Communications, which was established by executive order last fall. 

While other U.S. agencies may hack into extremist chat rooms to 

sew confusion or to render them useless, or for the purpose of collecting intelligence, CSCC’s mission is a very straightforward one. 

Its mission is to identify, confront, and undermine al-Qaeda or, as 

the Ambassador likes to say, ‘‘get in their heads.’’

Arabic, Urdu, and Somali speakers ‘‘contest’’ in these online chat 

rooms and media Web sites and these forums that are set up where 

al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda affiliates operate. As we will hear, the aim 

of its ‘‘digital outreach team’’ is to expose the inherent contradictions in al-Qaeda propaganda and bring to light al-Qaeda’s atrocities. One recent effort caught headlines after the al-Qaeda affiliate 

in Yemen posted photos of coffins. And in these pictures, they had 

coffins draped in American flags. The center produced a counter ad 

that replaced the flags with the flag of Yemen, conveying, of course, 

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that most of the victims of the attacks in Yemen have been local 

people. And these videos, of course, got a quick reaction. And they 

were applauded by analysts for the use of the ‘‘out-of-the-box’’ 

thinking. And the use of ridicule is pretty common here in terms 

of this interaction that goes on with al-Qaeda on these Web sites. 

So this is new. And there are issues for us to consider in this. 

Can the center keep from becoming just another office that is bureaucratic? Can we make sure the innovation isn’t beaten out of it, 

you know, keep it fresh? Is it responding to events on the ground 

with what I think you call the appropriate ‘‘counternarratives’’ for 

those situations? And the digital outreach team, which includes 

many contract personnel, have also got to master here some pretty 

sensitive and complicated issues, or they could do harm in this situation. 

So how does the State Department oversee their work? How do 

you avoid some of the quality control issues that have plagued 

some of the U.S. international broadcasting efforts over the years? 

I am thinking about some of the problems we have had with respect to Iran, for example. So those are the issues. And should it 

go beyond al-Qaeda as a target? Does the center face legal constraints is another issue. 

But an overriding question facing the center is the ability to 

measure its impact. Terrorist propagandists have felt compelled to 

react to the center’s work with vitriolic attacks. We have anecdotal 

evidence in terms of the effectiveness. In December, a top al-Qaeda 

Web site began discussing ways to counter the videos posted by the 

digital outreach teams that are reaching their audience. State Department officials take the attitude that it is better to be hated 

than ignored when it comes to al-Qaeda’s watchers. But at the end 

of the day, we need a measure of effectiveness. We need to know, 

are opinions changing? And if so, is the center a significant influence, or is it just a commendable but ultimately futile attempt to 

empty an ocean of militancy with a spoon? 

Those are the issues we are going to be discussing today. And we 

look forward to hearing from our witness. And I will turn now to 

Ranking Member Sherman for his opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

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Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Chairman, for holding these hearings. 

Back in September 2010, I was sitting there. You were sitting 

immediately to the right, and this same subcommittee held hearings called U.S. Strategy for Countering Jihadist Web Sites, in 

which we focused on the efforts to counter the radical messages online. And while I know our focus here is going to be online, television and radio continue to be even more important communications media in most of the world that we are trying to reach. 

The State Department Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 

Communications, CSCC, has as its mission to identify, confront, 

and undermine the communications of al-Qaeda affiliates. A principal focus is digital outreach. The staff of the center is about 45 

by the end of this year, I understand, with about 20 native speakers of Arabic, Urdu, and Somali, and I hope other languages as 

well. And perhaps in your statement you can indicate all the languages that you have native speakers communicating in. And they 

are battling on forums and other sites where al-Qaeda and its affiliates spread propaganda and recruit followers. They expose the 

work of hate, contradictions, false and empty ideology of al-Qaeda. 

And I hope that you are working hand in hand, and maybe you 

will tell us in your opening statement, with the CIA and others to 

identify who the bad guys are, rather than just to argue against 

them. There are some we are not going to be able to convince. 

These are open Web sites, forums where vulnerable minds can be 

swayed by al-Qaeda recruiters. According to the State Department, 

the center focuses on two themes in counterterrorism communications, that al-Qaeda-inspired violence kills disproportionately Muslims, and then violence is not necessary for political change. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed Islamic state on the front line of several 

conflicts. With so many extremist groups, Pakistan is a pressing 

international problem for us. My hope is that you are reaching out 

to the Pakistani people, not just in Urdu, which is the politically 

correct language that the government and the ISI in Pakistan 

would have you use, but also in the other languages, particularly 

Sindhi. The people of Sindh, who predominantly speak Sindhi, 

have been under attack by governmental bodies. And that is why 

the Government of Pakistan would just assume you not use that 

language. They are so helpful in so many ways, that perhaps you 

might want to ignore their advice. The U.S. must reach out to 

Sindh, when of course the Sindhi language is spoken by more people than Urdu, even though I know you have native Urdu speakers. 

So I hope you will be discussing your efforts to outreach to southern Pakistan. I would point out that this committee passed an 

amendment stating that at least $1.5 million be spent on radio 

broadcasts, preferably AM, perhaps based in the Emirates, to reach 

out in the Sindhi language. 

The terrorist organizations use the Internet to get their message 

across and spread propaganda. We are told that we should simply 

compete with them by posting things where they post things. The 

more aggressive thing to do is just take down their sites. And we 

invented the Internet, and we ought to perhaps be aggressive, either by serving notice on certain servers in certain countries or 

through more surreptitious means. Are you so sure that you are 

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going to outdebate them that you want them to have the run of the 

Internet? 

Another issue is the budget. You have had some belt tightening, a 2011 budget of $6.8 million. In 2012, it was $5 million. The request now is for $5.15 million. I would just point out that even if 

your work is 100th of 1 percent as important as our military, you 

are a real bargain. And it has the additional advantage of not having to pay in both blood and treasure for our anti-terrorism efforts. 

So I look forward to hearing from you as to what we can do to 

block terrorist communications as well as to answer them. I yield 

back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. 

Now we go to Mr. Duncan from South Carolina. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, I am grateful for the work that the State Department 

Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications is seeking 

to do. In addition to serving on this subcommittee, my work on the 

Homeland Security Committee has enabled me to study this issue 

in depth. And I believe strategic communications is crucial. 

This issue is really an issue about the war of ideas. How do we 

achieve victory on a battleground for the hearts and minds of individuals who not only commit violent actions, but who seek to destroy America, our values, our freedoms, and ultimately our Constitution? So what do we do with a war that involves conflicting visions of the world; western civilization, which values freedom, 

versus a totalitarian political ideology of Islamists espoused by alQaeda and other terrorist organizations, including the imposition of 

a rigid form of sharia? Radical Islamist clerics and terrorist organizations have become masters at using social media. Facebook, 

YouTube, Twitter, Internet chat rooms, and al-Qaeda’s Inspire 

allow the publication of religious commentary and religious opinions to large audiences instantaneously. 

In the course of this hearing, I would like know to know to what 

extent social media plays in the role of the center’s identification 

of current and emerging trends of extremist communication. Does 

the center have an alternative or counternarrative to al-Qaeda’s Inspire? Additionally, I want to understand how the center defines 

strategic counterterrorism communications. What is so strategic 

about what the center is doing? In other words, by strategic, does 

the center mean coordination of communications all across government channels? More a bureaucratic messaging strategy? Or does 

it mean that the U.S. Government communications will have a 

strategic effect? I believe the center is on the right path in seeking 

to steer individuals away from violence. 

However, I believe that we can take it further by, one, understanding the ideology of Islamists; number two, directly countering 

the ideology by attacking Islamists’ authenticity, delegitimizing 

groups, individuals, and movements that support Islamist discourse and power; and number three, neutralizing Islamist propaganda by showing the parallels between Islamism and other forms 

of political ideology, like totalitarianism and fascism and other 

things. And so Ambassador Fernandez, thank you for being here 

today to testify. I look forward to your testimony. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Duncan. 

Today we are joined by Ambassador Alberto Fernandez, the 

State Department’s Coordinator for the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication. 

Previously, Ambassador Fernandez served as U.S. Ambassador to 

Equatorial Guinea. He served as director for Near East Public Diplomacy from 2005 to 2007 and held senior diplomacy positions at 

the U.S. Embassies in Afghanistan, Jordan, and Syria. 

I think you were stationed in Sudan for a while. 

A career member of the Foreign Service, Ambassador Fernandez 

has received the Presidential Meritorious Service Award and the 

Edward R. Murrow Award for Excellence in Public Diplomacy, 

among others. He is fluent in Arabic and in Spanish. 

We welcome you to the committee. 

And I would like to acknowledge that the Ambassador submitted 

his testimony to the committee well in advance of this afternoon’s 

hearing, a first I think. It is much appreciated, obviously, by the 

members of the committee. 

Your complete written statement, of course, will appear in the 

record. What we are going to suggest is a shorter 5-minute opening 

statement, and then we will proceed with questions. 

And again, Ambassador, thank you for joining us. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, COORDINATOR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC COUNTERTERRORISM COMMUNICATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sherman, and Mr. Duncan, 

thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I am pleased to be 

with you this afternoon to discuss the interagency Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. I will make brief remarks 

drawing on my formal testimony. 

CSCC was established at the direction of the President and the 

Secretary of State to coordinate, orient, and inform governmentwide foreign communications activities targeted against terrorism 

and violent extremism, particularly al-Qaeda and its allies. We are 

housed in the Department of State with the Under Secretary for 

Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. I report directly to Under Secretary Sonenshine and work very closely with the Bureau of Counterterrorism, other department bureaus, and other agencies. 

We have a steering committee chaired by Under Secretary 

Sonenshine with CT Bureau Coordinator Ambassador Benjamin as 

vice chair. The committee comprises nine agencies, including 

NCTC, the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Justice, Homeland 

Security, CIA, and USAID. We target a specific audience overseas 

through our products for U.S. Government communicators, 

projects, and the online engagement of our Digital Outreach Team. 

As many of you know, al-Qaeda has repeatedly made clear the 

high importance it attaches to the media struggle. Ayman alZawahiri has described the communications space as more than 

half of the battle. And one scholar noted recently that al-Qaeda has 

transformed from a global terrorist organization that used the 

media into a global media organization that uses terrorism. So our 

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goal is to move quickly, to respond effectively and to contest the 

space which had been for too long monopolized by our adversaries. 

For example, very recently as troubling developments in Timbuktu unfolded last month, we were writing a preliminary media 

strategy and producing new digital material specifically focused on 

al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its allies’ destructive activities in northern Mali. To achieve our goals, CSCC is divided into 

three distinct areas of operation, intelligence and analysis, plans 

and operations, and the Digital Outreach Team, or DOT. 

The intelligence and analysis section gathers analytic support 

from the intelligence community, academia, and other sources of 

relevant expertise that is essential to our mission to counter violent 

extremism. 

We subscribe to two guiding principles for the center’s operation: 

That counterterrorism communications should be guided by the 

best intelligence and academic analysis of the audience, the adversary, and the appropriate communications themes and techniques; 

and that this must be an interagency effort, drawing on analytical 

and operational skills across U.S. Government agencies. The detail 

to CSCC of intelligence community and U.S. military personnel 

make this goal a feasible one. 

The second part is the plans and operations team, which designs 

and implements nondigital CVE communications strategies, tools, 

and programs to counter al-Qaeda’s ability to recruit and win support. This section focuses on undermining the efforts of al-Qaeda 

and its affiliates in and emanating from five priority areas using 

nondigital means. The five priority areas being Al-Shabaab in the 

Horn of Africa; al-Qaeda senior leadership and its affiliates and allies in Pakistan; AQIM and its associates across the Sahel through 

Northern and Western Africa; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; 

and al-Qaeda in Iraq and its offshoots in that general area of the 

Fertile Crescent. 

These plans and ops teams provide CVE communications material for use by all U.S. Government communicators with foreign audiences. These tools include CSCC communications templates on 

topics such as highlighting Al-Shabaab’s actions against Somalis 

and shorter Quick Thoughts documents, such as the recent, ‘‘A 

Plague of Locusts: CT Messaging Against AQIM and Ansar al-Din.’’

CSCC’s third section is the Digital Outreach Team, or DOT, 

which directly counters the al-Qaeda narrative in the interactive 

digital environment. Most of this team’s engagements, which number more than 7,000 since joining CSCC, consist of written text 

posted to online forums, Facebook, or the comments sections of 

media Web sites. But they also use video. They also use poster art, 

and other means. Engagements are branded. Writer analysts identify themselves as members of the Digital Outreach Team at the 

U.S. Department of State. This is overt communication in this digital space. 

Three basic principles animate this team’s activities: Contest the 

space, redirect the conversation, and confound the adversary. An 

early measure of effectiveness has been the irate responses from 

online extremists who fulminate on various occasions, expressing a 

desire to hack the Digital Outreach Team’s YouTube channel, 

warning their followers to be wary of providing fodder for the team, 

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and even discussing the possibility of setting up their own radical 

Digital Outreach Team to conquer what we are doing. The digital 

environment is rapidly changing, as are al-Qaeda’s efforts to exploit 

them. CSCC is committed to keeping pace and innovating. The rise 

of hand-held devices provides an opportunity to do so. And we have 

already deployed video with mobile platforms in one of our highest 

priority areas. A recent Yemen-focused clip garnered 15 to 20 percent of views on mobile devices. 

Future plans include establishing a presence on mobile-based 

interactive environments, distributing audio and visual files over 

mobile devices, and finding new ways to deliver digital content to 

the physical environment through hand-held devices. As an example of our work, we recently have a campaign that just included a 

focus in the Urdu language in Pakistan for a 30-month period in 

June-July 2012, pushing back against extremist narratives in Pakistan with examples of U.S.-funded aid projects. For more than 30 

days, the team carried out 255 engagements using 10 videos and 

10 still images on 29 online platforms, reaching nearly 50,000 people through Facebook and forums, and generating over 400 comments. That was one very targeted, narrowly focused campaign on 

a very specific subject. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your interest and your continued support, and I look forward to answering your questions and getting 

into greater detail. But thank you very much. And it is a real 

pleasure to be here. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fernandez follows:]

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Mr. ROYCE. We appreciate your testimony. 

Let me ask you a question that goes to your strategy. I can readily understand the video that you did, stressing al-Qaeda’s willingness to kill fellow Muslims, and especially the concept of destroying 

the indigenous culture, which we saw in Mali, which we saw in 

Timbuktu, which we saw on the attacks on the Sufi mosques in 

Pakistan and the destruction there. 

But moving to the issue of your team stressing the USAID 

projects in Pakistan, I have never seen our efforts win any points 

in Pakistan. We are about as unpopular as can be there. My last 

three trips there I saw that the Deobandi schools were still in full 

throttle. But why this particular message, as opposed to a message 

of what is being done to traditional Pakistani culture by this radical change, you know, on the order of what we saw in the Cultural 

Revolution in Mao’s China? It is an attempt to destroy the past evidence of the culture. You saw that in Afghanistan. The destruction 

of art, of Muslim art as well as Buddhist. And so I think that that 

is probably a more powerful argument, but I wanted to see why we 

were going with this approach. 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. That is a very good question, sir. We 

use a variety of themes at different times. The theme you identify 

of the radical extreme, unusually extreme nature of al-Qaeda and 

its allies, its virulence, its alien nature from the mainstream of 

Muslims everywhere is one that we stress traditionally. So we do 

stress that in Pakistan and in the other areas we work. This specific campaign, as I said, we often try to highlight a specific campaign at a specific time. So we wanted to use AID’s programs as 

a push back for this specific campaign that we did in the month 

of July. But the image, the thrust of what you described is our 

daily bread and butter. It is something that we do all the time. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you this. The center is beneath the 

Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy. One of the things I thought 

about here is we have got this new counterterrorism bureau, which 

the department would like to empower. And given your specific 

mission, it would seem to me that it should be placed right there. 

I wanted to ask you about that. 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Well, we are literally a stone’s throw 

from the CT bureau. They are our next door neighbors, and we 

meet with them on a daily basis. 

Mr. ROYCE. I understand that. But in terms of strategy and tactics, the Under Secretary is more focused, really, on cultural and 

educational exchanges and this type of thing. And I think the head 

of the counterterrorism bureau, given where we are trying to drive 

this policy, would be a lot better equipped to deal specifically with 

your mission. So I understand your argument that you talk with 

them. But I really think it is one and the same in terms of the 

strategy here. And there should be consideration in terms of readjusting that mission. Give me your response to that if you would. 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Certainly. I can see value in both approaches. I mean, obviously, we are working in a communications 

field. So that is very germane to the work of the Under Secretary 

for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. And this is, as Mr. Duncan noted, this is an ideological question, this is a question of messages and narratives. So I can see that it has a public dimension. 

16

On the other hand, we have to work very closely with our counterterrorism colleagues not only in the CT bureau, but across the 

interagency with NCTC, with CIA, and others. And so I can see the 

value of both of those arguments. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador Fernandez. 

Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. You have native speakers in Arabic 

and Urdu and Somali. What other languages do you have native 

speakers in? 

Mr. ROYCE. Ambassador, bring your mic a little closer when you 

answer, please. 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Thank you, sir. 

Generally, those are the three languages we focus on. Obviously, 

we have native speakers, for example some of our Urdu speakers 

speak more than Urdu. But our messaging has been in those three 

languages. But even that is new. We added Somali only recently. 

So we are certainly open to adding other languages. And we are 

certainly open in exploring the option that you discussed. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I would hope very much that you would focus on 

Pakistan, which is the only nuclear state of interest to your organization, and that you would focus on the different languages of 

Pakistan, since Urdu is spoken by only 8 percent of the population 

and the Sindhi language is spoken by 12 percent. I am glad to see 

you are part of the overall public diplomacy effort. 

But in the communications world, there is a tendency to just create some separate Web people, when in reality our overt communications on the Web are directly tied to what we do at Voice of 

America, radio and television, what we do under false flag Web 

postings, which I guess is another department, probably should be 

the same department. And how closely do you work with Voice of 

America to make sure that you are making the same points, especially when you are posting video, and they are making TV shows? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. We certainly, they are colleagues, and 

as a public diplomacy officer, I know them. We see them frequently. We have staff that came from the BBG. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Do you promote their programs? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Not really. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Do you take their tape and put it up on YouTube? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. That is not something that we have 

done. The reason I would say is our focus has been that there is 

a great deal out there that the U.S. Government is doing which is 

supportive, sending a positive message. What we are trying to do 

is attack the enemy. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I would hope that the Voice of America is doing 

that, too. If you are the only one countering the terrorist message 

directly, and we decided to do it only on the Web, and not radio 

and television, a lot of us are here in the communications business, 

some of us have been involved in campaigns, none of us would 

dream of getting our message exclusively out on the Web and ignoring radio and television. And I guess these days none of us 

would think of doing the exact opposite of that either. 

And then I pointed out in my opening statement, how closely do 

you work with those who could either take down a terrorist site or 

17

identify terrorist individuals by looking at what is going on on the 

Web? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. We work very closely with those who 

are identifying the appropriate recipients or individuals. Since we 

have an intelligence community component within CSCC, we have 

CIA officers working within CSCC. We have reach back into the intelligence community. 

Mr. SHERMAN. You don’t have to tell me what we have done, but 

has anybody taken down a major terrorist Web site, whether we 

did it or maybe, you know, some act of God did it? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. That is of course a related but different 

field, which is called cyber warfare. And I think there have been 

some very big successes there. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Have you noticed any of these sites that you are 

trying to oppose disappearing, which is a very good way to oppose 

them? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. They seem to come and go and come 

back. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Now, you have experts in the culture and language that you are trying to reach out to. But many of these arguments get down to the details of Islamic law and the Hadith, the 

Koran. Do you have people there who have read 1,000 fatwas from 

various respected clerics who can tell you what is a good Hadith 

and a bad Hadith? How good are you at having people that can 

argue on Islamic terms? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. That is a very good question. What we 

try do is focus not so much on abstract questions of Islamic law, 

but on the enemy’s actions and point to the internal contradictions, 

the incoherence and dissonance that exist in the enemy’s own discourse. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So you show that they are not—that they are hypocritical vis-a`-vis their own statements, not that they are unIslamic 

because their actions contradict parts of the Koran. 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. That is exactly right. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I don’t know if Congress will give you enough 

money to do it, but I hope that you would go beyond showing that 

they clash with their own statements and show that they clash 

with the best in Islam. And I believe my time has expired. Do get 

back to me on your efforts to go into those other languages. Thank 

you. 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. We are going to go now to Mr. Duncan from South 

Carolina. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, what is the center doing to neutralize the communications of state sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran, especially in 

the areas of immediate importance to the U.S., like Iraq and Afghanistan, where the Iranian Government is really seeking to fill 

the political vacuum the U.S. is leaving in its rapid withdrawal? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Sir, since our focus has been mostly on 

al-Qaeda, we are so new, Iran——

Mr. DUNCAN. I think you need to start focusing on Iran. Just a 

word of caution. 

18

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. I can see the value of that. That goes 

to a question that several of you have asked. Obviously, we have 

our main focus, which is guided from the National Counterterrorism Strategy, which focuses mostly, principally on al-Qaeda. But 

under the direction of the interagency, we are ready and willing to 

take up new tasks, whether it be new specific areas, new languages, or new adversaries. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. Define how the center views the long-term 

strategic goals of Islamist extremist groups that presently do not 

wage terrorism against the U.S., specifically the Muslim Brotherhood. How have you all addressed that? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Well, there is incredible hatred for the 

Muslim Brotherhood among al-Qaeda. You know, we see daily the 

daily vitriol, propaganda that al-Qaeda puts out every single day. 

And they call the Muslim Brotherhood traitors. They call them 

renegades. They call them people that are collaborating with this 

disgusting western thing which is called democracy and elections. 

Because they believe there should be no democracy, there should 

be no elections. 

The idea that a Muslim, even a conservative Muslim, like the 

Muslim Brotherhood, would be elected is anathema to al-Qaeda. 

Because for them if you are elected one day, as you yourselves 

know, one day you are elected, one day you can be chosen not to 

be elected. And the way al-Qaeda sees it, that is not the role of the 

people. The people have no role in that. 

So any Muslim, whether they be the most conservative, you 

know, anti-Western Muslim who participates in the political process, even Salafis, are seen as anathema by al-Qaeda. One of the 

most fascinating things which has happened over the last year, 

which I am sure you are well aware of, is that we have had the 

most dramatic, incredible political events in the Arab world in decades, maybe in centuries that have happened over the past year, 

and al-Qaeda had nothing do with it. Absolutely nothing. You had 

governments falling. You had people in the streets. You had millions marching, and al-Qaeda was not part of that conversation. 

This drives them crazy. This drives them crazy in the propaganda, 

that basically the most important thing that is happening in the 

Arab world, and al-Qaeda is basically an Arab organization, and 

they are completely irrelevant to that issue. 

Mr. DUNCAN. That is kind of an interesting answer. I appreciate 

you bringing that up. That is something I want to chew on a little 

longer. 

Just on a different line of questioning in my remaining time, reportedly the Fort Hood shooter, Major Hasan, was influenced over 

the Web. Has the center studied this indoctrination? And how has 

it influenced the way the center operates? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. That is a very good point, and it goes 

to a point that the chairman mentioned as well when he talked 

about the virtual caliphate. And that is that one of the unfortunate 

things or one of the realities that we face on the Internet is that 

over time, you have a base of stuff that is out there. And so there 

is a you can say a hill or a mountain of poisonous stuff that has 

been spewed out by the extremists, whether photos, or videos, or 

words, and it is there. And even if the terrorists are eliminated, 

19

that material is still there, and it can infect, it can poison young 

minds, impressionable minds, anywhere in the world. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Are you also looking—you are looking at what alQaeda and the extremists are posting on their Web sites, but you 

are also in the chat rooms, so you are seeing what possibly a Major 

Hasan would post himself in a chat room and engaging in conversation. Are you all monitoring that? Are you sharing that with 

other intelligence agencies? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Since we have a relationship with the 

intelligence community, we get information from them, and we 

also, when we see things, we share that with them if appropriate, 

yes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I think that is important. You know, I am frustrated on Homeland Security when I hear some of the agencies 

aren’t talking, aren’t sharing information, especially when it comes 

to immigration issues. But I want to make sure that we don’t have 

this stovepipe effect that we experienced after the 9/11, and what 

the commission report put out. 

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Duncan. 

We will go now to Mr. Poe from Texas. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

On Friday, a journalist who was angry with NBC’s tape delay, 

which we are not going to discuss, of the Olympics, spoke out over 

Twitter. NBC complained to Twitter. By Sunday, Twitter had shut 

down the journalist’s account. Twitter wouldn’t restore that for 2 

days. 

But when it comes to a terrorist using Twitter, Twitter has not 

shut down or suspended a single account. According to Twitter’s 

terms of policy, any ‘‘person barred from receiving services under 

the laws of the U.S. may not own a Twitter account.’’ Terrorist organizations using Twitter, to me, is a violation of U.S. law. 

Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that 

it is unlawful to provide a designated FTO with ‘‘material, support, 

or resources, including any property, tangible or intangible, or services.’’

Among those, communication equipment and facilities. Terrorists 

are using Twitter. Twitter is a communication service. It seems like 

it is a violation of the law. 

One example is the Somali al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Shabaab. 

Shabaab is an officially recognized foreign terrorist organization. 

Killed 74 people in a series of suicide bombings in Uganda during 

the 2010 World Cup. Shabaab has its own Twitter account. On December 7, interesting date, 2011, it tweeted, ‘‘The jihad being 

waged here in Somalia shall continue until the country is purified 

of all the invaders.’’ Two more officially recognized foreign terrorist 

organizations, Hamas and Hezbollah, started tweeting in 2009 and 

2011 respectfully. The Taliban, which the U.S. Government held 

accountable for the attacks on 9/11, has two official Twitter accounts. August 8, 2011, the Taliban tweeted, ‘‘Four American cowards killed, six wounded in battle, two tanks destroyed.’’ I could go 

on with more and more, but I won’t. 

Twitter says it can’t verify these accounts are really used by terrorist groups or someone claiming to be these groups. So Twitter 

20

relies on the United States Government to verify accounts. Twitter 

says it will comply if the government asks them to shut down an 

account. 

To my knowledge, not one terrorist Twitter account has ever 

been shut down by our Government. 

And I want you to correct me if I am wrong on that, Mr. 

Fernandez. 

There is a reason why Hezbollah tweeted an average of about 

250 tweets a day since it opened its account in November. Twitter 

is a great way to spread propaganda and get new recruits and promote crimes against Americans. 

My question is NBC was able to get the Twitter folks to close it 

down because some civilian complained about their news service or 

about the Olympics. Not saying that is right or wrong, but that did 

occur. 

So my question really is, can you describe the terrorists’ use of 

Twitter and what we are actively doing about it? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. I would say, sir, that is mostly a law 

enforcement question. So it is not my area of responsibility in the 

sense that we are dealing with communications. 

From what I see in Twitter, it is certainly in the languages that 

we are working, it is not a major issue in the vernacular languages. 

In other words, it is often used in English to communicate with 

English language constituencies. For example, Al-Shabaab using 

Twitter was in English, not in Somali. 

So since we are focused on the vernacular languages, Arabic, 

Urdu, Somali, and potentially others, that is not our main area of 

focus. 

But I certainly understand your concern. But I think that is a 

question for law enforcement authorities, both here and internationally, rather than a communications entity. 

Mr. POE. Does the State Department have a policy regarding 

FTOs using Twitter? Do you have a policy about what the State 

Department is going to do or not going do? Any policy at all about 

Twitter? Or is that just somebody else’s responsibility? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Twitter, obviously, is an American entity, and so it is all our responsibility. 

But as I said, since we are focused overseas in foreign languages 

and not in English and not in something like Twitter, which is very 

narrowly defined; that is not an area where we work on on a regular basis. Al-Qaeda doesn’t use Twitter. 

Mr. POE. You would agree, would you not, that some foreign terrorist organizations do? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Definitely. Definitely. 

Mr. POE. It works. They get recruits, and they spread propaganda. At least they claim to do things that have occurred throughout the world. And so I am just concerned about what the United 

States’ position on that is and what we can do about it, if anything. 

Do you have a recommendation? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. You know, since it is not something 

that we are working on in the Twitter field, it is not an area which 

I am very well versed. 

Certainly we need to look at all the tools in the toolbox. And 

CSCC’s view has always been that the area where the enemy foVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:58 Sep 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\TNT\080212\75389 HFA PsN: SHIRL
21

cuses on, that is where we should go. The main focus, for example, 

of al-Qaeda’s social media communications is video and text on 

Web sites, on media fora. For them, Twitter is not something that 

they look at. 

As you mentioned very rightly, some other terrorist groups do 

use it, especially to communicate with sympathizers in the West. 

So to me, that seems that that is a very legitimate question for law 

enforcement individuals in the State Department and outside of 

the State Department. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. We are going to go through another 

round of questions. 

Let me ask you this, Ambassador Fernandez. The State Department has a reputation, in terms of the clearance process, that a lot 

of times could hinder a rapid response, right? And the one thing 

you need to be effective is the ability to respond quickly. Is this a 

fair criticism, and how we can ensure that what you do isn’t 

weighed down by a process which becomes very cumbersome, very 

bureaucratic in nature? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Well, sir, anyone who has worked in 

Washington in government knows the clearance process can be 

very cumbersome. It is not just in the State Department. That is 

true anywhere in government. 

We are fortunate in CSCC in that the people that started this 

about 11⁄2 years ago realized that this was going to be an issue. So 

when it comes to our digital operations, the clearance process is internal to CSCC. 

Mr. ROYCE. I see. 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Which means we are able to respond 

within minutes to an opportunity. 

Mr. ROYCE. Very good. I wonder if you could just give us an example or two of the success beyond what we have talked about 

today in terms of what you do, how it works. Just share it with the 

committee. 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Well, there are many. I would say that 

it is not an easy thing. It is a difficult thing. One day you feel you 

have made a success, and another day you feel like you are starting 

all over again. The one that garnered a lot of attention is an important one in that, as you know, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

tried to establish a foothold in south Yemen. We focused on that. 

We used all our tools and did, over a very short period, 600 engagements. We put out videos. We put out poster art like the one that 

you referred to. It received a very positive response by basically 

people adopting the rhetoric that we were using against the terrorists. 

So, for example, one thing we did, al-Qaeda doesn’t like to call 

itself al-Qaeda in Yemen. They are ashamed of that. And so they 

use a pseudonym. They call themselves Ansar al-Shariah. Because 

sharia in some Muslim circles is like, you know, mom and apple 

pie. And so we began in our messaging to call them Ansar al-Sharr, 

which means Partisans of Evil. And we noticed other people writing digitally adopting the nickname that we had given to them. 

And this organization, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, in its 

last newsletter before it had to head for the hills when the Yemeni 

22

army drove them out of their safe havens, devoted an entire page 

to our operation, attacking what we were doing. 

Mr. ROYCE. That was clever, and it was quick. I remember the 

9/11 Commission, when they did their thorough study of our national security agencies, said we just lacked imagination. And the 

other concern is just that imagination can get quashed or destroyed 

by bureaucracy. So you have got a situation where everything is 

pre-cleared, you can basically use your best judgment to keep up 

with the terrorist networks. 

But let me ask you this. The other thing we are really interested 

in is how to quickly close down these sites. Now, I know as fast 

as these sites move and spring up and you try to stay abreast of 

them, that that is a difficult process. But tell us how you work in 

conjunction to make sure that we do all we can do to get these 

things off the Web. 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. That is a good question. I mean, there 

are two issues here. There are terrorist sites where terrorists communicate to each other. And those are often password protected 

sites, those are basically terrorists have to sign in, you know, this 

is terrorist so and so from—known by somebody. Those are the object of cyber operations. Where we focus on is a slightly larger but 

more dangerous pool, which is, as I was telling Mr. Duncan, the 

terrorists want to go from the margins to the mainstream. They 

want to metastasize. They want to infect a larger population. So 

where we focus with our overt work are these—the middle ground 

of the contested space, which are sites that often are very political 

sites where people in the Muslim world are concerned about politics and reading about politics. And al-Qaeda trolls for people to 

radicalize them, to make them from maybe people who are unhappy with the United States or even angry at the United States 

to go that extra mile from being angry to being a terrorist. So that 

is the area where we are working. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador Fernandez. 

Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. One of the important things in protecting the 

American homeland is to prevent the radicalization of those who 

are fluent in English and could be the most effective terrorists operating here. Do you operate in English? And if not, who does? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Sir, we do not operate in English. Obviously, since our being with the State Department, our focus being 

overseas, our main focus is of course in those vernacular languages 

which I mentioned. A lot of what you are talking about of course 

is extremely important. It falls in the area of domestic 

radicalization, would be DHS and others. 

Mr. SHERMAN. There is an international component to everything 

I am talking about. 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. U.S.-based sites don’t say how to build a bomb in 

the kitchen of your mom. So all of this is international. The 

English language is international. And preventing someone fluent 

in English from becoming radicalized may be many times more important than preventing someone else from being radicalized in the 

sense of protecting the districts we represent. It is hard to criticize 

you for not doing more, because your budget is I believe the smallVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:58 Sep 07, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\TNT\080212\75389 HFA PsN: SHIRL
23

est of any government entity that has come before this subcommittee, let alone the full committee. 

And so let me continue my efforts to get you to do more without 

necessarily being part of getting you any more resources. You seem 

to be focused on Sunni terrorism. What about the Shiite extremist 

groups and the Farsi language? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Farsi has not been our focus at all. We 

focus on those three languages. There are obviously other terrorist 

groups, like Hezbollah, which are of great concern to all of us. That 

has not been a task that we have taken on yet. But if we are directed to do so through the interagency, we are very happy to engage on that issue with the same alacrity and the same tools that 

we have engaged in Arabic against al-Qaeda. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Congress never said limit yourself to the Sunnis 

or limit yourself to the three languages you are doing. We would 

like you to do it all. And you may have to be larger. And I would 

hope that those a pay grade or two above you will indicate how we 

can make your operation larger without necessarily increasing the 

entire State Department budget. 

I would like to get back to the idea of taking down the bad sites. 

You have indicated these sites come and go. Have any of them gone 

in the sense of the plug was pulled on them? And has there been 

traffic where people complain that there was a popular terrorist 

Web site, and it looks like the damn Americans or somebody else 

has taken it down? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. That certainly has been things that 

have been said at times by terrorist groups and their sympathizers. 

But given the nature of the Internet, and given its very fluid nature, these things do tend to pop up. You know, when they are 

taken down, they pop up in a different—or a similar organization 

takes its place. 

Mr. SHERMAN. The disadvantage to the terrorists there is that, 

you know, a lot of American companies spend a fortune to get you 

on their, you know, bookmarked, et cetera. And to the extent that 

you can have people say, oh, that site is not there, I got to go 

search, maybe they will end up at a reasonable site. 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Make it more difficult. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes, exactly. 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Or put a cupcake on the picture, as I 

think I read on Congressman Royce’s blog. 

Mr. SHERMAN. You are searching the Internet more than I am. 

I have not read Congressman Royce’s blog. I am sure he will tell 

me about it on the floor. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. I will do it on your time right now. Foreign Intrigue 

Blog, if you would like to access the Web site. The Foreign Intrigue 

Blog. 

Thank you, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I have been sitting here listening, I keep going back to a couple of things. I want to blend some of the things I asked earlier 

with what Congressman Poe had mentioned. You know, Twitter is 

used abroad. And I think the center’s jurisdiction is focused on 

24

abroad, communications abroad, the foreign audience, communicating with a foreign audience. So I disagree with one thing you 

said. I don’t believe this is a DHS or an FBI law enforcement jurisdiction area. I do think the Department of State and your center 

does have some jurisdiction in this as regard to what foreign nationals do use Twitter for. And they are absolutely using Twitter. 

That is not a question. That is just a statement. If you want to respond to that in just a minute, I don’t mind that. 

But you keep going back to al-Qaeda. Is it the State Department 

and this administration’s policy that al-Qaeda is our only threat? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. We are guided by the National Counterterrorism Strategy. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Would you pull the microphone up a little bit? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. We are governed by the National Counterterrorism Strategy. The main focus of the National Counterterrorism Strategy is al-Qaeda. It also refers to other terrorist threats 

throughout the world. Given the sheer volume of poison that they 

put out in the digital world and in the communications world, it 

made sense for this organization, which is such a new organization, 

to focus on them. Certainly we are open to direction to do new 

tasks. But you have seen the threat information, as we have, and 

you have seen just the sheer volume of stuff that is put out there. 

Mr. DUNCAN. And it is amazing. It is overwhelming. I agree with 

you there. We have had this conversation. 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. We are certainly willing to look at 

other opportunities. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I just don’t want the agency, the State Department 

or any agency, to get tunnel vision, to be so focused on what you 

perceive as the threat coming from al-Qaeda that we get 

blindsided. Now, I hope you have looked at the foreign terrorist organization list on the State Department Web site. 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Yes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I glanced as it just now. And I see Hezbollah, Abu 

Sayyaf, Hamas, Palestinian Liberation Front, Al-Shabaab, 

Haqqani, Boko Haram, FARC. There are a lot of threats to this Nation. And we look at what has happened just in the Western Hemisphere with Iran coming over and the Saudi Ambassador assassination attempt that was thwarted. There are so many things, I 

do not want you to get tunnel vision. I think America is threatened 

more by the State Department focusing solely on al-Qaeda. 

And so as you are monitoring these sites, you know, you better 

monitor Hamas. You better monitor Hezbollah. You better monitor 

Abu Sayyaf, which is limited, but there are a number of others. I 

just want to raise awareness to that and ask you to respond to 

what is being done. 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. We are certainly very open-minded 

about the threat. Obviously, there is a lot the U.S. Government, including the State Department, does on counterterrorism aside from 

the communications field, a whole range of policies directed at all 

of those groups. But we are open to looking at those threats. We 

certainly aim not to have tunnel vision. 

I think maybe because we have a small budget, we want to be 

nimble. We want to be agile. We want to be creative. And we have 

25

been. So we will continue to be that way and monitor and look at 

the threat and go wherever the threat takes us. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Was your area within the State Department created post-9/11? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Yes, very much so. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. We have seen that created. We have seen 

the Department of Homeland Security created, 15,000 employees, 

$3.4 billion complex out on the Potomac. We are spending a heck 

of a lot of money in this country to bring assets online. And I can 

go on and on, National Counterterrorism Center and other things. 

I want to make sure that you guys are all talking. I think there 

is—you know, State is looking foreign, but I think there is a tie in 

and a need to make sure that NCTC, and your group there at 

State, and Homeland Security, and everyone else are communicating, sharing information. As overwhelming as it is, there are 

ways to assimilate and tie that information together. Are you doing 

that? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Absolutely. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Are there shared systems? Are there platforms, 

Google-based, where this information is all pulled together if you 

search one search word? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Absolutely. We think one of our distinctive features is our connection to the intelligence community. So 

that we are able to leverage the best analysis and thought of the 

intelligence community in our work. And it goes both ways. We 

sometimes find things that are of great use or interest to them, and 

they also help us in the whole question of collection of data, whether they be images, information, material that we can use to disparage and discredit the enemy. So, yes, I think there is an excellent 

relationship, excellent communication with CIA, with NCTC, and 

with others. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Ambassador, you have a challenge. And so thank 

you for sharing this. It is something I think we, as Congress, and 

the administration needs to work on to protect America. I appreciate your efforts. 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. I thank you. I think the members are supportive of 

your efforts here. You are taking on a very difficult mission. We 

will want to keep the conversation on this going. I wouldn’t be surprised if at some point you run into some of the same quality control issues that we have had with VOA and RFA on the Persian 

Service with respect to some of the Farsi speakers. It just seems 

to go with the territory. But as long as you are attuned to it, I 

think that would be important. As I mentioned, we will have some 

specific questions for you on the record. And again, we appreciate 

all your efforts. We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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