1

Filed 8/8/13

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, )

)

Plaintiff and Respondent, )

) S199495

v. )

) Ct.App. 6 H036687

RODRIGO MARTINEZ MARTINEZ, )

) Santa Clara County

Defendant and Appellant. ) Super. Ct. No. 156569

____________________________________)

Penal Code section 1016.5 requires that before accepting a plea of guilty or 

nolo contendere to any criminal offense, the trial court must advise the defendant 

that if he or she is not a United States citizen, conviction of the offense may result 

in deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of 

naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States. (Pen. Code, § 1016.5, 

subd. (a).)1 If the advisement was not given, and the defendant shows that 

conviction of the offense to which he or she pleaded guilty or nolo contendere may 

result in adverse immigration consequences, the court, on the defendant‘s motion, 

is required to vacate the judgment and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her 

plea and enter a plea of not guilty. (Id., subd. (b).) Relief will be granted, 

however, only if the defendant establishes prejudice. (People v. Superior Court 

(Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 210 (Zamudio).) As we explained in Zamudio, 

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 

noted.
2

prejudice is shown if the defendant establishes it was reasonably probable he or 

she would not have pleaded guilty if properly advised. (Ibid.)

We granted review to consider whether a court ruling on a motion to vacate 

pursuant to section 1016.5 may deny relief, for lack of prejudice, if it concludes 

the defendant would not have obtained a more favorable outcome had he or she 

chosen not to plead guilty or nolo contendere. We hold that because the question 

is what the defendant would have done, relief should be granted if the court, after 

considering evidence offered by the parties relevant to that question, determines 

the defendant would have chosen not to plead guilty or nolo contendere, even if 

the court also finds it not reasonably probable the defendant would thereby have 

obtained a more favorable outcome. 

Having so concluded, we also consider whether, as defendant contends, the 

court ruling on the motion may consider a claim that the defendant would have 

rejected the existing plea bargain to attempt to negotiate a bargain that would not 

result in deportation, a denial of naturalization, or exclusion from admission to the 

United States, or if, as the Attorney General contends, relief is available only if the 

defendant would have rejected the plea bargain to go to trial. We hold relief is 

available if the defendant establishes he or she would have rejected the existing 

bargain to accept or attempt to negotiate another.

Because the trial court in this case denied relief on the ground there was no 

reasonable probability defendant would have obtained a more favorable result by 

rejecting the plea bargain, which is not the test for prejudice, we reverse the 

judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming the trial court‘s order denying relief 

and direct it to remand the matter to the trial court to conduct further proceedings 

consistent with our opinion here. 
3

BACKGROUND

Arresting officer Frank Estrada was the sole witness at the preliminary 

hearing. Estrada testified that on May 15, 1992, while undercover, he observed 

defendant Rodrigo Martinez Martinez hand another man a brown bindle of 

marijuana in return for what was later determined to be $8. Defendant, an 18-

year-old citizen of Mexico, was on a bicycle when the transaction occurred, and 

was still on the bicycle when Estrada apprehended him approximately one hour 

later. Defendant had no money on his person. Estrada provided a detailed 

description of the person he had seen, stating he had no doubt defendant was that 

man. Defendant was charged with a single count of the sale or transportation of 

marijuana in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11360, subdivision (a). 

Pursuant to the terms of a plea bargain, defendant pleaded guilty to the 

charged offense and received a sentence of formal probation for a period of three 

years, a probationary jail term of 111 days with 111 days‘ credit for time served,

and was ordered to pay a fine, register as a narcotics offender, and undergo 

counseling. The written minute order for the plea proceeding has boxes to be 

checked for the advisements given a pleading defendant, including a box 

explaining that a defendant has been advised that the conviction might lead to 

immigration consequences. Unlike other boxes appearing there, the box referring 

to the advisement of immigration consequences is not checked. There are no other 

existing records of the proceedings. We accordingly presume defendant did not 

receive the required advisement. (§ 1016.5, subd. (b) [―Absent a record that the 

court provided the advisement required by this section, the defendant shall be 

presumed not to have received the required advisement.‖].)

Defendant successfully completed probation, and nothing in the record 

suggests he has since had any brushes with the law. He is now in a long-term
4

marriage to a lawful permanent resident, has four minor children who are United 

States citizens and, due to his wife‘s blindness, is the sole support for his family. 

In May 2008, upon defendant‘s application and in accordance with section 

1203.4, which authorizes relief to persons who have successfully completed 

probation, the superior court allowed defendant to withdraw his plea and enter a 

plea of not guilty, and dismissed the information against him. Defendant‘s 

conviction was therefore expunged from his record. That action, however, has no 

effect on the federal immigration consequences of his conviction. (RamirezCastro v. I.N.S. (9th Cir. 2002) 287 F.3d 1172, 1174-1175.) Two months later, 

defendant sought an adjustment in status to lawful permanent residency. His 

application was denied because of his conviction.2 Removal proceedings have 

been initiated against him, and he now faces deportation and permanent exclusion 

from this country.

In January 2011, defendant filed a motion to vacate his 1992 conviction 

pursuant to section 1016.5, asserting that, had he been aware that by pleading 

guilty he would become deportable and permanently barred from the United 

States, he would have rejected the plea offer and insisted on negotiating a different 

bargain without similar adverse immigration consequences, or failing that, would 

have exercised his right to a jury trial. Defendant also made an offer to ―elaborate 

on the reasons he immigrated to the United States, the ties, obligations, and 

opportunities he had here at the time of his plea, and the hardships he expected to 

face had he been forced to return to his native Mexico alone at the impressionable 

 

2 The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services found defendant 

inadmissible to the United States because he had committed an offense relating to 

trafficking in a controlled substance in violation of section 212(a)(2)(C) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act.
5

young age of eighteen years old.‖ The district attorney opposed the motion, 

asserting that to show prejudice defendant was required to demonstrate that if 

properly advised he would not have pleaded guilty and it was reasonably probable 

a result more favorable to him would have resulted had he gone to trial.

The only issue adjudicated at the hearing on defendant‘s motion was 

whether defendant would have received a more favorable outcome had he rejected 

the plea bargain. The court thereafter denied the motion, explaining it found it 

―highly improbable‖ defendant, by rejecting the plea bargain, would have been 

offered a more favorable plea bargain and even more unlikely he would have been 

acquitted had he gone to trial. It thus appears the court did not consider the 

possibility defendant might have rejected the plea bargain even were it not 

reasonably probable he could have negotiated a more favorable bargain or would 

have obtained a more favorable outcome had he gone to trial. The Court of 

Appeal affirmed the order denying relief. 

We granted review.

DISCUSSION

I.

Section 1016.5, subdivision (d) states the Legislature‘s purpose and intent 

in enacting that section: ―The Legislature finds and declares that in many 

instances involving an individual who is not a citizen of the United States charged 

with an offense punishable as a crime under state law, a plea of guilty or nolo 

contendere is entered without the defendant knowing that a conviction of such 

offense is grounds for deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, 

or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States. Therefore, it 

is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to promote fairness to such 

accused individuals by requiring in such cases that acceptance of a guilty plea or 

plea of nolo contendere be preceded by an appropriate warning of the special 
6

consequences for such a defendant which may result from the plea. It is also the 

intent of the Legislature that the court in such cases shall grant the defendant a 

reasonable amount of time to negotiate with the prosecuting agency in the event 

the defendant or the defendant‘s counsel was unaware of the possibility of 

deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of 

naturalization as a result of conviction. It is further the intent of the Legislature 

that at the time of the plea no defendant shall be required to disclose his or her 

legal status to the court.‖

Section 1016.5 thus requires the court accepting a plea to advise the 

defendant that ―conviction of the offense for which you have been charged may 

have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United 

States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.‖ (Id., 

subd. (a).) The defendant is then entitled to ―additional time to consider the 

appropriateness of the plea in light of the advisement . . . .‖ (Id., subd. (b).) The 

section contemplates a period during which the defendant, without risking the loss 

of the existing plea bargain, can reconsider its value in light of the immigration 

consequences that will result from it and attempt to negotiate a different bargain 

that will not have the same consequences. (Id., subds. (b) & (d).) Section 1016.5 

also provides a remedy for the failure to advise: ―If . . . the court fails to advise 

the defendant as required by this section and the defendant shows that conviction 

of the offense to which defendant pleaded guilty or nolo contendere may have the 

consequences for the defendant of deportation, exclusion from admission to the 

United States, or denial of naturalization . . . , the court, on defendant‘s motion, 

shall vacate the judgment and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty 

or nolo contendere, and enter a plea of not guilty.‖ (Id., subd. (b).) 

Section 1016.5 does not expressly recite that a defendant seeking relief for 

a failure to advise must establish prejudice beyond showing that the conviction 
7

may have immigration consequences. But in Zamudio, supra, 23 Cal.4th 183, we 

construed the section ―to require that defendants, in order to obtain relief under 

subdivision (b) of the statute, demonstrate they were prejudiced by any failure of 

the court to provide complete advisements under subdivision (a).‖ (Id. at pp. 199-

200.) We adopted the test for prejudice established in People v. Watson (1956) 46 

Cal.2d 818, 836, as applied to a failure to advise of the consequences of a plea, 

explaining the defendant must establish ―  ̳it is ―reasonably probable‖ the 

defendant would not have pleaded guilty if properly advised.‘ ‖ (Zamudio, at 

p. 210.) The test for prejudice thus considers what the defendant would have 

done, not whether the defendant‘s decision would have led to a more favorable 

result.

We have applied the same test in other situations. We recognized a 

defendant might decline to accept a bargain because it would result in a substantial 

restitution fine. (People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1023.) We also 

accepted the possibility a defendant might show prejudice by establishing he 

would not have accepted a plea offer had he been properly advised as to the length 

of time he would remain on parole following release from prison. (In re Moser 

(1993) 6 Cal.4th 342, 345, 353.) Although in People v. McClellan (1993) 6 

Cal.4th 367, we rejected a defendant‘s claim that he was prejudiced by the failure 

to advise him his conviction would require that he register as a sex offender 

pursuant to section 290, we did so because the defendant had provided no 

evidence to support his claim (McClellan, at p. 378), thus implicitly recognizing 

that in some other case, a failure to advise of the sex registration requirement 

might prove to be prejudicial.

 That a defendant might reject a plea bargain because it would result in 

deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of 

naturalization is beyond dispute. The Legislature so recognized when it enacted 
8

section 1016.5. (See id., subd. (d).) This court has found that ―criminal 

convictions may have  ̳dire consequences‘ under federal immigration law 

[citation] and that such consequences are  ̳material matters‘ [citation] for 

noncitizen defendants faced with pleading decisions.‖ (In re Resendiz (2001) 25

Cal.4th 230, 250.) ―[A] deported alien who cannot return  ̳loses his job, his 

friends, his home, and maybe even his children, who must choose between their 

[parent] and their native country.‘ ‖ (Zamudio, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 209.) 

Indeed, a defendant ―may view immigration consequences as the only ones that 

could affect his calculations regarding the advisability of pleading guilty to 

criminal charges‖ (Resendiz, at p. 253), such as when the defendant has family 

residing legally in the United States. ―Thus, even before the Legislature expressly 

recognized the unfairness inherent in holding noncitizens to pleas they entered 

without knowing the consequent immigration risks (see § 1016.5, subd. (d), added 

by Stats. 1977, ch. 1088, § 1, p. 3495), we held that justice may require permitting 

one who pleads guilty  ̳without knowledge of or reason to suspect [immigration] 

consequences‘ to withdraw the plea.‖ (Resendiz, at p. 250.) We therefore found 

that ―affirmative misadvice regarding immigration consequences can in certain 

circumstances constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.‖ (Id. at p. 240.) 

The United States Supreme Court, in Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 

356, ___ [130 S.Ct. 1473, 1478], similarly held that relief for the ineffective 

assistance of counsel may be available to a defendant whose attorney failed to 

advise him or her of the immigration consequences of a plea. It observed, ―as a 

matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part—indeed sometimes the most 

important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who 

plead guilty to specified crimes.‖ (Padilla, at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 1480], fn. 

omitted.) Further, ―  ̳ ―[p]reserving the client‘s right to remain in the United States 

may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.‖ ‘ [Citation.] 
9

Likewise, we have recognized that  ̳preserving the possibility of‘ discretionary 

relief from deportation . . .  ̳would have been one of the principal benefits sought 

by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to 

trial.‘ ‖ (Id. at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 1483].) 

In sum, our Legislature, the United States Supreme Court, and this court 

have recognized that the defendant‘s decision to accept or reject a plea bargain can

be profoundly influenced by the knowledge, or lack of knowledge, that a 

conviction in accordance with the plea will have immigration consequences. For 

that reason, and because the test for prejudice considers what the defendant would 

have done, not what the effect of that decision would have been, a court ruling on 

a section 1016.5 motion may not deny relief simply by finding it not reasonably 

probable the defendant by rejecting the plea would have obtained a more favorable 

outcome.

This is not to suggest the probability of obtaining a more favorable outcome 

is irrelevant. To the contrary, a defendant‘s assessment of the strength of the 

prosecution‘s case in relation to his or her own case is often a factor, and 

undoubtedly sometimes the determinative factor, in the decision to accept or reject 

a plea offer. A defendant convinced he or she is unlikely to avoid conviction thus 

might have few reservations about accepting a plea bargain that offers significant 

benefits over the probable consequences of proceeding to trial. Conversely, a 

defendant might decline to accept an offer if there is little to lose by rejecting it, 

particularly if acceptance would have significant adverse consequences. As we 

explained in Resendiz, a factor pertinent to the decision to accept or reject a plea 

may be the ―  ̳disparity between the terms of the proposed plea bargain and the 

probable consequences of proceeding to trial, as viewed at the time of the offer 

. . . .‘ ‖ (In re Resendiz, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 253.) For that reason, ―[i]n 

determining whether or not a defendant who has pled guilty would have insisted 
10

on proceeding to trial had he received competent advice, an appellate court . . . 

may consider the probable outcome of any trial, to the extent that may be 

discerned.‖ (Id. at p. 254.) But because the test for prejudice considers what the 

defendant would have done, that a more favorable result was not reasonably 

probable is only one factor for the trial court to consider when assessing the 

credibility of a defendant‘s claim that he or she would have rejected the plea 

bargain if properly advised.

We recognize such a rule poses a threat to the finality of convictions 

obtained through the plea bargaining process, particularly in cases such as this, 

where a defendant seeks relief many years after his or her plea has been entered 

and the difficulty of proving guilt may have become insurmountable. 

Nevertheless, the Legislature, by providing for section 1016.5 relief, has expressed 

its willingness to accept the threat to the finality of judgments ―to promote 

fairness‖ to affected individuals. (§ 1016.5, subd. (d).)3In any event, several 

considerations should act to limit the number of cases where relief might be 

sought or granted.

First, section 1016.5 relief is available only if the trial court failed to 

provide the statutory advisement or if the record is silent on that subject; in the 

vast majority of cases the defendant will have been adequately advised and the 

 

3 Section 1016.5, although not stating a time bar, limits relief with respect to 

pleas accepted prior to its effective date of January 1, 1978, but even there it 

provides: ―Nothing in this section, however, shall be deemed to inhibit a court, in 

the sound exercise of its discretion, from vacating a judgment [entered on a plea 

accepted before January 1, 1978,] and permitting a defendant to withdraw a plea.‖ 

(Id., subd. (c).) Nonetheless, we have suggested a defendant seeking relief may be 

required to proceed with ―  ̳reasonable diligence‘ ‖ after learning that the plea will 

result in deportation, exclusion, or a denial of naturalization. (Zamudio, supra, 23 

Cal.4th at pp. 203-204.)
11

record will reflect that the advisement was given. Second, relief is available only 

to persons who are not otherwise deportable, that is, who have not since their 

conviction engaged in other conduct that would trigger immigration consequences. 

Further, as observed by the United States Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky,

―an opportunity to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial—imposes its own 

significant limiting principle: Those who collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose 

the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea. . . . [T]he challenge may 

result in a less favorable outcome for the defendant . . . .‖ (Padilla v. Kentucky, 

supra, 559 U.S. at pp. ___-___ [130 S.Ct. at pp. 1485-1486].) And, as this court 

explained in Resendiz, ―[t]he choice . . . that petitioner would have faced at the

time he was considering whether to plead, even had he been properly advised, 

would not have been between, on the one hand, pleading guilty and being deported 

and, on the other, going to trial and avoiding deportation.‖ (In re Resendiz, supra,

25 Cal.4th at p. 254.) The defendant thus must convince the court he or she would 

have chosen to lose the benefits of the plea bargain despite the possibility or 

probability deportation would nonetheless follow.

Finally, it remains true that the defendant bears the burden of establishing 

prejudice. (Zamudio, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 210.) To that end, the defendant 

must provide a declaration or testimony stating that he or she would not have 

entered into the plea bargain if properly advised. It is up to the trial court to 

determine whether the defendant‘s assertion is credible, and the court may reject 

an assertion that is not supported by an explanation or other corroborating 

circumstances. 

In sum, relief will be neither sought nor available in the vast majority of 

cases, and in those where relief may be available, a defendant may have 

significant reasons why not to seek it. But in those cases where relief is 

potentially available and the risks attending withdrawal of the plea do not dissuade 
12

the defendant from seeking it, the court should give careful consideration to the 

defendant‘s claim that he or she would not have entered the plea had adequate 

advice been given, and should grant relief if convinced of the credibility of that 

claim, even if the court also concludes it is not reasonably probable the defendant 

would have obtained a better outcome. 

II.

Defendant argues that a court should grant section 1016.5 relief if it 

concludes the defendant, if properly advised, would not have entered into the plea 

bargain and would have sought to negotiate a different bargain that would not 

result in deportation, exclusion, or a denial of naturalization. The Attorney 

General argues instead that the existing test for prejudice, i.e., that prejudice is 

shown if the defendant establishes it was reasonably probable he or she would 

have rejected the plea if properly advised (Zamudio, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 210),

should be reformulated to allow relief only if the defendant establishes a 

reasonable probability that if properly advised, he or she would not have pleaded 

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Under that test, that the 

defendant‘s decision might have been influenced by the existence of a different 

bargain or the hope of obtaining one, would be irrelevant.

The Attorney General‘s test is patterned on that expressed by the United 

States Supreme Court in Hill v. Lockhart (1985) 474 U.S. 52, in the context of a 

defendant‘s claim that his plea should be set aside because his attorney had 

misinformed him about his parole eligibility date. The court explained, ―in order 

to satisfy the  ̳prejudice‘ requirement‖ that is the second prong of the test for 

granting relief for the ineffective assistance of counsel, stated by the high court in 

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, ―the defendant must show that 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s errors, he would not have 

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.‖ (Hill v. Lockhart, at 
13

p. 59.) But as the court later explained in Roe v. Flores-Ortega (2000) 528 U.S. 

470, the Hill v. Lockhart test comprehends that prejudice is presumed by the loss 

of a fair trial or, as in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, the loss of an appeal. ―Under such 

circumstances,  ̳[n]o specific showing of prejudice [is] required,‘ because  ̳the 

adversary process itself [is] presumptively unreliable.‘ ‖ (Roe, at p. 483.) To 

obtain relief on a claim that counsel‘s deficient performance caused the forfeiture 

of a proceeding, therefore, the defendant is required to demonstrate both that 

counsel‘s performance was deficient and that the deficiency actually caused the 

loss of the proceeding. (Ibid.) 

The Attorney General‘s analogy to the Strickland standard falls short. 

Relief under that standard is conditioned on the loss of a fair trial or other 

proceeding. Section 1016.5, by contrast, is aimed at ensuring that the defendant 

has the opportunity to decide whether or not to accept a plea offer despite possible 

immigration consequences. To establish prejudice, defendant must show that he 

would not have entered into the plea bargain if properly advised — a decision that 

might be based either on the desire to go to trial or on the hope or expectation of 

negotiating a different bargain without immigration consequences. Indeed, section 

1061.5 recites: ―It is . . . the intent of the Legislature that the court in such cases 

shall grant the defendant a reasonable amount of time to negotiate with the 

prosecuting agency in the event the defendant or the defendant‘s counsel was 

unaware of the possibility of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United 

States, or denial of naturalization as a result of conviction.‖ (§ 1016.5, subd. (d).) 

The section therefore expressly recognizes that the defendant‘s choice is not

whether to (1) accept the proffered bargain or (2) go to trial. Rather, it is whether 

to (1) accept the proffered bargain, or (2) accept or try to obtain a better bargain 

that does not include immigration consequences, or (3) go to trial.
14

The Attorney General asserts that permitting the court to consider factors 

other than probable success at trial undermines prosecutorial and judicial 

independence. The assertion assumes that to find the defendant would have 

rejected a plea bargain to negotiate a different bargain, the court must conclude a 

different bargain would have been offered by the prosecution and approved by the 

court. But again, a court deciding whether to grant relief considers what the 

defendant would have done, not what the result of the defendant‘s decision would 

have been. The court does not decide if the prosecution would have offered a 

different bargain; it considers evidence that would have caused the defendant to 

expect or hope a different bargain would or could have been negotiated. Nor does

a court considering whether to grant section 1016.5 relief have the power to 

compel the prosecutor to make some other plea offer or agree to a different 

bargain; its authority extends no further than to ―vacate the judgment and permit 

the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and enter a plea of 

not guilty.‖ (§ 1016.5, subd. (b).) The prosecutor retains the authority to refuse to 

negotiate further, and the sentencing court retains the authority to reject any plea 

bargain reached by the parties.

In sum, we hold that section 1016.5 relief may be granted if the court is 

convinced the defendant, if properly advised, would have rejected an existing plea 

offer in the hope or expectation that he or she might thereby negotiate a different 

bargain, or failing in that, go to trial.

III.

Turning to the present case, defendant claims it is reasonably probable he 

would have negotiated an immigration-neutral bargain and, if not, gone to trial. 

Defendant and amici curiae make a number of assertions in support of that claim,

maintaining, for example, that most criminal convictions result from plea bargains, 

the prevailing practice among defense counsel is to attempt to negotiate bargains 
15

that will not have immigration consequences, and prosecutors are, or at least 

should be, amenable to such dispositions. Defendant further insists plea options 

were available to him that would not have resulted in deportation.

But as we have explained, for purposes of a grant of section 1016.5 relief, 

the critical question is whether the defendant would have rejected the plea bargain,

not what the outcome of that decision would have been. That the defendant would 

have done so is not established by evidence that criminal prosecutions are resolved 

by plea bargains or an immigration-neutral bargain was possible. Nonetheless, in 

determining the credibility of a defendant‘s claim, the court in its discretion may 

consider factors presented to it by the parties, such as the presence or absence of 

other plea offers, the seriousness of the charges in relation to the plea bargain, the 

defendant‘s criminal record, the defendant‘s priorities in plea bargaining, the 

defendant‘s aversion to immigration consequences, and whether the defendant had 

reason to believe that the charges would allow an immigration-neutral bargain that 

a court would accept. 

IV.

Defendant offered to ―testify, and to elaborate on the reasons he immigrated 

to the United States, the ties, obligations, and opportunities he had here at the time 

of his plea, and the hardships he expected to face had he been forced to return to 

his native Mexico alone at the impressionable young age of eighteen years old.‖ 

But the only question litigated at the hearing on defendant‘s motion for section 

1016.5 relief was whether defendant would have obtained a more favorable result 

had he withdrawn his plea. Whether the parties and the court simply assumed 

defendant could establish his decision to plead guilty would have been different 

had he been fully advised, or believed it did not matter unless he could also 

establish a reasonable probability he would have obtained a better result had he 

rejected the plea, is unclear, but in any event, the record does not disclose the basis 
16

or depth of defendant‘s aversion to the immigration consequences of the plea he 

entered. The record does disclose that the plea did not result in a reduction in the 

charge filed against defendant and, although not dispositive on the point, suggests 

defendant had not previously been convicted. No particular reason appears why 

defendant would have been denied probation or would have received an 

aggravated sentence had he rejected the plea offer and gone to trial. That 

defendant, having little to gain by accepting the plea offer, would have rejected it

thus is not impossible. Under the circumstances, we find the matter should be 

returned to the trial court to allow the court to conduct further proceedings at 

which defendant may offer such evidence as he can to convince the court that it is 

reasonably probable he would not have entered the plea had he been properly 

advised.

DISPOSITION

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the court is directed 

to reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter to that court for 

further proceedings in accordance with our opinion here.

WERDEGAR, J.

WE CONCUR:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

KENNARD, J.

BAXTER, J.

CHIN, J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Martinez

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn filed 12/9/11 – 6th Dist.

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S199495

Date Filed: August 8, 2013

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Santa Clara

Judge: Marcel B. Poché

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Sara E. Coppin, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Law Offices of J.T. Philipsborn, John T. Philipsborn; California Supreme Court Clinic at UC Davis School 

of Law and Aimee Feinberg for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 

Defendant and Appellant.

Law Offices of Michael K. Mehr and Michael K. Mehr for Immigrant Legal Resources Center and Asian 

Law Caucus as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, 

Assistant Attorney General, Stan Helfman, Sharon G. Birenbaum, Seth K. Shalit and Masha A. Dabiza, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Sara E. Coppin

11075 Treehenge Lane

Auburn, CA 95602

(530) 401-6891

Masha A. Dabiza

Deputy Attorney General

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

(415) 703-1305