08 July 2008

Civil-Military Operations

Joint Publication 3-57
PREFACE 

i 

1. Scope 

 This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning and conduct of civil-military 

operations (CMO) by joint forces, the use of civil affairs forces, the conduct of civil 

affairs operations, and the coordination with other capabilities contributing to the 

execution of CMO to achieve unified action. 

2. Purpose 

 This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and 

other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, 

education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in 

preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the 

authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the 

JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the 

overall objective. 

3. Application 

 a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders 

of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate 

components of these commands, and the Services. 

 b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances 

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the 

contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. 

Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military 

command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United 
Preface 

ii JP 3-57 

States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should 

evaluate and follow the multinational commandís doctrine and procedures, where 

applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. 

 

 For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

 STEPHEN M. GOLDFEIN 

 Major General, USAF 

 Vice Director, Joint Staff 
iii 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION (JP) 3-57 

DATED 8 FEBRUARY 2001 

• Consolidates JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, and JP 3-57 formerly 

titled Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations 

• Emphasizes that civil-military operations (CMO) are an inherent 

responsibility of command and facilitate accomplishment of the 

commanderís mission 

• Amplifies the use of CMO as a primary military instrument to synchronize 

military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in 

support of stability, counterinsurgency and other operations dealing with 

ìasymmetricî and ìirregularî threats in the 21st century 

• Addresses provincial reconstruction teams 

• Enhances the discussion of CMO objectives 

• Discusses the relationship between CMO and civil affairs operations 

• Addresses how CMO support operations and activities as they relate to the 

phasing model (i.e., Shape, Deter, Seize Initiative, Dominate, Stabilize, 

Enable Civil Authorities) 

• Relates Chapter III ìPlanning,î to the planning process as addressed in JP 

5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and provides an Appendix B ìPlanning 

Considerations for Civil Affairs Operationsî 

• Provides an in-depth discussion of the relationship between CMO and the 

interagency, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental 

organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector 

• Updates Appendix A ìService Capabilitiesî 

• Provides definitions for civil affairs operations, indigenous populations and 

institutions, private sector, and provincial reconstruction team 

• Modifies the definition of civil-military operations center 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-57 

Intentionally Blank 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

v 

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii 

CHAPTER I 

 INTRODUCTION 

• General ......................................................................................................................I-1 

• Civil-Military Operations and Levels of War ...........................................................I-5 

• Objectives of Civil-Military Operations....................................................................I-9 

• Relationships Between Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs Operations....I-19 

CHAPTER II 

 ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR CIVIL-MILITARY 

 OPERATIONS 

• General .................................................................................................................... II-1 

• Responsibilities ....................................................................................................... II-2 

• Organizations Providing Civil-Military Operations Capabilities ........................... II-8 

• Organizing for Civil-Military Operations ............................................................ II-21 

CHAPTER III 

 PLANNING 

• General .................................................................................................................. III-1 

• Strategic and Operational Planning Considerations .............................................. III-3 

• Other Functional Planning Considerations............................................................. III-4 

CHAPTER IV 

 COORDINATION 

• General ..................................................................................................................IV-1 

• Host Nation and Foreign Nation ............................................................................IV-8 

• Multinational ..........................................................................................................IV-8 

• Interagency .............................................................................................................IV-9 

• Intergovernmental Organizations .........................................................................IV-12 

• Nongovernmental Organizations..........................................................................IV-14 

• The Private Sector ................................................................................................IV-16 

APPENDIX 

A Service Capabilities ........................................................................................... A-1 

B Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Operations.........................................B-1 

C References............................................................................................................C-1 

D Administrative Instructions ................................................................................ D-1 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-57 

GLOSSARY 

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ....................................................................GL-1 

Part II Terms and Definitions ................................................................................GL-6 

FIGURE 

I-1 Range of Military Operations ........................................................................I-4 

I-2 Phasing Model ................................................................................................I-8 

I-3 Possible Escalation Indicators.........................................................................I-9 

I-4 Notional Balance of Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Operations ..........I-18 

I-5 Civil-Military Operations Relationships.......................................................I-20 

II-1 Principles of Civil Affairs Operations ....................................................... II-13 

II-2 Specialized Engineering Capabilities ........................................................ II-15 

II-3 Health Service Support Activities in Civil-Military Operations ................ II-17 

II-4 Military Police or Security Forces Activities ............................................. II-20 

II-5 Possible Joint Task Force Organization ..................................................... II-23 

II-6 Typical Functions Performed by a Joint Civil-Military Operations 

 Task Force................................................................................................... II-24 

II-7 Notional Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force................................. II-25 

II-8 Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center .................... II-29 

II-9 Civil-Military Operations Center Functions ............................................... II-30 

II-10 Comparison Between Humanitarian Operations Center, Humanitarian 

 Assistance Coordination Center, and Civil-Military Operations Center .... II-32 

III-1 Civil-Military Operations General Planning Considerations ...................... III-2 

III-2 Legal Issues.................................................................................................. III-9 

IV-1 Comparison of United States Agency Organizational Structures................IV-7 

IV-2 Planning Factors for Multinational Forces ................................................IV-10 

A-C-1 Medical Planning Considerations in Medical Civil-Military 

 Operations................................................................................................. A-C-3 

B-1 Sample Checklist for Termination Planning..................................................B-5 

B-2 Sample Checklist for Transition Planning .....................................................B-7 
vii 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDERíS OVERVIEW 

• Describes Civil-Military Operations across the Range of Military 

Operations and the Levels of War 

• Discusses the Objectives of Civil-Military Operations 

• Discusses the Role of Civil-Military Operations within the Phases of a Joint 

Campaign 

• Describes the Relationships Between Civil-Military Operations and Civil 

Affairs Operations 

• Describes Commander Responsibilities for Civil-Military Operations 

• Discusses the Organizations Providing Civil-Military Operations 

Capabilities 

• Describes Civil-Military Operations Strategic and Operational Planning 

Considerations 

• Discusses Civil-Military Operations Coordination Requirements and 

Organizations 

Civil-Military Operations Overview 

Civil-Military Operations 

(CMO). The activities of a 

commander that establish 

collaborative relationships 

among military forces, 

governmental and 

nongovernmental civilian 

organizations and authorities, 

and the civilian populace in a 

friendly, neutral, or hostile 

operational area in order to 

facilitate military operations 

are nested in support of the 

overall US objectives. CMO 

may include performance by 

military forces of activities 

and functions normally the 

responsibility of local, 

At the strategic, operational and tactical levels and 

across the full range of military operations, civilmilitary operations (CMO) are a primary military 

instrument to synchronize military and nonmilitary 

instruments of national power, particularly in support of 

stability, counterinsurgency and other operations 

dealing with ìasymmetricî and ìirregularî threats. 

Potential challenges include ethnic and religious 

conflict, cultural and socioeconomic differences, 

terrorism and insurgencies, the proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction, international organized crime, 

incidental and deliberate population migration, 

environmental degradation, infectious diseases, and 

sharpening competition/exploitation of dwindling 

natural resources. Opportunities, conversely, include the 

integration and comprehensive use of 

intergovernmental, regional, national, and local 

governmental and nongovernmental and private sector 
Executive Summary 

viii JP 3-57 

regional, or national 

government. 

organizations, which have proliferated in number, 

variety, and capability. Recent policy initiatives, 

national security, military strategies, and military 

doctrine demonstrate a growing appreciation of the 

need to leverage more nonmilitary instruments of 

national power, reposed in the interagency process and 

the private sector, entailing a more holistic, and 

balanced strategy. 

CMO are holistic, cumulative, integrative, and 

synergistic, working in the seams of power and gaps in 

organizations, phases, and processes. CMO need to 

take into consideration the culture of the indigenous 

population. CMO are about engaging the population 

and building relationships. CMO are inherently joint, 

interagency, and multinational. At all levels, CMO use 

political bargaining, collaboration, consensus, and 

relationship-building to create conditions for success. 

At all levels, CMO use 

political bargaining, 

collaboration, consensus, 

and relationship-building to 

create conditions for success. 

Joint force commanders (JFCs) integrate civil affairs 

(CA) forces with other military forces (maneuver, 

health service, military police [MP]/security forces, 

engineering, transportation, and special operations 

forces [SOF]), security forces (e.g., national, border, 

and local police), other government agencies (OGAs), 

indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), 

intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), host nations 

(HNs), foreign nations (FNs), and the private sector to 

provide the capabilities needed for successful CMO. 

Liaison 

Liaison ensures mutual 

understanding and unity of 

purpose and action. 

Effective CMO require extensive liaison and 

coordination between US, multinational, and 

indigenous security forces and engaged OGAs as well 

as NGOs, IGOs, IPI, or the private sector. Liaison is the 

contact by which communications can be maintained 

between organizations and agencies to ensure mutual 

understanding and unity of purpose and action. 

Unity of Effort 

 One of the most difficult problems for the JFC in CMO 

is coordinating the activities of the military units with 

multiple civilian organizations having their own 
Executive Summary 

ix 

purpose and goals. The JFC must ensure that CMO are 

not only coordinated at the operational level, but also at 

the country and theater strategic levels. 

Civil-Military Operations and Levels of War 

Strategic. At the strategic level, CMO focus is on 

larger and long-term global or regional issues such as 

reconstruction, economic development, and stability. 

CMO can assist the 

geographic combatant 

commander in conducting 

strategic planning by linking 

his theater security 

cooperation plan regional 

engagement activities with 

national strategic objectives. 

Operational. At the operational level, CMO focus on 

immediate or near-term issues such as health service 

infrastructure; movement, feeding, and sheltering of 

dislocated civilians (DCs); police and security 

programs; building FN government legitimacy; 

synchronization of CMO support to tactical 

commanders; and the coordination, synchronization, 

and, where possible, integration of interagency, IGO, 

and NGO activities with military operations. 

Tactical. Tactical-level CMO include support of 

stakeholders at local levels, and promoting the 

legitimacy and effectiveness of US presence and 

operations among locals, while minimizing friction 

between the military and the civilian organizations in 

the field. These may include local security operations, 

processing and movement of DCs, project management 

and project nomination, civil reconnaissance, and basic 

health service support (HSS). 

Integrating CMO into Plans and Orders 

Integration of CMO into the combatant commanderís 

(CCDRís) plans and orders ensures all government 

activities are considered and coordinated, and that 

strategic, operational, and tactical level CMO are 

conducted to create the maximum effect. During 

complex contingency operations, the interagency 

community develops and promulgates a United States 

Government (USG) strategic plan for reconstruction, 

stabilization, or conflict transformation in compliance 

with national security Presidential directive (NSPD)-44. 

For the NSPD-44 planning process, Department of 

Defense (DOD) participants are the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. CCDR or 

subordinate JFC participation will coordinate on the 
Executive Summary 

x JP 3-57 

strategic plan for reconstruction, stabilization or conflict 

transformation in conjunction with the Joint Staff. The 

primary mechanism for coordinating CMO within an 

echelon and between echelons is annex G (CivilMilitary Operations) to operation plans and orders. 

Since CMO involve the activities of a number of staff 

sections and subordinate units, it is necessary to have a 

single document to identify, consolidate, deconflict, and 

synergize the activities of the various sections and units 

(e.g., engineers, health service, and transportation). 

Escalation Indicators 

Unforeseen changes or shifts in effort may arise from a 

failure to anticipate changes in the military or political 

situation as well as unexpected changes in the 

environment such as the occurrence of a natural or manmade disaster. Possible indicators to monitor include, 

but are not limited to: political activities and 

movements; food or water shortages; outbreaks of 

disease; military setbacks; natural disasters; crop 

failures; fuel shortages; onset of seasonal changes (e.g., 

winter may exacerbate fuel and food shortages); police 

force and corrections system deterioration; judicial 

system shortcomings; insurgent attacks; sharp rise in 

crime; terrorist bombing; disruption of public utilities; 

and, economic strife due to socioeconomic imbalance. 

Objectives of Civil-Military Operations 

CMO are a range of possible activities that are 

considered based on the desired level of civilian 

support, availability of resources, and inadvertent 

interference by the local population. The purpose of 

CMO is to facilitate military operations, and to 

consolidate and achieve operational US objectives, 

through the integration of civil and military actions 

while conducting support to civil administration (SCA), 

populace and resources control (PRC), foreign 

humanitarian assistance (FHA), nation assistance (NA), 

and civil information management (CIM). 

Support to Civil Administration. SCA helps continue 

or stabilize management by a governing body of a FNís 

civil structure by assisting an established government or 
Executive Summary 

xi 

by establishing military authority over an occupied 

population. SCA consists of planning, coordinating, 

advising, or assisting with those activities that reinforce 

or restore a civil administration that supports US and 

multinational objectives. 

Populace and Resources Control. PRC assists HN 

governments or de facto authorities in retaining control 

over their population centers, thus precluding 

complicating problems that may hinder joint mission 

accomplishment. PRC measures seek to identify, 

reduce, relocate, or access population resources that 

may impede or otherwise threaten joint operation 

success. 

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. FHA is defined as 

programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of 

natural or man-made disasters or other endemic 

conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or 

privation that might present a serious threat to life or 

that can result in great damage to or loss of property. 

The foreign assistance provided is designed to 

supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil 

authorities or agencies that may have the primary 

responsibility for providing FHA. 

Nation Assistance. NA is civil or military assistance 

(other than FHA) rendered to a nation by US forces 

within that nationís territory during peacetime, crises or 

emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually 

concluded between the US and that nation. NA 

programs often include, but are not limited to, security 

assistance, foreign internal defense, and humanitarian 

and civic assistance. 

Civil Information Management. Civil information is 

information developed from data about civil areas, 

structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and 

events that can be fused or processed to increase 

interagency, IGO, and NGO situational awareness. It is 

a CA planning consideration. CIM is the process 

whereby civil information is collected, entered into a 

central database, and fused with the supported JFC, 

higher headquarters, DOD and joint intelligence 

organizations, other USG and DOD agencies, 

interagency partners, NGOs, and the private sector to 
Executive Summary 

xii JP 3-57 

ensure the timely availability of information for 

analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the 

raw and analyzed civil information to military and 

nonmilitary partners. 

Civil-Military Operations in Joint Operations 

CMO occur across the range of military operations and 

throughout the joint operational phases. CMO can be 

broadly separated into support to military operations 

and support to civil actions, though at times those 

become mixed depending upon the operational 

environment and the potential to expand from military 

to civil or civil to military support. CMO tasks vary 

with the joint operation phases. 

More than minimizing 

civilian interference, CMO 

help hasten an end to 

hostilities and attempt to limit 

collateral damage on 

indigenous populations and 

institutions from offensive, 

defensive, or stability 

operations. 

Phase 0 -- Shape. CMO typically support many 

elements of the CCDRsí security cooperation plans 

(SCPs). At the strategic and operational levels, 

especially during the implementation of the CCDRís 

SCP, the timely application of CMO can mitigate the 

need for other military operations in response to a 

crisis. 

Phase I -- Deter. CMO should be integrated with 

flexible deterrent options to generate maximum 

strategic or operational effect through synergizing 

softer, more influential civil and harder, more 

coercive military power. 

Phase II -- Seize Initiative. During this phase, 

initiatives to gain access to theater infrastructure and 

to expand friendly freedom of action through CMO 

are continuous while the JFC seeks to degrade 

adversary capabilities with the intent of resolving 

the crisis at the earliest opportunity. 

Phase III -- Dominate. More than minimizing 

civilian interference, CMO help hasten an end to 

hostilities and attempt to limit collateral damage on 

IPI from offensive, defensive, or stability operations. 

Phase IV -- Stabilize. This phase typically is 

characterized by a change from sustained combat 

operations to stability operations. As this occurs, CMO 

facilitate humanitarian relief, civil order, and restoration 
Executive Summary 

xiii 

of public services as fighting subsides and emphasis 

shifts from relief to reconstruction. 

Phase V -- Enable Civil Authority. CA provide 

expertise in civil-sector functions normally the 

responsibility of civilian authorities and implement US 

policy to advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring 

civil-sector functions. 

Civil-Military Operations within Various Types of Military Operations 

Counterinsurgency Operations. CMO support to 

counterinsurgency operations involve decisive and 

timely employment of military capabilities to perform 

traditionally nonmilitary activities that assist the HN or 

FN in depriving insurgents of their greatest weapon ó 

dissatisfaction of the populace. 

Security Assistance. CMO support to security 

assistance can include training foreign military forces in 

CMO and civil-military relations. 

Peace Operations. CMO foster a cooperative 

relationship between the military forces, civilian 

organizations participating in the operation, and the 

governments and populations in the operational area. 

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. A CA officer 

could advise the advance party officer in charge on how 

to minimize population interference with evacuation 

operations, maintain close liaison with embassy 

officials to ensure effective interagency coordination 

and delineation of CA responsibilities and activities, 

and assist the joint force in accomplishing its mission 

by assisting embassy personnel in receiving, screening, 

processing, and debriefing evacuees. 

Stability Operations. Initially, CMO will be conducted 

to secure and safeguard the populace, reestablish civil 

law and order, protect or rebuild key infrastructure, and 

restore public services. US military forces should be 

prepared to lead the activities necessary to accomplish 

these tasks when indigenous civil, USG, multinational 

or international capacity does not exist or is incapable 

of assuming responsibility. 
Executive Summary 

xiv JP 3-57 

Relationships Between Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs Operations

There are six broad 

categories of civil affairs 

(CA) functional specialty 

areas ó rule of law, 

economic stability, 

governance, public health 

and welfare, infrastructure, 

and public education and 

information. 

The relationship between CMO and civil affairs 

operations (CAO) is best considered within the broad 

context of unified action that involves the 

synchronization, coordination, or integration of the 

activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities 

with military operations to achieve unity of effort. 

Commanders, in carrying out their CMO 

responsibilities are assisted by CA. 

The geographic combatant commader (GCC) and 

subordinate commanders normally establish a distinct, 

full-time CMO staff element comprised of CA 

personnel to centralize the direction and oversight of 

planning, coordination, implementation, and conduct of 

CMO. While CA forces are organized, trained, and 

equipped specifically to support CMO, other joint force 

enablers performing CMO include SOF, psychological 

operations (PSYOP), legal support, public affairs, 

engineer, transportation, HSS, MP, security forces, and 

maneuver units. 

Civil-Military Operations Responsibilities 

CMO are conducted to 

synergize civil and military 

instruments of power, 

minimize civil-military 

friction and threats from 

the civil component, 

maximize support for 

operations, and meet the 

commanderís legal 

obligations and moral 

responsibilities to the civilian 

populations within the 

operational area. 

CMO are an inherent command responsibility. They 

encompass the activities JFCs take to establish and 

maintain relations with civil authorities, the general 

population, and other organizations. JFCs plan and 

conduct CMO to facilitate military operations in 

support of political-military objectives derived from 

national strategic objectives. An integral part of this is 

maintaining military-to-civil relations as well as 

emphasizing open and productive communications 

among OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and selected elements of 

the private sector. 
Executive Summary 

xv 

Geographic Combatant Commanders. The GCCs 

provide regional coordination and direction to their 

subordinate commanders for the integration of 

CAO/CMO into military plans and operations. They 

support the goals and programs of other US 

Government departments and agencies related to 

CAO/CMO consistent with missions and guidance 

issued by the Secretary of Defense. They coordinate 

CAO/CMO with the appropriate chiefs of US 

diplomatic missions. They synchronize all CAO/CMO 

requirements within regional war on terrorism plans, 

SCPs, and other Phase 0 (Shape) activities. 

Subordinate Joint Force Commanders plan, 

integrate, and monitor the deployment, employment, 

sustainment, and redeployment of available CA 

functional assets in appropriate operational areas. 

They implement multinational CA plans consistent 

with international law, the law of armed conflict, and 

US law and treaty obligations with the government 

and civilian population in countries where US forces 

are employed. They employ CMO and CA forces to 

identify and coordinate as necessary sources of 

assistance, supplies, facilities, and labor from 

indigenous sources and to deal with local civilians 

and governments on the commanderís behalf. They 

coordinate CMO and CAO planning with appropriate 

multinational commanders and HN forces, as directed 

by the establishing authority (e.g., CCDR) in 

conjunction with the US embassy country team. 

Relationship between Intelligence and Civil-Military Operations 

In order to protect the 

credibility of their 

operations and for force 

protection reasons, CA 

personnel should not be 

directly involved in 

intelligence-gathering in 

any way. 

The operational relationship between intelligence and 

CMO is mutually enhancing, yet highly sensitive. 

Intelligence, intelligence operations and CMO are an 

inherent mission for all military personnel. With the rise 

of the importance of CMO to human intelligence and 

the concept of ìcultural intelligence,î the role of CMO 

in the joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

environment process has likewise accelerated. In order 

to protect the credibility of their operations and for 

force protection reasons, CA personnel should not be 

directly involved in intelligence-gathering in any way. 

Intelligence operators in the field operating openly and 

directly with CA could also place CA and other 
Executive Summary 

xvi JP 3-57 

personnel in support of CMO and their mission at great 

risk. Regardless, JFCs need to establish divisions of 

responsibility between CMO and intelligence and 

robust yet discreet operational lines of coordination to 

create operational synergies while managing risks. 

Organizations Providing Civil-Military Operations Capabilities 

Certain types of organizations, typically CA and 

PSYOP units, should form the nucleus of CMO 

planning efforts. Others, such as, but not limited to, 

other SOF, engineers, HSS, transportation, and MP and 

security forces, act as enablers. However, for CMO to 

be successful all commanders must carry out their 

responsibilities regarding CMO. CMO should not be 

considered something done only by CA and PSYOP 

forces. 

Special Operations Forces. Small SOF units generally 

accomplish CMO through operations that assist the HN 

or FN authorities, OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs in restoring 

peace, strengthening the infrastructure of the country, or 

providing disaster relief assistance. SOF are regularly 

employed in mobile training teams, joint and combined 

exercises, professional development program seminars, 

and other military-to-military activities that are a vital 

part of theater security cooperation strategies. CA and 

PSYOP are mutually supportive within CMO. During 

some operations, PSYOP support various CAO (e.g., 

establish populace control measures) to gain support for 

the HN or FN government in the international 

community, and reduce support or resources to those 

destabilizing forces threatening legitimate processes of 

the HN or FN government. PSYOP publicize both the 

existence and successes of CMO to generate target 

population confidence in and positive perception of US, 

HN, or FN actions. 

Civil Affairs. CA forces are a multiplier for JFCs. CA 

functions are conducted by CA teams of various types, 

to include civil affairs teams (CATs) at tactical levels, 

civil affairs planning teams and civil liaison teams at 

tactical and operational levels, civil-military support 

elements at operational and theater strategic levels, and 

civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) and 

functional specialty cells at all levels. The employment 
Executive Summary 

xvii 

of CATs at the tactical level links the maneuver 

commander with the civil populace. CA units establish 

the CMOC and provide direct functional specialist 

support to HN or FN ministries. 

Engineering. Engineers have a critical role in CMO, 

since engineer operations frequently result in direct 

effects that support the local civilian population (e.g. 

building roads, public facilities). Also, engineering 

frequently uses the capacity of nonmilitary 

organizations as well as military forces. 

Health Service Support. The use of HSS resources 

has historically proven to be a valuable low-risk asset 

in support of CMO. HSS is generally a 

noncontroversial and cost-effective means of using 

the military element to support US national interests 

in another country. The focus of HSS initiatives, 

although possibly targeted toward the health 

problems in the operational area, is not normally 

curative, but primarily long-term preventive and 

developmental programs that are sustainable by the 

HN. HSS activities in support of CMO include health 

services and dental treatment, veterinarian and 

preventive medicine services, health services 

logistics, and aeromedical evacuation. 

Transportation. Military transportation organizations 

can be invaluable in certain types of CMO. These units 

can be used to distribute food, water, and health 

services supplies; conduct health services evacuation; 

and move refugees to a safe environment. Additionally, 

some of these organizations have the technical expertise 

to assist in restoration of civilian transportation 

infrastructure. 

Military Police or Security Forces. MP or security 

forces have the requisite training, experience, and 

equipment to perform CMO. Aside from having 

firepower, mobility, and communications necessary to 

conduct combat support operations, MP or security 

forces also have a wealth of experience in exercising 

authority in tense circumstances without escalating the 

tension. MP or security forces can perform or assist in 

functions that include staffing checkpoints, liaison with 

police forces, traffic control, detainees and DC camps, 
Executive Summary 

xviii JP 3-57 

and force protection operations. 

Organizing for Civil-Military Operations 

Civil-Military Operations Staff Directorate. The 

CMO staff element may be found within an operations 

directorate of a joint staff or it may be organized under 

a separate staff element (usually the J-9) as designated 

by the JFC. 

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force. JFCs are 

responsible to conduct CMO but they may establish a 

joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF) 

when the scope of CMO requires coordination and 

activities beyond that which the organic CMO 

capability could accomplish. By design, the United 

States Army CA brigade, the maritime civil affairs 

group, or the Marine Corps civil affairs group 

organizational structure can provide the operational 

command and control (C2) system structure to form a 

JCMOTF. 

Civil-Military Operations Center The CMOC, 

normally based upon the organic CMOC of the 

supporting CA unit, is a mechanism for the 

coordination CMO that can serve as the primary 

coordination interface provides operational and tactical 

level coordination between the JFC and other 

stakeholders. Members of a CMOC may include 

representatives of US military forces, OGAs, IPI, IGOs, 

the private sector, and NGOs. A CMOC is formed to 

receive, validate, and coordinate requests for support 

from NGOs, IGOs, IPI, the private sector, and regional 

organizations. The CMOC then forwards these requests 

to the joint force for action. 

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). A PRT helps 

stabilize the operational environment in a province or 

locality through its combined diplomatic, informational, 

military, and economic capabilities. It combines 

representatives from interagency and international 

partners into a cohesive unit capable of independently 

conducting operations to stabilize the environment by 

enhancing the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the 

HN government. 
Executive Summary 

xix 

Strategic and Operational Planning Considerations

Some operational and environmental factors that may 

complicate the US militaryís relationships with foreign 

civilians and constrain the conduct of CMO include, but 

are not limited to, the following: 

Differing legal institutions, customs, social 

relationships, economic organizations, and concepts 

of human and fundamental rights; 

Religious, cultural, and legal practices; 

Lack of adequate education or resistance by affected 

groups that result in poor health and sanitation or 

inefficient agricultural or industrial practices; 

Effects of labor, procurement, or contracting 

commodities upon the population, economy, and 

governmental services; 

Dislocation of civilian populations and damage to 

facilities and infrastructure requiring military 

assistance, especially in areas of public health, DC 

care and control, civilian supply, public safety, 

transportation, and humanitarian relief; 

Humanitarian motives prompting US personnel to 

furnish relief or assistance that may conflict with 

local law, religion, or cultural standards; 

International law, customs and practice governing 

the sovereign territory of each nation. 

Civil-Military Operations Coordination

In CMO, interagency, IGO, NGO, IPI, and the private 

sector coordination is one of the top priorities. The 

CMOC, with its standing capability can serve as the 

JFCís primary coordination interface with OGAs, IPI, 

IGOs, NGOs, and multinational forces (MNFs). In 

many situations, the HN or FN and the private sector 

also will have a major role in coordination with the 

military, interagency, IGOs, and NGOs. A JFC's 

effective use of CMO improves the integration of the 

military effort with these organizations and links 

military objectives to the diplomatic, economic, and 
Executive Summary 

xx JP 3-57 

informational objectives. 

Procedures for Effective Cooperation. The 

interagency, IGO, and NGO process often is described 

as ìmore art than science,î while military operations 

tend to depend on structure and doctrine. However, 

some of the techniques, procedures, and systems of 

military C2 can assist in obtaining unity of effort if they 

are adjusted to the dynamic world of interagency, IGO, 

and NGO activities. Each geographic combatant 

command is aligned with both an active component 

Army CA element and with an Army CA command, 

which are found only in the US Army Reserve and 

staffed with functional experts possessing a wide range 

of critical civilian skills. These functional experts are 

knowledgeable in working with their respective civilian 

counterpart agencies responsible for their functional 

specialty. As such, they already are experienced in the 

duties, responsibilities, and in some cases the agenda(s) 

of such agencies. 

Political Advisor or Foreign Policy Advisor. The 

DOS assigns combatant commands a political advisor, 

also known as a foreign policy advisor who provides 

diplomatic considerations and enables informal linkage 

with embassies in the area of responsibility and with 

DOS ñ leading to greater interagency coordination. 

The chief of mission provides 

a de facto coordinating 

mechanism that can be 

tailored to each crisis as it 

arises, based upon the 

substance of the problem 

with little need for written 

rules. 

Chief of Mission (COM). The COM is the senior 

representative of the President in a FN and is 

responsible for policy decisions and the activities of 

USG employees in the country. The COM integrates the 

programs and resources of all USG agencies 

represented on the country team. 

Multinational Coordination. With the ever-increasing 

involvement with MNFs, it is imperative that the US 

military forces fully understand the special 

considerations arising when working with military and 

paramilitary forces of other nations. Nationsí agendas 

and interests will differ from those of the United States 

in many ways. In many instances, MNFs will not be 

able to influence the planning effort without prior 

approval of their home country and its commitment to 

the concept of operations and mission. 
Executive Summary 

xxi 

The joint interagency 

coordination group provides 

the CCDR with the capability 

to collaborate at the 

operational level with other 

United States Government 

civilian agencies and 

departments. 

Joint Interagency Coordination Group. The joint 

interagency coordination group (JIACG) is an 

interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, 

and collaborative working relationships between 

civilian and military operational planners. Composed of 

USG civilian and military experts accredited to the 

CCDR and tailored to meet the requirements of a 

supported CCDR, the JIACG provides the CCDR with 

the capability to collaborate at the operational level with 

other USG civilian agencies and departments. 

Intergovernmental Organizations. IGOs are 

organizations created by a formal agreement (e.g., a 

treaty) between two or more governments and may be 

established on a global or regional basis and may have 

general or specialized purposes. Responding to 

humanitarian situations is a fundamental responsibility 

of the IGOs system. This responsibility runs from the 

immediate response to the long-term amelioration of a 

crisis. Prior to arrival in country, it is advisable to 

contact United Nations Office for the Coordination of 

Humanitarian Affairs headquarters in Geneva. This 

office will have the informational and communications 

links that will assist the militaryís in reaching its end 

state. It also should be the focal point for advance 

planning and sharing of information on objectives. 

Nongovernmental Organizations. NGOs are playing 

an increasingly important role in the international arena. 

NGOs may range in size and experience from those 

with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global 

experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to 

newly created small organizations dedicated to a 

particular emergency or disaster. NGOs are involved in 

such diverse activities as education, technical projects, 

relief activities, DC assistance, public policy, and 

development programs. When dealing with NGOs, it is 

important to remember that they will likely object to 

any sense that their activities have been co-opted for the 

achievement of military objectives. Their mission is one 

of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting the 

military in accomplishing its objectives. Ultimately, 

commanders factor NGOs activities and capabilities 

into their assessment of conditions and resources to 

integrate them into the selected course of action. 
Executive Summary 

xxii JP 3-57 

The Private Sector. The private sector is ìan umbrella 

term that may be applied in the United States and in 

foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or 

commercial individuals and businesses, specified 

nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other 

scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental 

organizations.î The private sector can assist the USG 

by sharing information, identifying risks, performing 

vulnerability assessments, assisting in contingency and 

crisis action planning, and providing other assistance as 

appropriate. 

CONCLUSION 

This publication provides doctrine for the planning and 

execution of civil-military operations.
CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

I-1 

1. General 

a. Coordination among, mutual support of, and when practical, integration of the 

instruments of national power are required to accomplish the national strategic end state. 

Resolving national security issues in the evolving strategic environment of the 21st 

century increasingly requires the full range of diplomatic, informational, military, as well 

as, economic solutions. Both threats and opportunities emanate from the civil sector of 

society and the seams between nation-states. Potential challenges include ethnic and 

religious conflict, cultural and socioeconomic differences, terrorism and insurgencies, the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), international organized crime, 

incidental and deliberate population migration, environmental degradation, infectious 

diseases, and sharpening competition/exploitation of dwindling natural resources. 

Opportunities, conversely, include the integration and comprehensive use of 

intergovernmental, regional, national, and local governmental and nongovernmental and 

private sector organizations, which have proliferated in number, variety, and capability. 

Recent policy initiatives, national security, military strategies, and military doctrine 

demonstrate a growing appreciation of the need to leverage more nonmilitary instruments 

of national power, reposed in the interagency process and the private sector, entailing a 

more holistic, and balanced strategy. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 

44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, for 

example, tasks the Department of State (DOS) to lead interagency coordination, planning, 

and civil response for reconstruction and stabilization through the Office of the 

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Department of Defense Directive 

(DODD) 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction 

(SSTR) Operations, notes, ìIntegrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful 

stability operations.î At the strategic, operational and tactical levels and across the full 

range of military operations, civil-military operations (CMO) are a primary military 

instrument to synchronize military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, 

particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency (COIN) and other operations 

dealing with ìasymmetricî and ìirregularî threats. Because CMO permeate every aspect 

of applied national security and military strategy, they are inherently strategic in nature 

and a key element in winning and securing the peace. 

(1) CMO are holistic, cumulative, integrative, and synergistic, working in the 

seams of power and gaps in organizations, phases, and processes. Enabling, moderating, 

and balancing, they promote unity of effort while managing change, risk, and 

expectations. CMO foster cooperation largely through power, facilitate civil-military 

transition, minimize the costs and risks, and mitigate threats and exploit opportunities. 

 ìMilitary commanders must consider not only the military forces, but also the 

environment in which those forces operate. One factor of the environment that 

commanders must consider is the civilian populace and its impact ñ whether it is 

supportive, neutral, or hostile to the presence of military forces. A supportive 

populace can provide resources that facilitate friendly operations.î 

FM 3-07 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-57 

They help overcome frictions in these seams, gaps, and transitions, and accelerate 

decision cycles to gain advantage over asymmetric adversaries. 

 

(2) CMO need to take into consideration the culture of the indigenous 

population. CMO are about engaging the population and building relationships. They 

involve an intrinsically adaptive activity of a learning organization ñ critical, for example, 

to defeating asymmetric and irregular threats in COIN operations. 

 

(3) CMO are inherently joint, interagency, and multinational. Always 

subordinate to policy, they are at the heart of unity of effort and unified action through 

their coordinating and information management functions. 

(4) By expanding the range of options, CMO entail the military principle of 

offense. By introducing nonmilitary instruments of power to enhance or supplant power 

and mitigate or reduce the costs and risks of conflict, they apply the principle of 

economy-of-force. By being the nonlethal component of force protection (FP), they 

expand the principle of security. 

(5) At all levels, CMO use political bargaining, collaboration, consensus, and 

relationship-building to create conditions for success. 

(6) Joint force commanders (JFCs) integrate civil affairs (CA) forces with other 

military forces (maneuver, health service, military police [MP]/security forces, 

engineering, transportation, and special operations forces [SOF]), security forces (e.g., 

national, border, and local police), other government agencies (OGAs), indigenous 

populations and institutions (IPI), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), host nations (HNs), foreign nations (FNs), and 

the private sector to provide the capabilities needed for successful CMO. 

(7) The vignette below provides an illustration of CMO with both CA and other 

military forces working with OGA civilians, NGOs, HN representatives, and local 

ìThe understanding that Civil-Military Operations [CMO] are a key 

component to winning and securing the peace is ever widening. 

Commanders, now more than ever, are challenging their staffs to integrate 

CMO into all aspects of plans, operations, intelligence, logistics, 

information operations, and information management. Staff officers and 

NCOs [noncommissioned officers] are breaking new ground by building 

organizations and developing processes and procedures that enhance 

staff integration and capitalize on interagency coordination and 

overcoming the challenges of including stakeholders in their decision 

cycles through linkages, authorities, and information sharing. All good 

news stories!î 

David B. Morrison 

Captain, US Navy Commander, Special Operations Command, 

US Joint Forces Command 
Introduction 

I-3 

governments. Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are discussed in Chapter II, 

ìOrganization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations,î subparagraph 

4h. 

For more details on the interagency community, IPI, HNs, IGOs, NGOs, and the private 

sector, refer to Chapter IV, ìCoordination,î and Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, 

Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization 

Coordination During Joint Operations, Volumes I and II. Collectively, the above terms 

often are referred to as ìstakeholders.î 

 

b. Civil-Military Operations. The activities of a commander that establish 

collaborative relationships among military forces, governmental and nongovernmental 

civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or 

hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations are nested in support of 

the overall US objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities 

and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. 

These activities may occur throughout the range of military operations. CMO is the 

responsibility of the command and will be executed by all members of the command. It 

is not the sole purview of the CA team. CMO are conducted across the range of military 

operations as depicted in Figure I-1. 

c. Authority to Conduct Civil-Military Operations 

(1) The authority to conduct CMO or exercise controls in a given area or 

country may arise as a result of military operations, international cooperative agreement, 

or an agreement between the United States Government (USG) or appropriate military 

commander, and the government of the area or country in which US forces may be 

employed. A commanderís authority for undertaking CMO ultimately derives from a 

Presidential or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) decision. Factors such as mission, policy 

determinants, and the relationship between the government of the affected country and 

the USG also influence the authority to conduct CMO. 

The downside of this flexibility was confusion, particularly in the NGO 

(nongovernmental organization) and international donor community, about 

what a PRT (provincial reconstruction team) is, what it ought to do, and what 

its limits should be. People who served with some NGOs argued that PRT 

activities, particularly in the areas of governance and reconstruction, could be 

counterproductive. For example, in the startup phase, some PRTs 

constructed schools and clinics without paying enough attention to whether 

the Afghan government could afford to equip them with teachers, books, 

doctors, or medical supplies. While many PRTs have taken steps to redress 

this issue, the NGO and donor community remains concerned about the 

nature and scope of PRT programs. 

Source: Condensed from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: 

An Interagency Assessment 

Department of State 

Department of Defense 

US Agency for International Development 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-57 

(2) International law, principally the law of war that regulates the conduct of 

armed hostilities often called the law of armed conflict (LOAC), places certain 

responsibilities on occupying powers. These responsibilities include taking all measures 

within its powers to restore public order and safety, while respecting to the extent 

possible, the laws of the occupied country, to establish civil administrations, and to 

control or conduct governmental matters both during and after hostilities. International 

law, in accordance with state actions, determines whether a state is an occupying power 

triggering the occupation rights and responsibilities. Occupation occurs when territory is 

actually under the authority of a power, and generally follows the cessation of hostilities 

in the occupied territory. Occupation is a question of fact based on the ability of the 

occupying power to render the occupied government incapable of exercising public 

authority or, in the absence of a local government, an ungoverned area. However, mere 

presence of foreign forces in a state does not confer occupation rights or responsibilities 

on that force. Foreign forces present in a sovereign state by consent exercise rights and 

responsibilities arising from international agreements. For example, the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO)-led forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Stabilization Force and 

its predecessor Implementation Force) administered the region in accordance with the 

Dayton Peace Accords. The Stabilization Force was not an occupying force and had 

neither the rights nor responsibilities of an occupying force. 

d. Liaison. Effective CMO require extensive liaison and coordination between 

US, multinational, and indigenous security forces and engaged OGAs as well as NGOs, 

IGOs, IPI, or the private sector. Liaison is the contact by which communications can be 

maintained between organizations and agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity 

of purpose and action. Exchanging liaison officers is the most commonly employed 

technique for establishing close, continuous, and physical communications between 

organizations. Liaison personnel will enhance interoperability and contribute 

significantly to mission success. 

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Military Engagement,

Security Cooperation,

and Deterrence

Crisis Response and 

Limited Contingency Operations

Major Operations 

and Campaigns

Figure I-1. Range of Military Operations 
Introduction 

I-5 

e. Unity of Effort. One of the most difficult problems for the JFC in CMO is 

coordinating the activities of the military units with multiple civilian organizations 

having their own purpose and goals. As a fundamental precept, CMO must be closely 

coordinated with and through appropriate interagency authorities such as the US embassy 

country team and higher headquarters. The JFC must ensure that CMO are not only 

coordinated at the operational level, but also at the country and theater strategic levels. 

f. Responsibility. CMO are an inherent responsibility of command and 

facilitate accomplishment of the commanderís mission. Military operations continue 

to involve greater civil interface than in the past. Because the US has substantial military 

power, adversaries may rely upon asymmetric or irregular warfare to avoid direct 

confrontation with the US combat power. Their targets and means may be more civilian 

than military. Second, there is less distinction between civilian and military institutions, 

infrastructures, and systems ó dual-use is becoming more prevalent. Third, populationcentric and socio-cultural hubs now are often strategic centers of gravity (COGs) or 

decisive points rather than military forces or remote terrain features. As more people and 

power migrate to densely populated urban areas, the military force is very likely to be 

fighting there rather than in jungles or deserts. Consequently, CMO are integral to 

every military operation. 

2. Civil-Military Operations and Levels of War 

a. CMO are applicable at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war; 

importantly, specific actions at one level of war may affect all three levels 

simultaneously but with different effects at each level. Further, engaged civilian 

organizations likely will not distinguish between the various levels of war. NGO or IGO 

members that communicate with military members may report their conversations to their 

leadership in Washington, D.C., who may then discuss them directly with the USG 

officials. Inadvertent misperceptions of CMO actions by nonmilitary agencies can cause 

a commander to be distracted from his mission. Most civilian agencies, both NGOs and 

OGAs, are not organized with an ìoperational levelî distinct from the tactical or strategic 

organizations. Furthermore, working with NGOs and IGOs will be time consuming since 

they often do not have the authority to make decisions in the field that may result in a 

change from their original mission without the permission of the superiors at the US 

embassy or in Washington, D.C. 

b. To achieve the benefits of multitiered CMO, JFCs promulgate their intent early 

and include appropriate CMO guidance to staffs and subordinate commanders. The 

JFCís planners develop the commanderís intent from the top down with sufficient lead 

time to enable subordinate commands to produce detailed plans that are in harmony with 

the commanderís objectives. While the effort at each level may be focused on different 

specific objectives, the activities should be mutually supporting and synergistic. 

(1) Strategic. At the strategic level, CMO focus is on larger and long-term 

global or regional issues such as reconstruction, economic development, and stability. 

CMO can assist the geographic combatant commander (GCC) in conducting strategic 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-57 

planning by linking his theater security cooperation plan (SCP) regional engagement 

activities with national strategic objectives. Strategic vulnerability may pertain to 

political, geographic, economic, informational, scientific, sociological, or military 

factors; however, a US military strategic objective is subordinate to, and must fulfill, the 

national strategic objective. 

(2) Operational 

(a) At the operational level, missions supporting security cooperation 

feature programs to build relationships and mitigate the need for force. Subsequently, 

CMO focus on immediate or near-term issues such as health service infrastructure; 

movement, feeding, and sheltering of dislocated civilians (DCs); police and security 

programs; building FN government legitimacy; synchronization of CMO support to 

tactical commanders; and the coordination, synchronization, and, where possible, 

integration of interagency, IGO, and NGO activities with military operations. 

(b) As operations have become more complex, the operational level has 

become the critical juncture at which the coordination of the overall effort takes place, 

making operational-level CMO critical to present and future operations. It is the level at 

which the challenges to the success of an international peace operation (PO) are the 

greatest - not only in the coordination and synchronization of the myriad activities of the 

expanding number of donor-funded IGOs and NGOs, but also in the flow and 

management of information. Information is valuable to inter-entity coordination, to 

efficiently and effectively mobilizing and distributing resources (to include funding), and 

to winning in an operational environment no longer measured by traditional indicators of 

operational success. Operational commanders in particular must have an acute 

understanding of CMO. 

(3) Tactical

(a) Tactical-level CMO include support of stakeholders at local levels, and 

promoting the legitimacy and effectiveness of US presence and operations among locals, 

while minimizing friction between the military and the civilian organizations in the field. 

Tactical-level CMO normally are more narrowly focused and have more immediate 

effects. These may include local security operations, processing and movement of DCs, 

project management and project nomination, civil reconnaissance, and basic health 

service support (HSS). 

(b) Tactical-level commanders conduct CMO consistent with the JFCís 

intent in order to accomplish designated objectives. 

c. It is important that civil-military issues and objectives be incorporated early in 

the planning process for any operation. CMO are formulated and managed through 

interagency coordination; multinational partnerships; and coordination with IPI, IGOs, 

and NGOs; and integrated with strategic, operational, and tactical level plans and 

operations. To reach the national strategic end state and conclude the 
Introduction 

I-7 

operation/campaign successfully, JFCs must integrate and synchronize stability 

operations with other operations (offense and defense) within each major operation or 

campaign phase. Evaluation of the plan and information from the theater or regional 

level will be a continuous part of this process. Use of CA planners to conduct measure of 

effectiveness (MOE) assessments help ensure plans are properly focused to meet the JFC 

end state. 

d. Active participation by interagency and military CMO subject matter experts at 

the strategic, operational, and tactical planning levels ensure effective CMO. Integration 

of CMO into the combatant commanderís (CCDRís) plans and orders ensures all 

government activities are considered and coordinated, and that strategic, operational, and 

tactical level CMO are conducted to create the maximum effect. 

(1) During complex contingency operations, the interagency community 

develops and promulgates a USG strategic plan for reconstruction, stabilization, or 

conflict transformation in compliance with NSPD-44. The Secretary of State and 

SecDef will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military 

contingency plans and will develop a general framework for fully coordinating 

stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where 

appropriate. The DOS Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization is 

tasked with the implementation of the requirements of NSPD 44. Integrated planning and 

effective management of USG agency operations provides a framework at the national 

strategic level for follow-on theater and operational level planning and creates unity of 

effort within an operation that is essential for mission success. 

(2) For the NSPD-44 planning process, Department of Defense (DOD) 

participants are the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff. CCDR 

or subordinate JFC participation will coordinate on the strategic plan for reconstruction, 

stabilization or conflict transformation in conjunction with the Joint Staff. Further, the 

National Security Councilís (NSCís) plan provides guidance on a number of issues and 

requires interpretation with regard to the portions that relate to the military. Accordingly, 

the instructions to the CCDR and subordinate JFCs for implementing the operations plan 

will be issued by the SecDef through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). 

(3) The strategic plan for reconstruction, stabilization, or conflict 

transformation will guide and influence a CCDRís plan. 

e. The primary mechanism for coordinating CMO within an echelon and between 

echelons is annex G (Civil-Military Operations) to operation plans and orders. Since 

CMO involve the activities of a number of staff sections and subordinate units, it is 

necessary to have a single document to identify, consolidate, deconflict, and synergize 

the activities of the various sections and units (e.g., engineers, health service, and 

transportation). 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-57 

For more details concerning annex G (Civil-Military Operations), refer to Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and 

Execution System (JOPES), Volume II Planning Formats. 

f. The successful termination of a joint operation is based on more than an 

assessment of the military factors. An assessment of all political, military, economic, 

social, and infrastructure factors must be conducted to determine if the required national 

strategic end state has been achieved. Further, the assessment of stability operations 

using focused MOEs and measures of performance gauges the level of improvement in 

the quality of life of the populace and overall progress toward mission accomplishment. 

g. Missions are dynamic and, therefore, the relative effort devoted to CMO may 

change by phase or through unanticipated political or environmental influences. While 

CMO may play a supporting role through the first four joint operation phases, (see Figure 

I-2, Phasing Model), CMO are a leading line of operations in other phases. The 

termination criteria relies heavily on successful CMO efforts to establish a stable 

environment (Phase IV) for successful transfer to civil authority (in Phase V) prior to the 

redeployment of US combat forces. 

h. Unforeseen changes or shifts in effort may arise from a failure to anticipate 

changes in the military or political situation as well as unexpected changes in the 

environment such as the occurrence of a natural or man-made disaster. These changes 

are most dangerous when the joint forceís main effort is unexpectedly diverted from 

CMO to combat operations. The JFC must identify early indicators and warnings of this 

possibility, allocate resources for monitoring those indicators, and anticipate the shift in 

PHASING MODEL

STABILIZE

ENABLE 

CIVIL 

AUTHORITY

PREVENT

PREPARE

CRISIS 

DEFINED

ASSURE FRIENDLY 

FREEDOM OF 

ACTION/

ACCESS THEATER 

INFRASTRUCTURE

ESTABLISH 

DOMINANT FORCE 

CAPABILITIES/

ACHIEVE FULLSPECTRUM 

SUPERIORITY

ESTABLISH 

SECURITY

RESTORE 

SERVICES

TRANSFER TO 

CIVIL 

AUTHORITY

REDEPLOY

SEIZE

INITIATIVE SHAPE DETER DOMINATE

Phase 0 Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV Phase V

Figure I-2. Phasing Model 
Introduction 

I-9 

focus with sufficient warning to posture the force. Branch and sequel planning and early 

preventive action may mitigate the interruption of CMO. Possible indicators to monitor 

include, but are not limited to, those depicted in Figure I-3. The application of force 

supporting CMO within certain areas might occur as the main effort during the initial 

phases based upon the threat situation. Planning should identify those areas of the 

country of interest where CMO could be conducted by organizations, military forces or 

the United Nations (UN) during shaping, deterrence, dominating the enemy, and 

stabilization of the environment. 

3. Objectives of Civil-Military Operations 

a. CMO are a range of possible activities that are considered based on the desired 

level of civilian support, availability of resources, and inadvertent interference by the 

local population. CMO take place in friendly, neutral, or hostile operational areas 

independent of, and during, other military operations. The purpose of CMO is to 

POSSIBLE ESCALATION INDICATORS

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

Political activities and movements

Food or water shortages

Outbreaks of disease

Military setbacks

Natural disasters

Crop failures

Fuel shortages

Onset of seasonal changes (winter may exacerbate fuel 

and food shortages, for example)

Police force and corrections system deterioration

Judicial system shortcomings

Insurgent attacks

Sharp rise in crime

Terrorist bombing

Disruption of public utilities

Economic strife due to socioeconomic imbalance

Figure I-3. Possible Escalation Indicators 
Chapter I 

I-10 JP 3-57 

facilitate military operations, and to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives, 

through the integration of civil and military actions while conducting support to civil 

administration (SCA), populace and resources control (PRC), foreign humanitarian 

assistance (FHA), nation assistance (NA), and civil information management (CIM). 

These activities are particularly suited to support the development of a countryís material 

and human resources or to assist the HN or FN in achieving its political, economic, and 

informational objectives. 

(1) Support to Civil Administration. SCA helps continue or stabilize 

management by a governing body of a FNís civil structure by assisting an established 

government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. SCA 

consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting with those activities that 

reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US and multinational objectives. 

SCA occurs most often during stability operations. Some SCA is manifested in PRC, 

FHA, and NA. 

(a) Civil administration in friendly territory includes advising friendly 

authorities and performing specific functions within the limits of authority and liability 

established by international treaties and agreements. 

(b) Civil administration in occupied territory encompasses the 

establishment of a temporary government, as directed by the SecDef, to exercise 

executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the populace of a territory that US 

forces have taken from an enemy by force of arms until an indigenous civil government 

can be established. 

(c) Domestic and International Considerations. SCA fulfills obligations 

arising from US domestic laws, HN laws, international treaties, agreements, memoranda 

of understanding, and obligations under international law, including the LOAC. Within 

its capabilities, the occupying force must maintain an orderly government in the occupied 

territory and must have, as its ultimate goal, the creation of a legitimate and effective 

civilian government. Subject to the military requirements, the JFC should avoid military 

activities likely to increase tensions in the occupied territory and conduct those likely to 

facilitate and accelerate a return to a civil administration. This is especially important in 

multiethnic, multiracial, or multicultural environments where one or more of the parties 

to a conflict will almost invariably see a chosen course of action (COA) as biased against 

them. 

(2) Populace and Resources Control. PRC assists HN governments or de 

facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers, thus precluding 

complicating problems that may hinder joint mission accomplishment. PRC measures 

seek to identify, reduce, relocate, or access population resources that may impede or 

otherwise threaten joint operation success. PRC measures can be applied across the 

range of military operations. CA DC planners develop and coordinate PRC in 

conjunction with HN and NGO resources to include DC evacuation and camps. 
Introduction 

I-11 

(a) Regardless of the operational environment, military operations can be 

disrupted by:

1. Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of frightened civilians; 

2. Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians conducting

legitimate activities; or 

3. Illegal or illegitimate activities such as insurgent operations or 

black-market activities. 

(b) PRC consists of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control 

and resources control. 

1. Populace control provides for security of the populace, 

mobilization of human resources, denial of personnel availability to the enemy, and 

detection and reduced effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include 

curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, identification and registration cards, and 

voluntary resettlement. DC operations involve populace control that requires extensive 

planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations. 

2. Resources control regulates the movement or consumption of 

materiel resources, mobilizes materiel resources, and denies materiel to the enemy. 

Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints 

(e.g., roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities. 

(c) These controls normally are a responsibility of indigenous civil 

governments. PRC measures implemented by a joint force are necessary when HN civil 

authorities or agencies are either unable or unwilling to undertake that responsibility. 

They are further defined and enforced during times of civil or military emergency. In 

friendly territory, joint forces implement PRC measures with the consent of the local 

government. In hostile territory, PRC measures are applied in accordance with 

international law and the LOAC. 

 

(3) Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. FHA is defined as programs 

conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other 

endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a 

serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA 

provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The primary planning 

consideration is the funding available from the primary USG agency. The foreign 

assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil 

authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA 

operations are conducted outside the US, its territories, and possessions. 

For further detail concerning FHA, refer to DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, and 

JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 
Chapter I 

I-12 JP 3-57 

(4) Nation Assistance. NA is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) 

rendered to a nation by US forces within that nationís territory during peacetime, crises 

or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the US and 

that nation. 

(a) NA operations support a HN by promoting sustainable development 

and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional 

stability. NA programs often include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign 

internal defense (FID), and humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA). All NA actions are 

integrated through the US ambassadorís Mission Strategic Plan. 

1. Security cooperation is defined as the means by which the DOD 

encourages and enables countries and organizations to work with us to achieve strategic 

goals. As a subset of security cooperation, security assistance is a tool that will be 

explained more fully later in this chapter. 

2. FID programs encompass the diplomatic, economic, informational, 

and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion, 

lawlessness, and insurgency. US military involvement in FID includes indirect support, 

direct support, and/or combat operations. 

a. Types of military operations related to FID are NA and/or 

support to COIN; combating terrorism; PO; DOD support to counterdrug operations; and 

FHA. 

b. These categories may, to some degree, include FID operations 

as an integral component in supporting the fight against subversion, lawlessness, and 

insurgency. 

For further detail in regards to FID and security assistance, refer to JP 3-07.1, Foreign 

Internal Defense. 

 (b) HCA, in contrast to FHA, may be rendered by US military personnel in 

conjunction with military operations and exercises. HCA programs generally encompass 

planned activities and are limited by law to: 

 

 1. Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a 

country. 

 2. Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems. 

 3. Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities. 

 4. Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. 
Introduction 

I-13 

 5. Detection and clearance of landmines and other explosive remnants 

of war, including activities relating to the furnishing of education, training, and technical 

assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of landmines and other explosive 

remnants of war. 

(c) NA operations support USG efforts to assist and complement the HN 

with internal programs to promote stability, develop sustainability, and establish 

institutions responsive to the needs of the populace. They are key military engagement, 

security cooperation, and deterrence operations that enhance the CCDRís shaping and 

deterrence efforts. 

(d) Military Civic Action (MCA). MCA programs offer the JFC an 

opportunity to improve the HN infrastructure and the living conditions of the local 

populace, while enhancing the legitimacy of the HN government. These programs use 

predominantly indigenous military forces at all levels in such fields as education, 

training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, 

and other areas that contribute to the economic and social development of the nation. 

These programs can have excellent long-term benefits for the HN by enhancing the 

effectiveness of the host government by developing needed skills and by enhancing the 

legitimacy of the host government by showing the people that their government is 

capable of meeting the population's basic needs. MCA programs can be helpful in 

gaining public acceptance of the military, which is especially important in situations 

requiring a clear, credible demonstration of improvement in host-military treatment of 

human rights. MCA can also help eliminate some of the causes of civilian unrest by 

providing economic and social development services. 

1. MCA may involve US military supervision and advice but the 

visible effort should be conducted by the HN or FN military. 

 

2. MCA projects require interagency cooperation, coordination, and 

monitoring to succeed. The JFC and staff must be aware of legal and financial 

limitations in authorized projects. The success of MCA, as with all CMO, is dependent 

on a close relationship between engaged US interagency partners and the joint force staff, 

as well as the synergy created by the CA, psychological operations (PSYOP), and public 

affairs (PA) elements. 

3. MCA Employment Considerations. Many of the considerations on 

the use of US military personnel to conduct other CMO activities also apply to MCA 

support. The essential difference is that in MCA, HN or FN military or government 

personnel perform tasks that are visible to the indigenous population to garner popular 

support while US personnel provide training and advice. 

For further detail relating to MCA, refer to JP 3-07.1, Foreign Internal Defense. 

(5) Civil Information Management. (See Appendix B, ìPlanning 

Considerations for Civil Affairs Operations,î for more details on CIM.) 
Chapter I 

I-14 JP 3-57 

b. Civil-Military Operations in Joint Operations. CMO occur across the 

range of military operations and throughout the joint operational phases. CMO can 

be broadly separated into support to military operations and support to civil actions, 

though at times those become mixed depending upon the operational environment and the 

potential to expand from military to civil or civil to military support. 

(1) Support to Military Operations. CMO serve a variety of key roles that 

impact military mission accomplishment. Some roles are required by international law 

(e.g., human rights law), such as the need to minimize the effects of the military 

operation on the civilian population. Other roles facilitate military operations. 

(2) Specific Tasks. CMO planners must forecast CMO requirements by 

analyzing the mission to determine specific tasks. This includes establishing guidance 

for the specific CMO tasks and developing estimates of the situation to include area 

studies. Special, functional-oriented studies may be needed on certain topics. Planners 

must consider their knowledge of CMO, geographic areas of specialization, language 

qualifications, civil sector functional technical expertise, and contacts with IPI. This will 

allow for timely and critical information on the civilian capabilities and resources in the 

operational area. The information and insights gained from civilian contacts and 

professional knowledge is more extensive than the information collected through military 

intelligence channels. A CA area study followed by an area assessment to update the 

area study will assist the operation by providing critical information about the operational 

area. CMO estimates help the JFC conduct operational analysis of the civil component of 

the integrated operational environment as part of the joint planning process. 

(a) CMO tasks vary with the joint operation phases. Although JFCs 

determine the number and actual phases, use of the phases shown in Figure I-2 provides a 

flexible model to arrange smaller, related operations. The activities below, although not 

all inclusive, may occur during the notional joint operation phases, keeping in mind that 

some may overlap phases. A number of these activities may be performed by only CA 

personnel, other military forces, or a combination. 

1. Phase 0 -- Shape. CMO typically support many elements of the 

CCDRsí SCPs. At the strategic and operational levels, especially during the 

implementation of the CCDRís SCP, the timely application of CMO can mitigate the 

need for other military operations in response to a crisis. When a crisis is unavoidable, 

groundwork laid by CMO can facilitate rapid, decisive operations. CMO also can 

promote US policy objectives before, during, and after combat operations by influencing 

the civil component of the operational environment. This may include coordination with 

civilian organizations, as appropriate. 

2. Phase I -- Deter. CMO should be integrated with flexible 

deterrent options to generate maximum strategic or operational effect through synergizing 

softer, more influential civil and harder, more coercive military power. CA can conduct 

area studies, updated by area assessments, to include identifying potential civil sector and 

civilian COGs that may impact anticipated military operations. SCP activities provide an 
Introduction 

I-15 

ideal opportunity for CA to collect current open-source information obtained in the 

course of their normal duties to update assessments prior to a crisis. 

3. Phase II -- Seize Initiative. During this phase, initiatives to gain 

access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action through CMO 

are continuous while the JFC seeks to degrade adversary capabilities with the intent of 

resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity. To aid in seizing the initiative, CMO seek 

to minimize civil-military friction and shape the civil component of the integrated 

operational environment to support friendly political-military (POLMIL) objectives, 

always with a view to the end state. 

4. Phase III -- Dominate. More than minimizing civilian 

interference, CMO help hasten an end to hostilities and attempt to limit collateral damage 

on IPI from offensive, defensive, or stability operations. Stability operations are 

conducted as needed to ensure a smooth transition to the next phase, relieve suffering, 

and set conditions for civil-military transition. 

5. Phase IV -- Stabilize. This phase typically is characterized by a 

change from sustained combat operations to stability operations. As this occurs, CMO 

facilitate humanitarian relief, civil order, and restoration of public services as fighting 

subsides and emphasis shifts from relief to reconstruction. CMO focus on support to 

civilian efforts to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population. JFCs and their 

staffs, especially CA subject matter experts, continuously assess the feasibility of 

transferring authority to a legitimate civil entity and progress toward the military end 

state. 

6. Phase V -- Enable Civil Authority. CA provide expertise in 

civil-sector functions normally the responsibility of civilian authorities and implement 

US policy to advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civil-sector functions. This 

phase is predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance 

in the operational area. This includes coordination of CMO with interagency, 

multinational, IPI, IGO, and NGO participants; establishing and assessing MOEs and 

measures of performance; and favorably influencing the attitude of the population 

regarding both the US and the local civil authorityís objectives.

For more details concerning the phasing model, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

(b) Successful DC operations minimize civil-military friction, protect 

civilians from being combat hazards, alleviate human suffering, and provide for the 

centralized control of DCs. 

(c) CMO assist the commanderís other military operations through the 

associated coordination required with civilian agencies in implementing measures to 

locate and identify population centers. Coordination with the appropriate civilian 

agencies also is required to create, restore, and maintain public order. In addition, CMO 

involve activities to coordinate, safeguard, mobilize, and use civilian resources (e.g., 
Chapter I 

I-16 JP 3-57 

labor, supplies, and facilities). CMO will include coordination for immediate life 

sustaining services to civilians in the operational area(s) and assist with planning for the 

control of diseases that might endanger military forces. CMO also help minimize civilian 

movements, which would interfere with military operations and facilitate the equitable 

distribution of humanitarian supplies and services. 

(d) Commanders and their staffs identify populated areas and develop 

recommended schemes of maneuver and fires to mitigate undesired effects on the IPI. 

CMO assets may be utilized to designate routes and facilities for DCs to minimize their 

contact with forces engaged in combat and PSYOP products not intended for them. 

CMO involve taking action to maintain or restore law and order to protect the control of 

both public and private property. 

(e) CMO can contribute to host-nation support (HNS) or foreign nation 

support (FNS). Logistic planners identify projected shortfalls and communicate needs to 

CMO planners. CMO planners then identify the availability of goods and services within 

theater; to include location, lines of communications (LOCs), quantities available, and 

their cost. CMO plannersí responsibilities range from identifying resources and assisting 

other joint staff members sections/elements in their procurement to activating preplanned 

requests for wartime support from the civilian sector. 

(f) CMO may be a part of, or support, numerous types of military 

operations. There are some operations, such as raids and strikes, which probably have 

limited impact on the civil sector and therefore may have limited CMO requirements. 

Specific CMO implications for most of these operations are dependent on the mission 

scope, national strategic end state, and the characteristics of the civil sector in the 

operational area. Representative CMO activities in support of some of these operations 

include, but are not limited to: 

1. Counterinsurgency Operations. COIN operations consist of 

those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken 

by a government to defeat insurgency. CMO support to COIN operations involve 

decisive and timely employment of military capabilities to perform traditionally 

nonmilitary activities that assist the HN or FN in depriving insurgents of their greatest 

weapon ó dissatisfaction of the populace. CMO activities combine military with 

diplomatic, political, economic, and informational initiatives of the HN or FN and 

engaged OGAs to foster stability. The principle goal of CMO activities is to isolate the 

insurgents from the populace, thus depriving them of recruits, resources, intelligence, and 

credibility. CMO are an integral part of COIN activities; these may include aspects of 

SCA, PRC, NA, CIM, or MCA. 

2. Security Assistance. CMO support to security assistance can 

include training foreign military forces in CMO and civil-military relations. CA can 

provide training that is beyond the capability of in-country US military assistance 

elements. The SCP should synchronize CMO planning and CA forces with the other 

security assistance capabilities. 
Introduction 

I-17 

3. Peace Operations. PO are normally multiagency and 

multinational contingencies involving all instruments of national power, and may include 

international humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. CMO foster a cooperative 

relationship between the military forces, civilian organizations participating in the 

operation, and the governments and populations in the operational area. 

4. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs). A CA officer 

who is a member of a joint force advance party or its forward command element may 

conduct an initial CMO assessment of the operational area to validate information and 

assumptions of the CMO estimate and advise the advance party officer in charge (OIC) of 

CMO related issues affecting the NEO. Also, a CA officer could advise the advance 

party OIC on how to minimize population interference with evacuation operations, 

maintain close liaison with embassy officials to ensure effective interagency coordination 

and delineation of CA responsibilities and activities, and assist the joint force in 

accomplishing its mission by assisting embassy personnel in receiving, screening, 

processing, and debriefing evacuees. 

(g) Stability Operations. These missions, tasks, and activities seek to 

maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental 

services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. To achieve the 

national strategic end state and conclude the operation/campaign successfully, a 

GCC and subordinate commanders must integrate and synchronize stability 

operations with other operations (offense and defense) within each major operation 

or campaign phase (see Figure 1-4). Stability operations support USG plans for SSTR 

operations and likely will be conducted in coordination with and in support of HN 

authorities, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. 

1. Operation plans should outline an appropriate balance between 

offensive and defensive operations and stability operations in all phases. Most 

importantly, planning for stability operations should begin when joint operation 

planning is initiated. Planning for the transition from sustained combat operations to the 

termination of joint operations and then a complete handover to civil authority and 

redeployment must commence during plan development and be ongoing during all phases 

of a campaign or major operation. An imbalanced focus on planning offensive and 

defensive operations in the "dominate" phase may threaten full development of basic and 

supporting plans for the "stabilize" and "enable civil authority" phases and ultimately 

impact the joint operationís momentum. Even while sustained combat operations are 

ongoing, there will be a need to establish or restore security and control and provide 

humanitarian relief as succeeding areas are occupied or bypassed. 

2. Initially, CMO will be conducted to secure and safeguard the 

populace, reestablish civil law and order protect or rebuild key infrastructure, and restore 

public services. US military forces should be prepared to lead the activities necessary to 

accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil, USG, multinational or international 

capacity does not exist or is incapable of assuming responsibility. Once legitimate civil 
Chapter I 

I-18 JP 3-57 

authority is prepared to conduct such tasks, US military forces may support such 

activities as required/necessary. 

3. The military's predominant presence and its ability to command 

and control (C2) forces and logistics under extreme conditions may give it the de facto 

lead in stability operations normally governed by other agencies that lack such capacities. 

However, some stability operations likely will be in support of, or transition to support 

of, US diplomatic, IGO, or HN efforts. Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to 

success and military forces need to work competently in this environment while properly 

NOTIONAL BALANCE OF OFFENSIVE, DEFENSIVE, AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

Shape

Offensive Ops

Stability Ops

Defensive Ops

Deter

Stability Ops

Offensive Ops

Defensive Ops

Seize Initiative

Stability Ops Offensive Ops

Defensive Ops

Dominate

Stability Ops Offensive Ops

Defensive Ops

Stabilize

Stability Ops

Offensive Ops

Defensive Ops

Enable Civil Authority

Stability Ops

Offensive Ops

Defensive Ops

Figure I-4. Notional Balance of Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Operations 
Introduction 

I-19 

supporting the agency in charge. To be effective, planning and conducting stability 

operations require a variety of perspectives and expertise and the cooperation and 

assistance of interagency and alliance or coalition partners. Military forces should be 

prepared to operate in integrated civilian-military teams that could include representatives 

from IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and members of the private sector with relevant skills and 

expertise. 

4. Civilian institutions provide the long term engagement needed to 

achieve a viable and sustainable peace. The DOS utilizes an interagency management 

system with five related sectors that should be accomplished to achieve national goals. 

These sectors are security; humanitarian assistance (HA) and social well-being; justice 

and reconciliation; governance and participation; and, economic stabilization and 

infrastructure. These peace building mission sectors are discussed in detail in JP 3-07.3, 

Peace Operations. 

(h) Civil support operations are divided into the broad categories of: 

domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement support, and other activities. In many 

cases, these categories can overlap or be in effect simultaneously, depending on the 

particular circumstances of the incident. While many aspects of civil support may be 

applicable in a response to disasters in a FN, civil support applies only in a domestic 

context with US civil authorities. 

For further detail relating to civil support, refer to JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, and JP 

3-28, Civil Support. 

4. Relationships Between Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs Operations 

a. The relationship between CMO and civil affairs operations (CAO) is best 

considered within the broad context of unified action that involves the synchronization, 

coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental 

entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. JFCs seek this synergy by 

several means, one of the more prominent being through the conduct of CMO that bring 

together the activities of joint and multinational forces (MNFs) and nonmilitary 

ìThe United States employs its military capabilities at home and abroad in 

support of its national security goals in a variety of operations. These 

operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a range of 

military operations that extends from military engagement, security 

cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited 

contingency operations and, if necessary, major operations and campaigns. 

Use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, and 

deterrence activities helps shape the operational environment and keep the 

day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed 

conflict while maintaining US global influence.î 

JP 3-0, Joint Operations 
Chapter I 

I-20 JP 3-57 

organizations to achieve common objectives. Commanders, in carrying out their CMO 

responsibilities are assisted by CA. This relationship is depicted in Figure I-5. 

 

(1) There are six broad categories of CA functional specialty areas ó rule of 

law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and 

public education and information. Each is related to a certain extent, to every other 

CA functional specialty, and their interconnecting relationships obviate exclusive interest 

within any functional area. At the same time, some of the individual functions impose 

requirements for specialist personnel in more than one skill. 

(2) Within each functional specialty area, technically qualified and experienced 

individuals, known as CA functional specialists, advise and assist the commander and can 

assist or direct their civilian counterparts. These functional specialists, especially at the 

operational and strategic levels, may be employed to provide analysis in their specialty 

area that supports planning of interagency efforts or HN efforts, and in a general support 

(GS) role to joint force components requiring such capabilities. 

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS RELATIONSHIPS

CIVIL AFFAIRS 

OPERATIONS

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

UNIFIED ACTION

!

!

!

Conducted by CA forces

Provides specialized support of 

CMO

Applies functional skills normally 

provided by civil government

!

!

The responsibility of a commander

Normally planned by CA personnel, but 

implemented by all elements of the joint force

! Joint and multinational operations coordinated 

and integrated with the activities of local, state, 

and federal government agencies and 

intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations

! Takes place within unified commands, subordinate unified 

commands, and joint task forces under the direction of these 

commanders

Figure I-5. Civil-Military Operations Relationships 
Introduction 

I-21 

b. The GCC and subordinate commanders normally establish a distinct, full-time 

CMO staff element comprised of CA personnel to centralize the direction and oversight 

of planning, coordination, implementation, and conduct of CMO. While CA forces are 

organized, trained, and equipped specifically to support CMO, other joint force enablers 

performing CMO include SOF, PSYOP, legal support, PA, engineer, transportation, HSS, 

MP, security forces, and maneuver units. 

c. The CMO staff element develops a comprehensive staff estimate and supports 

planning by providing considerations of the implications on the civil sector and makes 

recommendations on those actions the JFC can take inclusive with other stakeholders. 

d. CAO usually are planned, directed, and conducted by CA forces due to the 

complexities and demands for specialized capabilities associated with activities normally 

the responsibility of indigenous civil governments or authorities. While all CAO 

support CMO, they remain a distinct CMO element. 
Chapter I 

I-22 JP 3-57 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER II 

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR 

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

II-1 

1. General 

CMO are an inherent command responsibility. They encompass the activities 

JFCs take to establish and maintain relations with civil authorities, the general 

population, and other organizations. JFCs are responsible for the organization and 

centralized direction of CMO in their operational areas. They plan and conduct CMO to 

facilitate military operations in support of POLMIL objectives derived from national 

strategic objectives. An integral part of this is maintaining military-to-civil relations as 

well as emphasizing open and productive communications among OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, 

and selected elements of the private sector. 

a. The organization and command relationships for conducting CMO are flexible, 

to a degree and the principles of effective C2 and staff organizational concepts apply to 

CMO just as they do for any other military operation. CCDRs are the vital link between 

those who determine national security strategy and the military forces conducting the 

military operations. JFCs integrate and synchronize the actions of military forces and 

capabilities to achieve strategic and operational objectives through joint operations. JFCs 

consider national objectives, environmental conditions, and availability of resources to 

aid in determining the options available. This effort is essential to successfully 

integrating the instruments of national power and leveraging the capabilities of all 

participants to achieve national strategic objectives. 

b. The JFC organizes the force to optimize its ability to plan, coordinate, and 

conduct CMO in support of military operations. Priorities based on the primary mission 

present challenges for effective CMO under various operational environments throughout 

the range of military operations. CMO are conducted to synergize civil and military 

instruments of power, minimize civil-military friction and threats from the civil 

component, maximize support for operations, and meet the commanderís legal 

obligations and moral responsibilities to the civilian populations within the operational 

area. Other challenges affect balancing CMO across requirements for offensive, 

defensive, and stability operations and to be prepared for potential mission change. 

ìUnified planning, centralized control, and a single point of responsibility are 

the very minimum requirements for a unity of effort which will offer success . 

. . Unity of effort, however, is extremely difficult to achieve because it 

represents the fusion of civil and military functions to fight battles which have 

primarily political, objectives . . . All the political, economic, psychological, 

and military means must be marshalled as weapons under centralized coordination and direction.î 

John J. McCuen 

The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-57 

2. Responsibilities 

a. President or Secretary of Defense. Policy guidance concerning civil-military 

interaction in an operational area should be communicated from the President or SecDef 

through the CJCS to the CCDR for detailed operational planning and execution. 

 

b. Department of Defense/Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations 

and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities) (ASD [SO/LIC & IC]),

serving under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy (USD[P]) is responsible for: 

(1) Acting as the principal civilian advisor to the SecDef and the USD (P) on 

the policy and planning for the use of CA within DOD; 

(2) Working within the interagency process as appropriate and translate 

national security objectives into specific defense policy objectives achievable through 

CAO; 

(3) Supervising the formulation of plans and policy impacting DOD CAO; 

(4) Overseeing the implementation of DOD CAO in policies and programs; 

(5) Providing policy advice, assistance, and coordination with other offices of 

the OSD and DOD officials regarding CAO and the use of CA in their responsible areas; 

(6) Acting as OSD point of contact for DOD: 

(a) Coordinating CAO as they relate to the activities of interagency 

partners, IGOs, NGOs, IPI, other organizations, and the private sector, in accordance with 

applicable laws and regulations to plan and conduct CMO. 

(b) Monitoring interagency partnersí use of DOD forces for the conduct of 

CAO. The SecDef should be contacted whenever it appears that questions may arise with 

respect to legality or propriety of such use. 

(7) Coordinating with OSD Director of Administration and Management to 

approve the detail of CA to duty with interagency partners; 

(8) Reviewing in conjunction with the Director for Operational Plans and Joint 

Force Development, Joint Staff and Director for Force Structure, Resource, and 

Assessment, Joint Staff, CA program recommendations and budget proposals from the 

Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, US Special Operations 

Command (CDRUSSOCOM); 

(9) Reviewing and coordinating requests for deployments for CA forces and 

making recommendations to the USD (P); 
Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations 

II-3 

(10) Developing and publishing DOD-wide standards for CA training and 

qualifications; and 

(11) Participating in and initiating OSD review processes of CAO integrated in 

component plans and programs to ensure compliance with policy. 

c. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for: 

 

(1) Providing, as the principal military advisor to the President, NSC, and the 

SecDef, advice on the employment of CMO and CA forces and the conduct of CMO and 

CAO; 

(2) Providing guidance to the supported CCDRs for the integration of CMO 

and CAO into military plans, including SCPs; 

(3) Integrating agency and multinational partners into planning efforts as 

appropriate; 

(4) Developing, establishing, and promulgating joint doctrine for CMO to 

include CA, engineer, medical, security police, and other CMO supporting forces. 

(5) Formulating policies for coordinating joint training events that incorporate 

in CAO; and 

(6) Submitting deployment orders for CA forces to the OSD in accordance with 

current DOD instructions for coordinating deployments. 

d. GCCs have responsibility for: 

(1) Planning, supporting, and conducting CMO and CAO. These activities 

shall be designed to: 

(a) Support national security policy and DOD goals and objectives; 

(b) Support the goals and programs of other interagency partners related to 

CMO and CAO consistent with missions and guidance issued by the SecDef; and 

(c) Support USG/DOD policy regarding respect for national sovereignty 

by coordinating with appropriate US embassies to establish HN agreements/arrangements 

with FNs that will be transited or within which joint forces will stage/operate. 

Information on existing agreements/arrangements with FNs can be found in DOD 

4500.54-G, Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide. The DOD Foreign 

Clearance Guide provides requirements and restrictions information for DOD personnel 

temporary travel and aircraft overflight and landing in FNs around the world. The 

information is coordinated daily with DOS, US embassies, and combatant commands. 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-57 

Reference http://www.fcg.pentagon.mil or http://www.fcg.pentagon.smil.mil for current 

copy of the DOD foreign clearance guide. 

 

 (2) Ensure the effectiveness of CMO applied into SCPs;

(3) Ensure the organizations having a part in CMO work together to focus and 

synchronize their efforts in achieving CMO priorities in their area of responsibility 

(AOR). 

e. Commander, United States Special Operations Command is responsible for 

carrying out the relevant responsibilities specified in subparagraph 2d above and to: 

(1) Provide GCCs with CA from assigned forces that are organized, trained, 

and equipped to plan and conduct CAO in support of GCCís missions; 

(2) Provide education and individual training in planning and conducting CAO 

for DOD and non-DOD personnel; 

(3) Assist in developing DOD-wide standards for CA training and 

qualifications under the direction of ASD(SO/LIC & IC); 

(4) Assist in developing training opportunities for CA forces with interagency 

partners, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector in accordance with applicable laws and 

regulations under the direction of ASD(SO/LIC & IC); 

(5) Assist in integrating CMO and CAO into joint strategy and doctrine under 

direction of the CJCS; 

(6) Establish standards to ensure interoperability of equipment and all US CA 

forces; 

(7) Prepare and submit to the SecDef program recommendations and budget 

proposals for activities and equipment unique to special operations (SO) for assigned CA 

forces; 

(8) Exercise authority, direction, and control over the expenditure of funds for 

activities and equipment unique to SO for assigned CA forces; 

(9) Establish prioritization and validate requirements for the deployment of 

assigned CA forces; 

(10) Serve as the joint proponent for CA, including doctrine, combat 

development, and institutional training; and 
Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations 

II-5 

(11) Conduct the research, development, testing, and evaluation of joint CA 

equipment and perform the acquisition of SOF peculiar CA equipment, materiel, 

supplies, and services. 

f. Commander, United States Joint Forces Command is responsible for 

carrying out the relevant responsibilities specified in subparagraph 2d above and to: 

(1) Effect integration of CMO into joint doctrine, experimentation, training, 

exercises, and operations;

(2) Ensure CMO are properly represented in joint training exercise scenarios; 

(3) Coordinate with United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 

for the development of collective training standards related to CAO; 

 

(4) Validate operational requirements for the deployment of assigned CA 

forces; 

(5) In coordination with the CJCS and the Secretaries of the Military 

Departments, provide conventional CA forces that are manned, trained and equipped to 

accomplish the CAO missions required to support the CCDRís CMO priorities; and 

(6) Validate requirements for the activation, mobilization, deployment, and 

reconstitution of Reserve Component (RC) CA forces. 

 

g. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for: 

(1) Developing and maintaining programs necessary to support CMO and CAO 

to meet their Service and combatant command requirements; 

(2) Providing for CA units and personnel in their force structures or requesting 

such CA from the SecDef, who will then coordinate the request with the CJCS; 

(3) Providing for the timely activation and mobilization of RC units and 

personnel as required to perform CAO in accordance with DODD 1235.10, Activation, 

Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve, for those Secretaries of the 

Military Departments with CA in their portion of the RC; 

(4) Assuming DOD-wide responsibilities for specific CAO as directed by the 

SecDef; and 

(5) Coordinating with the CDRUSSOCOM for CA training and professional 

education as it relates to Service-specific operations and forces. 
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-57 

h. The Secretary of the Army is responsible for: 

(1) Carrying out the responsibilities specified in subparagraph 2g above; and 

(2) Recruiting, training, organizing, equipping, and mobilizing units and 

personnel to meet the CA requirements of the supported commander and provide CA 

forces requested by the other DOD components as directed by the SecDef in accordance 

with the force levels, programs, plans, and missions approved by the SecDef. 

i. The Secretary of the Navy is responsible for: 

(1) Carrying out the responsibilities specified in subparagraph 2g above; and 

 

(2) Recruiting, training, organizing, equipping, and mobilizing units and 

personnel to meet the CA requirements of the supported commander and provide CA 

forces requested by the other DOD components as directed by the SecDef in accordance 

with the force levels, programs, plans, and missions approved by the SecDef. 

j. Services. As heads of their respective Services, the Service Chiefs have the 

responsibility to support interagency partners, the other Services, and multinational 

commanders and US CCDRs with appropriate forces or specialists capable of performing 

CMO and CAO, as directed by the SecDef, as well as with techniques and items of 

equipment typical or peculiar to their Service. Additionally, the Service Chiefs have 

responsibility for considering the following: 

(1) Supporting US policy and CCDR CA force requirements across the range of 

military operations, when required; 

(2) Directing their respective Services to include sufficient coverage of CMO 

and CAO responsibilities in Service planning; 

(3) Making recommendations to the CJCS concerning the adequacy and 

supportability of CMO and CAO portions or annexes of combatant command plans and 

orders as a part of normal review procedures; and 

(4) Providing for training of US CA as required to execute theater-specific 

plans. The training shall be coordinated with CDRUSSOCOM for CA and with the 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command. 

k. Geographic Combatant Commanders. The GCCs provide regional 

coordination and direction to their subordinate commanders for the integration of 

CAO/CMO into military plans and operations. These activities are designed to achieve 

the following: 

(1) Support the goals and programs of other USG departments and agencies 

related to CAO/CMO consistent with missions and guidance issued by the SecDef. 
Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations 

II-7 

(2) Designation of a staff element within the headquarters and subordinate 

command(s) for planning and coordinating CAO/CMO. 

(3) Coordination of CAO/CMO with the appropriate chiefs of US diplomatic 

missions. 

(4) Synchronization of all CAO/CMO requirements within regional war on 

terrorism plans, SCPs, and other Phase 0 (Shape) activities. 

l. Subordinate JFCs are responsible for: 

(1) Planning, integrating, and monitoring the deployment, employment, 

sustainment, and redeployment of available CA functional assets in appropriate 

operational areas; 

(2) Implementing multinational CA plans consistent with international law, the 

LOAC, and US law and treaty obligations with the government and civilian population in 

countries where US forces are employed, and ensuring that established 

agreements/arrangements for en route transit of US military forces/materiel to support the 

operation are in place; 

(3) Taking necessary actions, as directed, in accordance with appropriate laws 

and outlined in formal agreements to control DCs, maintain order, prevent and treat 

disease, provide relief of civilian suffering, and provide maximum protection and 

preservation of property and other resources usable to achieve US military objectives; 

(4) Ensuring all assigned or attached personnel are fully aware of the 

importance of their actions while in contact with or in the presence of civilian authorities 

or population; 

(5) Provide training and orientation all assigned or attached personnel of 

indigenous cultural, religious, and social attitudes or customs and sensitivities and of their 

expected or actual effects on the outcome of military operations; 

(6) Communicating civilian attitudes and needs to higher command levels and 

OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, IPI, and the private sector; 

(7) Securing the understanding, acceptance, and support of IPI to reduce or 

minimize frictions inherent in stationing or employing US military forces; 

(8) Employing CMO and CA forces to identify and coordinate as necessary 

sources of assistance, supplies, facilities, and labor from indigenous sources and to deal 

with local civilians and governments on the commanderís behalf; 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-57 

(9) Incorporating CMO estimates and CA assessments in developing strategy 

and objectives for plans and orders, as appropriate; 

(10) Ensuring staffs and subordinate commands have sufficient CA 

representation with political, legal, cultural, linguistic, and economic-related skills to plan 

and conduct CMO support required by plans; 

(11) Ensuring that deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of 

CA forces and conduct of CAO are coordinated with respective US embassy country 

teams, interagency partners and IGOs, NGOs, and IPI, and HN or FN military and 

civilian authorities; 

(12) Requesting guidance from the establishing authority (e.g., CCDR) on 

implementation of multinational policies and objectives, as appropriate; 

(13) Assisting regional friends and allies in planning and developing the 

operational skills and infrastructure necessary to ensure domestic stability through CMO 

and CAO; and 

(14) Coordinating CMO and CAO planning with appropriate multinational 

commanders and HN forces, as directed by the establishing authority (e.g., CCDR) in 

conjunction with the US embassy country team, as appropriate. Supported CCDRs and 

subordinate JFCs should consider establishing CMO working groups. The goal of these 

working groups is to bring all the players who have a part in CMO together to focus and 

synchronize their efforts in achieving CMO priorities. 

 

3. Organizations Providing Civil-Military Operations Capabilities 

a. Every contact between US military or government personnel and HN or FN 

population is a CMO engagement. This paragraph broadly highlights the capabilities of a 

number of US military organizations and their support to CMO. Other organizations 

such as OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, HNs, FNs, IPI, and the private sector are involved with 

CMO but will be discussed in Chapter IV ìCoordination.î Every US military 

organization has some capability to support CMO. Certain types of organizations, 

typically CA and PSYOP units, should form the nucleus of CMO planning efforts. 

Others, such as, but not limited to, other SOF, engineers, HSS, transportation, and MP 

and security forces, act as enablers. However, for CMO to be successful all commanders 

must carry out their responsibilities regarding CMO. CMO should not be considered 

something done only by CA and PSYOP forces. 
Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations 

II-9 

b. Special Operations Forces 

(1) Unless otherwise directed by the SecDef (assigned in Forces For 

Memoranda for Unified Commands), SOF are under the combatant command (command 

authority) (COCOM) of the CDRUSSOCOM. 

(2) CA and PSYOP are mutually supportive within CMO. During some 

operations, PSYOP support various CAO (e.g., establish populace control measures) to 

gain support for the HN or FN government in the international community, and reduce 

support or resources to those destabilizing forces threatening legitimate processes of the 

HN or FN government. PSYOP maximize these efforts through information products 

and programs. PSYOP publicize both the existence and successes of CMO to generate 

target population confidence in and positive perception of US, HN, or FN actions. 

 

 (3) Psychological Operations

 (a) PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected information and 

indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, 

and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and 

individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and 

behavior favorable to the originatorís objectives. PSYOP can provide key support and 

information when effectively integrated into CMO. For example: 

 

 1. Sharing information concerning the location, state of mind, and 

health of civilians and the physical characteristics of the operational area. 

 2. Disseminating information concerning the safety and welfare of 

the civilian population. 

ìIn order to address the underlying conditions that foster terrorism, SOCPAC 

[Special Operations Command, Pacific] works with its host nation partners in 

order to help provide security and stability. This attracts economic 

development and shapes conditions for good governance and rule of law. 

Much of SOCPACís activities consist of foreign internal defense and 

unconventional warfare. SOFís [special operations forceís] primary 

contribution in this interagency activity is to organize, train and assist host 

nation security forces. The indirect approach relies heavily on SOFís organic 

capability to build host nation defense capacity, provide civil affairs assets to 

assist in humanitarian and civic assistance, and offer information operations 

resources to aid the host nation in countering violent ideological threats. 

By working closely with our host nation and US embassy partners, we 

actively promote peace and prosperity and offer options other than violence 

and despair to the citizens in the region.î 

MG David P. Fridovich, Commander, Special Operations Command, Pacific in 

Special Operations Technology, 15 Mar 2007 
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-57 

 3. Influencing a civilian populationís attitude toward US policy and 

preparing it for CMO involvement in post conflict activities. 

 

 4. Maximizing the impact of CMO by publicizing the existence or 

successes of efforts in the areas directly impacting the civilian population like: health 

services and veterinary aid, construction, and public facilities activities, etc., to generate 

confidence in and positive perception of US and HN actions to the populace. 

 5. Assisting in assessments before and after the operation to 

determine the most effective application of effort and documenting the results. 

 6. Providing direct support to CMO units conducting emergency 

relocation operations of DCs and for DC camp operations. 

 7. As a corollary, when conducted within the framework of a viable 

CMO concept, CAO can contribute significantly to the overall success of PSYOP 

activities (deeds versus words). 

For further detail concerning PSYOP related activities and Service capabilities, refer to 

JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. 

 (4) Other SOF Support. Small SOF units generally accomplish CMO through 

operations that assist the HN or FN authorities, OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs in restoring 

peace, strengthening the infrastructure of the country, or providing disaster relief 

assistance. SOF are regularly employed in mobile training teams, joint and combined 

exercises, professional development program seminars, and other military-to-military 

activities that are a vital part of theater security cooperation strategies. 

c. Civil Affairs

(1) Concept of Employment for United States Army (USA) CA

(a) CMO staffs at every level, frequently augmented by deployed USA CA 

planners review and, if necessary, update plans and orders. An important element of the 

contingency or crisis action planning process focuses on developing a recommended CA 

task organization. The recommended CA task organization is validated by the supported 

GCC and included in the request for deployment of forces from the Joint Staff. The 

forces are sourced once the Joint Staff validates the request and assigns a joint force 

provider; USSOCOM for Active Component (AC) SOF CA and US Joint Forces 

Command for RC and conventional CA. Although AC CA primarily supports SOF, in the 

event the response time is too short for RC forces, AC CA forces can be tasked to deploy 

in support of an operational area or directly to the supported unit until RC CA can be 

deployed. This rapid response capability enhances the supported commanderís efforts to 

achieve timely interagency coordination that ultimately leads to a strong unity of effort. 
Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations 

II-11 

(b) Following the deployment of AC CA and completion of the initial CA 

assessments, a long-term plan is developed that articulates the specific functional skills 

required to support the mission. This plan is formulated with significant reachback input 

from continental United States (CONUS)-based CA functional specialists (note: the 

functional specialists should only deploy when or if there is a specific need for their 

expertise). The results of the initial CA assessment and the validated task organization 

flow from the supported GCC to the Joint Staff for validation, feasibility assessment, and 

resourcing. Resourcing of conventional force requirements will generally be provided by 

the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Commandís regionally aligned 

CA commands found in the United States Army Reserve (USAR). 

1. Concurrently, requests for the Presidential Reserve Call-up (if 

required) or other authorities for mobilization are initiated through the Joint Staff and 

DOD. When authorized, reserve CA elements are mobilized and deployed. 

2. Mission hand-over or transition occurs when the RC CA arrive. 

The AC CA are redeployed as needed. 

(2) Civil Affairs Operations. CA forces are a multiplier for JFCs. This occurs 

both within staff functions in GS as well as unit functions in direct support at all levels of 

command. CA functions are conducted by CA teams of various types, to include civil 

affairs teams (CATs) at tactical levels, civil affairs planning teams (CAPTs) and civil 

liaison teams (CLTs) at tactical and operational levels, civil-military support elements at 

operational and theater strategic levels, and civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) 

and functional specialty cells at all levels. 

 (a) The employment of CATs at the tactical level links the maneuver 

commander with the civil populace. Direct interaction with the civilian population and 

the environment provides commanders awareness and the ability to affect desired 

outcomes through operational tasks. 

 

(b) CA units establish the CMOC and provide direct functional specialist 

support to HN or FN ministries. 

(c) CA units perform staff functions by augmenting the CMO staff element 

or by being employed to subordinate commands where the specialized CA skills required 

are greater than the capability of attached CA forces. 

(d) CAO refer to activities performed or supported by CA that: 

1. Enhance the relationship between military forces and civil 

authorities in areas where military forces are present. 

2. Require coordination with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, IPIs, and the 

private sector. 
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 3-57 

3. Involve the application of CA functional specialty skills in areas 

normally the responsibility of civil government to enhance conduct of CMO. Use of 

dedicated CA and the conduct of CAO will enhance planned CMO by helping to ensure 

civil or indigenous understanding of, and compliance with, controls, regulations, 

directives, or other measures taken by commanders to accomplish the military mission 

and attain US objectives. 

4. CAO are distinguishable from CMO insofar as the former are 

characterized by applications of functional specialties in areas normally the responsibility 

of indigenous government or civil authority. CMO may extend to assumption of 

governmental functions required in an occupied territory during or immediately 

subsequent to hostilities. 

(3) Policies. The pattern and objectives of CAO in friendly, neutral, hostile, or 

occupied territories in any given area will correspond with applicable international and 

domestic law and depend on such variables as US foreign policy, the requirements of the 

military situation, participation of MNFs, and other factors. Specific guidance as to 

policy, plans, procedures, and doctrine to be followed in any given territory can be 

modified during the onset of hostilities or after the outbreak of an armed conflict as 

circumstances warrant. In the absence of guidance, military commanders take the 

initiative to request guidance and be prepared to execute command CAO and support US 

objectives. 

(a) Policy Flow. Because of the POLMIL nature and sensitivity of CAO 

undertaken by US commanders, whether in a joint or multinational context, their conduct 

is governed by deliberate policy developed and promulgated by the President or SecDef. 

Policy decisions generally are transmitted to commanders through command channels. 

Guidance for specific policies concerning the degree of civil-military interaction to be 

followed in any operational area is transmitted from the SecDef through the CJCS to the 

GCC. 

 

(b) US Commanders Serving as Multinational Commanders. Policies 

normally are developed by agreement between member nations of a MNF and provided 

to commanders through a council of ministers or a similar policy making body of which 

the United States is a participant. Should multinational CMO guidance be in conflict 

with international law or specific national instructions, commanders must immediately 

request guidance through US channels. Multinational commanders operating as part of a 

NATO force or with NATO forces should be mindful of the principles of civil-military 

cooperation (CIMIC), which govern CMO for NATO forces (to include US forces under 

such circumstances). See subparagraph 4i for additional CIMIC details. 

(c) Geographic Combatant Commanders. Policies concerning the scope 

of CMO and procedural guidance normally are covered in an Executive Order or by a 

policy directive originating within the NSC. Commanders receive guidance transmitted 

through the SecDef and the CJCS. Commanders provide guidance to subordinate 

commanders, including specific instructions regarding the exercise of authority for CAO. 
Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations 

II-13 

Commanders need to maintain close liaison with supporting CCDRs to work with US 

diplomatic representatives and liaise with US diplomatic representatives in their own 

AORs to ensure effective coordination and delineation of CA responsibilities and 

activities. 

(4) Principles. Certain general principles apply to all CAO. They are the basis 

for initial planning purposes in the absence of specific guidance. These principles are 

listed in Figure II-1 and described below. 

(a) Mission. CAO are conducted in support of military operations to 

further the US national interests and fulfill international obligations. 

(b) Command Responsibility. Responsibility for the conduct of CMO, is 

vested in the senior military commander, guided by directive, national policies, military 

strategy, and international law, including applicable agreements. 

(c) Continuity and Consistency of Policy. Essential to the success of 

CAO, in light of their inherent complexity and political sensitivity, is a comprehensive 

and clear USG policy transmitted through command channels. 

(d) Security Responsibility. Under Article 64 of the Geneva Convention 

Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the commander of an 

occupying force has the legal right to require the inhabitants within an operational area to 

comply with directives necessary for the security of the occupying force and proper 

administration of a given area. 

PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

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Mission

Command Responsibility

Continuity and Consistency of Policy

Security Responsibility

Economy of Personnel and Resources

Humanitarian Considerations

Figure II-1. Principles of Civil Affairs Operations
Chapter II 

II-14 JP 3-57 

(e) Economy of Personnel and Resources. The activities of CA should 

be limited, where possible, to those involving coordination, liaison, and interface with 

existing or reestablished civilian authorities. Maximum use of local or indigenous 

resources should be made consistent with satisfaction of minimum essential civil 

requirements. 

(f) Humanitarian Considerations. The use of force beyond that required 

to fulfill the mission is prohibited. Military commanders plan operations that strive to 

ensure minimum suffering for noncombatants, and comply with approved rules of 

engagement (ROE), rules for the use of force (RUF), and the LOAC. 

(5) Assets

(a) Although CA capability resides in the USA, United States Navy 

(USN), and United States Marine Corps (USMC), the USA has the preponderance of the 

units and personnel. 

(b) CA personnel assigned or attached to GCCs. 

(c) Other active and reserve personnel possessing functional specialty 

skills applicable to CAO across the range of military operations. 

(d) Appendix A, ìService Capabilities,î discusses CA assets in more 

detail. 

d. Intelligence. The operational relationship between intelligence and CMO is 

mutually enhancing, yet highly sensitive. In this operational environment, most 

actionable intelligence is of the ìhuman intelligenceî (HUMINT) variety. Most 

HUMINT originates from open sources and comes through information and cultural or 

situational awareness and understanding derived from personal contacts and relationships 

through diplomacy, commercial activities, information operations (IO), and CMO. 

Intelligence, IO and CMO are an inherent mission for all military personnel. With the 

rise of the importance of CMO to HUMINT and the concept of ìcultural intelligence,î 

the role of CMO in the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

(JIPOE) process has likewise accelerated. Through civil-military liaison activities such 

as key leader engagement and its CMOC and CIM functions, CA can contribute 

significantly as an information source for JIPOE. In order to protect the credibility of 

their operations and for FP reasons, CA personnel should not be directly involved in 

intelligence-gathering in any way. Intelligence operators in the field operating openly 

and directly with CA could also place CA and other personnel in support of CMO and 

their mission at great risk. Regardless, JFCs need to establish divisions of responsibility 

between CMO and intelligence and robust yet discreet operational lines of coordination 

to create operational synergies while managing risks. 
Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations 

II-15 

e. Engineering 

(1) Engineers have a critical role in CMO, since engineer operations frequently 

result in direct effects that support the local civilian population (e.g. building roads, 

public facilities). Also, engineering frequently uses the capacity of nonmilitary 

organizations as well as military forces. If the experiences of Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, 

Iraq, Afghanistan, and Hurricane Katrina are repeated in future military operations, 

engineer operations will include many DOD civilians as well as the services of NGOs, 

IGOs, interagency partners, and contractors. The total engineer force of military active 

and reserve, civilian, contractor, HN and allies constitute the primary resources 

commanders can draw upon to accomplish the engineer mission. 

(2) Capabilities. Engineer units support the JFC through combat engineering, 

geospatial engineering, and general engineering (GE), including construction. Each 

Service has engineering units and capabilities to meet specific operational needs. Within 

Service limitation, US military engineer units provide specialized capabilities as depicted 

in Figure II-2. In addition, technical engineering support and contract support are 

provided by a variety of supporting organizations within Service limitations. The HN 

may also have certain engineering capabilities specifically adapted to the local 

environment. Hired contractors and multinational military engineers in an immature 

SPECIALIZED ENGINEERING CAPABILITIES

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Firefighting services

Well-drilling

Underwater construction

Construction and repair of airfields and ports to include 

associated support equipment

Maintenance of lines of communications

Explosive hazard neutralization (limited)

Environmental assessments

Erection of bare base facilities

Construction of fuels and water supply

Power generation

Facilities engineering and management

Real estate management

Waste disposal

Public utilities, reconstruction/revitalization projects

Force protection enhancement

Figure II-2. Specialized Engineering Capabilities 
Chapter II 

II-16 JP 3-57 

theater also can provide valuable capabilities that may not be available in US engineer 

units. This mixture of capabilities may change during phases of the operation. 

Therefore, capabilities must be managed across Service lines throughout the course of an 

operation. 

 (3) Support to CMO. Within a joint force, engineers may operate with OGAs, 

NGOs, IGOs, and private sector participating in the operation. Given the multitude of 

organizations and capabilities involved, it is important that the joint force engineer 

coordinate with these organizations to ensure resources are focused on accomplishing the 

mission. Establishing and maintaining effective liaison with all participating agencies is 

critical to achieving unity of effort. The CMOC can be a focal point within the joint 

force for coordination with these agencies and organizations. 

For further detail concerning Service capabilities and other related engineer activities, 

refer to Appendix A, ìService Capabilities,î and JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. 

f. Health Service Support 

(1) The use of HSS resources has historically proven to be a valuable low-risk 

asset in support of CMO. HSS is generally a noncontroversial and cost-effective means 

of using the military element to support US national interests in another country. The 

focus of HSS initiatives, although possibly targeted toward the health problems in the 

operational area, is not normally curative, but primarily long-term preventive and 

developmental programs that are sustainable by the HN. HSS operations conducted to 

enhance the stability of a HN must be well coordinated with all concerned agencies, 

including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and 

integrated into the respective US embassy plans. Independent, unplanned health service 

civic action programs should not be undertaken. 

 

For more details concerning HSS, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support. 

(2) HSS Activities. HSS activities in support of CMO include health services 

and dental treatment, veterinarian and preventive medicine services, health services 

logistics, and aeromedical evacuation. However, consideration must be given to the 

differences when planning for CMO, for example, legal and policy issues regarding the 

treatment of foreign civilians; greater focus on preventive medicine and prevention and 

treatment of diseases rather than combat casualties, and significant patient population 

differences, (e.g., normal military population, pediatric, and relative health status of the 

local population and environmental/infrastructure conditions). 

 (3) Policies. Based upon the HSS estimate of the situation, and in coordination 

with the component command surgeons, the joint force surgeon must plan for health 

services policies and procedures that can be best adapted to the joint operation. 

(a) GCCs are ultimately accountable for coordinating and integrating HSS 

within their theaters. Medical intelligence can provide the CCDR an occupational and 
Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations 

II-17 

environmental threat analysis to ensure force health protection (FHP) of the deployed 

assets during CMO. 

(b) Where practical, dual use of available health services assets will be 

accomplished to support CMO requirements and military operations. 

(4) Assets. The Services have organic health services support capabilities that 

can be applied to CMO. 

(5) Support to CMO

(a) There are several HSS activities that constitute CMO as illustrated in 

Figure II-3. In addition, all HSS activities listed in JP 4-02, Health Service Support, 

should be considered. 

(b) HSS activities enhance HN stability by: 

1. Developing HSS programs tailored for the HN (e.g., appropriate 

and affordable). 

2. Developing sustainable training and acquisition programs. 

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES IN

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

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Public health activities, to include preventive medicine and veterinary 

care, food sanitation, water quality monitoring, sanitary facility 

evaluations, immunizations of humans and animals, pediatric medical 

support, and resuscitation and stabilization of acute illness and 

injuries

Diagnostic and treatment training

Development of health service support (HSS) logistic programs

Development of continuing HSS education programs

Development of HSS medical intelligence and threat analysis

Development of a host nation military field HSS support system for 

treatment and evacuation

Assistance in the upgrade, staffing, and supplying logistic support of 

existing HSS facilities

Disease vector control/surveillance operations

Figure II-3. Health Service Support Activities in Civil-Military Operations 
Chapter II 

II-18 JP 3-57 

3. Increasing the effectiveness of other USG agency programs such 

as USAID and US State Department Public Diplomacy program. 

4. Recommending and coordinating health services education 

opportunities for HN personnel. 

(c) Improving the economic well-being through veterinary medicine and 

animal husbandry. 

For further detail concerning Service capabilities, refer to Appendix A, ìService 

Capabilities.î 

g. Transportation 

 (1) There are many transportation resources available to the JFC that may 

augment the range of military operations. These military and commercial resources 

include airlift, sealift, land surface transportation, overseas resources (including vehicles), 

port operations, pre-positioning programs, and intermodal resources. The Commander, 

United States Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM) is assigned the mission 

to provide common-user air, land, and sea transportation for DOD, across the range of 

military operations. In this capacity, except for those assets that are Service-unique or 

theater-assigned, or HN transportation support assets the joint task force (JTF) or GCC 

has negotiated, CDRUSTRANSCOM exercises COCOM of the strategic transportation 

assets of the Military Departments and is the DOD Single Manager for Transportation. 

CDRUSTRANSCOM aligns traffic management and transportation single manager 

responsibilities to achieve optimum responsiveness, effectiveness, and economy for the 

supported CCDR. GCCs assigned transportation assets should ensure the assets are 

managed, controlled, and capable of full integration into the Defense Transportation 

System (DTS). Security of transportation assets at forward locations is a GCC 

responsibility with the task performed by subordinate commanders. 

For further information on the DTS, refer to JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense 

Transportation System. 

(2) Transportation Activities. Transportation organizations plan, coordinate, 

conduct, monitor, and control inter- and intratheater movement of personnel and materiel. 

(3) Policies. The Military Departments retain the responsibility for organizing, 

training, equipping, and providing the logistic support (including Service-unique 

transportation) of their respective forces. These forces and other DOD agencies also 

depend on common-user military transportation services. In this role, the Services, US 

Coast Guard, Defense Logistics Agency, and other DOD agencies are all generically 

called shipper services. Each Service and agency is responsible for establishing 

transportation policy for the movement of equipment and supplies funded by the 

applicable shipper service and for administrative support and performance of 
Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations 

II-19 

transportation operations assigned by CCDRs at either their local shipping installations or 

throughout the theater. 

(4) Assets. The JFC conducting CMO has available the transportation structure 

organic to the components of the joint force as well as support provided by United States 

Transportation Command. Organic transportation varies with force composition but 

typically will include trucks, helicopters, and possibly watercraft. 

(5) Support to CMO. Military transportation organizations can be invaluable 

in certain types of CMO. These units can be used to distribute food, water, and health 

services supplies; conduct health services evacuation; and move refugees to a safe 

environment. Additionally, some of these organizations have the technical expertise to 

assist in restoration of civilian transportation infrastructure. The versatility of military 

transportation assets (air, sea, and land) allows the JFC to select the mode of 

transportation most appropriate for the situation. JFCs should consider national 

transportation system infrastructure to include consulting with international agencies, 

such as the International Civil Aeronautics Organization. This will enable a smooth 

transition to civil stability operations and ensure a great source of revenue for the new 

national government. As some capabilities, such as international air traffic control, do 

not exist within military channels, detailed plans should address what civil agencies or 

contract organizations will eventually act as the interim service provider and transition 

agency from military to civil control. 

For further detail concerning Service transportation assets and capabilities, refer to 

Appendix A, ìService Capabilities.î 

h. Military Police or Security Forces 

(1) MP or security forces have the requisite training, experience, and equipment 

to perform CMO. Aside from having firepower, mobility, and communications necessary 

to conduct combat support operations, MP or security forces also have a wealth of 

experience in exercising authority in tense circumstances without escalating the tension. 

EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS IN CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS 

In the aftermath of Hurricane MITCH, the devastated nations of Central 

America requested helicopter support to distribute relief supplies as well as 

conduct search and rescue operations in areas that had been cut off by land 

slides, road washouts, and bridge damage. As USSOUTHCOM [US Southern 

Command] planners executed Operation FUERTES APOYO, a strictly civilmilitary operation; helicopter units were the first to deploy, and were followed 

by engineer and bridging units. The ability of helicopters to access remote 

areas was critical during the emergency phase of the operation, when the 

priority of effort was to save lives. Later, during rehabilitation and restoration 

phases, as roads were cleared and bridges repaired, helicopters redeployed 

as less expensive ground transportation could again be utilized. 

Source: United States Southern CommandóHurricane MITCH 1998 
Chapter II 

II-20 JP 3-57 

MP or security forces are the force of choice for CMO situations in which their signature 

as a police force, rather than a combat force, often defuses tension between the joint force 

and the parties in conflict. 

(2) MP or Security Forces Activities. MP or security forces activities include 

a wide range of specialized and routine operations in support of the joint force. Typical 

activities are shown in Figure II-4. 

(3) Policies. Commanders must have a clear understanding of the legal basis 

and limits pertaining to employment of MP or security forces and law enforcement 

activities in a foreign country. They must also provide appropriate direction to 

subordinate commanders. 

(4) Assets. The Services are organized with a variety of MP or security forces 

organizations providing the joint force with significant capabilities. 

(5) Support to CMO. MP or security forces force structure and training are 

well suited for CMO roles. MP or security forces can perform or assist in functions that 

include staffing checkpoints, liaison with police forces, traffic control, detainees and DC 

camps, and FP operations. 

(a) Commanders must exercise caution not to create an unintended 

impression on the civilian population that US forces, particularly MP or security forces, 

MILITARY POLICE OR SECURITY 

FORCES ACTIVITIES

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Convoy defense

Patrolling and manning checkpoints

Reaction force

Liaison to civilian police forces

Investigations of criminal activity

Handling, processing, safeguarding, and accounting for hostile 

individuals

Physical security and preservation of order

Dislocated civilian processing

Populace and resource control

Force protection

Figure II-4. Military Police or Security Forces Activities 
Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations 

II-21 

are exceeding their legal and moral limits in conducting police activities. Frequent 

consultation between the Ambassador, joint force staff judge advocate (SJA), provost 

marshal, CA representatives and appropriate OGAs, HN, FN, IGOs, and NGOs 

representatives can prevent misunderstandings and enhance cooperation in conducting 

MP or security forces activities. 

(b) Training and support of foreign police forces is tightly governed by 

statutory regulations. This includes restrictions on funding sources for support of training 

of foreign police forces. Commanders must ensure that they have a clear understanding 

of these restrictions when planning CMO that include training or reestablishing the police 

force of a FN. 

For further detail on Service MP or security forces capabilities, refer to Appendix A, 

ìService Capabilities.î 

4. Organizing for Civil-Military Operations 

There are numerous organizations that can assist in the CMO planning and execution 

and some of these will be subsequently addressed. The most logical first step is for the 

GCC to direct subordinate JFCs to establish a CMO staff element (e.g., staff directorate), 

if one has not been established early in the planning process. The CMO staff element 

may be found within an operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) or it may be organized 

under a separate staff element (usually the J-9) as designated by the JFC. By doing so, 

the CMO process will become more visible to, and better integrated with, the rest of the 

headquarters staff. This in turn, will better support the commander in planning and 

conducting offensive, defensive, and stability operations to meet the strategic military 

objectives. 

a. Civil-Military Operations Staff Directorate. CMO are a key component to 

winning and securing the peace. To accomplish this not only takes a dedicated military 

staff but a relationship with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, HNs, FNs, private sector, and IPI that 

brings these organizations into the realm of US military planning and information 

sharing. This synchronization of activities requires a staff directorate that possesses the 

know-how and experiences to deal on a day-to-day basis with a variety of organizations 

that have their own agendas and objectives. A CMO staff element can bridge the gap of 

the unique characteristics of these organizations enabling a common-shared 

understanding of the environment, collaboration, and deconfliction of policy, priorities 

for execution, and inclusion for cooperative planning. The CMO directorate coordinates 

with the above organizations to provide a conduit for information sharing, support 

requests, synchronize activities, compile relevant information of the civil environment, 

and perform analysis that supports the commanderís assessment. Other staff functions 

the CMO element can accomplish are the following: 

(1) Provide liaison as needed (to US country team, UN, USAID [Office of US 

Foreign Disaster Assistance {OFDA}], NGOs, IGOs, other JTFs). 
Chapter II 

II-22 JP 3-57 

(2) Provide staff oversight and direction to the CMOC if established by the 

JFC. 

(3) Provide representatives to the various headquarters centers, groups, bureaus, 

cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups (e.g., joint planning group), and planning 

teams support to the battle rhythm. 

(4) Ensure OGA, IGO, NGO, HN, FN, IPI, and private sector participation in 

the planning and operations process, as appropriate. It is important to remember that a 

good number of these organizations may be ìoutside the wireî further complicating 

unified action. CA personnel are the most likely to lead and compose a CMO element. 

For further details on joint staff directorates, see JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

b. Joint Task Force 

(1) In most scenarios, JTFs will conduct CMO. 

(2) The SecDef, a CCDR, a subunified commander, or an existing JTF 

commander may establish joint civil-military operations task forces (JCMOTFs), joint 

psychological operations task forces (JPOTFs), or joint special operations task forces 

(JSOTFs) when the scope of CMO in the joint operations area requires coordination and 

activities beyond that which other representation on the staff could accomplish. 

(3) Figure II-5 illustrates possible JTF organization. 

For further JTF guidance, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 

States and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

c. Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force. JFCs are responsible to conduct 

CMO but they may establish a JCMOTF when the scope of CMO requires coordination 

and activities beyond that which the organic CMO capability could accomplish.

(1) It is resourced to meet specific CMO requirements (e.g., stability 

operations). Figure II-6 highlights some of the typical JCMOTF responsibilities. 

 

(a) The composition of this organization should be representative of the 

forces comprising the JCMOTF. A JCMOTF may have both conventional and SOF 

assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. By design, the USA CA 

brigade, the maritime civil affairs group (MCAG), or the Marine Corps civil affairs group 

(CAG) organizational structure can provide the operational C2 system structure to form a 

JCMOTF. A notional JCMOTF staff organization is depicted in Figure II-7. 
Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations 

II-23 

(b) A JCMOTF is a US joint force organization, similar in organization to 

a JSOTF or JTF and is flexible in size and composition, depending on mission 

circumstances. It usually is subordinate to a JTF. 

(c) In rare instances, and depending on resources availability, a JCMOTF 

could be formed as a standing organization. 

(d) A JCMOTF can be formed in theater, in the United States (within the 

limits of the law), or in both locations, depending on scope, duration, or sensitivity of the 

CMO requirement and associated policy considerations.

POSSIBLE JOINT TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION

JOINT

TASK FORCE

ARMY 

COMPONENT

AIR FORCE

COMPONENT

NAVY

COMPONENT

MARINE 

CORPS

COMPONENT

JOINT FORCE 

SPECIAL

OPERATIONS

COMPONENT

JOINT FORCE 

MARITIME

COMPONENT

JOINT 

PSYCHOLOGICAL

OPERATIONS 

TASK

FORCE

JOINT FORCE 

LAND

COMPONENT

JOINT FORCE 

AIR

COMPONENT

JOINT

CIVIL-MILITARY

OPERATIONS 

TASK

FORCE

NOTES

1. A joint force always contains Service components (because of administrative and 

logistic support and training responsibilities).

2. A joint force composition can be a mixture of the above. (Navy and Marine Corps 

forces alone will not constitute a joint force).

3. There also may be a Coast Guard component in a joint force.

Figure II-5. Possible Joint Task Force Organization
Chapter II 

II-24 JP 3-57 

(2) Advantages of a JCMOTF 

 (a) Consolidated and coordinated CMO 

 

 (b) Unity of command 

 (c) Allows the JFC to centralize CMO and transition efforts under one 

headquarters 

(3) Disadvantages of a JCMOTF 

(a) Lack of synchronization between the joint force and JCMOTF 

commanders 

TYPICAL FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY A JOINT 

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

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Advising the commander, joint task force (CJTF) on policy, funding; 

multinational, foreign, or host-nation sensitivities; and their effect on 

theater strategy and/or campaign and operational missions.

Providing command and control or direction of military host-nation 

advisory, assessment, planning, and other assistance activities by joint 

US forces.

Assisting in establishing US or multinational and military-to-civil links for 

greater efficiency of cooperative assistance arrangements.

Performing essential coordination or liaison with host-nation agencies, 

country team, United Nations agencies, and deployed US multinational, 

and host-nation military forces and supporting logistic organizations.

Assisting in the planning and conduct of civil information programs to 

publicize positive results and objectives of military assistance projects, to 

build civil acceptance and support of US operations, and to promote 

indigenous capabilities contributing to recovery and economic-social 

development.

Planning and conducting joint and combined civil-military operations 

training exercises.

Advising and assisting in strengthening or stabilizing civil infrastructures 

and services and otherwise facilitating transition to peacekeeping or 

consolidation operations and associated hand-off to other government 

agencies, intergovernmental organizations, or host-nation responsibility.

Assessing or identifying host-nation civil support, relief, or funding 

requirements to the CJTF for transmission to supporting commanders, 

Military Services, or other responsible USG agencies.

Figure II-6. Typical Functions Performed by a Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force 
Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations 

II-25 

(b) Duplication of effort (if JTF is established to conduct CMO mission) 

(c) Increased force (personnel and logistic) requirements 

CMOC

CSEL

COMJCMOTF

DCJCMOTF

J-1

Civil-Military Operations Center

Command Senior Enlisted Leader

Commander , Joint Civil-Military 

Operations Task Force

Deputy Commander , Joint CivilMilitary Operations Task Force

Manpower and Personnel 

Directorate of a Joint Staff

Coordination

*CMOC is shown for illustrative purposes. The joint force commander determines the staff 

relationship

J-2

J-3

J-4

J-5

J-6

JCMOTF

Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff

Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff

Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff

Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff

Command, Control, Communications, 

and Computer Systems Directorate of 

a Joint Staff

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task 

Force

LEGEND

Nonmilitary

Agencies

Personal Staff Possible JCMOTF Units

J-1

J-2

J-3

J-4

J-5

J-6

Communications

Military Police/

Security Forces

Engineer

Medical

Aviation

Military Intelligence

Transportation

Services and Supply

Maintenance

Chief of Staff

DCJCMOTF

COMJCMOTF

CSEL

CMOC*

Surgeon

Chaplain

Inspector General

Staff Judge

Advocate

Comptroller

Provost Marshal

Public Affairs

Special Operations

Forces

NOTIONAL JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY

OPERATIONS TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION

Figure II-7. Notional Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force Organization 
Chapter II 

II-26 JP 3-57 

d. Joint Special Operations Task Force. Establishment of a JSOTF is 

appropriate when SOF C2 requirements exceed the capabilities of the theater special 

operations command (TSOC) staff. The core of the JSOTF staff normally is drawn from 

the TSOC or an existing SOF component with augmentation from other Service SOF. A 

JSOTF may be specifically established as a joint organization and deployed as an entity 

from outside the theater. The JSOTF commander will control assigned SOF as well as 

any conventional forces provided by the JFC in support of specific missions. 

For further details on JSOTFs, refer to JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force 

Operations. 

e. Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC). The HOC is a senior level 

international and interagency coordinating body that seeks to achieve unity of effort 

among all participants in a large FHA operation. HOCs are horizontally structured 

organizations with no C2 authority, and all members are ultimately responsible to their 

own organizations or countries. The HOC normally is established under the direction of 

the government of the affected country or the UN, or possibly OFDA during a US 

unilateral operation. Because the HOC operates at the national level, it should consist of 

senior representatives from the affected country, the US embassy or consulate, joint 

force, OFDA, NGOs, IGOs, and other major organizations in the operation. 

f. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC). In an FHA 

operation, the combatant commandís crisis action organization may organize as a HACC 

to assist with the interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination and planning. Normally, the 

HACC is a temporary body that operates during the early planning and coordination 

stages of the operation. Once a CMOC or HOC has been established, the role of the 

HACC diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through the normal organization of 

the combatant commandís staff and crisis action organization. 

g. Civil-Military Operations Center

(1) The CMOC, normally based upon the organic CMOC of the supporting CA 

unit, is a mechanism for the coordination CMO that can serve as the primary coordination 

interface provides operational and tactical level coordination between the JFC and other 

stakeholders. Members of a CMOC may include representatives of US military forces, 

OGAs, IPI, IGOs, the private sector, and NGOs. 

(2) Despite its name, the CMOC generally does not set policy or direct 

operations. Conceptually, the CMOC is the meeting place of stakeholders. In reality, the 

CMOC may be physical or virtual and conducted collaboratively through online 

networks. The organization of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent ó flexible 

in size and composition. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC. In fact, 

more than one CMOC may be established in an operational area, and each is taskorganized based on the mission. 
Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations 

II-27 

(3) A CMOC is formed to: 

(a) Carry out guidance and JFC decisions regarding CMO; 

(b) Exchange information. Sharing information is a key function of the 

CMOC, but military staff must be careful to avoid the impression that stakeholder 

organizations are being used for intelligence gathering; 

(c) Perform liaison and coordination between military capabilities and 

other agencies, departments, and organizations to meet the needs of the populace; 

(d) Provide a partnership forum for military and other participating 

organizations. It is important to remember that these organizations may decide to attend 

CMOC meetings but may choose not to consider themselves members of the CMOC to 

maintain the perception of their neutrality. Many of these organizations consider the 

CMOC as a venue for stakeholder discussions but not as a stakeholder forum; and 

(e) Receive, validate, and coordinate requests for support from NGOs, 

IGOs, IPI, the private sector, and regional organizations. The CMOC then forwards these 

requests to the joint force for action. 

(4) A CMOC can be tailored to the specific tasks associated with the mission. 

In establishing the CMOC, the JFC should build it from a nucleus of organic assets and 

CA personnel, logistic, legal, and communications elements. USA CA units have been 

reorganized to provide the JFC the manpower and equipment, to include a robust 

communications package, as the standing capability to form the nucleus of the CMOC. 

The JFC should invite representatives of other agencies that include the following: 

(a) Liaisons from Service and functional components and supporting 

infrastructure, such as ports and airfields; 

ìPossibly the most practical mechanism for ensuring coherence and 

cooperation is the CMOC [the civil-military operations center] . . . the civilmilitary operations center attached to a Joint Task Force, where operational 

contact in the field between military and humanitarian participants in complex 

emergencies can take place. As many of you know, there is no ëone size fits 

allí for the CMOC. The way a commander makes use of it depends on the 

situation. Commanders have used the CMOC to reach out to host-country 

nationals in a locality as well as to NGO [nongovernmental organizations] 

and international organizations, to offer a forum for airing problems as well 

as a vehicle for shaping expectations realistically regarding what forces in 

the field can and cannot do. The flexible, situation-specific CMOC may well 

be the instrument of choice for broad international and other coordination in 

the field.î 

Under Secretary of State 

Thomas R. Pickering 

Exercise EMERALD EXPRESS 1998 
Chapter II 

II-28 JP 3-57 

(b) USAID or OFDA representatives; 

(c) DOS, country team, and other USG representatives; 

(d) Military liaison personnel from participating countries; 

(e) Host country or local government agency representatives; and 

(f) Representatives of NGOs, IGOs, IPI, the private sector (as appropriate), 

and regional organizations. 

 (5) The composition of a notional CMOC is illustrated in Figure II-8. It is not 

the intent of this figure to emphasize the CMOC as the center of coordination for all 

activities but rather to illustrate organizations that a JFC may cooperate with and hold 

discussions with concerning an ongoing operation. 

(6) Political representatives in the CMOC may provide avenues to satisfy 

operational considerations and concerns, resulting in consistency of military and political 

actions. Additionally, the CMOC forum appeals to NGOs and IGOs because it avoids 

guesswork by providing these organizations a single-point of coordination with the 

military for their needs, ensuring that the unified efforts of a joint force and the relief 

community are focused when and where they are most needed. Although US forces may 

be latecomers compared to many relief agencies and IGOs, they bring considerable 

resources with them. 

(a) It is incumbent on the military not to dictate what will happen but to 

coordinate a team approach to problem resolution. 

(b) A JFC cannot direct interagency cooperation among engaged agencies. 

However, working together at the CMOC on issues like security, logistic support, 

information sharing, communications, and other items, can build a cooperative spirit 

among all participants. 

(7) The CMOC usually conducts daily meetings to identify participants capable 

of fulfilling needs. Validated requests go to the appropriate joint force or agency 

representative for action. Figure II-9 depicts some of the CMOC functions. 

(8) A joint force PA officer (PAO) or PA representative should attend recurring 

CMOC meetings. As an active member of the CMOC, the PAO or PA representative 

works with other CMOC communication specialists (as available) to develop 

comprehensive communication strategies that support CMO activities. 
Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations 

II-29 

(9) The CMOC OIC typically reports to the CMO officer on the J-3 staff. The 

OIC also might be assigned to the J-3, the chief of staff (COS), or the commander of the 

JCMOTF, if established. During certain operations, such as the conduct of FHA, the JFC 

might assign a deputy commander or the COS as the director of the CMOC, perhaps with 

another officer assigned to provide detailed supervision of its operation. The CMOC 

officer requires access to the JFC based on the situation and mission. 

See Figure II-10 for a comparison between a HOC, HACC, and CMOC. 

CARE

CMOC

DART

DOS

IGOs

NGOs

OGAs

OFDA

UNICEF

USDA

USG

Cooperative for Assistance and Relief 

Everywhere

Civil-Military Operations Center

Disaster Assistance Response Team

Department of State

Intergovernmental Organizations

LEGEND

Nongovernmental Organizations

Other Government Agencies

Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance

United Nations Childrens Fund

United States Department of Agriculture

United States Government

NOTIONAL COMPOSITION OF A

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

UNICEF

United Nations

CARE

United Nations

World Food

Programme

Doctors of 

the World

Save the

Children

United Nations High 

Commissioner

for Refugees

International

Rescue

Committee

Other Relief &

Benefit

Organizations CIA, 

OFDA/DART

USDA, DOS

Civil Affairs 

Team, LNOs

CMOC

MILITARY

NGOs

OGAs PRT

IGOs

Figure II-8. Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center 
Chapter II 

II-30 JP 3-57 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan 

By early 2006, 22 provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) were operating in 

Afghanistan, 13 managed by the US-led Combined Forces Command, Afghanistan 

and 9 by the International Security and Assistance Force. Initial guidance on the 

structure and functions of US-led PRTs was agreed to by senior civilian and military 

leadership in Afghanistan and approved by the US Deputies Committee in June 

2003. US PRTs comprised 50ñ100 personnel. A small number were US civilians, 

generally a Department of State representative, a United States Agency for 

International Development (USAID) representative, and a representative from United 

States Department of Agriculture. There was usually an Afghan representative from 

the Ministry of Interior. Not all PRTs had a full civilian complement. On the military 

side, there was a PRT commander, two civil affairs teams (with four members 

each), operational and administrative staff, and force protection elements. 

Each PRT was expected to address the most important issues in its area of 

responsibility, and many did so with remarkable creativity and success. In Gardez, 

for example, the USAID representative supported the work of the Tribal Liaison 

Office, an Afghan nongovernmental organization (NGO) dedicated to enabling 

dialogue between powerful tribes in unstable areas and the new central 

government. Building on this work, the Gardez PRT and the United Nations 

Assistance Mission in Afghanistan sponsored a provincial reconstruction 

workshop that brought together 100 tribal elders, local government officials, and 

representatives from Kabul to discuss national reconstruction plans. Similarly, in 

Jalalabad, the PRT commander held regular meetings with religious leaders, 

university students, and tribal elders. After riots in May 2005 over alleged US 

disrespect for the Koran, these meetings served as a forum to discuss local 

concerns. To demonstrate that the United States was not opposed to Islam, the 

PRT commander helped refurbish the cityís main mosque. 

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Providing nonmilitary agencies with a focal point for activities and 

matters that are civilian related

Assisting in the transfer of humanitarian responsibility to nonmilitary 

agencies

Receiving, validating, coordinating, and monitoring requests from 

humanitarian organizations for routine and emergency military support

Coordinating requests to nonmilitary agencies for their support

Convening ad hoc mission planning groups to address complex military 

missions that support nonmilitary requirements, such as convoy escort, 

and management and security of refugee camps and feeding centers

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Coordinating relief efforts with US or multinational commands, United 

Nations, host nation, and other nonmilitary agencies

Facilitating and coordinating activities of the joint force, other on-scene 

agencies, and higher echelons in the military chain of command

Coordinating the response to requests for military support with Service 

components

Coordinating with Disaster Assistance Response Team deployed by 

USAID/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance

Convening follow-on assessment groups

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS 

CENTER FUNCTIONS

Figure II-9. Civil-Military Operations Center Functions 
Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations 

II-31 

 h. Provincial Reconstruction Team. A PRT helps stabilize the operational 

environment in a province or locality through its combined diplomatic, informational, military, 

and economic capabilities. It combines representatives from interagency and international 

partners into a cohesive unit capable of independently conducting operations to stabilize the 

environment by enhancing the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the HN government. Focus 

on combined military and civil efforts to diminish the means and motivations of conflict, while 

developing local institutions so they can take the lead role in national governance, providing 

basic services, economic development, and enforcing the rule of law. 

(1) PRTs are tools for achieving objectives to stabilize and enable civil authority 

phases of the joint operation. Interagency planning, organization, and training of a PRT should 

take place during the initial planning and execution stages of an operation. As progress is made 

in stabilizing the area, the PRT will transition to civil authorities. 

 

(2) The focus of the PRT is on the provincial government and local infrastructure. 

Normally, PRTs are assigned by province, but may be assigned to local governments within a 

province or to more than one province. 

Implementing the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 

During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM (OIF), coalition forces established PRTs throughout Afghanistan 

and Iraq. Although PRTs were used in both operations to help stabilize the 

operational environment following major combat operations, the structure, 

oversight, and implementation differed in several significant ways. 

OEF PRTs 

All US-led PRTs commanded by military officer. PRTs generally maintain their 

own forward operating bases with their own force protection and support 

services. More focus on helping local governments rebuild infrastructure to 

meet basic needs. 

Each PRT has a different structure that meets the needs of the individual area 

of operations and those of the coalition country providing the manning and 

funding for the PRT. 

OIF PRTs 

PRTs led by senior Foreign Service officer. 

PRTs generally collocated with combat forces on an established base where 

support services are provided. Less focus on rebuilding infrastructure, more 

focus on coaching and mentoring government officials to build and grow the 

economies of their provinces. PRTs generally share a modular organizational 

structure. 

Source: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq: 

 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

Center for Army Lessons Learned 

January 2007 
Chapter II 

II-32 JP 3-57 

(3) PRT functions may include: 

(a) Increase provincial stability through international military presence 

and assist in developing nascent HN security and rule of law capacity. 

(b) Assist the establishment and improvement of local government by 

advising and empowering stakeholders and legitimate government bodies. 

CMOC

HACC

HOC

US

LEGEND

COMPARISON BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS 

CENTER, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COORDINATION 

CENTER, AND CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

Civil-Military Operations Center

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center

Humanitarian Operations Center

United States

Designated 

Individual of 

Affected Country, 

United Nations, 

or US 

Government 

Agency

Combatant

Commander

Joint Task Force 

or Component 

Commander

Coordinates Overall 

Relief Strategy at the 

National (Country) 

Level

Assists with 

Interagency 

Coordination and 

Planning at the 

Strategic Level. 

Normally is 

disestablished once a 

HOC or CMOC is 

established

Assists in Coordination 

of Activities at the 

Operational Level with 

Military Forces, US 

Government Agencies, 

Nongovernmental and 

Intergovernmental 

Organizations, and 

Regional Organizations

Representatives from:

 

Affected Country

 United nations

 US Embassy or Consulate

 Joint Task Force

 Other Nonmilitary Agencies

 Concerned Parties (Private 

Sector)

Representatives from:

 Combatant Command

 Nongovernmental Organizations

 Intergovernmental Organizations

 Regional Organizations

 Concerned Parties (Private 

Sector)

Representatives from:

Joint Task Force

Nongovernmental Organizations

Intergovernmental Organizations

Regional Organizations

US Government Agencies

Local Government (Host Country)

Multinational Forces

Other Concerned Parties (Private

Sector)

Coordination

Coordination

Coordination

ESTABLISHING 

AUTHORITY FUNCTION COMPOSITION AUTHORITY

HOC

HACC

CMOC

Figure II-10. Comparison Between Humanitarian Operations Center, Humanitarian 

Assistance Coordination Center, and Civil-Military Operations Center
Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations 

II-33 

(c) Coordinate with DOS for reconstruction at a pace that would begin to 

provide basic services, an economic system that provides necessary support to the people, 

gain buy-in for change and support of representative government, and ensure the popular 

expectations for international assistance are met or abated. 

(4) Military participation within the PRT will vary depending on the 

operational requirements, but should include CA representation as well as other forces for 

CMO, and security and staff forces as required. Interagency memoranda of agreement 

will be required in the establishment of PRTs to define roles, responsibilities, command 

relationships, and funding lines. When possible, PRT members should receive their 

training as a unit to facilitate unity of effort upon arrival in country. 

 i. NATO Civil-Military Cooperation. Allied doctrine uses the construct of 

CIMIC to describe CMO. CIMIC staff elements for the NATO commander provide 

essentially the same functions as CMO staff elements for the JFC. Similar to a CMOC, 

CIMIC centers may be established at the operational and tactical levels solely for the 

purpose of communication and coordination of effort. 

For further details concerning CIMIC, refer to AJP (Allied Joint Publication) ñ 9, NATO 

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine. 

j. United Nations Operations 

(1) UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord). The 

UN concept for employment of military forces in support of its operations is defined in 

the UN CMCoord Handbook as: ìThe essential dialogue and interaction between civilian 

and military actors in humanitarian emergencies necessary to protect and promote 

humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when 

appropriate pursue common goals.î The key elements of UN CMCoord are information 

sharing, task division, and planning. Basic strategies range from coexistence to 

cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common 

training. The humanitarian and military actors have fundamentally different institutional 

thinking and cultures, characterized by the distinct chain-of-command and clear 

organizational structures of the military vis-‡-vis the diversity of the humanitarian 

community. Civil-military coordination is a shared responsibility of the humanitarian 

and military actors. 

ìThe interaction between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both 

governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the success 

of operations. Civil-military cooperation is interdependent: military means are 

increasingly requested to assist civil authorities; at the same time civil support to 

military operations is important for logistics, communications, medical support, and 

public affairs. Cooperation between the Allianceís military and civil bodies will 

accordingly remain essential.î 

NATO Strategic Concept 1999
Chapter II 

II-34 JP 3-57 

(2) Coordination with the UN begins at the national level with the DOS through 

the US Representative to the UN. The US Representative to the UN may be an invited 

member of the NSC and participates in the formulation of policy matters relevant to the 

UN and its activities. An assistant from one of the Services coordinates appropriate 

military interest primarily with the UNís Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 

Affairs (UNOCHA) and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). 

(3) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, The United Nations Participation Act 

of 1945, and Executive Order 10206, Support of Peaceful Settlements of Disputes, 

authorize various types of US military support to the UN, either on a reimbursable or 

nonreimbursable basis. 

(4) US military operations in support of the UN usually fall within Chapter VI, 

ìPacific Settlement of Disputes,î or Chapter VII, ìAction with Respect to Threats to the 

Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,î of the UN Charter. 

(5) The UN normally will conduct PO or FHA under the provisions of a 

resolution or mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly. Politicians 

and diplomats trying to reach compromise develop mandates. Because of this, military 

commanders often have found it difficult to translate these mandates into workable 

mission orders. Commanders can use the interagency process and the USG strategic plan 

for reconstruction, stabilization, or conflict transformation (if developed) to feed back 

their concerns through the political apparatus of the UN. Though not always successful, 

clarity of mission should always be sought from the ambassador or UN resident 

coordinator, as appropriate. 

(6) The UN headquarters coordinates PO and FHA around the world. The UN 

organizational structure consists of the headquarters and the operational field elements. 

Thus, there is a combined strategic/operational level and separate tactical-level equivalent 

to the Armed Forces of the United States. 

(7) At the headquarters, the Secretariat plans and directs missions. Either the 

UNDPKO or the UNOCHA serves as the headquarters component during emergencies. 

Additional support by temporary augmentation from the Joint Staff and Service 

headquarters staffs may be provided for specific requirements. UN special missions, 

such as the UN Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, operate under the direction of 

the UN Secretary General (SYG). 

(8) Field-level organization often is based on the resident coordinator system 

administered by the UN Development Program in conjunction with the UNOCHA. The 

resident coordinator mobilizes and manages the local UN humanitarian resources and 

provides direction for the field relief effort. 

 

(9) In serious emergencies, the UN SYG may appoint a special representative 

who reports to the SYG directly, as well as advises UNDPKO and UNOCHA at UN 
Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations 

II-35 

headquarters. The special representative may direct day-to-day operations, as was the 

case in the UN operation in Cambodia. 

(10) The JFC deploying to a contingency site may discover the need for a direct 

channel to either the resident coordinator, the special representative of the SYG, or both. 

The arrangements between the joint force and UN forces should be set forth in the 

deployment order. 

(11) UN-sponsored operations normally employ a force under a single 

commander. The force commander is appointed by the SYG with the consent of the UN 

Security Council and reports directly to the SYGís special representative or to the SYG. 

In any multinational operation, the US commander will retain command authority over 

all assigned US forces. The US chain of command will flow from the SecDef through 

the GCC. On a case-by-case basis, the President will consider placing appropriate US 

forces under the operational control (OPCON) of a competent UN commander for 

specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council. 

k. Other Organizational Humanitarian Structures. In an affected country or 

joint operational area there may be other humanitarian relief organizations with similar 

goals and objectives as the HOC, HACC, CMOC, CIMIC center, or others. These 

organizations may be referred to by a variety of names or acronyms and are usually 

established early on and are temporary in nature. No matter the organizational name, the 

key is providing the link between all relief organizations for the betterment of the 

affected region(s). Once a HOC, HACC, CMOC, or CIMIC center has been established 

by the lead relief agency, the coordination role of others diminishes, and functions are 

accomplished through the normal organization of the JFCís staff. Effective coordination 

is the key to success, remembering all are ultimately responsible to their own 

organizations or countries and may have an agenda that does not support the US position, 

goals, or end state. 

ìUnique to this mission was the fact that an American commander was dualhatted as Commander of both UN Forces and US Forces. . . . Note that 

while US Forces were under operational control of UNMIH [United Nations 

Mission in Haiti], national command of these forces was never relinquished 

as was the case for all other nations contributing forces to UNMIH. This 

relationship was satisfactory since the goals and objectives of the US and 

the UN remained the same throughout the mission. To allay concerns of the 

troop-contributing nations with respect to these command relationships, the 

FC [force commander] and the Special Representative of the Secretary 

General (SRSG) visited UN Headquarters to inform national representatives 

of the operational concept and the Commanderís Intent for the operation. 

This joint appearance by the top leaders of the mission served to reassure 

contributing nations about the employment of their forces in the mission.î 

United Nations Mission In Haiti In The Service Of Peace 
Chapter II 

II-36 JP 3-57 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER III 

PLANNING 

III-1 

1. General 

a. It is important that CMO considerations be incorporated into the contingency 

and crisis action planning processes. It is the responsibility of a GCC and their 

subordinate JFCs to plan and conduct CMO. CMO contribute to shaping the 

operational environment and supporting the GCCís SCP. In all situations, CMO planning 

enhances the transition to civilian control from the outset of an operation. As the resident 

staff experts, CMO planners must ensure their input to the planning process supports the 

JFCís objectives. 

b. Planning. The CMO staff element (usually the J-9) coordinates with numerous 

organizations and provides a conduit for information sharing, and support requests. The 

CMO staff also synchronizes activities, compiles relevant information on the civil 

environment, and performs analysis that supports the commanderís assessment. 

c. Deployment, Employment, Sustainment, and Redeployment Planning. A 

clear concept of CMO mission requirements enhances selection of forces to perform 

CMO. JOPES integrates all elements of contingency or crisis action CMO planning, and 

identifies, resources, and phases CMO required forces. The combination of JOPES and 

the joint operation planning process (JOPP) promotes coherent planning across all levels 

of war and command echelons, whether the requirement is for a limited, single-phase 

operation such as noncombatant evacuation or for a multiphase campaign involving highintensity combat operations. JOPP is a less formal but proven analytical process. It 

provides a methodical approach to planning at any organizational level and at any point 

before and during joint operations. The focus of JOPP is on the interaction between an 

organizationís commander, staff, the commanders and staffs of the next higher and lower 

commands, and supporting commanders and their staffs to develop plans or orders for a 

specific mission. Figure III-1 depicts general planning considerations. 

For further detail concerning planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, JP 3-

33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, and JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment 

Operations. 

d. War. It may be prudent to overestimate the requirement for HA in planning 

assumptions. Certain areas may be devastated and lack self-sufficiency in facilities, 

services, and personnel as a result of hostilities. US and MNFs may be required to 

distribute emergency food/water, clothing, shelter, and health services supplies to 

civilians. At the same time, identification of CMO requirements derived from analysis of 

ìPlanning for the employment of military forces is an inherent responsibility 

of command. It is performed at every echelon of command and across the 

range of military operations. Joint planning integrates military actions with 

those of other instruments of national power and our multinational partners in 

time, space, and purpose to achieve a specified end state.î 

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-57 

both current operational and conflict termination or consolidation missions may entail 

any combination of the planning considerations identified above for contingencies or 

crisis-response operations. 

e. Conflict Termination or Consolidation Considerations. Planning 

considerations concerning use of forces conducting CMO include, but are not limited to, 

the following: 

(1) The post conflict mission objectives; 

(2) The need for and roles of integrated military-civilian organizational and 

oversight elements or agencies; 

(3) The extent of devastation and the potential of the affected country to regain 

its place in the family of nations; 

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

GENERAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

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Administrative, logistic, and communications support requirements of 

civil-military operations (CMO) forces

The need for early deployment and employment of CMO forces

The coordination between CMO requirements and plans and 

strategies

The coordination of CMO requirements with other appropriate staff 

functions, the interagency, intergovernmental organizations, 

nongovernmental organizations, host nation, and private sector

Additional lead time normally necessary for Reserve Component 

forces availability

The early identification of CMO resources and task organization to 

support the plan and maximize use of external organizations

Thorough inclusion and coverage of CMO in each phase of the plan 

requires proactive CMO staff work

The need to work closely with the intelligence directorate of a joint 

staff to both provide and obtain civil environment intelligence used in 

planning

CMO input to the targeting process will help reduce destruction of 

essential civilian capabilities needed in Phases IV (Stabilize) and V 

(Enable Civil Authorities)

The tactical, operational, and strategic objectives acheivable via CMO

Figure III-1. Civil-Military Operations General Planning Considerations 
Planning 

III-3 

(4) The complexity and duration of stability and reconstitution assistance 

efforts often require counteracting local violence and mobilizing IPI resources toward 

self-sufficiency; 

(5) The availability of indigenous leaders and civil servants; 

(6) The desires and objectives of other governments; 

(7) The degree of US domestic political support to involve US military forces 

in NA activities, regardless of identified needs; 

 

(8) The use of the US military in supporting reconstitution of failed states. 

f. Joint Lessons Learned Program. Commanders and their staffs should review 

CMO lessons learned from previous operations and exercises. In turn, upon completion 

of operations, it is the responsibility of the command to ensure lessons learned are 

recorded for future use. 

2. Strategic and Operational Planning Considerations 

 Some operational and environmental factors that may complicate the US militaryís 

relationships with foreign civilians and constrain the conduct of CMO include, but are not 

limited to, the following: 

a. Differing legal institutions, customs, social relationships, economic 

organizations, and concepts of human and fundamental rights; 

b. Public communications media controlled, censored, or considered inconsistent 

with US standards; 

c. Universal public education considered undesirable for economic or cultural 

reasons such as poverty, religion, race, or caste; 

d. Ownership of land or other forms of wealth-producing property; 

e. Religious, cultural, and legal practices; 

f. Lack of adequate education or resistance by affected groups that result in poor 

health and sanitation or inefficient agricultural or industrial practices; 

g. Effects of labor, procurement, or contracting commodities upon the population, 

economy, and governmental services; 

 

h. Dislocation of civilian populations and damage to facilities and infrastructure 

requiring military assistance, especially in areas of public health, DC care and control, 

civilian supply, public safety, transportation, and humanitarian relief; 
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 3-57 

i. Humanitarian motives prompting US personnel to furnish relief or assistance 

that may conflict with local law, religion, or cultural standards; 

j. Availability of US and HN civil communications resources to support CMO 

when competed for by information news agencies; 

k. Media coverage and perspective shapes local, HN, FN, and international opinion 

and support for CMO; 

l. International law, customs and practice governing the sovereign territory of each 

nation. 

3. Other Functional Planning Considerations 

a. Implementation of a comprehensive strategic communication process is critical 

to CMO success. This process engages all aspects of a GCCís responsibilities to include 

IO, PA, CMO, PSYOP, the country team, and the various organizations and partner 

countries that are involved in the given operation. Subordinate JFCs employ a strategic 

communication plan to ensure early and continuous coordination so their messages are 

not contradictory and damaging to the credibility of the joint force or compromise the 

essential elements of friendly information. 

b. Information Operations 

(1) There are three military functions (PA, CMO, and defense support to public 

diplomacy) specified as related capabilities for IO. These capabilities make significant 

contributions to IO and must always be coordinated and synchronized with the core and 

supporting IO capabilities. For this reason, the PA and CMO staffs must work in close 

coordination with the IO planning staff. 

(2) The CMO staff also has an important role to play in the development of 

broader IO plans and objectives. As the accessibility of information to the widest public 

audiences increases and as military operations increasingly are conducted in open 

environments, the importance of CMO to the achievement of IO objectives will increase. 

At the same time the direct involvement of CMO with core, supporting and related IO 

capabilities (for instance PSYOP, computer network operations, and counterintelligence) 

will also increase. CMO, by their nature, usually affect public perceptions in their 

immediate locale. Distribution of information about CMO efforts and results through PA 

and PSYOP can affect the perceptions of a broader audience and favorably influence key 

groups or individuals.

(3) CMO support IO by: 

(a) Multiplying the effects of CMO at strategic, operational, and tactical 

levels by incorporating CMO activities in the strategic communication plan; 

 
Planning 

III-5 

(b) Identifying key CMO targets, coordinating with targeting cell;

(c) Synchronizing communications media, assets, and messages with IO 

capabilities; and 

(d) Providing news and information to the local people. 

(4) IO support CMO by: 

(a) ìKey leader engagementî By establishing and maintaining liaison or 

dialogue with key IPI, NGOs, and IGOs, CMO can secure the most expedient and 

credible means of disseminating information and influencing behavior; 

(b) Assistance in creating and assessing messages and target audience; 

 

(c) Influencing and informing populace of CMO activities and support; 

(d) Neutralizing misinformation and hostile propaganda directed against 

civil authorities; 

 

(e) Gaining and maintaining information superiority; 

(f) Promoting civilian legitimacy for IPI; and 

(g) Controlling electromagnetic spectrum for legitimate purposes. 

(5) IO Cell. JFCs normally assign responsibility for IO to the J-3. When 

authorized, the director of the J-3 has primary staff responsibility for planning, 

coordinating, integrating, and assessing joint force IO. The J-3 normally designates an 

IO cell chief to assist in executing joint IO responsibilities. The organizational 

relationships between the joint IO cell and the organizations that support the IO cell are 

per JFC guidance. Nevertheless, the IO cell should have CMO or CA representation. 

JFCs employ the IO cell to ensure early and continuous coordination among PA, CA, 

PSYOP, and operations security (OPSEC) so their messages are not contradictory, 

damaging to the credibility of the JFC, or compromising the essential elements of 

friendly information. 

For more details concerning IO, refer to JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

c. Public Affairs

(1) Media coverage of CMO impacts perceptions of success or failure and may 

influence the commanderís decisions. 

(2) The mission of joint PA is to plan, coordinate, and synchronize US military 

public information activities and resources to support the commanderís operational and 
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-57 

strategic objectives through the communication of truthful, timely, and factual 

unclassified information about joint military activities within the operational area to 

foreign, domestic, and internal audiences. 

(3) The synchronized and coordinated use of PA with other military (e.g., 

MNFs) and nonmilitary (e.g., DOS) communication capabilities can shape the 

operational environment, prevent misinformation/disinformation from inciting protest or 

hostilities and aid in establishing or maintaining political and public support necessary for 

achieving the commanders objectives relative to CMO. 

(a) Coordination is required to ensure that the information released by one 

staff element does not conflict with or complicate the work of the other. PA, CMO, and 

PSYOP messages may be different, but they must not contradict one another or the 

credibility of all three will be lost. 

(b) PA tasks in support of CMO might include the following: 

1. Coordinate releases to the media with all appropriate agencies to 

ensure consistency and accuracy of information to the local population. 

2. Develop and disseminate media releases about CMO efforts to 

local, national, and international media, as well as to command information outlets. 

3. Assist media in covering known CMO or CAO. It may not always 

be in the United Statesí best interest to take credit for all activities. Highlighting the 

participation of the affected nation or civilian group or organization may lead to a quicker 

and sounder solution to the situation. 

4. In cooperation with CA, ensure the publication and broadcasting of 

information to protect DCs. 

5. PA can support CMO objectives by communicating clearly-stated 

US objectives and US intent to transition operations to HN agencies or NGOs (in the case 

of HA/disaster assistance operations) as soon as conditions permit. By highlighting US 

intention to provide assistance until the HN government or NGOs can lead operations, 

PA supports the exit strategy. This is particularly key for HA/disaster assistance 

operations. 

6. The JFC and PAO are the only official spokespersons. 

For further details concerning PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs. 

d. Legal

(1) Many aspects of CMO require scrutiny by legal experts. Key members of 

both the planning and operations staffs and legal advisors should review and assist in 
Planning 

III-7 

preparing plans or orders, as well as any agreements or memoranda of understanding 

established between US forces and the affected country or nonmilitary organizations 

inherent in CMO. Legal personnel must know the legal status of relief workers from the 

numerous agencies involved, DC, and refugees. CMO involve a myriad of statutory, 

regulatory, and policy considerations, both foreign and domestic, in addition to the 

normal constraints associated with deployments and operations. Many CMO staffs will 

have a CA legal team embedded for planning and legal analysis. The SJA is another 

important source of legal expertise whether or not a CA legal team is available. 

(2) In the planning phase, CA legal teams or SJAs provide advice and 

assistance in the preparation and review of CMO plans for consistency with US law, 

SecDef guidance, and the rules and principles of international law, including treaties, 

other international agreements, and the laws of the place where US military forces will 

conduct operations. Also during the planning phase, the CMO staff element will provide 

planning input into the development of ROE and RUF; CMO missions may warrant 

supplemental ROE due to unique mission parameters/requirements. 

(3) CA legal teams and SJAs review the legal section of area studies and 

assessments and of plans and orders compiled before deployment or hostilities. CA legal 

teams and SJAs also provide predeployment training to personnel and units preparing to 

conduct CMO. This training should include: 

(a) LOAC; 

(b) Human Rights Violations and Reporting Requirements. Personnel 

should be trained in the law of war to recognize and report violations to their chain of 

command; 

(c) ROE or RUF; 

(d) Status of Forces. The status of forces is an important concern for CMO 

planners. Numerous legal issues affecting the success of the operation must be resolved. 

Some of these include HN criminal and civil jurisdiction, authority to conduct law 

enforcement activities including trials by courts-martial, claims against the US or US 

personnel, authority for US forces to carry arms and use force, FP, entry and exit 

requirements, customs and tax liability, contracting authority, authority to provide health 

care without a local medical license, vehicle registration and licensing, communications 

support, facilities for US forces, contractor status (local, US or other nationals), authority 

to detain or arrest, and provisions for transferring custody. The SJA provides legal 

advice concerning status of forces issues, to include the provisions of current agreements, 

the need for additional agreements, and the procedures for obtaining agreements. 

(e) Environmental law issues. 

(4) During combat operations, CA legal teams address legal issues concerning 

population control measures; targeting to minimize collateral damage or injury to the 
Chapter III 

III-8 JP 3-57 

civilian population; treatment of DC, civilian internees, and detainees; acquisition control 

of private and public property for military purposes; legal concerns for PSYOP and IO; 

and other operational law matters as necessary. 

(5) During the stabilization phase, CA legal teams may provide legal services 

concerning such matters as claims submitted by local civilians and FHA issues. 

(6) Additionally, the joint staff SJA and the CA SJA will be called upon to give 

advice and assistance on matters relating to civil administration within a friendly or 

enemy country. SJAs also may provide counsel regarding the creation and supervision of 

military tribunals and other activities for the proper administration of civil law and order. 

In addition, legal services may be necessary with respect to the issue of a local courtís 

jurisdiction over US military personnel and activities. Figure III-2 highlights some of the 

legal issues that may influence joint force operations. 

For more details concerning legal matters, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military 

Operations. 

e. Mortuary Affairs

(1) The death of civilians and noncombatants presents a unique set of 

circumstances that requires specific political and cultural sensitivities. While not 

responsible for mortuary affairs, CA with their expertise in cultural awareness and 

contact with civil organizations can help the JFC avoid these complications. 

(2) CA could act as intermediaries between the affected organization and the 

families to ensure the command honors cultural traditions and complies with local 

national regulations. 

(3) CA can assist local agencies interface with military assets providing support 

to remove the remains. This can include handling customs, location of storage facilities, 

burial sites, transportation options, and providing linguists. 

 

(4) CA advise the command on cultural traditions impacting the handling and 

removing of remains. 

For further guidance on mortuary affairs, refer to JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint 

Operations.
Planning 

III-9 

f. Intelligence. The intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) must establish a 

wide ranging and interconnected intelligence function in support of CMO. In planning 

for CMO, the J-2 must conduct a thorough analysis of the operational environment using 

the JIPOE process. Through the JIPOE process, the J-2 is able to advise the JFC on the 

effects the operational environment, physical and cultural, will have on mission 

LEGAL ISSUES

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Joint Military Justice

Claims

Legal Assistance

Environmental Law

Fiscal Law/Contracts

International Law

Operations Law Issues

Rules of Engagement (ROE)/Rules for the Use of Force (RUF)

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Uniformity versus Efficiency

Courts-martial Asset Sharing

Divergent Command Philosophies

Chain of Command

Foreign Claims

Single-Service Claims Authority

Asset Utilization and Interoperability

Applicability of US Law Abroad

Environmental Treaties and Agreements

Fiscal Authority to Supply Logistic Support

Contingency Contracting and Host-Nation Support

Treaties and Customary International Law

Law of Armed Conflict

National Policy Issues

Executive Orders

Status-of-Forces Agreement/Status of Mission Agreements

Overflight of National Airspace

Freedom of Navigation

Basing Rights (intermediate staging bases and forward operations 

bases)

Dislocated Civilians

Humanitarian Assistance

Use of Deadly Force

An Operations (J-3) Responsibility

Legal Advisor may be the most experienced and educated in 

ROE/RUF Development

Figure III-2. Legal Issues 
Chapter III 

III-10 JP 3-57 

accomplishment; the goals and objectives of any potential adversaries, their COGs, and 

range of possible COAs. 

For more information on JIPOE, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 

Operational Environment. 

g. Logistics 

(1) Logistic planners should assess CMO logistic requirements and affected 

country and theater support capabilities. Attendant risks and logistic objectives also 

should be identified. Emphasis must be placed upon locating logistic bases as close as 

possible to the recipients. Logistic planners should avoid locating distribution points in 

major population centers to reduce movement of large portions of the population from 

traditional economic and social areas. All potential supply sources should be considered, 

including affected country, commercial, coalition, and pre-positioned supplies. Lessons 

learned indicate that logistics and the associated support facilities and infrastructure 

necessary to sustain CMO are frequently underestimated. CMO often are logistics and 

engineering intensive. Therefore, the overall logistic concept should be closely tied into 

the operational strategy and be mutually supporting. This includes: 

(a) Identifying time-phased material requirements, facilities, and other 

resources. Remote and austere locations may require deployment of materials handling 

equipment and pre-positioned stocks. 

 

(b) Identifying support methods and procedures required to meet air, land, 

and sea lines of communications. This also will require plans to deconflict civil and 

military transportation systems. 

(c) Establishing procedures for coordinating and controlling material 

movements to and within the operational area. Priorities may be established using 

apportionment systems, providing the commander flexibility to reinforce priority efforts 

with additional assets. 

(2) Planning must include logistic support that normally is outside the bounds 

of military logistics, such as support to the civilian populace (e.g., women, children, and 

the aged). CMO forces often are going to provide support for these categories of 

individuals, and planners must take appropriate steps early on to ensure proper aid is 

administered. 

(3) Planning also should consider the potential requirements to provide support 

to nonmilitary personnel (e.g., NGOs, IGOs, IPI, and the private sector). 

(4) Cultural and religious considerations are particularly important for logistic 

planners supporting CMO. Inappropriate foods, materials, and methods may have a 

dramatic impact on effects of CMO operations. 
Planning 

III-11 

(5) Logistic support to the joint force will likely require contracting and 

contractor management related interaction with foreign governments, commercial 

entities, OGAs, NGOs, IGOs, and IPI. During stability operations, contracting will 

normally have a large CMO component; requiring contracting actions must be carefully 

considered in the joint planning process. The JFC and subordinate commanders should 

publish sufficient guidance on contracting for operation plans and orders. Depending on 

the nature of the operation, some contracting support plans may need to include specific 

CMO related guidance such as directives to maximize theater support contracts. Local 

hires and contractors may need to be divided between multiple population groups (i.e., 

religious sects, nationalities, or tribes) to demonstrate impartiality. 

h. Civil-Military Impact of Contracting. Theater support contracting and some 

external support contracting actions can have a positive (and sometimes negative) effect 

on the civil-military aspects of the overall operation or campaign. Since the majority of 

theater support contracts are awarded to local vendors, these actions can have a tangential 

positive benefit by providing employment opportunities to indigenous personnel, 

promoting goodwill with the local populace and improving the local economic base. In 

some operations, there may be a high degree of local unemployment that can lead to local 

unrest and cause local nationals to support an insurgency simply for monetary 

compensation. Maximizing local hires through theater support contracting or civil 

augmentation programs can help alleviate this situation. 

(1) Depending on the nature of the operation, some contracting support plans 

may need to include specific CMO related guidance such as directives to maximize 

theater support contracts or local hires in support of crisis action planning task 

orders.

(2) Integrating contracting efforts to the civil-military aspects of the 

campaign plan. Integrating the contracting support plan into the civil-military aspects of 

the GCCsí campaign or operation plan requires very close coordination between the lead 

contracting activity, normally a Service, and the GCC plans and operations staff. This 

effort can be especially important in major stability operations where there may be 

significant reconstruction and transition to civil authority requirements. Normally, this 

reconstruction and transition to civil authorities related contracting effort will be done in 

support of the chief of mission (COM) or NGOs. In any case, these efforts can be a 

major challenge to the JFC contracting organizations. 

(a) Management Challenges. Planning and executing these civil-military 

related contracting actions can be very manpower intensive. If not properly staffed, 

staff sections and supporting organizations can be quickly overwhelmed in their 

dual mission to coordinate forces support and support to civil authorities. 

(b) Assessing and Balancing Risk to Forces Support. Another major 

challenge in planning for and executing contracting support in support of CMO is 

identifying both the potential risk CMO may cause to overall force support and any 

potential positive results toward achieving the civil-military objectives. What may be 
Chapter III 

III-12 JP 3-57 

good for forces support may not meet the needs of the civil-military aspects of the overall 

campaign plan. In all cases, both the increased security risks and contract management 

requirements must be closely analyzed prior to making any formal decisions. 

(c) Balancing Contracting Business Practices with Operational Needs. 

The JFC planners must work closely with the lead Service or joint contracting personnel 

to balance acceptable contracting business practices and operational needs. In some 

cases, general contracting business practices may be reinterpreted to achieve best value in 

terms of overall civil-military strategic objectives, schedule, performance, and cost 

factors. Care must be taken, however, to ensure that contracting officers do not violate 

Federal Acquisition Regulations in this effort. 

For further detail concerning logistics and contracting, refer to JP 1-06 Financial 

Management Support in Joint Operations, JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, JP 3-

34, Joint Engineer Operations, JP 4-0, Joint Logistics Support, and JP 4-10, Operational 

Contract Support. 

i. Financial Management

(1) Financial management supports accomplishment of the JFCís mission by 

providing two different but mutually supporting core functions: resource management 

(RM) and finance support. The joint force director for force structure, resource, and 

assessment or comptroller is responsible for integrating RM and finance support policy 

planning and execution efforts. Financial management objectives include: 

(a) Providing mission-essential funding as quickly and efficiently as 

possible using the proper source and authority of funds as provided for in applicable 

guidance and agreements. 

(b) Reducing the negative impact of insufficient funding on readiness. 

(c) Implementing internal controls to assure fiscal year integrity and to 

prevent antideficiency violations. 

(d) Ensuring detailed financial management planning is conducted and 

coordinating efforts between Services and combatant commands to provide and sustain 

resources. 

(2) Financial managers may be collocated with the joint force SJA and logistic 

officer to obtain legal opinions and consolidate efforts in the use of JFC fiscal resources. 

(3) Resource managers provide decision support to the commander, develop 

command resource requirements, identify sources of funding, determine costs, acquire 

funds, distribute and control funds, track costs and obligations, capture costs, conduct 

reimbursement procedures, establish an internal control process, and coordinate finance 
Planning 

III-13 

support which may include banking and currency support, financial analysis and 

recommendations and funding. 

(4) Civil support operations normally are conducted by DOD units under a cost 

reimbursement basis from either the primary agency, the local or state civil governmental 

authority requesting assistance, or under a cost share of both of the previous. Service 

comptroller should provide cost data capturing requirements and forwarding procedures 

to all installations and units supporting the civil authority. Installations and units should 

be prepared to gather cost data and submit their Service comptroller for proper 

reimbursement under the Stafford Act, Economy Act, or other reimbursement vehicle. 

For further detail pertaining to financial management, refer to JP 1-06, Financial 

Management Support in Joint Operations. 

 j. Information Management

(1) The complexity of operations requires a process to assist the commander in 

exercising C2. This process complements the commanderís decision making by 

improving the speed and accuracy of information flow as well as supporting execution 

through reliable communications. The goal of common understanding of information 

and appropriate sharing of the same is achieved through the proper management of 

personnel, equipment and facilities, and procedures. This management is achieved 

through a viable information management organization. 

(2) The information management organization is operationally focused on the 

facilitation of the commandís information flow processes (internally, externally, 

vertically, and horizontally), and solidifies and disseminates this in their command 

information management plan or standing operating procedure. Information 

management refers to the processes a command uses to receive, obtain, control, 

process, and transfer data into useful information. 

For more details on information management, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 

3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

k. Communications 

(1) Any force deploying to an operational area must bring or coordinate for the 

ability to communicate. This should include the capability to communicate in secure and 

nonsecure modes using voice, data, and video teleconferencing through a combination of 

military and commercial systems. The ability to communicate with all the interagency 

partners, military forces, NGOs, IGOs, HN or FN agencies, IPI, the private sector, and 

other organizations may be essential during CMO. 

(2) Effective communications systems are vital to planning, mounting, and 

sustaining successful CMO. Operations, logistic, and intelligence functions depend on 

responsive communications. Communications is the central system that not only ties 
Chapter III 

III-14 JP 3-57 

together all aspects of joint operations, but also allows commanders to maintain C2 of 

their forces. Therefore, the CMO plan must provide for interoperable and compatible 

communications using available commercial telecommunications networks, military 

satellite channels, C2 radio and radar coverage, and conventional military 

communications system to support the exchange of orders, directions, and information 

among all participants. Establishment of direct communications between commanders, 

interagency partners, NGOs, IGOs, IPI, and the private sector facilitates effective 

coordination and decision making. Information protection for nonsecure communications 

must be implemented. Additionally, communications systems planning must consider the 

termination or transition of US involvement and the transfer of responsibility to the UN, 

regional organizations, another military force, or civilian organizations. 

(3) Communications Security. Communications may be secured against 

monitoring through encryption or codes. Physical hardening, OPSEC (to include 

physical security), and redundancy reduce system failures stemming from sabotage and 

elements of nature. Coordination with other agencies (e.g., interagency partners and nonUS organizations) and MNFs also complicates communications security. A policy for 

the release of classified information should be considered early in the planning process 

and introduced as soon as practical in an operation. It is important to remember that nonUS military organizations may require access to classified material to accomplish their 

missions. Procedures for the release of classified information to support CMO must be 

established before it negatively affects the mission. These organizations often are force 

multipliers in CMO. 

(4) Frequency Management. Communication planners must include 

frequency management and coordinate radio frequency spectrum requirements at the 

earliest planning stage to help assure mission success. Also, MNFs and nonmilitary 

agency frequency requirements need to consider security precautions and coordinate 

accordingly. Lastly, host governments strictly control their sovereign spectrum use. 

 

(5) Interoperability. Identify communications equipment interoperability 

among all participants. Nonmilitary agencies may have their own communications 

networks, and the degree of sophistication will vary. These may include commercial 

leased circuits and satellite services, and high frequency radio equipment. Commercial 

satellite services can provide worldwide voice, data, and facsimile communications. This 

system can provide an excellent communications link between both military and 

nonmilitary organizations. Regardless of the systems available to military and 

nonmilitary organizations, it is critical that CMOCs are equipped with communication 

equipment that facilitates coordination with all participants. CMOC communications 

requirements must be identified early. Deployment planners should use commercial offthe-shelf equipment to meet end-user requirements. The need for interoperability of 

communications equipment in CMO also may necessitate using unclassified 

communications means during the operation. The key to success is evaluating the use of 

all available means of communicating (military, commercial, HN, and FN) to put 

together a network that supports CMO. Every situation will be unique. 
Planning 

III-15 

(6) Reports. JFCs should standardize similar communication reports to 

increase efficiency of operations. 

For further details on communications support, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications 

System. 

l. Religious Support 

(1) Wars and conflicts in the 21st century are increasingly nonconventional and 

ideologically motivated. Religion plays a pivotal role in the self-understanding of many 

people and has a significant effect on the goals, objectives, and structure of society. In 

some cases, religious self-understanding may play a determinative or regulating role 

on policy, strategy, or tactics. While it may not be the primary catalyst for war, religion 

can be a contributing factor. Some examples include: 

(a) Invoking religious overtones to develop an exclusivist vision and 

program for national and international action. 

(b) Using governments or groups religion as a motivating factor for 

socializing conflict. 

 

(c) Linking ideologies with theological concepts that have mass appeal to 

achieve the ideal; conflicts ìtheologizedî to justify existence, establish legitimacy, gain 

popularity, and enact policies, laws, and COAs for internal and external activities. 

(d) Achieving an end being gained by using theological concepts as a 

means to that end.

(2) By recognizing the significance of religion, cultural sensitivities, and 

ideology held by allies, multinational partners, and adversaries, JFCs may avoid 

unintentionally alienating friendly military forces or civilian populations that could 

hamper military operations. Commanders and their staffs also must consider religion, 

other cultural issues, and ideology while planning CMO. Chaplains, as military staff 

officers with expertise in matters of religion, may support CMO planning and execution 

within limits of endorsement, professional education or qualification, and individual 

conscience. Chaplains shall not participate in activities that might compromise their 

noncombatant status under the Geneva Conventions, nor shall they function as 

intelligence collectors. However, the joint force chaplain (JFCH) may provide relevant 

information on the religious, cultural and ideological environment in the area of 

operations. 

 

(3) Religious support teams, consisting of at least one chaplain and one 

chaplain assistant/religious program specialist, serve as the primary advisor to the 

commander on matters pertaining to religion as it impacts on the morale and welfare of 
Chapter III 

III-16 JP 3-57 

personnel assigned to the command. The JFCH, as a staff officer, will participate as 

appropriate in planning for the impact of religion on current and future operations.

(4) During CMO, the JFCH performs key religious support staff functions to 

include religious support planning as discussed above. Primarily, the JFCH provides 

worship services and pastoral care to authorized civilians (DOD and contracted). 

(5) As directed by the JFC, and in coordination with the CMOC, a JFCH may 

also function as a goodwill ambassador, in order to develop relationships with key 

civilian religious leaders and faith-based organizations, with the goal of fostering 

understanding and reconciliation. Examples of goodwill activities include gatherings of 

religious leaders for interfaith dialogue, support to reconstruction teams, and 

humanitarian projects to rebuild infrastructure like schools and cultural centers. 

For more details concerning religious support, refer to JP 1-05, Religious Support in 

Joint Operations. 

m. Civil Affairs Planning Considerations

(1) Successful accomplishment of CAO in large part depends on adequate plans 

and policy determinations, an adequate staff capability, and availability of dedicated CA 

to assist the commander in carrying out responsibilities for CMO. It is important that CA 

be concentrated on those tasks that are most likely to lead to mission accomplishment. 

(2) CA should be involved as early as possible in contingency or crisis action 

planning processes to accomplish required coordination efforts. 

For further details on CA planning, refer to Appendix B, ìPlanning Considerations for 

Civil Affairs Operations.î 
CHAPTER IV 

COORDINATION 

IV-1 

1. General 

 a. In CMO, interagency, IGO, NGO, IPI, and the private sector coordination is one 

of the top priorities. JFCs must understand civilian agencies roles, procedures, and 

processes to plan and operate within this arena. The CMOC, with its standing capability 

can serve as the JFCís primary coordination interface with OGAs, IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and 

MNFs. 

 (1) An appreciation of the skills and resources of various OGAs and an 

understanding of how they interact with NGOs, IGOs, IPI, private sector, and regional 

organizations are critical to mission accomplishment. 

 (2) Civil-military relations can create economic, political, and social stability as 

they encourage the development of the affected nationís materiel and human resources. 

JFCs utilize annex V (Interagency Coordination) of plans and orders to provide guidance 

for incorporating the interagency, IGO, and NGO communities into military operations. 

For more details concerning annex V (Interagency Coordination), refer to CJCSM 

3122.03B, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II, Planning 

Formats. 

 (3) In many situations, the HN or FN and the private sector also will have a 

major role in coordination with the military, interagency, IGOs, and NGOs. A JFCs 

effective use of CMO improves the integration of the military effort with these 

ìSuccessful interagency, IGO, [intergovernmental organization] and NGO 

[nongovernmental organization] coordination enables the USG [United 

States Government] to build international support, conserve resources, and 

conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared international 

goals.î 

JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental 

Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I 

ìResponding to the challenges facing the nation almost inevitably requires a 

multiagency, interdisciplinary approach that brings to bear the many diverse skills 

and resources of the Federal government and other public and private 

organizations. The requirement for coordination between these agencies and 

organizations is not new. The continually changing global security environment 

requires increased and improved communications and coordination among the 

numerous agencies and organizations working to achieve established national 

security objectives. This cooperation is best achieved through active interagency 

involvement, building on the core competencies and successful experiences of 

each.î 

JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental 

Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-57 

organizations and links military objectives to the diplomatic, economic, and 

informational objectives ñ unity of effort is one of the keys to success in achieving strategic 

objectives in a complex security environment. 

 

 b. Interagency Coordination at the National Level 

 (1) The integration of political, economic, civil, and military objectives and the 

subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action always have been 

essential to success at all levels of operations. 

 (2) The new, rapidly changing global environment is characterized by regional 

instability, the challenges of pluralistic governments, and unconventional threats will 

require even greater interagency, IGO, and NGO cooperation within a fully functioning 

civil-military partnership. Military operations must be synchronized with those of other 

interagency partners, as well as with MNFs, NGOs, IGOs, and regional organizations. 

These actions must be mutually supporting and proceed in a logical sequence. The 

military must understand the roles and relationships among the interagency, state and 

local governments, country teams, and engaged organizations to accomplish CMO. 

 (3) Coordination forges the vital link between the military and the economic, 

political or diplomatic, and informational entities of the USG as well as NGOs and IGOs. 

Successful coordination and planning enables these agencies, departments, and 

organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective operation ó achieving unity of 

effort. 

 (4) The common thread throughout all major operations is the broad range of 

agencies ó many with indispensable practical competencies and major legal 

responsibilities ó that interact with the Armed Forces of the United States. 

 (5) The intrinsic nature of coordination demands that planners consider all 

instruments of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ 

these instruments to achieve the objective. This consideration is dictated because the 

security challenges facing the United States today are growing in complexity, requiring 

the skills and resources of many organizations. 

 (6) Because the solution to a problem seldom, if ever, resides within the 

capability of a single agency, plans and orders must be developed to leverage the core 

competencies and functional responsibilities of all available agencies, synchronizing their 

efforts with military capabilities toward a single objective. The President or SecDef 

employ the Armed Forces of the United States when it is necessary to use military means 

to promote national interests. The use of the military instrument of national power as a 

component of the national security strategy takes the form of military objectives. These 

objectives need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, economic, and 

informational objectives. The military instrument often plays a supporting role to other 

national agencies. Understanding how military coordination efforts interface with other 
Coordination 

IV-3 

organizations toward mission accomplishment is essential to the success in joint 

operations and unified actions. 

 (7) Each organization brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and 

skills to the table. This diversity is the strength of this process, providing a cross-section 

of expertise, skills, and abilities. In one coordinated forum, the process integrates many 

views, capabilities, and options. 

 c. Procedures for Effective Cooperation 

 (1) The USAID Administrator usually is designated as the USG HA 

coordinator for emergency response. However, various agenciesí different and 

sometimes conflicting goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques make 

unity of effort a challenge. Some NGOs may have policies that are purposely antithetical 

to both the US military forces and USG agencies. 

 (2) The interagency, IGO, and NGO process often is described as ìmore art 

than science,î while military operations tend to depend on structure and doctrine. 

However, some of the techniques, procedures, and systems of military C2 can assist in 

obtaining unity of effort if they are adjusted to the dynamic world of interagency, IGO, 

and NGO activities. Unity of effort can only be achieved through close, continuous 

interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation, which are necessary to 

overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic 

and personal limitations. Each geographic combatant command is aligned with both an 

AC Army CA element and with an Army CA command, which are found only in the US 

Army Reserve and staffed with functional experts possessing a wide range of critical 

civilian skills. These functional experts are knowledgeable in working with their 

respective civilian counterpart agencies responsible for their functional specialty. As 

such, they already are experienced in the duties, responsibilities, and in some cases the 

agenda(s) of such agencies. 

 d. Political Advisor or Foreign Policy Advisor 

 

 (1) The DOS assigns combatant commands a political advisor (POLAD), also 

known as a foreign policy advisor (FPA) who provides diplomatic considerations and 

ìIt is essential to appreciate the strength of what I call bureaucratic faultlines-policy 

areas where agencies have overlapping responsibilities and very distinctive 

institutional interests and perspectives. The most important faultline of this sort 

occurs at the intersection of political and military affairs. . . . What is required is not 

coordination in an administrative or technical sense but the integration of divergent 

(and sometimes mutually antagonistic) perspectives through the active exercise of 

strategic thought.î 

Carnes Lord 

Strategy and Organization at the National Level, 

Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process 
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-57 

enables informal linkage with embassies in the AOR and with DOS ñ leading to greater 

interagency coordination. 

 (2) The POLAD or FPA provides the commander the following additional 

capabilities: 

 (a) Supplies information regarding DOS policy goals and objectives that are 

relevant to the GCCís theater strategy; 

 (b) Uses regional knowledge and language skills to assist the CCDR in 

translating political objectives into military strategy; 

 (c) Coordinates with, and facilitates cooperation between, the primary US 

political and military personnel or their designated representatives; and 

 (d) Moves more freely and works more easily with different participants 

than military personnel. 

 (3) Under certain circumstances, a POLAD or FPA may be assigned to 

strategic, operational or tactical level organizations. 

 e. Interagency Structure in Foreign Countries

 (1) The COM, i.e., the ambassador or senior US Foreign Service official, has 

authority over all elements of the USG in country, except forces assigned or attached to a 

combatant command. Other key USG organizations in place within most nations include 

the US defense attachÈ office (USDAO) and the security assistance organization (called 

by various specific names, such as the office of defense cooperation, the security 

assistance office, the military group, and others, largely governed by the preference of the 

receiving country) ó both part of the country team. In some countries, a single military 

office may perform these two functions. It is important to understand the differences 

between these agencies in theater interagency coordination. 

 (2) Chief of Mission. As discussed, the COM is the senior representative of 

the President in a FN and is responsible for policy decisions and the activities of USG 

employees in the country. The COM integrates the programs and resources of all USG 

agencies represented on the country team. The COM provides a de facto coordinating 

mechanism that can be tailored to each crisis as it arises, based upon the substance of the 

problem with little need for written rules. Additionally, the COM functions at both the 

operational and tactical levels where recommendations and considerations for crisis 

action planning are provided directly to the GCC and subordinate JFCs. While forces in 

the field under a geographic combatant command or subunified command are exempt 

from the COMís statutory authority, the COMís political role is important to the success 

of military operations involving US military forces. In special cases, the COM has the 
Coordination 

IV-5 

authority to deny US military access into the country and can compel military personnel 

to leave. 

(a) US Defense AttachÈ Office. The senior defense official/defense 

attachÈ is the COMís principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, 

the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned to a US diplomatic 

mission, and the single point of contact for all DOD matters involving the embassy or 

DOD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. Service attachÈs also comprise 

the USDAO. The Defense Intelligence Agency rates and funds defense attachÈs and 

keeps the CCDR informed of their activities. These attachÈs are valuable liaisons to their 

HN counterparts. The attachÈs also serve the ambassador and coordinate with, and 

represent, their respective Military Departments on Service matters. The attachÈs assist 

the FID program by exchanging information with the CCDRís staff on HN military, 

social, economic, and political conditions. 

(b) Security Assistance Organization. These are the GCCs 

representatives in a foreign country responsible for executing the theater security 

cooperation strategy. These include military assistance advisory groups, military 

missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and 

defense attachÈ personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. 

1. Security assistance programs are authorized by the Foreign 

Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as 

amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, 

military training, and other defense related services. 

2. Security assistance functions and programs provide furtherance of 

national policies and objectives. 

(3) Country Team. The country team system provides the foundation for 

rapid interagency consultation, coordination, and action on recommendations from the 

field and effective execution of US missions, programs, and policies. The country team 

typically includes political, economic, administrative, and consular officers as well as a 

PAO, regional security officer, and communications staff. Security cooperation officers, 

senior defense officials from DOD and attaches from USG agencies, law enforcement 

agencies, and USAID are often represented on the team. The country team often is less 

than adequately staffed for every need. The relationship with military chains of 

command is frequently ad hoc. Coordination is necessary to achieve unity of effort. 

(a) The country team concept encourages agencies to coordinate their plans 

and operations and keep one another and the COM informed of their activities. 

(b) Although the GCC is not a member of the diplomatic mission, the GCC 

may participate or be represented in meetings and coordination conducted by the country 

team. 

 
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-57 

(c) The JFC should request that a joint force liaison officer participate in a 

country teamís meetings, when appropriate. 

f. Comparison of United States Agency Organizational Structures 

(1) One difficulty of coordinating operations among US agencies is 

determining an appropriate counterpart. Another significant difficulty is the 

determination of the primary agency for a given interagency activity. Organizational 

differences exist between the military hierarchy and other USG departments and 

agencies. Further, overall lead authority in a complex contingency operation is likely to 

be exercised not by the GCC, but by a US ambassador or other senior civilian, who will 

provide policy and goals for all USG agencies and military organizations in the operation. 

(2) Decision making at the lowest levels often is thwarted because field 

coordinators may not be vested with the authority to speak for parent agencies, 

departments, or organizations. Figure IV-1 depicts comparative US agency 

organizational structures using the three ìlevels of warî among DOD, executive 

departments and agencies, and, state and local government. 

 g. Organizational Environments 

(1) In order for the interagency process to be successful, it should bring 

together the interests of multiple agencies, departments, and organizations. This cohesion 

is even more complex than the multidimensional nature of military combat operations. 

When the other instruments of national power ó diplomatic, informational, and 

economic ó are applied, the complexity and the number and types of interactions expand 

significantly. 

(2) The Nature of Interagency Bureaucracy. Interagency coordination 

processes tend to be bureaucratic and diffused, inhibiting the concentration of power 

within a small or select group of agencies. 

(a) Core Values and Requirements. Each agency has core values and 

legal requirements that it will not compromise. These values form the foundation 

upon which key functions of the agency grow. In any interaction, all participants must be 

constantly aware that each agency will continuously cultivate and create external sources 

of support and maneuver to protect its core values. 

(b) Individual Agency Perspective. Individual agencies have differing 

perspectives on many issues. This can complicate policy development and creation of a 

common approach across all USG elements. 
Coordination 

IV-7 

(c) Reduction of Uncertainty. Many bureaucracies try to standardize 

their operations but often fail to prepare for crisis management. Uncertainty 

TACTICAL

OPERATIONAL

STRATEGIC

ARMED FORCES OF

THE UNITED STATES

EXECUTIVE

DEPARTMENTS AND

AGENCIES

Secretary of Defense

Chairman of the Joint

 Chiefs of Staff

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Combatant Commander (1)

National Headquarters

Department Secretaries

Ambassador/Embassy (3)

Country

Reconstruction and

 Stabilization Group

Combatant Commander

Commander, Joint

 Task Force (CJTF0 (2)

Defense Coordinating

 Office/Defense

 Coordinating Element 

Ambassador/Embassy

Liaisons (4)

Federal Coordinating

 Officer or Principal

 Federal Official

Regional Office

CJTF

Components

Service

Functional

Ambassador/Embassy

Field Office

US Agency for International

 Development (USAID)/

Office of US Foreign Disaster

 Assistance (OFDA)/

Disaster Assistance

Response Team (DART)/

Liaison (5) Response Team

US Refugee Coordinator

Advanced Civilian Team

Forward Advanced

 Civilian Team

NOTES

COMPARISONS OF UNITED STATES AGENCY 

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

1. The combatant commander, within the context of unified action, may function at both the strategic and 

operational levels in coordinating the application of all instruments of national power with the actions of 

other military forces. United States Government (USG) agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 

regional organizations, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and corporations toward theater strategic 

objectives.

2. The CJTF, within the context of unified action, functions at both the operational and tactical levels in 

coordinating the application of all instruments of national power with the actions of other military forces, 

USG agencies, NGOs, regional organizations, IGOs, and corporations toward theater operational objectives.

3. The Ambassador and Embassy (which includes the country team) function at the strategic, operational, and 

tactical levels and may support joint operation planning conducted by a combatant commander or CJTF.

4. Liaisons at the operational level may include the Foreign Policy Advisor or Political Advisor assigned to the 

combatant commander by the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency liaison officer, or any 

other US agency representative assigned to the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group or otherwise assigned 

to the combatant commanderís staff.

5. USAIDís OFDA provides its rapidly deployable DART in response to international disasters. A DART 

provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist US embassies and USAID missions 

with the management with the management of USG response to disaster.

STATE AND LOCAL

GOVERNMENT

Governor

State Adjutant 

General

 State Coordinating

 Officer

Office of Emergency

 Services

Department/Agency

National Guard

County 

Commissioner

Mayor/Manager

County

City (e.g., Police

 Department)

Figure IV-1. Comparisons of United States Agency Organizational Structures 
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-57 

increases in a crisis and it is likely that compromises will be made. Compromise may 

bring the sacrifice of power, security, or prestige. Uncertainty allows for the coexistence 

of varying views about the likely outcomes of a given action; these differences in 

viewpoint often lead to conflicting interests. An organization will seek to reduce 

uncertainty and lessen the threat to its own stability. Information can reduce uncertainty 

and increase an organizationís power. Thus, information equates to power in 

interagency coordination, as it provides those who possess it a decided advantage in 

the decision-making process.

(3) Consensus Within the Department of Defense. Before attempting to gain 

consensus in the interagency arena, it must first be attained within DOD. The various 

elements ó OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, DOD agencies and field 

activities, Military Departments, and combatant commands ó should develop a common 

position on the appropriate military role in interagency coordination before broadening 

the discussion to include other agencies, departments, and organizations. DOD has a 

common culture, procedures, and a hierarchical structure. 

For further detail on interagency coordination at the national level, refer to JP 3-08, 

Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization 

Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I. 

2. Host Nation and Foreign Nation 

a. In interacting with the HN or FN, the role of CMO is to provide coordination, 

consultation, liaison, and a unification that leads to achieving US military objectives. 

Additionally, it assists in making civil resources (i.e., HNS or FNS) available to the joint 

force and ensures a balance exists between the joint force, IGOs, NGOs, and the HN in 

regards to the use of these resources. Furthermore, by interacting with the HN or FN, 

CMO forces also can prevent unnecessary civilian hardship, while promoting the 

commanderís intent as related to legal obligations and moral considerations. 

b. CA functional specialists may assist HN or FN governmental organizations and 

agencies, as required. In turn, this enhances access to appropriate HN or FN authorities 

at the governmental level with whom negotiations will need to be conducted and at the 

regional and local levels with whom the execution of HNS or FNS will need to be 

coordinated. For example, these specialists can provide JFCs the overall status and 

capability of a HN or FN economy, infrastructure, health care, and LOCs to support the 

commanderís operational requirements (i.e., develop the civil components to the common 

operational picture [COP]). 

3. Multinational 

a. With the ever-increasing involvement with MNFs, it is imperative that the US 

military forces fully understand the special considerations arising when working with 

military and paramilitary forces of other nations. 
Coordination 

IV-9 

b. Political and military intentions of multinational partners will impact planning 

and operations. Nationsí agendas and interests will differ from those of the United States 

in many ways. In many instances, MNFs will not be able to influence the planning effort 

without prior approval of their home country and its commitment to the concept of 

operations and mission. 

c. Additional factors should be considered when planning with an MNF. Figure 

IV-2 highlights some of these planning factors. 

d. To effectively and efficiently plan with a MNF, the GCC must recognize and 

accept the differences between US and MNFs and work to develop a harmonizing 

approach to the planning effort. The GCC must be sensitive to MNFs position(s) while 

ensuring the planning process is a team effort. Where possible, the GCC should develop 

standardization procedures to reduce uncertainty between and among MNFs. 

e. In addition to operating as part of a joint force, CA prepare for combined 

operations with allied governmentsí land, air, and maritime forces. Unity of effort in 

multinational operations proceeds from the political and strategic leadership of the 

alliance. Allied governments normally develop directives covering a combined 

commandís POLMIL objectives. They include objectives and policies for the conduct of 

CMO. CA personnel may provide staff augmentation for joint or combined headquarters 

in support of multinational CMO. US military standard staff planning and coordination 

as well as interagency coordination activities are the most likely mission support 

activities that CA elements will undertake in the joint or multinational environment. 

Senior level combatant command or Service component plans, policies and programs 

teams are best suited for conducting joint or multinational operations due to the rank and 

experience of the team members. 

For further details concerning operating with multinational forces, refer to JP 3-16, 

Multinational Operations. 

4. Interagency 

 a. JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental 

Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I states: ìIn order for the 

ìWhile the United States will retain the capability to act alone, the current 

US National Security Strategy reflects that ëAmerica will implement its 

strategies by organizing coalitions ó as broad as practicable ó of states 

able and willing to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.í US 

commanders should expect to conduct military operations as part of a 

multinational force (MNF). These operations could span the full range of 

military operations and require coordination with a variety of US 

Government (USG) agencies, military forces of other nations, local 

authorities, IGOs, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).î 

JP 3-16, Multinational Operations
Chapter IV 

IV-10 JP 3-57 

interagency process to be successful, it should bring together the interests of multiple 

agencies, departments, and organizations. This cohesion is even more complex than the 

multidimensional nature of military combat operations. When the other instruments of 

national power ó diplomatic, informational, and economic ó are applied, the 

complexity and the number and types of interactions expand significantly. The essence 

of interagency coordination is the effective integration of multiple agencies with 

their diverse perspectives and agendas.î

 b. Internal interagency bureaucracy often inhibits the integration of multiple 

interagency partners that may further affect the civil-military relationship. 

 (1) As noted earlier, each agency has core values and legal requirements that it 

will not compromise. 

 

 (2) Individual agency perspective and agendas complicate policy development. 

PLANNING FACTORS FOR 

MULTINATIONAL FORCES

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

Force capabilities

Command, control, and communications--will there be 

problems with transfer of authority?

Logistics--will the United States have to provide support 

and to what extent?

Level of training

Deployment capability--will US transportation assets be 

required?

Procedures for collecting, dissemination, and sharing 

intelligence (information)

Status of existing agreements--have there already been 

agreements established that the joint task force will be 

expected to support?

"Degree of risk"--what is acceptable to multinational 

forces (may be politically driven)?

Cultural and historical background

Divergent rules of engagement

Figure IV-2. Planning Factors for Multinational Forces 
Coordination 

IV-11 

 

ìWe mustÖimprove the responsiveness of our government to help nations 

emerging from tyranny and warÖ[O]ur government must be able to move quickly 

to provide needed assistance. So last summer, my administration established a 

new Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization in the State Department.î 

President Bush, May 18, 2005 

ìThe purpose . . . is to present and refine an interagency planning process for 

reconstruction, stabilization, and conflict transformation operations that will serve as 

the future framework for integrated civilian and military planning. This planning 

framework, developed by the S/CRS [Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 

and Stabilization], enables USG [United States Government] civilian agency planners 

to identify and gain policy-level approval for overarching policy goals, corresponding 

major mission elements, and the essential tasks of an operation. The process 

develops a resource strategy to achieve policy goals, identifies lead agencies 

responsible for essential tasks, and incorporates a structure for metrics and 

evaluation. . . . 

S/CRS was established to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize USG civilian capacity 

to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct 

societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path 

toward peace, democracy, and a market economy. To fulfill this mission, a 

standardized interagency approach to planning for conflict transformation operations 

is needed. S/CRS and other organizations within the USG must have tools to 

develop clear policy options concerning states and regions of greatest risk and 

interest, to facilitate USG decision-making on these options, and to lead USG 

planning focused on these priorities. 

The planning process is designed to: 

ï Assess the operational environment to determine drivers of conflict or instability, 

define assumptions and interests, and focus all efforts on transforming these 

dynamics. 

ï Determine clear and measurable goals of intervention based on US national 

interests and drivers of instability. 

ï Harmonize policy goals with available resources, and focus policymakers on 

resource implications that may limit goal achievement. 

ï Identify essential tasks and assign agency responsibility for tasks. 

ï Orchestrate the application and integration of all USG ìtoolsî to accomplish 

policy goals. 

ï Integrate US national efforts with those of other international partners and 

organizations. 

ï Create a meaningful evaluation system to measure progress in achieving goals 

and mission elements. 

ï Incorporate lessons learned from international experience.î 

United States Joint Forces Command J7 Pamphlet 

Version 1.0, US Government Draft Planning Framework for 

Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation
Chapter IV 

IV-12 JP 3-57 

 (3) Many bureaucracies try to standardize their operations but often fail to 

prepare for crisis management. 

 (4) For all their strengths, each agency represents particular interests. 

 c. The challenge for JFCs is to achieve unity of effort between the different 

interagency partners and the military to close the integration gap culminating in 

ìsituational awarenessî and interoperability. This is necessary not only for military 

operations, such as Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM, but 

also for civil support operations. 

 d. There are organizations that have the assets to perform such functions. The joint 

interagency coordination group (JIACG) is an interagency staff group that establishes 

regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military 

operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the 

CCDR and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported CCDR, the JIACG provides 

the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG 

civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs complement the interagency coordination 

that takes place at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels through the civil-military 

organizations established by the NSC Interagency Management System. Members 

participate in contingency, crisis, and transition planning, and provide links back to their 

parent civilian agencies to help synchronize JTF operations with the efforts of 

interagency partners. A CA command has the capabilities to provide theater level 

analysis of civil considerations in coordination with the JIACG and to develop strategic 

level civil input to the supported commander. A CMO staff section plans, coordinates, 

and provides staff oversight of CMO and civilian component issues through direct 

coordination with the supported unitís operations officer. Throughout the process, this 

staff sectionís plans officer continuously ensures the fusion of the civil inputs received 

from subordinate CA elements, maneuver elements, OGAs, NGOs, IGOs, and HN 

sources (private/non-private sectors) to the unit commanderís COP. At the CA brigade 

level, the functions may fall under the purview of the joint, interagency, multinational, 

and coalition element. The establishment of an operational level CMOC is capable of 

supporting all military operations. The specific name of the staffing element may change 

with the level of authority, the integration of CMO into the staff or working group is 

imperative. The capabilities of the private sector partnership when orchestrating 

interagency coordination can and may prove to be unlimited. 

5. Intergovernmental Organizations 

 a. IGOs are organizations created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) 

between two or more governments and may be established on a global or regional 

basis and may have general or specialized purposes. NATO and the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe are regional security organizations, while the African 

Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity) and the Organization of American 

States are general regional organizations. A new trend toward subregional organizations 

also is evident, particularly in Africa where, for example, the Economic Community of 
Coordination 

IV-13 

West African States has taken on some security functions. These organizations have 

defined structures, roles, and responsibilities, and may be equipped with the resources 

and expertise to participate in complex interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination. 

 b. Coordination with IGOs

 (1) Role of IGOs. Responding to humanitarian situations is a fundamental 

responsibility of the IGOs system. This responsibility runs from the immediate response 

to the long-term amelioration of a crisis. One or more of these organizations such as the 

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) or the World Food 

Program will represent this community in a crisis. 

 (2) The body within this community charged with the coordination of the IGOs 

humanitarian activities is the UNOCHA. It does not have the authority to enforce 

coordination but plays a more facilitating and informational role. UNOCHA also has 

responsibility for organizing the consolidated appeals document, which presents to the 

donor community the best thinking of the IGO community on their needs in relation to a 

specific crisis or crisis area. 

 (3) The IGOs relate to UNOCHA in organizing joint assessments and reporting 

to the donor community. 

 (4) IGOs generally will have specific responsibility for certain specialties. For 

example, a major role is played by the World Food Program in the delivery of food and 

determination of an appropriate nutrition standard. The UNHCHR takes the lead in 

providing legal protection and material support to DCs or those in refugee-like situations. 

 (5) The role of the IGOs, along with that of the NGOs, is fundamental to the 

resolution or stabilizing of a humanitarian situation. They will be present and it is 

essential that contact be made at the earliest opportunity. 

 (6) Taking individual action in reaction to an occurrence or perceived need 

without some form of consultation with the IGO community can easily backfire. 

Providing humanitarian daily ration as an immediate solution to a food crisis can be 

exactly the wrong thing to do. While such relief efforts may provide a critical stopgap 

allowing civilian agencies to overcome a temporary problem, it may further distort the 

local market and negatively affect the economy. 

 (7) Typically, UNOCHA will have set up a coordination center. The NGOs 

will be aware of its location and role as will the US embassy. UNOCHA also will be in 

contact with government ministries (if the government is functioning) as the main 

responsibility eventually will fall into the hands of the host country.

 (8) Prior to arrival in country, it is advisable to contact UNOCHA headquarters 

in Geneva. This office will have the informational and communications links that will 
Chapter IV 

IV-14 JP 3-57 

assist the militaryís in reaching its end state. It also should be the focal point for advance 

planning and sharing of information on objectives.

6. Nongovernmental Organizations 

 a. Role of NGOs. NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in the 

international arena. Working alone, alongside the US military, or with other US 

agencies, NGOs are assisting in all the worldís trouble spots where humanitarian or other 

assistance is needed. NGOs may range in size and experience from those with 

multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and 

humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular 

emergency or disaster. Capability, equipment, resources, and expertise vary greatly 

from one NGO to another. NGOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, 

technical projects, relief activities, DC assistance, public policy, and development 

programs. The sheer number of lives they affect, the resources they provide, and the 

moral authority conferred by their humanitarian focus enable NGOs to wield a great deal 

of influence within the interagency and international communities. In fact, individual 

organizations often are funded by national and international donor agencies as 

implementing partners to carry out specific functions. Similarly, internationally active 

NGOs may employ indigenous groups, such as the Mother Teresa Society in Kosovo, as 

local implementing partners. 

 (1) There are thousands of NGOs. These can be US- or foreign-based 

organizations. 

 (2) It is incumbent upon JFCs through their legal counsels to verify that US 

persons are not prohibited from dealing with a particular organization by virtue of its 

inclusion on the list of individuals and entities subject to the various economic sanctions 

programs administered by the Department of the Treasuryís Office of Foreign Assets 

Control.

ìWhereas the militaryís initial objective is stabilization and security for its 

own forces, NGOs seek to address humanitarian needs first and are often 

unwilling to subordinate their objectives to achievement of an end state 

which they had no part in determining. The extent to which specific 

NGOs are willing to cooperate with the military can thus vary considerably. 

NGOs desire to preserve the impartial character of their operations, accept 

only minimal necessary assistance from the military, and ensure that 

military actions in the relief and civic action are consistent with the 

standards and priorities agreed on within the civilian relief community.î 

JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization and Nongovernmental 

Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I 
Coordination 

IV-15 

 b. When dealing with NGOs, it is important to remember that they will likely 

object to any sense that their activities have been co-opted for the achievement of 

military objectives. Their mission is one of a humanitarian nature and not one of 

assisting the military in accomplishing its objectives. Ultimately, commanders factor 

NGOs activities and capabilities into their assessment of conditions and resources to 

integrate them into the selected COA. 

 (1) When humanitarian organizations choose, they set up coordinating 

structures usually by sectors such as health and food. One of the militaryís first tasks is 

to establish contact with these entities or any NGOs capable of providing assistance in 

contacting the larger community. A positive and open approach to this sort of outreach 

bears big dividends when the supported command decides to establish a CMOC. When 

possible and within FP restraints, the military should coordinate with humanitarian 

organizations in the most open forum possible (i.e., outside the wire). This type of 

cooperation will foster a better relationship between the military and humanitarian 

organizations. 

 (2) The military may expect NGOs to come with a variety of resources but they 

will, very often, lack logistic capability to include transportation. That capability may be 

high on their list of expected support from the military.

 c. The extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various 

nations make private organizations valuable sources of information about local and 

regional affairs and civilian attitudes, and they are sometimes willing to share such 

information based on collegiality. Virtually all IGO and NGO operations interact with 

military operations in some way ó they use the same (normally limited) LOCs; they 

draw on the same sources for local interpreters and translators; and they compete for 

ìAlthough DOD has combined Private Voluntary Organization into the 

NGO [nongovernmental organization] category, personnel working with 

these organizations should be aware that this combination is not 

necessarily widely accepted across the USG [United States Government] 

or by the organizations themselves. As a point of reference, USAID 

[United States Agency for International Development] defines a private 

voluntary organization as a tax exempt, non-profit organization working in, 

or intending to become engaged in, international development activities. 

These organizations receive some portion of their annual revenue from the 

private sector (demonstrating their private nature) and voluntary 

contributions of money, staff time, or in-kind support from the general 

public (demonstrating their voluntary nature). USAID defines NGOs as any 

private or nonprofit entity that is formed or organized independently from 

any national or local governmental entity. These can include for-profit 

firms, academic degree-granting institutions, universities and colleges, 

labor institutions, foundations, private voluntary organizations.î 

JP 3-08, Interagency Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental 

Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume II 
Chapter IV 

IV-16 JP 3-57 

buildings and storage space. Thus, sharing of operational information in both 

directions is an essential element of successful CMO. 

 (1) Information acquired through interaction with IGOs and NGOs can be 

invaluable in answering commanderís critical information requirements (CCIRs). 

Personnel conducting CMO should submit reports that answer CCIRs through 

appropriate channels. However, this information and knowledge should be acquired in a 

collateral fashion, and not part of intelligence collection operations. NGOs will share 

what they know of the environment and conditions in general but they will hesitate or 

refuse to cooperate if there are any implications that this comes under the heading of 

ìintelligence gathering.î

 (2) Conversely, NGOs will expect the military to function as a partner in 

dealing with a difficult situation. For example, sharing information on mine locations 

and areas of hostility leads to more cooperation and coordination with these 

organizations. 

7. The Private Sector 

 The private sector is ìan umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and 

in foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and 

businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic 

institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations.î The private sector can assist 

the USG by sharing information, identifying risks, performing vulnerability assessments, 

assisting in contingency and crisis action planning, and providing other assistance as 

appropriate. 

 a. Role of Private Sector. When the military is employed in coordination with 

other instruments of national power, the NSC normally coordinates the effort. In 

wielding the economic and informational instruments, the United States must be 

cognizant of the significant role the private sector can play in these arenas. Leveraging 

the private sector, during Phase 0, IV, and V operations, to assume such roles as 

economic and business development is more than an economy-of-force measure. It often 

is the most expedient, effective, and enduring way to introduce the connectivity of 

globalization, grow a stakeholder community, and achieve a POLMIL end state receptive 

to broad-based, long-term US interests. The military force and the interagency that have 

responsibilities and activities in these areas must incorporate the private sector 

perspectives into their assessments of strategic and operational issues. CMO encourage 

individual businesses, trade associations and other NGOs to foster dialogue with the US 

military and the FN or HN government. The sharing of operational information with 

and coordinating support of the private sector is an essential element of successful 

CMO. 

 b. Establishing and maintaining communications between the US military and the 

private sector promotes US national interests/policy and objectives. CMO, through 

establishing and maintaining communications is one of the best ways to unify military 
Coordination 

IV-17 

and public/private partnerships and best practices to improve the FNís or HNís internal 

security and promote stability operations in the operational area. Stability operations task 

when dealing with the private sector includes fostering dialogue, helping revive the 

interface between all parties, including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic 

activity and constructing necessary infrastructure. The private sector, even in some third 

world countries, possess the skills and expertise to contribute to the overall US 

objectives. 

 c. Critical infrastructure protection is a shared responsibility among the established 

government, local officials, factions, and tribal governments and the owners and 

operators of the nation's critical infrastructure and key resources. Partnership between 

the public and private sectors is essential. The private sector can own and operate a large 

portion of the HNís or FNís critical infrastructure; government agencies have access to 

critical threat information, and each controls security programs, research and 

development, and other resources that may be more effective if discussed and shared, as 

appropriate, in a public/private partnership setting. 

 d. The lead agency for federal response to disasters or emergencies within the 

homeland is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Within DHS, the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is charged with coordinating the overall 

federal response. Within FEMA, the joint field office and defense coordinating officer 

are the focal points for coordination of civil support operations. DOD provides civil 

support when requested by a lead or primary agency. The President or SecDef may direct 

DOD to provide support to civil authorities, as required to provide expertise and 

capabilities to other lead agency authorities. 
Chapter IV 

IV-18 JP 3-57 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX A 

SERVICE CAPABILITIES 

A-1 

Annex A Civil Affairs Service Capabilities 

 B Engineering 

 C Medical Civil-Military Operations 

 D Military Police or Security Forces 

 E Psychological Operations 

 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-57 

1. General 

The purpose of this appendix is to provide an overview of some of the Service 

capabilities that would most likely support CMO. 

2. Service Capabilities 

Each annex to this appendix will discuss a different Service capability. For example, 

Annex A to Appendix A, ìCivil Affairs Service Capabilities.î 
ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A 

CIVIL AFFAIRS SERVICE CAPABILITIES 

A-A-1 

1. United States Army 

SecDef assigns USA CA units stationed in CONUS to CDRUSSOCOM or 

Commander, US Joint Forces Command. One USA Reserve CA brigade headquarters is 

assigned to the Commander, US Pacific Command. 

a. Active Army. USSOCOM provides one active USA CA brigade consisting of a

headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) and four regionally focused battalions 

structured to deploy rapidly and provide initial CA support to SOF and contingency 

operations. The four battalions with four line companies are capable of performing 

Defense Planning Guidance-directed missions, of executing comprehensive SCPs, and of 

supporting GCCs across the range of military operations. The CA battalions are flexible, 

multipurpose organizations for training, equipping, and deploying task organized CATs 

in support of CMO. The CA battalions support US SOF missions conducted under 

geographic combatant commands or country teams. They provide CA support to the 

respective geographic combatant command, as necessary by attaching task organized 

elements from their headquarters or attached CA assets. These CA elements support SOF 

at the operational and tactical levels. The CA battalion has an HHC, a civil affairs 

planning team (CAPT), a CMOC capable of providing a CLT, and four CA line 

companies, each with a CMOC. Each CA line company can provide C2 to the assigned 

CATs and can provide planning, coordination, and assessment at the tactical level.

(1) The CA brigade has a worldwide mission. 

(2) The brigade is rapidly deployable through various means of infiltration, to 

include static-line parachute, providing US SOF with a responsive, flexible, and modular 

CA force package. The brigade has the ability to deploy classified and unclassified 

communications links that provide communications capability with supported forces 

(SOF and conventional), IPI, IGOs, the interagency, private sector and NGOs. 

(3) The brigade has the structure to form the core of the theater-level JCMOTF 

and is C2 system-capable. 

b. United States Army Reserve. The majority of the Armyís CA organizations 

are USAR and consist of commands, brigades, battalions, and companies capable of 

supporting SOF and conventional forces at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. 

(1) There are currently four CA commands, each commanded by a USAR 

brigadier general. They are regionally aligned to support US Pacific Command, United 

States European Command, United States Central Command, and United States Southern 

Command. The CA command develops plans, policy, and programs through planning 

teams, fusion of information management, engagement, and analysis at the strategic and 

theater level. Their primary mission is to provide theater-level CA planning, 

coordination, policies, and programs in support of stabilization, reconstruction, and 

development efforts. The CA command may deploy a theater-level CMOC to coordinate, 

analyze, and enable policies, programs, and CMO capabilities in support of the 
Annex A to Appendix A 

A-A-2 JP 3-57 

geographic combatant command and to develop and manage the strategic-level civil 

inputs to the COP for the geographic combatant command. A typical CA command 

consists of a HHC, five CAPTs, and a CMOC capable of split operations (forward and 

rear) with three functional specialty cells, two CLTs, and one CIM cell. Each CA 

command has one or more CA brigades assigned, each CA brigade has two or more 

subordinate CA battalions. All are regionally focused and have expertise in the cultural 

and political aspects of countries within a region. 

(2) CA brigades function as the regionally focused, expeditionary, operational 

level CA capability that supports an Army Service component command (ASCC)/corps 

or three-star JTF. Dependent on the staffing, the brigade commander may be required to 

be dual-hatted: commander and staffer. Without a CA element on the staff, the 

commander may serve as the ASCC/corps/JTF commanderís senior CA advisor. The 

brigadeís focus is development, reconstruction, and stabilization. The CA brigade 

enables SCA and is the operational C2 system structure to form a JCMOTF, if required. 

The brigade headquarters provides C2 and staff supervision of the operations of the CA 

brigade and assigned CA battalions or attached units. Its focus is on tactical and 

operational employment of CA forces and attached CMO forces. The CA brigade plans, 

enables, shapes, and manages CAO in coordination with IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and the OGAs 

through its CLT, which is found in the CA brigades CMOC. 

(3) The CA battalion focus is on the division commanderís ready-capability to 

plan, enable, shape, and manage stabilization and reconstruction and the 

enablement/reestablishment/support of civil administration at the provincial level. USAR 

CA battalions possess CA functional specialty support- in the areas of rule of law, 

governance, public health and welfare, and infrastructure, and provide tactical CA 

support to the division command. This battalion has an HHC, a CAPT, a CMOC capable 

of providing one CLT, a functional specialty cell, and four CA companies, each with a 

CMOC and five CATs. Each CA line company can provide planning, coordination, and 

assessment at the tactical level, and C2 to the assigned CATs. 

(4) Employment Considerations. Reserve CA employment as attached forces 

requires detailed management of time-phased force and deployment data and task 

organizations by unit identification code. Supported unit commanders are responsible to 

provide the vast majority of administrative and logistic support because these capabilities 

are not usually organic to CA. By table of organization and equipment, CA units are 

authorized the latest in conventional and SO communications equipment and computers 

to allow secured and unsecured Internet communication, over-the-horizon and satellitecapable radios and laptop computers with access to the Internet. Additionally, CA units 

must be equipped with the current and most common civilian communications equipment 

to allow them to interface with IGOs, NGOs, IPI, and private sector in the AOR. Specific 

requirements beyond these capabilities are determined during mission analysis and 

forwarded to the supported command as a statement of requirements. 
Civil Affairs Service Capabilities 

A-A-3 

2. United States Marine Corps 

a. USMC commands have the capability to plan and conduct CMO across the 

range of military operations. Dedicated CA structure is maintained within the RC and 

consists of two CAGs, each commanded by a colonel (O-6). While every effort is made 

to recruit and train Marines with a broad variety of military and civilian skills, each 

member of the CAG is a CA generalist. The CAGs are organic to the Marine 

expeditionary force (MEF): they augment and reinforce the capabilities of the MEF or 

other Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). USMC CAGs are not apportioned 

separately under the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, but are inherent when a MEF is 

provided to a combatant command for planning or operations. Each CAG is regionally 

oriented to the projected employment of the MEF it supports. MAGTF commanders 

request USMC CA support via their Marine Corps component commander. USMC CA 

participate in security cooperation efforts when made available by their component 

commanders. 

b. USMC CMO typically are centrally planned by the MAGTF staff for 

decentralized execution by assigned forces. Each MAGTF has organic air, ground, C2, 

and logistic capabilities that provide immediate and integrated CMO options to the JFC. 

Operational maneuver from the sea, implementing ship-to-objective maneuver and 

seabased logistics, enables rapid execution of USMC CMO, without the need to establish 

extensive infrastructure ashore. Qualified USMC volunteers must provide initial CA 

support to a deployed MAGTFs and be prepared to deploy within days of a validated 

request, even if no Presidential Reserve Call-up is authorized. Additional volunteers may 

provide further support, by Presidential Reserve Call-up of CAG elements for 

contingencies, or by mobilization of entire CAGs. Regardless of size, USMC CA 

elements will require support from the MAGTF in such areas as transportation, health 

services, supply, and messing. 

c. USMC CMO are performed to directly support the MAGTFís assigned mission, 

which typically is of limited duration, performed under austere conditions, and 

expeditionary in nature. These missions might include NEOs, the offload of maritime 

pre-positioning ships, HA in response to complex emergencies, amphibious operations, 

or employment as an enabler for follow-on operations. These types of limited 

contingency operations rarely will allow for exhaustive coordination of details or 

extensive planning prior to execution. Instead, the MAGTF must understand the goals 

and priorities of the JFCs, COMs, and US embassy country teams within the operational 

area. CA and CMO initially focus on confirming, updating, and disseminating the 

assessment of the situation; providing an initial response to emergencies; stabilizing the 

operational area; and enhancing the legitimacy of the force. Initial CA plans prepare for 

a transition of responsibilities to other agencies, such as other US military forces, the 

interagency, IGOs, or NGOs. USMC CA are also prepared to assist a supported Navy 

commander. This support might be required when amphibious shipping is tasked to 

transship evacuees, provide emergency medical support to civilian casualties, or control 

sea approaches, pier space, or cargo handling. 
Annex A to Appendix A 

A-A-4 JP 3-57 

d. As a self-contained, combined arms force, the MAGTF may become involved in 

sustained operations ashore. These situations will require detailed coordination with the 

GCCís CA assets, IGOs, NGOs, and the other interagency organizations operating within 

the MAGTFís area of operations. Deployed CA forces (and those accessed via reachback) facilitate mission accomplishment by focusing on noncombatants. They leverage 

the MAGTFís resources, especially in C2 systems, by integrating the complementary 

capabilities of other agencies to achieve success and allow timely force redeployment. 

Throughout, Marine CA efforts help the commander to meet moral and legal 

responsibilities while accomplishing the military mission. 

e. To complement the CAGs, the USMC has assigned its artillery community with 

the secondary mission of conducting CMO. 

3. United States Navy 

 All USN maritime CA units are based within CONUS and are assigned by the 

SecDef to Commander, US Joint Forces Command. They report administratively to the 

Chief of Naval Operations via Commander, US Fleet Forces Command and Commander, 

to the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), a subordinate organization of US 

Fleet Forces Command. 

a. USN CA forces were established primarily to support naval units engaged in the 

conduct of CMO within the maritime domain. The USN has developed or enhanced 

capabilities to operate in the maritime domain through aggregating forces within its 

NECC. Among the many capabilities found within NECC are Riverine, Naval Coastal 

Warfare, Explosives Ordnance Disposal, Naval Construction Force (SEABEEs), 

Expeditionary Logistics Support Group, Expeditionary Security Force, Expeditionary 

Training Command, and the MCAG. MCAG, together with other NECC Navy 

expeditionary forces or other USN forces, provides capabilities for the conduct of CMO 

within the coastal riverine, and near shore environments. These capabilities range from 

projection of CMO forces ashore from carrier and amphibious ships utilizing small 

surface craft and helicopters to ground transportation, engineer, communications, 

medical, and security force capabilities provided by NECC as an adaptive force package 

or that are organic to individual ships or carrier and expeditionary strike groups. The 

MCAG serves as the link between USN forces and the civil element within the maritime 

domain. MCAG conducts CAO across the maritime domain supporting GCC, USN 

component commanders, numbered fleets, and strike groups, in the planning and conduct 

of the full range of CMO. 

b. The MCAG is a multi-composition organization containing a mix of Active and 

Reserve Components. It is organized with a group headquarters staff and a functional 

specialty team, two regionally aligned maritime CA squadrons along with subordinate 

maritime CA unit headquarters and maritime civil affairs teams (MCATs). The MCAG 

is immediately available for contingency operations and is trained for worldwide 

operations within the maritime domain. MCAG core competencies include: 
Civil Affairs Service Capabilities 

A-A-5 

(1) Maritime CA Plans and Operations. MCAG provides a highly mobile 

group or squadron forward headquarters serving as a CMO plans and operations element 

integrating with Navy component and fleet headquarters that are also capable of 

integrating as joint CMO planners and operations staff within a JTF. This forward 

headquarters element is capable of providing C2 for direction of employed MCAT 

assessment operations and in directing/synchronizing the efforts of the CMOC. This 

forward headquarters maintains communications with their parent maritime CA 

headquarters and reach-back to maritime CA functional experts. 

(2) Maritime Civil Affairs Team Assessment. MCAG provides regionally 

aligned, highly mobile MCATs capable of rapid deployment to their assigned theaters. 

MCATs provide a reconnaissance capability producing a civil assessment of the 

supported commanderís area of operations. They deploy with ground and maritime 

mobility packages along with a robust communications suite with long-distance radio and 

satellite communications, digital photo and video capabilities. 

(3) Civil-Military Operations Center. MCAG is capable of establishing and 

operating a CMOC. 

(4) Maritime Functional Area Expertise. MCAG provides a full range of 

functional expertise tailored for use within the maritime domain. Additionally, MCAG 

provides unique functional expertise in marine fisheries and resources, commercial port 

operations, and harbor and channel construction and maintenance. 

c. Employment Considerations. Although MCAG possesses the capability to 

respond rapidly in support of contingency operations, its multi-composition 

(Active/Reserve) nature and size constrains its ability to respond to large scale operations 

outside of its intended purpose, the support of theater naval component forces. MCAG 

forces are not substitutes for USA or USMC CA forces and should only support other 

Services in extreme situations. 

4. United States Air Force 

a. The United States Air Force (USAF) does not maintain CA units. The USAF 

has tasked its Judge Advocate General to provide an organic capability within the Air 

Force to advise and assist in CAO. Many Air National Guard (ANG), active duty Air 

Force, and Air Force reserve judge advocates and paralegals are trained in CA issues and 

have been involved in significant CAO (e.g., PRTs in Afghanistan). A variety of 

functional organizations and capabilities within the Air Force Reserve Command and 

ANG as well as the active force can support or complement CAO. These include legal, 

air mobility, chaplain, health services, security forces, intelligence, surveillance, 

reconnaissance, civil engineering, bioenvironmental, and meteorological services. In 

supporting CCDRs, the USAF upon request can provide specially qualified personnel for 

service in Army or joint CA units as specialists. 
Annex A to Appendix A 

A-A-6 JP 3-57 

b. Air National Guard Readiness Center. Access to ANG personnel with CArelated skills may be accomplished through the Air National Guard Readiness Center, an 

active Air Force unit that exercises administrative control over such personnel ordered to 

active duty under conditions short of full mobilization. 

 

c. The Air Force International Health Specialist (IHS) Program develops a cadre of 

multi-corps health professionals with expertise in CMO including domestic and 

international interagency coordination. IHS personnel are ideally suited to integrate 

public health and welfare with all CA functional specialty areas. 

5. United States Coast Guard 

a. The Coast Guard does not maintain CA. However, the Coast Guard can provide 

a variety of capabilities, assistance, equipment, and training in helping a country organize 

and establish a coast guard. Generally, maritime USCG forces have four principal 

missions: military operations and preparedness, law enforcement, maritime safety 

(including search and rescue), and enforcement of shipping and navigation laws. 

b. The Coast Guard Model Maritime Service Code is a valuable reference for other 

nations to use for establishing a maritime force. 
ANNEX B TO APPENDIX A 

ENGINEERING 

A-B-1 

1. United States Army 

a. The USA has a wide variety of engineer units at division, corps, and theater 

level that provide particular technical capabilities required to accomplish essential, 

diversified tasks throughout the depth of the theater. The engineer architecture forms 

these units into an organization that is responsive to commanders at all echelons. 

b. US Army operational engineer headquarters, assigned to Army and joint 

organizations, include 2 theater engineer commands (TECs), 13 engineer brigades, and 

over 85 engineer battalions. The TEC, headed by major general, provides C2 to engineer 

brigades and other engineers in a theater as well as joint civil engineering support 

planning for a theater and operates in close conjunction with the senior contract 

construction agent from the US Army Corps of Engineers in the operational area. TECs 

and engineer brigades composed of up to five engineer battalions are normally assigned 

to an ASCC for major operations. Engineer brigades and battalions also may be assigned 

or attached to corps, divisions, or combat support brigades (maneuver enhancement) for 

the conduct of operations. Engineer battalions consist of a task organized companies and 

teams. Engineer companies include a variety of combat engineer units to support the 

mobility, countermobility, and survivability of maneuver forces; geospatial units; and 

vertical and horizontal construction companies for GE. Engineer teams include 

specialized units for diving, mine dog detection, facilities management, construction 

management, geospatial planning, explosive hazards coordination, water well drilling, 

real estate management, quarrying, asphalt, and firefighting. 

c. The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is the Armyís major 

command assigned responsibility to execute Army and DOD military construction, real 

estate acquisition, and development of the nationís infrastructure through the civil works 

program. Other services include wetlands and waterway management and disaster relief 

support operations. With its subordinate divisions, districts, laboratories and centers, 

USACE provides a broad range of engineering service support to the Military 

Departments, federal agencies, state governments, and local authorities. The USACE 

also provides technical assistance and contract support to joint forces deployed 

worldwide. 

d. US Army engineers are capable of providing the senior engineer command 

headquarters in the operational area or integrating into a joint force and supporting other 

Services as well as multinational and civilian organizations. 

For additional information on the employment of US Army engineers, refer to Field 

Manual (FM) 3-34, Engineer Operations, and JP 3-34 Joint Engineer Operations. 

2. United States Marine Corps 

a. The MEF is supported by an engineer support battalion (ESB) that is organic to 

the Marine logistics group (MLG) contained within the MEF. The ESB is structured to 

facilitate task organization and provide GE and combat service support to the MEF. The 
Annex B to Appendix A 

A-B-2 JP 3-57 

ESB is organized to plan, coordinate, and supervise GE support functions. The GE 

support includes enhancing the MEFís mobility, countermobility, and/or survivability 

(M/CM/S), in addition to conducting the MEFís explosive ordnance disposal missions. 

(1) ESB provides vertical and horizontal construction, gap crossing, water 

purification, and mobile electric power. 

(2) ESB can conduct limited counter obstacle missions. 

(3) ESB is the primary USMC engineering unit to support CMO. 

b. The Marine division is supported by one combat engineer battalion (CEB), 

which provides combat engineering support and limited GE support through taskorganized combat engineer elements. The mission of the CEB is to enhance the M/CM/S 

of the Marine division. The Marine division contains three infantry regiments, and a 

combat engineer company that normally supports each regiment. The CEB and combat 

engineer company both enhance the movement of operational forces in much the same 

manner as the ESB. The Marine aircraft wing has engineer capabilities embedded in the 

Marine wing support squadrons (MWSSs). These support squadrons possess capabilities 

for the construction and maintenance of airfields, fuel handling, materials handling, and 

limited vertical and horizontal construction. They also can provide mobile electric power 

and can purify water to potable standards. Engineer requirements exceeding MWSS 

capabilities are augmented by the ESB. The Marine division, wing, and MLG structure 

outlined here is similar for I and II MEFs. The organizational structure for engineering 

support for III MEF is similar but slightly reduced due to a smaller end strength. 

3. United States Navy 

a. Naval civil engineering forces are organized and equipped to meet the 

requirements of diverse CMO engineering tasks. They are versatile, flexible, expandable, 

rapidly deployable, sustainable, and are able to reconstitute for expeditionary operations. 

Naval civil engineering forces combine the complementary but distinct capabilities of the 

engineering operating forces of the First Naval Construction Division (1NCD) and naval 

amphibious construction battalions (PHIBCBs) of the naval beach groups, the business 

enterprise of Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), and combatant 

command staff engineer positions. 

(1) Because of integral working relationships, naval civil engineering forces are 

able to leverage an unlimited range and scope of engineering and construction 

capabilities to support the warfighter. Mission support areas include construction of 

advance bases, horizontal and vertical construction, battle damage repair, the full range of 

facility planning, design, construction, contracting, operation and maintenance, and 

environmental compliance. 

(2) With expertise ranging from amphibious and underwater construction, to 

construction contracting, facilities management, real estate acquisition, environmental 
Engineering 

A-B-3 

compliance, ship-to-shore support, pier construction and repair, well-drilling, fleet 

hospital erection, construction of standard and nonstandard bridges, water and fuel 

storage and distribution, electrical power generation systems, and utilities systems. They 

also provide technical engineering and contract support. 

b. The naval construction force (NCF), also known as the SEABEEs, provides the 

JFC with flexible expeditionary engineering forces capable of supporting a wide range of 

missions. The NCF primarily supports the MEF and Navy ashore forces as directed by 

existing plans and orders. The NCF also supports component missions specified by the 

CCDRs. NCF capabilities enable the JFC to optimize the effectiveness of dedicated 

Armed Forces across the range of military operations. 

(1) NCF units enhance the MAGTF through complementary, not duplicative, 

support. 

(2) NCF units are highly skilled specialists capable of executing projects of a 

more sophisticated and permanent nature than normally accomplished by USMC 

engineer battalions. Their capabilities include the following: 

(a) Military construction engineering support to GCCs, the USN, and the 

USMC; 

(b) Battle damage repair; 

(c) Construct and maintain expeditionary airfields, main supply routes, 

advanced bases and port facilities, ammunition supply points, deliberate bridging, as well 

as a wide range of other combat support and combat service support facilities; 

(d) In a contingency environment, provide organic capability for defensive 

military operations and sustainment for independent operations; and 

(e) In a peacetime environment, provide Navy component commanders 

and joint force maritime component commanders with contributory support and GCCs 

with recovery operations, FHA, PO, and other operational support with a rapid, 

expeditionary engineering response capability. 

c. 1NCD provides forces to fulfill operational requirements of a CCDR exercising 

C2 over subordinate naval construction regiments (NCRs). It may deploy when two or 

more subordinate NCR units (e.g., five or more naval mobile construction battalions 

[NMCBs]) deploy to a theater. 1NCD is comprised of 3 active and 4 reserve NCRs, 9 

active and 12 reserve NMCBs, 2 active construction battalion maintenance unit (CBMUs) 

with reserve augment support, two active underwater construction teams (UCTs), and a 

reserve naval construction force support unit (NCFSU). NCF units include the following: 

 (1) The NMCB is the basic operating organization and most capable SEABEE 

unit for conducting construction and engineer operations. It is a modular task 
Annex B to Appendix A 

A-B-4 JP 3-57 

organization of air transportable, ground, and logistics elements. NMCBs can deploy 

rapidly as part of amphibious ready forces, maritime pre-positioning forces, and air 

contingency forces. It constructs advance base facilities in support of the USN, USMC, 

and other Armed Forces and provides repair, maintenance, and construction support 

during contingency, emergency, or recovery operations; 

 (2) CBMU provides follow-on public works operations, maintenance and repair 

at existing advanced base shore facilities or facilities constructed by NMCBs in 

contingency operations. It also provides public works support for various expeditionary 

medical facility configurations during military operations. Designated personnel are 

assigned in accordance with Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 4-02.4, 

Fleet Hospitals. In peacetime, CBMUs provide repair and maintenance support to US 

shore installations and have a secondary mission to conduct disaster recovery missions; 

 (3) UCT provides underwater engineering, construction, repair, and inspection 

support and performs complex inshore and deep ocean underwater construction tasks, 

including ocean bottom surveys for potential underwater facilities; 

 (4) NCFSU provides construction and engineering support for NCF units, 

including specialized civil engineering support equipment, material, repair parts, and 

technical expertise; and 

 (5) NCR exercises C2 over subordinate NCF units, providing planning, 

coordination, and oversight. It deploys when two or more subordinate NCF units deploy 

to a theater. 

For additional information on the employment of the NCF, refer to Navy Warfare 

Publication (NWP) 4-04, Navy Civil Engineering Operations, and NTTP 4-04.1, Seabee 

Operations in the MAGTF. 

d. NAVFAC is the Navyís global shore facilities manager. It is an Echelon II 

systems command reporting to the Chief of Naval Operations and consists of more than 

13,000 military, civilians, and contractors who serve as engineers, architects, contract 

specialists, and professionals. This commandís primary mission is to provide facilities 

engineering, acquisition, and technical support to the operating forces of the USN and 

USMC. It provides construction supplemental and contingency contracting capability for 

planning, designing, and executing construction in theater including 

architectural/engineering services, real estate, environmental compliance, and base 

operation support/facility services. It also provides technical support across a broad 

spectrum of engineering and scientific disciplines during contingency and crisis action 

planning, and solves challenging problems related to engineering, infrastructure, and 

environmental compliance during contingency operations using reach-back capabilities. 

NAVFAC also maintains standing contingency contracts with large international and 

continental US civil construction, engineering, and facility support service firms for 

contingency response missions. 
Engineering 

A-B-5 

For additional information on the employment of NAVFAC, refer to NWP 4-04, Navy 

Civil Engineering Operations. 

e. Amphibious construction battalions, also known as PHIBCBs, are an integral 

part of naval civil engineering operating forces organized under the naval beach group. 

They provide over-the-shore logistic movement and construction support to amphibious 

forces. 

For information on the employment of the PHIBCBs, refer to NWP 3-02.1, Ship to Shore 

Movement, and NTTP 3-02.14 (REV A), The Naval Beach Group. 

4. United States Air Force 

a. The USAF engineering mission is to provide the necessary assets and skilled 

personnel to prepare and sustain global installations as stationary platforms for projecting 

air and space power across the range of military operations. Air operations are highly 

dependent on operating bases; consequently, engineering planners must participate in all 

stages of operational planning for bases to be available when they are needed. Air Force 

engineering units can deploy either as a part of an expeditionary force, or as detached 

units operating in support of specific missions and operational taskings. The USAF civil 

engineering mission in support of a typical plan or order includes rapid runway repair, 

emergency war damage repair to other essential facilities, force beddown, operations and 

maintenance, crash rescue and fire suppression, explosive ordnance disposal, chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazard mitigation including toxic industrial 

materials, and improvised explosive devices, and construction management of emergency 

repair of war damage and force beddown that are necessary for employing USAF forces 

and weapons systems. These engineering forces are organized either as Prime Base 

Engineer Emergency Forces (Prime BEEF), or Rapid Engineers Deployable Heavy 

Operations Repair Squadron, Engineers (RED HORSE) units. During any type of 

military operation, engineer requirements will be numerous, and military engineers may 

be stretched beyond their capability. A force multiplier for USAF engineering is the Air 

Force contract augmentation program (AFCAP) that allows civil engineers to focus on 

the most critical missions. 

b. Prime BEEF is the primary organizational structure for supporting both mobility 

and in-place contingency requirements. The principle objective of deploying Prime 

BEEF teams is to beddown and support an air and space expeditionary task force. Force 

beddown generally divides into three categories ó aircraft, personnel, and infrastructure 

support. Aircraft support provides the maintenance shops, hangars, squadron operations 

centers, munitions storage, fuel storage, and other facilities directly supporting the flying 

mission. Personnel support provides the housing, feeding facilities, latrines, showers, 

administrative offices, and other indirect support facilities. Infrastructure support 

provides the utility systems, solid and hazardous waste disposal, roads, and 

communications that serve the beddown site. Beddown locations range from main 

operating bases with adequate existing facilities to bare bases with no facilities other than 

runways, taxiways, and aircraft parking aprons. Tasks accomplished by Prime BEEF 
Annex B to Appendix A 

A-B-6 JP 3-57 

units include airfield support, fire protection, fuel systems setup and support, explosive 

ordnance disposal functions, FP, base defense, base denial, rapid runway repair, facility 

repair, and utility repair. 

c. The AFCAP provides commanders with another option to relieve military 

engineers, particularly for critical high threat or critical missions. AFCAP has 

installation support capabilities that mirror the USAF engineering and Services functional 

capabilities. AFCAP can provide all the installation support services and operations 

inherent in the Air Force engineering and Services functional areas, except explosive 

ordnance disposal; CBRN operations; field operations and mortuary affairs. AFCAP may 

be used after an initial military beddown response, for facility erection and construction 

requirements, or to support recovery operations at existing locations across the full 

spectrum of conflicts. 

d. RED HORSE squadrons and their associated unit type code configurations 

provide highly mobile, largely self-sufficient, rapidly deployable echelons to support 

major force beddown requirements and to repair heavy war damage. RED HORSE units 

are stand-alone squadrons not tied to peacetime base support. They provide Air Force 

component commanders a dedicated, flexible, airfield and base heavy construction and 

repair capability that allows the GCCs to move and support missions as the air order of 

battle dictates. RED HORSE units accomplish major construction in forward locations, 

often in advance of the main deploying force. They provide heavy horizontal (earth 

moving and pavements) and vertical (facility and utility skills such as petroleum, oils, 

and lubricants; structural, mechanical, and power generation) engineer capability, and 

possess special capabilities such as quarry operation (blasting and rock crushing), well 

drilling, concrete or asphalt batch plant operations, specialized building construction (KSpans), and constructive explosive operations. RED HORSE units also are required to be 

current in a variety of other capabilities across the range of military operations. 

For more details on engineering, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. 
ANNEX C TO APPENDIX A 

MEDICAL CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS 

A-C-1 

1. Overview

An assessment of total HSS requirements for CMO comes from careful mission 

analysis, resource application, and an adequate survey of existing health service 

infrastructure. This health service assessment should then be coordinated within the 

theater HSS community. Medical civil-military operations (MCMO) will be performed 

by health service units directly and in conjunction with CA units. These activities must 

always be in line with the overall JFCís CMO objectives. DODD 2205.2, Humanitarian 

and Civic Assistance (HCA) Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations, lists 

medical and other health interventions as primary tools to promote the security interests 

of the USG and the HN, enhance operational readiness skills of US military units, and 

promote USG foreign policy interests. There is significant DOD policy on HCA and HA 

based on legal authority within Title 10, US Code. Additionally, there are several 

funding sources for CA and medical forces to perform MCMO missions legally and 

effectively. 

2. Civil Affairs and the Health Sector 

a. It is important for health personnel to be involved directly with the assessments, 

planning, and execution of CMO that directly and indirectly affect the health sector. The 

health sector is a term used internationally to include all aspects within a country or area 

that affects the populationís health. It is critical to consider all the aspects of that 

particular country to develop positive relationships and acquire information to maximize 

the health of the largest number of people. A viable health sector that can lead to better 

overall health is thus very important to a population and in stabilization and 

reconstruction efforts.

b. The term ìhealthî is considered in the broadest sense as defined by the World 

Health Organization (WHO), ìa state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, 

and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.î Thus, health includes direct care, 

disease surveillance and prevention, sanitation, nutrition, potable water, hazardous waste 

and material management, and consideration of physical and psychological impact of 

conflict and hardship. All of these components of health are typically disrupted, and 

often destroyed, in nations in which military operations are conducted or other natural or 

man-made crises have occurred. Many times, these services were already in disrepair 

and a new emergency or conflict makes them even worse. 

c. Other sectors of a society that, overlap with and, impact the health sector include 

governance, administration, logistics, economics, and security. The amount of HN 

governmental control over health infrastructure, policy, and personnel, or lack thereof, 

will determine how the health assets will be employed and if they can be reconstructed. 

A countryís processes and alternative processes for acquiring medical materiel will be 

affected by its other logistic needs and capabilities. Finally, if the environment is 

insecure, the risk to health sector workers may prevent them from delivering services to 

the population. 
Annex C to Appendix A 

A-C-2 JP 3-57 

3. Medical Civil-Military Operations

a. MCMO are CMO that are accomplished by health service personnel and 

typically affect the health sector of the involved nation and where other civil sectors 

integrate with the health sector. MCMO can be employed across the range of military 

operations. Cooperation and coordination with joint military assets, the interagency, HN, 

FN, IPI, NGOs, IGOs, private sector, and other entities will facilitate better long-term 

effects and outcomes. 

b. MCMO through the Range of Military Operations. MCMO include 

peacetime medical engagement cooperation activities, HA, disaster response and disease 

outbreak response in a permissive environment, pre-conflict health-related CMO, and 

health related activities during major campaigns and operations, and post-conflict 

stability operations. Although the primary mission of HSS is to enable FHP, HSS 

personnel may be tasked to conduct or support MCMO in activities that build HN or FN 

capacity in the public health sector. These operations often are conducted in areas where 

social services have been disrupted, resulting in poor sanitation, inadequate and unsafe 

food and water (as well as distribution problems), civil disturbances, and general civil 

unrest, diseases, uncontrolled distribution of hazardous wastes and hazardous materials, 

and environmental extremes. In this environment, there are several HSS activities that 

may be appropriate for MCMO that include: public health activities, to include 

preventive medicine initiatives, personal sanitation and hygiene training, safe food and 

water preparation and handling, infant and child care, preventive dental hygiene, 

immunizations of humans and animals, veterinary care and behavioral health surveillance 

and support. Additional efforts can include the development of logistic programs, 

continuing HSS education programs and HSS medical intelligence and threat analysis, 

and assistance in upgrading and devising methods for supplying and sustaining existing 

HN medical infrastructure and facilities. 

4. Planning for Medical Civil-Military Operations

a. Medical planners must consider FHP and direct care needs of US forces as well 

as the assets and resources needed to support CMO designed for the indigenous 

population. For example, the medical planners may have to adjust typical personnel and 

logistic packages to care for women and children affected even in operations not 

originally of a humanitarian nature. 

b. Medical planning should account for the appropriate MCMO that will enhance 

each type of operation and at each operational phase. The medical planner in conjunction 

with other experts within the joint force surgeonís office must liaison with the CMO staff, 

the HN or FN ministry of health, the country team, USAID, and other USG and 

international agencies that address the health sector. An understanding of the capabilities, 

intentions, and efforts of these organizations will allow the joint force surgeon and the 

medical planners to include, or exclude, joint US military health assets as appropriate. 
Health Service Support 

A-C-3 

c. Needs assessment should be led or conducted in conjunction with the HN or FN 

ministry of health or governance leadership in the health sector, when possible. Civilian 

health partners such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, WHO, USAID, and 

any NGOs/IGOs familiar with the operational area also can help with this process. The goal 

is to identify the health sector priorities of the HN or FN and the most threatening issues to 

the local population. In doing so, the medical health service can then target resources and 

health assets to projects that will help build indigenous health system capacity and 

capabilities, save lives, meet the commanderís CMO objectives, and be sustainable by the 

HN or FN upon transition. 

d. Medical logistics play a significant role in the delivery of health care during 

stability operations. Prior to a deployment, the joint force surgeon determines if there are 

any special medical supplies or equipment requirements for the operation; due to the variety 

of operations there will be different priorities to meet MCMO needs. The medical planner 

must include plans on how logistics experts will obtain and coordinate transportation, and 

transport, receive, sort, store, and distribute Class VIII materiel. Further, health service 

logistic personnel can collaborate with IGOs, NGOs, and the HN or FN in assisting the 

military or civilian medical supply infrastructure and industry. See Figure A-C-1 for CMO 

medical planning considerations. 

5. Caring for Non-United States Patients 

Past lessons in stability operations indicate that although providing care and health 

resources to non-US patients has not been specifically planned for except in pure 

humanitarian missions, it is done in almost every operation. Populations that are cared 

MEDICAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS IN

MEDICAL CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

!

!

!

!

!

!

Enhance host nation legitimacy

Account and prepare for local cultural and religious norms

Share information and validation of ideas with civil affairs, foreign 

area officers, and local and international health experts

Recognize local and international standards of care and avoid 

raising expectations above what is sustainable by the host nation

Account for potential negative effects of medical civil-military 

operations on local health care system and the economy

Legal issues

Figure A-C-1. Medical Planning Considerations in Medical Civil-Military Operations 
Annex C to Appendix A 

A-C-4 JP 3-57 

for include DCs, enemy wounded, and detainees. In practice, concepts of international 

law, under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, have adopted into DOD policy as part of the 

LOAC. Additionally, the care of local populations that are affected by conflict in which 

the United States is involved has been assumed to be a moral obligation by the precedent 

of US military actions. Often times, health care experts from preventive medicine to 

surgical care act and treat people in need regardless of the personís affiliation or 

combatant status. 

6. Health Sector Capacity Building 

a. Health sector capacity building includes interventions with intent to rebuild 

indigenous capability and ownership in the health sector. The goal is to equip, or reequip, the HN or FN to take care of their own people instead of the US military providing 

care and services of a different kind, quality, scope, and logistic package than what will 

be present upon transition. Basically, capacity building should avoid providing parallel 

health services support that foster different expectations or standards than HN or FN can 

sustain in the future. 

b. Health sector capacity building should focus on public health and preventive 

medicine, which are the basis of a strong health sector. The most common causes of 

morbidity and mortality are addressed mainly with sanitation, potable water availability, 

and nutritious food availability. Direct medical care and ancillary health services have a 

role as well and the US military medical forces can partner with other agencies to do so. 

Capacity building includes planning for the transition of health services totally to HN or 

FN control with other long-term NA health sector entities in support, such as USAID, the 

Red Cross, NGOs, or IGOs. 

c. The focus of HSS initiatives during MCMO is to improve HN or FN capacity to 

provide public health and medical services to its population, thereby enhancing 

legitimacy of the HN or FN, enhancing FP, and accomplishing the JFCís objectives. 

Capacity building initiatives during MCMO should emphasize long-term developmental 

programs that are sustainable by the HN or FN. 

7. Teams 

Multiple teams and cells can be established to bring military and civilian minds 

together, both indigenous and multinational, to coordinate and cooperate on CMO. 

Health/medical personnel can be members on these teams and function in advisory and 

planning capacities to help achieve success in the health sector that supports USG 

objectives. The health care experts on these teams may come from different US agencies 

including DOD, USAID, the US embassy in the HN, Department of Health and Human 

Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control Prevention or NGO/IGO 

experts in MCMO and public health. Additionally, WHO and other regional or 

international health organizations may provide invaluable collaboration. 
Health Service Support 

A-C-5 

8. Joint Medical Assets for Civil-Military Operations

The seven functional capabilities of HSS are: policy and resource acquisition, 

prevention and protection capability, first responder capability, forward resuscitative care 

capability, theater hospitalization capability, definitive care capability, and en route care 

capability. These functions, although not necessarily available at each level, are 

considered throughout the continuum of the health care system by the command surgeons 

and medical planners. MCMO is not one of these seven listed capabilities, and there are 

no stand alone medical units from any Service primarily designated to accomplish 

MCMO; theater medical assets must be designated to accomplish MCMO as an 

additional mission. However, capabilities are present within each Service that can adapt 

to providing civic assistance. There are a limited number of medical personnel within 

each Service who have acquired training and experience in CMO related activities and 

are well suited for leading, planning, and executing MCMO. 

a. United States Army. CA units have health service personnel assigned with the 

duties of providing evaluation and advice on health sector issues pertinent to the CAO. 

Particular emphasis of the health service CA team member is placed upon preventive 

medicine sanitation and disease prevention, veterinary medicine and prevention of 

zoonotic diseases. CA health personnel are not intended to provide joint FHP, casualty 

care, or patient movement capabilities to the CA unit, nor deliver medical supplies to the 

populations to achieve CA objectives. Consequently, CA units are dependent on theater 

HSS assets for the care of the CA unit and dependent upon theater HSS assets in 

conjunction with HN and NGO assets to execute MCMO. USA battalion and brigade 

size units and higher contain attached or assigned Professional Filler System doctors, 

assigned physician's assistants and organic medical platoons and companies that can 

provide health service expertise to maneuver units conducting CMO. 

b. US Navy. The Navy does not have any medical personnel or units primarily 

dedicated to MCMO or CA support. Hospital corpsmen in SO have some CA training as 

do all SOF. Forward deployable preventive medicine units are ideally suited to assume a 

civic assistance role and accomplish collaborative MCMO with HN or FN and 

international assets. Navy hospital ships are capable of bringing US standard medicine 

and personnel to a region in a sustainable and visible fashion. These and other organic 

medical assets can be employed to provide civic assistance in various operations but 

again should be employed with the planning principles noted previously into primarily 

capacity building activities with long-term sustainability and effects for the allies being 

supported. 

c. USMC. The Navy provides all medical support to the Marines including 

medical corpsmen who embed in Marine Corps units. The Marine Corpsí CAG is similar 

to the Army CA in that they do not necessarily have a medical expert on the team. 

d. US Air Force. The Air Force Medical Service (AFMS) deploys modular, 

expandable field health service units and equipment packages to accomplish care in 

expeditionary force operations. The AFMS provides an infrastructure designed to field 
Annex C to Appendix A 

A-C-6 JP 3-57 

and sustain a medically ready force throughout the entire range of military operations. 

This postures the AFMS to cover the full range of global engagement and enlargement 

and to respond in HA, disaster response, as well as traditional health care operations. 

Due to the modularity and rapid deployment capability, AFMS assets may be used to 

support a primarily humanitarian, civic, or other multinational stability operations. 

AFMS personnel participate at the start of force employment planning and expeditionary 

force operations. Health service surveillance teams are critical assets in this process and 

can report on health threats at deployment locations. The USAF IHS program serves 

combatant and component command surgeons by providing medics with proficiency in a 

second language, regional and cultural expertise, medical planning, medical diplomacy, 

CMO, knowledge of IGOs and NGOs, knowledge of HA and disaster response, and other 

medical stability operations. IHS personnel assigned to combatant commands or to a JTF 

surgeonís staff work at the strategic and operational levels with CA to monitor and guide 

MCMO. IHS personnel from the AC and RC can lead or augment other health assets in 

tactical execution of MCMO. 
ANNEX D TO APPENDIX A 

MILITARY POLICE OR SECURITY FORCES 

A-D-1 

1. United States Army 

a. MP perform five functions in any combination needed to accomplish the 

mission in both joint and multinational operations. These functions are: 

(1) Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations ó support to river crossing 

operations, breaching operations, passage of lines, straggler and DC control, route 

reconnaissance and surveillance, main supply route regulation enforcement. 

(2) Area Security Operations ó reconnaissance, rear area and sustainment 

operations security, response force operations, critical asset, site, and high-risk person 

security. 

(3) Law and Order Operations ó law enforcement, criminal investigation 

and US Customs operations. 

(4) Internment and Resettlement Operations ó Detainee handling, PRC, 

and US military prisoner operations. 

(5) Police Intelligence Operations ó MP functions that support, enhance, and 

contribute to a commanderís situational understanding and operational environment 

visualization and FP program by portraying the relevant criminal threat and friendly 

information which may affect the operational and tactical environments. 

b. The US Army provides the JFC a complete range of MP organizations from 

theater-level MP commands, headed by a major general, through MP brigades task 

organized with five to seven MP combat support or internment/resettlement battalions, to 

a variety of companies and teams. Combat support MPs focus on providing maneuver 

and mobility support or area security operations to their supported unit. 

Internment/resettlement battalions are designed to provide personnel service, logistic 

support, and custodial care for either 4,000 detainees or life support and protection for 

8,000 DCs. Specialized MP teams include military working dogs and law and order 

detachments. MP commands and brigades normally are assigned to an ASCC while MP 

battalions also may be assigned to division-level combat support brigade (maneuver 

enhancement). 

c. US Army Criminal Investigations Command (USACIDC) is the USA sole 

agent responsible for investigating felony crimes. USACIDC provides investigative 

support to commanders at every echelon. USACIDC investigates violations of 

international agreements on land warfare and provides forensic science support to other 

USACIDC units in the theater. In addition, at the direction of the commanding general of 

USACIDC or higher authority, they conduct special investigations. 

For more information on US Army MPs, see FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, and 

FM 3-19.40, Internment/Resettlement Operations. 
Annex D to Appendix A 

A-D-2 JP 3-57 

2. United States Marine Corps 

a. A Marine Corps MP company is assigned to the division, wing, and MLG. A 

provost marshal assigned to the MAGTF command element coordinates their efforts. 

While MP assets are currently resident within each MAGTF subordinate element, a 

variety of task organizations and control options may be employed by the MAGTF 

commander depending on the mission and situation. The MP companyís sole purpose is 

to provide security support to the MAGTF; thus, it is dependent upon the other 

organizations for administration, supply, maintenance, health services, and food service 

support. 

b. The security support provided to the MAGTF commander encompasses the 

following operations: 

(1) Antiterrorism (AT)/FP support ó Vulnerability assessments to identify 

command areas that are vulnerable to terrorist attack. Assist criminal and tactical 

information gathering. Assist in AT/FP training. 

(2) Traffic control maneuver and mobility support ó Route reconnaissance 

and surveillance; main supply route regulation and enforcement; area damage control 

identification; and information collection, reporting, and dissemination. 

(3) Area security ó Security and protection of LOCs, critical assets (e.g., 

airfields, service support areas), physical security, and MAGTF rear areas. 

(4) Detainee operations ó US military prisoner operations; DC and straggler 

control. 

(5) Law and order ó Services to assist the MAGTF commander in 

maintaining good order and military discipline including law enforcement, criminal 

investigations, customs support, and MP information control. 

(6) The four USMC artillery regiments are assigned CMO responsibilities as a 

secondary mission in support of Marine Corps divisions. 

3. United States Air Force 

a. The USAF has a security and law enforcement arm, Air Force security forces 

that perform security and law enforcement functions on bases and installations. 

b. Security forces have overall mission responsibilities throughout the USAF for 

the following: 

 
Military Police or Security Forces 

A-D-3 

(1) Air and Space Systems Security provides security for and the protection 

of all operational and combat-ready weapon systems from sabotage, espionage, 

subversion, and attack. 

 

(2) Law enforcement is responsible for installation entry control, crime 

prevention, traffic control, resource protection, limited criminal investigations, and motor 

vehicle accident investigations. 

(3) Antiterrorism maintains the capability to protect USAF resources and 

personnel from terrorism and respond to terrorist attacks. 

(4) Air Base Defense. During increased tensions, conflict, or war, security 

forces provide combat capability to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy ground 

attacks. Air base defense is a common task of all security forces specialties. 

(5) Corrections. Security forces control USAF inmates at its corrections 

facilities and are responsible for movement, local security, and transient prisoner security 

throughout the Air Force. 

(6) Information security manages USAF information security, personal 

security, industrial security, and the classification management programs. 

 

c. Security forces conduct these missions throughout the USAF, CONUS, and 

outside the continental United States (OCONUS). Security forces conduct these missions 

fully armed and prepared to confront any threat against US national security. 

d. In a tactical environment, OCONUS the air base defense mission may include a 

base boundary that extends outside the air base permitting tactical maneuver to assess and 

defend the threat of attack using standoff-type weapons. SF conduct combat patrols 

outside the physical boundaries of the perimeter fence within the base boundary. 

Security forces are doctrinally trained to coordinate these operations with local law 

enforcement, or in a theater of war, with HN, FN, or MP assets. MP ensures the area of 

security for the base is understood and procedures to respond and reinforce the security 

forces are carefully coordinated. 

e. The Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI) is a field operating 

agency that has been the Air Forceís felony-level investigative service since 1948. It 

reports to the Inspector General, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. The AFOSI 

provides professional investigative service to commanders of all Air Force activities. It 

further identifies, investigates, and neutralizes criminal, terrorist, and espionage threats to 

the USAF and DOD personnel and resources. The command focuses on four priorities: 

detect and provide early warning or worldwide threats to the USAF; identify and resolve 

crime impacting USAF readiness or good order and discipline; combat threats to USAF 

information systems and technologies; and detect and defeat fraud impacting USAF 

acquisitions and base level capabilities. 
Annex D to Appendix A 

A-D-4 JP 3-57 

f. Security forces are also actively involved in the military working dogs security 

missions, and are responsible for the DOD military working dogs center at Lackland Air 

Force Base, TX. In view of the large geographical areas that security forces must secure 

(air base), the military working dogs greatly assist in patrolling and are an excellent 

addition to enhance the security of the facilities. 
ANNEX E TO APPENDIX A 

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 

A-E-1 

1. United States Army 

a. PSYOP are planned operations conveying selected information and indicators to 

foreign audiences and are intended to influence the emotions, motives, objective 

reasoning, attitudes and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, 

groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign 

attitudes and behaviors favorable to US national policy objectives.

(1) PSYOP are a core capability of IO and have a central role in the 

achievement of IO objectives in support of the JFC across the range of military 

operations. The effectiveness of PSYOP is enhanced by the synchronization and 

coordination of the core, supporting, and related capabilities of IO. Conversely, 

dissemination of information about CMO efforts and results via PSYOP can affect the 

perceptions of a broader audience and favorably influence key groups or individuals. 

(2) Commander, USSOCOM exercises COCOM of CONUS-based active USA 

PSYOP forces; CONUS-based USA Reserve PSYOP forces are assigned to US Joint 

Forces Command and further assigned to the USA Reserve Command. When directed, 

CDRUSSOCOM and Commander, US Joint Forces Command provide trained and ready 

PSYOP personnel to GCCs and US ambassadors. C2 of PSYOP forces normally is 

executed by the establishment of a joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF) 

directly under the JFC. The USA PSYOP capability consists of one active and two USA 

Reserve PSYOP groups. 

b. Psychological Operations Group (POG). The POG plans, coordinates, and 

executes PSYOP activities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. A POG is 

structured to support conventional and SOF deployed worldwide. It can operate up to 

two PSYOP task forces at the combatant command and the JTF level. A POG typically 

contains the following organizations: 

(1) Regional PSYOP Battalion (POB). Found only in the active USA POG, 

regional POBs provide cultural and linguistic expertise and are capable of providing 

simultaneous PSYOP support to two or more organizations within the combatant 

command. 

(2) Dissemination PSYOP Battalion. Dissemination POBs provide audio, 

visual, and audiovisual materials production, signal support, and media broadcast 

capabilities to the POG, JPOTF, and tactical PSYOP units. The dissemination POBs can 

simultaneously support two separate operational areas at the combatant command level. 

(3) Tactical PSYOP Battalion (TPB). TPBs provide tactical PSYOP support 

to corps-level units and below and select SO and conventional task forces at Army-level 

equivalent-sized units. The TPB develops, produces, and disseminates tactical products 

within the guidance (themes, objectives, and target audiences) assigned by the JPOTF 

and authorized by the product approval authority (CCDR or subordinate JFC). The 
Annex E to Appendix A 

A-E-2 JP 3-57 

primary capability of the TPB is the dissemination of PSYOP products to include 

loudspeaker messages, leaflets, handbills, posters, and face-to-face communications. 

c. In addition to supporting CMO, PSYOP also can support the SO missions of 

FID, unconventional warfare, direct action, and counterterrorism. PSYOP also support 

the SO collateral activity, and humanitarian demining operations. 

2. United States Marine Corps 

The USMC has the capability to execute both audible and visible actions designed to 

convey specific impressions to the enemy (e.g., broadcasts from either shore-based or 

airborne loudspeaker systems). Furthermore, the KC-130 or helicopter assault support 

assets organic to the Marine aircraft wing can conduct leaflet dissemination. PSYOP 

expertise within the USMC resides principally within the RC. The CAGs form PSYOP 

detachments from personnel drawn from the CAG, or trained for PSYOP. The CAGs, 

when activated, require support from the MAGTF command elementís support unit in 

such areas as supply, health services, mess, and transportation. 

3. United States Navy 

 

a. Capabilities to produce audiovisual products are available from Fleet Imaging 

Command, Pacific; Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic; various film libraries; Naval Media 

Center; and from aircraft carriers and large deck amphibious ships. A Navy Reserve 

PSYOP audiovisual unit assigned to the US Joint Forces Command also is available to 

provide support. 

b. Navy personnel assets have the capability to produce documents, posters, 

articles, and other material for PSYOP. Administrative capabilities ashore and afloat 

exist to prepare and produce various quantities of printed materials. Language 

capabilities exist in naval intelligence and among naval personnel for most Asian and 

European languages. 

4. United States Air Force 

a. The USAF has a variety of assets capable of conducting or supporting PSYOP. 

Some are specifically modified for the PSYOP role. A limited number of EC-130 

COMMANDO SOLO aircraft have PSYOP as their primary mission and are equipped for 

airborne broadcasts of radio and television signals. MC-130 COMBAT TALON and 

COMBAT SHADOW are capable of leaflet airdrop missions. 

b. Most all other USAF air and space assets have the inherent capability to support 

PSYOP. USAF satellites and aerial reconnaissance photos can be used to support 

PSYOP targeting and discredit adversary claims or intentions. C-130 and HC-130 

aircraft can be configured for leaflet airdrop operations. Additionally, USAF fighter and 

bomber aircraft can dispense leaflets by dropping M-129 leaflet bombs. 
Psychological Operations 

A-E-3 

c. PSYOP can be conducted across the range of military operations. In peacetime, 

the major command/numbered Air Force operations officer, in conjunction with the IO 

team, is the operational planning element for IO and may coordinate IO actions when an 

air and space operations center has not been activated. When the air and space operations 

center is activated, a portion of the information warfare flight is established as an IO team 

and integrates into the warfighting divisions within the air and space operations center. 

The IO team provides the IO expertise to plan, employ, and assess IO capabilities prior to 

the initiation of hostilities, transition to conflict, and reconstitution. It is important to 

note that some IO are planned or executed throughout the USAF every day, regardless of 

the status of an operational air and space operations center. 

For additional information, refer to JP 3-13.2, Doctrine for Joint Psychological 

Operations.
Annex E to Appendix A 

A-E-4 JP 3-57 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX B 

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS 

B-1 

1. General 

TSOCs provide C2 of SOF deployed in theater. They ensure that SOF capabilities 

are employed and that SOF are synchronized with conventional military operations. 

TSOCs also ensure SOF personnel participate in theater mission planning and that theater 

component commanders are thoroughly familiar with SOF capabilities in addition to 

operational and support requirements. Regardless of the command relationship, TSOCs 

are the link between theater SOF and the geographic combatant commands. JFC CMO 

staffs provide staff support of USA, USMC, and USN CA forces deployed in theater. 

They ensure that CA capabilities are employed and that CAO are synchronized with 

conventional military operations. JFC CMO staffs also ensure CA personnel participate 

in theater mission planning and that theater component commanders are thoroughly 

familiar with CA capabilities in addition to operational and support requirements. 

a. CA Selection. Selection of CA in support of a plan or order should be based on 

a clear concept of CA mission requirements. Once requirements are developed, the CMO 

staff element should determine appropriate augmentation requirements based on CA 

functional expertise. 

b. Analyzing the Civil Dimension. The challenge to CMO planners is to 

articulate their contribution to the JFCís mission. In the course of mission analysis, the 

COGs concept is useful as an analytical tool while designing campaigns and operations to 

assist commanders and staffs in analyzing friendly and adversary sources of strength as 

well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Commanders and CMO planners must look 

beyond the traditional military-to-military construct in considering the impact of the civil 

dimension on operations. While the civil dimension applies to both adversary and 

friendly COGs, in some operations, it can dominate the focus of analysis. Additionally, 

analysis of the civil dimension is a continuous process throughout an operation and looks 

at the following six interrelated factors: 

(1) Key Civil Geographic Areas. Key civilian areas are localities or aspects 

of the terrain within a commanderís operational environment, which are not normally 

thought of as militarily significant. The commander must analyze key civilian areas in 

terms of how these areas affect the militaryís mission as well as how military operations 

impact these areas. Examples of key civilian areas that a commander should analyze are 

areas defined by political boundaries (e.g., districts within a city and municipalities 

within a region); locations of government centers; social, political, religious, or criminal 

enclaves; agricultural and mining regions; economic and industrial zones; ethnic fault 

lines; trade routes; and possible sites for the temporary settlement of DCs or other civil 

functions. Failure to consider key civilian areas can seriously affect the success of any 

military mission. 

(2) Infrastructures and Buildings. Existing structures take on many 

significant roles. Bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams, are often 

considered high-value targets. Others, such as churches, mosques, and national libraries, 

are cultural sites that are generally protected by international law or other agreements. 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-57 

Hospitals are given special protection under international law. Other facilities with 

practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools, television and radio stations, 

and print plants may be useful for military purposes. Analyzing structures involves 

determining the location, functions, capabilities, application, and consequences of 

supporting military operations. Using a structure for military purposes often competes 

with civilian requirements for the same structure and requires careful consideration. 

Additionally, if exigent military operations require decisions whether or not to destroy 

specific structures, consideration must balance the short- and long-term effects of such 

actions. 

(3) Institutional Capabilities. Capabilities can be analyzed from different 

levels. The analyst views capabilities in priority from the perspective of those required to 

save, sustain, or enhance life. Capabilities can refer to the ability of local authorities be 

they HNs or FNs, aggressor nations, or some other bodies ó to provide key functions or 

services to a populace (e.g., public administration, public safety, emergency services, 

food, water and agriculture). Capabilities include those areas with which the populace 

needs assistance in revitalizing after combat operations (e.g., public works and utilities, 

public health, economics, and commerce). Capabilities also refer to resources and 

services that can be contracted to support the military mission (e.g., interpreters, laundry 

services, and construction materials and equipment). The HN or other nations may 

provide these resources and services. 

(4) Influential Organizations. These organizations are nonmilitary groups or 

institutions that influence and interact within the operational area. They generally have a 

hierarchical structure, defined goals, established operations, fixed facilities or meeting 

places, and a means of financial or logistic support. Some organizations may be 

indigenous to the area, such as church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service 

organizations, labor unions, criminal organizations, and community watch groups. Other 

organizations may be introduced to the area from external sources, such as multinational 

corporations, the interagency, IGOs, and NGOs. 

(a) The commander must be familiar with the organizations operating 

within the operational area (e.g., their activities, capabilities, and limitations). 

Additionally, the commander must understand how the operations of different 

organizations impact on the commandís mission, how military operations impact on 

organizational activities, and how organizations and military forces can work together 

towards common goals, as necessary. 

(b) The commander uses the CMOC to keep advised of all these issues. 

(5) Key Communicators and Populace. This general term is used to describe 

the nonmilitary personnel encountered by military forces during operations. The term 

includes all the civilians within an operational area as well as those outside this area 

whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the military mission. 

Individually or collectively, people impact military operations in positive, negative, or 

neutral manners. 
Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Operations 

B-3 

(a) There may be many different groups of people living and working 

within a given operational area. Like the discussion of organizations above, people may 

be indigenous to the area or introduced from external sources. An analysis of 

demographics should identify various capabilities, needs, and intentions of a specific 

population. 

(b) It is useful to separate people into distinct categories that consider 

historical, cultural, ethnic, political, economic, and humanitarian factors. It is critical to 

identify key communicators as well as the formal and informal communication processes 

used to influence a given population. 

(6) Events. Events include routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities 

that significantly impact both civilian lives and military operations. Some civil events 

that affect organizations, people, and military operations are national and religious 

holidays, agricultural crop/livestock and market cycles, elections, civil disturbances, and 

celebrations. Other events are disasters from natural, man-made, or technological sources 

that create civil hardship and require emergency response. Examples of events 

precipitated by military forces include combat operations, deployments, redeployments, 

and paydays. Once the analyst determines which events are occurring, it is important to 

template the events and to analyze them for political, economic, psychological, 

environmental, and legal implications. 

c. Predeployment Planning

 (1) The early deployment of CA in the operational area can be a great force 

multiplier, setting the stage for the introduction of follow-on forces into an environment 

that has benefited from specialized interaction with the local population. 

 (2) The functional composition of CA varies with mission, availability, 

qualifications of CA, plus the supported commanderís preferences. 

 (3) Mobilization of RC CA must be a consideration during predeployment 

planning. 

(a) The USA, USN, and USMC all have authorizations for CA specialists. 

The majority these CA authorizations are in the RC.

(b) USA RC CA units normally arrive in theater 130 days after Presidential 

Reserve Call-up for contingencies or upon mobilization. 

(4) Ensure agreement/arrangement is in place with the HN through the 

appropriate en route and operational area US embassies for personnel and aircraft 

diplomatic clearances to support CA arrival. 
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 3-57 

d. Post-Conflict Operations. Post-conflict activities typically begin with 

significant military involvement, and then move increasingly toward civilian dominance 

as the threat wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished. US forces frequently will 

be in transition from one mission to another. The transitions may cause the US military 

to be engaged in several types of joint operations across the range of operations. 

Transitions at the conclusion of any major military operation require significant 

preparation, planning, and coordination between the interagency community, NGOs, 

IGOs, and the HN/FN government. US military forces, at the conclusion of hostilities, 

will support long-term US interests and strategic objectives including the establishment 

of security and stability in the region. 

(1) Transition or termination occurs either upon accomplishment of the mission 

or as the President or SecDef so directs. CMO planners play a major role in transition 

and termination not only in the planning process (by establishing a transition mechanism) 

but also with assisting civilian organizations in clarifying their respective roles and 

responsibilities after US military forces leave the area. 

(2) MOEs or success, availability of resources, or a specific date is the basis for 

transition or termination criteria. A successful harvest or restoration of critical facilities 

in the crisis area are examples of events that might trigger termination of the mission. An 

acceptable drop in mortality rates, a certain percentage of DCs returned to their homes, or 

a given decrease in threat activity is statistical criteria that may prompt the end of US 

military forcesí involvement. 

 

(3) When other organizations (such as UN, NGOs, HN, FN, and IGOs) have 

marshaled the necessary capabilities to assume the mission, US forces may execute a 

transition plan. 

(4) Transition may occur between the US joint force, another military force 

(e.g., United States, multinational, and affected country), regional organization, the UN, 

or civilian organizations. A detailed plan addressing the various functions and to whom 

they will transition will greatly reduce the turmoil typically associated with transition. A 

comprehensive transition plan includes specific requirements for all elements involved in 

the transition, summarizes capabilities and assets, and assigns specific responsibilities. A 

major aspect during transition is the movement of large numbers of military forces and 

civilians out of or within the operational area. 

(a) An unclassified transition plan written in easily understood terms 

particularly is required when transitioning to nonmilitary organizations. Organizing the 

plan by specific functions (such as provision of food, restoration of facilities, and medical 

care) also enhances the transition. 

(b) The joint force staff should periodically review the transition plan with 

all organizations that have a part in it. This will help ensure that planning assumptions 

are still valid, and determine if changes in the situation require changes in the transition 

plan. 
Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Operations 

B-5 

(5) Termination plans should cover transition to post-disaster or emergency 

activities and conditions, as well as disposition of military forces. Orders and termination 

plans should be prepared simultaneously and in conjunction with the deployment plan, 

with the termination plan serving as a supporting plan to an order. See Figure B-1 for a 

sample checklist for termination planning. 

(6) Transition Planning. CMO planners play a major role in transition 

planning and may be the best group to perform this function because of their expertise. 

In order for these planners to accomplish this task, a clearly identifiable end state and 

transition or termination criteria for the operation must be developed. 

(a) Transition planning is an integral part of operation planning and 

mission analysis. 

(b) Transferring control of an operation from US military to a nonmilitary 

organization or another military force requires detailed planning and execution. Mission 

analysis (analysis of mission statement), an identifiable end state, USG strategic plan for 

reconstruction, stabilization, or conflict transformation, and the national policy will all 

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

Has the end state been achieved?

Can forces be safely withdrawn from the operational area? What are the 

force protection requirements? 

Has coordination for redeployment of the joint force been conducted with 

appropriate commands, agencies, and other organizations?

Has consideration been given as to when Reserve Component forces will 

be released?

Has transition planning been accomplished in the event that operations 

are transitioning to another military force, regional organization, United 

Nations, or civilian organization?

What arrangements have been made with other organizations to 

accomplish the post-conflict activities? For example, will there be 

humanitarian, governmental, and infrastructure assistance requirements?

Will the joint force be expected to support these types of activities?

"

"

"

"

"

"

Have stated operational objectives been accomplished?

Have the underlying causes of the conflict been considered, and how 

do they influence termination planning?

Has the joint force commander identified post-conflict requirements?

What additional support will be required for redeployment?

What is the policy for redeployment? What is the relationship between 

post-conflict requirements and the redeployment of the joint force?

What is the policy for evacuation of equipment used by the joint force?

SAMPLE CHECKLIST FOR TERMINATION PLANNING

Figure B-1. Sample Checklist for Termination Planning
Appendix B 

B-6 JP 3-57 

play an important role in the transition process. Transferring control of an operation is 

situation dependent and each one will possess different characteristics and requirements. 

(c) Transition planning must be initiated during the initial phases of 

operation planning to ensure adequate attention is placed in this critical area ó plan for 

transition when planning for intervention. 

(d) As the redeployment phase for US military forces approaches, it is 

important to continue emphasizing FP. The redeployment phase can be the most 

hazardous because the tactical focus shifts toward redeployment and away from FP. 

(e) Areas that will significantly impact the development of a transition plan 

are: 

1. Identification of issues. 

2. Key events (past and present). 

3. Work required to accomplish the transition. 

4. A thorough knowledge of the organization or force taking over 

control of the operation. 

(f) The CMOC is heavily involved in the transition process. The CMOC 

prepares to hand over its role as the facilitator between US forces and IGOs, NGOs, other 

interagency organizations, and local government agencies. CMOC personnel prepare a 

transition plan that includes all ongoing projects and coordination, points of contact for 

all agencies with which the CMOC has worked, possible resources, and any other 

information that may facilitate the transition process. The CMOC can support joint, 

combined, or single-Service operations from the strategic to the tactical level. In general, 

the CMOC is a structured coordination center in which transition planning is an essential 

activity. 

(g) All CMO assets involved in a mission must be prepared to assist in the 

planning and execution of transition operations. The civil dimension may be the most 

complex portion of this process. It is imperative that all teams or sections develop 

historical files to aid in the transition process. The transition process must be considered 

from the initial planning of the mission. CA play a major role in this planning process 

because of their functional expertise, regional focus, and ability to operate and facilitate 

activities with a variety of organizations. Figure B-2 depicts a sample checklist for 

transition planning. 
Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Operations 

B-7 

Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?

Have stated operational objectives been accomplished?

Who will fund the transition?

What is the new mission?

What US forces, equipment, and/or supplies will remain 

behind?

What will be the command relationship for US forces that 

remain behind?

What will be the communications requirements for US forces 

that remain behind?

Who will support US forces that remain behind?

Can intelligence be shared with the incoming force or 

organization?

Will new rules of engagement be established?

Will ongoing operations (e.g., engineer projects) be 

discontinued or interrupted?

Will the United States be expected to provide communications 

capability to the incoming force or organization?

Will the incoming force or organization use the same 

headquarters facility as the joint force?

What is the policy for redeployment of the joint force?

Will sufficient security be available to provide force 

protection? Who provides it?

How will the turnover be accomplished?

Who will handle public affairs for the transition?

Have redeployment airlift and sealift arrangements been 

approved and passed to the United States Transportation 

Command?

SAMPLE CHECKLIST FOR TRANSITION PLANNING

Figure B-2. Sample Checklist for Transition Planning 
Appendix B 

B-8 JP 3-57 

e. Force Protection

(1) FP includes actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD 

personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. 

These actions conserve the forceís fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive 

time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive 

measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading 

opportunities for the enemy. FP does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect 

against accidents, weather, or disease. Elements of FP include but are not limited to the 

following: 

(a) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear. Joint warfighter 

CBRN defense capability requirements are divided into four functional concept areas ñ 

sense, shape, shield, and sustain. Core capabilities for sense include reconnaissance, 

detection and identification (contamination avoidance); shape includes information 

systems; shield includes individual and collective protection, and medical prophylaxes 

and pretreatments; and sustain includes decontamination, restoration, and post-exposure 

medical capabilities (i.e., therapeutics and diagnostics). 

For further guidance concerning nuclear, biological, and chemical defense, refer to JP 

3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Environments. 

(b) Antiterrorism. AT programs support FP by establishing measures that 

reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. These measures may 

include limited response and containment by local military forces. They also consist of 

defensive measures to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, 

facilities, information, and equipment. 

For further guidance on AT, refer to JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism. 

 (c) Security. Security of forces and means enhances FP by identifying and 

reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security operations 

protect flanks and rear areas in the operational area. Physical security measures deter, 

detect, and defend critical installations, facilities, information, and systems against threats 

from intelligence assets, terrorists, criminals, and unconventional forces. Measures 

include fencing and perimeter stand-off space, lighting and sensors, vehicle barriers, blast 

protection, intrusion detection systems and electronic surveillance, and access control 

devices and systems. Physical security measures, like any defense, should be 

overlapping and deployed in depth. 

For further guidance on physical security measures, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security 

Operations in Theater. 

(d) Operations Security. Effective OPSEC measures minimize the 

ìsignatureî of joint force activities, avoid set patterns, and employ deception when 
Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Operations 

B-9 

patterns cannot be altered. OPSEC measures are an integral element of IO. Although 

strategic OPSEC measures are important, the most effective methods manifest 

themselves at the lowest level. Varying patrol routes, staffing guard posts and towers at 

irregular intervals, and conducting vehicle and personnel searches and identification 

checks on a set but unpredictable pattern discourage terrorist activity. 

For further guidance concerning OPSEC, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security. 

(e) Law Enforcement. Law enforcement aids in FP through the 

prevention, detection, response, and investigation of crime. A cooperative police 

program involving military and civilian or HN or FN law enforcement agencies directly 

contributes to overall FP. 

 

(f) Personal Security. Personal security measures consist of commonsense rules of on- and off-duty conduct for every Service member. They also include use 

of individual protective equipment, use of hardened vehicles and facilities, employment 

of dedicated guard forces, and use of duress alarms. 

 (2) Planning for Force Protection 

(a) JFCs and their subordinate commanders must address FP during all 

phases of contingency action planning. All aspects of FP must be considered and threats 

minimized to ensure maximum operational success. JFCs and their subordinate 

commanders must implement FP measures appropriate to all anticipated threats, to 

include terrorists. 

(b) Supported and supporting commanders must ensure that deploying 

forces receive thorough briefings concerning the threat and personnel protection 

requirements prior to and upon arrival in the operational area. 

(c) In addition, JFCs and their subordinate commanders must evaluate the 

deployment of forces and each COA for the impact of terrorist organizations supporting 

the threat and those not directly supporting the threat but seeking to take advantage of the 

situation. 

(d) CA forces must address their particular FP concerns with JFCs. For 

example, it may be inappropriate and counterproductive for CA in full combat attire to 

conduct liaison with local officials. These type concerns should be addressed early in the 

ì. . . I try to make the point that there is no way to guarantee 100 percent 

force protection while accomplishing the variety of missions we undertake 

out there. Somewhere, sometime, we are going to lose people again to 

terrorist or other actions that take advantage of our own less-than-perfect 

protective measures.î 

General Anthony Zinni, US Marine Corps Commander in Chief, US Central 

Command, 1997-2000 Address at the US Naval Institute 
Appendix B 

B-10 JP 3-57 

planning process. Additionally, CA must address with JFCs how the various elements of 

FP (discussed above) impact on how they perform their mission. 

(e) CA, because of their ability to work with the populace and their overall 

expertise, can provide JFCs insight into FP concerns before they become major issues. 

(f) Intelligence support to FP consists of monitoring and reporting 

activities, intention, and capabilities of adversarial groups and determine their possible 

COAs. Detecting the adversaryís methods in todayís operational environment requires a 

higher level of situational understanding, informed by current and precise intelligence. 

This type of threat drives the need for predictive intelligence based on analysis of focused 

information from intelligence, law enforcement, and security activities. 

For more detailed discussion of FP, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

f. Joint Urban Operations

(1) In any operational area, most of the civil authority and the greater part of 

the population are likely to reside in one or more urban areas. Because of the numbers 

and density of civilians, any urban operation will require a significant CMO (CAO) effort 

on the part of the joint force. 

(2) CMO conducted as part of urban operations strive to achieve the same 

objectives as in other types of operations. These are: 

(a) Enhance military effectiveness, 

 

(b) Support national objectives, and 

(c) Reduce the negative impact of military operations or other destructive 

force on civilians. 

(3) CMO and Urban Operations

(a) As with other activities, the complex, physical aspects of urban terrain 

can hamper CMO. The urban terrain can fragment and channel CMO efforts, particularly 

FHA. It will be difficult to find and reach all those in need of support. Constricted 

terrain makes it more difficult to control large numbers of people in PRC operations. 

Urban areas normally offer many buildings usable for shelter, medical care, and other 

forms of support, but the damage to those structures from military operations or natural 

or man-made disaster can make them unusable, thus adding to the support difficulties. 

(b) Noncombatants are the primary focus of CMO, and urban areas may 

contain huge numbers of civilians. These numbers may range from the thousands to the 

millions. Depending on the circumstances, many will be displaced and in need of basic 

support. Services may be degraded or nonexistent. The requirement to control and 
Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Operations 

B-11 

support the noncombatant population can easily overwhelm local capabilities. Effective 

urban CMO requires knowledge of the ethnic, cultural, religious, and attitudinal 

characteristics of the populace. Noncombatant populations in urban areas are rarely 

homogenous, therefore effective CMO will require the understanding of neighborhoods, 

tribal relations, and the basic allegiances and daily life of the inhabitants. 

(c) Urban infrastructure may be functioning with some degree of 

effectiveness, in which case CMO must work through and with local authorities and 

services. It may be necessary to repair physical infrastructure facilities and means, such 

as power plants or water stations, as part of CMO. Existing service infrastructure may be 

totally lacking or overwhelmed by circumstances, requiring the joint force to provide not 

only basic subsistence and shelter, but the full gamut of support personnel ó police, 

legal, administration, engineer, sanitation, medical, transportation, and other. 

(d) The proximity of civilians to military targets increases the requirement 

to actively screen the joint integrated prioritized target list for indirect fires and minimize 

the impact of collateral damage. The proximity to civilians increases the risks that 

diseases and other public health hazards will pose health risks to military personnel. 

(4) CMO Considerations in Joint Urban Operations. Urban operations will 

include CMO. Urban CMO can support overall operational objectives or be the main 

focus of operations, but are in any case the responsibility of the CCDR to plan and 

conduct. 

 

(5) Planning Considerations. Planning for CMO support of urban operations 

is generally the same as for other CMO with special emphasis on the nature of the urban 

area. The JFC and staff should consider the impact of military operations on 

noncombatants to include their culture, values, and infrastructure; thereby viewing the 

urban area as a dynamic and complex system ó not solely as terrain. General planning 

considerations were addressed earlier in this chapter. Additional planning considerations 

are below: 

(a) CMO planners should carefully consider these aspects of the urban area 

ó terrain, civilian populace, environment, and infrastructure. 

(b) Some other factors to consider include legal implications, 

communications, culture, education, economic, religious, labor, health, and 

administrative infrastructure. 

(c) NGOs, IGOs, the interagency community, and IPI also play a major 

part in all CMO but may be of more importance in urban operations. 

(6) Synchronization. CMO must be synchronized both internally and with 

other operations. The relation of CMO to the overall operation can vary a great deal 

depending on the situation. Joint urban operations could require the full extent of CMO 

in one portion of an urban area while another is still being heavily contested. Most likely, 
Appendix B 

B-12 JP 3-57 

regardless of the situation, civilians in the operational area will have a great impact on 

operations. Planning must be synchronized to ensure CMO and other operations (e.g., 

combat operations) support the USG overall objectives. 

(7) Support. CMO may require support in a number of key areas from other 

forces (e.g., HSS, engineer, and MP/security forces). 

(8) Other Operational Considerations. The most important urban operation 

consideration is that CMO will most likely occur simultaneously with, not subsequent to, 

other operations ó including combat. The JFC must therefore identify sufficient forces 

and synchronize the planning and execution of these operations as well as the support 

required. The relation of CMO to other operations in joint urban operations will vary, but 

CMO will be a significant part of any operation. 

For further guidance concerning urban operations, refer to JP 3-06, Doctrine for Joint 

Urban Operations. 

g. Consequence Management (CM). DOD defines CM as actions taken to 

maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from 

disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. 

(1) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence 

Management. The CM activities for all deliberate and inadvertent releases of CBRN that 

are undertaken when directed or authorized by the President. CBRN CM supports the 

United States, its territories, and possessions. This type of response occurs under the 

primary jurisdiction of the affected state and local government. The Federal government 

provides assistance when required. When situations are beyond the capability of the 

state, the governor may request federal assistance from the President. In accordance with 

the National Response Framework, the President may direct the Federal government to 

provide supplemental assistance to state and local governments to alleviate the suffering 

and damage resulting from disasters or emergencies. FEMA bears primary 

responsibility for coordination of federal assistance to state and local governments. 

(2) The Commander, United States Northern Command acts as the supported 

CCDR for all CM operations conducted in CONUS. The Commander, United States 

Northern Command exercises OPCON of all DOD forces in such operations with the 

exception of JSOTFs and the US Corps of Engineers supporting the primary agency. 

(a) Commander, US Northern Command, Commander, US Southern 

Command, and Commander, US Pacific Command. These GCCs have specific 

responsibilities for assisting domestic civil authorities in their AORs and are the 

supported commanders during CBRN CM operations. In addition to the homeland 

defense mission, these commanders, when directed by the President or SecDef, provide 

civil support, to include CBRN CM operations. Other geographic and functional 

commands support Commander, US Northern Command, Commander, US Southern 

Command, and Commander, US Pacific Command in their CBRN CM efforts. 
Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Operations 

B-13 

(b) Additionally, there are standing forces such as Joint Task Force-Civil 

Support and US Army North with its two operational command posts that may be 

employed as task forces or JTFs (with augmentation) and tasked by US Northern 

Command to respond to CBRN CM situations. Other organizations with specific 

missions to respond to CBRN CM situations include the USMC Chemical Biological 

Incident Response Force, the USA Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Team, USN 

Response Task Force, and three USAF Response Task Forces (Air Combat Command, 

Air Force Space Command, and United States Air Forces, Europe). The President also 

can federalize the National Guard WMD civil support teams. 

(c) WMD civil support teams assigned to each state's National Guard will 

provide CM assistance to that state or to other states, in the event of a WMD event. 

(3) The Commander, US Southern Command acts as the supported CCDR for 

all CM operations conducted in Puerto Rico or the US Virgin Islands. 

(4) The Commander, US Pacific Command acts as the supported CCDR for all 

CM operations conducted in Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, American Samoa, or any of the 

other US possessions in the Pacific AOR. 

For further detail on CM support in the United States, refer to JP 3-27, Homeland 

Defense, JP 3-28, Civil Support, and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management. 

(5) Foreign CM is support to the HN or FN in response to the use of CBRN 

contaminants against an ally, regional friend, or US vital interest. These operations 

involve those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems 

resulting from disasters and catastrophes. Such services may include transportation, 

communications, public works, fire fighting, information planning, care of mass 

casualties, resources support, essential or routine health and medical services, urban 

search and rescue, hazardous materials, food, and energy. 

(6) Primary responsibility for managing and mitigating the effects of foreign 

WMD incident resides with the HN or FN government. The DOS is designated as the 

primary agency for foreign CM operations in support of a foreign government. All DOD 

support will be coordinated through the responsible US embassy COM and country team. 

 

For further detail concerning foreign CM, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Instruction (CJCSI) 3214.01B, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management 

Operations, JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management. 

(7) CA Support to CM
Appendix B 

B-14 JP 3-57 

(a) CM operations require extensive interagency coordination. 

 

(b) In CM operations, CA may provide liaison to the USG agencies, 

conduct assessments of the situation, or provide other expertise as required to include 

providing consultation to HN decision makers with the approval of the lead agency. 

h. Humanitarian Demining Operations. The general role of CA in these types of 

operations is to assist SOF and other forces in their efforts in supporting USG and 

geographic combatant commands in achieving their objectives. 

(1) CA execute programs that build capabilities in management, administration, 

logistics, equipment maintenance, communications, and data processing. CA are 

instrumental in the establishment of the HN Humanitarian Demining Office and the 

coordination of support with NGOs and IGOs. 

(a) Special forces teams train HN cadre in techniques to locate, identify, 

and destroy landmines and unexploded ordnance. 

(b) PSYOP teams assist HN governments to develop and implement mine 

awareness programs to train local populations to identify, avoid, and report locations of 

landmines and unexploded ordnance until these threats are removed. 

 

(c) CA train the HN demining headquarters in management and C2 of its 

subordinate elements. CA also provide liaison with the USG, IGOs, NGOs, and local 

organizations to coordinate support of the HN or FN demining infrastructure. 

(2) CA possess the expertise to support other SOF, conventional forces, and 

civilian organizations in humanitarian demining operations. CA possess the unique skills 

that foster relationships with the civilian community, which allow them to be a logical 

choice as part of a team to assist FNs in demining operations. 

For further guidance on military support to humanitarian demining operations, refer to 

CJCSI 3207.01A, Military Support to Humanitarian Mine Action Operations, JP 3-15, 

Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations, JP 3-29, Foreign 

Humanitarian Assistance, JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, and JP 3-

41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives 

Consequence Management. 

i. Negotiation and Mediation

(1) Although negotiation normally is not a primary responsibility for CA, often 

it falls upon them. CA often find themselves in the role of a mediator or even arbitrator 

at some point during operations. Each role requires different attributes, but there are 

many common ones and the following focuses on those common attributes and 

techniques. The US COM is the lead USG representative in-country and must authorize 

JFC personnel to coordinate with HN departments, IGOs, and NGOs. 
Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Operations 

B-15 

(a) Negotiations do not occur in a vacuum. It is important to understand 

the broader issues of conflict and their changing nature. 

(b) In many operations, it is essential to maintain dialogue with all parties, 

groups, and organizations ó including of course the government if one exists, but also 

the opposition or various factions or militias. 

(c) It is also important not to allow any one incident to destroy dialogue 

(even if force is applied) ó creating an atmosphere of hostility will not lead to a 

resolution. 

(2) Negotiation is an exercise in persuasion. It is a way to advance the 

commandís interests by jointly decided action. Cooperation of the other parties is a must; 

consider them partners in solving problems. 

(3) Think carefully about the full range of the forceís interests and prepare 

thoroughly for the full range of interests of the other parties. What are the underlying 

interests behind a particular position that a party has taken on a particular issue? People 

negotiate for different reasons such as: 

(a) tasks (e.g., the lease of a compound); 

(b) relationships (e.g., to get to know the other party and find out more 

information about whom that person is); and 

(c) status (e.g., legitimacy as a participant in the eyes of others). 

(4) Think carefully about alternatives in negotiating an agreement. How will 

you as a negotiator be most persuasive in educating others to see a negotiated settlement 

as being in their best interests? 

(5) Be attuned to cultural differences. Actions can have different connotations. 

The use of language can be different; ìyesî may mean ìnoî. How people reason and 

what constitutes facts and what principles apply are shaped by culture. Solutions often 

are best when they come from the factions themselves. Nonverbal behavior such as the 

symbolic rituals or protocols of the arrangement for a meeting also is important. It is 

particularly important to look at opportunities for small interim agreements that can be 

seen as ìtrust buildingî steps that are necessary when it will take time to reach agreement 

on larger issues. 

 

(6) Negotiations will be conducted at several levels: negotiations among US 

agencies and departments; between the multinational partners; between the joint force 

and UN agencies; between the joint force and local leaders. This complex web of 

negotiations requires the following to build consensus: tact, diplomacy, honesty, open 
Appendix B 

B-16 JP 3-57 

mindedness, patience, fairness, effective communications, cross-cultural sensitivity, and 

careful planning. 

(7) Procedures for Negotiation and Mediation. Successful negotiations 

should be based on the following steps: 

(a) Establish communications. The first step is to establish an effective 

means of communicating with the political or faction leader(s). Do not assume that 

certain leaders or elements are opposed to your efforts without careful investigation. 

Insist on fact finding before forming any opinions. 

(b) Carefully develop a strategic plan and diagram the results of your 

analysis. Useful questions to answer in this analysis are: 

1. What are the main issues? 

2. Who are the relevant parties? First order? Second? Third? 

3. What are these partiesí publicly stated positions? Privately stated 

positions? 

4. What are the underlying interests behind these positions? 

5. What are the bottom-line needs of each party? 

 

6. What are their concerns? Fears? To what degree does ìhistorical 

baggageî affect them? 

(c) There will be a negotiation on the conduct of negotiations. This 

process must be addressed in the initial planning sessions. 

(d) Set clear goals and objectives. Know what the joint force is trying to 

accomplish as well as the limits of its authority. Think carefully about how the joint 

force wants to approach the issues. Settle the easy issues first. Settle issue by issue in 

some order. Look to create linkages or to separate nonrelated issues. For example, 

security issues might be separated from logistic issues. Consider having details worked 

out at later sessions with the right people. Understand these sessions also will be 

negotiations. 

(e) Work with the parties to identify common ground on which to build 

meaningful dialogue. Expect to spend considerable time determining the exact 

problem(s). At this stage, be problem-oriented rather than solution-oriented. 

1. If a party perceives more benefits from an alternative to 

negotiations than to any outcome negotiations could produce, do not expect that party to 
Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Operations 

B-17 

negotiate to achieve an agreement. You need to educate and persuade them that 

negotiations will in fact produce the most benefits. 

2. Focus on underlying interests. Differences in the relative value of 

interests, forecasts of future events, aversion to risk, and time preferences may offer 

opportunities to develop options for mutual gain. 

3. Learn from the parties. Seek ways through partnering with them to 

find possible alternatives beyond their present thinking. 

4. When necessary, assume the role of convener, facilitator, or 

mediator. Be patient. 

(f) Composition of negotiating forum and decision-making mechanisms. 

In some cases a committee or council can be formed with appropriate representation from 

the various interested parties. It is critical to identify the right participants in advance. 

For example, will it include COM and JFC-level, mid-level, or working-level personnel? 

1. In deciding what constitutes the appropriate construct for a 

meeting, consider the culture. For example, what role do women play in the society? 

How is status defined in the culture? 

2. Composition of the committee or council also may include legal 

advisors, political representatives (e.g., DOS, UN agencies, or others), military 

representatives, and other civilian representatives from the joint force, NGOs, or IGOs. 

3. Members should possess the status and ability to deal with the 

leadership representing all involved parties. 

4. For those members seen as part of the joint force, it is important 

that they understand the issues and speak with one voice. This will require a prior 

coordination within the joint forceís delegation. They must understand policy and 

direction from higher authority. 

5. Negotiations are time-consuming and can be frustrating. As the 

head negotiator, be attentive to whether you have the people negotiating who can 

effectively recommend that their superiors ratify an agreement reached. Are all the 

decision makers who will determine whether the agreement reached is implemented 

represented in the committee or council? 

6. A supportive climate needs to be developed for the decision 

makers to complete an agreement. In that vein, it is useful to talk to those who are not 

decision makers but from whom the decision makers will need support. In this way, they 

may assist you in helping their decision makers reach agreement. 
Appendix B 

B-18 JP 3-57 

7. In zones of severe conflict and state collapse, it is frequently 

difficult to determine the legitimate community leaders with whom any lasting agreement 

must be made. 

8. The JFC must ensure that all of his or her negotiators understand 

the scope and latitude of their authority. Their requirement to obtain the JFCís prior 

approval will empower them in their role as negotiator or mediator. 

(g) Establish the venue. What is the manner in which meetings can be 

called? Can a neutral ground be found that is acceptable to all sides? Should US 

representatives go to the factional leaderís location, or will this improperly affect the 

negotiations? What about the details such as the seating arrangements or specific settings 

traditionally used in the culture? 

1. Selection of a negotiating venue also should be based on security 

for all involved parties, accessibility, availability of communications facilities, and 

comfort. 

2. Ensure that appropriate information arising from, or relevant to, 

the negotiations is shared with all parties. The timing of this sharing may vary depending 

on the circumstances. 

3. Sharing of information notwithstanding, all information generated 

from the negotiations may be held in confidence until officially released. That decision 

will depend on the nature of the talks. For example, if publicity may help create support 

and empower the negotiators to agree, release of information may be constructive. 

Flexibility is needed here rather than a hard and fast rule. 

(h) Cultural Considerations 

1. There are organizational cultures within the various agencies and 

departments of the USG that shape the context of negotiations. Equally important are 

national cultural differences. 

2. It is imperative that experienced interpreters be part of the 

negotiating team. What is critical is their understanding of the cultural context of terms 

used. The team needs more than literal translators. 

3. Negotiation is only one means of resolving conflict. It is 

worthwhile to consider indigenous conflict resolution techniques in selecting an 

approach. Adapting your techniques to indigenous ones (degradation of US objectives is 

not acceptable) may improve the prospects for a settlement. 

4. There are differences in styles of reasoning, manner in which an 

individual negotiates, who carries authority, and behavior in such dimensions as protocol 

and time. For example, in our culture it is accepted that one may offer concessions early 
Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Operations 

B-19 

in a negotiation to reach an agreement. That approach may not have the same 

connotation in other cultures. Moreover, the concept of compromise, which has a 

positive connotation for Americans, may have a negative one in other cultures. 

5. Where we as Americans tend to be direct problem solvers with a 

give-and-take approach, other cultures are indirect, most concerned with the long-term 

relationship, historical context, and principles. Issues of symbolism, status, and face may 

be important considerations. 

6. For example, answers may not be direct and you will have to look 

for indirect formulations and nonverbal gestures to understand what the other party is 

telling you. In turn, this means you need to be careful with your wording and gestures so 

that unintended meanings are not sent. The other party may not say no directly to a 

proposal but that is what is meant. 

7. If you cannot reach agreement, keep the dialogue going. At a 

minimum, seek agreement on when the parties will meet again. Look for something to 

keep the momentum alive. Go back to earlier discussions on common ground. Seek to 

keep trust alive in the process. 

8. Within your own team, consider selecting one person who 

understands conflict dynamics and cross-cultural issues to look at the process of the 

negotiations and advise you. This individual can watch for body language and other 

indicators of how the process is working. In turn, they may be able to coach the joint 

force negotiators in more effective techniques. 

(i) Implementation 

1. At the conclusion of negotiations, a report should be prepared to 

ensure all accomplishments, agreements, and disagreements are recorded for future use. 

2. Consider giving one person the task of reporting and presenting to 

all participants what has taken place. This can build trust in the process if it is viewed as 

an honest effort to understand each sideís position. 

2. Use of Civil Information Management 

 Civil information is information developed from data about civil areas, structures, 

capabilities, organizations, people, and events that can be fused or processed to increase 

interagency, IGO, and NGO situational awareness. It is a CA planning consideration. 

a. CIM is the process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central 

database, and fused with the supported JFC, higher headquarters, DOD and joint 

intelligence organizations, other USG and DOD agencies, interagency partners, NGOs, 

and the private sector to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the 

widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and 
Appendix B 

B-20 JP 3-57 

nonmilitary partners. CIM is not solely the task of the CA officer or noncommissioned 

officer in the CIM cell. It is an essential task for all components of a CA unit in 

coordination with the J-2, and should be broadly tasked to the supported units intelligence 

and maneuver elements to enhance the COP and facilitate the JIPOE process. The CIM 

goal is the enhancement of situational awareness and understanding for all elements in 

the operational environment to achieve decision superiority. 

b. Civil reconnaissance is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and 

evaluation of those specific civil aspects of the operational environment. It should be 

coordinated with the combatant commandís joint intelligence operations center to ensure 

integration and deconfliction with the intelligence collection plan. CA or other assets 

(e.g., engineer, medical, MP/security forces, HN or FN organizations, unmanned aircraft 

systems, interagency partners, or intelligence systems) can conduct civil reconnaissance. 

It is related to and often performed in conjunction with infrastructure reconnaissance 

(assessment and survey). The focus of collection in the JFCís operational area for civil 

reconnaissance is the daily interaction between civilians and US forces. This results in 

capturing contacts and data points. CAO and CMO planners in coordination with the 

CMOC integrate civil reconnaissance into the overall supported commanderís plans and 

orders, enhancing COP development. 

For further information on infrastructure reconnaissance, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineer 

Operations. 

c. The civil information grid provides the capability to coordinate, collaborate, 

and communicate. This grid provides a common shared collaborative information 

environment between the joint force components headquarters, CMO staff, and civil 

partners or stakeholders. 
APPENDIX C 

REFERENCES 

C-1 

The development of JP 3-57 is based upon the following primary references. 

1. General 

a. NSPD-44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and

Stabilization. 

b. Unified Command Plan.

2. Department of Defense Publications 

a. Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum. 

b. DOD 3210-R, Grant and Agreement Regulations. 

c. DOD 4500.54-G, Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide. 

d. DODD 1235.10, Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready 

Reserve. 

e. DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and 

Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. 

f. DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief. 

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications 

a. CJCSI 3207.01A, Military Support to Humanitarian Mine Action Operations. 

b. CJCSI 3214.01B, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management 

Operations. 

c. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), 

Volume II Planning Formats. 

d. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

e. JP 1-04, Legal Support to Joint Operations. 

f. JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations. 

g. JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations. 

h. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

i. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-57 

j. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 

k. JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations. 

l. JP 3-07.1, Foreign Internal Defense.

m. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism. 

n. JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations. 

o. JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental 

Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volumes I and II. 

p. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

(CBRN) Environments. 

q. JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

r. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security. 

s. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 

t. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense. 

u. JP 3-28, Civil Support. 

v. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 

w. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

x. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. 

y. JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 

z. JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

aa. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives 

Consequence Management. 

bb. JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. 

cc. JP 3- 61, Public Affairs. 

dd. JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. 
References 

C-3 

ee. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 

ff. JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System. 

gg. JP 4-02, Health Service Support. 

hh. JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning. 

ii. JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations. 

jj. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

kk. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 

3. Allied Joint Publication 

AJP ñ 9, NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine. 

4. US Army Publications 

FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations. 

5. United States Marine Corps Publications 

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force CivilMilitary Operations.

6. United States Navy Publications 

Tactical Memorandum 3-07.6-05, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) 

Operations Planning.
Appendix C 

C-4 JP 3-57 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX D 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

D-1 

1. User Comments 

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint 

Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments 

should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and 

appearance. 

2. Authorship 

 The lead agent is the United States Special Operations Command and the Joint Staff 

doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3). 

3. Supersession 

This publication supersedes JP 3-57, 8 February 2001, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military 

Operations, and JP 3-57.1, 14 April 2003, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs. 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: CDRUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//SOKF-J7-DD// 

 INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// 

 CDR USJFCOM NORFOLK VA//DOC GP// 

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting 

Center, ñDoctrine and Education Group and info the Director for Operational Plans and 

Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. 

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that 

directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. 

The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7, 

when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 

c. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

 

______________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 3-57 

 

5. Distribution Publications 

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. 

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be 

in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

 a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET) and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the 

combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication 

to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy 

(Defense AttachÈ Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 

Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-7400. 

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and 

deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications.
GLOSSARY 

PART I ñ ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

GL-1 

AC Active Component 

AFCAP Air Force contract augmentation program 

AFMS Air Force Medical Service 

AFOSI Air Force Office of Special Investigation 

AJP Allied joint publication 

ANG Air National Guard 

AOR area of responsibility 

ASCC Army Service component command 

ASD (SO/LIC & IC) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and LowIntensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities) 

AT antiterrorism 

C2 command and control 

CA civil affairs 

CAG civil affairs group 

CAO civil affairs operations 

CAPT civil affairs planning team 

CAT civil affairs team 

CBMU construction battalion maintenance unit 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CCDR combatant commander 

CCIR commanderís critical information requirement 

CDRUSSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations Command 

CDRUSTRANSCOM Commander, United States Transportation Command 

CEB combat engineer battalion 

CIM civil information management 

CIMIC civil-military cooperation 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

CLT civil liaison team 

CM consequence management 

CMO civil-military operations 

CMOC civil-military operations center 

COA course of action 

COCOM combatant command (command authority) 

COG center of gravity 

COIN counterinsurgency 

COM chief of mission 

CONUS continental United States 

COP common operational picture 

COS chief of staff 

DC dislocated civilian 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-57 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DOS Department of State 

DTS Defense Transportation System 

ESB engineer support battalion 

1NCD First Naval Construction Division 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance 

FHP force health protection 

FID foreign internal defense 

FM field manual 

FN foreign nation 

FNS foreign nation support 

FP force protection 

FPA foreign policy advisor 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GE general engineering 

GS general support 

HA humanitarian assistance 

HACC humanitarian assistance coordination center 

HCA humanitarian and civic assistance 

HHC headquarters and headquarters company 

HN host nation 

HNS host-nation support 

HOC humanitarian operations center 

HSS health service support 

HUMINT human intelligence 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

IHS international health specialist 

IO information operations 

IPI indigenous populations and institutions 

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff 

JCMOTF joint civil-military operations task force 

JFC joint force commander 

JFCH joint force chaplain 

JIACG joint interagency coordination group 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

JOPP joint operation planning process 
Glossary 

GL-3 

JP joint publication 

JPOTF joint psychological operations task force 

JSOTF joint special operations task force 

JTF joint task force 

LOAC law of armed conflict 

LOC line of communications 

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force 

MCA military civic action 

MCAG maritime civil affairs group 

MCAT maritime civil affairs team 

MCMO medical civil-military operations 

M/CM/S mobility, countermobility, and/or survivability 

MEF Marine expeditionary force 

MLG Marine logistics group 

MNF multinational force 

MOE measure of effectiveness 

MP military police (Army and Marine) 

MWSS Marine wing support squadron 

NA nation assistance 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NAVFAC Naval Facilities Engineering Command 

NCF naval construction force 

NCFSU naval construction force support unit 

NCR naval construction regiment 

NECC Navy Expeditionary Combat Command 

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NMCB naval mobile construction battalion 

NSC National Security Council 

NSPD national security Presidential directive 

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures 

NWP Navy warfare publication 

OCONUS outside the continental United States 

OFDA Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance 

OGA other government agency 

OIC officer in charge 

OPCON operational control 

OPSEC operations security 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

PA public affairs 

PAO public affairs officer 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-57 

PHIBCB amphibious construction battalion 

PO peace operations 

POB psychological operations battalion 

POG psychological operations group 

POLAD political advisor 

POLMIL political-military 

PRC populace and resources control 

Prime BEEF Prime Base Engineer Emergency Forces 

PRT provincial reconstruction team 

PSYOP psychological operations 

RC Reserve Component 

RED HORSE Rapid Engineers Deployable Heavy Operations Repair 

Squadron, Engineers 

RM resource management 

ROE rules of engagement 

RUF rules for the use of force 

SCA support to civil administration 

SCP security cooperation plan 

SEABEE Navy construction engineer 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SJA staff judge advocate 

SO special operations 

SOF special operations forces 

SSTR stability, security, transition, and reconstruction 

SYG Secretary General (UN) 

TEC theater engineer command 

TPB tactical psychological operations battalion 

TSOC theater special operations command 

UCT underwater construction team 

UN United Nations 

UN-CMCoord United Nations humanitarian civil-military coordination 

UNDPKO United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations 

UNHCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 

UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 

Affairs 

USA United States Army 

USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers 

USACIDC United States Army Criminal Investigation Command 

USAF United States Air Force 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

USAR United States Army Reserve 

USDAO United States defense attachÈ office 
Glossary 

GL-5 

USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

USG United States Government 

USMC United States Marine Corps 

USN United States Navy 

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

WHO World Health Organization (UN) 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 
GL-6 

PART II ñ TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and 

property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military 

and civilian forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.2) 

civil administration. An administration established by a foreign government in (1) 

friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to 

exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile 

territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises 

executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can 

be established. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, 

trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support 

civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) (This term and 

its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion 

in the next edition of JP 1-02.) 

civil affairs operations. Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that 

(1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities 

where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency 

organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, 

indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve 

application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil 

government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. Also called CAO. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, 

influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and 

nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a 

friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to 

consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may 

include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the 

responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may 

occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if 

directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be 

performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of 

civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

civil-military operations center. An organization normally comprised of civil affairs, 

established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the 

United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, 

intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, 

and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called 
Glossary 

GL-7 

CMOC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) (This term and its definition modify the existing 

term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) 

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission 

under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the 

Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional 

responsibilities. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority 

established by title 10 (ìArmed Forcesî), United States Code, section 164, exercised 

only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise 

directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command 

authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to 

perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and 

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving 

authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and 

logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant 

command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of 

subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through the subordinate 

joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. 

Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and 

employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to 

accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command 

(command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant 

commands established by the President. Also called CCDR. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-

0) 

complex contingency operations. Large-scale peace operations (or elements thereof) 

conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations that 

involve one or more of the elements of peace operations that include one or more 

elements of other types of operations such as foreign humanitarian assistance, nation 

assistance, support to insurgency, or support to counterinsurgency. Also called CCOs. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08) 

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against 

espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on 

behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign 

persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-

0) 

country team. The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by 

the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-57 

represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic 

mission. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.4) 

dislocated civilian. A broad term that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an 

expellee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Also 

called DC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

evacuee. A civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons 

of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-57) 

expellee. A civilian outside the boundaries of the country of his or her nationality or 

ethnic origin who is being forcibly repatriated to that country or to a third country for 

political or other purposes. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

force health protection. Measures to promote, improve, or conserve the mental and 

physical well-being of Service members. These measures enable a healthy and fit 

force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards. Also called 

FHP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-02) 

force protection. Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against 

Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, 

and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy 

or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

3-0) 

foreign humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results 

of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, 

disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result 

in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by 

US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed 

to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies 

that may have the primary responsibility for providing foreign humanitarian assistance. 

Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are those conducted outside the United 

States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-33) 

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a 

government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other 

designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, 

and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

foreign nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation when 

operating outside its national boundaries during military operations based on 

agreements mutually concluded between nations or on behalf of intergovernmental 

organizations. Support may come from the nation in which forces are operating. 

Foreign nation support also may be from third party nations and include support or 
Glossary 

GL-9 

assistance, such as logistics, rendered outside the operational area. Also called FNS. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 1-06)

homeland defense. The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic 

population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other 

threats as directed by the President. Also called HD. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-27) 

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or 

NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. 

Also called HN. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) (This term and its definition modify the 

existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 

1-02.) 

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign 

forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war based on 

agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 4-0) 

humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by 

predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This 

assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401 and 

funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is 

limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; 

(2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and 

construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair 

of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally 

create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. Also called HCA. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-57) (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its 

definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) 

humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural 

or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, 

or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage 

to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in 

scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement 

the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary 

responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. Also called HA. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-57) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

humanitarian assistance coordination center. A temporary center established by a 

geographic combatant commander to assist with interagency coordination and planning. 

A humanitarian assistance coordination center operates during the early planning and 

coordination stages of foreign humanitarian assistance operations by providing the link 

between the geographic combatant commander and other United States Government 

agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international and regional organizations 

at the strategic level. Also called HACC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 
Glossary 

GL-10 JP 3-57 

humanitarian operations center. An interagency policymaking body that coordinates 

the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign 

humanitarian assistance operation. It normally is established under the direction of the 

government of the affected country or the United Nations, or a United States 

Government agency during a United States unilateral operation. The humanitarian 

operations center should consist of representatives from the affected country, the 

United States Embassy or Consulate, the joint force, the United Nations, 

nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and other major players in the 

operation. Also called HOC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08) 

indigenous populations and institutions. A generic term used to describe the civilian 

construct of an operational area to include its populations (legal citizens, legal and 

illegal immigrants, and all categories of dislocated civilians), governmental, tribal, 

commercial, and private organizations and entities. Also called IPI. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-57) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of 

electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military 

deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related 

capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated 

decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-

13) 

interagency. United States Government agencies and departments, including the 

Department of Defense. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08) 

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, 

the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged 

US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-08) 

intergovernmental organization. An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a 

treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, 

or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect 

and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United 

Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called IGO. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08) 

joint civil-military operations task force. A joint task force composed of civil-military 

operations units from more than one Service. It provides support to the joint force 

commander in humanitarian or nation assistance operations, theater campaigns, or civilmilitary operations concurrent with or subsequent to regional conflict. It can organize 

military interaction among many governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian 

agencies within the theater. Also called JCMOTF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05.1.) 
Glossary 

GL-11 

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned 

or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force 

commander. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

joint psychological operations task force. A joint special operations task force 

composed of headquarters and operational assets. It assists the joint force commander 

in developing strategic, operational, and tactical psychological operation plans for a 

theater campaign or other operations. Mission requirements will determine its 

composition and assigned or attached units to support the joint task force commander. 

Also called JPOTF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-53) 

joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations 

units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or 

prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The 

joint special operations task force may have conventional non-special operations units 

assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of 

Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task 

force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE:; JP 1) 

law of war. That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. 

Also called the law of armed conflict. (JP 1-02) 

lead mobility wing. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects 

useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public 

works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others 

contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve 

the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise 

or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have 

formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 1) 

nation assistance. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces 

within that nationís territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on 

agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, 

but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other Title 10, US 

Code programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies 

or intergovernmental organizations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 
Glossary 

GL-12 JP 3-57 

nongovernmental organization. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization 

dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, 

economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict 

resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil 

society. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08) 

operational area. An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for 

geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas 

include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of war, 

theater of operations, joint operations area, amphibious objective area, joint special 

operations area, and area of operations. Also called OA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any 

echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in 

combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. 

Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over 

subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces,

assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to 

accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all 

aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions 

assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the 

commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through 

subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component 

commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize 

commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational 

control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of 

itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, 

discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 1) 

other government agency. Within the context of interagency coordination, a non 

Department of Defense agency of the United States Government. Also called OGA. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 

peace operations. A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis 

response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national 

power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the 

environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to 

legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, 

peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts. Also called PO. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-07.3) 

Presidential Reserve Call-up. Provision of a public law (title 10, US Code, section 

12304) that provides the President a means to activate, without a declaration of national 

emergency, not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve and the Individual 

Ready Reserve (of whom not more than 30,000 may be members of the Individual 
Glossary 

GL-13 

Ready Reserve), for not more than 270 days to meet the requirements of any 

operational mission. Members called under this provision may not be used for disaster 

relief or to suppress insurrection. This authority has particular utility when used in 

circumstances in which the escalatory national or international signals of partial or full 

mobilization would be undesirable. Forces available under this authority can provide a 

tailored, limited-scope, deterrent, or operational response, or may be used as a 

precursor to any subsequent mobilization. Also called PRC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-

05) 

private sector. An umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and in foreign 

countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, 

specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, 

and selected nongovernmental organizations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) (Approved 

for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

provincial reconstruction team. An interim interagency organization designed to 

improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of a 

host nation local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens and 

delivering essential government services. Also called PRT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-

57) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and 

indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective 

reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, 

and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce 

foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originatorís objectives. Also called 

PSYOP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-53) 

refugee. A person who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left their home 

country or country of their nationality and is unwilling or unable to return. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-07.6) 

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 

1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other 

related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, 

and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of 

national policies and objectives. Also called SA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

security assistance organization. All Department of Defense elements located in a 

foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance 

management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military 

missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and 

defense attachÈ personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. Also 

called SAO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.1) 
Glossary 

GL-14 JP 3-57 

special operations. Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 

environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic 

objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional 

force requirement. These operations require covert, clandestine, or low visibility 

capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. 

They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional 

forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by 

indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations 

in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, 

independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational 

intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military 

Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, 

and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-05.1) 

stability operations. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, 

tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other 

instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, 

provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and 

humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

status-of-forces agreement. An agreement which defines the legal position of a visiting 

military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the 

status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining 

to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may 

form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the 

authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of 

the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. Also 

called SOFA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-16) 

strategic communication. Focused United States Government efforts to understand and 

engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the 

advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through 

the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized 

with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to 

inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the 

pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-07.2) 

theater special operations command. A subordinate unified or other joint command 

established by a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint 
Glossary 

GL-15 

special operations within the joint force commanderís assigned operational area. Also 

called TSOC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05.1) 

unified action. The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of 

governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of 

effort. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 
Glossary 

GL-16 JP 3-57 

Intentionally Blank 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATION

PLANS SYSTEMS

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to

fill extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of

the development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-57 Operations