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i 

58–228 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–136] 

THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 16, 2010 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BOB DEGRASSE, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

ALEJANDRA VILLARREAL, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, March 16, 2010, The Status of United States Strategic Forces .......... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, March 16, 2010 ........................................................................................ 41 

TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 2010 

THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC FORCES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Chairman, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ...................................................................... 1 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ............................................................................ 3 

WITNESSES 

Chilton, Gen. Kevin P., USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command .............. 8 

Miller, Dr. James, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 

U.S. Department of Defense ................................................................................ 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Chilton, Gen. Kevin P. ..................................................................................... 67 

Langevin, Hon. James R. ................................................................................. 45 

Miller, Dr. James .............................................................................................. 53 

Turner, Hon. Michael ....................................................................................... 48 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 95 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 96 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 95 

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 95 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 104 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 103 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 99 

Mr. Thornberry ................................................................................................. 100 

(1) 

THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC FORCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 16, 2010. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:12 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James Langevin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good morning. This hearing of the Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee will now come to order. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine the strategic posture of the United States and the status of our strategic forces, including our nuclear weapons, missile defense systems and military 

space programs. 

These activities, which fall under the jurisdiction of the Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee, also track closely with responsibilities of 

U.S. Strategic Command, or STRATCOM. Thus, we are pleased 

that General Kevin Chilton, the commander of STRATCOM, agreed 

to appear before the subcommittee today. 

Welcome, General Chilton. 

General Chilton has testified before the subcommittee in the 

past, and we thank him for coming back here this morning. 

Dr. James Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy, has also agreed to appear before the subcommittee 

today, and I would like to welcome him to the committee this 

morning as well. 

Welcome. 

Dr. Miller’s presence is particularly timely given the release yesterday of the Interim Space Posture Review, the release of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review last month and the pending release 

of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). 

Much has transpired in the realm of strategic forces and strategic policy since the subcommittee took testimony on these matters last March. On April 5th, 2009, President Obama delivered a 

comprehensive address on nuclear security in Prague in which he 

declared, ‘‘I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear 

weapons.’’ 

He went on to say, ‘‘As long as these weapons exist, the United 

States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter 

any adversary and guarantee that defense to our allies, including 
2 

the Czech Republic. But we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal.’’ 

On July 9th, President Obama and Russian President Medvedev 

issued a joint statement of understanding for establishing a followon to the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty that included 

targets for the number of accountable warheads and launchers 

under a new agreement. 

Last summer, in response to the increasing challenges we face in 

protecting our computers and networks from intrusion, Secretary 

Gates announced his intention to create U.S. Cyber Command, or 

CYBERCOM, as a subordinate unified command under 

STRATCOM. 

On September 17th, President Obama announced his plan for 

strengthening missile defenses in Europe through a Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA) deploying defenses against the threat of Iranian ballistic missiles. 

Just a week later, the President revealed that the Iranians had 

been building a covert uranium facility near Qom for several years 

now. 

In December, the START Treaty expired and Presidents Obama 

and Medvedev issued a joint statement saying that the two nations 

would continue to work together in the spirit of the START Treaty 

following its expiration. 

At the same time, the two presidents also expressed ‘‘their firm 

intention to ensure that the new treaty on strategic arms enter into 

force at the earliest possible date.’’ 

However, while the two presidents talked about this issue last 

Saturday, the New START Treaty has yet to be completed. The 

press reports suggest that it has been delayed by the complex technical details involving data exchanges and verification as well as 

the complicated political details related to missile defenses. 

On January 12th, 2010, China announced the successful test of 

a ground-based mid-range missile interceptor. This technology 

demonstration has implications not only for Chinese missile defense but also for the safety of space systems in low Earth orbit. 

On February 1st, the Department of Defense released the first 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review along with the President’s fiscal 

year 2011 budget. Notably, the Department did not release either 

the Nuclear Posture Review or the Space Posture Review, both of 

which were required to be released on that date as well. 

Now, the Department has informed the Congress that the NPR 

will be delayed until March 1st and that the Space Posture Review 

would not appear until later this summer. 

Yet at the same—at the time, we were promised the early submission of the preliminary Space Posture Review and were also— 

and so we are pleased that the Interim Space Review was, in fact, 

released yesterday. 

However, the Nuclear Posture Review still has not been submitted and appears to be delayed, if we can believe press reports, 

by the President’s deliberations on a few key issues, including U.S. 

declaratory policy; specifically, for what purposes might the use— 

might we use nuclear weapons and whether and how many forward 

deployed weapons in Europe and Asia are needed for extended deterrence. 
3 

Well, this morning we certainly look forward to hearing our witnesses’ perspective on the events of the past year and the progress 

we have made toward addressing the key challenges that we face. 

As the witnesses are well aware, the subcommittee has had a 

long record of seeking bipartisan approaches to the complicated 

challenges that we face in the strategic arena. Through this hearing, we hope to continue these critical discussions so that we may 

together chart the right strategic path forward for the United 

States. 

So therefore, we look forward to your testimony here today and 

your help in making progress toward that goal. 

So before, though, turning to our witnesses, let me ask at this 

time for my partner in this effort, our ranking member, Mike Turner, for any comments that he may have. 

Mr. Turner. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would also like to extend a warm welcome to General Chilton 

and Dr. Miller and thank you both for your leadership and for your 

service to our Nation. 

Today’s hearing comes amid considerable change in our strategic 

forces policy and posture. We anticipate the delivery of a Nuclear 

Posture Review, NPR, within the coming weeks that may significantly alter U.S. nuclear policy. 

According to reports, the U.S. and Russia are near completion on 

a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START. We have seen 

major changes in missile defense policy, including plans for missile 

defense in Europe. And later this year, we expect to see a new national space policy and Space Posture Review. 

Meanwhile, we continue to witness disturbing trends in foreign 

strategic forces developments. Of particular concern, Iran and 

North Korea continue very public nuclear and ballistic missile programs. 

China is preparing to field a next-generation maneuvering ballistic missile and continues to develop counterspace capabilities. 

Russia possesses an overwhelming arsenal of tactical nuclear 

weapons and continues to modernize its strategic nuclear forces. 

I would like to highlight today a few concerns that I hope our 

witnesses will address here. First, let me start with U.S. nuclear 

policy. The President seeks ‘‘a world without nuclear weapons.’’ I 

think we all share this long-term vision. 

But as French President Nicolas Sarkozy said last fall, ‘‘We live 

in a real world, not a virtual one.’’ The bipartisan Strategic Commission similarly observed that it ‘‘would require a fundamental 

transformation of the world political order.’’ Our national security 

policies must reflect this reality. To do otherwise would be irresponsible. 

It is, therefore, deeply concerning when Administration officials 

and press reports suggest that our nuclear policy will center on 
4 

zero as the policy goal; that the NPR will reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons, starting with U.S. declaratory policy; and 

that another round of arms control talks will commence after 

START to further reduce our nuclear forces. 

It is unclear what changes in the threat or security environment 

are driving such deep reductions. What is the strategic rationale 

behind this policy? 

Do we expect others like North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Russia 

and China to give up their nuclear arms once the U.S. reduces 

theirs? 

Will allies who benefit from U.S. extended deterrence commitments feel equally assured when the U.S. reduces its nuclear deterrent and offers conventional forces as a substitute? I hope our witnesses here today can address these fundamental questions. 

I was pleased to see a 13 percent increase in this year’s budget 

request for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s weapon 

and nonproliferation activities. 

It appears that the Administration has embraced the Stockpile 

Management Program established by this committee last year and 

will fund more comprehensive life extension programs, warhead 

safety and security enhancements, and infrastructure modernization. 

However, a commitment to the sustainment and modernization 

of our Nation’s deterrence capabilities cannot be measured with a 

single year’s budget request. As we all know, strategy, programs 

and budgets are derived from policy. 

Though we are seeing a one-year influx of funding, I am concerned that a zero policy might lead to less program and budget 

support in the out-years. Will it alter STRATCOM’s ability to effectively deter potential adversaries and lead to greater risk in our 

strategic posture? 

Second, while there is bipartisan support in Congress for European missile defense, that support is contingent upon a clear and 

detailed understanding of the Administration’s plans, which we 

have not seen. Ranking Member McKeon and I wrote the President 

last week asking for such details. 

The Phased, Adaptive Approach for Europe and the new regional 

missile defense architectures outlined in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, BMDR, have significant force structure and inventory implications. 

However, without a detailed understanding of these plans, it is 

difficult to assess whether the budget is sufficient. One thing is 

clear: demand exceeds supply. 

How will STRATCOM manage these limited assets, particularly 

Aegis ships? Will an increase in missile defense assets for Europe 

result in less protection for other theaters? 

I want to commend the Department on the BMDR and restoration of some missile defense funding. It is a welcome indication 

that the Administration took note of the concerns of many of us 

that a top-line increase was necessary to sustain our homeland 

missile defense capabilities, to fund the new approach for Europe 

and expand missile defense inventories. 

I do worry, however, that we are giving up on some promising 

technologies while rushing to pursue others. The Airborne Infrared 
5 

(ABIR), Precision Tracing Space System (PTSS) and SM–3 Block 

IIB are interesting concepts but still unproven technologies. 

Meanwhile, the Airborne Laser recently demonstrated a successful missile shoot-down. Yet the budget request barely keeps it 

going to support further development of directed energy technologies. 

Third, I would appreciate our witnesses’ thoughts on space and 

cyberspace. I am particularly concerned about the health of our 

space industrial base and what it portends for the future of our national space enterprise. 

For example, NASA’s recent termination of the Constellation 

Program will leave DOD to carry the full cost of the solid and liquid rocket engine supplier base, which could lead to the doubling 

of program budgets in the out-years. 

Much of the aerospace workforce is nearing retirement. Young 

engineering and technical talent won’t stick around to build more 

of the same, nor should we want them to. 

If our Nation is to retain its leadership in space and defense 

technology, then we need a strategic, long-term, interagency approach that encourages innovation, invests in cutting-edge science 

and technology, and fosters new design and development activities 

that can transition into mature programs of record. 

Any thoughts that you can share on how the Department is tackling these strategic challenges would be appreciated, as well as 

your thoughts on export control reform. 

Lastly, if one assumes that our strategic forces capabilities are 

interrelated, if there is a link between offensive and defensive capabilities, then logic would say that we should increase our missile 

defenses as our nuclear forces decrease and prevent any limitations 

on those capabilities. 

Such was the intent of Congress last year when we stated that 

U.S. missile defense must not be limited in the START follow-on 

treaty with Russia. I want to reemphasize that point today. 

General Chilton, Dr. Miller, thank you again for being with us 

today. You each possess a tremendous amount of expertise and insight on our Nation’s strategic forces, and our Nation is better off 

as a result of your service. I look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 48.] 

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Turner—— 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Before we begin the testimony, if we could, I just 

want to mention—and welcome members of the Armed Services 

Committee that do not serve on the subcommittee but who are in 

attendance at the hearing: Representative Bishop of Utah and Representative Fleming of Louisiana. I want to thank them both for 

joining us this morning. 

And without objection, once each of the members has had the 

chance to ask questions, you will, in turn, be able to ask questions. 

But at this time, I believe we are going to turn now to General 

Chilton to begin the testimony. Is that what we agreed upon? 

Voice. [Off mike.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Fair enough. 

Dr. Miller, then the floor is yours. 
6 

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES MILLER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Dr. MILLER. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Turner, members of the subcommittee, Representatives Bishop and Fleming, I 

very much appreciate the opportunity to testify today on behalf of 

the Department of Defense on strategic issues. And I also want to 

thank the committee for its strong support for the Nation’s strategic capabilities. 

It is a pleasure to join General Chilton in discussing these issues 

related to nuclear weapons, missile defense. I will say a little bit 

about combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well, as 

well as space and cyberspace. 

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of these issues 

to the Nation. And each of these has been the topic of in-depth 

study in the Department of Defense over the last year. And indeed, 

some of that study, as was noted, is still ongoing. 

In February, in addition to delivering the Ballistic Missile Defense Report to Congress, the Department of Defense provided the 

Quadrennial Defense Review report, which emphasized the importance of both combating WMD and improving our capabilities in 

cyberspace and outlined some important steps that the Nation 

needs to take to improve capabilities there. 

As the chairman noted, DOD, working with the Office of the Director for National Intelligence, recently submitted an interim report on the Space Posture Review, and we continue to work on a 

national security space strategy that we intend to submit to Congress this summer. 

And as was noted, working closely with the Departments of State 

and Energy, as well as with the National Security Council, we are 

nearing completion of the Nuclear Posture Review, and I do expect 

that we will submit a report to Congress within a month. 

Mr. Chairman, you asked me to address in particular nuclear 

issues, missile defenses and space, and I would like to say just a 

few words about each, and I will be brief in this oral statement. 

The Nuclear Posture Review will be a foundational document for 

this Administration. It is intended to be a practical work plan for 

the agenda laid out by President Obama in his April 2009 Prague 

speech. 

It will provide concrete steps to reduce the role and number of 

nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal—of a world free of nuclear 

weapons while sustaining, as the President said in his speech—as 

long as nuclear weapons exist, sustaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal. 

One of its key aims will be to strengthen deterrence and to 

strengthen assurance of allies and partners, and the report will 

outline a number of specific steps to do so. 

As mandated by Congress, the report will also address U.S. arms 

control objectives, and the NPR in particular has focused on the ongoing New START negotiations. 

One of the review’s early conclusions was that the United States 

should retain a nuclear triad under a New START Treaty comprised of intercontinental ballistic missiles, land-based; submarinelaunched ballistic missiles; and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, 
7 

and the fiscal year 2011 budget submitted to Congress reflected 

this conclusion. 

Ballistic missile threats, as noted by Mr. Turner, are growing 

both in quantity and in quality, and we expect this trend to continue over the next decade or more. 

The Department’s first-ever Ballistic Missile Defense Review 

aims to align U.S. missile defense posture with near-term regional 

missile threats while sustaining and enhancing our ability to defend the homeland against a limited long-range attack. 

Broadly, our goal is to ensure an effective defense of the homeland against limited missile attacks while creating an environment 

in which the development, acquisition, deployment and use of ballistic missiles by regional adversaries is deterred and, if necessary, 

defeated. Strengthening international cooperation with key allies 

and partners in Europe, East Asia and the Middle East is critical 

to achieving that goal. 

And as was noted, the President announced in September 2009 

that the Administration would pursue a Phased, Adaptive Approach to U.S. missile defenses in Europe, and I am very pleased 

that we have had robust cooperation with our European allies for 

that effort. 

I just want to note a couple of those. As you know, Poland committed last year to host a land-based site for the Standard Missile3 or Aegis Ashore which would be deployed by 2018. 

Recently, Romania agreed to host an Aegis Ashore site starting 

in 2015. 

And the Czech Republic continues to have a strong interest in 

missile defenses, and we are discussing how they may be involved 

in the new architecture. 

At the same time, we are continuing discussions with our North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies about making territorial missile defense a NATO mission and about next steps to develop and deploy improved capabilities. 

The Administration was clear from the outset about our intent 

to move forward with both a northern site and a southern site in 

Europe for Standard Missile-3, for Aegis Ashore, and have worked 

to build broad support in NATO for this mission. At the same time, 

I want to say today that things went much faster than expected, 

with Romania in particular. 

I understand the interest of Congress in these issues, as does the 

Department of Defense, and want to say quite plainly that the 

DOD recognizes the need to consult more effectively with Congress 

going forward. 

Finally, as discussed in the interim report of the Space Posture 

Review, the space environment is increasingly congested, competitive and contested. And to deal with these challenges, the Administration is currently revising its national space policy. 

This ongoing national-level policy review will seek to synchronize 

the broad U.S. equities in space, and it will span national security, 

science and commerce issues. 

Building from this revised national space policy, the Department 

of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence are working 

now to develop a national security space strategy. 
8 

We aim to complete this effort in June and then address its implications for export control and investment in various types of capabilities with an aim to principally affect fiscal year 2012 budgets 

and forward. 

Our objective is to align the appropriate ends, ways and means 

to help the Nation succeed in what is increasingly a congested, 

competitive and contested space environment, and we do look forward to reporting back to the subcommittee and to Congress on 

these and other strategic issues. 

I have a more detailed written statement which I would ask to 

be submitted for the record. And with that, I will look forward to 

joining General Chilton in answering your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 53.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Thank you, Dr. Miller, for your testimony. 

General Chilton, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, COMMANDER, 

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 

General CHILTON. Thank you. Chairman Langevin and Ranking 

Member Turner, members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to 

join you again this year and have this opportunity to testify before 

you. 

And it is also a particular pleasure to join Dr. Miller here in this 

session, having worked so closely with him over the past year. 

I am privileged to showcase STRATCOM, which I am so privileged to command, these joint teams of achievements, discuss our 

requirements and highlight future national security challenges 

across our diverse and global mission areas. 

U.S. Strategic Command’s active duty and Reserve military 

members and civilians and contractors form a superb joint team 

whose dedicated planning, advocacy and operational execution efforts advance our warfighting priorities every day. 

We continue to strengthen and sharpen our focus on deterrence 

while at the same time focusing on preserving our freedom of action in both space and cyberspace. 

In all of these efforts, we greatly appreciate the support of the 

members of Congress and your staff whose legislative investments 

across our mission areas enable us to deliver global security for 

America. 

Over the past year, we have actively supported the Administration’s four major defense policy reviews which uniquely impacted 

U.S. Strategic Command, to include the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and now the Space Posture Review. We also provided analytical and intellectual capital to the New Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty, or START, negotiations. 

While not all yet completed, these reviews will shape the role of 

our strategic capabilities and define the investments necessary to 

recapitalize and sustain them for the future. 

Their focus areas also highlight U.S. Strategic Command’s—also 

highlight the emphasis that we put on—and the participation we 

are a part of as the nexus of today’s national security challenges. 
9 

Global security in general and the United States in specific face 

a myriad of challenges today from expected and unexpected corners 

of the globe, by way of economic and political turmoil, non-traditional threats to include terrorism, and continuing overseas contingency operations. 

Actors continue to seek the means to challenge the U.S. and our 

allies not only in conventional but also in asymmetric fashion. 

U.S. Strategic Command remains committed to conducting deterrent, space and cyberspace operations and advocating for the capabilities our national leadership and geographic combatant commanders need each and every day in the areas of missile defense; 

information operations; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); and combating weapons of mass destruction. 

In the deterrence arena, our energetic exercise program conducted this past year, called Global Thunder 2009, was highly successful and was, indeed, the most extensive nuclear command and 

control and communications field exercise in over a decade. 

Our forces’ success proved America’s well-placed confidence in 

USSTRATCOM’s strategic deterrent and demonstrated the success 

of this Command’s effort to reemphasize a culture of excellence 

across the nuclear enterprise. 

In space, our acceptance of the Space Situational Awareness 

sharing mission expanded the Command’s relationship with international and commercial partners toward ensuring a safe and responsibly managed space domain. 

Future Space Situational Awareness efforts and space investments must continue to build on recent advances, including advances made in greater and more frequent conjunction or collision 

analysis to ensure the availability of essential space-based capabilities. 

Moreover, the Department of Defense sustained its progress in 

defending DOD information networks by unifying U.S. Strategic 

Command’s components for network warfare and global network 

operations by increasing the training for our cyber professionals 

and welcoming the standup of each of the services’ cyber components. 

We carefully planned this past year for the standup of U.S. 

Cyberspace Command and look forward to the confirmation of its 

first commander. 

Additionally, in the past year, we dramatically expanded our 

military-to-military outreach program and were honored to host 

such leaders as United Kingdom’s First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Mark 

Stanhope, Australia’s Vice Chief of the Defense Force Lieutenant 

General David Hurley, France’s Chief of the Defense Staff General 

Jean-Louis Georgelin, and the Vice Chairman of China’s Central 

Military Commission General Xu Caihou. 

All of these meetings and discussions centered around strategic 

deterrence, space, cyberspace, and missile defense, and all advanced the dialogue between these countries and the United States 

Strategic Command. 

Although not contained within the DOD budget, I would like to 

mention my support for the Administration’s fiscal year 2011 request for the National Nuclear Security Administration. The budg-
10 

et seeks a nearly 13 percent increase for NNSA, designed to provide much-needed infrastructure and human capital investments. 

I have long advocated for such critical investments, which will 

help keep our stockpile safe, secure and effective for future generations. Our deterrence credibility rests on such confidence, and I appreciate you and your colleagues’ support for this request. 

In the year ahead, U.S. Strategic Command will address the 

challenges I mentioned above as we focus on further developing our 

workforce, sustaining a culture of excellence in the nuclear enterprise, and integrating our global mission sets. 

U.S. Strategic Command’s uniquely global missions support national objectives, whole-of-government solutions, and enhanced 

international cooperation. 

Our future success requires investment in the deterrent, the 

standup of U.S. Cyberspace Command, and both expanding our 

awareness and sustaining our capability investments within the 

space domain. 

As we move forward, I look forward to continuing to partner with 

this committee and your staff. And again, thank you for the opportunity to be with you here today, and I also ask that my posture 

statement be submitted for the record. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General Chilton can be found in the 

Appendix on page 67.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General Chilton. 

Thank you both for your testimony. Before we go to questions, 

just for our guests in the audience, let me just read a bit of the 

interesting bios of both of our witnesses here today. 

Dr. Miller was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Principal 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on April 2nd, 2009, 

and he serves as the principal staff assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and provides advice and assistance to 

the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense on all 

matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DOD policy and 

plans to achieve national security objectives. 

Prior to his confirmation, Dr. Miller, served as the Senior Vice 

President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security. 

Previous positions—including serving as Senior Vice President 

and Vice President at Hicks & Associates Incorporated; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Requirements, Plans and Counterproliferation Policy; assistant professor at Duke University; and 

senior Professional Staff Member for the House Armed Services 

Committee from 1988 to 1992—a little plug there for the Armed 

Services Committee work you have done. 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, you saved the best for last. Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Absolutely. 

General Kevin Chilton is Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, 

Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. He is responsible for the global 

command and control of the U.S. Strategic Forces to meet decisive 

national security objectives. 

USSTRATCOM provides a broad range of strategic capabilities 

and options for the President and Secretary of Defense. Command 
11 

mission areas include full-spectrum global strike, space operations, 

computer network operations, Department of Defense information 

operations, strategic warning, integrated missile defense, global 

command operations, strategic warning, integrated missile defense—again, global command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, the combating of weapons of mass destruction, and specialized expertise to 

the joint war fighter. 

General Chilton is a distinguished graduate of the U.S. Air Force 

Academy, class of 1976, a Guggenheim fellow. He completed a Master of Science degree in mechanical engineering at Columbia University. He flew operational assignments in the RF–4C and F–15 

as a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School. 

General Chilton conducted weapons testing in various models of 

the F–4 and F–15 prior to joining the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration (NASA) in 1987. At NASA he flew on three 

space shuttle missions and served as the Deputy Program Manager 

for Operations in the International Space Station program. 

Quite a bio, General. 

So thank you again. Welcome to you both. 

I would like to turn now to questions. It is my intention to do 

two rounds of questions and so we will stick to the five-minute 

rule. 

Dr. Miller, if I could, I would like to start with you. Last September, President Obama announced his plan for strengthening 

missile defenses in Europe through a Phased, Adaptive Approach 

to deploying defenses in Europe. The PAA, as it is called, supplanted the previous administration’s plans for 10 ground-based 

interceptors (GBIs) in Poland and the X–Band Radar in the Czech 

Republic. 

Now, I am assuming that the Administration performed a rigorous analysis of alternatives for addressing the evolving Iranian 

threat and protecting U.S. interests before the decision was announced. I would assume that—again, being that the case—if so, 

when can we expect the Department to share this analysis with the 

Congress? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, yes, that is correct. The Department conducted 

a quite extensive analysis of the threat from Iran and potentially 

others to the European theater, and considering also the possible 

contribution of any architecture to the defense of the United States 

homeland as well. 

I believe we have shared a good amount of that analysis with the 

Congress. And I know that the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) is currently doing a review of the decision-making that led 

up to that. And as part of that, we will be releasing information 

associated with the analysis and the decision-making process. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. So it is a formal report that you will be 

able to release to the Congress that details the analysis? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, we are currently in discussions with GAO about 

which parts of the decision—which parts of the—what was a very 

lengthy decision-making and analytical process—should be released 

and we are committed to providing the information necessary for 

Congress to understand that decision. 
12 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Well, I clearly think that would be helpful 

to the members of the committee and to the Congress in giving 

greater confidence to the—again, the plan itself and the need to 

supplant the previous administration’s previous plans on missile 

defense for Europe. 

So we would look forward to that analysis. 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, I could say in open session right now that there 

is no question that Iran in particular has significant and increasing 

capabilities for short-, medium-range and beginning to develop intermediate-range capabilities. 

And a fundamental part of the assessment was to recognize that 

10 interceptors were likely to be woefully inadequate for coping 

with the scale of the type of attack that Iran could mount today, 

let alone in the future. 

And so the ability to adapt the system, to bring it online earlier, 

which we can with Aegis ships, and to be able to adapt it over time 

with a more flexible architecture was really fundamental to the decision-making. 

I will also say we looked at the question of the contribution of 

the Phased, Adaptive Approach and the previous architecture to 

national missile defense, and both of them—both of the architectures shared an important feature, which is an early deployment 

of an X-Band Radar that will give us an early look on any attack 

coming—that could come from Iran toward the United States. 

The plan under the Phased, Adaptive Approach is to deploy that 

in 2011, which is earlier than previously planned, so we moved 

that forward to look to improve the capabilities of our ground-based 

interceptors. 

And in addition, we looked at the tradeoff between adding the 

same type of interceptor in Europe that we have in the United 

States, a two-stage versus a three-stage, but fundamentally the 

same interceptor, versus going for a different type of phenomenology with ascent-phase intercept, which we aim to provide in 

Phase Four. 

And so the analysis—again, we have—I think we have briefed it, 

but we can certainly share more about it. But the analysis, to my 

mind, suggested very strongly that moving assets there earlier to 

deal with today’s threat and with the possible future intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat—possible future, but the 

2011 deployment gets us earlier capability. 

And moving toward a different way of engaging that threat 

through ascent-phase was going to contribute more, both to our 

theater-based defenses and to our national defense. And happy to 

follow up with more details, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. That detail would be very much welcome. 

If I could, continuing on on this topic, it was announced that— 

more recently it was announced—and you have mentioned—you 

touched on it this morning—that the Romanian government has 

agreed to base missile defense interceptors, the so-called Aegis 

Ashore system, on its soil as early as 2015 as part of the second 

phase of the PAA. 

Could you describe to the committee, or provide it for the record 

if it is classified, the defended footprint of the SM–3 Block IB mis-
13 

sile system that will be deployed in Romania and the threats from 

Iran and the Aegis Ashore system it will defend against? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, I would like to provide that for the record, if I 

can, and provide it in a closed session. We would be happy to provide maps showing the estimated footprint for the system for each 

of the four phases of the Phased, Adaptive Approach. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 95.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good enough. We would welcome that. 

Then let me also, then, ask could you also describe any discussions with NATO that preceded the announcement of an agreement 

with Romania? 

Can you assure this committee that the U.S. will, in fact, work 

with our allies to ensure that we meet NATO’s objectives as adopted by the North Atlantic Council in April 2009 that ‘‘any future 

missile defense system deployed in Europe should be part of a comprehensive approach that addresses the most likely threats on a 

prioritized basis’’? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, yes. We had multiple briefings with our NATO 

allies prior to the meeting with Romania. As I said, that particular 

meeting resulted in a conclusion more quickly than many had expected. 

But those meetings included briefings to the North Atlantic 

Council by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, by the Assistant Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs. I briefed on the progress 

on the Nuclear Posture Review and made mention of it, but didn’t 

go into the same detail as they did. 

And I also believe the Secretary engaged with our NATO allies 

on these issues as well during that period. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you, Dr. Miller. 

Let me, if I could, just turn my final set of questions for this 

round to General Chilton. 

General, last summer Secretary Gates announced his intention 

to stand up U.S. Cyber Command as a subordinate unified command under STRATCOM. Secretary Gates made it clear that 

CYBERCOM would be the focal point for cybersecurity operations 

within the Department. 

More recently, the standup has been delayed, as we all know, by 

the fact that the designated commander has not yet been confirmed 

by the Senate. 

General, would you update the committee on STRATCOM’s 

progress toward establishing Cyber Command? And can you explain also STRATCOM’s role, if any, in the National Cyber Initiative? 

General CHILTON. Sure, happy to, Chairman. Last year when the 

Secretary made the decision to stand up a sub-unified command 

under U.S. Strategic Command, the other thing he asked for is an 

implementation plan. 

And over the months of 2009 we worked very closely with the 

STRATCOM headquarters, with Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD), as well as with our two components, the Joint Task Force 

for Global Network Operations (JTFGNO) and the Joint Functional 

Component Command for Net Warfare to pull together an implementation plan for the standup of this new command. 
14 

We delivered that to the Secretary in the fall of last year. He has 

reviewed it and made adjustments to it, and we think we have 

complied with those. But we are holding off on the signing and 

moving forward on the plan until we do have a commander assigned for this command. 

I was pleased to see that General Alexander received his advance 

policy questions to address back to the Senate and so I am hopeful 

that an opportunity for him to testify and have a hearing will soon 

arise on the calendar. And then, once we have a commander, it will 

be time to put the implementation plan into action. 

I don’t want to suggest, though, that we have been standing static in this mission area at all. We continue to robustly operate the 

Joint Task Force for Network Ops and Network Warfare. 

We put JTFGNO under the operational command direction of the 

Network Warfare Command, so we have already started to unify 

those two mission areas, which I think is exactly the right way to 

provide for a better defense for our military networks, which we 

are chartered to do, and as well as more secure operations. 

So I am anxious to move forward in this area. I think it is the 

right thing to do. And I think we will be in a much better position 

to both operate and defend and be prepared to conduct military operations in cyberspace in the future as we stand up the subordinate 

command of U.S. CYBERCOM. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And the National Cyber Initiative? 

General CHILTON. I am sorry, sir. In the National Cybersecurity 

Initiative, the United States Strategic Command benefitted from 

investments in certain technologies that I believe will help us to do 

defense in a more real-time fashion, rather than waiting until we 

know our computers are infected, and then doing the forensics to 

figure out the malware and then working our way backward up the 

threat, to actually have some real-time—more real-time detection 

systems employed that will allow us to look for threats coming into 

the networks and head them off before they get to our computers. 

So that type of technology is part of the investment portfolio in 

the National Cybersecurity Initiative which will support us. 

Additionally, there is a good portion of that initiative that supports National Security Agency (NSA), and NSA is one of our key 

intelligence providers for this particular domain. We rely on intelligence from all intelligence agencies, from the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency, from Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, et cetera. 

But NSA particularly is supportive in this area, and so plus-ups 

to their ability to do their mission set also benefits United States 

Strategic Command as well as the Department of Homeland Security. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are the network defenses primarily designed by 

NSA and given to STRATCOM, or is STRATCOM actually involved 

with designing those defenses? 

General CHILTON. A lot of the technology comes to us through 

contracts through NSA, but also Defense Information Systems 

Agency (DISA). You know, DISA is important to us, too, because 

they design and build the networks. And so as much as you can 

design and build in capability for ease of operation and defense, 

that is important as well. 
15 

So they are really—DISA is a major trainer and equipper, if you 

will, of the networks which we operate, and so their part in that 

is equally important. 

Of course, we have no acquisition authority and we do not exercise that. We are about requirements and demanding the things we 

need to conduct our mission sets. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good enough. 

Then my last question before I turn to the ranking member, for 

both our witnesses, what do you see as the key issues still outstanding in the cybersecurity arena? 

Dr. MILLER. Late last summer, the Secretary of Defense asked us 

to bring together a comprehensive approach for the Department of 

Defense in dealing with cybersecurity, and we have begun to do 

that, working closely with STRATCOM and with others. 

And quite frankly, there is a significant list of issues that we 

need to deal with. It starts with thinking through the problem from 

the perspective of strategy. 

We have begun to do that within the Department, understanding 

that we need to plug into the national effort that is now under way 

to develop a new cybersecurity strategy, and the Department of Defense is supporting that effort. 

We are looking at the importance of personnel, of highly trained, 

educated, talented personnel and whether the personnel models 

that we have as a department and within the services are appropriate for recruiting and retaining the types of people that will be 

successful. 

We are asking a question of how to accelerate the pace of innovation both in the concepts we apply to cybersecurity and in the technologies we use. 

We would like to—you know, we are dealing with the challenge 

of Moore’s Law and with the rapidly changing technology and the— 

frankly, the rapid innovation of people who may try to get into our 

networks. 

We need to continue to think about how to accelerate the pace 

of technical change and present more of a moving target, if you 

will, to people who might get into our networks. 

And finally, we need—we are looking hard at what types of cooperation make sense, what we can do to build on the work we already do with the private sector and with other agencies and, for 

that matter, internationally as well. We have begun to reach out 

to some key allies and talk about their thinking and capabilities on 

cybersecurity. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Thank you, Dr. Miller. 

General. 

General CHILTON. And I would just add that kind of looking at 

it from the deck plate up, the things that we have been focusing 

on in U.S. Strategic Command over the last year and a half is— 

we call them the Three Cs: culture, conduct and capability. 

Trying to change the general culture of the way we look at our 

networks in the military—it is not just—when there is a problem 

with a computer, it is not just a technical—or technician’s problem, 

it is the commander’s problem. 

It should be the focus of every commander in the field, the health 

and status of their networks, just as they are focused on the health 
16 

and status of their people, their tanks, their airplanes, their ships, 

because the networks are so critical. 

So changing that cultural mindset is really important. Changing 

the way we conduct ourselves, providing the appropriate training 

for all of our members in the military who touch our networks— 

each one of them is really a gate guard to the networks based on 

their behavior on their computer. 

So changing their conduct, training them and then holding people accountable for their behavior on the network is important. 

Operationalizing this domain such that we treat it like other domains with operational concepts and orders that allow us to be postured to readily protect and defend the networks I think are also 

absolutely essential, and we are working that problem hard. 

And I have already mentioned the capability piece about technologies that can help us better defend our networks. 

But also, I think in addition to what I mentioned before, the development, as we have asked for, in the space domain of a common 

operating picture, situational awareness that we can provide our 

commanders so they can see the health and status of the network 

real-time, they can see attacks developing against those networks, 

then take appropriate action, and then making sure we are sharing 

that information as widely as possible not only within the military 

but with the Department of Homeland Security. 

So these are some of the capability areas, too, that we will continue to press for and look to advance in the future. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. 

Well, thank you both. Obviously, the cybersecurity area is a dynamic one and one—a threat that is ever-evolving. It seems the 

challenge is to stay one step ahead of our adversaries, or the bad 

guys, if you will. 

And we have our—obviously, our work cut out for us. But thank 

you for your work that you are doing in that area. I am going to 

continue to—this is a particular area of interest to me that I will 

continue to spend a great deal of time on and oversight. 

I am also fortunate to have Congresswoman Sanchez here, who 

chairs the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities 

Subcommittee. I know it is an issue of great importance to her as 

well as to many other members. 

But with that, let me turn now to the ranking member for his 

questions. 

And thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the chairman’s questions. In fact, I am going to be 

following up with you, in effect, on the questions that he asked. 

Dr. Miller, when the announcement was made for the abandonment of the ground-based interceptors in Europe, many in Congress were concerned because it was our understanding that it was 

not a threat-based decision. As you indicated in your comments, 

our ballistic missile threat is increasing, not decreasing. 

There is no information that anyone has provided to Congress 

that would show that the threat from Iran is diminishing. Nothing 

has changed in our understanding of their intent and their programs or their current technical capabilities. 
17 

And the chair asked you when is Congress going to receive the 

information upon which the decision was based in looking at the 

threat from Iran, and you gave an answer that I think we need to 

clarify. 

You said we are currently deciding what to release. And I doubt 

that you are sitting in front of us telling us that you are considering whether or not you give the information to Congress that 

Congress is asking, because as you know, when the Administration 

makes a decision and we ask for the information upon which it is 

based, it is the Administration’s responsibility to provide it. 

So perhaps you could embellish what that answer is in the context of the chairman’s question of when can we see the information 

upon which the decision was based to abandon those ground-based 

interceptors, which many of us believe are essential to protect the 

United States? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, yes, your summary of what my intent was is 

correct. There were, I don’t know, scores to, perhaps, more than 

that, briefings developed by the staff. There is a lot of analytical 

work that was completed by both the OSD staff, joint staff working 

with STRATCOM and Missile Defense Agency. 

There are reams and reams of documents. And quite frankly, I 

don’t think it—I don’t think it makes sense—I wouldn’t want to go 

back through all of them, and what we want to do is identify the 

most important milestone documents in the process that identify 

where an assessment was made and, particularly, where senior 

leadership was engaged. 

And we are looking to do that so that Congress can see what the 

basis of the decision was. 

Mr. TURNER. I appreciate that answer. And I know from many 

in Congress, and including the members of this committee, we are 

very eager for that process to be completed so that we can review 

it, because again, all the information—in fact, all the testimony 

that we have had in other hearings—has confirmed that the threat 

is not diminishing from Iran. 

And so how that can be correlated to a decision to diminish our 

missile defense capability is where we are concerned. 

To another question that the chair asked, he asked about Romania, and I know a number of us have concerns about a unilateral 

action on part of the Administration in working with Romania, as 

opposed a NATO-ization of a missile defense system. 

Because you know there was significant criticism of the last administration for their approach with Poland and the Czech Republic. The criticisms were that the bilateral discussions were bypassing NATO and were preventing, really, a NATO-ization of a missile 

defense system. 

So we were all surprised when Romania was approached, when 

we know that there has not yet been a NATO-ization. Now, you answered the chair that there were a number of briefings with NATO 

when he asked NATO’s involvement. 

But I am going to ask you the next step of that. It is my understanding that the selection of Romania was not done in conjunction 

with a process with NATO in determining the strategic positioning 

and the needed assets for a joint U.S.-NATO system, that this is 
18 

the Administration that decided the approach to this with Romania 

and informed NATO. Is my characterization correct? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, the Administration briefed NATO on the overall 

architecture and the requirement in that architecture for both a 

land-based site in southern Europe as well as a land-based site in 

northern Europe. 

There were several options for each of those that would ultimately provide the possibility for a territorial—complete territorial—defense of European countries and NATO. 

It turned out that Poland was one in the north and, as I think 

we have testified before, the priority was given to reaching out to 

the Poles because of their earlier and continued commitment to 

missile defense. It turned out to be that Slupsk, the location we are 

likely to go to, is a good location. 

With respect to Romania, there were several countries as well 

that were possible options, and the United States made that 

clear—the Administration made that clear in our discussion with 

allies. 

It was always going to be necessary to conduct bilateral negotiations with the hosting country rather than to try to ‘‘NATO-ize’’ 

that process, in order to reach closure on that. 

But certainly, our allies were aware of the range of possibilities 

with respect to both the southern side and the northern side. 

And I would also add that in considering the missile threat and 

how it relates to the Phased, Adaptive Approach, I believe the 

Phased, Adaptive Approach was based on a recognition that the 

missile threat was both more urgent because it is here today and 

because the United States needs to begin to—needs to think about 

how to protect our forces that are deployed and our capabilities to 

operate, as well, and a recognition that it is growing and we need 

to have the adaptability to modify the system. 

A key downside of the former architecture is with 10 GBIs and 

two-for-one targeting SRVs, five missile shots and you are out of 

it. And there is no more capability to be provided. Phased, Adaptive 

Approach is intended to address that challenge. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay, a couple things. One, you know, obviously, 

the concern with respect to NATO-ization is that, you know, our 

goal to increase our relationships internationally, to increase our 

relationships with our allies, and to the extent that they are not 

brought to the table, obviously, there is a communication of value 

that I think could be enhanced if they are more at the table versus 

informed. 

With respect to the interceptors, you know, obviously, a concern 

that we have with the Phased, Adaptive Approach is that many of 

the systems that are identified by the Administration in it are 

paper systems—they don’t currently exist—and that the groundbased interceptors that were intended for Poland—although you indicate their limitation in number, they truly exist—would have existed and would have been something that is available to us, which 

takes us to the Phased, Adaptive Approach. 

And that is that your evaluative statements, your review of the 

Phased, Adaptive Approach and what its benefits are, is something 

that Congress really isn’t able to do right now because we don’t 
19 

have from the Administration the Phased, Adaptive Approach 

briefings, information, for us to be able to evaluate. 

We can’t evaluate it based on its effectiveness and compared to 

other systems or even, too, whether or not the Administration is 

living up to its obligations in funding the types of systems and research and development that will be necessary to take what is not 

only unproven systems but non-existent systems to deployable systems. 

When will Congress be able to receive the Phased, Adaptive Approach and be able to review it? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, I had the opportunity to brief this committee 

shortly after the announcement and in that did include some maps 

that showed estimates of coverage. The reality is that these are estimates and that the details of the architecture will—in terms of 

the location of the systems—change those. 

So the ones that I showed to this committee—would have been, 

I guess, last September—will look a little bit different. They will 

still have about the same coverage. They will—complete within the 

later phases the territorial coverage of Europe. 

Sir, I offered to come back and provide that briefing in a closed 

session, if we could, at the convenience of the committee. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay, great, because what we are looking for is not 

just how the system might work. We want what systems you are 

actually proposing. What are the timelines? What is the development? What systems are going to have to be purchased and acquired? What, of the systems that don’t currently exist, are there 

milestones that will have to be achieved in order for it to be 

deployable or to bring it into existence? You know, we certainly 

have seen, I think almost everybody on the committee, the zone or 

scope of where these type of systems might provide coverage, but 

certainly, we are looking for more than just that. Dr. Miller, I hope 

that you can provide it. 

One more question and, General Chilton, I am going to pass to 

you for my second round since we have so many people here, and 

I want to defer and make certain everyone gets to ask a question. 

But, Dr. Miller, I don’t want to leave our discussion without talking about your reference to the President’s Prague speech and 

the—I think in your comments you referred to it as a ‘goal’ of going 

to zero. I have heard it referred to as a ‘policy’ of going to zero. 

And I am very concerned about that as it goes to—and I believe 

your comments were how it is translated into policy to affect the 

role and numbers of our nuclear weapons. 

Now, I mean, let me tell you, I was a mayor of a community. And 

as a mayor of a community, I look out at the community and assess 

a threat, crime, and look to putting together a plan to address that 

threat, crime. 

My desire for there not to be crime in my community did not result in me strategically reducing my police force. I wouldn’t have 

attacked crime by saying I am going to reduce my deterrence to 

crime. In fact, I increased police. And we saw a decrease in crime. 

Now, we know that the threat of nuclear weapons is actually increasing by the number of countries that are both seeking and/or 

possessing nuclear weapons technology. That threat does not appear to be decreasing. 
20 

So I am very concerned as we try to translate what perhaps 

should be a stated dream into an actual goal or policy that affects 

both the role and numbers of our strategic deterrent, instead of it 

merely just being, you know, something that we are advocating for 

on the national—on the international stage, we are actually looking 

to our national policy and changing, as you said, the role and numbers of our weapons. 

Could you speak to that issue a moment and how that balance 

can keep us safe? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, sir. I will start by noting again that in the 

President’s April Prague speech he suggested the elimination of nuclear weapons as a long-term goal and noted that it might not 

occur within our lifetimes, that it, indeed, is extremely challenging 

to imagine the situation in which elimination of nuclear weapons 

is possible. It is clearly not possible today. 

And the President also said at Prague that as long as nuclear 

weapons exist, the United States would retain a safe, secure and 

effective nuclear arsenal to deter threats against ourselves and our 

allies. 

You see in the fiscal year 2011 budget and our plans that follow 

it a commitment to that, a sustainment to a triad with respect to 

our strategic forces and, as General Chilton and the chairman 

noted, a 13 percent increase in overall funding for NNSA to sustain 

our nuclear weapons infrastructure and enterprise. 

So understanding that it is a long-term objective, the United 

States, in my view, ought to continue to sustain both its deterrent 

and the infrastructure required to support that over time. And in 

fact, that has been translated into policy. 

With respect to the goal of zero nuclear weapons, it is a goal that 

almost every president in the past has embraced, including Ronald 

Reagan. It is, I think, generally understood to be something that 

is not on the near-term horizon but something that can help guide 

us as we go forward. 

The United States has an obligation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue nuclear disarmament. Again, it is difficult to foresee the timeline under which that could be possible. 

But to look to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons over 

time, as consistent with not just maintaining but strengthening our 

deterrence posture is, in my view, a very reasonable policy goal and 

one that this Nation can and should pursue. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Dr. Miller. 

I will save my questions for General Chilton if we are doing a 

second round, since there are so many people who have questions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. 

I thank the ranking member for his questions. 

We will be now operating under the five-minute rule, and I am 

pleased to turn to Mr. Spratt for a round of questions. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you both for your testimony. 

Dr. Miller, I wasn’t sure he was going to reach the crucial points 

in your past when he was outlining your curriculum vitae, and 

your training here surely has propelled you into the position you 

now hold. You don’t need to reply to that. [Laughter.] 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, I would just say the four years I spent here 

were 10 of the best years of my life. 
21 

Mr. SPRATT. [Off mike.] 

Dr. MILLER. I learned a tremendous amount. Thank you. 

Mr. SPRATT. You made a tremendous contribution here, and we 

are pleased to see you where you are, because we know what your 

potential is. 

Tactical nukes—we haven’t discussed them very much, but we 

have discussed the greatest concern we have, and that is that nuclear terrorists would get nuclear weapons of some kind in their 

hands, and the likeliest weapon that they would be able to lay 

their hands upon and also utilize would be tactical nuclear weapons. 

The arms control talks have largely focused upon the big systems 

that do constitute a daily threat to us, and there are lots of issues 

with respect to tactical nukes—are they stored adequately? How 

many? Do we have a have a good inventory of them? 

To what extent are we taking steps with the Russians to make 

this the forefront of our negotiations, because they do constitute, in 

my opinion, a significant part of the non-state terrorist threat 

today? 

General CHILTON. And if I could first talk about the—— 

Mr. SPRATT. Please, yes, sir. 

General CHILTON [continuing]. The accountability of them, we do 

have excellent—perfect accountability of our nuclear weapons 

today, sir, and—— 

Mr. SPRATT. How about the—— 

General CHILTON [continuing]. And security for our weapons. We 

don’t have the insight into the Russian stockpile—— 

Mr. SPRATT. Yes. 

General CHILTON [continuing]. Of tactical weapons that we would 

like to see. 

Mr. SPRATT. There have been anecdotal accounts of these weapons in insecure locations throughout the former Soviet Union. Is 

there any effort on your part—are you engaged at all in the process 

of trying to get a better, more rigorous count of their nuclear—their 

tactical nuclear weapons and where they may be located? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, sir. As you know, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has moved its tactical weapons in general back 

more towards the interior of the country. It has improved the security associated with those weapons and reduced them relatively significantly. 

Our judgment would be that there is a good distance to go both 

with respect to reductions and security, and that is a—that has 

been a point of discussion, as you know, over the—in fact, over the 

years with Russia. 

Mr. SPRATT. Is this an agenda item with respect to START? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, it is not an item within the START negotiations. 

Mr. SPRATT. Is it anywhere a formal item of discussion or is it 

something we just deal with ad hoc from time to time? 

Dr. MILLER. It is something that has been a focus of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, and it is an issue with respect to 

negotiations where, post-START, we would like to look towards reductions. 

But as you know, we have been engaged in discussions of nuclear 

security, really, for the last almost two decades with Russia. 
22 

Mr. SPRATT. Dr. Miller, when you were here on the staff, the Ballistic Missile Defense Program included something I think then 

was called Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Low and SBIRS 

High. 

And it has gone through several permutations since those days, 

but it is still not a deployed system. In fact, it has taken on a different configuration. It is a space surveillance system today, I believe. But clearly, if it works as intended and is designed, it enhances missile defense. 

Could you give us an update on where the latest rendition of 

SBIRS lies? 

General CHILTON. Right, sir, I can take that. The—— 

Mr. SPRATT. Yes, sir. 

General CHILTON [continuing]. SBIRS High program, which is 

being managed by the United States Air Force—its latest schedule 

for first launch of the geosynchronous satellite, which will replace 

our Defense Support Program constellation, is scheduled for the 

end of this year. 

And that will be a welcome first launch of this capability. Today 

we have in the highly elliptical orbits already airborne the sensors—two of the sensors that will be part of the geosynchronous 

belt as well. They are performing exceptionally well, so that is a 

good news story. But we look forward to that first launch of the 

SBIRS High geosynchronous. 

SBIRS Low, as you pointed out, sir, has changed names and 

moved from the Air Force into the Missile Defense Agency as an 

experimental program. There is two satellites—Satellite Tracking 

Surveillance System they are called now. They are not for space 

surveillance. 

They are, as you described, infrared satellites to support missile 

defense-type operations. And they are going through their test and 

checkout now to see the utility of them for potential future architectures in support of missile defense. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much. 

I have a couple more questions, but my time has expired. I will 

come back on the next round. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Franks for five minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank both of you for being here. 

You know, General, I never want to miss the opportunity to say 

a special word of thanks to people such as yourself that have given 

their lives to this cause. Because you do your job so well, a lot of 

the rest of us don’t have to worry like we perhaps should on an 

issue of this kind of gravity. 

Let me, if I could, add my voice to both the ranking member and 

the chairman related to the missile defense issue in Europe. 

I think Mr. Spratt pointed out a point that I have made on a 

number of occasions here, that my greatest concern for at least the 

immediate short-term, and what—I mean in the next year or two 

or three—threat to this country is terrorists gaining control or access to a nuclear capability. And he is exactly right, a tactical nuke 

is probably the thing that is most likely. 
23 

But it seems that sometimes we forget the connection. My concern—and I hope that it will be part of your report to us, Dr. Miller—what rationale went into the concern of trying to work ourselves into Iran’s calculus as to whether or not to actually become 

a nuclear nation. 

I think their intent is clear, but they have a great many concerns 

out there. Israel, our own response—there is a lot of things that 

speak against them moving forward here. But one of those things 

would have been the ability to have met that threat the day that 

it became operational. 

And a lot of us are very happy with the idea of having additional 

Phased, Adaptive Approach capability, but we are concerned about 

not having the ground-based system in Europe in time to be a part 

of Iran’s calculus, because I think that by the time we have the 

ability to truly do what the ground-based system would—will be 

able to do, they will already become a nuclear-armed nation. 

And I think that all other issues at that point might have to fall 

off the table. So that is just a commercial. I hope that that will be 

part of the information that we receive. 

General Chilton, in your testimony last year before this committee you said, ‘‘Within the nuclear enterprise, the U.S. stockpile 

requires the most urgent attention. Without action, our current 

weapons are not indefinitely sustainable. We mitigate that risk 

today along with the risk from an inability to respond through strategic surprise only by maintaining more weapons than we would 

otherwise need.’’ 

And I think you were absolutely right. We do need to do that. 

But in light of the current Administration negotiating with Russians on the follow-up to START, which may significantly reduce 

our nuclear stockpile, a significant reduction in our inventory concerns me, particularly if it doesn’t accommodate to concerns that 

you raised in your testimony last year. 

So what types of programs and what type of support would be 

required to sustain or maintain our stockpile, in your mind, as a 

professional, in your judgment, that would maintain those—meet 

those concerns without abandoning the approach of maintaining 

more weapons than we would ‘‘otherwise need’’? 

General CHILTON. Thank you, sir. Fundamental to that is an investment in the nuclear enterprise infrastructure. To have a firstclass nuclear deterrent, you must have a first-class plutonium production capacity and uranium production capacity. 

And the investments in this budget that start to improve the infrastructure at Los Alamos National Laboratory as well as at Oak 

Ridge are absolutely fundamental to enabling the capabilities that 

I have talked about that we need in the past. 

Additionally, part of the focus of the budget increase is to attract 

the quality people that we are going to need for the future and hire 

the young people into the enterprise to make sure that we can sustain the stockpile for the future. 

And lastly, we need to continue to move out on the W76 production, get that up to full rate production, so that we can complete 

that by 2017. Today, because of the issues with infrastructure, we 

are only capitalized to handle one weapon at a time. So it is a se-
24 

rial—we have to approach our problems serially. Hopefully we will 

fix that in the future with the investments. 

But given the reality for the next 10 years until that can be 

achieved, it is important to get the W76 done so we can move on 

to the next weapon, which needs life extension attention, and that 

would be the B61. 

So the investments in these areas are absolutely critical to follow 

that path that I outlined before. 

Mr. FRANKS. Can I throw one last question to Mr. Miller here? 

Secretary Gates assured this committee that the START negotiations with Russia would not be linked to missile defense reductions 

for this country. Do you continue to assure us of that as of today? 

General CHILTON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Larsen is now recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, welcome back, and a couple of questions. Can you just 

go back to the nuclear infrastructure? Can you tell us what in the 

budget—what the budget says about year 2012 and about Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) that gives you 

confidence about the nuclear weapons facilities infrastructure and 

its ability to support a capable deterrent? 

General CHILTON. Sir, I would like to send that over for the 

record, the specifics of that. It is in the NNSA budget, and as we 

have looked at it, it is the start of exactly what I believe we need 

to do as far as recapitalizing both those facilities. 

But I would like to take that for the record and make sure we 

get you the exact numbers, how they are proceeding. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 95.] 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, please do that. 

Dr. Miller, can you address that from your end of things? 

Dr. MILLER. I would also like—sir, would like to take it for the 

record, give you the exact numbers. I will say that this was a focus 

of early work in the Nuclear Posture Review, and the decision was 

taken to move forward with both of these, both of these facilities, 

in parallel. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 94.] 

Mr. LARSEN. Great. 

General, in regard to space policy, there is obviously concerns 

about other space-faring nations, China in particular, usually, and 

sometimes Russia. Are we headed towards—with regards to space 

policy, are we being driven by a goal of dominance in space, of control of space, or access to space? 

General CHILTON. Sir, I would defer the policy question to my 

colleague here who is in charge of that. 

But I can give you a war fighter’s perspective—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

General CHILTON [continuing]. If I could. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 
25 

General CHILTON. From a U.S. military perspective, it is clear we 

are dependent on space for our military operations today. My observation of other countries in the world is that they are growing 

more and more dependent as well on space because they see the 

advantages of utilizing space in both our precision munitions and 

also our ability to globally communicate and move information 

around. 

So in the future, I have no doubt in my mind that we will be 

challenged. Our forces will be challenged. Future adversaries will 

seek to deny us the ability to use the advantages we have in space. 

And that, from a military perspective, is something we should anticipate and prepare for. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. 

So then, Dr. Miller, what does that mean for what drives the policy: dominance, control or access? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, the access to space is fundamental to day-to-day 

military operations, as the general suggested. And in fact, it is accurate to say that our dependency as well as others’ is increasing 

there. 

One of the things that we were focused on very heavily in the 

ongoing review of strategy is what should be the United States’ deterrence posture with respect to space. And this is dealing with 

the—not just the reality that it is congested, as I said before, but 

also increasingly contested. 

We are looking at a number of elements. We start with the resilience of our space-based capabilities. We look at the requirement 

to hedge against the possibility of the loss of some of those capabilities both with respect to the ability to conduct operations in a degraded space environment but also be able to provide capabilities 

from other domains, so—for example, air breathers for both ISR 

and possibly for communications relays. 

And then part of the deterrence posture has to be to consider 

how we would respond to various types of actions taken against our 

space assets. And we have begun to work through that problem relatively systematically. 

I think that we will have a good bumper sticker, if you will, for 

the objective. But the goal is going to be to assure access to space 

and to ensure that we as a military and as a country are able to 

continue to operate and to fulfill the requirements that space provides for the warfighter and for our economy and for our society. 

Mr. LARSEN. Well, we will look forward to the space policy and 

the—and, for that matter, the NPR as well. I look forward to all 

the reviews that are due, and delayed, getting up here. 

Dr. MILLER. Me, too. 

Mr. LARSEN. Us more so. 

General, you are in charge of the Capabilities Based Assessment 

on Electronic Warfare, and I wouldn’t be—you know, it wouldn’t be 

fair for me to sit here and not take any of my time to talk about 

Electronic Warfare. 

So can you give me an update on where STRATCOM is on the 

Capabilities Based Assessment on Electronic Warfare and what we 

can expect to see as a deliverable this year? 

General CHILTON. Yes, sir. It was about a year and a half ago 

that Admiral Keating came forward to the Joint Chiefs and 
26 

STRATCOM to express this concern about what he perceived as a 

lack of attention in the electronic warfare area, and STRATCOM 

was chartered to go off and do an Electronic Warfare Capabilities 

Based Assessment, which the Joint Information Operations Center 

did for us and completed this past year. 

Our goal is always to get that done in time to inform the budget 

that has just been submitted to the Congress this year, and I think 

we achieved that. 

You will see plus-ups in the acquisition plans for the Growler, 

the F–18 Growler, as well as investments for sustainment of the 

Marine EA–6B and an addition of an Air Force Compass Call aircraft to this budget. 

Where I would describe we are, Congressman, now is we have 

analyzed and understand our capability shortfalls, defining requirements and advising the budget, and I can see that continuing to 

go forward. And it will be important for us to go forward here because I think we got to where we were a couple years ago by lack 

of attention in this area. 

And I think, also, the exigencies of the fight we were in in Iraq 

and Afghanistan—suddenly we started to see interference between 

various elements of the services bringing in Electronic Warfare to 

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device, for example, so maybe that 

interfered with the Comm system from another service, or maybe 

even in service. 

So a better focus on integrating these capabilities as we bring 

them forward is something we are going to have to keep our eye 

on. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. Well, thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Lamborn for five minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Chilton, it is good to see you again. 

And my question is what, or who, is the responsible agency for 

missile defense training? And what joint requirements have been 

established for such training? And has STRATCOM assessed the 

need or the overall existence of training as it stands now to identify 

possible shortcomings? 

In my understanding, it is sort of scattered and diffuse right 

now. What is your assessment? And is there a responsible agency 

at this time? 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Congressman. The responsibility 

for organizing, training and equipping belongs to the services. With 

the accelerated time frame and the way that we rolled out missile 

defense as quickly as we did, a lot of the development—sort of the 

organization and development of the systems was in MDA, the Missile Defense Agency. 

And so now what we are seeing is transfer of those capabilities 

over to the services. All of the various capabilities in the missile 

defense arena have been assigned to various services, I would say 

with the exception of the Command, Control, Battle Management 

and Communication (C2BMC) function, which is still yet to be assigned. 
27 

So as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) goes forward, as Aegis goes forward, the Army will organize, train and 

equip THAAD. The Navy will organize, train and equip Aegis. The 

Navy has already taken on Sea-Based X–Band Radar, that system, 

to do that function, to organize, train and equip that radar platform. 

And so we see these all transferring over to the services, and 

they will have the responsibility for training the forces, to provide 

them to the regional combatant commanders to execute those 

weapon systems. 

Mr. LAMBORN. So it is fair to say that there is no overall joint 

training at this time. 

General CHILTON. Not a formal joint organization that is doing 

training. That is not to suggest that our operators are not trained 

in their systems. They are today. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Oh, sure. 

General CHILTON. But the responsibility for long-term training, 

growth of the force, recruitment, school sets, et cetera, will be the 

responsibility of the services. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Okay, thank you. 

And, Dr. Miller, I would like to take a step back and ask more 

of a broader strategic question. Last year, the Administration justified cuts to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System 

because the long-term threat was said to be ‘‘slower to develop than 

previously estimated.’’ 

However, since then, we have all become aware of significant 

threat developments in North Korea and Iran’s long-range missile 

programs. 

At what point would the Department reevaluate either its reductions to homeland defense and, specifically, cutting the groundbased interceptors from 44 to 30, or to consider accelerating the 

Phases Three and Four of the Phased, Adaptive Approach? 

What has to happen before we will take those steps now that we 

see what is happening more with Iran and North Korea? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, that was a question that was looked at in some 

detail in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and you are absolutely correct that there have been some developments over the last 

year with respect to both North Korea and Iran and their capabilities and the programs and activities that underlie them. 

The Department will continue to assess the requirements associated with ballistic missile defense, including the GMD system. 

One of the things that the Secretary of Defense did in order to 

hedge our position was to go ahead and finish off the silos at Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely so that, in the event that the threat does 

emerge in greater quantity than we currently would anticipate, we 

are able to respond relatively quickly by adding additional missiles. 

They would come from the test program if that were necessary. 

With respect to accelerating any Phased, Adaptive Approach and 

the possibility of accelerating SM–3 Block IIA and IIB, as you 

know, the IIA is just very early in its development at this point, 

and the IIB is a program that is just about to—just really getting 

under way. 

I think at this time it would be premature to talk about accelerating them. We have got some important milestones for SM–3 
28 

IIA in the next couple of years. And at that point, it would be possible to answer that question with more data. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. 

And along a similar line, some of us are concerned about cuts in 

the resources for—Operationally Responsive Space. In two years 

now, that has been cut by 59 percent, and just 24 percent of that 

was this year. 

So we are concerned about that, given what is happening with 

China’s capabilities, for instance, and shooting down its own satellite. So do you share our concern about those budget cuts for 

Operationally Responsive Space? 

General CHILTON. Sir, I don’t at this point. I think the Operationally Responsive Space Organization Office, in general, has 

made great progress along the lines which I think are important, 

and that is developing the key enabling technologies, concepts of 

operations, investments in the things that would enable a responsive space program. 

There are three phases. We broke it into three requirements in 

STRATCOM: Tier 1, 2 and 3, Tier 1 being what can we do faster 

and better with what we have today on orbit, and that, I think, has 

matured quite well. 

Tier 2 is a little more difficult, and that is, how do you build the 

infrastructure and the systems and put them in place so that you 

could rapidly launch, either to augment in crisis or replenish in 

time of war, your satellites on orbit. 

And of course, Tier 3 was to—how could you put a system in 

place that would allow you to quickly implement new technologies 

or new needs that might arise along the way. 

Fundamental to that is launch systems, common buses, common 

interfaces, et cetera, and I think the funding is supporting that 

quite well. We saw some increases required because the follow-on 

to the first four TacSats was Operationally Responsive Satellite-1, 

which is a program that is moving forward to be launched. 

But you can expect to see a bump-up in that funding requirement and then a bump-down, and so long as we see that steady 

funding to support the enabling technologies, I am comfortable. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman. 

All of the members of the subcommittee have had their chance 

to ask the questions in the first round, and I now turn to Mr. 

Bishop for an opportunity to ask questions. He is a member who 

is a member of the full Armed Services Committee. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 

being invited back to the subcommittee on which I at one time did 

serve, a long, long time ago. 

Both Dr. Miller and General Chilton, once again, thank you for 

being here. 

Dr. Chilton, I appreciated your written testimony, even though 

I only cared about pages 10 through 12, but those three pages were 

great. 

Let me ask you four questions that deal with the industrial 

bases, if I could. Let me just give them to you out there. And if I 

have time I would actually like to talk about some of your comments about uranium development. 
29 

But the first four questions are based on the fact that last year 

was the 50th anniversary of the ICBM. And as you said on page 

10, it is still the most responsive and cost-effective leg of the triad, 

which I agree. 

I am concerned, though, that the Department of Defense and Air 

Force may be taking the ICBM for granted, in the way it sustains 

its long-term financial support. 

Specifically, in fiscal year 2011, only $46 million was allotted to 

solid rocket motors for the Minuteman III, which will produce three 

motor sets, even though the industrial base has said they need to 

do six to maintain the warm line facility. 

In contrast, the Navy funds 12 motor sets for their D5 warm line. 

Now, what really worries me is the Air Force in fiscal year 2012 

only has $10 million for that line and in fiscal year 2013 and beyond, it is zero. So the first question is, obviously, do you have an 

opinion on how many motor sets for Minuteman III you really need 

to sustain the solid rocket motor industrial base. And since there 

seems to be a disconnect there, how do you solve that one? 

Number two goes into another area which is closer to you, with 

your background obviously having been in space. We asked both 

Secretary Gates and Donley if they had been consulted by NASA 

before they came up with their naive decision to cancel Constellation, and they answered in the negative, although the Pentagon 

has sent us two reports and a letter from the Under Secretary of 

Acquisition talking about the significant negative impact on the 

military side even a slowdown of Constellation may be. 

And it goes into what Mr. Lamborn was asking that, you know, 

if you don’t have the industrial base and you want to reevaluate 

GMD, you may not have the ability to do it. So question number 

two is, did any high-level NASA officials talk to you or 

USSTRATCOM about the impact to the industrial base? 

Number three, if you would react to—I don’t know if it is General 

Payton or General Kehler. I think it was General Kehler who last 

week testified over in the Senate that there is a potential of at 

least doubling the cost to the Air Force of future propulsion for the 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs) if, indeed, the industrial base is harmed in some way. 

And the fourth one is how important is the solid rocket motor industrial base to our national defense, and how are you at 

STRATCOM involved with NASA and the Administration today in 

trying to address that industrial base issue which Secretary Donley 

did say was a concern that they had to address somewhere in the 

future when he was in front of the full committee? 

And if you can get through all of those, I have one on uranium, 

but we will see what happens, okay? 

General CHILTON. Thank you, sir. I will give it my best shot. 

First of all, United States Strategic Command and our component, 

Air Force Space Command, are paying close attention to the ICBM, 

the health of that force. 

We are trying to make the—advocate for and make sure the appropriate investments are made to sustain that capability through 

2030, and we are seeing those investments start to come in to enable that currently. 
30 

With regard to the industrial base, I have raised concerns about 

that in the past, and it is not just for—I would point out, not just 

for solid rocket motor propulsion technology and production, which 

is important, but I think, writ large, it is appropriate for us to look 

at industrial bases for all of the things that we need to conduct 

military operations, to include large aircraft production, whether it 

be tankers or airlift or bombers, to include space satellite productions, all of those things. 

Those are important that we, every now and then, pause and 

look at those. And Secretary Carter in Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics (AT&L), I know, is taking these issues very seriously and 

looking at them. 

I don’t have an opinion on what is adequate to sustain the industrial base in the solid rocket motor area, but I think analysis needs 

to be done to do that. The Navy and the Air Force had really two 

different approaches to their solid rocket motor programs. The Air 

Force was, buy them all at once and end the production. The Navy 

was to keep a warm line going. 

The startup of a warm line for the Air Force this year is actually 

a change to the way they had done business in the past, and can 

no doubt assist the industrial base. But I don’t have a good answer 

for you on whether or not—I don’t have the knowledge base to assess whether that is adequate or not to support it. 

With regard to NASA, I was not consulted with regard to the 

cancellation of the Constellation program before it was announced. 

And with regard to EELV costs, I think General Kehler is the 

right person to talk to this. From an organize, train and equip perspective, Air Force Space Command runs the programs that support access to space and launch, and so I would be at peril in arguing with his assessment of what the future costs might be. 

And lastly, I think kind of circling back as well, the—any decision made on—by the part of NASA on how they would proceed forward with their needs for solid rocket motors certainly needs to be 

taken into the calculus of AT&L as they look at the broader industrial base and our needs for solid rocket motors for the strategic deterrent. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, General. I have got 10 seconds and I will 

finish this up. I would appreciate for the record an analysis of what 

you are going to do with the warm line if, indeed, you go from 46 

to 10 to zero million in maintaining a warm line and, indeed, if the 

three that are in there for this year—and the industry says you 

still need six to maintain the warm line. That is a disconnect. I 

would appreciate for the record if you could provide that. 

And I also appreciate very much your answer to those other 

questions, and we will talk about how Department of Interior’s canceling of some of our industrial—our development of uranium in 

northern Arizona impacts you later on. 

I yield back, sir. 

General CHILTON. Thank you, sir. And we will take those for the 

record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 95.] 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman. 
31 

We will now turn to our second round of questions for those 

members who have further questions. 

Let me turn to another issue that is of concern to me, and that 

is our management of our weapons stockpile. As both witnesses 

well know, last year Section 3113 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 created the Stockpile Management 

Program. 

The statute contains five objectives, which I am sure you are well 

aware. Increase the reliability, safety and security of the nuclear 

weapons stockpile. Two, further reduce the likelihood of the resumption of underground nuclear testing. Three, achieve reductions 

in the future size of the nuclear weapons stockpile. Four, reduce 

the risk of an accidental detonation. And five, reduce the risk of a 

weapon being diverted to a terrorist. 

Now, the statute also contains three limitations. First, any 

changes to the stockpile must be made to achieve the objectives of 

the statute. 

Second, any changes must remain consistent with basic design 

parameters by including, to the maximum extent feasible, components that are well understood or are certifiable without the need 

to resume underground nuclear weapons testing. 

And third, any changes must use the design certification and 

production expertise resident in the nuclear complex to fulfill current mission requirements of the existing stockpile. 

So my question to you, General Chilton, is whether you are comfortable with both of those objectives and limitations contained 

within the statute. In particular, do you believe the United States 

can achieve its nuclear deterrence mission while limiting changes 

to those that ‘‘fulfill current mission requirements to the existing 

stockpile’’? 

General CHILTON. Chairman, I am very comfortable with the objectives of the Stockpile Management Program and with the statement you just made with regard to—I need no new military capabilities today for the weapons that are required for providing the 

strategic nuclear deterrent for the United States of America. 

And I think the recommendations are prudent that we ought not 

to develop changes that would necessitate testing, since that is our 

goal, is not to test. 

On the other hand, we should not constrain our engineers and 

scientists in developing options on what it will take to achieve the 

objectives of the Stockpile Management Program, and let them 

bring forward their best recommendations for both the President 

and for the Congress to assess as to what is the best way forward. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. 

Dr. Miller, did you have any comments? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, my short answer is yes, the objectives make 

good sense, and that the Nuclear Posture Review report will describe, in part, how the Department of Defense and Energy will 

move forward in meeting the guidelines of the Stockpile Management Plan. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Well, Dr. Miller, then my question to 

you is how the current Administration interprets the statutory 

guidance. 
32 

And as you know, the bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture 

Commission identified a continuum of options that might be used 

to manage the stockpile, that continuum being refurbishment, 

reuse and replacement. 

Further, the commission recommended that decisions concerning 

the management of each weapon should be made on a case-by-case 

basis within the basic limitation that the weapons should not be 

designed to accomplish new missions. 

With that in mind, do you expect that the Nuclear Posture Review is going to limit options for managing the stockpile along the 

continuum described by the bipartisan strategic commission? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, I would like to say that that has been a central—an important question of discussion and of analysis in the 

Nuclear Posture Review, and what I would like to do is come back 

and brief or pre-brief the results of that review to the committee. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. I would welcome that, and other members would as well. 

With that, I will turn to the ranking member for a question. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Chilton, then turning my questions to you, getting back 

to this issue of our deterrent and how to strengthen our deterrent, 

you know, many people are very concerned that when you lessen 

the numbers of overall weapons, that it doesn’t strengthen but 

weakens the overall deterrent. 

There are those that advocate that conventional weapons have a 

role to play as a deterrent. And obviously, you know, there are 

those, including myself—I am very concerned that the tradeoff between conventional and strategic weapons do not play the same 

role as a deterrent. 

Could you speak for a moment as to whether or not conventional 

weapons could be substituted as a deterrent? 

General CHILTON. Certainly, sir. First of all, with regards to the 

numbers, as numbers decrease, I think it is instructive to examine 

why we have the numbers we have and what is the principal driving force, particularly in the deployment of our strategic weapons. 

And it has been carried over from the Cold War period, looking 

at Russia’s threat to the United States with their capability and 

deterring that. And so as numbers go down in the Russian arsenal, 

you know, we start feeling more and more comfortable bringing our 

numbers down, which is why NPR and START, et cetera, are so 

closely intertwined together as we move forward. 

So I think that is an important context to take when we start 

looking at total numbers of deployed strategic weapons anyway. 

With regard to conventional weapons, I think there is a—there 

is no doubt that conventional strength can be a deterrent to misbehavior, so you can deter perhaps an invasion, let’s say, by North 

Korea of South Korea by a strong conventional posture of both U.S. 

and South Korean conventional forces on the peninsula. And I 

think we have been successful in deterring in that fashion in the 

past. 

However, we have to be careful when we start talking about onefor-one substitutions of conventional weapons for nuclear weapons, 

because when it comes to the deterrence mission—not the 

warfighting mission necessarily, but the deterrence mission—the 
33 

nuclear weapon has a deterrent factor that far exceeds a conventional threat. 

And so we have to be very careful in our discussions and dialogue on this. Are we talking about conducting warfighting operations or deterrence operations when we start looking at these options? 

That said, when we start looking at Prompt Global Strike and 

from a conventional perspective, I look at that as an additional 

weapon in the quiver of the President to give him options in time 

of crisis today in which he maybe only has a nuclear option for a 

timely response. 

And so I am an advocate for having a Prompt Global Strike capability as an additional weapon set. But the connective tissue between that and the one-for-one exchange for a nuclear deterrent— 

I am not quite there. 

Mr. TURNER. I think, perhaps in even both of your comments, the 

concerns with respect to the space industrial base and how it is 

supported were reflected—the committee and its members certainly 

have concerns. 

Could you tell us, you know, your concerns and what we need to 

be doing to strengthen the competitiveness and the future of our 

space industrial base and, really, how critical that is in supporting 

our future capabilities? 

General CHILTON. Sir, I believe our space industrial base is absolutely critical, as I mentioned, as well as our solid rocket industrial 

base and an aircraft production industrial base, for our mission 

sets. 

Last year in my testimony I raised the issue of International 

Traffic in Arms Reductions (ITAR) not because I am an expert on 

ITAR but because I had heard enough conversations in the space 

community of—that it seemed logical that we should take a close 

look at that, because there was debate as to whether that was helping us or hurting us in a broader sense with regard to our industrial base. 

And I am happy to see that the Department is starting to take 

a look at those regulations along with the State Department to 

see—to have a healthy debate and discussion on what is the best 

thing forward to ensure we preserve our industrial base to provide 

the capabilities we know we will need in the future. 

And there is quite a bit of policy involved in that as well, so I 

will turn it over to Dr. Miller. 

Dr. MILLER. If I could just add very briefly, export control reform 

is a very high priority of the Secretary of Defense. We have had 

a number of high-level inter-agency meetings on this. 

And last week on March 11th the President gave a speech to the 

Ex-Im Bank, Export-Import Bank, in which he talked about longterm goal of—a goal of increasing our exports substantially. He 

also noted in that speech that the Secretary of Defense would be 

giving a talk within the next couple of weeks on export control reform. And that is, indeed, the case. 

It is a priority. It is important for the space industrial base. And 

it is also—has, obviously, broader implications as well. 

I would just add that we want to think about—as we go forward 

with our national security space strategy, we want to think about 
34 

the appropriate role of the private sector in providing both the assets and the services in some space mission areas. And we will be 

looking hard at the appropriate balance there. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Spratt is now recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. SPRATT. I thought that Mr. Larsen would raise the matter 

of the ABL, the airborne laser, but he didn’t, and I am curious as 

to know what is your assessment of its potential in light of the recent feasibility test that indicated it may be feasible. And what remains before we can consider this a deployable system? 

Dr. MILLER. I will go first on this one. The concerns about the 

ABL were not—that led to its—to the restructuring of the program 

in fiscal year 2010 were not about the technical abilities of the 

laser but, really, centered around the operational concept and the 

ability of the platform to survive in a realistic threat environment, 

and for us to affordably procure enough of them to provide effective 

missile defenses relative to other options. 

Sir, I think the future on laser capabilities is more likely to be 

in solid state, and we are learning things from the ABL program 

about that. That is now part of our technology effort. And I expect 

we will see that move forward substantially over the coming several years. 

Mr. SPRATT. Another question. Reading quickly both your testimonies while you were testifying, I didn’t notice anywhere any reference to something called a Replacement Warhead Program 

(RRW). Is there still such a program ongoing? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, there is no such program under way. I will say 

that I just discovered yesterday that the Air Force apparently inadvertently had a line in its budget submission that said RRW. It had 

all zeroes, but it is—that program has been terminated since, I believe, fiscal year 2008. And there are no plans to bring it back. 

Mr. SPRATT. Towards the end of your testimony, you indicated 

that things were happening so rapidly in the cyber world that you 

needed—you are—at least to some kind of extraordinary procurement authority to waive the ordinary time-consuming procedures of 

procurement. 

Could you elaborate on that? And are you asking us to do something to give you a special dispensation from the rules so that you 

can quickly respond to developments in that world? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, no, I am not at this time asking for any additional acquisition authority on the part—on behalf of the Department—an observation that with the rapid cycling of technology 

that we are often challenged, given how our acquisition system 

works typically, to be able to innovate. 

And what we will be looking at as part of our strategy development is not just the possible changes to acquisition, which you 

would then—we would then request changes if necessary to Congress, but also how we can get innovation to happen more quickly. 

Some of the changes we most need may be with respect to software rather than any hardware that has to be procured. 

Mr. SPRATT. General Chilton, in your testimony, you indicated 

that talking about rebuilding or refurbishing the nuclear production complex—you mentioned, first of all, Y–12 at Oak Ridge. And 

then you mentioned Los Alamos. 
35 

Were you referring there to the possibility that building TA–55 

would be the production source for plutonium pits in the future? 

General CHILTON. It is the CMRR, the investment at Los Alamos 

that I was referring to, and that is—and that details what we will 

provide from the NNSA on what exactly their fundings will go into 

there, sir, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility there. 

Mr. SPRATT. Would you give us in a wrap-up where we stand on 

the START negotiation? To what extent are the Russians proving 

to be cooperative and—— 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, with recognition of—that this is an open forum 

and those are ongoing negotiations, I do think it is fair to say that 

over the past several weeks and the beginning of the new year 

there were some bouncy patches in the negotiations. 

I think there has been substantial progress over the last couple 

weeks and, in fact, very substantial progress last week at the negotiations in Geneva. I think it is realistic to think now about concluding a treaty within the next several weeks. 

It does not mean that that is going to be done. It is still the subject of negotiation. But the differences have narrowed substantially 

over the last week or so. 

Mr. SPRATT. What is the range of likely deployed systems you are 

negotiating, numerically? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, the last range that was discussed publicly was 

between 1,500 and 1,675 nuclear weapons, and then a very wide 

range with respect to delivery vehicles, between 500 and 1,100. 

That range is, needless to say, much narrower today in the negotiations. 

And because it is the subject of ongoing negotiations, I would 

prefer to answer in closed session to be any more precise. 

Mr. SPRATT. That is fine. Thank you much. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. I thank the gentleman. 

Before turning to Mr. Franks for the next question, I am going 

to turn the gavel over to Chairman Spratt right now as I depart, 

and want to thank both Dr. Miller and General Chilton for your 

testimony and for your great service to our Nation. 

Thank you for the work you are doing. 

Dr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. With that, the chair now recognizes Mr. Franks 

for five minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you again, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, while we are waiting on the ratification by our partners in Czech Republic and Poland to begin the Phased, Adaptive 

Approach for missile defenses in Europe, you know, it is clear that 

the first phase, 1A, was scheduled to be implemented by 2011; the 

second phase, 1B, by 2015. 

But if you look at the numbers of interceptors we are buying— 

and I know this point has been made before, but the SM–3 Block 

IB inventory buy in 2011 includes only eight additional SM–3 

Block IB interceptors. 

And of course, one of the critiques of the former Missile Defense 

Plan in Poland and Czech Republic was that it was expected to 

only cover 75 percent of our European allies by 2013. 
36 

So, Dr. Miller, I will direct my first question to you. How does 

the Phased, Adaptive Approach compare, coverage-wise, by the percentage of allies supported by—I will say 2013, but you can add additional timelines there? How is it covering us as opposed to the 

ground-based system? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, I don’t have the precise numbers, and it will differ by phase. It expands from Phase One to Two to Three to Four, 

and the most significant coverage does come in the later phases. 

What I will say is we can come back in a closed session and I 

will not just have the sort of lay-down but those numbers as well. 

I do want to note with respect to the Standard Missile-3 that we 

are currently coming toward the end of procurement on the Standard Missile-3 Block IA and in the transition phase over to the 

IIB—I am sorry, to the Standard Missile-3 IB. 

Mr. FRANKS. Right. 

Dr. MILLER. And consistent with our approach of essentially fly 

before you buy, that the Department made a decision not to ramp 

up this year in fiscal year 2011 substantially the SM–3 Block IAs, 

but just the numbers that we are looking to buy SM–3 IB deliveries—324 by fiscal year 2017. 

And once we have gotten to this development of the program, we 

are basically going to be pedal to the metal on that. And current 

plan—buy just of those two types is 436 of the IA and IB types. 

Additional interceptors will be of IIA and IIB. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. 

General Chilton, in terms of deterring Iran in the immediate future, what do you think are our best strategies and our best capabilities to do that, deterring them from moving forward with their 

nuclear program, rather than defending them after? 

My great concern is that the Administration may have come to 

the conclusion at this point that Iran is going to become a nuclear 

nation and that their strategy is toward containment in the future. 

And I am terrified of that possibility. What opportunities do we 

have to deter Iran from gaining that capability in the first place 

on the table now? 

General CHILTON. Well, this question is probably a little more 

appropriate for Dr. Miller. I will tell you, though, from my perspective, I have never—I have not seen any sense of giving up on any 

type of effort to encourage Iran not to develop a nuclear weapons 

program. 

I think the Administration is foursquare behind that effort, and 

it is a whole-of-government approach. It can’t just be a military approach. I mean, if we look back, we could say, ‘‘Well, you know, our 

nuclear might did not deter North Korea from developing a nuclear 

capability. Our nuclear might did not deter Pakistan and India 

from developing capabilities.’’ 

Nation-states develop capabilities for their own reasons independent, I think, of our nuclear posture. It is not to say that our 

defense, both conventional strength in the region and our nuclear 

posture, is not an important element, but it is much broader than 

that, I believe. 

And I would turn it over to Dr. Miller to comment on that. 

Dr. MILLER. I will just say very briefly that Iran had an opportunity in the negotiations that were undertaken over preceding 
37 

months to come forward with and to agree to a proposal that I 

think was very reasonable with respect to the Tehran research reactor and with respect to coming into full compliance with the NonProliferation Treaty. 

As you know, sir, to date it has not taken those steps, and we 

are working with our allies and with others in the international 

community to really shift to what is, frankly, a pressure trap with 

respect to Iran and to look to try to change their incentives to bring 

themselves into compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

At the same time, the development of capabilities for missile defense, for counter-WMD and the improvement of conventional capabilities of our partners in the region will both help to dissuade Iran 

from pursuing this path, because it will reduce the benefits of them 

moving forward with their nuclear program. 

And we want to continue to develop the capabilities of ourselves 

and of our partners to cope effectively with whatever capabilities 

Iran may pursue to discount their value. 

And this dissuasion, this different form of deterrence, is really a 

fundamental purpose of the types of capabilities we are developing 

today. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but I am hoping that 

the gentleman might take for the record a question related to directed energy programs in the future. 

I mean, I meant to get to ABL. I think that the accomplishment 

there was pretty profound and that we would love to hear what 

your thoughts are for directed energy applications in the future. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 96.] 

Mr. SPRATT. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Franks. 

Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Chilton, as a follow-up to my question earlier this morning about missile defense training, you mentioned that C2BMC 

training is currently unassigned. Why is that the case? And do you 

have an opinion as to where that should be assigned for that type 

of training? 

General CHILTON. I think we are at the phase in the program 

where it is maturing to the point that we need to—and the Missile 

Defense Executive Board (MDEB) has recognized that in our last 

meeting that it is time to go off and decide who should be assigned 

that authority. 

I don’t have an opinion on who should take that, but clearly one 

of the services should do that, and the MDEB is taking a look at 

that, and we will make a—there will be a committee—there is a 

group studying that and they will make a recommendation back to 

the MDEB. 

But I think it is a matter of maturity of the system and the timing of it. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. 

And, Dr. Miller, I would like to ask you a question about declaratory policy. According to some press reports, there are White House 

principals who believe that the U.S. should declare that it will 

never be the first to use nuclear weapons and that it will only em-
38 

ploy them against nuclear targets—for example, writing off the 

possibility of ever using them against chemical and biological types 

of WMD attacks. 

What is the current declaratory policy? And what would be the 

rationale for changing it? 

Dr. MILLER. The President has been presented with a wide range 

of options for considerations with respect to declaratory policy. And 

I think it would be inappropriate for me to discuss each of those 

in—certainly, in open session today. 

Our current declaratory policy, I think, has accurately been characterized as calculated ambiguity. Since 1967 we have had a policy 

called our negative security assurance that says—that has said 

that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states that are in compliance with the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

At the same time—so that is one side of it. At the same time, 

multiple administrations have broadly hinted at the possibility— 

and done it in different ways, but broadly hinted at the possibility 

of nuclear threats associated with other activities. 

So, for example, administrations have talked about the possibility of a devastating and overwhelming response to the use of 

weapons of mass destruction without necessarily ruling out explicitly the use of nuclear weapons in that response. 

Again, that has been described as calculated ambiguity. Others 

have different names for it, but that is what has been provided. 

And at this point, I can say, again, that the President has been 

provided with a number of options to consider for declaratory policy, and it has been a point of some significant amount of analysis, 

both with respect to its impact on those we wish to deter and its 

impact on potential perception by allies and partners whom we 

wish to assure of our commitment. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Are you saying—and if you can’t answer this, I 

would understand, but that he is anticipating—the President is anticipating making a change in policy? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, I am saying that the range of options is under 

consideration and staying with the current policy would be—is one 

of those options. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. 

Dr. MILLER. The range is under consideration. That is really all 

I can say. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, I appreciate that. Thank you. 

Mr. SPRATT. Gentleman yields back his time? 

Any further questions? Mr. Franks, did you have a question? 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, other than just asking them to take 

the ABL and just the entire subject of directed energy for the 

record. I would like to get some insight, because we really, really 

haven’t had a hearing on that test result yet, and I would love to 

hear that. Thank you, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 96.] 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much for your testimony and for 

your responsive answers, and if you will also respond in due time 

to the questions for the record, and on some occasion we may take 

you up on the offer for a confidential hearing. 
39 

Thank you very much indeed, and thank you for your service to 

our country. 

Dr. MILLER. Thank you, Chairman. 

General CHILTON. Thank you, sir. 

[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 16, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 16, 2010 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 16, 2010 

(95) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Dr. MILLER. Representatives from OSD Policy and the Joint Staff are working 

with the House Armed Services Committee staff to schedule a briefing for professional staff members early in April 2010. That briefing will show the notional coverage footprints of each phase of the European Phased, Adaptive Approach. [See 

page 13.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN 

General CHILTON. The FY 2011 President’s Budget (PB) begins a multi-year funding increase for critical plutonium and uranium infrastructure improvements needed to sustain stockpile credibility. It is critical that we complete these projects as 

soon as possible. NNSA plans call for achieving full operations at the Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research Replacement, Nuclear Facility (CMRR–NF) and the Uranium 

Processing Facility (UPF) by 2022. 

Refurbishment of Plutonium Facility 4 (PF–4) in Technical Area 55 (TA–55) is one 

of two critical components required to support plutonium processing. The FY11 

NNSA Plutonium Sustainment ($190M) and TA–55 Reinvestment Project ($20M) 

budget lines reflect needed PF–4 funding for safety improvements and configuration 

modification to improve manufacturing efficiencies. 

Completion of CMRR–NF is required to provide plutonium R&D and analytical 

capabilities in support of surveillance and stockpile management. It will also support nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, arms control treaty monitoring, nuclear forensics and counterterrorism, and emergency response capabilities. The 

CMRR–NF FY11 budget request of $225M funds design completion and begins construction. When complete, activities that were transferred from closed portions of 

the aging CMR facility to PF–4 will move to CMRR–NF. This should free space 

within PF–4 needed to meet stockpile management capacity requirements. 

The FY11 PB request of $115M for UPF at Y–12 funds design and construction 

planning activities. When complete, the UPF will support production, surveillance, 

and dismantlement of highly enriched uranium components. [See page 24.] 

Dr. MILLER. Funding for nuclear weapons facilities infrastructure is in the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) budget. The President’s FY2011 

budget request for the NNSA includes the following for Chemistry and Metallurgy 

Research Replacement (CMRR) construction specifically and total NNSA new facility construction projects for FY 2010–2012: 

FY 2010 Appropriated $M FY 2011 

Request $M 

FY 2012 Out-year Target ($M) 

CMRR Construction ........................................................................ $97.0M $225.0 $305.0 

Total for all NNSA Construction Projects ....................................... $303.9 $399.0 $542.3 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has reviewed the budget information for the 

major NNSA construction projects. This budget starts the recapitalization of nuclear 

facilities that are essential to support DOD requirements. 

The NNSA will deliver its Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan to Congress in spring, 2010. This document will identify a plan for evolving and sustaining 

the nuclear stockpile. [See page 24.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

General CHILTON. Our entire strategic defense enterprise faces industrial base 

sustainment issues. Unfortunately, solid rocket motor industry concerns are more 

acute because of the significant expected reduction in defense and NASA demand 

for these propulsion systems in the coming years. As you know, when an industry 

faces reduced demand, substantial downsizing in capacity generally follows. As the 

Combatant Commander responsible for strategic deterrence, I am concerned with 
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the prospect of an irrevocable loss of sufficient capacity to recapitalize systems 

which rely on solid rocket motor propulsion. 

The Navy and Air Force have taken different approaches to ensuring they have 

sufficient capacity to recapitalize their force structure. The Navy has stated confidence that their low-rate D5 missile production model, delivering a planned 12 

missiles annually, will ensure production skills are protected into the future. While 

I cannot comment on how many Air Force motor production units is sufficient to 

sustain industrial capacity, the Air Force FY11 budget submission does not make 

a similar a long-term commitment to help preserve solid rocket motor production 

and related industrial capacity. 

The Air Force is developing a plan to protect sufficient capacity to recapitalize the 

Minuteman force, and I look to their FY12 POM submission to articulate and adequately resource such a plan to meet this critical need. [See page 30.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Dr. MILLER. The Airborne Laser (ABL) program was transitioned from a weapons 

acquisition program to a technology demonstration test-bed because of affordability 

concerns, and serious questions about the survivability and military utility of the 

ABL. On February 11, 2010, the ABL had a successful test where it destroyed a 

boosting ballistic missile. The successful test validates the decision to preserve the 

ABL test-bed program as a pathfinder for the Nation’s directed-energy program. 

In the FY2011 budget request, directed energy research programs are funded for 

$98.7 million in the Missile Defense Agency budget. This includes funding for solidstate laser technology that is showing promise. Solid-state lasers would have much 

higher power than the current chemicalbased lasers in a much smaller package. 

This could allow laser technology to be used on more survivable and operationally 

practical platforms. [See page 37.] 

Dr. MILLER. USSTRATCOM supports the continued research and development of 

directed energy projects, although the actual technology development is not a combatant command responsibility. For the Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB), 

USSTRATCOM stands ready to make recommendations for possible emergency activation of the ALTB if we believe it could prove effective in an emerging crisis. 

This revolutionary technology holds the most promise for boost-phase intercept 

and to address different raid sizes, and it offers an offsetting strategy from a missile 

vs. missile approach, which is cost imposing. [See page 38.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 16, 2010 

(99) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Section 912 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2010 made permanent the pilot program that has allowed the Department to 

provide space situational awareness information to non-U.S. government entities. 

This statute also contained additional protections for those non-U.S. government entities that might provide data to the U.S. Given STRATCOM’s responsibility for this 

so-called ‘‘commercial and foreign entities program,’’ and for space situational 

awareness in general, could you provide the committee with an update on your efforts to implement this statute? 

General CHILTON. USSTRATCOM assumed responsibility for sharing space situational awareness from the USAF in December 2009. We transitioned the existing 

services which consist of 1) catalog and satellite information posted to the 

www.space-track.org Web site, and 2) SSA services under a sharing agreement that 

offers conjunction assessment support (predictions of close approaches between satellites) and launch support (closure windows to avoid collisions with orbiting objects, 

and early orbit satellite for launching satellites). Additionally, we offer additional 

services to entities which includes conjunction assessment support to satellite maneuver planning, re-entering and deorbiting objects, and disposal and end-of-life operations. We also support anomaly resolution and interference resolution when it is 

in the national security interest, and when resources are available. 

We are evaluating the spectrum of services we offer, and the quality and utility 

of that information. We are in the process of finalizing efforts to provide more detailed conjunction assessment predictions that will enable satellite operators to refine their probability of collision calculations and afford them more information to 

support their decision to maneuver or not. A goal is to reduce the number of unnecessary satellite avoidance maneuvers conducted. Additionally, we submitted a request to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the authority to negotiate and 

conclude SSA sharing agreements with non-U.S. governments. The AFSPC pilot program did not support requests from foreign governments. Our request is currently 

in interagency coordination. Once approved, we will engage with Allies and other 

nations and intergovernmental organizations to establish SSA sharing agreements 

to provide them services to promote safe spaceflight, and to receive SSA information 

in return to improve USG SSA. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What, in your view, are the most important steps the U.S. needs 

to take to improve our Space Situational Awareness capabilities? 

General CHILTON. Our current Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is inadequate 

and thus impacts the ability of USSTRATCOM to predict, detect, and characterize 

orbiting objects and to attribute anomalies and attacks on space systems. We must 

implement several investment strategies to meet our SSA requirements and thus 

enable access to and freedom of action in this domain. 

We must first continue our investment in the critical legacy elements that include 

service life extensions, maintenance, and upgrades of the dedicated, collateral, and 

contributing sensors of our Space Surveillance Network. Secondly, USSTRATCOM 

will advocate for prudent investments in future capabilities like Space Based Space 

Surveillance, Space Fence, Space Surveillance Telescope, and Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) upgrades to ensure more accurate, timely, and operationally 

relevant SSA. 

Finally, we must continue working with satellite owners/operators who share orbital information on their satellites in order to automate the exchange of satellite 

positional information. We will leverage the JSpOC Mission System program to foster collaborative data-sharing across USG Agencies and Departments, our allies, 

and the commercial sector to enhance global coverage and awareness, which improves our ability to combine a space operational picture with effective C2 systems. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Yesterday, the Department of Defense and the Office of Director 

for National Intelligence delivered to the committee an interim Space Posture Review. And you have testified that you are nearing the completion of the Nuclear Posture Review. Can you give us any insight into how, as you think about deterrence 

against 21st century threats, the Administration plans to achieve deterrence in 

space? 
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Dr. MILLER. Deterrence in space domain, as elsewhere, depends on a combination 

of denying the hoped for benefits and increasing the costs to a would-be attacker, 

and effectively communicating both capabilities and intent. The potential benefits 

of attacking U.S. space systems can be reduced, for example, by increasing systems’ 

survivability and resilience, by having complementary capabilities (e.g., air-breathing systems), and being prepared to operate with denied or degraded access to space 

for some period of time. 

Achieving deterrence in space against 21st century threats requires a whole-ofgovernment approach. The Administration is currently reviewing the existing (2006) 

national space policy. The resulting revision of this national policy will seek to synchronize the broad U.S. equities in space, spanning national security, diplomacy, 

science, and commerce. 

Building from this new national space policy, DOD and the Office of the Director 

of National Intelligence (ODNI) will develop a National Security Space Strategy 

(NSSS). The NSSS effort is intended to help us better align the ends, ways, and 

means to succeed in the congested, contested, and competitive space environment. 

Concurrent with NSSS development, DOD is continuing to develop concepts for 

best practices in space, and in May 2010 the Air Force is conducting a ‘‘Schriever’’ 

series war game that will include a simulated Code of Conduct to assess the operational implications of a voluntary Code. ‘‘Schriever’’ series outcomes will bolster 

NSSS development and address questions of rules of the road/codes of conduct and 

declaratory policy. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Specifically, can you talk about how we might deter others from 

holding our space systems at risk? How might we respond to attacks against our 

space assets, and how do we manage the risk of escalation? 

Dr. MILLER. Deterring others from holding our space systems at risk, and managing escalation risk if the situation warrants it, require a whole-of-government approach. The Administration is currently reviewing the existing (2006) national space 

policy. The resulting national space policy will seek to synchronize the broad U.S. 

equities in space, spanning national security, diplomacy, science, and commerce. 

Building from this new national space policy, DOD and the Office of the Director 

of National Intelligence (ODNI) will develop a National Security Space Strategy 

(NSSS). This effort, building upon the findings of the interim Space Posture Review, 

will help us better align the ends, ways, and means to succeed in the congested, 

contested, and competitive environment of space. 

Deterrence in space domain, as elsewhere, depends on a combination of denying 

the hoped for benefits and increasing the costs to a would-be attacker, and effectively communicating both capabilities and intent. The potential benefits of attacking U.S. space systems can be reduced, for example, by increasing systems’ survivability and resilience, by having complementary capabilities (e.g., air-breathing systems), and being prepared to operate with denied or degraded access to space for 

some period of time. 

U.S. responses to any attacks on our space systems would, as in other domains, 

be consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict, including proportionality and discrimination. Such responses may or may not be limited to the space domain. The 

risk of escalation would have to be considered in the specific context on the conflict 

at hand. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY 

Mr. THORNBERRY. General Chilton, in your testimony you state that, ‘‘Increasing 

the safety, security, and long-term confidence in the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains 

a top priority.’’ Last November, the Global Security Newswire quoted you as calling 

our current nuclear weapons complex infrastructure ‘‘inadequate;’’ and, citing last 

year’s Perry-Schlesinger Report, ‘‘genuinely decrepit.’’ Can you elaborate on your 

statements and discuss, in your view, the current state of the weapons complex and 

what you see as key challenges and shortfalls with complex infrastructure modernization? 

General CHILTON. I agree with the Nuclear Posture Review conclusion that today’s nuclear complex ‘‘. . . has fallen into neglect.’’ Facilities that process plutonium 

and uranium date back to the Manhattan Project era. They have emerging safety, 

security and environmental concerns and are subject to unplanned shutdown with 

no backup capability. In addition, the skilled human capital base has been underdeveloped over the last decade making it difficult to attract and retain the best and 

brightest scientists and engineers. A strong national commitment to sustaining warheads and nuclear technical capabilities is essential to counter these trends. A modern nuclear infrastructure and highly skilled workforce is consistent with our na-
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tion’s arms control and nonproliferation objectives and can provide the capability to 

respond in a timely manner to technical or geopolitical surprise. Investments outlined in the 2011 President’s Budget request will strengthen the science, technology 

and engineering base and begin to address physical infrastructure and human capital problems. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. General Chilton, U.S. Cyber Command was recently set up as 

a sub-unified component of U.S. Strategic Forces Command. What is the role of the 

U.S. military in cybersecurity, computer network attack, defense, and exploitation? 

When should America act under Title 50 authorities, and at what point Title 10? 

How does the War Powers Act affect the use of force in cyberspace? The U.S. military’s #1 priority is homeland defense; should the military defend America’s networks, even private networks? 

General CHILTON. The military is responsible for the operation, security, and defense of Department of Defense networks. If directed by the President or Secretary 

of Defense, the military will support other executive agencies and departments in 

the defense of non-Department information networks and infrastructure. Further, 

the military is responsible for fielding offensive cyberspace capabilities, and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, employing those capabilities as traditional military activities. 

The armed forces leverage the intelligence community for all source intelligence, 

including computer network exploitation, in accordance with the National Intelligence Priority Framework and in support of combatant commander requirements. 

These foreign intelligence activities are reportable to Congress under Title 50. The 

terminology ‘‘Title 10’’ and ‘‘Title 50’’ are frequently used to describe the division between military operations and intelligence community activities. This is not an entirely accurate characterization, as Title 10, entitled ‘‘Armed Forces’’ and Title 50, 

entitled ‘‘War and National Defense’’ both contain wide-ranging laws covering their 

respective topics—both of which are directly connected to military operations. Neither Title 10 nor Title 50 contain any specific reference to the use of cyberspace for 

cybersecurity, computer network attack, defense, or exploitation. As to the division 

of intelligence activity, Title 50 contains a section that broadly assigns different intelligence activities to the National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office and Defense Intelligence Agency (all 

DOD organizations). The section ends, however, noting ‘‘the military departments 

maintain sufficient capabilities to collect and produce intelligence’’ to meet the requirements of, among other needs, ‘‘the requirements of the unified and specified 

combatant commands and of joint operations.’’ Clarification of this division of authorities and responsibilities come from a variety of documents, perhaps most notably, Executive Order 12333, addressing U.S. intelligence activities, but also a number of other documents, including, among others, Department of Defense Instructions, Directives, and Manuals, the Unified Command Plan, and the Standing Rules 

of Engagement. 

The constitution gives the President authority for both sets of activities—military 

operations and foreign intelligence activities. In cyberspace there is the potential for 

some overlap, as ‘‘computer network exploitation,’’ an activity conducted by the National Security Agency is vital to conduct of military operations under ‘‘computer 

network defense’’ and also ‘‘computer network attack.’’ It is also very similar to the 

military mission of ‘‘operational preparation of the environment.’’ Dual hatting the 

commander of U.S. Cyber Command as the Director of the National Security Agency, has allowed close integration of these two organizations, allowing them to appropriately leverage each other to fulfill national security requirements. 

As to the War Powers Resolution, 50 USC 1541 et seq., by its own terms it ‘‘will 

apply to the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into 

situations where imminent involvement in hostilities, is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.’’ 50 USC 1541(a). 

Further, ‘‘The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to 

introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, 

or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories 

or possessions, or its armed forces.’’ 50 USC 1541(c). 

Pursuant to this Act, Congress passed the ‘‘Authorization for use of military force 

against those responsible for attacks launched against the United States on Sept. 

11, 2001.’’ This authorization, pursuant to the War Powers Act, provides in relevant 

part: ‘‘[t]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force 

against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 

committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
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harbored such organizations or persons in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.’’ This can be seen as Congressional approval of our military operations in our 

on-going fight against terrorism. Current efforts in cyberspace play an important 

role in this struggle against our adversaries, a role that is consistent with the Congressional authorization under the War Powers Resolution. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for the defense of 

non-DOD Federal networks and coordinating with private industry and providers 

for the defense of the private networks. U.S. Strategic Command, and the Department of Defense, supports the defense of critical infrastructure networks in response 

to a request for assistance from DHS. That assistance could include technical assistance and recommendations for immediate defensive actions; as well as technical assistance and recommendations for more systemic mitigation, such as improvements 

in network configurations and improvements in information assurance measures or 

best practices. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Dr. Miller, U.S. Cyber Command was recently set up as a subunified component of U.S. Strategic Forces Command. What is the role of the U.S. 

military in cybersecurity, computer network attack, defense, and exploitation? When 

should America act under Title 50 authorities, and at what point Title 10? How does 

the War Powers Act affect the use of force in cyberspace? The U.S. military’s #1 priority is homeland defense; should the military defend America’s networks, even private networks? 

Dr. MILLER. To first consider cybersecurity and network defense, the U.S. military 

will defend and secure its networks and systems to ensure that our forces are able 

to conduct their operations and missions with access to and use of cyberspace. The 

security of the U.S. military’s networks requires a whole-of-a-government approach. 

We need to build robust relationships with interagency, industry, and international 

partners. DOD is working closely with the President’s Cybersecurity Coordinator, 

and with our interagency partners as we develop a way forward on cyber issues. 

DOD is also collaborating with the private sector, through two main channels: the 

Enduring Security Framework and the Defense Industrial Base. The Enduring Security Framework is a public-private partnership between the Director for National 

Intelligence, DOD, the Department of Homeland Security, and the private sector; its 

goal is to provide a permanent forum for USG-industry dialogue. The Defense Industrial Base offers another platform for public-private partnerships; it is a critical 

infrastructure partnership council established by DOD to facilitate coordination between USG critical infrastructure programs and private sector owners and operators. 

DOD conducts military operations and intelligence activities, including those in 

cyberspace, under Title 10 and Title 50 authorities, respectively. USCYBERCOM’s 

mission focuses on Title 10 military activities: ‘‘USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, 

integrates, synchronizes, and conducts activities to: direct the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense information networks and; prepare to, and 

when directed, conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and 

deny the same to our adversaries.’’ The National Security Agency’s mission will not 

change as it will both continue to protect U.S. national security systems through 

information assurance and through the production of foreign signals intelligence information. The NSA capabilities will help enable USCYBERCOM to direct the operation and defense of the DOD information networks and conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace operations. 

Whether DOD acts under Title 10 or Title 50 depends upon the nature of the operation or activity being executed. DOD does not engage in covert action, as defined 

by 50 U.S. Code § 413b(e). Assuming that all are otherwise legally available and appropriate options, it is the President’s option to conduct appropriate military activities in cyberspace under Title 10 or Title 50 authorities, and/or to direct covert action under Title 50. 

Cyber capabilities are much like any other DOD capability or weapon, i.e., they 

may be employed in support of the deployment and operation of U.S. Armed Forces 

around the world. Their use alone, however, does not implicate the provisions of the 

War Powers Resolution. 

How and when the U.S. military acts is at the discretion of the President. The 

Department of Defense will provide the support directed, requested or required to 

defend the United States and its assets, whenever and wherever required, at the 

direction of the President. There are mechanisms in place to provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities, under which the Department is able to provide support requested by the Department of Homeland Security to help defend and secure those 

assets determined to be vital to National Security. 
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. Our potential adversaries have shown the capability and willingness to deny our forces access to satellite communications either through the use 

of anti-satellite weapons or communications jamming. While anti-satellite technology is a very real threat, proven by China’s January 2007 shoot down of one of 

their aging satellites, the technology to interfere with satellite communications is 

simple and readily available worldwide from any local Radio Shack store. What specific measures has STRATCOM taken to ensure missile defense command and control in a satellite communications denied environment? I understand if parts of your 

answer are classified, but I encourage you to share what you can with this committee today and in classified follow-ups. 

General CHILTON. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. In 2004, STRATCOM conducted a Military Utility Assessment 

(MUA) of the initial set of Ground-based Missile Defense (GMD) capabilities deployed in California and Alaska to determine their militarily effectiveness. How confident are you in current GMD system capabilities? Do you have any plans to conduct another MUA of the GMD system? If so, when do you expect to have the MUA 

completed? 

General CHILTON. I am confident the current GMD system provides sufficient capability to protect the U.S. from a North Korean threat. Version 2009 (fifth version) 

of the Ballistic Missile Defense System MUA was completed 5 Aug 2009 and subsequently forwarded to SecDef via Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Version 2010 

(sixth version) of the Ballistic Missile Defense System MUA is in the final stages 

of staffing and expected to be completed by August 2010. 

Mr. LAMBORN. What is our national and military policy if our space assets are 

attacked? How have military operational plans and contingency plans changed to reflect the possibility that those satellites may be unavailable during times of crisis 

and war? 

Dr. MILLER. The United States considers space systems to have rights of passage 

through, and operations in, space without interference. This is consistent with U.S. 

law, applicable international law including the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and existing (2006) national space policy. The United States views purposeful interference 

with its space systems as an infringement on its rights and will take those actions 

necessary to preserve its freedom of action in space. The United States reserves the 

right to take the full range of appropriate responses, including military action as 

consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict. 

The Administration is reviewing the 2006 national space policy and will update 

Congress accordingly on any changes. On 15 March 2010, the Department of Defense (DOD) provided Congress with an ‘‘Interim’’ Space Posture Review, which provided our initial thinking on national security equities in space. 

The DOD is addressing the possibility that space systems may be unavailable during times of crisis and war via its operational and contingency planning processes. 

Numerous war games, such as the ‘‘Schriever’’ wargame series (the sixth in the series will be conducted in early May 2010) have shown that testing ourselves in a 

framework of diminished access to space is an important part of our strategy development. Each of the Services conducted a ‘‘day without space’’ study to understand 

the impact of losing critical space capabilities; the results were stark and highlight 

the importance of your question. 

The DOD is currently working with the office of the Director of National Intelligence to develop a National Security Space Strategy that will provide a basis for 

further delineating guidance for space-related plans and programs. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Do we have clear red lines or thresholds for attacks against our 

space assets? What are the merits of a declaratory policy that signals our intent and 

lays out consequences? Do you see merit in establishing international rules of the 

road and/or codes of conduct in space? 

Dr. MILLER. The United States stated that space systems have rights at passage 

through, and operation in, space without interference. Our current national Space 

Policy states that our space capabilities are vital to our national interests, and we 

will preserve our rights, capabilities and freedom of action in space, including if necessary military action as consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict. 

There may be merits in employing voluntary, non-treaty approaches (e.g., international rules of the road and/or a code of conduct) for the space domain. Over the 

past two years, the United States engaged in dialogue with European experts regarding the European Union’s proposal for a ‘‘Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.’’ In addition, the United States is participating in a multi-year study of 

‘‘long-term sustainability of space activities’’ within the United Nations Committee 
104 

on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This study is examining the feasibility of voluntary ‘‘best practice guidelines’’ to help reduce operational risks to all space systems; it should serve as a valuable cooperation opportunity with established and 

emerging members of the space-faring community and with the private sector to enhance spaceflight safety and preserve the space environment for future generations. 

In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) is continuing to develop concepts for 

best practices in space, and in May 2010 the Air Force is conducting a ‘‘Schriever’’ 

series wargame which will include a simulated Code of Conduct to assess the operational implications of a voluntary Code. 

The DOD is currently working with the office of the Director of National Intelligence to develop a National Security Space Strategy, which will further address 

questions of rules of the road/codes of conduct, and declaratory policy. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

Mr. BISHOP. The Air Force FY11 proposed budget only provides $46 million for 

production of three Minuteman III (MMIII) motor sets as its ‘‘Warm-Line’’ effort to 

sustain MMIII begins. The Air Force’s current Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP) only 

provides $10 million in FY12, and $0 in FY13 for MMIII warm line. The imperiled 

Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) industry maintains that 6 motor sets for MMIII is the 

bare minimum required to sustain a viable MMIII warm line, which is fewer than 

the 12 D–5 ICBM motors that are currently produced annually under the Navy’s 

comparable warm-line effort. What is your opinion on what the proper level of Air 

Force funding is required in FY11 and in the FYDP to adequately sustain the 

MMIII weapons system and its SRM industrial base? 

General CHILTON. U.S. Strategic Command has not done analysis to assess funding required to adequately sustain a viable SRM Warm-line. However, looking 

ahead, we do anticipate new challenges across the industrial base which could impact both the capacity and costs associated with supporting the Minuteman III in 

the future. Secretary Carter’s AT&L-led task force study on the SRM industrial base 

will inform our investment strategy to ensure we can meet the nation’s strategic 

propulsion needs. 

Mr. BISHOP. Specifically, how many MMIII motor sets do you believe are minimally necessary to adequately sustain the warm line and the SRM industrial base? 

General CHILTON. I do not have an opinion regarding what production level is 

adequate to sustain the SRM industrial base. However, given the complexity associated with solid rocket motor technology, we cannot afford to lose the expertise required to recapitalize our deterrent force in the future. Secretary Carter’s AT&Lled task force study on this issue will inform our investment strategy to ensure we 

can meet the nation’s strategic propulsion needs. 

Mr. BISHOP. How important is maintenance of a viable SRM industrial base to 

the strategic and military interests of the United States, particularly in light of the 

Administration’s decisions to terminate NASA’s Constellation and Ares 1 and Ares 

5 rockets, and last year’s decision to also terminate the Kinetic Energy Interceptor 

(KEI) and Ground Midcourse Defense (GMD) ground-based missile interceptor programs, which, when combined with the end of the Space Shuttle program, the end 

of MMIII Propulsion Replacement program, and the total lack of any new ICBM 

modernization or follow-on programs, means that the U.S. does not have any largescale defense or space SRM program in full-rate production for the first time in 50 

years? 

General CHILTON. Until the OSD/AT&L study is complete, it is premature to speculate on the extent of the impact to our industrial base and intellectual capital as 

the solid rocket motor industry adjusts to the Constellation Program cancellation 

and other significant program changes. We believe Secretary Carter’s AT&L-led 

task force study on the SRM industrial base will inform our investment strategy to 

ensure we can meet the nation’s strategic propulsion needs. 

Mr. BISHOP. How does the Interior Department’s recent decision to revoke uranium mining leases on public lands in the Western United States negatively impact 

the long-term strategic interests of the United States in maintaining a domestic 

supply of raw nuclear materials in its defense strategic stockpiles? 

General CHILTON. Planning, analysis and forecasting of overall weapons related 

nuclear materials is provided by the National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA). I am advised by NNSA that the recent Department of Interior decision to 

suspend issuing uranium mining leases on public lands in the Western U.S. for two 

years has no near-term impact on the domestic supply of raw materials needed to 

meet national defense needs. Any future Interior Department decision to withdraw 
105 

these or other lands for a longer period of time will need to be assessed for longterm impacts. 

Mr. BISHOP. What is your estimate of the percentage of raw nuclear materials 

which will now have to be imported into the United States to meet national defense 

needs in the future because of the Interior Department’s actions in revoking uranium mining leases on public lands in the Western United States? 

General CHILTON. I am advised by the National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) that there will be no near-term change in the percent of raw nuclear materials imported into the U.S. to meet national defense needs. I understand the decision does not prohibit ongoing or future mining operations for valid pre-existing 

claims. Any future Interior Department decision to withdraw these or other lands 

for a longer period of time will need to be assessed for long-term impacts. 

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