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[House Report 112-665]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

112th Congress                                            Rept. 112-665
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session                                                      Part 1
======================================================================
 
              WMD PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS ACT OF 2012

                                _______
                                

               September 12, 2012.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. King of New York, from the Committee on Homeland Security, 

                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 2356]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Homeland Security, to whom was referred 
the bill (H.R. 2356) to enhance homeland security by improving 
efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover 
from an attack with a weapon of mass destruction, and for other 
purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon 
with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do 
pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................    27
Background and Need for Legislation..............................    27
Hearings.........................................................    28
Committee Consideration..........................................    32
Committee Votes..................................................    33
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................    34
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures    34
Congressional Budget Office Estimate.............................    34
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............    36
Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff 
  Benefits.......................................................    38
Federal Mandates Statement.......................................    38
Preemption Clarification.........................................    38
Advisory Committee Statement.....................................    38
Applicability to Legislative Branch..............................    38
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation...................    38
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    61
Additional Views.................................................    87

    The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``WMD Prevention and 
Preparedness Act of 2012''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

               TITLE I--A NATIONAL BIODEFENSE ENTERPRISE

Sec. 101. Special Assistant for Biodefense.
Sec. 102. National Biodefense Plan.
Sec. 103. National Biosurveillance Strategy.
Sec. 104. Comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis.

                     TITLE II--INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Sec. 201. National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from 
Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Sec. 202. National Intelligence Strategy for Countering Biological 
Threats.
Sec. 203. State, local, and tribal defined.

                  TITLE III--HOMELAND SECURITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Weapons of mass destruction prevention and preparedness.

  ``TITLE XXI--WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS

                        ``Subtitle A--Prevention

        ``Sec. 2101. Weapons of mass destruction intelligence and 
                        information sharing.
        ``Sec. 2102. Risk assessments.
        ``Sec. 2103. National Export Enforcement Coordination.
        ``Sec. 2104. Communication of threat information.
        ``Sec. 2105. Individual and community preparedness for 
                        chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
                        attacks.

                        ``Subtitle B--Protection

        ``Sec. 2121. Detection of biological attacks.
        ``Sec. 2122. Rapid biological threat detection and 
                        identification at ports of entry.
        ``Sec. 2123. Evaluating detection technology.
        ``Sec. 2124. Domestic implementation of the Global Nuclear 
                        Detection Architecture.

                         ``Subtitle C--Response

        ``Sec. 2131. First responder guidance concerning chemical, 
                        biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks.
        ``Sec. 2132. Integrated plume modeling for collective response.
        ``Sec. 2133. Establishment of the system assessment and 
                        validation for emergency responders (SAVER) 
                        program.
        ``Sec. 2134. Payment for laboratory response services.
        ``Sec. 2135. Bioforensics capabilities.
        ``Sec. 2136. Metropolitan Medical Response System Program.

                         ``Subtitle D--Recovery

        ``Sec. 2141. Identifying and addressing gaps in recovery 
                        capabilities.
        ``Sec. 2142. Recovery from a chemical, biological, 
                        radiological, and nuclear attack or incident.
        ``Sec. 2143. Exercises.
Sec. 302. Enhancing laboratory biosecurity.
Sec. 303. Definitions.
Sec. 304. Dual-use terrorist risks from synthetic biology.
Sec. 305. Dissemination of information analyzed by the Department to 
State, local, tribal, and private entities with responsibilities 
relating to homeland security.

                    TITLE IV--PUBLIC HEALTH MATTERS

Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding Federal coordination on medical 
countermeasures.
Sec. 402. National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy.
        ``Sec. 319F-5. National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing 
                        Strategy.
Sec. 403. National pre-event vaccination and antimicrobial dispensing 
policy review.
Sec. 404. Management of short shelf life vaccine and antimicrobial 
stockpiles.
Sec. 405. Material threat determinations reviews.
Sec. 406. Background checks.
Sec. 407. State, local, and tribal defined.

                   TITLE V--FOREIGN RELATIONS MATTERS

Sec. 501. International engagement to enhance biodefense and laboratory 
biosecurity.
Sec. 502. International collaboration and information sharing relating 
to biosecurity.
Sec. 503. Interagency task force on best practices for global 
biopreparedness.
Sec. 504. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

   In this Act:
          (1) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means 
        the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
        Representatives and any committee of the House of 
        Representatives or the Senate having legislative jurisdiction 
        under the rules of the House of Representatives or Senate, 
        respectively, over the matter concerned.
          (2) The term ``Intelligence Community'' has the meaning given 
        that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 
        (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
          (3) The term ``national biosecurity and biodefense 
        stakeholders'' means officials from the Federal, State, local, 
        and tribal authorities and individuals and other persons from 
        the private sector who are involved in efforts to prevent, 
        protect against, respond to, and recover from a biological 
        attack or other phenomena that may have serious health 
        consequences for the United States, including wide-scale 
        fatalities or infectious disease outbreaks.

               TITLE I--A NATIONAL BIODEFENSE ENTERPRISE

SEC. 101. SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR BIODEFENSE.

  (a) In General.--The President shall assign a member of the National 
Security Council to serve as Special Assistant to the President for 
Biodefense, who shall--
          (1) serve as the principal advisor to the President regarding 
        coordination of Federal biodefense policy including prevention, 
        protection, response, and recovery from biological attacks or 
        other phenomena that may have serious health consequences for 
        the United States, including wide-scale fatalities or 
        infectious disease outbreaks;
          (2) identify gaps, duplication, and other inefficiencies in 
        existing biodefense activities and the actions necessary to 
        overcome these obstacles;
          (3) lead the development of a coordinated National Biodefense 
        Plan, in accordance with section 102;
          (4) lead the development of a coordinated National 
        Biosurveillance Strategy, in accordance with section 103;
          (5) lead the development of a coordinated national research 
        and development strategy and implementation plan for microbial 
        forensics, the latter to be updated not less than once every 4 
        years;
          (6) oversee, in coordination with the Director of the Office 
        of Management and Budget, the development of a comprehensive 
        cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis to inform 
        prioritization of resources and ensure that biodefense 
        challenges are adequately addressed, in accordance with section 
        104; and
          (7) conduct ongoing oversight and evaluation of 
        implementation of Federal biodefense activities by relevant 
        Government departments and agencies.
  (b) Access by Congress.--The appointment of the Special Assistant to 
the President for Biodefense shall not be construed as affecting access 
by Congress or committees of either House of Congress to information, 
documents, and studies in the possession of, or conducted by or at the 
direction of, the Special Assistant.

SEC. 102. NATIONAL BIODEFENSE PLAN.

  The Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense shall submit to 
the President a National Biodefense Plan that--
          (1) defines the scope and purpose of a national biodefense 
        capability;
          (2) identifies biological risks to the Nation to be addressed 
        by the Plan, consistent with section 2102 of the Homeland 
        Security Act of 2002, as amended by this Act;
          (3) delineates activities and tasks to be performed, 
        including prevention, protection, response, and recovery 
        activities, to address the risks identified under paragraph 
        (2);
          (4) defines research and development needs for improving the 
        capacity for threat awareness and prevention, protection, 
        response, and recovery;
          (5) identifies biodefense assets, interdependencies, 
        capability gaps, and gaps in the integration of capabilities;
          (6) provides goals, activities, milestones, and performance 
        measures;
          (7) identifies resource and investment needs;
          (8) defines organizational roles, responsibilities , and 
        coordination of Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities 
        (as those terms are defined in the Homeland Security Act of 
        2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.)) with respect to the activities and 
        tasks delineated in paragraph (3);
          (9) integrates and supports the strategies outlined in 
        Presidential Policy Directives 2 and 8 and Homeland Security 
        Presidential Directives 5, 9, 10, 18, 21, and their successors, 
        the National Biosurveillance Strategy published under section 
        103 of this Act, the National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing 
        Strategy developed under section 319F-5 of the Public Health 
        Service Act, as amended by this Act, and other strategy 
        documents as appropriate;
          (10) is consistent with the National Response Framework as 
        published by the Secretary of Homeland Security in January 
        2008, and any successors thereof;
          (11) incorporates input from Federal, State, local, and 
        tribal stakeholders;
          (12) provides planning guidance to biosecurity and biodefense 
        stakeholders, including leveraging of existing guidance; and
          (13) shall be submitted to the President and the Congress 
        within 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
        and updated as necessary.

SEC. 103. NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE STRATEGY.

  (a) Strategy for Biosurveillance.--The Special Assistant to the 
President for Biodefense shall publish a National Biosurveillance 
Strategy that shall--
          (1) identify the purpose and scope of a nationally integrated 
        biosurveillance capability;
          (2) establish goals, objectives, priorities, milestones, and 
        performance measures to guide the development of such 
        capability;
          (3) define and prioritize costs, benefits, and resource and 
        investment needs, with particular attention to leveraging 
        existing resources;
          (4) delineate Federal, State, local, tribal, and private 
        roles and responsibilities; and
          (5) describe how the Strategy is integrated with related 
        national strategies.
  (b) Matters for Consideration.--In developing the strategy required 
under subsection (a), the Special Assistant shall take into 
consideration--
          (1) the state of biosurveillance domestically and 
        internationally;
          (2) material threat assessments and determinations developed 
        by the Secretary of Homeland Security in accordance with the 
        Project BioShield Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-276) and the 
        amendments made by that Act;
          (3) risk assessments consistent with section 2102 of the 
        Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by this Act;
          (4) reports on global trends produced by the Office of the 
        Director of National Intelligence regarding the biological 
        threat;
          (5) Intelligence Community needs as articulated in relevant 
        intelligence strategies;
          (6) information available in biosurveillance systems and 
        changes to information technology including systems used 
        commercially to allow for the incorporation and integration of 
        this information; and
          (7) costs associated with establishing and maintaining the 
        necessary infrastructure to integrate biosurveillance systems.
  (c) Implementation Plan.--In addition to the strategy required under 
subsection (a), the Special Assistant shall publish an implementation 
plan for such strategy that includes benchmarks for measuring the 
success of the Strategy. The implementation plan shall--
          (1) include a plan for advancing situational awareness of 
        biological threats, by rapid detection and dissemination of 
        biosurveillance information in real time, and through other 
        means;
          (2) include a plan for fostering information sharing among 
        national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders--
                  (A) to identify potential threats, reduce 
                vulnerabilities, and improve collective response 
                activities to, and investigations of, suspected 
                biological attacks;
                  (B) that addresses the type of information to be 
                shared and how it will be shared; and
                  (C) that identifies critical sensitivities to be 
                protected; and
          (3) include a plan for enhancing the capability of the 
        Federal Government to rapidly identify, characterize, localize, 
        and track a biological event of national concern by integrating 
        and analyzing data relating to human health, animal, plant, 
        food, and environmental monitoring systems (both national and 
        international).
  (d) Deadline; Submission; Updates.--The Special Assistant shall--
          (1) publish the strategy, and submit it to the appropriate 
        congressional committees, by not later than 1 year after the 
        date of enactment of this Act; and
          (2) publish an implementation plan for such strategy not 
        later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, and 
        update the implementation plan at least once every 4 years.

SEC. 104. COMPREHENSIVE CROSS-CUTTING BIODEFENSE BUDGET ANALYSIS.

  (a) In General.--In order to enhance strategic planning, eliminate 
redundancies, identify capability gaps, and provide for greater 
transparency, the Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense, in 
coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, 
shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees, concurrent 
with the submission of the President's annual budget to the Congress, a 
comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis that delineates 
and integrates the biodefense expenditure requests for the departments 
and agencies headed by the officials listed in subsection (c).
  (b) Contents.--
          (1) In general.--The comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense 
        budget analysis shall provide a detailed, separate analysis, by 
        budget function, by department or agency, and by initiative 
        area (as determined by the Administration), for the prior 
        fiscal year, the current fiscal year, and the fiscal years for 
        which the budget is submitted, identifying the amounts of gross 
        and net appropriations or obligational authority and outlays 
        that contribute to biodefense, with separate displays for 
        mandatory and discretionary amounts, including--
                  (A) summaries of the total amount of such 
                appropriations or obligational authority and outlays 
                requested for biodefense;
                  (B) an estimate of the current service levels of 
                biodefense spending; and
                  (C) an indication of how the Federal activities or 
                accounts covered by the analysis support the activities 
                delineated in the National Biodefense Plan under 
                section 102(2).
          (2) Account-level amounts.--With respect to subparagraphs (A) 
        through (C) of paragraph (1), amounts shall be provided by 
        account for each program, project, and activity.
  (c) Coordination.--
          (1) Submission to special assistant.--Each official listed in 
        paragraph (2) shall, by not later than 30 days before 
        submitting the annual appropriations request for the agency 
        under section 1108 of title 31, United States Code, submit to 
        the Special Assistant--
                  (A) the proposed appropriations request; and
                  (B) a progress report on how the department or agency 
                under the official's authority agency has met the 
                responsibilities of the official under the National 
                Biodefense Plan under section 102.
          (2) Covered official.--The officials referred to in paragraph 
        (1) are--
                  (A) the Secretary of Agriculture;
                  (B) the Secretary of Commerce;
                  (C) the Secretary of Defense;
                  (D) the Secretary of Energy;
                  (E) the Secretary of Health and Human Services;
                  (F) the Secretary of Homeland Security;
                  (G) the Secretary of State;
                  (H) the Secretary of Veterans Affairs;
                  (I) the Attorney General;
                  (J) the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
                Agency;
                  (K) the Director of the National Science Foundation;
                  (L) the Postmaster General of the United States; and
                  (M) heads of other Federal departments and agencies 
                as considered appropriate by the Special Assistant.
  (d) Consultation With Congress.--Periodically, but at least annually, 
the Special Assistant for Biodefense shall consult with the Committee 
on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Budget 
Committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate, the 
Appropriations Committees of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, and the Congressional Budget Office.

                     TITLE II--INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

SEC. 201. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING THE THREAT FROM 
                    WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

  (a) Strategy.--
          (1) Development.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
        heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, 
        shall develop and implement--
                  (A) a strategy designed to improve the capabilities 
                of the United States to collect, analyze, and 
                disseminate intelligence related to weapons of mass 
                destruction; and
                  (B) a plan to implement such strategy.
          (2) Title.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall 
        be known as the ``National Intelligence Strategy for Countering 
        the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction''.
  (b) Contents.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall--
          (1) identify and address core capabilities needed for 
        successful intelligence collection on weapons of mass 
        destruction;
          (2) include methods for the recruitment, training, and 
        retention of a workforce with expertise in the collection, 
        analysis, and dissemination of intelligence related to all 
        types of weapons of mass destruction and science and technology 
        related to weapons of mass destruction, as well as expertise in 
        science and technology relating to risks posed by weapons of 
        mass destruction; and
          (3) include methods for information sharing and 
        collaboration, as appropriate, with non-Federal national 
        biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders.
  (c) Implementation Plan.--The plan for implementing the strategy 
required under subsection (a) shall include--
          (1) actions necessary to increase the effectiveness and 
        efficiency of the sharing of intelligence on weapons of mass 
        destruction throughout the Intelligence Community and with 
        other Federal partners, including a description of statutory, 
        regulatory, policy, technical, security, or other barriers that 
        impede such sharing, and, as appropriate, the development of 
        uniform standards across the Intelligence Community for such 
        sharing;
          (2) methods to disseminate intelligence products to national 
        biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders in classified and 
        unclassified formats to increase the effectiveness and 
        efficiency of the sharing of information;
          (3) actions necessary to provide open-source intelligence 
        relating to weapons of mass destruction to--
                  (A) appropriate Federal departments and agencies;
                  (B) State, local, and tribal authorities; and
                  (C) private entities;
          (4) specific objectives to be accomplished, with 
        corresponding schedule, for each year of the 5-year period that 
        begins on the date on which the strategy is submitted to the 
        appropriate congressional committees under subsection (e) and 
        tasks to accomplish such objectives, including--
                  (A) a list prioritizing such objectives and such 
                tasks; and
                  (B) a schedule for meeting such objectives and 
                carrying out such tasks;
          (5) assignments of roles and responsibilities to elements of 
        the Intelligence Community to implement the strategy; and
          (6) a schedule for assessment of the effectiveness and 
        efficiency of the strategy, including metrics, and a 
        description of the components of the assessment.
  (d) Coordination.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
coordinate with State, local, and tribal government authorities, the 
private sector, and nongovernmental organizations in the development of 
the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from 
Weapons of Mass Destruction.
  (e) Deadline for Submission.--Not later than 6 months after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the strategy 
and plan required under subsection (a). The submission shall be in 
unclassified form but with a classified annex, as appropriate.
  (f) Updates.--The Director of National Intelligence shall update the 
implementation plan at least once every 4 years.

SEC. 202. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING BIOLOGICAL 
                    THREATS.

  (a) Strategy.--
          (1) Development.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
        Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of 
        Agriculture, the Special Assistant to the President for 
        Biodefense, and the heads of other appropriate Federal 
        departments and agencies, shall develop and implement a 
        strategy and a plan for implementing the strategy that is 
        integrated into the National Intelligence Strategy for 
        Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction, as 
        required under this title.
          (2) Title.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall 
        be known as the ``National Intelligence Strategy for Countering 
        Biological Threats''.
  (b) Contents.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall--
          (1) identify and address target capabilities needed for 
        successful intelligence collection on biological threats;
          (2) include a plan for establishing in the Intelligence 
        Community a cadre of collectors and analysts in all relevant 
        agencies in the Intelligence Community that are familiar with 
        biological threats, biological science, and biotechnology, 
        including--
                  (A) biological scientists;
                  (B) biotechnologists; and
                  (C) experts with knowledge of the current state of 
                technologies that could be used to develop a weapon of 
                mass destruction;
          (3) include a plan for defining the functions, capabilities, 
        and gaps in the Intelligence Community workforce with respect 
        to assessing the biological threat;
          (4) include methods for collaboration--
                  (A) with non-Intelligence Community technical experts 
                within Federal departments and agencies; and
                  (B) as appropriate, with individuals with expertise 
                described in paragraph (2) who are not employed by the 
                Federal Government, in particular with State and local 
                biodefense stakeholders;
          (5) include a plan for defining, integrating, focusing, and 
        enhancing existing capabilities in the Intelligence Community 
        dedicated to current and strategic biological threats; and
          (6) include a plan for ensuring the prioritization and 
        sustained commitment of intelligence personnel and resources to 
        address biological threats.
  (c) Implementation Plan.--The implementation plan for the strategy 
required under subsection (a) shall--
          (1) include actions necessary to increase the effectiveness 
        and efficiency of the sharing of intelligence throughout the 
        Intelligence Community on biological weapons and organisms that 
        could be used for biological terrorism, including a description 
        of statutory, regulatory, policy, technical, security, or other 
        barriers that prevent such sharing, and, as appropriate, the 
        development of uniform standards across the Intelligence 
        Community for such sharing;
          (2) address strategic and tactical human intelligence, 
        measurement and signature intelligence, technical intelligence, 
        medical intelligence, and open-source intelligence activities 
        necessary to implement the strategy;
          (3) identify specific objectives to be accomplished during 
        each year of the 5-year period that begins on the date on which 
        the strategy is submitted to the appropriate congressional 
        committees under subsection (d) and tasks to accomplish such 
        objectives, including--
                  (A) a list prioritizing such objectives and such 
                tasks; and
                  (B) a schedule for meeting such objectives and 
                carrying out such tasks;
          (4) assign roles and responsibilities to elements of the 
        Intelligence Community to implement the strategy;
          (5) a schedule for assessment of the effectiveness and 
        efficiency of the strategy, including metrics; and
          (6) a schedule for evaluating on a regular basis the efforts 
        of the Intelligence Community and progress on understanding and 
        countering biological threats.
  (d) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees the strategy and plan required 
under subsection (a). The report shall be in unclassified form but with 
a classified annex, as appropriate.
  (e) Updates.--The Director of National Intelligence shall update the 
implementation plan at least once every 4 years.

SEC. 203. STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL DEFINED.

  In this title, the term ``State, local, and tribal'' has the same 
meaning that term has in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
101 et seq.).

                  TITLE III--HOMELAND SECURITY MATTERS

SEC. 301. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS.

  (a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et 
seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new title:

  ``TITLE XXI--WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS

                        ``Subtitle A--Prevention

``SEC. 2101. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION 
                    SHARING.

  ``(a) In General.--The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the 
Department shall--
          ``(1) conduct intelligence and information sharing activities 
        consistent with the National Intelligence Strategy for 
        Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction under 
        section 201 of the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2012 
        and the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering 
        Biological Threats under section 202 of that Act;
          ``(2) support homeland security-focused intelligence analysis 
        of terrorist actors, their claims, and their plans to conduct 
        attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, and 
        nuclear materials against the Nation;
          ``(3) support homeland security-focused intelligence analysis 
        of global infectious disease, public health, food, 
        agricultural, and veterinary issues;
          ``(4) support homeland security-focused risk analysis and 
        risk assessments of the homeland security hazards described in 
        paragraphs (2) and (3), by providing relevant quantitative and 
        nonquantitative threat information;
          ``(5) leverage existing and emerging homeland security 
        capabilities and structures, including fusion centers 
        established pursuant to section 210A, to enhance prevention, 
        protection, response, and recovery efforts with respect to a 
        chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack;
          ``(6) share information and provide tailored analytical 
        support on these threats to State, local, and tribal 
        authorities as well as other national biosecurity and 
        biodefense stakeholders; and
          ``(7) perform other responsibilities, as assigned by the 
        Secretary.
  ``(b) Coordination.--Where appropriate, the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis shall coordinate with other relevant Department 
components, others in the Intelligence Community, including the 
National Counter Proliferation Center, and other Federal, State, local, 
and tribal authorities, including officials from high-threat areas, and 
enable such entities to provide recommendations on optimal information 
sharing mechanisms, including expeditious sharing of classified 
information, and on how they can provide information to the Department.
  ``(c) Report.--
          ``(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
        the enactment of this section and annually thereafter, the 
        Secretary shall report to the appropriate congressional 
        committees on--
                  ``(A) the intelligence and information sharing 
                activities under subsection (a) and of all relevant 
                entities within the Department to counter the threat 
                from weapons of mass destruction; and
                  ``(B) the Department's activities in accordance with 
                relevant intelligence strategies, including the 
                National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the 
                Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction and the 
                National Intelligence Strategy for Countering 
                Biological Threats.
          ``(2) Assessment of implementation.--The report shall 
        include--
                  ``(A) a description of methods established to assess 
                progress of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis in 
                implementing this section; and
                  ``(B) such assessment.

``SEC. 2102. RISK ASSESSMENTS.

  ``(a) In General.--The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary 
for Science and Technology, shall, in coordination with relevant 
Department components and other appropriate Federal departments and 
agencies--
          ``(1) produce and update periodically a terrorism risk 
        assessment of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
        threats; and
          ``(2) produce and update periodically an integrated terrorism 
        risk assessment that assesses all of those threats and compares 
        them against one another according to their relative risk.
  ``(b) Methodology.--
          ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall--
                  ``(A) convene an interagency task force of relevant 
                subject matter experts to assess the proposed 
                methodology to be used for assessments required under 
                subsection (a), and to provide recommendations to the 
                Secretary as to the adequacy of such methodology;
                  ``(B) conduct sensitivity analysis on each assessment 
                to identify and prioritize research activities to close 
                knowledge gaps; and
                  ``(C) consider the evolving threat from an 
                intelligent adversary.
          ``(2) Inclusion in assessment.--Each assessment under 
        subsection (a) shall include a description of the methodology 
        used for the assessment.
  ``(c) Usage.--The assessments required under subsection (a) shall be 
used to inform and guide risk management decisions, including--
          ``(1) the threat assessments and determinations by the 
        Secretary regarding agents and toxins pursuant to section 319F-
        2 of the Public Health Service Act;
          ``(2) allocation of resources for research and development 
        for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attack 
        prevention, protection, response, and recovery;
          ``(3) prioritization of medical countermeasure research, 
        development, acquisition, and distribution activities and other 
        national strategic biodefense research;
          ``(4) tailored risk assessments and risk mitigation studies, 
        as appropriate, on topics such as radiological materials 
        security or the economic risks of a biological attack; and
          ``(5) other homeland security activities as determined 
        appropriate by the Secretary and the heads of other agencies.
  ``(d) Input and Sharing.--The Secretary shall, for each assessment 
required under subsection (a)--
          ``(1) seek input from national biosecurity and biodefense 
        stakeholders, and other Federal, State, local, and tribal 
        officials involved in efforts to prevent, protect, respond to, 
        and recover from chemical, biological, radiological, and 
        nuclear threats;
          ``(2) ensure that written procedures are in place to guide 
        the interagency development of the assessments, including for 
        input, review, and implementation purposes, among relevant 
        Federal partners;
          ``(3) share the risk assessments with Federal, State, local 
        and tribal officials with appropriate security clearances and a 
        need for the information in the classified version; and
          ``(4) to the maximum extent practicable, make available an 
        unclassified version for Federal, State, local, and tribal 
        officials involved in prevention and preparedness for chemical, 
        biological, radiological, and nuclear events.
  ``(e) Written Procedures.--The Secretary shall establish written 
procedures for appropriate usage of the assessments required under 
subsection (a), including--
          ``(1) a description of the types of departmental activities 
        for which the assessments should be considered;
          ``(2) the extent to which the findings of the assessments 
        should play a role in such activities;
          ``(3) the point in planning processes at which the 
        assessments should be considered; and
          ``(4) how users can access expertise within the Department to 
        aid in interpretation of the results of the assessments.

``SEC. 2103. NATIONAL EXPORT ENFORCEMENT COORDINATION.

  ``(a) Establishment.--There shall be maintained in the Department the 
Export Enforcement Coordination Center, with capability for national 
export enforcement coordination that is managed by the Secretary and 
coordinates the export enforcement activities among the Department, the 
Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Department 
of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Justice, the 
Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Intelligence 
Community, and other Federal agencies as appropriate.
  ``(b) Responsibilities.--The Center shall--
          ``(1) enhance Federal coordination for law enforcement 
        counterproliferation investigations, including coordination and 
        deconfliction with intelligence counterproliferation 
        activities;
          ``(2) address licensing inquiries, reviews, requests, checks, 
        and verifications; and
          ``(3) conduct outreach and provide training to the export 
        trade community.

``SEC. 2104. COMMUNICATION OF THREAT INFORMATION.

  ``(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
          ``(1) The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass 
        Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism recommended that `the 
        Federal Government should practice greater openness of public 
        information so that citizens better understand the threat and 
        the risk this threat poses to them'.
          ``(2) There are unique challenges for community preparedness 
        for attacks from weapons of mass destruction.
  ``(b) Communications Plan.--
          ``(1) In general.--The Administrator of the Federal Emergency 
        Management Agency shall develop a communications plan designed 
        to provide information to the public related to preventing, 
        preparing for, responding to, and recovering from chemical, 
        biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks;
          ``(2) Consultation.--As appropriate, the Administrator of the 
        Federal Emergency Management Agency shall consult with State, 
        local, and tribal authorities and coordinate with other Federal 
        departments and agencies in developing the communications plans 
        under paragraph (1).
          ``(3) Pre-scripted messages and message templates.--
                  ``(A) In general.--The Administrator of the Federal 
                Emergency Management Agency shall develop and 
                disseminate, through an alerts and warnings system, 
                pre-scripted messages and message templates for State, 
                local, and tribal authorities so that those authorities 
                can quickly and rapidly disseminate critical 
                information to the public in anticipation of, during, 
                or in the immediate aftermath of a chemical, 
                biological, radiological, and nuclear attack, and to be 
                included in the Department of Homeland Security's 
                lessons learned information sharing system.
                  ``(B) Development and design.--The pre-scripted 
                messages or message templates shall--
                          ``(i) be developed in consultation with 
                        State, local, and tribal authorities and in 
                        coordination with other appropriate Federal 
                        departments and agencies;
                          ``(ii) be designed to provide accurate, 
                        essential, and appropriate information and 
                        instructions to the population directly 
                        affected by an incident, including information 
                        regarding an evacuation, sheltering in place, 
                        hospital surge operations, health, and safety;
                          ``(iii) be designed to provide accurate, 
                        essential, and appropriate information and 
                        instructions to children and other special 
                        needs populations within the population 
                        directly affected by an incident;
                          ``(iv) be designed to provide accurate, 
                        essential, and appropriate information and 
                        instructions to emergency response providers 
                        and medical personnel responding to an 
                        incident; and
                          ``(v) include direction for the coordination 
                        of Federal, State, local, and tribal 
                        communications teams.
                  ``(C) Communications formats.--The Administrator 
                shall develop pre-scripted messages or message 
                templates under this paragraph in multiple formats to 
                ensure delivery--
                          ``(i) in cases where the usual communications 
                        infrastructure is unusable;
                          ``(ii) to individuals with disabilities or 
                        other special needs and individuals with 
                        limited English proficiency; and
                          ``(iii) to educational and childcare 
                        facilities, including daycare centers, grade 
                        schools, universities, hospitals, and elderly 
                        care facilities.
                  ``(D) Dissemination and technical assistance.--The 
                Administrator shall ensure that all pre-scripted 
                messages and message templates developed under this 
                paragraph are made available to State, local, and 
                tribal authorities so that those authorities may 
                incorporate them, as appropriate, into their emergency 
                plans. The Administrator shall also make available 
                relevant technical assistance to those authorities to 
                support communications planning.
                  ``(E) Exercises.--To ensure that the pre-scripted 
                messages or message templates developed under this 
                paragraph can be effectively utilized in a disaster or 
                incident, the Administrator shall incorporate Federal, 
                State, local, and tribal communications teams that 
                deliver such pre-scripted messages or message templates 
                into exercises, including those conducted under the 
                National Exercise Program.
          ``(4) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
        enactment of this subsection, the Administrator of the Federal 
        Emergency Management Agency shall submit to the appropriate 
        congressional committees the communications plans required to 
        be developed under this subsection, including pre-scripted 
        messages or message templates developed in conjunction with the 
        plans and a description of the means that will be used to 
        deliver these messages during such incidents.
  ``(c) Terrorism Threat Awareness.--
          ``(1) Terrorism threat awareness.--The Secretary, in 
        coordination with the Attorney General and heads of appropriate 
        Federal agencies, shall for purposes of preparedness and 
        collective response to terrorism and for other purposes--
                  ``(A) ensure that homeland security information 
                concerning terrorist threats is provided to State, 
                local, and tribal authorities and the public within the 
                United States, as appropriate; and
                  ``(B) establish a process to optimize opportunities 
                for qualified heads of State, local, and tribal 
                government entities to obtain appropriate security 
                clearances so that they may receive classified threat 
                information when appropriate.
          ``(2) Threat bulletins.--
                  ``(A) In general.--Consistent with the requirements 
                of paragraph (1), the Secretary shall, on a timely 
                basis, prepare unclassified threat bulletins on 
                chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
                threats.
                  ``(B) Requirements.--Each assessment required under 
                subparagraph (A) shall--
                          ``(i) include guidance to the public for 
                        preventing and responding to acts of terrorism 
                        arising from such threats; and
                          ``(ii) be made available on the Internet Web 
                        site of the Department and other publicly 
                        accessible Internet Web sites, communication 
                        systems, and information networks.
          ``(3) Guidance to state, local, and tribal authorities.--The 
        Secretary, using information provided by the terrorism risk 
        assessments under section 2102 and material threat assessments 
        and determinations under the Project BioShield Act of 2004 
        (Public Law 108-276) and the amendments made by that Act--
                  ``(A) shall provide to State, local, and tribal 
                authorities written guidance on communicating 
                terrorism-related threats and risks to the public 
                within their jurisdictions; and
                  ``(B) shall identify and articulate the governmental 
                rationale for identifying particular communities as 
                being at heightened risk of exploitation.
          ``(4) Use of existing resources.--The Secretary shall use 
        Internet Web sites, communication systems, and information 
        networks in operation on the date of an assessment under this 
        subsection, and shall coordinate with other heads of Federal 
        departments and agencies to provide information through 
        existing channels to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 
        (2)(B)(ii). The Secretary shall provide guidance on how State, 
        local, tribal, and private entities can partner with public 
        television stations to disseminate information provided by the 
        Department and shall provide information on best practices on 
        disseminating information to residents of local communities, 
        including leveraging public television stations.

``SEC. 2105. INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS FOR CHEMICAL, 
                    BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR ATTACKS.

  ``(a) In General.--The Secretary, acting through the Administrator 
for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall assist State, local, 
and tribal authorities in improving and promoting individual and 
community preparedness and collective response to terrorist attacks 
involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials 
against the United States by--
          ``(1) developing guidance and checklists of recommended 
        actions for individual and community prevention and 
        preparedness efforts and disseminating such guidance and 
        checklists to communities and individuals;
          ``(2) updating new and existing guidance and checklists as 
        appropriate;
          ``(3) disseminating to communities and individuals the 
        guidance developed under section 2131, as appropriate;
          ``(4) providing information and training materials in support 
        of individual and community preparedness efforts;
          ``(5) conducting individual and community preparedness 
        outreach efforts; and
          ``(6) such other actions as the Secretary determines 
        appropriate.
  ``(b) Coordination.--The Secretary shall coordinate with Federal 
departments and agencies and with private sector and nongovernmental 
organizations to promote individual and community preparedness and 
collective response to terrorist attacks involving chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear materials against the United 
States.
  ``(c) Best Practices.--In compiling guidance for individual and 
community preparedness in order to carry out subsection (a)(4), the 
Secretary shall give due regard to best practices based on the 
experience of other agencies and countries and the expertise of 
academic institutions and nongovernmental organizations.

                        ``Subtitle B--Protection

``SEC. 2121. DETECTION OF BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS.

  ``(a) Program.--The Secretary shall carry out a program to detect a 
biological attack or event that poses a high risk to homeland security. 
Through such program, the Secretary shall--
          ``(1) deploy detection capabilities to areas, based on high 
        risks identified by Department assessments, to indicate the 
        presence of biological agents;
          ``(2) consider multiple deployment strategies including surge 
        capability;
          ``(3) provide information to participating laboratories and 
        programs for their use in monitoring public health, and 
        biological material or other data from those detectors to 
        participating laboratories and programs for testing and 
        evaluation;
          ``(4) regularly communicate with, and provide information 
        about the presence of biological agents to, appropriate 
        Federal, State, and local agencies responsible for public 
        health, law enforcement, and emergency services, in a manner 
        that ensures transparency with the governments served by such 
        personnel;
          ``(5) provide advanced planning tools, concepts of operations 
        (including alarm resolution protocols and response guidance), 
        standard operating procedures, and training exercises 
        (including in collaboration with relevant national level 
        exercises) for collective response to and recovery from 
        biological attacks; and
          ``(6) provide technical assistance to jurisdictions hosting 
        the program to improve their ability to respond to a detected 
        pathogen.
  ``(b) Program Requirements.--Under the program required under 
subsection (a), the Secretary shall--
          ``(1) enter into memoranda of agreement or interagency 
        agreements under the Economy Act of 1933 (31 U.S.C. 1535 et 
        seq.) with the Director of the Centers of Disease Control and 
        Prevention and the Administrator of the Environmental 
        Protection Agency, and the heads of other Federal departments 
        and agencies, setting forth roles and responsibilities, 
        including with respect to validating performance and developing 
        testing protocols for participating laboratories and 
        coordination with appropriate State, local, and tribal 
        agencies;
          ``(2) establish criteria for determining whether plans for 
        biological detector capabilities and coverage sufficiently 
        protect the United States population, and make such 
        determinations on an annual basis;
          ``(3) acting through the Under Secretary for Science and 
        Technology, and in consultation with the Director of the 
        Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, implement a process 
        for establishing assay performance standards and evaluation for 
        equivalency for biological threat assays, that--
                  ``(A) evaluates biological threat detection assays, 
                their protocols for use, and their associated response 
                algorithms for confirmation of biological threat 
                agents, taking performance measures and concepts of 
                operation into consideration;
                  ``(B) develops interagency peer-reviewed assay 
                performance and equivalency standards based on the 
                findings of the evaluation under subparagraph (A);
                  ``(C) requires implementation of the standards 
                developed under subparagraph (B) for all Department 
                biological detection programs;
                  ``(D) promotes use of such standards among all other 
                Federal biological detection programs and makes them 
                available to the private sector and other end-users as 
                appropriate; and
                  ``(E) is updated as necessary;
          ``(4) prior to obligating funds to acquire biodetection 
        systems for purposes of operational testing and evaluation, 
        require--
                  ``(A) a determination of the sensitivity and 
                specificity of the currently deployed biodetection 
                system;
                  ``(B) an assessment of the sensitivity and 
                specificity of the next generation biodetection system 
                or systems under consideration for acquisition and 
                whether it meets established operational requirements;
                  ``(C) provision of all raw data to the Science and 
                Technology Directorate to enable the Under Secretary 
                to--
                          ``(i) conduct a trade-off study comparing the 
                        results of subparagraphs (A) and (B); and
                          ``(ii) perform a technical readiness 
                        assessment in accordance with section 308(b); 
                        and
                  ``(D) that the findings under subparagraph (C) inform 
                the cost-benefit analysis under paragraph (5)(A) and 
                any Departmental acquisition review board decision 
                regarding the biodetection system or systems under 
                consideration; and
          ``(5) prior to acquiring and deploying biodetection 
        technology, require--
                  ``(A) a cost-benefit analysis, including an analysis 
                of alternatives, that shall be informed by the 
                terrorism risk assessments under section 2102;
                  ``(B) operational testing and evaluation;
                  ``(C) operational assessment by the end users of the 
                technology; and
                  ``(D) the Department, other relevant executive 
                agencies, and local jurisdictions intended to host the 
                systems to agree on concepts of operations for 
                resolving alarms.
  ``(c) Contract Authority.--The Secretary may enter into contracts 
with participating laboratories and programs for--
          ``(1) the provision of laboratory services or other 
        biosurveillance activities as appropriate for purposes of this 
        section on a fee-for-service basis or on a prepayment or other 
        similar basis; and
          ``(2) administrative and other costs related to hosting 
        program personnel and equipment in these laboratories or 
        programs.
  ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
          ``(1) The term `participating laboratory' means a laboratory 
        that has been accepted as a member of the Laboratory Response 
        Network for Biological Terrorism that--
                  ``(A) is fully equipped to detect and respond quickly 
                to acts of biological terrorism;
                  ``(B) provides biocontainment and microbiological 
                analysis in support of the Department and relevant law 
                enforcement agencies with responsibilities for 
                investigating biological incidents; and
                  ``(C) supports assay evaluation, research and 
                development.
          ``(2) The term `assay' means any scientific test that is 
        designed to detect the presence of a biological threat agent 
        that is of a type selected under criteria established by the 
        Secretary.

``SEC. 2122. RAPID BIOLOGICAL THREAT DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION AT 
                    PORTS OF ENTRY.

  ``(a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall require 
the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, in consultation with 
the heads of other relevant operational components of the Department of 
Homeland Security, to assess whether the development of technological 
screening capabilities for biological agents, pandemic influenza, and 
other infectious diseases should be undertaken by the Directorate of 
Science and Technology to support entry and exit screening at ports of 
entry and for other homeland security purposes.
  ``(b) Development of Methods.--If the Under Secretary determines that 
the development of such screening capabilities should be undertaken, 
the Secretary shall, to the extent possible, initiate development of 
safe and effective methods to--
          ``(1) rapidly screen incoming persons at ports of entry for 
        biological agents, pandemic influenza, and other infectious 
        diseases; and
          ``(2) obtain results of such screening near the point of 
        entry.

``SEC. 2123. EVALUATING DETECTION TECHNOLOGY.

  ``To inform the purchase of detection technology, the Secretary, in 
coordination with the Director of the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology, may carry out a program to--
          ``(1) establish near-term minimum performance metrics to 
        support public safety actionable activities, based to the 
        greatest extent practicable on voluntary consensus standards, 
        to evaluate the effectiveness of detection technology for high-
        priority biological agents and toxins and high-priority 
        chemical agents;
          ``(2) establish a process for voluntary testing and 
        evaluation of technology by an accredited laboratory to 
        demonstrate conformance to such consensus standards, or 
        performance metrics if standards do not exist, for the 
        effective detection of high-priority biological agents and 
        toxins and high-priority chemical agents, including 
        incentivization for the program through potential cost sharing 
        with technology manufacturers and for SAFETY Act certification 
        or placement on the authorized equipment list, or both; and
          ``(3) with permission from the detection technology 
        manufacturer, make available to Federal departments and 
        agencies, State, territorial, local, and tribal entities, and 
        the private sector the results of detection system testing and 
        evaluation under paragraph (2).

``SEC. 2124. DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION 
                    ARCHITECTURE.

  ``(a) Securing the Cities.--The Director of the Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office shall establish and maintain a multilayered system of 
detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance 
the Nation's ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear 
attack in high-risk United States cities, as determined by the 
Secretary.
  ``(b) Surge Capabilities.--The Director shall develop a surge 
capability for radiological and nuclear detection systems that can be 
deployed within the United States rapidly in response to actionable 
intelligence or warnings, and includes procurement of appropriate 
technology, training, and exercises.
  ``(c) Integration.--The programs under subsections (a) and (b) shall 
be integrated into the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and shall 
inform architecture studies, technology gaps, and research activities 
of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.

                         ``Subtitle C--Response

``SEC. 2131. FIRST RESPONDER GUIDANCE CONCERNING CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, 
                    RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR ATTACKS.

  ``(a) Establishment of Voluntary Guidance.--Not later than 1 year 
after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the 
Secretary of Agriculture, the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Attorney General, and the heads of other Federal 
departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall--
          ``(1) develop for police, fire, emergency medical services, 
        emergency management, and medical and public health personnel, 
        voluntary guidance for responding to a release of chemical, 
        biological, radiological, and nuclear material;
          ``(2) make such guidance available to State, local, and 
        tribal authorities, including primary and secondary schools and 
        other educational institutions, nongovernmental organizations, 
        the private sector, and the public; and
          ``(3) in developing the guidance under paragraph (1)--
                  ``(A) review the experiences of other countries and 
                the expertise of academic institutions and 
                nongovernmental organizations; and
                  ``(B) consider the unique needs of children and other 
                vulnerable populations.
  ``(b) Contents.--The guidance developed under subsection (a)(1) shall 
be voluntary, risk-based guidance that shall include--
          ``(1) protective action guidance for ensuring the security, 
        health, and safety of emergency response providers and their 
        families and household contacts;
          ``(2) specific information regarding the effects of the 
        chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material on 
        those exposed to the agent; and
          ``(3) best practices for emergency response providers to 
        effectively diagnose, handle, and otherwise manage individuals 
        affected by an incident involving chemical, biological, 
        radiological, or nuclear material.
  ``(c) Review and Revision of Guidance.--The Secretary shall--
          ``(1) review the guidance developed under subsection (a)(1) 
        at least once every 2 years;
          ``(2) make revisions to the guidance as appropriate; and
          ``(3) make any revised guidance available to State, local, 
        and tribal authorities, nongovernmental organizations, the 
        private sector, and the public.
  ``(d) Procedures for Developing and Revising Guidance.--In carrying 
out the requirements of this section, the Secretary shall establish 
procedures to--
          ``(1) enable members of the first responder and first 
        provider community to submit recommendations of areas in which 
        guidance is needed and could be developed under subsection 
        (a)(1);
          ``(2) determine which entities should be consulted in 
        developing or revising the guidance;
          ``(3) prioritize, on a regular basis, guidance that should be 
        developed or revised; and
          ``(4) develop and disseminate the guidance in accordance with 
        the prioritization under paragraph (3).

``SEC. 2132. INTEGRATED PLUME MODELING FOR COLLECTIVE RESPONSE.

  ``(a) Development.--
          ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall acquire, use, and 
        disseminate the best available integrated plume models to 
        enable rapid response activities following a chemical, 
        biological, nuclear, or radiological attack or event.
          ``(2) Scope.--The Secretary shall--
                  ``(A) identify Federal, State, and local needs 
                regarding plume models and ensure the rapid development 
                and distribution of integrated plume models that meet 
                those needs to appropriate officials of the Federal 
                Government and State, local, and tribal authorities to 
                enable immediate response to a chemical, biological, 
                radiological, or nuclear attack or event;
                  ``(B) establish mechanisms for dissemination by 
                appropriate emergency response officials of the 
                integrated plume models described in paragraph (1) to 
                nongovernmental organizations and the public to enable 
                appropriate collective response activities;
                  ``(C) ensure that guidance and training in how to 
                appropriately use such models are provided; and
                  ``(D) ensure that lessons learned from assessing the 
                development and dissemination of integrated plume 
                models during exercises administered by the Department 
                are put into the lessons learned information sharing 
                system maintained by the Department.
  ``(b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
          ``(1) The term `plume model' means the assessment of the 
        location and prediction of the spread of agents following a 
        chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack or event.
          ``(2) The term `integrated plume model' means a plume model 
        that integrates protective action guidance and other 
        information as the Secretary determines appropriate.

``SEC. 2133. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT AND VALIDATION FOR 
                    EMERGENCY RESPONDERS (SAVER) PROGRAM.

  ``The Secretary shall carry out a program for system assessment and 
validation of emergency response equipment at the Department, to be 
known as the `SAVER Program'. The Secretary shall ensure that such 
program--
          ``(1) conducts objective, impartial, practitioner-relevant, 
        and operationally oriented assessments and validations of 
        commercial emergency responder equipment and systems, including 
        hand-held detectors for chemical, biological, radiological, and 
        nuclear agents;
          ``(2) prioritizes such evaluation based on the technical 
        results obtained from the program established under section 
        2123, if available;
          ``(3) is supported by a network of scientists who, in 
        coordination with subject matter experts, perform the 
        assessment and validation activities using strict scientific 
        and testing protocols;
          ``(4) provides results along with other relevant equipment 
        information to the emergency response provider community in an 
        operationally useful form;
          ``(5) provides information on equipment that falls within the 
        categories listed in the Department's authorized equipment 
        list;
          ``(6) provides information that enables decision-makers and 
        responders to better select, procure, use, and maintain 
        emergency responder equipment; and
          ``(7) shares such information nationally with the emergency 
        response provider community.

``SEC. 2134. PAYMENT FOR LABORATORY RESPONSE SERVICES.

  ``In carrying out their functions, responsibilities, authorities, and 
duties to counter biological terrorism, the Secretary, the Attorney 
General, and the heads of other participating Federal agencies are 
authorized, subject to the availability of appropriations, to enter 
into contracts with laboratories that comprise the Laboratory Response 
Network for Biological Terrorism and other federally networked 
laboratories that agree to participate in such a contract, for the 
provision of laboratory testing services on a fee-for-service basis or 
on a prepayment or other similar basis. Prior to entering into such a 
contract with any laboratory in the Laboratory Response Network for 
Biological Terrorism, the Secretary, the Attorney General, or the head 
of any other participating Federal agency shall inform the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention.

``SEC. 2135. BIOFORENSICS CAPABILITIES.

  ``(a) Bioforensics Analysis Center.--There is authorized in the 
Department a bioforensics analysis center to provide support for law 
enforcement and intelligence-related investigations and actions to--
          ``(1) provide definitive bioforensics analysis in support of 
        the executive agencies with primary responsibilities for 
        preventing, deterring, responding to, attributing, and 
        recovering from biological attacks; and
          ``(2) undertake other related bioforensics activities.
  ``(b) Payment for Services.--The center shall charge and retain fees 
to reimburse the cost of any service provided to an executive agency 
that requested such service.
  ``(c) Detailee Program.--Subject to the availability of 
appropriations, the Secretary may implement a program under which 
executive agencies as considered appropriate by the Secretary provide 
personnel, on a reimbursable basis, to the center for the purpose of--
          ``(1) providing training and other educational benefits for 
        such stakeholders to help them to better understand the 
        policies, procedures, and laws governing national bioforensics 
        activities; and
          ``(2) bolstering the capabilities and information sharing 
        activities of the bioforensics analysis center authorized under 
        subsection (a) with national biosecurity and biodefense 
        stakeholders.

``SEC. 2136. METROPOLITAN MEDICAL RESPONSE SYSTEM PROGRAM.

  ``(a) In General.--The Secretary shall conduct a Metropolitan Medical 
Response System Program, that shall assist State and local governments 
in preparing for and responding to public health and mass casualty 
incidents resulting from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and 
other man-made disasters.
  ``(b) Financial Assistance.--
          ``(1) Authorization of grants.--
                  ``(A) In general.--The Secretary, through the 
                Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management 
                Agency, may make grants under this section to State and 
                local governments to assist in preparing for and 
                responding to mass casualty incidents resulting from 
                acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other man-
                made disasters.
                  ``(B) Consultation.--In developing guidance for 
                grants authorized under this section, the Administrator 
                shall consult with the Chief Medical Officer.
          ``(2) Use of funds.--A grant made under this section may be 
        used to support the integration of emergency management, 
        health, and medical systems into a coordinated response to mass 
        casualty incidents caused by any hazard, including--
                  ``(A) to strengthen medical surge capacity;
                  ``(B) to strengthen mass prophylaxis capabilities 
                including development and maintenance of an initial 
                pharmaceutical stockpile sufficient to protect first 
                responders, their families, and immediate victims from 
                a chemical or biological event, including the 
                procurement of home medical kits that are approved 
                pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
                (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.) or the Public Health Service 
                Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), as applicable;
                  ``(C) to strengthen chemical, biological, 
                radiological, nuclear, and explosive detection, 
                response, and decontamination capabilities;
                  ``(D) to develop and maintain mass triage and pre-
                hospital treatment plans and capabilities;
                  ``(E) for planning;
                  ``(F) to support efforts to strengthen information 
                sharing and collaboration capabilities of regional, 
                State, and urban areas in support of public health and 
                medical preparedness;
                  ``(G) for medical supplies management and 
                distribution;
                  ``(H) for training and exercises;
                  ``(I) for integration and coordination of the 
                activities and capabilities of public health personnel 
                and medical care providers with those of other 
                emergency response providers as well as other Federal 
                agencies, the private sector, and nonprofit 
                organizations, for the forward movement of patients; 
                and
                  ``(J) for such other activities as the Administrator 
                provides.
          ``(3) Eligibility.--
                  ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph 
                (C), any jurisdiction that received funds through the 
                Metropolitan Medical Response System Program in fiscal 
                year 2009 shall be eligible to receive a grant under 
                this section.
                  ``(B) Additional jurisdictions.--
                          ``(i) Unrepresented states.--
                                  ``(I) In general.--Except as provided 
                                in subparagraph (C), the Administrator 
                                may make grants under this section to 
                                the metropolitan statistical area with 
                                the largest population in any State in 
                                which no jurisdiction received funds 
                                through the Metropolitan Medical 
                                Response Program in fiscal year 2009, 
                                or in which funding was received only 
                                through another State.
                                  ``(II) Limitation.--For each of 
                                fiscal years 2012 through 2014, no 
                                jurisdiction that would otherwise be 
                                eligible to receive grants under 
                                subclause (I) shall receive a grant 
                                under this section if it would result 
                                in any jurisdiction under subparagraph 
                                (A) receiving less funding than such 
                                jurisdiction received in fiscal year 
                                2009.
                          ``(ii) Other jurisdictions.--
                                  ``(I) In general.--Subject to 
                                subparagraph (C), the Administrator may 
                                determine that additional jurisdictions 
                                are eligible to receive grants under 
                                this section.
                                  ``(II) Limitation.--For each of 
                                fiscal years 2012 through 2014, the 
                                eligibility of any additional 
                                jurisdiction to receive grants under 
                                this section is subject to the 
                                availability of appropriations beyond 
                                that necessary to--
                                          ``(aa) ensure that each 
                                        jurisdiction eligible to 
                                        receive a grant under 
                                        subparagraph (A) does not 
                                        receive less funding than such 
                                        jurisdiction received in fiscal 
                                        year 2009; and
                                          ``(bb) provide grants to 
                                        jurisdictions eligible under 
                                        clause (i).
                  ``(C) Performance requirement after fiscal year 
                2012.--A jurisdiction shall not be eligible for a grant 
                under this subsection from funds available after fiscal 
                year 2012 unless the Secretary determines that the 
                jurisdiction maintains a sufficient measured degree of 
                capability in accordance with the performance measures 
                issued under subsection (c).
          ``(4) Distribution of funds.--
                  ``(A) In general.--The Administrator shall distribute 
                grant funds under this section to the State in which 
                the jurisdiction receiving a grant under this section 
                is located.
                  ``(B) Pass through.--Subject to subparagraph (C), not 
                later than 45 days after the date on which a State 
                receives grant funds under subparagraph (A), the State 
                shall provide the jurisdiction receiving the grant 100 
                percent of the grant funds, and not later than 45 days 
                after the State releases the funds, all fiscal agents 
                shall make the grant funds available for expenditure.
                  ``(C) Exception.--The Administrator may permit a 
                State to provide to a jurisdiction receiving a grant 
                under this section 97 percent of the grant funds 
                awarded if doing so would not result in any 
                jurisdiction eligible for a grant under paragraph 
                (3)(A) receiving less funding than such jurisdiction 
                received in fiscal year 2009.
          ``(5) Regional coordination.--The Administrator shall ensure 
        that each jurisdiction that receives a grant under this 
        section, as a condition of receiving such grant, is actively 
        coordinating its preparedness efforts with surrounding 
        jurisdictions, with the official with primary responsibility 
        for homeland security (other than the Governor) of the 
        government of the State in which the jurisdiction is located, 
        and with emergency response providers from all relevant 
        disciplines, as determined by the Administrator, to effectively 
        enhance regional preparedness.
  ``(c) Performance Measures.--The Administrator of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the Chief Medical 
Officer, and the National Metropolitan Medical Response System Working 
Group, shall issue performance measures within 1 year after the date of 
enactment of this section that enable objective evaluation of the 
performance and effective use of funds provided under this section in 
any jurisdiction.
  ``(d) Metropolitan Medical Response System Working Group Defined.--In 
this section, the term `National Metropolitan Medical Response System 
Working Group' means--
          ``(1) 10 Metropolitan Medical Response System Program grant 
        managers, who shall--
                  ``(A) include 1 such grant manager from each region 
                of the Agency;
                  ``(B) comprise a population-based cross section of 
                jurisdictions that are receiving grant funds under the 
                Metropolitan Medical Response System Program; and
                  ``(C) include--
                          ``(i) 3 selected by the Administrator of the 
                        Federal Emergency Management Agency; and
                          ``(ii) 3 selected by the Chief Medical 
                        Officer; and
          ``(2) 3 State officials who are responsible for 
        administration of State programs that are carried out with 
        grants under this section, who shall be selected by the 
        Administrator.
  ``(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $42,000,000 to carry out the program for each of fiscal 
years 2012 through 2016.

                         ``Subtitle D--Recovery

``SEC. 2141. IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING GAPS IN RECOVERY CAPABILITIES.

  ``(a) Risk Assessment.--
          ``(1) Tailored risk assessment.--The Secretary, acting 
        through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology and in 
        coordination with the Administrator of the Environmental 
        Protection Agency, shall conduct tailored risk assessments to 
        inform prioritization of national recovery activities for 
        chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents, to 
        be updated as necessary.
          ``(2) Considerations.--In conducting the risk assessments 
        under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall--
                  ``(A) consult with the Secretary of Health and Human 
                Services, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary 
                of the Interior, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory 
                Commission, and the heads of other relevant Federal 
                departments and agencies;
                  ``(B) consider recovery of both indoor areas and 
                outdoor environments; and
                  ``(C) consider relevant studies previously prepared 
                by other Federal agencies, or other appropriate 
                stakeholders.
          ``(3) Collaboration.--Upon completion of the risk assessments 
        required by this section, the Secretary shall provide the 
        findings to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
        Agency and heads of other relevant Federal agencies in order to 
        inform ongoing and future work, including research and guidance 
        development, undertaken by those agencies in recovery and 
        remediation from chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 
        incidents.
  ``(b) Research.--The results of the risk assessment under this 
section shall inform appropriate Federal research to address the high-
risk capability gaps uncovered by each assessment.
  ``(c) Submission to Congress.--The results of each risk assessment 
shall be submitted to the appropriate congressional committees within 
30 days after completion of the assessment.

``SEC. 2142. RECOVERY FROM A CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND 
                    NUCLEAR ATTACK OR INCIDENT.

  ``(a) Establishment of Guidance.--The Secretary shall develop and 
issue guidance for clean-up and restoration of indoor and outdoor 
areas, including subways and other mass transportation facilities, that 
have been exposed to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 
materials. The Secretary shall develop and issue the guidance, within 
24 months after the date of enactment of this section, in consultation 
with--
          ``(1) the Secretary of Agriculture;
          ``(2) the Secretary of Commerce;
          ``(3) the Secretary of Education;
          ``(4) the Secretary of the Interior;
          ``(5) the Attorney General;
          ``(6) the Secretary of Labor;
          ``(7) the Secretary of Transportation;
          ``(8) the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development;
          ``(9) the Secretary of Health and Human Services;
          ``(10) the Secretary of Veterans Affairs;
          ``(11) the Secretary of the Treasury;
          ``(12) the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
        Agency; and
          ``(13) the Administrator of the Small Business 
        Administration.
  ``(b) Contents.--The guidance developed under subsection (a) shall 
clarify Federal roles and responsibilities for assisting State, local, 
and tribal authorities and include risk-based recommendations for--
          ``(1) standards for effective decontamination of affected 
        sites;
          ``(2) standards for safe post-event occupancy of affected 
        sites, including for vulnerable populations such as children 
        and individuals with health concerns;
          ``(3) requirements to ensure that the decontamination 
        procedures for responding organizations do not conflict;
          ``(4) requirements that each responding organization uses a 
        uniform system for tracking costs and performance of clean-up 
        contractors;
          ``(5) maintenance of negative air pressure in buildings;
          ``(6) standards for proper selection and use of personal 
        protective equipment;
          ``(7) air sampling procedures;
          ``(8) development of occupational health and safety plans 
        that are appropriate for the specific risk to responder health; 
        and
          ``(9) waste disposal.
  ``(c) Review and Revision of Guidance.--The Secretary shall--
          ``(1) not less frequently than once every 2 years, review the 
        guidance developed under subsection (a);
          ``(2) make revisions to the guidance as appropriate; and
          ``(3) make the revised guidance available to the Federal 
        Government, State, local, and tribal authorities, 
        nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and the 
        public.
  ``(d) Procedures for Developing and Revising Guidance.--In carrying 
out the requirements of this section, the Secretary shall establish 
procedures to--
          ``(1) prioritize issuance of guidance based on the results of 
        the risk assessment under section 2131;
          ``(2) inventory existing relevant guidance;
          ``(3) enable the public to submit recommendations of areas in 
        which guidance is needed;
          ``(4) determine which entities should be consulted in 
        developing or revising the guidance;
          ``(5) prioritize, on a regular basis, guidance that should be 
        developed or revised; and
          ``(6) develop and disseminate the guidance in accordance with 
        the prioritization under paragraph (5).
  ``(e) Consultations.--The Secretary shall develop and revise the 
guidance developed under subsection (a), and the procedures required 
under subsection (d), in consultation with--
          ``(1) the heads of other Federal departments and agencies 
        that are not required to be consulted under subsection (a), as 
        the Secretary considers appropriate;
          ``(2) State, local, and tribal authorities; and
          ``(3) nongovernmental organizations and private industry.
  ``(f) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment 
of this section, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall provide 
appropriate congressional committees with--
          ``(1) a description of the procedures established under 
        subsection (d);
          ``(2) any guidance in effect on the date of the report;
          ``(3) a list of entities to which the guidance described in 
        paragraph (2) was disseminated;
          ``(4) a plan for reviewing the guidance described in 
        paragraph (2), in accordance with subsection (e);
          ``(5) the prioritized list of the guidance required under 
        subsection (d)(4), and the methodology used by the Secretary 
        for such prioritization; and
          ``(6) a plan for developing, revising, and disseminating the 
        guidance.

``SEC. 2143. EXERCISES.

  ``(a) In General.--To facilitate recovery from a chemical, 
biological, radiological, or nuclear attack or other incident involving 
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials and to foster 
collective response to terrorism, the Secretary shall develop exercises 
in consultation with State, local, and tribal authorities and other 
appropriate Federal agencies, and, as appropriate, in collaboration 
with national level exercises, including exercises that address, to the 
best knowledge available at the time, analysis, indoor environmental 
cleanup methods, and decontamination standards, including those 
published in the guidance issued under section 2142.
  ``(b) Lessons Learned for National Level Exercises.--The Secretary 
shall provide electronically, to the maximum extent practicable, 
lessons learned reports to each designated representative of State, 
local, and tribal jurisdictions and private sector entities that 
participate in National Level Exercises of the Department. Each lessons 
learned report shall be tailored to convey information on that exercise 
that could be leveraged to enhance preparedness and response.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 1(b) of 
such Act is amended by adding at the end the following new items:

  ``TITLE XXI--WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS

                        ``Subtitle A--Prevention

``Sec. 2101. Weapons of mass destruction intelligence and information 
sharing.
``Sec. 2102. Risk assessments.
``Sec. 2103. National Export Enforcement Coordination.
``Sec. 2104. Communication of threat information.
``Sec. 2105. Individual and community preparedness for chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks.

                        ``Subtitle B--Protection

``Sec. 2121. Detection of biological attacks.
``Sec. 2122. Rapid biological threat detection and identification at 
ports of entry.
``Sec. 2123. Evaluating detection technology.
``Sec. 2124. Domestic implementation of the Global Nuclear Detection 
Architecture.

                         ``Subtitle C--Response

``Sec. 2131. First responder guidance concerning chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear attacks.
``Sec. 2132. Integrated plume modeling for collective response.
``Sec. 2133. Establishment of the system assessment and validation for 
emergency responders (SAVER) program.
``Sec. 2134. Payment for laboratory response services.
``Sec. 2135. Bioforensics capabilities.
``Sec. 2136. Metropolitan Medical Response System Program.

                         ``Subtitle D--Recovery

``Sec. 2141. Identifying and addressing gaps in recovery capabilities.
``Sec. 2142. Recovery from a chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear attack or incident.
``Sec. 2143. Exercises.''.

  (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 316 of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 195b), and the item relating to such section in 
section 1(b) of such Act, are repealed.
  (d) Metropolitan Medical Response Program Review.--
          (1) In general.--The Administrator of the Federal Emergency 
        Management Agency, the Chief Medical Officer of the Department 
        of Homeland Security, and the National Metropolitan Medical 
        Response System Working Group shall conduct a review of the 
        Metropolitan Medical Response System Program authorized under 
        section 2136 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by 
        this section, including an examination of--
                  (A) the extent to which the program goals and 
                objectives are being met;
                  (B) the performance metrics that can best help assess 
                whether the Metropolitan Medical Response System 
                Program is succeeding;
                  (C) how the Metropolitan Medical Response System 
                Program can be improved;
                  (D) how the Metropolitan Medical Response System 
                Program complements and enhances other preparedness 
                programs supported by the Department of Homeland 
                Security and the Department of Health and Human 
                Services;
                  (E) the degree to which the strategic goals, 
                objectives, and capabilities of the Metropolitan 
                Medical Response System Program are incorporated in 
                State and local homeland security plans;
                  (F) how eligibility for financial assistance, and the 
                allocation of financial assistance, under the 
                Metropolitan Medical Response System Program should be 
                determined, including how allocation of assistance 
                could be based on risk;
                  (G) implications for the Metropolitan Medical 
                Response System Program if it were managed as a 
                contractual agreement; and
                  (H) the resource requirements of the Metropolitan 
                Medical Response System Program.
          (2) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
        enactment of this Act, the Administrator and the Chief Medical 
        Officer shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of 
        the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland 
        Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on the 
        results of the review under this section.
          (3) Consultation.--The Administrator of the Federal Emergency 
        Management Agency shall consult with the Secretary of Health 
        and Human Services in the implementation of paragraph (1)(E).
          (4) Definition.--In this subsection the term ``National 
        Metropolitan Medical Response System Working Group'' has the 
        meaning that term has in section 2136 of the Homeland Security 
        Act of 2002, as added by this section.

SEC. 302. ENHANCING LABORATORY BIOSECURITY.

  (a) Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel.--
          (1) Panel.--
                  (A) Establishment.--The President shall establish a 
                permanent advisory panel to be known as the Federal 
                Experts Security Advisory Panel to make technical and 
                substantive recommendations on biological agent and 
                toxin security.
                  (B) Membership.--The members of the Panel--
                          (i) shall consist of the voting members 
                        appointed under subparagraph (D) and the 
                        nonvoting members appointed under subparagraph 
                        (E); and
                          (ii) except as provided in subparagraph (E), 
                        shall each be an official or employee of the 
                        Federal Government.
                  (C) Co-chairs.--The voting members of the Panel 
                appointed under clauses (i), (v), and (vi) of 
                subparagraph (D) shall serve jointly as the Co-Chairs 
                of the Panel.
                  (D) Voting members.--The voting members of the Panel 
                shall consist of 1 voting representative of each of the 
                following Government entities, appointed (except with 
                respect to the National Security Council) by the head 
                of the respective entity:
                          (i) The Department of Agriculture.
                          (ii) The Department of Commerce.
                          (iii) The Department of Defense.
                          (iv) The Department of Energy.
                          (v) The Department of Health and Human 
                        Services.
                          (vi) The Department of Homeland Security.
                          (vii) The Department of Justice.
                          (viii) The Department of Labor.
                          (ix) The Department of State.
                          (x) The Department of Transportation.
                          (xi) The Department of Veterans Affairs.
                          (xii) The Environmental Protection Agency.
                          (xiii) The National Security Council, which 
                        shall be represented by the Special Assistant 
                        to the President for Biodefense.
                          (xiv) The Office of the Director of National 
                        Intelligence.
                          (xv) Any other department or agency 
                        designated by the Co-Chairs.
                  (E) Nonvoting members.--The nonvoting members of the 
                Panel shall consist of--
                          (i) such additional representatives of the 
                        Government entities listed in subparagraph (D) 
                        as may be appointed by the heads of the 
                        respective entities; and
                          (ii) a representative of the public health 
                        laboratory community or biological laboratory 
                        community (or both).
                  (F) Administrative support.--The Secretary of Health 
                and Human Services shall provide to the Panel such 
                facilities, staff, and support services as may be 
                necessary for the Panel to carry out its 
                responsibilities under paragraph (2).
          (2) Responsibilities.--Not later than 6 months after the date 
        of the enactment of this section, the Panel shall, with respect 
        to biological agent and toxin security, deliver to the 
        Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and 
        Homeland Security plurality recommendations, including any 
        statements of dissent, concerning--
                  (A) the designation as highest risk of that subset of 
                biological agents and toxins listed pursuant to section 
                351A(a)(1) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 
                262a(a)(1)) that presents the greatest risk of 
                deliberate misuse with significant potential for mass 
                casualties or devastating effects to the economy, 
                informed by--
                          (i) any biological or bioterrorism risk 
                        assessments conducted by the Department of 
                        Homeland Security and relevant assessments by 
                        other agencies; and
                          (ii) determinations made by the Secretary of 
                        Homeland Security pursuant to section 319F-
                        2(c)(2)(A) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 247d-
                        6b(c)(2)(A));
                  (B) the development of a set of minimum risk-based 
                prescriptive laboratory security performance standards 
                based on the risk at the lowest level, allowing for 
                enhancements as risk increases;
                  (C) the establishment of appropriate standards and 
                practices to improve vetting and monitoring of, and 
                ensure reliability of, personnel with access to highest 
                risk biological agents and toxins at facilities 
                registered under section 351A(d) of the Public Health 
                Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262a(d));
                  (D) the establishment of appropriate practices for 
                physical security and cyber security for facilities 
                that possess highest risk biological agents or toxins;
                  (E) standards for training of laboratory personnel in 
                security measures;
                  (F) other emerging policy issues relevant to the 
                security of biological agents and toxins;
                  (G) adequacy of information sharing protocols with 
                biodefense and biosecurity stakeholders; and
                  (H) any other security standards determined 
                necessary.
  (b) Revision of Rules and Regulations.--
          (1) Proposed rules.--The Secretaries of Health and Human 
        Services and Agriculture, in coordination with the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security, no later than 1 year after the date of 
        receipt of recommendations under subsection (a)(2), shall, as 
        appropriate, propose rules under section 351A of the Public 
        Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262a) establishing security 
        standards and procedures that are specific to highest risk 
        biological agents and toxins.
          (2) Final rules.--The Secretaries of Health and Human 
        Services and Agriculture, in coordination with the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security, no later than 24 months after the date of 
        the enactment of this section, shall promulgate final rules 
        described in paragraph (1).
  (c) Coordination of Federal Oversight.--To ensure that the Federal 
Government provides for comprehensive and effective oversight of 
biological agents and toxins security, the heads of the Government 
entities listed in subsection (a)(1)(D) shall for facilities in which 
the entity supports biological agent or toxin laboratory activities and 
by no later than 6 months after the submission of recommendations under 
subsection (a)(2), develop and implement a plan for the coordination of 
biological agents and toxins security oversight that--
          (1) articulates a mechanism for coordinated inspections of 
        and harmonized administrative practices for facilities 
        registered under section 351A(d) of the Public Health Service 
        Act (42 U.S.C. 262a(d)), pursuant to subsection (d) of this 
        section; and
          (2) ensures consistent and timely identification and 
        resolution of biological agents and toxins security and 
        compliance issues.
  (d) Common Inspection Procedures.--The heads of the entities listed 
in subsection (a)(1)(D) shall coordinate or consolidate laboratory 
inspections and ensure that such inspections are conducted using a 
common set of inspection procedures across such entities in order to 
minimize the administrative burden on such laboratory.
  (e) Inspection Reports.--Any inspection report resulting from an 
inspection described in paragraph (1) shall be available to--
          (1) each Federal agency that supports biological agent or 
        toxin laboratory activities at the laboratory that is the 
        subject of the inspection report; and
          (2) the laboratories that are the object of inspection.
  (f) Laboratory Biosecurity Information Sharing.--
          (1) Federal sharing.--The Secretaries of Health and Human 
        Services and Agriculture shall--
                  (A) develop a process for sharing of information 
                pertaining to biological agents and toxins with 
                agencies that support biological agent or toxin 
                laboratory activities, that identifies the purpose for 
                sharing, and a mechanism for securing, such 
                information;
                  (B) share relevant information pertaining to 
                biological agents and toxins, including identification 
                of laboratories possessing highest risk biological 
                agents and toxins, and compliance issues with the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security; and
                  (C) share relevant information pertaining to 
                biological agents and toxins, including identification 
                of laboratories possessing highest risk biological 
                agents and toxins, with appropriate State, local, and 
                tribal government authorities, including law 
                enforcement authorities and emergency response 
                providers.
          (2) Classified and sensitive information.--The Secretaries of 
        Agriculture and Health and Human Services shall ensure that any 
        information disseminated under this section is handled 
        consistently with--
                  (A) the authority of the Director of National 
                Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and 
                methods under the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
                U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and related procedures or similar 
                authorities of the Attorney General concerning 
                sensitive law enforcement information;
                  (B) section 552a of title 5, United States Code 
                (commonly referred to as the ``Privacy Act of 1974''); 
                and
                  (C) other relevant laws.
  (g) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) The terms ``biological agent'' and ``toxin'' refer to a 
        biological agent or toxin, respectively, listed pursuant to 
        section 351A(a)(1) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 
        262(a)(1)).
          (2) The term ``highest risk'' means, with respect to a 
        biological agent or toxin, designated as highest risk as 
        described in subsection (a)(2)(A).
          (3) The term ``Panel'' means the Federal Experts Security 
        Advisory Panel under subsection (a).
          (4) The term ``State, local, and tribal'' has the same 
        meaning that term has in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
        U.S.C. 101 et seq.).

SEC. 303. DEFINITIONS.

  Section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101) is 
amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
          ``(19) The term `Intelligence Community' has the meaning 
        given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 
        1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
          ``(20) The term `national biosecurity and biodefense 
        stakeholders' means officials from the Federal, State, local, 
        and tribal authorities and individuals from the private sector 
        who are involved in efforts to prevent, protect against, 
        respond to, and recover from a biological attack or other 
        biological incidents that may have serious health or economic 
        consequences for the United States, including wide-scale 
        fatalities or infectious disease outbreaks.''.

SEC. 304. DUAL-USE TERRORIST RISKS FROM SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY.

  (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the field of 
synthetic biology has the potential to facilitate enormous gains in 
fundamental discovery, public health, and biotechnological 
applications, but that it also presents inherent dual-use homeland 
security risks that must be managed.
  (b) Assessment of Risk.--Not less frequently than once every two 
years, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under 
Secretary for Science and Technology, shall undertake a risk assessment 
of the dual-use and other risks associated with synthetic biology.
  (c) Establishment of Guidance.--Not later than six months after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall develop and 
provide to the heads of all departments and agencies that fund life 
sciences research, guidance on compliance with United States laws, arms 
control agreements to which the United States is a party or signatory, 
and individual department and agency policy, including consideration 
of--
          (1) best practices for establishing a department or agency 
        process that achieves compliance for department or agency 
        research, development, or acquisition projects in the life 
        sciences;
          (2) the types of projects that should be assessed;
          (3) at what stage or stages such projects should be assessed; 
        and
          (4) means for preventing the release of homeland or national 
        security information.
  (d) Research and Development.--Based upon the findings of the risk 
assessment undertaken in accordance with subsection (b), the Under 
Secretary may conduct research into the risks and ways to mitigate such 
risks of synthetic biology, including--
          (1) determining the current capability of synthetic nucleic 
        acid providers to effectively differentiate a legitimate 
        customer from a potential terrorist or other malicious actor;
          (2) determining the current capability of synthetic nucleic 
        acid providers to effectively screen orders for sequences of 
        homeland security concern; and
          (3) making recommendations regarding screening software, 
        protocols, and other remaining capability gaps uncovered by 
        such risk assessment.

SEC. 305. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ANALYZED BY THE DEPARTMENT TO 
                    STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL, AND PRIVATE ENTITIES WITH 
                    RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO HOMELAND SECURITY.

  Section 201(d)(8) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
121(d)(8)) is amended by striking ``and to agencies of State'' and all 
that follows and inserting ``to State, local, tribal, and private 
entities with such responsibilities, and, as appropriate, to the 
public, in order to assist in preventing, deterring, or responding to 
acts of terrorism against the United States.''.

                    TITLE IV--PUBLIC HEALTH MATTERS

SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING FEDERAL COORDINATION ON MEDICAL 
                    COUNTERMEASURES.

  It is the sense of Congress that--
          (1) 10 years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
        2001, and 7 years after enactment of the Project BioShield Act 
        of 2004 (Public Law 108-276), coordination among Federal 
        agencies involved in activities relating to researching, 
        developing, and acquiring medical countermeasures still needs 
        improvement; and
          (2) aggressive action should be taken by the Department of 
        Health and Human Services (in particular, the heads of the 
        National Institutes of Health, the Biomedical Advanced Research 
        and Development Authority, the Centers for Disease Control and 
        Prevention, and the Food and Drug Administration), the 
        Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense 
        to foster greater coordination with respect to such activities, 
        including adoption of an interagency agreement that sets forth 
        the relative areas of responsibility with respect to 
        establishing medical countermeasure requirements and 
        researching, developing, and acquiring medical countermeasures 
        to meet those requirements.

SEC. 402. NATIONAL MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURE DISPENSING STRATEGY.

  Title III of the Public Health Service Act is amended by inserting 
after section 319F-4 (42 U.S.C. 247d-6e) the following:

``SEC. 319F-5. NATIONAL MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURE DISPENSING STRATEGY.

  ``(a) Definitions.--In this section--
          ``(1) the term `dispense' means to provide medical 
        countermeasures to an affected population in response to a 
        threat or incident; and
          ``(2) the term `medical countermeasure' means a qualified 
        countermeasure (as defined in section 319F-1(a)(2)).
  ``(b) Strategy.--
          ``(1) In general.--The Secretary, in coordination with the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Agriculture, 
        and other appropriate Federal agencies, shall develop, 
        implement, and, as appropriate, periodically update a National 
        Medical Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy to enhance 
        preparedness and collective response to a terrorist attack on 
        humans or animals with any chemical, biological, radiological, 
        or nuclear material, that delineates Federal, State, and local 
        responsibilities.
          ``(2) Considerations.--The strategy shall be sufficiently 
        flexible to meet the unique needs of different communities, 
        including first responders, and shall consider--
                  ``(A) a variety of options for dispensing medical 
                countermeasures, including to individuals, schools, 
                universities, hospitals, and elderly care facilities;
                  ``(B) post-incident requirements for emergency use 
                authorizations before countermeasures can be 
                distributed legally;
                  ``(C) the inclusion of locally held caches of 
                countermeasures in event-specific authorizations 
                covering federally held countermeasures of the same 
                type; and
                  ``(D) distribution to the public of home medical kits 
                for personal stockpiling purposes, within 30 days after 
                a domestic or international bioterrorist attack 
                resulting in human infection.
  ``(c) Coordination.--The Secretary shall coordinate with the 
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, State, local, 
and tribal authorities, representatives from the private sector, and 
nongovernmental organizations on the National Medical Countermeasures 
Dispensing Strategy.
  ``(d) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment 
of this section, the Secretary shall submit the National Medical 
Countermeasures Dispensing Strategy to the appropriate congressional 
committees.''.

SEC. 403. NATIONAL PRE-EVENT VACCINATION AND ANTIMICROBIAL DISPENSING 
                    POLICY REVIEW.

  (a) Requirement.--The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary 
of Agriculture, shall review the adequacy of domestic vaccination and 
antimicrobial dispensing policy, guidance, and information provided to 
the public in light of any known terrorist risk of a biological attack 
or other phenomena that may have serious health consequences for the 
United States, including wide-scale fatalities or infectious disease 
outbreaks including outbreaks associated with the avian flu. In 
carrying out the review under this section, the Secretary shall 
consider--
          (1) terrorism risk assessments under section 2102 of the 
        Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by this Act, and 
        material threat assessments and determinations under the 
        Project Bioshield Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-276) and the 
        amendments made by that Act;
          (2) reports on global trends and intelligence produced by the 
        Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the 
        Intelligence Community regarding biological threats;
          (3) the availability of federally provided vaccines and 
        antimicrobials to dispense to first responders and the public, 
        on a voluntary basis, in anticipation of a biological attack;
          (4) applicability of Federal shelf-life extension programs to 
        locally held stockpiles of medical countermeasures, to the 
        extent that information on local stockpiles is available;
          (5) making expiring products available to appropriate 
        international organizations or foreign partners once the 
        requests of domestic stakeholders have been fulfilled;
          (6) the implications of pre-event vaccination and 
        antimicrobial dispensing to livestock; and
          (7) mechanisms to increase coordination between the Strategic 
        National Stockpile established under section 319F-2 of the 
        Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247D-6b) and the National 
        Veterinary Stockpile that would enhance vaccination and 
        dispensing capabilities.
  (b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall report to 
the appropriate congressional committees on the review required by 
subsection (a), together with any recommendations relating to the 
availability of domestic vaccine and antimicrobials for disbursing to 
the public and voluntary immunization by first responders.

SEC. 404. MANAGEMENT OF SHORT SHELF LIFE VACCINE AND ANTIMICROBIAL 
                    STOCKPILES.

  The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall make available 
surplus vaccines and antimicrobials, and vaccines and antimicrobials 
with short shelf lives, from the strategic national stockpile under 
section 319F-2(a) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d-
6b(a)) to State, local, and tribal first responders, including health 
care responders, for administration to such responders who voluntarily 
consent to such administration, and shall--
          (1) establish any necessary logistical and tracking systems 
        to facilitate making such vaccines and antimicrobials so 
        available; and
          (2) distribute disclosures regarding associated risks to end 
        users.

SEC. 405. MATERIAL THREAT DETERMINATIONS REVIEWS.

  Section 319F-2(c)(2)(A) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 
Sec 247d-6b(c)(2)(A)) is amended--
          (1) in clause (i), by striking ``and'' at the end;
          (2) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii);
          (3) by inserting after clause (i) the following:
                          ``(ii) establish criteria for the issuance of 
                        a material threat determination;'';
          (4) in clause (iii), as so redesignated, by striking the 
        period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and
          (5) by adding at the end the following:
                          ``(iv) review and reassess determinations 
                        under clause (iii) to determine whether agents 
                        continue to present a material threat against 
                        the United States population sufficient to 
                        affect national security and homeland 
                        security.''.

SEC. 406. BACKGROUND CHECKS.

  Section 351A(e)(3)(A) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 
262a(e)(3)(A)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``In 
identifying whether an individual is within a category specified in 
subparagraph (B)(ii)(II), the Attorney General shall consult with the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, and the 
Secretary of State to determine whether these officials possess any 
information relevant to the identification of such an individual by the 
Attorney General.''.

SEC. 407. STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL DEFINED.

  In this title, the term ``State, local, and tribal'' has the same 
meaning that term has in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
101 et seq.).

                   TITLE V--FOREIGN RELATIONS MATTERS

SEC. 501. INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT TO ENHANCE BIODEFENSE AND LABORATORY 
                    BIOSECURITY.

  The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Special Assistant to 
the President for Biodefense, and the heads of appropriate Federal 
agencies, shall, as appropriate--
          (1) support efforts of other countries to establish and build 
        capacity to effectively implement legislation criminalizing the 
        development or use of biological weapons or acts of 
        bioterrorism;
          (2) engage other countries and international nongovernmental 
        entities to develop and establish common standards, guidance, 
        and best practices for actions relevant to preventing acts of 
        bioterrorism and the illicit use of life sciences;
          (3) support the efforts of other countries to enhance 
        biosecurity and safety practices at laboratories and other 
        facilities with materials that could be used in biological 
        weapons or in an act of bioterrorism;
          (4) promote the development and adoption of international 
        guidance for the safety and security of high-risk pathogens and 
        toxins; and
          (5) promote information sharing relating to threats and best 
        practices between the intelligence community, Federal law 
        enforcement, and international law enforcement and security 
        officials.

SEC. 502. INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION AND INFORMATION SHARING RELATING 
                    TO BIOSECURITY.

  The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, and the heads of other appropriate Federal 
agencies, shall, as appropriate--
          (1) support efforts in other countries and regions to develop 
        mechanisms and capabilities for reporting to United Nations 
        organizations validated data on biological attacks or other 
        phenomena that may have serious health consequences for the 
        United States, including wide-scale fatalities or infectious 
        disease outbreaks;
          (2) engage other Federal and nongovernmental entities and 
        other countries to advance awareness and understanding of the 
        risk posed by information derived from the life sciences that 
        has the potential for misuse to cause harm, and advance 
        recommendations on how best to address such risk;
          (3) engage such entities and countries to promote greater 
        awareness and understanding of the global availability of and 
        access to life science technologies and materials; and
          (4) promote the development and use of mechanisms for 
        reporting, preserving, and sharing data on Federal programs and 
        investments in international scientific, agricultural, medical, 
        and public health collaborations in support of efforts to 
        enhance global biosecurity.

SEC. 503. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON BEST PRACTICES FOR GLOBAL 
                    BIOPREPAREDNESS.

  (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that preparedness 
for a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident must be 
undertaken not only domestically but also internationally. 
Specifically, there is a need for a global preparedness architecture 
for such an event. Congress supports efforts to provide an 
international forum for discussion of key health security policies with 
international dimensions, and the establishment of a formal United 
States interagency task force to develop best practices and 
recommendations for implementation of a global preparedness 
architecture could enhance global preparedness.
  (b) Establishment of Task Force.--The Secretary of State shall 
convene and lead an interagency task force to examine--
          (1) the state of global biopreparedness for a major 
        biological event;
          (2) necessary components of a global biopreparedness 
        architecture that would advance international health security, 
        including considerations of--
                  (A) risk assessments;
                  (B) prevention;
                  (C) protection;
                  (D) regional stockpiling of medical countermeasures, 
                including considerations of--
                          (i) security of the stockpile;
                          (ii) preservation of the stockpile through 
                        effective detection and diagnosis, shelf life 
                        extension programs, and other means;
                          (iii) delivery planning; and
                          (iv) legal considerations for implementing 
                        such an architecture;
                  (E) response and attribution;
                  (F) other elements that should be a component of such 
                an architecture; and
                  (G) obstacles to implementing such an architecture;
          (3) best practices for preparedness based on lessons learned 
        from domestic efforts to address the above issues, and that may 
        be applicable internationally;
          (4) activities undertaken through the National Intelligence 
        Strategy for Countering Biological Threats developed under 
        section 202 and the International Health Regulations 2005, as 
        well as other activities deemed relevant by the task force; and
          (5) the utility of working through existing international 
        forums as a mechanism for distributing this information to the 
        international community.
  (c) Membership.--Members of the task force shall include 
representatives from--
          (1) the Department of Homeland Security;
          (2) the Department of Health and Human Services, including 
        the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
          (3) the Department of Agriculture;
          (4) the Department of Defense;
          (5) the Department of Justice;
          (6) the Department of State;
          (7) the Director of National Intelligence;
          (8) other Federal departments and agencies, as determined 
        appropriate by the Secretary; and
          (9) national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholder 
        community, including from the pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
        industries, and the diagnostic laboratory community, as 
        determined by the Secretary.
  (d) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report on the findings of the task force established under 
this section.

SEC. 504. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION.

  The Secretary of State shall--
          (1) promote confidence in effective implementation of and 
        compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
        Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
        (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 
        (commonly referred to as the ``Biological and Toxin Weapons 
        Convention'') by the States party to the Convention by 
        promoting transparency with respect to legitimate activities 
        and pursuing compliance diplomatically to address concerns;
          (2) promote universal membership in the Convention;
          (3) develop an action plan for increasing international 
        adherence to the Convention; and
          (4) ensure that United States participation in Convention 
        meetings is broadly inclusive of representatives of relevant 
        Federal departments and agencies.

                          Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 2356, the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2011, 
was introduced by Representatives Bill Pascrell, Jr. (D-NJ) and 
Peter T. King (R-NY) on June 24, 2011. The purpose of H.R. 2356 
is to enhance homeland security by improving efforts to 
prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from attacks 
with weapons of mass destruction, and for other purposes.

                  Background and Need for Legislation

    Title 18 of the ``Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007'' authorized the establishment of a 
bipartisan commission to study the threat posed by the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Congress 
directed the independent Commission for the Prevention of WMD 
Proliferation and Terrorism (Commission) to assess current 
activities related to WMD prevention and preparedness.
    The Commission, led by former Senators Bob Graham (Chair) 
and Jim Talent (Vice-Chair), was charged with: Assessing 
Federal activities, initiatives, and programs to prevent WMD 
proliferation and terrorism; and providing a clear and 
comprehensive strategy and concrete recommendations to address 
the WMD threat. Due to time constraints and also to the nature 
of the threats that emerged through their research, the 
Commission chose to focus its efforts on biological and nuclear 
threats, the two WMD threats that they felt had the greatest 
potential to kill the largest number of people within the 
United States.
    The Commission submitted a report entitled, ``World at 
Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism'' to the 
President and the Congress in December 2008. The Commission 
concluded that: Unless the global community acts decisively and 
urgently, a terrorist attack involving WMD will more likely 
than not occur somewhere in the world by the end of 2013; 
terrorists are more likely to obtain and use a biological 
weapon than a nuclear weapon; and the United States government 
needs to more aggressively limit the proliferation of 
biological weapons and reduce the prospect of a biological 
terrorist attack.
    In October 2009, the Commission issued a progress report 
entitled, ``The Clock is Ticking: A Progress Report on 
America's Preparedness to Prevent Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Proliferation and Terrorism'' to call attention to what the 
Commission believed to be the lack of progress in implementing 
its previous recommendations. Subsequently, in January 2010, 
the Commission released a ``Prevention of WMD Proliferation and 
Terrorism Report Card,'' which assessed the actions taken by 
the United States to address the recommendations made in 
``World at Risk.'' Most recently, in October 2011, the follow-
up to the Commission--known as The WMD Center--released its 
``Bio-response Report Card,'' which detailed key areas still at 
risk in biopreparedness three years after the Commission's 
initial recommendations were made.
    Commissioners Graham and Talent testified before the Full 
Committee on Homeland Security on April 21, 2010. The former 
Senators testified to their belief that a WMD terrorist attack 
will occur somewhere in the world by 2013. They reiterated 
their view that the Nation has not done enough to prevent and 
prepare for a domestic biological attack. They also expressed 
their concern about the fractured state of Congressional 
jurisdiction over homeland security matters and their desire to 
see jurisdiction for the Department of Homeland Security 
consolidated in the Committee on Homeland Security in the House 
of Representatives, and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs in the Senate.
    Enactment of H.R. 2356 is needed to better address the gaps 
identified by the Commission and to better organize efforts by 
the public and private sectors to prevent, protect against, 
respond to, and recover from an attack involving WMD. This 
legislation implements the Commission's recommendations by 
requiring a comprehensive approach to preventing and preparing 
for biological and other WMD attacks. The bill addresses the 
range of actions necessary to counter the WMD threat as 
identified through the Committee on Homeland Security's 
oversight work and the recommendations of the Commission on the 
Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism. The approach is 
to include all aspects of the preparedness framework--
prevention, protection, response, and recovery--for chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks and 
incidents.

                                Hearings

    The Committee has convened numerous hearings during the 
110th, 111th, and 112th Conresses that have informed the 
substance of this and prior legislations.

110th Congress
    On September 18, 2007, the Committee on Homeland Security 
held a hearing entitled ``Protecting the Protectors: Ensuring 
the Health and Safety of our First Responders in the Wake of 
Catastrophic Disasters.'' The Committee received testimony 
from: Jon R. Krohmer, MD, Deputy Chief Medical Officer and 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Health Affairs, 
Department of Homeland Security; John Howard, MD, Director, 
National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety, Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, Department of Health and 
Human Services; Ms. Cynthia A. Bascetta, Director, Health Care, 
Government Accountability Office; Philip J. Landrigan, MD, MSc, 
Professor and Chairman, Department of Community and Preventive 
Medicine, Mount Sinai School of Medicine; Deputy Chief Nicholas 
Visconti, International Association of Fire Fighters; and Mike 
D. McDaniel, PhD, Secretary, Department of Environmental 
Quality, State of Louisiana.
    On May 15, 2008, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, 
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a 
hearing entitled ``The Resilient Homeland: How DHS Intelligence 
Should Empower America to Prepare for, Prevent, and Withstand 
Terrorist Attacks.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from: 
Stephen E. Flynn, PhD, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for 
National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; Mr. 
Amos N. Guiora, Professor of Law, University of Utah; and Mr. 
R.P. Eddy, Ergo Advisors.
    On July 22, 2008, the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, 
Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology held a field hearing 
in Providence, Rhode Island entitled, ``Emerging Biological 
Threats and Public Health Preparedness: Getting Beyond Getting 
Ready.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from: Jeffrey W. 
Runge, MD, Chief Medical Officer and Assistant Secretary for 
Health Affairs, Department of Homeland Security; RADM W. Craig 
Vanderwagen, MD, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and 
Response, Department of Health and Human Services; Captain 
Peter Boynton, Deputy Regional Principal Federal Official for 
Pandemic Influenza and Federal Security Director, Bradley 
International Airport (Connecticut), Transportation Security 
Administration, Department of Homeland Security; Michael G. 
Kurilla, MD, PhD, Director, Office of Biodefense Research 
Affairs and Associate Director for Biodefense Product 
Development, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Department of Health 
and Human Services; Daniel M. Sosin, MD, MPH, Director, 
Biosurveillance Coordination Unit, and Associate Director for 
Science, Coordination Office for Terrorism Preparedness and 
Emergency Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Department of Health and Human Services; David Gifford, MD, 
MPH, Director of Health, Department of Health, State of Rhode 
Island; MG Robert T. Bray, Rhode Island Adjutant General, 
Commanding General, Rhode Island National Guard, Director Rhode 
Island Emergency Management Agency, and Homeland Security 
Advisor, State of Rhode Island; Mr. Thomas J. Kilday, Jr., 
Homeland Security Program Manager, Rhode Island Emergency 
Management Agency, State of Rhode Island; and Hon. Peter T. 
Ginaitt, Director, Emergency Preparedness, Lifespan Hospital 
Network.

111th Congress
    On July 29, 2009, the Committee on Homeland Security held a 
hearing entitled ``Beyond Readiness: An Examination of the 
Current Status and Future Outlook of the National Response to 
Pandemic Influenza.'' The Committee received testimony from: 
Hon. Jane Holl Lute, Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland 
Security; Hon. William Corr, Deputy Secretary, Department of 
Health and Human Services; Ms. Bernice Steinhardt, Director, 
Strategy Issues, Government Accountability Office; Ms. Colleen 
M. Kelley, National President, National Treasury Employees 
Union; Mark B. Horton, MD, MSPH, Director, Department of Public 
Health, State of California; Mr. Richard G. Muth, Executive 
Director, Maryland Emergency Management Agency, State Emergency 
Operations Center, State of Maryland; and Thomas A. Farley, MD, 
MPH, Health Commissioner, New York City, State of New York.
    On September 14, 2009, the Subcommittee on Emerging 
Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology held a field 
hearing in Brooklyn, New York entitled ``Status Report on 
Federal and Local Efforts to Secure Radiological Sources.'' The 
Subcommittee received testimony from: Mr. Craig Conklin, 
Director, Sector Specific Agency Executive Management Office, 
Office of Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland 
Security; Mr. Kenneth Sheely, Associate Assistant Deputy 
Administrator for Global Threat Reduction, National Nuclear 
Security Administration, Department of Energy; Mr. Robert 
Lewis, Director, Division of Materials Safety and State 
Agreements, Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Captain Michael 
Riggio, Counterterrorism Division, Police Department, City of 
New York, State of New York; Mr. Gene Miskin, Director, Office 
of Radiological Health, Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene, New York City, State of New York; Bonnie Arquilla, DO, 
Director of Disaster Preparedness, State University of New York 
Downstate Medical Center; and Mr. Gene Aloise, Director, 
Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability 
Office.
    On October 27, 2009, the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, 
Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology held a hearing 
entitled ``Real-Time Assessment of the Federal Response to 
Pandemic Influenza.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from: 
Alexander Garza, MD, Chief Medical Officer and Assistant 
Secretary for Health Affairs, Department of Homeland Security; 
Nicole Lurie, MD, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and 
Response, Department of Health and Human Services; Mr. Richard 
Serino, Deputy Administrator, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, Department of Homeland Security; and Ms. Marcy Forman, 
Director, Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center, 
Department of Homeland Security.
    On April 21, 2010, the Full Committee held a hearing 
entitled ``Viewpoints on Homeland Security: A Discussion with 
the WMD Commissioners.'' The Committee received testimony from 
former Senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent.
    On June 15, 2010, the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, 
Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology held a legislative 
hearing on H.R. 5498. The Subcommittee received testimony from 
Sara (Sally) T. Beatrice, PhD, Assistant Commissioner, Public 
Health Laboratory, Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 
City of New York; Randall S. Murch, PhD, Associate Director, 
Research Program Development, National Capital Region, Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University; Robert P. Kadlec, 
MD, Vice President, Global Public Sector, PRTM Management 
Consulting; and Julie E. Fischer, PhD, Senior Associate, Global 
Health Security Program, Henry L. Stimson Center.

112th Congress
    On March 17, 2011, the Subcommittee on Emergency 
Preparedness, Response, and Communications held a hearing 
entitled ``Ensuring Effective Preparedness, Response, and 
Recovery for Events Impacting Health Security.'' The 
Subcommittee received testimony from Dr. Alexander G. Garza, 
MD, MPH, Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs, Chief Medical 
Officer, Department of Homeland Security. This hearing provided 
Subcommittee Members with an opportunity to examine the 
President's Fiscal Year 2012 budget request for OHA and OHA's 
progress in developing its mission to provide for health 
security, among other purposes.
    On April 13, 2011, the Subcommittee on Emergency 
Preparedness, Response, and Communications held a hearing 
entitled, ``Taking Measure of Countermeasures (Part 1): A 
Review of Government and Industry Efforts to Protect the 
Homeland Through Accelerated Research, Development, and 
Acquisition of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 
Medical Countermeasures.'' The Subcommittee received testimony 
from Ms. Cynthia Bascetta, Managing Director, Health Care, 
Government Accountability Office; Dr. Segaran P. Pillai, Chief 
Medical and Science Advisor, Chemical and Biological Division, 
Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland 
Security; Dr. Richard J. Hatchett, Chief Medical Officer and 
Deputy Director, Strategic Sciences and Management, Department 
of Health and Human Services; Dr. Gerald W. Parker, Deputy 
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Chemical and Biological 
Defense, Department of Defense; Ms. Phyllis Arthur, Senior 
Director, Vaccines, Immunotherapeutics, and Diagnostics Policy, 
Biotechnology Industry Organization; Mr. John M. Clerici, 
Principal, Tiber Creek Partners LLC; and Dr. Daniel Fagbuyi, 
Medical Director, Disaster Preparedness and Emergency 
Management, Children's National Medical Center.
    On May 12, 2011, the Subcommittee on Emergency 
Preparedness, Response, and Communications convened a hearing 
titled, ``Taking Measure of Countermeasures (Part 2): A Review 
of Efforts to Protect the Homeland through Distribution and 
Dispensing of CBRN Medical Countermeasures.'' The Subcommittee 
received testimony from Dr. Alexander Garza, Assistant 
Secretary for Health Affairs and Chief Medical Officer, Office 
of Health Affairs, Department of Homeland Security; Rear 
Admiral Ali Khan, Director, Office of Public Health 
Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Department of Health and Human Services; Mr. Mike 
McHargue, Director of Emergency Operations, Division of 
Emergency Medical Operations, Florida Department of Health; Mr. 
David Starr, Director, Countermeasures Response Unit, New York 
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene; Chief Lawrence E. 
Tan, Emergency Medical Services Division, New Castle County, 
Delaware (testifying on behalf of the Emergency Services Sector 
Coalition on Medical Countermeasures); and Dr. Jeffrey Levi, 
Executive Director, Trust for America's Health. This hearing 
provided Subcommittee Members with the opportunity to examine 
various distribution and dispensing plans and efforts at the 
Federal, State, local, and private sector levels, including an 
assessment of the challenges faced in distributing and 
dispensing countermeasures to large segments of the population.
    On June 23, 2011, the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, 
Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies and the 
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and 
Communications held a joint hearing, prior to introduction, on 
this legislation. The Subcommittees received testimony from 
Hon. William J. Pascrell, Jr. a Representative in Congress from 
the 8th District of New Jersey; Senator Jim Talent, Vice 
Chairman, The WMD Center; Dr. Robert P. Kadlec, Former Special 
Assistant to the President for Biodefense; and Mr. Richard H. 
Berdnik, Sheriff, Passaic County, New Jersey.
    On July 26, 2011, the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, 
Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies held a 
hearing entitled, ``The Last Line of Defense: Federal, State, 
and Local Efforts to Prevent Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism 
Within the United States.'' The hearing examined Federal, 
State, and local efforts to implement the domestic portion of 
the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), with a focus 
on efforts to build capability in the interior of the U.S. 
including through the Securing the Cities program. The 
Subcommittee received testimony from Mr. Warren M. Stern, 
Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of 
Homeland Security; Mr. Carl Pavetto, Deputy Associate 
Administrator, Office of Emergency Operations, National Nuclear 
Security Administration, Department of Energy; Mr. Richard 
Daddario, Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism, New York 
City Police Department; Mr. Mark Perez, Homeland Security 
Advisor, Florida Department of Law Enforcement; and Mr. David 
C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, 
Government Accountability Office.
    On April 17, 2012, the Subcommittee on Emergency 
Preparedness, Response, and Communications held a third hearing 
titled, ``Taking Measure of Countermeasures (Part 3): 
Protecting the Protectors.'' The Subcommittee received 
testimony from Dr. James D. Polk, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary, Office of Health Affairs, Department of Homeland 
Security; Mr. Edward J. Gabriel, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary, Preparedness and Response, Department of Health and 
Human Services; Chief Al H. Gillespie, President and Chairman 
of the Board, International Association of Fire Chiefs; Mr. 
Bruce Lockwood, Second Vice President, USA Council, 
International Association of Emergency Managers; Sheriff Chris 
Nocco, Pasco County Sheriff's Office, Pasco County, Florida; 
and Mr. Manuel Peralta, Director of Safety and Health, National 
Association of Letter Carriers. This hearing, the third in the 
series on medical countermeasures, provided Subcommittee 
Members with the opportunity to explore plans and strategies to 
ensure that emergency response personnel are protected in the 
event of such an attack, including through voluntary pre-event 
vaccination.
    The Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and 
Communications and the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, 
Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies held a 
joint hearing on May 9, 2012 entitled, ``First Responder 
Technologies: Ensuring a Prioritized Approach for Homeland 
Security Research and Development.'' The Subcommittees received 
testimony from Dr. Robert Griffin, Director of First Responder 
Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of 
Homeland Security; Ms. Mary H. Saunders, Director, Standards 
Coordination Office, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology; Chief Edward Kilduff, Chief of Department, New York 
City Fire Department, New York City, New York; Ms. Annette 
Doying, Director, Office of Emergency Management, Pasco County, 
Florida; and Ms. Kiersten Todt Coon, President and CEO, Liberty 
Group Ventures.

                        Committee Consideration

    The Committee met on May 9, 2012, to consider H.R. 2356, 
and ordered the measure to be reported to the House with a 
favorable recommendation, amended, by voice vote. The Committee 
took the following actions:
    The Committee adopted H.R. 2356, as amended, by unanimous 
consent.
      The following amendments were offered:
    An Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by 
Mr.King (#1); was AGREED TO by voice vote.
    An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute 
offered by Mr. Cuellar (#1A); was AGREED TO, by unanimous 
consent.

  Page 67, line 7, before ``To facilitate'' insert ``(a) In General.--
''.
  Page 67, after line 18, insert a new paragraph entitled ``(b) Lessons 
Learned for National Level Exercises.''

    An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute 
offered by Mr. McCaul (#1B); was AGREED TO, by unanimous 
consent.

  Amend section 303 ``Sec. 304. Dual-use Terrorist Risks from Synthetic 
Biology.''

    An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute 
offered by Mr. McCaul (#1C); was AGREED TO, by unanimous 
consent.

  In section 2102, add at the end a new paragraph entitled ``(e) 
Written Procedures.''

    An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute 
offered by Ms. Richardson (#1D); was AGREED TO, by unanimous 
consent.

  Page 31, after line 7, insert a new subparagraph ``(iii) be designed 
to provide accurate, essential, and appropriate information and 
instructions to children and other special needs populations within the 
population directly affected by an incident;''

    An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute 
offered by Ms. Richardson (#1E); was AGREED TO, by unanimous 
consent.

  Page 31, strike ``and'' after the semicolon at line 21, strike the 
period at line 24 and insert ``; and'', and after line 24 insert the 
following:
                        ``(iii) to educational and childcare 
                        facilities, including daycare centers, grade 
                        schools, universities, hospitals, and elderly 
                        care facilities.
  Page 83, line 26, before the semicolon insert ``, including to 
individuals, schools, universities, hospitals, and elderly care 
facilities''.

    An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute 
offered by Ms. Richardson (#1F); was AGREED TO, by unanimous 
consent.

    Page 54, line 24, insert before the semicolon at the end the 
following: ``, including the procurement of home medical kits that are 
approved pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 
U.S.C. 301 et seq.) Or the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et 
seq.), as applicable'.''.

    An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute 
offered by Ms. Hahn (#1G); was AGREED TO, by unanimous consent.

    Page 85, line 7, after ``outbreaks'' insert ``including outbreaks 
associated with the avian flu''.

                            Committee Votes

    Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives requires the Committee to list the recorded 
votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments 
thereto.
    No recorded votes were requested during consideration of 
H.R.2356.

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee has held oversight 
hearings and made findings that are reflected in this report.

   New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee finds that H.R. 
2356, the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2011, would 
result in no new or increased budget authority, entitlement 
authority, or tax expenditures or revenues.

                  Congressional Budget Office Estimate

    The Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared 
by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to 
section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.

                                                      June 7, 2012.
Hon. Peter T. King,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2356, the WMD 
Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2012.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark 
Grabowicz.
            Sincerely,
                                              Douglas W. Elmendorf.
    Enclosure.

H.R. 2356--WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2012

    Summary: CBO estimates that H.R. 2356 would authorize the 
appropriation of $394 million over the 2013-2017 period for 
programs in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and other 
agencies to address the threat of weapons of mass destruction.
    Assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts, CBO 
estimates that implementing H.R. 2356 would cost $342 million 
over the 2013-2017 period. The bill would not affect direct 
spending or revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do 
not apply.
    H.R. 2356 would impose intergovernmental and private-sector 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) 
by requiring public and private laboratories to comply with new 
security standards. Because the number of entities affected, 
the types of toxins and biologic agents covered, and the nature 
of security measures required would depend on future regulatory 
actions, CBO cannot estimate the costs of the mandates or 
whether they would exceed the annual thresholds for 
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates ($73 million and 
$146 million in 2012, respectively, adjusted annually for 
inflation).
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
budgetary impact of H.R. 2356 is shown in the following table. 
The costs of this legislation fall within budget functions 150 
(international affairs), 450 (community and regional 
development), 550 (health), 750 (administration of justice), 
and 800 (general government).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                         -------------------------------------------------------
                                                            2013     2014     2015     2016     2017   2013-2017
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION

FEMA Programs:
    Authorization Level.................................       42       42       42       42        0       168
    Estimated Outlays...................................       12       25       42       42       29       150
HHS Programs:
    Estimated Authorization Level.......................       45       40       40       40       40       205
    Estimated Outlays...................................       17       36       39       39       40       171
Other Programs:
    Estimated Authorization Level.......................        7        5        3        3        3        21
    Estimated Outlays...................................        7        5        3        3        3        21
    Total Changes:
        Estimated Authorization Level...................       94       87       85       85       43       394
        Estimated Outlays...............................       36       66       84       84       72      342
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: FEMA = Federal Emergency Management Agency; HHS = Department of Health and Human Services.

    Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that the 
bill will be enacted in 2012, that the necessary amounts will 
be provided each year, and that spending will follow historical 
patterns for similar activities.
    H.R. 2356 would authorize the appropriation of $42 million 
annually over the 2013-2016 period for the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) in DHS to make grants to state, local, 
and tribal governments to prepare for and respond to acts of 
terrorism and natural or man-made disasters that result in 
significant loss of life. CBO estimates that implementing this 
grant program would cost $150 million over the 2013-2017 period 
and an additional $18 million after 2017.
    CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 2356 would require the 
appropriation of $205 million over the 2013-2017 period for 
activities to be conducted by HHS and its agencies. The bill 
would direct HHS to establish and implement a strategy for 
dispensing antidotes or other countermeasures to mitigate the 
effects of a terrorist attack. H.R. 2356 also would require HHS 
to review its vaccination and antimicrobial dispensing policy 
and to make recommendations to improve that policy. Based on 
information from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
and on costs for similar activities, CBO estimates that 
implementing those requirements would cost $171 million over 
the 2013-2017 period.
    H.R. 2356 would require the Secretary of State to establish 
an interagency task force that would evaluate and improve 
global preparedness for a major biological attack and to report 
its findings to the Congress. The bill also would authorize the 
National Security Council to advise the President on biodefense 
matters, including developing a national biodefense plan and 
analyzing activities undertaken by the federal government to 
combat biological attacks. In addition, H.R. 2356 would require 
DHS to develop security plans and assessments and to prepare 
reports relating to threats from weapons of mass destruction. 
Based on the cost of similar programs, CBO estimates that it 
would cost $21 million over the 2013-2017 period to carry out 
those activities.
    Pay-As-You-Go considerations: None.
    Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 2356 
would require public and private laboratories to comply with 
new security standards and procedures that are specific to 
highest-risk biological agents and toxins. Those new standards 
include personnel hiring and training practices, physical and 
cyber security requirements, information sharing protocols, and 
other security standards deemed necessary. The duty to comply 
with the new standards would impose intergovernmental and 
private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA. Because the number 
of entities affected, the types of toxins and biologic agents 
covered, and the nature of limits and security measures 
required would depend on future regulatory actions, CBO cannot 
estimate the cost of the mandates. Consequently, CBO cannot 
determine whether the costs would exceed the annual thresholds 
for intergovernmental or private-sector mandates ($73 million 
and $146 million in 2012, respectively, adjusted annually for 
inflation).
    Grants and other forms of assistance authorized in the bill 
would benefit agencies of state, local, and tribal governments, 
including public institutions of higher education that prepare 
for and respond to acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and 
other man-made disasters.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Mark Grabowicz (DHS), 
Stephanie Cameron (HHS), Daniel Hoople (FEMA), Sunita D'Monte 
(Department of State); Matthew Pickford (National Security 
Council); Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Lisa 
Ramirez-Branum; Impact on the Private Sector: Michael Levine.
    Estimate approved by: Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

         Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, H.R. 2356 contains the following 
general performance goals, and objectives, including outcome 
related goals and objectives authorized.
    The purpose of H.R. 2356 is to enhance homeland security by 
improving efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and 
recover from attacks with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
and for other purposes. This bill addresses the range of 
actions necessary to counter the WMD threat as identified 
through the Committee on Homeland Security's oversight work and 
the recommendations of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD 
Proliferation and Terrorism in its report, ``World at Risk: The 
Report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism.'' The bill addresses 
all aspects of the preparedness framework--prevention, 
protection, response, and recovery--for chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks and incidents.
    The objectives of H.R. 2356 are to:
         Address the recommendations of the Commission for the 
        Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism as 
        described in its report, ``World at Risk'';
         Provide for a strategic approach to the national 
        biodefense enterprise through high level planning, 
        leadership, and integrated budgeting;
         Establish a national biosurveillance strategy to 
        increase awareness of the biological threat and 
        identify acts of bioterrorism;
         Improve the capabilities of the United States to 
        collect, analyze, and disseminate WMD-related 
        intelligence;
         Integrate national biosecurity and biodefense 
        stakeholders into the homeland security intelligence 
        and information sharing process;
         Provide a strong basis for CBRN risk assessments to be 
        used in order to improve security while prioritizing 
        resources;
         Ensure that the export enforcement activities of the 
        Federal government are coordinated;
         Ensure that prevention goals are met through 
        activities including appropriate information sharing; 
        performance of CBRN terrorism risk assessments; 
        coordination of Federal export enforcement; proper 
        communication of threat information to state, local, 
        and Tribal authorities and to the public; and promoting 
        individual and community preparedness;
         Ensure that protection goals are met through 
        activities including detection of biological attacks; 
        rapid biological threat identification at ports of 
        entry; evaluation of detection technology; and domestic 
        implementation of the Global Nuclear Detection 
        Architecture;
         Ensure that response goals are met through activities 
        including promulgation of guidance for first 
        responders; development and dissemination of integrated 
        plume models; establishment of a program to assess and 
        validate first responder equipment; authorization of 
        appropriate payment for laboratory response services; 
        authorization of a bioforensics analysis center; and 
        authorization of the Metropolitan Medical Response 
        System Program;
         Ensure that recovery goals are met through initiatives 
        including identification of gaps in recovery 
        capabilities; promulgation of guidance for recovery; 
        and exercising of recovery activities;
         Strengthen security at laboratories that possess 
        biological agents considered material threats to the 
        nation;
         Promote research that will help prevent the misuse of 
        synthetic biology, and promote the promulgation of 
        guidance for Federal agencies that conduct research 
        with dual use potential;
         Provide the sense of Congress that coordination of 
        Federal research and development into medical 
        countermeasures requires improvement;
         Require the development of a National Medical 
        Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy to improve rapid 
        response capabilities in the aftermath of a CBRN 
        incident, and similarly require a review of pre-event 
        vaccination and antimicrobial dispensing policies;
         Require that surplus vaccines and antimicrobials, and 
        those with short shelf lives, be made available on a 
        voluntary basis to first responders;
         Require regular review of the list of agents 
        considered material threats to the nation;
         Require improved coordination among Federal agencies 
        on background checks for those individuals requesting 
        access to work with select agents;
         Reduce the misuse of life sciences and enhance global 
        biosecurity through increased international 
        collaboration and information sharing;
         Identify and communicate best practices for 
        preparedness based on lessons learned from United 
        States domestic efforts that may be useful 
        internationally;
         Promote the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; 
        and
         Leverage existing systems and frameworks to the 
        greatest extent possible to achieve the above goals; 
        and
         Overall, improve interagency cooperation on addressing 
        CBRN risks.

   Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff 
                                Benefits

    In compliance with rule XXI of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives, this bill, as reported, contains no 
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff 
benefits as defined in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of the rule 
XXI.

                       Federal Mandates Statement

    The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal 
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act.

                        Preemption Clarification

    In compliance with section 423 of the Congressional Budget 
Act of 1974, requiring the report of any Committee on a bill or 
joint resolution to include a statement on the extent to which 
the bill or joint resolution in intended to preempt State, 
local, or Tribal law, the Committee finds that H.R. 2356 does 
not preempt any State, local, or Tribal law.

                      Advisory Committee Statement

    No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this 
legislation.

                  Applicability to Legislative Branch

    The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to 
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public 
services or accommodations within the meaning of section 
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.

             Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation

Sec. 1.   Short title; table of contents.
    This section provides that the Act may be cited as the 
``WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2012.''

Sec. 2.   Definitions.
    This section defines the following terms: ``appropriate 
congressional committees''; ``Intelligence Community''; and 
``national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders.''

               Title I--A National Biodefense Enterprise

Sec. 101.   Special Assistant for Biodefense.
    Section 101 requires the President to assign a member of 
the National Security Council to serve as the Special Assistant 
to the President for Biodefense. The Special Assistant shall 
serve as the principal advisor to the President regarding 
coordination of Federal biodefense policy including prevention, 
protection, response, and recovery from biological attacks or 
other phenomena that may have serious health consequences for 
the United States, including wide-scale fatalities or 
infectious disease outbreaks. In so doing, the Special 
Assistant shall identify gaps in the existing biodefense 
posture, lead the development of a National Biodefense Plan, 
National Biosurveillance Strategy, and microbial forensics 
strategy, oversee with the Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget a cross-cutting biodefense budget, and in general 
conduct oversight of the implementation of Federal biodefense 
activities.
    The Committee is concerned that the President has not 
designated an individual with sufficient authority and 
singularity of mission for the substantial responsibility of 
coordinating Federal biodefense activities. A position of the 
kind described existed under both President William J. Clinton 
and President George W. Bush, and was eliminated in the current 
Administration. Although the Administration has designated a 
``WMD Coordinator'' as required by the ``Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,'' (Pub. Law 
111-53) this individual has engaged almost exclusively in 
nuclear counterproliferation matters. Without a central point 
of authority to coordinate the myriad departmental and 
interagency Federal activities related to biodefense, 
inefficiencies, redundancies, and gaps in resource allocation 
across an estimated $6 billion annual enterprise are likely to 
occur. The Committee intends for this individual to be vested 
with the necessary authorities to ensure a truly strategic 
Federal approach to biodefense.

Sec. 102.   National Biodefense Plan.
    Section 102 requires the Special Assistant to the President 
for Biodefense to submit to the President a National Biodefense 
Plan that integrates myriad existing plans and addresses 
identified capability gaps. Specifically, the plan identifies 
biological risks to the nation and capability gaps in 
mitigating those risks, delineates needed defense activities, 
coordinates existing strategic documents and plans, defines 
intergovernmental roles, and provides planning guidance to 
biodefense and biosecurity stakeholders.
    A central tenet of the WMD Commission's report was that 
United States policy and strategy have not kept pace with 
growing risks. Other bodies have also criticized Federal 
efforts at strategic planning, such as the National Biodefense 
Science Board, which found weaknesses in the Federal approach 
to medical countermeasure development. Of course, agency-
specific planning efforts have not always been sufficient, 
either; correspondence between goals and investments must occur 
at the agency level for any interagency effort to be completely 
successful. The Committee believes that cross-agency planning 
should be centralized, should have metrics that are assessed 
regularly, and should be led by an individual endowed with the 
necessary authority to see to it that budget decisions are 
appropriate, and take corrective action when they are not. The 
Committee recognizes that numerous documents are considered to 
be targeted or broad biodefense strategies or implementation 
plans, including, but not limited to, several Homeland Security 
Presidential Directives; Presidential Policy Directives; the 
``National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza'' and its 
implementation plan; and, most recently, the ``National Health 
Security Strategy'' and its implementation plan. Many of these 
have elements that would direct preparedness and response for 
biological events, but the Committee believes that a single 
implementation plan dedicated to the biodefense enterprise--a 
National framework that would organize and prioritize 
biodefense investments based on risk--is still needed.
    The Committee understands that the scope of such a plan 
could be so extensive as to make it unfeasible to implement in 
a useful way. As such, the Committee intends for the plan to 
prioritize those efforts that will mitigate the variety of 
biological risks in the most meaningful and cost-effective way. 
This can be done by assessing and then addressing areas of most 
urgent need in prevention, protection, response, and recovery, 
including through use of Department of Homeland Security risk 
assessments. It should also consider that some critical 
infrastructure sectors are more vulnerable than others, and the 
plan should leverage strengths of different agencies for 
minimizing cross-sector vulnerabilities. The Committee also 
encourages the planners to think innovatively and consider 
alternative approaches to preparedness than have previously 
been the paradigm, for instance, the narrow planning for a 
given agent that has characterized some previous efforts. The 
Committee also intends the plan to address food defense.

Sec. 103.   National Biosurveillance Strategy.
    Section 103 requires the Special Assistant to the President 
for Biodefense to examine the current state of biosurveillance 
and develop and maintain a national strategy for 
biosurveillance. Importantly, this strategy shall include an 
implementation plan to: Advance real-time situational 
awareness; foster information sharing among stakeholders; and 
enhance the capability of the Federal government to rapidly 
identify, characterize, localize, and track a biological event 
of National concern by integrating and analyzing data.
    The National Academies of Science reported in 2009 that the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health 
and Human Services should enhance efforts to develop a national 
system of situational awareness for biological threats. In 
2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that 
the Nation still lacks an overall strategy to help guide 
Federal agencies and their partners' efforts to build and 
maintain an integrated National biosurveillance capability. As 
the GAO points out, the ``National Strategy for Countering 
Biological Threats'' and the ``National Health Security 
Strategy'' direct further development of biosurveillance 
strategies and plans to help support their broader biodefense 
goals. The Committee intends for the National Biosurveillance 
Strategy to build on these proposed goals and frameworks, and 
to focus explicitly on how to meet the challenges associated 
with sourcing good data and with information sharing. The 
Committee is aware that many challenges are associated with the 
acquisition and analysis of biosurveillance data sets, with the 
sharing of the data between and among different professions, 
and in dealing with relevant classified information. There are 
also many opportunities, however, that may facilitate such a 
system, such as the expansion of use of electronic health 
records. Such a capability is critical, given that biological 
events often cannot be prevented, but can be mitigated through 
early detection. The Committee encourages the drafters to 
consider aligning goals and activities to those of Presidential 
Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) and its follow-ons.
    Inconsistency in the definition and interpretation of 
``biosurveillance'' has complicated challenges associated with 
implementation and coordination of efforts at the National 
level. The Strategy must include a definition of 
``biosurveillance'' so that efforts to meet the goals of the 
Strategy are properly focused. Definitions should be 
standardized with other National biosurveillance efforts.
    Upon Committee filing of this report, the National Security 
Staff released such a strategy. The strategy is consistent with 
the Committee's intent to frame the purpose of a Nationally 
integrated biosurveillance capability, to integrate it with 
other relevant strategies, and to emphasize the need for 
leveraging existing activities. Important components, however, 
such as defining goals and milestones, and defining roles and 
responsibilities, are lacking. The Committee is, therefore, 
anxious to examine the implementation plan that is due to 
follow in 120 days, which will hopefully address these and 
other needed details. Such an implementation plan is 
particularly important in light of the fact that the one 
Federal effort toward integrating biosurveillance information--
the National Biosurveillance and Integration System--has not 
achieved optimal performance and the nation remains without 
this capability.

Sec. 104.   Comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense budget 
analysis.
    Section 104 requires the Special Assistant to the President 
for Biodefense, in coordination with the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget, to transmit to the appropriate 
Congressional committees a comprehensive cross-cutting 
biodefense budget analysis that delineates and integrates the 
biodefense expenditure requests for all Departments and 
agencies involved in Federal biodefense efforts. All agencies 
that perform biodefense work shall submit their proposed budget 
request to the Special Assistant 30 days in advance of their 
formal submission to the Office of Management and Budget. The 
budget analysis shall provide a detailed analysis identifying 
appropriations, obligational authority, and outlays that 
contribute to biodefense. The analysis will also include an 
indication of how the Federal activities in the budget support 
the activities outlined in the National Biodefense Plan.
    The Office of Management and Budget neither assesses nor 
directs all annual Federal biodefense expenditures in a cross-
cutting manner. In fact, estimates of total Federal dollars 
spent are derived only from think tank analyses. In the absence 
of such an integrated approach, funds will not be optimally 
spent. The Committee intends that the Special Assistant to the 
President for Biodefense, working with the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget, will be endowed with 
sufficient authority to collect the necessary information from 
all relevant Departments and agencies, and require 
modifications to budget submissions as necessary, consistent 
with the National Biodefense Plan.

                     Title II--Intelligence Matters

Sec. 201.   National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the 
Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction.
    Section 201 requires the Director of National Intelligence, 
in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and 
other appropriate Federal agencies, to develop and implement a 
National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from 
Weapons of Mass Destruction to improve national capabilities to 
collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence related to WMD. 
The strategy shall identify and address target capabilities 
needed for successful WMD intelligence collection; include 
methods for recruitment, training, and retention of individuals 
with expertise in the collection, analysis, and dissemination 
of intelligence related to different types of WMD; and include 
methods for information sharing and collaboration with non-
Federal stakeholders. The strategy shall be accompanied by an 
implementation plan.
    The Congressionally-mandated Commission on the Prevention 
of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism found insufficiencies in the 
Intelligence Community's ability to undertake WMD collection 
and analysis. The Committee recognizes that the Intelligence 
Community addresses the WMD threat in various parts of the 
National Intelligence Strategy but believes that the 
establishment of a targeted national strategy for countering 
this homeland security threat is necessary given that the 
responses to this emerging threat are dissimilar from responses 
to traditional threats. Accordingly, the Committee intends for 
the strategy to take these differences into account and to 
contain goals and objectives that are tailored to the unique 
characteristics of the WMD threat. The Committee believes that 
individuals with considerable knowledge of WMD may reside in 
the United States government but outside of the Intelligence 
Community. The Committee intends for the Intelligence Community 
to reach out to these experts and, where appropriate, to ask 
these experts to assist in the analysis of technical 
information related to WMD.

Sec. 202.   National Intelligence Strategy for Countering 
Biological Threats.
    Recognizing the unique nature of the biological threat, 
Section 202 requires the Director of National Intelligence, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense, and the 
heads of other agencies to develop and implement a National 
Intelligence Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. The 
strategy shall identify and address target capabilities needed 
for successful intelligence collection on biological threats; 
include a plan for establishing a cadre of collectors and 
analysts in the Intelligence Community; include methods for 
collaboration; and include a plan for ensuring the 
prioritization and sustained commitment of personnel and 
resources to address biological threats. The strategy shall be 
accompanied by an implementation plan.
    The bioweapons threat must remain among the highest 
national intelligence priorities, according to the WMD 
Commission. The Committee has, therefore, called out an 
additional strategy for biological threats since it is this 
threat that the Commission determined to be of the most 
concern; this strategy may be separate from the strategy 
outlined in Sec. 201, or an annex to it. The Committee intends 
for this strategy to build on the National Intelligence 
Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, as initially 
produced in 2007 and to authorize the activities already in 
place regarding the National Intelligence Strategy for 
Countering Biological Threats. The Committee also intends for 
the Director of National Intelligence to draw upon knowledge in 
the National Counterproliferation Center, the National 
Counterterrorism Center and other members of the Intelligence 
Community, as appropriate.

Sec. 203.   State, local, and tribal defined.
    In this title, the term ``State, local, and tribal'' has 
the same meaning that term has in the ``Homeland Security Act 
of 2002.''

                  Title III--Homeland Security Matters

Sec. 301.   Weapons of mass destruction prevention and 
preparedness.
    Amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. Law 107-417) 
by adding at the end the following new title:

   Title XXI--Weapons of Mass Destruction Prevention and Preparedness

                         Subtitle A--Prevention

Sec. 2101.   Weapons of mass destruction intelligence and 
information sharing.
    Section 2101 requires the Department of Homeland Security 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) to support homeland-
security focused analysis of terrorist actors pertaining to 
CBRN materials, global biological threats, public health and 
food, agricultural, and veterinary issues. The Department is 
required to leverage existing and emerging homeland security 
capabilities, such as fusion centers, and share information 
with State, local, and Tribal partners and other stakeholders. 
Where appropriate, I&A shall coordinate with other relevant 
Department components, others in the Intelligence Community, 
and other Federal, State, local, and Tribal authorities, 
including officials from high-threat areas, and enable such 
entities to provide recommendations on optimal information 
sharing mechanisms. The Secretary shall report annually to the 
appropriate congressional committees on activities to counter 
the threat from WMD conducted by all relevant entities within 
the Department.
    The Committee is aware that many agencies, including the 
Department of Homeland Security, are engaged in CBRN 
intelligence and information sharing activities. This provision 
ensures that the Department has adequate and enduring expertise 
in its intelligence division to analyze and disseminate CBRN 
information, which may be highly technical, and provide value 
within the Intelligence Community. The Committee believes that 
this unit should work to the greatest extent possible with 
other Department of Homeland Security components (operational 
and intelligence), headquarters elements, others in the 
Intelligence Community, and State, local, and Tribal 
authorities in order to enhance the Department's counter-WMD 
activities. State, local, and Tribal participation, in 
particular, should include officials from high threat areas. 
The effective and appropriate sharing of information with State 
and local partners is paramount and remains a Committee 
priority. The Committee does not intend for the activities 
outlined by this section to duplicate those already conducted 
by the National Counterterrorism Center, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, or other members of the Intelligence Community. 
The Committee believes that strict adherence to relevant 
national intelligence strategies, including those authorized in 
Sections 201 and 202 of this Act, will ensure clarity of 
mission for each Federal entity engaged in WMD intelligence 
activities.

Sec. 2102.   Risk assessments.
    Section 2102 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, 
and in coordination with other appropriate Department of 
Homeland Security components and Federal departments and 
agencies, to produce and periodically update a terrorism risk 
assessment for CBRN threats, as well as an integrated risk 
assessment that assesses all of the above threats and ranks 
them against one another according to their relative risk. Each 
assessment shall include a description of the methodology used 
to conduct it, and the Secretary shall convene an interagency 
task force of subject matter experts to provide recommendations 
as to the adequacy of the methodologies. Sensitivity analyses 
shall also be conducted on each assessment, and each assessment 
shall consider the risk from an evolving adversary. The 
assessments shall be used to inform and guide Department of 
Homeland Security material threat assessments and 
determinations; allocation of research and development 
resources; prioritization of medical countermeasure research, 
development, acquisition, and distribution and other national 
strategic biodefense research; tailored risk assessments and 
risk mitigation studies; and other homeland security 
activities. In developing the assessments, the Secretary shall 
seek input from national biosecurity and biodefense 
stakeholders. The assessments shall be shared in classified and 
unclassified formats with Federal, State, local, and Tribal 
officials with a need for the information. The Secretary shall 
also establish written procedures for appropriate usage of the 
assessments.
    The Committee believes that risk assessments are critical 
for the determination of the most appropriate responses for 
investment of finite budget resources. Such assessments must be 
used to inform Departmental priorities, investments, and 
activities, as well as other governmental CBRN activities, such 
as development of medical countermeasures. They are important 
for understanding the comparative risks of each type of threat, 
and therefore where to prioritize investments. The Committee is 
aware that the Department undertakes terrorism risk assessments 
of the type described on a two-year cycle, and intends to 
provide further guidance on what those assessments should look 
like and how they should be used. The National Academies of 
Science has reviewed the Department's approach to risk 
assessments, and has provided recommendations to the Department 
for improvement, specifically with respect to the bioterrorism 
risk assessments and the challenges with using standard 
techniques to assess that risk. The Committee expects for all 
of the risk assessments performed under this section to 
continue to improve in their reliability and utility, and for 
recommendations from the established task force to be taken 
seriously. In light of findings from the GAO that the 
Department's risk assessments lack written procedures for 
usage, this section calls for the formalization of such 
procedures.

Sec. 2103.   National Export Enforcement Coordination.
    Section 2103 establishes that the Department of Homeland 
Security shall maintain a unit for national export enforcement 
coordination that is managed by the Secretary and that 
coordinates the export enforcement activities among the 
Departments of Homeland Security, Agriculture, Commerce, 
Defense, Energy, Justice, State, and the Treasury, the 
Intelligence Community, and other Federal agencies.
    The Committee supports the Administration's efforts to 
create greater efficiencies in the export control community. 
The Committee intends to authorize activities underway at the 
Department of Homeland Security to create greater efficiencies 
in the export control community. The Committee recognizes the 
investigations that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
and other Federal law enforcement agencies conduct in this 
regard, and believes that a network for such coordination will 
increase efficiencies and better integrate law enforcement, 
intelligence, and other related activities for export control. 
The Committee also intends for these activities to be 
undertaken with an understanding of the commerce and security-
related context in which counter-proliferation activities must 
occur. The Committee does not intend to subsume counter-
proliferation activities conducted by the Intelligence 
Community under the Department of Homeland Security.

Sec. 2104.   Communication of threat information.
    Section 2104 requires the Administrator of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in consultation with State, 
local, and Tribal governments and in coordination with other 
agencies, to develop a communications plan for providing 
information to the public related to preventing, preparing for, 
responding to, and recovering from CBRN attacks. Specifically, 
the Administrator shall develop and disseminate pre-scripted 
messages and message templates to State, local, and Tribal 
officials so that they can incorporate them into emergency 
plans, and quickly disseminate critical information to the 
public in anticipation of or in the immediate aftermath of an 
attack. The Administrator shall incorporate such message 
templates into exercises.
    This section also directs the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, in coordination with the Attorney General and heads 
of appropriate Federal agencies, to: ensure that homeland 
security information concerning terrorist threats is 
disseminated to the general public within the United States, as 
appropriate; and establish a process to optimize opportunities 
for qualified heads of State, local, and Tribal governments to 
obtain appropriate security clearances so that they may receive 
classified threat information when appropriate. This section 
requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to prepare 
unclassified threat bulletins on CBRN threats. The Secretary 
shall also provide guidance to State, local, and Tribal 
authorities on why certain communities are identified as being 
at heightened risk of exploitation, and on how to communicate 
terrorism-related threats and risks to the public within their 
jurisdiction.
    The Committee intends for FEMA to take every opportunity to 
appropriately inform the public about risks, threats, and 
guidance for response to CBRN incidents. Sustained public 
education campaigns to disseminate as much information as 
possible in advance of a CBRN event are critical. This practice 
will minimize the amount of work and information sharing that 
must occur post-incident. Pre-scripted messages and templates 
will allow State, local, and Tribal authorities to exercise 
their own plans in advance for sharing information with the 
public. Unclassified threat bulletins will ensure that the 
public has sufficient knowledge of the nature of a CBRN attack 
that has occurred, without compromising classified information 
and ongoing investigations. Messaging that provides strong 
guidance on the responsibility of individuals in the early 
stages of an attack, and the most appropriate actions they 
should take to help themselves and those around them, must be 
part of this planning. The Integrated Public Alert and Warning 
System (IPAWS) should be leveraged in these efforts. The 
Committee recognizes that FEMA is already undertaking work in 
this area, such as in its improvised nuclear device 
communications planning, and expects this work to continue 
under the guidance of this section, and to leverage the 
increasing body of literature on effective risk communication. 
The Committee recommends consultation with non-governmental 
organizations that can represent the needs of the public, 
including those with disabilities and access and functional 
needs, in the development of appropriate messaging.

Sec. 2105.   Individual and community preparedness for 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks.
    In order to enhance our ability to establish individual and 
community preparedness Nation-wide for CBRN threats, Section 
2105 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting 
through the Administrator of FEMA, to assist State, local, and 
Tribal governments in improving and promoting individual and 
community preparedness and collective response to terrorist 
attacks by: Developing and disseminating guidance and 
checklists of recommended actions for individual and community 
prevention and preparedness efforts; compiling and 
disseminating information on best practices; providing 
information and training materials; and conducting individual 
and community preparedness outreach efforts.
    Preparedness is not solely a Federal responsibility. 
States, localities, the private sector, and individuals must 
participate to ensure adequate preparation for terrorist events 
and disasters. Individuals and communities must understand in 
advance those functions that they may have to manage for 
themselves. Section 2105 requires FEMA to provide guidance to 
ensure that all relevant parties have the information they need 
to establish their own measures of preparedness. The Committee 
is aware that FEMA has undertaken efforts to build a toolkit 
that includes checklists, good practices, and outreach efforts 
for government at all levels to engage the whole community in 
all-hazards preparedness, including CBRN attacks. The Committee 
also recognizes that FEMA is undertaking activities in 
association with PPD-8 and the National Preparedness Goal that 
are relevant to the directives in this section. The Committee 
recommends that these efforts be coordinated and consolidated 
in a way that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of 
individuals and communities, in the ``whole of community'' 
context, and contains all necessary guidelines, checklists, 
training, and other tools for CBRN preparedness and response.

                         Subtitle B--Protection

Sec. 2121.   Detection of biological attacks.
    Section 2121 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
implement a biological detection capability. The Secretary, 
through this program, shall deploy detectors to areas based on 
risk to indicate the presence of biological agents, and provide 
advanced planning tools, concepts of operation, training 
exercises, and technical assistance to jurisdictions hosting 
the program. This section also directs the Secretary to: Enter 
into memoranda of agreement with other agencies to set forth 
roles and responsibilities; establish criteria to determine 
whether coverage is sufficient; implement an assay equivalency 
program; and contract with participating laboratories for the 
provision of laboratory services on a fee-for-service basis or 
other similar basis. This section also requires that a host of 
criteria are met before any new system is procured, including 
performance of cost-benefit analyses and agreement with 
localities on concepts of operations.
    Enhancing the nation's capabilities for rapid response to 
biological attacks was one of the top recommendations from the 
WMD Commission. Because detection of a pending biological 
attack is so difficult, rapid post-event detection is key. 
While an early warning detection system is not the sole means 
to detect a bioterror event, the Committee believes that the 
nation should have an early detection capability so that 
recognition of sick individuals in the aftermath of the attack 
is not the only means of detection. The detection system called 
for in this section could currently be met via the BioWatch 
system, although the Committee is well aware that BioWatch has 
not been without management and operational challenges. 
Accordingly, the Committee notes that the early detection 
mandates of this section could be met through other solutions 
as threats and capabilities evolve over time. To the extent 
that the current BioWatch program is utilized to meet this 
mandate, information should be provided to participating 
laboratories on specificity, sensitivity, and limitations of 
the technology, as well as on the public health implications of 
a positive result. A biodetection system should not be seen as 
a replacement for surveillance via the health care system and 
detection via astute physicians; advanced patient-side assays 
under development will be a critical piece to early detection.
    Biodetection cannot be the responsibility of a single 
department or agency, and efforts must be made across 
government to improve capabilities. Furthermore, the Department 
of Homeland Security must work with its Federal partners to 
ensure consensus on matters such as assay selection and 
standards. The Committee also recognizes that the success of 
the BioWatch program depends on effective interaction with host 
State and local public health laboratories. Finally, any 
efforts to improve detection technologies must be balanced with 
cost, and to do this, a cost-benefit analysis is required. The 
fiscal costs of developing a new system may be too great if no 
or minimal increase in system sensitivity is achieved; 
alternatively, if an increase in capability along with a 
decrease in cost per data point can be accomplished, this might 
be a good investment. Thorough analysis of the capabilities of 
the existing system must be undertaken prior to obligation of 
funds for a new system. The Committee intends for development, 
procurement, and deployment of any such system to be carried 
out in alignment with the goals and objectives of the National 
Biodefense Plan outlined in Section 102 and the National 
Biosurveillance Strategy outlined in Section 103.

Sec. 2122.   Rapid biological threat detection and 
identification at ports of entry.
    Section 2122 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology 
and in consultation with relevant component heads, to assess 
whether the development of technological screening capabilities 
for biological agents, pandemic influenza, and other infectious 
diseases to support entry and exit screening at ports of entry 
should be undertaken. If the Under Secretary determines such a 
capability would be of value, the Secretary is directed, to the 
extent possible, to initiate the development of safe and 
effective methods to rapidly screen incoming persons at ports 
of entry.
    When the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic originated in the 
United Mexican States and crossed over the United States 
border, it surprised U.S. officials who had expected that the 
next pandemic would emanate from Asia. The border remained open 
and thousands continued to cross every day with no system for 
border officials to determine who was infected. That experience 
demonstrated that international borders offer very little 
protection from the spread of infectious disease due to the 
inability to quickly and effectively screen travelers. This 
section, therefore, requires the Department to determine if a 
rapid screening capability could be deployed at ports of entry 
for infectious diseases and could be operationally feasible and 
useful in controlling the spread of disease or the trafficking 
of biological weapons. If the Department believes that such 
screening tools are necessary, the Committee intends for the 
Science and Technology Directorate to develop these screening 
capabilities.

Sec. 2123.   Evaluating detection technology.
    Section 2123 authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
in coordination with the Director of the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, to establish a program for evaluation 
of chemical and biological detector technologies for end users 
such as first responders. The program would establish metrics 
for the adoption of voluntary consensus standards; establish a 
process for voluntary testing and evaluation of such 
technology; and, with manufacturer permission, make available 
the results of testing and evaluation.
    The Committee intends for the Science and Technology 
Directorate to focus resources on this type of testing and 
evaluation as rigorously as possible to determine the value of 
existing technologies and to inform the purchase of detection 
technology. This program should be coordinated with the 
activities of the System Assessment and Validation for 
Emergency Responders (SAVER) program, and also with the 
Stakeholder Panel on Agent Detection Assays and other standards 
work. Test results may be disclosed to Federal agencies, State, 
local and Tribal governments, and the private sector with 
permission of the manufacturer.

Sec. 2124.   Domestic implementation of the Global Nuclear 
Detection Architecture.
    Section 2124 requires the Director of the Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office (DNDO) to establish and maintain a multi-
layered system of detection technologies and programs to 
enhance the Nation's ability to interdict a radiological or 
nuclear device in high-risk cities. This section also requires 
the Director to develop a surge capability for radiological and 
nuclear detection systems that can be rapidly deployed in 
response to actionable intelligence. The programs described 
above shall be integrated into the Global Nuclear Detection 
Architecture.
    This section authorizes the Securing the Cities (STC) 
program to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack 
in high-risk United States cities. The detonation of an 
improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device in 
a metropolitan area of the United States would have devastating 
consequences due to loss of life, destruction of property, and 
economic repercussions that ripple across the nation. STC is 
the only DHS program dedicated specifically to reducing the 
risk of radiological and nuclear terrorism through targeted 
detection. STC has fostered unprecedented collaboration and 
coordination among its many Federal, State, and local partners. 
The Committee finds that STC has substantially increased 
preventive radiological and nuclear detection awareness and 
capabilities in the New York City metropolitan areaarea and is 
an effective strategy for addressing the domestic layer of the 
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. The Committee commends 
DNDO for its development and oversight of this unified 
strategy. The Committee believes the experience in New York 
City should be used as a template for expanding the program to 
other high-risk cities that participate in the Urban Area 
Security Initiative. Building on the program's record of 
success, DNDO is highly encouraged to develop a cost-effective 
plan for expansion of STC to additional cities and encompass a 
broader range of WMD threats.
    The Director of DNDO is also instructed to focus efforts on 
coordinating the development of surge capabilities for 
radiological and nuclear detection systems that can be deployed 
within the United States rapidly in response to intelligence or 
warnings. This includes support to State and local entities 
with equipment, training and exercises. The Committee believes 
the combination of both fixed and agile detection components 
into a flexible architecture is the most cost-effective, risk-
based strategy for the domestic prevention of radiological and 
nuclear terrorism. DNDO is strongly encouraged to address gaps 
in the detection of shielded highly enriched uranium as it 
develops and deploys these new surge capabilities.

                          Subtitle C--Response

Sec. 2131.   First responder guidance concerning chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks.
    Section 2131 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
in coordination with the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Administrator of 
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Attorney General, and 
the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, to develop 
voluntary, risk-based guidance for emergency and public health 
personnel for responding to an explosion or release of CBRN 
material. This guidance shall contain components such as 
protective actions for ensuring the security, health, and 
safety of emergency response providers and their families and 
household contacts, and best practices for emergency response 
providers to effectively diagnose, handle, and otherwise manage 
individuals affected by an incident involving such an agent. 
The Secretary shall enable the first responder and first 
provider community to submit recommendations for areas for 
which guidance could be developed.
    Stakeholders have advised the Committee that current 
guidance is disparate and can be difficult to follow. The 
Committee believes it is necessary that a resource be developed 
to serve as a comprehensive emergency response standard, which 
addresses the full range of hazards or concerns currently 
facing emergency responders. The Committee intends that the 
Department will standardize a process that will involve 
appropriate individuals from the emergency responder 
communities to participate in the reviews and provide material 
that is quickly accessible and easily updated. The Committee 
hopes that the inclusion of the community in the process will 
result in universal guidance of considerable utility. The 
Committee intends that the Department will review relevant 
existing Federal, non-Federal, international, academic, and 
non-governmental materials when developing the guidance. 
Guidance promulgated under this section should be integrated 
into curricula for first responder training provided by the 
Center for Domestic Preparedness and other such accredited 
facilities to enhance WMD capabilities among our nation's first 
responders.
    The Committee recognizes the importance of aligning 
response throughout the chain of leadership in the event of a 
WMD attack or incident. The Committee expects the Department to 
work closely with other Executive departments and agencies, 
such as the Department of Labor, the Department of Health and 
Human Services, and the Environmental Protection Agency, on the 
development and dissemination of this guidance. The Committee 
recognizes that reaching ``perfect'' standards may be 
impossible. The Committee expects, however, that the Department 
will leverage existing standards and integrate those standards 
using the best available science to provide better guidance and 
a framework that enhances response capability and safety to the 
greatest extent possible in an area of considerable risk.

Sec. 2132.   Integrated plume modeling for collective response.
    Section 2132 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
develop and disseminate integrated plume models to enable rapid 
response activities following a CBRN release. The Secretary 
shall identify Federal, State, and local needs regarding plume 
models; establish mechanisms for dissemination of these models 
to enable appropriate collective response activities; and 
ensure that guidance and training for the use of such models 
are provided.
    Plume models help first responders predict locations to 
where a CBRN agent might disperse, allowing for forward 
deployment of resources and the potential to save many lives. 
The Committee believes plume models must be integrated with 
protective action guidelines and other appropriate information 
so they present a comprehensive picture to guide optimal 
response to a CBRN event. The Committee recognizes the 
considerable work already underway for plume modeling for 
assisting government at all levels, including FEMA's work with 
national laboratories and academia to support local government 
planning needs. The Committee also recognizes that agencies 
other than the Department of Homeland Security (such as the 
Department of Energy and the Department of Defense) have 
produced many plume models for a variety of theoretical and 
real-world events. The Committee does not intend for the 
Department of Homeland Security to duplicate this work. 
Instead, the Committee intends for the Department to acquire 
plume models from these agencies, work with them to integrate 
protective action guidelines and other appropriate information, 
and subsequently use and disseminate them.

Sec. 2133.   Establishment of the system assessment and 
validation for emergencyresponders (SAVER) program.
    Section 2133 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
assess and validate commercial emergency responder equipment 
and systems (including hand-held detectors for CBRN agents), 
provide results to the emergency response provider community in 
an operationally useful form, provide information about 
equipment on the departmental authorized equipment list, enable 
decision-makers and responders to better select, procure, use, 
and maintain emergency responder equipment, and share this 
information nationally with the emergency response provider 
community.
    This section authorizes ongoing activity within the Science 
and Technology Directorate. The Committee is concerned that 
some equipment and systems that are commercially available for 
first responders have not been operationally tested, and 
manufacturer claims may provide insufficient information to 
assure that the equipment will perform reliably in the field. 
The Committee supports the System Assessment and Validation for 
Emergency Responders (SAVER) program because it objectively 
validates the reliability of these systems and equipment and 
provides first responders with information necessary for better 
purchasing decisions. The Committee urges the SAVER program to 
consult with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other 
Federal agencies that have conducted evaluations of such 
equipment and systems for other purposes for their relevant 
input, and intends that SAVER will undertake coordination with 
other Federal efforts to develop minimum standards of 
detection. The Committee also intends that the SAVER Program be 
supported by the Stakeholder Panel on Agent Detection Assays 
program.

Sec. 2134.   Payment for laboratory response services.
    Section 2134 authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
the Attorney General, and other participating Federal agencies 
to contract with State and local public health laboratories 
that are members of the Laboratory Response Network (LRN) for 
Biological Terrorism and other laboratories for the provision 
of laboratory testing services on a fee-for-service basis or on 
a prepayment or other similar basis. The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) will be informed by the agencies 
of such contracts before such time that the contracts are 
signed.
    The Committee recognizes the important work of the 
participating laboratories in the LRN. The Committee also 
recognizes that the vast amount of initial laboratory testing 
of suspicious powders and other materials is conducted by State 
and local public health member laboratories. Additionally, the 
Committee understands that at least one Federal agency has made 
an unsuccessful attempt to transfer funds to the Department of 
Health and Human Services for support of LRN laboratories. The 
Committee intends for the provision to allow Federal agencies 
participating in the LRN to be able to contract directly with 
State and local LRN laboratories to pay for laboratory testing 
services on a fee-for-service or similar basis, without going 
through other Federal agencies. The Committee does not intend 
for such payment for LRN services to supplant or replace other 
funding that State and local public health laboratories receive 
from other sources, including those from the Department of 
Health and Human Services. The Committee intends for the 
Federal agencies that utilize the laboratories to ensure that 
these contracts are standardized and do not cause interference 
among other contracts. Furthermore, it is the intent of the 
language that requires informing of the CDC of outside 
contracts to allow the CDC to assess whether such contracts 
would impact the LRN laboratory's primary mission of responding 
to public health emergencies.

Sec. 2135.   Bioforensics capabilities.
    Section 2135 authorizes a bioforensics analysis center in 
the Department of Homeland Security that provides law 
enforcement and intelligence-related investigations with 
forensic examination of biothreat agents and related evidence. 
The center will require that other Executive Branch agencies 
reimburse it for services, rather than rely on Congressional 
appropriations.
    The Committee supports funding a strong bioforensics 
capability that enables law enforcement to investigate and 
attribute attacks and respond appropriately. Such analysis is 
intended to support the executive agencies responsible for 
preventing, deterring, responding to, attributing and 
recovering from biological attacks. This mandate could be met 
by the National Bioforensics and Analysis Center (NBFAC). 
Section 2135 requires that executive agencies pay for the 
forensic analysis and capability, exclusive of overhead, rather 
than having the Department bear all of the costs. The Committee 
expects that the implementation of a user fee-based system will 
cover the costs of running casework and foster greater 
oversight by the agencies that are NFBAC customers. A detailee 
program is also authorized for the purposes of training and 
information sharing.

Sec. 2136.   Metropolitan Medical Response System Program.
    Section 2136 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
conduct a Metropolitan Medical Response System Program (MMRS) 
to assist State and local governments in preparing for and 
responding to public health and mass casualty incidents 
resulting from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other 
man-made disasters. The Secretary of Homeland Security is 
authorized to provide grants through the Administrator of FEMA 
to State, local, and Tribal governments to strengthen medical 
surge capacity; strengthen mass prophylaxis capabilities; 
enhance detection capabilities; develop mass triage plans; 
support information sharing and collaboration; conduct training 
and exercises; and strengthen decontamination capabilities. 
Jurisdictions that received funding in Fiscal Year 2009 are 
eligible for continued funding. After Fiscal Year 2012, a 
jurisdiction shall not be eligible unless the Secretary 
determines that the jurisdiction maintains a sufficient 
measured degree of capability in accordance with outlined 
performance measures. The provision also requires a review of 
the program to provide recommendations going forward. For each 
of fiscal years 2012 through 2016, $42 million is authorized. 
Section 301(d) requires a review of the program to provide 
recommendations going forward.
    The Committee believes that MMRS is an important grant 
program for the first responder community. Authorizing it at 
appropriate levels will ensure that it remains a stand-alone 
program with dedicated funding, thereby providing localities 
with the resources they require to meet critical medical 
preparedness needs. Activities for which MMRS provides 
resources include response training, equipment purchases, 
dispensing of medical countermeasures, and overall coordination 
for catastrophic incident response. These activities are 
resource intensive and require continual equipment maintenance, 
exercises, and other resources. The Committee believes that 
continued support of homeland security grant programs is 
necessary to ensure that State and local governments build and 
sustain necessary capabilities to prevent, prepare for, respond 
to, and recover from terrorist attacks.

                          Subtitle D--Recovery

Sec. 2141.   Identifying and addressing gaps in recovery 
capabilities.
    Section 2141 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology 
and in coordination with the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, to conduct risk assessments to inform 
prioritization of recovery activities for CBRN incidents. The 
results of the assessments shall inform Federal efforts to 
address the capability gaps uncovered by each assessment.
    The ability to recover from a CBRN event is as critical as 
other activities, such as response. If we cannot resume 
commerce and provide a safe and secure environment for living, 
basic standards of living grind to a halt. The Committee 
believes that insufficient attention has been paid to recovery. 
The Committee intends that these risk assessments be conducted 
in coordination with the heads of appropriate departments and 
agencies, such as the Department of Health and Human Services 
and the Environmental Protection Agency. The results shall 
inform recovery research and the development of recovery 
guidelines by the Environmental Protection Agency.

Sec. 2142.   Recovery from a chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear attack or incident.
    Section 2142 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
in coordination and consultation with the heads of several 
agencies, to develop and issue guidance for clean-up and 
restoration of indoor and outdoor areas that have been affected 
by a CBRN attack or incident. The guidance shall clarify 
Federal roles and responsibilities for assisting State, local, 
and Tribal authorities, and shall include risk-based 
recommendations for matters such as standards for effective 
decontamination and means for developing health and safety 
plans to address first responder health risks. In carrying out 
the guidance development, existing guidance shall be 
inventoried, and the public shall be invited to submit 
recommendations. The guidance should be prioritized based on 
the risk assessments performed pursuant to section 2141.
    The bill authorizes this existing activity and adds 
additional requirements to address clean-up and restoration of 
internal areas, such as subways; produce a decision framework 
for local officials to determine how much of an organism 
growing in specimens taken from places that have been cleaned 
is acceptable; establish effective clean-up standards; and 
establish standards for safe occupancy of affected sites. The 
guidance should be straightforward and sufficiently detailed to 
help local officials restore their communities and ensure that 
affected areas are appropriately sampled, assessed, 
characterized, and cleaned. The guidance developed under this 
section should be consistent with existing and planned efforts 
in other Federal departments and agencies, such as 
decontamination and disposal requirements being developed by 
the Department of Agriculture, and interagency work on the 
National Disaster Recovery Framework. Important kinds of 
technologies that would aid in recovery efforts, such as those 
for rapid and effective decontamination, should be considered 
for FEMA's Authorized Equipment List and cross-referenced in 
the guidance. The Committee recognizes that the Department of 
Homeland Security is not the sole Federal authority in 
recovery, but views it as the best-suited agency to coordinate 
the efforts of many agencies in developing much needed 
guidance. The Department should, through this process, help to 
clarify roles and responsibilities among Federal departments 
and agencies, as well as State responsibilities. The guidance 
should be consistent with existing and planned efforts.

Sec. 2143.   Exercises.
    Section 2143 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
develop exercises in consultation with State, local, and Tribal 
authorities to facilitate recovery from a CBRN attack or 
incident. The Secretary shall provide, to the maximum extent 
practicable, lessons learned reports to those governments and 
other entities that participate in the exercises. The goal of 
this section is to ensure that the guidance developed and 
promulgated under Section 2142 is sufficiently exercised by 
State and local stakeholders. Exercises may be conducted in 
coordination with the National Exercise Program.

Sec. 301(c) Conforming amendment.
    Section 301(c) repeals Section 316 of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002, which established within the Department of 
Homeland Security a National Biosurveillance and Integration 
Center (NBIC). Section 301 instead requires the Special 
Assistant to the President for Biodefense to publish a National 
Biosurveillance Strategy, which shall include a plan for 
enhancing the capability of the Federal government to rapidly 
identify, characterize, localize, and track a biological event 
of National concern.
    The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 
of 2007 (Pub. Law 107-53) required the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to establish and operate the NBIC to rapidly identify 
and track a biological event of national concern. While a 
variety of systems exist at the Federal, State, and local 
levels to retrieve some of this information, none actually 
integrates all of the data from all sectors--human, animal, 
plant, food, and the environment. This lack of integration has 
prevented the Federal government from quickly discovering an 
agent that might hit two sectors at once, or that is detected 
in two states which use different databases.
    Unfortunately, the Department has been unable to achieve 
its mandate. While reasons for this shortcoming have included 
technological difficulties and poor management, the Committee 
believes that the most important failing has been refusal by 
other agencies to share their data in the absence of a 
perceived incentive to do so. Lacking sufficient data sharing, 
the approximate $7 million annual cost of the program is wasted 
taxpayer dollars. The Committee recognizes that the National 
Security Staff are currently working on a new strategy for 
biosurveillance, but is concerned at its significant delay. The 
Committee looks forward to receiving this plan, and hopes that 
it harnesses the authority of the President to require the 
dozen agencies with this kind of data to share the needed 
information. Although the Department of Homeland Security must 
play a coordinating role, it has not succeeded in being the 
prime integrator, and a new approach is necessary.

Sec. 302.   Enhancing laboratory biosecurity.
    Section 302 requires the President to establish a permanent 
advisory panel, to be known as the Federal Experts Security 
Advisory Panel (FESAP), to make recommendations on biological 
agent and toxin security. The panel is comprised of voting 
members from more than a dozen agencies, and is co-chaired by a 
representative from the Department of Agriculture, the 
Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of 
Homeland Security. A member of the laboratory community shall 
also retain a seat as a nonvoting member. The panel shall 
deliver recommendations on the highest risk biological agents 
and toxins that the panel deems to present the greatest risk of 
deliberate misuse; the development of a set of minimum risk-
based laboratory security performance standards; establishment 
of standards to ensure reliability of personnel with access to 
the highest risk pathogens; and establishment of physical, 
cybersecurity, and other necessary security standards. The 
Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services shall 
issue proposed and final rules, as appropriate, based on the 
panel recommendations. This section further requires that 
Federal oversight over biological laboratories be coordinated, 
including with respect to inspections. Finally, this section 
requires sharing, as appropriate, of information with State, 
local, and Tribal authorities pertaining to laboratories 
possessing the highest risk agents.
    The Committee acknowledges the work of the FESAP, which was 
initiated after calls from the Congress and the WMD Commission 
for closer attention to laboratory biosecurity. This section 
codifies the FESAP and ensures that the Department of Homeland 
Security plays a major role in the panel's decision-making 
processes. The Secretary of Homeland Security is designated as 
one of three recipients of the FESAP recommendations to ensure 
full situational awareness. The establishment of personnel 
reliability standards outlined should include a thorough 
evaluation of existing vetting practices, should be approached 
from a cost-benefit perspective, and should not impose 
processes that would impose unsupportable burdens at the local 
or laboratory level. The Committee intends that the proposed 
rules will include guidance and tools to help laboratories with 
implementation. Information sharing activities, particularly 
with State, local, and Tribal partners, are proscribed because 
the Committee believes that it is important for these 
authorities to participate fully in the homeland security 
mission, and that in order to do so, these authorities must be 
empowered with knowledge.

Sec. 303.   Definitions.
    Section 303 amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to 
include definitions of the terms ``Intelligence Community'' and 
``national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders.''

Sec. 304.   Dual-use terrorist risks from synthetic biology.
    Section 304 expresses the sense of Congress that the field 
of synthetic biology has the potential to facilitate enormous 
gains in fundamental discovery, but that its inherent dual-use 
risks must be managed. Not less frequently than once every two 
years, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the 
Under Secretary of Science and Technology, is required to 
undertake a risk assessment of the dual-use and other risks 
associated with synthetic biology. The Secretary of Homeland 
Security is also required to promulgate guidance to other 
departments and agencies on best practices for assuring 
compliance with laws and treaties that govern biodefense 
research. This section also authorizes the Under Secretary for 
Science and Technology to conduct research into ways to 
mitigate the dual-use threat.
    The Committee intends for the Department of Homeland 
Security to ascertain whether companies that produce and sell 
synthesized DNA have the ability to support legitimate 
researchers while screening out and preventing bad actors from 
obtaining these materials. Because the field progresses so 
rapidly, the provision requires regular assessment of the risks 
to provide policymakers opportunities for decision making into 
ways to mitigate the risks and prioritize budgets 
appropriately. Understanding that it is challenging to 
undertake a quantitative risk assessment of synthetic biology, 
the assessment should at least attempt to utilize well-
established methodologies wherein risk is considered as a 
function of threat, vulnerability, and consequences. With 
respect to promulgation of guidance by the Department of 
Homeland Security, the Department has a robust compliance 
division for this purpose, and adherence by other agencies to 
similar procedures could prevent unintentional breaches of 
statute, international agreement, or sensitive information.

Sec. 305.   Dissemination of information analyzed by the 
Department to State, local, Tribal, and private entities with 
responsibilities relating to homeland security.
    Section 305 expands the list of entities in section 
201(d)(8) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to which the 
Department disseminates information to include State, local, 
Tribal, and private sector entities with homeland security 
responsibilities, and as appropriate, to the public, in order 
to assist in preventing, deterring, or responding to acts of 
terrorism against the United States. Specifically, this 
provision adds Tribal entities and the public to the existing 
provision, recognizing that they are important stakeholders and 
partners in these efforts.

                    Title IV--Public Health Matters

Sec. 401.   Sense of Congress regarding Federal coordination on 
medical countermeasures.
    Section 401 expresses the sense of Congress that 
coordination among Federal agencies involved in research, 
development, and acquisition of medical countermeasures 
requires improvement, and that aggressive action should be 
taken by the Department of Health and Human Services, the 
Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense 
to foster improved coordination of such activities, including 
adoption of an interagency agreement that sets forth relative 
areas of responsibility.
    The development of medical countermeasures to prevent and 
treat the effects of CBRN agents has progressed significantly 
since the anthrax attacks of 2001. The Committee notes, 
however, that the Federal enterprise to develop such 
countermeasures is still maturing, and improved interagency 
collaboration is necessary. The Committee, through its 
oversight work, has observed a need to set forth improved 
agreements among the departments and agencies outlined 
regarding which entities should be undertaking what activities, 
consistent with existing statutory authorities. These 
agreements must occur among the departments outlined above, and 
also within the several agencies of the Department of Health 
and Human Services engaged in such work, including the National 
Institutes of Health, the Biomedical Advanced Research and 
Development Authority, and the CDC. Some areas have been 
orphans--for instance, only just recently has the Department of 
Homeland Security undertaken a pilot to examine prospects for a 
voluntary anthrax vaccination program for first responders, a 
notion that languished for years without any one agency taking 
responsibility for it. On the other hand, the lines between 
basic and advanced research are sometimes blurred, leading to 
the potential for duplicative and/or uncoordinated research 
initiatives.

Sec. 402.   National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing 
Strategy.
    Section 402 requires the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the heads of other 
appropriate Federal agencies, to develop and implement a 
National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy to enhance 
preparedness and collective response to an attack on humans or 
animals with a CBRN agent. The strategy shall consider a 
variety of options for dispensing medical countermeasures; 
post-incident requirements for emergency use authorizations; 
the inclusion of locally held caches in such authorizations; 
and the distribution of home medical kits for personal 
stockpiling within 30 days of an attack. The Secretary shall 
coordinate the strategy with key stakeholders, including FEMA, 
and shall provide the strategy to appropriate congressional 
committees within one year of the date of enactment of the Act.
    The WMD Commission's initial report found the nation's 
capability to respond rapidly to a biological attack and 
thereby prevent the infliction of mass casualties to be 
lacking, and subsequent report cards have found the same. 
Although capabilities have improved considerably since the 
anthrax attacks of 2001, the Committee remains concerned that a 
mass event would still overwhelm current capabilities in most 
places. The Committee recognizes that the Department of Health 
and Human Services has addressed medical countermeasures 
dispensing to some extent in the National Health Security 
Strategy, and intends for the Department to give enhanced focus 
to developing a strategy for dispensing medical 
countermeasures. That detailed strategy should include an 
implementation plan and be adaptable to the needs of local 
jurisdictions. In coordinating with State, local, and Tribal 
authorities, the private sector, and non-governmental 
organizations, the Secretary is particularly encouraged to seek 
input from State and local public health officials and from the 
first responder community. The strategy should provide a 
connection between its recommendations for State and local 
governments and FEMA concepts of operations.

Sec. 403.   National pre-event vaccination and antimicrobial 
dispensing policy review.
    Section 403 requires the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland 
Security and the Secretary of Agriculture, to review the 
adequacy of domestic vaccination and antimicrobial dispensing 
policy, guidance, and information provided to the public in 
light of known terrorist risks of biological attacks or events 
with significant health consequences to the United States. 
Considerations for the review include such matters as the 
applicability of shelf life extension programs to locally held 
stockpiles, provision of expiring products to international 
organizations or foreign partners, the implications for public 
health of pre-event vaccination and antimicrobial dispensing to 
livestock, and ways to increase coordination between the 
Strategic National Stockpile and the National Veterinary 
Stockpile. The Department of Homeland Security terrorism risk 
assessments and material threat determinations, as well as 
emerging intelligence, should inform the review. The Secretary 
shall report to the appropriate congressional committees within 
one year of enactment with the review and with recommendations.
    The Committee notes that current vaccination policy 
appropriately varies according to threat and risk from specific 
agents, and does not require that vaccines for potential 
bioterrorism agents be provided in advance of the terrorist use 
of biological agents. The Committee believes that vaccination 
policy should align with material threat determinations, and 
reviews should be undertaken periodically to determine which, 
if any, countermeasures in the national stockpile should be 
made available for pre-event dispensing. The Committee is aware 
that the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures 
Enterprise develops utilization policies for countermeasures in 
the Strategic National Stockpile, and the Committee believes 
that pre-event usage should be part of these discussions. In 
carrying out this section, the designated departments should 
take into consideration the views of public health, public 
safety, and homeland security experts. The Committee also 
intends for this examination to specifically address (in 
addition to other issues deemed important by the Secretaries) 
voluntary immunization of first responders, further pre-
distribution of antimicrobials to the public or a subset of the 
public, and sending expired vaccine and antimicrobials from the 
national stockpile to other countries that could make immediate 
use of these expiring medicines.

Sec. 404.   Management of short shelf life vaccine and 
antimicrobial stockpiles.
    Section 404 requires the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to make available on a voluntary basis surplus 
vaccines and antimicrobials, and vaccines and antimicrobials 
with short shelf lives, from the Strategic National Stockpile 
to State, local, and Tribal first responders.
    The Committee is aware of and supports recent work 
undertaken by the Department of Homeland Security to establish 
a pilot program to provide otherwise-expiring anthrax vaccine 
from the national stockpile to first responders. The approach, 
however, appears to be ad hoc. While this section is non-
specific as to which countermeasures should be provided, it is 
the intent of the Committee that the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services engage in a thorough determination of which of 
the countermeasures maintained in the stockpile warrant 
voluntary provision to first responders, and for which such 
provision would be feasible.

Sec. 405.   Material threat determinations reviews.
    Section 405 amends the Public Health Service Act (42 
U.S.C.) to require review of existing material threat 
determinations to determine whether these agents continue to 
present a material threat against the United States population 
sufficient to affect national security and homeland security.
    Recognizing the evolving nature of CBRN threats, advances 
in technology, and changing priorities, this section requires 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services and the heads of other 
appropriate Federal departments and agencies, to review and 
reassess existing material threat determinations and decide 
whether the agents addressed continue to present material 
threats against the United States population. The Committee 
recognizes that some agents pose material threats to the 
Nation; it acknowledges, however, the possibility that these 
agents may not always pose material threats or the same level 
of threat over time. The Committee intends for the list of 
material threat agents to be composed of agents that present 
current material threats to the nation. The Committee also 
intends for agents to be removed from this list when they no 
longer pose such a material threats. Additionally, the 
Committee intends for these decisions to be made in 
consideration of availability of medical and other 
countermeasures, new science and technologies, immunization 
rates, and other relevant factors.

Sec. 406.   Background checks.
    Section 406 amends the ``Public Health Service Act'' to 
require the Attorney General to coordinate with the Secretary 
of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, and the 
Secretary of State to determine if these departments possess 
any information relevant to the identification of individuals 
who should not be given access to select agents because they 
are reasonably suspected of involvement with an organization 
that engages in domestic or international terrorism or with any 
other organization that engages in domestic or international 
terrorism or crimes of violence.
    The Committee intends for Federal agencies to share 
information on individuals that should not be provided access 
to Select Agents, in order to prevent duplication of background 
investigations and the inappropriate accessing of Select 
Agents. The Committee intends for all previous legislation 
addressing background investigations, sole use considerations, 
etc., to remain in place.

Sec. 407.   State, local, and tribal defined.
    In this title, the term ``State, local, and tribal'' has 
the same meaning that term has in the ``Homeland Security Act 
of 2002.''

                   Title V--Foreign Relations Matters

Sec. 501.   International engagement to enhance biodefense and 
laboratory biosecurity.
    Section 501 requires the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Special Assistant to the President for 
Biodefense and the heads of appropriate Federal agencies, to 
comprehensively address biosecurity in the international arena. 
Issues to be addressed include criminalizing the use of 
biological weapons or acts of bioterrorism, prevention of 
bioterrorism and the misuse use of life sciences, supporting 
efforts to enhance biosecurity and biosafety, and information 
sharing.
    The Committee recognizes that in order to achieve true 
security, a culture of security awareness must be engendered in 
the life sciences, not just domestically but also 
internationally. The Committee intends that the work required 
under this section build upon engagement activities being 
undertaken by the Department of State.

Sec. 502.   International collaboration and information sharing 
relating to biosecurity.
    Section 502 directs the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of 
Agriculture, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and 
the heads of other agencies, to support efforts in other 
countries to share information regarding biological attacks and 
events with significant health consequences through United 
Nations organizations; to advance awareness of the global 
availability of life science information and its potential dual 
use risk; and to promote the development of information sharing 
mechanisms.
    Information sharing, both in terms of intelligence of 
ongoing events and in pre-event preparedness and education, is 
critical domestically and internationally. Much as these themes 
have been addressed in the domestic sections of this Act, the 
Committee intends an interagency approach to fostering these 
same goals overseas.

Sec. 503.   Interagency task force on best practices for global 
biopreparedness.
    Section 503 requires the Secretary of State to convene an 
interagency taskforce to examine the State of global 
preparedness for a major biological attack or event and 
identify best practices for preparedness based on lessons 
learned from domestic efforts that may be useful or applicable 
internationally. The task force shall include representatives 
from the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 
Health and Human Services, the Department of Agriculture, the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the 
Department of State, the Director of National Intelligence, 
other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, and other 
appropriate national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders.
    The Committee recognizes that the United States is ahead of 
many nations with respect to efforts to prevent, protect 
against, respond to, and recover from CBRN attacks. The 
Committee also recognizes that other countries may benefit from 
United States' lessons learned, best practices, and other 
information as they work to undertake these activities. The 
Committee intends for the Federal government to gather and 
communicate this information to other countries, as 
appropriate, and by building upon existing frameworks and fora 
in which the Department of State participates, without 
compromising homeland and national security.

Sec. 504.   Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
    Section 504 requires the Secretary of State to promote the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention by promoting 
transparency, pursuing compliance diplomatically, promoting 
universal membership, developing an action plan for increasing 
international adherence, and ensuring United States 
participation in meetings is broadly inclusive of 
representatives from relevant Federal agencies.
    The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, while 
imperfect in large part due to verification challenges, is one 
of the best tools at the disposal of the international 
community to limit the development, production, and acquisition 
of biological and toxin weapons. While the origin of the threat 
of biological weapons development has largely shifted since the 
Convention's inception from state actors toward non-state 
actors, the Convention is still relevant. The Committee 
recognizes that the Department of State has been working to 
promote adherence to the Convention, and intends for the 
leadership role of the Department of State to be maintained and 
strengthened in the parameters outlined, and particularly to 
ensure that the expertise of the many Federal agencies that 
work in the biodefense space is integrated into the approach.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

                     HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is 
as follows:
     * * * * * * *

    TITLE III--SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN SUPPORT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

     * * * * * * *
[Sec. 316. National Biosurveillance Integration Center.]
     * * * * * * *

   TITLE XXI--WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS

                         Subtitle A--Prevention

Sec. 2101. Weapons of mass destruction intelligence and information 
          sharing.
Sec. 2102. Risk assessments.
Sec. 2103. National Export Enforcement Coordination.
Sec. 2104. Communication of threat information.
Sec. 2105. Individual and community preparedness for chemical, 
          biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks.

                         Subtitle B--Protection

Sec. 2121. Detection of biological attacks.
Sec. 2122. Rapid biological threat detection and identification at ports 
          of entry.
Sec. 2123. Evaluating detection technology.
Sec. 2124. Domestic implementation of the Global Nuclear Detection 
          Architecture.

                          Subtitle C--Response

Sec. 2131. First responder guidance concerning chemical, biological, 
          radiological, and nuclear attacks.
Sec. 2132. Integrated plume modeling for collective response.
Sec. 2133. Establishment of the system assessment and validation for 
          emergency responders (SAVER) program.
Sec. 2134. Payment for laboratory response services.
Sec. 2135. Bioforensics capabilities.
Sec. 2136. Metropolitan Medical Response System Program.

                          Subtitle D--Recovery

Sec. 2141. Identifying and addressing gaps in recovery capabilities.
Sec. 2142. Recovery from a chemical, biological, radiological, and 
          nuclear attack or incident.
Sec. 2143. Exercises.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

  In this Act, the following definitions apply:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (19) The term ``Intelligence Community'' has the 
        meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National 
        Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
          (20) The term ``national biosecurity and biodefense 
        stakeholders'' means officials from the Federal, State, 
        local, and tribal authorities and individuals from the 
        private sector who are involved in efforts to prevent, 
        protect against, respond to, and recover from a 
        biological attack or other biological incidents that 
        may have serious health or economic consequences for 
        the United States, including wide-scale fatalities or 
        infectious disease outbreaks.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

      TITLE II--INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

  Subtitle A--Information and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection; 
                         Access to Information

SEC. 201. INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Responsibilities of Secretary Relating To Intelligence 
and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.--The 
responsibilities of the Secretary relating to intelligence and 
analysis and infrastructure protection shall be as follows:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (8) To disseminate, as appropriate, information 
        analyzed by the Department within the Department, to 
        other agencies of the Federal Government with 
        responsibilities relating to homeland security, [and to 
        agencies of State and local governments and private 
        sector entities with such responsibilities in order to 
        assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or 
        response to, terrorist attacks against the United 
        States.] to State, local, tribal, and private entities 
        with such responsibilities, and, as appropriate, to the 
        public, in order to assist in preventing, deterring, or 
        responding to acts of terrorism against the United 
        States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

TITLE III--SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN SUPPORT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

[SEC. 316. NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE INTEGRATION CENTER.

  [(a) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish, operate, 
and maintain a National Biosurveillance Integration Center 
(referred to in this section as the ``NBIC''), which shall be 
headed by a Directing Officer, under an office or directorate 
of the Department that is in existence as of the date of the 
enactment of this section.
  [(b) Primary Mission.--The primary mission of the NBIC is 
to--
          [(1) enhance the capability of the Federal Government 
        to--
                  [(A) rapidly identify, characterize, 
                localize, and track a biological event of 
                national concern by integrating and analyzing 
                data relating to human health, animal, plant, 
                food, and environmental monitoring systems 
                (both national and international); and
                  [(B) disseminate alerts and other information 
                to Member Agencies and, in coordination with 
                (and where possible through) Member Agencies, 
                to agencies of State, local, and tribal 
                governments, as appropriate, to enhance the 
                ability of such agencies to respond to a 
                biological event of national concern; and
          [(2) oversee development and operation of the 
        National Biosurveillance Integration System.
  [(c) Requirements.--The NBIC shall detect, as early as 
possible, a biological event of national concern that presents 
a risk to the United States or the infrastructure or key assets 
of the United States, including by--
          [(1) consolidating data from all relevant 
        surveillance systems maintained by Member Agencies to 
        detect biological events of national concern across 
        human, animal, and plant species;
          [(2) seeking private sources of surveillance, both 
        foreign and domestic, when such sources would enhance 
        coverage of critical surveillance gaps;
          [(3) using an information technology system that uses 
        the best available statistical and other analytical 
        tools to identify and characterize biological events of 
        national concern in as close to real-time as is 
        practicable;
          [(4) providing the infrastructure for such 
        integration, including information technology systems 
        and space, and support for personnel from Member 
        Agencies with sufficient expertise to enable analysis 
        and interpretation of data;
          [(5) working with Member Agencies to create 
        information technology systems that use the minimum 
        amount of patient data necessary and consider patient 
        confidentiality and privacy issues at all stages of 
        development and apprise the Privacy Officer of such 
        efforts; and
          [(6) alerting Member Agencies and, in coordination 
        with (and where possible through) Member Agencies, 
        public health agencies of State, local, and tribal 
        governments regarding any incident that could develop 
        into a biological event of national concern.
  [(d) Responsibilities of the Directing Officer of the NBIC.--
          [(1) In general.--The Directing Officer of the NBIC 
        shall--
                  [(A) on an ongoing basis, monitor the 
                availability and appropriateness of 
                surveillance systems used by the NBIC and those 
                systems that could enhance biological 
                situational awareness or the overall 
                performance of the NBIC;
                  [(B) on an ongoing basis, review and seek to 
                improve the statistical and other analytical 
                methods used by the NBIC;
                  [(C) receive and consider other relevant 
                homeland security information, as appropriate; 
                and
                  [(D) provide technical assistance, as 
                appropriate, to all Federal, regional, State, 
                local, and tribal government entities and 
                private sector entities that contribute data 
                relevant to the operation of the NBIC.
          [(2) Assessments.--The Directing Officer of the NBIC 
        shall--
                  [(A) on an ongoing basis, evaluate available 
                data for evidence of a biological event of 
                national concern; and
                  [(B) integrate homeland security information 
                with NBIC data to provide overall situational 
                awareness and determine whether a biological 
                event of national concern has occurred.
          [(3) Information sharing.--
                  [(A) In general.--The Directing Officer of 
                the NBIC shall--
                          [(i) establish a method of real-time 
                        communication with the National 
                        Operations Center;
                          [(ii) in the event that a biological 
                        event of national concern is detected, 
                        notify the Secretary and disseminate 
                        results of NBIC assessments relating to 
                        that biological event of national 
                        concern to appropriate Federal response 
                        entities and, in coordination with 
                        relevant Member Agencies, regional, 
                        State, local, and tribal governmental 
                        response entities in a timely manner;
                          [(iii) provide any report on NBIC 
                        assessments to Member Agencies and, in 
                        coordination with relevant Member 
                        Agencies, any affected regional, State, 
                        local, or tribal government, and any 
                        private sector entity considered 
                        appropriate that may enhance the 
                        mission of such Member Agencies, 
                        governments, or entities or the ability 
                        of the Nation to respond to biological 
                        events of national concern; and
                          [(iv) share NBIC incident or 
                        situational awareness reports, and 
                        other relevant information, consistent 
                        with the information sharing 
                        environment established under section 
                        1016 of the Intelligence Reform and 
                        Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 
                        U.S.C. 485) and any policies, 
                        guidelines, procedures, instructions, 
                        or standards established under that 
                        section.
                  [(B) Consultation.--The Directing Officer of 
                the NBIC shall implement the activities 
                described in subparagraph (A) consistent with 
                the policies, guidelines, procedures, 
                instructions, or standards established under 
                section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and 
                Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) 
                and in consultation with the Director of 
                National Intelligence, the Under Secretary for 
                Intelligence and Analysis, and other offices or 
                agencies of the Federal Government, as 
                appropriate.
  [(e) Responsibilities of the NBIC Member Agencies.--
          [(1) In general.--Each Member Agency shall--
                  [(A) use its best efforts to integrate 
                biosurveillance information into the NBIC, with 
                the goal of promoting information sharing 
                between Federal, State, local, and tribal 
                governments to detect biological events of 
                national concern;
                  [(B) provide timely information to assist the 
                NBIC in maintaining biological situational 
                awareness for accurate detection and response 
                purposes;
                  [(C) enable the NBIC to receive and use 
                biosurveillance information from member 
                agencies to carry out its requirements under 
                subsection (c);
                  [(D) connect the biosurveillance data systems 
                of that Member Agency to the NBIC data system 
                under mutually agreed protocols that are 
                consistent with subsection (c)(5);
                  [(E) participate in the formation of strategy 
                and policy for the operation of the NBIC and 
                its information sharing;
                  [(F) provide personnel to the NBIC under an 
                interagency personnel agreement and consider 
                the qualifications of such personnel necessary 
                to provide human, animal, and environmental 
                data analysis and interpretation support to the 
                NBIC; and
                  [(G) retain responsibility for the 
                surveillance and intelligence systems of that 
                department or agency, if applicable.
  [(f) Administrative Authorities.--
          [(1) Hiring of experts.--The Directing Officer of the 
        NBIC shall hire individuals with the necessary 
        expertise to develop and operate the NBIC.
          [(2) Detail of personnel.--Upon the request of the 
        Directing Officer of the NBIC, the head of any Federal 
        department or agency may detail, on a reimbursable 
        basis, any of the personnel of that department or 
        agency to the Department to assist the NBIC in carrying 
        out this section.
  [(g) NBIC Interagency Working Group.--The Directing Officer 
of the NBIC shall--
          [(1) establish an interagency working group to 
        facilitate interagency cooperation and to advise the 
        Directing Officer of the NBIC regarding recommendations 
        to enhance the biosurveillance capabilities of the 
        Department; and
          [(2) invite Member Agencies to serve on that working 
        group.
  [(h) Relationship to Other Departments and Agencies.--The 
authority of the Directing Officer of the NBIC under this 
section shall not affect any authority or responsibility of any 
other department or agency of the Federal Government with 
respect to biosurveillance activities under any program 
administered by that department or agency.
  [(i) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out this 
section.
  [(j) Definitions.--In this section:
          [(1) The terms ``biological agent'' and ``toxin'' 
        have the meanings given those terms in section 178 of 
        title 18, United States Code.
          [(2) The term ``biological event of national 
        concern'' means--
                  [(A) an act of terrorism involving a 
                biological agent or toxin; or
                  [(B) a naturally occurring outbreak of an 
                infectious disease that may result in a 
                national epidemic.
          [(3) The term ``homeland security information'' has 
        the meaning given that term in section 892.
          [(4) The term ``Member Agency'' means any Federal 
        department or agency that, at the discretion of the 
        head of that department or agency, has entered a 
        memorandum of understanding regarding participation in 
        the NBIC.
          [(5) The term ``Privacy Officer'' means the Privacy 
        Officer appointed under section 222.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

   TITLE XXI--WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS

                         Subtitle A--Prevention

SEC. 2101. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION 
                    SHARING.

  (a) In General.--The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of 
the Department shall--
          (1) conduct intelligence and information sharing 
        activities consistent with the National Intelligence 
        Strategy for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass 
        Destruction under section 201 of the WMD Prevention and 
        Preparedness Act of 2012 and the National Intelligence 
        Strategy for Countering Biological Threats under 
        section 202 of that Act;
          (2) support homeland security-focused intelligence 
        analysis of terrorist actors, their claims, and their 
        plans to conduct attacks involving chemical, 
        biological, radiological, and nuclear materials against 
        the Nation;
          (3) support homeland security-focused intelligence 
        analysis of global infectious disease, public health, 
        food, agricultural, and veterinary issues;
          (4) support homeland security-focused risk analysis 
        and risk assessments of the homeland security hazards 
        described in paragraphs (2) and (3), by providing 
        relevant quantitative and nonquantitative threat 
        information;
          (5) leverage existing and emerging homeland security 
        capabilities and structures, including fusion centers 
        established pursuant to section 210A, to enhance 
        prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts 
        with respect to a chemical, biological, radiological, 
        or nuclear attack;
          (6) share information and provide tailored analytical 
        support on these threats to State, local, and tribal 
        authorities as well as other national biosecurity and 
        biodefense stakeholders; and
          (7) perform other responsibilities, as assigned by 
        the Secretary.
  (b) Coordination.--Where appropriate, the Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis shall coordinate with other relevant 
Department components, others in the Intelligence Community, 
including the National Counter Proliferation Center, and other 
Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities, including 
officials from high-threat areas, and enable such entities to 
provide recommendations on optimal information sharing 
mechanisms, including expeditious sharing of classified 
information, and on how they can provide information to the 
Department.
  (c) Report.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date 
        of the enactment of this section and annually 
        thereafter, the Secretary shall report to the 
        appropriate congressional committees on--
                  (A) the intelligence and information sharing 
                activities under subsection (a) and of all 
                relevant entities within the Department to 
                counter the threat from weapons of mass 
                destruction; and
                  (B) the Department's activities in accordance 
                with relevant intelligence strategies, 
                including the National Intelligence Strategy 
                for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass 
                Destruction and the National Intelligence 
                Strategy for Countering Biological Threats.
          (2) Assessment of implementation.--The report shall 
        include--
                  (A) a description of methods established to 
                assess progress of the Office of Intelligence 
                and Analysis in implementing this section; and
                  (B) such assessment.

SEC. 2102. RISK ASSESSMENTS.

  (a) In General.--The Secretary, acting through the Under 
Secretary for Science and Technology, shall, in coordination 
with relevant Department components and other appropriate 
Federal departments and agencies--
          (1) produce and update periodically a terrorism risk 
        assessment of chemical, biological, radiological, and 
        nuclear threats; and
          (2) produce and update periodically an integrated 
        terrorism risk assessment that assesses all of those 
        threats and compares them against one another according 
        to their relative risk.
  (b) Methodology.--
          (1) In general.--The Secretary shall--
                  (A) convene an interagency task force of 
                relevant subject matter experts to assess the 
                proposed methodology to be used for assessments 
                required under subsection (a), and to provide 
                recommendations to the Secretary as to the 
                adequacy of such methodology;
                  (B) conduct sensitivity analysis on each 
                assessment to identify and prioritize research 
                activities to close knowledge gaps; and
                  (C) consider the evolving threat from an 
                intelligent adversary.
          (2) Inclusion in assessment.--Each assessment under 
        subsection (a) shall include a description of the 
        methodology used for the assessment.
  (c) Usage.--The assessments required under subsection (a) 
shall be used to inform and guide risk management decisions, 
including--
          (1) the threat assessments and determinations by the 
        Secretary regarding agents and toxins pursuant to 
        section 319F-2 of the Public Health Service Act;
          (2) allocation of resources for research and 
        development for chemical, biological, radiological, and 
        nuclear attack prevention, protection, response, and 
        recovery;
          (3) prioritization of medical countermeasure 
        research, development, acquisition, and distribution 
        activities and other national strategic biodefense 
        research;
          (4) tailored risk assessments and risk mitigation 
        studies, as appropriate, on topics such as radiological 
        materials security or the economic risks of a 
        biological attack; and
          (5) other homeland security activities as determined 
        appropriate by the Secretary and the heads of other 
        agencies.
  (d) Input and Sharing.--The Secretary shall, for each 
assessment required under subsection (a)--
          (1) seek input from national biosecurity and 
        biodefense stakeholders, and other Federal, State, 
        local, and tribal officials involved in efforts to 
        prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from 
        chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
        threats;
          (2) ensure that written procedures are in place to 
        guide the interagency development of the assessments, 
        including for input, review, and implementation 
        purposes, among relevant Federal partners;
          (3) share the risk assessments with Federal, State, 
        local and tribal officials with appropriate security 
        clearances and a need for the information in the 
        classified version; and
          (4) to the maximum extent practicable, make available 
        an unclassified version for Federal, State, local, and 
        tribal officials involved in prevention and 
        preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological, 
        and nuclear events.
  (e) Written Procedures.--The Secretary shall establish 
written procedures for appropriate usage of the assessments 
required under subsection (a), including--
          (1) a description of the types of departmental 
        activities for which the assessments should be 
        considered;
          (2) the extent to which the findings of the 
        assessments should play a role in such activities;
          (3) the point in planning processes at which the 
        assessments should be considered; and
          (4) how users can access expertise within the 
        Department to aid in interpretation of the results of 
        the assessments.

SEC. 2103. NATIONAL EXPORT ENFORCEMENT COORDINATION.

  (a) Establishment.--There shall be maintained in the 
Department the Export Enforcement Coordination Center, with 
capability for national export enforcement coordination that is 
managed by the Secretary and coordinates the export enforcement 
activities among the Department, the Department of Agriculture, 
the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the 
Department of Energy, the Department of Justice, the Department 
of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Intelligence 
Community, and other Federal agencies as appropriate.
  (b) Responsibilities.--The Center shall--
          (1) enhance Federal coordination for law enforcement 
        counterproliferation investigations, including 
        coordination and deconfliction with intelligence 
        counterproliferation activities;
          (2) address licensing inquiries, reviews, requests, 
        checks, and verifications; and
          (3) conduct outreach and provide training to the 
        export trade community.

SEC. 2104. COMMUNICATION OF THREAT INFORMATION.

  (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
          (1) The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of 
        Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism 
        recommended that ``the Federal Government should 
        practice greater openness of public information so that 
        citizens better understand the threat and the risk this 
        threat poses to them''.
          (2) There are unique challenges for community 
        preparedness for attacks from weapons of mass 
        destruction.
  (b) Communications Plan.--
          (1) In general.--The Administrator of the Federal 
        Emergency Management Agency shall develop a 
        communications plan designed to provide information to 
        the public related to preventing, preparing for, 
        responding to, and recovering from chemical, 
        biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks;
          (2) Consultation.--As appropriate, the Administrator 
        of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall 
        consult with State, local, and tribal authorities and 
        coordinate with other Federal departments and agencies 
        in developing the communications plans under paragraph 
        (1).
          (3) Pre-scripted messages and message templates.--
                  (A) In general.--The Administrator of the 
                Federal Emergency Management Agency shall 
                develop and disseminate, through an alerts and 
                warnings system, pre-scripted messages and 
                message templates for State, local, and tribal 
                authorities so that those authorities can 
                quickly and rapidly disseminate critical 
                information to the public in anticipation of, 
                during, or in the immediate aftermath of a 
                chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
                attack, and to be included in the Department of 
                Homeland Security's lessons learned information 
                sharing system.
                  (B) Development and design.--The pre-scripted 
                messages or message templates shall--
                          (i) be developed in consultation with 
                        State, local, and tribal authorities 
                        and in coordination with other 
                        appropriate Federal departments and 
                        agencies;
                          (ii) be designed to provide accurate, 
                        essential, and appropriate information 
                        and instructions to the population 
                        directly affected by an incident, 
                        including information regarding an 
                        evacuation, sheltering in place, 
                        hospital surge operations, health, and 
                        safety;
                          (iii) be designed to provide 
                        accurate, essential, and appropriate 
                        information and instructions to 
                        children and other special needs 
                        populations within the population 
                        directly affected by an incident;
                          (iv) be designed to provide accurate, 
                        essential, and appropriate information 
                        and instructions to emergency response 
                        providers and medical personnel 
                        responding to an incident; and
                          (v) include direction for the 
                        coordination of Federal, State, local, 
                        and tribal communications teams.
                  (C) Communications formats.--The 
                Administrator shall develop pre-scripted 
                messages or message templates under this 
                paragraph in multiple formats to ensure 
                delivery--
                          (i) in cases where the usual 
                        communications infrastructure is 
                        unusable;
                          (ii) to individuals with disabilities 
                        or other special needs and individuals 
                        with limited English proficiency; and
                          (iii) to educational and childcare 
                        facilities, including daycare centers, 
                        grade schools, universities, hospitals, 
                        and elderly care facilities.
                  (D) Dissemination and technical assistance.--
                The Administrator shall ensure that all pre-
                scripted messages and message templates 
                developed under this paragraph are made 
                available to State, local, and tribal 
                authorities so that those authorities may 
                incorporate them, as appropriate, into their 
                emergency plans. The Administrator shall also 
                make available relevant technical assistance to 
                those authorities to support communications 
                planning.
                  (E) Exercises.--To ensure that the pre-
                scripted messages or message templates 
                developed under this paragraph can be 
                effectively utilized in a disaster or incident, 
                the Administrator shall incorporate Federal, 
                State, local, and tribal communications teams 
                that deliver such pre-scripted messages or 
                message templates into exercises, including 
                those conducted under the National Exercise 
                Program.
          (4) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
        the enactment of this subsection, the Administrator of 
        the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall submit to 
        the appropriate congressional committees the 
        communications plans required to be developed under 
        this subsection, including pre-scripted messages or 
        message templates developed in conjunction with the 
        plans and a description of the means that will be used 
        to deliver these messages during such incidents.
  (c) Terrorism Threat Awareness.--
          (1) Terrorism threat awareness.--The Secretary, in 
        coordination with the Attorney General and heads of 
        appropriate Federal agencies, shall for purposes of 
        preparedness and collective response to terrorism and 
        for other purposes--
                  (A) ensure that homeland security information 
                concerning terrorist threats is provided to 
                State, local, and tribal authorities and the 
                public within the United States, as 
                appropriate; and
                  (B) establish a process to optimize 
                opportunities for qualified heads of State, 
                local, and tribal government entities to obtain 
                appropriate security clearances so that they 
                may receive classified threat information when 
                appropriate.
          (2) Threat bulletins.--
                  (A) In general.--Consistent with the 
                requirements of paragraph (1), the Secretary 
                shall, on a timely basis, prepare unclassified 
                threat bulletins on chemical, biological, 
                radiological, and nuclear threats.
                  (B) Requirements.--Each assessment required 
                under subparagraph (A) shall--
                          (i) include guidance to the public 
                        for preventing and responding to acts 
                        of terrorism arising from such threats; 
                        and
                          (ii) be made available on the 
                        Internet Web site of the Department and 
                        other publicly accessible Internet Web 
                        sites, communication systems, and 
                        information networks.
          (3) Guidance to state, local, and tribal 
        authorities.--The Secretary, using information provided 
        by the terrorism risk assessments under section 2102 
        and material threat assessments and determinations 
        under the Project BioShield Act of 2004 (Public Law 
        108-276) and the amendments made by that Act--
                  (A) shall provide to State, local, and tribal 
                authorities written guidance on communicating 
                terrorism-related threats and risks to the 
                public within their jurisdictions; and
                  (B) shall identify and articulate the 
                governmental rationale for identifying 
                particular communities as being at heightened 
                risk of exploitation.
          (4) Use of existing resources.--The Secretary shall 
        use Internet Web sites, communication systems, and 
        information networks in operation on the date of an 
        assessment under this subsection, and shall coordinate 
        with other heads of Federal departments and agencies to 
        provide information through existing channels to 
        satisfy the requirements of paragraph (2)(B)(ii). The 
        Secretary shall provide guidance on how State, local, 
        tribal, and private entities can partner with public 
        television stations to disseminate information provided 
        by the Department and shall provide information on best 
        practices on disseminating information to residents of 
        local communities, including leveraging public 
        television stations.

SEC. 2105. INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS FOR CHEMICAL, 
                    BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR ATTACKS.

  (a) In General.--The Secretary, acting through the 
Administrator for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
shall assist State, local, and tribal authorities in improving 
and promoting individual and community preparedness and 
collective response to terrorist attacks involving chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear materials against the 
United States by--
          (1) developing guidance and checklists of recommended 
        actions for individual and community prevention and 
        preparedness efforts and disseminating such guidance 
        and checklists to communities and individuals;
          (2) updating new and existing guidance and checklists 
        as appropriate;
          (3) disseminating to communities and individuals the 
        guidance developed under section 2131, as appropriate;
          (4) providing information and training materials in 
        support of individual and community preparedness 
        efforts;
          (5) conducting individual and community preparedness 
        outreach efforts; and
          (6) such other actions as the Secretary determines 
        appropriate.
  (b) Coordination.--The Secretary shall coordinate with 
Federal departments and agencies and with private sector and 
nongovernmental organizations to promote individual and 
community preparedness and collective response to terrorist 
attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear materials against the United States.
  (c) Best Practices.--In compiling guidance for individual and 
community preparedness in order to carry out subsection (a)(4), 
the Secretary shall give due regard to best practices based on 
the experience of other agencies and countries and the 
expertise of academic institutions and nongovernmental 
organizations.

                         Subtitle B--Protection

SEC. 2121. DETECTION OF BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS.

  (a) Program.--The Secretary shall carry out a program to 
detect a biological attack or event that poses a high risk to 
homeland security. Through such program, the Secretary shall--
          (1) deploy detection capabilities to areas, based on 
        high risks identified by Department assessments, to 
        indicate the presence of biological agents;
          (2) consider multiple deployment strategies including 
        surge capability;
          (3) provide information to participating laboratories 
        and programs for their use in monitoring public health, 
        and biological material or other data from those 
        detectors to participating laboratories and programs 
        for testing and evaluation;
          (4) regularly communicate with, and provide 
        information about the presence of biological agents to, 
        appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies 
        responsible for public health, law enforcement, and 
        emergency services, in a manner that ensures 
        transparency with the governments served by such 
        personnel;
          (5) provide advanced planning tools, concepts of 
        operations (including alarm resolution protocols and 
        response guidance), standard operating procedures, and 
        training exercises (including in collaboration with 
        relevant national level exercises) for collective 
        response to and recovery from biological attacks; and
          (6) provide technical assistance to jurisdictions 
        hosting the program to improve their ability to respond 
        to a detected pathogen.
  (b) Program Requirements.--Under the program required under 
subsection (a), the Secretary shall--
          (1) enter into memoranda of agreement or interagency 
        agreements under the Economy Act of 1933 (31 U.S.C. 
        1535 et seq.) with the Director of the Centers of 
        Disease Control and Prevention and the Administrator of 
        the Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of 
        other Federal departments and agencies, setting forth 
        roles and responsibilities, including with respect to 
        validating performance and developing testing protocols 
        for participating laboratories and coordination with 
        appropriate State, local, and tribal agencies;
          (2) establish criteria for determining whether plans 
        for biological detector capabilities and coverage 
        sufficiently protect the United States population, and 
        make such determinations on an annual basis;
          (3) acting through the Under Secretary for Science 
        and Technology, and in consultation with the Director 
        of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
        implement a process for establishing assay performance 
        standards and evaluation for equivalency for biological 
        threat assays, that--
                  (A) evaluates biological threat detection 
                assays, their protocols for use, and their 
                associated response algorithms for confirmation 
                of biological threat agents, taking performance 
                measures and concepts of operation into 
                consideration;
                  (B) develops interagency peer-reviewed assay 
                performance and equivalency standards based on 
                the findings of the evaluation under 
                subparagraph (A);
                  (C) requires implementation of the standards 
                developed under subparagraph (B) for all 
                Department biological detection programs;
                  (D) promotes use of such standards among all 
                other Federal biological detection programs and 
                makes them available to the private sector and 
                other end-users as appropriate; and
                  (E) is updated as necessary;
          (4) prior to obligating funds to acquire biodetection 
        systems for purposes of operational testing and 
        evaluation, require--
                  (A) a determination of the sensitivity and 
                specificity of the currently deployed 
                biodetection system;
                  (B) an assessment of the sensitivity and 
                specificity of the next generation biodetection 
                system or systems under consideration for 
                acquisition and whether it meets established 
                operational requirements;
                  (C) provision of all raw data to the Science 
                and Technology Directorate to enable the Under 
                Secretary to--
                          (i) conduct a trade-off study 
                        comparing the results of subparagraphs 
                        (A) and (B); and
                          (ii) perform a technical readiness 
                        assessment in accordance with section 
                        308(b); and
                  (D) that the findings under subparagraph (C) 
                inform the cost-benefit analysis under 
                paragraph (5)(A) and any Departmental 
                acquisition review board decision regarding the 
                biodetection system or systems under 
                consideration; and
          (5) prior to acquiring and deploying biodetection 
        technology, require--
                  (A) a cost-benefit analysis, including an 
                analysis of alternatives, that shall be 
                informed by the terrorism risk assessments 
                under section 2102;
                  (B) operational testing and evaluation;
                  (C) operational assessment by the end users 
                of the technology; and
                  (D) the Department, other relevant executive 
                agencies, and local jurisdictions intended to 
                host the systems to agree on concepts of 
                operations for resolving alarms.
  (c) Contract Authority.--The Secretary may enter into 
contracts with participating laboratories and programs for--
          (1) the provision of laboratory services or other 
        biosurveillance activities as appropriate for purposes 
        of this section on a fee-for-service basis or on a 
        prepayment or other similar basis; and
          (2) administrative and other costs related to hosting 
        program personnel and equipment in these laboratories 
        or programs.
  (d) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) The term ``participating laboratory'' means a 
        laboratory that has been accepted as a member of the 
        Laboratory Response Network for Biological Terrorism 
        that--
                  (A) is fully equipped to detect and respond 
                quickly to acts of biological terrorism;
                  (B) provides biocontainment and 
                microbiological analysis in support of the 
                Department and relevant law enforcement 
                agencies with responsibilities for 
                investigating biological incidents; and
                  (C) supports assay evaluation, research and 
                development.
          (2) The term ``assay'' means any scientific test that 
        is designed to detect the presence of a biological 
        threat agent that is of a type selected under criteria 
        established by the Secretary.

SEC. 2122. RAPID BIOLOGICAL THREAT DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION AT 
                    PORTS OF ENTRY.

  (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
require the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, in 
consultation with the heads of other relevant operational 
components of the Department of Homeland Security, to assess 
whether the development of technological screening capabilities 
for biological agents, pandemic influenza, and other infectious 
diseases should be undertaken by the Directorate of Science and 
Technology to support entry and exit screening at ports of 
entry and for other homeland security purposes.
  (b) Development of Methods.--If the Under Secretary 
determines that the development of such screening capabilities 
should be undertaken, the Secretary shall, to the extent 
possible, initiate development of safe and effective methods 
to--
          (1) rapidly screen incoming persons at ports of entry 
        for biological agents, pandemic influenza, and other 
        infectious diseases; and
          (2) obtain results of such screening near the point 
        of entry.

SEC. 2123. EVALUATING DETECTION TECHNOLOGY.

  To inform the purchase of detection technology, the 
Secretary, in coordination with the Director of the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, may carry out a program 
to--
          (1) establish near-term minimum performance metrics 
        to support public safety actionable activities, based 
        to the greatest extent practicable on voluntary 
        consensus standards, to evaluate the effectiveness of 
        detection technology for high-priority biological 
        agents and toxins and high-priority chemical agents;
          (2) establish a process for voluntary testing and 
        evaluation of technology by an accredited laboratory to 
        demonstrate conformance to such consensus standards, or 
        performance metrics if standards do not exist, for the 
        effective detection of high-priority biological agents 
        and toxins and high-priority chemical agents, including 
        incentivization for the program through potential cost 
        sharing with technology manufacturers and for SAFETY 
        Act certification or placement on the authorized 
        equipment list, or both; and
          (3) with permission from the detection technology 
        manufacturer, make available to Federal departments and 
        agencies, State, territorial, local, and tribal 
        entities, and the private sector the results of 
        detection system testing and evaluation under paragraph 
        (2).

SEC. 2124. DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION 
                    ARCHITECTURE.

  (a) Securing the Cities.--The Director of the Domestic 
Nuclear Detection Office shall establish and maintain a 
multilayered system of detection technologies, programs, and 
guidelines designed to enhance the Nation's ability to detect 
and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack in high-risk 
United States cities, as determined by the Secretary.
  (b) Surge Capabilities.--The Director shall develop a surge 
capability for radiological and nuclear detection systems that 
can be deployed within the United States rapidly in response to 
actionable intelligence or warnings, and includes procurement 
of appropriate technology, training, and exercises.
  (c) Integration.--The programs under subsections (a) and (b) 
shall be integrated into the Global Nuclear Detection 
Architecture and shall inform architecture studies, technology 
gaps, and research activities of the Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office.

                          Subtitle C--Response

SEC. 2131. FIRST RESPONDER GUIDANCE CONCERNING CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, 
                    RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR ATTACKS.

  (a) Establishment of Voluntary Guidance.--Not later than 1 
year after the date of the enactment of this section, the 
Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Administrator 
of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Attorney General, 
and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, as 
appropriate, shall--
          (1) develop for police, fire, emergency medical 
        services, emergency management, and medical and public 
        health personnel, voluntary guidance for responding to 
        a release of chemical, biological, radiological, and 
        nuclear material;
          (2) make such guidance available to State, local, and 
        tribal authorities, including primary and secondary 
        schools and other educational institutions, 
        nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and 
        the public; and
          (3) in developing the guidance under paragraph (1)--
                  (A) review the experiences of other countries 
                and the expertise of academic institutions and 
                nongovernmental organizations; and
                  (B) consider the unique needs of children and 
                other vulnerable populations.
  (b) Contents.--The guidance developed under subsection (a)(1) 
shall be voluntary, risk-based guidance that shall include--
          (1) protective action guidance for ensuring the 
        security, health, and safety of emergency response 
        providers and their families and household contacts;
          (2) specific information regarding the effects of the 
        chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material 
        on those exposed to the agent; and
          (3) best practices for emergency response providers 
        to effectively diagnose, handle, and otherwise manage 
        individuals affected by an incident involving chemical, 
        biological, radiological, or nuclear material.
  (c) Review and Revision of Guidance.--The Secretary shall--
          (1) review the guidance developed under subsection 
        (a)(1) at least once every 2 years;
          (2) make revisions to the guidance as appropriate; 
        and
          (3) make any revised guidance available to State, 
        local, and tribal authorities, nongovernmental 
        organizations, the private sector, and the public.
  (d) Procedures for Developing and Revising Guidance.--In 
carrying out the requirements of this section, the Secretary 
shall establish procedures to--
          (1) enable members of the first responder and first 
        provider community to submit recommendations of areas 
        in which guidance is needed and could be developed 
        under subsection (a)(1);
          (2) determine which entities should be consulted in 
        developing or revising the guidance;
          (3) prioritize, on a regular basis, guidance that 
        should be developed or revised; and
          (4) develop and disseminate the guidance in 
        accordance with the prioritization under paragraph (3).

SEC. 2132. INTEGRATED PLUME MODELING FOR COLLECTIVE RESPONSE.

  (a) Development.--
          (1) In general.--The Secretary shall acquire, use, 
        and disseminate the best available integrated plume 
        models to enable rapid response activities following a 
        chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological attack 
        or event.
          (2) Scope.--The Secretary shall--
                  (A) identify Federal, State, and local needs 
                regarding plume models and ensure the rapid 
                development and distribution of integrated 
                plume models that meet those needs to 
                appropriate officials of the Federal Government 
                and State, local, and tribal authorities to 
                enable immediate response to a chemical, 
                biological, radiological, or nuclear attack or 
                event;
                  (B) establish mechanisms for dissemination by 
                appropriate emergency response officials of the 
                integrated plume models described in paragraph 
                (1) to nongovernmental organizations and the 
                public to enable appropriate collective 
                response activities;
                  (C) ensure that guidance and training in how 
                to appropriately use such models are provided; 
                and
                  (D) ensure that lessons learned from 
                assessing the development and dissemination of 
                integrated plume models during exercises 
                administered by the Department are put into the 
                lessons learned information sharing system 
                maintained by the Department.
  (b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
          (1) The term ``plume model'' means the assessment of 
        the location and prediction of the spread of agents 
        following a chemical, biological, radiological, or 
        nuclear attack or event.
          (2) The term ``integrated plume model'' means a plume 
        model that integrates protective action guidance and 
        other information as the Secretary determines 
        appropriate.

SEC. 2133. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT AND VALIDATION FOR 
                    EMERGENCY RESPONDERS (SAVER) PROGRAM.

  The Secretary shall carry out a program for system assessment 
and validation of emergency response equipment at the 
Department, to be known as the ``SAVER Program''. The Secretary 
shall ensure that such program--
          (1) conducts objective, impartial, practitioner-
        relevant, and operationally oriented assessments and 
        validations of commercial emergency responder equipment 
        and systems, including hand-held detectors for 
        chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents;
          (2) prioritizes such evaluation based on the 
        technical results obtained from the program established 
        under section 2123, if available;
          (3) is supported by a network of scientists who, in 
        coordination with subject matter experts, perform the 
        assessment and validation activities using strict 
        scientific and testing protocols;
          (4) provides results along with other relevant 
        equipment information to the emergency response 
        provider community in an operationally useful form;
          (5) provides information on equipment that falls 
        within the categories listed in the Department's 
        authorized equipment list;
          (6) provides information that enables decision-makers 
        and responders to better select, procure, use, and 
        maintain emergency responder equipment; and
          (7) shares such information nationally with the 
        emergency response provider community.

SEC. 2134. PAYMENT FOR LABORATORY RESPONSE SERVICES.

  In carrying out their functions, responsibilities, 
authorities, and duties to counter biological terrorism, the 
Secretary, the Attorney General, and the heads of other 
participating Federal agencies are authorized, subject to the 
availability of appropriations, to enter into contracts with 
laboratories that comprise the Laboratory Response Network for 
Biological Terrorism and other federally networked laboratories 
that agree to participate in such a contract, for the provision 
of laboratory testing services on a fee-for-service basis or on 
a prepayment or other similar basis. Prior to entering into 
such a contract with any laboratory in the Laboratory Response 
Network for Biological Terrorism, the Secretary, the Attorney 
General, or the head of any other participating Federal agency 
shall inform the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

SEC. 2135. BIOFORENSICS CAPABILITIES.

  (a) Bioforensics Analysis Center.--There is authorized in the 
Department a bioforensics analysis center to provide support 
for law enforcement and intelligence-related investigations and 
actions to--
          (1) provide definitive bioforensics analysis in 
        support of the executive agencies with primary 
        responsibilities for preventing, deterring, responding 
        to, attributing, and recovering from biological 
        attacks; and
          (2) undertake other related bioforensics activities.
  (b) Payment for Services.--The center shall charge and retain 
fees to reimburse the cost of any service provided to an 
executive agency that requested such service.
  (c) Detailee Program.--Subject to the availability of 
appropriations, the Secretary may implement a program under 
which executive agencies as considered appropriate by the 
Secretary provide personnel, on a reimbursable basis, to the 
center for the purpose of--
          (1) providing training and other educational benefits 
        for such stakeholders to help them to better understand 
        the policies, procedures, and laws governing national 
        bioforensics activities; and
          (2) bolstering the capabilities and information 
        sharing activities of the bioforensics analysis center 
        authorized under subsection (a) with national 
        biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders.

SEC. 2136. METROPOLITAN MEDICAL RESPONSE SYSTEM PROGRAM.

  (a) In General.--The Secretary shall conduct a Metropolitan 
Medical Response System Program, that shall assist State and 
local governments in preparing for and responding to public 
health and mass casualty incidents resulting from acts of 
terrorism, natural disasters, and other man-made disasters.
  (b) Financial Assistance.--
          (1) Authorization of grants.--
                  (A) In general.--The Secretary, through the 
                Administrator of the Federal Emergency 
                Management Agency, may make grants under this 
                section to State and local governments to 
                assist in preparing for and responding to mass 
                casualty incidents resulting from acts of 
                terrorism, natural disasters, and other man-
                made disasters.
                  (B) Consultation.--In developing guidance for 
                grants authorized under this section, the 
                Administrator shall consult with the Chief 
                Medical Officer.
          (2) Use of funds.--A grant made under this section 
        may be used to support the integration of emergency 
        management, health, and medical systems into a 
        coordinated response to mass casualty incidents caused 
        by any hazard, including--
                  (A) to strengthen medical surge capacity;
                  (B) to strengthen mass prophylaxis 
                capabilities including development and 
                maintenance of an initial pharmaceutical 
                stockpile sufficient to protect first 
                responders, their families, and immediate 
                victims from a chemical or biological event, 
                including the procurement of home medical kits 
                that are approved pursuant to the Federal Food, 
                Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.) 
                or the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 
                et seq.), as applicable;
                  (C) to strengthen chemical, biological, 
                radiological, nuclear, and explosive detection, 
                response, and decontamination capabilities;
                  (D) to develop and maintain mass triage and 
                pre-hospital treatment plans and capabilities;
                  (E) for planning;
                  (F) to support efforts to strengthen 
                information sharing and collaboration 
                capabilities of regional, State, and urban 
                areas in support of public health and medical 
                preparedness;
                  (G) for medical supplies management and 
                distribution;
                  (H) for training and exercises;
                  (I) for integration and coordination of the 
                activities and capabilities of public health 
                personnel and medical care providers with those 
                of other emergency response providers as well 
                as other Federal agencies, the private sector, 
                and nonprofit organizations, for the forward 
                movement of patients; and
                  (J) for such other activities as the 
                Administrator provides.
          (3) Eligibility.--
                  (A) In general.--Except as provided in 
                subparagraph (C), any jurisdiction that 
                received funds through the Metropolitan Medical 
                Response System Program in fiscal year 2009 
                shall be eligible to receive a grant under this 
                section.
                  (B) Additional jurisdictions.--
                          (i) Unrepresented states.--
                                  (I) In general.--Except as 
                                provided in subparagraph (C), 
                                the Administrator may make 
                                grants under this section to 
                                the metropolitan statistical 
                                area with the largest 
                                population in any State in 
                                which no jurisdiction received 
                                funds through the Metropolitan 
                                Medical Response Program in 
                                fiscal year 2009, or in which 
                                funding was received only 
                                through another State.
                                  (II) Limitation.--For each of 
                                fiscal years 2012 through 2014, 
                                no jurisdiction that would 
                                otherwise be eligible to 
                                receive grants under subclause 
                                (I) shall receive a grant under 
                                this section if it would result 
                                in any jurisdiction under 
                                subparagraph (A) receiving less 
                                funding than such jurisdiction 
                                received in fiscal year 2009.
                          (ii) Other jurisdictions.--
                                  (I) In general.--Subject to 
                                subparagraph (C), the 
                                Administrator may determine 
                                that additional jurisdictions 
                                are eligible to receive grants 
                                under this section.
                                  (II) Limitation.--For each of 
                                fiscal years 2012 through 2014, 
                                the eligibility of any 
                                additional jurisdiction to 
                                receive grants under this 
                                section is subject to the 
                                availability of appropriations 
                                beyond that necessary to--
                                          (aa) ensure that each 
                                        jurisdiction eligible 
                                        to receive a grant 
                                        under subparagraph (A) 
                                        does not receive less 
                                        funding than such 
                                        jurisdiction received 
                                        in fiscal year 2009; 
                                        and
                                          (bb) provide grants 
                                        to jurisdictions 
                                        eligible under clause 
                                        (i).
                  (C) Performance requirement after fiscal year 
                2012.--A jurisdiction shall not be eligible for 
                a grant under this subsection from funds 
                available after fiscal year 2012 unless the 
                Secretary determines that the jurisdiction 
                maintains a sufficient measured degree of 
                capability in accordance with the performance 
                measures issued under subsection (c).
          (4) Distribution of funds.--
                  (A) In general.--The Administrator shall 
                distribute grant funds under this section to 
                the State in which the jurisdiction receiving a 
                grant under this section is located.
                  (B) Pass through.--Subject to subparagraph 
                (C), not later than 45 days after the date on 
                which a State receives grant funds under 
                subparagraph (A), the State shall provide the 
                jurisdiction receiving the grant 100 percent of 
                the grant funds, and not later than 45 days 
                after the State releases the funds, all fiscal 
                agents shall make the grant funds available for 
                expenditure.
                  (C) Exception.--The Administrator may permit 
                a State to provide to a jurisdiction receiving 
                a grant under this section 97 percent of the 
                grant funds awarded if doing so would not 
                result in any jurisdiction eligible for a grant 
                under paragraph (3)(A) receiving less funding 
                than such jurisdiction received in fiscal year 
                2009.
          (5) Regional coordination.--The Administrator shall 
        ensure that each jurisdiction that receives a grant 
        under this section, as a condition of receiving such 
        grant, is actively coordinating its preparedness 
        efforts with surrounding jurisdictions, with the 
        official with primary responsibility for homeland 
        security (other than the Governor) of the government of 
        the State in which the jurisdiction is located, and 
        with emergency response providers from all relevant 
        disciplines, as determined by the Administrator, to 
        effectively enhance regional preparedness.
  (c) Performance Measures.--The Administrator of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the Chief 
Medical Officer, and the National Metropolitan Medical Response 
System Working Group, shall issue performance measures within 1 
year after the date of enactment of this section that enable 
objective evaluation of the performance and effective use of 
funds provided under this section in any jurisdiction.
  (d) Metropolitan Medical Response System Working Group 
Defined.--In this section, the term ``National Metropolitan 
Medical Response System Working Group'' means--
          (1) 10 Metropolitan Medical Response System Program 
        grant managers, who shall--
                  (A) include 1 such grant manager from each 
                region of the Agency;
                  (B) comprise a population-based cross section 
                of jurisdictions that are receiving grant funds 
                under the Metropolitan Medical Response System 
                Program; and
                  (C) include--
                          (i) 3 selected by the Administrator 
                        of the Federal Emergency Management 
                        Agency; and
                          (ii) 3 selected by the Chief Medical 
                        Officer; and
          (2) 3 State officials who are responsible for 
        administration of State programs that are carried out 
        with grants under this section, who shall be selected 
        by the Administrator.
  (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to 
be appropriated $42,000,000 to carry out the program for each 
of fiscal years 2012 through 2016.

                          Subtitle D--Recovery

SEC. 2141. IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING GAPS IN RECOVERY CAPABILITIES.

  (a) Risk Assessment.--
          (1) Tailored risk assessment.--The Secretary, acting 
        through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology 
        and in coordination with the Administrator of the 
        Environmental Protection Agency, shall conduct tailored 
        risk assessments to inform prioritization of national 
        recovery activities for chemical, biological, 
        radiological, and nuclear incidents, to be updated as 
        necessary.
          (2) Considerations.--In conducting the risk 
        assessments under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall--
                  (A) consult with the Secretary of Health and 
                Human Services, the Secretary of Agriculture, 
                the Secretary of the Interior, the Chairman of 
                the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the 
                heads of other relevant Federal departments and 
                agencies;
                  (B) consider recovery of both indoor areas 
                and outdoor environments; and
                  (C) consider relevant studies previously 
                prepared by other Federal agencies, or other 
                appropriate stakeholders.
          (3) Collaboration.--Upon completion of the risk 
        assessments required by this section, the Secretary 
        shall provide the findings to the Administrator of the 
        Environmental Protection Agency and heads of other 
        relevant Federal agencies in order to inform ongoing 
        and future work, including research and guidance 
        development, undertaken by those agencies in recovery 
        and remediation from chemical, biological, 
        radiological, or nuclear incidents.
  (b) Research.--The results of the risk assessment under this 
section shall inform appropriate Federal research to address 
the high-risk capability gaps uncovered by each assessment.
  (c) Submission to Congress.--The results of each risk 
assessment shall be submitted to the appropriate congressional 
committees within 30 days after completion of the assessment.

SEC. 2142. RECOVERY FROM A CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND 
                    NUCLEAR ATTACK OR INCIDENT.

  (a) Establishment of Guidance.--The Secretary shall develop 
and issue guidance for clean-up and restoration of indoor and 
outdoor areas, including subways and other mass transportation 
facilities, that have been exposed to chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear materials. The Secretary shall develop 
and issue the guidance, within 24 months after the date of 
enactment of this section, in consultation with--
          (1) the Secretary of Agriculture;
          (2) the Secretary of Commerce;
          (3) the Secretary of Education;
          (4) the Secretary of the Interior;
          (5) the Attorney General;
          (6) the Secretary of Labor;
          (7) the Secretary of Transportation;
          (8) the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development;
          (9) the Secretary of Health and Human Services;
          (10) the Secretary of Veterans Affairs;
          (11) the Secretary of the Treasury;
          (12) the Administrator of the Environmental 
        Protection Agency; and
          (13) the Administrator of the Small Business 
        Administration.
  (b) Contents.--The guidance developed under subsection (a) 
shall clarify Federal roles and responsibilities for assisting 
State, local, and tribal authorities and include risk-based 
recommendations for--
          (1) standards for effective decontamination of 
        affected sites;
          (2) standards for safe post-event occupancy of 
        affected sites, including for vulnerable populations 
        such as children and individuals with health concerns;
          (3) requirements to ensure that the decontamination 
        procedures for responding organizations do not 
        conflict;
          (4) requirements that each responding organization 
        uses a uniform system for tracking costs and 
        performance of clean-up contractors;
          (5) maintenance of negative air pressure in 
        buildings;
          (6) standards for proper selection and use of 
        personal protective equipment;
          (7) air sampling procedures;
          (8) development of occupational health and safety 
        plans that are appropriate for the specific risk to 
        responder health; and
          (9) waste disposal.
  (c) Review and Revision of Guidance.--The Secretary shall--
          (1) not less frequently than once every 2 years, 
        review the guidance developed under subsection (a);
          (2) make revisions to the guidance as appropriate; 
        and
          (3) make the revised guidance available to the 
        Federal Government, State, local, and tribal 
        authorities, nongovernmental organizations, the private 
        sector, and the public.
  (d) Procedures for Developing and Revising Guidance.--In 
carrying out the requirements of this section, the Secretary 
shall establish procedures to--
          (1) prioritize issuance of guidance based on the 
        results of the risk assessment under section 2131;
          (2) inventory existing relevant guidance;
          (3) enable the public to submit recommendations of 
        areas in which guidance is needed;
          (4) determine which entities should be consulted in 
        developing or revising the guidance;
          (5) prioritize, on a regular basis, guidance that 
        should be developed or revised; and
          (6) develop and disseminate the guidance in 
        accordance with the prioritization under paragraph (5).
  (e) Consultations.--The Secretary shall develop and revise 
the guidance developed under subsection (a), and the procedures 
required under subsection (d), in consultation with--
          (1) the heads of other Federal departments and 
        agencies that are not required to be consulted under 
        subsection (a), as the Secretary considers appropriate;
          (2) State, local, and tribal authorities; and
          (3) nongovernmental organizations and private 
        industry.
  (f) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this section, and annually thereafter, the 
Secretary shall provide appropriate congressional committees 
with--
          (1) a description of the procedures established under 
        subsection (d);
          (2) any guidance in effect on the date of the report;
          (3) a list of entities to which the guidance 
        described in paragraph (2) was disseminated;
          (4) a plan for reviewing the guidance described in 
        paragraph (2), in accordance with subsection (e);
          (5) the prioritized list of the guidance required 
        under subsection (d)(4), and the methodology used by 
        the Secretary for such prioritization; and
          (6) a plan for developing, revising, and 
        disseminating the guidance.

SEC. 2143. EXERCISES.

  (a) In General.--To facilitate recovery from a chemical, 
biological, radiological, or nuclear attack or other incident 
involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 
materials and to foster collective response to terrorism, the 
Secretary shall develop exercises in consultation with State, 
local, and tribal authorities and other appropriate Federal 
agencies, and, as appropriate, in collaboration with national 
level exercises, including exercises that address, to the best 
knowledge available at the time, analysis, indoor environmental 
cleanup methods, and decontamination standards, including those 
published in the guidance issued under section 2142.
  (b) Lessons Learned for National Level Exercises.--The 
Secretary shall provide electronically, to the maximum extent 
practicable, lessons learned reports to each designated 
representative of State, local, and tribal jurisdictions and 
private sector entities that participate in National Level 
Exercises of the Department. Each lessons learned report shall 
be tailored to convey information on that exercise that could 
be leveraged to enhance preparedness and response.
                              ----------                              

PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

TITLE III--GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Part B--Federal-State Cooperation

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 319F-2. STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE AND SECURITY COUNTERMEASURE 
                    PROCUREMENTS.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Additional Authority Regarding Procurement of Certain 
Countermeasures; Availability of Special Reserve Fund.--
          (1) * * *
          (2) Determination of material threats.--
                  (A) Material threat.--The Homeland Security 
                Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary 
                and the heads of other agencies as appropriate, 
                shall on an ongoing basis--
                          (i) assess current and emerging 
                        threats of chemical, biological, 
                        radiological, and nuclear agents; [and]
                          (ii) establish criteria for the 
                        issuance of a material threat 
                        determination;
                          [(ii)] (iii) determine which of such 
                        agents present a material threat 
                        against the United States population 
                        sufficient to affect national 
                        security[.]; and
                          (iv) review and reassess 
                        determinations under clause (iii) to 
                        determine whether agents continue to 
                        present a material threat against the 
                        United States population sufficient to 
                        affect national security and homeland 
                        security.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 319F-5. NATIONAL MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURE DISPENSING STRATEGY.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section--
          (1) the term ``dispense'' means to provide medical 
        countermeasures to an affected population in response 
        to a threat or incident; and
          (2) the term ``medical countermeasure'' means a 
        qualified countermeasure (as defined in section 319F-
        1(a)(2)).
  (b) Strategy.--
          (1) In general.--The Secretary, in coordination with 
        the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of 
        Agriculture, and other appropriate Federal agencies, 
        shall develop, implement, and, as appropriate, 
        periodically update a National Medical Countermeasure 
        Dispensing Strategy to enhance preparedness and 
        collective response to a terrorist attack on humans or 
        animals with any chemical, biological, radiological, or 
        nuclear material, that delineates Federal, State, and 
        local responsibilities.
          (2) Considerations.--The strategy shall be 
        sufficiently flexible to meet the unique needs of 
        different communities, including first responders, and 
        shall consider--
                  (A) a variety of options for dispensing 
                medical countermeasures, including to 
                individuals, schools, universities, hospitals, 
                and elderly care facilities;
                  (B) post-incident requirements for emergency 
                use authorizations before countermeasures can 
                be distributed legally;
                  (C) the inclusion of locally held caches of 
                countermeasures in event-specific 
                authorizations covering federally held 
                countermeasures of the same type; and
                  (D) distribution to the public of home 
                medical kits for personal stockpiling purposes, 
                within 30 days after a domestic or 
                international bioterrorist attack resulting in 
                human infection.
  (c) Coordination.--The Secretary shall coordinate with the 
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
State, local, and tribal authorities, representatives from the 
private sector, and nongovernmental organizations on the 
National Medical Countermeasures Dispensing Strategy.
  (d) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this section, the Secretary shall submit the 
National Medical Countermeasures Dispensing Strategy to the 
appropriate congressional committees.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Part F--Licensing--Biological Products and Clinical Laboratories

Subpart 1--Biological Products

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 351A. ENHANCED CONTROL OF DANGEROUS BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND TOXINS.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Safeguard and Security Requirements for Registered 
Persons.--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (3) Submitted names; use of databases by attorney 
        general.--
                  (A) In general.--Upon the receipt of names 
                and other identifying information under 
                paragraph (2)(B), the Attorney General shall, 
                for the sole purpose of identifying whether the 
                individuals involved are within any of the 
                categories specified in subparagraph (B), 
                promptly use criminal, immigration, national 
                security, and other electronic databases that 
                are available to the Federal Government and are 
                appropriate for such purpose. In identifying 
                whether an individual is within a category 
                specified in subparagraph (B)(ii)(II), the 
                Attorney General shall consult with the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary 
                of Defense, and the Secretary of State to 
                determine whether these officials possess any 
                information relevant to the identification of 
                such an individual by the Attorney General.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

    While I agree with most of views expressed in the 
underlying report, it is unfortunate that the report seems to 
give the impression that the President's decision on how to 
organize White House-level staff to address the WMD threat, on 
its face, reflects a lack of seriousness about the biosecurity 
threat. President Obama has shown leadership in the area of 
biosecurity. The President issued a ``National Strategy for 
Countering Biological Threats'' in November 2009 that set forth 
policies to ensure that the United States will be able to 
prevent, protect against, and respond to both naturally-
occurring and man-made biological events by engaging in 
prevention activities at home and engaging with the 
international community.
    As for the involvement of the ``WMD Coordinator'' in 
biosecurity efforts, I would note that the WMD Coordinator's 
office played a significant role in the December 2011 
Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference. Additionally, 
the WMD Coordinator's office was a key player in development of 
the aforementioned strategy to counter biological threats.
    I agree that more can and should be done to protect the 
United States from a biological attack. At the same time, I 
also believe the current Administration's efforts in this 
regard ought to be recognized.

                                                Bennie G. Thompson.

                                  
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