FILED

May 11, 1999

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

 ______________________________________________

CHARLES BELK, 

Appellant,

Obion Circuit No. 7-527

Vs. C.A. No. 02A01-9807-CV-00189

OBION COUNTY, TENNESSEE

SHERIFF EWELL BAKER, 

Appellees.

____________________________________________________________________________

FROM THE OBION COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM B. ACREE, JR., JUDGE

Charles Belk, Pro Se

James I. Pentecost; Waldrop & Hall of Jackson

For Appellees

REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED

Opinion filed: 

W. FRANK CRAWFORD,

PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.

CONCUR:

ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE

DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE

Plaintiff, Charles Belk (Belk), filed suit against defendants, Sheriff Ewell Baker (Baker),

in his official capacity as Sheriff of Obion County, and Obion County, Tennessee, claiming

deprivation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as violations of the
2

Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA). Belk alleged that Baker violated his civil

rights by delaying medical aid while he was a prisoner in the Obion County jail. Belk appeals

the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Baker and Obion County.

On March 25, 1996, Belk was an inmate at the Obion County jail in Union City,

Tennessee. At approximately midnight, Belk tied his bed sheets together and climbed through

a second floor window in an attempt to escape. The bed sheets tore in the attempt, and he fell

to the pavement below suffering a compound fracture to his lower leg. Prison officials

immediately discovered Belk’s escape attempt, notified Baker, and called an ambulance. 

Baker arrived within minutes of the notification, and an ambulance arrived shortly

thereafter at 12:08 a.m. It is disputed whether Baker left orders with the prison guards that the

medical personnel were not to assist or move Belk without prior approval. However, it is

undisputed that Belk laid in a pool of rainwater without medical assistance until 12:27 a.m. when

medical personnel were allowed to administer treatment. After being stabilized and placed in

the ambulance, Belk arrived at the hospital at 12:30 a.m.

The events after Belk’s fall and injury are disputed. According to Baker, Belk told him

that another prisoner had pushed him from the roof of the jail. Knowing that the other prisoner

named by Belk was housed in a prison block opposite the incident, Baker states in his affidavit

that he assumed a major prison breakout had occurred. In order to secure the area, Baker refused

to allow Belk to be moved until he had investigated the situation. Baker, however, denies in his

affidavit that he instructed medical personnel not to treat Belk.

Belk disputes Baker’s assertions. Specifically, he states in his affidavit that a sheet he

was using to climb down tore, causing him to fall. He also states that deputies said that Baker

instructed them not to allow medical personnel to treat him.

On March 24, 1997, Belk brought this action against Baker and Obion County alleging

that the medical personnel were present shortly after the fall, but they were not allowed to attend

to his injuries or move him as a direct result of Baker’s orders. He further avers that he was

deprived of his rights and privileges as afforded him under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and in contravention of 42 U.S.C. §§

1983 and 1988 and the laws of the state of Tennessee in that Baker and the County acted

negligently and in a willful, wanton, and deliberate disregard for his well being, and that the
3

defendants acted under color of state law in their official capacity.

Baker and the County moved for summary judgment in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ.

P. 56. After a hearing, the trial judge granted the defendants’ motion and rendered judgment in

favor of Baker and the County. Belk filed a timely appeal and the issue for review is whether

the trial court erred in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

A motion for summary judgment should be granted when the movant demonstrates that

there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The party moving for summary judgment bears the

burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d

618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must take the strongest

legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences

in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. Id. In Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d

208 (Tenn. 1993), our Supreme Court stated:

Once it is shown by the moving party that there is no genuine

issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must then

demonstrate, by affidavits or discovery materials, that there is a

genuine, material fact dispute to warrant a trial. In this regard,

Rule 56.05 provides that the nonmoving party cannot simply rely

upon his pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

Id. at 211 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

Summary judgment is only appropriate when the facts and the legal conclusions drawn

from the facts reasonably permit only one conclusion. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 26

(Tenn. 1995). Since only questions of law are involved, there is no presumption of correctness

regarding a trial court's grant of summary judgment. Bain, 936 S.W.2d at 622. Therefore, our

review of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo on the record before this Court.

Warren v. Estate of Kirk, 954 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tenn. 1997).

WefirstexamineBelk’s42U.S.C.§1983claimagainstthecountyforBaker’sactsallegedlyviolatingrights

undertheFourth,Fifth,andFourteenthAmendments. BakerandtheCountyassertthatBelk’sclaimisnotactionable

becausenopolicyorcustomwasshownasrequiredunder§1983,orinthealternative,ifdeliberateindifferenceisthe

correct standard, Belk does not meet it because Baker acted to secure the prison. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) provides, in pertinent part:

Everypersonwho,undercolorofanystatute,ordinance,regulation,custom,or
1The Pembaur Court noted an example relevant to the case before this Court. They

stated in pertinent part:

Thus, for example, the County Sheriff may have discretion to hire

and fire employees without being the county official responsible

for establishing any county employment policy. If this were the

case, the Sheriff’s decisions respecting employment would not

give rise to municipal liability, although similar decisions with

respect to law enforcement practices, over which the Sheriff is the

official policy maker, would give rise to municipal liability.

Pembaur, 106 S.Ct. at 1300, n.12.

4

usage,ofanyStateorTerritoryortheDistrictofColumbia,subjects,orcausesto

be subjected, anycitizenoftheUnitedStatesorotherpersonwithinthe

jurisdictionthereoftothedeprivationofanyrights,privileges,orimmunities

securedbytheConstitutionandlaws,shallbeliabletothepartyinjuredinan

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

TheCountychallengesBelk’sclaimonthebasisthatasingleinstanceofunconstitutionalactivitycannotgive

risetoa§1983action. Whileitistrue,asthedefendantsassert,thatliabilityunder§1983islimitedtodeprivations

offederallyprotectedrightscausedbyactiontaken“pursuanttoofficialmunicipalpolicyofsomenature...,”Monell

v.NewYorkCityDept.ofSoc.Serv.,436U.S.658,98S.Ct.2018,56L.E.2d 611 (1978), a decision by

municipalpolicymakersonasingleoccasionmaysatisfythisrequirement. Pembaurv.CityofCincinnati,106

S. Ct. 1292, 1294 (1986).

The United States Supreme Court in Pembaur stated in pertinent part:

Butthepowertoestablishpolicyisnomoretheexclusiveprovinceofthe

legislature atthe locallevelthanatthe stateornationallevel. Monell’s

languagemakesclearthatitexpresslyenvisionedotherofficials“whoseactsor

edictsmayfairlybesaidtorepresentofficialpolicy,”Monell,supra,436U.S.,

at694,98S.Ct.at2037-2038,andwhosedecisionsthereforemaygiveriseto

municipal liability under § 1983.

* * *

[A]governmentfrequentlychoosesacourseofactiontailoredtoaparticular

situationandnotintendedtocontroldecisionsinlatersituations. Ifthedecision

toadoptthatparticularcourseofactionisproperlymadebythatgovernment’s

authorizeddecisionmakers,itsurelyrepresentsanactofofficialgovernment

“policy”asthattermiscommonlyunderstood. Moreimportantly,whereaction

isdirectedbythosewhoestablishgovernmentalpolicy,themunicipalityis

equallyresponsiblewhetherthatactionistobetakenonlyonceortobetaken

repeatedly. Todenycompensationtothevictimwouldthereforebecontraryto

the fundamental purpose of § 1983.

* * *

Municipalliabilityattachesonlywherethedecision-makerpossessesfinal

authoritytoestablishmunicipalpolicywithrespecttotheactionordered. ... The

officialmustalsoberesponsibleforestablishingfinalgovernmentalpolicy

respectingsuchactivitybeforethemunicipalitycanbeheldliable.1 Authorityto
2Appellees’ own brief submitted in this appeal states, “[t]hus, the Sheriff is a policy

maker, for purposes of Tennessee law. . . .”

5

makemunicipalpolicymaybegranteddirectlybyalegislativeenactmentormay

bedelegatedbyanofficialwhopossessessuchauthority,andofcourse,whether

an official had final policy making authority is a question of state law. 

Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. at 1298-1300.

WemustdeterminewhetherBakerwasa“policymaker”asdefinedbyPembaur. TheTennesseestatute

which defines the powers and duties of county sheriffs states in pertinent part:

8-8-201. Duties of office. -- It is the sheriff’s duty to:

* * *

(3)Takechargeandcustodyofthejailofthesheriff’scounty,andoftheprisoners

therein;receivethoselawfullycommitted,andkeepthempersonally,orby

deputies or jailer, until discharged by law; . . . .

T.C.A. § 8-8-201(3) (Supp. 1998). 

Afterexaminingtheabovestatute,webelievethatBakerhasfinaldecisionmakingauthorityconcerningthe

countyprisonandisa“policymaker”asdefinedbytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtinPembaur.

2

 Therefore,one

instance of unconstitutional activity by Baker states a cause of action under § 1983.

Next,wemustdeterminethecorrectstandardfordeterminingaviolationofaprisonersrighttomedicalcare.

TheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtarticulatedthestandardfordeterminingwhetheraprisoner’sconstitutionalrightto

medicalcareundertheEighthAmendmentoftheU.S.ConstitutionhasbeenviolatedinEstellev.Gamble,429U.S.

97, 104-05, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291, 50 L. Ed.2d 251 (1976). The Supreme Court stated in pertinent part:

Wethereforeconcludethatdeliberateindifferencetoseriousmedical

needsofprisonersconstitutesthe“unnecessaryandwantoninflictionofpain,”

proscribedbytheEighthAmendment. Thisistruewhethertheindifferenceis

manifestedbyprisondoctorsintheirresponsetotheprisoner’sneedsorbyprison

guardsinintentionallydenyingordelayingaccesstomedicalcareorintentionally

interferingwiththetreatmentonceprescribed. Regardlessofhowevidenced,

deliberateindifferencetoaprisoner’sseriousillnessorinjurystatesacauseof

action under § 1983.

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05, 97 S. Ct. at 291 (citation omitted).

AsnotedbytheSixthCircuit,theEstellestandardconsistsoftwocomponents,oneobjectiveandone

subjective:“(1)asufficientlygravedeprivation,suchasmedicalneeds;and(2)asufficientlyculpablestateofmind.”

Berrymanv.Rieger,etal,150F.3d561,566(6thCir.1998).Whenaprisonersufferspainneedlesslyandrelief

isreadilyavailable,theyhaveacauseofactionagainstthosewhosedeliberateindifferenceisthecauseofthesuffering.

Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1154-55 (6th Cir. 1991). 
6

AstheSupremeCourtnotedinFarmerv.Brennan,511U.S.825, 114S.Ct.1970,128L.Ed.2d811

(1994),aplaintiffmustprovethathismedicalneedsareseriousinordertoshowdeliberateindifference. A“serious

medicalneed”hasbeendefinedas“onethathasbeendiagnosedbyaphysicianasmandatingtreatmentoronethatis

soobviousthatevenalaypersonwouldeasilyrecognizethenecessityforadoctor’sattention.” Laamanv.

Helgemoe,437F.Supp.269,311(D.N.H.1977). Inconsideringtheseriousnessofamedicalneed,courtsmust

determinewhetherthedefendant’sactoromissionresultedinadenialof“theminimalcivilizedmeasureoflife’s

necessities.” Rhodesv.Chapman,452U.S.337,347,101S.Ct.2392,2399,69L.Ed.2d59(1981). Neither

negligencenorgrossnegligencewillsupporta§1983claim. “Inordertostateacognizableclaim,aprisonermust

allegeactsoromissionssufficientlyharmfultoevidencedeliberateindifferencetoseriousmedicalneeds. Itisonlysuch

indifferencethatcanoffend‘evolvingstandardsofdecency’inviolationoftheEighthAmendment.” Estelle,429U.S.

at 105-06, 97 S. Ct. at 292.

Inordertodeterminetheappropriatenessofsummaryjudgment,weexaminethreeelements:“(1)whether a

factualdisputeexists;(2)whetherthedisputedfactismaterialtotheoutcomeofthecase;and(3)whetherthe

disputed fact creates a genuine issue for trial.” Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 214 (Tenn. 1993).

Clearly, the facts in this case are disputed. Baker’s affidavit states in pertinent part:

9. WhileIdonotrecallmakinganystatementtotheeffectthattheprisoner,

CharlesBelk,wasnottobemoved,anysuchstatementwhichImayhavemade

wouldhavebeenoutofmyconcernforthesafetyandwell-beingoftheprisoner

andwouldhaveonlymeantthattheprisonerwasnottobemoveduntilmedical

techniciansfromtheObionCountyRegionalEmergencyMedicalServices

arrived.

* * *

14. Ineithersawnorspokewiththeambulancedriverorothermedicalpersonnel

at the scene, as I was upstairs in the jail making sure that the jail was secure.

15. Ineverinstructedtheambulancedriverorothermedicalattendantnotto

perform any medical services for the prisoner.

16. Ineverinstructedtheambulancedriverorthemedicalattendantnottomove

the prisoner.

17. SinceIwasalreadyupstairsinthejailwhentheambulancearrivedonthe

scene,Ineitherspoketonorsaweithertheambulancedriverorthemedical

attendant,andthereforeitwouldbeimpossibleformetohave“instructedthe

ambulancedrivertonotperformanyservicesortomovetheprisoneruntilfurther

instructions were given” as alleged in the complaint.

Baker’sassertionsinhisaffidavitaredisputedbythreewitnessesatthescene. Belk’saffidavitstatesin

pertinent part:
7

3. TheambulancearrivedandtheattendantsaskedtheSheriff’sDeputyifthey

couldtreatmeandwasinformedbytheSheriff’sDeputythattheycouldnotdo

anythingormovemeinanywaypendingfurtherordersfromtheSheriff.... Ms.

DosterpleadedwithoneofthePoliceOfficersguardingmetogointothe

CourthouseandasktheSheriffifIcouldbetreatedormovedandafterafew

minutespassedthePoliceOfficercamebackandstatedthattheSheriffsaidthat

Icouldnotbemoveduntilfurtherinstructions. Finallyafterwhatseemedlike a

verylongtime,aSheriff’sDeputygavetheambulanceattendantpermissionto

move me. . . .

LindaDoster,whoworkedacrossthestreetfromthecourthouseandcameovertoseewhathadhappenattheprison

when Belk fell, provided the following affidavit.

2. IwasinmyofficeonMarch25,1996,whenIobservedacommotionatthe

CourthouseandIwentacrossthestreettotheCourthousetoseewhatwasgoing

on. IobservedCharlesBelklyingontheconcretesidewalkintherain,lyingin

a puddleofwaterwithhisleg brokenandtheboneprotrudingfrom

theskin. Theambulancearrivedafewminuteslaterandtheattendantswere

toldbythedeputythatSheriffBakersaidnoonewastomoveMr.Belk. Ifinally

gotanumbrellaandheldoverMr.Belkasnooneelsewasassistinghimor

protectinghimfromtheelementsandstoodtherewhileallofuswerewaitingfor

approval from the Sheriff for Mr. Belk to be treated.

3. IrecallseveralpersonsaskingpermissiontotreatandremoveMr.Belkand

takehimtothehospitalandrememberthatthedeputieswhorespondedtothese

inquiriesrelatedthattheSheriffhadstatedthathedidnotwantMr.Belkmoved

or touched in any way.

* * *

7. Mr.Belkwaslyingfacedowninapproximatelythreeinchesofwaterwithhis

handshandcuffedbehindhisback. Hehadaseverelycrushedleftleg. Hewas

surroundedbypolicepersonnelandsheriff’sdeputiesallofwhomwerejust

standing around. Noone [sic] was doing anything for Mr. Belk.

(emphasis added).

Further,JamesShipley,theparamedicandambulancedriverthattreatedBelk,statedinhisaffidavitthat“I

wasinformedbyaDeputyoftheObionCountySheriff’sDepartmentnottomoveCharlesBelkwithoutthepermission

of Sheriff Ewell Baker.”

Thesedisputedfactsmustbematerialtoprecludesummaryjudgment. Adisputedfactismaterialifitmust

bedecidedinordertoresolvesubstantiveclaimsordefensesatwhichthesummaryjudgmentmotionisdirected. Byrd,

847S.W.2dat215. Deliberateindifferencetoaprisonersmedicalneedsisdeterminedthroughatwoparttest. First,

theprisonermustshow“asufficientlygravedeprivation,suchasmedicalneeds...” Berrymanv.Rieger,etal,

150F.3d561,567(6thCir.1998). ItisundisputedthatBelksufferedacompoundfracturetotheleg,andthebonewas

clearly visible protruding through the skin. We believe this satisfies the first element.

ThesecondelementrequiresthatBakeractedwith“sufficientlyculpablestateofmind.” Berryman,150

F.3dat567. Negligenceandgrossnegligencearenotenough. “Inordertostateacognizableclaim,aprisonermust
8

allegeactsoromissionssufficientlyharmfultoevidencedeliberateindifferencetoseriousmedicalneeds.” Estelle

v.Gamble,429U.S.97,106,97S.Ct.285,292(1976). Asnotedabove,BakerdeniestellingdeputiesthatBelkwas

nottobetreated. However,BelkclaimsthatBakeractedinadeliberatelyindifferentmanner. ThisdisputeastoBaker’s

purpose for leaving Belk unattended goes directly to Baker’s state of mind, and is therefore material.

[T]hetestfora“genuineissue”iswhetherareasonablejurycouldlegitimately

resolvethatfactinfavorofonesideortheother. Iftheanswerisyes,summary

judgmentisinappropriate;iftheanswerisno,summaryjudgmentisproper

becauseatrialwouldbepointlessastherewouldbenothingforthejurytodoand

the judge need only apply the law to resolve the case.

 Byrd,847S.W.2dat215. ItseemsclearthatajurycouldresolvethisdisputeinfavorofBelkandfindthatBakerwas

deliberatelyindifferenttoBelk’smedicalneedsbydelayingmedicalcaretohimtopunishhimforhisescapeattempt.

Therefore, a genuine issue of a material fact exists in this case and summary judgment was improper. 

ThefinalissuewemustaddressconcernsBelk’sclaimundertheTennesseeGovernmentalTortLiabilityAct

(GTLA),T.C.A.§29-20-201,etal(1980&Supp.1998). TheGTLAallowssuitagainstcountyandmunicipal

governmentsfornegligentactsofitsemployees;however,neitherintentionaltortsnorviolationsofcivilrightsare

coveredundertheGTLA. T.C.A.§29-20-205(2)(1980);Jenkinsv.LoudonCounty,736S.W.2d603,608

(Tenn. 1987). Thus, summary judgment was appropriate on this issue.

Theorderofthetrialcourtgrantingsummaryjudgmentonthe§1983claimisreversed,andtheorderinall

otherrespectsisaffirmed. Thecaseisremandedforsuchotherproceedingsasmaybenecessary. Costsoftheappeal

are assessed against the appellee.

_________________________________

W. FRANK CRAWFORD, 

PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.

CONCUR:

____________________________________

ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE

____________________________________

DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE