11 August 2011

Joint Operations

Joint Publication 3-0
This revised edition of Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, reflects the current 

guidance for conducting joint activities across the range of military operations and is the 

basis for U.S. participation in multinational operations where the United States has not 

ratified specific doctrine or procedures. This keystone publication forms the core of joint 

warfighting doctrine and establishes the framework for our forces’ ability to fight as a 

joint team. 

Often called the “linchpin” of the joint doctrine publication hierarchy, the 

overarching constructs and principles contained in this publication provide a common 

perspective from which to plan and execute joint operations independently or in 

cooperation with our multinational partners, other U.S. Government departments and 

agencies, and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. 

As our Nation continues into the 21st century, the guidance in this publication will 

enable current and future leaders of the Armed Forces of the United States to design, 

plan, organize, train for, and execute worldwide missions as our forces transform to meet 

emerging challenges. To succeed, we need adaptive and thinking professionals who 

understand the capabilities their Service brings to joint operations; how to integrate those 

capabilities with those of the other Services and interorganizational partners to optimize 

the strength of unified action; and how to organize, employ, and sustain joint forces to 

provide national leaders with multiple options for addressing various security threats. 

Above all, we need professionals imbued with a sense of commitment and honor who 

will act decisively in the absence of specific guidance. 

I challenge all commanders to ensure the widest distribution of this keystone joint 

publication and actively promote the use of all joint publications at every opportunity. I 

further challenge you to study and understand the guidance contained in this publication 

and teach these principles to your subordinates. Only then will we be able to fully exploit 

the remarkable military potential inherent in our joint teams. 

M. G. MULLEN 

Admiral, U.S. Navy 
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PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication is the keystone document of the joint operations series. It provides the 

doctrinal foundation and fundamental principles that guide the Armed Forces of the United 

States in joint operations across the range of military operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for 

military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, 

and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of 

authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and 

prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by 

the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of 

this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing 

the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the 

accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders of 

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of 

these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate 

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of 

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of 

a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine 

and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the 

US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and 

procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.
Preface

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0, DATED 17 SEPTEMBER 2006 

(INCORPORATING CHANGE 2 DATED 22 MARCH 2010)

 Incorporates a discussion of the art of joint command, including new ideas on 

command-centric leadership and operational design. 

 Incorporates a new section on creating shared understanding, which 

emphasizes the interaction of information management and knowledge 

sharing to create an organizational environment of learning that facilitates 

joint operations. 

 Consolidates information related to organizing for joint operations in a single 

Chapter IV. 

 Consolidates Chapters V, VI, and VII in a single Chapter V. 

 Reduces redundancies and improves continuity between Joint Publication 

(JP) 3-0 and JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

 Reduces redundancies and improves continuity between JP 3-0 and JP 5-0, 

Joint Operation Planning. 

 
Summary of Changes

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... ix

CHAPTER I

FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS

• Introduction................................................................................................................I-1

• Strategic Environment and National Security Challenges.........................................I-2

• Instruments of National Power and the Range of Military Operations.....................I-4

• Strategic Guidance.....................................................................................................I-5

• Unified Action ...........................................................................................................I-8

• Levels of War ..........................................................................................................I-12

• Types of Military Operations...................................................................................I-14

CHAPTER II

THE ART OF JOINT COMMAND

• Introduction...............................................................................................................II-1

• Commander-Centric Leadership...............................................................................II-1

• Operational Art .........................................................................................................II-3

• Operational Design ...................................................................................................II-4

• Joint Operation Planning ..........................................................................................II-5

• Assessment ...............................................................................................................II-9

CHAPTER III

JOINT FUNCTIONS

• Introduction............................................................................................................. III-1

• Command and Control............................................................................................ III-2

• Intelligence ........................................................................................................... III-20

• Fires ...................................................................................................................... III-22

• Movement and Maneuver..................................................................................... III-27

• Protection.............................................................................................................. III-29

• Sustainment........................................................................................................... III-35

CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZING FOR JOINT OPERATIONS

• Introduction.............................................................................................................IV-1

• Understanding the Operational Environment .........................................................IV-1

• Organizing the Joint Force......................................................................................IV-6

• Organizing the Joint Force Headquarters.............................................................IV-10

• Organizing Operational Areas..............................................................................IV-11
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CHAPTER V 

JOINT OPERATIONS ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 

 Introduction .............................................................................................................. V-1

Section A. Types of Military Operations ....................................................................... V-3 

 Military Operations and Related Missions, Tasks, and Actions .............................. V-3 

Section B. A Phasing Construct ..................................................................................... V-5 

 Phasing a Joint Operation ........................................................................................ V-5 

Section C. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence ..................... V-9 

 Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence ................................. V-9 

 Typical Operations ................................................................................................. V-11 

 Other Considerations ............................................................................................. V-18 

Section D. Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations .............................. V-19 

 Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations ......................................... V-19 

 Typical Operations ................................................................................................. V-20 

 Other Considerations ............................................................................................. V-29 

Section E. Major Operations and Campaigns ............................................................... V-31 

 Major Operations and Campaigns ......................................................................... V-31 

 The Balance of Offense, Defense, and Stability Operations ................................. V-35 

 Considerations for Shaping .................................................................................... V-37 

 Considerations for Deterrence ............................................................................... V-39 

 Considerations for Seizing the Initiative ............................................................... V-43 

 Considerations for Dominance .............................................................................. V-50 

 Considerations for Stabilization ............................................................................ V-59 

 Considerations for Enabling Civil Authority ......................................................... V-63 

APPENDIX 

A Principles of Joint Operations ................................................................... A-1 

B References ..................................................................................................B-1 

C Administrative Instructions ........................................................................C-1 

GLOSSARY 

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................. GL-1 

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-5 

FIGURE 

I-1 Principles of Joint Operations ..................................................................... I-2 

I-2 Common Operating Precepts ...................................................................... I-3 

I-3 Range of Military Operations ...................................................................... I-5 

I-4 Unified Action ............................................................................................. I-9 

I-5 Relationship Between Strategy and Operational Art ................................ I-13 

I-6 Examples of Military Operations .............................................................. I-15 

II-1 Elements of Operational Design ................................................................II-5 
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II-2 Joint Operation Planning Process...............................................................II-7

III-1 Command Relationships Synopsis........................................................... III-3

III-2 Creating Shared Understanding ............................................................. III-12

III-3 Risk Management Process ..................................................................... III-16

IV-1 Visualizing the Operational Environment................................................IV-3

IV-2 The Interconnected Operational Environment .........................................IV-5

IV-3 Notional Joint Force Headquarters and 

Cross-Functional Staff Organization......................................................IV-10

IV-4 Operational Areas within a Theater .......................................................IV-12

IV-5 Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas...............................IV-14

V-1 Range of Military Operations.................................................................... V-1

V-2 Examples of Military Operations.............................................................. V-4

V-3 Notional Operation Plan Phases versus Level of Military Effort.............. V-6

V-4 Notional Balance of Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Operations..... V-36

V-5 Combinations of Areas of Operations and 

Linear/Nonlinear Operations................................................................... V-53
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

 Presents the Fundamentals of Joint Operations as an Instrument of National 

Power and as Part of Unified Action

 Discusses the Art of Command as It Pertains to Authority, CommanderCentric Leadership, Operational Art of Design, Operational Design, Joint 

Operations Planning Process 

 Explains Joint Functions of Command and Control, Intelligence, Fires, 

Movement and Maneuver, Protection, and Sustainment

 Describes Organizing for Joint Operations, Including Organizing the Joint 

Force Headquarters 

 Discusses Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations 

Fundamentals of Joint Operations 

Joint operations is a general term 

that describes military actions 

conducted by joint forces or by 

Service forces employed under 

command relationships. 

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 is the keystone document 

in the joint operations series, and is a companion to 

joint doctrine’s capstone JP 1, Doctrine for the 

Armed Forces of the United States. It provides 

guidance to joint force commanders (JFCs) and their 

subordinates for planning, preparing, executing, and 

assessing joint military operations. Although 

individual Services may accomplish tasks and 

missions in support of Department of Defense (DOD) 

objectives, the primary way DOD employs two or 

more Services (from two Military Departments) in a 

single operation, particularly in combat, is through 

joint operations. 

Strategic Environment and 

National Security Challenges 

The strategic environment is characterized by 

uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change, which 

requires persistent engagement. This environment is 

fluid, with continually changing alliances, 

partnerships, and new national and transnational 

threats constantly appearing and disappearing. In 

addition to traditional conflicts, to include emerging 

peer competitors, significant challenges continue to 

include irregular warfare (IW), catastrophic terrorism 

employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and 
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threats to disrupt the Nation’s ability to project power 

and maintain its qualitative edge. 

The strategic environment presents five broad 

national security challenges likely to require the 

employment of joint forces in the future. 

 A secure US homeland is the Nation’s first 

priority. 

 Deterring our adversaries is a US goal. 

 Defending national interests requires not only 

being able to prevail in conflict, but also taking 

preventive measures to deter potential adversaries 

who could threaten the vital interests of the 

United States or its partners. 

 Establishing, maintaining, and enhancing security 

cooperation among our alliances and partners is 

important to strengthen the global security 

framework of the United States and its partners. 

 As it has in the past, the United States will 

continue to respond to a variety of civil crises by 

acting to relieve human suffering and restoring 

civil functioning, most often in support of civil 

authorities. 

Instruments of National Power 

and the Range of Military 

Operations 

Our national leaders can use the military instrument 

of national power in a wide variety of activities, 

tasks, missions, and operations that vary in purpose, 

scale, risk, and combat intensity. Operations are 

grouped in three areas that compose the range of 

military operation. 

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and 

Deterrence. These are ongoing routine activities that 

establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with 

other nations and domestic civil authorities (e.g., 

state governors or local law enforcement). 

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency 

Operations. These can be small-scale, limitedduration operations, such as strikes, raids, and peace 

enforcement, which might include combat depending 

on the circumstances. 
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Major Operations and Campaigns. These are 

extended-duration, large-scale operations that usually 

involve combat.

Strategic Guidance 

A combatant commander is the 

vital link between those who 

determine national security policy 

and strategy and the military 

forces or subordinate joint force 

commanders (JFCs) who conduct 

military operations. 

National strategic direction provides strategic 

context for the employment of the instruments of 

national power and defines the strategic purpose that 

guides employment of the military instrument of 

national power as part of a global strategy. Based on 

guidance from the President and Secretary of 

Defense, geographic and functional combatant 

commanders (CCDRs) develop strategies that 

translate national and multinational strategic 

direction into strategic concepts or courses of action 

to meet joint operation planning requirements. 

Unified Action 

Unified action is a comprehensive 

approach that synchronizes, 

coordinates, and when 

appropriate, integrates military 

operations with the activities of 

other governmental and 

nongovernmental organizations to 

achieve unity of effort. 

Whereas the term joint operations focuses on the 

integrated actions of the Armed Forces of the United 

States in a unified effort, the term unified action has a 

broader connotation. JFCs are challenged to achieve 

and maintain operational coherence given the 

requirement to operate in conjunction with 

interorganizational partners. CCDRs play a pivotal 

role in unifying joint force actions, since all of the 

elements and actions that comprise unified action 

normally are present at the CCDR’s level. However, 

subordinate JFCs also integrate and synchronize their 

operations directly with the operations of other 

military forces and the activities of nonmilitary 

organizations in the operational area to promote 

unified action. 

Levels of War 

There are no finite limits or 

boundaries between these levels, 

but they help commanders 

visualize a logical arrangement of 

operations, allocate resources, and 

Three levels of war—strategic, operational, and 

tactical—model the relationship between national 

objectives and tactical actions. 

Strategic Level. In the context of military 

operations, strategy develops an idea or set of ideas 

for employing the instruments of national power in a 

synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve 

theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. 

Operational Level. The operational level links the 

tactical employment of forces to national and military 

strategic objectives. 
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assign tasks to the appropriate 

command. 

Tactical Level. Tactics is the employment and 

ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each 

other. Joint doctrine focuses this term on planning 

and executing battles, engagements, and activities at 

the tactical level to achieve military objectives 

assigned to tactical units or task forces. 

Types of Military Operations 

Each military operation may 

occur simultaneously with or 

independently of other operations, 

or multiple operations may 

overlap.

The United States employs its military capabilities in 

support of its national security goals in a variety of 

military operations. Operations such as 

counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism are 

primarily related to IW. Large-scale combat 

operations associated with traditional warfare 

typically characterize major operations and 

campaigns, although the extended nature of some IW 

will require operations phased over time as a 

campaign. 

The Art of Joint Command 

Command is the authority that a 

commander in the armed forces 

lawfully exercises over 

subordinates by virtue of rank or 

assignment. 

While command authority stems from appropriate 

orders and other directives, the art of command 

resides in the commander’s ability to use 

situational leadership to maximize operational 

performance. The combination of courage, ethical 

leadership, judgment, intuition, situational awareness, 

and the ability to consider contrary views gained over 

time through training, education, and experience 

helps commanders make difficult decisions in 

complex situations. 

Commander-Centric Leadership Historical analysis shows that commander-centric 

organizations out-perform staff-centric, processoriented organizations. A commander’s perspective 

of the challenge at hand is broader and more 

comprehensive than the staff’s due to interaction with 

civilian leaders; senior, peer, subordinate, and 

supporting commanders; and interorganizational 

partners. Clear commander’s guidance and intent, 

enriched by the commander’s experience and 

intuition, are common to high-performing units. 

Operational Art 

Operational art applies to all 

aspects of joint operations and 

Operational art is the use of creative thinking by 

commanders and staffs to design strategies, 

campaigns, and major operations and organize 

and employ military forces. Operational art 
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integrates ends, ways, and means, 

while accounting for risk, across 

the levels of war. 

requires a broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and 

the skill to plan, prepare, execute, and assess. It 

helps commanders and their staffs order their 

thoughts and understand the conditions for victory 

before seeking battle. Operational art encompasses 

operational design—the conception and 

construction of the intellectual framework that 

underpins joint operation plans and their 

subsequent execution. 

Operational Design 

Operational design supports 

operational art with a general 

methodology using elements of 

operational design for 

understanding the situation and 

the problem. 

Operational design extends operational art’s vision 

with a creative process that helps commanders and 

planners answer the ends–ways–means–risk 

questions. The commander is the central figure in 

operational design. The elements of operational 

design are individual tools that help the JFC and staff 

visualize and describe the broad operational 

approach. Operational art, operational design, and 

joint operation planning process blend in 

complementary fashion as part of the overall process 

that produces the eventual plan or order that drives 

the joint operation. 

Joint Operation Planning 

Joint operation planning process 

underpins planning at all levels 

and for missions across the range 

of military operations. 

Joint operation planning consists of planning 

activities associated with joint military operations by 

CCDRs and their subordinate JFCs in response to 

contingencies and crises. It transforms national 

strategic objectives into activities by development of 

operational products, which include planning for the 

mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, 

redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. 

Regardless of the commander’s level of 

involvement, certain key planning elements 

require the commander’s participation and 

decisions. These include the operational approach, 

mission statement, commander’s planning guidance, 

commander’s intent, commander’s critical 

information requirements, and concept of operations 

(CONOPS). 

Assessment 

Continuous assessment helps the 

JFC and joint force component 

commanders determine if the joint 

force is “doing the right things” 

Assessment is a process that evaluates changes in 

the environment and measures progress of the 

joint force toward mission accomplishment. 

Assessment begins during mission analysis when the 

commander and staff consider what to measure and 

how to measure it to determine progress toward 
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(measures of effectiveness) to 

achieve its objectives, not just 

“doing things right” (measures of 

performance). 

accomplishing tasks, creating conditions, or 

achieving objectives. During execution, the 

commander’s staff identifies those key assessment 

indicators that suggest progress or setbacks in 

accomplishing tasks, creating effects, and achieving 

objectives. Assessment actions and measures help 

commanders adjust operations and resources as 

required, determine when to execute branches and 

sequels, and make other critical decisions to ensure 

current and future operations remain aligned with the 

mission and military end state. 

Joint Functions 

Joint functions are related 

capabilities and activities grouped 

together to help JFCs integrate, 

synchronize, and direct joint 

operations. 

Functions that are common to joint operations at all 

levels of war fall into six basic groups—command 

and control (C2), intelligence, fires, movement 

and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. The 

joint functions reinforce and complement one 

another, and integration across the functions is 

essential to mission accomplishment. 

Command and Control C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and 

direction by a commander over assigned and attached 

forces to accomplish the mission. The JFC provides 

operational vision, guidance, and direction to the 

joint force. 

Intelligence The intelligence function supports this understanding 

by providing integrated, evaluated, analyzed, and 

interpreted information concerning foreign nations, 

hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or 

areas of actual or potential operations. Intelligence 

tells JFCs what the enemy is doing, is capable of 

doing, and may do in the future. 

Fires To employ fires is to use available weapons and 

other systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal 

effect on a target. Joint fires are those delivered 

during the employment of forces from two or more 

components in coordinated action to produce desired 

results in support of a common objective. Fires 

typically produce destructive effects, but various 

nonlethal ways and means (such as electronic attack) 

can be employed with little or no associated physical 

destruction. 
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Movement and Maneuver This function encompasses the disposition of joint 

forces to conduct operations by securing positional 

advantages before or during combat operations and 

by exploiting tactical success to achieve operational 

and strategic objectives. This function includes 

moving or deploying forces into an operational area 

and maneuvering them to operational depths for 

offensive and defensive purposes. It also includes 

assuring the mobility of friendly forces. 

Protection The protection function focuses on preserving the 

joint force’s fighting potential in four primary ways. 

One way uses active defensive measures that protect 

the joint force, its information, its bases, necessary 

infrastructure, and lines of communications from an 

enemy attack. Another way uses passive defensive 

measures that make friendly forces, systems, and 

facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. 

Equally important is the application of technology 

and procedures to reduce the risk of fratricide. 

Finally, emergency management and response reduce 

the loss of personnel and capabilities due to 

accidents, health threats, and natural disasters. 

Sustainment Sustainment is the provision of logistics and 

personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong 

operations through mission accomplishment and 

redeployment of the force. Sustainment provides the 

JFC with the means to enable freedom of action and 

endurance and the ability to extend operational reach. 

Effective sustainment determines the depth to which 

the joint force can conduct decisive operations, 

allowing the JFC to seize, retain, and exploit the 

initiative. 

Organizing for Joint Operations 

Organizing for joint operations Organizing for joint operations involves many 

considerations. Most can be associated in three 

primary groups related to organizing the joint force, 

organizing the joint force headquarters (HQ), and 

organizing operational areas to help control 

operations. 

Understanding the Operational 

Environment 

The JFC’s operational environment is the composite 

of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that 
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affect employment of capabilities and bear on the 

decisions of the commander. It encompasses 

physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, 

and space domains) and the information environment 

(which includes cyberspace). Included within these 

are enemy, friendly, and neutral systems that are 

relevant to a specific joint operation. The nature and 

interaction of these systems will affect how the 

commander plans, organizes for, and conducts joint 

operations. 

Organizing the Joint Force 

Joint forces can be established on 

a geographic or functional basis. 

How JFCs organize their assigned or attached forces 

directly affects the responsiveness and versatility of 

joint operations. The first principle in joint force 

organization is that JFCs organize forces to 

accomplish the mission based on their intent and 

CONOPS. Unity of command, centralized planning 

and direction, and decentralized execution are key 

considerations. JFCs may elect to centralize selected 

functions within the joint force, but should avoid 

reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative 

of subordinate forces. JFCs should allow Service and 

special operations forces tactical and operational 

forces, organizations, and capabilities to function 

generally as they were designed. 

Organizing the Joint Force 

Headquarters 

Joint force HQ include those for unified, subunified, 

and specified commands and joint task forces. While 

each HQ organizes to accommodate the nature of the 

JFC’s operational area, mission, tasks, and 

preferences, all generally follow a traditional 

functional staff alignment (i.e., personnel, 

intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and 

communications). Boards, centers, working groups, 

and other semipermanent and temporary 

organizations facilitate cross-functional coordination, 

synchronization, planning, and information sharing 

between principal staff directorates. Although these 

organizations are cross-functional in their 

membership, they typically fall under the oversight of 

a principal staff directorate. 

Organizing Operational Areas Except for areas of responsibility, which are assigned 

in the Unified Command Plan, geographic combatant 

commanders and other JFCs designate smaller 

operational areas (e.g., joint operations area and area 
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of operations) on a temporary basis. Operational 

areas have physical dimensions comprised of some 

combination of air, land, maritime, and space 

domains. JFCs define these areas with geographical 

boundaries, which help commanders and staffs 

coordinate, integrate, and deconflict joint operations 

among joint force components and supporting 

commands. 

 

Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations 

The range of military operations is 

another fundamental construct 

that provides context. 

Military operations vary in scope, purpose, and 

conflict intensity across a range that extends from 

military engagement, security cooperation, and 

deterrence activities to crisis response and limited 

contingency operations and, if necessary, to major 

operations and campaigns. 

Military Operations and Related 

Missions, Tasks, and Actions 

In general, a military operation is a set of actions 

intended to accomplish a task or mission. Although 

the US military is organized, trained, and equipped 

for sustained, large-scale combat anywhere in the 

world, the capabilities to conduct these operations 

also enable a wide variety of other operations as well. 

Examples of military operations include stability 

operations; civil support; foreign humanitarian 

assistance (FHA); recovery; noncombatant 

evacuation (NEO); peace operations (PO); combating 

WMD; chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear consequence management; foreign internal 

defense (FID); counterdrug (CD) operations; 

combating terrorism; COIN; and homeland defense 

(HD). 

Phasing a Joint Operation A phase is a definitive stage of an operation or 

campaign during which a large portion of the forces 

and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually 

supporting activities for a common purpose. 

Phasing, which can be used in any operation 

regardless of size, helps the JFC organize large 

operations by integrating and synchronizing 

subordinate operations. Phasing helps JFCs and 

staffs visualize, design, and plan the entire operation 

or campaign and define requirements in terms of 

forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. 
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Military Engagement, Security 

Cooperation, and Deterrence 

Military engagement, security cooperation, and 

deterrence missions, tasks, and actions encompass a 

wide range of actions where the military instrument 

of national power is tasked to support other 

government agencies (OGAs) and cooperate with 

intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (e.g., United 

Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and 

other countries to protect and enhance national 

security interests, deter conflict, and set conditions 

for future contingency operations. 

Typical Operations of Military 

Engagement, Security 

Cooperation, and Deterrence 

Engagement activities generally 

are governed by various directives 

and agreements and do not 

require a joint operation plan or 

operations order for execution. 

Even when the US is not conducting limited 

contingency operations, major operations, or 

campaigns, numerous routine missions (such as 

security cooperation) and continuing operations or 

tasks (such as ensuring freedom of navigation) are 

occurring under the general heading of engagement. 

Some typical operations of military engagement, 

security cooperation, and deterrence are: emergency 

preparedness; arms control, nonproliferation, and 

disarmament; combating terrorism; DOD support to 

CD operations; enforcement of sanctions; enforcing 

exclusion zones; ensuring freedom of navigation and 

overflight; nation assistance; FID; protection of 

shipping; show of force operations; support to 

insurgency; and COIN. 

Other Considerations for Military 

Engagement, Security 

Cooperation, and Deterrence 

Other considerations for military engagement, 

security cooperation, and deterrence are: interagency, 

intergovernmental, and nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs) and host nation (HN) 

coordination; information sharing; and cultural 

awareness. 

Crisis Response and Limited 

Contingency Operations 

A limited contingency operation in response to a 

crisis includes all of those operations for which a JFC 

must develop an operation plan or operation order. 

The level of complexity, duration, and resources 

depends on the circumstances. Included are 

operations to ensure the safety of American citizens 

and US interests while maintaining and improving 

US ability to operate with multinational partners to 

deter the hostile ambitions of potential aggressors. 

Typical Crisis Response and 

Limited Contingency Operations 

Some typical crisis response and limited contingency 

operations are: NEO; PO; FHA; recovery operations; 
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strikes and raids; and HD and defense support of civil 

authorities. 

Other Considerations for Crisis 

Response and Limited 

Contingency Operations 

Other considerations for crisis response and limited 

contingency operations are: duration and end state, 

intelligence collection, constraints and restraints; 

force protection, and training. 

Major Operations and Campaigns 

Campaigns are joint in nature—

functional and Service 

components conduct supporting 

operations, not independent 

campaigns. 

When required to achieve national strategic 

objectives or protect national interests, the US 

national leadership may decide to conduct a major 

operation or campaign involving large-scale combat, 

placing the United States in a wartime state. In such 

cases, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy 

as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and 

establish conditions favorable to the HN, the United 

States, and its multinational partners. A major 

operation is a series of tactical actions, such as 

battles, engagements, and strikes, and is the primary 

building block of a campaign. A campaign is a series 

of related military operations aimed at accomplishing 

a military strategic or operational objective within a 

given time and space. 

The Balance of Offense, Defense, 

and Stability Operations 

Combat missions and tasks can vary widely 

depending on context of the operation and the 

objective. Most combat operations will require the 

commander to balance offensive, defensive, and 

stability operations. This is particularly evident in a 

campaign or operation, where combat occurs during 

several phases and stability operations may occur 

throughout the campaign or operation. Commanders 

strive to apply the many dimensions of military 

power simultaneously across the depth, breadth, and 

height of the operational area. 

Considerations for Shaping JFCs are able to assist in determining the shape and 

character of potential future operations before 

committing forces. In many cases, these actions 

enhance bonds between potential multinational 

partners, increase understanding of the region, help 

ensure access when required, strengthen future 

multinational operations, and prevent crises from 

developing. 
Executive Summary 

xx JP 3-0

Considerations for Deterrence The deter phase is characterized by preparatory 

actions that indicate the intent to execute subsequent 

phases of the operation. Deterrence should be based 

on capability (having the means to influence 

behavior), credibility (maintaining a level of 

believability that the proposed actions may actual be 

employed), and communication (transmitting the 

intended message to the desired audience) to ensure 

greater effectiveness. Emphasis should be placed on 

setting the conditions for successful joint operations 

in the dominate and follow-on phases should 

deterrence fail. 

Considerations for Seizing the 

Initiative 

As operations commence, the JFC needs to exploit 

friendly advantages and capabilities to shock, 

demoralize, and disrupt the enemy immediately. The 

JFC seeks decisive advantage through the use of all 

available elements of combat power to seize and 

maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the 

opportunity to achieve its objectives, and generate in 

the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat. 

Considerations for Dominance 

The JFC may designate one 

component or line of operation 

(LOO) to be the main effort, with 

other components providing 

support and other LOOs as 

supporting efforts. 

During sustained combat operations, JFCs 

simultaneously employ conventional and special 

operations forces and capabilities throughout the 

breadth and depth of the operational area. Some 

missions and operations (i.e., strategic attack, 

interdiction, and information operations) continue 

throughout to deny the enemy sanctuary, freedom of 

action, or informational advantage. These missions 

and operations, when executed concurrently with 

other operations, degrade enemy morale and physical 

cohesion and bring the enemy closer to culmination.

Considerations for Stabilization Operations in this phase continue pursuit of the 

national strategic end state. These operations 

typically begin with significant military involvement, 

to include some combat, and then move increasingly 

toward enabling civil authority as the threat wanes 

and civil infrastructures are reestablished. As 

progress is made, military forces will increase their 

focus on supporting the efforts of HN authorities, 

OGAs, IGOs, and/or NGOs. 

Considerations for Enabling Civil 

Authority 

In this phase, the joint operation normally is 

terminated when the stated military strategic and/or 
Executive Summary 

xxi

operational objectives have been met and 

redeployment of the joint force is accomplished. 

This should mean that a legitimate civil authority has 

been enabled to manage the situation without further 

outside military assistance. In some cases, it may 

become apparent that the stated objectives fall short 

of properly enabling civil authority. This situation 

may require a redesign of the joint operation as a 

result of an extension of the required stability 

operations in support of US diplomatic, HN, IGO, 

and/or NGO efforts. 

CONCLUSION 

 This publication is the keystone document of the joint 

operations series. It provides the doctrinal 

foundation and fundamental principles that guide the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations 

across the range of military operations.
Executive Summary 

xxii JP 3-0

Intentionally Blank 
I-1

CHAPTER I

FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

a. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 is the keystone document in the joint operations series, and 

is a companion to joint doctrine’s capstone JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the

United States. It provides guidance to joint force commanders (JFCs) and their subordinates 

for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing joint military operations. It also informs 

civilian decision makers and interorganizational partners of fundamental principles, precepts, 

and philosophies that guide the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States. JP 3-

0 describes fundamental keystone constructs—such as unified action and joint functions—

that apply regardless of the nature or circumstances of a specific joint operation. This 

publication provides a context not only for the joint operations series, but also for other 

keystone doctrine publications that describe supporting functions and processes.

b. The fundamental purpose of military power is to deter or wage war in support of 

national policy. In these capacities, military power is a coercive instrument, designed to 

achieve by force or the threat of force what other means have not. While leaders may 

employ this power in more benign ways for a variety of important purposes across a wide 

range of situations, they must understand that these other uses can imperil this Nation’s 

fundamental ability to wage war. 

c. Although individual Services may accomplish tasks and missions in support of 

Department of Defense (DOD) objectives, the primary way DOD employs two or more 

Services (from two Military Departments) in a single operation, particularly in combat, is 

through joint operations. Joint operations is a general term that describes military actions 

conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command 

relationships with each other, which, of themselves, do not establish joint forces. A joint 

force is one composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military 

Departments operating under a single JFC. 

d. Joint operations doctrine is built on a sound base of warfighting philosophy, 

theory, and practical experience. Its foundation rests upon the bedrock principles of war 

and the associated fundamentals of joint warfare, described in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed 

Forces of the United States. Joint doctrine recognizes the basic and beneficial effects of 

unity of command and the synergy that results from the integration and synchronization of 

military operations in time, space, and purpose. Our leaders employ the Armed Forces of the 

United States in coordination with the other instruments of national power to advance and 

defend US values and interests, achieve objectives consistent with national strategy, and 

conclude operations on terms favorable to the US.

“Joint warfare is team warfare.” 

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
Chapter I

I-2 JP 3-0

e. Joint Warfare is Team Warfare. The synergy that results from the integration and 

synchronization of Service components’ capabilities under a single JFC maximizes the 

effectiveness and efficiency of the force. The advantage of a joint team extends beyond the 

operational environment and across the range of military operations. A joint operation does 

not require that all forces participate in a particular operation merely because they are 

available; the JFC has the authority and responsibility to tailor forcesfor the mission at hand.

f. Principles of Joint Operations. Since the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

in 1947, joint doctrine has recognized the nine principles of war. Subsequent experience 

from a wide variety of irregular warfare (IW) situations has identified three additional 

principles—restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Together, they comprise the 12 

principles of joint operations (see Figure I-1) as discussed in Appendix A, “Principles of 

Joint Operations.” 

g. Common Operating Precepts. In addition to the principles of joint operations, ten 

common operating precepts underlie successful joint operations. Listed in Figure I-2, these 

precepts flow logically from the broad challenges in the strategic environment to the specific 

conditions, circumstances, and influences in a JFC’s operational environment. JP 3-0’s text 

highlights each common operating precept where it applies.

2. Strategic Environment and National Security Challenges

a. The strategic environment is characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and rapid 

change, which requires persistent engagement. This environment is fluid, with continually 

changing alliances, partnerships, and new national and transnational threats constantly 

appearing and disappearing. While it is impossible to predict precisely how challenges will 

emerge and what form they might take, we can expect that uncertainty, ambiguity, and 

surprise will dominate the course of regional and global events. In addition to traditional 

conflicts to include emerging peer competitors, significant and emerging challenges continue 

to include irregular threats, information operations (IO) directly targeting our civilian 

leadership and population, catastrophic terrorism employing weapons of mass destruction 

Figure I-1. Principles of Joint Operations

Principles of Joint Operations

&

&

&

&

&

&

Objective

Offensive

Mass

Maneuver

Economy of force

Unity of command

&

&

&

&

&

&

Security

Surprise

Simplicity

Restraint

Perseverance

Legitimacy
Fundamentals of Joint Operations

I-3

(WMD), and other threats to disrupt the nation’s ability to project power and maintain its 

qualitative edge. 

b. The strategic environment presents broad national security challenges likely to 

require the employment of joint forces in the future. These are not new challenges. They are 

the natural products of the enduring human condition, but they will exhibit new features in 

the future. None of these challenges is a purely military problem. Rather, all are national 

problems calling for the application of all the instruments of national power.

(1) A secure US homeland is the Nation’s first priority. 

(2) Deterring our adversaries is a US goal. However, winning the Nation’s wars 

remains the preeminent justification for maintaining capable and credible military forces in 

the event that deterrence should fail. 

(3) Defending national interests requires not only being able to prevail in conflict, 

but also taking preventive measures to deter potential adversaries who could threaten the 

vital interests of the United States or its partners. These threats could range from direct 

aggression to less openly belligerent actions that nonetheless threaten vital national interests.

(4) Establishing, maintaining, and enhancing security cooperation among our 

alliances and partners is important to strengthen the global security framework of the United 

States and its partners. Security cooperation allows us to proactively take advantage of 

opportunities and not just react to threats.

Figure I-2. Common Operating Precepts

Common Operating Precepts

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

Inform domestic audiences and influence the perceptions and attitudes of key foreign 

audiences as an explicit and continuous operational requirement.

Achieve and maintain unity of effort within the joint force and between the joint force and 

US Government, international, and other partners. 

Leverage the benefits of operating indirectly through partners when strategic and 

operational circumstances dictate or permit. 

Integrate joint capabilities to be complementary rather than merely additive. 

Avoid combining capabilities where doing so adds complexity without compensating 

advantage. 

Focus on operational objectives whose achievement suggests the broadest and most 

enduring results. 

Ensure freedom of action. 

Maintain operational and organizational flexibility. 

Plan for and manage operational transitions over time and space. 

Drive synergy to the lowest echelon at which it can be managed effectively.
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-0 

(5) As it has in the past, the United States will continue to respond to a variety of 

civil crises by acting to relieve human suffering and restoring civil functioning, most often in 

support of civil authorities.

c. Joint operations increasingly occur in urban terrain and in cyberspace. The US 

homeland and other US interests are potential targets for direct and indirect attack. 

Adversary actions are likely to follow asymmetric principles. They will avoid “hard” 

(defended) targets and attack vulnerable ones. Vulnerable targets may include US and 

partner nation lines of communications (LOCs), ports, airports, staging areas, civilian 

populations, critical infrastructure, and economic centers. Advances in information 

technology increase the tempo, lethality, and depth of warfare. Within this environment, 

maintaining national security and managing the inevitable changes are continuous processes 

that often preclude simple solutions. These challenges often require well-planned and 

executed joint operations in conjunction with actions by a variety of other participants. In 

addition to military forces (including multinational forces) and civilians, there may be a 

number of interagency partners, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs), and elements of the private sector whose presence or influence can 

affect the JFC’s operations. 

For more information on the strategic environment, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed 

Forces of the United States. For more information on interorganizational coordination, 

refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.

3. Instruments of National Power and the Range of Military Operations 

a. The various institutions that represent the US instruments of national power face 

daily challenges within the strategic environment. 

b. The routine interaction of the instruments of national power is fundamental to US 

activities in the strategic environment. The instruments of national power are tools the US 

uses to apply its sources of power, including its culture, industry, science and technology, 

academic institutions, geography, and national will. The ability of the United States to 

advance its national interests is dependent on the effectiveness of the United States 

Government (USG) in employing the instruments of national power to achieve national 

strategic objectives. The appropriate governmental officials, often with National Security 

Council direction, normally coordinate these instruments of national power (diplomatic, 

informational, military, and economic). The military instrument’s role increases relative to 

the other instruments as the need to compel a potential adversary through force increases. 

c. Our national leaders can use the military instrument of national power in a wide 

variety of activities, tasks, missions, and operations that vary in purpose, scale, risk, and 

combat intensity. Operations are grouped in three areas that compose the range of military 

operations (Figure I-3). 

(1) Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence. These are 

ongoing routine activities that establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other 

nations and domestic civil authorities (e.g., state governors or local law enforcement). Many 
Fundamentals of Joint Operations 

I-5 

of these activities occur across the conflict continuum, and will usually continue in areas 

outside the operational areas associated with ongoing limited contingency operations, major 

operations, and campaigns. 

(2) Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations. These can be smallscale, limited-duration operations, such as strikes, raids, and peace enforcement, which 

might include combat depending on the circumstances. Commanders conduct these 

operations individually, in simultaneous or concurrent groupings, or in conjunction with a 

major operation or campaign. 

(3) Major Operations and Campaigns. These are extended-duration, large-scale 

operations that usually involve combat. A major operation is a series of related tactical 

actions, such as battles, engagements, and strikes. It can be conducted independently or can 

serve as an important component of a campaign. A campaign, in turn, is a series of related 

major operations. Both campaigns and major operations can achieve strategic or operational 

objectives, or both, within a given time and space. 

For more information on the instruments of national power, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the 

Armed Forces of the United States. Refer to Chapter V, “Joint Operations Across the Range 

of Military Operations,” for more information on the types and scope of joint operations. 

4. Strategic Guidance

a. National strategic direction provides strategic context for the employment of the 

instruments of national power and defines the strategic purpose that guides employment of 

the military instrument of national power as part of a global strategy. Continuing 

Figure I-3. Range of Military Operations 

Range of Military Operations

Major Operations and Campaigns

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

Range of 

Military 

Operations

Our national leaders can use the military instrument of national power across the conflict 

continuum in a wide variety of operations that are commonly characterized in three groups as 

this figure depicts.

Peace Conflict Continuum War
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-0 

 assessments of the current and future strategic environment shape our national strategy, 

goals, and objectives. 

(1) In general, the President frames the strategic context by defining national 

interests and goals in documents such as the National Security Strategy (NSS), Presidential 

policy directives, executive orders, and other strategic documents in conjunction with 

additional guidance and refinement from the National Security Council/Homeland Security 

Council. When the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council work as one, 

they are referred to as the National Security Staff. The National Strategy for Homeland 

Security, also signed by the President, provides national direction to secure the homeland 

through a comprehensive framework for organizing the efforts of federal, state, local, and 

private organizations whose primary functions are often unrelated to national security. 

(2) DOD’s strategic documents provide amplification to the NSS. The documents 

outline how DOD will support NSS objectives, and provide a framework for other DOD 

policy and planning guidance, such as the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), 

Defense Planning and Programming Guidance, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. 

(3) The President also signs the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which is developed 

by the Joint Staff. The UCP establishes combatant command (CCMD) missions, 

responsibilities, and geographic areas of responsibility (AORs). The President approves the 

contingency planning guidance contained in the GEF, which is developed by the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense. The GEF provides written policy guidance and priorities to the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and combatant commanders (CCDRs) for 

reviewing and preparing operation plans (OPLANs) and theater campaign plans (TCPs). 

b. From this broad strategic guidance, more definitive national, functional, and theaterstrategic objectives help focus and refine the context and guide the military’s joint operation 

planning and execution related to a specific crisis or end state. The President and Secretary of 

Defense (SecDef), through the CJCS, direct national-level support for combatant and 

subordinate commanders. SecDef, with the CJCS’s assistance, continually assesses the 

relative importance and urgency of various theater operations to determine where to focus US 

military efforts and when and where the Nation can afford to accept risk. Integrated planning, 

coordination, and guidance among the Joint Staff, CCMD staffs, Service Chiefs, and other 

government agencies (OGAs) translate strategic priorities into clear planning guidance, 

tailored force packages, and sufficient sustainment for the joint force to accomplish its mission. 

For more information on national strategic direction, see Presidential Policy Directive 1, 

Organization of the National Security System, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Instruction (CJCSI) 5715.01B, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs, JP 1, 

Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

c. Strategic communication (SC) is an important component of strategic guidance. 

The USG uses SC processes to guide the informational instrument of national power in 

specific situations. In an ever-changing environment, the communications strategy and 

success of a joint operation may depend heavily on the sympathy or support of key global 

audiences. This is especially true for protracted operations. Operations that are concluded 
Fundamentals of Joint Operations 

I-7 

rapidly will be much less affected by public opinion even if they are more politically 

controversial. Through SC, the USG focuses processes and efforts to understand and engage 

key audiences and create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance USG 

interests, policies, and objectives. This occurs through the use of coordinated information, 

themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with the other instruments of national 

power. Commanders support USG SC efforts during joint operations primarily through their 

communications strategies. See paragraph 2.l., “Strategic Communication and 

Communications Strategy,” in Chapter III, “Joint Functions,” for more information. 

For more information on SC, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 

States, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

d. The Combatant Commander’s Strategic Role

(1) A CCDR is the vital link between those who determine national security policy 

and strategy and the military forces or subordinate JFCs who conduct military operations. 

Based on guidance from the President and SecDef, geographic and functional CCDRs 

develop strategies that translate national and multinational strategic direction into strategic 

concepts or courses of action (COAs) to meet joint operation planning requirements. 

Theater and functional strategies contain strategic concepts and COAs directed toward 

securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the 

integrated employment of military capabilities synchronized with the other instruments of 

national power specific to geographic and functional CCMDs. 

(2) Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) develop their theater strategies by 

analyzing events in the operational environment and developing options to set conditions for 

achieving strategic end states. They translate these options into an integrated set of steadystate engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities described in theater and 

subordinate campaign plans, formal products of the Adaptive Planning and Execution 

(APEX) system. In some cases, a CCDR may be required to develop a global campaign 

plan. These plans operationalize the CCDR’s theater strategy. Contingency plans developed 

to respond to specific contingencies are treated as branch plans to the campaign plan. 

Functional combatant commanders (FCCs) develop their functional strategy based on 

guidance in the UCP and their functional objectives and strategic end states contained in the 

GEF. FCCs may be responsible for developing functional global or subordinate campaign 

plans or both. See Chapter V, “Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations,” 

for more information on campaign plans. 

(3) In joint operations, the supported CCDR often will have a role in achieving 

more than one national strategic objective. Some national strategic objectives will be the 

primary responsibility of the supported CCDR, while others will require a more balanced use 

of all instruments of national power, with the CCDR in support of other agencies. 

Supporting CCDRs and their subordinates design their actions to be consistent with the 

supported commander’s strategy. All CCDRs provide strategic direction; assign missions, 

tasks, forces, and resources; designate objectives; establish operational limitations such as 

rules of engagement (ROE), constraints, and restraints; and define policies and concepts of 

operations (CONOPS) to be integrated into OPLANs and operation orders (OPORDs). In 
Chapter I

I-8 JP 3-0

applying military power, CCDRs use the capabilities of assigned, attached, and supporting 

military forces. They also consider and, when appropriate, integrate the contributions of the 

other instruments of national power and the capabilities of multinational partners to gain and 

maintain strategic advantage.

For more information on the strategic environment, strategic guidance, strategy and 

estimates, and the role of CCDRs, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 

States. For more information on APEX and joint operation planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint 

Operation Planning.

(4) Terminating joint operationsis an aspect of the CCDR’s functional or theater 

strategy that links to achievement of national strategic objectives. Based on the President’s 

strategic objectives that compose a desired national strategic end state, the supported 

CCDR can develop and propose termination criteria—the specified conditions approved by 

the President or SecDef that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded. These 

termination criteria help define the desired military end state, which normally represents a 

period in time or set of conditions beyond which the President does not require the military 

instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining national objectives. 

This period or set of circumstances signals a transition from military to civilian lead of 

subsequent activities. Strategic and operational-level commanders and their staffs consider 

termination of operations early in planning in a coordinated effort with relevant 

interorganizational partners. The ability to understand how and when to terminate operations 

is instrumental to operational design and planning.

For more information on end state and termination, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation 

Planning.

5. Unified Action

a. General. Whereas the term joint operations focuses on the integrated actions of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in a unified effort, the term unified action has a broader 

connotation. Unified action has its foundation in national strategic direction, which is 

governed by the Constitution, federal law, USG policy, international law, and our national 

interests. Unified action is a comprehensive approach that synchronizes, coordinates, and

when appropriate, integrates military operations with the activities of other governmental and 

NGOs to achieve unity of effort. Enabled by unity of command, US joint forces have 

established effective mechanisms to achieve military unity of effort. The goal of unified 

action is to achieve a similar level of unity of effort with external partners, as Figure I-4

shows. This publication uses the term interorganizational partners to refer collectively to 

USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military 

forces and government agencies; nongovernmental agencies; and the private sector. This 

aligns with the term and definition of interorganizational coordination established in JP 3-

08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.

COMMON OPERATING PRECEPT

Achieve and maintain unity of effort within the joint force and between the 

joint force and interorganizational partners.
Fundamentals of Joint Operations 

I-9 

b. The JFC’s Role. JFCs are challenged to achieve and maintain operational coherence 

given the requirement to operate in conjunction with interorganizational partners. CCDRs 

play a pivotal role in unifying joint force actions, since all of the elements and actions that 

comprise unified action normally are present at the CCDR’s level. However, subordinate 

JFCs also integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the operations of other 

military forces and the activities of nonmilitary organizations in the operational area to 

promote unified action. 

c. Multinational Participation in Unified Action

(1) General. Joint forces must be prepared to plan and execute operations with 

forces from other nations within the framework of an alliance or coalition under US or otherthan-US leadership. However, US forces often will be the predominant and most capable 

force within an alliance or coalition and can be expected to play a central leadership role. 

The military leaders of contributing member nations must emphasize common objectives as 

well as mutual support and respect. Cultivation and maintenance of personal relationships 

between counterparts are fundamental to achieving success. Language and communications 

differences, cultural diversity, historical animosities, and the varying capabilities of allies 

and multinational partners are among the many factors that complicate the integration and 

synchronization of their activities during multinational operations. Likewise, differing 

Figure I-4. Unified Action 

Unified Action

Unified 

Action

Intergovernmental 

Organizations

Multinational 

Forces

US Joint Forces

Private Sector 

and Others

Nongovernmental 

Organizations

US Government 

Departments and 

Agencies

The joint force commander plans, coordinates, synchronizes, and, when appropriate, integrates 

military operations with the activities of other governmental and nongovernmental entities to achieve 

unity of effort.
Chapter I

I-10 JP 3-0

national obligations derived from international treaties and agreements and national 

legislation complicate multinational operations. Regardless of other members’ treaty 

obligations or their lack of participation in a treaty, US forces will remain bound by US 

treaty obligations.

(2) Command and Control of US Forces. By law, the President retains 

command authority over US forces. This includes the authority and responsibility to 

effectively plan for, organize, coordinate, control, employ, and protect these forces. 

Nevertheless, the President may deem it prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as 

maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unified action) to place specific US forces 

under the control of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. Even 

when operating under the operational control (OPCON) of a foreign commander, US 

commanders will maintain the capability to report separately to higher US military 

authorities.

(3) Command and Control Structures. Alliances typically have developed 

command and control (C2) structures, systems, and procedures, with the predominant 

contributing nation providing the allied force commander. Staffs are integrated, and 

subordinate commands often are led by senior representatives from member nations. Shared 

doctrine, standardization agreements, close military cooperation, and robust diplomatic 

relations characterize alliances. Coalitions are less standardized and may adopt a parallel or 

lead-nation C2 structure or a combination of the two. In a parallel command construct,

Commanding officer of 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, whose mission is to conduct 

counterinsurgency operations in partnership with the Afghan national security forces in southern 

Afghanistan, greets Afghan national army generals during a key leader engagement involving Afghan 

national army soldiers and local Nawa District officials at Patrol Base Jaker in Afghanistan’s Helmand 

province.
Fundamentals of Joint Operations 

I-11 

nations retain control of their deployed forces and operate under their own doctrine and 

procedures, and in a lead nation command construct, the nation providing the 

preponderance of forces and resources typically provides the commander of the coalition 

force. These command structures also can exist simultaneously within a coalition. 

For more information on unified action with respect to multinational participation, refer to 

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. For more information on all 

aspects of multinational operations, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. For more 

information on multinational logistics, refer to JP 4-08, Logistics in Support of 

Multinational Operations. For North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) specific doctrine 

ratified by the United States, see Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(C), Allied Joint Doctrine,

and AJP-3(A), Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations. 

d. Interorganizational Coordination in Unified Action 

(1) General. CCDRs and subordinate JFCs often operate with interorganizational 

partners. The nature of interagency coordination demands that JFCs and planners consider 

the contribution of other instruments of national power and recognize which agencies can 

best contribute toward achieving objectives. DOD may support other agencies during some 

operations, but US military forces will remain under the DOD command structure. Federal 

lead agency responsibility may be prescribed by law or regulation, Presidential directive, 

policy, or agreement among or between agencies. Even then, because of its resources and 

well-established planning methods, the joint force will likely provide significant support to 

the lead agency. 

(2) Civil-Military Integration

(a) Military operations will require some level of civil-military integration. 

The degree of integration depends on the mission, objectives, and interests involved. 

Presidential directives guide participation by all USG departments and agencies in such 

operations. Military leaders work with the other members of the national security team to 

promote unified action. The agencies’ different and sometimes conflicting policies, 

procedures, decision-making processes, organizational cultures, and nature and extent of 

resourcing complicate this interface. 

(b) Integration and coordination among the military force and 

interorganizational counterparts are much less rigid than military C2. Some 

organizations may have policies that conflict with those of the USG, particularly those of the 

US military. Formal agreements, robust liaison, and information sharing with 

interorganizational partners are processes that should facilitate common understanding, 

coordination, and support mission accomplishment. Information sharing with NGOs and the 

private sector may be more restrictive, but options such as the joint interagency coordination 

group (JIACG) and civil-military operations center (CMOC) are available to the JFC to 

facilitate interorganizational coordination and information sharing. DOD, in collaboration 

with USG departments and agencies, and state, local, and tribal governments use the 

unifying structures and procedures provided by the National Response Framework (NRF) 

and the National Incident Management System in order to prepare for, plan, coordinate, and 
Chapter I

I-12 JP 3-0

respond to natural and man-made disasters in the US and its territories. Similar structures 

and processes, incorporating the capabilities and interests of foreign partners, can be 

incorporated into disaster-response and civil affairs (CA) in connection with US operations 

in foreign countries.

For more information on interorganizational coordination, refer to JP 3-08, 

Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. For more information on civilmilitary operations (CMO) and the CMOC, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

e. The intent of unified action is not that the US must lead every operation, since our 

country will not be able to respond directly to every crisis. Also, any large-scale 

employment of US military forces abroad invites political repercussions simply because it is 

the US that is acting. Some international parties will oppose almost any US military 

commitment, no matter how limited or benign, solely to restrain the exercise of American 

power. In such circumstances, friendly surrogates assisted by US joint forces may be able to 

conduct operations and achieve mutually agreeable objectives when the direct employment 

of US forces would be objectionable or infeasible. In other instances, such as 

counterinsurgency (COIN), eventual success may depend on the indigenous government 

demonstrating its own sovereign power, and the overt exercise of power by US forces may 

ultimately be counterproductive. JFCs may increasingly find it advantageous or necessary to 

pursue operational and strategic objectives by enabling and supporting such partners, 

whether friendly nations, international organizations, or some other entity.

6. Levels of War

a. General. Three levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical—model the 

relationship between national objectives and tactical actions. There are no finite limits or 

boundaries between these levels, but they help commanders visualize a logical arrangement 

of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. Echelon of 

command, size of units, types of equipment, and types and location of forces or components 

may often be associated with a particular level, but the strategic, operational, or tactical 

purpose of their employment depends on the nature of their task, mission, or objective. For 

example, intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered principally 

strategic assets, are also significant resources for tactical operations. Likewise, tactical 

actions can cause both intended and unintended strategic consequences, particularly in 

today’s environment of pervasive and immediate global communications. Figure I-5 depicts 

general relationships between strategy, operational art, and tactics and between leaders who 

typically focus at these levels.

COMMON OPERATING PRECEPT

Leverage the benefits of operating indirectly through partners when strategic 

and operational circumstances dictate or permit.
Fundamentals of Joint Operations

I-13

b. Strategic Level. In the context of military operations, strategy develops an idea or 

set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated 

fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. Through development 

of strategy (such as the NSS and National Military Strategy), a nation’s leader, often as a 

committee member with other nations’ leaders, determines national or multinational strategic 

objectives and guidance to develop and use national resources to achieve these objectives. 

The President, aided by the National Security Staff, establishes policy and national strategic 

objectives. SecDef translates these into strategic military objectives that facilitate theater 

strategic planning. CCDRs usually participate in strategic discussions with the President and 

SecDef through the CJCS and with allies and multinational members. Thus the CCDR’s 

strategy is an element that relates to both US national strategy and operational-level activities 

within the theater. Military strategy, derived from national policy and strategy and informed 

by doctrine, provides a framework for conducting operations. 

c. Operational Level 

(1) The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to national and 

military strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on the design, planning, and 

execution of operations using operational art: the application of creative imagination by 

commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to design 

strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. JFCs 

and component commanders use operational art to determine how, when, where, and for 

Figure I-5. Relationship Between Strategy and Operational Art

Relationship Between Strategy and Operational Art

Operational art links tactical action to strategic purpose. Operational art governs the deployment of 

forces and the arrangement of operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives. 

Unified Action

National 

Strategic 

Objectives

Strategy Operational Art

Theater 

Strategic 

Objectives

Operational-Level 

Objectives

Tactical 

Objectives

President

National Security 

Staff

Agency Heads

Chief of Mission

Combatant 

Commander

Chief of Mission

Operational-Level 

Joint Force 

Commander

Department and 

Agency 

Representatives

Tactical 

Commander
Chapter I

I-14 JP 3-0

what purpose major forces will be employed and to influence the adversary’s disposition 

before combat. Operational art governs the deployment of those forces and the arrangement 

of operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

(2) Many factors will affect relationships between leaders at these levels. For 

example, the primary Service and functional component commanders of a joint force do not 

plan tactical actions in a vacuum; they and their staffs collaborate with the operational-level 

JFC in planning the joint operation. This collaboration facilitates the components’ tactical 

planning and execution. Likewise, the operational-level JFC and staff typically collaborate 

with the CCDR on framing theater strategic objectives as well as tasks that the CCDR 

eventually will assign to the subordinate joint force. In some cases, such as in the 1991 

Operation DESERT STORM, the CCDR will not form a subordinate joint force and will 

direct both operational-level and theater strategic actions. In this instance, the CCDR’s 

component commanders assume a greater operational-level role, while their subordinates 

focus on tactical execution.

d. Tactical Level. Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in 

relation to each other. Joint doctrine focuses this term on planning and executing battles, 

engagements, and activities at the tactical level to achieve military objectives assigned to 

tactical units or task forces (TFs). An engagement can include a wide variety of noncombat 

tasks and activities and combat between opposing forces normally in a short-duration action. 

A battle consists of a set of related engagements. Battles typically last longer, involve larger 

forces, and normally affect the course of a campaign. Forces at this level generally employ 

various tactics to achieve their military objectives.

7. Types of Military Operations 

a. The United States employs its military capabilities in support of its national security 

goals in a variety of military operations (Figure I-6). Operations generally involve military 

action or the accomplishment of a strategic, operational, or tactical, service, training, or 

administrative military mission. Operations such as COIN and counterterrorism (CT) are

primarily related to IW. Encounters between friendly and enemy forces in IW seldom 

amount to more than tactical engagements. Insurgents, terrorists, and other IW actors rarely 

mass in sufficient numbers to fight battles. However, IW can occur in conjunction with 

large-scale traditional operations as well. Large-scale combat operations associated with 

traditional warfare typically characterize major operations and campaigns, although the 

extended nature of some IW will require operations phased over time as a campaign. Each 

military operation may occur simultaneously with or independently of other operations, or

multiple operations may overlap. Additionally, each may have different root causes and 

objectives. 

b. With a significant array of available Service capabilities―supplemented as required 

by specialized joint or other capabilities―joint forces can be designed, organized, equipped, 

and trained to accomplish a wide variety of military operations such as those in Figure I-6. 

The nature of objectives and the magnitude of tasks and requirements will determine if a 

joint force headquarters (HQ) and joint operations are necessary or if a single-Service force 

can accomplish the mission. Chapter V, “Joint Operations Across the Range of Military 
Fundamentals of Joint Operations

I-15

Operations,” describes various types of joint operations and considerations in the context of 

the three broad areas that compose the range of military operations.

Figure I-6. Examples of Military Operations

Examples of Military Operations

l

l

l

l

l

l

Chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear consequence management

Foreign internal defense

Counterdrug operations 

Combating terrorism

Counterinsurgency

Homeland defense

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

Stability operations

Civil support

Foreign humanitarian assistance

Recovery

Noncombatant evacuation 

Peace operations

Combating weapons of mass destruction
Chapter I

I-16 JP 3-0

Intentionally Blank
II-1 

CHAPTER II

THE ART OF JOINT COMMAND

1. Introduction

a. Command is the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises 

over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Accompanying this authority is the 

responsibility to effectively organize, direct, coordinate, and control military forces to 

accomplish assigned missions. Command includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, 

and discipline of assigned personnel.

b. While command authority stems from appropriate orders and other directives, the art 

of command resides in the commander’s ability to use situational leadership to 

maximize operational performance. The combination of courage, ethical leadership, 

judgment, intuition, situational awareness, and the ability to consider contrary views gained 

over time through training, education, and experience helps commanders make difficult 

decisions in complex situations. The desired result is the conscious and skillful exercise of 

command authority through visualization, decision making, and leadership. Effective 

decision making combines judgment and visualization with information; it requires knowing 

if to decide, when to decide, and what to decide quickly enough to maintain the initiative 

over the adversary. Information management (IM), knowledge sharing, an understanding of 

the operational environment, and a sound battle rhythm facilitate decision making. 

c. This chapter discusses factors related to “commander-centric” leadership, and then 

focuses on operational art and processes that help the commander make decisions during 

planning and execution. 

2. Commander-Centric Leadership

a. Historical analysis shows that commander-centric organizations out-perform staffcentric, process-oriented organizations. A commander’s perspective of the challenge at hand 

is broader and more comprehensive than the staff’s due to interaction with civilian leaders; 

senior, peer, subordinate, and supporting commanders; and interorganizational partners. 

Clear commander’s guidance and intent, enriched by the commander’s experience and 

intuition, are common to high-performing units. Employing the “art of war,” which has been 

the commander’s central historical command role, remains critical in the contemporary 

complex environment regardless of technological and informational improvements in 

control—the “science of war.” Successful commanders can strike a balance between the “art

of war” (human interaction) and the “science of war” (technological solutions) by 

emphasizing the inherently human aspects of warfare.

“When all is said and done, it is really the commander’s coup d’oeil, his ability to 

see things simply, to identify the whole business of war completely with himself,

that is the essence of good generalship.”

Carl von Clausewitz

On War
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-0 

b. The C2 function is commander-centric and network-enabled to facilitate initiative 

and decision making at the lowest appropriate level. Although we have grown used to 

communicating freely without fear of jamming or interception, natural phenomena or an 

adaptive enemy may rapidly negate technology advantages. This is especially true at the 

lower echelons. If a commander loses reliable communications, he must have subordinates 

who can act without instructions. Mission command—a key component of the C2 function 

described in Chapter III, “Joint Functions”—is the conduct of military operations through 

decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. Successful mission command 

demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative and act 

aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission. They focus their orders on the 

purpose of the operation rather than on the details of how to perform assigned tasks. They 

delegate decisions to subordinates wherever possible, which minimizes detailed control and 

empowers subordinates’ initiative to make decisions based on understanding what the 

commander wants rather than on constant communications. Essential to mission command 

is the thorough understanding of the commander’s intent at every level of command. See 

paragraph 5.e., “Key Planning Elements,” for a discussion of commander’s intent as a key 

planning element. 

c. Commanders should engage other leaders to build personal relationships and develop 

trust and confidence. Developing these relationships is a conscious collaborative act rather 

than something that just happens. Commanders build trust through words and actions and 

continue to reinforce it not only during actual operations, but also during training, education, 

and practice. Trust and confidence are essential to synergy and harmony, both within the 

joint force and also with our interorganizational partners. Commanders also may engage 

other political, societal, and economic leaders and other influential people in the operational 

environment who are potentially key to the joint force’s success. This engagement not only 

supports mission accomplishment, but is also essential to continuity of the commander’s 

communications strategy themes and messages. The JFC ensures that subordinate 

commanders understand the importance of key leader engagement and encourages them to 

extend the process to lower levels, as appropriate, based on the mission and communications 

strategy requirements. 

d. Commanders should provide subordinate commands with sufficient time to plan, 

particularly in a crisis action planning situation. They do so by issuing a warning order to 

subordinates at the earliest opportunity and by collaborating with other commanders, agency 

leaders, and multinational partners (as appropriate) to ensure a clear understanding of the 

commander’s mission, intent, guidance, and priorities. Commanders resolve command-level 

issues that are beyond the staff’s authority. Examples of such issues include the close-hold, 

compartmented planning that occurs with some sensitive operations, and the continuing 

challenge of incorporating interorganizational partners in the joint operation planning 

process (JOPP) given their potentially limited capabilities and restricted access to some 

information. 

e. Commanders collaborate with their seniors to resolve differences of interpretation of 

higher-level objectives and the ways and means to accomplish these objectives. A 

commander might tend to expect that the higher HQ has correctly described the operational 

environment, framed the problem, and devised a sound approach to achieve the best solution. 
The Art of Joint Command 

II-3 

Strategic guidance can be vague, and the commander must interpret and clarify it for the 

staff. While national leaders and CCDRs may have a clear strategic perspective of the 

problem, subordinate JFCs and their component commanders often have a better perspective 

of the situation at the operational level. Both perspectives are essential to a sound solution. 

During a commander’s decision cycle, subordinate commanders should aggressively share 

their perspective with senior leaders with the intent to resolve issues at the earliest 

opportunity. 

f. The essential skill of a JFC is the ability to match the mission of each Service 

component to its capabilities. Each component’s mission should also create a 

complementary synergy with that of the others. This enables the actions of each component 

to enhance the capabilities and limit the vulnerabilities of the others. Achieving this

complementary synergy requires more than just understanding the particular capabilities and 

limitations that each component brings to the operation. The JFC must also be able to 

visualize operations holistically, identify the preconditions that enable each component to 

optimize its own contribution, and then determine how the other components might help to 

produce them. The JFC must be willing to compare alternative component missions and 

mixes solely from the perspective of combined effectiveness, unhampered by Service 

parochialism. But this approach also requires mutual trust among commanders that the 

missions assigned to components will be consistent with their intrinsic capabilities and 

limitations; that those capabilities will not be risked for insufficient overall return; and that 

components will execute their assignments. 

g. The JFC executes a commander-centric approach to leadership using operational art 

and design, joint operation planning, rigorous assessment of progress toward objectives, and 

timely decision making. The remainder of this chapter discusses these key areas.

3. Operational Art

a. Operational art is the use of creative thinking by commanders and staffs to 

design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military 

forces. It is a thought process that uses skill, knowledge, experience, and judgment to 

overcome the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex environment and understand the 

problem at hand. Operational art also promotes unified action by encouraging JFCs and 

staffs to consider the capabilities, actions, goals, priorities, and operating processes of 

interorganizational partners, while determining objectives, establishing priorities, and 

assigning tasks to subordinate forces. It facilitates the coordination, synchronization, and, 

where appropriate, integration of military operations with those of interorganizational 

partners, thereby promoting unity of effort. 

b. Operational art requires a broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and the skill to plan, 

prepare, execute, and assess. It helps commanders and their staffs order their thoughts and 

COMMON OPERATING PRECEPT

Integrate joint capabilities to be complementary rather than merely additive.
Chapter II

II-4 JP 3-0 

understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle. Without operational art, 

campaigns and operations would be sets of disconnected events. Operational art governs the 

deployment of forces and the arrangement of operations to achieve military operational and 

strategic objectives.

c. The commander is the central figure in operational art, not only due to education and 

experience, but also because the commander’s judgment and decisions are required to guide 

the staff throughout joint operation planning and execution. Commanders draw on 

operational art to mitigate the challenges of complexity and uncertainty, leveraging their 

knowledge, experience, judgment, and intuition to generate a clearer understanding of the 

conditions needed to focus effort and achieve success. Operational art supports the effective 

exercise of command by enabling a broad perspective that deepens understanding and 

visualization. Commanders compare similarities of the existing situation with their own 

experiences or history to distinguish the unique features that require innovative or adaptive 

solutions. They understand that each situation requires a solution tailored to the context of 

the problem. Through the application of operational art, commanders seek innovative, 

adaptive options to solve complex problems. 

d. Operational design requires the commander to encourage discourse and leverage 

dialogue and collaboration to identify and solve complex, ill-defined problems. To that end, 

the commander must empower organizational learning and develop methods to determine if 

modifying the operational approach is necessary during the course of an operation. This 

requires continuous assessment, evaluation, and reflection that challenge understanding of 

the existing problem and the relevance of actions addressing that problem. 

e. Operational art applies to all aspects of joint operations and integrates ends, ways, 

and means, while accounting for risk, across the levels of war. Among the many 

considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions. 

(1) What are the objectives and desired end state? (Ends) 

(2) What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve those objectives and end 

state? (Ways)

(3) What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)

(4) What is the likely chance of failure or unacceptable results in performing that 

sequence of actions? (Risk)

f. Operational art encompasses operational design—the conception and construction 

of the intellectual framework that underpins joint OPLANs and their subsequent 

execution. Together, operational art and operational design strengthen the relationship

between strategy and tactics.

4. Operational Design 

a. Operational design extends operational art’s vision with a creative process that helps 

commanders and planners answer the ends–ways–means–risk questions. Operational design 
The Art of Joint Command 

II-5 

supports operational art with a general methodology using elements of operational design for 

understanding the situation and the problem. The methodology helps the JFC and staff to 

understand conceptually the broad solutions for attaining mission accomplishment and to 

reduce the uncertainty of a complex operational environment. The elements of operational 

design (Figure II-1) are individual tools that help the JFC and staff visualize and describe the 

broad operational approach. These operational design elements are useful throughout JOPP. 

b. Commanders and staffs can use operational design when planning any joint 

operation. Notwithstanding a commander’s judgment, education, and experience, the 

operational environment often presents some situations so complex that they defy complete 

understanding. Nor does such complexity lend itself to coherent planning. Bringing 

adequate order to complex problems to facilitate further detailed planning requires an 

iterative dialogue between commanders and staff. Rarely will members of the staff 

recognize an implicit operational approach during their initial analysis of the operational 

environment and tasks from higher HQ. Successful development of the approach requires 

continuous analysis, learning, and discourse between commander, staff, and other subject 

matter experts. The challenge is even greater when the JFC considers the intended and 

unintended consequences of both military and interorganizational actions within the joint 

operations area (JOA), the perceptions and plans of those partners, the expectations of the 

local populace and host nation (HN) government, and the regional and global implications. 

c. Operational art, operational design, and JOPP blend in complementary fashion as part 

of the overall process that produces the eventual plan or order that drives the joint operation. 

Effective operational design results in more efficient detailed planning and increases the 

chances of mission accomplishment. 

For more information on operational art and the details of operational design, refer to 

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

5. Joint Operation Planning 

a. Joint operation planning consists of planning activities associated with joint military 

operations by CCDRs and their subordinate JFCs in response to contingencies and crises. It 

Figure II-1. Elements of Operational Design 

Elements of Operational Design















Termination

Military end state

Objective

Effects

Center of gravity

Decisive point

Lines of operation and lines of effort













Direct and indirect approach

Anticipation

Operational reach

Culmination

Arranging operations

Forces and functions
Chapter II

II-6 JP 3-0 

transforms national strategic objectives into activities by development of operational 

products, which include planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, 

sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. It ties the military instrument 

of national power to the achievement of national security goals and objectives and is 

essential to securing desired strategic end states during peacetime and war. Planning begins 

with the end state in mind, providing a unifying purpose around which actions and resources 

are focused.

b. Joint operation planning occurs within APEX, which is the department-level system 

of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures. APEX is supported by 

communications and information technology that is used by the joint planning and execution 

community (JPEC) to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, 

sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. 

APEX formally integrates the planning activities of the JPEC and facilitates the JFC’s 

seamless transition from planning to execution during times of crisis. The integration of 

joint operation planning with interagency and multinational partners begins with national 

strategic direction. APEX activities span many organizational levels, but the focus is on the 

interaction between SecDef and CCDRs, which ultimately helps the President and SecDef 

decide when, where, and how to commit US military forces. The interactive and 

collaborative process at the national level guides the way in which planning and execution 

occurs throughout the Armed Forces. 

c. Based on understanding gained through the application of operational design, more 

detailed planning takes place within the steps of JOPP. JOPP is an orderly, analytical 

process, which consists of a set of logical steps to analyze a mission; develop, analyze, and 

compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; and produce a plan or order. Through 

JOPP, planners effectively translate the commander’s planning guidance into a feasible COA 

and CONOPS by which the joint force can achieve its assigned mission and military end 

state. This, in turn, links tactical actions, through operational planning and execution, to the 

accomplishment of national strategic objectives in support of the strategic end state. 

Planners align actions and resources in time and space to complete the plan. In doing so, 

they must take into account the details of force requirements, force availability, task 

organization, and sustainment and deployment concepts. They should also take into account 

the capacity and objectives of the other instruments of national power, risk, and functional 

elements of the plan (i.e., personnel, intelligence, logistics). 

d. JOPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the range of 

military operations. It applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to component 

and subordinate commands when they participate in joint planning. Together with 

operational design, JOPP facilitates interaction between the commander, staff, and their HQ

throughout planning. JOPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their planning 

activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander’s intent, and 

develop effective plans and orders. Figure II-2 shows the primary steps of JOPP. 

e. Key Planning Elements. Commanders typically participate in planning to the 

greatest extent possible from early operational design through approval of the plan or order. 

Regardless of the commander’s level of involvement, certain key planning elements 
The Art of Joint Command 

II-7 

require the commander’s participation and decisions. These include the operational 

approach, mission statement, commander’s planning guidance, commander’s intent, 

commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs), and CONOPS.

(1) Operational Approach. The operational approach is a commander’s 

description of the broad actions the force must take to achieve the desired military end state. 

It is the commander’s visualization of how the operation should transform current conditions 

into the desired conditions at the end state—the way the commander wants the operational 

environment to look at the conclusion of operations. The operational approach is based 

largely on an understanding of the operational environment and the problem facing the JFC. 

Once the JFC approves the approach, it provides the basis for beginning, continuing, or 

completing detailed planning. The JFC and staff should continually review, update, and 

modify the approach as the operational environment, end state, or problem change. 

(2) Mission Statement. The joint force’s mission is what the joint force must 

accomplish. It is described in the mission statement, which is a sentence or short paragraph 

that describes the organization’s essential task (or set of tasks) and purpose—a clear 

statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The mission statement—

approved by the commander—contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why; 

but seldom specifies how. It forms the basis for planning and is included in various products 

such as the planning guidance and as paragraph 2 (Mission) of the completed OPLAN or 

order. Clarity of the joint force mission statement and its understanding by subordinates are 

essential to success.

Figure II-2. Joint Operation Planning Process

Joint Operation Planning Process

Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Step 4

Step 5

Step 6

Step 7

Planning Initiation

Mission Analysis

Course of Action (COA) Development

COA Analysis and Wargaming

COA Comparison

COA Approval

Plan or Order Development
Chapter II

II-8 JP 3-0 

(3) Commander’s Planning Guidance. JFCs guide the joint force’s actions 

throughout planning and execution. However, the staff and component commanders 

typically expect the JFC to issue initial guidance soon after receipt of a mission or tasks from 

higher authority and provide more detailed planning guidance after the JFC approves an 

operational approach. This guidance is an important input to subsequent mission analysis, 

but the completion of mission analysis is another point at which the JFC may provide 

updated planning guidance that affects COA development.

(4) Commander’s Intent. Commander’s intent is the commander’s clear and 

concise expression of what the force must do and the conditions the force must establish to 

accomplish the mission. It is a succinct description of the commander’s visualization of the 

entire operation and what the commander wants to accomplish. Commander’s intent 

supports mission command and allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action. 

It provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to 

achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders once the operation begins, 

even when the operation does not unfold as planned. Successful command demands that 

subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and 

independently to accomplish the mission within the commander’s intent. Subordinates’ 

emphasis is on timely decision making, understanding the higher commander’s intent, and 

clearly identifying the subordinates’ tasks necessary to achieve the desired end state. Wellcrafted commander’s intent improves subordinates’ ability to act effectively in fluid, chaotic 

situations.

(5) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements. CCIRs are elements of 

friendly and enemy information the commander identifies as critical to timely decision

making. They focus IM and help the JFC and staff assess the operational environment. The 

CCIR list is normally a product of mission analysis, and JFCs add, delete, and update CCIRs 

throughout an operation. 

(6) Concept of Operations. The CONOPS, included in paragraph 3, (Execution) 

of the plan or order, describes how the JFC intends to integrate, synchronize, and phase 

actions of the joint force components and supporting organizations to accomplish the 

mission, including potential branches and sequels. The CONOPS typically is a detailed 

extension of the operational approach, but incorporates modifications based on updated 

information and intelligence gained during planning as well as the JFC’s approved COA. 

The staff writes (or graphically portrays) the CONOPS in sufficient detail so that subordinate 

and supporting commanders understand their mission, tasks, and other requirements and can 

develop their supporting plans accordingly. The CONOPS also provides the basis for 

developing the concept of fires, concept of intelligence operations, and concept of logistic 

support, which also are included in the final OPLAN or OPORD.

COMMON OPERATING PRECEPT

Ensure freedom of action.
The Art of Joint Command 

II-9 

f. Freedom of Action. The JFC must maintain freedom of action throughout the 

operation. Of necessity, freedom of action must extend beyond the JFC’s operational area. 

For example, operational reach—the distance and duration across which a joint force can 

successfully employ military capabilities—can extend far beyond the limits of a JFC’s JOA 

and is inextricably tied to lines of operation (LOOs). So the joint force must protect LOOs to 

ensure freedom of action. Likewise, the C2 and intelligence functions depend on operations 

within cyberspace. Losing the capability to operate effectively in cyberspace can greatly 

diminish the JFC’s freedom of action. While various actions (such as computer network 

defense [CND] and the consideration of branches to current operations) contribute 

individually to freedom of action, operational design and joint operation planning are the 

processes that coherently link these actions. Thus the JFC and staff must consider freedom 

of action from the outset of operational design and must be alert to indicators during 

operations that freedom of action is in jeopardy.

For more information on JOPP, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. For more 

information on fires and joint fire support planning, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, and 

JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. For more information on intelligence support and planning, refer 

to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and other intelligence series publications. For more 

information on logistic planning, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and other logistics series 

publications. 

6. Assessment 

a. Assessment is a process that evaluates changes in the environment and measures 

progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. Commanders continuously

assess the operational environment and the progress of operations, compare them to their 

initial visualization, understanding, and intent, and adjust operations based on this analysis. 

Staffs monitor key factors that can influence operations and provide the commander timely 

information needed for decisions. The CCIR process is linked to the assessment process

by the commander’s need for timely information to support decision making. Commanders 

devise ways to continually update their understanding of the operational environment and 

assess their progress toward achieving assigned objectives without mistaking activity for 

progress. 

b. Assessment begins during mission analysis when the commander and staff consider 

what to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward accomplishing 

tasks, creating conditions, or achieving objectives. During planning and preparing for an 

operation, for example, the staff assesses the joint force’s ability to execute the plan based on 

available resources and changing conditions in the operational environment. During the early 

mission analysis process, the commander and staff begin to devise indicators of progress that 

will be incorporated in the plan or order and used during execution. Certain assessment 

indicators act as triggers during the operation to help the commander determine the necessity 

to revise the original design approach.

c. During execution, the commander’s staff identifies those key assessment indicators 

that suggest progress or setbacks in accomplishing tasks, creating effects, and achieving 
Chapter II

II-10 JP 3-0 

objectives. Assessment actions and measures help commanders adjust operations and 

resources as required, determine when to execute branches and sequels, and make other 

critical decisions to ensure current and future operations remain aligned with the mission and 

military end state. Normally, the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3), assisted by the 

intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2), is responsible for coordinating assessment 

activities. The chief of staff facilitates the assessment process and the determination of 

CCIRs by incorporating them into the HQ’s battle rhythm. Various elements of the JFC’s 

staff use assessment results to adjust both current operations and future planning. 

d. Actions by friendly forces, the HN and population, adversary, and neutral diplomatic, 

informational, and economic entities in the operational environment can affect military 

actions and objectives. When relevant to the mission, the commander must determine how 

to assess results of these actions to include relevant information on the civil environment. 

This typically requires collaboration with other agencies and interorganizational partners—

preferably within a common, accepted process—in the interest of unified action. Many of 

these organizations may be outside the JFC’s authority. Accordingly, the JFC should grant 

some joint force organizations (CA directorate/CMOC) authority for direct coordination with 

key outside organizations—such as USG interagency elements from the Departments of 

State or Homeland Security, national intelligence agencies, intelligence sources in other 

nations, and other CCMDs—to the extent necessary to ensure timely and accurate 

assessments.

e. Levels of War and Assessment

(1) Assessment occurs at all levels and across the range of military operations. 

Even in operations that do not include combat, assessment of progress is just as important 

and can be more complex than traditional combat assessment. As a general rule, the level 

at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which

such activity is assessed. To do this, JFCs and their staffs consider assessment ways, 

means, and measures during planning, preparation, and execution. This properly focuses 

assessment and collection at each level, reduces redundancy, and enhances the efficiency of 

the overall assessment process.

(2) Assessment at the operational and strategic levels is typically broader than at 

the tactical level (e.g., combat assessment), and uses measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and 

measures of performance (MOPs) that support strategic and operational mission 

accomplishment. Assessment at these levels concentrates on broader tasks, conditions, 

objectives, and progress toward the military end state. Continuous assessment helps the 

JFC and joint force component commanders determine if the joint force is “doing the 

right things” (MOE) to achieve its objectives, not just “doing things right” (MOP).

(3) Tactical-level assessment uses MOEs and MOPs to evaluate task 

accomplishment. The results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature, but also can 

reflect the impact on specific functions and systems. Tactical-level assessment may include 

assessing progress by phase lines; destruction of enemy forces; control of key terrain, 

peoples, or resources; and other tasks. Assessment of results at the tactical level helps 

commanders determine operational and strategic progress, so JFCs must have a 
The Art of Joint Command 

II-11 

comprehensive, integrated assessment plan that links assessment activities and measures at 

all levels.

(4) Combat assessment is an example of a tactical-level assessment and a term that 

can encompass many tactical-level assessment actions. Combat assessment typically focuses 

on determining the results of weapons engagement (with both lethal and nonlethal 

capabilities), and thus is an important component of joint fires and the joint targeting process 

(see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting). Combat assessment is composed of three related 

elements: battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness assessment, and reattack 

recommendations or future targeting. However, combat assessment methodology also 

can be applied by joint force functional and Service components to other tactical tasks not 

associated with joint fires (e.g., disaster relief delivery assessment, relief effectiveness 

assessment, and future relief recommendations).

For more information on assessment, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 
Chapter II

II-12 JP 3-0 

Intentionally Blank
III-1

CHAPTER III

JOINT FUNCTIONS

1. Introduction

a. This chapter discusses joint functions, related tasks, and key considerations. Joint 

functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, 

synchronize, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at 

all levels of war fall into six basic groups—C2, intelligence, fires, movement and 

maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Some functions, such as C2 and intelligence, 

apply to all operations. Others, such as fires, apply as the JFC’s mission requires. A number 

of subordinate tasks, missions, and related capabilities help define each function, and some 

could apply to more than one joint function.

b. The joint functions reinforce and complement one another, and integration across 

the functions is essential to mission accomplishment. For example, joint fires can enhance 

the protection of a joint security area (JSA) by dispersing or disrupting enemy assets 

threatening the JSA. Likewise, ground forces can improve their protection by using 

intelligence to alter movement or maneuver so that enemy ambushes or other hazards are 

avoided. In any joint operation, the JFC can choose from a wide variety of joint and Service 

capabilities and combine them in various ways to perform joint functions and accomplish the 

mission. The OPLAN or OPORD describes how the JFC uses military capabilities (i.e., 

organizations, people, and systems) to perform tasks associated with each joint function. 

However, forces and other assets are not characterized by the functions for which the JFC is 

employing them. Individual Service capabilities often can support multiple functions 

simultaneously or sequentially while the joint force is executing a single task. For example, 

capabilities employed in the air domain typically accomplish tasks that support all six 

functions in a single combat operation. Just as component commanders integrate activities 

across functions to accomplish tasks and missions, the JFC and staff do likewise for the joint 

force. Various factors complicate the JFC’s integration challenge, such as competing 

demands for high-priority capabilities and the fact that joint force components have different 

function-oriented approaches, procedures, and perspectives. The synchronization, 

coordination, and/or integration of military operations with the activities of 

interorganizational partners to achieve unity of effort are key to success, and military forces 

need to work competently in this environment while properly supporting the lead agency, 

department, or organization.

“US military power today is unsurpassed on the land and sea and in the air, space, 

and cyberspace. The individual Services have evolved capabilities and 

competencies to maximize their effectiveness in their respective domains. Even 

more important, the ability to integrate these diverse capabilities into a joint whole 

that is greater than the sum of the Service parts is an unassailable American 

strategic advantage.”

Admiral M. G. Mullen

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, January 2009
Chapter III

III-2 JP 3-0

c. While information operations (IO) is not a separate function, the JFC and staff apply 

the IO core, supporting, and related capabilities across the joint functions and independently 

in some cases. Some IO capabilities are offensive in application, such as computer network 

attack (CNA). Operations security (OPSEC) is an example of a defensive capability, and 

relates to the protection function. Regardless of these alignments, integration and 

synchronization across IO capabilities and actions is essential to many aspects of joint 

operations. For example, the commander and staff integrate public affairs (PA) and the 

commander’s defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) with other IO actions to enable 

the commander’s communications strategy.

For a more detailed discussion of IO, see JP 3-13, Information Operations.

2. Command and Control

a. C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over 

assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission. The JFC provides operational 

vision, guidance, and direction to the joint force. The C2 function encompasses a number of 

tasks, including the following:

(1) Establish, organize, and operate a joint force HQ.

(2) Command subordinate forces.

(3) Prepare and, when required, modify plans, orders, and guidance.

(4) Establish appropriate command authorities among subordinate commanders.

(5) Assign tasks and operational areas as needed.

(6) Prioritize and allocate resources.

(7) Manage risk.

(8) Communicate and maintain the status of information.

(9) Assess progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating conditions, and achieving 

objectives.

(10) Coordinate and control the employment of joint lethal and nonlethal 

capabilities.

(11) Coordinate, synchronize, and when appropriate, integrate joint operations with 

the operations and activities of interorganizational partners.

(12) Conduct PA from the operational area.

b. Command includes both the authority and responsibility to effectively use available 

resources to accomplish assigned missions. Command at all levels is the art of motivating 

and directing people and organizations into action to accomplish missions. The C2 function 
 Joint Functions 

III-3 

supports an efficient decision-making process. Enabled by timely intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR), the goal is to provide the ability to make decisions and execute 

those decisions more rapidly and effectively than the adversary. This decreases risk and 

allows the commander more control over the timing and tempo of operations. 

c. Command Authorities. JFCs exercise command authorities (i.e., combatant 

command [command authority] {COCOM}, OPCON, tactical control [TACON], and 

support) delegated to them by law or senior leaders and commanders over assigned and 

attached forces. Command relationships is another term for these authorities. JP 1, Doctrine 

for the Armed Forces of the United States, provides details on each authority, and Figure III1 summarizes their relationships. Unity of command in joint operations is maintained 

through the application of the various command relationships as follows. 

“The key is not to make quick decisions, but to make timely decisions.” 

General Colin Powell 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

01 October 1989–30 September 1993 

Figure III-1. Command Relationships Synopsis

Command Relationships Synopsis











Authoritative direction for all military operations and joint training

Organize and employ commands and forces

Assign command functions to subordinates

Establish plans and requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance activities

Suspend subordinate commanders from duty

Operational control when delegated

Tactical control when 

delegated

Support relationship when 

assigned









Planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process input

Assignment of subordinate commanders

Relationships with Department of Defense agencies

Directive authority for logistics

Combatant Command (Command Authority)

(Unique to Combatant Commander)

Local direction and control of 

movements or maneuvers to 

accomplish mission

Aid, assist, protect, or sustain 

another organization
Chapter III

III-4 JP 3-0

(1) COCOM is the nontransferable command authority established by Title 10, 

United States Code (USC), Section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or 

specified CCMDs unless otherwise directed by the President or SecDef. COCOM, which 

cannot be delegated, is the authority of a CCDR to perform those functions of command over 

assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, 

designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military 

operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the 

command. COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate 

organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and Service 

and/or functional component commanders. COCOM provides full authority to organize and 

employ commands and forces as the CCDR considers necessary to accomplish assigned 

missions. In crisis response and combat, or where critical situations require changing the 

normal logistic process, the CCDRs’ logistic authority enables them to use all logistic 

capabilities of all forces assigned and attached to their commands as necessary to accomplish 

their mission. Under peacetime conditions, the CCDR will exercise logistic authority 

consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, DOD policy or regulations, 

budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by 

SecDef or CJCS.

(2) Operational control is inherent in COCOM and may be delegated within the 

command. OPCON is command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any 

echelon at or below the level of CCMD to perform those functions of command over 

subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning 

tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the 

mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and 

joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. This authority 

should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations, normally through 

subordinate JFCs and Service and/or functional component commanders. OPCON normally 

provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the 

commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it 

does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of 

administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.

(3) Tactical control is inherent in OPCON. TACON is command authority over 

assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for 

tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers 

within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. TACON 

may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of CCMD. TACON 

provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical 

use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Commanders may delegate 

TACON to subordinate commanders at any echelon at or below CCMD and may exercise 

TACON over assigned or attached forces or military capabilities or forces made available for 

tasking. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for 

administrative and logistic support or discipline (Uniform Code of Military Justice 

authority); the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise those responsibilities 

unless the establishing directive specifies otherwise. Except for special operations forces 
Joint Functions

III-5

(SOF), functional component commanders typically exercise TACON over military 

capabilities or forces made available for tasking.

(4) Support. Establishing support relationships between components (as described 

in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States), is a useful option to accomplish 

needed tasks. The JFC can establish support relationships among all functional and 

Service component commanders, such as for the coordination of operations in depth 

involving the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and the joint force air 

component commander (JFACC). Within a joint force, the JFC may designate more than 

one supported commandersimultaneously, and components may simultaneously receive and 

provide support for different missions, functions, or operations. For instance, a joint force 

special operations component commander (JFSOCC) may be supported for a direct-action 

mission while simultaneously supporting a JFLCC for a raid. Similarly, a joint force 

maritime component commander (JFMCC) may be supported for a sea control mission while 

simultaneously supporting a JFACC to achieve air superiority over the operational area.

(5) Other authorities granted to commanders, and to subordinates as required, 

include administrative control, coordinating authority, and direct liaison authorized. JP 1, 

Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, outlines the specific details for each 

command relationship.

(6) The perceived benefits of “jointness” do not occur naturally just by virtue of C2 

relationships. The integration necessary for effective joint operations requires explicit effort, 

can increase operational complexity, and will require additional training, technical and 

technological interoperability, liaison, and planning. Although effectiveness typically is 

more important than efficiency in joint operations, the JFC and component commanders 

must determine when the potential benefits of joint integration cannot compensate for the 

additional complicating factors. Synergy is a means to greater operational effectiveness, not 

an end in itself. The joint operations principle simplicity is always a key consideration.

d. Control is inherent in command. To control is to manage and direct forces and 

functions consistent with a commander’s command authority. Control of forces and 

functions helps commanders and staffs compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate 

efforts. Control is necessary to determine the status of organizational effectiveness, identify 

variance from set standards, and correct deviations from these standards. Control permits 

commanders to acquire and apply means to support the mission and develop specific 

instructions from general guidance. Control provides the means for commanders to maintain 

freedom of action, delegate authority, direct operations from any location, and integrate and 

synchronize actions throughout the operational area. Ultimately, it provides commanders a 

means to measure, report, and correct performance.

COMMON OPERATING PRECEPT

Avoid combining capabilities where doing so adds complexity without 

compensating advantage.
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-0 

e. Area of Operations and Functional Considerations

(1) Command and Control in an Area of Operations. The land and maritime 

force commanders are the supported commanders within their designated areas of 

operations (AOs). Through C2, JFLCCs and JFMCCs integrate and synchronize movement 

and maneuver with intelligence, fires, protection, and sustainment and the supporting IO 

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 

In December 2002, representatives from United States Central Command 

(USCENTCOM) and United States European Command (USEUCOM) met in 

Stuttgart, Germany to discuss Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). The two 

broad issues were organizing the operational area and coordinating the 

command relationships for all OIF phases. 

The USCENTCOM OIF theater of operations would by necessity cross the 

Unified Command Plan (UCP) designated USCENTCOM and USEUCOM areas 

of responsibility (AORs) boundary. Specifically, the land and airspace of 

Turkey was recognized for its potential to contribute to opening a northern 

line of operation. 

Discussions over the potential options for organizing the OIF operational 

area led to an agreement not to request a temporary change in the UCP 

modifying the AORs, but to rely on the establishment of appropriate 

command relationships between the two combatant commanders (CCDRs). 

Discussions over the potential command and control options led to the 

decision to establish a support relationship between USCENTCOM 

(supported) and USEUCOM (supporting). This relationship was established 

by the Secretary of Defense. It enabled the development of coherent and 

supporting campaign plans. 

In the campaign design and plan, USEUCOM retained tactical control for the 

coordination and execution of operational movement (i.e., reception, staging, 

onward movement, and integration); intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance; logistic and personnel support; and protection in support 

of USCENTCOM forces transiting the USEUCOM AOR; specifically Turkey. 

Once USCENTCOM-allocated joint forces were positioned and prepared to 

cross the Turkish–Iraqi border (to commence offensive operations) 

operational control would be given to USCENTCOM. 

Maintaining UCP AOR boundaries and the establishment of an umbrella 

support relationship between the CCDRs with conditional command 

authorities exercised over the participating forces based on their readiness 

and operation phase provided a workable solution to the integration and 

employment of joint forces on the boundary of two AORs. 

Various Sources 
Joint Functions

III-7

activities. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, they have the authority to 

designate target priority, effects, and timing of fires within their AOs.

(a) Synchronization of efforts within land or maritime AOs with theaterand/or JOA-wide operations is of particular importance. To facilitate synchronization, the 

JFC establishes priorities that will guide or inform execution decisions throughout the theater 

and/or JOA, including within the land and maritime force commander’s AOs. The JFACC is 

normally the supported commander for the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort, while 

JFLCCs and JFMCCs are supported commanders for interdiction in their AOs.

(b) In coordination with the JFLCCs and JFMCCs, other commanders 

designated by the JFC to execute theater- or JOA-wide functions have the latitude to plan 

and execute these JFC-prioritized operations within land and maritime AOs. Commanders 

executing such a mission within a land or maritime AO must coordinate the operation to 

avoid adverse effects and fratricide. If those operations would have adverse impact within a 

land or maritime AO, the commander assigned to execute the JOA-wide functions must 

readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the land or maritime component commander, or 

consult with the JFC for resolution.

(2) Command and Control of Space Operations. A supported JFC normally 

designates a space coordinating authority (SCA) to coordinate joint space operations and 

integrate space capabilities. Based on the complexity and scope of operations, the JFC can 

either retain SCA or designate a component commander as the SCA. The JFC considers the 

mission, nature, and duration of the operation; preponderance of space force capabilities 

made available, and resident C2 capabilities (including reachback) when selecting the 

appropriate option. The SCA is responsible for coordinating and integrating space 

capabilities in the operational area and has primary responsibility for joint space operations 

planning, to include determining space requirements within the joint force. The SCA 

normally will be supported by assigned or attached embedded space personnel. There are 

established doctrinal processes for articulating requirements for space force enhancement 

products. These processes are specifically tailored to the functional area they support and 

result in prioritized requirements. Thus the SCA typically has no role in prioritizing the 

JFC’s day-to-day space force enhancement requirements. The SCA gathers operational 

requirements that may be satisfied by space capabilities and facilitates the use of established 

processes by joint force staff to plan and conduct space operations. Following coordination, 

the SCA provides the JFC a prioritized list of recommended space requirements based on 

joint force objectives. To ensure prompt and timely support, the supported CCDR and 

Commander, United States Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM), may authorize 

direct liaison between the SCA and applicable United States Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM) component(s). Joint force component commands should communicate 

their requirements to the SCA or designated representative to ensure that all space activities 

are properly integrated and synchronized.

For detailed guidance on C2 of space operations, refer to JP 3-14, Space Operations.

(3) Command and Control of Joint Air Operations. The JFC will normally 

designate a JFACC and assign responsibilities. The JFACC’s responsibilities normally 
Chapter III

III-8 JP 3-0

include, but are not limited to organizing the staff, planning, coordinating, and monitoring 

joint air operations, and the allocation and tasking of joint air operations forces based on the 

JFC’s CONOPS and air apportionment decision. The JFC may designate the JFACC as the 

supported commander for strategic attack, air interdiction, and airborne ISR (among other 

missions) who is responsible to the JFC for planning, coordinating, executing, and assessing 

these missions. When the JFC designates a JFACC, the JFC also normally designates 

the JFACC as the area air defense commander (AADC) and airspace control authority 

(ACA) because the three functions are so integral to one another. When appropriate, the JFC 

may designate a separate AADC or ACA. In those joint operations where separate 

commanders are designated, close coordination is essential for unity of effort, prevention of 

fratricide, and deconfliction of joint air operations.

(a) Airspace Control Authority. The JFC is ultimately responsible for 

airspace control in the operational area. The ACA, in conjunction with the Service and 

functional components, coordinates and integrates the use of the airspace under the JFC’s 

authority. The ACA develops guidance, techniques, and procedures for airspace control and 

for the coordination required among units within the operational area. The ACA establishes 

an airspace control system (ACS) that is responsive to the JFC’s needs, integrates ACS with 

the HN, and coordinates and deconflicts user requirements. The airspace control plan (ACP) 

and airspace control order (ACO) express how the airspace will be used to support mission 

accomplishment. The ACA develops the ACP and, after JFC approval, distributes it 

throughout the operational area and to all supporting airspace users. The ACP begins with 

the distribution of the ACO, and is executed when components and users comply with the 

ACO as described in JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

(b) Area Air Defense Commander. The AADC is responsible for defensive 

counterair (DCA) (which includes both air and missile threats) operations. The AADC must 

identify those volumes of airspace and control measures that support and enhance DCA 

operations, identify required airspace management systems, establish procedures for systems 

to operate within the airspace, and ensure they are incorporated into the ACS. During 

complex operations or campaigns conducted in a large theater of operations, the AADC may 

recommend and the JFC may choose to divide the JOA into separate air defense regions, 

each with a regional air defense commander who could be delegated responsibilities and 

decision-making authority for DCA operations within the region.

f. Command and Control System. JFCs exercise authority and direction through a C2 

system, which consists of the facilities, equipment, communications, staff functions and 

procedures, and personnel essential for planning, preparing for, monitoring, and assessing 

operations. The C2 system must enable the JFC to maintain communications with higher, 

supporting, and subordinate commands in order to control all aspects of current operations 

while planning for future operations.

(1) The joint force staff is the linchpin of the C2 system, since the JFC understands, 

plans, directs, and controls most aspects of operations through the staff’s expertise and 

efforts.
Joint Functions

III-9

(2) Liaison is an important aspect of C2. Commanders may exchange liaison 

teams or individuals between higher, supporting, and subordinate commands as required. 

Liaison personnel generally represent the interests of the sending commander to the 

receiving commander, but can greatly promote understanding of the commander’s intent at 

both the sending and receiving HQ; they should be assigned early during joint operation 

planning. Liaison officers (LNOs) from supporting to supported commanders are 

particularly essential in determining needs and coordinating supporting actions.

(3) Control and Coordination Measures. JFCs establish various maneuver and 

movement control, airspace coordinating, and fire support coordination measuresto facilitate 

effective joint operations. These measures include boundaries, phase lines, objectives, 

coordinating altitudes to deconflict air operations, air defense areas, operational areas, 

submarine operating patrol areas, no-fire areas, and others as required.

For additional guidance on C2 of air operations, refer to JP 3-30, Command and Control for 

Joint Air Operations. For additional guidance on control and coordination measures, refer 

to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, and JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control. See Military Standard2525C, Common Warfighting Symbology, for additional guidance on the use and discussion 

of graphic control measures and symbols for the joint force.

(4) Communications and ISR systems provide communications, ISR, targeting, 

and ballistic missile warning. The precision, speed, and interoperability with which these 

systems operate improve access to the information available to all command levels, thereby 

enhancing a common perspective of the operational environment. Effective command at 

varying operational tempos requires timely, reliable, secure, interoperable, and sustainable 

communications. Communications and ISR planning increases options available to JFCs by 

providing the communications sensor systems necessary to collect, process, store, protect, 

and disseminate information at decisive times. These communications and sensor systems 

permit JFCs to exploit tactical success and facilitate future operations.

(a) Communications System Planning. The mission and structure of the 

joint force determine specific information flow and processing requirements. These 

requirements dictate the general architecture and specific configuration of the 

communications system. Therefore, communications system planning must be integrated 

and synchronized with joint operation planning. Through effective communications system 

planning, the JFC is able to apply capabilities at the critical time and place for mission 

success.

(b) Communications system planning considers, and when appropriate, 

accommodates communications links with interorganizational partners. Interoperability and 

communications security planning with these partners is essential to ensure secure 

communications protect sensitive information. Routine communications and backup systems 

may be disrupted, and civil authorities might have to rely on available military 

communications equipment. Communications system planning also must consider 

termination of US involvement and procedures to transfer communications system control to 

another agency such as the United Nations (UN). Planning should consider that it may be 
Chapter III

III-10 JP 3-0

necessary to leave some communications resources behind to continue support of the 

ongoing effort.

(c) Use of ISR capabilities for domestic non-intelligence activities is known as 

incident awareness and assessment. All requests for imagery or other intelligence support 

for areas within the United States are subject to USG intelligence oversight regulations and 

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5240.1, DOD Intelligence Activities. DOD 

intelligence component capabilities, resources, and personnel as a rule may not be used for 

activities other than foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (CI), unless that use is 

specifically approved by SecDef. In addition, to ensure compliance with the Posse 

Comitatus Act requests for direct DOD support to civilian law enforcement agencies are 

closely reviewed and processed separately for approval.

For additional guidance on the communications and ISR systems support, refer to JP 2-01, 

Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, JP 6-0, Joint 

Communications System, and North American Aerospace Defense Command and United 

States Northern Command Instruction 14-3, Domestic Imagery.

g. Network Operations

(1) Network Operations (NETOPS) is the DOD-wide operational, organizational, 

and technical capabilities for operating and defending DOD information networks. NETOPS 

includes, but is not limited to, enterprise management, net assurance, and content 

management. DOD information networks situational awareness is gained through the 

operational and technical integration of enterprise management and defense actions and 

activities across all levels of command.

(2) CDRUSSTRATCOM is the supported commander for global NETOPS and 

synchronizes planning for cyberspace operations. US Cyber Command is a subunified 

command subordinate to USSTRATCOM and directs the operations and defense of specified 

DOD information networks. It is capable of conducting full-spectrum military cyberspace 

operations to enable US freedom of action in cyberspace and enable actions in other domains 

and deny the same to our adversaries. CDRUSSTRATCOM also is a supported commander 

for nonglobal NETOPS and provides support to affected CCMDs, Services, and DOD 

agencies. OGAs also may provide support per intra-governmental agreements.

For additional guidance on NETOPS, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

h. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

(1) CCIRs are elements of information that the commander identifies as being 

critical to timely decision making. CCIRs help focus IM and help the commander assess 

the operational environment and identify decision points during operations. CCIRs belong 

exclusively to the commander. The CCIR list is normally short so that the staff can focus 

its efforts and allocate scarce resources. But the CCIR list is not static; JFCs add, delete, 

adjust, and update CCIRs throughout an operation based on the information they need for 

decision making. At a minimum, CCIRs should be reviewed and updated during each phase 

of the operation.
Joint Functions

III-11

(2) Categories. Priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and friendly force 

information requirements (FFIRs) constitute the total list of CCIRs.

(a) PIRsfocus on the enemy or adversary and the operational environment and 

drive intelligence collection and production requirements. All staff sections can recommend 

potential PIRs that they believe meet the JFC’s guidance. However, the joint force J-2 has 

overall staff responsibility for consolidating PIR nominations and for providing the staff 

recommendation to the commander. JFC-approved PIRs are automatically CCIRs. PIRs are 

continuously updated as they are addressed during the intelligence collection and production 

efforts. PIRs are reviewed during the transition of each operational phase to ensure they are 

still relevant.

For more information on PIRs, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

(b) FFIRs focus on information the JFC must have to assess the status of the 

friendly force and supporting capabilities. All staff sections can recommend potential FFIRs 

that they believe meet the JFC’s guidance. The plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5)

typically has overall staff responsibility for consolidating FFIR nominations and for 

providing the staff recommendation to the commander during planning prior to execution. 

During execution, the joint force J-3 is responsible for consolidating these nominations and 

providing the recommendation for FFIRs that relate to current operations. However, the J-5 

remains responsible for consolidating nominations and recommending FFIRs related to the 

future plans effort. JFC-approved FFIRs are automatically CCIRs.

i. Battle Rhythm. The HQ battle rhythm is its daily operations cycle of briefings, 

meetings, and report requirements. A stable battle rhythm facilitates effective decision

making, efficient staff actions, and management of information within the HQ and with 

higher, supporting, and subordinate HQ. The commander and staff should design a battle 

rhythm that minimizes meeting requirements while providing the necessary venues for 

command and staff interaction internal to the joint force HQ and with subordinate 

commands. Joint and component HQ’s battle rhythms should be synchronized to 

accommodate operations in multiple time zones and the battle rhythm needs of higher, 

subordinate, and adjacent commands. Other factors such as planning, decision, and 

operating cycles (i.e., intelligence collection, targeting, and air tasking order cycles) 

influence the battle rhythm. Further, meetings of the necessary staff organizations must be 

synchronized. The chief of staff normally manages the joint force HQ’s battle rhythm. 

When coordinating with civilian USG departments and agencies, the joint force HQ should 

consider that those organizations often have limited capabilities and restricted access to some 

information.

j. Creating Shared Understanding. In one sense, decisions are the most important 

products of the C2 function, because they guide the force toward objectives and mission 

accomplishment. Commanders and staff require not only information to make these

decisions, but also the knowledge and understanding that results in the wisdom essential to 

sound decision making (Figure III-2).
Chapter III

III-12 JP 3-0

(1) Information management is an essential process that receives, organizes, 

stores, controls, and secures an organization’s wide range of data and information in a 

manner that facilitates availability to relevant users, while concurrently preventing 

inadvertent disclosure of sensitive or proprietary information. IM is important for the 

commander’s battle rhythm and the development and sharing of information to increase both 

individual and collective knowledge. Effective IM improves the speed and accuracy of 

information flow and supports execution through reliable communications. The process is 

used to manage the organization’s information resources and optimize access to information 

by all who need it. As the key joint force staff integrator, the chief of staff may be 

responsible for managing the IM process, while the communications system directorate of a 

joint staff ensures the operation and connectivity of the supporting C2 communication 

systems and processes. Many joint HQ will also have an IM officer and an IM plan. HQ

may also form a joint IM board to serve as a focal point for information oversight and 

coordination. HQ’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) normally will describe specific 

IM procedures and responsibilities. IM feeds the development and sharing of knowledgebased information products.

Figure III-2. Creating Shared Understanding

Creating Shared Understanding

Processing

Individual 

Learning

Team 

Learning

Insight

Data

Shared 

Understanding

Wisdom

Making Decisions

Sharing Knowledge to 

Create Shared 

Understanding

Managing 

Information

Experience

Art and 

Leadership

Science 

and 

Systems

Knowledge

Information
Joint Functions

III-13

For further guidance on IM, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, and JP 3-33, 

Joint Task Force Headquarters.

(2) Knowledge sharing complements the value of IM with processes to create an 

organizational culture that encourages and rewards knowledge and information sharing to 

achieve shared understanding. It supports team learning activities and a supporting 

environment. While information can be collected, processed, and stored as structured or 

unstructured content, such as in reports and databases, knowledge is acquired through a 

cognitive process and exists in the minds of individuals. The knowledge sharing that 

occurs is best characterized as an activity within a learning environment, rather than 

defined as a purely systematic process with inputs and outputs.

(a) For example, the free exchange of ideas between the commander and staff 

that should typify early operational design is an activity that shares the individual knowledge 

of numerous functional experts, modifies and increases their collective knowledge, and 

promotes shared understanding. In a similar way, the after-action sessions that a commander 

conducts with subordinate commanders and staff during and following an operation create an 

environment of learning in which participants share knowledge and increase their collective 

understanding. Knowledge and understanding occur better through interaction, whether in 

person or virtual, than through reading and assimilating various products.

(b) Certain products are particularly relevant to knowledge sharing. For 

example, commander’s intent is a knowledge-based product that commanders use to share 

their insight and direction with the joint force. The intent creates shared purpose and 

understanding, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders 

act to achieve objectives without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as 

planned. Likewise, lessons-learned databases are knowledge-based products that help users 

avoid previous mistakes and adopt proven best practices. These databases exemplify how 

the marriage of IM and decision-support processes can improve future operations by sharing 

knowledge gained through experience.

(3) Specific IM, knowledge-sharing, and other collaborative processes and products 

vary across joint commands based on the commander’s needs and preferences. The HQ SOP 

should specify these procedures and products and describe the relationship between IM, 

knowledge sharing, and the HQ battle rhythm.

(4) Collaboration

(a) Effective collaboration enhances C2 by sharing knowledge and aiding the 

creation of shared understanding. Although the value of face-to-face interaction is 

indisputably preferred, capabilities that improve long-distance, asynchronous collaboration 

among dispersed forces can enhance both planning and execution of joint operations. One 

has to consider, however, the added risk as long-distance collaboration may create a critical 

vulnerability that an adversary can exploit. These capabilities not only can improve 

efficiency and common understanding during routine, peacetime interaction among 

participants, they also can enhance combat effectiveness during time-compressed operations 

associated with both combat and noncombat operations.
Chapter III

III-14 JP 3-0

(b) A collaborative environment is one in which participants are encouraged to 

solve problems and share information, knowledge, perceptions, ideas, and conceptsin a spirit 

of mutual cooperation that extends beyond the requirement to coordinate with others. In 

joint operations, commanders and staffs tend to collaborate due to an established common 

purpose. However, collaboration can be enhanced when personnel understand the value of 

leveraging social networks, establishing trusted relationships, and sharing knowledge. This 

is particularly important in relationships with interorganizational partners, since their 

objectives and perceptions of the desired end state will not always coincide with the 

military’s.

(c) Collaborative Capabilities. Collaborative capabilities can enable planners 

and operators worldwide to build a plan without being colocated. Collaboration also 

provides planners with a “view of the whole” while working on various sections of a plan, 

which helps them identify and resolve planning conflicts early. Commanders can participate 

more readily in COA analysis even when away from the HQ, with the potential to select a 

COA without the traditional sequential briefing process. The staff can post plans and orders 

on interactive web pages or portals for immediate use by subordinate elements (e.g., as 

facilitated by automated machine-to-machine interfaces or “publish and subscribe” 

mechanisms). Collaborative capabilities require effective and efficient processes, trained

and disciplined users, and a usable collaborate tool infrastructure. A fully functioning 

electronic collaborative environment requires more than just collaborative capabilities that 

help participants share and protect information and knowledge. A second component of 

this environment is infrastructure—the various information systems on which the tools 

reside and the networks that link these systems. The C2 systems, networks, and 

collaborative tools and participants need procedures—based on accepted theory and practice 

and established to meet joint force needs—that enable exchanges of knowledge and 

information. The full benefit of these capabilities is realized only with a fourth component—

users who are trained to use the tools and systems and educated to understand the 

advantages and power of a collaborative environment.

(d) Information Sharing. The sharing of information with relevant USG 

agencies, foreign governments and security forces, interorganizational partners, NGOs, and 

members of the private sector, has proved vital in recent operations. Commanders at all 

levels should determine and provide guidance on what information needs to be shared with 

whom and when. DOD information should be appropriately secured, shared, and made 

available throughout the information life cycle to appropriate mission partners to the 

maximum extent allowed by US laws and DOD policy. Commanders, along with their 

staffs, need to recognize the criticality of the information-sharing function at the outset of 

complex operations and not as an afterthought.

For additional guidance on collaboration and related capabilities, refer to CJCSI 6715.01B, 

Joint Operational Employment of Virtual Collaboration, and JP 6-0, Joint Communications 

System.

k. Risk Management. Risk is inherent in military operations. Risk management is the 

process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and 

making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Risk management is a 
Joint Functions

III-15

function of command and a key planning consideration. Risk management helps 

commanders preserve lives and resources, avoid or mitigate unnecessary risk, identify 

feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do not exist, and develop 

valid COAs. Risk management does not inhibit a commander’s flexibility and initiative; 

remove risk altogether (or support a zero-defects mindset); dictate a GO/NO-GO decision to 

take a specific action; sanction or justify violating the law; or remove the necessity for SOPs. 

Risk management is relevant at all levels of war, across the range of military operations, and 

through all phases of an operation and its branches and sequels. To alleviate or reduce risk, 

commanders may take a variety of actions, such as changing the CONOPS, changing the 

plan for employment of operational fires, or executing a branch to the original plan.

(1) Safety is crucial to successful operations and the preservation of military 

power. High-tempo operations may increase the risk of injury and death due to mishaps. 

Command interest, discipline, risk mitigation measures, education, and training lessen those 

risks. The JFC reduces the chance of mishap by conducting risk assessments, assigning a 

safety officer and staff, implementing a safety program, and seeking advice from local 

personnel. Safety planning factors could include geospatial and weather data, local road 

conditions and driving habits, uncharted or uncleared mine fields, and special equipment 

hazards.

(2) To assist in risk management, commanders and their staffs may develop or 

institute a risk management process tailored to their particular mission or operational area. 

Figure III-3 is a generic model that contains the likely elements of a risk management 

process.

l. Strategic Communication and Communications Strategy

(1) The term strategic communication, an aspect of strategic guidance, applies to 

USG-level department and agency activities. CCDRs are the primary interface for 

implementing SC in the context of their theater strategies and during specific joint 

operations. The US military plays an instrumental role in SC, primarily through IO, PA, and 

DSPD. SC considerations affect every military operation and are essential when the focus is 

on gaining and maintaining the support of the relevant population as is common in IW.

(2) Integral to joint operation planning, CCDRs and subordinate JFCs develop 

communications strategies to nest with and support USG SC plans, programs, and actions

and influences key audiences. The JFC designs the communications strategy to provide 

intent, objectives, thematic guidance, and the process by which IO, PA, and other SC-related 

means coordinate and integrate their efforts and ensure consistency of messages, activities, 

and operations to the lowest level. The JFC’s communications strategy synchronizes and, 

when appropriate, integrates communications-related activities across subordinate and 

supporting commands and with interorganizational partners. The OPLAN or OPORD 

supplements the communications strategy with additional guidance and tasks as necessary. 

In particular, the strategy and plan or order synchronize and integrate the JFC’s primary 

supporting capabilities and actions of PA, IO, and DSPD to achieve the strategy’s objectives. 

The typical communications strategy for a specific operation contains at least a narrative, 

themes, messages, visual products, supporting activities, and key audiences. These 
Chapter III

III-16 JP 3-0

elements, in conjunction with specific tasks in the plan or order, help guide and regulate joint 

force actions when communicating and interacting with the local populace, 

interorganizational partners, and the media, and they support other relevant objectives.

(a) The Narrative. This is the overarching expression of the context, reason, 

and desired results associated with the CCDR’s communications strategy or a specific joint 

operation. The narrative enables understanding for external stakeholders whose perceptions, 

attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors are relevant to the operation.

(b) Themes. The communications strategy typically contains two or more 

themes, which are distinct, unifying ideas or intentions that support the narrative and are 

designed for broad application to achieve specific objectives. A subordinate JFC’s 

communications strategy themes normally nest under the GCC’s communications strategy 

themes and support the overarching narrative.

(c) Messages. These are narrowly focused communications that support a 

specific theme. They are typically directed at a specific audience to create a specific effect.

For additional guidance on PA and IO support to SC and communications strategy, refer to 

JP 3-61, Public Affairs, and JP 3-13, Information Operations. Also see JP 5-0, Joint 

Operation Planning, for information on SC-related planning.

Figure III-3. Risk Management Process

Risk Management Process

Identify Hazards

Supervise and 

Evaluate

Implement 

Controls

Assess Hazards

Develop 

Controls
Joint Functions

III-17

m. Key Leader Engagement. Most operations require commanders and other leaders 

to engage key local and regional leaders in order to affect their attitudes and gain their 

support. Building relationships to the point of effective engagement and influence 

usually takes time. Commanders can be challenged to identify key leaders, develop 

appropriate messages, establish meaningful dialogue, and determine other effective ways and 

means of delivery, especially in societies where interpersonal relationships are paramount. 

Interaction opportunities with friendly and neutral leaders could include face-to-face 

meetings, town meetings, and community events. Understanding cultural context, cognitive 

orientation patterns, and communication methods is essential. The J-2’s joint intelligence 

preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) should include identification of key 

enemy and neutral leaders, and well as key friendly leaders who are not in the commander’s 

usual sphere of influence. However, the entire staff should identify leaders relative to their 

functional areas as part of JIPOE.

n. Public Affairs. PA are the public information, command information, and 

community engagement activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with 

interest in DOD. Joint PA plans, coordinates, and synchronizes US military public 

information activities and resources in order to support the commander’s communications 

strategy and operational objectives through the distribution of truthful, timely, and factual 

information about joint military activities. PA contributes to the achievement of military 

objectives, by countering adversary misinformation and disinformation through the 

publication of accurate information. PA also assists OPSEC by educating the media on the 

implications of premature release of information or the inadvertent release of classified or 

sensitive information. PA advisesthe JFCs on the possible impact of military operations and 

activities within the public information realm.

(1) The speed and methods with which people and organizations can collect and 

convey information to the public makes it possible for the world populace to quickly become 

aware of an incident. Internet sites, social media, text messages, and cellular telephones are 

some of the means through which potential adversaries engage audiences worldwide in the 

information environment. This instantaneous, unfiltered and often incomplete, intentionally 

biased, or factually incorrect information provided via satellite and the Internet makes 

planning and effective execution of PA essential.

(2) The JFC should develop a PA plan relevant to the mission that addresses both 

current and future operations. This plan should minimize adverse effects upon the joint 

operation from inaccurate media reporting/analysis, violations of OPSEC, and promulgation 

of disinformation and misinformation. Well-planned PA support is important in every phase 

of operations. PA plans should provide for open, independent reporting and anticipate and 

respond to media queries. These plans should provide the maximum disclosure allowed with 

minimum delay and create an environment between the JFC and reporters that encourages 

balanced coverage of operations. An effective plan provides proactive ways to communicate 

information about an operation and fulfills the US military’s obligation to keep the American 

public informed while maintaining requisite OPSEC.

(3) Communication Coordination. Commanders and their staffsshould integrate 

communication activities throughout planning and execution to establish consistency in 
Chapter III

III-18 JP 3-0

intent, actions, and information disseminated about those actions. While audiences and 

intent at times differ, the JFC, through the communications strategy and JOPP, coordinates 

planning for PA, IO, CMO, and DSPD to establish and reinforce consistent themes and 

messages.

(4) PA and IO activities directly support military objectives; counter adversary 

propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation; and deter adversary actions. Although 

both PA and IO plan and execute public information activities and conduct media analysis, 

IO may differ with respect to audience, scope, and intent. As such, they are governed by 

separate procedures. JFCs ensure appropriate coordination between PA and IO activities 

consistent with the DOD principles of information, policy, or legal limitation and security.

For additional guidance on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

o. Civil-Military Operations. CMO establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations 

between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and 

authorities, and the civilian populace to facilitate military operations and consolidate and 

achieve the commander’s objectives. CMO may include activities and functions normally 

the responsibility of the local, regional, or national governments. CMO are conducted to 

minimize civil-military friction and threats from the civil component, maximize support for 

operations, and meet the commander’s legal obligations and moral responsibilities to the 

civilian populations within the operational area. These activities may occur prior to, during, 

or after other military actions. They also may occur, if directed, in the absence of other 

military operations. CMO are an inherent command responsibility.

For additional guidance on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

p. Military Deception. Military deception (MILDEC) includes actions executed to 

deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, 

and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will 

contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The intent is to cause adversary 

commanders to form inaccurate impressions about friendly force dispositions, capabilities, 

vulnerabilities, and intentions; misuse their ISR assets; and/or fail to employ combat or 

support units to their best advantage. As executed by JFCs, MILDEC targets adversary 

leaders and decision makers through the manipulation of adversary intelligence collection, 

analysis, and dissemination systems. MILDEC depends on intelligence to identify 

appropriate deception targets, to assist in developing a credible story, to identify and orient

on appropriate receivers (the readers of the story), and to assess the effectiveness of the 

deception effort. Deception requires a thorough knowledge of opponents and their decisionmaking processes. During the formulation of the CONOPS, planners determine how the JFC 

wants the adversary to act at critical points in the operation. Those desired adversary actions 

then become the MILDEC objective. MILDEC is focused on causing the opponents to act in 

a desired manner, not simply to be misled in their thinking.

For additional guidance on MILDEC, refer to JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.
Joint Functions

III-19

q. Language, Regional, and Cultural Expertise. Language skills, regional 

knowledge, and cultural awareness enable effective joint operations. Deployed joint forces 

must be capable of understanding and effectively communicating with native populations, 

local and national government officials, and coalition partners. Supporting this capability 

should be an understanding of the regional and local culture, economy, politics, religion, and 

customs. Lessons learned from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and Operation 

ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) proves that these force-multiplying capabilities can save 

lives and are integral to mission accomplishment. Consequently, commanders will integrate 

foreign language and regional expertise capabilities in contingency, security cooperation, and 

supporting plans, and provide for them in support of daily operations and activities.

For specific planning guidance and procedures regarding language and regional expertise, 

refer to CJCSI 3126.01, Language and Regional Expertise Planning.

MILITARY DECEPTION IN THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, 1973

On 6 October 1973, the Egyptian 3rd Army surprised the Israeli Defense 

Force by attacking across the Suez Canal. Egyptian forces gained a 

significant foothold in the Sinai and began to drive deeper until a determined 

defense and counterattack drove them back.

To achieve the initial surprise, Egyptian forces conducted deception 

operations of strategic, operational, and tactical significance to exploit 

Israeli weaknesses. At the strategic level, they conveyed the notions that 

they would not attack without both a concerted Arab effort and an ability to 

neutralize the Israeli Air Force, and that tactical preparations were merely in 

response to feared Israeli retaliation for Arab terrorist activity. At the 

operational level, Egyptian forces portrayed their mobilization, force buildup, 

and maneuvers as part of their annual exercises. Egyptian exercises 

portraying an intent to cross the canal were repeated until the Israelis 

became conditioned to them and therefore did not react when the actual 

attack occurred. At the tactical level, Egyptian forces expertly camouflaged 

their equipment, denying information to Israeli observers and creating a 

false impression of the purpose of the increased activity.

For their part, Israeli forces were overconfident and indecisive at the 

operational and strategic levels. In spite of the deception, tactical observers 

reported with increasing urgency that the Egyptian buildup and activity were 

significant. Their reports caused concern, but no action. Egyptian forces 

exploited these vulnerabilities and timed the attack to occur on Yom Kippur, 

the Jewish Day of Atonement, when they perceived the response of Israeli 

forces would be reduced.

As a result of their deception efforts, synchronized with other operations of 

the force, Egyptian forces quickly and decisively overwhelmed Israeli forces 

in the early stages of the Yom Kippur War.

Various Sources
Chapter III

III-20 JP 3-0

For additional and more detailed guidance on C2 of joint forces, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for 

the Armed Forces of the United States.

For additional guidance on C2 of air, land, or maritime operations, refer to JP 3-30, 

Command and Control for Joint Air Operations; JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint 

Land Operations; and JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations.

For additional guidance on C2 of special operations (SO), refer to JP 3-05, Special 

Operations, and JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

3. Intelligence

a. Understanding the operational environment is fundamental to joint operations. 

The intelligence function supports this understanding by providing integrated, evaluated, 

analyzed, and interpreted information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially 

hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. Intelligence tells JFCs 

what the enemy is doing, is capable of doing, and may do in the future. These assessments 

are important to acting inside the enemy’s decision cycle. Thus, intelligence must be 

sufficiently detailed and timely to satisfy the commander’s decision-making needs.

b. Intelligence identifies enemy capabilities, helps identify enemy and friendly centers 

of gravity (COGs), projects probably enemy COAs, and assists in planning friendly force 

employment. The process also attempts to identify what the enemy is able to discern about 

friendly forces. Intelligence provides assessments that help the JFC decide which forces to 

deploy; when, how, and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a manner that 

accomplishes the mission. The process helps JFCs and their staffs visualize the operational 

environment and achieve information superiority. During all activities, the operational 

environment can produce casualties due to disease and combat or noncombat injuries.

Intelligence provides information that helps decision makers devise protection measures to 

mitigate these threats.

c. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

(1) JFCs use a broad range of supporting capabilities to develop a current 

intelligence picture or to conduct an analysis of adversary systems. These supporting 

capabilities include combat support agencies and national intelligence agencies (e.g., 

National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, 

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency [NGA]). A national intelligence support team 

provides the J-2 with the means to integrate national intelligence capabilities into a 

comprehensive intelligence effort designed to support the joint force. J-2 should integrate 

these supporting capabilities with the efforts of the joint intelligence center. Liaison 

personnel from the various agencies provide access to the entire range of capabilities resident 

in their agencies and can focus those capabilities on the JFC’s intelligence requirements.

(2) At the advent of a crisis or other indication of potential military action, JFCs 

examine available intelligence estimates. As part of the JIPOE process, JFCs focus 

intelligence efforts to determine or confirm enemy COGs and refine estimates of enemy 

capabilities, dispositions, intentions, and probable COAs within the context of the current 
Joint Functions

III-21

situation. They look for specific indications and warning of imminent enemy activity that 

may require an immediate response or an acceleration of friendly decision cycles.

For additional guidance on intelligence support to joint operations, refer to the JP 2-0 

series.

d. The intelligence function encompasses the following intelligence process 

components:

(1) Planning and direction, to include managing CI activities that protect against 

espionage, sabotage, and assassinations.

(2) Collection of data.

(3) Processing and exploitation of collected data to produce relevant information.

(4) Analysis of information and production of intelligence.

(5) Dissemination and integration of intelligence with operations.

(6) Evaluation and feedback regarding intelligence effectiveness and quality.

e. Key Considerations

(1) Responsibilities. JFCs and their component commanders are the key 

players in planning and conducting intelligence tasks. Commanders are more than just 

consumers of intelligence. They are ultimately responsible for ensuring that intelligence is 

fully integrated into their plans and operations. They are also responsible for distributing 

intelligence and information to subordinate commands, and when appropriate, to 

interorganizational partners through established protocols and systems. Commanders 

establish the operational and intelligence requirements and continuous feedback needed to 

ensure optimum intelligence support to operations. This interface is essential to support the 

commander, to support operational planning and execution, to avoid surprise, to assist 

friendly deception efforts, and to assess the results of operations.

(2) Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Surveillance and reconnaissance are 

important elements of the intelligence function that support information collection across the 

range of military operations. JFCs require wide-area surveillance of the operational area that 

is focused on planned collection requirements and has sufficient flexibility to respond to 

time-sensitive and operationally emerging requirements. Commanders will also require 

persistent surveillance of specific targets that they determine are mission essential and 

support guidance and intent. Computer network exploitation is a form of surveillance and 

reconnaissance conducted in cyberspace that involves the use of computer networks to gather 

data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks.

(3) CI and Human Intelligence (HUMINT). JFCs rely on intelligence acquired 

through CI and HUMINT capabilities and throughout all phases of joint operations. CI and 

HUMINT both use human sources to collect information, and while their activities may at 
Chapter III

III-22 JP 3-0

times be overlapping, each has its own distinct purpose and function. CI support is essential 

to protecting the force and must be fully integrated into operation planning and execution.

For additional information on CI, refer to Secret JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human 

Intelligence in Joint Operations.

For additional guidance on the intelligence function, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence; JP 2-

01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations; and other subordinate 

JPs that address intelligence support to targeting, CI, HUMINT, geospatial intelligence

(GEOINT), and JIPOE.

4. Fires

a. To employ fires is to use available weapons and other systems to create a specific 

lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. Joint fires are those delivered during the employment 

of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired results in 

support of a common objective. Fires typically produce destructive effects, but various 

nonlethal ways and means (such as electronic attack [EA]) can be employed with little or no 

associated physical destruction. This function encompasses the fires associated with a 

number of tasks, missions, and processes, including:

(1) Conduct joint targeting. This is the process of selecting and prioritizing 

targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of command 

objectives, operational requirements, and capabilities.

(2) Provide joint fire support. This task includes joint fires that assist joint forces 

to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters.

(3) Countering air and missile threats. This task integrates offensive and 

defensive operations and capabilities to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority 

and force protection. These operations are designed to destroy or negate enemy aircraft and 

missiles, both before and after launch.

(4) Interdict enemy capabilities. Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys 

the enemy’s military surface capabilities before they can be used effectively against friendly 

forces, or to otherwise achieve their objectives.

(5) Conduct strategic attack. This task includes offensive action against targets—

whether military, political, economic, or other—which are selected specifically in order to

achieve strategic objectives.

(6) Employ IO Capabilities. This task focuses on military actions involving the 

use of electronic warfare (EW) and military information support operations (MISO). It can 

involve targeting key leaders and influential groups to affect their decision-making 

processes.

(7) Assess the results of employing fires. This task includes assessing the 

effectiveness and performance of fires as well as their contribution to the larger operation or 
Joint Functions

III-23

objective. For more guidance on assessment, refer to paragraph 6, “Assessment,” of Chapter 

II, “The Art of Joint Command.”

b. Key Considerations. The following are key considerations associated with the 

above tasks.

(1) Targeting supports the process of linking the desired effects of fires to actions 

and tasks at the component level. Commanders and their staffs must consider strategic and 

operational objectives, the potential for fratricide and other undesired fires effects, and legal 

limitations (e.g., constraints and restraints) when making targeting decisions. Successful 

integration of IO considerations into the targeting process is important to mission 

accomplishment in many operations.

(a) Oversight. JFCs may task their staff to accomplish broad targeting 

oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander. 

Typically, JFCs organize joint targeting coordination boards (JTCBs). If the JFC so 

designates, a JTCB may be either an integrating center for this effort or a JFC-level review 

mechanism. In either case, it should be composed of representatives from the staff, all 

components and, if required, their subordinate units. The primary focus of the JTCB is to 

ensure target priorities, guidance, and the associated desired results link to the JFC’s 

objectives. Briefings conducted at the JTCB should focus on ensuring that all components 

and applicable staff elements coordinate and synchronize targeting efforts with intelligence 

and operations.

(b) Delegation of Joint Targeting Process Authority. The JFC is 

responsible for all aspects of the targeting process, and may conduct joint targeting at the 

joint force HQ level or authorize a component commander to do so. The JFC normally 

appoints the deputy JFC or a component commander to chair the JTCB. When the JFC does 

not delegate targeting authority and does not establish a JTCB, the JFC performs this task at 

the joint force HQ with the assistance of the J-3. In this instance, the JFC may approve the 

formation within the J-3 of a joint fires element to provide recommendations to the J-3. The 

JFC ensures that this process is a joint effort involving applicable subordinate commands. 

Whoever the JFC authorizes to plan, coordinate, and deconflict joint targeting must possess 

or have access to a sufficient C2 infrastructure, adequate facilities, joint planning expertise,

and appropriate intelligence.

For additional targeting guidance, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

(c) Air Apportionment. In the context of joint fires, air apportionment is part 

of the targeting process. Air apportionment is how the JFACC ensures the weight of joint 

force air effort is consistent with the JFC’s intent and objectives. After consulting with other 

component commanders, the JFACC recommends air apportionment to the JFC, who makes 

the air apportionment decision. The JFACC’s rationale for the recommendation may include 

priority or percentage of effort based on the JFC’s CONOPS, specific tasks for which air 

assets are essential, and other factors such as the component commanders’ joint fires 

requirements. Following the JFC’s air apportionment decision, the JFACC allocates and 

tasks the capabilities/forces made available.
Chapter III

III-24 JP 3-0

For additional guidance on air apportionment, refer to JP 3-30, Command and Control for 

Joint Air Operations.

(2) Joint fire support includes joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and SOF to 

move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. Joint fire 

support may include, but is not limited to, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft capabilities, naval 

surface fire support, artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles, as well as nonlethal effects of 

some EA, space control operations, and other nonlethal capabilities. Integration and 

synchronization of joint fires and joint fire support with the fire and maneuver of the 

supported force are essential.

For additional guidance on joint fire support, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

(3) Countering Air and Missile Threats

(a) The JFC normally seeks to gain and maintain air superiority as quickly as 

possible to allow friendly forces to operate without prohibitive interference from adversary 

air threats. Air superiority is achieved through the counterair mission, which integrates both 

offensive counterair (OCA) and DCA operations from all components to counter the air and 

missile threat. These operations may use aircraft, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air 

missiles, artillery, SOF, ground forces, and EA. US military forces must be capable of 

countering the air and missile threat from initial force projection through redeployment of 

friendly forces. Missiles represent a particularly difficult and dangerous threat because of 

their proliferation, advances in missile technologies (perhaps coupled with WMD), and the 

often fleeting nature of adversary missile targets. Unmanned aircraft are a new challenge to 

US air defenses, as many systems have smaller radar cross sections and fly at much slower 

speeds than manned aircraft making them much harder to detect. Close coordination and 

synchronization between DCA and OCA operations to counter the missile threat is essential. 

DCA (both air and missile defense) is essential to the protection function described in 

paragraph 6, “Protection.”

(b) OCA operations are the preferred method of countering theater air and 

missile threats. OCA consists of offensive measures to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy 

aircraft, missiles, launch platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before 

and after launch, but as close to the source as possible. Ideally, joint OCA operations will 

prevent the launch of, or destroy enemy aircraft and missiles and their supporting 

infrastructure prior to launch. OCA includes attack operations, fighter sweep, fighter escort, 

and suppression of enemy air defenses.

For additional guidance on air superiority and countering air and missile threats, refer to 

JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

(4) Interdiction

(a) Interdiction is a powerful tool for JFCs. Interdiction operations are actions 

to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military surface capability before it can be 

used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. Air interdiction 

is conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air 
Joint Functions

III-25

mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. The JFC is 

responsible for the planning and synchronization of the overall interdiction effort in the 

assigned operational area. The JFACC normally is the supported commander for the JFC’s 

overall air interdiction effort, while JFLCCs and JFMCCs are supported commanders for 

interdiction in their AOs.

(b) At the direction of appropriate authorities, forces engaged in homeland 

defense (HD) or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) may perform interdiction 

against specific targets. For example, military forces also provide DSCA to US departments 

or agencies responsible for domestic law enforcement interdiction activities when requested 

and approved by SecDef or the President. These activities include actions to divert, disrupt, 

delay, intercept, board, detain, or destroy, as appropriate, suspect vessels, vehicles, aircraft, 

people, and cargo. Federal law and DOD policy impose limitations on the types of support 

that the US military may provide and what type of military mission (e.g., HD or DSCA) is 

being conducted.

See DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, for more 

information on DSCA to domestic law enforcement interdiction activities.

(c) Many elements of the joint force can conduct interdiction operations. Air, 

land, maritime, and SOF can conduct interdiction operations as part of their larger or overall 

mission. For example, naval expeditionary forces charged with seizing and securing a 

lodgment along a coast may include the interdiction of opposing land and maritime forces 

inside the amphibious objective area (AOA) as part of the overall amphibious plan.

(d) JFCs may choose to employ interdiction as a principal means to achieve an 

objective (with other components supporting the component leading the interdiction effort). 

For example, one of the JFC’s objectives associated with the seize initiative phase of an 

operation might be to prevent the enemy’s navy from interfering with friendly force sea 

transit through a choke point in the operational area. The JFC might task the JFACC to 

accomplish this through an interdiction effort supported by SOF. Interdiction during 

warfighting is not limited to any particular region of the operational area, but generally is 

conducted forward of or at a distance from friendly surface forces. Likewise, military 

interdiction that supports HD is guided and restricted by domestic law to a greater extent 

than other interdiction. Joint interdiction can be planned to create tactical, operational-level, 

or strategic advantages for the joint force, with corresponding adverse effects on the enemy. 

Interdiction deep in the enemy’s rear area can have broad operational effects; however, deep 

interdiction may have a delayed effect on land, maritime, and selected SO. Interdiction 

closer to land, maritime, and joint SOF will have more immediate operational and tactical 

effects. Thus, JFCs vary the emphasis upon interdiction operations and surface maneuvers, 

depending on the strategic and operational situation confronting them.

(e) Counter threat finance (CTF) incorporates efforts to interdict money that 

funds terrorism, illegal narcotics networks, weapons proliferation, espionage, and other 

activities that generate revenue through trafficking networks. Illicit finance networks

represent a critical vulnerability of state and non-state adversaries threatening US national 

security. Employing CTF activities are the means to detect, counter, contain, disrupt, deter, 
Chapter III

III-26 JP 3-0

or dismantle these illicit financial networks. Monitoring, assessing, analyzing, and

exploiting financial information are key support functions for CTF activities.

For more guidance on joint interdiction operations, refer to JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.

(5) Strategic Attack. A strategic attack is a JFC-directed offensive action against 

a target—whether military, diplomatic, economic, or other—that is specifically selected to 

achieve national or military strategic objectives. The JFC should consider conducting 

strategic attacks, when feasible. These attacks seek to weaken the adversary’s ability or will 

to engage in conflict or continue an action and as such, could be part of a campaign, major 

operation, or conducted independently as directed by the President or SecDef. Additionally, 

these attacks may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having to achieve 

operational objectives as a precondition. Suitable targets may include but are not limited to 

enemy strategic COGs. All components of a joint force may have capabilities to conduct 

strategic attacks.

(6) IO Capabilities in Support of Fires

(a) CNA disrupts, denies, degrades, or destroys information resident in 

computers and computer networks (relying on the data stream to execute the attack), or the 

computers and networks themselves.

(b) EA involves the use of electromagnetic (EM) energy, directed energy, or 

antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of 

degrading, neutralizing, or destroying adversary combat capability. The effects of EA can be 

lethal or nonlethal. EA can be used against a computer when the attack occurs through the 

electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), while CNA attacks using the data stream through the 

AIR INTERDICTION DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, most of the effort against Iraqi ground 

troops was focused on Republican Guard divisions and on a handful of 

stalwart regular divisions that formed part of the defensive ring south of 

Baghdad.

One prominent air interdiction success story involved the Iraqi Republican 

Guard’s redeployment of elements of the Hammurabi, Nebuchadnezzar, and 

Al Nida divisions after 25 March 2003 to the south of Baghdad toward 

Karbala, Hillah, and Al Cut. Their road movements were steadily bombed by 

US Air Force A-10s and B-52s (dropping 500-pound bombs) and British 

Tornados. An Iraqi commander concluded that their movement south had 

been one of the Iraqi regime’s major errors because it exposed the 

Republican Guard to coalition air power and resulted in large casualty 

figures.

SOURCE: Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #30

Carl Conetta, 26 September 2003
 Joint Functions 

III-27 

network or by physical destruction. Integration and synchronization of EA with maneuver, 

C2, and other joint fires are essential. 

(c) MISO. MISO convey selected information and indicators to foreign 

audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning, and ultimately 

induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. 

MISO provide a nonlethal capability to craft messages using a variety of print, audio, audiovisual, and electronic media, which can then be delivered by air, land, and sea-based means 

or through cyberspace to select target audiences. MISO have strategic, operational, and 

tactical applications and must be considered early in planning to ensure maximum 

effectiveness. MISO are central to the achievement of objectives, so the JFC should address 

the approval authorities for MISO during planning to ensure integration and unity of effort 

between MISO, civil support (CS), and supporting IO. 

For additional guidance on EA, refer to JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.

For additional guidance on MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support 

Operations. MISO support to non-US military is outlined in DODD S-3321-1, Overt 

Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in 

Contingencies Short of Declared War (U).

(7) Limiting Collateral Damage. Collateral damage is an important consideration 

at all levels of command. Collateral damage is unintentional or incidental injury or damage 

to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets based on the operational 

limitations existing at the time and does not violate the law of war so long as it is not 

excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the 

attack. Under the law of war, the balancing of military necessity in relation to collateral 

damage is known as the principle of proportionality. Limiting collateral damage will not 

only reduce the requirement to address civilian claims but may help better support friendly 

and HN actions to influence the population and reduce the magnitude of stability operations 

required. 

(8) Nonlethal Capabilities. Nonlethal capabilities can generate effects that limit 

collateral damage, reduce risk to civilians, and may reduce opportunities for adversary 

propaganda. They may also reduce the number of casualties associated with excessive use of 

force, limit reconstruction costs, and maintain the good will of the local populace. 

5. Movement and Maneuver 

a. This function encompasses the disposition of joint forces to conduct operations by 

securing positional advantages before or during combat operations and by exploiting tactical 

success to achieve operational and strategic objectives. This function includes moving or 

deploying forces into an operational area and maneuvering them to operational depths for 

offensive and defensive purposes. It also includes assuring the mobility of friendly forces. 

The movement and maneuver function encompasses a number of tasks including: 

(1) Deploy, shift, regroup, or move joint and/or component force formations within 

the operational area by any means or mode (i.e., air, land, or sea). 
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III-28 JP 3-0

(2) Maneuver joint forces to achieve a position of advantage over an enemy.

(3) Provide mobility for joint forces to facilitate their movement and maneuver 

without delays caused by terrain or obstacles.

(4) Delay, channel, or stop movement and maneuver by enemy formations. This 

includes operations that employ obstacles (i.e., countermobility), enforce sanctions and 

embargoes, and conduct blockades.

(5) Control significant areas in the operational area whose possession or control 

provides either side an operational advantage.

b. Movement to Attain Operational Reach

(1) Forces, sometimes limited to those that are forward-deployed or even 

multinational forces formed specifically for the task at hand, can be positioned within 

operational reach of enemy COGs or decisive points to achieve decisive force at the 

appropriate time and place. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a 

joint force can successfully employ its military capabilities. At other times, mobilization and 

deployment processes can be called up to begin the movement of reinforcing forces from the 

continental United States (CONUS) or other theaters to redress any unfavorable balance of 

forces and to achieve decisive force at the appropriate time and place. Alert may come with 

little or no notice.

(2) JFCs must carefully consider the movement of forces and whether to 

recommend the formation and or movement of multinational forces. At times, movement of 

forces can contribute to the escalation of tension, while at other times its deterrent effect can 

reduce those tensions. Movement of forces may deter adversary aggression or movement.

For more information on deployment process, refer to JP 3-35, Deployment and 

Redeployment Operations.

c. Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area through 

movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the 

enemy. Maneuver of forces relative to enemy COGs can be key to the JFC’s mission 

accomplishment. Through maneuver, the JFC can concentrate forces at decisive points to 

achieve surprise, psychological effects, and physical momentum. Maneuver also may enable 

or exploit the effects of massed or precision fires.

(1) The principal purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy at a disadvantage 

through the flexible application of movement and fires. The goal of maneuver is to render 

opponents incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and physical cohesion (i.e., their 

ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole) by moving to a point of advantage to 

deliver a decisive blow. This may be achieved by attacking enemy forces and controlling 

territory, airspace, populations, key waters, and LOCs through air, land, and maritime 

maneuvers.
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III-29

(2) There are multiple ways to attain positional advantage. A naval expeditionary 

force with airpower, cruise missiles, and amphibious assault capability, within operational 

reach of an enemy’s COG, has positional advantage. In like manner, land and air

expeditionary forces that are within operational reach of an enemy’s COG and have the 

means and opportunity to strike and maneuver on such a COG also have positional 

advantage. Maintaining full-spectrum superiority contributes to positional advantage by 

facilitating freedom of action. See Chapter V, “Joint Operations Across the Range of 

Military Operations,” paragraph 14.f, “Full-Spectrum Superiority.”

(3) At all levels of war, successful maneuver requires not only fire and movement 

but also agility and versatility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations. It requires 

designating and then, if necessary, shifting the main effort and applying the principles of 

mass and economy of force.

(a) At the strategic level, deploying units to and positioning units within an 

operational area are forms of maneuver if such movements seek to gain positional advantage. 

Strategic maneuver should place forces in position to begin the phases or major operations of 

a campaign.

(b) At the operational level, maneuver is a means by which JFCs set the terms 

of battle by time and location, decline battle, or exploit existing situations. Operational 

maneuver usually takes large forces from a base of operations to an area where they are in 

position to achieve operational objectives. The objective for operational maneuver is usually 

a COG or decisive point.

(4) JFCs should consider various ways and means to help maneuver forces attain 

positional advantage. For example, SOF may expose vulnerabilities through special 

reconnaissance and attack the enemy at tactical, operational, and strategic levels through 

direct action or using indigenous or surrogate forces. Additionally, the planning of CA and 

use of an effective IO program may minimize civilian interference with operations as well as 

the impact of military operations on the populace.

6. Protection

a. The protection function focuses on preserving the joint force’s fighting potential in 

four primary ways. One way uses active defensive measures that protect the joint force, its 

information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and LOCs from an enemy attack. Another 

way uses passive defensive measures that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities 

difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. Equally important is the application of technology and 

procedures to reduce the risk of fratricide. Finally, emergency management and response 

reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to accidents, health threats, and natural 

disasters. As the JFC’s mission requires, the protection function also extends beyond force 

protection to encompass protection of US noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil 

infrastructure of friendly nations; and interorganizational partners. Protection capabilities 

apply domestically in the context of HD, CS, and emergency preparedness.

b. The protection function encompasses a number of tasks, including:
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III-30 JP 3-0

(1) Providing air, space, and missile defense.

(2) Protecting US civilians.

(3) Providing physical security for forces and means.

(4) Conducting defensive countermeasure operations, including counterdeception 

and counterpropaganda operations and operations to counter-improvised explosive devices 

(C-IEDs).

(5) Providing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense.

(6) Conducting OPSEC, CND, information assurance (IA), defensive EA, and 

electronic protection activities.

(7) Securing and protecting forces, bases, JSAs, and LOCs.

(8) Conducting personnel recovery (PR) operations.

(9) Mitigating the effects of CBRN threats and hazards through WMD consequence 

management.

(10) Establishing antiterrorism programs.

(11) Establishing capabilities and measures to prevent fratricide.

(12) Providing emergency management and response capabilities and services.

c. Protection considerations affect planning in every joint operation. Campaigns and 

major operations involve large-scale combat against a capable enemy. These operations 

typically will require the full range of protection tasks, thereby complicating both planning 

and execution. Although the operational area and joint force may be smaller for a crisis 

response or limited contingency operation, the mission can still be complex and 

dangerous, thus requiring a variety of protection considerations. Permissive environments 

associated with military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence still require 

that commanders and their staffs consider protection measures commensurate with potential 

risks. These risks may include a wide range of threats such as terrorism, criminal 

enterprises, environmental threats/hazards, and CNAs. Thus continuous research and access 

to accurate, detailed information about the operational environment along with realistic 

training can enhance protection activities.

d. Force protection includes preventive measures taken to prevent or mitigate hostile 

actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and 

critical information. These actions preserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied 

at the decisive time and place and incorporate integrated and synchronized offensive and 

defensive measures that enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading 

opportunities for the adversary. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the 

enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Force health protection (FHP) 
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III-31

complements force protection efforts by promoting, improving, preserving, or restoring the 

mental or physical well being of Service members. Force protection is achieved through the 

tailored selection and application of multilayered active and passive measures commensurate 

with the level of risk. Intelligence sources provide information regarding an adversary’s 

capabilities against personnel and resources, as well as information regarding force 

protection considerations. Foreign and domestic law enforcement agencies can contribute to 

force protection through the prevention, detection, response, and investigation of crime, and 

by sharing information on criminal and terrorist organizations.

e. Key Considerations

(1) Security of forces and means enhances force protection by identifying and 

reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security operations 

protect forces, bases, JSAs, and LOCs. Physical security includes physical measures 

designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, 

material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and 

theft. The physical security process includes determining vulnerabilities to known threats; 

applying appropriate deterrent, control, and denial safeguarding techniques and measures; 

and responding to changing conditions. Functions in physical security include facility 

security, law enforcement, guard and patrol operations, special land and maritime security 

areas, and other physical security operations like military working dog operations or 

emergency and disaster response support. Measures include fencing and perimeter stand-off 

areas, land or maritime force patrols, lighting and sensors, vehicle barriers, blast protection, 

intrusion detection systems and electronic surveillance, and access control devices and 

systems. Physical security measures, like any defense, should be overlapping and deployed 

in depth.

For additional guidance on physical security measures, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security 

Operations in Theater.

(2) Defensive Counterair. DCA encompasses active and passive measures for air 

and missile defense that contribute to force protection by detecting, identifying, intercepting, 

and destroying or negating enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly 

airspace to include WMD delivery systems.

(a) Active air and missile defense includes all direct defensive actionstaken 

to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against 

friendly forces and assets. It includes the use of aircraft, air and missile defense weapons, 

EW, and other available weapons. Ideally, integration of systems will allow for a defense in 

depth, with potential for multiple engagements that increase the probability for success. 

Active air and missile defense recognizes both air defense and missile defense as unique and 

separate capabilities that are closely integrated. The JSA coordinator coordinates with the 

AADC to ensure that air and missile defense requirements for the JSA are integrated into air 

defense plans.

(b) Passive air and missile defense includes all measures, other than active air 

and missile defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats 
Chapter III

III-32 JP 3-0

against friendly forces and assets. These measures include camouflage, concealment, 

deception, dispersion, reconstitution, redundancy, detection and warning systems, and the 

use of protective construction.

For additional guidance on countering theater air and missile threats, refer to JP 3-01, 

Countering Air and Missile Threats.

(3) Defensive use of IO ensures timely, accurate, and relevant information access 

while denying adversaries opportunities to exploit friendly information and information 

systems for their own purposes.

(a) OPSEC is a process that identifies critical information to determine if 

friendly actions can be observed by enemy intelligence systems, denies critical information 

to the enemy, determines if information obtained by the enemy could be useful to them, and 

then executes selected measures that eliminate or reduce enemy exploitation of friendly 

critical information. Unlike security programs that seek to protect classified information, 

OPSEC measures identify, control, and protect generally unclassified evidence that is 

associated with sensitive operations and activities.

For additional guidance on OPSEC, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

(b) CND includes actions taken to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and 

respond to unauthorized activity within DOD information systems and computer networks.

(c) IA encompasses measures that protect and defend information and 

information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, 

and nonrepudiation. IA incorporates protection, detection, response, restoration, and 

reaction capabilities and processes to shield and preserve information and information 

systems. IA for DOD information and information systems requires a defense-in-depth that 

integrates the capabilities of people, operations, and technology to establish multilayer and 

multidimensional protection to ensure survivability and mission accomplishment. IA must 

account for the possibility that access to DOD’s information and information systems can be 

gained from outside of DOD’s control.

(d) Electronic protection is that division of EW involving action taken to 

protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the 

EMS that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability.

(e) Defensive EA activities use the EMS to protect personnel, facilities, 

capabilities, and equipment. Examples include self-protection and force protection measures 

such as use of expendables (e.g., chaff and active decoys), jammers, towed decoys, directed 

energy infrared countermeasure systems, and counter radio-controlled improvised explosive 

device (IED) systems.

(4) Personnel Recovery. PR missions use military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to 

recover and reintegrate isolated personnel. There are five PR tasks (report, locate, support, 

recover, and reintegrate) necessary to achieve a complete and coordinated recovery of US 

military personnel, DOD civilians, DOD contractors, and others designated by the President 
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III-33

or SecDef. JFCs should consider all individual, component, joint, and interorganizational 

partner capabilities available when planning and executing PR missions.

For further guidance on PR, refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

(5) CBRN Defense. Preparation for potential enemy use of CBRN weapons is 

integral to any planning effort. Even when an adversary does not possess traditional CBRN 

materiel or weapons regarded as WMD, easy access to materials such as radiation sources 

and toxic industrial chemicals represents a significant planning consideration. The result of a 

CBRN attack may not be to achieve traditional military objectives, but instead have strategic, 

operational, psychological, economic, and political impacts. CBRN defense focuses on 

avoiding CBRN hazards (contamination), protecting individuals and units from CBRN 

hazards, and decontamination in order to restore operational capability. Effective CBRN 

defense may also deter enemy WMD use by contributing to the survivability of US forces.

For additional guidance on CBRN defense, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments, and JP 3-40, Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction.

(6) Antiterrorism programs support force protection by establishing defensive 

measures that reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include 

limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. These programs also 

include personal security and defensive measures to protect Service members, high-risk 

personnel, civilian employees, family members, DOD facilities, information, and equipment. 

Personal security measures consist of commonsense rules for the on- and off-duty conduct of

every Service member. They also include employment of dedicated guard forces and use of 

individual protective equipment (IPE), hardened vehicles, hardened facilities, and duress 

alarms. Security of high-risk personnel safeguards designated individuals who, by virtue of 

their rank, assignment, symbolic value, location, or specific threat, are at a greater risk than 

the general population. Terrorist activity may be discouraged by varying the installation 

force protection posture through the use of a random antiterrorism measures program, which 

may include varying patrol routes; staffing guard posts and towers at irregular intervals; and 

conducting vehicle and vessel inspections, personnel searches, and identification checks on a 

set but unpredictable pattern. To be effective, these measures should be highly visible to any 

hostile elements conducting surveillance.

For additional guidance on antiterrorism, refer to JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

(7) The intent of combat identification (CID) is to accurately distinguish enemy 

objects and forces in the operational environment from others to support engagement 

decisions. Effective CID supports force protection and enhances operations by providing 

confidence throughout the force in the accuracy of CID characterizations. Effective CID 

procedures help minimize fratricide and collateral damage.

(a) Depending on operational requirements, CID characterization may be 

limited to, “friend,” “enemy/hostile,” “neutral,” or “unknown.” In some situations, 

additional characterizations may be required including, but not limited to, class, type, 
Chapter III 

III-34 JP 3-0 

nationality, and mission configuration. CID characterizations, when applied with ROE, 

enable engagement decisions concerning use or prohibition of lethal weapons and nonlethal 

capabilities. 

(b) The staff should develop CID procedures early during planning. These 

procedures must be consistent with ROE and should not interfere with the ability of a unit or 

individual to engage enemy forces. When developing the JFC’s CID procedures, important 

considerations include the missions, capabilities, and limitations of all participants including 

interorganizational partners. 

For additional guidance on CID, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

(8) Force Health Protection. FHP complements force protection efforts, and 

includes all measures taken by the JFC and the Military Health System to promote, improve, 

and preserve the well-being of Service members. FHP measures focus on the prevention of 

illness and injury. The JFC must ensure adequate capabilities are available to identify health 

threats and implement appropriate FHP measures. Health threats are a composite of 

ongoing or potential enemy actions; occupational, environmental, geographical, and 

meteorological conditions; endemic diseases; and the employment of chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) that can reduce the effectiveness 

of military forces. Therefore, a robust health surveillance system is essential to FHP 

measures. Health surveillance includes identifying the population at risk; identifying and 

assessing hazardous exposures; employing specific countermeasures to eliminate or mitigate 

exposures; and monitoring and reporting battle injury, disease, and non-battle injury trends 

and other health outcomes. Occupational and environmental health surveillance enhances 

the joint force’s ability to limit all categories of injuries including combat and operational 

stress exposure to CBRNE hazards. 

For further guidance on FHP, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

(9) Critical infrastructure protection programs support the identification and 

mitigation of vulnerabilities to defense critical infrastructure, which includes DOD and nonDOD domestic and foreign infrastructures essential to plan, mobilize, deploy, execute, and 

sustain US military operations on a global basis. Coordination between DOD entities and 

other USG departments and agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and 

equivalent foreign entities, is key in effective protection of critical assets controlled both by 

DOD and private entities. Vulnerabilities found in defense critical infrastructure shall be 

remediated and/or mitigated based on risk management decisions made by responsible 

authorities. These vulnerability mitigation decisions should be made using all available 

program areas, including antiterrorism, MILDEC, OPSEC, and force protection. 

(10) Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations. C-IED operations are 

the collective efforts at all levels to neutralize the IED threat to friendly forces and civilians. 

They are conducted as an integral part of the broader joint operation and include measures 

taken to neutralize the infrastructure supporting the production and employment of IEDs; 

technical exploitation of the device to obtain information to support targeting and improve 
Joint Functions

III-35

friendly force protection measures; and the development of tactics, techniques, and 

procedures to counter the IED threat at the tactical level.

For further guidance on C-IED, refer to JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device 

Operations.

7. Sustainment

a. Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to 

maintain and prolong operations through mission accomplishment and redeployment of the 

force. Sustainment provides the JFC with the means to enable freedom of action and 

endurance and the ability to extend operational reach. Effective sustainment determines the 

depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations, allowing the JFC to seize, 

retain, and exploit the initiative. The ultimate goal is for logistics planners to develop a 

feasible, supportable, and efficient concept of logistic support and to be able to identify risks 

to the execution of the CONOPS. Prior to the development of contingency plans, CCMDs 

develop logistic planning products that are part of the CCMD’s TCP.

(1) Logistics is planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It 

includes those aspects of military operations that deal with:

(a) The design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, 

maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of material.

(b) Movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel.

(c) Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of 

facilities.

(d) Acquisition or furnishing of services.

(2) Logistics concerns the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical support 

efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and movement of forces and 

materiel to support the JFC’s CONOPS. The relative combat power that military forces can 

generate against an adversary is constrained by a nation’s capability to plan for, gain access 

to, and deliver forces and materiel to required points of application. Logistics covers the 

following core capabilities: supply, maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, 

health service support (HSS), logistic services, engineering, and operational contract support.

(3) Personnel services are those sustainment functions provided to personnel 

rather than to systems and equipment. Personnel services complement logistics by planning 

for and coordinating efforts that provide and sustain personnel during joint operations. 

These services include the following:

(a) Human resources support.

(b) Religious ministry support.
Chapter III 

III-36 JP 3-0 

(c) Financial management. 

(d) Legal support. 

b. JFCs should identify sustainment capabilities early in planning for an operation. 

Sustainment should be a priority consideration when the timed-phased force and deployment 

data list is built. Sustainment provides JFCs with flexibility to develop any required 

branches and sequels and to refocus joint force efforts as required. 

c. The sustainment function encompasses a number of tasks including: 

(1) Coordinating the supply of food, fuel, arms, munitions, and equipment. 

(2) Providing for maintenance of equipment. 

(3) Coordinating and providing support for forces, including field services, 

personnel services support, HSS, mortuary affairs, religious ministry support, postal support, 

morale, welfare and recreational support, financial support, and legal services. 

(4) Building and maintaining sustainment bases. 

(5) Assessing, repairing, and maintaining infrastructure. 

(6) Acquiring, managing, and distributing funds. 

(7) Providing common-user logistics support to OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and other 

nations. 

(8) Establishing and coordinating movement services. 

(9) Establishing large-scale detention compounds and sustaining enduring detainee 

operations.

For further guidance on logistic support, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. For further 

guidance on personnel services, refer to JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support. For further 

guidance on legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations. For 

further guidance on religious affairs, refer to JP 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations. 

For further guidance on financial management support, refer to JP 1-06, Financial 

Management Support in Joint Operations. 

d. Key Considerations

(1) Employment of Logistic Forces. For some operations, logistic forces may be 

employed in quantities disproportionate to their normal military roles, and in nonstandard 

tasks. Further, logistic forces may precede other military forces or may be the only forces 

deployed. Logistic forces also may continue to support interorganizational partners after the 

departure of combat forces. In such cases, they must be familiar with and adhere to 

applicable status-of-forces agreements and acquisition and cross-servicing agreements to 
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III-37

which the United States is a party. Given the potential complexity of operational 

environments, logistic forces must be familiar with and adhere to legal, regulatory, and 

political restraints governing US involvement because of the specialized nature and unique 

authorities in operations such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. Logistic forces, 

like all other forces, must be capable of self-defense, particularly if they deploy alone or in 

advance of other military forces.

(2) Facilities. JFCs need to plan for the early acquisition (leasing) of real estate 

and facilities for force and logistic bases where temporary occupancy is planned and/or the 

HN provides inadequate or no property. Early negotiation for facilities can be critical to the 

successful flow of forces.

(3) Environmental Considerations. Environmental considerations are broader 

than just protection of the environment and environmental stewardship. They also include 

continuously integrating the FHP, CMO, and other more operationally focused 

environmental considerations that affect US military forces and objectives. Military 

operations do not generally focus on environmental compliance and environmental 

protection, but JFCs are responsible for protecting the environment in which US military 

forces operate to the greatest extent possible consistent with operational requirements. 

Commanders comply with the command guidance on environmental considerations specified 

in the OPLAN or OPORD and included in unit SOPs. Environmental considerations link 

directly to risk management and the safety and health of Service members. All significant 

risks must be clearly and accurately communicated to deploying DOD personnel and the 

chain of command. Environmental considerations, risk management, and health risk 

communications are enabling elements for the commander and are an essential part of 

military planning, training, and operations. While complete protection of the environment 

during military operations may not always be possible, careful planning should address 

environmental considerations in joint operations, to include legal aspects.

For additional guidance on environmental considerations, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer 

Operations.

(4) Health Service Support. HSS provides services to promote, improve, 

preserve, or restore the behavioral or physical well-being of personnel. HSS includes, but is 

not limited to, the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and 

facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the sick, wounded, or 

injured; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood 

management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat and operational 

stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, nutrition therapy, and 

medical intelligence services. CCDRs are responsible for HSS of forces assigned or attached 

to their command and should establish HSS policies and programs accordingly.

(a) Actions to obtain health threat information begin prior to deployment 

and are continually updated as forces are deployed. Disease and injury occurrences can 

quickly affect combat effectiveness and may adversely affect the success of a mission and 

can have a greater impact on operations when the forces employed are small independent 

units.
Chapter III

III-38 JP 3-0

(b) The early introduction of preventive medicine personnel or units into 

theater helps protect US forces from diseases and injuries. It also permits a thorough 

assessment of the health threat to and operational requirements of the mission. Preventive 

medicine support includes education and training on personal hygiene and field sanitation, 

personal protective measures, epidemiological investigations, pest management, and 

inspection of water sources and supplies. For maximum effectiveness, preventive medicine 

needs to be provided to as many as possible within the operational area. In addition to US 

forces, as much as possible, include multinational forces, HN civilians, and dislocated 

civilians. JFCs and joint force surgeons must be aware of any legal constraints unique to the 

operational environment and intended recipient of services. Issues such as eligibility of 

beneficiaries, reimbursement for supplies used and manpower expended, and provisions of 

legal agreements and other laws applicable to the theater must be reviewed.

(c) Medical and rehabilitative care provides essential care in the operational 

area and rapid evacuation to definitive care facilities without sacrificing quality of care. It 

encompasses care provided from the point of illness or injury through rehabilitative care.

For further guidance on HSS, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support. For further 

guidance on procedures for deployment health activities, refer to DOD Instruction 6490.03,

Deployment Health.

(5) Host-Nation Support (HNS). HNS requires interaction with the HN 

government to establish procedures for requesting support and negotiating support terms. 

Logistic planners should analyze the capability of the HN economy to supplement the 

logistic support that US or multinational forces require and exercise care to limit adverse 

effects on the HN economy. Accordingly, early mission analysis must consider distribution 

requirements. This should be a collaborative analysis with all HN providers, which will

support a systems analysis for designated focus areas when they are established. The 

assessment must include airfields, seaports, rail and road networks, particularly those in 

underdeveloped countries where their status is questionable. Delay in completing the 

assessment directly affects the flow of strategic lift assets into the region. Additional support 

forces may be required to build or improve the supporting infrastructure to facilitate followon force closure as well as the delivery of humanitarian cargo.

(6) Operational Contract Support. Logistic support requirements are often met 

through contracts with commercial entities inside and outside the operational area. Most 

joint operations will require a level of contracted support, and certain contracted items or 

services could be essential to deploying,sustaining, and redeploying joint forces effectively. 

Operational contract support generally covers three types of contracts: theater support, 

external support, and system support. Theater support contracts are those with local 

vendors, and processed through in-theater Service or joint contingency contracting offices. 

External support contracts include the Services’ civil augmentation programs such as the 

Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, the Air Force Contract Augmentation 

Program, and the Navy’s Global Contingency Construction Contract program as well as 

other logistic and combat support contracts processed through authorities outside the theater. 

System support contracts are those awarded by program management offices that provide 

technical support to newly fielded systems or, in some cases, life-cycle systems support. In 
Joint Functions

III-39

all operations, contracted support must be properly planned, integrated, coordinated, and 

managed to ensure accurate, timely, and effective support to the deployed joint force.

For more detailed information and guidance on contracting, refer to JP 4-10, Operational 

Contract Support.

(7) Disposal Operations. Disposal is an important link in the logistic chain. 

Disposal is a consideration throughout planning and execution, and until forces redeploy. 

Inadequate understanding of disposal operations may cause violations of public and 

international law, confusion over roles and requirements, increased costs, inefficient 

operations, and negative health implications. Defense Logistics Agency support to the 

CCDR’s component commands includes the capability to receive and dispose of materiel in 

a theater. The Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service element in theater establishes 

theater-specific procedures for the reuse, demilitarization, or disposal of facilities, 

equipment, and supplies, to include hazardous materiel and waste.

(8) Legal Support. Legal support is important across all joint functions. Many 

decisions and actions have potential legal implications. The JFC’s staff judge advocate 

(SJA) provides the full spectrum of legal support through direct and reachback capability. A 

key member of the JFC’s personal staff, the SJA provides legal advice on the laws, 

regulations, policies, treaties, and agreements that affect joint operations. Legal advisors 

actively participate in the planning process from mission analysis to execution, an essential 

function given the complexity of the operational environment. Legal advisors provide 

support on fiscal activities, operational limitations, international law, and many other factors 

that can affect operations. Further, the JFC should integrate HN legal personnel into the 

command legal staff as soon as practical to provide guidance on unique HN domestic legal 

practices and customs.

For more detailed information and guidance on legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Legal 

Support to Military Operations.

(9) Financial management encompasses the two core processes of resource 

management and finance support. The joint force comptroller is the officer responsible for 

providing the elements of finance operations. The resource management process normally 

consists of costing functions and the effort to leverage appropriate fund sources. Finance 

operations provide the necessary funds to conduct contracting and limited pay support. The 

joint force comptroller’s management of these elements provides the JFC with many 

necessary capabilities, from contracting and banking support to cost capturing and fund 

control. Financial management support for contracting, subsistence, billeting, transportation, 

communications, labor, and a myriad of other supplies and services, particularly in distant, 

austere environments, can be necessary for successful mission accomplishment.

For more detailed information and guidance on financial management support, refer to JP 

1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations.
Chapter III

III-40 JP 3-0

Intentionally Blank
IV-1 

CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZING FOR JOINT OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

Organizing for joint operations involves many considerations. Most can be 

associated in three primary groups related to organizing the joint force, organizing the 

joint force headquarters, and organizing operational areas to help control operations. 

Understanding the operational environment helps the JFC understand factors that may 

affect decisions in each of these areas.

2. Understanding the Operational Environment

a. General. Factors that affect joint operations extend far beyond the boundaries of 

the JFC’s assigned operational area. The JFC’s operational environment is the 

composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect employment of 

capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (see Figure IV-2). It 

encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) 

and the information environment (which includes cyberspace). Included within these 

are enemy, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint 

operation. The nature and interaction of these systems will affect how the commander 

plans, organizes for, and conducts joint operations. 

b. Physical Areas and Factors

(1) Physical Areas. The pertinent physical areas in the operational 

environment include the assigned operational area and the associated area of influence

and area of interest. Designation of the areas of influence and interest help orient 

commanders and staffs to relevant physical locations during both planning and execution. 

(a) An operational area is an overarching term encompassing more 

descriptive terms for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. 

Operational areas include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as AOR, theater of war, 

theater of operations, JOA, AOA, joint special operations area (JSOA), and AO.

“US military power today is unsurpassed on the land and sea and in the air, 

space, and cyberspace. The individual Services have evolved capabilities and 

competencies to maximize their effectiveness in their respective domains. 

Even more important, the ability to integrate these diverse capabilities into a 

joint whole that is greater than the sum of the Service parts is an unassailable 

American strategic advantage.”

Admiral M.G. Mullen

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, January 2009
Chapter IV

IV-2 JP 3-0 

(b) An area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is 

directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally 

under the commander’s command or control. The area of influence normally surrounds 

and includes the assigned operational area. The extent of a subordinate command’s area 

of influence is one factor the higher commander considers when defining the 

subordinate’s operational area. Understanding the command’s area of influence helps the 

commander and staff plan branches to the current operation that could require the force to 

employ capabilities outside the assigned operational area. The commander can describe 

the area of influence graphically, but the resulting graphic does not represent a boundary 

for operations or other control measure for maneuver or fire support. 

(c) An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including 

the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the 

objectives of current or planned operations if those objectives are not currently within the

assigned operational area. This area also includes areas occupied by forces or other 

factors that could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. An area of interest 

serves to focus ISR support for monitoring enemy, adversary, or other activities outside 

the operational area that may affect current and future operations. The commander can 

describe this area graphically, but the resulting graphic does not represent a boundary for 

operations or other control measure for maneuver or fire support.

(2) Physical Factors. The JFC and staff must consider many factors associated 

with operations in the air, land, maritime, and space domains, and the information 

environment (which includes cyberspace). These factors include terrain (including urban 

settings), weather, topography, hydrology, EMS, and other environmental conditions in 

the operational area; distances associated with the deployment to the operational area and 

employment of joint capabilities; the location of bases, ports, and other supporting 

infrastructure; and both friendly and enemy forces and other capabilities. Combinations 

of these factors greatly affect operations and sustainment. 

c. Information Environment. The information environment is a global 

environment composed of all individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, 

process, disseminate, or act on information. 

(1) The information environment is where humans and automated systems 

observe, orient, decide, and act upon information, and is therefore the principal 

environment of decision making. This environment is pervasive to all activities 

worldwide and to the air, land, maritime, and space domains of the JFC’s operational 

environment. The actors in the information environment include military and civilian

leaders, decision makers, individuals, and organizations. Resources include the 

information itself and the materials and systems employed to process, store, display, 

disseminate, and protect information and produce information-related products. 

(2) Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment. It 

consists of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, 

including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded 

processors and controllers. 
Organizing for Joint Operations 

IV-3 

(3) Cyberspace operations employ cyberspace capabilities primarily to achieve 

objectives in or through cyberspace. Such operations include computer NETOPS and 

activities to operate and defend DOD information networks. 

For more information on the information environment, refer to JP 3-13, Information 

Operations. 

d. Visualizing the Operational Environment

(1) Figure IV-1 illustrates a notional operational environment for a joint force 

that is conducting operations within a GCC’s AOR. Planners have depicted an area of 

influence. It is not a boundary, but it represents the reach of the joint force’s capabilities. 

Figure IV-1 also shows the area of interest, which includes an enemy mechanized force 

that is located outside the theater of operations, but close enough to influence the JFC’s 

operations at some point in time.

(2) The purpose of Figure IV-1 is to help visualize the scope of an operation 

environment, although it normally would not be depicted in graphic form. Within this 

notional operations environment is a forward base the GCC established outside the JOA. 

There also is a CONUS installation, which could represent any of the myriad supporting 

Figure IV-1. Visualizing the Operational Environment

Visualizing the Operational Environment

AOR area of responsibility forward bases

Legend

XXX Continental 

United States 

Installation

Area of 

Interest

Joint 

Operations 

Area

Area of 

Influence

AOR

Information 

Environment

Operational 

Environment
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-0 

capabilities outside the AOR that are crucial to successful joint operations. These 

capabilities typically reside at USG facilities such as military reservations, installations, 

bases, posts, camps, stations, arsenals, vessels/ships, or laboratories, which support joint 

functions such as C2, intelligence, and sustainment. Although DOD installations 

normally lie outside the designated operational area and area of influence, they are part of 

the JFC’s operational environment. For example, the JFC requires force visibility 

throughout deployment to the completion of reception, staging, onward movement, 

integration, and redeployment. DOD installations provide support to deployed forces 

until they return. The ability to receive support from DOD installations can reduce the 

size of the forward deployed force. To a significant degree, events occurring at DOD 

installations affect the morale and performance of deployed forces. Thus, the JFC’s 

operational environment encompasses all “home station” installation functions, including 

family programs. Although not depicted in Figure IV-1, the operational environment also 

includes a wide variety of intangible factors such as the culture, perceptions, beliefs, and 

values of enemy, adversary, neutral, or friendly political and social systems. 

e. A Systems Perspective

(1) A system is a functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of 

regularly interacting or interdependent elements forming a unified whole. One way to 

think of the operational environment is as a set of complex and constantly interacting 

political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII), and other 

systems as Figure IV-2 depicts. The nature and interaction of these systems will affect 

how the commander plans, organizes for, and conducts joint operations. The JFC’s 

interorganizational partners routinely focus on systems other than military (political, 

economic, etc.), so the JFC and staff must understand these systems and how military 

operations affect them. Equally important is understanding how elements in other 

PMESII systems can help or hinder the JFC’s mission. A commonly shared 

understanding among partners in the operation can help influence actions beyond the 

JFC’s directive authority and promote a unified, comprehensive approach to achieve 

objectives. 

(2) A systems understanding of the operational environment typically will 

require cross-functional participation by other joint force staff elements and collaboration 

with various intelligence organizations, USG departments and agencies, and 

nongovernmental centers that possess relevant expertise. The JFC must consider the best 

way to manage or support this cross-functional effort. The J-2 is the staff lead for this 

effort as part of JIPOE. A variety of factors, including planning time available, will 

affect the fidelity of a systems perspective. 

(3) Understanding PMESII systems, their interaction with each other, and how 

system relationships will change over time will increase the JFC’s knowledge of how 

actions within a system can affect other system components. Among other benefits, this 

perspective helps intelligence analysts identify potential sources from which to gain 

indications and warning, and facilitates understanding the continuous and complex 

interaction of friendly, adversary, and neutral systems. A systems understanding also 

supports operational design by enhancing elements such as COGs, LOOs, and decisive 
Organizing for Joint Operations 

IV-5 

points. For example, Figure IV-2 depicts notional operational and strategic COGs (there 

could be more). It shows each as a sub-system composed of related nodes and clarifies 

that the two COGs are related by a common node. This helps commanders and their 

staffs visualize and design a broad approach to mission accomplishment early in the 

planning process, which makes detailed planning more efficient.

For further guidance on developing a systems perspective as part of JIPOE, refer to JP 

2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. For further 

guidance on the use of a systems perspective in operational design and joint operation 

planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

Figure IV-2. The Interconnected Operational Environment

Legend

COG center of gravity Decisive Point COG Node Node Link

The Interconnected Operational Environment

A systems perspective facilitates operational design and joint operation planning by providing 

the joint force commander (JFC) and staff with a common frame of reference for collaboration 

with interorganizational and multinational partners to determine and coordinate actions that are 

beyond the JFC’s command authority.

Operational 

COG

Strategic 

COG

Military

Social

Informational

Infrastructure

Political

Economic
Chapter IV

IV-6 JP 3-0 

3. Organizing the Joint Force 

a. General. How JFCs organize their assigned or attached forces directly affects the 

responsiveness and versatility of joint operations. The first principle in joint force 

organization is that JFCs organize forces to accomplish the mission based on their 

intent and CONOPS. Unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and 

decentralized execution are key considerations. Joint forces can be established on a 

geographic or functional basis. JFCs may elect to centralize selected functions within 

the joint force, but should avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of 

subordinate forces. JFCs should allow Service and SOF tactical and operational forces, 

organizations, and capabilities to function generally as they were designed. All Service 

components contribute their distinct capabilities to joint operations; however, their 

interdependence is essential to overall joint effectiveness. Joint interdependence is the 

purposeful reliance by one Service on another Service’s capabilities to maximize the 

complementary and reinforcing effects of both; the degree of interdependence varies with 

specific circumstances. When JFCs organize their forces, they should also consider 

interoperability with multinational forces and interaction with other potential 

interorganizational partners. Complex or unclear command relationships and 

organizations are counterproductive to synergy among multinational forces. Simplicity 

and clarity of expression are essential.

b. Joint Force Options

(1) Combatant Commands. A CCMD is a unified or specified command with 

a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by 

the President, through SecDef, and with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. Unified 

commands typically are established when a broad continuing mission exists requiring 

execution by significant forces of two or more Military Departments and necessitating 

single strategic direction and/or other criteria found in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed 

Forces of the United States. Specified commands normally are composed of forces from 

one Military Department, but may include units and staff representation from other 

Military Departments. The UCP defines geographic AORs that are assigned to GCCs 

that include all associated land, water, and airspace. Other CCDRs (e.g., FCCs) execute 

assigned functional responsibilities such as deploying trained and ready joint forces, 

conducting global distribution operations, providing combat-ready SOF, or conducting 

space and cyberspace operations. Functionally oriented CCDRs operate across all 

geographical regions and normally provide supporting forces and capabilities to the 

GCCs. They also may conduct operations as a supported commander when directed by 

SecDef or the President.

(2) Subordinate Unified Commands. When authorized by SecDef through the 

CJCS, commanders of unified (not specified) commands may establish subordinate 

unified commands (also called subunified commands) to conduct operations on a 

continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A 

subordinate unified command may be established on a geographic area or functional 

basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities 

similar to those of the commanders of unified commands and exercise OPCON of 
Organizing for Joint Operations 

IV-7 

assigned commands and forces and normally of attached forces within the assigned 

operational or functional area. 

(3) Joint Task Forces (JTFs). A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so 

designated by SecDef, a CCDR, a subordinate unified command commander, or an 

existing commander, joint task force (CJTF) to accomplish missions with specific, 

limited objectives and which do not require centralized control of logistics. However, 

there may be situations where a CJTF may require directive authority for common 

support capabilities delegated by the CCDR. JTFs may be established on a geographical 

area or functional basis. JTFs normally are established to achieve operational objectives. 

When direct participation by departments other than DOD is significant, the TF 

establishing authority may designate it as a joint interagency task force. This might 

typically occur when the other interagency partners have primacy and legal authority and 

the JFC provides supporting capabilities, such as disaster relief and humanitarian 

assistance. The proper authority dissolves a JTF when the JTF achieves the purpose for 

which it was created or is no longer required. There are several ways to form a JTF HQ. 

Normally, the CCMD’s Service component HQ or the Service component’s existing 

subordinate HQ (e.g., Army corps, numbered air force, numbered fleet and Marine 

expeditionary force) to convert themselves to JTF HQ. Also, the theater SO command 

or a subordinate SOF HQ with the requisite C2 capability can form the basis for a JTF 

HQ staff. CCDRs are responsible for verifying the readiness of assigned Service HQ 

staffs to establish, organize, and operate as a JTF-capable HQ. JTF HQ basing depends 

on the JTF mission, operational environment, and available capabilities and support. JTF 

HQ can be land- or sea-based with transitions between both basing options. JTFs are 

normally assigned a JOA. 

(4) Forming the joint force HQ and task organizing the joint force prior to 

operations can be challenging, particularly in crisis action situations. During operations, 

the ability to quickly adjust both operations and organization in response to planned 

operational transitions or unexpected situational transitions is essential. For example, 

achieving combat-related objectives in the dominate phase of an operation much earlier 

than anticipated could require the JFC to shift emphasis and organization quickly to 

stability operations commonly associated with the stabilize (Phase IV), and enable civil 

authority (Phase V) phases. 

For further guidance on the formation and employment of a JTF HQ to command and 

control a joint operation, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

c. Component Options. Regardless of the organizational and command 

arrangements within joint commands, Service component commanders retain 

responsibility for certain Service-specific functions and other matters affecting their 

COMMON OPERATING PRECEPT

Maintain operational and organizational flexibility. 
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-0 

forces, including internal administration, personnel support, training, logistics, and 

Service intelligence operations. Further, functional and Service components of the 

joint force conduct supported, subordinate, and supporting operations, not 

independent campaigns.

(1) Service Components. CCDRs and subordinate unified commanders 

conduct either single-Service or joint operations to accomplish a mission. All JFCs may 

conduct operations through their Service component commanders, lower-echelon Service 

force commanders, and/or functional component commanders. Conducting joint 

operations through Service components has certain advantages, which include clear 

and uncomplicated command lines. This arrangement is appropriate when stability, 

continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate 

organizational integrity of Service components. While sustainment remains a Service 

responsibility, there are exceptions such as arrangements described in Service support 

agreements, CCDR-directed common-user logistics lead Service, or DOD agency 

responsibilities. 

(2) Functional Components. The JFC can establish functional component 

commands to conduct operations when forces from two or more Services must operate in 

the same physical domain or accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. These 

conditions apply when the scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities and 

functions of forces from more than one Service be directed toward closely related 

objectives and unity of command is a primary consideration. For example, functionally 

oriented components are useful when the scope of operations is large and the JFC’s 

attention must be divided between major operations or phases of operations that are 

functionally dominated. Functional component commands are subordinate components 

of a joint force. Except for the JFSOCC/commander, joint special operations task force 

(JSOTF), functional components do not constitute a “joint force” with a JFC’s authorities 

and responsibilities, even when composed of forces from two or more Military 

Departments. 

(a) JFCs may conduct operations through functional components or employ 

them primarily to coordinate selected functions. The JFC will normally designate the 

Service component commander who has the preponderance of forces and the ability to 

command and control them as the functional component commander. However, the JFC 

will always consider the mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, 

and C2 capabilities when selecting a commander. The establishment of a functional 

component commander must not affect the command relationship between Service 

component commanders and the JFC. 

(b) The functional component commander’s staff composition should 

reflect the command’s composition so that the staff has the required expertise to help the 

commander effectively employ the component’s forces. Functional component staffs 

require advanced planning, appropriate training, and frequent exercises for efficient 

operations. Liaison elements from and to other components facilitate coordination and 

support. Staff billets and individuals to fill them should be identified and used when the 

commander forms the functional component staff for exercises and actual operations. 
Organizing for Joint Operations 

IV-9 

The number of staff personnel should be appropriate for the mission and nature of the 

operation. The staff structure should be flexible enough to add or delete personnel and 

capabilities in changing conditions without losing effectiveness. 

(c) The JFC designates forces and/or military capabilities that will be made 

available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate 

command relationship(s). JFCs also may establish a support relationship between 

components to facilitate operations. Regardless, the establishing JFC defines the 

authority and responsibilities of functional component commanders based on the 

CONOPS, and the JFC may alter their authority and responsibilities during the course of 

an operation. 

(3) Combination. Joint forces often are organized with a combination of 

Service and functional components. For example, joint forces organized with Service 

components normally have SOF organized under a JFSOCC, while the conventional air 

forces will normally have a JFACC designated, whose authorities and responsibilities are 

defined by the establishing JFC based on the JFC’s CONOPS. 

d. SOF Employment Options

(1) Used independently with conventional force enable support or integrated 

with conventional forces, SOF provide additional and unique capabilities to achieve 

objectives that otherwise may not be attainable. SOF are most effective when SO are 

fully integrated into the overall plan, and the execution of SO is through proper SOF C2 

elements employed intact. 

(2) Commander, United States Special Operations Command 

(CDRUSSOCOM) is responsible for synchronizing planning for global operations 

against terrorist networks, and will do so in coordination with other CCMDs. When 

directed to execute global operations, CDRUSSOCOM can establish and employ JSOTFs 

as a supported commander. 

(3) SOF in CONUS are under the COCOM of the CDRUSSOCOM. When 

directed, CDRUSSOCOM provides CONUS-based SOF to a GCC. The GCC normally 

exercises COCOM of assigned SOF and OPCON of attached SOF through a theater 

special operations command commander (a subunified commander). The GCC will 

define command relationships between the JSOTF commanders and JTF/TF 

commanders. 

For more information on SO, refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations.

e. Joint HQ Augmentation Options. There are various options available to 

augment a joint HQ that is forming for joint operations. 

For more information, see JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.
Chapter IV

IV-10 JP 3-0 

4. Organizing the Joint Force Headquarters

a. Joint force HQ include those for unified, subunified, and specified commands and 

JTFs. While each HQ organizes to accommodate the nature of the JFC’s operational 

area, mission, tasks, and preferences, all generally follow a traditional functional staff 

alignment (i.e., personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and communications) 

depicted in Figure IV-3. The primary staff functional areas also are generally consistent 

with those at Service component HQ, which facilitates higher, lower, and lateral crosscommand staff coordination and collaboration. Some HQ may combine functions under 

a staff principal, while other HQ may add staff principals.

b. Figure IV-3 also shows boards, centers, working groups, and other 

semipermanent and temporary organizations. These facilitate cross-functional 

coordination, synchronization, planning, and information sharing between principal staff 

directorates. Although these organizations are cross-functional in their membership, they 

typically fall under the oversight of a principal staff directorate. For example, the joint 

operations center aligns under the J-3, the joint intelligence support element under the 

J-2, and the joint media operations center under PA. 

Figure IV-3. Notional Joint Force Headquarters and Cross-Functional Staff Organization

Legend

J-1 manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff

J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff

J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff 

Notional Joint Force Headquarters and 

Cross-Functional Staff Organization

Chief of Staff

J-1 J-2 J-3 J-4 J-5

Offices and 

Elements

Centers and 

Groups Boards Bureaus 

and Cells

Working 

Groups and 

Planning 

Teams

J-6
Organizing for Joint Operations 

IV-11 

c. HQ also have personal and special staff sections or elements, which perform 

specialized duties as prescribed by JFC and handle special matters over which the JFC 

wishes to exercise personal control. Examples include the SJA, provost marshal, and 

inspector general.

For detailed guidance on the organization of a joint force HQ, refer to JP 3-33, Joint 

Task Force Headquarters. 

5. Organizing Operational Areas 

a. General. Except for AORs, which are assigned in the UCP, GCCs and other 

JFCs designate smaller operational areas (e.g., JOA and AO) on a temporary basis. 

Operational areas have physical dimensions comprised of some combination of air, land, 

maritime, and space domains. JFCs define these areas with geographical boundaries, 

which help commanders and staffs coordinate, integrate, and deconflict joint operations 

among joint force components and supporting commands. The size of these operational 

areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the 

mission and the projected duration of operations. 

b. Combatant Command-Level Areas. GCCs conduct operations in their assigned 

AORs. When warranted, the President, SecDef, or GCCs may designate a theater of war 

and/or theater of operations for each operation (see Figure IV-4). GCCs can elect to 

control operations directly in these operational areas, or may establish subordinate joint 

forces for that purpose, while remaining focused on the broader AOR. 

(1) Area of Responsibility. An AOR is an area established by the UCP that 

defines geographic responsibilities for a GCC. A GCC has authority to plan for 

operations within the AOR and conduct those operations approved by the President or 

SecDef. CCDRs may operate forces wherever required to accomplish approved 

missions. All cross-AOR operations must be coordinated between the affected 

GCCs.

(2) Theater of War. A theater of war is a geographical area established by the 

President, SecDef, or GCC for the conduct of major operations and campaigns involving 

combat. A theater of war is established primarily when there is a formal declaration of 

war or it is necessary to encompass more than one theater of operations (or a JOA and a 

OPERATIONAL AREAS FOR OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

During Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, the joint forces rear area 

was centered around the separate sites of the embassy compound, port, 

and airfield in the city of Mogadishu, while its operational area was widely 

scattered around the towns and villages of the interior. The area of 

interest included the rest of the country and particularly those population 

and relief centers not under the joint force commander’s supervision.

Various Sources
Chapter IV

IV-12 JP 3-0 

separate theater of operations) within a single boundary for the purposes of C2, 

sustainment, protection, or mutual support. A theater of war does not normally 

encompass a GCC’s entire AOR, but may cross the boundaries of two or more AORs. 

(3) Theater of Operations. A theater of operations is an operational area 

defined by the GCC for the conduct or support of specific military operations. A theater 

of operations is established primarily when the scope of the operation in time, space, 

purpose, and/or employed forces exceeds what a JOA can normally accommodate. More 

than one joint force HQ can exist in a theater of operations. A GCC may establish one or 

more theaters of operations. Different theaters will normally be focused on different 

missions. A theater of operations typically is smaller than a theater of war, but is large 

enough to allow for operations in depth and over extended periods of time. Theaters of 

operations are normally associated with major operations and campaigns and may cross 

the boundary of two AORs. 

c. Operational- and Tactical-Level Areas. For operations somewhat limited in 

scope and duration, the commander can establish the following operational areas.

Figure IV-4. Operational Areas within a Theater

Operational Areas within a Theater

This example depicts a combatant commander's AOR, also known as a theater. Within the AOR, 

the combatant commander has designated a theater of war. Within the theater of war are two 

theaters of operations and a JSOA. To handle a situation outside the theater of war, the combatant 

commander has established a theater of operations and a JOA, within which a joint task force will 

operate. JOAs could also be established within the theater of war or theaters of operations.

Theater of 

Operations

JSOA

JOA

AOR Theater of 

War

Legend

AOR area of responsibility

JOA joint operations area

JSOA joint special operations area
Organizing for Joint Operations 

IV-13 

(1) Joint Operations Area. A JOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, 

defined by a GCC or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a CJTF) 

conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are particularly 

useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are

to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters.

(2) Joint Special Operations Area. A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and 

airspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of SOF to conduct SO activities. It may be 

limited in size to accommodate a discreet direct action mission or may be extensive 

enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. A JSOA 

is defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities. JFCs may use a JSOA to 

delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and SO. The JFSOCC is the supported 

commander within the JSOA. 

For additional guidance on JSOAs, refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations.

(3) Joint Security Area. A JSA is a specific surface area, designated by the 

JFC as critical, that facilitates protection of joint bases and supports various aspects of 

joint operations such as LOCs, force projection, movement control, sustainment, C2, 

airbases/airfields, seaports, and other activities. JSAs are not necessarily contiguous with 

areas actively engaged in combat (see Figure IV-5). JSAs may include intermediate 

support bases and other support facilities intermixed with combat elements. JSAs may be 

used in both linear and nonlinear situations. 

For additional guidance on JSAs, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

(4) Amphibious Objective Area. The AOA is a geographic area within which 

is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious force. This area must be of 

sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious force’s mission and must 

provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. 

For additional guidance on AOAs, refer to JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

(5) Area of Operations. JFCs may define AOs for land and maritime forces. 

AOs typically do not encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be 

large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their 

forces. Component commanders with AOs typically designate subordinate AOs within 

which their subordinate forces operate. These commanders employ the full range of joint 

and Service control measures and graphics as coordinated with other component 

commanders and their representatives to delineate responsibilities, deconflict operations, 

and achieve unity of effort.

d. Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas 

(1) Operational areas may be contiguous or noncontiguous (see Figure IV-5). 

When they are contiguous, a boundary separates them. When operational areas are 

noncontiguous, subordinate commands do not share a boundary. The higher HQ retains 

responsibility for the unassigned portion of its operational area. 
Chapter IV

IV-14 JP 3-0 

(2) In some operations, a Service or functional component (typically the ground 

component) could have such a large operational area that the component’s subordinate 

units operate in a noncontiguous manner, widely distributed and beyond mutually 

supporting range of each other. In these cases, the JFC should consider options whereby 

joint capabilities can be pushed to lower levels and placed under control of units that can 

use them effectively.

e. Considerations When Assuming Responsibility for an Operational Area. The 

establishing commander should activate an assigned operational area at a specified date 

and time based on mission and situation considerations addressed during COA analysis 

and wargaming. Among others, common considerations include C2, the information 

environment, intelligence requirements, communications support, protection, security, 

LOCs, terrain management, movement control, airspace control, surveillance, 

reconnaissance, air and missile defense, PR, targeting and fires, interorganizational 

interactions, and environmental issues. 

For specific guidance on assuming responsibility for an operational area, refer to JP 3-

33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

Figure IV-5. Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas

Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas

Adjacent, subordinate command’s operational 

areas share boundaries. In this case, the higher 

headquarters has assigned all of its operational 

area to subordinate commands.

Contiguous Noncontiguous

Subordinate commands are assigned operational 

areas that do not share boundaries. The higher 

headquarters retains responsibility for the portion 

of its operational area not assigned to subordinate 

commands.

MARFOR

AO

ARFOR

AO

JSA

MARFOR

AO

JSA

JSOA

ARFOR

AO

Legend

AO area of operations

ARFOR Army forces

JSA joint security area

JSOA joint special operations area

MARFOR Marine Corps forces
V-1 

CHAPTER V 

JOINT OPERATIONS ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY 

 OPERATIONS 

1. Introduction 

a. The range of military operations is another fundamental construct that provides 

context. Military operations vary in scope, purpose, and conflict intensity across a range 

that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to 

crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, to major operations 

and campaigns (Figure V-1). Use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security 

cooperation, and deterrence activities helps shape the operational environment and keep 

the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict 

while maintaining US global influence. Many of the missions associated with crisis 

response and limited contingencies, such as CS and foreign humanitarian assistance 

(FHA), may not require combat. But others, as evidenced by Operation RESTORE 

“Today’s US Armed Forces are, I believe, the most capable in our Nation’s 

history, and these capabilities provide important strategic advantages with 

respect to nearly any situation or potential adversary. US forces can conduct 

operations on a scale that very few others can approach. Their ability to project 

and sustain military power over global distances is unmatched. US joint 

intelligence capabilities, a key factor in the success of practically any kind of 

military operation, are the best in the world.” 

Admiral M. G. Mullen 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, January 2009

Figure V-1. Range of Military Operations 

Range of Military Operations

Major Operations and Campaigns

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

Range of 

Military 

Operations

Our national leaders can use the military instrument of national power across the conflict 

continuum in a wide variety of operations that are commonly characterized in three groups as 

this figure depicts.

Peace Conflict Continuum War
Chapter V 

V-2 JP 3-0 

HOPE in Somalia, can be extremely dangerous and may require combat operations to 

protect US forces while accomplishing the mission. Individual major operations and 

campaigns often contribute to a larger, long-term effort (e.g., OEF). The nature of the 

strategic security environment may require US forces to engage in several types of joint 

operations simultaneously across the range of military operations. For these missions, 

commanders combine and sequence offensive, defensive, and stability operations and 

activities to achieve objectives. The commander for a particular operation determines the 

emphasis to be placed on each type of mission or activity. Although this publication 

discusses specific types of operations under the various categories in the range of military 

operations, each type is not doctrinally fixed and could shift within that range. For 

instance, a counterinsurgency operation could escalate from a security cooperation 

activity into a major operation or campaign.

(1) Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence. These 

ongoing activities establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations and 

domestic civil authorities (e.g., state governors or local law enforcement). The general 

strategic and operational objective is to protect US interests at home and abroad. See 

Section C, “Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence.” 

(2) Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations. A crisis response 

or limited contingency operation can be a single small-scale, limited-duration operation 

or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat. The 

associated general strategic and operational objectives are to protect US interests and/or 

prevent surprise attack or further conflict. See Section D, “Crisis Response and Limited 

Contingency Operations.” 

(3) Major Operations and Campaigns. When required to achieve national 

strategic objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to 

conduct a major operation or campaign normally involving large-scale combat. During 

major operations, joint force actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in 

accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. A campaign

is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational 

objectives within a given time and space. See Section E, “Major Operations and 

Campaigns.” 

b. Simultaneous Nature of Theater Operations

(1) CCDR’s can simultaneously conduct joint operations with different 

military end states within an AOR. JFCs might initiate major operations and 

campaigns while security cooperation activities are ongoing in the same or another part 

of the theater (such as OEF during the enforcement of UN sanctions on Iraq). Further, a 

crisis response or limited contingency operation could occur separately or as part of a 

campaign or major operation (such as the 1991 noncombatant evacuation operation 

[NEO] in Somalia during Operation DESERT SHIELD). In the extreme, major 

operations or a theater campaign may occur within a theater concurrently with a separate 

or related global campaign (such as OEF and OIF). CCDRs should pay particular 

attention to synchronizing and integrating the activities of assigned, attached, and 
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations 

V-3 

supporting forces through subordinate and supporting JFCs to achieve national, 

theater, and/or multinational strategic objectives. Due to the transnational nature of 

various enemies or adversaries (e.g., insurgents, terrorists, drug cartels, pirates), 

coordination and synchronization requirements may also extend to adjacent GCCs. 

Additionally, CCDRs and subordinate JFCs must work with US chiefs of mission, 

Department of State (DOS), and other departments and agencies to best integrate 

military actions with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national 

power in unified action. 

(2) Some military operations may be conducted for one purpose. FHA 

operations, for example, are military operations with a humanitarian purpose. A strike 

may be conducted for the specific purpose of compelling action or deterrence (such as 

Operation EL DORADO CANYON, the 1986 operation to coerce Libya to conform with 

international laws against terrorism). Often, however, military operations will have 

multiple purposes and be influenced by a fluid and changing situation. Branch and 

sequel events may require additional tasks by the joint force, challenging the command 

with multiple missions (e.g., Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE 

were peace enforcement operations [PEO] that evolved from FHA efforts). Joint forces 

must strive to meet such challenges with clearly defined objectives addressing diverse 

purposes. 

SECTION A. TYPES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 

2. Military Operations and Related Missions, Tasks, and Actions 

a. In general, a military operation is a set of actions intended to accomplish a task or 

mission. Although the US military is organized, trained, and equipped for sustained, 

large-scale combat anywhere in the world, the capabilities to conduct these operations 

also enable a wide variety of other operations as well. No two military operations are 

exactly alike. Characterizing the employment of military capabilities (people, 

organizations, and equipment) as one or another type of military operations has several 

benefits. For example, publications can be developed that describe the nature, tasks, and 

tactics associated with specific types of diverse operations, such as noncombatant 

evacuation and counterinsurgency. These publications provide the bases for related joint 

training and joint professional military education that help joint forces conduct military 

operations as effectively and efficiently as possible even in difficult and dangerous 

circumstances. Characterizations also help military and civilian leaders explain US 

military involvement in various situations to the US and international public and news 

media in order to minimize misinterpretation of purpose. Likewise, such 

characterizations, supplemented by operational experience, can clarify the need for 

specific capabilities that enhance certain operations. For example, facial recognition 

software associated with biometric capabilities helps military and law enforcement 

personnel identify terrorists and piece together their human networks as part of 

combating terrorism (see JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism). The titles of many operations (such 

as NEO) listed as “types” in the following paragraph describe the operation’s focused 

task or mission. In some cases (such as stability operations), the title covers a variety of 

missions, tasks, and activities. 
Chapter V 

V-4 JP 3-0 

b. Following is a brief summary of examples of military operations. (See 

Figure V-2).

(1) Stability Operations. Stability operations is an umbrella term for various 

military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in 

coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe 

and secure environment and to provide essential governmental services, emergency 

infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (See JP 3-07, Stability Operations)

(2) Civil Support. DOD support to US civil authorities for domestic 

emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities. (See JP 3-28, Civil 

Support) 

(3) Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. DOD activities, normally in support of 

the United States Agency for International Development or DOS, conducted outside the 

United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, 

disease, hunger, or privation. (See JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance) 

(4) Recovery. An operation to search for, locate, identify, recover, and return 

isolated personnel, human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national 

security. (See JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery) 

(5) Noncombatant Evacuation. An operation to evacuate noncombatants and 

civilians from foreign countries to safe havens or to the United States when their lives are 

endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster. (See JP 3-68, Noncombatant 

Evacuation Operations) 

(6) Peace Operations (PO). A category that encompasses operations to 

contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation 

and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. PO include 

Figure V-2. Examples of Military Operations

Examples of Military Operations

l

l

l

l

l

l

Chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear consequence management

Foreign internal defense

Counterdrug operations 

Combating terrorism

Counterinsurgency

Homeland defense

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

Stability operations

Civil support

Foreign humanitarian assistance

Recovery

Noncombatant evacuation 

Peace operations

Combating weapons of mass destruction
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-5 

peacekeeping operations (PKO), peace enforcement, peacemaking (PM), peace building 

(PB), and conflict prevention efforts. (See JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations)

(7) Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. Activities within eight 

military mission areas that include WMD-related security cooperation and partner 

activities, offensive operations against WMD, defensive operations, and managing the 

consequences of WMD attacks. (See JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction) 

(8) CBRN Consequence Management. DOD support to USG actions that 

plan for, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the effects of domestic and foreign 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. (See JP 3-41, Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management) 

(9) Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Participation by civilian and military 

agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or 

other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, 

insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. FID is an example of nation 

assistance. (See JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense) 

(10) Counterdrug Operations. Support provided by the DOD to law 

enforcement agencies to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use 

of illegal drugs. (See JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations) 

(11) Combating Terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive 

measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and CT (actions taken directly 

against terrorist networks) to oppose terrorism. (See JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, and JP 3-

26, Counterterrorism)

(12) Counterinsurgency. This is an operation that encompasses 

comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address 

any core grievances. (See JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations) 

(13) Homeland Defense. The protection of United States sovereignty, 

territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats 

and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. (See JP 3-27, Homeland 

Defense) 

SECTION B. A PHASING CONSTRUCT

3. Phasing a Joint Operation 

a. Purpose. A phase is a definitive stage of an operation or campaign during which 

a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually 

supporting activities for a common purpose. Phasing, which can be used in any operation 

regardless of size, helps the JFC organize large operations by integrating and 

synchronizing subordinate operations. Phasing helps JFCs and staffs visualize, design, 

and plan the entire operation or campaign and define requirements in terms of forces, 

resources, time, space, and purpose. It helps them systematically achieve military 
Chapter V 

V-6 JP 3-0 

objectives that cannot be attained all at once by arranging smaller, related operations in a 

logical sequence. Phasing also helps commanders mitigate risk in the more dangerous or 

difficult portions of an operation. 

b. Application. The JFC’s vision of how the operation should unfold drives 

subsequent decisions regarding phasing. In turn, phasing helps the commander and staff 

synchronize the CONOPS and organize tasks assigned to subordinate commanders. By 

arranging operations and activities into phases, the JFC can better integrate and 

synchronize subordinate operations in time, space, and purpose. Each phase should 

represent a natural subdivision of the campaign/operation’s intermediate objectives.

c. Sequence, Level of Effort, and Overlap. Figure V-3 shows OPLAN phases and 

the notional level of effort for each as the operation progresses. Working within this 

generic phasing construct, the actual phases will vary (e.g., compressed, expanded, or 

omitted entirely) according to the nature of the operation and the JFC’s decisions. 

During planning, the JFC establishes conditions, objectives, or events for transitioning 

Figure V-3. Notional Operation Plan Phases versus Level of Military Effort

Notional Operation Plan Phases versus Level of Military Effort

Legend

OPLAN operation plan OPORD operation order Level of Military Effort

Stabilizing 

Activities

Seizing the 

Initiative Activities

Deterring Activities

Dominating 

Activities

Enabling Civil 

Authority 

Activity

Shaping Activities

Theater 

Shaping

OPLAN 

Approval

OPORD

Termination

OPORD 

Activation

OPORD Execution

Global 

Shaping

Phase 0

Shape

Phase I

Deter

Phase II

Seize 

Initiative

Phase III

Dominate

Phase IV

Stabilize

Phase V

Enable 

Civil 

Authority

Phase 0

Shape

Plan Phases

OPLAN

xxxx

Shaping

OPLAN

xxxx

Shaping
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-7 

from one phase to another and plans sequels and branches for potential contingencies. 

Phases are designed to be conducted sequentially, but some activities from a phase may 

begin in a previous phase and continue into subsequent phases. The JFC adjusts the 

phases to exploit opportunities presented by the adversary and operational situation or to 

react to unforeseen conditions. 

d. Transitions

(1) A transition marks a change of focus between phases or between the 

ongoing operations and execution of a branch or sequel. Transitions between phases are 

designed to be distinct shifts in focus of operations by the joint force, often accompanied 

by changes in command or support relationships and priorities of effort. They require 

planning and preparation well before their execution. The activities that predominate 

during a given phase, however, rarely align with neatly definable breakpoints. The need 

to move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that a set of objectives has 

been achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major change in 

focus for the joint force. Thus, the transition to a new phase is usually driven by events 

rather than time. An example is the shift of focus from sustained combat operations in 

the dominate phase to a preponderance of stability operations in the stabilize and enable 

civil authority phases. Through continuous assessment, the staff measures progress 

toward planned transitions so that the force prepares for and executes them. 

(2) Sometimes, however, the situation facing the JFC will undergo an 

unexpected change in conditions that is not necessarily associated with a planned 

transition, yet may require the JFC to direct an abrupt shift in operations. Such a change 

in conditions will rarely be uniform in time and space across an operational area, but can 

represent a critical period in the course of operations. The JFC must be able to recognize 

this fundamental transformation in the situation, and transition quickly and smoothly in 

response. Failure to do so can cause the joint force to lose momentum, miss an important 

opportunity, experience a significant setback, or even fail to accomplish the mission. 

Conversely, successful transition can allow the joint force to seize the initiative in a 

situation and garner disproportionately favorable results. The JFC must seek to anticipate 

potential situational transformations as well as planned shifts during the course of 

operations. 

e. Phasing Model. Although the commander determines the number and actual 

phases for the operation, the phases shown in Figure V-3 and described below comprise a 

flexible model to arrange combat and stability operations. Within the context of these 

phases established by a higher-level JFC, subordinate JFCs and component

commanders may establish additional phases that fit their CONOPS. OPLANs for 

contingencies that support the CCDR’s TCP generally do not include security

COMMON OPERATING PRECEPT

Plan for and manage operational transitions over time and space. 
Chapter V 

V-8 JP 3-0 

cooperation activities that are addressed in other approved documents. CCDRs generally 

use the phasing model in Figure V-3 to link security cooperation activities in the TCP to 

pertinent OPLANs. Following is a discussion of each phase in the phasing model. 

For more information on the phasing model and details on the individual phases, refer to 

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

(1) Shape. Shape phase missions, task, and actions are those that are designed 

to dissuade or deter adversaries and assure friends, as well as set conditions for the 

contingency plan and are generally conducted through security cooperation activities. 

Joint and multinational operations and various interagency activities occur routinely 

during the shape phase. Shape activities are executed continuously with the intent to 

enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation by shaping 

perceptions and influencing adversaries’ and allies’ behavior; developing allied and 

friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; improving 

information exchange and intelligence sharing; providing US forces with peacetime and 

contingency access; and mitigating conditions that could lead to a crisis.

(2) Deter. The intent of this phase is to deter an adversary from undesirable 

actions because of friendly capabilities and the will to use them. Deter is generally 

weighted toward security activities that are characterized by preparatory actions to 

protect friendly forces and indicate the intent to execute subsequent phases of the planned 

operation. A number of flexible deterrent options (FDOs) could be implemented during 

this phase. Once the crisis is defined, these actions may include mobilization, tailoring of 

forces, and other predeployment activities; initial deployment into a theater; employment 

of ISR assets; and development of mission-tailored C2, intelligence, force protection, and

logistic requirements to support the JFC’s CONOPS. CCDRs continue to engage 

multinational partners, thereby providing the basis for further crisis response. Many 

actions in the deter phase build on activities from the previous phase, and are conducted 

as part of security cooperation activities. They can also be part of stand-alone operations. 

(3) Seize Initiative. JFCs seek to seize the initiative in all situations through 

decisive use of joint force capabilities. In combat, this involves both defensive and 

offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the enemy to culminate 

offensively and setting the conditions for decisive operations. Rapid application of joint 

combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the enemy’s initial aggression 

and to deny the enemy its initial objectives. Operations to gain access to theater 

infrastructure and expand friendly freedom of action continue during this phase, while the 

JFC seeks to degrade enemy capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the 

earliest opportunity.

(4) Dominate. This phase focuses on breaking the enemy’s will to resist or, in 

noncombat situations, to control the operational environment. Success in the dominate

phase depends on overmatching enemy capabilities at the critical time and place. 

Operations can range from large-scale combat to various stability operations depending 

on the nature of the enemy. Dominate phase activities may establish the conditions to 
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-9 

achieve strategic objectives early or may set the conditions for transition to the next phase 

of the operation. 

(5) Stabilize. The stabilize phase is typically characterized by a shift in focus 

from sustained combat operations to stability operations. These operations help 

reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential government services, 

emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. The intent in this phase 

is to help restore local political, economic, and infrastructure stability. Civilian officials 

may lead operations during part or all of this phase, but the JFC typically will provide 

significant supporting capabilities and activities. The joint force may be required to 

perform limited local governance, and integrate the efforts of other supporting 

interorganizational partners until legitimate local entities are functioning. The JFC 

continuously assesses the impact of operations in this phase on the ability to transfer 

authority for remaining requirements to a legitimate civil entity, which marks the end of 

the phase.

(6) Enable Civil Authority. This phase is predominantly characterized by 

joint force support to legitimate civil governance. The commander provides this support 

by agreement with the appropriate civil authority. In some cases, and especially for 

operations within the United States, the commander provides this support under direction 

of the civil authority. The purpose is to help the civil authority regain its ability to govern 

and administer to the services and other needs of the population. The military end state is 

achieved during this phase, signaling the end of the joint operation. CCMD involvement 

with other nations and OGAs, beyond the termination of the joint operation, may be 

required to achieve the national strategic end state.

For more information on stability operations, refer to JP 3-07, Stability Operations. 

SECTION C. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, SECURITY COOPERATION, AND 

DETERRENCE

4. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

a. Scope. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence missions, 

tasks, and actions encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of 

national power is tasked to support OGAs and cooperate with IGOs (e.g., UN, NATO) 

and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests, deter conflict, and 

set conditions for future contingency operations. These activities generally occur 

continuously in all GCCs’ AORs regardless of other ongoing contingencies, major 

operations, or campaigns. They usually involve a combination of military forces and 

capabilities separate from but integrated with the efforts of interorganizational partners. 

Because DOS is frequently the major player in these activities, JFCs should maintain a 

working relationship with the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions in their area. 

Commanders and their staffs should establish and maintain dialogue with pertinent 

interorganizational partners to share information and facilitate future operations.
Chapter V 

V-10 JP 3-0 

b. Engagement. Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between 

individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another 

nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build 

trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain 

influence. Military engagement occurs as part of security cooperation, but also extends 

to interaction with domestic civilian authorities. Support to military engagement may 

include specific mission areas such as religious affairs and medical support.

c. Security Cooperation. Security cooperation involves all DOD interactions with 

foreign defense and security establishments to build defense relationships that promote 

specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military and security 

capabilities for internal and external defense for and multinational operations, and 

provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to the HN. Developmental 

actions enhance a host government’s willingness and ability to care for its people. 

Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations. GCCs 

shape their AORs through security cooperation activities by continually employing 

military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power. The 

GCC’s security cooperation strategy provides a framework within which CCMDs engage 

regional partners in cooperative military activities and development. Ideally, security 

cooperation activities lessen the causes of a potential crisis before a situation deteriorates 

and requires coercive US military intervention.

d. Deterrence

(1) Deterrence prevents adversary action through the presentation of a credible 

threat of counteraction. In both peace and war, the Armed Forces of the United States 

help to deter adversaries from using violence to reach their aims. Deterrence stems from 

an adversary’s belief that a credible threat of retaliation exists, the contemplated action 

cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh the perceived benefits of acting. Thus, a potential 

aggressor chooses not to act for fear of failure, cost, or consequences. Ideally, deterrent 

forces should be able to conduct decisive operations immediately. However, if 

committed forces lack the combat power to conduct decisive operations, they conduct 

defensive operations while additional forces deploy. Effective deterrence requires a 

security cooperation plan that emphasizes the willingness of the US to employ forces in 

defense of its interests. Various joint operations (such as show of force and enforcement 

of sanctions) support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve and willingness to use 

force when necessary. Others (such as nation assistance and FHA) support deterrence by 

enhancing a climate of peaceful cooperation, thus promoting stability. Joint actions such 

as nation assistance, antiterrorism, DOD support to counterdrug (CD) operations, show of 

force operations, and arms control are applied to meet military engagement, security 

cooperation, and deterrence objectives.

(2) Sustained presence contributes to deterrence and promotes a secure 

environment in which diplomatic, economic, and informational programs designed to 

reduce the causes of instability can perform as designed. Presence can take the form of 

forward basing, forward deploying, or pre-positioning assets. Forward presence activities 

demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, 
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-11 

and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. Joint 

force presence often keeps unstable situations from escalating into larger conflicts. The 

sustained presence of strong, capable forces is the most visible sign of US commitment to 

allies and adversaries alike. However, if sustained forward presence fails to deter an 

adversary, committed forces must be agile enough to transition rapidly to combat 

operations. In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, forward presence involves 

periodic rotational deployments and redeployments, access and storage agreements, 

multinational exercises, port visits, foreign military training, foreign community support, 

and both military-to-military and military-to-civilian contacts. Given their location and 

knowledge of the region, forward presence forces could be the first that a CCDR commits 

when responding to a crisis.

5. Typical Operations 

a. Even when the US is not conducting limited contingency operations, major 

operations, or campaigns, numerous routine missions (such as security cooperation) and 

continuing operations or tasks (such as ensuring freedom of navigation) are occurring 

under the general heading of engagement. In some cases, what begins as an engagement 

activity (such as limited support to a counterinsurgency through a security assistance 

program) can expand to a limited contingency operation or even a major operation when 

the President commits US forces. Engagement activities generally are governed by 

various directives and agreements and do not require a joint OPLAN or OPORD for 

execution.

b. Emergency Preparedness. Emergency preparedness consists of measures taken 

in advance of an emergency to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect a 

nation’s institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive emergency 

management program of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. At the 

strategic level, emergency preparedness encompasses those planning activities, such as 

continuity of operations and continuity of government, undertaken to ensure DOD 

processes, procedures, and resources are in place to support the President and SecDef in a 

designated national security emergency. 

(1) Continuity of operations ensures the degree or state of being continuous in 

the conduct of functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or 

mission in carrying out the national military strategy. Continuity of operations includes 

the functions and duties of the commander, as well as the supporting functions and duties 

performed by the staff and others under the authority and direction of the commander. If 

the President directs, DOD may be tasked with additional missions relating to emergency 

preparedness.

(2) Continuity of government involves a coordinated effort within each USG 

branch (executive, legislative, and judicial) to ensure the capability to continue minimum 

essential functions and responsibilities during a catastrophic emergency. 

c. Arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament involves the necessary steps 

to establish an effective system of international control, or to create and strengthen 
Chapter V 

V-12 JP 3-0 

international organizations for the maintenance of peace. Although it may be viewed as 

a diplomatic mission, the military can play an important role. For example, US 

military personnel may be involved in verifying an arms control treaty; seizing WMD; 

escorting authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials (i.e., enriched uranium) to 

preclude loss or unauthorized use of these assets; conducting and hosting site inspections; 

participating in military data exchanges; implementing armament reductions; or 

dismantling, destroying, or disposing of weapons and hazardous material. 

d. Combating Terrorism. Combating terrorism involves actions taken to oppose 

terrorism from wherever the threat exists. It encompasses antiterrorism—defensive 

measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts—and CT—offensive measures 

taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. 

(1) Antiterrorism involves defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability 

of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment 

by local military forces and civilians. Antiterrorism programs form the foundation for 

effectively combating terrorism. The USG may provide antiterrorism assistance to 

foreign countries under the provisions of Title 22, USC (under Antiterrorism Assistance). 

For further guidance on antiterrorism, refer to JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

(2) Counterterrorism. CT is primarily a SO core task and consists of actions 

taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and 

regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. Normally, CT operations 

require specially trained personnel capable of mounting swift and effective action. CT is 

often associated with IW. However, terrorism can also occur in conjunction with largescale traditional combat and require commanders to integrate CT with these operations. 

An enemy using irregular methods often will use terrorist tactics to wage protracted 

operations in an attempt to break the will of their opponent and influence relevant 

populations. At the same time, terrorists and insurgents also seek to bolster their own 

legitimacy and credibility with those same populations. Therefore, CT efforts should 

include all instruments of national power to undermine an adversary’s power, will, and its 

credibility and legitimacy, as well as its ability to influence the relevant population. 

For further details concerning CT and SO, refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations, and JP 

3-26, Counterterrorism. For US policy on CT, refer to the National Strategy for 

Combating Terrorism.

e. DOD Support to CD Operations. DOD supports federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies in their effort to disrupt the transport and/or transfer of illegal 

drugs into the United States. Specific DOD CD authorities are contained in the 

National Defense Authorization Act of 1991; Public Law Number 101-510, Section 

1004, as amended; as well as Title 10, USC, Sections 124 and 371-382.
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-13 

For additional guidance on CD operations, refer to JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug 

Operations. 

f. Enforcement of sanctions is an operation that employs coercive measures to 

interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or 

specified area. Maritime interception operations are a form of maritime interdiction 

that may include seaborne coercive enforcement measures. These operations are military 

in nature and serve both political and military purposes. The political objective is to 

compel a country or group to conform to the objectives of the initiating body, while the 

military objective focuses on establishing a barrier that is selective, allowing only 

authorized goods to enter or exit. Depending on the geography, sanction enforcement 

normally involves some combination of air and surface forces. Assigned forces 

should be capable of complementary mutual support and full communications 

interoperability.

g. Enforcing Exclusion Zones. A sanctioning body establishes an exclusion zone 

to prohibit specified activities in a specific geographic area. Exclusion zones usually 

are imposed due to breaches of international standards of human rights or flagrant 

violations of international law regarding the conduct of states. Situations that may 

warrant such action include the persecution of the civil population by a government and 

efforts to deter an attempt by a hostile nation to acquire territory by force. Exclusion 

zones can be established in the air (no-fly zones), sea (maritime), or on land (no-drive 

zones). An exclusion zone’s purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify 

their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of 

sanctions or threat or use of force. Such measures usually are imposed by the UN or 

another international body of which the United States is a member, although they may 

be imposed unilaterally by the United States (e.g., Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in 

JOINT TASK FORCE-NORTH

An example of Department of Defense support to counterdrug operations 

was the establishment of joint task force (JTF)-6 in 1989. Its mission 

originally focused exclusively along the Southwest border of the United 

States. A succession of National Defense Authorization Acts expanded 

the JTF-6 charter by adding specific mission tasks for the organization. In 

1995, the JTF-6 area of responsibility expanded to include the continental 

United States. In June 2004, JTF-6 was officially renamed JTF-North and 

its mission was expanded to include providing support to federal law 

enforcement agencies in countering transnational threats.

Mission: JTF-North provides military support to civil law enforcement 

agencies, conducts theater security cooperation as directed, and 

facilitates interagency synchronization within the US Northern Command

area of responsibility in order to anticipate, detect, deter, prevent, and 

defeat transnational threats to the homeland.

Various Sources
Chapter V 

V-14 JP 3-0 

Iraq, initiated in August 1992, and Operation DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia, from March 

1993 to December 1995). 

h. Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight. These operations are 

conducted to protect US navigation, overflight, and related interests on, under, and over 

the seas against excessive maritime claims. Freedom of navigation is a sovereign right 

accorded by international law.

(1) International law has long recognized that a coastal state may exercise 

jurisdiction and control within its territorial sea in the same manner that it can exercise 

sovereignty over its own land territory. International law accords the right of “innocent” 

passage to ships of other nations through a state’s territorial waters. Passage is 

“innocent” as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the 

coastal state. The high seas are free for reasonable use of all states.

(2) Freedom of navigation by aircraft through international airspace is a wellestablished principle of international law. Aircraft threatened by nations or groups 

through the extension of airspace control zones outside the established international 

norms will result in a measured legal response, appropriate to the situation. The 

International Civil Aviation Organization, a specialized agency of the UN, codifies the 

principles and techniques of international air navigation and fosters the planning and 

development of international air transport to ensure safe and orderly use of international 

airspace.

i. Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a 

nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or 

emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States 

and that nation (such as Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, in 1990, following Operation 

JUST CAUSE in Panama). Nation assistance operations support the HN by promoting 

sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote 

long-term regional stability. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, 

security assistance, FID, and other Title 10, USC, programs. Collaborative planning 

between the JFC and interorganizational and HN authorities can greatly enhance the 

effectiveness of nation assistance. The JIACG can help facilitate this coordination. All 

nation assistance actions are integrated into the US ambassador’s country plan. 

ENSURING OVERFLIGHT AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OPERATIONS

The Berlin air corridors, established between 1948 and 1990, which 

allowed air access to West Berlin, were taken to maintain international 

airspace to an “air-locked” geographical area. The ATTAIN DOCUMENT 

series of operations against Libya in 1986 were freedom of navigation 

operations, both air and sea, in the Gulf of Sidra.

Various Sources
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations 

V-15 

(1) Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the United States 

provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign 

nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and 

objectives. Some examples of US security assistance programs are the Foreign 

Military Sales Program, the Foreign Military Financing Program, the International 

Military Education and Training Program, the Economic Support Fund, and commercial 

sales licensed under the Arms Export Control Act. Security assistance surges

accelerate release of equipment, supplies, or services when an allied or friendly nation 

faces an imminent military threat. Security assistance surges are military in nature and 

are focused on providing additional combat systems (e.g., weapons and equipment) or 

supplies, but may include the full range of security assistance, to include financial and 

training support. 

(2) Foreign internal defense programs encompass the diplomatic, economic, 

informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against 

subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. US 

military support to FID should focus on the operational assistance to HN personnel and 

collaborative planning with interorganizational and HN authorities to anticipate, 

preclude, and counter these threats. FID supports HN internal defense and development 

programs. US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused on helping a 

nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow its lawful government. 

US FID programs may address other threats to the internal stability of an HN, such as 

civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. While FID is a legislativelymandated core task of SOF, conventional forces also contain and employ organic 

capabilities to conduct these activities. 

For further guidance on FID, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. For further 

guidance on SOF involvement in FID, refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations, and JP 3-

05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations. 

(3) Security Force Assistance (SFA). SFA is DOD’s contribution to a unified 

action effort to support and augment the development of the capacity and capability of 

foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions to facilitate the 

achievement of specific objectives shared by the USG. The US military engages in 

activities to enhance the capabilities and capacities of a partner nation (or regional 

security organization) by providing training, equipment, advice, and assistance to those 

FSF organized in national ministry of defense (or equivalent regional military or 

paramilitary forces), while other USG departments and agencies focus on those forces 

assigned to other ministries (or their equivalents) such as interior, justice, or intelligence 

services. 

For further guidance on SFA, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. 

(4) Humanitarian and civic assistance programs are governed by Title 10, 

USC, Section 401. This assistance may be provided in conjunction with military 

operations and exercises and must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally 

create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. In contrast to emergency relief 
Chapter V 

V-16 JP 3-0 

conducted under FHA operations, humanitarian and civic assistance programs generally 

encompass planned activities in the following categories: 

(a) Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural or underserved 

areas of a country. 

(b) Construction and repair of basic surface transportation systems.

(c) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.

(d) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities such as 

schools, health and welfare clinics, and other nongovernmental buildings. 

j. Protection of Shipping. When necessary, US forces provide protection of US 

flag vessels, US citizens (whether embarked in US or foreign vessels), and US property 

against unlawful violence in and over international waters (such as Operation 

EARNEST WILL, in which Kuwaiti ships were reflagged under the US flag in 1987). 

This protection may be extended to foreign flag vessels under international law and with 

the consent of the flag state. Actions to protect shipping include coastal sea control, 

harbor defense, port security, countermine operations, and environmental defense,

in addition to operations on the high seas. Protection of shipping, which is a critical 

element in the fight against piracy, requires the coordinated employment of surface, air, 

space, and subsurface units, sensors, and weapons, as well as a command structure both 

ashore and afloat and a logistic base. Protection of shipping may require a combination 

of operations to be successful. These actions can include area operations, escort duties, 

mine countermeasures, and environmental defense missions. 

k. Show of force operations are designed to demonstrate US resolve. They involve 

the appearance of a credible military force in an attempt to defuse a situation that, if 

allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests. These operations also

underscore US commitment to our multinational partners. 

(1) The US deploys forces abroad to lend credibility to its promises and 

commitments, increase its regional influence, and demonstrate its resolve to use 

military force if necessary. In addition, SecDef orders a show of force to bolster and 

reassure friends and allies. Show of force operations are military in nature but often 

serve both diplomatic and military purposes. These operations may influence other 

governments or politico-military organizations to refrain from belligerent acts. 

SHOW OF FORCE IN THE PHILIPPINES

Operation Joint Task Force-PHILIPPINES was conducted by US forces in 

1989 in support of President Aquino during a coup attempt against the 

Philippine government. During this operation, a large special operations 

force was formed, fighter aircraft patrolled above rebel air bases, and two 

aircraft carriers were positioned off the coastline of the Philippines.

Various Sources
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-17 

(2) Political concerns dominate a show of force operation, and as such, 

military forces often are under significant legal and political constraints and restraints. 

The military force coordinates its operations with the country teams affected. A show of 

force can involve a wide range of military forces including joint US or multinational 

forces. Often, bilateral or multinational training and exercises are scheduled (time and 

location) with the intent of demonstrating strength and resolve. Forces conducting a 

show of force operation are also capable of FDOs and transitioning to crisis response or 

limited contingency activities.

l. Support to Insurgency. An insurgency is defined as the organized use of 

subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change 

of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. It uses a mixture 

of political, economic, informational, and combat actions to achieve its political aims. It 

is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of 

an established government, an interim governing body, or a peace process while 

increasing insurgent control and legitimacy—the central issues in an insurgency. The US 

may support selected insurgencies that oppose oppressive regimes. The US coordinates 

this support with its friends and allies. Because support for an insurgency is often covert, 

many of the operations connected with it are special activities. Due to their extensive 

unconventional warfare training, Special Forces are well suited to provide this support. 

Conventional forces may assist when the situation requires their functional specialties. 

US forces may provide logistic and training support as it did for the Mujahadin resistance 

in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. In certain circumstances the 

US can provide direct combat support, such as support to the French Resistance in World 

War II, the Afghanistan Northern Alliance to remove the Taliban in 2001-2002, or for 

NATO’s liberation of Kosovo in 1999.

m. Counterinsurgency operations include support provided to a government in the 

military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions it undertakes 

to defeat insurgency. Insurgents will increasingly resort to irregular forms of warfare as 

effective ways to undermine their adversaries’ legitimacy and credibility and to isolate 

their adversaries from the relevant populations and their external supporters, physically as 

well as psychologically. At the same time, they also seek to bolster their own legitimacy 

and credibility to exercise authority over that same population. COIN operations often 

include security assistance programs such as foreign military sales, foreign military 

financing, and international military education and training. Such support also may 

include FID and SFA. In some cases, US COIN operations can be much more extensive 

and involve joint force limited contingency or major operations.

For further guidance on support to COIN, refer to JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency 

Operations, and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.
Chapter V 

V-18 JP 3-0 

6. Other Considerations 

a. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations and 

Host Nation Coordination. There is an increased need for the military to work with 

interorganizational and HN authorities to plan and conduct military engagement, security 

cooperation, and deterrence operations and activities. Liaison organizations such as a 

JIACG can help promote interaction and cooperation among diverse agencies. 

Consensus building is a primary task and can be aided by understanding each agency’s 

capabilities and limitations as well as any constraints that may preclude the use of a 

capability. The goal—to develop and promote the unity of effort needed to accomplish a 

specific mission—can be achieved by establishing an atmosphere of trust and 

cooperation. 

For further discussion on interorganizational coordination, refer to JP 3-08, 

Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.

b. Information Sharing. NGOs and IGOs, by the very nature of what they do, 

become familiar with the infrastructure in a region and the culture, language, sensitivities, 

and status of the populace. This information is very valuable to commanders and staffs 

who may have neither access nor current information. NGOs and IGOs also may need 

information from commanders and staffs concerning security issues. However, these 

organizations hold neutrality as a fundamental principle. They will resist being used as 

sources of intelligence, and they may be hesitant to associate with the military. Careful 

coordination is necessary to maintain their neutrality. Consequently, the JFC should 

establish mechanisms like a CMOC or a similar organization to coordinate activities and 

facilitate information sharing. IGOs and NGOs will likely participate if they perceive 

that mutual sharing of information aids their work and is not a threat to their neutrality.

c. Cultural Awareness. The social, economic, and political environments in which 

security cooperation activities occur require a great degree of cultural understanding. 

Military support and operations that are intended to support a friendly HN require an indepth understanding of the HN’s cultural and political realities because of the increased 

likelihood that military elements will be required to work with and among the HN 

population. A fundamental requirement for military success is a sound understanding of 

the operational environment. This requires a careful study of the geography, population, 

and culture. The JFC may augment Service-provided language and cultural awareness 

training and tailor these to the JOA and mission. This also requires intelligence and 

engagement strategies and actions that provide a continuously updated picture of relevant 

“Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you 

create a political committee, a civil-military operations center to interface with 

volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as 

opposed to a combat or fire-support operations center.”

Lieutenant General A. C. Zinni, US Marine Corps

Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force

1994-1996
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-19 

information. The beliefs, perceptions, lifestyles, and economic underpinnings of the 

society, among other considerations, influence the operational environment and will 

affect planning and execution. 

(1) Security cooperation efforts likely will impact countries throughout a 

region. Traditional rivalries among neighboring states and hostility toward the United 

States may be factors. For example, US assistance to a nation with long-standing 

enemies in the area may be perceived by these enemies as upsetting the regional balance 

of power. These same nations or others may see US intervention in the area simply as 

US imperialism. While such factors will not dictate US policy, they will require careful 

evaluation and consideration when conducting military operations under those conditions. 

(2) The emergence of non-state regional actors and an increase in multinational 

efforts to enhance stability and foster development, have increased cultural and language 

challenges faced by joint forces and increased interpreter and translator requirements to 

support multinational operations.

SECTION D. CRISIS RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY 

OPERATIONS

7. Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations 

a. A limited contingency operation in response to a crisis includes all of those 

operations for which a JFC must develop an OPLAN or OPORD. The level of 

complexity, duration, and resources depends on the circumstances. Included are 

operations to ensure the safety of American citizens and US interests while maintaining 

and improving US ability to operate with multinational partners to deter the hostile 

ambitions of potential aggressors (such as JTF SHINING HOPE in the spring of 1999 

to support refugee humanitarian relief for hundreds of thousands of Albanians fleeing 

their homes in Kosovo). Many of these operations involve a combination of military 

forces and capabilities in close cooperation with interorganizational partners. 

b. Initial Response. When crises develop and the President directs, CCDRs 

respond. If the crisis revolves around external threats to a regional partner, CCDRs 

employ joint forces to deter aggression and signal US commitment (such as deploying 

joint forces to train in Kuwait). If the crisis is caused by an internal conflict that threatens 

regional stability, US forces may intervene to restore or guarantee stability (such as 

Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY, the 1994 intervention in Haiti). If the crisis is 

within US territory (e.g., natural or man-made disaster, deliberate attack), US joint forces 

will conduct CS and HD operations as directed by the President and SecDef. Prompt 

deployment of sufficient forces in the initial phase of a crisis can preclude the need to 

deploy larger forces later. Effective early intervention also can deny an adversary time to 

set conditions in their favor or achieve destabilizing objectives; or mitigate the effects of 

a natural or man-made disaster. Deploying a credible force rapidly is one step in 

deterring or blocking aggression. However, deployment alone will not guarantee success. 

Achieving successful deterrence involves convincing the adversary that the deployed 
Chapter V 

V-20 JP 3-0 

force is able to conduct decisive operations and the national leadership is willing to 

employ that force and to deploy more forces if necessary.

c. Scope. Crisis response and limited contingency operations are typically limited in 

scope and scale and conducted to achieve a very specific strategic or operational 

objective in an operational area. They may be conducted as stand-alone operations in 

response to a crisis (such as a NEO) or executed as an element of a larger, more complex 

campaign or major operation. Crisis response and limited contingency operations may be 

conducted to achieve operational and, sometimes, strategic objectives. 

d. Political Aspects. Two important factors about political primacy in crisis 

response and foreign limited contingency operations stand out. First, understanding the 

political objective helps avoid actions that may have adverse effects. It is not 

uncommon in some operations, such as peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make 

decisions that have significant political implications. Second, commanders should 

remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also in political 

objectives that may warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not 

always be obvious. Therefore, commanders must strive to detect subtle changes, which 

may eventually lead to disconnects between political objectives and military operations. 

Failure to recognize changes in political objectives early may lead to ineffective or 

counterproductive military operations.

e. Economy of Force. The strategic environment requires the United States to 

maintain and prepare joint forces for crisis response and limited contingency operations 

simultaneously with other operations, preferably in concert with allies and/or coalition 

partners when appropriate. This approach recognizes that these operations will vary in 

duration, frequency, intensity, and the number of personnel required. The burden of 

many crisis response and limited contingency operations may lend themselves to using 

small elements like SOF in coordination with allied HNs. Initially, SOF may take the 

lead of these operations as an economy of force measure to enable major operations and 

campaigns with conventional focus to progress more effectively.

8. Typical Operations 

a. NEOs are operations directed by the DOS or other appropriate authority, in 

conjunction with DOD, whereby noncombatants and civilians are evacuated from 

locations within foreign countries to safe havens when their lives are endangered by, or in 

anticipation of, war, civil unrest, or natural disaster. Although principally conducted to 

evacuate US citizens, NEOs also may include citizens from the HN as well as citizens 

from other countries. Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency 

Preparedness Responsibilities, DOS is responsible for the protection and evacuation of 

American citizens abroad and for safeguarding their property. This order also directs 

DOD to advise and assist DOS in preparing and implementing plans for the evacuation of 

US citizens. The US ambassador, or chief of the diplomatic mission, is responsible for 

preparation of emergency action plans that address the military evacuation of US citizens 

and designated foreign nationals from a foreign country. The conduct of military 
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-21 

operations to assist in the implementation of emergency action plans is the responsibility 

of the GCC, as directed by SecDef.

(1) NEOs are often characterized by uncertainty. They may be directed 

without warning because of sudden changes in a country’s government, reoriented 

diplomatic or military relations with the United States, a sudden hostile threat to US 

OPERATION EASTERN EXIT

On 2 January 1991, the United States Ambassador to Somalia requested 

military assistance to evacuate the Embassy. Americans and other 

foreign nationals had sought shelter in the Embassy compound that day 

as the reign of Somali dictator Siad Barre disintegrated into a confused 

battle for control of Mogadishu.

The next day, Operation EASTERN EXIT was initiated. Despite the 

priorities of the Gulf War, special operations forces helicopters were put 

on alert, Air Force C-130 transport aircraft were deployed to Kenya, and 

two Navy amphibious ships with elements of a Marine expeditionary 

brigade embarked were sent south from the North Arabian Sea toward 

Somalia. Initial plans called for evacuation of the endangered Americans 

through Mogadishu’s international airport, utilizing Air Force aircraft 

staged in Kenya. The situation in Mogadishu rapidly worsened and 

aircraft, even those of the United States Air Force, could not land safely at 

the airport. It seemed unlikely in any case that those sheltered at the 

Embassy could travel safely through the embattled city to the airport.

By 4 January, it had become apparent that the Embassy’s only hope lay 

with the two ships still steaming south at flank speed. At 0247, two CH53E helicopters with Marines and Navy SEALs departed the USS Guam for 

the 466-mile flight to Mogadishu. After two in-flight refuelings from KC130 aircraft, the helicopters arrived over the Embassy at dawn. About 100 

armed Somali stood with ladders by one wall. As the CH-53Es flew into 

the compound, the Somalis scattered. Shortly after the helicopters 

touched down, a special operations AC-130 gunship arrived overhead to 

provide fire support, if needed. The CH-53Es unloaded the security force, 

embarked 61 evacuees, and took off for the 350-mile return flight.

The ships continued to steam at full speed toward Somalia throughout the 

day. The final evacuation of the Embassy started at midnight, after the 

ships had arrived off the coast. The remaining 220 evacuees and the 

security force were extracted during the night.

Operation EASTERN EXIT, which resulted in the rescue of 281 people—

from 30 different countries—from a bloody civil war, was the result of the 

synergistic employment of widely dispersed joint forces that rapidly 

planned and conducted a noncombatant evacuation operation in the 

midst of the Gulf War.

Various Sources
Chapter V 

V-22 JP 3-0 

citizens from elements within or external to a foreign country, or in response to a natural 

disaster. 

(2) NEO methods and timing are significantly influenced by diplomatic 

considerations. Under ideal circumstances there may be little or no opposition; however, 

commanders should anticipate opposition and plan the operation like any combat 

operation. 

(3) NEOs, conducted in an uncertain or hostile operational environment, are 

similar to a raid in that the operation involves swift insertion of a force, temporary 

occupation of physical objectives, and ends with a planned withdrawal. It differs from a 

raid in that if force is used, it is normally limited to that required to protect the evacuees 

and the evacuation force. Forces employed within foreign territory should be kept to the 

minimum consistent with mission accomplishment. 

For additional guidance on NEOs, refer to JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation 

Operations. 

b. Peace Operations. PO are multiagency and multinational operations involving 

all instruments of national power—including international humanitarian and 

reconstruction efforts and military missions—to contain conflict, redress the peace, and 

shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the 

transition to legitimate governance. For the Armed Forces of the United States, PO 

encompass PKO, predominantly military PEO, predominantly diplomatic PB actions, PM 

processes, and conflict prevention. PO are conducted in conjunction with the various 

diplomatic activities and humanitarian efforts necessary to secure a negotiated truce and 

resolve the conflict. PO are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of 

diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict. PO support national/multinational 

strategic objectives. Military support improves the chances for success in the peace 

process by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve 

viable political settlements.

(1) PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major 

parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an 

agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to

reach a long-term political settlement. Such actions are often taken under the authority of 

Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, of the UN Charter. An example of PKO is 

the US commitment to the Multinational Force Observers in the Sinai since 1982. 

“Peacekeeping is a job not suited to soldiers, but a job only soldiers can do.”

Dag Hammarskjold

UN Secretary-General, 1953-1961
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-23 

(2) PEO are the application of military force or threat of its use, normally 

pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or 

sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PEO may include the 

enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of FHA, restoration of 

order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute. Unlike 

PKO, such operations do not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties 

to the conflict (e.g., Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR, JOINT GUARD, and JOINT 

FORGE, 1995-2001 in Bosnia and JOINT GUARDIAN, 1999-2001 in Kosovo). 

(3) Peace Building. This consists of stability actions (predominantly 

diplomatic, economic, and security related) that strengthen and rebuild governmental 

infrastructure and institutions, build confidence, and support economic reconstruction to 

prevent a return to conflict. Military support to PB may include rebuilding roads, 

reestablishing or creating government entities, or training defense forces.

(4) Peacemaking. This is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or 

other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute or resolves issues

that led to conflict. It can be an ongoing process, supported by military, economic, 

diplomatic, and informational instruments of national power. The purpose is to instill in 

the parties an understanding that reconciliation is a better alternative to fighting. The 

military can assist in establishing incentives, disincentives, and mechanisms that promote 

reconciliation. Military activities that support PM include military-to-military exchanges 

and security assistance.

US joint forces are often deployed with military forces from other nations to carry out 

operations and exercises focused on United Nations-mandated ground level 

peacekeeping tasks.
Chapter V 

V-24 JP 3-0 

(5) Conflict prevention consists of diplomatic and other actions taken in 

advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence, deter parties, and reach an 

agreement before armed hostilities. These actions are normally conducted under Chapter 

VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, of the UN Charter. However, military deployments 

designed to deter and coerce parties will need to be credible, and this may require a 

combat posture and an enforcement mandate under the principles of Chapter VII, Action 

with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, of 

the UN Charter. Conflict prevention activities include diplomatic initiatives, efforts 

designed to reform a country’s security sector and make it more accountable to 

democratic control, and deployment of forces designed to prevent a dispute or contain it 

from escalating to hostilities. Other conflict prevention activities may include military 

fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections, and monitoring. Military 

forces used for conflict prevention should be focused on support to political and 

developmental efforts to ameliorate the causes of tension and unrest. Military activities 

will be tailored to meet political and development demands. 

OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

Beginning in December 1995, US and allied nations deployed peace 

operations forces to Bosnia in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. 

Task Force EAGLE, comprised of 20,000 American soldiers (primarily 

from the 1st Armored Division), implemented the military elements of the 

Dayton Peace Accords. This operation marked the first commitment of 

forces in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) history as well 

as the first time since World War II that American and Russian soldiers 

have shared a common mission. Today, thousands of people are alive in 

Bosnia because of these soldiers’ service.

During Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, deployed intelligence personnel 

provided aircrews and staffs at several locations with critical threat 

information and airfield data. Taking advantage of the Combat 

Intelligence System (CIS) capabilities and an emerging global connectivity 

to military networks and databases, intelligence personnel provided the 

best and most timely support ever to air mobility forces. This 

improvement was particularly evident during the Mission Report (MISREP) 

process, when intelligence analysts used CIS to provide MISREP data 

very quickly to aircrews and staffs, ensuring the people in need of this 

intelligence received it while the data were still useful. 

The European Command’s Amphibious Ready Group/Marine 

Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) was assigned as theater 

reserve for NATO forces, while Naval Mobile Construction Battalions 133 

and 40 constructed base camps for implementation force personnel. In 

addition, from June to October a Marine Corps unmanned aerial vehicle 

(UAV) squadron, VMU-1, supported the operation with Pioneer UAV 

imagery both to US and multinational units. VMU-2 continues to provide 

similar support.

Various Sources
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-25 

For additional guidance on PO, refer to JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

c. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. FHA operations relieve or reduce the impact 

of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, 

disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the United States. These 

operations are different from nation assistance primarily because they occur on short 

notice to provide aid in specific crises or similar events rather than as more deliberate 

programs to promote long-term regional stability. FHA provided by US forces is 

generally limited in scope and duration; it is intended to supplement or complement 

efforts of HN civil authorities or agencies with the primary responsibility for providing 

assistance. DOD provides assistance when the need for relief is gravely urgent and when 

the humanitarian emergency dwarfs the ability of normal relief agencies to effectively 

respond. 

(1) The US military is capable of rapidly responding to emergencies or disasters 

and restoring relative order in austere locations. US forces may provide logistics, 

planning, and communications resources required to initiate and sustain FHA operations. 

(2) FHA operations may be directed by the President or SecDef when a serious 

international situation threatens the political or military stability of a region considered of 

interest to the United States, or when SecDef deems the humanitarian situation itself 

sufficient and appropriate for employment of US forces. DOS or the US Ambassador 

in country is responsible for declaring a foreign disaster or situation that requires 

US Navy Sailors and members of Joint Task Force-Bravo working with Project Handclasp, a San 

Diego-based organization, unload humanitarian supplies in Honduras in 2007. US forces can 

effectively assist civilian humanitarian organizations such as Project Handclasp by accepting and 

transporting educational, humanitarian, and goodwill material overseas on a space-available 

basis aboard military ships and aircraft.
Chapter V 

V-26 JP 3-0 

FHA. Within DOD, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy has the overall 

responsibility for developing the military policy for international FHA operations. 

(3) FHA operations include a broad range of tasks, including establishing a 

secure environment for humanitarian relief efforts. US military forces participate in 

three basic types of FHA operations—those coordinated by the UN, those where the 

United States acts in concert with other multinational forces, or those where the United 

States responds unilaterally.

For further guidance on FHA operations, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian 

Assistance. 

d. Recovery operations may be conducted to search for, locate, identify, recover, 

and return isolated personnel, sensitive equipment, items critical to national security, or 

human remains (such as JTF—Full Accounting, which had the mission to achieve the 

fullest possible accounting of Americans still unaccounted for as a result of the war in 

Southeast Asia). Regardless of the recovery purpose, each type of recovery operation is 

generally a sophisticated activity requiring detailed planning in order to execute. 

Recovery operations may be clandestine, covert, or overt depending on whether the 

operational environment is hostile, uncertain, or permissive. 

OPERATION ATLAS RESPONSE

In the early part of February 2000, Cyclone Connie drenched the Southern 

Africa region with over 40 inches of rain causing many rivers in the region 

to overflow and flood populated areas. US European Command sent a 

humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) to get “eyes on the ground.” 

Just as the effects of Connie were lessening and the HAST was preparing 

to head home, Cyclone Eline hit Madagascar. The storm pushed further 

inland and rain fell in Zimbabwe, adding to reservoirs that were already 

full. This forced the release of water from reservoirs, causing even more 

flooding. Mozambique (MZ) was the country with the greatest needs in 

the region. Consequently, between 18 February and 1 April 2000, Joint 

Task Force (JTF)-ATLAS RESPONSE, under the command of Major 

General Joseph H. Wehrle, Jr., US Air Force, was sent to aid the people of 

Mozambique, South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.

The joint force commander established a small, main headquarters in 

Maputo, MZ to be near the US Ambassador. The majority of forces and 

staff resided at Air Force Base Hoedspriut, South Africa. Eventually, a 

small contingent of forces would deploy to Beira, MZ to work at a supply 

distribution hub. The primary predeployment tasks of the JTF: 1) Search 

and rescue (SAR), 2) Coordination and synchronization of relief efforts, 

and 3) Relief supply distribution changed during the operation. Upon 

arrival, the JTF discovered SAR efforts were essentially complete and a 

fourth key task became the ability to conduct aerial assessment of the 

lines of communications. This fourth task was important because it was 

also a key indicator in the exit strategy.
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-27 

e. Strikes and Raids

(1) Strikes are attacks conducted to damage or destroy an objective or a 

capability. Strikes may be used to punish offending nations or groups, uphold 

international law, or prevent those nations or groups from launching their own attacks 

(e.g., Operation EL DORADO CANYON conducted against Libya in 1986, in response 

to the terrorist bombing of US Service members in Berlin). Although often tactical in 

nature with respect to the ways and means used and duration of the operation, strikes can 

achieve strategic objectives as did the strike against Libya. 

(2) Raids are operations to temporarily seize an area, usually through forcible 

entry, in order to secure information, confuse an adversary, capture personnel or 

equipment, or destroy an objective or capability (e.g., Operation URGENT FURY, 

During the brief time of the operation, the JTF’s aircraft carried a total of 

714.3 short tons of intergovernmental organization 

(IGO)/nongovernmental organization (NGO) cargo, most of it for direct 

support of the local population. Helicopters and C-130s also moved 511 

non-US passengers. The majority were medics or aid workers carried on 

special operations forces HH-60s bringing immediate relief to populations 

cut off from the rest of the world.

Important lessons were learned during this operation. First, the best 

course of action may not be bringing enough manpower and resources to 

dominate the running of a foreign humanitarian assistance operation. In 

this case, supporting the essentially civil-run operation and providing 

effective counsel worked far better than trying to control the operation as 

a supported commander. Political feathers were not ruffled and future 

operations with these nations or aid agencies likely will be that much 

easier. Second, the civil-military operations center (CMOC) was key to 

working with the participating IGOs and NGOs. CMOC personnel were 

able to set up information nodes that moved information among aid 

agencies that were sometimes in competition with each other. Because of 

CMOC’s low key approach, it was able to steer each organization it 

touched to greater organization and efficiency. Finally, early development 

of an exit strategy provided decision points with tangible measures. All 

parties must have buy-in to execute it together and there must be “top 

cover” from the civilian side to ensure national objectives are met.

Operation ATLAS RESPONSE was a political and military success. Not 

only was humanitarian aid provided to the people of Mozambique, but 

good relations with South African military and many IGOs and NGOs were 

forged.

SOURCE: Derived from Dr. Robert Sly’s, “ATLAS RESPONSE Study,”

Third Air Force History Office, 2000
Chapter V 

V-28 JP 3-0 

Grenada 1983, to protect US citizens and restore the lawful government). Raids end with 

a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. 

f. Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Security and 

defense of the US homeland is the USG’s top responsibility and is conducted as a 

continuous cooperative effort among all federal agencies as well as state, tribal, and local 

government. Military operations inside the United States and its territories, though 

limited in many respects, are conducted to accomplish two missions—HD and DSCA. 

HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical 

defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as 

directed by the President. DSCA consists of DOD support to US civil authorities for 

domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities. Requests 

for federal assistance of this nature must be submitted to the DOD Executive Secretary.

(1) Homeland Defense. The purpose of HD is to protect against and mitigate 

the impact of incursions or attacks on sovereign territory, the domestic population, and 

critical defense infrastructure. DOD is the federal agency with lead responsibility, 

supported by other agencies, in defending against external threats/aggression. 

However, against internal threats DOD may be in support of an OGA. When ordered to 

conduct HD operations within US territory, DOD will coordinate closely with 

OGAs. Consistent with laws and policy, the Services will provide capabilities to support 

CCDR requirements against a variety of threats to national security. These include 

invasion, CNA, and air and missile attacks.

OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON

The strike was designed to hit directly at the heart of Gaddafi’s ability to 

export terrorism with the belief that such a preemptive strike would 

provide him “incentives and reasons to alter his criminal behavior.” The 

final targets were selected at the National Security Council level “within 

the circle of the President’s advisors.” Ultimately, five targets were 

selected. All except one of the targets were chosen because of their 

direct connection to terrorist activity. The single exception was the 

Benina military airfield which based Libyan fighter aircraft. This target 

was hit to preempt Libyan interceptors from taking off and attacking the 

incoming US bombers.

The actual combat commenced at 0200 (local Libyan time), lasted less 

than 12 minutes, and dropped 60 tons of munitions. Navy A-6 Intruders 

were assigned the two targets in the Benghazi area, and the Air Force F111s hit the other three targets in the vicinity of Tripoli. Resistance 

outside the immediate area of attack was nonexistent, and Libyan air 

defense aircraft never launched. One F-111 strike aircraft was lost during 

the strike.

Various Sources
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-29 

(2) Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Support provided by US federal 

military forces, DOD civilians, contract personnel, component assets, and National Guard 

forces (when SecDef, in coordination with the Governors of the affected states, elects and 

requests to use those forces in Title 32, USC status) in response to requests for assistance 

from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other 

domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. For DSCA operations, 

DOD supports and does not supplant civil authorities. Within a state, that state’s 

governor is the key decision maker.

(a) The majority of DSCA operations are conducted in accordance with the 

NRF. The NRF establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic 

incident response. The NRF identifies the key response principles, as well as the roles 

and structures that organize national response. It describes how communities, states, the 

USG and private-sector and nongovernmental partners apply these principles for a 

coordinated, effective national response. In addition, it describes special circumstances 

where the USG exercises a larger role, including incidents where federal interests are 

involved and catastrophic incidents where a state would require significant support. It 

lays the groundwork for first responders, decision makers, and supporting entities to 

provide a unified national response. DOD provides this support with the stipulation that 

it does not conflict with DOD’s mission or its ability to respond to military contingencies.

(b) Other DSCA operations can include CD activities, incident awareness 

and assessment or investigative support, or other support to civilian law enforcement in 

accordance with specific DOD policies and US law.

(3) Global Perspective. Commander, US Northern Command, and 

Commander, US Pacific Command, have specific responsibilities for HD and DSCA. 

These responsibilities include conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats 

and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within their 

assigned AORs, as directed by the President or SecDef. However, DOD support to HD is 

global in nature and is often conducted by all CCDRs beginning at the source of the 

threat. In the forward regions outside US territories, the objective is to detect and deter 

threats to the homeland before they arise and to defeat these threats as early as possible 

when so directed. 

For detailed guidance on CS, see JP 3-28, Civil Support, and for more detailed guidance 

on DSCA, see DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

For detailed guidance on HD, see JP 3-27, Homeland Defense. 

9. Other Considerations

a. Duration and End State. Crisis response and limited contingency operations 

may last for a relatively short period of time (e.g., NEO, strike, raid) or for an extended

period of time to attain the national strategic end state (such as US participation with ten 

other nations in the independent [non-UN] peacekeeping operation, Multinational Force 

and Observers, in the Sinai Peninsula since 1982). Short duration operations are not 
Chapter V 

V-30 JP 3-0 

always possible, particularly in situations where destabilizing conditions have existed for 

years or where conditions are such that a long-term commitment is required to achieve 

national strategic objectives. Nevertheless, it is imperative to have a clear national 

strategic end state for all types of contingencies.

b. Intelligence Collection. As soon as practical, JFCs and their staffs determine 

intelligence requirements to support the anticipated operation. Intelligence planners also 

consider the capability for a unit to receive external intelligence support, the capability to 

store intelligence data, the timeliness of collection systems, the availability of intelligence 

publications, and the possibility of using other agencies and organizations as intelligence 

sources. In some contingencies (such as PKO), the term information collection is used 

rather than the term intelligence because of the operation’s sensitivity.

(1) HUMINT often may provide the most useful source of information and is 

essential to determining foreign intent. If a HUMINT infrastructure is not in place when 

US forces arrive, it needs to be established as quickly as possible. HUMINT also 

complements other intelligence sources with information not available through technical 

means. For example, while overhead imagery may graphically depict the number of 

people gathered in a town square, it cannot gauge the motivations or enthusiasm of the 

crowd. Additionally, in underdeveloped areas, belligerent forces may not rely heavily on 

radio communication, thereby denying US forces intelligence derived through signal 

intercept.

(2) Where there is little USG or US military presence, open-source intelligence 

(OSINT) may be the best immediately available information to prepare US forces to 

operate in a foreign country. OSINT from radio broadcasts, newspapers, and periodicals 

often provide tip-offs for HUMINT and other intelligence and information collection 

methods. 

(3) Intelligence collection requires a focus on adversary system factors that 

affect the situation. This requires a depth of expertise in, and a mental and psychological 

integration with, all aspects of the operational environment’s peoples and their cultures, 

politics, religion, economics, and related factors; and any variances within affected 

groups of people. In addition, intelligence collection must focus quickly on 

transportation infrastructure in the operational area, to include capabilities and limitations 

of major seaports, airfields, and surface LOCs. 

(4) Intelligence organizations (principally at the JTF HQ level) should include 

foreign area officers. They add valuable cultural awareness to the production of useable 

intelligence.

c. Constraints and Restraints. A JFC tasked with conducting or supporting a 

crisis response or limited contingency operation may face numerous constraints and 

restraints. For example, international acceptance of each operation may be extremely 

important, not only because military forces may be used to support international 

sanctions, but also because of the probability of involvement by IGOs. As a 

consequence, legal and fiscal constraints unique to the operation should be addressed in 
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-31 

detail by the CCDR’s staff. Also, operational limitations imposed on any agency or 

organization involved in the operation should be clarified for other agencies and 

organizations to facilitate coordination.

d. Force Protection. Limited contingency operations may involve a requirement to 

protect nonmilitary personnel. In the absence of the rule of law, the JFC must address 

when, how, and to what extent he will extend force protection to civilians and what that 

protection means. 

e. Training. Participation in or around the operational environment of certain types 

of smaller-scale contingencies may preclude normal mission-related training. For 

example, infantry units or fighter squadrons conducting certain protracted PO may not 

have the time, facilities, or environment in which to maintain individual or unit 

proficiency for traditional missions. In these situations, commanders should develop 

programs that enable their forces to maintain proficiency in their core 

competencies/mission essential tasks to the greatest extent possible.

SECTION E. MAJOR OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS

10. Major Operations and Campaigns 

a. When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national 

interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct a major operation or 

campaign involving large-scale combat, placing the United States in a wartime state. In 

such cases, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible, 

conclude hostilities, and establish conditions favorable to the HN, the United States, and 

its multinational partners. Establishing these conditions often requires joint forces to 

conduct stability operations to restore security, provide essential services and 

humanitarian relief, and conduct emergency reconstruction. 

b. Major operations and campaigns typically include multiple phases (such as the 

1990-1991 Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and 2003 OIF). Some 

specific crisis-response or limited contingency operations may not involve large-scale 

combat, but could be considered major operations or campaigns depending on their scale 

and duration (such as Tsunami relief efforts in Indonesia or Hurricane Katrina relief 

efforts in the US, both in 2005).

c. A major operation is a series of tactical actions, such as battles, engagements, and 

strikes, and is the primary building block of a campaign. Within a campaign, combat 

forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, conduct major 

operations to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. Forces 

conduct these actions simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan 

and are controlled by a single Service commander or the JFC. A noncombat operation, 

such as FHA, can be a major operation if the combination of size, scope, and duration 

requires the commander to phase the operation as a set of tasks, activities, and missions 

over time.
Chapter V 

V-32 JP 3-0 

d. A campaign is a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing 

a military strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. Planning 

for a campaign is appropriate when the contemplated military operations exceed the 

scope of a single major operation. Thus, campaigns are often the most extensive joint 

operations in terms of time and other resources. Campaign planning has its greatest 

application in the conduct of large-scale combat operations, but can be used across the 

range of military operations. While intended primarily to guide the use of military 

power, campaign plans consider all instruments of national power and how their 

integrated efforts work to attain national strategic objectives.

e. Campaigns are joint in nature—functional and Service components conduct 

supporting operations, not independent campaigns. A campaign plan is not a unique type 

of joint OPLAN. JFCs normally prepare a campaign plan in OPLAN format in 

accordance with the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System under APEX. 

However, the size, complexity, and anticipated duration of operations typically magnify 

the planning challenges. There are three categories of campaigns, which differ generally 

in scope. 

(1) Global Campaign. A global campaign is one that requires the 

accomplishment of military strategic objectives within multiple theaters that extend 

beyond the AOR of a single GCC. 

(2) Theater Campaign. A theater campaign encompasses the activities of a 

supported GCC, and accomplishes military strategic or operational objectives within a 

theater of war or theater of operations that is primarily within the supported commander’s 

AOR. OIF has shown that adjacent GCCs can, at the direction of SecDef, conduct 

supporting operations within the AOR of the supported commander, or within their own 

AORs, under the overall direction of the supported GCC. 

(3) Subordinate Campaign. A subordinate JFC may conduct a subordinate 

campaign to accomplish (or contribute to) military strategic or operational objectives in 

support of a global or theater campaign. Subordinate JFCs develop subordinate 

campaign plans if their assigned missions require military operations of substantial size, 

complexity, and duration and cannot be accomplished within the framework of a single 

major joint operation. Subordinate campaign plans must be consistent with the strategic 

and operational guidance and direction provided in the supported JFC’s campaign plan. 
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-33 

THE GULF WAR, 1990-1991

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Much of the rest of 

the world, including most other Arab nations, united in condemnation of 

that action. On 7 August, the operation known as DESERT SHIELD began. 

Its principal objectives were to deter further aggression and to force Iraq 

to withdraw from Kuwait. The United Nations (UN) Security Council 

passed a series of resolutions calling for Iraq to leave Kuwait, finally 

authorizing “all necessary means,” including the use of force, to force 

Iraq to comply with UN resolutions.

The United States led in establishing a political and military coalition to 

force Iraq from Kuwait and restore stability to the region. The military 

campaign to accomplish these ends took the form, in retrospect, of a 

series of major operations. These operations employed the entire 

capability of the international military coalition and included operations in 

war and operations other than war throughout.

The campaign—which included Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT 

STORM and the subsequent period of postconflict operations—can be 

viewed in the following major phases.

• DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP (to include crisis action 

planning, mobilization, deployment, and deterrence)

• DEFENSE (with deployment and force buildup continuing)

• OFFENSE

• POSTWAR OPERATIONS (to include redeployment)

DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP. While diplomats attempted to 

resolve the crisis without combat, the coalition’s military forces 

conducted rapid planning, mobilization, and the largest strategic 

deployment since World War II. One of the earliest military actions was a 

maritime interdiction of the shipping of items of military potential to Iraq.

The initial entry of air and land forces into the theater was unopposed. 

The Commander, United States Central Command (CDRUSCENTCOM), 

balanced the arrival of these forces to provide an early, viable deterrent 

capability and the logistic capability needed to receive, further deploy, 

and sustain the rapidly growing force. Planning, mobilization, and 

deployment continued throughout this phase.

DEFENSE. While even the earliest arriving forces were in a defensive 

posture, a viable defense was possible only after the buildup of sufficient 

coalition air, land, and maritime combat capability. Mobilization and 

deployment of forces continued. Operations security (OPSEC) measures, 

operational military deception, and operational psychological operations 

were used to influence Iraqi dispositions, expectations, and combat 

effectiveness and thus degrade their abilities to resist CDRUSCENTCOM’s
Chapter V 

V-34 JP 3-0 

selected course of action before engaging enemy forces. This phase 

ended on 17 January 1991, when Operation DESERT STORM began.

OFFENSE. Operation DESERT STORM began with a major airpower 

effort—from both land and sea—against strategic targets; Iraqi air, land, 

and naval forces; logistic infrastructure; and command and control (C2). 

Land and special operations forces supported this air effort by attacking 

or designating for attack forward-based Iraqi air defense and radar 

capability. The objectives of this phase were to gain air supremacy, 

significantly degrade Iraqi C2, deny information to enemy commanders, 

destroy enemy forces and infrastructure, and deny freedom of movement. 

This successful air operation would establish the conditions for the attack 

by coalition land forces.

While airpower attacked Iraqi forces throughout their depth, land forces 

repositioned from deceptive locations to attack positions using extensive 

OPSEC measures and simulations to deny knowledge of movements to 

the enemy. Two Army corps moved a great distance in an extremely short 

time to positions from which they could attack the more vulnerable 

western flanks of Iraqi forces. US amphibious forces threatened to attack 

from eastern seaward approaches, drawing Iraqi attention and defensive 

effort in that direction.

On 24 February, land forces attacked Iraq and rapidly closed on Iraqi 

flanks. Under a massive and continuous air component operation, 

coalition land forces closed with the Republican Guard. Iraqis 

surrendered in large numbers. To the extent that it could, the Iraqi 

military retreated. Within 100 hours of the start of the land force attack, 

the coalition achieved its strategic objectives and a cease-fire was 

ordered.

POSTWAR OPERATIONS. Coalition forces consolidated their gains and 

enforced conditions of the cease-fire. The coalition sought to prevent the 

Iraqi military from taking retribution against its own dissident populace. 

Task Force Freedom began operations to rebuild Kuwait City.

The end of major combat operations did not bring an end to conflict. The 

coalition conducted peace enforcement operations, humanitarian relief, 

security operations, extensive weapons and ordnance disposal, and 

humanitarian assistance. On 5 April, for example, President Bush 

announced the beginning of a relief operation in the area of northern Iraq. 

By 7 April, US aircraft from Europe were dropping relief supplies over the 

Iraqi border. Several thousand Service personnel who had participated in 

Operation DESERT STORM eventually redeployed to Turkey and northern 

Iraq in this joint and multinational relief operation.

This postwar phase also included the major operations associated with 

the redeployment and demobilization of forces.

Various Sources
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-35 

11. The Balance of Offense, Defense, and Stability Operations

a. Combat missions and tasks can vary widely depending on context of the operation 

and the objective. Most combat operations will require the commander to balance 

offensive, defensive, and stability operations. This is particularly evident in a campaign 

or operation, where combat occurs during several phases and stability operations may 

occur throughout the campaign or operation. 

b. Offensive and Defensive Operations. Major operations and campaigns, whether 

or not they involve large-scale combat, normally will include some level of both offense 

and defense (including interdiction, maneuver, forcible entry, fire support, counterair, 

CND, base defense, etc.). Although defense may be the stronger force posture, it is the 

offense that is normally decisive in combat. In striving to achieve military strategic 

objectives quickly and at the least cost, JFCs normally will seek the earliest opportunity 

to conduct decisive offensive operations. Nevertheless, during sustained offensive 

operations, selected elements of the joint force may need to pause, defend, resupply, or 

reconstitute, while other forces continue the attack. Further, force protection includes 

certain defensive measures that are required throughout each joint operation or campaign 

phase. Forces at all levels within the joint force must possess the agility to rapidly 

transition between offense and defense and vice versa. The relationship between offense 

and defense, then, is a complementary one. Defensive operations enable JFCs to conduct 

or prepare for decisive offensive operations. 

c. Stability Operations. These missions, tasks, and activities seek to maintain or 

reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, 

emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. Many of these missions 

and tasks are the essence of CMO. To achieve the desired military end state and 

conclude the operations successfully, JFCs must integrate and synchronize stability 

operations with other operations (offense and defense) within each major operation 

or campaign phase. Stability operations support USG stabilization efforts and 

contribute to USG initiatives to build partnerships. These initiatives set the conditions for 

interaction with partner, competitor, or adversary leaders, military forces, or relevant 

populations by developing and presenting information and conducting activities to affect 

their perceptions, will, behavior, and capabilities. The JFC will likely conduct them in 

coordination with interorganizational partners and the private sector in support of HN 

authorities. Since stability operations are conducted outside the United States, DOD 

provides similar support to US civil authorities through CS operations. 

For further guidance on stability operations, refer to JP 3-07, Stability Operations. 

d. Balance and Simultaneity

(1) Commanders strive to apply the many dimensions of military power 

simultaneously across the depth, breadth, and height of the operational area. This applies 

in all combat operations, but is the most extensive in a campaign. Consequently, JFCs 

normally achieve concentration in some areas or in specific functions and require 

economy of force in others. However, plans for major operations and campaigns require
Chapter V 

V-36 JP 3-0 

an appropriate balance between offensive and defensive operations and stability 

operations in all phases. Therefore, planning for stability operations should begin 

when joint operation planning begins.

(2) Figure V-4 relates to Figure V-3 and the phasing explanation in 

paragraph 3, “Phasing a Joint Operation.” Figure V-4 illustrates the notional balance 

between offensive, defensive, and stability operations as a major operation or campaign 

progresses. Since the focus of the shape phase is on prevention and preparation, any 

stability operations in the JFC’s proposed operational area might continue, and combat 

(offense and defense) may be limited or absent. Defensive measures might be limited to 

providing an increased level of security. A similar balance applies to the deter phase, 

Figure V-4. Notional Balance of Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Operations

Notional Balance of Offensive, Defensive, and

Stability Operations

NOTE: are conducted outside the United States. Department of Defense provides 

similar support to US civil authorities for homeland defense and other operations in the US through 

operations.

Stability operations

civil 

support

Shape

Stability

Enable Civil Authority

Defense

Offense

Stability

Dominate

Defense

Offense

Stability

Stabilize

Defense

Stability Offense

Deter

Defense

Offense

Stability

Seize Initiative

Defense

Offense

Stability
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-37 

since the intent is to limit escalation in the operational area. A JFC might begin to limit 

stability operations if an adversary’s potential combat actions are imminent. In combat 

operations, seize the initiative and dominate phases focus on offense and defense. 

Stability operations are likely restricted to parts of the operational area away from 

immediate combat, or might not occur at all. As the joint force achieves objectives and 

combat abates, the focus shifts to actions typical of stabilize and enable civil authority. 

Stability operations resume and will usually increase in proportion to the decrease in 

combat as the situation approaches relative peace.

(3) Planning for the transition from sustained combat operations to the 

termination of joint operations, and then a complete handover to civil authority, must 

commence during plan development and be ongoing during all phases of a campaign or 

major operation. Planning for redeployment should be considered early and continued 

throughout the operation and is best accomplished in the same time-phased process in 

which deployment was accomplished. An unnecessarily narrow focus on planning 

offensive and defensive operations in the dominate phase may threaten full development 

of the stabilize and enable civil authority phases and negatively affect joint operation 

momentum. Even while sustained combat operations are ongoing, it is necessary to 

establish or restore security and control and provide humanitarian relief as succeeding 

areas are occupied, bypassed, or transitioned to civilian control. 

12. Considerations for Shaping

a. General. JFCs are able to assist in determining the shape and character of 

potential future operations before committing forces. In many cases, these actions 

enhance bonds between potential multinational partners, increase understanding of the 

region, help ensure access when required, strengthen future multinational operations, and 

prevent crises from developing. 

b. Organizing and Training Forces. Organizing and, where possible, training 

forces to conduct operations throughout the operational area can be a deterrent. JTFs and

components that are likely to be employed in theater operations should be exercised 

regularly during peacetime. Staffs should be identified and trained for planning and 

controlling joint and multinational operations. The composition of joint force staffs 

should reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure that those responsible for 

employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. 

When possible, JFCs and their staffs should invite non-DOD agencies to participate in 

training to facilitate a common understanding and to build a working relationship prior to 

actual execution. When it is not possible to train forces in the theater of employment, as 

with US-based forces with multiple taskings, maximum use should be made of regularly 

scheduled and ad hoc exercise opportunities. The training focus for all forces and the 

basis for exercise objectives should be the CCDR’s joint mission-essential task list.

c. Rehearsals. Rehearsal is the process of learning, understanding, and practicing a 

plan in the time available before actual execution. Rehearsing key combat and logistic 

actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the 

plan. This process assists them in orienting joint and multinational forces to their 
Chapter V 

V-38 JP 3-0 

surroundings and to other units during execution. Rehearsals also provide a forum for 

subordinate leaders to analyze the plan, but they must exercise caution in adjusting the 

plan. Changes must be coordinated throughout the chain of command to prevent errors in 

integration and synchronization. HQ at the tactical level often conduct rehearsals 

involving participation of maneuver forces positioned on terrain that mirrors the 

operational environment. HQ at the operational level rehearse key aspects of a plan using 

command post exercises, typically supported by computer-aided simulations. While the 

joint force may not be able to rehearse an entire operation, the JFC should identify 

essential elements for rehearsal.

d. Maintaining Operational Area Access. JFCs establish and maintain access to 

operational areas where they are likely to operate, ensuring forward presence, basing (to 

include availability of airfields), freedom of navigation, and cooperation with allied 

and/or coalition nations to enhance operational reach. In part, this effort is national or 

multinational, involving maintenance of intertheater (between theaters) air and sea LOCs. 

Supporting CCDRs can greatly enhance this effort.

e. Space Considerations. Space operations are a critical enabler that supports all 

joint operations. When conflict occurs, commanders need to ensure US, allied, and/or 

multinational forces gain and maintain space superiority, which is achieved through 

global and theater space control, space force enhancement, space support, and space force 

application operations. Also, commanders must anticipate hostile actions that may affect 

friendly space operations. Commanders should anticipate the proliferation and increasing 

sophistication of commercial space capabilities and products available that the 

commander can leverage, but which also may be available to the adversary. 

USSTRATCOM has the responsibility to plan and conduct space operations. The GCC 

has the responsibility to conduct theater space operations, and may request the 

CDRUSSTRATCOM’s assistance in integrating space forces, capabilities, and 

considerations into each phase of campaign and major OPLANs. Global and theater 

space operations require robust planning and skilled employment to synchronize and 

integrate space operations with the joint operation. It is therefore incumbent upon the 

GCCs to coordinate as required to minimize conflicts. Space capabilities help shape the 

operational environment in a variety of ways including providing ISR and 

communications necessary for keeping commanders and leaders informed worldwide. 

JFCs and their components should request space support early in the planning process to 

ensure effective and efficient use of space assets. 

f. Stability Operations. Activities in the shape phase primarily will focus on 

continued planning and preparation for anticipated stability operations in the subsequent 

phases. These activities should include conducting collaborative interagency planning to 

synchronize the civil-military effort, confirming the feasibility of pertinent military 

objectives and the military end state, and providing for adequate intelligence, an 

appropriate force mix, and other capabilities. Stability operations in this phase may be 

required to quickly restore security and infrastructure or provide humanitarian relief in 

select portions of the operational area to dissuade further adversary actions or to help gain 

and maintain access and future success.
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-39 

13. Considerations for Deterrence

a. General. The deter phase is characterized by preparatory actions that indicate the 

intent to execute subsequent phases of the operation. Deterrence should be based on 

capability (having the means to influence behavior), credibility (maintaining a level of 

believability that the proposed actions may actual be employed), and communication 

(transmitting the intended message to the desired audience) to ensure greater 

effectiveness. Before hostilities begin, the JFC and staff analyze and assess the 

adversary’s goals and decision-making process to determine how, where, and when these 

can be affected and what friendly actions (military and others) can influence events and 

act as a deterrent. Emphasis should be placed on setting the conditions for successful 

joint operations in the dominate and follow-on phases should deterrence fail. 

b. Preparing the Operational Area

(1) Special Operations. SOF play a major role in preparing and shaping the 

operational area and environment by setting conditions which mitigate risk and facilitate 

successful follow-on operations. The regional focus, cross-cultural/ethnic insights, 

language capabilities, and relationships of SOF provide access to and influence in nations 

where the presence of conventional US forces is unacceptable or inappropriate. SOF 

contributions can provide operational leverage by gathering critical information, 

undermining a potential adversary’s will or capacity to wage war, and enhancing the 

capabilities of conventional US, multinational, or indigenous/surrogate forces. 

CDRUSSOCOM synchronizes planning for global operations against terrorist networks 

in coordination with other CCMDs, the Services, and, as directed, appropriate USG

agencies. In coordination with GCCs and the supported JFC, CDRUSSOCOM plans and

executes or synchronizes the execution of activities related to preparing the operational 

environment and operational area, or provides SOF to other CCMDs. 

For further guidance on SO, refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations.

(2) Stability Operations. Joint force planning and operations conducted prior 

to commencement of hostilities should establish a sound foundation for operations in the 

stabilize and enable civil authority phases. JFCs should anticipate and address how to fill 

the power vacuum created when sustained combat operations wind down. 

Accomplishing this task should ease the transition to operations in the stabilize phase and 

shorten the path to the national strategic end state and handover to another authority. 

Considerations include: 

(a) Limiting the damage to key infrastructure and services.

(b) Establishing the intended disposition of captured leadership and 

demobilized military and paramilitary forces.

(c) Providing for the availability of cash or other means of financial 

exchange. 
Chapter V 

V-40 JP 3-0 

(d) Determining the proper force mix (e.g., combat, military police, CA, 

engineer, medical, multinational).

(e) Assessing availability of HN law enforcement and HSS resources.

(f) Securing key infrastructure nodes and facilitating HN law enforcement 

and first responder services.

(g) Developing and disseminating information necessary to suppress 

potential new enemies and promote new governmental authority. 

(3) CA units contain a variety of specialty skills that may support the joint 

operation being planned. CA units can assess the civil infrastructure, assist in the 

operation of temporary shelters, and serve as liaisons between the military and civil 

organizations. Establishing and maintaining military-to-civil relations may include 

interaction among US, allied or multinational, HN forces, as well as OGAs, IGOs, and 

NGOs. CA forces can provide expertise on factors that directly affect military operations 

to include culture, social structure, economic systems, language, and HNS capabilities. 

CA may be able to perform functions for limited durations that normally are the 

responsibility of local or indigenous governments. Employment of CA forces should be 

based upon a clear concept of CA mission requirements for the type operation being 

planned. 

For further guidance on CA, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

(4) Sustainment. Thorough planning for logistic and personnel support is 

critical. For example, the infrastructure required to deploy and support combat 

operations must be identified, resourced, and emplaced in a timely manner. Planning 

must include active participation by all deploying and in-theater US and multinational 

forces. 

c. Isolating the Enemy

(1) With Presidential and SecDef approval, guidance, and national support, 

JFCs strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary. The intent is to 

strip away as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible, while limiting the 

enemy’s potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. JFCs also may be tasked by the 

President and SecDef to support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions. 

(2) The JFC also seeks to isolate the main enemy force from both its 

strategic leadership and its supporting infrastructure. Such isolation can be achieved 

through the use of IO and the interdiction of LOCs or resources affecting the enemy’s 

ability to conduct or sustain military operations. This step serves to deny the enemy both 

physical and psychological support and may separate the enemy leadership and military 

from their public support. 

d. Flexible Deterrent Options. FDOs are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions 

carefully tailored to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict. Both 
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-41 

military and nonmilitary FDOs can be used to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to 

deter further aggression during a crisis. FDOs are developed for each instrument of 

national power, but they are most effective when used in combination. 

(1) Military FDOs can be initiated before or after unambiguous warning. 

Deployment timelines, combined with the requirement for a rapid, early response, 

generally require economy of force; however, military FDOs should not increase risk to 

the force that exceeds the potential benefit of the desired effect. Military FDOs must be 

carefully tailored regarding timing, efficiency, and effectiveness. They can rapidly 

improve the military balance of power in the operational area; especially in terms of early 

warning, intelligence gathering, logistic infrastructure, air and maritime forces, MISO, 

and protection without precipitating armed response from the adversary. Care should be 

taken to avoid undesired effects such as eliciting an armed response should adversary 

leadership perceive that friendly military FDOs are being used as preparation for a 

preemptive attack.

(2) Nonmilitary FDOs are preplanned, preemptive actions taken by OGAs to 

dissuade an adversary from initiating hostilities. Nonmilitary FDOs need to be 

coordinated, integrated, and synchronized with military FDOs to focus all instruments of 

national power. 

For further guidance on planning FDOs, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

e. Protection. JFCs must protect their forces and their freedom of action to 

accomplish their mission. This dictates that JFCs not only provide force protection, but 

be aware of and participate as appropriate in the protection of interagency and regional 

multinational capabilities and activities. JFCs may spend as much time on protection as 

on direct preparation of their forces for combat.

f. Space Force Enhancement. JFCs depend upon and exploit the advantages of 

space capabilities. During the deter phase, space forces are limited to already fielded and 

immediately deployable assets and established priorities for service. As the situation 

develops, priorities for space force enhancement may change to aid the JFC in assessing 

the changing operational environment. Most importantly, the JFC and component 

commanders need to anticipate “surge” space capabilities needed for future phases due to 

the long lead times to reprioritize or acquire additional capabilities.

g. Geospatial Intelligence Support to Operations. Geospatial products or 

services—including maps, charts, imagery products, web services, and support data—

must be fully coordinated with JFC components as well as with the Joint Staff, Office of 

SecDef, and the NGA through the JFC’s GEOINT cell. Requests for or updates to 

GEOINT products, including maps or annotated imagery products, should be submitted 

as early as possible through the JFC’s GEOINT cell to the NGA support team at the 

JFC’s HQ. US products should be used whenever possible, since the accuracy, scale, and 

reliability of foreign maps and charts may vary widely from US products. In any joint or 

multinational operation, the World Geodetic System-1984 should be the common system. 

If US products are to be used in a coalition environment or within a multinational HQ, 
Chapter V 

V-42 JP 3-0 

the release of US mapping materials or imagery products may first require foreign 

disclosure/release adjudication.

For further guidance on GEOINT, refer to JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to 

Joint Operations. 

h. Physical Environment

(1) Weather, terrain, and sea conditions can significantly affect operations 

and logistic support of the joint force and should be carefully assessed before sustained 

combat operations. Mobility of the force, integration and synchronization of operations, 

and ability to employ precision munitions can be affected by degraded conditions. 

Climatological and hydrographic planning tools, studies, and forecast products help the 

JFC determine the most advantageous time and location to conduct operations.

(2) Urban areas possess all of the characteristics of the natural landscape, 

coupled with man-made construction and the associated infrastructure, resulting in a 

complicated and dynamic environment that influences the conduct of military operations

in many ways. The most distinguishing characteristic of operations in urban areas, 

however, is not the infrastructure but the density of noncombatants. Joint urban 

operations (JUOs) are conducted in large, densely populated areas with problems unique 

to clearing enemy forces while possibly restoring services and managing major 

concentrations of people. For example, industrial areas and port facilities often are 

collocated with highly populated areas creating the opportunity for accidental or 

deliberate release of toxic industrial materials which could impact JUOs. During JUOs, 

joint forces may not focus only on destruction of enemy forces but also may be required 

to take steps necessary to protect and support noncombatants and their infrastructure from 

which they receive services necessary for survival. As such, ROE during JUOs may be 

more restrictive than for other types of operations. When planning JUOs, the JFC and 

staff should consider the impact of military operations on noncombatants to include their 

culture, values, and infrastructure; thereby viewing the urban area as a dynamic and 

complex system—not solely as terrain. This implies the joint force should be capable of 

understanding the specific urban environment; sensing, locating, and isolating the enemy 

among noncombatants; and applying combat power precisely and discriminately.

For additional guidance on JUOs, refer to JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations. 

(3) Littoral Areas. The littoral area contains two parts. First is the seaward 

area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations 

ashore. Second is the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and 

defended directly from the sea. Control of the littoral area often is essential to maritime 

superiority. Maritime operations conducted in the littoral area can project power, fires, 

and forces to support achieving the JFC’s objectives; and facilitate the entry of other 

elements of the joint force through the seizure of an adversary’s port, naval base, or air 

base to allow entry and movement of other elements of the joint force. Depending on the 

situation, mine warfare may be critical to control of the littoral areas.
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-43 

(4) The electromagnetic spectrum, which has become increasingly complex, 

contested, and congested as technology has advanced, can significantly affect joint force 

operations. Operational experiences demonstrate not only how successful control of the 

EMS can influence the outcome of the conflict, but highlight US dependence on the EMS 

in order to successfully operate. When planning operations, the JFC should consider both 

the impact of military operations on the current EM operational environment as well as 

its affect on military operations.

14. Considerations for Seizing the Initiative

a. General. As operations commence, the JFC needs to exploit friendly advantages 

and capabilities to shock, demoralize, and disrupt the enemy immediately. The JFC seeks 

decisive advantage through the use of all available elements of combat power to seize and 

maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve its objectives, and 

generate in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat. Additionally, the JFC 

coordinates with OGAs to facilitate coherent use of all instruments of national power in 

achieving national strategic objectives.

b. Force Projection

(1) The President and SecDef may direct a CCDR to resolve a crisis quickly, 

employing immediately available forces and appropriate FDOs as discussed above to 

preclude escalation. When these forces and actions are not sufficient, follow-on strikes 

and/or the deployment of forces from CONUS or another theater and/or the use of 

multinational forces may be necessary. Consequently, the CCDR must sequence, enable, 

and protect the deployment of forces to achieve early decisive advantage. The CCDR 

should not overlook enemy capabilities to affect deployment from bases to ports of 

embarkation. The CCDR may have to adjust the time-phased force and deployment data

to meet a changing operational environment. The deployment of forces may be either 

opposed or unopposed by an adversary.

(a) Opposed. Initial operations may be designed to suppress adversary 

anti-access capabilities. For example, the ability to generate sufficient combat power 

through long-range air operations or from the sea can provide for effective force 

projection in the absence of timely or unencumbered access. Other opposed situations 

may require a forcible entry capability. In other cases, force projection can be 

accomplished rapidly by forcible entry operations coordinated with strategic air mobility, 

sealift, and pre-positioned forces. For example, the seizure and defense of lodgment 

areas by amphibious forces would then serve as initial entry points for the continuous and 

uninterrupted flow of pre-positioned forces and materiel into the theater. Both efforts 

demand a versatile mix of forces that are organized, trained, equipped, and poised to 

respond quickly.

(b) Unopposed deployment operations provide the JFC and subordinate 

components a more flexible operational environment to efficiently and effectively build 

combat power, train, rehearse, acclimate, and otherwise establish the conditions for 

successful combat operations. In unopposed entry, JFCs arrange the flow of forces, to 
Chapter V 

V-44 JP 3-0 

include significant theater opening logistic forces, that best facilitates the CONOPS. In 

these situations, logistic forces may be a higher priority for early deployment than combat 

forces, as determined by the in-theater protection requirements. 

(2) Commanders should brief deploying forces on the threat and force 

protection requirements prior to deployment and upon arrival in the operational area. 

Also, JFCs and their subordinate commanders evaluate the timing, location, and other 

factors of force deployment in each COA for the impact of sabotage, criminal activity, 

and terrorist acts and their impact on joint reception, staging, onward movement, and 

integration (JRSOI) and the follow-on CONOPS. The threat could involve those not 

directly supporting or sympathetic to the adversary, but those seeking to take advantage 

of the situation. 

(3) During force projection, US forces and ports of debarkation must be 

protected. JFCs should introduce forces in a manner that provides security for rapid force 

buildup. Therefore, early entry forces should deploy with sufficient organic and 

supporting capabilities to preserve their freedom of action and protect personnel and 

equipment from potential or likely threats. Early entry forces also should include a 

deployable joint C2 capability to rapidly assess the situation, make decisions, and 

conduct initial operations. 

(4) JRSOI occurs in the operational area and comprises the essential processes 

required to transition arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into forces capable of 

meeting operational requirements. Forces are vulnerable during JRSOI, so planning must 

include force protection requirements. 

For further information on JRSOI, refer to JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment 

Operations.

c. Unit Integrity During Deployment

(1) US Service forces normally train as units, and are best able to accomplish a 

mission when deployed intact. By deploying as an existing unit, forces are able to 

continue to operate under established procedures, adapting them to the mission and 

situation, as required. When personnel and elements are drawn from various commands, 

effectiveness may be decreased. By deploying without established operating procedures, 

an ad hoc force takes more time to form and adjust to requirements of the mission. This 

not only complicates mission accomplishment, but also may have an impact on force 

protection. 

(2) Even if political restraints on an operation dictate that a large force cannot 

be deployed intact, commanders should select elements for deployment that have 

established internal procedures and structures, have trained and operated together, and 

possess appropriate joint force combat capabilities. In order to provide a JFC with 

needed versatility, it may not be possible to preserve complete unit integrity. In such 

cases, units must be prepared to send elements that are able to operate independently of 

parent units. Attachment to a related unit is the usual mode. In this instance, units not 
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-45 

accustomed to having attachments may be required to provide administrative and logistic 

support to normally unrelated units. 

(3) The CCDR, in coordination with Commander, United States Transportation 

Command, subordinate JFCs, and the Service component commanders, needs to carefully 

balance the desire to retain unit integrity through the deployment process with the 

effective use of strategic lift platforms. While maximizing unit integrity may reduce 

JRSOI requirements and allow combat units to be employed more quickly, doing so will 

often have a direct negative impact on the efficient use of the limited strategic lift. In 

some cases, this negative impact on strategic lift may have a negative effect on DOD 

deployment and sustainment requirements beyond the GCC’s AOR. A general rule of 

thumb is that unit integrity is much more important for early deploying units than for 

follow-on forces. 

d. Forcible entry is a joint military operation conducted either as a major operation 

or a part of a larger campaign to seize and hold a military lodgment in the face of 

armed opposition for the continuous landing of forces. Forcible entry operations can 

strike directly at the enemy COGs and can open new avenues for other military 

operations. 

(1) Forcible entry operations may include amphibious, airborne, and air assault 

operations, or any combination thereof. Forcible entry operations can create multiple 

dilemmas by creating threats that exceed the enemy’s capability to respond. The joint 

forcible entry operation commander will employ distributed, yet coherent, operations to 

attack the objective area or areas. The net result will be a coordinated attack that 

overwhelms the adversary before the adversary has time to react. A well-positioned and 

networked force enables the defeat of any adversary reaction and facilitates follow-on 

operations, if required. 

(2) Forcible entry normally is complex and risky and should therefore be 

kept as simple as possible in concept. These operations require extensive intelligence, 

detailed coordination, innovation, and flexibility. Schemes of maneuver and coordination 

between forces need to be clearly understood by all participants. Forces are tailored for 

the mission and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and employment. When 

airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations are combined, unity of command is vital. 

Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry. Participating forces need 

to be prepared to fight immediately upon arrival and require robust communications and 

intelligence capabilities to move with forward elements. 

(3) The forcible entry force must be prepared to immediately transition to 

follow-on operations and should plan accordingly. Joint forcible entry actions occur 

in both singular and multiple operations. These actions include establishing forward 

presence, preparing the operational area, opening entry points, establishing and sustaining 

access, receiving follow-on forces, conducting follow-on operations, sustaining the 

operations, and conducting decisive operations. 
Chapter V 

V-46 JP 3-0 

(4) Successful OPSEC and MILDEC may confuse the adversary and ease 

forcible entry operations. OPSEC helps foster a credible MILDEC. Additionally, the 

actions, themes, and messages portrayed by all friendly forces must be consistent if 

MILDEC is to be believable. 

(5) SOF may precede forcible entry forces to identify, clarify, and modify 

conditions in the lodgment. SOF may conduct the assaults to seize small, initial 

lodgments such as airfields or seaports. They may provide or assist in employing fire 

support and conduct other operations in support of the forcible entry, such as seizing air 

fields or conducting reconnaissance of landing zones or amphibious landing sites. They 

may conduct special reconnaissance and direct action well beyond the lodgment to 

identify, interdict, and destroy forces that threaten the conventional entry force. 

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, the Commander, US 

Southern Command, Joint Task Force (JTF) Panama, conducted multiple, 

simultaneous forcible entry operations to begin Operation JUST CAUSE. 

By parachute assault, forces seized key lodgments at Torrijos-Tocumen 

Military Airfield and International Airport and at the Panamanian Defense 

Force (PDF) base at Rio Hato. The JTF used these lodgments for force 

buildup and to launch immediate assaults against the PDF.

The JTF commander synchronized the forcible entry operations with 

numerous other operations involving virtually all capabilities of the joint 

force. The parachute assault forces strategically deployed at staggered 

times from bases in the continental United States, some in C-141 

Starlifters, others in slower C-130 transport planes. One large formation 

experienced delays from a sudden ice storm at the departure airfield—its 

operations and timing were revised in the air. H-hour was even adjusted 

for assault operations because of intelligence that indicated a possible 

compromise. Special operations forces (SOF) reconnaissance and direct 

action teams provided last-minute information on widely dispersed 

targets.

At H-hour the parachute assault forces, forward-deployed forces, SOF, 

and air elements of the joint force simultaneously attacked 27 targets—

most of them in the vicinity of the Panama Canal Zone. Illustrating that 

joint force commanders organize and apply force in a manner that fits the 

situation, the JTF commander employed land and SOF to attack strategic 

targets and stealth aircraft to attack tactical and operational-level targets.

The forcible entry operations, combined with simultaneous and follow-on 

attack against enemy command and control facilities and key units, 

seized the initiative and paralyzed enemy decision making. Most fighting 

was concluded within 24 hours. Casualties were minimized. It was a 

classic coup de main.

Various Sources
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-47 

(6) The sustainment requirements and challenges for forcible entry 

operations can be formidable, but must not be allowed to become such an overriding 

concern that the forcible entry operation itself is jeopardized. JFCs must carefully 

balance the introduction of sustainment forces needed to support initial combat with 

combat forces required to establish, maintain, and protect the lodgment as well as forces 

required to transition to follow-on operations. 

For additional and detailed guidance on forcible entry operations, refer to JP 3-18, Joint 

Forcible Entry Operations. 

e. Attack of Enemy Centers of Gravity. As part of achieving decisive advantages 

early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against enemy COGs using 

conventional and SO forces and capabilities. These attacks may be decisive or may begin 

offensive operations throughout the enemy’s depth that can create dilemmas causing 

paralysis and destroying cohesion. 

f. Full-Spectrum Superiority. The cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, 

maritime, and space domains and information environment (which includes cyberspace) 

that permits the conduct of joint operations without effective opposition or prohibitive 

interference is essential to joint force mission success. JFCs seek superiority in these 

domains to prepare the operational area and information environment and to accomplish 

the mission as rapidly as possible. The JFC may have to initially focus all available joint 

forces on seizing the initiative. A delay at the outset of combat may damage US

US Marines assigned to a Landing Force participate in a live fire amphibious landing exercise on 

Binturan Beach, Brunei during Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training Brunei 2010.
Chapter V 

V-48 JP 3-0 

credibility, lessen coalition support, and provide incentives for other adversaries to begin 

conflicts elsewhere.

(1) JFCs normally strive to achieve air and maritime superiority early. Air 

and maritime superiority allows joint forces to conduct operations without prohibitive 

interference from opposing air and maritime forces. Control of the air is a critical enabler 

because it allows joint forces both freedom from attack and freedom to attack. Using 

both defensive and offensive operations, JFCs employ complementary weapon systems 

and sensors to achieve air and maritime superiority.

(2) Land forces can be moved quickly into an area to deter the enemy from 

inserting forces, thereby precluding the enemy from gaining an operational advantage. 

The rapid deployment and employment of land forces with support of other components 

enable sustained operations more quickly contribute to the enemy’s defeat and help 

restore stability in the operational area. 

(3) Space superiority must be achieved early to support freedom of action. 

Space superiority allows the JFC access to communications, weather, navigation, timing, 

remote sensing, and ISR assets without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. 

Space control operations are conducted by joint and allied and/or coalition forces to gain 

and maintain space superiority. 

(4) Cyberspace superiority may enable freedom of action throughout the 

operational area.

(5) Early superiority in the information environment also is vital in joint 

operations. It degrades the enemy’s C2 while allowing the JFC to maximize friendly 

C2 capabilities. Superiority in the information environment also allows the JFC to better 

understand the enemy’s intentions, capabilities, and actions and influence foreign 

attitudes and perceptions of the operation. 

(6) Control of the EM environment must be achieved early to support freedom 

of action. This control is important for superiority across the physical domains and 

information environment. 

g. C2 in Littoral Areas

(1) Controlled littoral areas often offer the best positions from which to 

begin, sustain, and support joint operations, especially in operational areas with 

limited or poor infrastructure for supporting US joint operations ashore. The ability to 

project fires and employ forces from sea-based assets combined with their C2, ISR, and 

IO capabilities are formidable tools that JFCs can use to gain and maintain initiative. 

Maritime forces operating in littoral areas can dominate coastal areas and rapidly 

generate high intensity offensive power at times and in locations required by JFCs. 

Maritime forces’ relative freedom of action enables JFCs to position these capabilities 

where they can readily strike opponents. Maritime forces’ very presence, if made known, 

can pose a threat that the enemy cannot ignore. 
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-49 

(2) JFCs can operate from an HQ platform at sea. Depending on the nature 

of the joint operation, a maritime commander can serve as the JFC or function as a 

JFACC while the operation is primarily maritime, and shift that command ashore if the 

operation shifts landward in accordance with the JFC’s CONOPS. In other cases, a 

maritime HQ may serve as the base of the joint force HQ, or subordinate JFCs or other 

component commanders may use the C2 and intelligence facilities aboard ship.

(3) Transferring C2 from sea to shore requires detailed planning, active 

liaison, and coordination throughout the joint force. Such a transition may involve a 

simple movement of flags and supporting personnel, or it may require a complete change 

of joint force HQ. The new joint force HQ may use personnel and equipment, especially 

communications equipment, from the old HQ, or it may require augmentation from 

different sources. One technique is to transfer C2 in several stages. Another technique is 

for the JFC to satellite off the capabilities of one of the components ashore until the new 

HQ is fully prepared. Whichever way the transition is done, staffs should develop 

detailed checklists to address all of the C2 requirements and the timing of transfer of 

each. The value of joint training and rehearsals in this transition is evident. 

h. SOF-Conventional Force Integration. The JFC, using SOF independently or 

integrated with conventional forces, gains an additional and specialized capability to 

achieve objectives that might not otherwise be attainable. Integration enables the JFC to 

take fullest advantage of conventional and SOF core competencies. SOF are most 

effective when SO are fully integrated into the overall plan and the execution of SO is 

through proper SOF C2 elements in a supporting or supported relationship with 

conventional forces. Joint SOF C2 elements are provided to conduct a specific SO or 

prosecute SO in support of a joint campaign or operation. SO commanders also provide 

liaison to component commands to integrate, coordinate, and deconflict SOF and 

conventional force operations. Exchange of SOF and conventional force LNOs is 

essential to enhance situational awareness and reduce risk of fratricide.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES 

INTEGRATION DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

Special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces integration 

demonstrated powerful air-ground synergies in Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM. Army special forces, while performing the classic special 

operations core task of unconventional warfare, organized and 

coordinated operations of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban and 

their al Qaeda allies. Supported by other joint SOF, they frequently 

directed massive and effective close air support from Air Force, Navy, and 

Marine Corps assets. The effects of the continuous SOF-directed air 

strikes so weakened the Taliban and al Qaeda that the Northern Alliance 

was able to quickly capture the major cities of Afghanistan early in the 

campaign.

Various Sources
Chapter V 

V-50 JP 3-0 

i. Stability Operations. Combat in this phase provides an opportunity to begin 

various stability operations that will help achieve military strategic and operational 

objectives and create the conditions for the later stability and enable civil authority 

phases. Operations to neutralize or eliminate potential stabilize phase enemies may be 

initiated. National and local HN authorities may be contacted and offered support. Key 

infrastructure may be seized or otherwise protected. Civil IM, which is broadly tasked to 

support the overall intelligence collection on the status of enemy infrastructure, 

government organizations, and humanitarian needs, should be increased. MISO used to 

influence the behavior of approved foreign target audiences in support of military 

strategic and operational objectives can ease the situation encountered when sustained 

combat is concluded. In coordination with interorganizational partners, the JFC must 

arrange for necessary financial support of these operations well in advance.

j. Protection. JFCs must strive to conserve the fighting potential of the 

joint/multinational force at the onset of combat operations. Further, HN infrastructure 

and logistic support key to force projection and sustainment of the force must be 

protected. JFCs counter the enemy’s fires and maneuver by making personnel, systems, 

and units difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. They protect their force from enemy 

maneuver and fires, including the effects of WMD. OPSEC and MILDEC are key 

elements of this effort. Operations to gain air, space, and maritime superiority; defensive 

use of IO; PR; and protection of airports and seaports, LOCs, and friendly force lodgment 

also contribute significantly to force protection at the onset of combat operations. 

k. Prevention of Fratricide. JFCs must make every effort to reduce the potential 

for the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly fire. The 

destructive power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and 

rapid tempo of modern combat, increase the potential for fratricide. Commanders must 

be aware of those situations that increase the risk of fratricide and institute appropriate 

preventive measures. The primary mechanisms for reducing fratricide are command 

emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among component commands and 

multinational partners, SOPs, technology solutions (e.g., identify friend or foe, blue force 

tracking), rehearsals, effective CID, and enhanced awareness of the operational 

environment. Commanders should seek to minimize fratricide while not limiting 

boldness and initiative. 

15. Considerations for Dominance

a. General. JFCs conduct sustained combat operations when a “coup de main” is 

not possible. During sustained combat operations, JFCs simultaneously employ 

conventional and SO forces and capabilities throughout the breadth and depth of the 

operational area. The JFC may designate one component or LOO to be the main effort, 

with other components providing support and other LOOs as supporting efforts. When 

conditions or plans change, the main effort might shift. Some missions and operations 

(i.e., strategic attack, interdiction, and IO) continue throughout to deny the enemy 

sanctuary, freedom of action, or informational advantage. These missions and 

operations, when executed concurrently with other operations, degrade enemy morale and 

physical cohesion and bring the enemy closer to culmination. When prevented from 
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-51 

concentrating, opponents can be attacked, isolated at tactical and operational levels, and 

defeated in detail. At other times, JFCs may cause their opponents to concentrate their 

forces, facilitating their attack by friendly forces.

b. Linear and Nonlinear Operations

(1) In linear operations, each commander directs and sustains combat power 

toward enemy forces in concert with adjacent units. Linearity refers primarily to the 

conduct of operations with identified forward lines of own troops (FLOTs). In linear 

operations, emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of friendly forces in relation to 

other friendly forces. From this relative positioning of forces, security is enhanced and 

massing of forces can be facilitated. Also inherent in linear operations is the security of 

rear areas, especially LOCs between sustaining bases and fighting forces. Protected 

LOCs, in turn, increase the endurance of joint forces and ensure freedom of action for 

extended periods. A linear operational area organization may be best for some operations 

or certain phases of an operation. Conditions that favor linear operations include those 

where US forces lack the information needed to conduct nonlinear operations or are 

severely outnumbered. Linear operations also are appropriate against a deeply arrayed, 

echeloned enemy force or when the threat to LOCs reduces friendly force freedom of 

action. In these circumstances, linear operations allow commanders to concentrate and 

synchronize combat power more easily. Multinational operations also may require a 

linear design. World Wars I and II offer multiple examples of linear operations.

(2) In nonlinear operations, forces orient on objectives without geographic 

reference to adjacent forces. Nonlinear operations typically focus on creating specific 

effects on multiple decisive points. Nonlinear operations emphasize simultaneous 

operations along multiple LOOs from selected bases (ashore or afloat). Simultaneity 

overwhelms opposing C2 and allows the JFC to retain the initiative. In nonlinear 

operations, sustaining functions may depend on sustainment assets moving with forces or 

aerial delivery. Noncombatants and the fluidity of nonlinear operations require careful 

judgment in clearing fires, both direct and indirect. Situational awareness, coupled with 

precision fires, frees commanders to act against multiple objectives. Swift maneuver 

against several decisive points supported by precise, concentrated fire can induce 

paralysis and shock among enemy troops and commanders. Nonlinear operations were 

applied during Operation JUST CAUSE. The joint forces oriented more on their 

assigned objectives (e.g., destroying an enemy force or seizing and controlling critical 

terrain or population centers) and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly 

forces. To protect themselves, individual forces relied more on situational awareness, 

mobility advantages, and freedom of action than on mass. Nonlinear operations place a 

premium on the communications, intelligence, mobility, and innovative means for 

sustainment. 

(a) During nonlinear offensive operations, attacking forces must focus 

offensive actions against decisive points, while allocating the minimum essential combat 

power to defensive operations. Reserves must have a high degree of mobility to respond 

where needed. JFCs may be required to dedicate combat forces to provide for LOC and 

base defense. Vulnerability increases as operations extend and attacking forces are 
Chapter V 

V-52 JP 3-0 

exposed over a larger operational area. Linkup operations, particularly those involving 

vertical envelopments, require extensive planning and preparation. The potential for 

fratricide increases due to the fluid nature of the nonlinear operational area and the 

changing disposition of attacking and defending forces. The presence of noncombatants 

in the operational area further complicates operations.

(b) During nonlinear defensive operations, defenders focus on destroying 

enemy forces, even if it means losing physical contact with other friendly units. 

Successful nonlinear defenses require all friendly commanders to understand the JFCs 

intent and maintain a common operational picture (COP). Noncontiguous defenses are 

generally mobile defenses; however, some subordinate units may conduct area defenses 

to hold key terrain or canalize attackers into engagement areas. Nonlinear defenses place 

a premium on reconnaissance and surveillance to maintain contact with the enemy, 

produce relevant information, and develop and maintain a COP. The defending force 

focuses almost exclusively on defeating the enemy force rather than retaining large areas. 

Although less challenging than in offensive operations, LOC and sustainment security 

will still be a test and may require allocation of combat forces to protect LOCs and other 

high risk functions or bases. The JFC must ensure that clear command relationships are 

established to properly account for the added challenges to base, base cluster, and LOC 

security.

(3) Areas of Operations and Linear/Nonlinear Operations

(a) General. JFCs consider incorporating combinations of contiguous and 

noncontiguous AOs with linear and nonlinear operations as they conduct operational 

design. They choose the combination that fits the operational environment and the 

purpose of the operation. Association of contiguous and noncontiguous AOs with linear 

and nonlinear operations creates the four combinations in Figure V-5. 

(b) Linear Operations in Contiguous AOs. Linear operations in 

contiguous AOs (upper left-hand pane in Figure V-5) typify sustained offensive and 

defensive operations against powerful, echeloned, and symmetrically organized forces. 

The contiguous areas and continuous FLOT focus combat power and protect sustainment 

functions. 

(c) Linear Operations in Noncontiguous AOs. The upper right-hand 

pane of Figure V-5 depicts a JFC’s operational area with subordinate component 

commanders conducting linear operations in noncontiguous AOs. In this case, the JFC 

retains responsibility for that portion of the operational area outside the subordinate 

commanders’ AOs.
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-53 

(d) Nonlinear Operations in Contiguous AOs. The lower left-hand pane 

in Figure V-5 illustrates the JFC’s entire assigned operational area divided into 

subordinate AOs. Subordinate component commanders are conducting nonlinear 

operations within their AOs. This combination typically is applied in stability operations 

and CS operations. 

Figure V-5. Combinations of Areas of Operations and Linear/Nonlinear Operations

Combinations of Areas of Operations and

Linear/Nonlinear Operations

Contiguous Areas of Operation Noncontiguous Areas of Operation

Nonlinear Operations Nonlinear Operations

Linear Operations

XXX

Linear Operations XX XX

XX XX

XX

XX

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

II

II

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX

XX

X

X

XX

XX

XXX

XX

X

X X X

X X

X

X X

l Joint Task Force 

Andrew

l Vietnam 1965-73 l JUST CAUSE l RESTORE HOPE

l Operation 

OVERLORD

l DESERT STORM l Hue City l URGENT FURY

Rear 

Area

Rear 

Area

Forward Line 

of Own Troops

Forward Line 

of Own Troops

Forward Edge 

of the Battle 

Area

Forward Edge 

of the Battle 

Area
Chapter V 

V-54 JP 3-0 

(e) Nonlinear Operations in Noncontiguous AOs. The lower right-hand 

pane of Figure V-5 depicts both the JFC and subordinate JFCs conducting nonlinear 

operations (e.g., during 1992 in Somalia, joint forces conducted nonlinear stability 

operations in widely separated AOs around Kismayu and Mogadishu). The size of the 

operational area, composition and distribution of enemy forces, and capabilities of 

friendly forces are important considerations in deciding whether to use this combination 

of operational area organization. 

(f) Commanders should seek ways to improve tactical effectiveness by 

making select joint capabilities available at the lowest appropriate level. The control and 

management of joint capabilities typically resides at a JTF or higher joint command or 

national agency. But operational circumstances could dictate that low-level tactical units 

exercise selective or routine control of certain joint assets. Advances in areas such as 

communications, information sharing, and targeting can increase the JFC’s opportunities 

to push joint capabilities to lower echelons in ways that improve tactical effectiveness 

while contributing to operational objectives. 

c. Operating in the Littoral Areas. Even when joint forces are firmly established 

ashore, littoral operations provide JFCs with excellent opportunities to achieve leverage 

over the enemy by operational maneuver from the sea. Such operations can introduce 

significant size forces over relatively great distances in short periods of time into the rear 

or flanks of the enemy. The mobility and fire support capability of maritime forces at 

sea, coupled with the ability to rapidly land operationally significant forces, can be key to 

achieving military operational objectives. These capabilities are further enhanced by 

operational flexibility and the ability to identify and take advantage of fleeting 

opportunities.

d. Attack on Enemy COGs. Attacks on enemy COGs typically continue during 

sustained operations. JFCs should time their actions to coincide with actions of other 

operations of the joint force and vice versa to achieve military strategic and operational 

objectives. As with all operations of the joint force, direct and indirect attacks of enemy 

COGs should be designed to achieve the required military strategic and operational 

objectives per the CONOPS, while limiting potential undesired effects on operations in 

follow-on phases. 

e. Synchronizing and/or Integrating Maneuver and Interdiction

(1) Synchronizing and/or integrating air, land, and maritime interdiction and 

maneuver, enabled by space-based capabilities, provides one of the most dynamic 

concepts available to the joint force. Interdiction and maneuver usually are not 

considered separate operations against a common enemy, but rather are complementary 

COMMON OPERATING PRECEPT

Drive synergy to the lowest echelon at which it can be managed 

effectively.
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-55 

operations designed to achieve the military strategic and operational objectives. 

Moreover, maneuver by air, land, or maritime forces can be conducted to interdict enemy 

military potential. Potential responses to integrated and synchronized maneuver and 

interdiction can create a dilemma for the enemy. If the enemy attempts to counter the 

maneuver, enemy forces may be exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the 

enemy employs measures to reduce such interdiction losses, enemy forces may not be 

able to counter the maneuver. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing 

interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational 

level.

(2) As a guiding principle, JFCs should exploit the flexibility inherent in joint 

force command relationships, joint targeting procedures, and other techniques to resolve 

the issues that can arise from the relationship between interdiction and maneuver. When 

interdiction and maneuver are employed, JFCs need to carefully balance the needs of 

surface maneuver forces, area-wide requirements for interdiction, and the undesirability 

of fragmenting joint force capabilities. The JFC’s objectives, intent, and priorities, 

reflected in mission assignments and coordinating arrangements, enable subordinates to 

exploit fully the military potential of their forces while minimizing the friction generated 

by competing requirements. Effective targeting procedures in the joint force also 

alleviate such friction. As an example, interdiction requirements often will exceed 

interdiction means, requiring JFCs to prioritize requirements. Land and maritime force 

commanders responsible for integrating and synchronizing maneuver and interdiction 

within their AOs should be knowledgeable of JFC priorities and the responsibilities and 

authority assigned and delegated to commanders designated by the JFC to execute 

theater- and/or JOA-wide functions. JFCs alleviate this friction through the CONOPS 

and clear statements of intent for interdiction conducted relatively independent of surface 

maneuver operations. In doing this, JFCs rely on their vision as to how the major 

elements of the joint force contribute to achieving military strategic objectives. JFCs 

then employ a flexible range of techniques to assist in identifying requirements and 

applying capabilities to meet them. JFCs must define appropriate command 

relationships, establish effective joint targeting procedures, and make apportionment 

decisions. 

(3) All commanders should consider how their operations can complement 

interdiction. These operations may include actions such as MILDEC, withdrawals, 

lateral repositioning, and flanking movements that are likely to cause the enemy to 

reposition surface forces, making them better targets for interdiction. Likewise, 

interdiction operations need to conform to and enhance the JFC’s scheme of maneuver. 

This complementary use of maneuver and interdiction places the enemy in the 

operational dilemma of either defending from disadvantageous positions or exposing 

forces to interdiction strikes during attempted repositioning. 

(4) Within the joint force operational area, all joint force component operations 

must contribute to achievement of the JFC’s objectives. To facilitate these operations, 

JFCs may establish AOs within their operational area. Synchronization and/or 

integration of maneuver and interdiction within land or maritime AOs is of 
Chapter V 

V-56 JP 3-0 

particular importance, particularly when JFCs task component commanders to execute 

theater- and/or JOA-wide functions. 

(a) Air, land, and maritime commanders are directly concerned with those 

enemy forces and capabilities that can affect their current and future operations. 

Accordingly, that part of interdiction with a near-term effect on air, land, and maritime 

maneuver normally supports that maneuver. In fact, successful operations may depend 

on successful interdiction operations; for instance, to isolate the battle or weaken the 

enemy force before battle is fully joined.

(b) JFCs establish land and maritime AOs to decentralize execution of land 

and maritime component operations, allow rapid maneuver, and provide the ability to 

fight at extended ranges. The size, shape, and positioning of land or maritime AOs will 

be based on the JFC’s CONOPS and the land or maritime commanders’ requirements to 

accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Within these AOs, land and 

maritime commanders are designated the supported commander for the integration 

and synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. Accordingly, land and 

maritime commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction 

operations within their AOs. Further, in coordination with the land or maritime 

commander, a component commander designated as the supported commander for 

theater/JOA-wide interdiction has the latitude to plan and execute JFC prioritized 

missions within a land or maritime AO. If theater/JOA-wide interdiction operations 

would have adverse effects within a land or maritime AO, then the commander 

conducting those operations must either readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the 

appropriate component commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution. 

(c) The land or maritime commander should clearly articulate the vision of 

maneuver operations to other commanders that may employ interdiction forces within the 

land or maritime AO. The land or maritime commander’s intent and CONOPS should 

clearly state how interdiction will enable or enhance land or maritime force maneuver in 

the AO and what is to be accomplished with interdiction (as well as those actions to be 

avoided, such as the destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain 

munitions in a specific area). Once this is understood, other interdiction-capable 

commanders normally can plan and execute their operations with only that coordination 

required with the land or maritime commander. However, the land or maritime 

commander should provide other interdiction-capable commanders as much latitude as 

possible in the planning and execution of interdiction operations within the AO. 

(d) Joint force operations in maritime or littoral operational areas often 

require additional coordination among the maritime commander and other interdictioncapable commanders because of the highly specialized nature of some maritime 

operations, such as antisubmarine and mine warfare. This type of coordination requires 

that the interdiction-capable commanders maintain communication with the maritime 

commander. As in all operations, lack of close coordination among commanders in 

maritime operational areas can result in fratricide and failed missions. The same 

principle applies concerning joint force air component mining operations in land or 

maritime operational areas.
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-57 

(5) JFCs need to pay particular attention and give priority to activities 

impinging on and supporting the maneuver and interdiction needs of all forces. In 

addition to normal target nomination procedures, JFCs establish procedures through 

which land or maritime force commanders can specifically identify those interdiction 

targets they are unable to engage with organic assets within their operational areas that 

could affect planned or ongoing maneuver. These targets may be identified individually 

or by category, specified geographically, or tied to a desired effect or time period. 

Interdiction target priorities within the land or maritime operational areas are considered 

along with theater and/or JOA-wide interdiction priorities by JFCs and reflected in the air 

apportionment decision. The JFACC uses these priorities to plan, coordinate, and 

execute the theater- and/or JOA-wide air interdiction effort. The purpose of these 

procedures is to afford added visibility to, and allow JFCs to give priority to, targets 

directly affecting planned maneuver by air, land, or maritime forces.

f. Operations When WMD are Employed or Located

(1) Locating WMD and WMD materials. Since an enemy’s use of WMD can 

quickly change the character of an operation or campaign, joint forces may be required to 

locate and control WMD, materials used to develop WMD, or dual-use materials when 

discovered or located in an operational area. Commanders should consider locating and 

controlling WMD-related weapons and materials when planning in order to deny their 

use by a potential adversary. Such a requirement can exist across the conflict continuum. 

Once located, resources may be required to secure, inventory, destroy, neutralize, dispose 

of, or transport these materials. Materials that can be used to create a CBRN weapon or 

device, such as a radiological dispersal device, exist in even the most austere locations. 

Would-be terrorists can exploit materials that are often present at medical and industrial 

facilities. For example, cesium-137 is present at many medical facilities and is ideal for 

the creation of a radiological dispersal device. 

(2) Enemy Employment. The use or the threatened use of WMD can cause 

large-scale shifts in strategic and operational objectives, phases, and COAs. 

Multinational operations become more complicated with the threatened employment of 

these weapons. An enemy may use WMD against other multinational partners, especially 

those with little or no defense against these weapons, to disintegrate the alliance or 

coalition.

(a) Intelligence and other joint staff members advise JFCs of an enemy’s 

capability to employ WMD and under what conditions that enemy is most likely to do so. 

This advice includes an assessment of the enemy’s willingness and intent to employ these 

weapons. It is important to ensure that high force or materiel concentrations do not 

provide lucrative targets for enemy WMD.

(b) Known threat of WMD use and associated preparedness against such 

use are imperative in this environment. The joint force can survive use of WMD by 

anticipating their employment and taking appropriate offensive and defensive measures. 

Commanders can protect their forces in a variety of ways, including training, MISO, 

OPSEC, dispersion of forces or materiel, use of IPE, and proper use of terrain for 
Chapter V 

V-58 JP 3-0 

shielding against blast and radiation effects. Enhancement of CBRN defense capabilities 

may reduce incentives for a first strike by an enemy with WMD.

(c) The combination of active and passive defense can reduce the 

effectiveness or success of an enemy’s use of WMD. The JFC may have to conduct 

offensive operations to neutralize or destroy enemy WMD capabilities before they can be 

brought to bear. Offensive measures include raids, strikes, and operations designed to 

locate and neutralize the threat of such weapons. When conducting offensive operations, 

the JFC must fully understand the collateral effects created by striking or neutralizing 

enemy WMD capabilities.

(d) JFCs should immediately inform HN authorities, OGAs, IGOs, or 

NGOs in the operational area of enemy intentions to use WMD. These organizations do 

not have the same intelligence or decontamination capabilities as military units and need 

the maximum amount of time available to protect their personnel. In the event WMD are 

used against nonmilitary targets, JFCs must plan for and prepare to manage the 

consequences of CBRN incidents to mitigate the effects.

For additional guidance on defensive CBRN measures and countermeasures, refer to JP 

3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Environments; JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction; JP 3-41, Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management; and the National 

Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

(3) Friendly Employment. When directed by the President and SecDef, 

CCDRs will plan for the employment of nuclear weapons by US forces in a manner 

consistent with national policy and strategic guidance. The employment of such weapons 

signifies an escalation of the war and is a Presidential decision. USSTRATCOM’s 

capabilities to assist in the collaborative planning of all nuclear missions are available to 

support nuclear weapon employment. If directed to plan for the use of nuclear weapons, 

JFCs typically have two escalating objectives.

(a) The first is to deter or prevent the enemy from using WMD. To make 

opponents understand that friendly forces possess and will use such weapons, JFCs may 

simply communicate that to the enemy, using IO or other means. Regardless, JFCs must 

implement measures to increase readiness and preserve the option to respond, including 

the alert and forward positioning, if required, of appropriate systems. Prevention or 

denial may include targeting and attacking enemy WMD capability by conventional and 

SO forces.

(b) If deterrence is not an effective option or fails, JFCs will respond 

appropriately, consistent with national policy and strategic guidance, to enemy aggression 

while seeking to control the intensity and scope of conflict and destruction. That 

response may include the employment of conventional, SO, or nuclear forces. 
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-59 

16. Considerations for Stabilization

a. General. Operations in this phase continue pursuit of the national strategic end 

state. These operations typically begin with significant military involvement, to include 

some combat, and then move increasingly toward enabling civil authority as the threat 

wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished. As progress is made, military forces 

will increase their focus on supporting the efforts of HN authorities, OGAs, IGOs, and/or 

NGOs. National Security Presidential Directive-44, Management of Interagency Efforts 

Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, assigns DOS the responsibility to plan and 

coordinate USG efforts in stabilization and reconstruction. The Secretary of State is 

responsible to coordinate with SecDef to ensure harmonization with planned and ongoing 

operations. Military support to stability operations within the JOA are the responsibility 

of the JFC.

b. Several LOOs may be initiated immediately (e.g., providing FHA, establishing 

security). In some cases, the scope of the problem set may dictate using other 

nonmilitary entities which are uniquely suited to address the problems. The goal of these 

military and civil efforts should be to eliminate root causes or deficiencies that create the 

problems (e.g., strengthen legitimate civil authority, rebuild government institutions, 

foster a sense of confidence and well-being, and support the conditions for economic 

reconstruction). With this in mind, the JFC may need to address how to coordinate CMO 

with the efforts of participating OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and HN assets. 

For further guidance on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

JOINT TASK FORCE-CIVIL SUPPORT

Joint task force-civil support (JTF-CS) is the nation’s only standing 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) JTF. It is 

comprised of active, reserve, and National Guard members from the 

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines as well as civilian and contract 

personnel. Established in October 1999, JTF-CS is assigned to US 

Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and focused on CBRN consequence 

management planning, preparedness, and command and control of 

Department of Defense (DOD) forces during CBRN incidents. The 

commander of US Army North serves as the joint force land component 

commander and has operational control of JTF-CS.

When directed, JTF-CS deploys with USNORTHCOM's allocated forces 

and conducts CBRN response operations in support of civil authorities. 

JTF-CS coordinates and synchronizes DOD capabilities into the federal, 

state, local, and tribal response in order to save lives, prevent further 

injury, and provide temporary critical support to enable community 

recovery.

Various Sources
Chapter V 

V-60 JP 3-0 

c. Forces and Capabilities Mix. The JFC may need to realign forces and 

capabilities or adjust force structure to begin stability operations in some portions of the 

operational area even while sustained combat operations still are ongoing in other areas. 

For example, CA forces and HUMINT capabilities are critical to supporting stabilize

phase operations and often involve a mix of forces and capabilities far different than 

those that supported the previous phases. Planning and continuous assessment will reveal 

the nature and scope of forces and capabilities required. These forces and capabilities 

may be available within the joint force or may be required from another theater or from 

the Reserve Component. The JFC should anticipate and request these forces and 

capabilities in a timely manner to facilitate their opportune employment. 

d. Stability Operations

(1) As sustained combat operations conclude, military forces will shift their 

focus to stability operations. Force protection will continue to be important and combat 

operations might continue, although with less frequency and intensity than in the 

dominate phase. Of particular importance will be CMO, initially conducted to secure and 

safeguard the populace, reestablish civil law and order, protect or rebuild key 

infrastructure, and restore public services. US military forces should be prepared to lead 

the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks and restore Rule of Law when 

indigenous civil, USG, multinational or international capacity does not exist or is 

incapable of assuming responsibility. Once legitimate civil authority is prepared to 

conduct such tasks, US military forces may support such activities as required/necessary. 

A US Army soldier, assigned to provide security to a provincial reconstruction team in 

Afghanistan, greets the foreman of a local construction company during an inspection of a 

greenhouse project in eastern Afghanistan’s Nuristan province.
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-61 

Security force assistance plays an important part during stability operations by supporting 

and augmenting the development of the capacity and capability of FSFs and their 

supporting institutions. Likewise, the JFC’s communications strategy will play an 

important role in providing public information to foreign populations during this period.

For further guidance on SFA, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

(2) The military’s predominant presence and its ability to command and control 

forces and logistics under extreme conditions may give it the de facto lead in stability 

operations normally governed by other agencies that lack such capacities. However, 

some stability operations likely will be in support of, or transition to support of, US 

diplomatic, UN, or HN efforts. Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to success 

and military forces need to work competently in this environment while properly 

supporting the agency in charge. To be effective, planning and conducting stability 

operations require a variety of perspectives and expertise and the cooperation and 

assistance of OGAs, other Services, and alliance or multinational partners. Military 

forces should be prepared to work in integrated civilian military teams that could include 

representatives from other US departments and agencies, foreign governments and 

security forces, IGOs, NGOs, and members of the private sector with relevant skills and 

expertise. Typical military support includes emergency infrastructure reconstruction, 

engineering, logistics, law enforcement, HSS, and other activities to restore essential 

services. 

For further guidance on stability operations, refer to JP 3-07, Stability Operations, and 

Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.05, Stability Operations.

(a) CA forces are organized and trained to perform CA operations that 

support CMO conducted in conjunction with stability operations. MISO forces will 

develop, produce, and disseminate products to gain and reinforce popular support for the 

JFC’s objectives. Complementing conventional forces IW efforts, SOF will conduct FID 

to assess, train, advise, and assist foreign military and paramilitary forces as they develop 

the capacity to secure their own lands and populations. 

For further guidance on SOF, refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations. 

(b) CI activities safeguard essential elements of friendly information. This 

is particularly pertinent in countering adversary HUMINT efforts. HN authorities, IGOs, 

and NGOs working closely with US forces may pass information (knowingly or 

unknowingly) to adversary elements that enables them to interfere with stability 

operations. Members of the local populace, who might actually be belligerents, often 

gain access to US military personnel and their bases by providing services such as 

laundry and cooking. They can then pass on information gleaned from that interaction in 

order to seek favor with a belligerent element or to avoid retaliation from belligerents. 

The JFC must consider these and similar possibilities and take appropriate actions to 

counter potential compromise. CI personnel develop an estimate of the threat and 

recommend appropriate actions. 
Chapter V 

V-62 JP 3-0 

(c) PA operations provide command information programs, 

communication with internal audiences, media and community relations support, and 

international information programs.

e. During stability operations in the stabilize phase, protection from virtually any 

person, element, or group hostile to US interests must be considered. These could 

include activists, a group opposed to the operation, looters, and terrorists. Forces will 

have to be even more alert to force protection and security matters after a CBRNE 

incident. JFCs also should be constantly ready to counter activity that could bring 

significant harm to units or jeopardize mission accomplishment. Protection may involve 

the security of HN authorities and OGA, IGO, and NGO members if authorized by 

higher authority. For contractors, the GCC must evaluate the need for force protection 

support following the guidelines of DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to 

Accompany the US Armed Forces. 

f. Personnel should stay alert even in an operation with little or no perceived risk. 

JFCs must take measures to prevent complacency and be ready to counter activity 

that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation. However, security 

requirements should be balanced with the military operation’s nature and objectives. In 

some stability operations, the use of certain security measures, such as carrying arms, 

wearing helmets and protective vests, or using secure communications may cause 

military forces to appear more threatening than intended, which may degrade the force’s 

legitimacy and hurt relations with the local population. 

g. Restraint. During the stabilize phase, military capability must be applied even 

more prudently since the support of the local population is essential for success. The 

actions of military personnel and units are framed by the disciplined application of force, 

including specific ROE. These ROE often will be more restrictive and detailed when 

compared to those for sustained combat operations due to national policy concerns. 

Moreover, these rules may change frequently during operations. Restraints on weaponry, 

tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment. The use of excessive force 

could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of 

both short- and long-term goals. The use of nonlethal capabilities should be considered 

to fill the gap between verbal warnings and deadly force when dealing with unarmed 

hostile elements and to avoid raising the level of conflict unnecessarily. The JFC must 

determine early in the planning stage what nonlethal technology is available, how well 

the force is trained to use it, and how the established ROE authorize its employment. The 

principle of restraint does not preclude the application of overwhelming force, when 

appropriate, to display US resolve and commitment. The reasons for the restraint often 

need to be understood by the individual Service member, because a single act could cause 

adverse political consequences.

h. Perseverance. Some operations may move quickly through the stabilize phase 

and transition smoothly to the enable civil authority phase. Other situations may require 

years of stabilization activities before this transition occurs. Therefore, the patient, 

resolute, and persistent pursuit of national strategic end state conditions for as long as 

necessary to achieve them often is the requirement for success.
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-63 

i. Legitimacy. Military activities during the stabilize phase should sustain the 

legitimacy of the operation and of the emerging or host government. During operations 

where a government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with 

individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them. Implementation 

of SC-related guidance through the commander’s communications strategy can enhance 

perceptions of the legitimacy of stability operations.

j. OPSEC. Although there may be no clearly defined threat, the essential elements 

of US military operations should be safeguarded. The uncertain nature of the situation, 

coupled with the potential for rapid change, require that OPSEC be an integral part of 

stability operations. OPSEC planners must consider the effect of media coverage and the 

possibility coverage may compromise essential security or disclose critical information.

17. Considerations for Enabling Civil Authority 

a. General. In this phase, the joint operation normally is terminated when the stated 

military strategic and/or operational objectives have been met and redeployment of the 

joint force is accomplished. This should mean that a legitimate civil authority has been 

enabled to manage the situation without further outside military assistance. In some 

cases, it may become apparent that the stated objectives fall short of properly enabling 

civil authority. This situation may require a redesign of the joint operation as a result of 

an extension of the required stability operations in support of US diplomatic, HN, IGO, 

and/or NGO efforts.

b. Peace Building. The transition from military operations to full civilian control 

may involve ongoing operations that have a significant combat component, including 

counterinsurgency operations, antiterrorism, and CT. Even while combat operations are 

ongoing, the operation will include a large stability component that is essentially a PB 

mission. PB, transitioning to a DOS led effort, provides the reconstruction and societal 

rehabilitation that offers hope to the HN populace. Stability measures establish the 

conditions that enable PB to succeed. PB promotes reconciliation, strengthens and 

rebuilds civil infrastructures and institutions, builds confidence, and supports economic 

reconstruction to prevent a return to conflict. The ultimate measure of success in PB is 

political, not military. Therefore, JFCs seek a clear understanding of the 

national/coalition strategic end state and how military operations support that end state. 

c. Transfer to Civil Authority. In many cases, the United States will transfer 

responsibility for the political and military affairs of the HN to another authority. JFCs 

may be required to transfer responsibility of operations to another authority (e.g., UN 

observers, multinational peacekeeping force, or NATO) as the termination criteria. This 

probably will occur after an extended period of conducting joint or multinational stability 

operations and PB missions as described above. Overall, transfer likely will occur in 

stages (e.g., HN sovereignty, PO under UN mandate, termination of all US military 

participation). Joint force support to this effort may include the following:
Chapter V 

V-64 JP 3-0 

(1) Support to Truce Negotiations. This support may include providing 

intelligence, security, transportation and other logistic support, and linguists for all 

participants.

(2) Transition to Civil Authority. This transfer could be to local or HN 

federal government, to a UN PKO after PEO, or through the UN High Commissioner for 

Refugees to a NGO in support of dislocated civilians. 

d. Redeployment

(1) Conduct. Redeployment is defined as the transfer of forces and materiel to 

support another JFC’s operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and 

materiel to home/demobilization stations for reintegration and out-processing. 

Redeployment normally is conducted in stages—the entire joint force likely will not 

redeploy in one relatively short period. It may include waste disposal, port operations, 

closing of contracts and other financial obligations, disposition of contracting records and 

files, clearing and marking of minefields and other explosive ordnance disposal activities, 

and ensuring that appropriate units remain in place until their missions are complete. 

Redeployment must be planned and executed in a manner that facilitates the use of 

redeploying forces and supplies to meet new missions or crises.

(a) Redeployment planning is the responsibility of the losing supported 

commander when personnel, equipment, and materiel are redeployed to home or 

demobilization stations. The gaining supported commander is responsible for this 

planning when the redeployment is to a new operational area. 

(b) Upon redeployment, units or individuals may require refresher training 

prior to reassuming more traditional roles and missions. Because of this, redeployment 

planning must be a collaborative and synchronized effort between supported and 

supporting commanders. 

(2) Redeployment to Other Contingencies. Due to competing demands for 

limited forces, the joint force provider may recommend allocating a force from one 

CCDR to another higher priority mission if the risks warrant. If SecDef approves the 

recommendation, the allocation will be ordered in a deployment order. Commanders and 

their staffs should consider how they would extricate forces and ensure that they are 

prepared for the new contingency. This might include such things as a prioritized 

redeployment schedule, identification of aerial ports for linking intra- and intertheater 

airlift, the most recent intelligence assessments and supporting GEOINT products for the 

new contingency, and some consideration to achieving the national strategic objectives of 

the original contingency through other means. 

(3) Redeployment in Support of Rotational Requirements. Due to Service 

or other rotational requirements, forces may be relieved in place and redeployed to home 

station for reconstitution or regeneration. Commanders and their staffs must consider 

security and protective measures during the relief in place between incoming and 

outgoing forces. 
Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

V-65 

For further information on redeployment, refer to JP 3-35, Deployment and 

Redeployment Operations. For further guidance on considerations for termination of 

operations, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force 

Headquarters. 
Chapter V 

V-66 JP 3-0 

Intentionally Blank
A-1 

APPENDIX A 

PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

The principles of joint operations are formed around the traditional principles of 

war. Three additional principles―restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy―are relevant 

to how the Armed Forces of the United States use combat power across the range of 

military operations. These three, added to the original nine, comprise 12 principles of 

joint operations. 

2. Principles of Joint Operations

a. Objective

(1) The purpose of specifying the objective is to direct every military operation 

toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal.

(2) The purpose of military operations is to achieve the military objectives that 

support attainment of the overall political goals of the conflict. This frequently involves 

the destruction of the enemy armed forces’ capabilities and their will to fight. The 

objective of joint operations not involving this destruction might be more difficult to 

define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, 

quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation 

must contribute to strategic objectives. JFCs should avoid actions that do not contribute 

directly to achieving the objective(s).

(3) Additionally, changes to the military objectives may occur because political 

and military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation, or they may occur 

because the situation itself changes. The JFC should anticipate these shifts in political 

goals necessitating changes in the military objectives. The changes may be very 

subtle, but if not made, achievement of the military objectives may no longer support the 

political goals, legitimacy may be undermined, and force security may be compromised. 

b. Offensive

(1) The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the 

initiative.

(2) Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to achieve a clearly 

defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes 

and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive 

results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war.

(3) Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must 

seek every opportunity to seize or regain the initiative. An offensive spirit must be 

inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations. 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-0 

c. Mass

(1) The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the 

most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results. 

(2) In order to achieve mass, appropriate joint force capabilities are integrated 

and synchronized where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass 

often must be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects of combat power, 

rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to produce 

decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

d. Maneuver

(1) The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage 

through the flexible application of combat power. 

(2) Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or 

retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver—or threaten delivery of—the 

direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy 

off balance and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in 

exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by 

continually posing new problems for the enemy. 

e. Economy of Force

(1) The purpose of economy of force is to expend minimum essential combat 

power on secondary efforts in order to allocate the maximum possible combat power on 

primary efforts.

(2) Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It 

is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, 

defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations to achieve mass elsewhere at 

the decisive point and time. 

f. Unity of Command

(1) The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one 

responsible commander for every objective. 

(2) Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander 

with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. 

During multinational operations and interagency coordination, unity of command may 

not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of 

effort—the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the 

participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—is the product 

of successful unified action. 
Principles of Joint Operations 

A-3 

g. Security

(1) The purpose of security is to prevent the enemy from acquiring unexpected 

advantage.

(2) Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to 

hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by 

commanders to protect their forces. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy 

strategy, tactics, and doctrine enhance security. Risk is inherent in military operations. 

Application of this principle includes prudent risk management, not undue caution. 

h. Surprise

(1) The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for 

which the enemy is unprepared. 

(2) Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and 

thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing 

to surprise include speed in decision-making, information sharing, and force movement; 

effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; OPSEC; and 

variations in tactics and methods of operation. 

i. Simplicity

(1) The purpose of simplicity is to increase the probability that plans and 

operations will be executed as intended by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and 

concise orders.

(2) Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, 

concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the 

simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution 

planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission 

execution in the stress, fatigue, fog of war, and complexities of modern combat, and are 

especially critical to success in multinational operations.

j. Restraint

(1) The purpose of restraint is to limit collateral damage and prevent the 

unnecessary use of force. 

(2) A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; 

therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful and 

disciplined balancing of the need for security, the conduct of military operations, and the 

national strategic end state. For example, the exposure of intelligence gathering 

activities, such as interrogation of detainees and prisoners of war, could have significant 

political and military repercussions and should be conducted with sound judgment. 

Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby damaging the legitimacy of 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-0 

the organization that uses it while potentially enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing 

party.

(3) Commanders at all levels must ensure their personnel are properly 

trained─including knowing and understanding ROE─and are quickly informed of any 

changes. Failure to understand and comply with established ROE can result in fratricide, 

mission failure, and/or national embarrassment. Restraint is best achieved when ROE

issued at the beginning of an operation address most anticipated situations that may arise. 

Since the domestic law of some nations may be more restrictive concerning the use of 

force than permitted under coalition or allied force ROE, commanders must be aware of 

national restrictions imposed on force participants.

k. Perseverance

(1) The purpose of perseverance is to ensure the commitment necessary to 

attain the national strategic end state.

(2) Perseverance involves preparation for measured, protracted military 

operations in pursuit of the national strategic end state. Some joint operations may 

require years to reach the termination criteria. The underlying causes of the crisis may be 

elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. The patient, resolute, and 

persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives often is essential to success. This will 

frequently involve diplomatic, economic, and informational measures to supplement 

military efforts.

l. Legitimacy

(1) The purpose of legitimacy is to maintain legal and moral authority in the 

conduct of operations. 

(2) Legitimacy, which can be a decisive factor in operations, is based on the 

actual and perceived legality, morality, and rightness of the actions from the various 

perspectives of interested audiences. These audiences will include our national 

leadership and domestic population, governments, and civilian populations in the 

operational area, and nations and organizations around the world. 

(3) Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the 

host government, where applicable. Security actions must be balanced with legitimacy 

concerns. All actions must be considered in the light of potentially competing strategic 

and tactical requirements, and must exhibit fairness in dealing with competing factions 

where appropriate. Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the 

international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and fairness 

in dealing with various factions. Restricting the use of force, restructuring the type of 

forces employed, and ensuring the disciplined conduct of the forces involved may 

reinforce legitimacy.

(4) Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed upon a local 

government through the perception of the populace that it governs. Humanitarian and 
Principles of Joint Operations 

A-5 

civil military operations help develop a sense of legitimacy for the supported 

government. Because the populace perceives that the government has genuine authority

to govern and uses proper agencies for valid purposes, they consider that government as 

legitimate. During operations in an area where a legitimate government does not exist, 

extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and organizations to avoid 

inadvertently legitimizing them.
Appendix A 

A-6 JP 3-0 

Intentionally Blank
B-1

APPENDIX B

REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-0 is based upon the following primary references:

1. General

a. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 

(Title 10, USC, Section 161).

b. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.

c. National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.

d. National Defense Authorization Act.

e. National Military Strategy.

f. The National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

g. The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations.

h. National Strategy for Homeland Security.

i. The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.

j. National Response Framework.

k. The Quadrennial Defense Review 2010.

l. Unified Command Plan.

m. Guidance for Employment of the Force.

n. Defense Planning and Programming Guidance.

o. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

p. Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities.

q. National Security Presidential Directive-44, Management of Interagency Efforts 

Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. 

r. UN Charter.

2. DOD Publications

a. DODI 3000.05, Stability Operations.
Appendix B

B-2 JP 3-0

b. DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed 

Forces.

c. DODD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances.

d. DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

e. DODD 5240.1, DOD Intelligence Activities.

f. DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.

3. CJCS Publications

a. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of 

Force for US Forces.

b. CJCSI 3126.01, Language and Regional Expertise Planning.

c. CJCSI 3141.01D, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans.

d. CJCSI 5715.01B, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs.

e. CJCSI 5810.01C, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program.

f. CJCS Manual 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

(JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures).

g. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

h. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

i. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

j. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

k. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

l. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.

m. JP 3-05, Special Operations.

n. JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

o. JP 3-07, Stability Operations.

p. JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations.

q. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.
References

B-3

r. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

s. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

t. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Environments.

u. JP 3-13, Information Operations.

v. JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

w. JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.

x. JP 3-14, Space Operations.

y. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

z. JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations.

aa. JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations.

bb. JP 3-26, Counterterrorism.

cc. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense.

dd. JP 3-28, Civil Support.

ee. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

ff. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

gg. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarter.

hh. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence 

Management.

ii. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

jj. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

kk. JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

ll. JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

mm. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

nn. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

oo. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 3-0 

pp. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

4. Allied Joint Publications

a. AJP-01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine.

b. AJP-3(B), Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Operations. 
C-1 

APPENDIX C 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

1. User Comments 

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition 

Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Support Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, 

Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, 

consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance. 

2. Authorship 

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Joint Forces Command. The 

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operational Plans and 

Joint Force Development (J-7). 

3. Supersession 

This publication supersedes JP 3-0, 17 September 2006, Doctrine for Joint 

Operations, incorporating Change 2, 22 March 2010. 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// 

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint and 

Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Support 

Division and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J7/JEDD. 

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change 

source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a 

proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and 

other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source 

documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 

5. Distribution of Publications 

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is 

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must 

be in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program.
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-0 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the CCMDs, 

Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or foreign 

nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, 

Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, 

Washington, DC 20340-5100. 

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community 

member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. 

This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can 

be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands and Services. 
GL-1 

GLOSSARY 

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

AADC area air defense commander 

ACA airspace control authority 

ACO airspace control order 

ACP airspace control plan 

ACS airspace control system 

AJP Allied joint publication 

AO area of operations 

AOA amphibious objective area 

AOR area of responsibility 

APEX Adaptive Planning and Execution 

C2 command and control 

CA civil affairs 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 

 explosives 

CCDR combatant commander 

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement 

CCMD combatant command 

CD counterdrug 

CDRUSSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations Command 

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command 

C-IED counter-improvised explosive device 

CI counterintelligence 

CID combat identification 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJTF commander, joint task force 

CMO civil-military operations 

CMOC civil-military operations center 

CNA computer network attack 

CND computer network defense 

COA course of action 

COCOM combatant command (command authority) 

COG center of gravity 

COIN counterinsurgency 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CONUS continental United States 

COP common operational picture 

CS civil support 

CT counterterrorism 

CTF counter threat finance 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-0 

DCA defensive counterair 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DODI Department of Defense instruction 

DOS Department of State 

DSCA defense support of civil authorities 

DSPD defense support to public diplomacy 

EA electronic attack 

EM electromagnetic 

EMS electromagnetic spectrum 

EW electronic warfare 

FCC functional combatant commander 

FDO flexible deterrent option 

FFIR friendly force information requirement 

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance 

FHP force health protection 

FID foreign internal defense 

FLOT forward line of own troops 

FSF foreign security forces 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GEF Guidance for Employment of the Force 

GEOINT geospatial intelligence 

HD homeland defense 

HN host nation 

HNS host-nation support 

HQ headquarters 

HSS health service support 

HUMINT human intelligence 

IA information assurance 

IED improvised explosive device 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

IM information management 

IO information operations 

IPE individual protective equipment 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

IW irregular warfare 

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff 

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff 

JFACC joint force air component commander 
Glossary 

GL-3 

JFC joint force commander 

JFLCC joint force land component commander 

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander 

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander 

JIACG joint interagency coordination group 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the 

 operational environment 

JOA joint operations area 

JOPP joint operation planning process 

JP joint publication 

JPEC joint planning and execution community 

JRSOI joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration 

JSA joint security area 

JSOA joint special operations area 

JSOTF joint special operations task force 

JTCB joint targeting coordination board 

JTF joint task force 

JUO joint urban operation 

LNO liaison officer 

LOC line of communications 

LOO line of operation 

MILDEC military deception 

MISO military information support operations 

MOE measure of effectiveness 

MOP measure of performance 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation 

NETOPS network operations 

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NRF National Response Framework 

NSS National Security Strategy 

OCA offensive counterair 

OEF Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

OGA other government agency 

OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

OPCON operational control 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operation order 

OPSEC operations security 

OSINT open-source intelligence 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-0 

PA public affairs 

PB peace building 

PEO peace enforcement operations 

PIR priority intelligence requirement 

PKO peacekeeping operations 

PM peacemaking 

 PMESII political, military, economic, 

 social, information, and infrastructure

PO peace operations 

PR personnel recovery 

ROE rules of engagement 

SC strategic communication 

SCA space coordinating authority 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SFA security force assistance 

SJA staff judge advocate 

SO special operations 

SOF special operations forces 

SOP standard operating procedure 

TACON tactical control 

TCP theater campaign plan 

TF task force 

UCP Unified Command Plan 

UN United Nations 

USC United States Code 

USG United States Government 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 
GL-5 

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

accuracy of information. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

activity. 1. A unit, organization, or installation performing a function or mission. 2. A 

function, mission, action, or collection of actions. Also called ACT. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.)

adversary. A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against 

which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

air apportionment. The determination and assignment of the total expected effort by 

percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations for 

a given period of time. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

air interdiction. Air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the 

enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against 

friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02.) 

air mission. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

alliance. The relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more 

nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the 

members. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

apportionment (air). None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

area of influence. A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of 

influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the 

commander’s command or control. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with 

JP 3-0 as the source JP.) 

area of interest. That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, 

areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes 

areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the 

mission. Also called AOI. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land 

and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and 

protect their forces. Also called AO. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

armed forces. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

assessment. 1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of 

employing joint force capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of 

the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an 

objective. 3. Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 3-0 

planned intelligence activity. 4. Judgment of the motives, qualifications, and 

characteristics of present or prospective employees or “agents.” (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

assign. 1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is 

relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the 

units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the 

unit or personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such 

duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-0) 

attach. 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement 

is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to specific functions where 

such functions are secondary or relatively temporary. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02.) 

attachment. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

aviation combat element. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

base of operations. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

battle damage assessment. The estimate of damage composed of physical and 

functional damage assessment, as well as target system assessment, resulting from 

the application of lethal or nonlethal military force. Also called BDA. (Approved 

for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

boundary. A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating 

coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or 

areas. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

brigade. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

capability. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

ceasefire. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

center of gravity. The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, 

freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

chain of command. The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a 

subordinate through which command is exercised. Also called command channel. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-0 as the source JP.) 

clear. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

close air support. Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets 

that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of 
Glossary 

GL-7 

each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

cold war. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant 

commands established by the President. Also called CCDR. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-0) 

combat power. The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military 

unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-0 as the source JP.) 

combat service support element. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

combat zone. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

command channel. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

commander’s critical information requirement. An information requirement 

identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making. 

Also called CCIR. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

commander’s estimate of the situation. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

commander’s intent. A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and 

the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the 

staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the 

commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does 

not unfold as planned. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

command guidance. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

command post exercise. An exercise in which the forces are simulated, involving the 

commander, the staff, and communications within and between headquarters. Also 

called CPX. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-0 as the source JP.) 

common infrastructure. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

common operational picture. A single identical display of relevant information shared 

by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all 

echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called COP. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

communications zone. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

condition. 1. Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, 

system, or individual is expected to operate and may affect performance. 2. A 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-0 

physical or behavioral state of a system that is required for the achievement of an 

objective. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

conflict. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

continuity of operations. The degree or state of being continuous in the conduct of 

functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission in 

carrying out the national military strategy. Also called COOP. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

control. 1. Authority that may be less than full command exercised by a commander 

over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations. (JP 1) 2. In 

mapping, charting, and photogrammetry, a collective term for a system of marks or 

objects on the Earth or on a map or a photograph, whose positions or elevations (or 

both) have been or will be determined. (JP 2-03) 3. Physical or psychological 

pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as 

directed. (JP 3-0) 4. An indicator governing the distribution and use of documents, 

information, or material. Such indicators are the subject of intelligence community 

agreement and are specifically defined in appropriate regulations. (JP 2-01) 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

counterattack. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

coup de main. An offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise and simultaneous 

execution of supporting operations to achieve success in one swift stroke. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its citizens, 

military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such 

diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and 

resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

cultivation. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

culture. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

cyberspace operations. The employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary 

purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

decisive engagement. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

decisive point. A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, 

when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary 

or contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

defense in depth. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-9 

deployable joint task force augmentation cell. None. (Approved for removal from JP 

1-02.) 

desired effects. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

deterrence. The prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of 

unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the 

perceived benefits. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

disarmament. The reduction of a military establishment to some level set by 

international agreement. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-0 as the 

source JP.) 

economy of force. The judicious employment and distribution of forces so as to expend 

the minimum essential combat power on secondary efforts in order to allocate the 

maximum possible combat power on primary efforts. (Approved for inclusion into 

JP 1-02 with JP 3-0 as the source JP.) 

effect. 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of 

actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. 

A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-0) 

end state. The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s 

objectives. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

engagement. 1. In air defense, an attack with guns or air-to-air missiles by an 

interceptor aircraft, or the launch of an air defense missile by air defense artillery and 

the missile’s subsequent travel to intercept. (JP 3-01) 2. A tactical conflict, usually 

between opposing lower echelons maneuver forces. (JP 3-0) (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

escalation. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

exclusion zone. A zone established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specific activities 

in a specific geographic area in order to persuade nations or groups to modify their 

behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of 

sanctions, or the use or threat of force. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

expedition. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

expeditionary force. An armed force organized to achieve a specific objective in a 

foreign country. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

fire support coordination measure. A measure employed by commanders to facilitate 

the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly 

forces. Also called FSCM. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-10 JP 3-0 

first strike. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

force projection. The ability to project the military instrument of national power from 

the United States or another theater, in response to requirements for military 

operations. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-0 as the source JP.) 

force protection. Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against 

Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, 

and critical information. Also called FP. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

force structure. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

freedom of navigation operations. Operations conducted to protect US navigation, 

overflight and related interests on, under and over the seas. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

friendly force information requirement. Information the commander and staff need to 

understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. Also called 

FFIR. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

full-spectrum superiority. The cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, 

maritime, and space domains and information environment (which includes 

cyberspace) that permits the conduct of joint operations without effective opposition 

or prohibitive interference. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

ground combat element. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

hostile. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

hostile environment. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

hostile force. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

incidents. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

information management. The function of managing an organization’s information 

resources for the handling of data and information acquired by one or many different 

systems, individuals, and organizations in a way that optimizes access by all who 

have a share in that data or a right to that information. Also called IM. (Approved 

for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

innocent passage. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

in-place force. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

inspection. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, 

the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and 
Glossary 

GL-11 

engaged US Government agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an 

objective. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

intervention. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

joint fires. Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more 

components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common 

objective. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

joint fire support. Joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and special operations forces 

to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned 

or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force 

commander. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, 

subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing 

commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or 

made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or 

accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. Also called JFACC. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

joint force land component commander. The commander within a unified command, 

subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing 

commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or 

made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or 

accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. Also called JFLCC. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

joint force maritime component commander. The commander within a unified 

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the 

establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, 

attached, and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; planning and 

coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as 

may be assigned. Also called JFMCC. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a 

unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to 

the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, 

attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and assets; 

planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational 

missions as may be assigned. Also called JFSOCC. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02.) 

joint functions. Related capabilities and activities placed into six basic groups of 

command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and 
Glossary 

GL-12 JP 3-0 

sustainment to help joint force commanders synchronize, integrate, and direct joint 

operations. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

joint operations. A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces 

and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each 

other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic 

combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force 

commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to 

accomplish a specific mission. Also called JOA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

joint readiness. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

joint special operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint 

force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct 

special operations activities. Also called JSOA. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02.) 

link. 1. A behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. 2. In 

communications, a general term used to indicate the existence of communications 

facilities between two points. 3. A maritime route, other than a coastal or transit 

route, which links any two or more routes. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

main battle area. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

major operation. 1. A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) 

conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and 

place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. 2. For 

noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military 

operation. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

maneuver. 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of 

advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the 

ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or 

vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces in the 

operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of 

advantage in respect to the enemy. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

Marine air-ground task force. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Marine expeditionary force. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Marine expeditionary unit. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable). None. (Approved for 

removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-13 

maritime interception operations. Efforts to monitor, query, and board merchant 

vessels in international waters to enforce sanctions against other nations such as 

those in support of United Nations Security Council Resolutions and/or prevent the 

transport of restricted goods. Also called MIO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

measure of effectiveness. A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, 

capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an 

end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

measure of performance. A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to 

measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

military capability. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

military education. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

military engagement. Routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements 

of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, 

or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, 

share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

military intervention. The deliberate act of a nation or a group of nations to introduce 

its military forces into the course of an existing controversy. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-0 as the source JP.) 

military occupation. A condition in which territory is under the effective control of a 

foreign armed force. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-0 as the 

source JP.) 

mission. 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be 

taken and the reason therefore. (JP 3-0) 2. In common usage, especially when 

applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 

(JP 3-0) 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. 

(JP 3-30) (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

modernization. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

nation assistance. Assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s 

territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

near real time. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

neutral. In combat and combat support operations, an identity applied to a track whose 

characteristics, behavior, origin, or nationality indicate that it is neither supporting 
Glossary 

GL-14 JP 3-0 

nor opposing friendly forces. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-0 

as the source JP.)

neutrality. In international law, the attitude of impartiality during periods of war 

adopted by third states toward a belligerent and subsequently recognized by the 

belligerent, which creates rights and duties between the impartial states and the 

belligerent. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

neutralize. 1. As pertains to military operations, to render ineffective or unusable. 2. To 

render enemy personnel or material incapable of interfering with a particular 

operation. 3. To render safe mines, bombs, missiles, and booby traps. 4. To make 

harmless anything contaminated with a chemical agent. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02 with JP 3-0 as the source JP.) 

node. 1. A location in a mobility system where a movement requirement is originated, 

processed for onward movement, or terminated. (JP 3-17) 2. In communications 

and computer systems, the physical location that provides terminating, switching, and 

gateway access services to support information exchange. (JP 6-0) 3. An element of a 

system that represents a person, place, or physical thing. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-0) 

normal operations. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

operating force. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

operation. 1. A series of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 

1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, 

service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 3-0) (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

operational area. An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms (such as 

area of responsibility and joint operations area) for geographic areas in which 

military operations are conducted. Also called OA. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02.) 

operational art. The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their 

skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, 

campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, 

ways, and means. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences 

that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the 

commander. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are 

planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or 

other operational areas. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-15 

operational reach. The distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully 

employ military capabilities. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

overlap. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

permissive environment. Operational environment in which host country military and 

law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist 

operations that a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

preemptive attack. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

preventive diplomacy. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

primary interest. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

protection. 1. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related 

military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and 

infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given 

operational area. (JP 3-0) 2. In space usage, active and passive defensive measures 

to ensure that United States and friendly space systems perform as designed by 

seeking to overcome an adversary’s attempts to negate them and to minimize 

damage if negation is attempted. (JP 3-14) (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-

02.) 

protection of shipping. The use of proportionate force, when necessary for the 

protection of US flag vessels and aircraft, US citizens (whether embarked in US or 

foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

raid. An operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse 

an adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability culminating 

with a planned withdrawal. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

range. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

reaction time. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

real time. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

reinforcing. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

risk management. The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising 

from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission 

benefits. Also called RM. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-0 as 

the source JP.) 
Glossary 

GL-16 JP 3-0 

sanction enforcement. Operations that employ coercive measures to control the 

movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified 

area. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

sanctuary. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

security cooperation activity. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

show of force. An operation designed to demonstrate US resolve that involves increased 

visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if 

allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

special purpose Marine air-ground task force. None. (Approved for removal from JP 

1-02.) 

stability operations. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, 

tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other 

instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure 

environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure 

reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

standing joint force headquarters. A staff organization operating under a flag or 

general officer providing a combatant commander with a full-time, trained joint 

command and control element integrated into the combatant commander’s staff 

whose focus is on contingency and crisis action planning. Also called SJFHQ. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

strategic advantage. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group 

of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic 

security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to 

achieve those objectives. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

strategy. A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power 

in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or 

multinational objectives. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

strike. An attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-0) 

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all 

aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint 

operation planning authority. 2. In the context of joint operation planning, the 

commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to 

requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 3. In the context of a 

support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another 
Glossary 

GL-17 

commander’s force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the 

supporting commander understands the assistance required. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other 

support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. 2. In the 

context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, 

complements, or sustains another commander’s force, and who is responsible for 

providing the assistance required by the supported commander. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

supporting forces. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, 

places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: 3-0) 

sustainability. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

sustainment. The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and 

prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-0) 

system. A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly 

interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified 

whole. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and 

executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

tactical unit. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate 

response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

termination criteria. The specified standards approved by the President and/or the 

Secretary of Defense that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

theater of operations. An operational area defined by the geographic combatant 

commander for the conduct or support of specific military operations. Also called 

TO. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

theater of war. Defined by the President, Secretary of Defense, or the geographic 

combatant commander as the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, 
Glossary 

GL-18 JP 3-0 

directly involved in the conduct of major operations and campaigns involving 

combat. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

theater strategy. An overarching construct outlining a combatant commander’s vision 

for integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations with the other 

instruments of national power in order to achieve national strategic objectives. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

troops. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

uncertain environment. Operational environment in which host government forces, 

whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not 

have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended 

operational area. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

unit readiness. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

unity of command. The operation of all forces under a single responsible commander 

who has the requisite authority to direct and employ those forces in pursuit of a 

common purpose. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-0 as the 

source JP.) 

weapon system. A combination of one or more weapons with all related equipment, 

materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable) 

required for self-sufficiency. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

LOGISTICS COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEM PLANS

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

JP 1-0

PERSONNEL

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

JP 3-0

OPERATIONS

JP 2-0

INTELLIGENCE

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts frontend analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

JS J-7 approves and releases PD to

lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant

command, JS directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the

development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-0 Operations