NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

ANDREW U.D. STRAW,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT WILKIE, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________

2020-2090

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 18-7129, Judge William S. Greenberg, Judge Joseph L. Toth, Judge Joseph L. Falvey, Jr.

______________________

Decided: January 15, 2021

______________________

ANDREW U.D. STRAW, Washington, DC, pro se. 

 ANDREW JAMES HUNTER, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by JEFFREY B. CLARK, TARA K. HOGAN, ROBERT 

EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR. 

 ______________________

Case: 20-2090 Document: 33 Page: 1 Filed: 01/15/2021
2 STRAW v. WILKIE

Before TARANTO, BRYSON, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Andrew U.D. Straw appeals a panel decision 

by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims

affirming a Board of Veterans’ Appeals decision which denied Mr. Straw payment or reimbursement for non-VA 

medical care as a Camp Lejeune family member under 

38 U.S.C. § 1787 and 38 C.F.R. § 17.410. We affirm the

Veterans Court’s decision.

I

In 2012, the Honoring America’s Veterans and Caring

for Camp Lejeune Families Act (Act) was enacted to provide hospital care and medical services to veterans who 

were stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, while 

water at Camp Lejeune was contaminated. Straw v. 

Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 374, 375 (2020) (Decision); Pub. L. 

No. 112–154, 126 Stat. 1165. Among other benefits, the 

Act provides certain healthcare benefits to family members 

of veterans who resided at Camp Lejeune for at least 

30 days during the period between August 1, 1953, and December 31, 1987, or who were in utero during the same period while their mother resided at Camp Lejeune. 

38 U.S.C. § 1787. These healthcare benefits include payment or reimbursement for non-VA healthcare for covered 

illnesses under 38 C.F.R. § 17.400(b), including neurobehavioral effects. See 38 C.F.R. § 17.410.

The relevant facts here, as established by the Board, 

are that Mr. Straw’s father was a veteran who served as a 

member of Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461, based 

at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina. 

Decision, 32 Vet. App. at 377. The Board took judicial notice that Marine Corps Air Station New River is very close 

to Camp Lejeune. 2018 WL 9670888, at *1 (first citing Yeoman v. West, 140 F.3d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998); and then citing Dedicatoria v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 441 (1995)). Mr. 

Case: 20-2090 Document: 33 Page: 2 Filed: 01/15/2021
STRAW v. WILKIE 3

Straw was born on March 19, 1969, at Camp Lejeune Naval 

Hospital where he and his mother stayed until March 22, 

1969, when they were discharged. Decision, 32 Vet. App.

at 377. Hospital records and Mr. Straw’s birth certificate 

list his parents’ residence as an off-base home address in 

Jacksonville, North Carolina. Id. 

Mr. Straw argues that he suffered a neurobehavioral 

effect associated with Camp Lejeune, and that under 

38 U.S.C. § 1787 and 38 C.F.R. § 17.410, he qualifies for 

healthcare benefits because he and his mother regularly 

visited and were present at Camp Lejeune for at least 

30 days, both while he was in utero and after his birth. 

Mr. Straw argues that this qualifies as “resid[ing] at” 

Camp Lejeune under 38 U.S.C. § 1787. Appellant’s Br. 

at 14.1 Construed liberally, Mr. Straw’s brief also argues 

that the Veterans Court’s decision denying him medical 

benefits was a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Equal 

Protection Clause because Mr. Straw was treated differently from others who did qualify for such benefits. Id. at 2. 

Finally, Mr. Straw argues that the Veterans Court failed 

to adjudicate the fact that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs’ brief was untimely, and this was grounds for a pro 

forma reversal. Id.

II

Upon appeal from the Veterans Court we have jurisdiction to review “all relevant questions of law, including interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions.” 

38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). However, except to the extent that 

an appeal presents a constitutional issue, we lack jurisdiction to review a factual determination or an application of 

1 Citations to Mr. Straw’s informal brief and motion 

to supplement reflect the pagination applied by this court’s 

electronic case files system, Docket Nos. 4 and 28 respectively.

Case: 20-2090 Document: 33 Page: 3 Filed: 01/15/2021
4 STRAW v. WILKIE

law to fact. Id. § 7292(d)(2). Where we have jurisdiction, 

we must set aside an interpretation that is “(A) arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, 

power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or in violation of a statutory right; or (D) without observance of procedure 

required by law.” Id. § 7292(d)(1). We review Veterans 

Court legal determinations de novo. Prenzler v. Derwinski, 

928 F.2d 392, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

III

Section 1787(a) provides that: 

a family member of a veteran described in subparagraph (F) of section 1710(e)(1) of this title who resided at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, for not 

fewer than 30 days during the period described in 

such subparagraph or who was in utero during 

such period while the mother of such family member resided at such location shall be eligible for hospital care and medical services furnished by the 

Secretary for any of the illnesses or conditions described in such subparagraph, notwithstanding 

that there is insufficient medical evidence to conclude that such illnesses or conditions are attributable to such residence.

The Board’s findings of fact establish that Mr. Straw 

was born during the period provided for in the statute and 

Mr. Straw contends that he suffers from neurobehavioral 

effects which are covered by the statute. Decision, 

32 Vet. App. at 376 n.2. However, the Veterans Court

found that Mr. Straw does not qualify for § 1787 benefits 

because neither he nor his mother resided at Camp 

Lejeune for 30 days as required by the statute. Id. at 379. 

Mr. Straw argues that the Veterans Court improperly construed the phrase “resided at” and that under a proper interpretation he resided at Camp Lejeune.

Case: 20-2090 Document: 33 Page: 4 Filed: 01/15/2021
STRAW v. WILKIE 5

Mr. Straw argues that he should be deemed to have 

resided at Camp Lejeune because he was born at Camp 

Lejeune Naval Hospital, and because he made numerous 

trips to Camp Lejeune with his mother, both in utero and 

after his birth. Appellant’s Br. at 11. Mr. Straw argues 

that the phrase “resided at” should be construed liberally 

to ensure that the statute serves its purpose. Id. at 15. As 

evidence of the broad purpose of the Act, Mr. Straw points 

to the Section title: “Health care of family members of veterans stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina,” and to 

President Barack Obama’s statements when signing the 

Act, touting its benefits to Camp Lejeune veterans and 

their families without mention of the residency requirement. Id. at 29–30. Mr. Straw advances that one interpretation of the residence requirement could include days of 

“base access,” at least for infants born at Camp Lejeune 

Naval Hospital. Id. at 30. 

In supplemental briefing, Mr. Straw also argues that 

the plain meaning of residence does not foreclose the possibility of having a residence separate from where one lives. 

Appellant’s S. Br. at 2–3. Mr. Straw cites the “variety of 

meanings” in the Cambridge English Dictionary, including 

“much vaguer definitions such as ‘artist in residence’” or 

“Governor’s Residence.” Id. Mr. Straw also argues that the 

phrase “primary residence” implies that one could have a 

non-primary residence where they do not live. Id.

The Veterans Court denied Mr. Straw’s argument that 

he should be deemed to have resided at Camp Lejeune 

based on the time that he spent there, finding that this argument would require the Veterans Court to read language 

into the law. Decision, 32 Vet. App. at 378–79. The Veterans Court explained that Congress could have allowed such 

a “constructive residence” theory by allowing family members to show a regular presence at Camp Lejeune or by imposing a residency requirement that included land near 

Camp Lejeune, but that it chose not to. Id.

Case: 20-2090 Document: 33 Page: 5 Filed: 01/15/2021
6 STRAW v. WILKIE

The Veterans Court also denied Mr. Straw’s argument 

that residence should be broadly construed to effectuate 

the purpose of the Act, finding that the plain meaning of 

“resided at” excluded Mr. Straw and that where the meaning of statutory language is plain, a court cannot ignore 

this meaning in favor of a judicially determined statutory 

purpose. Id. (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 

480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (per curiam)).

We agree with the Veterans Court that “resided at 

Camp Lejeune” has a plain meaning that includes only 

those who lived on base. Using the dictionary selected by 

Mr. Straw, the Cambridge English Dictionary, the first definition of reside is “to live, have your home, or stay in a 

place.” See Reside, CAMBRIDGE ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/reside. This definition is consistent with the other dictionary 

definitions cited by the Veterans Court. Decision, 

32 Vet. App. at 378 (citing United States v. Williams, 

836 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“To ‘reside’ is ‘[t]o dwell permanently or for a considerable time’ or ‘to have one’s settled or usual home in or at a particular place.’”) (alteration 

in original) (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 

1989))); see also Reside, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://

www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reside (“to dwell 

permanently or continuously: occupy a place as one’s legal 

domicile”). The other examples cited by Mr. Straw—“artist 

in residence” or “Governor’s Residence”—are unavailing 

because these phrases are not used in the statute. 

Having determined that “resided at” has a plain meaning that includes only those who lived at Camp Lejeune, we 

agree with the Veterans Court that the statutory language 

does not allow for “constructive residence” based on time 

spent on Camp Lejeune because this would defy the plain 

meaning of the statute. We also agree with the Veterans 

Court that we cannot construe residence to be broader than 

its plain meaning based on statutory purpose. 

Case: 20-2090 Document: 33 Page: 6 Filed: 01/15/2021
STRAW v. WILKIE 7

See Rodriguez, 480 U.S. at 525–26 (“[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs”).

Because Mr. Straw and his mother lived at an off-base 

residence and did not reside at Camp Lejeune for 30 days, 

we affirm the Veterans Court’s decision that he does not 

meet the § 1787(a) requirements for entitlement to 

healthcare benefits.

IV

Construed liberally, Mr. Straw’s informal brief also advances a Fifth Amendment equal protection claim, arguing 

that if he is not granted § 1787(a) benefits then he is not 

being treated equally to those who did live on base and 

qualify for such benefits. Appellant’s Br. at 2. 

“In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld 

against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational 

basis for the classification.” FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 

508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). “A rational basis is ‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts’ that support the classification.” Briggs v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 331 F.3d 1307, 1318 

(Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 

313).

The statutory classification made in § 1787(a) does not 

proceed on suspect lines because the statute does not create 

a classification based on race, sex, alienage, or national 

origin. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 

(1973) (plurality opinion). Thus, we turn to whether Mr. 

Straw has met his burden of showing an absence of a rational basis for the classification. As the Veterans Court 

explained, “Congress could have adopted the 30-day residency requirement for family members for any number of 

rational reasons, such as a proxy for the likelihood of harmful exposure to contaminants on the base, or the need for 

Case: 20-2090 Document: 33 Page: 7 Filed: 01/15/2021
8 STRAW v. WILKIE

administrative feasibility.” Decision, 32 Vet. App. at 380

(citations omitted). Because we agree with the Veterans 

Court that Mr. Straw has not established a lack of a rational basis in the statutory classification, we affirm. 

V

Finally, Mr. Straw argues that the Veterans Court decision was procedurally deficient because the Secretary’s 

brief was untimely, and the Veterans Court failed to address the timeliness of the Secretary’s filing in its decision. 

Because the Secretary’s filing was timely, it was not error 

for the Veterans Court to omit a discussion of timeliness. 

Mr. Straw submitted his informal brief to the Veterans 

Court on October 10, 2019, but it was not accepted because 

Mr. Straw was represented by counsel at the time, and 

“[w]hen an appellant is represented, the Court accepts papers only from the representative.” S.A. at 9. The Veterans 

Court granted Mr. Straw’s counsel’s motion to withdraw on 

October 17, and ordered that Mr. Straw be treated as selfrepresented. Id. at 4. The Veterans Court also accepted 

Mr. Straw’s informal brief on October 17. Id. Pursuant to 

the Veterans Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, the 

Secretary had 60 days from October 17 to respond to Mr. 

Straw’s brief. U.S. Vet. App. R. 31(a)(2). The Secretary 

timely filed his brief on December 16, 2019. Id. at 5.

VI

Because the Veterans Court properly construed the 

statute, and because there was no constitutional or procedural violation, we affirm the Veterans Court’s decision.

AFFIRMED 

No costs.

Case: 20-2090 Document: 33 Page: 8 Filed: 01/15/2021