THE JOINT STAFF 

 

The Trident Conference: May 1943 

The principal participants at the Trident Conference—which was held in Washington, DC, from 

May 12 to 25, 1943—were President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston S. 

Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). British Field Marshal Archibald P. Wavell; 

Major General Claire L. Chennault, USA; and Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, USA, 

from the China-Burma-India Theater were also present for the discussions on this region, 

marking the first time when Allied commanders from Asia attended a major wartime conference. 

Building on the decision at the Casablanca Conference to knock Italy out of the war first, 

the planning for the Italian campaign, which would begin with the amphibious invasion of Sicily 

(Operation Husky), was a major focus at the Trident Conference. The Allied leaders also 

deliberated on how and when to stage the cross-Channel invasion of France to bring the war with 

Germany to an end. Other notable topics of discussion at Trident included increasing air attacks 

on Axis targets—with an emphasis on bombing the oil fields in Ploiesti, Romania—and 

recapturing Burma from Japanese forces and reopening the supply lines to China. 

Trident was one in a series of high-level conferences held by the US and British leaders 

in Washington, DC; Casablanca; Quebec; Cairo; Tehran; Malta; Yalta; and Potsdam to formulate 

the Allied grand strategy. At the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences, the Soviet leader 

Joseph Stalin was also in attendance and played an important role. Reports, memorandums, 

position papers, and maps were prepared by the CCS for the conferences, and minutes were 

taken at the accompanying CCS meetings. Taken together, these documents address virtually 

every policy and strategy issue of the war, from troop deployments, to debates about the location 

and timing of key Allied offensives, to discussions about postwar occupation boundaries. Thus, 
they record the early years of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and serve as an indispensable primary 

source on the planning and conduct of World War II. 

Originally highly classified, the conference materials were declassified on October 3, 

1973. The Joint History Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is publishing these documents as 

eBooks and web-ready PDFs to make them widely available to historians, faculty and students at 

the joint and service schools and other institutions of higher learning, and the general public. 

In addition to Trident, the other conferences are available as eBooks in Mobi, ePub, and 

PDF formats: 

Arcadia Conference (Washington, DC), December 24, 1941–January 14, 1942: ISBN 

978-0-16-093887-0 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093886-3 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093888-7 (PDF) 

Post-Arcadia Conference (Washington, DC), January 23–May 19, 1942: ISBN 978-0-

16-093890-0 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093889-4 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093891-7 (PDF) 

Casablanca Conference (Morocco), January 14–24, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093893-1 

(Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093892-4 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093894-8 (PDF) 

Quadrant Conference (Quebec City, Canada), August 14–24, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-

093882-5 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093881-8 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093883-2 (PDF) 

Sextant Conference (Cairo, Egypt), Eureka Conference (Tehran, Iran), and the Second 

Cairo Conference (Egypt), November 22–December 7, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093885-6 (Mobi); 

ISBN 978-0-16-093884-9 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093926-6 (PDF) 

Octagon Conference (Quebec City, Canada), September 12–16, 1944: ISBN 978-0-16-

093925-9 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093927-3 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093928-0 (PDF) 
Argonaut Conference (Malta and Yalta, Soviet Union), January 30–February 11, 1945: 

ISBN 978-0-16-093930-3 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093929-7 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093924-2 

(PDF) 

Terminal Conference (Potsdam, Germany), July 17–August 2, 1945: ISBN 978-0-16-

093923-5 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093931-0 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093932-7 (PDF) 

David B. Crist, PhD 

Director for Joint History 
TRIDENT CONFERENCE 

MAY 1943 

PAPERS 

AND 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS 

EDITED AND PUBLISHED BY THE 

OFFICE, U. S. SECRETARY, 

OFFICE OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

1943 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. PAGE 

2 15 Invasion of the European Continent from the 

United Kingdom in 1943-44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 

*216 

217 Plan for Combined Wer Offensive from the 

United Kingdom . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . 5 

*218 

219 Conduct of the War in 1943-1944 . . . . . . . . , . . 25 

220 Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan . . . . . . . . 31 

*22 1 

*222 

223 Operations after HUSKY . . , . . . . . . . . . , . . . 37 

224 Operations in the European Theater between 

mKY and RCU" . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . 45 

225 Operations from India, 1943-44 . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 

226 Use of Portuguese Atlantic Islands . . . . . . . . . . 57 

226/2 Use of Portuguese Atlantic Islands . . . . . . . . . . 63 

(Memorandum for the President and Prime Minister) 

22 I Relief and Supplies for Occupied and 

Liberated Territories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 

*228 

229 Potentialities of Air Route from hssam to China . . . 69 

*230 

231 Operations in Burma to Open and Secure an 

Overland Route to China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 

232/1 Agreed Essentials in the Conduct of the War . . . . . 73 

233/1 Agenda for the Remining Conferences . . . . . . . . . 77 

234 Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe 

(Elimination of Italy First) . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 

235 Defeat of Axis Pmers in Europe 

(Concentration of Largest Possible Force 

inU. K.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1@3 

*23 6 

*Not considered as a TRJDW Paper. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAPERS 

C.C.S. 

23 7/1 Resolutions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

(European Operations) ................ 238 Operations in Burma 1943-44 .............. 239/1 Operations in the Pacific and Far East in 

1943-44.. ..................... 240 Sonic Warfare ..................... 24 1/3 Ant i-U-Baat War fare .................. (Suggested Basis for Discuss ion) 

2411'4 Ant i-U-Bce t Warfare .................. 242/6 Final Report to the Resident and Prime 

Minister ...................... *243 

244/1 Implementation of Assumed Basic Undertakings 

ad Specific Operations for tk Conduct of 

the War 1943-1944 .................. *245 

246 Movements of the 'QUEENS". .............. *24 7 

248/1 Provisions of New L.S.I. (L)'s ............ 249 Code Names for Agreed Operations ........... 250/1 Implementation of Decisions Reached at the 

TRIDENT Conference ................. 251/1 Proposals for Improving Combined Planning ....... 

*Not considered as a TRIDEhT Paper. 

ii 

PAGE 

12 1 

125 

12 7 

157 

15 9 

163 

167 

183 

229 

23 1 

235 

23 7 

245 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES 

PAGE 

1st Meeting, The White House .................. 25 1 

Global Strategy 

The Conduct of War 

2nd Meeting, The White House .................. 263 

India-Burma-China Theater 

3rd Meeting, The White House .................. 211 

The U-Bcat War and the Use of Portuwese 

Atlantic Islands 

Post-HUSKY 

4th Meeting, The White House .................. 283 

Azores Islands 

The Combined Bomber Offensive from the 

United Kingdom 

Defeat of the Axis Pavers in Europe 

Burma-China Theater 

Operations in the Pacific 1943-44 

Re-Arming of the French in North Africa 

Bombing of Ploest i 

5th Meeting, The White House .................. 2 95 

Report to the President ad Prime Minister 

Rearmament of French Forces 

Operations to seize the Azores 

Cross-Channel Operations 

Operations in the Mediterranean to Eliminate 

Italy from the War 

The Bding of Ploesti 

Operations in the Burma-China Theater 

Equipnent for Turkey 

6th Meeting, The White House .................. 307 

Employment of the Poles 

Final Report to the President and Prim 

Minister 

Comnunicaticm of Certain Decisions to the 

Chinese 

Official Statement for the Press 

Visit of General Stilwell and General 

Chennault to the United Kingdom 

Post -HUSKY Operations 

Ccde Names for Future Operations 

The PLOUGH Scheme 

Consultations with the Russians 

Adjournment of the Conference 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES 

PAGE 

C.C.S. 83rd Meeting ...................... 315 

Conduct of the Conference 

Global Strategy of the War 

Coduct of the War in 1943-1944 

Bombing of Plwsti 

C.C.S. 84th Meeting ...................... 343 

Global Strategy 

Operations in Burma 

C.C.S. 85th Meeting ...................... 363 

Future Work of tk Cornittee 

Operations in Burma 

Operations in Europe 

Directive to Allied Authorities in the 

Far East 

The Azores 

C.C.S. 86th Meeting ...................... 375 

Situation in China 

Portuguese Islands 

Agreed Essentials in the Coduct of the War 

Agenda for the Remainder of the Conference 

Operation HUSKY 

Operation UPKEEP 

C.C.S. 87th Meeting ...................... 387 

Portuguese Islands 

Future Work of the Comnittee 

Policy for Coming Operations Regarding 

Propaganda and Subversive Activities 

Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe 

Re-Arming of the French in North Africa 

Plan for Combined Bomber Offensive from the 

United Kingdom 

Bombing of Ploesti 

Operation VPKEP 

C.C.S. 88th Meeting ...................... 403 

Agreed Essentials in the Coduct of the War 

Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe 

C.C.S. 89th Meeting ...................... 411 

Defeat of the Axis Parers in Europe 

Operations from India 

Provision of Transport Aircraft for HUSKY 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES 

PAGE 

C.C.S. 90th Meeting ...................... 415 

Policy for Coming Operations Regarding 

Propaganda ad Subversive Activities 

Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan 

Operations in Burma to Open and Secure 

an Overland Route to China 

Potentialities of the Air Route from 

Assam to Burma 

C.C.S. 91st Meeting ...................... 42 7 

The Burma-China Theater 

C.C.S. 92nd Meeting ...................... 42 9 

Selection of Cale Names 

Military Supplies for Turkey 

Operations in the Pacific and Far East in 

1943-44 

C.C.S. 93rd Meeting ...................... 43 7 

Ant i-U-Boa t Warfare 

.Policy for Coming Operations Regarding 

Propaganda and Subversive Activities 

Sonic Warfare 

Movemnts of the ‘QUEENS” 

C.C.S. 94th Meeting ...................... 445 

Anti-U-Boat Warfar? 

Movements of the ‘OUEENS” 

Policy for Coming Operations Regarding 

Propaganda and Shversive Activities 

Implementation of Assumed Basic Undertakings 

and Specific Operations for the Corduct of 

the War in 1943-1944 

Despatch of U.S. Service and Engineer Troops 

to the United Kingdom 

Ope rat ion BRISK 

Third Soviet Protocol 

C.C.S. 95th Meeting ...................... 455 

Draft Report to President and Prime Minister 

Directive on Organization and Operations of 

Military Goverrnent for “HUSKY” 

Provision of New L.S.I. (L)’s 

Requiremnts toExpand the Capacity of the 

Air Route to China 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

MINUTES 

C.C.S. 96th Meeting ................ Final Report to President and Prime Minister 

Implenentation of Decisiom Reached at the 

TRIDMT Conference 

Suggested Statement to be Made to the Chinese 

Proposals for Improving Combined Planning 

Conclusion of the Conference 

ALGIERS CONFERENCE 

MINUTES 

PAC33 

... 461 

1st Algiers Meeting ....................... 467 

HOBGOBLIN 

HUSKY 

Pos t -HUSKY Ope rat ions 

2nd Algiers Meeting ....................... 477 

Post -HUSKY Operations 

Situation in the Mediterraman 

3rd Algiers Meeting ....................... 4 97 

Operation SCMPSUDS 

krshalling Yards at Rome 

Operation HUSKY 

Post -HUSKY 

(Conclusion of the Conference) 

INDEX ........................... 5 07 

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C.C.S. 215 

INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT FROM THE 

UNITED KINGDOM IN 1943 - 1944 

C.C.S. 215 was circulated 15 May 1943 to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff as a memorandum by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff. 

This paper was considered but final action on the subject was 

taken in C.C.S. 242/6. 

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C.C.S. 215 13 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT FROM 

THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1943-1944 

Memorandum by the (1. S. Chiefs of Staff 

The enclosed study as prepared by the United States Joint Staff 

Planners and meets with the approval of the United States Chiefs of 

Staff. It is submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. 

ENCLOSURE 

INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT FROM 

THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1943-1944 

1. A detailed examination of the merits and possibilities of the 

defeat of the European AXIS by a bomber offensive and air-ground invasion of the Continent from the UNITED KINGDOM has been made by the 

U. S. Chiefs of Staff. 

2. It is estimated that GERMANY has 32 divisions in FRANCE and 

the lw countries. Seven of these divisions are highly mobile and could 

on short notice be moved to oppose an invasion effort. These forces 

could he increased in time to a grand total of 60 divisions. She also 

has about 1254 planes in the area (747 fighters) which could be increased to 1766 (1158 fighters) by stripping all areas except the 

MEDITERRANEAN and Eastern Front. In addition to a coastal defense 

zone varying from 5 to 15 miles in depth, she has four detensive belts 

which must be reduced or neutralized before the West Wall is reached. 

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3. The projected bomber offensive against GERMANY may be expected 

to so reduce her ability to wage war as to create favorable conditions 

for a reentry to the Continent unless GERMANY is able to develop timely 

ad effective counter-measures. 

4. By maximum utilization of shipping and UNITED KINGDOM port facilities for the movemnt of UNITED STATES forces, and by placing increased emphasis on the conversion of British defensive divisions into 

offensive units, it is estimated that 36 UNITED NATIONS Divisions can 

be made available for cross-Channel operations by 1 April 1944. 

5. Whether the available shipping is used to move forces from the 

UNITED STATES or the MEDITERRANEAN,the total nunber of divisions available in the UNITED KINGDOM will be the same. However, the addition 

of battle seasoned troops from the MEDITERRANEAN will provide an added 

insurance for the success of the initial assault. 

6. The two most promising areas for assault operations, the CAEN and 

COTENTIN PENINSULA sectors, will afford port facilities for a build-up 

in 12 months of about 1,000,000 men. By extending this bridgehead to 

include the SEINE RIVER and the ports of Lfi HAVRE and ROUEN, the buildup in 12 months would be about 4,000,000 nien,or about 100 divisions. 

7. It should be noted that consideration of cross-aannel operations in this study has been confined to the initial movement. Landing craft for this purpose as compared with the requirements of C.C.S. 

105/2 may be met, but at the eltpense of som operations in other theaters. The build-up immediately thereafter and the requirements in 

APA's, AKA'S, AP's, AK's, etc, have not been eramined. 

8. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT: 

a. The cdined brnnber offensive be given first priority in buildup an3 its execution be facilitated. 

b. As the combined bomber offensive progresses, its effects should 

be continuously eDtamined and integrated with other factors, the 

results of these examinations to be used in determinmg the date for 

cross-Channel operat ions. 

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c. A balanced invasion force be built up in the UNITED KINGDOM 

as rapidly as possible for the purpose of an early invasion in the 

event of a collapse of GERMANY (SLEDGEHAMMER). 

d. No operations be undertaken in the MEDITERRANEAN which will 

interfere with the build-up of maximum forces in the UNITED KINGDOM 

for SLELGEHAMMER as well as for ROUNDUP. 

e. Production of landing craft be increased to the maximum without 

undue inte'rfcrence with the construction of other essential war 

materials. 

f. The target date of 1 April 1944 be accepted for operations 

from the UNITED KINGDOM. The target date coincides with the completion of the fwrth phase of the bomber offensive and is subject 

to revision in the light of the results obtained. 

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C.C.S. 217 

PLAN FOR COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

FROM THE IJNITED KINGDOM 

References: 

CCS 85th Meeting Minutes. Item (4) 

CCS 87th Meeting Minutes, Item (7) 

4th White House Meeting Minutes. Item (2) 

C.C.S. 217 was circulated 15 May 1943 to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. 

This paper was considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the 

recomndations contained herein were approved in their 87th &eting. 

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C.C.S. 217 14 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PLAN FOR COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 

Note by the Secretaries 

The attached plan for a combined bomber offensive from the UNITED 

KINGDOM meets with the approval of the United States Chiefs of Staff, 

and is submitted for the Consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

H. REDMAN. 

J. R. DEANE. 

Combined Secretariat. 

PLAN FOR COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 

1. PROBLEM: To provide a plan to accomplish, by a combined U. S.-

British air offensive, the " progressive destruction and dislocation 

of the Gcrman Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened;"as directed by the 

Combined Chiefs of staff at CASABLANCA. 

2. Under the direction of the Commanding Ceneral, European Theater 

of Operations, a plan to accomplish the above objective in early 1944 

has been prepared. The complete plan is on file with the Secretary, 

IJ. S. Chiefs of Staff. A brief presentation of the plan is contained 

in Enclosure " R". 

3. Representatives of the R.A.F. collaborated in the preparation of 

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this plan which has ken approved hy the British Air Ministry (See Enclosure '' A" ). 

4. The plan establistes rpqriirements for U. S. aircraft in the UNITED 

KINGDOM as follows: 

Heavy Bombers Mediurr Bombers 

By 30 June 1943 944 200 

By 30 September 1943 1192 400 

By 31 Decrmber 1943 1746 600 

By 31 March 1944 2702 800 

5. The Present U. S. Army Air Forces expansion program provides the 

air units and aircraft necessary to implement the above program, after 

provision has been made for meeting all present and planned undertakings in other theaters with reasonable balance in estimated aircraft 

production for unforeseen contingencies that may arise. 

6. IT IT RECOMMENDED: 

That the Conhined Chiefs of Staff approve the '' Plan for Combined 

Bomber Offensive from the UNITED KINGDOM, " presented in Enclosure 'I B.' 

and direct its invlementation to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with meeting airciaft production objectives, with the availability 

of combined shipping, and with proper relationship to strategic objectives given in Item 5, Minutes, Combined Chiefs of Staff, 76th Meeting. 

ENCLOSURE "A " 

AIR MINISTRY, 

King Charles Street, 

Whitehall, S.W.l. 

15th April, 1943. 

My dear Arnold, 

As you know, the Eighth Air Force has been engaged with the Air 

Staff in drawing up a detailed plan for the purpose of discharging the 

responsibilities laid upon our combined bomber forces at the Casablanca 

Conference. 

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The plan is now complete. It is based on our combined resources 

in the matter of intelligence and operational data including the very 

valuable report of your Operations Analysts and has been drawn up in 

close consultation with the Ministry of Economic Warfare. 

I have carefully examined the plan and discussed it in all its 

aspects with the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force. I take this 

opportunity of saying that I believe it to he entirely sound and that 

it has my full support. 

The plan includes an estimate of the rate at which the strength 

of the Eighth Air Force must he developed in order to achieve the planned effect. I believe this rate of huild-up and the time factor general1.y to be of primary importance. The German Fighter strength is 

increasing rapidly and every week's delay will make the task more difficult to accomplish. We cannot afford to miss the god bonhing weatkr 

which will soon be due. 'Ne cannot exploit to the full the great potentialities of the daylight bombing technique if the requisite numbers are not available. 

For all these reasnns I rarwstly hope that every effort will be 

made to achieve and if possible to exceed the programme. 

The plan has been carefully examined by the Commander in Chief, 

Bomber Cmd, and he too is convinced of its soundness and importance. 

With best wisks. 

Yours sincerely. 

/s/ C. Portal 

ENCLOSURE " B" 

THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 

1. THE MISSION 

a. The mission of the U. S. and British bomber forces, as pre8 
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scribed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at CAVtBLANCA. is as follows: 

To conduct a joint U. S.-British air offensive to 

accomplish the progressive destruction and dislocation of 

the German Military, industrial, and economic system and 

the undermining of the morale of the German people to a 

point where their capacity for armd resistance is fatally 

weakened. This is constructed as maning so weakened as 

to permit initiation of final combined operations on the 

Continent . 

2. THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES 

a. A thorough study of those elements of the German Military. 

industrial, and economic system which appeared to he profitable as 

bombing objectives was made by a group of Operations Analysts consisting of eminent U. S. experts. The report of the Operations 

Analysts concludes that: 

The destruction and continued neutralization of some 

sixty (60) targets would gravely impair and might paralyze 

the western AXIS war effort. There ar.e several combinations 

of targets from among the industries studied which might 

achieve this result. 

b. Examination of this report shows compl.e.te agreement by U. S. 

and British experts. From the systems proposed bv the Operations 

Analysts. six systems, comprising seventy-six (76) precision targets 

have been selected. These targets are located within the tactical 

radius of action of the two air forces, and their destruction is 

directed against the three major elemnts of the German Military 

mchine: its suhmarine fleet, its air force, and its ground forces, 

and certain industries vital to their support. 

c. The six systems are: 

Suhmarine construction yards and bases. 

German aircraft idustry. 

BaI~Ibearings. 

Oil. 

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Synthetic rubber ad tires. 

Military transport vehicles. 

Concentration of ef f,ort against these systems will have the following 

effect. The percentage of destruction is as indicated by the Operations Analysts. 

(1) Submarine Construction Yards and Bases 

Destruction of the submarine buil.ding yards selected will 

reduce present submarine construction by e ighty-nine percent 

(8%). Attack of submrine bases will affect the submarine effort 

at sea. If it is found that successful results can be achieved, 

these attacks should continue whenever conditions are favorable 

for as long and as often as is necessary. 

(2) GPrman Aircraft Industry 

Depletion of the German Air Force will fatally weaken Germn 

capacity to resist our air and surf-ace, operations. Complete 

domination of the air is essential for our ultimate decisive effort. Destruction of forty-three percent (43%) of the German 

fighter capacity and sixty-five percent (65%) of the German bomber 

capacity is provided for in this plan, and will produce the effect 

required 

(3) Ball Bearings 

The critical condition of the ball bearing industry in 

GERKANY is startling. The concentration of that idustry renders 

it outstandingly vulnerable to air attack. Seventy-six percent 

(76%) of the ball bearing prduction can be eliminated by destruction of the targets selected. This will have immediate and critical repercussions on the production of tanks, airplanes, artillery, diesel engines - in fact, upon nearly all the, special weapons 

of modern war. 

(4) Oil 

The quantities of petroleum and synthetic oil products now 

available to the German is barely adequate to supply the life 

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blood which is vital to the German war machine. The oil situation is made more critical by failure of the Germans to secure 

and retain the Russian supplies. If the PLOESTI refineries, 

which process thirty-five percent (35%) of current refined oil 

products available to the AXIS are destroyed, and the synthetic 

oil plants in GERMANY which process an additional thirteen percent 

(13%) are also destroyed, the resulting disruption will have a 

disastrous effect upon the supply of finished oil products available to the AXIS. 

(5) Synthetic Rubber and tires 

These products are vital to all phases of Cerman Military 

strength on land and in the air. Provision is made for destruction of fifty percent (5%) of the synthetic rubber capacity and 

nearly all of the tire production. This destruction will have a 

crippling effect. 

(6) Military Transport Vehicles 

Seven (7) plants produce a large proportion of the military 

transport and armored vehicles. The precise proportion in unknown. Loss of these plants will strike directly at the German 

Military strength. The cumulative effect of the destruction of 

the targets comprising the systems just listed will fatally weaken 

the capacity of the German people for armed resistance. 

d. The selection of these objectives is confirmed by the fact that 

the systems about which the Germans are most sensitive an3 about 

which they have concentrated their defenses such as balloons, camouflage, anti-aircraft, searchlights, decoys, and smoke are: 

Aircraft factories. 

Submarine constrriction yards. 

Ekill bearings. 

Oil. 

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3. INTERHEDIATE OBJECTIVE 

a. The Germans, recognizing the vulnerability of their vital industries, are rapidly increasing the strengtb of their fighter defenses. The German fighter strength in western EUROPE is being 

augmented. If the growth of the German fighter strength is not 

arrested quickly, it may become literally impossible to carry out 

the destruction planned and thus to create the conditions necessary 

for ultimate decisive action by our cmbinerl forces on the Continent. 

b. Hence the successful prosecution of the air offensive against 

the principal objectives is dependent upon a prior (or simultaneous) 

offensive against the German fighter strength. 

c. To carry out the Eighth Air Force's part of thiscombined bomber offensive it will be necessary to attack precision targets deep 

in German territory in daylight. The principal obstacle to this is 

the growing strength of the German Air Force. The growth of this 

fighter force has become so pronounced as to warrant a brief review 

of this developrent (Chart A). 

rl. The upper curve shows what has been happening to the German 

Air Force in the past nine months. The bomber strength has been 

sharply reduced from 1760 bombers to 1450 in operational units. The 

fighters, on the other hand, increased from 1690 to 1710. The'y 

suffered a reduction in strength doubtless caused by the intense 

operations in RUSSIA and the MEDITERRANEAN as well as in the Western 

Front. but those losses have been made good at the expense of the 

bombers. That same trend is reflected in the lower curve, which 

shows production was maintained fairly constantly for about five 

months and then increased so that fighter production has risen from 

720 to 810 per month. Over a longer period of time, from the entrance of the U. S. into the war until the present time, the trend 

has been even more pronounced. German fighter strength has increased 

by forty-four percent (44%) in that period in spite of the heavy 

losses. Th.is chart shows the margin of production over average 

monthly wastage in German fighters. Of cmrse, the monthly wastage 

has not been constant over the past seven months, as shown on the 

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chart, but the average for that period has been fairly accurately 

determined at 655 fighters per month. The production rate as of last 

February showed 810 fighters per month. The average increase in 

production over the six month period depicted indicates a monthly 

surplus of production over average wastage of 108 airplanes. If 

this trend simply continues in its present ratio, jt is well within 

the capacity of the Germans to produce enough fighter airplanes over 

and above wastage to provide a strength of 3,000 fighters by this 

time next year. (See Chart D). This is, of course, a capability and 

not necessarily a German intention, although current German development points very strongly in that direction. The increase in 

fighter strength is not reflected in this curve covering the past 

eight months; however, during that period the Germans diverted a 

great many fighter type airplanes into fighter bombers and fighter 

reconnaissance airplanes. The wastage rate was very high in those 

units and that probably accounts for the temprary decline in German 

fighter strength; however, in the last three months it has shown a 

sharp uprise. 

e. The disposition of German fighters is also significant. (See 

Chart C). The top line shows the number of fighters on the Western 

Front. Since we entered the war, that strength has nearly doubled. 

It has risen from 420 to 830. This, in spite of the heavy drains on 

the Russian and MEDITERRANEAN Fronts. When we entered the war only 

thirty-six percent (36%) of German fighters were concentrated on the 

Western Front; today, fifty percent (50%) of all fighters available 

to the German Air Force are concentrated in opposition to our principal bombing effort from the United Kingdom. The German fighter 

force is taking a toll of our forces both by day and by night, not 

only in terms of combat losses but more especially in terms of reduced tactical effectiveness. If the German fighters are materially 

increased in number it is quite conceivable that they could make our 

daylight bombing unprofitable and perhaps our night bombing too. 

On the other hand, if the German fighter force is partially neutralized our effectiveness will be vastly improved. 

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f. For this reason German fighter strength must be considered as 

an Intermediate objective second to none in priority. 

4. INTEGRATED R.A.F.-U. S. ARMY AIR FORCES OFFENSIVE 

a. The combined efforts of the entire U. S. and British bomber 

forces can produce the results required to achieve the mission prescribed for this theater. Fortunately the capabilities of the two 

forces are entirely complementary. 

b. The tremendous and ever increasing striking power of the R.A.F. 

bombing is designed to so destroy German material facilities as to 

undermine the willingness and ability of the German worker to continue the war. Because of this, there is great flexibility in the 

ability of the R.A.F. to direct its material destruction against 

those objectives which are closely related to the U. S. boding eftort which is directed toward the destruction of specific essential 

industrial targets. It is considered that the most effective results 

from strategic bombing will be obtained by directing the combined 

day and night effort of the U. S. and British bomber forces to allout attacks against targets which nre mutually complementary in 

undermining a limited number of selected objective systems. Allout attncks imply precision bombing of.related targets by day and 

night where tactical conditions permit, and orea bombing by night 

against the cities associated with these targets. The timing of 

the related day and night attacks will be determined by tactical 

considerations. 

c. This plan does not attempt to prescribe the maior effort of the 

R.A.F. Bomber Conunand. It simply recognizes the fact that when precision targets are bombed by the Eighth Air Force in daylight, the 

effort should be complemented and completed by R.A.F. bombing attacks 

against the surrounding industrial are? at night. Fortunately the 

industrial areas to be attacked are in most cases identical with the 

industrial areas which the British Bomber Command has selected for 

mass destruction anyway. They include HAMBURG, BREMEN, HANOVER. 

BERLIN, LE IPZIG, WILHELMSHAVEN ~ BREMERSHIRE, COLOGNE, STVTTGAR'T, 

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and many other principal cities. They also, of course, include 

smaller towns whose principal significance is coupled with the precision targets prescribed for the Eighth Air Force. 

5. GENERAL PLAN OF OPERATIONS 

a. It would be highly desirable to initiate precision bombing 

attacks against German fighter assembly and engine factories immediately. However, our present force of day bombers is too small 

to make the deeper penetrations necessary to reach the majority of 

these factories. Considering the number of German fighters which can 

be concentrated laterally to meet our bombers on penetration, and 

again on withdrawal, it is felt that 300 heavy bombers is the minim 

operating force necessary to make deep penetrations. 

b. The general tactical plan of operations with this minimum force 

involves the following general conception. A holding attack intending to attract German fighters to a particular area and prevent their 

massing against the main attacking force. For this purpose 50 heavy 

bombers with fighter escort are required. Second, a main striking 

force to penetrate through the fighter defenses and carry out the 

destruction of targets in Germany and return. Two hundred bombers 

is considered the minimum requirement to provide self-protectionand 

at the same time carry out worthwhile destruction. Third, the covering force to attack still another area and attract fighters in order 

to divert them from the main force on withdrawal. Again, 50 bombers 

with fighter escort is the minimum force to carry out such a funct ion. 

c. In order to establish a yardstick to be used in the determination of the number of bombers required to destroy the objectives 

desired, the following procedure was employed: 

Twelve successful missions were conducted in January, 

February, and March. Approximately 100 bombers were dispatched on each. It was found that sufficient bombs fell 

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within a circle of 1000 foot radius centered about the aiming point to cause the desired destruction. For each prospective target the number of 1000 font radius circles necessary to cover it has been calculated. The yardstick as 

determined by experience is therefore: the number of 1000 

foot radius circles of destruction, each requiring 100 

bombers . 

d. The plnn of operations is divided into four phases. (See 

Haps 1, 2, 3, &. 4). The depth of penetration, the number of targets available, and the capacity of the bombing forces increases 

successively with each phase. 

e. Seventy-six precision targets have been selected for Eighth 

Air Force bombing Operations. Having selected these 76 targets the 

questions arise: Can they be effectively destroyed, nrd if so, how 

many bombers will be required? As to the first question, operational experience answers yes. 

6. EFFECTIVENESS OF EIGUH AIR FORCE 

a. The operations of the U. S. Army Air Force in daylight bnmbing of defended objectives in German occupied EUROPE have been 

sufficient to establish a criterion of precision dqylight bombing 

effectiveness; the operations of the R.A.F. Bomber Comnand leave 

no room for doubt of the ability of that force to devastate industrial areas. 

b. The daylight operations of the Eighth Air Force from 3 January 1943 to 6 April 1943 definitely establish the fact that it is 

possible to conduct prPcision pattern bombing operations against 

selected precision targets from altitudes of 20,000 feet to 30,000 

feet in the face of anti-aircraft artillery and fighter defenses. 

c. Of 20 missions dispatched by the U. S. Eighth Air Force in 

that period, 12 have been highly effective. These 12 daylight 

missions have been directed against a variety of targets, including: 

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Submarine bases. 

Locomotive shops. 

Power houses. 

Marshalling yards. 

Shipbuilding yards . Motor vehicle and armament works. 

Airplane engine factories. 

The average number of aircraft dispatched against these targets has 

been eighty-six. The destructive effect has, in every case. been 

highly sstisfactory. From this experience it may be definitely 

accepted that 100 bombers dispatched on erch successful mission 

will provide entirely satisfactory destructive effect of that part 

of the target ?rea within 1000 feet of the aiming point; and that 

two-thirds of the missions dispatched each month will be successful 

to this extent. 

7. FORCES REQUIRED 

a. Heavy Bombers 

(1) In computing the force required, a yardstick of 100 bombers dispatched per target area of 1000 feet about each aiming 

point has been accepted as a reasonable product of actual experience to date. Each target has been evaluated in terms of these 

Tarpet Units, or the number of 1000 foot radius circles in which 

this destructive effect must be produced. 

(2) Experience in the European Theater to dnte indicates that 

at least PO0 airplanes must be in the theater to dispatch 300 

bombers on operations. Hence, until the level of U. S. bomber 

strength in this theater reaches approximately 800, it will not 

be feasible to sustain a precision bombing offensive against the 

German fighter factories. It is estimated that we will be able 

to accommodate and train a force of this capacity by July of this 

year. In the interim every effort should be made to reduce the 

German fighter force by attack of those fighter factories which 

can be reached, and by combat under favorable conditions. The 

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repair depots and airdromes are included for the purpose of 

giving commanders the necessary tactical latitude. Concurrently, 

operations can be conducted against submarine installations 

within reach and against other targets contributing directly to 

the principal objectives which are within covering range of our 

own fighters, or which do not require deep penetration. Some 

operations will have to be conducted to provide the necessary 

training for the incoming forces; such operations must be conducted against objectives within the listed categories. 

(3) During the next phase, fror July to October, in which it 

is estimated that we will be able to penetrate to a limit of 400 

miles, a determined effort must be made to break down the German 

fighter strength by every means at our disposal, concentrating 

primarily upon fighter aircraft factories. During this time 

interim an additional increment of 258 bombers is required so 

that the strength in the theater by October should be approximately 1192. This would provide a striking force of 450 bombers 

at the end of this period. The average striking force during 

this period would be 400. 

(4) During the third phase, the German fighter force must be 

kept depleted, and the other sources of German strength must also 

be undermined. Curing this phase our bombing offensive forces 

must be adequate to perform all their major tasks. 

(5) From October to January an additional increment of 554 

bombers is required, bringing the total to 1746. This should 

provide an operationai striking force of 655 bombers at the end 

of that the. The average striking force during this period 

will be 550 bombers. 

(6) During the last phase - early 1944 - the entire force 

should be used to sustain the effect already produced and to 

pave the way for a cowbined operation on the Continent. This 

will require a force of 2702 heavy bombers. 

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(7) It will be ohserved that the charts of the actual location 

of the targets to be attacked in each phase show the joint homhing 

effort of each phase. It will he noted that in the first phase 

(see Map 1). operations are limited to relatively shallow penetration. They inclurle submarine bases along the coast, submarine construction yards, and the Focke Wulf airplane factory at BREIIEN. 

Acrually, of course, these operations have all been undertaken 

with the small forces available and in the case of the submarine 

yards at VEGESACK and the Focke Wulf plsnt at SREMEN, a long step 

has already been taken toward completion of the plan. There are 

two other systems of operations calling for deep penetrations shown 

in this phase. One of them calls for an attack against oil installations in the RUHR. This operation is entirely contingent 

upon an earlier attack from the MEDITERRANEAN Area against the 

oil refineries at PLOESTI in RUMANIA. Such an attack is under 

consi3eration now and if it is carried out we will he forced to 

operate against the RUHR refineries in order to eltploit the advantage achieved in RUMANIA. Tshe other attack calls for a vevy 

deep penetration at SCWEINFURT. This operation might be undertaken as a surprise attack in view of the tremendous advantages 

accrued from a successful destruction of these plants; however, 

it would be most unwise to attempt it until we are perfectly sure 

we have enough force to destroy the objective in a single operation. Any attempt to repeat such an attack will meet with very 

hitter opposition. In the second phase (see Map 2), the plan 

calls for a concentration of effort against the German fighter 

assembly and fighter aircraft factories as well as attacks a ­

gains.t airdromes and repair facilities. It is anticipated that 

approximately 75% of the striking force will he applied to this 

end during this phase. The other 25% is directed against suhmarine construction yards. In the third phase (see Map 3). an 

all-out attack against all the principal objectives is provided 

as well as repeat operations to continue neutralization of installations which have been destroyed and which can be repaired. 

During the fourth phase (see Map 4). these operations are continued and allowances made for concentration of attacks against 

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installations more directly associated with a cross-Channel operation such as rail transportation, arsenals, Military installations, 

etc. 

(8) The determination of the number of aircraft rewired in each 

phase has been based strictly upon past experience, As to rate 

of operations, the Eighth Air Force has averaged six per month 

over the past six months. In the past three months, it has actually carried out twelve highly successful operations out of 

a total of 20. This plan is based on a total of 12 successful 

operations in each three month phase and recognizes the prohability that the other six will for one reason or another he Less 

satisfactory. Experience has shown that about 3/8 of the total 

number of airplanes in the theater can he dispatched on operational missions at any one time. This makes allowances for the 

airplanes in depot reserve, those in depot repir. ad those being ferried and modified. There is every reason to believe that 

our forces will be more effective in the future than these figures indicate. In order to he as realistic as possible, however, 

the plan has been based in each case upon actual past experience. 

(9) Charts appended to Maps 1, 2, 3. and 4 tabulate all the 

targets for contemplated destruction by the U. S. and British homber forces to carry out the mission. The precision targets for 

attacks by the U. S. Bomber Command are shown as small symbols. 

The, cities and towns in or near those precision targets and which 

constitute the complementary targets of the R.A.F. are shown as 

in circles. The German fighters are at present deployed in four 

main concentrations positioned well forward toward the coast. 

In general, the day fighters are in four lots of approximately 

100 each in the general areas of northwest coastal GERUANY, 

HOLLAND and BELCIUU, the Channel coast of FRANCE and western 

FRANCE in the vicinity of the submarine pens. These fighters 

are capable of concentrating laterally from bases at least 200 

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miles away so that forces of 300 fighters might be employed a ­

gainst our main efforts if we penetrated directly toward the 

RUHR without distracting or diverting part of them. 

(10) Chart D is illustrative of the effect of this plan of 

operations upon the intermediate objective, German fighter 

strength. This chart must be considered as pictorial rather than 

precise. The top line shows the increase in German fighter 

strength. That is a German capability if they choose to follow 

it. If German production is not interrupted ad if German wastage is not increased it is possible for GERMANY to have in operation 3,000 fighters by next April. The broken line shows the 

effect of our operations upon that German fighter strength. In 

the first phase we do not expect to accompl.ish ir great deal because our forces will not have been built up to decisive proportions. In the second phase, our attacks against German fighter factory and engine factories and the increased attrition 

should cause the levelling off of the Germn fighter strength. 

In the third phase the full effect of the attacks against German 

fighter production should make themselves felt so that German 

fighter strength should fall off rapidly in this phase. In the 

fourth phase that German fighter strength should decline at a 

precipitant rate. This second line has been computed in the 

followring manner. The decrease in German fighter strength is 

the result of two factors. One is the attacks against German 

fighter factories, the other the accelerqted rate of combat wastage caused by our increased bomber forces. This wastage rate 

has been computed in an extremely conservative manner. It is 

realized that pnst claims of enemy aircraft shot down may seem 

high, although our evaluation of them is very careful; nevertheless. in order to avoid any charge of unwarranted optimism combat 

claims have been arbitrarily divided by four, the resulting decrease in German fighter strength dependent upon expected combat 

wastage is at a rate only one quarter as great as our present 

combat claims. Even under these very conservative assumptions 

it is apparent that the German fighter strength will have passed 

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its limit by the end of the second phase and its powers of resistance should decline very rapidly thereafter. 

b. Medium Bombers 

It will be noted that no U. S. medium bombardment aircraft 

have been specifically included in the computation of force required 

above. That does not mean that medium bombardment is not necessary 

to implement this plan. Supplementary attacks against all strategic 

targets within range of medium bombers are anticipated as necessary 

adjuncts to the heavy bomber attacks. In addition, medium bombardment is required in order to conduct repeated attacks against Gerrran 

fighter airdromes, to aid the passage of the heavy bombers until 

the attacks against the German aircraft industry make themselves 

felt. Medium bombardment will be necessary to support combined 

operations in early 1944. The crews must be operationally trained 

in this theater by that date. 

c. Fighters 

At all times there is a need for an extensive U. S. fighter 

force both to protect the bombers and to assist in the reduction 

of the German fighter strength. Prior to the initiation of operations on the Continent, this fighter strength must be at a maximum, 

and must be fully trained for operations in this theater. 

NOTE: This plan deals entirely with the requirements for the strategic 

bombing force, except for its use in the 4th phase on missions 

which will render most effective support to surface operations 

on the Continent, which may begin in early 1944. In order to 

supplement this force in providing the close support required 

for the surface operations, steps must be taken early to create 

and train a tactical force in this theater. This force must include light bomber, reconnaissance, fighter, and troop carrier 

elements . 

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a. CONCLUSIONS 

a. Recapitulation of U. S. Bomber Forces Required 

Henvy Medium 

1st Phase 944 200 Bombers required by 30 June 1943 

2nd Phase 1192 400 Bombers required by 30 September 1943 

3rd Phase 1746 600 Bombers required by 31 December 1943 

4th Phase 2702 PO0 Bombers required by 31 March 1944 

b. If the forces required as set forth above are made available 

on the dates indicated, it will be possible to carry out the mission 

prescribed in the Casablanca Conference. If those forces are not 

made available, then that mission is not attainable by mid-1944. 

c. Depletion of the German fighter strength must be accomplish. 

first. Failure to neutralize that force will jeopardize the pr 

ecution of the war toward a favorable decision in this theater. 

d. The following bombing objectives should be destroyed under the 

provisions of the general directive issued at the Cgsablanca Conference: 

(1) Intermediate Objectives: 

German fighter strength. 

(2) Primary Objectives: 

German submarine yards and bases. 

The remainder of the German aircraft industry. * Ball bearings. 

Oil. * (Contingent upon attacks agsinst PLOESTI 

from the MEDITERRANEAN). 

* A successful initial attack on the key element of 

either of those systems would demand the immediate 

concentration of effort on the remaining elements of 

that system to ?uDloit the initial success. 

(3’)Secondary objectives in order ot priority: 

Synthetic rubber and tires. 

Military motor transport vehicles. 

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e. The following statement of principle, expressed by the Operations Analysts, is concurred in: 

In view of the ability of adeiwte and properly utilized air 

power to impair the industrial source of the enemy’s Military 

strength, only the most vital corsiderations should be permitted 

to delay or divert the application of an adequate air striking force 

to this task. 

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h 

COMPARISON OF GERMAN 

BOMBERS AND FIGHTERS 

1942 1943 

r. 5T. N?V. DFC. I JAN. FFB. MAR. APR. 18w 

17W 

I600 

'\ I 

\ 1500 

'\ 

1400 

- loo0 

900 

MONTHLY PRODUCTION 

(Indudn hpid Warn) 

/ 800 

iRS 

''\\I 700 

ERS '\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\--- 600 

/-- N-0 

'\\ 

500 

I 
& 0 

8 

zlr 

4 c

'r 

"cZ 

0 8 s 0 

-wI rhU I 

I 

-1-

I 

I 

-II 

I 

I 

-1-

I 

I 

-II 

I 

-II 

I 

I,

-1-

I 

I 

-1 -
U.S. SECRET 

BRZTZSH MOST SECRET 

I I

11 DISPOSITION OF GERMAN FIGHTER 

I '41 '42 

11/11 1 12/19 1/1 1

--t 

41

1 

-./.' 

I I 
3ERMAN FIGHTER STRENGTH

1\\

1944

FEE. I MAR I 

I I 

PROJECTIONS 

JAN. I 

I 

MC. I 

I 

I NOV. 

I 

OF 

I r. c SEPT. I I AUG. 

1943 

JULY I 

TWO 

JUNE I 

SECRET 

MAY I 

A 

MOST 

I 

SECRET U.

BRITISH 

S. 
T 



U.S. SECRET 

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C.C.S. 219 

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943 - 1944 

References: 

CCS 83rd Meet.ing 

CCS 84th Meeting 

C.C.S. 219 was circulsted 14 May 1943 to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. 

This paper was read by Admiral Leahy during the CCS 84th Meeting. 

The concepts contained herein are superseded by the final action in 

C.C.S. 249/6. 

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C.C.S. 219 14 !V-Y 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943 - 1944 

Memorandum by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff 

'he enclosed study was prepared by the I'nited States Joint Staff 

planners and meets with the approval of the United Strtes Chiefs of 

Staff. It is submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. 

ENCLOSURE 

CotinucT OF THE WAR IN 1943 - 1944 

1. UNITED NATIONS OVERALL OBJECTIVE 

The overall objective o! th? UNITED NATIONS, in conjunction with 

RUSSIA and other Allies, is to bring the wur against GERMANY, JAPAN, 

end ITALY to a successful conclusion at the earliest possible date. 

2. CVERALL STRATEGIC OONCEPT FOR THE PRDSECUTION Of THE WAR 

a. In cooperation with RUSSIA and other Allies to force an unconconditional surrender of the AXIS in FUROPE. 

b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN 

with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from urhich her ultimate unconditional surrender 

can be forced. 

c. Upon the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE, in cooperation with 

other PACIFIC Powers and, if possible with RUSSIA. to direct the 

full resources of the UNITED STATES and GREAT SRITAIN to force the 

unconditional surrender of JAPAN. If, however, conditions develop 

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which indicate that the war as R whole can be brought more quickly to 

a successful conclusion by the earlier mounting of a major offensive 

against JAPAN, the strategical concert set forth herein may be reversed. 

3. OPERATIONS IN THE A7LAN7IC AND EUEQFEAN-AFRICAN AREAS 

a. Secure the lines of communications in the ATLANTIC by defeating the U-boat md removing other threats to these sea communications. 

b. Europem Are? 

(1) Conduct a full-scale assault from the UNITED KINGDOM 

against the Ccntinent in the spring of 1944. 

(2) Conduct a vigorous air offensive with a view to reducing 

CERIANY’S war potential and to waking fensible a cross-Channel 

o?erition and exrloitation from lodgments on the Continent in the 

spring of 1944. 

(3) Build up appropriate forces in the UNITED KINGIXlM for task 

(1) and (2). 

(4) Frppqre for and return to the Continent in the event of 

German disintegrntion at any time from now onwards with whatever 

forces may be ~viil-~le a t the time. 

c. African Area 

(1 ) Accomplish HUSKY. 

(2) After the completion of HUSKY, or in the event that HUSKY 

is cancelled, conduct limited offensive operations in the MEDITERRANEAN Area. These operations will be designed: 

(a) To destroy Italian war potential by continuing air attacks from MEDITERRANEAN bases; 

(b) To continue support to RUSSIA by the diversion of AXIS 

forces and materials; 

(c) To force dispersion of AXIS forces in order to facjlitate a cross-Channel operation; and 

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(d) To maintain the security of olir positions and communications in the MEDITERRANEAN Area. 

The strength of the force? to be employed jn the MEDITERRANEAN will be so limited as not to prejudice the SIiccesS of a 

cross-Channel operation in 1944. IJ. S. ground and naval forces 

will not be employed in the MEDITERRANEN east of SICILY. 

4. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST 

a. Conduct orerations to Imainta in lines of communication in the 

PACIFIC, partictularly to AUSTUIA; to maintqin pressure on JAPAN, 

retain the initiative, forc? attrition, contain the Japanese Fleet 

in the PACIFIC, and attain or retain Fositions of readiness for a 

full-scale offensive agpinst JAPAN; and to keep CHINA in the war. 

b. For these purposes, U. S. Naval forces will be increased to a 

maximum consistent with the minimum requirements in the ATLANTIC. 

With due regard to the requirements of the main effort against the 

EUROPEAN AXIS, air and ground forces will be provided so as to facilitate joint action and make optimum use of the increasing strength of 

U. S. Naval forces. 

c. Offensive operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST in 1943 - 1944 

will have the following objectives: 

(1) Conduct of air operations in and from CHINA. 

(2) Seizure of BURMA. 

(3) Ejection of the Japanese from the ALEUTIANS. 

(4) Seizure of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS. 

(5) Seizure of the SOLOMONS, the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, and Japanese held NEW GUINEA. 

5. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE COMBATANT FRENCH 

a. Sustain the Soviet forces by the greatest volume of munitions 

that can be supplied and transported to RUSSIA without militating 

against the attainment of the overall objectives. 

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b. Sustain CHINA by continuing to furnish munitions to the greatest extent practicable. 

c. Continue to furnish munitions to the combatant French in Northwest Africa on the scale previously agreed upon. 

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C.C.S. 220 

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

References: 

CCS 90th Meeting, Item (3) 

CCS 92nd Meeting, Item (1) 

C.C.S. 220 was circulated 19 May 1943 to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in their 90th Meeting, accepted 

C.C.S. 220 as a basis for a combined study and elaboration for future 

plans. 

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C.C.S. 220 14 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

Memorandum by the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 

The attached strategic plan, preparyd by the United States Joint 

Staff Planners, meets with the approval of the United States Chiefs of 

Staff and is submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for considerat ion. 

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

1. A brief discussion of a strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN 

is contained in Enclosure " A ". 

2. The plan is based on the following overall strategic concept for 

the prosecution of the war. 

a. In cooperation with RUSSIA and other Allies to force an unconditional surrender of the AXIS in EUROPE. 

b. Simultaneously, in cooperation pith other PACIFIC Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure *gainst JAPAN 

with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and 

attaining positions from which her ultimate unconditional surrender 

can be forced. 

c. Upon the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE, in cooperation with 

other PACIFIC Powers and, if possible, with RUSSIA, to direct the 

full resources of the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN to force the 

unconditional surrender of JAPAN If, however, conditions develop 

which indicate that the war as a whole can be brought more quickly 

to a successful conclusion by the earlier mounting of a major of32 
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BRITISH MOST SECRET 

fensive against JAPAN, the strategical concept set forth herein may 

be reversed. 

3. In view of the long period covered and the inevitable changes in 

conditions that cannot be foreseen, it is not practicable te divide the 

plan into definitely coordinated phases. With this reservation in regard to timing and coordination, the plan is expressed as follows: 

PHASE I 

a. CONTINUE AND AUGMENT EXIS7INC UNDERTAKINGS IN AND FROM CHINA. 

Chinese Forces assisted by U. S. Forces. 

b . RECAPTVRE BURMA. 

British Forces assisted by U. S. and Chinese Forces. 

c. OPEN A LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS 70 THE CEIEBES SEA. 

IJnited States Forces. 

PHASE I1 

a. OPERATIONS To OPEN 7HE STRAIT OF MALACCA AND 70 CONPEL WIDE 

DISPERSION OF ENEMY FORCES. 

British Forces. 

b. RECAPTURE THE PHILIPPINES. 

United States Forces. 

C. PREPARE ro CAPTURE HONG KONG. 

Chinese Forces. 

PHASE I11 

a. CONTINUE OPERATIONS TO OPEN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA AND TO COMPEL WIDE DISPERSION OF ENEMY FORCES. 

British Forces. 

b. SECURE CONTROL OF THE NORTHERN PART OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, 

AND ASSIST IN THE CAPTURE OF HONG KONG. 

[Jnited States Forces. 

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c. CAPTURE HONG KONG. 

Chinese Forces. 

PHASE IV 

ESTABLISH AIR BASES IN JAPANESE OCCUPIED CHINA FROM WHICH TO 

LAUNCH AN OVERWHELMING BOMRINC OFFENSIVE AGAINST JAPAN. 

Chinese Forces, assisted by British and U. S. Forces. 

PHASE V 

CONDUCT AN OVERWHELMING AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST JAPAN. 

U. S. Forces, assisted by British and Chinese Forces 

PHASE VI 

INVADE JAPAN. 

11. S. Forces, assisted by British and Chinese Forces. 

ENCLOSURE “A ” 

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

4. Objective of the Plan 

The UNITED NATIONS war objective is the unconditional surrender 

of the AXIS Powers. The accomplishment of this objective may require 

the invasion of JAPAN. 

5. Most Probable Japanese Courses of Action 

JAPAN’S most probable courses of action are to direct her major 

effort toward securing and exploiting the territory she controls, and 

eliminating CHINA from the war. 

6. The Invasion of JAPAN 

Since the invasion of JAPAN is a vast undertaking, it should not 

be attempted until Japanese power and will to resist have been so reduced that favorable conditions for invasion obtain. Under these conditions the invasion of JAPAN is considered feasible. 

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It is probable that the reduction of JAPAN'S power and will to 

resist may only be accomplished by a sustained, systematic, and largescale air offensive against JAPAN itself. 

7. An Overwhelming Air Offensive against JAPAN 

An air offensive on the required scale can only be conducted from 

bases in CHINA. 

8. Recapture BLIRMA 

The attainment of bases in CHINA for the air offensive against 

JAPAN is dependent on the continuation of CHINA in the war, and on the 

establishment of adequate supply routes, not only to maintain CHINA, 

but also to maintain UNITED NATIONS forces.which are to operate in and 

from CHINA. The recapture of BURMA is a prerequisite to the attainment 

of adequate bases in CHINA. The capacity of the Burma Road supplemented 

by the air route from INDIA is inadequate to support the air and ground 

forces required to implement an air offensive on the required scale. 

The seizure of a Fort in CHINA to augment the supply routes through 

BURMA is essential. 

9. The Seizure of a port in CHINA 

HONG KOM is the most suitable port which may be seized initially. 

Its seizure requires an offensive from the interior of CHINA by forces 

supported through BURMA, and, probably, by supolementary amphibious 

operations. Control of the SOUTH CHINA SEA by the UNITED NATIONS will 

be necessary toprevent JAPAN from successfully opposing these measures. 

10. A Line of Communications to HONG KONG 

The mcst feasible sea route trom the UNITED STATES to HONG KONG 

is through the CELEBES and SllLCI SEAS: that from the UNITED KINGDOM is 

through the STRAIT OF MALACCA. The establishment of these routes will 

require the neutralization of Japanese bases in the northern EAST 

INDIES, the PHILIPPIhES, FORMOSA, and on the Asiatic mainland south of 

HONG KONG. Control of these areas will prevent JAPAN from supporting 

her forces in the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES andwill deny herthe economic 

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advantages she receives from that area. Cperations to open a line 

of communications to HONC KONG and to control the SOUTH CHINA SEA 

are considered feasible. 

11. A Line of Communications from HAWAII to the CELEBES SEA 

This line of communications to the CELEBES SFA will be established by advancing in the CENTRAL and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC areis with a view 

to shortening the sea route, providing for its security, and denying 

to the enemy bases and means by which he may interfere with the line 

of communicat ions. 

12. A Line of Communications through the STRAIT OF MMACCA 

Although the supply of forces in CHINA will cone mainly from the 

VNI7ED STATES, operations to open the STPAIT OF MALACCA. after the 

reconquest of BURMA. are a vital part of the plan. The enemy must be 

continuously compelled to disperse his forces throughout the PACIFIC 

and ASIA7IC areas thus exposing them to nttrition on an additional 

front in SOUTHEASTERN ASIA. This area is one of British strategic responsibility, find is a suitable and feasible undertaking for Eritish 

Comonwealth Forces. 

13. Control of the Seas 

Since control of the seas in the western PACIFIC by the UNITED 

NA7IONS may force the unconditional surrender of JAPAN before invasion 

and even before JAPAN is subjected to an intensive air offensive, every 

means to gain this control will be undertaken by the UNITED STATES. 

The estnblishment of the line of communications to the CELEBES SEA will 

be used as the vehicle to gain this end. The selection of intermediate 

objectives which will compel the enemy to expose his naval forces will 

be the greatest single factor in determining the enemy positions to be 

seized. 

Attrition of enemy shipping, air, and naval resources will be a 

continuing objective. Raids on Japanese lines of communication, and 

carrier-based air raids on Japanese positions extending to JAPAN itself, will be implemented as our naval.strength increases. 

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C.C.S. 223 

OPERATIONS AFTER NUSKY 

References : 

5th White House Meeting Minutes 

6th White House Meeting Minutes, Item (6) 

C.C.S. 223 was circulnted 14 May 1943 for the information of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

Finn1 action on the subject was taken in C.C.S. 242/6. 

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C.C.S. 223 14 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATIONS AFTER HUSKY 

Memorandum by Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters, 

North African Theater of Operations 

The attached paper (Enclosure “A ”) prepared by the Operations 

Division, Allied Force Feadquarters, represents the views of General 

Eisenhower and Admiral Cunningham with respect to operations after 

‘HUSKY. It is not concurred in by Air Chief Varshal Tedder whose comments are sttached (Enclosure “R ”). It is requested that both papers 

be submitted for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as 

representative of the opinion of the Commander in Chief, Allied Force, 

from the local viewpoint only. 

ENCLOSURE “ A ” 

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS 

G-3 SECTION 

7 May 1943. 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff. 

SUBJECT : Operations after BVSKY. 

1. After Operation HUSKY there are two immediate possibilities: 

a. To continue operations against the Italian mainland by action 

against: 

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(1) The REGGIO - SANGIOVANNI area (Operation BU77RESS) 

(2) The CROTONE area (Operation GOBLET) 

(3) The Heel of ITALY (Operation MUSKET) 

These operations would be preparatory to an advance into 

ITALY in the direction of NAPLES. 

b. To occupy SARDINIA and CORSICA as a preparatory measure to 

such further operations as may be decided upon. 

2. OBJECT 

To discuss the relative merits of the two courses of action referred to above. 

3. OPERATIONS BUTTRESS, WBLET AND MUSKET 

a. The advantages of this course of action are: 

(1) Operations on the Italian mainland even though cmfined 

to one area might be sufficient to compel ITALY to ask for terms. 

(2) Operation BUTTRESS and possibly CaBLET might be undertaken so as to coincide with the final stages of Operation HUSKY 

thus taking direct advantage of the disorganization and confusion which may occur as a result of a rapid success in HUSKY. 

(3) The fact that operations were carried into the mainland 

of EUROPfiwould have considerable political value. 

(4) Bases would be obtained from which operations in the BALKANS could be supported if this strategy is decided upon. 

b. The disadvantages are: 

(1) The operations themselves will require considerable forces. Should ITALY not ask for terms as a result, we may be committed to a major campaign on the Italian mainland possibly involving all the forces available in the MEDITERRANEAN. 

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(2) Should CERMANYbe in a position strongly to reinforce 

I7AL.Y and should she so decide, we might be involved in a campaign against superior German forces in country in which superiority in numbers would have full weight. 

(3) Both during and after the operations a considerable garrison commitment will be involved, since we shall be opersting 

in enemy as opposed to occupied territory. 

(4) We shall be responsible for the administration and supply 

of such areas of the mainland as we occupy. This will constitute 

a heavy shipping and economic commitment. 

(5) Even if it is decided to limit the area of operations to 

the Toe and Heel of ITALY, considerable forces will be required 

to defend these areas unless ITALY has gone out of the war. 

c. It is estimated that some 4-5 divisions would be required for 

Operations BUTTRESS and GOBLET. For Operation MUSKET it is estimated 

that 4-5 divisions would be required initially. The force in this 

area would probably have to be built up to a total of approximately 

10 divisions (including two Armored divisions) if further operations 

are to be undertaken on the mainland. 

The above requirements would be to some extent counterbalanced 

by the reduction which it would be possible to make in the garrison 

of HUSKY. It is clear, however, that operations on the mainlandxre 

likely to involve all the resources which we can make available. 

4. OPERATIONS BRIMSTONE AND FIREBRAND 

a. The advantages of this course of action are: 

(1) It will place the whole of ITALY within easy bombing 

range. This fact alone might be sufficient to induce ITALY to 

ask for terms. 

(2) A threat of invasion will exist overthe entire length of 

the west coast of ITALY. This is likely to cause the Italians 

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to withdraw troops from the BALKANS and will cause the maximum 

dispersion of Axis troops on the mainland. 

(3) It will constitute a threat to southern FRANCE and thereby 

tend to retain German troops in that area. 

(4) It renders our sea communications in the western MEDI7ERRANEAN secure and reduces the air threat to North AFRICA thus 

freeing sir and AA resources. 

(5) The operational commitment is I.imited and the subsequent 

garrison requirement will be small. Operation FIREBRAND can be 

undertaken by French forces. 

b. The disadvantages are: 

(1) If the occupation of SARDINIA and CORSICA does not induce 

ITALY to ask forterms,we should still be faced with the necessity 

for conducting operations on the mainland in order to achieve that 

end. 

(2) We shall not be taking advantage of the disorganization 

which may be caused on the mainland by the success of HUSKY. 

(3) We shall not reap the political advantages which will accrue from the opening of a campaign on the mainland of EUROPE. 

c. It is estimated that Operation BRIMSTONE will require about 5 

Inf Divs and one Armd Div; the garrison commitment is unlikely to be 

greater than 2 Inf Divs. On the other hand, it must be remembered 

that if this course is adopted it may be necessary to retain the mwimum garrism in HUSKY. 

5. SUIIIMARY 

The position may therefore be summarized as fallows: 

a. Operations BUTTRESS, COBLET and MUSKET require considerable 

forces ad once we have embarked upon this course we are committed. 

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Unless Italian morale is already weakening,we may be involved in a 

major campaign the duration and requirements of which it is not possible to foresee. 

b. Operations BRIivSTONE and FIREBRAND can be carried out with comparatively limited forces and after these operations we shall still 

retqin full liberty of action to strike in whatever direction may 

seem advisable. If Italian morale is weakening after RUSKY, the 

threat of heavy bombing which these operations will produce may be 

sufficient to induce ITALY to ask for terms. 

c. The decision between these two courses of action must depend 

to a great extent upon the state of Italian morale after HUSKY. It 

will not be easy to assess this accur3tely and it is therefore considered that the course of action which does not definitely commit 

us to the mainland is preferable. 

6. CONCLUSION 

It is concluded that the next operations after HUSKY should be 

BRIMSIONE and FIREBRAND in preference to BUT7RESS. COBLET and MUSKET. 

LOWELL W. RDOKS. 

Brigadier General, G.S.C., 

Assistant Chief of Staff, C-3. 

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ENCLDSURE " B " 

MOST SECRET 

Headquarters, Mediterranean Air Command. 

8 May 1943 

Ref: ACMT/S. 515. 

To : General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 

Commanding General, 

Allied Force Headquarters. 

MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY 

I have just seen si paper prepared by G.3. section for the Chief 

of Staff. This paper hrs not been considered by the J.P.S. Previous 

editions of the paper (P/68) have been considered by the J.P.S. and I 

have instructed my representative to emphasize certain factors. This 

final paper does not, in my opinion, give these factors due weight. I 

cannot, therefore, agree with it or with its conclusions. The main 

points on which I sim in disagreement are the following: 

1. Firstly, the difficulties of the capture of Sardinia are completely glossed over. In my opinion, owing to the distance from air bases 

the capture of Sardinia would be a more difficult problem than Husky. 

2. The alleged advantage that " It placed the whole of the Italian 

mainland within easy bombing range" is true, but misleading. The whole 

Italian mainland is already within easy bombing range from Tunisia and 

Sicily. The value of additional bases in Sardinia is more than balanced 

by the additional maintenance and supply involved. 

3. The value of Sardinia is, in my opinion, almost entirely a defensive one, in that it would reduce the commitment for the protection of 

shipping passing along the North African coast. 

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4. I do not agree that the capture of Sardinia would free considerable A.A. resources in North Africa, since North African bases are within reasonable operation range of enemy bases in Italy. 

5. As regards Italy itself, the paper does point out that the establishment of air bases in central Italy would bring within range of our 

heavy bombers the main Axis industrial centers in southern Germany, etc, 

also the Roumanian oil fields. This is true, but the main advantage of 

using Italy as a base is omitted. The main value of such an air bnse 

is that heavy bomber attacks on the majority of the most vital centers 

in Germany, and other Axis countries pass through routes which completely evade the great belt of fighter and A.A. defenses which Germany has 

set up along the whole North and North kestern approaches. These defenses are exacting an increasing toll on our bomber offensive. It would be 

quite impossible from every point of view for theenemy to create a similar organization covering the Southern approach, and bomber offensive 

directed from the South, especially when coordinated with that of U.K. 

would have enormously increased material and moral effects. 

6. I mst emphasize, therefore, that in my opinion the conclusions 

to paper No. P/69 are unsound insofar as they fail to pay due weight to 

the air aspect which I am sure you will agree has already proved itself 

to be one of the vital factors. 

A. W. TEDDER. 

Air Chief Marshal, 

Air Commander in Chief. 

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C.C.S. 224 

OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 

BETWEEN " HUSKY '' AND " ROUNDUP" 

References: 

CCS 84th Meeting, Item (2) 

C.C.S. 224 was circulated 14 May 1943 to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. 

Final action on this subject was taken in C.C.S. 242/6. 

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C.C.S. 224 14 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 

BETWEEN " HIJSKY "AND " ROUNDUP !' 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. The object of this paper is to indicate the action we recommend 

in the period which will elapse between the completion of HUSKY, which 

we assume will be about the middle of August, and the invasion of FRANCE. 

2. In the Mediterranean Theater, Germany will be occupying a long and 

vulnerable front with poor north and south and even worse lateral communications. In this area large hostile popidations *re being, with difficulty, held down mainly by Italian troops. On the other hand, we shall 

be firmly established on the whole North African shore and will have 

developed a superior combination and structure of sea and air power. 

We shall have mastered an important stepping-stone to Europe, and we 

shall have large and experienced forces standing ready for fresh enterprises. We cannot afford to keep those forces out of action for a period 

of nine or ten months before we can launch an offensive from the United 

Kingdom into northern France. During this time, the battles on the Russian Front will be raging, and Germany will require all the forces that 

she can muster against the Russians. The first essential, therefore, 

will be to make certain that there will be no diminution of the threat 

to Germany's Southern Front, the vulnerability of which is proved by 

the tenacity with which she has clung regardless of cost to Tunisia. So 

long as she is faced by our formidable Mediterranean forces, she cannot 

be certain where the next blow will fall, and must lock up resources 

she can ill afford to spare in unsuitable localities for the prosecution of the war. 

3. It will not be sufficient to exercise a threat across the Mediterranean. The qttack on Italy mist be carried out relentlessly to insure 

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her elinination frov the war. We believe that this, more than any other 

single event, w0111.l hasten the early defeat cf Germany. Through the fall 

of Italy, Germany nust be fcrced to divert large forces from the Russian 

Front to Yugoslavia, Greece and France, thus relieving the pressure on 

Russia. The way would thuy be paved for the defeat of Germany on the 

Russian Front, and thus for a successful return to the Continent frm the 

United Kingdom in 1944. We think these events, ccupled with a great increase in the air bombardment of Germany possibly from Northern Italy as 

well as from the United Kingdom, may well bring about her collapse. 

4. We have examined very carefully the various operations which we 

might carry out after HUSKY in the Mediterranean, with the object of 

eliminating Italy. The alternatives are: 

a. Operations against the Mainlad of Italy 

These would take the form of the capture during cr immediately 

after HUSKY of a bridgehead on the toe of Italy, to be followed by 

the seizing of Cotrone and further assault on the heel as a prelude 

to an advance on Bari and Naples. These operations present many 

difficulties and their practicability must depend on the situation 

prevailing in Russia and its repercussions on German assistance to 

Italy. Success must contribute materially to the disintegration of 

Italy and provide useful bases for further action against the Ralkans. 

b. The Capture of Sardinia 

kch will depend on the extent to which this island is reinforced 

after HUSKY, particularly by the Germans. If strongly defended, the 

operation would be comparable to HUSKY. Cn the other hand we should 

enjoy the benefit of the experience gained in a successful HUSKY and 

be able to apply this tc good effect against Sardinia. After Sardinia 

we should capture Corsica, which should not present undue difficulties. 

The capture of the island would assist US to increase the intensity 

of our air attack against Italy, would threaten the south of France 

and increase the security of our sea communications in the Mediterranean. 

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5. Furtkr alternatives, not so directly connected with the elimination of Italy, have also been examined. Cf these the most promising are: 

a. An Assault on Greece from the West 

The capture of the Athens Area and the establishment of a front in 

Greece would enable us to increase the pressure on Germany, ipterrupt 

sea communications to Crete 2nd the islands in the Aegean and would 

give us air fields from which the Roummian oil fields could be at. 

tacked. In view, however, of the strength of the German garrison, 

the difficulty of providing fighter cover, and the lack of ports in 

the Gulf of Corinth this operation does not appear a practicable one 

at the present time. 

h. Operations against the Dodecanese 

These operations have been fully examined in the Middle East. In 

our view, they cannot be carried nut simultaneously with amphibious 

operations in the Central Mediterranean. The use of air fields in 

Turkey would greatly simplify the air problem. We consider that the 

right time to carry out these operations is simultaneously with the 

entry of Turkey into the .war. This contingency is considered later 

in this paper. 

6. Our conclusion, after prolonged study of these alternatives, is 

that we ought to undertake those which not only contribute most directly 

to the elimination of Italy, but which also relate themselves naturally 

to operations from the United Kingdom in 1944. Our proposal, therefore, 

is as follows: 

a. That prenaratinns should be wade forthwith for the establishment of a bridgehead on the toe of Italy, during or immediately after 

HUSKY. 

b. That alternative plans should be made by General Eisenhower 

for operations against the heel of Italy, and for the capture of 

Sardinia. A decision on which of these two operations should actually 

be undertaken should he made when we see how matters stand at the 

conclusion of HUSKY. If as a result of Russian successes and the 

consequent lack of German reinforcements for Italy and the weakening 

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or witMrawa1 of German air forces, Italy is on the point of collapse, 

then we should enter the heel so as to administer the coup de grace, 

and prepare for exploitation ircross the Adriatic. If, on the other 

hand, Germany diverts large force to Italy - an event which in itself 

would relieve the pressure on the Russian Front - we could go for 

Sardinia and Corsica. The seizure of these islands would not only 

increase the pressure on northern Italy early next year, but would 

provide stepping-stones from which to threaten and perhaps invade 

the south cf France, and thus ease the cross-Channel operation. At 

the same time it would add to the security of our communications 

through the Mediterranean. 

7. It is quite possible, of course, that Italy may collapse before 

any of the operations discussed above have been carried out. The moral 

and materiel effects of her crushing defeats in Africa, the fall of 

HUSKYland, and the effects of our air attack on Italy herself, may prove 

decisive. If this proves to be so, than we shall have reached at an 

early stage the favorable position in the Mediterranean at which we are 

aiming, and which, if properly exploited, should insure the earliest 

possible defeat of Germany. We must act quickly in the confusion before 

the Germans have time to regroup their forces. This would be the moment 

to bring pressure to bear on Turkey, either to permit the use of Turkish 

bases by our forces, or to enter the war on our side. Provided the Russians are doing well, there is no other time when a Turkish entry would 

be so opportune or so likely. 

8. If, therefore, Italy collapses after HUSKY, our immediate action 

should be: 

a. To occupy southern Italy, taking over air bases and at least 

one port in the heel, anair field at Reggio or Cotrone, and the air 

fields in theRome-Naples Area. 

b. To establish a bridgehead in the Durrazo area, and introduce 

supplies and long-range penetration groups to rally and support the 

guerillas. 

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C. To seize the Dodecanese. and if possible move into Turkey and 

attack Ploesti. 

d. To occupy Corsica and the key points in Sardinia, and to complete the occupation of Sicily. 

e. To land forces in central Italy to prevent German infiltration from the north. 

9. The further exploitation of the situation must depend upon the 

progress of events and the German reaction. More than one possible theater of operations would be available. We do not believe that Germany 

can hold both northern Italy and the Balkans without risking a collapse 

on the Russian Front. Even if she decides to abandon Italy, and hold 

the Balkans, her task will be by no means easy, especially if Turkey 

comes into the war. We would carry out our plans for going to the support of Turkey in the first place with air and specialized units, and 

we should be prepared to exploit any weakening of the German position 

in the Balkans. 

10. A further promising line of action would be to direct forces 

towards southern France from Corsica and northern Italy. Such a movement would fit in well with a simultaneous operation into northern 

France from the United Kingdom. 

11. These projects shmld. we think, be further examined and we should 

like to hear the views of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff. 

12. Our final conclusion is that the Mediterranean offers us opportunities for action in the coming autumn and winter, which may be decisive, and at the least will do far more to prepare the way for a 

successful cross-Channel operation in 1944 than we should achieve by 

attempting to transfer back to the United Kingdom any of the forces now 

in the Mediterranean Theater. If we take these opportunities, we shall 

have every chance of breaking the Axis and of bringing the war with 

Gerwny to a successful conclusion in 1944. 

S. S. QUEEN MARY. 
U.S, SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 225 

OPERATIONS FROM INDIA , 1943 -44 

References : 

03 Mth Meeting, Item (2) 

Paragraph 11 

c<s 89th Meeting, Item (2) 

C.C.S. 225 was circulated for information 14 May 1943. 

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C.C.S. 225 14 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATIONS FROM INDIA, 1943-44 

Memorandum by British Chiefs of Staff 

1. At the Casabknca Conference the following were agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and approved by the President and the Prime Minister, to cover operations from India into Burma and China during 1943-44 

(C.C.S. 170/2, Section V (b). 

(a) Operations aimed at the capture of Akyab before May, 1943 

(CANNIBAL). 

(b) A limited forward advance from Assam before May, 1943, to 

gain bridgeheads for further operations; to improve the air route to 

China; and possibly to gain additional air fields. 

(c) The improvement ot the air transportation services into China 

with the object of enabling a larger air striking force to be maintained. 

(d) A provisional date of 15 November 1943, and a schedule of 

forces required for launching an assault on Burma (ANAKIM). This 

date to be subject to the availability of the necessary forces and 

to be reviewed in July, 1943. 

2. Since the Casablanca Conference, the following developments have 

taken place: 

(a) The advance on Akyab has not succeeded, and the capture of 

this place before the monsoon must now be ruled out. 

(b) The forward advance from Assam has not been undertaken because 

of administrative difficulties and the inability of the Chinese to 

advance from Yunnan during the spring. 

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(c) Some increase has been made in the air transport available for 

the China route, but it has been established that the full development of the air route and the full requirements of land operations 

towards Central Burma cannot both be provided by the engineering and 

transportation resources available. 

(d) The ANAKIM plan has been prepared in outline and has been examined by the British Chiefs of Staff with the Commanders in Chief. 

3. In the light of all the above developments, and of the competing 

claims of all theaters of war for the available resources and shipping, 

we consider it essential that the review of ANAKIM, previously arranged 

for July, should take place now. 

4. The British Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the full 

ANAKIM operation should not be attempted in the winter of 1943-44. Their 

main reasons are: 

(a) The re-conquest of Burma involves a large-scale combined operation, followed by extended operations in very difficult country. 

These operations must be brought to a conclusion in a limited period 

of time, otherwise the onset of the monsoon will find us in a position of great difficulty. Even when Rurma is once more in our hands, 

the operation is by no means finished. The Japanese have a good reinforcement route from Siam and we should become involved in ever extending operations in that country and in the Malay Peninsula. Operation ANAKIM is thus a very heavy commitment which we do not feel 

we can undertake at a time when the war with Germany isapproaching 

its climax and when we cannot affort to relax the pressure for an 

instant. 

(b) we are very doubtful of the feasibility of the operation if 

undertaken this year. Burmais acountry whosetopography is far more 

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suited to Japanese tactics and eyuipment than to our own. The assault 

on Rangoon involves a difficult combined operation which depends for 

its succcss or failure by the Japanese to fortify the river approach. 

For there to be any reasonable yrosrect of success, we must have a 

sufficiency of forces especially trained and equipped. and backed up 

by ample reserves of men and material. These conditions cannot be 

fulfilled in the coming winter. 

(c) Until long-term plans for the ultimate defeat of Japan have 

been decided upon, it cannot be assumed that the re-conquest of Burma, 

however desirable the political effect, especially on China and India 

is indispensable from the military point of view. 

(d) Operation ANAKIK, even if successful in 1943-44, would not be 

likely to reopen the Burma Road until the middle of 1945. 

5. We do nevertheless fully recognize that the objects which the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff had in mind at Casablanca still hold good, 

namely: 

(a) Increase in the air effort against Japanese sea communications. 

(b) Pressure on the Japanese forces in the Burma-China Theater. 

(c) Help to China. 

We should do everything we can to achieve these objects and we must also 

bear in mind the effect on India of inaction and failure to remove the 

air threat to Bengal. 

6. The following are some suggestions which we would like to discuss 

with the United States Chiefs of Staff, together with any which they 

themselves may desire to propose: 

(a) The concentration of available resources on building up and 

increasing the capacity of the air route to China, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to: 

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(i) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma; 

(ii) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China with 

the object of striking at Japanese ports and shipping: 

(iii) Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to China. 

(b) Limited land operations in Assam with the object of containing 

as many Japanese forces as possible, and covering the air route to 

China. These operations would, however, be limited to a scale which 

would not prejudice the development of the air facilities by excessive demands on engineer and transportation resources. 

(c) The capture of Akyab. This would contribute to the main object 

of developing an air offensive, as it is possible from this air base 

to attack Japanese air fields and communications in Central Burma; 

while an attack on this island would bring on an air battle which 

would help to stretch the Japanese. Its capture would also provide a 

base from which we could increase our control of the Bay of Bengal. 

and from which coastal operations southwards could be covered. 

(d) The capture of Ramree Island. The possession of this island 

is of assistance to the position, gives a good advance base for 

light naval forces, and, by threatening a landing at Taungup. from 

which there is a possible route inland to Prome, is likely to contain 

Japanese Air Forces. 

7. The ways and means of providing the resources for these operations 

require examination, but we think they are likely to be within our power. 

8. Whether or not ANAKIM should be undertaken at a later date must, 

we suggest, depend upon whether the reconquest of EIurma is found to be 

essential to the ultimate defeat of Japan. We have already suggested to 

the United States Chiefs of Staff that steps should be taken forthwith 

to set up the machinery for evolving the plan for bringing about the defeat of Japan after Germany has sued for peace. Early and effective 

British participation must depend largely upon long-term preparations 

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in India and Ceylon, which will be the bases for British operations. 

These preparations can only be made effectively in the light of an 

agreed plan. 

Washington, D. C. 

13 May 1943 

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C.C.S. 226 

USE OF PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS 

CCS 

CCS 

CCS 

3rd 

4th 

Fe fe r ence : 

85th Meeting, Item (6) 

86th Meeting, Item (4) 

87th Meeting, Item (2) 

White House 

White House 

Meeting. Item (2) 

Meeting, Item (1) 

Meeting. 

1943 for consideration of the 

their 86th keeting, considered 

5th White House 

C.C.S. 226 was circulated 15 May 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in 

C.C.S. 226 and agreed: 

That the acquisition of the Azores Islands should be accomplished as soon as possible and that an effort should first 

be wade to secure the use of these islands by diplomatic 

means without making military commitments to the Portuguese 

Government. They directed that the Secretaries, in consultation with the Chief of the British Air Staff, should prepare for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff a draft 

letter for submission to the President and the Prime Minister 

which would include the above reconmendations and proposals. 

C.C.S. 226/1 (17 May 1943) circulated a draft letter to the President and Prime Minister. In their 87th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff considered the draft letter, agreed to certain nmendments, and 

circulated the amended version, as prepared for the signature of Sir 

Alan Brooke and Admiral Leahy, as C.C.S. 226/2, 18 May 1943. 

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C.C.S. 226 15 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

USE OF PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

The enclosure is a report prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff 

Ccmmittee which is submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff. 

ENCLOSURE 

WAR CABINET 

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE 

USE OF PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS 

Report by the Chiefs of Staff Committee 

1. Experience has shown that so long as we can keep even a single 

aircraft with a convoy during the greater part of each day, the operation of 1J-boats is greatly hampered. In order to obtain maximum air 

protection at the present time it is necessary for our convoys to follow 

a route which not onlJ suffers from the disadvantages of bad weather and 

ice, but which inevitably becomes known tc the enemy. If we take a 

southerly route at the present time we have to forego a considerable 

measure of air protection. If we had both a northerly and southerly 

route which had equal air protection it would be a great advantage and 

consequently facilities in the Portuguese Atlantic Islands would be 

of outstanding value in shortening the war by convincing the enemy he 

has lost the Battle of the Atlantic. 

2. The facilities which we particularly require are as follows: 

a. Facilities in the Azores on Terciera and San Miguel Islands 

for operating V.L.R. and L.R. aircraft; 

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b. Unrestrjcted fuelling facilities for naval escorts at either 

Sen Miguel or Fayal; 

c. Facilities in the Cape Verde Islands for operatirlg G.R. aircraft. These, though desirable, are not comparable in importance to 

a above. 

3. The benef.its which would accrue from these facilities may be summarised as follows:­

a. They would give us a much extended air cover for all convoys 

plying between ­

(1) U.S.A. or West Indies and the Mediterranean: 

(2) West Indies and the U.K.; 

(3) South America and the U.K.; 

(4) U.K. and the Mediterranean; 

(5) U.K. and West Africa, and the Cape and Eastwards. 

h. The increased areas under air cover would give us much greater 

scope for evasive routing, e.g., when U-boats were concentrating in 

northern waters, North Atlantic convoys could be routed via the 

Azores instead of always having to follow the Icelmd (C) route. 

c. Without the Azores we shall always be moving on the outside of 

the circle while the enemy operates inside it. Air forces there 

would be centrally placed to cover all vnrieties of the U-boat 

campaign against the North Atlantic and Mediterranean theatres. 

d. We should be able to increase our carrying capacity owing to 

the possibility of using more direct routes across the middle of the 

Atlantic. 

e. We could increase our harassing action against U-boats not 

only when on passage to and from the Biscay bases, but also while 

resting, refuelling and recharging their batteries in mid-ocean where 

hitherto they have been practically immune from interference by aircraft. New detection and attacking devices, which are expected to 

come into service this spring, would enhance the effect of such 

action. 

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f. Unrestricted fuelling facilities in the Islands would enable us 

to make better use of our inadequate numbers of surface escorts. 

g. Blockade running between Germany and Japan would be rendered so 

hazardous as not to be worth the risk. 

h. German warships and raiders would have greater difficulty in 

evading detection sfter breaking out into the Atlantic. 

i. The Islands would prove useful staging points on the sir supply 

routes from U.S.A. to the Mediterranean theatres of operations. 

4. We shall clearly have to Fay a price and undertake new commitments 

in order to induce Portugal to give us the facilities in question. The 

extent of the price and the charncter of those commitments will depend 

upon our, ad still more important the Portuguese, estimate of the way 

in which the Axis js likely to react to the transaction. Although we 

cannot be certain of it, strong reasons cqn be advanced for thinking 

that Germany will not, in fact, attack the Iberian Peninsula. 

It would, however, be clearly wrong to discount such an attack 

altogether, and we have, therefore, examined its possibilities. If we 

assume the worst case, i.e., that the Axis powers would at once makz war 

upon Portugal and attack her metropolitsn overseas territory by all the 

means at their disposal, the commitments which Portugal would require us 

to undertake in the face of this possibility would probably include:­

a. The defence of Portugal against land and air attack; 

b. The protection of Portuguese shipping; and 

c. Assistance in the local defence of Portuguese ports. 

5. Of the above, only a calls for detailed consideration. The 

Portuguese Army is practically cegligible and could not, of itself, 

offer any appreciable resistance. We have made a Staff study of the 

maximum scale of attack which could be built up against Portugal, with 

Spain’s acquiescence (which is doubtful), without regardto the possible 

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availability of enemy forces. This works out at 2 divisions ten days 

after crossing the Spanish frontier, rising to P divisions after seven 

weeks. It is certain that the Germans could concentrate forces overland 

in Portugal more quickly than we could by sea. To fulfil a guarantee to 

go to the assistance of Portugal against such a scale of attack we 

shou1.d have to earmark and prepare now between 9 and 11 divisions and 

some 20 squadrons of aircraft, and hold these forces in readiness together with their shipping. This course could only be followed at the 

expense of HUSKY and other future operations in the Mediterranean. Even 

if this could be done, there would be no certainty that we could protect 

more than a portion of Portuguese territory. 

In the event of the Germans moving into the Iberian Peninsula, our 

interests would be to cover the Straits of Gibraltar, not to protect 

Portugal., and this again would be an undertaking we could not hope to 

fulfil except at the expense of other Mediterranean operations. 

If we take the risk of provoking a German invasion of the Iberian 

Peninsula, even if we consider such an invasion unlikely, we must do so 

with our eyes open to what the consequences may be. In fact, we may 

well find that we shall be left without a footing in the Peninsula, 

except at Gibraltar itself. 

6. A base in the Azores would be of particular value during the 

winter, when the weather in the north frequently interferes with flying. 

From this aspect therefore, it is desirable to make our approach to the 

Portuguese sufficiently early to allow the base to be in full working 

order by the autunm. A particularly favourable moment to open negotiations is now when victory in Tunis is in sight. The Portuguese are less 

likely to make high demands for protection and the Spaniards Rre more 

likely to resist German pressure. 

7. Having regard to the fact that we consider Germany is unlikely to 

invade the Iberian Peninsula, and the tremendous benefits we would gain 

from the use of the Islands, which are set out in paragraph 3, we feel 

the risk is acceptable. We therefore recommend that the War Cabinet 

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should authorise an approach to the Portuguese Government now, but no 

guarantee should be given, and every endeavour should be made to persuade the Portuguese that no threat exists. 

/s/ A. F. BROOKE, 

DVDLE Y POIIND, 

C . PORTAL. 

S. S. QUEEN MARY, 

7 may 1943 

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C.C.S. 226/2 18 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

USE OF PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLAND6 

Note by the Secretaries 

The' enclosure is a memorandum for the President and the Prime 

Minister which has been approved by the Cdined Chiefs of Staff. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. VEANE, 

Combined Secretariat 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

WASH ING TON 

18 May 1943. 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND, T'HE PRIME MINISTER: 

Subject: Use of Portuguese Atlantic Islands 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed as to the tremendous 

benefits which the United Nations would gain from the earliest possible 

use of the Azores Islands. They recomnend that the Portuguese Government should be approached at once on this subject, but that no guarantee 

should be given and that every endeavor should be made to persuade the 

Portuguese that no threat exists. They consider that Germany is unlikely to invade the Iberian Peninsula if the Azores Islands are so 

used, and that the risk is acceptable. 

In submitting this recomnendation the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

propose that while the diplomatic approach is being made forces should 

be prepared for the prompt seizure and use of the Azores if diplomacy 

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fails. Plai are therefore beming preplred and will be submitted, showing the earliest date for their execution and how, if at all, they will 

affect operations ncw in view. 

A. F. BROOKE. WILLIAM D. LEAHY, 

Gene r a 1, Admiral, U.S. Navy, 

Chief of the Imperial Chief of Staff to the 

General Staff. Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. 

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C.C.S. 227 

RELIEF AND SUPPLIES FOR OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED TERRITORIES 

C.C.S. 227 was circulated 16 May 1943 for the information .>f the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

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C.C.S. 227 16 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

RELIEF AND SUPPLIES FOR OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED TERRITORIES 

Reference: C.C.S. 85th Mtg., Item 4 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

ITALY 

1. It is assumed that the Armistice terms would include a clause 

saying that, provided Italy supplies the necessary shipping, food, 

fuel and other commodities will be provided from United Nations stocks 

so far as military necessities allow. Until the Italian ships were 

in operation we would undertake to deliver the bare necessities of 

life. 

2. To maintain the population at a minimum nutritional level (i.e. 

on about the present scale of rations) the only food imports required 

would be about 2,000 tons.of edible oils and fats per month until 

December, when this amount would be doubled until hhrch 1944. Italy is 

self-supporting in other foodstuffs, except for 75,000/100,000 tons of 

wheat per month for April, May and June. By April 1944 there should be 

sufficient Italian shipping to lift this wheat, so our commitments for 

food wmld be covered by one ship per month. 

3. Though coal is available in Sardinia and on the mainland, Italy 

has insufficient fuel even to provide for those industries needed for 

the production and distribution of the essentials of life. The minimum 

requirements are 200,000 tons of coal and 45,000 tons of oil permonth. 

The oil could be provided from the Eastern Mediterranean by some 8 

tankers, or less when Albanian supplies of 15,000 t.p.m. are restored, 

but the coal commitment would be far more difficult to meet. The coal 

output position is such that the requirement could not be met from 

United Nations sources, even if the necessary 80 or 100 ships were 

available to carry it. Sm coal could be found at the expense of kditerranean or other stocks, but the supply of more than 10,000 or 20,000 

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tons for each of the first few months would be extremely difficult. 

Therefore, owing to the shortage of coal, not more than 10 ships would 

be required for the coal trade. 

4. Distribution of goods between the islands and the mainland would 

continue as at present in Italian coasters and schooners, except for 

the Dcdecanese, which would have to be included in our supply programme 

for the Aegean area for some months. The total Italian shipping commitment is, therefore, 10-12 store ships and about 8 tankers. 

GREECE 

5. The minimum monthly requirements for Greece are 30,000 tons Of 

food (mainly wheat); 12,500 tons of coal and 7,000 tons of oil. The 

fuel is an essential for the distribution of the food. It is presumed 

that these minimum supplies for Greece would be a first charge on our 

shippine in tk Eastern Mediterranean after our own military commitments were met. The necessary shipping, one tanker and about eight 

store ships, could be supplied without any great readjustment to the 

existing allocation of tonnage. 

ALBANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA 

6. The areas in which we will operate will not be open for normal 

trading and distribution, at least for the first few months. Supplies 

to these countries will, therefore, have to be included in our military 

requirements. They will, in any case, not amount to more than one 

store shipamnth for Albania and two or three per month for Yugoslavia. 

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C.C.S. 229 

POTENTIALITIES OF AIR ROUTE 

FROM ASSAM TO CHINA 

References: 

CCS 84th Meeting, Item (3) 

2nd White House Meeting 

CtS 85th Meeting, Item (3) (5) 

CCS 86th Meeting, Item (2) 

CCS 90th Meeting, Item (51 

CCS 91st Meeting 

CCS 92nd Meeting, Item (1) 

CCS 95th Meeting, Item (5) 

C.C.S. 229 was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff 19 May 

1943. 

This paper was considered together with C.C.S. 231 (Operations 

in Burma to Open and Secure an Overland Route to China) and the comments 

of the Combined Staff Planners on C.C.S 229 and C.C.S. 231 (C.C.S. 238 

- Operations in Burma 1943-1944). 

Action on these subjects was taken n the Minutes of the 91st Meeting which also directed that C.C.S. 229, C.C.S. 231, and C.C.S. 238 be 

withdrawn from the agenda; therefore these papers are not published in 

this volume. The final action on the subject contained in C.C.S. 229 

was included in C.C.S. 242/6. 

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C.C.S. 231 

OPERATIONS IN BURMA TO OPEN AND SECURE AN 

OVERLAND ROUTE TO CHINA 

References: 

CCS 84th Meeting, Item (3) 

2nd White House Meeting 

CCS 85th Meeting, Item (3) 

CCS 86th Meeting, Item (3) 

CCS 90th Meeting, Item (4) 

Cts 91st Meeting 

CCS 92nd Meeting, Item (1) 

C.C.S. 231 was circulated 19 May 1943 for consideration of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered this paper together with 

C.C.S. 229 (Potentialities of Air Route from Assam to China) and the 

Combined Staff Planners comments on C.C.S. 229 and C.C.S. 231. circulated as C.C.S. 238 (Operations in Burma 1943-1944). 

Action on these subjects was taken in the Minutes ofthe91st 

Meeting which also directed that C.C.S. 229, C.C.S. 231, and C.C.S. 

238 be withdrawn from the agenda; therefore these papers are not published in this volume. The final action on the subject contained in 

C.C.S. 231 was included in C.C.S. 242/6. 

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C.C.S. 232/1 

AGREED ESSENTIALS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 

References : 

CCS 85th Meeting, Item (2) 

CCS86th Meeting, Item (5) 

CCS 87th Meeting; Items (1) (3) 

CCS 88th Meeting, Item (2) 

C.C.S. 232 was circulated 16 May 1943 for the consideration of 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 86th Meeting agreed to 

certain amendment-s to C.C.S. 232, (corrections noted in CCS 87th 

Meeting) and directed that the Secretaries publish an amended version 

of C.C.S. 232 which will show the items of agreement and disagreement 

(subsequently published as C.C.S. 232/1). 

Final decisions re C.C.S. 232/1 are included in the resolutions 

contained in C.C.S. 242/6. 

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C.C.S. 232/1 18 May 1943 

COMBINED CAIEFS OF STAFF 

AGREED ESSENTIALS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 

Reference: a. C.C.S. 85th Meeting, Item 2 (1) 

Note by the Secretaries 

Of the following items, all except those in the split columns have 

been agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Those in the split 

columns have not so far been agreed upon but are subject to further 

consideration. 

I. OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 

The overall objective of the UNITED NATIONS is: 

In conjunction with RUSSIA and other allies to bring about at the 

earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS POWERS. 

2. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR 

a. In cooperation with RUSSIA and other allies to bring about at 

the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the AXIS in 

EUROPE. 

Proposed by C.P.S. 

b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other PACIFIC 

POWERS concerned, to maintain 

and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN with the 

purpose of continually reducing her military power and 

attaining positions from which 

her ultimate surrender can be 

forced. 

Amendment proposed by 

British Chiefs of Staff 

Alter to read: 

"To maintain, and so far as is 

consistent with 8- above, to 

extend.. .It 

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c. Upon the defeat of the AXIS in Europe, in cooperation with other 

PACIFIC POWERS and, if possible, with RUSSIA to direct the full resources of the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN to bring about at the 

earliest possible date the unconditional surremler of JAPAN. 

3. ESTABLISHED UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF THE OVERALL STRATEGIC 

CONCEPT 

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall 

strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a 

first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation. 

a. Maintain the security and warmaking capacity of the WESTERN 

HEMISPHERE and BRITISH ISLES. 

Amendment proposed by Proposed by C.P.S. British Chiefs of Staff 

b. Support and maintain the bit. 

warmaking capacity of our 

forces in all areas to which 

committed. 

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of comnunication, with particular 

emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace. 

Proposed by C.P.S. 

d. Intensify the air offensive from the I'nited Kingdom 

and concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as 

early as practicable for the 

purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis 

citade 1. 

Amendment proposed by 

British Chiefs of Staff 

Re-letter as c and amend to 

read: 

"Intensify the air offensive 

against the AXIS POWERS in 

Europe. 1' 

Add new paragraph: 

"d. Take all necessary and 

practicable measures to draw 

land and air forces from the 

Russian front.1' 

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e. Sustain the Soviet Forces by the greatest volume of munitions 

that can be supplied ad transported to RUSSIA without militating 

against the attainment of the overall objectives. 

Proposed by C.P.S. 

f. Undertake such measures 

as may be necessary to provide CHINA with a volume of 

supplies sufficient to keep 

CHINA actively in the war 

against JAPAN. 

Amendment proposed by 

British Chiefs of Staff 

Amend to read: 

1l.f. Undertake such measures 

as may be necessary and practicable in order to keep 

CHINA actively in the war 

against JAPAN. " 

H. REDMAN. 

J. R. DEANE. 

Combined Secretariat 

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C.C.S. 233/1 

AGENDA FOR THE REMAINING CONFERENCES 

References: 

CCS 85th Meeting, Item (2) 

CCS 86th Meeting, Item (6) 

Pursuant to a directive in the C.C.S. 85th Meeting that the Combined Staff Planners prepare a draft agenda for the remaining conferences in the light of the discussion which had taken place, C.C.S. 

233 was circulated 16 hky 1943 for the consideration of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. 

The Combined Chiefs of St3ff in their 86th Meeting considered 

and approved C.C.S. 233 subject to certain amendments. 

Revised agenda subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 233/1 17 May 

1943: 

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C.C.S. 233/1 17 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

(TRIDENT) 

AGENDA FOR THE REMAINING CONFERENCES 

Reference: a. C.C.S. 85th Meeting, Item 2 a (2) 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosed agenda was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

at their 86th Meeting on Monday, 17 May 1943. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

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TRIDENT CONFERENCE 

TENTATIVE PROGRAM OF WORK 

PROPOSALS BY THE COMBINED STAFF PLANNERS 

1. We submit the following tentative program of work. It is based 

on the assumption that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will have a full 

discussion on the "statement of agreed essentials" on Moday, 17 May. 

Thereafter, the program should be broadly as set out below. 

TUESDAY I. THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY 

18th 

AND 

a. A United States paper on the bunber offensive against 

Germany. 

b. Plan for the defeat of Germany by concentrating on 

the biggest possible invasion force in the United 

Kingdom as soon as possible. 

Paper under preparation by U.S. Planners in 

consultation with the British. 

2. Plan for the defeat of Germany accepting the elimination of Italy as a necessary preliminary. 

Paper under preparation by the British Planners 

in consultation with the U.S. 

WEDNESDAY d_. The possibility of an air offensive against Ploesti. 

19th 

Paper under preparation by the Combined Staff 

Planners. 

THURSDAY 2. THE DEFEAT OF JAPAh' 

20th 

-a. A paper showing proposals for operations in the 

Pacific is under preparation by the United States 

Staffs. 

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-b. The potentialities of the air route from Assam to 

China. 

Paper under preparation by the Combined Staff 

Planners. 

2. Study of the most promising operation for opening 

a land route to China. 

Paper under preparation by the Combined Staff 

Planners. 

FRIDAY 3. THE U-BOAT CAMPAIGN (Discussion) 

21st 

4. REARMING OF FRENCH FORCES IN NORTH AFRICA 

5. TURKISH SITUATION (General Discussion) 

6. 6iISCELLANEOUS ITEMS ARISING DURING THE WEEK 

SATURDAY 7. RELATION OF RESOURCES TO AGREED STRATEGY WITH PARTICULAR 

22nd REFERENCE TO SHIPPING AND LANDING CRAW 

Although these problems will be considered in the discussion on all the various plans for the defeat of Germany 

and the defeat of Japan, it will not be possible to collate 

a paper on the subject until all these various plans have 

been discussed. Once Items 2 and 3 have been cleared out 

of the way, the Combined Staff Planners will have to prepare 

a paper on this subject relating resources to agreed strategy. 

SUNDAY 

8. GLOBAL STRATEGY: FINAL CONSIDERATION 23rd 

MONDAY 9. FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER 

24th 

This report is visualized as including agreed statements 

on global strategy, and on existing and projected undertakings arranged if possible in order of priority. 

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C.C.S. 234 

DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE 

(Elimination of Italy First) 

References : 

CCS 85th keting, Item (4) 

CCS 87th Meeting, Item (5) 

CCS 88th Meeting, Item (3) 

5th White House Meeting 

Pursuant to a directive in the C.C.S. 85th Meeting, the subject 

paper prepared by the British Planners in consultation with the U. S. 

Planners was circulated 17 May 1943. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered C.C.S. 234 together with 

a U. S. paper, prepared in consultation with the British Planners, 

(C.C.S. 235) in their 88th Meeting and agreed upon certain resolutions 

which were circulated as C.C.S. 237 (Revised in C.C.S. 237/1) and which 

were also included in C.C.S. 242/6. 

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C.C.S. 234 17 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE 

(Elimination of Italy First) 

(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 85th Mtg., 

Itearn 4 a (2)) 

Note by the Secretaries 

The attached memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff, 

prepared after consultation with the U. 3. Joint Plsnners, contains 

a plan for the defeat of Cermny. showinE the course of operations and 

their feasibility accepting the e,Jimination of Italy as a necessary 

predimina ry . 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEM, 

Combined Secretariat. 

BRITISH PLAN FOR 

THE DEFEAT OF AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE 

OBJECT 

The decisive defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe as early as 

practicahle. 

SECTION I - INVASION OF N.W. EUROPE 

1. A necessary prerequisite to a re-entry on the Continent across 

the Channel is the initial softening of German war potential by the 

intensified comhined bomber offensive, the naval blockade and the 

Russian offensive on the Eastern Front. Since this re-entry will 

ultimately be necessary, no plan for the defeat of Germany can be 

drawn up without first examining the essential features of the operation. 

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2. The essentials for invasion are as follows:­

a. A high degree of air superioritv must be achieved during the 

assault and build-up. 

b. Air fields must be captured at an early date. 

c. The Coast defences must he sufficiently reduced by the employment of all availahle means, hoth before and durinz the assault. 

d. The initial assault must he on a sufficiently large scale and 

nur rate of build-up must compete with that of the enemy. 

e. The beach capacity must be sufficient to allow of the subsequent maintenance of the force Landed in the first seven days. Sufficient ports rrust he captured and available for use early. 

f. Weather conditions must be suitable. 

3. There are two rain factors in this problem. These are:­

a. The size of force whirh can he employed in the assault. which 

in general is limited by the assault shipping and landing craft 

aoai Lahle . b. The relative rate of huild-up of nu? own force, compared to 

that of the enemy, which can be achieved after the initial assault. 

ASSAULT SHIPPING AND LANDING CRAFT REQUIREMENE 

4. Any assault is likely to meet not less than three divisions in 

the coastal zme reinforced hy up to four divisions afte'r 24 hours. 

The scale of assault cannot therefore he less than 10 divisions. 

The assault shipping and lading craft required for an operation 

involving a force of this nature, run into large figures owing to the 

necessity for seven of these divisions heing afloat simultaneously. 

The scale of craft has heen worked out in great detail by the 

British Planners in conjunction with the ROUNDUP Combined Planners. 

The number of craft required to cross the Channel is higher than in 

other parts of the world on accrunt of the need for a quicker rate of 

build-up and of the higher dezree of resistance expected. 

5. Of the total force of 10 Divisions, the British can provide 2 

assault and 3 immediate follow-up divisions provided that the Amricans 

allot the follaving assault shipping ad craft:­

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?.. .? .T .2 122 ) 

J .S.C,. 6 ) All required in 

L.C. I. (J ) 140 ) 

L.C.T.5 or 6 125 ) 11.5. hy 1st 

I..C. M.3 280 ) 

Certain maintenance ) February, 1944. 

equinment ) 

The ahwe figures are hased on the assumption that operations 

after H!!SKY will take place in the ikditerranean, resulting in additional casualties to landing craft and ships. 

6. The American cnntrihution in the assault wilJ amount to two assault divisions ad three follow-up divisions. The two assault divisions which must he assault trained hefore arrivsl in U.K. must. he 

carried in Amrican assault shipping and American mnnel craft. The 

three fo!lnw-up divisions will be carried in the first turn-round of 

the ships and craft employed in the British and Amxican assaults. 

7. We understand that it is very dwhtful if the total requirements 

could be found by 1 February 1944 - to permit an assault date of 1 

April 1944. This would mean either a reduction in the scale of the 

assault or a rate of build-up too slow to be acceptable. 

RATE OF BUILD-UP FOR INVASION 

8. The most favcurable area for build-up is that of the North Seine 

ports - Diem to Rwen, in which we estimte that there would he by D 

plus 7 ten Divisions ashore. Allowing far the build-up of reserves and 

for ports being put into working order, we estimate that by D plus 90 

- twentv Divisions would he ashore, and by D plus 125 - twenty-five 

Divisions would be ashore. Thereafter additional ports would have to 

be usrd for the maintenance of a fnrce of more than twenty-five Divisions. 

9. The maximum maintenance capacity of the ports in the Cotentin 

peninsula is ten Divisions by D plus 90. Any huild-up in this area can 

only hr accomplished if additional ports outside the peninsula are 

captured. 

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ENEMY STRENGTH 

10. The estimated German strength in France and the Low Countries 

in 1944 is 35 Divisions, of which at least four would be available as 

a mobile reserve. In addition there'are some 100,000 static internal 

security defence troops. Reinforcinq divisions wmld have to come from 

Germany or the Eastern Front. Up to ten under-strength divisions might 

conceivably be available in Germany, but would almost certainly not be 

available if Turkey were already in the war. Advance units of these 

misht arrive four days after the decision to reinforce and might arrive 

tle.re:.'ter in Frai:w (Lut I,.' rcccisszriJy in the thre;.ler,ec' area j at 

the rate of six divisions a week. The, arrival of reinforcements from 

Russia must depend on the situation on that front. None, could in any 

case arrive ir less than 14 days, after which any available, could come 

at the rate of 2 divisions a week. The defection of Italy would, however, have already reduced the German strength in Russia. Assuming, 

therefore. that the initial assauJ~tis faced by four divisions, our 

forces would. in the worst case, be faced by eighteen German divisions 

within the first fortnight, after which mobile reinforcements could 

mly corrr at the expense of the Russian Front. 

11. These rates of reinforcement might be considerably reduced by 

successful Allied air action, but the eate'nt of this reduction would 

depnd on a number of factors and cannot be assessed until the outline 

plan is firm. 

12. Over ad above the fixed defences the minimum Axis garrison 

wtich might be in France ad the Low Countries, short of a complete 

withdrawal, is estivated at twenty-two divisions of which three would 

be in mobile reserve. 

13. It is clear that unless Xussian action or Allied action e,lsewhere reduces the enemy potential in France from the figures in pragraph 10 to something approaching those given in paragraph 12, we are 

unlike,ly to he able to retain a foothold in France until our rate of 

build-up gives us suwriority over the enemy. 

14. AnotFer most important factor, though it cannot be defined as 

one that is limiting, is the achievement of a high degree of air 

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superiority during the assault and build-up. The Combined Intelligence 

Staffs have agreed: ­ a. If the exploitation of HUSKY is abandoned. the opposition to 

cross-Channel operations at 1 May 1944 will he 105 squadrons or 950 

combat plams in France an3 the Low Countries. These might be reinforced imdiately by some 10 squadrons, say 100 planes. Within a 

week 50 additional squadrons, 450 planes, would be concentrated in 

the area, giving a total, without losses, of 165 squadrons or 1,485 

planes. Further reinforcements would depend on Germany’s will to 

strip the Russian Front. 

b. If Italy is out of the war the early opposition to crossChannel operations will also he 105 squadrons or 950 combat planes. 

But the enemy’s ability to reinforce this force, will be negligible 

unless he is prepared to strip the Russian Front. 

DEDUCTIONS 

15. To ignore the limitations of a cross-Channel operation outlined 

above would be to invite the danger of entering on a build-up race in 

which we could probably never obtain the necessary margin of superiority for success. If, however, the German strength in France can he 

reduced to the required eatent - and we feel ccnfident that it can ­ without too serious an effect on the availability of our forces in the 

U.K., successful invasion should be possible. with the forces outlined 

above in the spring or summer of 1944. 

16. The Mediterranean connnitment which would result from a collapse 

of Italy wculd cause a reduction from some 1.480 to 950 aircraft in the 

potential ability of Germany to resist our cross-Channel operations. 

Chly some unknavn an3 incalculable weakness on the part of Russia could 

ease this situation for Germany. 

METHOD OF DEFEATING GERMANY 

17. After HUSKY we must intensify, with every means at our disposal. 

the process of weakening Germany sufficiently to ensure a successful 

invasion across the Channel in 1944. To the effect of the intensified 

bomber offensive, the naval blockade and the Russian war, we must 

therefore add continded pressure by our combined forces further 

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to stretch the enemy without respite, and if possible win new bases 

from which to hit him. 

POTENTIALITIES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE 

18. We have in the Mediterranean paverful ard seasoned forces, whose 

attack is now gaining its full impetus, destroying the enemy and forcing him to give ground. This momentum must be sustained till we have 

reaped the ereat advantages in weakening Germany which it promises. 

Not to do so would he to cast away an unrivalled opportunity of inflicting on Germany a mortal iniury and, instead, to give her a chance 

to parry tk final hlow and del~ayher defeat for at least another year. 

19. This final blow can only he struck across the Channel; it cannot 

he de,livered from the hkditerranean - but the peculiar nature of the 

cross-Channel opration sets limits to the weight of this blow. 

We therefore strongl~yhold the belief that to make this blow 

possible every opportunity must be taken between nm and its delivery 

to exhaust ad weaken Germany. 

DDCEPTION 

20. Moreover, apart from weakening the Germans, it is an essential 

part of this preparation to deceive them as to our intentions. To 

discontinue oprations in the Mediterranean and concentrate our forces 

in the United Kingdan in a series of moves which could not be cmcealed. 

would he to invite them to take appropriate measures to meet what would 

becm an ohvious threat. 

INNEDIAlX EFFECTS OF AN ITALIAN CDLLAPSE 

21. After a successful HUSKY the greatest aid we could give to 

Russia, and thereby inflict greatest injury which could be done to 

Germany, would he to tear Italy from the Axis. 

22. Seven Italian divisions in France and Corsica, and 32 in the 

Belkans and the Aegean would lay down their arms ad Germany would have 

to find at least fifteen divisions to replace them or so weaken her 

hold on the Balkans that she would he in danger of losing control in 

this vital area - a prospect which she could not tolerate. The loss 

of some 1,400 Italian aircraft, and the appraach of the war towards the 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

southern boundaries of the Reich would cost the extended Luftwaffe, at 

least 450 fighters, half of which would have to be found by improvisation. The e,nemy's total air commitments would reduce his ability to 

reinforce, the Western Front to negligible proportions unless he were 

prepared to strip the Russian Front. The Italian fleet, though admittedly no great menace, contains valuable British heavy units which 

would be immediately released to engage the Japanese. 

23. Apart, therefore, from the' moral and political effects of the 

collapse of Italy, this calamity woul~d immediately prove for Germany 

a military disaster of the first mgnitude. 

SUBSEQUENT EFFETS 

24. In the West, the occupation of key points in Sardinia and the 

restoration of Corsica to France would create a threat to southern 

France which the Germans could not ignore. The Germans would e.ither 

have to occupy and fight for northern Italy, which they might well be 

unable to do, or yield air bases which could place 500 bombers within 

range of a large number of important German targets - notably aircraft 

factories and oil plants - which cannot be'attacked from England, North 

Africa or Sicily. The safe areas to which the population of western 

Germany are being evacuated would come under constant threat of air 

attack, with serious effect on morale. The German air de,fences would 

lx split and the effectiveness of the air offensive greatly increased. 

Moreover, the threat of invasion to southern France would be increased, 

together with the potentialities of diversionary action to coincide 

with our invasion across the, Channel. 

25. In Russia the German forces on land ad in the air would have to 

be reduced below the strength that was already inadequate during the 

winters of 1941/42 and 1942/43. 

26. In the East, the Ge.rmns would have great difficulty in controlling the Balkans. Sustained at comparatively little' cost to the 

Allies, and supported by air action, up to 300,000 gueaillas could 

harass the enemy's vulnerable communications, denying him important 

economic resources in Yugoslavia ad Greece, facing him with seriously 

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increasing recalcitrance'and throttling his garrisons in Greece to such 

an extent that it is difficult to see ho.v they could be maintained. 

27. Added to this, PJoesti itself would, for the first time, be 

brought within range of effective air attack, from Italy; great - possibly vital - damage could be done, and the German air defence comitments would nnce more be increased. The Roumanians are, moreover, 

unlikely to shmv much firmness under air bombardment ad only a small 

proportion of the 38,000 operatives are thought to be Germans. 

28. In the Aegean, the Ddecanese would be weakened and might well 

be taken, and the way opened for Turkey to enter the lists. This event 

would be a furthez heavy blw. Its political effect would be immense, 

Ploesti would be threatened, tozet'ler with the eastern Balkan ad Black 

Sea communications, and Germany voirld be faced with B land front in 

Thrace which she could only attack if she were to find 7 to 8 more 

divisions ad allot proportionate air squadrons from her already attentuated air forces. We are committed to support Turkey if she is 

attacked with 48 squadrons and two armoured divisions These forces 

must, tkrefore, be held ready in the Mediterranean against this poss ibility . 

DEDUCTION 

29. Collectively, all these strategic prizes might even be decisive. 

This policy, together with the effects of the Eastern Front and the 

we,ighty air offensive, is bound to produce powerful results. The 

results in our opinion will create a situation which will make the 

dlfference between success or failure of a re-entry into northwest 

Eurow in 1944. 

SECTION I1 - SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS 

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

THE COLLAPSE OF ITALY 

30. The Tunisian disaster has been a severe shock to the Italians. 

While HUSKY is being mounted, southern Italy will be bombed, and virtually blockaded at sea. Success in HUSKY will be a further blow to 

Italian morale. Whether Italy will collapse at once will depend to a 

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great extent on the degree of support which sk receives from Gertmny 

and on events on the Eastern Front. 

31. If HUSKY does not bring about a collapse, Italy can be subjected 

to a heayy scale, of air attack. From August onwards, the bomber force 

from the United Kingdom could develop a scale of attack on the industrial areas concentrated in the North which would’create conditions in 

which the supply an3 maintenance of the Italian armed forces would 

become precarious. Concurrently an even heavier attack could be directed from North Africa ard Sicily against the South. The canbined 

effects of these, attacks might well bring about the collapse of Italy. 

32. It is, however, so important to knock Italy out quickly that we 

cannot rely on air attack alone. We, therefore, consider that limited 

combined operations should be derre,loped to support the air offensive, 

maintain the momentum of the onslaught and tip the scales in our favor, 

as this can be done at reasonable cost and with the resources present 

on the spot. 

33. In the Central Mediterranean, we have the choice of two lines of 

advance, one northeastwards into the Toe and Heel of Italy to threaten, 

if necessary, the Rome-Naples area, the other northwestwards to Sardinia and Corsica. An Aegean advance by the Dodecamse would not have 

an immediate or speedy effect on the collapse of Italy. Operations 

against the binlard are more continuous than an attack on Sardinia and 

are more likely to collapse Italy this autuw. The capture of Sardinia 

would cost the equivalent of seven divisions. The capture of the Heel 

of Italy would involve a total of nine divisions. In either case we 

should employ the, bulk of our resources in present Allied air forces 

in the Mediterranean. The seclection of the course to be pursued must 

await HUSKY and will turn on such factors as the general air and land 

situation at tk tine: German remiinforcement: if any, of the objectives: 

ad the morale of the Army and people of Italy. 

34. We feel that eithr of these operations following rapidly upon a 

successful HUSKY ad in coditions of rising air bombardment would tip 

the scale in our favor. 

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SITUATION AFTER AN ITALIAN COLLAPSE 

35. The general war weariness ad dissatisfaction of all sections of 

the Italian people will dispose them towards dealing with the Allies. 

(kring to the heavy cow.mitment imposed by an Italian default, Germany 

will be forced to cut her unessential camnitrents and dispose her available forces so as to hold the areas which she considers essential to 

her security. Tkse are, we consider: ­ a. The Waritirne Alps between France ad Italy which she. will hold 

with sm two or three divisions. 

b. The area east of the River Adige towards the Yugoslav frontier 

held with sane two or three divisions. 

36. The fear of air attack on south Germany from airdromes in the 

Milan ard Turin areas, might force the enemy to fight a delaying action 

on the line Ravema-Pisa. In this case five low category divisions 

would be required for internal security in north Italy, tweive divisions 

for a determined stand on the line Ravenna-Pisa or four divisions for a 

token stand to delay our progress northward. The provision of these 

forces would leave the Balkans disastrously weak. 

OPERATIONS AFTER AN ITALIAN COLLAPSE 

37. After an Italian collapse we must take full advantage of the 

situation, to give the, maximum further aid to Russia and to facilitate 

crass-Channel operations in 1944. 

38. During the period of confusion we should secure a bridgehead at 

Durazzo. This would cost four assault brigades and two infantry divisions with one mixed division in reserve in Italy, and might be accanplished with little opposition. We should thus put in a total force 

of three divisions. This force would activate the guerillas, and we 

could suppqrt it with up to 500 bombers and 300 transport aircraft from 

the mainland. 

39. On an Italian collapse, we should forestall the Germans ip tLe 

Dcdecanese and bring pre,ssure on Turkey to enter the war, and so make 

available to us the benefits we have already noted, and in particular 

the use Of air bases from which to bomb Ploesti. 

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40. Should the Germans decide to remain on the Ravenna-Pisa line, 

three divisions would be required in the Rome-Naples area to stop German 

infiltration to the southward. An enemy withdrawal from the Milan-Turin 

area would leave the air fields open to occupation by us, if we wished 

to do so. A force of six divisions would be required to secure the air 

fields against an estimated scale of German attack of 4 - 6 divisions, 

but only minor forces would then be required in the Rome-Naples area. 

GARRISON WMMITMENE 

41. We should occupy the Cagliari and Alghero areas of Sardinia and 

Corsica ard occupy. or remain in occupation of, the Trapani, Messina ard 

possibly the Catania areas of Sicily. This commitment would amount to 

about 15 battalions ad 3 brigades. 

SUMMARY OF CDMMITMENTS 

42. Our proposals for meting these commitments and our commitments 

in North Africa are detailed in Amendix "A". After they have been met, 

we estimate that we shall have available in reserve, or for further 

opratims such as an attack on the south of France:­

5 American Divisions 

4 - 7 British Divisions 

1 French Division 

In any event our total commitment on the Italian mainland in the 

event of a collapse will not exceed 9 divisions. 

43. The economic commitment which my have to be shouldered is describ~din C.C.S. 227. This problem will have to be faced in the event 

of an Italian collapse, whether or not we carry out any further operations in the Mediterranean after HUSKY. 

SECTION I11 - EFFECT OF MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY 

ON THE BUILD-UP OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN FORCES 

IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 

ASSAULT SHIPS AND CRAFT 

44. Allowing for casualties at the agreed rate,any of the above 

courses of action can be carried out with the assault shipping and 

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landing craft (British and American combined) allocated to the Mediterranean Theatre for HUSKY, together with one or two minor reinforcements 

of certain specialized British types. 

45. Operations in the Mediterranean subsequent to HUSKY would only 

reduce the amount of assault shipping and landing craft for crossChannel operations in 1944, by the equivalent of 10% of the total 

personnel and 6% of the total number of vehicles to be landed. The 

reduction in personnel lift is not serious as the numhers could be 

be ferried from ship to shore. 

Thus, in terms of assault shipping and craft, it is evident that 

the continuance of Mediterranean operations after HUSKY has comparatively little effect on cross-Chm1 operations in 1944. 

alLER0 BUILD- UP 

46. After allowing for a SICKLE movemnt of 380,000 men as well as 

for the necessary R.N., R.A.F. and Canadian troop movements by 1st 

April, 1944, the number of U.S. divisions which will be in the U.K. by 

this date will be: 

a. Assuming no further Mediterranean operation after 

HUSKY ,20 

b. Assuming a continuanre of Mediterranean operation 

after HUSKY . 14-1/2 

Of the above divisions under a, two will be in process of disembarkation ad two will be linking up with their equipment; but under b,owing 

to the slower rate of movemnt to the United Kingdom, only one wlll be 

in process of disemharkation and one linking up with its equipment. 

The total number of U.S. divisions which will, therefore, be available 

for operations from the U.K. on 1st April 1944, under the two above 

hypotheses will be: 

a. 16 divisions 

b. 12-1/2 divis OnS 

47. In this connec ion, the two examinations of the cargo shipping 

position just completed by the British and United States Committes on 

Shipping Availability reveal an apparent deficiency against total 

requiremnts, other than post-HUSKY, of 336 sailings for the rest of 

the year. 

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Losses have so far been less than the agreed rate taken as the 

basis of the calculations. In view of this and the economies that could 

be effected by the Combined Loading of British imports and U.S. Army 

supplies in the North Atlantic, this deficiency may he largely eliminated and all calculations in the above paragraph are based on the 

realization of this hope. It my even happen that the reduction in the 

programmed BOLERO movement shavn above due to the additional requirement 

of some 90 ships for post-HUSKY operations, may not be fully necessary. 

BRITISH FCUCES AVAILABLE IN THE U.K 

48. The British forces available in them U.K. for cross-Channe'l operations by 1st April~1944 amount to 10-14 divisions dependent on whether 

cannibalization proves necessary or not. 

RETURN OF LAND FORCES FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN 

49. The size of the cross-Channel assault,as we have already shown, 

is limited by the number of lan-ling craft that will be available. It 

would he possible to bring two additional British divisions ex North 

Africa to U.K. in the first quarter of 1944 without materially affecting 

the BOLERO program as planned for that quarter. 

50. It will be seen from Appendix "A" that after the elimination of 

Italy there .will be some ten divisions (British and American) in the 

Mediterranean available for other employmnt. Even if we halted in the 

Mediterranean after HUSKY, there will be no object in bringing these 

forces back to U.K. exce(pt that they are battle eaperienced troops, 

since the availability of landing craft and maintenance limitat ions 

will preclude their use in ROVNDUP. 

DEDUCTION 

51 Thus, if we continue operations in the Mediterranean after HUSKY, 

there can be available in the United Kingdom by 1st April 1944 for 

cross-Channel operations some 22 1/2 - 26 1/2 divisions,United States 

and British. These figures could be increased by a further two divisions if it is decided to bring two British divisions back from North 

Africa (see paragraph 49 above). Even if no post-HUSKY operations 

are carried out, the total number of divisions available in the United 

Kingdom would only he increased by 3 1/2. 

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AIR FORCES 

52. There are sufficient air forces in the Mediterranean to implement 

the strategy recommended. Allowing for the homhing of Italy ad necessary air striking forces, defensive fighter comnitments and air forces 

for Turkey, we could possibly return to Unite3 Kingdom, if offensive 

amphibious operations in the Mediterranean stopped after HUSKY, up to 

the follaving strength of air forces: 

-U.S. British Total

I!LE% Sqns. A/c Sqns . A/c Sqns. A/c 

Fighter 16 400 9 144 25 544 

Fightermecce 2 36 2 32 4 68 

Light Bomber 12 156 5 80 17 236 

P.R.U. 1 13 2 24 3 37 

Transport 20 250 - 20 258 

53. It is at present impossible to say to what extent this would 

actually increase the air forces available in U.K. in April, 1944, since 

only a proportion of these units could actually be reconstituted in the 

line. Additional strength would, havever, he given to existing formaticns by additional reserves of aircraft and personnel. 

54. If amphibious operations were continued in the Mediterranean 

after HUSKY, the air forces stated in paragraph 52 would have to remain 

until offensive operations were concluded. There should then still be 

tim to bring back a proportion he,fore April, 1944, but there would be 

no fighter squadrons to spare. and extra transport aircraft would have 

to be retained. The retention of fighter squadrons in the hkditerranean 

would, in addition to the consideratiom stated in paragraph 53, probably not have a restricting effect on fighter reserves for cross-Channel 

operations. 

SECTION IV - CONCLUSIONS 

55. To concentrate our efforts after the completion of HUSKY solely 

upon ROUNDUP is to forego the initiative to the enemy for some months, 

to adopt a defensive attitude on lad and to allow Germany to concentrate for the defense of France and the Low Countries against our 

invasion. 

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56. Our pian for the, defeat of Germny is therefore: 

a. To eliminate Italy by: 

(1) Air action and one of the follaving alternatives: 

Either 

(2) During or immediately after HUSKY, a landing in the RECCIO 

area and thereafter continuing operations as soon as possible on 

the mainland by landing first at COTRONE and then in the HEEL. 

We estimate that the approximate timings of those operations might be mid-August, 1st September, and mid-Cktober. 

Or 

(3) During or imediately after HUSKY a landing in the RECCIO 

area and thereafter continuing operations as soon as possible by 

a landing in SARDINIA followed by one in CORSICA. 

We estimate that the approximte timing of these operations 

might be mid-August, mid-Oztober, and mid-November, respectively. 

b. To invade northwest Europe with the target date of April 1944. 

/s/ C. E. W E 

/s/ W. P(3RTER 

/s/ W. ELLIOT 

Washington, D. C. 

17th May 1943 

APPENDIX "A" 

COMMITMENTS IN T,HE MEDITERRANEAN 

AFTER THE ELIMINATION OF ITALY 

1. t the conclusion of a successful HUSKY, there will be he following forces in the Mediterranean:­

us. - 9 divisions 

British - 25 divisions 

French - 4 divisions 

Total 38 divisions 

Cn the assumption that a deduction of 10 pe'rcent Over all should 

be made to cover casualties in further operations in the Mediterranean 

after HUSKY, this total would be reduced to 35 divisions, made up as 

follows :­

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u. s. - 8 divisions 

British - 23 divisions 

French - 4 divisions 

Total 35 divisions 

2. After the collapse of Italy, we estimate that we shall require the 

follaving forces for garrison an3 internal security purposes:­

3. SICILY 

3 Static Bns. 

1 Inf. We (Mobile) 

4. TOE OF ITALY 

2 Static Bns. 

1 Inf. Bn. (Mobile) 

5. HEEL OF ITALY 

3 Static Bns. 

1 Inf. Me. (Mobile) 

1 Ard. Regt. 

6. ENFORCEMENT OF ARMISTICE 

a. Heel of Italy. We estimate that we shall need one mixed division in this area (in addition to the permanent occupation force in 

para. 5) to provide the threat of further military occupation necessary for the enforcement of the Armistice. 

b. Rome Area. There will he one mixed division in reserve in this 

area for use in central or northern Italy (see para. 7 below). For 

enforcement of the Armistice one brigade group would probably he 

sufficient . 

7. CENTRAL ITALY 

If the Germans retain a hold on the north of Italy a force of 3 

divisions will he required in the Rane-Naples area to prevent incursion 

southwards. If the Germans withdraw from northern Italy, a force of 6 

divisions wmld be required, if it were decided to occuw the air fields 

in the Milan-Turin area. 

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8. KCUPATION OF SARDINIA 

1 division 

9. OCcLlPATION OF CORSICA 

1 division 

10. BRIDGEHEAD IN DURAZZO AREA 

3 Inf. Divs. 

11. S,CIIRITY OF DOnECANESE 

5 Static Bns. 

1 Inf. Me. as reserve 

12. CObMITMENT IF TURKEY ENTERC THE TAR 

2 Ard. Divs. 

13. SECURITY IN NORTH AFRlCA 

Morccco* 

Tunisia and Algeria 

Tr ipolitania 

Cyrena ica 

Levant and Cyprus 

AN0 LEVANT 

2 divisions 

2 divisions 

1 division 

1 division 

2-1/3 divisions 

8-1/3 divisions 

14. The total liabilities as shown above will therefore be a total of 

22 - 25 divisims, made up as follows:-

Equivalent Divisions 

British us.French 

Sicily, Toe and ke,I of Italy 1-2/3 - -

Enforcement of Armistice 

Central Italy 

Sardinia 

Corsica 

Security N. Africa and Levant 

Ddecanese 

Durazzo bridgehead 

Commitment for Turkey 

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15. When this liability is subtracted from the assets shown in paragraph 1, there will he available in the Mediterranean as reserve and for 

other employment :­ 5 American Divisions 

4 - 7 British Divisions 

1 French Division 

Total 10 - 13 Divisions. 

APPENDIX “B” 

BRITISH AND AMERICAN AIR FORCES 

AVAILABLE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

-

Type British u. 

-

s. Total

- Sqns . A/c Sqns . A/c Sqns . A/c 

S.E.F. 48 768 27 575 75 1443 

T.E.F. (D) 4 64 9 225 13 289 

T.E.F. (N) 7 112 4 64 11 176 

L.B. 8 128 12 192 20 320 

M.B.(D) - - 28 448 28 448 

M.B. (N) 6 120 - - 6 120 

H.B. (D) - - 24 288 24 288 

H.B. (N) 2 32 - - 2 32 

Transport 3 48 28 364 31 412 

Army Co-op. 5 80 2 36 7? 116 ? 

B4SIS OF COMPUTATION 

British 

M.B. (N) 

All other sqns. 

u. s. 

S.E.F. ) 

T.E.F.(D) ) 

L.B. ) 

M.B. (D) ) 

H.B. (D) 

Transport 

20 aircraft. 

16 aircraft. 

25 aircraft. 

16 aircraft. 

12 aircraft. 

13 aircraft. 

Army Co-op. 18 aircraft. 

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FIGHTER 

Levant 

Egypt 

Cyrenaica 

Tripolitania 

Tunisia 

Sicily 

Malta 

Reggio 

Crotone 

Hee 1 

Durazza 

Y. Italy 

C. Italy 

Dodecanese 

Sardinia & Corsica 

Algeria lk Morocco 

TOTAL 

FORCE NECESSARY FOR DEFENCE ON 

CONCLUSION OF OPERATIONS 

-

S.E.F. T.E.F. (N)

1 ­

3 w 

3 H 

- ­

2 'h 

2 1 

1 y1 

1 -

1 -

4 w 

4 1 

12 3 

10 1 

3 ?4 

5 1 

2 1 - 54 6 11 

COMMIT~hiENT TO TURKEY 

HARDIHOOD I 

S.E.F. 

T.E.F.(D) 

T.E.F.(N) 

L.B. 

Fflecce . (G.R. 

17 

1 

1 

3 

2 

1) 

HARDIHOOD II 

S.E.F. 7 

H.B. 12 

(G.R. 1) 

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C ONC LUS ION 

Apart from S.E.F. squadrons (of which there would be a small 

deficit) and transport aircraft. the same forces as those detailed 

in para. 52 of the paper would be available for transfer to U. K., 

though there might not be sufficient time to take full advantage of 

this before April, 1944. 

* If a threat to Spanish Morocco develops, a further 2-1/3 divisions 

will be required. 

** Rome area covered by Central Italy comnitment. 

101 
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C.C.S. 235 

DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE 

(Concentration of Largest Possible Force in U. K.) 

References : 

CCS 85th Meeting, Item (4) 

CCS 88th keting, Item (3) 

4th White House keting, Item (3) 

5th White House Meeting 

Pursuant to a directive in the C.C.S. 85th Meeting, the subject 

paper prepared by the U. S. Planners in consultation with the Rritish 

Planners was circulated 18 May 1943. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered C.C.S. 235 together with 

a British paper, prepared in consultation with the U. S. Planners 

(C.C.S. 234) in their 88th Meeting and agreed upon certain resolutions 

which were circulated as C.C.S. 237 (Revised in C.C.S. 237/1), and 

which are also incluled in C.C.S. 242/6. 

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C.C.S. 235 18 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

DEFEAT OF AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE 

(Concentration of Largest Possible Force in U.K.) 

Previous reference: C.C.S. 85th Mtg., Item 4 a (1) 

Note by the Secretaries 

The attached memorandum by the U. S. Joint Staff Planners, 

prepared after consultation with the British Joint Planning Staff, 

contains a plan for the defeat of Germany shming the course of operations and their feasibility by concentrating the biggest possible 

invasion force in the U. K. as soon as possible. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secre'tar iat. 

DEFEAT OF GERMANY FROM THE UNITED KINGDmOM 

PROBLEM 

1. To present a plan for the defeat of GERMNY (showing the course 

of operations and their feasibility) by concentrating on the biggest 

possible invasion force in the UNITED KINGDOM as soon as possible. 

ASSUMPTIONS, 1943-44 

2. a. RUSSIA remains an effective Ally in the war and is containing 

the bulk of the Cermn forces. She is at peace with JAPAN. 

b. No amphibious operations will be undertaken in the MEDITERRANEAN area subsequent to HUSKY. 

c. HfJSKY starts on the date at present planned and all organized 

opposition in the island ceases by 31 August. Landing craft can be 

released by 15 August for movement to other areas for further operations by 15 August. 

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d. SICKLE continues at full scale as planned. 

e. Air operations in the MEDITERRANEAN area will be limited to 

the protection of shipping and the bombing of ITALY and other remunerative AXIS targets. 

f. SPAIN remains neutral. 

g. TURKEY is either neutral or an active Ally. 

OBJECTIVE 

3. The decisive defeat of the AXIS Pomrs in EUROPE as early as 

practicable. 

GENERAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 

EUROPEAN - MEDITERRANEAN AREA, 1943-44 

4. To attain this objective we believe that the courses of action 

out lined below are essentia 1: 

a. SICKLE, and the bonber offensive from the UNITED KINGDOM. 

b BOLERO, in order to achieve the primary objective, ROUNDUP, 

in the spring of 1944. 

c. Keep RUSSIA in the war. 

d. MEDITERRANEAN air operations after HUSKY must not prejudice 

SICKLE, the bomber offensive from the UNITED KINGDOM, BOLERO, and 

ROUNDI.JP. 

5. A sound strategic concept for the defeat of GERWNY at the earliest possible date can only be developed after careful analysis of 

existing and anticipated conditions in the entire European-MEDITERRANEAN 

area in 1943-44. Our strategic concept is firmly based on such an 

asse~sment,and accepts the follcwing premises: 

a. Defeat of the Western AXIS by means of an invasion from the 

MEDITERRANEAN is unsound strategically and logistically. 

b. The UNITED KINGDOM is an unparalleled base from which to create 

conditions for a successful landing on the Continent and to launch 

the decisive invasim of the Fortress of EUROPE. 

c. GERMANY intends to concentrate on the defeat of the Russian 

armed forces in 1943. hly a major threat from another direction 

will divert GERMNY from this purpose, as she is fully conscious that 

failure on the Russian Front means her ultimate defeat by the UNITED 

NATIONS. The minor operations in the MEDITERRANEAN which could be 

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conducted after HUSKY, within the limited capbilities of the UNITED 

NATIONS, even if they resulted in the defection or collapse of ITALY, 

would he of lesser importance to GERMANY than the defeat of RUSSIA. 

The UNITED ST4TES and British forces are incapable of interfering 

seriously; by Military action other than air. with AXIS operations 

against RUSSI4 in 1943. GERMANY will. either fail or succeed in 

RUSSIA this sumer. 

d. We believe that RUSSIA will continue to require the major part 

of the AXIS effort in 1944. The heavy pressure on the AXIS by the 

Russian armies, together with the devastating results of an overwhelming and uninterrupted bomber offensive from the UNITED KINGDOM, 

AFRICA, and SICILY, will create a situation favorable for ROUNDUP 

in April 1944. 

e. We further believe: that the elimination of ITALY is not a 

prerequisite for the creation of corditions favorable for ROUNDUP; 

that the elimination of ITALY may possibly be brought about without 

need of further amphibious operations in the MEDITERRANEAN, by a 

successful HUSKY and an intensified bomber offensive against ITALY-­

in fact Italian defection might precede HUSKY; that if, after HUSKY, 

ITALY has not surrendered or collapsed, the advantage6 to be gained 

in eliminating ITALY by conducting further amphibious operations 

are not worth the cost in forces, shipping, amphibious equipment, 

and time: that secondary operations after HUSKY to eliminate ITALY 

will have a drastic effect in forces, shipping amphibious equipmnt, 

and time on our main effort--SICKLE, the bomber offensiw, BOLERO, 

and ROUNDUP. 

f. Experience in TORCH and in prepration for HUSKY has shown 

that once an operation, even though admittedly secondary, is directed, the desire to insure its success leads to increasing demnds 

for greater and greater forces. Such would undoubtedly be the case 

with secondary operations in the MEDITERRANEAN after HUSKY, especially if directed against ITALY. The additional force6 can only he 

provided at the direct expense of SICKLE, BOLERO, and ROUNDUP. 

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AXIS CAPABILITIES IN THE SPRING OF 1944 

(Reference C.I.C. 24, 16 May 1943) 

GENERAL 

6. GERMANY will be increasingly war weary and will he faced with an 

economy ipadequate to a prolonged war, resulting, amohg other things, 

in the armed forces heginning to experience shortages in supply. The 

presence of RUSSIA on the East and the Allied threat on the West will 

prevent the hoped for remanning of industry by men released from the 

armed forces. Her total number of divisions will remain approximately 

static, hut they will he under strength. Cur build-up in the UNITED 

KINGDOM will offer for the first time a positive threat of a war on a 

second front. While this buil~d-upis being effected, the hombe,r offensive will he carrying the striking power of the UNITED NATIONS to the 

Gertmns and creating conditions favorable for a successful invasion. 

GROUND FORCES 

7. In the spring of 1944, German ground forces my he'e'stimated at 

about 280 combat divisions, which could be distributed as follows: 

Eastern Front (including FINLAND) 195 

NORWAY 11 

POLAND 2 

DENMARK 2 

Southeastern EUROPE 11 

FRANCE and Low Countries 32 (1/3 ref it ting) 

GERMANY (Strategic reserve,) 27 (1/3 re.­

fitting) 

8. An attack against the European coast would be nmt by coastal 

divisions varying, with the area attacked, from 2 - 3 to 3 - 5. The 

mobile reserves of 2 to 4 divisions could hegin to arrive afte,r 24 

hours, hut the movement of these divisions can reasonably he expected 

to be delayed hy aerial actim. 

9. The strategic reserve in GERMANY will total a maximum of 18 understrength divisions. Units could begin to arrive in 4 days and the total 

could be in FRANCE, hut not in the areas of operations, in 3-1/2 weeks. 

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If this movement were not undertaken prior to our attack, it would 

require 5 weeks to complete the move to FRANCE. If units could be 

spared from the Eastern Front, the first division would arrive in 14 

days and 2 each week thereafter. Continued air attack on these units 

while enroute will materially reduce their combat effectiveness. 

AIR FORCES 

10. The number of airplane,s is difficult to determine, but after 

planes have been allocated to the Russian Front, it is estimated that 

there will be 2050 planes available for all other areas. 

11. It is estimated that on 1 May 1944 there will be 950 combat 

airplanes in FRANCE and the Low Countries. The,se might be reinforced 

imdiately by 100 additional planes. Within a week, 450 planes probably could be concentrated in the area giving a total of 1500 planes, 

assuming no losses. Further reinforcements would depend on GERNANY’S 

will to strip the Russian Front, but in any event the absolute number 

of German planer is of relatively minor importance due to the UNITED 

NATIONS’ preponderance (8 to 1) of air pauer, in the UNITED KINGDOM. 

NAVAL FORCES 

12. An invasion would probably be opposed at sea by 70 E-boats, 17 

destroyers, 30 torpedo boats, and a large but indeterminate number of 

submarines. 

SLIMMARY 

13. A cross-Channel assault would be faced, initially, with from 2 

to 5 coastal defense divisions which might be reinforced by 2 to 4 

mobile divisions after a minimum of 24 hours. A minimum delay of from 

3 to 5 weeks can be expected before the 18 understrength divisions in 

GERMANY could be moved to FRANCE. Additional time would be required to 

move them to the combat zone. 

14. Our overwhelming air superiority (8 to 1) could seriously delay, 

or even prevent, the arrival of reserves, if not eliminate them entirely 

from early arrival in combat. This applies equally to the mobile 

reserves in FRANCE as well as to the 18 understrength divisions in 

GERMNY. Therefore, 3 to 4 ccestal divisions must be defeated initially 

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U.S. SECRET 

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and a build-up effected to face a reinforcemnt of 2 to 4 divisions 

which may arrive in a depleted and disorganized condition, as a result 

of our air attacks. After 30 to 60 days, GERMANY might be in a position 

to face us with a maximum of 15 - 20 understrength divisions. At this 

time their air strength would be negligible unless they chose to strip 

other areas inclding the Russian Fr0r.t. 

CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION 

TARGET DATE 

15. Because 1 April 1944 coincides with the comp1.etion of the 4th 

phase of the Allied bomber offensive against GERMANY, and is the earliest date on which the weather becomes favorable for a cross-Channel 

operation: it should be accepted for planning purposes as the date on 

which we must he prepared to re-enter the Continent. The continued 

examination of the re'sults of the bomber offensive and the integration 

of its effects with other factors, including events on the Russian 

Front and in the MEDITERRANEAN, will enable the UNITED NATIONS to de'­

cide by November, 1943, if a change in the proposed target date should 

be necessary. 

GENERAL CONCEPT 

16. The Chief of Staff of the Supre,m Comander for cross-Channel 

operations has been directed to stdy and pre'pre plans for invasion 

at any time with whatever forces may be available. This planning is 

proceeding, but has not yet progre'ssed to a full study of ROUNDUP. 

Lacking complete examination of this problem, only the hrcader aspects 

of a plan can be pre'sented. Detailed examination may there'fore resul~t 

in some mdifications to the plan presented herewith. 

17. In general, it is proposed that an operation be conducted to 

secure a lodgment in the north of FRANCE. It is estimated that ten 

divisions will be required for the initial cross-Channel movement, and 

that sufficient amphibious assault craft will he availabJe to float 

those required in the initial assault provided those nav in the MEDITERRANEAN are moved to the UNITED KINGDOM on the completion of HUSKY, an3 

that no other major amphibious operations in the MEDITERRANEAN are 

undertaken. Thereafter, a build-up of forces be accomplished at the 

109 
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maximum rate consistent with available port capacities together with 

an exploitation of the lcdgment to secure additional ports and air 

bases. When a sufficient build-up of forces and the organization of 

logistical establishments have been accomplished, and when the effects 

of the air offensive has been reflected in decreased German resistance, 

the advance to the kart of the German citadel can be accomplished. 

AVAILABILITY OF UNITED NATIONS FORCES 

AIR FORCES 

18. The U.S.A.A.F. program and the R.A.F. projected order of battle 

for April, 1944, is indicated below. The U.S.A.A.F. must be given 

first priority on shipping if the bomber offensive program is to be 

accomplished. 

U.S.A.A.F. R.A.F. 

Aircraft Aircraft 

(U.E.) Squadrons (U.E.) 

Heavy Bombers 51 2448 80 1600 

Medium Bombers 9 576 12 240-

Light and Dive Bombers 13 832 13 260 

Bomber Reconn. 1 14 

Day Fighter 25 2500 62 1116 

Night Fighter 19 412 

Fighter Reconn. 15 231 

Army Support (Fighters) 8 112 

Army Support (Bombers) 4 56 

Fkto Reconn. 2 168 5 100 

Cbservat ion 4 336 10 160 

Air/Sea Rescue 8% 170 

Transport 8?h 442 -

7 -

1 90 

112% 7302 244% 4661 

GROUND FORCES 

19. If comnitments to other theate.rs remain at the 1943 leve,l there 

will be available in the UNITED STATES, through 1944. more divisions 

than can be shipped to the UNITED KINGDOM. After HUSKY, 6 additional 

U. S divisions in the MEDITERRANEAN will be available for use e,lsewhere. 

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20. The British will have 10 offensive divisions available in the 

UNITED KINGWM by October, 1943. This may be increased to 14 divisions 

by 1 April 1944. After HUSKY, 11 additional British divisions in the 

MEDITHRANEAN will be available for use elsewhere. 

BUILD-UP IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 

21. The build-up in the UNITED KINGDOM for a cross-Channel operation 

can be obtained by the movement of forces from the UNITED STATES only, 

or by moving troops from the UNITED STATES and transferring surplus 

U. S. and British formations frow NORTH AFRICA. The two methods of 

build-up are indicated below (priority on shipping has been given to 

the air force units and provides for completion of U.S.A.A.F. build-up 

by May, 1944). These figures are based on British estimates of the 

numbers that can be processed through U. K. ports rather than on a 

larger nunher which can actually be moved by available shipping. 

BUILD-UP (DNS.) FROM THE UNITED STATES ONLY (SEE APPENDIX “A”) 

1 Oft 1 Jan 1 Apr 1 Jul 1 Oct 1 Jan 

-1943 1944 1944 1944 1944 1945 

u. s. 7 13 20 25 28 31 

British 10 -

1c -14’ -

14 -14 -

14 

Total 17 23 34 39 42 45 

22. It is reasonable to assume that operations have secured continental ports through which troops and cargo may pass, and that the 

flaw through U. K. ports has been increased, thus permitting the following build-up: 

1 Jul 1 ckt 1 Jan 

1944 1944 1945 

Total divisions 43 50 64 

* These 4 additional British divisions are dependent on the present 

program of conversion of defensive divisions to an offensive type. 

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23. BUILD-UP (DIVS.) FROM THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH AFRICA (SEE 

APPENDIX “A ”) 

1 a-t 1 Jan 1 Apr 1 Jul 1 Oct 1 Jan 

1943 1944 1944 1944 -

1944 -1945 

u. s. 6 8 10 18 24 27 

British -

10 -14 -24 -25 -25 -25

Total 16 22 34 43 49 52 

These figures are based on what the British have indicated can he 

processed through U. K. ports and not on the availability of shipping. 

The latter would permit a material increase in the build-up indicated 

were it not for the limitations imposed by the port capacities of the 

UNITED KINGDOM. 

24. The second method of build-up, fron: the UNITED STATES and NORTH 

AFRICA is presented because of the desirability of using battle seasoned 

units for the initial cross-Channel operations. Units can be founc! in 

the MEDITERRANEAN that are not only composed of veterans, hut that have 

also participated in large scale amphibious operations. 

AMPHIBIOL’S ASSAULT CRAFT 

25. Appendix ‘’ B” lists the amphibious assault craft which wi 11 be 

available after HUSKY. and also after each of two major amphibious 

operations subsequent to HUSKY, if such operations are conducted. 

GARR EONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

26. Froposed garrisons in the MEDITERRANEAN are contained in Appendix 

I, c. .. 

EFFECT OF OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO HUSKY 

ON ROUNDUP AND SICKLE 

GROUND FORCES 

27. If major operations, other than by air are undertaken in the 

MEDITERRANEAN after the successful completion of HUSKY, no ground 

forces may be released for BOLERO until after the collapse of ITALY. 

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28. Such operations may interfere seriously with ROUNDUP if shipping 

available for BOLERO has to be diverted to reinforce and support the 

forces engaged in the MEDITERRANEAN. 

29. The tive required to gain the ohiective of the MEDITERRANEAN 

operations--the collapse of ITAL.Y--is indefinite. Success cannot be 

exppcted before 1 January 1944. After that date sufficient time remains 

to move two divisions from the MEDITERRANEAN to the L'NITED KINGMOM befrre the target date selected for RCL'NDZIP, but there can be no assurance 

that shipping wi 1.1 be available. ROL~NDL'P would prohahly be deprived, 

therefore, of battle-experienced troops. 

3C. Little would be gained in the build-up following ROUNDUP by 

moving any other available forces from the MFDITERRANEAN to the UNITED 

KINGDOM over the moverrent of sirrilar numbers frorr the L'NITED STATES. 

AIR FORCES 

31. After providing for an air offensive aeainst ITALY, convoy protection. and defense. about 9CC covbat aircraft and 250 transports will 

be available and could be moved to the UNITED KINGDCN followine the 

completion of HUSKY. Hmever. if further advances are undertaken, all 

aircraft errployed at the time of IlVSKY will remain in the MEDITERRANEAN 

until offensive operations are corrpleted. P.11 of the fighters (550). 

most of which are first line, and 250 transports, sufficient to lift 

two parachute regirrents simultaneously, would be retained in the MEDI7ERRANEAN for garrison and supply of additionally ocrupied area%. Cnly 

light bombers and special purpose airplanes (about 35C) could be released for transfer to the UNITED KINGDOM. 

AMPFIBIOUS ASSAU1.T CRAFT (SEE APPENDIX " B ") 

32. If no operations are conducted subsequent to HUSKY. the number 

of amphibious assault craft available for RCL'NDCP will total 4,657 of 

all types. 

33. After one major arphibious operation subsequent to HUSKY. the 

total will be reduced to 3,54C, or 76 percent of the maximum. 

34. A second major amphibious opcration subsequent to PL'SKY will 

reduce the total to 2.461 or 53 percent of the total. 

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35. If the second operation is not undertaken until the middle of 

November 1943, the amphibious assault craft remaining cannot arrive in 

the UNITED KIWWM until about 1 March 1944. 

36. It is probable that the amphibious assault craft available after 

HUSKY will not meet fully the maximum vehicle requirements of a large 

scale ROUNDUP. It is apparent, therefore, that any lesser number would 

be entirely inadequate. 

CONCLUSIONS 

37. After HUSKY. the main effort of the UNITED NATIONS should be 

concentrated on executing SICKLE, the bomber offensive, BOLERO, and 

ROLINWP . 

38. The planning date for RWNDUP should be 1 April 1944. 

39. The launching of a RWNDUP operation about 1 April 1944 is considered entirely feasible, and the movement of UNITED STATES and British 

resources to the UNITED KIhGLQM, therefore, should be executed. 

40. Cperations in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY should be 

limited to the air offensive, because any other operations would use 

resources vital to ROUNDUP and present the risk of a limitless commitment of UNITED NATIONS resources to the MEDITERRANEAN vacuum, thus 

needlessly prolonging the war. 

APPENDIX “A” 

BUILD-UP IN THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR 

CROSS -CHANNEL OPERATIONS 

1. The build-up in the UNITED KINGDOM for cross-Channel operations 

can be accomplished by two methods: 

a. The movement of forces from the UNITED STATES only. 

b. The movement of forces fran the UNITED STATES and the transfer 

of all excess U. S. and British units from NORTH AFRICA. 

114 
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The results of these two methods are indicated below: 

BUILD-UP FROM THE UNITED STATES ONLY 

2. Cargo shipping will be available to move and maintain troops up 

to the limit of troopship capacity. 

3. Reckoning the initial movement requirements at 7 ship tons per 

Fan, monthly maintenance at 1 ship ton per man, and the strength for a 

division at 40,000 men and replacements at 4,000 men per month until 

1 April 1944, after that time at 5 percent per quarter, the following 

build-up of U. S. forces in the UNITED KINGDOM from the UNITED STATES 

can be obtained (all figures are cumulative). Army Air Force units are 

given priority Over ground forces. 

1 July 1943 

1 Ckt 1943 

1 Jan 1944 

1 Apr 1944 

1 July 1944 

1 Ckt 1944 

1 Jan 1945 

BUILD-UP IN 

Total 

In the, U.K. 

180,700 

449.7CO 

783,700 

1,180.000 

1,409,000 

1,553,000 

1,646.000 

PERSONNEL 

-Air 

117.800 

170,000 

278,000 

390.000 

406,000 

406,000 

406.000 

Ground 

62,900 

279,700 

505,700 

750,000 

1,003.000 

1,147,000 

1,240,000 

-

Div .

1 

7 

13 

20 

25 

28 

31 

4. The total U. S. and British divisions that will be available in 

the UNITED KINGCOM for cross-Channel operations are indicated below: 

1 July 1 Jan 1 Jan 

1943 1944 1 Apr 1 July 1 Ckt 1945 

u. s. 1 7 13 20 25 28 31 

British -

4 -

10 -

10 -

14* -14* -

14* -14*

Total 5 17 23 34 39 42 45 

*These 4 additional British divisions are dependent on the present 

program of conversion of defensive divisions to an offensive type. 

The figure may later be revised either up ar down. 

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5. If operations have secured continental ports through which troops 

and cargo may pass or if the flow through the UNITED KINGDOH ports 

should be increased, the build-up under troop lift restrictions could 

increase the above by the number of divisions indicated below: 

1 lulv 1944 4 Divisions 

1 October 1944 11 Divisions 

1 .January 1945 19 Divisions 

6. The information in paragraph 3 above is based on what the British 

have indicated can be processed through U. K. ports and not on the 

availability of shipping. The accomplishment of this build-up will 

require Army Service Force troops in Tune and Iuly to operate 16.CGG.OOC 

square feet of depot space, now in existence for U. S. Forces, at maximm. capacity. Port battalions must be furnished to discharge additional 

cargo ships arriving from August onward. Engineer construction units 

must be provided in August and September to allow the completion of 4 

new depots by December for handling increased tonnage. 

7. A time lag of 4 weeks should be allowed between the arrival of 

troops in the UWITED KINGDOM and the completion of the distribution of 

equipment to their units. It is also estimated that units should be in 

the UNITED KINGDOM 3 months prior to the initiation of operations to 

provide for the completion of the distribution of equipment, planning, 

training, rehearsals, and final organization. These allowances have not 

been made in stating the rrumber available on the various dates listed in 

the preceding paragraphs. 

BUILD-UP FROM THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH AFRICA 

8. After the completion of HL’SKY and the garrisoning of the MEDITERlWNEIw area. if no further operations are conducted in this theater, the 

fol1.owing units would be available for transfer elsewhere: 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

-AIR 

-

Type u. s. British Total

Rnr. A/c Sqns . A/c Sqns. A/c 

Fighter 16 400 9 144 25 544 

Fighter Recons. 2 36 2 32 4 68 

Light Romber 12 192 5 80 17 272 

P.R.U. 1 13 2 24 3 37 

Transport 2c 25C - - 20 258 

GROUND 

6 - U. S. divisions (including 1 A/B div.) 

11 - British divisions 

9. If the excess divisions are moved from NaRTH AFdICA to the UNITED 

KINCI)OM, the U. S. divisions will leave their equipment in NCRTH AFRICA 

for the French and mill be refitted in England. The British will carry 

their equiprent with them. The same information on the capabilities of 

British ports again applies. The air forces are given priority on 

shipping. The following build-up can be effected: 

BUILD-UP 

Total 

in the U.K. 

1 .ply 1943 180,700 

1 Cct 1943 415 700 

1 Jan 1944 656,300 

1 Apr 1944 844,700 

1 .rub 1944 1,195,700 

1 Oct 1944 1,418,700 

1 Jan 1945 1,560,700 

BUILD-UP 

It4 U. S. PERSONNEL 

-Air Ground ­Div. 

117,OOC 62,900 1 

l86.0CO 229.700 6 

332,000 324,300 8 

444,ccc 4CO.7CO 10 

460,OOC 735,700 18 

460,COO 958,700 24 

460,000 1,100,700 27 

IN BRITISH PERSONNEL 

Total Divs . moved a heady Total 

to the U.X. Air Ground Qiy. in the U.K. -

Divs . 1 Cct 1943 43,oco 8.000 35,oco 1 10 11 

1 Jan 1944 163,400 23,400 140.COO 4 10 14 

1 Apr 1944 389,SOC 23,4CO 360.100 1C 14 24 

1 July 1944 409,500 23,40C 386.lCC 11 14 25 

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10. The total U. S. and British divisions that will be available in 

the UNITED KINGDOM for cross-Channel oprations are idicated below: 

1 July 1 Oct 1 Jan 1 Apr 1 Jul 1 Oct 1 Jan 

-

1943 -1943 -

1944 -1944 -

1944 -1944 1945 

u. s. 1 6 8 10 18 24 27 

British - 11 14 24* 25* 25 * 25 * - - - - - - - Total l? 17 22 34 43 49 52 

* Four additional British divisions have been added as an increase in 

the UNITED KINGDOM. This comes from the conversion of defensive divisions to an offensive role. The figure my later be revised either up 

or dorrn. 

11. The figures given above are also based on what the British have 

indicated can be accepted through UNITED KINGWM ports, and not on the 

availability of shipping. The latter would allow an increase in the 

number of units. 

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APPENDIX B *’ 

DEFEAT OF GERMANY FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT CRAFT THAT CAN BE IN 

THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1 APRIL 1944 

No operation subsequent to HUSKY One opera- Two operation subse- tions subseU.K. provide U.S. provide Total quent to quent to 

HUSKY HUSKY 

18 18 15 12 

4 4 4 3 

5 5 4 3 

25 25 25 24 

3 3 2 2 

4 4 3 3 

2 2 2 2 

3 3 3 2 

24 24 15 6 

327 327 267 207 

180 180 140 100 

32 32 32 32 

465 465 329 193 

80 80 68 56 

24 24 24 24 

28 28 20 12 

12 12 12 12 

89 89 77 65 

32 32 16 0 

19 19 9 0 

380 380 380 380 

408 408 408 408 

200 200 200 200 

48 116 164 136 108 

5 5 5 5 

89 122 211 161 111 

136 250* 386 228 70 

103 95 198 80 0 

283 283 240 197 

221 800* 1021 621 221 

-

25 - -

25 -

14 3 

3242 1415 4657 3540 2461 

* Shject to some further increase, if required. 

NOTE: (1) APA’s and AKA’S are additive to the above. 

(2) Attrition allowed for subsequent operations isassumed the same 

as HUSKY. 

(3) U.S. figures have had a 3 months’ slippage applied to insure 

availability in U.K. 

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APPENDIX “C” 

MEDITERRANEAN GARRISONS FOLLOWING A SUCCESSFUL HUSKY 

1. Following a successful HUSKY, and provided no further maior amphibious operations are undertaken, garrisons in the NEDITERRANEAN will 

be required as follows: 

a. GROUND FQRCFS 

FRENCH MOROCCO 

ALGERIA and TUNISIA 

SICILY 

TRIPOLITANIA 

CYRENAICh 

EGYPT, LEVANT STATES, 

AND CYPRUS 

(Includes cmitment 

for the defense 

of TURKEY) 

7WAL 

b. AIR FORCE‘S 

3 U. S. and 4 French divisions 

2 U. S. or British divisions (Other 

French forces not listed will 

be available for local security 

in French African possessions.) 

4 U. S. or British divisions 

1 British division 

1 British division 

6 British divisions 

21 divisions 

MS. 

2% A/c 

20 500 

24 3 84 

20 240 

8 104 

* British A/c 

39 624 

3 4e 

6 120 

2 32 

3 48 

3 48 

Fighters 

L. B. 

M.B. 

H.B. 

Transport 

Army Coop. 

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C.C.S. 237/1 

DRAFT RESOLUTIONS BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

References: 

CCS 88th Meeting, Item (3) 

CCS 89th Meeting, Item (1) 

C.C.S. 237 circulated the draft resolutions determined by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 88th Meeting during the discussion 

of C.C.S. 234 and C.C.S. 235. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered these draft resolutions 

in their 89th Meeting and agreed upon certain amendments which are 

incorporated in C.C.S. 237/1, and which are also included in C.C.S. 

242/6. 

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C.C.S. 237/1 20 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

RESOLUTIONS BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

(European Operations) 

Reference: C.C.S. 89th Meeting, Item 1 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: 

Re 6 olved : 

a. That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom 

with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 Hay 1944 

to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive 

operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be 

such as to necessitate the follaving forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944: 

Assault: 5 Infantry Divisions (Simultaneously loaded 

in landing craft) 

2 Infantry Divisions - Follow-up 

_1Airborne Divisions 

Total: 9 Divisions in the Assault 

Bui Id-up: 20 Divisions available for movement into lcdgment 

- area 

Total: 29 Divisions 

b. That the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, should be instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as are best 

calculated to eliminate Italy from the war ad to cantain the maximum 

number of German forces. Zach specific operation will be subject to 

the approval of the Canbined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander 

in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations a11 those forces 

available in the Mediterranean area except for four American and 

three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 NOvember onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the 

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United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be 

approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for 

HUSKY will not be considered available. 

C. The above resolution shall be reviewed by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff at a meting in July or early in August, the date to be decided 

later, in order that the situation may be examined in the light of 

the result of HUSKY ad the situation in Russia. 

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C.C.S. 238 

OPERATIOXS IN BURMA 1943-44 

References: 

CCS 91st Meeting 

4th White House Meeting, Item. (41 

5th White House Meeting 

C.C.S. 238 circulated 19 May 1943 the Combined Staff Planners' 

comments on C.C.S. 229 and C.C.S. 231. 

The Ccmbined Chiefs of Staff considered this paper together with 

C.C.S. 229 (Fotentialities of Air Route from Assam to China) and C.C.S. 

231 (Operations in !3urma. to Open and Secure an Cverland Route to 

China). Action on these subjects was taken in the hiinutes of the 91st 

hieeting which also directed that C.C.S. 229, C.C.S. 231, and C.C.S. 

238 be withdrawn from the agenda; therefore,these papers are not published in this volume. The final action on the subject contained in 

C.C.S. 238 was included in C.C.S. 242/6. 

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C.C.S. 2391’1 

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44 

References : 

CCS 92nd Meeting, Item (4) 

4th White House Meeting, Item (5) 

C.C.S. 239 WRS circulated 20 May 1943 for consideration of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

In their 92nd Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved 

C.C.S. 239 subject to certain amendments which ere incorporated in the 

amended version subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 239/1. The conclusions 

of C.C.S. 239/1 are included in C.C.S. 242/6. 

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C.C.S. 239/1 23 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAK EAST IN 1943-44 

Reference: a. C.C.S.220 

b. C.C.S. 92nd Mtg., Item 4 

Note by the Secretaries 

1. The enclosed report by the UniteJStates Joint Staff Flanners, 

in the form as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in 

their 92nd Meeting, is circulited for the information of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. 

2. The operations set forth in this paper are in support of the overall " Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan" as set forth in C.C.S. 

22C, already noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This phn for 1943­

1944 operations is based on the premises: 

a. That China must be retained as a base for operations against 

Japan 

b. Thnt Jnpinese lines of comnunication must be subjected to cmtinuous attack. 

c. That Japanese Military forces nwst be subjected to continuous 

and increasing pressure to prevent conyolidation and to effect attrition on Japanese Military power. 

d. That positions must be secured in readiness for full-scale 

operations when such operations can be undertaken. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat 

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OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44 

1. An analysis has been made of possible UNITED NATIONS courses of 

action in the PACIFIC-Asiatic area in 1943 and 1944 to conform to the 

objectives set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 219. The 

analysis is contained in Enclosure "A". 

2. The courses of action examined and conclusions reached are es 

f01lows: 

a. Far Eastern Theater 

(1) Operations in BURMA to augment supplies to CHINA. 

Vital to implementing the strategic plan for the defeat of 

JAPAN and to kreping CHINA in the war. 

(2) Air Operations in and from CHINA 

Close coordination with other elements of plan are essential. 

b. PACIFIC Theater 

(1) Operations in the SOLOMONS and BTSNARCK ARCHIPEIACO 

Provides for retaining the initiative, maintaining pressu-r 

on JAPAN, and the defense of AUSTRALIA. 

(2) Operations in NEW GUINEA 

The -7pture of NEWGUINEA will facilitate the opening of a 

line of communications to the CELEBES SEA and contribute to the 

defLnse of AUSTRALIA. 

(3) Operations in eastern NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES 

Due to limitation of forces, operations other than air warfare should be restricted to the seizure of those islands necessary to the capture of NEW GIJINEA. 

(4) Operations in the MARSHALL ISLANDS 

Shortens line of communications to SOUTHWEST PACIFIC and 

CELEBES SEA. 

(5) Operations in thr CAFOLINE ISLANDS 

Necessary to gain control of Central PACIFIC, thereby facilitating establishment of line of communications to CELERES SEA. 

Will enable UNITED NATIONS forces to directly threaten the Japanese Archipelago. 

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(6) Intensification of Operations against Fnemy Lines of Communication. 

All thc foregoingoperations are essential to the attainment 

of positions wliich enable the intensification end expansion of 

attacks on the enemy lines of communication in the Pacific. 

3. CONCLUSIONS: 

a. Offensive operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST in 1943-1944 

should have the following objectives: 

(1) Condrict of air operations in and from CHINA. 

(2) Operations in BURMA to augment supplies to CHINA. 

(3) Ejection of the Japmese from the AlElrTIANS. 

(4) Seiziire of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLAKES. 

(5) Seizure of the SOLOMONS, the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO. and Japanese held NEW CL'INFA . 

C6) Intensification of operatio,is against enemy lines of communication. 

h. Operations to gain these objectives will be restricted by the 

availability of trained emphibious divisions and amphibious craft. 

ENCLOSURE ''A" 

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44 

STATEbENT OF THE PROBLEM 

1. To prepare an analysis of possible UNITED NATIONS courses of action in the PACIFIC-Asintic area in 1943 and 1944, in :onformity with 

UNITED PATIONS strategy. 

ASSUMPTIONS 

2. It is ?ssumed that: 

a. CHINA will continue in the war against JAPAN. 

h. It is the intention of JAPAN to invade SIBERIA at a time rdvintqgeous to her and disrdvantageous to RUSSIA, and before GFRNANY 

is defeated. 

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3. After a thorough estimate of the situation for 1943-44 was made 

it was concluded that in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST: 

a. The UNITED NATIONS should conduct limited offensive operations 

in order to maintain pressure on JAPAN. retain the initiative, and 

attain or retain positions of readiness for a full-scale offensive 

against JAPAN, and in order to keep CHINA in the war. 

b. For these purposes, UNITED STATES Naval forces should be increased to a maxirum consistent with the minimum requirements in the 

ATLANTIC, and with due regard to the requirements of the main effort 

against the European AXIS, air and ground forces should he provided 

so as to facilitate joint action and nake optimum use of the increasing strength of UNITED STATES Naval forces. 

4. C.C.S. 220 sets forth a strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN. 

Rased on this strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN, the following 

courses of action are open to the UNITED NATIONS: 

a. In the Asiatic Theater: 

(1) Operations ANAXIM and Revised ANAKIM. 

(2) Air operations in and from CHINA. 

b. In the PACIFIC Theater: 

(1) Operations in the SOLOJlONS and in the BISJ!ARCK ARCHIPELAGO. 

(2) Operations in NEW GUINEA. 

(3) Operations in the eastern NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. 

(4) Operations in the MARSHALL ISLANDS. 

(5) Operations in the CAROLINE ISLANDS. 

(6) Operations in the northern PACIFIC. 

PART I 

OPERATIONS IN ASIA 

5. @perations in BVR#A 

These operations have been considered in other papers. 

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6. Air Operations in and from CHINA 

a. General examination of this course of action. 

(1) This course of action is suitable. 

(2) The feasibility of the current plan for air operations in 

CHINA is limited by the problem of supply. Air transport is the 

only route of supply leading into CHINA and air operationsin 

CHINA during 1943 and 1944 will expand in size and scope of operations, in direct proportion to the increase in the amountof 

supplies made ava:lable to the air force in CHINA. 

b. In the event that the operntion ANAXIM or 0 Revised ANAKIM is 

successful, it is estimated that supplies to CHINA will begin to move 

by land routes in approximately six months. A rapid expansion of the 

capacity of the air route will be immediately practicable,due to the 

added facilities available at the western terminus, and theexistence 

of more favorable operating conditions. 

c. Current plans for the air transport route to CHINA contemplate 

that its present capacity of approximately 3,000 tons per month mny 

be expanded to qproximately 10,000 tons per month by the end of 1943. 

d. The Commanding General, 14th Air Force, estimates that the 

forces required to conduct planned combet operations in CHINA are 

as follows: 

4 Fighter Groups 300 airplanes 

2 Medium Bomber Groups 114 .I 

1 Heavy Bomber Group 35 '8 

1 Reconn. Squadron -

24 .L 

TOTAJ. 473 airplnnes 

e. The Commanding Cenernl, 14th Air Force, estimates that this 

force can be operated on a monthly supply of 7,128 tons. This is only 

possible by cutting the ground echelon T/O approximately in half and 

utilizing local sources of supply to the utmost. 

f. It is believed that the operation of this force will accomplish 

the following objectives: 

(1) Subject the Japanese Air Force to a very costly attrition. 

(2) Permit sustained and damaging attacks against Japanese shipping on the YANGTSE RIVER, along the CHINA coast, and out to sea 

to include all of the islands of FORMOSA and HAINAN and the sea 

lane between JAPAN and SHANGHAI. 

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(3) Permit damaging air attack on Japanese industrial targets 

as far north as SHAN-HAI-KWAN and east to include NANKING, SHANGHAI, and the island of FORMOSA. 

(4) Permit limited bombardment attacks on the mainland of 

JAPAN. 

(5) Make extensive preparations for the eventual operation of 

large air forces to be used in the air offensive against JAPAN 

proper. 

(6) Give support to Chinese gr0Wd forces. 

g. Air operations in and from CHINA are considered a vital and 

necessary step in the “Strategic Plan for the Defeat of JAPAN,“ 

C.C.S. 220. The scale and tempo of the air operations must be carefully gauged 3s they progress, in the light of probable Japanese 

reaction. If advanced too rapidly they might precipitate a large 

scale land offensive by the Japanese in CHINA, at an earlier date 

than we conyider desirable. 

h. Following these limited operations, the large scale, sustained 

air offensive against JAPAN proper becomes feasible when supply 

routes to CHINA are developed to the point where the forces involved 

can be logistically maintained. This latter phase will undoubtedly 

require logistic support through a CHINA port in order that it may be 

conducted on the scale we contemplate. 

PART I1 

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC 

7. Operations in the SOLOMONS and in theEISNARCK ARCHIPELAGO. 

a. Operations nowDirected 

(1) Operations for the seizure of the SOLOMONS-BISMARCK ARCHIPELAW have been tinder way since July. 1942 (about nine months). 

The tasks prescribed by the latest directive of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff (28 March 1943) are quoted below: 

“ TASKS 

“4.(a) Establish air fields on KIRIWINA and WmOLZRK ISLANDS. 

(b) Seize LAE - SALAMAUA - FINSCHAFEN - MADANG area and 

occupy western NEW BRTTAIN. 

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(c) Seize and occupy SOL0,VOOF ISLANDS to include the southern portion of BOWAINVILLE. 

"5. Purposes To inflict losses on Jnpanese forces, to deny 

these areas to JAPAN, to contain Japnnese forces in the 

PACIFIC Theater by maintaining the initiative, nnd to prepare for the ultimate seizure of BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO." 

b. Present Status of Operations 

(1) Genernl 

The Supreme Comnnder, SWPA, given 15 June 1943 PS the target date for the occupation of KIRIWINA and WOODLARK TSUNDS. No 

date is indicnted for subsequent phnses of the entire operation. 

(2) Forces Required 

It is estimated that on 1 July 1943, UNITED NATIONS forces 

in the SOUTH nnd SOUTHWEST PACIFIC areas will total 14 offensive 

divisions and 2,106 combat aircraft. These forces, together with 

naval forces in the area, are considered adequate for the operations directed. 

(3) Time of Completion 

The exnct timing of the successive operations is impracticable ~t this time to predict, since the enemy reaction to the 

plans is indeterminate, nnd limited topographical intelligence 

may result in unexpected hindrances. The operations may run well 

into 1944. 

c. Subsequent Operations 

(1) Capture BISNARCK ARCHIPELAGO 

(a) Genernt 

UNITED NATIONS strategic plans envisage the capture of 

the RISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO (including ADNIRALTY ISLANDS) followthe completion of tasks indicated in paragraph a above. 

The existing concept of operations provides initially for 

the capture of KAVIENG, in order to isolate sea communications 

to RADAVL. After the establishment of airdromes in NEW BRITAIN 

and NEW IRELAND the defenses of RABAUL will be heavily attacked 

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by land-based aviation. When the enemy defenses are softened 

up, capture of the area will be made by two amphibious forces. 

One force will be mounted fron- the SOUTHWES7 PACIFICand one 

from the SOUTH PACIFIC. 

After the seizure of the NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND area, 

the ADMIR.4LTY ISLANDS can be neutralized by land-based aviation operating from NEW GllINE.4 and NEW PRITAIN. Seizure will 

be made by amphibious forces. 

(h) Forces Required 

The Supreme Commander, SWPA, estivates that 7 Infantry 

divisions, 5 of which ere amphibious, will be required to seize 

KAVIENC and capture RABAUL. It is believed, however that with 

effective Rir neutralization of the RABAUL area, the foregoing 

estimate may be reduced to 5 divisions, 3 of which would be 

amphibious. 

The timing of the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO 

will determine to a great extent the availability of ground 

forces. Provided there is sufficient time for reorganization 

snd recuperation of units, it appears the 5 divisions can be 

provided from the 1P offensive divisions allocated to the areR 

9s of 1 January 1944. This figure will be subject to revision 

after the operations now projected for the area get under way. 

The ground forces rewired for the successive operations in the 

BISMARCK-NEW GUIflEA area must take into account the losses from 

malaria and battle casualties which necessitate withdriwal of 

troops to rear areas for rehabilitation after four to six 

months . 

It appears that 2,579 cowbat aircraft allocated to the 

SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC as of 1 Tanuary 1944, will be sufficient to complete the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO. 

(c) Time Required for Operation 

Assuming the OKITED NATIOPS establish positions in western NEW RRITAlN and southern POUGAINVILLE by 1 December 1943, 

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it is estimated that, exclusive of medical rehabilitation of 

personnel, at least two months will be required to reorganize 

amphibious units, develop the advance air bases, and make the 

complete preparations for the amphibious attack on the RABAUL 

area. It is estimated that a minimum of two months will be required to complete the operations subsequent to the landing 

attack on RABAUL. From the foregoing, it appears that the mst 

optimistic estimates indicate that the BISMARCK operations cannot be completed before 1 April 1944. 

R. Operations in NEW GUINEA 

a. Capture NEW GUINEA 

After the seizure of the HUON PENINSULA and the capture of the 

of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, our strategic plans contemplate operations to extend our line of communications through the PACIFIC to the 

HALMAHERA-northwest CELEBES area. The control of NEW GUINEA to include the VOGELKOP area is obviously essential to accomplishing this 

objective. 

The concept of ocxratiDns for the seizure of NEW GUINEA envisages the projection of our line of comunications to the VOGrLKCJP 

region by the successive seizure of air bases along the north 2nd 

southwest coasts. 

The initial phases of operations along the north coast consiqt 

primarily of air-grnud action, covered by air and fleet operations 

to prevent interference by enemy counterattacks. Ground forces will 

be employed in the seiziire of air bases by shore-to-shore amphibious 

operations. 

In order to gain control of the ARAFURA-UANM seas and of the 

south coast of NEW GUINEA, it will be necessary to sej~zeAROE, KEI, 

and posn ibly TANIMBAR Is kid. 

b. The operations to capture NEW GUINEA will consist of two 

phases as fdlows: 

PHASE I 

(I) Seizure of north coast of NEW GUINEA to include CAPE 

D' LIRVILLE . 

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(2) Establishment of an air base on southwest coast of NEW 

GUINEA as a preliminary to seizure of the AROE Islands. Possible 

occupation of TANIMBAR Is land. 

PHASE XI 

(1) Capture of the VOCELKOP area to include the Island of 

WAIGEO . 

This phase will be qccomplished by the seizure of SCHOUTEN 

and JAPEN Islands on the north coast. The southern and western 

portion of the VOCELKOP will be seized after we have established 

positions in McCLUER GULF ad AMBOINA. 

c. The capture of NEW WINFA envisages a movement along the 

coast line 1,200 miles in length. The forces required for this 

operation, so distar,t in the future, cannot be estimated with 

any degree of accuracy. 4fter tk loss of the WON PENINSULA 

and the RABAUL area, the enemy my decide to withdraw to a more 

advantageous defensive position in the CELEBES SEA area. f)n the 

other hand, he may be able to build up his defenses in depth 

along the entire north coast. 

The extent of our control of the sea to the north of NEW 

GUINEA will in a great masure determine the ease with which we 

eject him from the area. 

d. Estimate of Enemy Forces 

(1) Ground forces 

It is estimated that the Japanese now have approximately 

five divisions deployed in the area. It is assumed that this 

force could be augmented to a total of eight divisions. Port 

facilities and enemy sbipping will be limiting factors. 

(2) Air forces 

It is estimated tht the Japanese now have approximately 

807 operative aircraft deployed in this area (SWU and ~ ~ H W E s T 

PACIFIC). It is assumed that the Japanese could reinforce to a 

total of 1.000 to 1,200 aircraft. deperding on the state of their 

activity and requiremnts on other fronts. 

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e. ESTIMATE OF UNITED NATIONS FORCES REQUIRED 

(1) Ground forces (assault units) 

2 air-borne divisions 

16 infantry divisions (including 5 amphibious) 

2 parachute regiments 

(2) Air forces 

(a) Assault 

-

Type

BH 

BM 

L/DB 

Fighters 

Photo Reconn. 

Obsn. 

Troop Carrier 

Total 

(b) Area defense 

BH 

BM 

L/DB 

Fighters 

Photo Reconn. 

Cbsn. 

Troop Carrier 

Total 

TOTAL 

(3) Naval forces 

Sufficient forces 

Groups Aircraft 

7 245 

6 321 

6 321 

9 720 

1 52 

5 260 

10 -

390 Groups Aircraft 

44 2309 44 2309 

3 105 

3 171 

3 171 

3 240 

1 52 -

-

13 739 13 739 

57 3048 

to 

(a) Cover advances along the north and south coasts of 

NEW GUINM . (b) Protect line of comrunications. 

(c) Provide naval defense in ARAFURA-BAND4 Seas. 

9. FURTHER OPERATIONS To EASTERN NETHERIANDS EAST INDIES 

a. Paragraph 8 discussed tk implications of a campaign through the 

ARAFURA-BANDA sea area for the purpose of seizing the VOGELKOP region. 

If those operations are not conducted. other offensive-defensive operations should be undertaken in the TIMOR-CELEBES-CERAM area in order to 

maintain the security of AUSTRALIA ad subject enemy forces to attrition. 

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b. These operations will consist of air and amphibious action. In 

view of other operations more pressing in attaining our strategic objectives, it is considered that the availability of forces will limit 

our activity primrily to air action. 

10. OPERATIONS IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS 

a. The capture and occupation of the MAKSHALL ISLANDS is a preliminary objective in establishing a line of communications to the 

CELEBES SEA. It also secures ard shortens the line of communications 

to the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. The occupation of these islands extends our 

control of the sea two thousad miles into the central PACIFIC. Landbased aircraft from bases in the MARSHALLS will facilitate the operation of naval surface craft against enemy lines of communication. 

Operations in this area will force attritional losses on enemy aircraft and shipping. It may also compel the Japanese Fleet to accept 

battle. It is in cmformity with the strategic plan for the defeat 

of JAPAN. 

b. Operations against enemy positiom in the MARSHALLS consist of 

amphibious operations initially supported by carrier aircraft. The 

success of the operation will be greatlv enhanced by the use of amphibious tractors which are capable of crossing coral reefs. 

c. To control the MARSHALLS it will be necessary to occupy or neutralize all of the sajor atolls in the group and WAKE ISLAND. The 

amphibious troops will have to be relieved by garrison troops, ad then 

reorganized and trained for the CAROLINE operatiom. A minimum estimte of the perids required are as follcavs: 

Control of the MARSHALLS 

Relief by garrison force 

Rehabilitation in HAWAII 

Training new replacemnts and 

rehearsals for CAROLINES 

Movemnt, HAWAII to MARSHALLS and 

preparation for assault on PONAPE 

TCllW 

3.0 months 

1.5 " 

75 " 

1.0 " 

.5 " 

6.75 months 

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d. It is estimated that forces required for capture of the MARSHALLS 

are as follavs: 

(1) Ground 

2 Infantry Amphibious Divisions, reinforced 

(2) Air 

2 Groups, Bombardment (I!) 

2 Groups, Fighter 

Carrier-based aircraft in 4 CVs and 4 ACVs 

(72 VT, 192 VSR, 156 VF) 

(3) Naval 

4 BB, 4 CV, 7 ACV, 8 CA, 8 CL, 63 DD, 

24 APA, 44 IST, plus landing craft. 

e. The following forces will be required to garrison the islands: 

(1) Ground 

1 Infantry Division, reinforced 

10 Defense Battalions 

(2) Air 

-

B(H) __ B(M) __ VF VSB VT -

Total

Land -based 72 72 22 1 108 72 545 

Seaplanes 72 VP 

24 VSO 

(3) Naval 

18 FT, miscellaneous craft. 

11. OPERATIONS IN THE CAROLINES 

a . Purpose 

Oprations in the CAROLINES will be for the purpose of wresting 

control of the central PACIFIC from the Japanese. The establishnent 

of a main fleet base at TRUK, adequately protected by outlying air 

bases, is required in order to maintain control, and thus be in a 

position to continue westward across the PACIFIC, to provide naval 

support for BANDA SEA operations, or to directly threaten the Japanese 

Archipelago. 

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0. Operations required 

The following operations are required in a campaign to capture 

the CAROLINES: 

TASK ONE. To capture PONAPE and TRUK, and to establish air and 

garrison forces thereon. 

(1) Operations 

(a) Capture PONAPE. 

(b) Destroy or mutralize enemy air on atolls within radius of 

250 miles ad as far west as WOLEAI. 

(c) Prevent interference with landing operations by major 

naval forces. 

(d) Prevent strong reinforcemnt of TRUK garrison after landing operations have been initiated. 

(e) Capture TRUK, by attack launched from the MARSHALLS and 

PONAPE, in three phases with several days elapsing between initial landing and final assault and capture, during which tine 

considerable naval support must remain in the vicinity. The 

capture should not be envisaged as placing a landing force ashore 

and then a departure of naval forces. 

(f) Movemnt of garrison forces to TRUK, 

TASK TWO. To secure control of the western CAROLINES. 

(1) Operations 

(a) Neutralization of emmy air establishnts in the western 

CAROLINES in which there are five probable seaplane bases. 

(b) Aerial raids against GUAM ad SAIPAN. 

(c) Aerial raids against KAPINGAMARINCI, if enemy occupie5 

RABAUL . 

(d) Establishment of air ad garrison forces on NOMOI, WLEAI. 

and GAFERbT. 

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TASK THREE. To establish a main fleet operating base onTRUK. 

(1) Availability of mobile operating ad repair facilities such 

as LIONS, CUBS, and ACORNS must be assured prior to execution of 

TASK TWO. 

(2) Operations 

(a) Assembly of this material at PEARL HARBOR and western coast 

of the UNITED STATES. 

(b) Movement of this material to TRUK and assembly thereof. 

c , FAClWS INFLUENCING THE CAMPAIGN 

(1) The campaign should be launched from the MARSHALLS even though 

we hold RAEAUL. It should follw the capture of the MARSHALLS as 

quickly as possible. It appears that the controlling factors in this 

respect will be : 

(a) Length of time the two amphibious divisions which captured 

the MARSHALLS are held thereon before being relieved by the garrison division. 

(b) The availability of a third amphibious division and its 

trans ports . 

(2) A study of the time required to complete the operations enumerated in Tasks be, Two, and Three, above, clearly indicates that 

the capture of the CAROLINES will require a cammpaign of several 

months duration. 

d. ESTIMATE OF FORCES REQUIRED 

(1) In determining forces required, estimates are based on tasks 

to be performed and a considerable increase of the Japanese garrisons. At TRUK, the garrison is estimated to be one reinforced division. 

(2) For the capture of the CAROLINES 

(a ) Ground 

3 Inf . Amph. Divs., reinf. 

(b) Air 

Land-based 

2 Groups, Bombardrrent (H) 

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Carrier-based (10 CV's ENTERPRISE-ESSEX 

Class and 7 Am's) 

VF VSB m VSTB 

%. sq. sq. sq. 

23-1/2 23 7 4- 1/2 

(c) Naval 

4 BB, 9 OBB, 10 CV, 7 ACV, 3 CA. 10 CA or CL, 

18 CL, 108 DD, 20 SS, 45 APA, 15 AKA, 6 ISD, 

3 m.Ships, Misc. aux. 

(3) For garrisoning the CAROLINES 

(a) Ground 

2 Infantry Divisions, reinforced 

3 Defense Battalions 

(b) Air 

Land-based 

1 VP Wing 

3 VSO (Naval) Squadrons 

1 Group, Borbardment (H) 

1 Group, Bombardment (M) 

1 Group, Bombardment (L ad D) 

2 Groups, Pursuit 

(c) Naval 

Misc. Harbor ad Local Defense Craft 

12. OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH PACIFIC 

a. General 

Operations are now in progress for the capture of ATTU and the 

occupation of SHEMYA. These operatiom envisage cutting the enemy line 

of comunicatiom from JAPAN to KISKA. The seizure of this area will 

provide additional bases for the air offensive against KISKA and will 

emble us to base our submarine operations further to the westward. 

Until tk Japanese are driven out of KISKA, the UNITED STATES must 

keep large air and ground forces in the ALEUTIANS and is forced to 

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disperse naval forces to that area. The Japanese must be expelled 

from KISKA. It may be that the air offensive ad blockade will force 

them to evacunte or surrender. Based on the results of the aerial 

offensive which has been in progress for several months past. it is 

probable that landing operations will be required. 

The Japamse reaction to our seizure of ATTU will determine 

the strength of forces and length of time required for operations 

in the north PACIFIC. 

b. U. S. forces now engaged 

(1) Ground 

3 Infantry Regiments, reinforced 

1 Engineer Regiment 

(2) Air 

2 Sq. Heavy Bombardment 

2 Sq. Medium Bonbardment 

6 Sq. Pursuit 

54 Patrol planes 

(3 ) Naval 

3 OBB, 3 CA, 4 CL., 19DD, 3 DM, 11 C6S, 1 ACV, 

4 APA, 1 Am, 4 AP, 1 AT, 1 XAP. 3 XAK, 3 XAPc, 

6 AO, 2 AD, 11 hTB, 1 AVP, 2DE, 1 FG, 3 AM, 4 IST. 

C. Our present strategic cmcept does not contemplate further 

amphibious operations west of the ALEUTIANS. Our forces there will 

assume a defensive role until conditions are favorable to operations 

in support of RUSSIA in the KAMCHATKA PENINSULA-Siberian area. 

13. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC 

Naval operations in the fall of 1943 will have to be undertaken 

in the PACIFIC to hold Japanese naval forces in the PACIFIC at the time 

operations are caducted in the Bay of Eengal in connection with operations in BURMA. It is unlikely that operations in the SOLOMONS-NEW 

GUINEA area will have the desired effect. Probably a carrier-based 

air attack on JAPAN will be required. 

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AVAILABILITY AS TO MEANS 

14. General 

One of the controlling factors for the operations discussed above 

is the availability of amphibious divisions and amphibious equipent. 

a. Amphibious divisions 

The only amphibious divisions available in May. 1943 are two 

Marine Corps divisions in the SOUTH PCICIFIC and one in the SOUTHWEST 

PACIFIC. Readiness for action dates are: 

1st Marine Division, (Southwest Pac) 1 June 

2d Marine Division, (SoPac) 1 June 

3d Marine Division, (less 1 Regt.) 

(Sopac ) 1 June 

1 Regt., 3d Marine Division 15 July 

Commander SOUTHWEST PACIFIC has set 15 June as target date for 

commencing operations designed to continue as far as NADANC (NEW 

GUINEA) - western NEW BRITAIN - BOUGAINVILLE, and has stated that 

sequence and tirring is subiect to fluctuation of tactical cirrurrstances. Three amphibious divisions are required in these operations. 

A most optimistic view, excluding the capture of RABAUL, ran 

not envisage relief of amphibious divisions from the SOLOMON -

BISMARCK - NEW GUINEA area before February, 1944. Any division 

relieved will require four to six months for rehabilitation. 

The 4th Marine Division is scheduled to depart UNITED STATES 

in December, 1943. It could be earmarked as one of the two amphibious divisions required for the capture of the MARSHALLS. provided 

excessive losses are not encountered in SOUTHWEST PACIFIC operations 

prior to the completion of the MADANC (NEW GUINEA) - western NEW 

BRITAIN - BOUGAINVILLE campaign. 

Therefore, for the capture of the MARSHALLS there is available 

one Marine Corps amphibious division from the UNITED STATES in 

December, 1943, while the other must be provided from the SOOTI/WFST 

PACIFIC or by tiaining an Army division in the UNITED STATES. 

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(I) Summary of availability of amphibious divisions 

Campaign Divisions Possible sources of 

number Area required divisions required 

1 YADANC-we st er n 3 3 Marine Corps Divisions 

NEW BRITAIN - in SOWH PACIFIC and 

DCUGAINVILLE SOlll7WEST PACIFIC 

(See par. 7 a) 

2 BISpARCR 5 3 Marine Corps Divisions 

ARCf/IPELAGO (possibly used in Canpaign No. 1, 

(See par. reduced after 4 - 6 months 

7 c) to three) rehabilitation. 

3 NEW GUINEA 

(See par. 8) 

1 Marine Corps nivision 

from U. S. in Dec., 1943. 

1 Army Division must be 

trained. 

5 CASE I 

Army and Marine Corps 

Divisions used in Campaign 

No. 2, nfter 4 - 6 month 

relvlbi 1it at ion 

or 

CASE XI 

Train 5 Army Divisions 

during Campaign No. 2. 

4 Furtkr opera- 5 Same as for Campaign No. 3 

tions in 

eastern NEI 

(See par. 9) 

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Campaign Divisions 

number -

Area required

5 MARSHALL ISLANDS 2 

(See par. 10) 

6 CAROLINES 

(See par. 11) 

Possible sources of 

divisions required 

CASE I 

1 Marine Corps Division in 

U. S. in 1943 in which 

case 2 Army Divisions 

must be trained for 

Campaign No. 2. 

1 Marine Corps Division 

from SOWH PACIFIC upon 

completion Campaign No. 1 

in which case other 

provisions must be made 

for 1 Division if Campaign No. 2 is to follow 

No. 1 without delay. 

or 

CASE XI 

1 Marine Corps Division 

in U. S. in December, 1943 

with same implications as 

noted in Case I. 

1 Army Division or a new 

brine Corps Division 

must be trained in U. S. 

CASE I 

2 Divs. used in Campaign 

No. 5. 

1 Army or a second new 

Marine Corps Division 

must be trained in U. S. 

Or 

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Campaign Divisions 

number -

Area required

Possible sources of 

divisions required 

CASE XI 

2 Divisions used in Campaign No. 5. 

1 Division fran SGWH 

PACIFIC about after 

Campaign No. 2, and 

possibly after 4 - 6 

months rehabilitation; in 

which circmstances Campaign No. 3 (Case I) will 

be short 1 Division and 

arra=ements must be made 

to prcwide it. 

NOlE: It should be emphasized that in transferring divisions from 

SOUTH or SOUTHWEST PACIFIC to central PACIFIC an additional 

load will be placed on shipping. 

(2) Conclusions based on above sunnary 

A minimup of four additional amphibious divisions must be 

organized. Consideration should he given to organizing: 

2 Marine Corps divisions - making a total of 6 

Marine Corps divisions. 

2 Army divisions. 

b. Amphibious craft 

(1) It is estimated that 26 APA’s and 7 AKA’s will be in 

service in the PACIFIC on 1 January 1944. This will be sufficient 

to lift two amphibious divisions. Assuming that all APA’s and AKA’s 

becoming available for assignment in 1944 are assigned to the PACIFIC, 

and allowing no attrition after 1 January 1944, the following table 

indicates the number available to meet all of the requirements in the 

PACIFIC Theater: 

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1 Apr 1944 1 Jul 1944 1 Cct 1944 1 Jan 1945 

A PA 31 43 55 63 

AKA 8 20 32 40 

The CAROLINE operations alone will require 45 APA’s. 

(2) In addition to special types of lading craft nm allocated 

for use in the PACIFIC. it is assumed that landing craft used for 

cross-Channel operations in May 1944 will become available for 

transfer to PACIFIC Theater about June 1944. 

c. Ground (less amphibious), air, and naval forces 

The UNITED NATIONS have 14 offemive divisiom in the SOUTH 

and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Theaters. The deployment of these divisions 

cannot be determined far in advance of an actual operation. The 

requiremnts for the defense of important bases in tk line of communications, ad the necessity for rehabilitaticn of units greatly 

reduces the number of units actually available at any one time for 

offensive action. 

Experiences to date in NEW GUINEA and tk SOLOMON ISLANDS 

indicate that combat units can carry on offensive operations for 

approximately 3 months, after which they must be witMrawn to rear 

positions for recuperation. For each division (or similar combat 

unit) actually engaged with the enemy, it is essential that an additional division be located in the combat zone in order to insure 

the availability of combat units to meet cmnter-attacks or recoup 

an unfavorable situaticn. Due to the distances involved, the recuperative period will be about 6 months. It follows that onethird the combat units will at all times be in, or enroute to, 

recuperative bases too far from the combat zone to be available for 

an emergency. For plarning purposes, it can therefore be assumed 

that not over one-third of tk offensive divisiom actually in the 

area will be available for operatiom at any given date. The foregoing estimate is substantiated by experiences thus far in the 

PACIFIC lhater. 

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Estimates of requirements for subsequent operations are therefore based on the foregoing analysis. 

15. OPERATIONS IN CHINA 

a. Air 

The estimated aircraft requirements for CHINA as listed in 

paragraph 6 d above, totals 473 airplanes. 

Present deployments indicate tk following total aircraft 

available, ad shortages, not classified by types: 

Aircraft 

avail able Short age 

Present 2 09 2 64 

July 1, 1943 2 09 2 64 

Jan 1, 1944 2 09 2 64 

July 1, 1944 279 194 

Jan 1, 1945 2 79 194 

16. OPERATIONS IN BISNARCK ARCHIPELAGO 

a. Ground 

It was noted in paragraph 7 c (1) (b) that a minimum of five 

divisions will be required for the capture of the BISMRCK ARCHIPELAGO. Assuming the occupation of the IIADANG-western NEW BRITAINBOUGAINVILLE area is accomplished with the forces now planned, it 

is estimated there will be sufficient infantry divisions available 

in the area to complete the BISMRCK operation. The availability 

of amphibiaus forces has been discussed in paragraph 14 a, above. 

b. Air 

2,579 combat airplanes are estimated to be required ih the 

area. This number will be available as of 1 January 1944. This 

includes Army, Navy, R.A.A.F., and R.N.Z.A.F. Some adjustment as 

to typs may be mcessary. 

c. Naval 

Sufficient naval forces will be made available for this operation. 

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17. OPERATIONS IN NEW GUINEA 

a. Ground 

It is estimated that 18 offensive divisions will be required 

to capture NEW GUINU. In additim a minimm of five divisions will 

be required to secure vital bases on the line of communications, 

making a total of 23 divisions. Tentative deployments as of 1 January 1944 idicate that the UNITED NATIONS will have 18 divisions in 

the SUl~78and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. This number is exclusive of Australian ad NEW ZULAND defense divisions. 

It would appear, therefore, that a minimum of five additional 

offensive divisions will be required to provide the' necessary divisions to capture NEW GUINEA. 

It should be pointed out that the 18 divisions irrlude three 

U. S. Marine Divisions. The witMrawa1 of these units to the central PACIFIC would require their replacenent with three Army Divisions. 

The status of the availability of the amphibious equipment 

for this operation camot be dqtermined until after the RABAUL 

campaign. 

b. Air 

A total of 3,048 combat aircraft are estimated to be required 

for this operation. As of 1 January 1944.2.579 will be available. 

This includes Army, Navy, R.A.A.F., ad R.N.Z.A.F. This indicates 

a shortage of 469 aircraft. In addition sone adjustment as to types 

may be recessary. 

c . Naval 

In view of the other operations which may be conducted in the 

PACIFIC, such as the BISMARCK, CAROLINE, or MARSHALLS operations, 

the requirements and availability of naval forces for the capture 

of NEW GUINE4 cannot be determined. 

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18. OPERATIOWS IN THE MARSHALL AND CARaINE ISLANDS 

a. Ground 

The defense of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS will require 

three Army Divisions. One division may be obtained from HAWAII by 

reducing the strength of the garrison to two divisions. The remaining two divisions must come from the UNITED STATES. 

b. Air (MARSHAUS) 

(less carr ie r -based ) 

B (H) 

B (M) 

B (LD) 

Ft r 

Assault Garrison 

96 72 

0 72 

0 180 

-

200 ­221

2% 545 

As of 1 January 1944 the U. S. &vy will have 714 combat aircraft of all types (exclusive of carrier-based), deoloyed for special 

assignment by CINCPAC. Required aircraft should be available for 

this operation. 

c. Naval (MARSMUS) 

The situation in cruisers to mount tk MARSHALL ISLANDS operation (8 CL plus 8 CA) will be tight until early in 1944. As of 

1 January 1944 there will be 9 CA, 12 CL, an3 4 KL in the PACIFIC. 

If all cruisers which become available for assignment in the first 

quarter of 1944 (1 CA and 4 CL) are assigned to the PACIFIC, and 

assuming no attrition after 1 January 1944, there would be available 

on 1 April 1944 10 CA, 16 CL, an3 4 KL. After meeting the requirements for this operation 2 CA, 8 CL, ad 4 OCL would be available 

to meet all other requirements in the PACIFIC. One CL and one CA 

become available for assignment during tk second quarter of 1944. 

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d. Air (CAROLINES) 

(exclusive of carr ier-based) 

Assault Garrison 

VSO 0 36 

As of 1 January 1944 the U. S. Navy will kve 714 combat aircraft of all types (exclisive of carrier-based) deployed for special 

assignment by CINCPAC. No deployments have been made for later 

dates, but it is assumed that this figure of 714'will be increased 

after 1 January 1944 and that the CAROLINE opration is not likely 

to occur until after this date. It tkrefore appears that sufficient 

aircraft will be available for this operation. 

e. Naval (CARCLINES) 

The CAROLINES operation requires 4 BB and 9 OBB, total 13. 

Assigned to tk PACIFIC as of 1 January 1944 are 6 BB and 8 OBB, 

total 14. One additional SB becomes available for assignment in 

the 3rd quarter of 1944. 

Thirty-one cruisers are required for this operation. Assigned 

to the PACIFIC as of 1 January 1944 are 9 CA, 12 CL, 4 EL, a total 

of 25. Assuming the 2 CA and 5 CL which become available in the 

first half of 1944 are all assigned to the PACIFIC, and no attrition 

after 1 January 1944, there will be 32 cruisers in the PACIFIC on 

1 July 1944 available to met all tk requirements of that area. 

Ten CV are required for tk CAROLINES. Nine will be available for the PdCIFIC on 1 January 1944. Assurring tk five which 

become available in tk first blf of 1944 are all assigned to the 

PACIFIC, and no attrition after 1 Janvary 1944, on 1 July 1944 there 

will be 14 CV available to meet all the requirements of that area. 

Seven ACV will be required ad will be available. 

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It is estimated that destroyers ad other types can be made 

available. 

19. SUMMARY AS TO AVAILABILITY OF MEANS 

a. Ground 

From the above, it is estimated that the capture of NEW GUINEA 

and the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS will require the shipment of 

7 additional Army divisions to the PACIFIC. 

b. Air 

Air operations in CHINA will require additional aircraft as 

shown in paragraph 15 a above. 

Air deployments to SOUTH and SObTHWEST PACIFIC (2,579 aircraft), 

1 January 1944, have been mde in accordance with requests for forces 

by the Comander, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, to perform tasks assigned, 

exclus ive of capture of RABAUL. 

It is entirely possible that attrition of Japanese aircraft 

during the preliminary phases of operations under way will permit 

the taking of RABAUL and corrpletion of subsequent operations in NEW 

GUINEA, with the forces allocated. 

However, for planning purposes, ad assuming JAPAN has not been 

evicted from the CAROLINES, it is estimated that for operations to 

complete the capture of NEW GUINEA, including defense forces, 3,048 

aircraft will be required. This indicates a shortage of 469 aircraft 

as of 1 January 1944. 

There will be sufficient land-based aircraft available to 

CINCPAC for the operations in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES during 

1944. 

c. Naval 

It is concluded that there are sufficient naval forces to 

carry on major operations in the central PACIFIC and amphibious 

operations in the SOUTH PACIFIC simultaneously during 1943-44. 

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d. Logi s tics 

The logistical implications for suwortirg major operations 

such as those in NEW GUINEA or the CAROLINES have not been assessed 

in this paper. Among these implications would be the shipping required to support the additional grmnd, air, and naval forces moved 

to the theater. Furthermore, as the forces advance there will be 

increasing demands for cargo shipping due to the extension of the 

line of cmunications, such as from HAWAII to the HARSHALLS, the 

MARSHAUS to the CAROLINES, or from RABAUL to NEW GUINEA. 

20. SEQUEMCE OF OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC 

Operations in the northern PACIFIC are in progress. 

The MADANG-western NEW BRITAIN-BOLIGAINVILLE campaign will cmence 

about 15 June, ad will probably take the reminder of 1943 to complete. 

Prior to the completion of the above campaign, a decision must be 

made whether to launch the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO or MARSHALL ISLANDS 

campaign. The MARSHALL ISANDS campaign cqnnot be launched before early 

1944. 

The relative value, as well as the magnitude, of further operations in NEW GUINEA with respect to operatiom in the CAROLINE ISLANUS 

must be assessed during the progress of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO or 

MARS'MLL ISLANDS campaign, depending on which had been previously 

selected . 

When the direction of the main effort has beendetermined, a 

firm decision on the sequence of operations can be made. 

CONCLUSIONS 

21. From the above discussion, it is concluded that the objectives 

in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST in the 1943-44 should be: 

a. Conduct of air operations in and from CHINA. 

b. Operations in BURMA to augmnt supplies to CHINA. 

c. Ejection of Japanese from the ALEUTIANS. 

d. Seizure of the MARSMLL and CAROLINE ISLANDS. 

e. Seizure of the SOLOHONS, the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, and Japanese 

held NEW GUINEA. 

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C.C.S. 240 

SONIC WARFARE 

Reference: 

CCS 93rd Meeting, Item (4) 

C.C.S. 240 was circulated 21 May 1943 for consideration of the 

Cdined Chiefs of Staff. 

In their 93rd Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the 

recommendations contained in this paper. 

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C.C.S. 240 21 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SONIC WARFARE 

Memorandum by the Representatives of 

British Chiefs of Staff 

1. The development of Sonic equipment in the United Kingdom has 

been based on the use of sound for the purpose of deception. Sounds 

of tanks, vehicles and other battle noises can now be reproduced with 

98 per cent fidelity over ranges of 1500 to 3500 yards according to 

conditions of weather and terrain. Special units are now being formed 

to handle this equipment and should be ready for operations by the 

autuvn of 1943. 

2. It is understood that Sonic equipment has been developed in the 

U.S.A. but no details are known. It is from the first use of this new 

weapon that the maximum effects can be expected, and it is considered 

that its first use should be in some major operation. The British 

Chiefs of Staff recommend, for the approval of the IJ. S. Chiefs of 

Staff, that the first operational use of Sonic Warfare in any form 

should be subject to the prior agreevent of the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. 

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C.C.S. 241/3 

ANTI-U-BOAT WARFARE 

(Suggested Basis for Discussion) 

Reference: 

CCS 93rd Meeting, Item (2) 

CCS 94th Meeting, Iterr (2) 

C.C.S. 241 (21 May 1943) circulated lines for discussion of the 

subject, suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

In their 94th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered 

C.C.S. 241 together with C.C.S. 241/1, a memorandum by the United States 

Chiefs of Staff, and took note of C.C.S. 241 subject to certain amendments. (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 241/3.) 

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C.C.S. 241/3 24 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ANTI-U-BOAT WARFARE 

(Suggested Basis for Discussion) 

Reference: C.C.S. 94th Mtg., Item 2 

Note by the Secretaries 

The attached Memorandum. amended in accordance with 

C.C.S. 94th Meeting, conclusion 2 a. is circulated herewith 

for purposes of record. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

(No paper 3s been circula !d with the number C.C.S. 241/2.) 

ENCLOSURE 

ANT I -U-BOAT WARFARE 

(Suggested Basis for Discussion) 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. FLEXIBILITY OF SUPPORT GROUPS 

During the last month support groups have proved how essential 

they are whilst the escorts for convoys are below strength. At the 

moment the U-boats are disposed with the majority of those working in 

the Atlantic to the north of the line 40° N. It is estimated that the 

number of support groups required in the area north of 40° N. is 9, 

but owing to the withdrawal of the Home Fleet destroyers, which are 

now acting as support groups, the number from the middle of June onwards will be reduced to 7, in which is includedBOCUE’S support group. 

The 7 support groups will only be obtained by opening the cycle of HX 

ON convoys from 5 to ‘7% days, in consequence of which the number o 

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ships in each convoy will be increased up to a possible maximum of 80. 

In view of the importance of not reducing the number of support groups 

below 7, it is hoped that BOCIIE's support group may be retained until it 

is possible to replace it, which is not likely to be until the end of 

August . 

On the assumption that it is the intention of the Navy Departrent 

to create support groups operating in connection wlth convoys running 

south of 40° N., it is suggested that support groups should be transferred from the area north of 40° h'. to that south of 40° N. or vice 

versa, according to how the U'boats are disposed. 

2. V.L.R. AIRCRAFT 

At the present time, 45 V.L.R. are in operation either from Iceland 

(C) or N. Ireland. In addition there are 16 Halifaxes which cannot do 

more than 1700 miles. It would be of value if we could be informed of 

the rate of build up of the V.L.R. aircraft in Newfoundland. 

3. BAY OFFENSIVE 

The nuvber of aircraft available for the Bay Offensive is now 72 

short of the number it is estimated is required for producing the results 

given in C.C.S. 189/4. 

Retween 13th April and 17th May there were 89 sightings and 60 attacks in the Bay of Riscay area. The results of these ~ttacksare as 

follows: 

2 sunk 

3 probably sunk 

4 probably seriously damaged. 

We are at the moment shorter of aircraft for day patrol as opposed 

to night patrol and hence it is not necessary for all the 72 aircraft 

referred to above to be fitted with A.S.V., and though it is desirable 

that these aircraft should be L.R., this also is not essential. 

As the U-boat offensive in the Bay is equally effective whatever 

the "trend" of the disposition of the IJ-boats may be, it is of great importance that it should be made fully efficient at the earliest possible 

date. 

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It is therefore hoped that as many additional aircraft as possible 

up to a maxivum of 72 may be provided by the TI. S. A. to supplement the 

Ray Off ens ive. 

4. TRANSFER OF AIRCRAFT FROM U. S. ARMY ANTI-SURMARINE COMMAND TO 

BAY OFFENSIVE 

In the u. S. Army Anti-Submarine Command Monthly Intelligence 

Report for February, 1943, it is noticed that the number of hours flown 

on anti-submarine operations in the Gulf and Eastern Sea Erontiers was 

26.067 and that there were no sizhtings or sinkings due to the fact that 

there were apparently no U-boats in either of these areas during February. 011 the other hand, the operational hours flown by Coastal Command, 

including Iceland (C) and Gibraltar, for the same month totalled 14,000. 

During this period there were over 100 U-boats operating in Coastrl Command’s area and there were 87 sightings of U-boats and 43 attacks. 

The accepted policy as laid down in A.C.C.3 was that A/S air units 

should be transferred from time to time where the need is greatest. On 

the above facts it would appear that it would be advantageous to transfer 

sone of the aircraft now working in the Gulf and Eastern Sea Frontiers 

to the Bay Offensive and it is suggested that this should be given cnnsideration. On the other hand it is believed that the number of operational hours flown by aircraft in the Gulf and Eastern Sea Frontiers is 

largely made up of patrols by single seater aircraft of short range, 

which would be of no value for the Bay Offensive and, shouJd this be the 

case, the case for a transfer as proposed above would not be so strong. 

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C.C.S. 241/4 

ANTI-U-BOAT WARFARE 

Reference : 

CCS 93rd Meetinq, Item (2) 

CCS 94th Meeting, Item (2) 

C.C.S. 241/1 (22 May 1943) circulated a memorandum by the U. S. 

Chiefs of Staff. 

In their 94th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered 

C.C.S. 241/1 together with C.C.S. 241. They agreed to take note of 

C.C.S. 241/1 subject to certain amendments. (Subsequently published as 

241/4.) 

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C.C.S. 241/4 24 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

ANTI-U-BOAT WARFARE 

Ref-erence: C.C.S. 94th Mtg., Item 2 

Note by the Secretaries 

The attached memorandum, arended in accordance with C.C.S. 94th 

Meeting, Conclusion 2 b, is circulated herewith for purposes of record. 

n. REDMAN. 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

22 May 1943 

MEMORANDUM BY 

THE UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF 

TO 

THE COMBINED CWIEFS OF STAFF 

Subject: C.C.S. 241 

1. FLEXIBILITY OF SUPFORT GROUPS 

The views as to the value of support groups and altering of convoy cycles in the NORTH ATLANTIC are concurred in. Havever, prospective 

additional cornitrents are such that there is small possibility of the 

UNITED STATES being able to maintain any support groups other than the 

EOGUE Group which, though committed only until 1 July 1943, will be made 

available to operate under British control until 1 September 1943. As 

to recornendations for exchange of support groups between the area north 

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of 40-N ad south of 40-N, this is a matter that should be handled by 

the First Sea Lord and the Comnander in Chief, United States Fleet, and 

not by the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board. This view is taken because this mtter is considered to be a command function. 

2. VLR AIRCRAFT 

At present there are one and one half Army squadrons and one half 

a Navy squadron in NEWFOUNDLAND. It is planned that these numbers will 

be increased to two and one, respectively, as of 1 June and, by 1 July, 

to three Army squadrons and one Navy squadron. 

3. BAY OFFENSIVE 

On several previous occasions a genuine desire to augment British 

Air Forces in the Bay Offensive has been indicated. At the moment there 

are no IR planes in excess of requirements, but it appears possible that 

some British IR planes may become available for this project by 1 July 

when they can be relieved elsewhere. In this connection it is to be 

noted that fourteen squadrons of Navy LB planes (PBM type), that are 

frequently considered in making calculations as to possible assignments, 

are of a type that has not yet proven itself in service. This matter is 

further referred to in paragraph 4. 

4. TRANSFER OF AIRCRAFT FROM U. S. ARMY AIR A/S COMMAND TO BAY OFFENSIVE 

As to the 26,067 hours flown in the GULF and EASTERN SEA FRONTIERS 

in February, 1943, a breakdown of the figures shows that only about 

4,500 of these hours were flown by planes of the rating of IR (Army and 

Navy), or better: the remainder having been flown by SR planes and Civil 

Air Patrol. Investigations toward this end which have been in hand for 

some time will be continued in the endeavor to provide planes for service in the MY OF BISCAY. 

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C.C.S. 242/6 

DRAFT OF AGREED DECISIONS 

Re f er ence : 

CCS 92nd Meeting, Item (5) 

4th White House Meeting 

CCS 95th Meeting, Item (2) 

5th White Hou.se Meeting 

CCS 96th Meeting, Item (1)(2) 

6th White House Meeting (2) 

A mmmndum to the President and Prime Minister settingout 

the agreed decisions that had been reached so far by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 242, was prepared by the Secretaries at the 

direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 92nd Meeting, circulated and shmitted 21 May 1943. 

In the 4th White House Meeting certain amendments were agreed 

upon. 

C.C.S. 242/1 (23 May 1943) was circulated for consideration by 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff as a draft report to the president and 

and Prime Minister. 

C.C.S. 242/2 (23 May 1943) was a revision of C.C.S. 242/1 prepared by the Combined Secretariat in the light of the most recent 

dec is i ons . 

Following the discussions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in 

their 95th Meeting C.C.S. 242/3 (24 May 1943) was the first draft 

of the Final Report to be presented to the President and Prime Minister. 

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C.C.S. 242/3 was considered and amended in the 5th White House 

Meeting. Amended paper subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 242/4 (24 May 

1943). 

C.C.S. 242,’s (25 May 1943) contained certain changes to C.C.S. 

242/4 which were suggested by the Prime Minister. 

In their 96th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the 

final report to the President and Prime Minister (C.C.S. 242/4) as 

modified by C.C.5. 242/5 and as amended in the course of discussion. 

The President and Prime Minister at the 6th White House Meeting 

gave final approval to the report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

(Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 242/6, 25 May 1943.) 

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C.C.S. 242/6 25 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

(FINAL REVISION) 

FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

The Enclosure is the final report on the results of the TridenL 

Conference as approved by the President and the Prime Minister on 2 -

May 1943. 

ENCLOSURE 

TRIDENT 

Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Final Agreed Summary 

of Conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 242) the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present Conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These conclusions 

have been amended to accord with the views expressed by the President 

and the Prime Minister. The amended conclusions, and others reached 

since the previous rnemorandtm was submitted, have now been related to 

resources available, and a :_.,a1 agreed sumary of conclusions is submitted herein. 

I. OVERALL OBJECTIVE 

In conjunction with RUSSIA and other Allies to bring about at the 

earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS powers. 

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11. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR 

1. In cooperation with RUSSIA and other Allies to bring about at the 

earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS in 

EUROPE. 

2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers concerned 

to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN with the 

purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of 

any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken. 

3. Upon the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE, in cooperation with other 

PACIFIC Powers and, if possible, with RUSSIA, to direct the full resources of the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN to bring about at the 

earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of JAPAN. 

111. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT 

Whatever operations are decided on in supnort of the overall 

strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a 

first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation. 

1. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the WESTERN 

HEMISPHERE and the BRITISH TSLES. 

2. Support the war making capacity of our forces in all areas. 

3. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular 

emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace. 

4. Intensify the air offensive against the AXIS Powers in EUROPE. 

5. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as 

practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the 

AXIS citadel. 

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6. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid 

the war effort of RUSSL4. 

7. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in 

order to aid the war effort of CHINA as an effective Ally and as a base 

for operations against JAPAW. 

8. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of 

7URKEY in the war on the side of the Allies. (See also Section VI 1.) 

9. To prepare the French Forces in AFRICA to fulfill an active role 

in the war against the AXIS powers. (See also Section VI 2.) 

IV. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS F'QR 1943-44 IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC 

CONCEPT 

The following operations in execution of the overall strategic 

concept are agreed upon. No order of priority is necessary since the 

result of relating resources to operations shows that all are possible 

of accomplishment. (See Section V.) If a conflict of interests should 

arise, it will be referred to the Corhined Chiefs of Staff. 

1. 7HE U-BOA7 WAR 

a. Operation to Seize the AZORES ISLANDS 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the occupation 

of the AZORES is essential to the efficient conduct of the anti-llboat war for the reasons set out in the Annex. The preparation of the 

plan for the capture of the AZORES ISLANDS is a responsibility of the 

British Chiefs of Staff, and accordingly plans are actively in preparation under their authority. The British Chiefs of Staff have made 

a preliminary examination of these plans. It is proposed thtlt the 

expedition should be mounted from the UNI7ED KINGDOM and that in the 

first place the islands of FAYAL and TERCEIRA should be seized. It 

is expected that a force of about nine battalions will be required. 

The availability of landing craft is likely to be the limiting factor 

regarding the date of the operation and as far as can be seen at 

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present the earliest date for the arrival of the force in the AZORES 

will be about the end of August. It is agreed that the land, air, 

and sea facilities of the AZORES will be available to all UNITED 

NATIONS forces. 

The possibility of an earlier move on the AZORES will receive 

further study. Meanwhile, the political decision involved will be 

settled by the two Governments. 

b. Other Anti-U-boat Measures 

All possible measures for strengthening the air forces engaged 

in the Bay of Biscay Offensive and for increasing the number of 

VLR aircraft engaged in convoy protection have been examined and 

such steps as are practicable are being taken. 

C. Flexibility of Forces 

The necessity for flexibility in the utilization of both air 

and sea forces has been agreed, and steps to improve matters in this 

respect are being constantly studied and implemented. 

2. DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE 

a. Combined Bomber Offensive from the UNITED KINGDOM 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined U. S. - British air offensive, the progressive 

destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and 

economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German 

people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is 

fatally weakened. 

The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and 

1 April 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will 

allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate 

objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of 

German fighter strength. 

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b. Cross-Channel Operations 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved: 

That forces and equipment shall be established in the 

UNITED KINGDOM with the object of mounting an operation with target 

date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which 

further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of 

the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces 

being present and available for use in the UNITED KINGDOM by 1 May 

1944. in addition to the air forces then available. 

Assault: 5 Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in 

tanding craft). 

2 Infantry Divisions - Follow-up. 

-

2 Air-borne Divisions.

Total 9 Divisions in the Assault. 

Build-up: 20 Divisions available for movement into lodgment 

area. 

Total 29 Divisions. 

The possibility of adding one French Division will be considered 

at a later date. 

The expansion of logistical facilities in the UNITED KINGDOM 

will be undertaken immediately, and after the initial assault, the 

seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in 

order that the build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the UNITED STATES or elsewhere of additional divisions 

and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month. 

The preparation and constant keeping up to date of plans for 

an emergency crossing of the Channel in the event of a German collapse will proceed in accordance with the directive already given 

to General Morgan. In addition, General Morgan will prenare and 

submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for sending forces 

to NORWAY in the event of a German evacuation becoming anparent. 

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c. Cperations in the MEDITERRANEAN to Eliminate ITALY from the War 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved: 

That the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, will be 

instructed, as a matter of urgency, to plan such operations in 

exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate I7ALY 

from the War and to contain the maximum number of German forces. 

Which of the various specific operatiors should be adopted, and 

thereafter mounted, is a decisinn which will be reserved to the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in NOR7H 

AFRICA may use for his operations all those forces available in 

the MEDITERRANEAN Area except for four American and three British 

divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward 

for withdrawal to take part in operations from the UNITED KINGDIM, 

provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff whec the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY will 

not be considered available. It is estimnted that the equivalent 

strength of 19 British and Allied, 4 United States, and 4 French 

divisions, or a total of 27 divisions will be available for garrisons and operations in the NEDITERRANEAN area subsequent to HUSKY 

These figures exclude the 4 United States and 3 British divisions 

to be transferred to the UNITED KINGWM and the 2 British divisions 

constituting the British commitment to TURKEY. It is further estimated that there will be available after HUSKY a total of 3,648 

aircraft including 242 heavy bombers (day and night), 519 medium 

bombers (day and night), 299 light and dive bombers, 2,012 fighters, 

412 transports, and 164 army cooperatives. 

d. Bombing of Ploesti 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the U. S. Army 

Air Forces shouLd send representatives, without delay, to present 

to the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, the plan which 

they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Rumanian oil fields 

from bases in NORTH AFRICA. Further, they have agreed that the 

Commander in Chief, North African Theater, will be asked to submit 

appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. These steps have been taken. 

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3. OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an appreciatior leading up to a plan for the defeat of JAPAN, including 

an estimate of the forces required. 

a. Operations in the BURMA-CHINA Theater 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on: 

(1) The concentration of available resources, as first priority 

within the ASSAM-BURMA Theater, on the building up and increasing of 

the air route to CHINA to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early 

fall, and tl-e development of air facilities in ASSAH with a view to: 

(a) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in 

BURMA; 

(b) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in CHINA; and 

(c) Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to CHINA. 

(2) Vigorous and agressive land and air operations at the end 

of the 1943 monsoon from ASSAM into BURNA via LEDO and IMPHAL. in 

step with an advance by Chinese forces from YUNNAN, with the object 

of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air 

route to CHINA, and as an essential step towards the opening of the 

BURMA Road. 

(3) The capture of AKYAB and of RAMREE TSLAND by amphibious 

operations, with possible exploitation. 

(4) The interruption of Japanese sea cmmunicat ions into BURMA. 

(5) The continuance of administrative preparations in INDIA 

for the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the 

size of ANAKIM. 

b. Operations in the PACIFIC 

Various courses of action have been examined by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff and the operations they have agreed to undertake 

have the following objects: 

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(1) Conduct of air operations in and from CHINA. 

(2) Ejection of the Japnese from the ALEUTIANS. 

(3) Seizure of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISUNDS. 

(4) Seizure of the SOLONONS, the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, and 

Japanese held NEW GUINEA. 

(5) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of 

communication. 

V. AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN EXECUIION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT 1943-44 

We have examined our resources with the object of assessing 

our ability to carry out the above operations and our conclusions 

are as follows: 

GROUND FORCES 

1. A11 the ground forces required can be made available. 

NAVAL FORCES 

2. If a covering force is required for the operations to capture 

AKYAB and RAMREE, and if the Italian fleet has not been eliminated 

some diversion of U. S. Naval forces may be required. Subject to 

this, all the naval forces required can be mde available. 

AIR FORCES 

3. Sroadly there are sufficient air forces to meet all re7uirements 

in all theaters. 

4. For cross-Channel operations there will be sufficient air forces 

in the U. K. with the exception of transport aircraft, the provision 

of which needs further investigation. In the absence of any detailed 

plan for cross-Channel operations, it has not been possible to estimate 

the requirements in gliders. This will have to be the subject of urgent 

study, which ue are initiating. 

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5. For operations in BURhA there are only small deficiencies which 

can probably be reconciled by adjustments within the theater. 

6. Subject to the development of air fields and necessary communications in ASSQM, the air transport and defense requirements of the 

air route into CHINA, up to 10,000 tons per month, can be met. 

ASSAULT SHIPPING AND LANDING CRAFT 

7. Provided the casualties in operations are no greater than we 

have allowed for, and provided that the U. S. and British planned 

productions are maintained, all the assault shipping and landing craft 

required can be made available. We have agreed upon the necessary 

allocations. 

SUPPLY OF CRITICAL ITEMS 

8. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater 

it is not possible to give finalized requirements and to estimate detailed shortages of critical items. With the exception of steel for 

landing craft construction, deficiencies do not appear serious. !4e 

recommend that the possibilities of providing the necessary items, and 

particularly steel, should be further examined. 

SHIPPING 

9. The examination of the shipping resources of the United Nations 

shows that so far as can be foreseen now, and on the assumption that 

future losses do not exceed the agreed estimate, personnel shipping 

will be available to permit of the optimum deploymerlt of United Nations 

forces up to the limits imposed by the availability of cargo shipping. 

The optimum deployment of available United Nations cargo shippl:ig 

to meet the requirements of the basic undertakings and projected operations for 1943/1944 reveals small deficiencies in the third and 

fourth quarters of 1943 and first quarter of 1944 and a surplus of 

sailings in the second and third quarters in 1944. The deficiencies 

are small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the 

effect will not be unmanageable. 

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OIL 

10. He have not been able to incltlde a survey of the oil position 

in the various theaters, but the whole question of stocks and of tankers 

must receive urgent examination in the light of the decisions taken 

at the Trident Conference. 

VT. CaNcLvsIms ON MxscELuNEavs SVRJECTS 

1. ECUIPMEKT FOh TURKEY 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed at the ANFA Conference that 

the Flritish should be responsible for framing and presenting to the 

Munitions Assianments Boards all bids for equipment for TVRKEY. The 

Combined Chiefs of Staff have now agreed that, with due regard to 

other important commitments, the assignment of such equiument as may 

be agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be made with the 

least practicable delay. 

2. RE-ARMING OF THE FRENCH IN NORTH AFRICA 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the rearming and 

reequipping of the French forces in !'ORTH AFKICA should be proceeded 

with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and e7uipment will 

allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of Rritish 

and U. S. forces. The use of captured German equipment for this purDose will be explored. 

v 11. ornE;C CO~FERENCES 

1. Oecisions of the CASABLANCA Conference in conflict with the 

provisions of this report are modified or cancelled accordingly. 

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet in July or early August 

in order to examine the decisions reached at this Conference in the 

light of the situation existing at the time. 

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ANNEX 

ADVAPTAGES TO BE GAINED 3Y THE I'SE CF THE AZORFS 

1. Experience has shown that so long as we can keep even a single 

aircraft with a convoy during the greater part of each day, the oneration of ['-boats is grertly hampered. In order to obtain maxinum 

air protection at the present time it is necessary for the I!. S.-

C. K. convoys to follow a northerly route which not only suffers from 

the disadvantages of bad weather and ice, but which inevitably becomes 

known to the enemy. If we take a southerly route at the present time, 

we lose shore-lased air protection over a large nart of the :>assage. 

There is the further peril of U-boat concentrations against the I!. S.­

3lediterranean convoys. We regard the immediate occupation of the 

AZORES as imperative to conserve Lives and shipping and. above all, to 

shorten the Uar. 

2. The facilities which we particularly require are as follows: 

a. Facilities in the AZORES on TERCIEtA for operating V.L.R. 

aircraft: 

b. [Inrestricted fueling facilities for naval escorts at either 

SAN .WIGIILL or FAYAL. 

3. The benefits which would accrue from these facilities may be 

summarized as follows: 

a. They would give us a much extended air cover for all convoys 

plying between: 

(1) U. S. A. or WEST INCIES and the WEDITZRRANEAN; 

(2) WEST INDIES ancl the U. K.: 

(3) SOUTH AMLRICA and the (1. K.; 

(4) U. K. and the MEDITERRANEAN: 

(5) U. K. and WEST AFRTCA, and the Cape and Eastwards. 

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b. The increased areas under air cover would give us much greater 

scope for evasive routing, e.g., when U-boats were concentrated in 

northern waters, NORTR ATLANTIC convoys could be routed via the 

AZORES instead of always having to follow the ICELAND (C) route. 

(See diagram. 

c. Without the AZORES we shall always be moving on the outside 

of the circle while the enemy operates inside it. Air forces there 

would be centrally placed to cover all varieties of the U-boat campaign against the NORTH ATLANTIC and MEDITERRANEAN Theaters. 

d. We should be able to increase our carrying capacity owing to 

the possibility of using more direct routes across the middle of 

the ATLANTIC. 

e. We could increase our harassing action against U-boats not 

only when on passage to and from the BISCAY bases, but also while 

resting, refueling and recharging their batteries in mid-ocean 

where hitherto they have been practically immune from interference 

by aircraft. New detection and attacking devices, which are expected to come into service this spring, would enhance the effect 

of such action. 

f. Unrestricted Fueling facilities in the Islands would enable 

us to make better use of our inadequate numbers of surface escorts. 

g. Blockade running between GERMANY and JAPAN would be rendered 

so hazardous as not to be worth the risk. 

h. German warships and raiders would have greater difficulty in 

evading detection after breaking out into the ATLANTIC. 

i. The Islands would provide more direct all-weather air supply 

routes from U. S. A. to EUROPE, AFRIC4, and the FAR EAST. 

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C.C.S. 244/1 

IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC 

OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943-1944 

Reference: 

CCS 4Qth kketing, Item (5) 

C.C.S.244 was circulated 22 May 1943 for consideration of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

In their 94th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved 

C.C.S. 244. as amnded, except that paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Summary 

of Conclusions should be taken note of as recommendations only. 

The amended version of C.C.S. 244 subsequently circulated as 

C.C.S. 244/1, 25 !.lay 1943. 

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C.C.S. 244/1 25 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC 

OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 1943-1944 

Reference: C.C.S. 94th Mtg., Item 5 

Note by the Secretaries 

The attached revision of C.C.S. 244 incorporates the amendments 

agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 94th Meeting and 

certain changes requested by the Combined Staff Planners for purposes 

of necessary editing end clarification. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat 

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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 

IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC 

OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 1943-1944 

AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES To MEET THE 

REQUIREMENTS OF CRITICAL STRATEGY 

Report by the Combined Staff Planners 

1. We have examined the available means of the United Nations with 

the object of assessing our ability to carry out the policy agreed by 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

2. A summary of this policy,which has been taken as the basis of 

our investigation, is attached as Annex I. 

3. Our conclusions are set out below. 

Ground Forces (Annex 11) 

4. All the ground forces required can be made available. 

Naval Forces (Annex 111) 

5. If a covering force is required for the operations to capture 

AKYAB and RAMREE, and if the Italian fleet has not been eliminated, 

some diversion of U.S. naval forces may be required (see Annex 111, 

paras. 7 to 10). Subject to this, all the naval forces required can 

be made available. 

Air Forces (Annex IV) 

6. Broadly there are sufficient air forces to meet all requirements 

in all theaters. 

7. For -Operation ROUNDHAMMER there will be sufficient air forces in 

the U.K. with the exception of transport aircraft, the provision of 

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which needs further investigation (see Appendix "A" to Annex IV). In 

the absence of any detailed plan for ROUNDHAMMER, it has not been 

possible to estimate the requirements of gliders. This will heve to 

be the subject of urgent study by the ROUNDHAMMER planners. 

8. For operations in Burma it will be seen there are only small 

deficiencies which can probably be reconciled by adjustments within 

the theater. (See Annex IV, Appendix "C"). 

9. Subject to the development of air fields and necessary comwunications in Assam, the air transport and defense requirements of the air 

route into China, up to 10,000 tons per month, can be met. 

Assault Shipping and Landing Craft (Annex VI 

10. Provided the casualties in operations are no greater than we have 

allowed for, and provided that the U.S. and Rritish planned productions 

are maintained, all the assault shipping and landing craft required can 

be made available. 

11. The allocations set out in Appendix "El" to Annex Vare recommended. 

12. Further recommendations are: ­

(a) If production permits 6 naval pontoon causeways or treedway 

bridges should be sunplied to the Indian Ocean Area, to arrive simultaneously with the L.S.T. from the U.S., and 56 should be sup?lierl for 

ROUNDHAMMER. 

(b) There is need for one floating dock capable of docking an 

L.S.T. in the Indian Ocean Area. 

Supply of Critical Items (Annex VI) 

13. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater 

it is not possible to give finalized requirements and to estimate detailed shortages of criticnl items. Aprovisionnl estimate is, however, 

set out in Annex VI. With the exception of steel for landing craft 

construction, these deficiencies do not appear serious. We recommend 

that the possibilities of providing these items, and particulerly the 

steel shruld be further examined. 

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Shipping (Annex VII) 

14. The examination of the shipping resources of the United Nations 

shows that so far as can be foreseen now, and on the assumption that 

future losses do not exceed the agreed estim-te (C.C.S. 174),* personnel shipping will be available to permit of the optimum deployment of 

United Nations forces up to the limits imposed by the availability of 

cargo shipping. 

The optimm denloyment of available United Nations cargo shipping 

to meet the requirements of the bsic undertakings and projected operations for 1943/1944 reveals small defjciencies in the third and 

fourth quarters of 1943 and first quarter of 1944 and a surplus of 

sailings in the second and third quarters in 1944. The deficiencies 

are small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, 

the effect will not be unmanageable. 

0;I 

15. We have not been able to include R survey of the oil position 

in the various theaters hit we feel that the whole question of stocks 

and of tankers will require urgent examination in the light of decisions taken at the Trident Cmference. 

* See paragraph 6 of Annex I1 

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ANNEX I 

BASIS OF INVESTIGATION 

The following operations and undertakings have been used as 

a basis for this investigation. They are not arranged in order of 

priority. 

I. USE OF THE AZORES ISLANDS 

Preparation and earmarking of the necessary British forces 

for the occupation of the AZORES. 

11. OPERATIONS IN NORTHWESTERN EUROPE 

(1) Combined air offensive from the United Kingdom. 

(2) Cross-Channel operations. 

To be launched from the United Kingdom with a target date 

of 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which 

further offensive operations can be carried nut. The scope of 

the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces 

being present and available fnr use in the United Kingdom by 

1 May 1944. 

Assault: 5 Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in 

landing craft) 

2 Infantry Divisions - Follow-up 

-

2 Air-borne Divisions 

Tota1 : 9 Divisions in the assault 

Build-up: Available for movement into lodgment area - 20 Divisions. 

111. OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

(1) Bombing of Ploesti by U.S. Army Air Forces from bases in 

North Africa. 

(2) Continuing directed operations against Sicily. 

(3) Such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate ITALY from the war and to contain the maximum 

number of German forces. The Allied Commander in Chief in NORTH 

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AFRICA may use for his operations all those forces available in the 

Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British Divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for 

withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, 

provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY will not 

be considered available. 

IV. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC - FAR EAST THEATER 

(1) Operations in Burma 

(a) The concentration of available resources as first priority within the ASSAM-BURMA theater on the building up and increasing of the air route to CHINA to a capacity of 10,000 tons 

a month by early fall, ad the development of air facilities in 

ASSAM with a view to ­ (i) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in 

BURMA. 

(ii) kintaining increased American Air Forces in CHINA. 

(iii) Msintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to CHINA. 

(b) Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations from 

ASSAM into BURMA via LEDO ad IMPHAL, in step with an advance 

by Chinese forces frm YUNNAN, with the object of containing as 

many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to 

CHINA, and as an essential step towards the opening of the 

BURMA Road. 

(c, The capture of AKYAB and of RAMREE ISLAND by amphibious 

operations, with possible exploitations. 

(d) The interruption of Japanese sea communications into 

BURMA. 

(2) Conduct air operations in and from CHINA 

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(3) Continue the directed operations in the SOLOMWS-BISMARCKNEW GUINEA Area. 

(4) Seizure Of the SOLOMONS, the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO and Japanese-held NEW GUINEA. 

(5) Seizure of the MARSHALL. and CAROLINE ISLANDS. 

(6) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communica t ions. 

(7) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians. 

V. OTHER UNDERTAKINGS 

(1) Maintain the securit) and war-making capacity of the WESTERN 

HEMISPHERE and BRITISH ISLES. 

(2) Support and maintain the war-making capacity of our forces 

in all areas. 

(3) Maintain vital overseas lines of comunications, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace. 

(4) Ihdertake such measures as may be necessary to provide CHINA 

with a volume of supplies to keep CHIFA actively in the war against 

JAPAN. 

(5) To sustain the Soviet forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to RUSSIA without militating against the attainment of the over-all objectives. 

(6) To provide for the fulfillment of British undertakings to 

Turkey with due regard to other important commitments. 

(7) To provide for the maintenance of prisoners of war. 

(8) To provide for the econunic support of countries occupied by 

the United Nations. 

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(9) To rearm and reequip French forces in North Africa as 

rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, 

but as secondary commitment to the requirements of British and 

I'nited States forces in the various theaters. 

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ANNEX I1 

LAND FORCES 

SECTION I - MEDITERRANEAN 

I. RESOURCES AVAILABLE 

a. At the conclusion of a successful HUSKY, there will be the 

following forces in the Mediterranean: 

British & Allied 27 Divisions 

u. s. 9 Divisions 

French 4 Divisions 

Total 40 Divisions 

On the assumption that 10% over-all casualties are allowed to 

cover HllSk'Y and subsequent operations in the Mediterranean, this 

total will be reduced to the equivalent strength of 36 Divisions, 

made up as follows: 

British & Allied 24 Divisions 

U.S. 8 Divisions 

French 4 Divisions 

Total 36 Divisions 

2. UNDERTAKINGS 

After allowing for the forces to be returned to the U.K. after 

1 November 1943 (4 American and 3 British Divisions) and the British 

undertaking to Turkey (2 Divisions) there will be available in the 

Mediterranean the following Divisions: 

British t3 Allied 19 Divisions 

U.S. 4 Divisions 

French 4 Divisions 

Total 27 Divisions 

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3. Subject to the overriding approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 

the method of employment of those divisions will be for the Allied 

C-in-C to decide. The garrison undertakings which might have to be met 

might amount to: 

British 14-17 Divisions 

U.S. 3 Divisions 

French 3 Divisions 

Total 20-23 Divisions 

(For calculation see Appendix to this Annex) 

4. The balance which will, therefore, be available after 1 November 

1943 is as follows: 

3ritish -

I1.S. French

Total available, 

allowing for 

casualties 24 8 4 Divisions 

Total undertakings, 

as shown above 19-22 -

7 -

3 Divisions 

Balance Available -2 - 5 -

1 -

1 Divisions 

5. The figures in this section include 1-1/3rd British and 1 U.S. 

Air-borne9ivisions. and 31st Indian Armored and 4th Indian Infantry 

and N.7. Mixed Divisions. The two INDIAN Divisions might return to 

the IndianTheater before the end of the war. Our figures take no 

account of further French Divisions furnished with the equipment of 

U.S. Divisions moving to the U.K. 

SECTION I1 - UNITED KINGDOM 

6. FORCES AVAILABLE 

The forces available in the United Kingdom on 1 May 1944, provided 

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that the shipping losses continue at less than the agreed rate* and 

economies are effected by the combined loading of British imports 

and U.S. Army supplies in the North Atlantic, will be as follows: 

British - 10-14 Divisions, dependent on whether 

cnnniba 1izat ion proves necessary , 

or n@t 

3 Divisions returned from the 

Mediterranean 

1 Air-borne Division 

American - 12% Divisions ex U.S. (includes one at present 

in U.K.) 

4 Divisions returned from the 

Mediterranean 

1 ex Iceland 

1 Air-borne Division, ex U.S. 

Grand Total 3.5!4-%% Divisions 

7. Of the above, 6% American Divisions which will be in the U.K. will 

not be operationally available on 1 May 1944. These 6% American 

* The "agreed rate" here envisaged is taken from C.C.S. 174 and 

is as follows:­

(a) For non-tankers permanently in use for the fighting 

Services 

0.91% per month for the whole of 1943 (to be adjusted 

for planned operational hazards). 

(b) For other non-tanker shipping: ­

2.39% per month for the first half of 1943. 

1.91% per month for the second half of 1943. 

This "agreed rate" is subject to revision on 1st July, '1943. 

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Divisions will, however, be operationally available two months from 

their date of arrival and can, therefore, be used in the bLrild-Lip 

subsequent to the initial assaults. 

Between May and September 1944, the build-up will be limited by 

reception and despatch facilities in the U.K. to approximately a 

half Division per month, assuring operations start in May. Every 

expedient should therefore be used to overcome the conqestion in 

depnts and ports which will not otherwise be able to deal with the 

simultaneous output and intake during the period of active operations. 

A gradual build-up of from 3 to 5 Divisions per month could be 

accomplished in the lodgment area assuming the availability of sppropriate port facilities on the Continent. 

8. FORCES OPERATIONALLY AVAILABIE ON 1 MAY 1944 

The total forces which will, therefore, be operationally available 

on 1 May 1944 are as follows:-

British 13-17 Divisions (includes Canadians) 

Arne r ican 11 Divisions 

Air-borne 2 Divisions (1 British and 1 American) 

Tota I 26-30 Divisions 

In addition to the above, 6% American Divisions will be available 

for the subsequent build-up, which should continue at the rate, if 

practicable, of 3 to 5 Divisions per month through ports made available on the Continent. 

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SECTION I11 - INDIA AND BURMA 

9. REQUIRED FOR OPERATIONS 

British 6 Divisions* including 

3 Assault Brigades 

3 Follow-up Brigades 

3 Long Range Penetration Croups 

(2 battalions each) 

1 Parachute Brigade 

Chinese 13 Divisions 

10. RESOURCES AVAILABLE 

British forces available in India are adequate for the operations 

envisaged. 

Chinese forces available amount to 22 Divisions (assuming 10,000 

to a Division). This will allow 9 Divisions in reserve. 

SECTION IV - THE AZORES 

11. UNDERTAKING 

3 Infantry Brigades and minimum supporting Arms. 

2 Commandos. 

12. AVAILABICITY OF FORCES 

The above can be found from the forces in the U.K., for an assault 

date about the end of August, without interfering with any other operations. 

* Two additional Divisions as a reserve will be held in India, and 

extra engineers for the making of the Assam road are required. 

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SECTION V - THE PACIEIC 

13. RESOURCES AVAILABLE 

The following major Allied Ground Forces are present in, or projected for, the area as of 1 January 1944. 

ALASKA 

PACIFIC OCEAN 

CENTRAL PACIFIC 

SOUTH PACIFIC 

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 

Equivalent of 3 Infantry 

D iv is ions 

1 Marine Infantry Division 

3 Infantry Divisions 

5 Infantry Divisions 

2 Marine Infantry Divisions 

1 N. 2. Division 

4, Infantry Divisions 

1 Air-borne Division 

1 Marine Infantry Division 

11 Australian Divisions 

Note: Three Australian Infantry Divisions (6th, 7th and 9th) 

are available for offensive operations. There are also six 

Australian Infantry Divisions and two Australian Armored Divisions (militia) presently assigned for defense. 

14. REQUIREMENT FOR CONTEMPLATED OPERATIONS AND AVAILABLE FROH 

U.S. RESOURCES 

Presently directed operations 

in the Solomons-3ismrck-New 

Guinea Area 

Kiska 

Marsha I1 s 

Carolines 

New Guinea 

Required in addition 

to allocations in 

paragraph 13 above 

None 

1 Division 

2 Divisions 

2 Divisions 

3 Divisions 

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APPENDIX TO ANNEX I1 

LAND FORCES 

POSSIBLE GARRISON REQUIREMENTS IN THE 

MEDITERRANEAN 

Sicily, Toe ad Heel of Italy 

Enforcement of .4r mis t ice 

Central Italy 

5ardinia 

Corsica 

Security of N. Africa ad Levant 

Dodecanese 

Durazzo bridgehead 

British V.S. French Divisions 

1-2/3rds -

1* 

3-6 - 1 

- 1 

4-1/3rd 2 2 

1 

3 - ­

Tota 1s 14-17 3 3 Divisions 

* Rome area covered by Central Italy undertaking. 

The above estimate of garrison requirements is believed to be 

the absolute minimum, and should be reviewed at the next cenference 

when a more accurate estimate of the German reaction to the yrobable 

collapse or surrender of Italy may be made. 

Apperdix to Annex I1 

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ANNEX I11 

PROVISION OF NAVAL FORCES 

1. General requirements for the escorts for the specific strategic 

operations projected in this paper can be met from our combined resources without unduly weakening the convoy escorts and support groups 

required for the existing convoy system. The escorts required for the 

North Russian convoys, should they be resumed in September, and for 

certain adjustments envisaged in existing convoy cycles can, however, 

only be met partly by new construction and partly by a reduction in 

the number of support groups employed. 

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS 

USE OF THE AZORES 

2. The British forces in the Atlantic will be sufficient to undertake the occupation of the Azores while at the same time guarding 

agsinst a breakout of the German Fleet. 

CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS (ROUNDHAMNER) 

3. By accepting a reduction in local convoy escorts and Local 

Defense requirements in United Kingdom waters, there will be sufficient 

light craft to counter a probable German threat within the Channel, 

while the British Home Fleet will be of sufficient strength to counter 

any move by German heavy units. 

U.S. - U.K. MOVEMENT 

4. Two escort groups will be required for U.S. - U.K. personnel 

ships. Two U.S. groups now employed with U.G.F. convoys will cease 

to run by tk time the movement starts, and will then become available 

for use elsewhere. 

OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

5. Sufficient forces have already been allocated for Operation 

HUSKY. 

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6. British forces in the Mediterranean after HUSKY will be sufficient for through Mediterranean and local convoy escorts and for 

Operations BUTTRESS, GOBLET and MUSKET or BRIMSTONE, except that 

there will be a deficiency of some 22 escorts should the Allied 

Commander in Chief decide to undertake Operation BRIMS’ONE. Assuming 

that no extra escorts could be taken from the Atlantic, this could 

only be met by a temporary interference with all convoys inside the 

Mediterranean. The above is dependent on the losses sustained in 

HUSKY. 

THE CAPTURE OF AKYAB AND RAMREE 

7. It is not possible to say at present whether a covering force 

will be required, as this is dependent on the extent to which the 

Japanese Fleet is contained by United States operations in the Central 

and Southwest Pacific. If a covering force is required, we estimate 

that it should not exceed that set out in the right hand column in 

paragraphs 8 and 9 belw. 

8. The British can provide forces as follows: 

Assault Forces Covering Forces 

4 Cruisers (C.L.) 3 Battleships (O.B.B.) 

1 Escort Carrier (A..C.If,) 4 Heavy Cruisers (C.A.) 

2 A.A. Cruisers 2 Light Cruisers (C.L.) 

5 Destroyers (D.D.) 14 Destroyers (D.D.) 

24 Escorts (D.E.) 

8 Minesweepers 

8 Submarines 

9. To complete estimated requirements, there will be needed from 

the United States: 

Assault Forces Covering Forces 

5 Escort Carriers (A.C.V.) 2 Fleet Carriers (C.V.) ­

21 Destroyers (D.D.) Should Italy be out of 

6 Submarines the war, the British will 

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Tanker Force be able to provide one of 

8 Escorts (D.E.) these. 

VICTORIOUS is counted 

as a U.S. unit. 

10. U.S. ships now available and becoming available in 1943 and 1944 

provide for the operations now under way in the Aleutians, those directed in the SOLOMONS-BISMARCK-NEW GUINEA Area, and those projected 

in NEW GUINEA, the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES. The need for U.S. Naval 

forces set forth in paragrauh 9 will involve some diversions from 

present planned deployment. 

SMALL CRAFT FOR INSHORE AND RIVER WORK 

11. Numerous small patrol etc. craft will be required on the Burma 

coast and rivers. The provision of these craft cannot be assessed, 

but as the original operations against Rangoon have been postponed, 

the present construction program of river steamers in India should be 

reexamined to decide whether we can slow it down and produce patrol 

craft instead. The possibility of supplying the necessary engines 

would require detailed investigation. 

PROVISION OF NAVAL PERSONNEL 

12. There are some requirements for special naval personnel for 

which provision has to be made. Proposals as to how they might be 

met are as under:­

(a) Naval Embarkation Staff at Loading Ramps for 

ROUNDHAHMER 

Total requirement is estimated at 120 officers and 920 

men of which the British portion might be two thirds. 

(i)British portion 

Since no technical knowledge is required it is considered these shuld be found from local Home Guard or equivalent 

sources. This will be resolved in the United Kingdom. 

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(ii) American portion 

The provision of approximately 40 officers and 300 

seamen can be met by the United States. 

(b) Naval Port Parties for Captured Ports in ROUNDHAMMER 

The numbers required have not yet been computed but they 

are considerable and include a proportion of technicians and specialists. The requirements and the method of providing them should 

be set forth in the plan for the cross-Channel operation. 

(c) Naval Port Parties for Captured Ports of 4kyab and Ramree 

These parties, which will not be large, but include specialists and technicians, cannot be found from Indiz ana mustbe 

provided from elsewhere. 

(d) Naval Beach Parties 

The requirements outside ROUNDHAMMER and the Mediterranean 

are as follows:­

(i) Akyab and Ramree - 3 

One of these is available in India and it is proposed 

that the other two should either be transferred from those surplus in the Mediterranean on completion of HUSKY if MUSKET is 

carried out, or provided from the V.K. if BRIMSTOAE is carried 

out. 

(ii) Azores - 2 (low establishment) 

These can both be provided frvm the I'nited Kingdomwhen 

the operation is mounted. 

(e) Naval Landing Craft Maintenance Personnel 

On the assumption that each nation will provide the maintenance personnel for its own craft in all operations, the I3ritish 

and American portions can be provided. 

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ANNEX IV 

PROVISION OF AIR FORCES 

1. The following appendices show the resources available to us 

for the various operations. 

Appendix "A" Cross-Channel Operations - Provision 

of Forces. 

Appendix "B" Operations in the BEDZTERRANEAN to 

eliminate ITALY from the war. 

Appendix "C" Operations in WJRMA. 

We summarize below our conclusions on the availability of 

forces for the operations contemplated. 

ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS FROB THE AZORES 

2. It is planned that R.A.F. Coastal Commnd will initiallv provide 

the V.L.R. aircraft which will be established after the occupation. 

It is recognized that combined United States-British forces may be 

employed subsequently from this area in anti-submarine warfare, and 

for other purposes. 

COMBINED BOBBER OFFENSIVE FROB THE U.K. 

3. The projected strength of American Heavy and Medium Bomber 

Force for the combined bomber offensive from U.K. as of 1 April 1944 

is included in Appendix "A". This tabulation of unit equipment does 

not show reserves which were included in the requirements for "0s. 

aircraft set torth in C.C.S. 217. 

BOMBING OF PLOESTZ 

4. Sufficient forces are available in the U.K. and the MEDZTERRANEAN Air Command. 

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CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS (ROUNDHAYMER) 

5. With the exception of transport aircraft the provision of which 

needs further investigation, there will be sufficient air forces in 

the U.K. to support Operation ROVNDHAMWER. (See Appendix “A”.) 

OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

5. There are sufficient air forces in the MEDITERRANEAN for contemplated operations, except for an estimated deficiency of 108 transport aircraft for Operation BRIMSTONE. (See Appendix “B” .) 

OPERATIONS IN BURMA 

7. In Appendix “C” is a table showing the British and U.S. forces 

available for operations. 

8. The operations planned in BURYA take place in November and 

December 1943. In Appendix T”is a table showing the air forces required for the operations and for the fighter defense of CEYLON and 

CALCUlTA together with an estimate of the British and U.S. Air Forces 

likely to be available in the theater at the time of the start of 

operations. From this it will be seen that there are some deficiencies. These can probably be reconciled by adjustments within 

the theater. 

AIR OPERATIONS IN AND FROM CHINA 

9. The planned strength of the 14th Air Force is 1 Heavy Bomber 

Group, 1 Medium Romber Squadron - to be increased to 1 Group when 

10,000 tons per month capacity on the CHINA air route is achieved ­ and 2 Fighter Groups. In addition, there will be 80 ChineseFighters 

and 40 Chinese Medium Bombers. This is considered the maximum force 

which can be maintained in CHINA until the limited lifting capacity 

of the air route has been increased beyond 10,COO tons a month. Contemplated operations should result in increasing facilities for the 

CHINA air route. 

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DIRECTED OPERATIONS IN SOLOMONS-BISMARCK-NEW GUINEA AREA, AND OPERATIONS To SEIZE THE 33LOMONS. THE BISMAECK ARCHIPELAGO AND IAPANESEHELD NEW GUINEA 

10. Accepting the air requiremnts of the SWTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 

for the continuing of directed operations in the SQLOMONS-BISMARCK-NEW 

GUINEA area as king those allocated by J.C.S. 238/3, it would appear 

that adequate forces are or will be available in those theaters for 

the operations contemplated in their due progression. 

SEIZE THE MARSHALL AND CAROLINE ISLANDS 

11. No approved plan for this operation exists. Preliminary estimates of required air strength for seizure of the MARSHALL ISLANDS 

alone are: 

HB MB Fighter -

LB Patrol (k0 Patrol (L)

72 36 113 90 36 24 

With the exception of the heavy and medium bomber categories, 

it would appear that adequate air forces for this enterprise would 

be available about January 1944, with a somewhat reduced garrison 

force for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. The U.S. Naval aircraft indicated 

therein do not include those available to the Commander in Chief, 

Pacific Fleet, for assignment. Certain air units from these might 

be made available. A firm estimate of requirements for the seizure 

of the IHARSHALL. and CAROLINE ISLANDS cannot be made at this time. 

EJECT THE JAPANESE FROM THE ALEUTIANS 

12. Adequate air forces are available for this operation. 

Annrv 

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APPENDIX "A" 

COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE U.K. AND 

CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS (ROUNDHAMMER) 

After allowing for the fighter defense requirements of the U.P. 

and Northern Ireland not covered by the ROUNDHAMMER operation, which 

will amount to 18 SFF Squadrons and 13 TEF Night Fighter Squadrons, 

it is estimated that the following air forces will be available in the 

U.K. by 1 May 1944, subject to the provision of accommodation, which 

requires further 

Heavy Bombers 

Medium Bombers 

Light & Dive 

Rombe r s 

Bombers Recce 

Day Fighters 

Flight Fighters 

Fighter Pecce 

Army Support 

(Fighters) 

4rvy Support 

(Bombers) 

Photo Recce 

Observation 

A ir/Sea Rescue 

Transport 

Total 

study. 

U. S.A.A.F. 

Groups Aircraft 

(1T.E.) ­

51 2,448 

9 576 

13 832 

25 2,5CG 

2 168 

4 336 

-

8% -442 

- -

7,302

R.A.F. 

Squadrons* Aircraft 

(11.E. ) 

80 1,600 

12 240 

13 260 

1 14 

44 792 

6 150 

15 231 

8 112 

4 56 

5 100 

10 160 

8% 170 

-

7 190

- 4,c75

* These squadrons represent those that will be formed or forming cn 

1 January 1944 which will allow for their being fully operational 

for cross-Channel operations by 1 May 1944. 

Appendix "A" to Annex IV 

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Of the above U.S. forces, the 51 Heavy Bomber Groups, the 

9 Medium Bomber Groups and 10 of the Fighter Croups are projected 

for the Combined Bomber Offensive. 

It should te noted that there will only be 632 transport aircraft available in the U.K. for the lift of two air-borne divisions. 

This will leave a deficiency which, together with the use and provision 

of gliders, will require further detailed investigatim as a matter of 

urgency. 

Appendix "A" Annex IV 

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APPENDIX “9” 

OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN TO ELIMINATE 

ITALY FROM THE WAR 

1. BRITISH AND AMERICAN AIR FORCES AVAILABLE IN THE MEDITERRANLAN 

Brit is h 

Type Sqdns. -A /C

-

Total

-

Sqdns . _. 

A/C

S.E.F. & 

T.E.F. (D) 

T.E.F. (N) 

L.B. 

M.B. (D) 

M.B. (N) 

n.B. (D) 

H.B. (N) 

TRANSPORT 

ARMY CO-OP 

2. Operations 

set out below: 

3. Operations 

52 852 40 1,000 92 1,852 

7 112 4 48 11 160 

8 128 12 171 20 299 

- - 28 399 28 399 

6 120 - - 6 120 

- - 24 2 10 24 2 10 

2 32 - - 2 32 

3 48 28 364 31 41 2 

5 so 4 84 9 164 

VARIOUS MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS 

which might be undertaken in the Mediterranean are 

to Collapse Italy 

With the air forces available (except for an additional 108 

transport aircraft for BRIHSTONE) either of the two following sets 

of operations (A or B) could be undertaken in addition to all necessary defensive undertakings in the Mediterranean. 

(b) BUlTRESS - 37 S.E.F. Sqdns. 

(c) GOBLET - 37 S.E.F. Sqdns. 

(d) MUSKET - 20 S.E.F. Sqdns. 

- 1 F/Recce Sqdn. 

1 Strat/Recce Sqdn. 

9 T.E.F.(D) Sqdns. 

All deFndent on (: 

for bomber support. 

Cperations are not 

simultaneous. 

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(e) Required in S. Italy after (d) 24 S.E.F. Sqdns . 

1 F/Recce. 

1 Stratfiecce. " 

1 T.E.F. (N) " 

4 L/M.B. (D) I' 

OR B ~ 

(f\ Air offensive against 

(S) BUTRESS 

(h) BRIMSTONE 

(i) FIREBRAND 

ITALY - All heavy and medium bombers 

37 S.E.F. Sqdns. Dependent on 

(f) for bomber support. 

40 S.E.F. 

12 T.E.F. 

2 T.E.F. 

25 L/M.B. 

6 M.B. 

24 H.R. 

2 H.B. 

Sqdns. 

" (D) " (N) 

(D) " 

(N) ' 

(D) ! 

(N) n 

2 Strat/Recce "

520 Transport Aircraft 

8 S.E.F. Sqdns. 

" 9 T.E.F. (D) " 4 L/M.B. (D) 

4. Operations after an Italian Collapse 

After an Italian collapse, there would be sufficient air forces 

to undertake the following further operations (C) and meet essential 

defensive commitments (D), as well as assistance to Turkey (E). 

-

C

(a) Establishment of a bridgehead at Durazzo - 22 S.E.F. Sqdns. 

2 T.E.F.(N\ 

Sqdns . 4 L.B. ,, 

Appendix "B" to Annex IV 

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(b) Establishment of P bomber force in central (and southern) 

Italy for an air offensive against southern Germany and the Balkans, 

together with such transpcrt aircraft as may be available in the 

Mediterranean A.C. for the supply of guerrjllas in the Balkans: 

12 S.E.F. Squadrons 

1 T.E.F. (N) Squadron 

The following bomber force (in aircraft): 

160 M.B. (D) 

210 H.B. (D) 

120 M.B. (N) 

32 H.B. (N) 

D- (c) Fighter force necessary for defense on ccnclusion of operations (in Sqdns.). 

S.E.F. T.E.F. (D) T.E.F. (N) 

Levant 1 (i3r.) 

Egypt 3 (Br.) 1/2 (Br.) 

Cyrena ica 3 (Br.) 1 (Br.) 1/2 (Br.) 

Tripoli tania 1 (Br.) 

Tunisia 2 (U.S.) 1/2 (U.S 

Sicily 2 (Br.) 1/2 (Br. 

Malta 1 (Br.) 1/2 (Br. 

Reggio 1 (Br.) 

Cot rone 1 (Br.) 

Heel 4 (U.S.) 1 (Br.) 1/2 (U.S.) 

Sardinia & Corsica 5 (U.S.) 1 (U.S.) 1 (U.S.) 

C. Italy 10 (U.S.) 1 (U.S.) 1 (U.S.) 

Durazzo 4 (Br.) 1 (Br.) 

Algeria & Morocco 4 (1J.S.) 1 (U.S.) 1 (U.S.) 

Dodecanese 3 (Br.) 1 (Br.) 

Totals 44 8 

Appendix "B" to Annex IV 

210 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

(d) Assistance to Turkey (British) 

Hardihood I - 17 S.E.F. Sgdns, 

1 T.E.F. (D) " 

1 T.E.F. (N) 

3 L.B. 11 

2 F/Recce. n 

1 F.R. n 

Hardihood I1 - 7 S.E.F. I! 

12 H.B. ,, 1 G.R. $1 

CONCLUSION 

5. With the air forces available (as shown in paragraph 1 above) 

we could undertake operations A nr B, and C, D and E (except for an 

estimated deficiency of 108 transport aircraft for operation BRIMSTONE). 

Appendix "B" to Annex IV 

211 
212 

F: 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX V 

ASSAULT SHIPPING AND CRAFT 

1. See Appendix “A” for availability and deployment of assault ships 

and landing craft for operations HUSKY, BUTTRESS, GOBLET, MUSKET, 

ANAKIM. BRISK, and RWNDHAMNER. This table is based on a casualty rate 

of 20 per cent in the cnse of special ships and 50 per cent in the case 

of landing craft as committed in exh major amphibious operation. 

2. See Appendix “B“ for allocation of U.S. production to the ATLANTIC, INDIAN and PACIFIC Theaters. No deployment within the PACIFIC 

has been shown. 

3. Figures given for British built landing craft allow for the 

maximum rate of production. Production of major landing craft, i.e., 

L.C.T., L.C.F.(L), and L.C.G.(M), cannot be increased except at the 

expense of other naval construction, such as corvettes, destroyers, 

etc. This cannot be accepted. 

4. U.S. allocations are based on production as indicated below 

and are subject to revision in the event that this production is not 

rea 1 ized. 

(a) LST’s - Bureau of Ships estimated production (dated 15 May 

1043) for remainder of calendar year 1943; and a production thereafter of 12 per month through 1944. 

(b) LCI(L)’s - Increasing production from 16 per month to 20 per 

month beginning in October 1943 and continuing at that rate until 

the end of 1944. 

(c) LCT(6)’s - Maintaining production at the November 1943 level 

of 20 per month until the end of 1944. 

5. All of these assumptions provide fok an increase in production. 

It should be noted that no increase in landing craft production is 

Annex V 

2 13 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

possible unless sufficient additional material is made available for 

this purpose. For the present naval building program there is already 

a deficit 9f 110,000 tons of steel in the third quarter. 

6. NAVAL PONTOON CAUSEWAYS OR TREADWAY BRIDGES 

148 L.S.T. are being used in Operation HUSKY. In order that 

vehicles can be landed from L.S.T. on flat beaches, 48 Naval Pontoon 

Causeways, each 175 feet long, have been sup~lied. These are sufficient for 24 L.S.T., or one-sixth of the total number employed. 

18 L.S.T. are allocated to Operation ANAKIM. On the same basis 

as the HUSKY requirements, 6 pontoons or bridges will be necessary. 

143 L.S.T. are to be used in Operation ROUNDHAMMER. The beaches 

on the north coast of FRANCE are narticularly flat. Naval Pontoon 

Causeways sufficient for one-quarter of the above should be available. 

Assuming enough equipment to provide 16 causeways can be salvaged from 

the MEDITERRANEAN, a further allocation of 56 causeways is necessary. 

7. DOCKING FACILITIES FOR OPERATTOK AKAKIM 

The facilities for docking ships and craft for ANAKIM are limited. 18 L.S.T.(2) are being used in the oreratlons In addition to 

some 19G small craft. Consideration should be given to the supply of 

at least one floating dock to IhDIAN OCEAN Area for docking of L.S.T. 

The L.S.D. could be used, prior to the operation, for docking small 

craft. 

CONCLUSION 

8. Provided: 

(1) The casualties in operations do not exceed our estimate 

(paragraph 1 ’1, 

(2’1 United States and British production is realized (paragraphs 3 and S), 

(3) 42 LCI(L) are alloceted to the British for Pritish manning 

if necessary (Appendix “6” footnote), 

there will be sufficient landing craft for the operations contemplated. 

Annex V 

2 14 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ApPpmIX " A" 

Detailed Study Showing Prwisim of 

SHIPS rn LrnIffi mAFr 

For operations HIJSKY, BlTlXES, ANAKIM. BRISK. GOBLET, W.RoIMDHI\NhlER 

NCTES: 

Include. 8 1!.S. converted transports. 

4 to be converted frm KA's in INDIA. 

LSIfLI. I.Sli 0"lY. 

The requirements for operation RO%w)llh\c~marc 

bared on the assmotion that the Rrifirh orovide 

two assault divisions and "me imnediate follou.-up 

division and the lWIIED STAlFS provide one assault 

division and ""e immediste follow-up di"iJi0". 

Approximately 100 will be equipped with 

flame thrower. and not available as trom carriers 
U.S. SECRET APPENDIX "B" 

BRITISH MOST SECRET UNITED STATES ALLOCATIONS 

I 

LST LCT 

1 ALL:lED AS OF 

1 Tulv Jul Aug 

1943 

Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb 

1944 

Mar Apr May Jun 

I 

!sT:�Y 

Jul Aug 

1943 

Sep Oct Nov Dec 

I

I Jan Feb 

1944 

Mar Apr May Jun 

PACIFIC 

ATLANTIC 

0 

(144) 

0 

(138) 

0 

(144) 

0 

(138) 

C 0 

(144) (144) 

0 0 

(138) (138) 

0 

(144) 

0 

(138) 

0 

(144) 

0 

(138) 

180 

139 

3

(183) 

7 

(146) 

3

(186) 

7 

(153) 

3

(189) 

11 

(164) 

6

(195) 

14 

(178) 

6

(201) 

14 

(192) 

14 

(206) 

6

(213) I 1 

(207) 

6

(219) 

6 6

(225) (231) 

6 6

~(237) (243) 

0 

I COMMITTED TO U.K. 

I

UNALLOCATED

I TOTAL 22 22 20 22 19 18 12 12 12 12 12 12 10 10 14 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 

* Allocated from early June production. 

Parenthetical figures are cumulative. 

LCI(L) LCM(3)'s, LCVP's, and LSD's 

ALLOCATED 

1943 1944 OPERATION LCM( 3 ) LCVP LSD 

To ,m,,oF, Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec .Tan Feb Mar Apr May Jun I HUSKY 154 324 

PACIFIC 70 12 10 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 

I

I(82) (92) (104) (116) (128) (140) (152) (164) (176) (188) (200) 1 ROUNDHAMMER I 196 389 I 

I ATLANTIC 102 4 6 4 8 8

I ANAKIM I 0 I II r- TOTAL I 350 I 713 I 1 I 

COMMITTED O* 

TO U.X. 

UNALLOCATED 8 8 8 8 20 

(8) (16) (24) (32) (52) -

TOTAL 16 16 16 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 

(106) (112) (116) (124) (132) I ANAKIM I l I 

* None committed. However, on the assumption that the United Kingdom provides two assault 

and one imdiate follow-updivisions and the United States provides one assault and one 

immediate follow-updivision, 42 of the LCI(L)'s provided by the U.S. will be needed to 

lift British troops ad it would appear desirable that they be British wnned. 

Parenthetical figures are cumlative. 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX VI 

AVAILABILITY OF CRITICAL SUPPLY AND CONSTRUCTION ITEMS 

1. After providing for the basic undertakings, as stated in Annex I, 

which are to be the first charge against our resources, the United 

Nations will be able to provide the critical supply and construction 

item peculiar to the specific operations projected, except as indicated hereafter. 

a. GENERAL 

There are overall shortages in radar and radio equipment. 

It is estimated that this condition will improve progressively to 

an extent which will permit an adequate distribution of these items 

to V.S. Army Air Forces by September 30, 1943, and to meet all 

projected requirements by June, 1944. 

An increase in the production of spare parts for naval aircraft will be necessary to support the projected operations without 

resort to cannibalization. 

Finally, in the absence of detailed plans of operations for 

each theater,it is not possible to give finalized requiremepts, ad 

to estimate shortages. These must be the subject of further detailed examination and discussion. The following,therefore, must 

be read in the light of the foregoing, and must not be read as 

complete planning data. 

b. THE OCCUPATION OF THE AZORES 

The British are able to meet all requirements for this operat ion. 

In the event t1.S. or Brazilian forces are involved in the 

occupation of or in Pnti-submarine operations from the islands, 

they can be equipped with United States equipment after completing 

training. Training of Brazilian units has not yet started and is 

expected to take nine months. 

Annex 1'1 

2 15 
W.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

c. OPERATIONS IN NORTHWESTERN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 

(1) Combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom 

Requirements are being met. 

(2) Bombing of PLOESTI by U. S. Army Air Forces from Bases 

in North Africa 

Requirements can be met. 

(3) Cross-Channel Operations (ROUNDHAMMER) 

U.S. reauirements can be met. 

Requirements for Lend-Lease for British are being met 

in most prt. There is urgent need for heavy motor vehicles 

(6-ton Mack, 10-ton White-Mack, and 2?4-ton Amphibian (DUKWl 

and every effort sbuld be made to expedite their production. 

Landing craft in adequate numbers can only be furnished 

provided the correct projected rate of production can be maint a ined. 

(4) Operations in the Mediterranean to Elimirnte ITALY from 

the War 

All requirements for HUSKY are being met. It is expected 

that, with continued maintenance, all critical supply and construction items necessary for subsequent operations in the Mediterranean Theater will be available in North Africa. 

d. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC-FAR EAST THEATER 

(1) Operations in Burma 

All requirements for the U.S. -Chinese forces in ASSAM 

are being met. 

Shortages in Lend-Lease supplies for the British can be 

met at the expense of requirements of U.S. troops overseas. 

Critical items are 2%-ton amphibian trucks (DUKW), armored 

amphibians, %-ton trailers and pipe lines. High priority must 

Annex VI 

216 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

be given also to the remainder of the excavating and road-making 

machinery, and to the assigned equipment for increasing the output of the DIGBOI refinery. 

Although the highest priority has been given to the 10 

heavy moorings needed by the British at Trincomalee before the 

naval covering force assembles there in November, the critical 

item in short supply is the steel chains. Information is not 

available as to production, but these will be made available 

for shipment immediately they come off production. 

(2) Air Operations in ad from China 

The amount of supplies delivered by air transport into 

China is directly dependent upon the capacity of the ferry route 

and the communications in ASSAM. 

(3) Directed operations in the Solomons-Bismarck-New Guinea 

Area 

Requirements are being furnished and can continue to be 

furnished. 

(4) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago and 

Japanese-held New Guinea 

It is expected that requirements, when determined, can 

be met. 

(5) Seizure of the Marsh11 ad Caroline Islands 

Equipnent for two amphibious divisions canbe furnished. 

It is expected that other requirements, when determined, can 

be met. 

(b) Eject the Japanese from the Aleutiam 

Requirements are being met. 

Annex VI 

217 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX VII 

PART I - DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSIT’ION 

Military cargo shipping requirements for the remainder of 1943 

have been reexamined in the light of the strategy agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These requirements are now as follows:­

1. For the maintenance and build-up of British Forces overseas 

monthly sailings are required as shown below:­

a. 

Theater JUL AX SEF Kc I”0V DEC 

UK US UK US UK US UK US UK us UK us 

India & Ceylon 10 18 9 18 8 15 8 15 8 15 8 15 

Mediterranean 

Theaters 41 32 58 29 56 27 51 32 47 29 43 27 

Russian Aid 5 - 4 - 10-10- 10 - 10 - Turkish Aid 4 5 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 5 - -

Persian Gulf 2 4 3 5 3 5 2 4 2 4 2 

b. -1944

Sailings from U.K. and U.S. Combined 

Theater 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 

India & Ceylon 80 100 100 

Mediterranean 

Theaters 25 0 280 2 80 

Russian Aid 30 30 30 

Turkish Aid 25 25 25 

Persian Gulf 20 20 20 

It is believed that it is just possible that the 1943 sailings can 

be met from British availabilities together with the customary assistance afforded by the W.S.A. Individual adjustments may, hcwever, be 

necessary from month to month. In 1944 a higher rate of assistance 

from the U.S.A. will be necessary, which is indicated in paragraph 3. 

Annex VII 

218 

4 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

2. Operational shipping is required in addition as follows:­

a. BRISK 8 vessels representing a loss of approximately 8 North 

Atlantic sailings in the second half of 1943. 

b. Operations post-HUSKY 90 cargo ships (plus say 15 Combat 

Loaders) retained after HUSKY for some five months representing 

an equivalent loss of North Atlantic sailings of 90 in 1943 and 70 

in 1944. 

C. Operations in Burma, 25 cargo ships from November to January 

representing a further loss of 30 North Atlantic sailings in 1944. 

Although the shipping required for the three sets of operations 

above can no doubt be found fran the United Nations shipping physically available in their respective areas, the loss of North Atlantic capacity involved cannot be made good from any British 

resources and must, therefore, be a commitment against U.S. tonnage. 

3. These requirements are, therefore, included with all I7.S. commitments and are given in the following table cf sailings: 

-1943 ­1944

Requirement 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr 1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 

Tao maintain the 

war making capacity of WESTERN 

HEMISPHERE 134 134 134 134 134 

To maintain war 

making capacity of 

BRITISH ISLESI1.P. Import Program 270 300 330 330 360 

T'o maintain war 

making capacity of 

areas other than the 

BRITISH ISLESRegular Lend-Lease 

A1 locations 111 111 150 180 200 

Annex VII 

219 
U.S.SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Requirement 

Support and maintenance of forces in 

all areasU.S. Navy requirements 

U.S. Army requirements 

(Less U.K.-

N.Af r ica -China -Burma­

-

1943 ­1944

3rd Qtr 4th Qtr 1st Qtr 2nd -

@r 3rd Qtr

240 235 204 195 205 

365 355 240 240 240 

India-Pacific mves 

in 1944) 

Aid to Russia 45 54 54 54 54 

Re-arm and re-equip 

FRENCH forces Included in North African reauirements or by 

use of French shipping. 

Maintenance of 

prisoners of war 12 2 - - - Economic support 

of occupied countries - - 90 90 90 

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS 

China-Burma-India 

U.S. Army requirement s 

U.S. allocations for 

British 

hditerranean 

operat ions 

BRISK 

U.K. 

U.S. Army requirement 

British requirement 

(from North Africa) 

North Africa 

Marshall Islands 

U.S. Army requirememt s 

IJ.S. Navy requirements 

52 34 51 51 

- 25 

90 70 

8 -

280 420 4GO 360 

44 31 - ­

166 123 123 123 

- 25 22 9 

- ­

220 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

1943 1944 

Requirement 3rd Qtr 4th Qtz 1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 

Solomons -BismarckNew Guinea 

1J.S. Army requirement s - - 47 84 39 

U.S. Navy requitement s - - 45 24 -

TOTAL REQUIREMENTS 1672 1831 2022 1927 1883 

TOTAL AVAILABLE 1606 1762 1900 2050 2250 

BALANCE -66 -69 -122 +123 +367 

NOTE: The foregoing is based on the assumption that each BOLERO cargo 

ship will lift approximately 1500 tons of British import cargo 

and on the other hand the equivalent of 12 shiploads of measurement cargo on BOLERO account will be lifted monthly in U.K. 

import vessels. 

Annex VII 

221 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

PART I1 - PERSONNEL SHIPPING POSITION 

4. In examining the British personnel shipping resources and determining their optimum deployment, the following assumptions have 

been made: 

a. That the operational requirements will be as in Table I 

attached. 

b. That the move of 82 West African Division from West Africa 

to India will not take place. 

c. That British personnel shipping will be required to fulfill 

the following permanent commitments. 

(1) 9.000 troops per month from U.K. to North Africa. 

(2) 17,GOC troops per month from U.K. to Indian Ocean. 

(3) Move of 81 West African Division to India during 3rd 

puarter of 1943. 

(4) 15.000 Canadian troops and Air Trainees and Naval personnel Fer month to be moved from Canada to the U.K. 

d. Losses in the operations shown in Appendix "A" do not exceed 

40 per cent of the shipping employed. 

e. North African personnel route can not open until January 1944. 

f.That the pool of British personnel shipping to the Indian 

Ocean is capable of meeting local requirements (except for certain 

operational requirements) in that theater. 

5. After meeting the requirements in paragraph 4 above, it has 

been assumed that British personnel shipping will be available fer 

the movement of United States troops from U.S.A. to United Kingdom, 

and that from November onwards some ships of the escorted class of 

shipping will also be available to move IJnited States troops either 

from North Africa or U.S.A. to the United Kingdom. 

Annex VII 

222 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

6. Post-HUSKY operations make use of capacity of 80,000 in their 

initial stages, but it is estimated that about half of this can be 

released after the assault. In view of the fact that the average 

interval between convoys from the United States to the United Kingdom 

will be about four weeks, it is unlikely that any of this shipping, 

when released, would be able to move United States troops from the 

U.S.A. to the United Kingdom during 1943. This shipping will, however, be able to move British and United States troops from Worth 

Africa to the United Kingdom during November and December 1943. It 

is considered that personnel shipping released from the Mediterranean 

should be used for the movement of troops from North Africa in preference to the movement of troops from U.S.A. to United Kingdom because 

the employment from North Africa will save this shipping a voyage 

empty westbound across the Atlantic. 

7. In the calculations, account has been taken of the fact that 

the balanced movement of troops and their cargo into the United Kingdom 

is limited by the quantity of cargo which can be accepted each month 

into the I1.K. The maximum practical limit is 150 shiploads of cargo 

per month except in absolute emergency. This must include the maintenance requirements of the growing number of U.S. troops in the 

U.K. and,therefore, conditions the monthly SICKLE/BOLERO build-up. 

It is pointed out that the early arrival of certain Port and Engmeer 

hits is essential if the maximum quantity of SICKLE/BOLERO cargo is 

to be handled. 

8. The opening of a personnel route along the North African coast 

to the Middle East would release personnel shipping from the 1I.K.-

Indian Ocean route equal to a total capacity of about 30,000. This 

would give a further monthly lift from North America across the Atlantic of 20,000 men per month as soon as the route is opened. If 

work on the development of the route starts now, perscnnel movement 

should start in January. 

9. British personnel shinping, after meeting all present known 

British personnel movement requirements, can lift U.S. troops into 

Annex VII 

223 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

U.K. or through Atlantic continental ports on the scale shown in 

Table 11. It must be borne in mind, however, that in 1944 a monthly 

movement of 35,000 personnel across the Atlantic in British shipping 

(cr 55,000 if the North African personne.1 route is open) is entirely dependent upon the provision of escorts. 

10. The deployment of U.S. personnel shipping and of British personnel shipping, which is available for the movement of U.S. troops, 

is shown in Table 111. This table also shows the BOLERO build-up 

in terms of divisions. 

Annex VII 

224 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

TABLE I 

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONNEL SHIPPING 

Operations Oct/Dec 

in 1943 

Mediterra ­ nean 

Ja n/Feb 

M ov/Dec 

1943 

Portuguese Aug/Sep 

Islands 1943 

80,000 

(including 

12 L.S.I.(L)) 

30.000 

36,000 

(including 

6 L.S.I..(L) 

and 3 L.S.P.) 

14,000 

(including 

2 L.S.P. and 

4 L.S.I.(L)) 

(20,000 now in Med: ('8s)) 

(50,000 UK-Indian Ocean 

(WS)) 

(10,000 Indian Ocean (10)) 

16,OOG UK-Indian Ccean (WS) 

20,000 Indian Ocean (10) 

14,000 UK-Indian Ocean ,~HS) 

* Notes: (WS) Large troopships over 14% knots permanently employed on 

the U.K.-Indian Ocean Service. 

(10) Smaller troopships unsuitable for major ocean voysges and 

used for local movement between Indian Ocean theaters. 

Annex VII 

225 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

TABLE I1 

AVAILABILITY OF BRITISH FERSONNEL SHIPPING FOR THE MOVEMENT OF U.S. 

TROOPS FROM U.S.A.. OR OF U.S. AND BRITISH TROOPS FROM NORTH AFRICA 

July 1943 

August 

September " 

Oc t obe r I! 

November " 

December " 

January 1944 

February " 

March n 

April " 

" May 

June ,I 

n July 

August n 

September " 

Unescorted 

26,COO 

26.000 

25,000 

25,000 

25,000 

25,OGO 

25,COO 

25,000 

25,000 

34,000 

34,000 

34,000 

34,COO 

34,000 

34,000 

TO U.K. 

From U.S.A. 

Escorted 

-

-

-

-

-

-

35,OCO 

35,OCC 

35,OCO 

35,000 

35,000 

35,000 

35,000 

35,000 

35,000 

From North 

Africa 

Escorted 

-

-

-

- 25,000 

25,000 

or 45,COO 

Annex VII 

226 
TABLE I11 U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET U,S . TROOP MOVEMENTS 

-

STRENGTH 1943 1944 

July 1 July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr . hY June Aug. Sept.

1943 

3rd Quarter 4th Quarter 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 

1. U.S. Trooplift Reserved 

for Navy 83,800 102,000 102,000 76,600 80.500 

2. U.S. Army Troop Movements to all 

areas excevt U.K., North Africa, 

China-Burma-Indiaand Pacific: 

in 1944 832,300 84,250 67,070 

3. U.K. Build-Up 

From U.S. 180,700 22,000 124,200 114,40C 92,000 91,000 34,000 58,000 128,000 147,000 154,000 115,000 24,000 20,000 17.000 15,000 

From Iceland 15.000 

Replacements 4,OGO 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,OCO 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 22,oco 24,000 24,000 24.000 25,000 

Cumulative (incl. transfers from 

N. Africa) 202,700 341,900 456,300 548,300 684,300 763,300 871,300 999,300 1,146,300 1,300,300 1,415,300 1,439,300 1,459,3001,476,300 1,491.300 

AAF (cumulative) 118,000 131,800 148,000 170,000 201,800 234,500 278,200 317,200 359,700 380,900 393,200 406,500 406,500 406,500 406,500 406,500 

ACF and ASF (cumulative) 62,700 70,900 193,900 286,300 346,500 449,800 485,100 554,100 639,600 765,400 907,100 1,008,800 1,032,800 1,052,8001,069,800 1,084,800 

DIVISIONS 1 1 2 4 1/2 5 1/2 6 1/2 8 10 12 15 18 1/2 21 21 1/2 22 22 1/2 23 

(Limited by Ports from by 1944) 

Surplus troop capacity 45,000 110,000 160,000 165,000 170,000 

To U.K. from North Africa 

.U.S. Ships 45,000 45,000 45,000 = 4 U.S. Divisions incl. in cumulative total above 

+ 5,000

British Ships (British Troops) (25,000) (25,000 (40,000 = 3 British Divisions not incl. in totals 

4. North Africa 9,000 -45,000 -45,000 -50,000 

Cumulative 503,300 512,300 512,300 512,300 512,300 467,300 422,300 372,300 372,300 372.300 

5. China-Burma-India 15,500 6,100 9,500 11,100 

Cumulative 40,600 56,100. 56,100 62,200 71,700 71,700 82,800 83,000 83,000 83,000 83,000 83,000 83,000 83,000 83,000 83,000 

6. Marshall Islands 15,000 20,000 

Cumulative 15,000 35,000 

7. Solomons-Bismark-NewGuinea 20,000 25,000 25,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 

Cumulative 20,000 45,000 70,000 105,000 140,000 175,000 175,000 175,000 175,000 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

PART I11 - CONCLUSIONS 

11. The examination of the shipping resources of the United Nations 

shows that, so far as can be foreseen now, and on the assumption that 

future losses do not exceed the agreed estimate as indicated in C.C.S. 

174, the shipping limitation on the fulfillment of the overall strategy 

will be cargo shipping. 

Personnel shipping will be available to permlt of the optimum 

deployment of United Nations forces, up to the limits imposed by the 

availability of cargo shipping. 

The opt imum deployment of available United Nations cargo shipping to meet the requirements of the besic undertakings and projected 

operations for 1943-1944 reveals the following balance in cargo ship 

sailings: 

3rd Quarter 1943 - 66 sailings deficient 

4th Quarter 1943 - 69 sailings deficient 

1st Quarter 1944 - 122 sailings deficient 

2nd Quarter 1944 - 123 sailings surplus 

3rd Quarter 1944 - 367 sailings surplus 

The deficiencies are small, but if properly spread over all 

the programs concerned the effect will not be unmanageable. 

During the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1944 there are considerable 

surpluses of personnel and cargo shipping which roughly balance one 

another and which could lift approximately half a million men on an 

Atlantic or equivalent voyage within that period. 

NOTE 1: Memorandum by Mr. Lewis W. Douglas and Lord Leathers is attached hereto as an Appendix. 

NOTE 2: The detailed employment of British shipping has been published 

seperately as the report of the British Committee on Shipping 

Availability, dated 24 April 1943. 

Annex VII 

227 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

APPENDIX TO PART I11 OF ANNEX VII 

23 May 1943 

COMBINED STATEMENT COVERING DRY CARGC 

SHIPPING AVAILAB ILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS 

This statement commenting on the schedules of cargo shipping is 

divided into two parts. The first summarizes the estimates of requirements for dry cargo ships and the ships available for loading 

during the period 1 June 1943 to 1 January 1944; the second summarizes the estimated requirements and availables for the period 1 

January 1944 through September 1944. 

The Statement is divided in this manner because the method of 

determining the estimates during the last half of 1943 is quite different from the method employed for the nine months period in 1944. 

The first period, being closer to hand, is less liable to error than 

the second. Moreover, there are certain important still undetermined 

factors such, for example, as the ship construction program, that 

render estimates for the nine months period of 1944 subject to a more 

considerable variation. 

I JUNE 1943 - I JANUARY 1944 

Based upon the statement of estimated requirements and available 

dry cargo ships in paragraph 3, there appears to be a deficiency of 

155 U.S. controlled ships available for loading during the period in 

question. This deficit, if properly spread, is not unmanageable. 

1 JANUARY 1944 - I OCTOBER 1944 

There are at the moment so many undetermined factors in the 

estimates of requirements and availables for this period that further 

review of the position is necessary. It does not now, however, appear 

to present insurmountable difficulties. 

/s/ LEWIS W. DOUGLAS /s/ LEATHERS 

Appendix to Part 111 of Annex VII 

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r.c.s. 246 

MOVEMENTS OF THE “QUEENS” 

Reference : 

CCS 93rd Meeting, Item (5) 

CCS 94th Meeting, Item (3) 

In their 93rd Meeting the Combined Chiefs Staff took note that 

the British Chiefs of Staff would present a paper recommending a change 

in the cycle of military transport vessels of the‘IQueen” type with a 

view to lessening the risk of passage. 

C.C.S. 246 (23 May 1943) circulated the British memorandum as noted 

in the above meeting. 

In their 94th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted the 

proposals for the future movement of the“QUEENS” as set out in Paragraph 

6 of c.r.3. 246. 

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C.C.S. 246 23 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MOVEMENTS OF THE "QUEENS" 

(Reference: C.C.S. 93rd Mtg., Item 5) 

Memorandum hy British Chiefs of Staff 

1. The most dangerous part of the trans-Atlantic passage is that which 

crosses the Bay of Biscay and it is essential that this part of the 

passage should take place under the most favorable conditions which are 

those when there is little or no moon. 

2. By running these ships on a 28 day cycle it could be arranged that 

the passage of the dangerous areas in both directions is carried out in 

favorable conditions. 

3. Up to the present time these ships have been running on the 21 day 

cycle and after the 28 day cycle is adopted it will result in a loss in 

troop lift of 15,000 for the third quarter of the year and 31,COO for the 

fourth quilrter, making a total of 46,000 for the remainder of the year. 

4. Should one of these ships be torpedoed she will be out of action 

for several months and the loss in lift will be considerably more than 

the 46,000 mentioned above. 

5. The loss of life, should one of these ships be damaged to such an 

extent that it is necessary to take to the boats,will be inevitably very 

great in view of the fact that only 3.000 out of 15,000 carried on an 

eastward passage can be accomodated in the boats. 

6. Taking the above factors into consideration,it is considered that 

these ships should be run on the 28 day cycle and that the consequent 

loss in lift should be accepted. 

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C.C.S. 248/1 

PROVISIONS OF NEW L.S.I. (L)'S 

Reference : 

CCS 95th Meeting, Item (4) 

C.C.S. 248 was circulated 23 May 1943 for consideration of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

In their 95th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that 

certain amendments should be made to C.C.S. 24P as incorporated in C.C.S. 

248/1. Further action on this paper was deferred. 

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C.C.S. 248/1 24 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROVISICN OF NEW L.S.I. (L)’S 

Reference: C.C.S. 95th Meeting, Item 4 

Note bv the Secretaries 

The Enclosure is C.T.S. 248 as amended by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff in their 95th Meeting. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

ENCLOSURE 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. The present L.S.I. (L)’s in use by the British include nine large 

liners of 15,000 to 23,000 tons. 

2. The use of these large ships as assault ships is most undesirable 

since, not only are they exposed to great risk, but by virtue of being 

used in the assault, they waste a proportion of their carrying capacity. 

The most economical use of this type of ship is undoubtedly on normal 

trooping service where their full lift can be employed. 

The Minister of War Transport has reported that there are no further 

suitable British ships left of 15 knots speed or over which can be converted to L.S.I. (Ll’s to replace these ships. He has also suggested 

that, in his opinion, the most suitable types of ship available for this 

service, and those which would most nearly meet “ideal” requirements, 

are: 

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a. Certain of the Dutch “Jay” ships. 

b. American corrbat loaders. 

3. Both the above types are operated by the Averican Army and kvy. 

Several of the former are at present understood to be employed on trooping service; the latter, which include many ships under construction, as 

assault ships. 

4. Both types of ship would require conversion, including alterations 

to davits, to be able to hoist British type L.C.A.’s. 

5. RECOMMENDATION 

a. The total number of ships required by the British is thirteen, 

made up as follows: 

(1) Nine to replace the large liners referred to in paragraph 1 

above: 

(2) Four to replace estimated casualties that may occur during 

operations in 1943; this number only to be supplied when and if 

these casualties do in fact occur. 

b. It is therefore recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be 

asked to authorize: 

(1) The allocation for use by the British Services of as many 

“Jay” ships irs are suitable for conversion to L.S.I. (L’l’s. If 

required, the corresponding lift could be made available from 

British personnel ships to make good the loss of carrying capacity 

to the Americans. 

(2) That as many combat loaders under construction as are 

necessary to make up the total number of thirteen ships referred to 

in the previous paragraph should be converted in the same way, to 

be able to lift L.C.A.’s, and then after conversion temporarily 

allocated to Rritjsh control. 

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C.C.S. 249 

CODE NAMES FOR AGREED OPERATIONS 

Reference : 

CCS 92nd Meeting, Item (2) 

CCS 93rd Meeting, Item (4) 

6th White House Meeting, Item (7) 

C.C.S. 249 was pre.sented by hand to the President, Prime Minister 

and each Chief of Staff present during the 6th Meeting at the White 

House. This paper was not circulated. It contains proposed code names 

for operations agreed upon during the Trident Conference. With some 

amendments, C.C.S. 249 was apprwed by the President and Prime Minister 

and thereafter sent to appropriate security agencies of the United States 

and United Kingdom for implementation. 

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C.C.S. 250/1 

IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS REACHED AT THE 

TRIDENT CONFERENCE 

Re fer ence: 

CCS 96th Meeting, Item (3) 

C.C.S. 250 was circulated 24 May 1943 for consideration of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

In their 96th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the 

covering memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners 0s amended in the 

course of discussion and approved the draft directives to General Eisenhower and the draft supplementary directive to the Chief of Staff to 

the Supreme Commander (Designate) subject to the incorporation therein 

by the Secretaries of the agreed decisions that had been arrived at 

subsequent to the preparation of these draft directives. 

Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 250/1, 25 May 1943. 

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C.C.S. 250/1 25 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS REACHED 

AT THE TRIDENT CONFERENCE 

Note by the Secretaries 

The attached memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners is in the 

form as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 

96th Meeting. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. P. DEANE, 

Combined Secret aria t . 

IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS REACHED 

AT THE TRIDENT CONFERENCE 

Kemorandum by the Combined Staff Planners 

1. In order that there may be no delay in action to implement the 

decisions arrived at the Trident Conference, the Combined Staff Planners 

recommend as follows: 

a. That a directive be issued to General Eisenhower for operations 

after HUSKY (Enclosure A). 

b. That a supplementary directive be issued to General Morgan 

(Enclosure B). 

c. That General Morgan should be instructed to give, as soon as 

possible, a preliminary estimate of the requirements for operation 

ROUNIJHAHMER in transport aircraft and gliders. 

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2. In view of the urgency of completing the ROUNDHAMMER plan, we 

suggest that further consideration should be given to the early appointment of the Supreme Commander. 

ENCLOSURE A 

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER 

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved: 

a. That forces and equipment shall be established in the UNITED 

KINGDOE with the object of mounting an operation with target date 

1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further 

offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation 

will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present 

and available for use in the UNITED KINGDOH by 1 May 1944, in addition to the air forces then available. 

ASSAULT : 5 Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded 

in landing craft) 

2 Infantry Divisions - Follow-up 

-

2 Air-borne Divisions

Total 9 Divisions in the Assault 

BUILD-UP: 20 Divisions available for movement into 

lodgment area - Total 29 Divisions 

The possibility of adding one French Division will be considered at 

a later date. 

The expansion of logistical facilities in the UNITED KINGDOM 

will be undertaken immediately, and after the initial assault the 

seizure and development of ContinentaJ ports will be expedited in 

order that the build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the UNITED STATES or elsewhere of additional divisions 

and supporting units at the rate 3f 3 to 5 divisions per month. 

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h. That the Allied Commander in Chief North Africa will be instructed, as a matter of urgency, to plan such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate ITALY from 

the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Which of 

the various specific operations should be adopted, and theresfter 

mounted, is 3 deciqion which will be reserved to the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in NORTH AFRICA may use 

for his operations all those forces available in the MEDITERRANEAN 

Are7 except for four American and three 3ritish divisions which will 

be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take 

part in operations from the UNITED KINGDOM, provided that the naval 

vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on 

a temporary basis for HUSKY will not be considered available. It is 

estimated that the equivalent strength of 19 British and Allied, 

4 United States, ad 4 French divisions, or a total of 27 divisions 

will be available for garrisons and operations in the MEDITERRANEAN 

Area subsequent to IIUSKY. These figures exclude the 4 United States 

ad 3 British divisions to be transferred to the UNITED KINGDOM and 

the 2 qritish divisions constituting the British commitment to ?ORKEY. It is further estimated tlat there will be available after 

IlUSKY a total of 3,648 aircraft incluiing 242 heavy bombers (day and 

night), 519 medium bombers (day and night), 299 light and dive bombers, 2,012 fighters, 412 transports, and 164 army cooperatives. Further instructions will be issued as to the availability of combat 

loaders and cargo ships. 

2. You are directed to submit proposals with appropriate recommendations for operations in the MEDITERRANEAN Area, to be carried out 

concurrently with or subsequent to a successful HUSKY. All considerations related to your proposed operations must be consonance with the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff agreements quoted in paragraph 1 above. Proposals will be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 

1 July 1943. 

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3. LANDING CRAFT. In view of necessity for starting preparations 

in the UNITED KINGDOM at once for cross-Channel operations referred to 

in paragraph 1 a above, it may be necessary after HUSKY to withdraw from 

the MEDI7ERRANEAN and LEVAN7: 

a. The crews of all landing craft that may L lost in HUSKY. 

b. Maintenance and base staffs, with repair equipment and spare 

gear surplus to those required for the upkeep of landing ships and 

craft then remaining. 

The landing craft available for operations in the MEDI7ERRANEAN 

after HUSKY are based on an estimate of 50 per cent loss in that operation. If the losses are less than this, surplus crews and craft may 

have to be returned to the U. K. This does not necessarily apply to 

special ships. 

ENCLOSURE E 

DRAFT SUPPLEMENTARY DIRECTIVE TO THE CHIEF 

OF STAFF TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER (DESIGNATE) 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS FROM THE U. K. 

1. Under the terms of your present directive you have been instructed 

to prepare plans for: 

a. An elaborate camouflage and deception scheme extending over the 

whole sumner with a view to pinning the enemy in the West and keeping 

alive the expectation of large-scale cross-Channel operations in 

1943. This would include at least one amphibious feint with the 

object of bringing on an air battle employing the Metropolitan Royal 

Air Force and the U.S. 8th Air Force. 

b. A return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration 

at any time from now onwards with wbtever forces may be available 

at the time. 

C. A full-scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as 

possible . 

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2. In amplification of paragraph c above the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

have now resolved that forces and equipment shall be established in the 

United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 

1 May 1944, to secure a lodgment on the Continent frov which further 

offensive operations can be carried out. 

3. You will, therefore, plan an operation based on the presence of 

the following ground forces available for use in the U.K. on 1 May 1944: 

ASSAULT: 5 Infantry Divisions simultaneously loaded 

in landing craft. 

2 Infantry Divisions - follow up. 

2 Air-borne Divisions. 

Total 9 Divisions in the assault. 

BUIL D-UP: -20 Divisions available for movement into

lodgment area. 

Total 29 Divisions. 

A detailed statement of the forces which it is estimated will 

be available for this operation will be provided separately, and 

the possibility of adding one French Division will be considered 

rt a later date. 

4. The expansion of logistical facilities in the U. K. will be undertaken immediately. You should plan for the development nnd seizure of 

Continental ports, after the initial assault, in order that the buildup forces may be augmented, and follow-up shipments may be made from 

the United States, or elsewhere, of additional divisions and supporting 

units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month. 

The preparation ad constant keeping up to date of plans for an 

emergency crossing of the Channel in the event of n German collapse 

will proceed in accordance with the directive already given to you. 

In addition, you will prepare and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

a plan for sending forces to NORWAYin the event of a Germ-n evacuation 

becoming apparent. 

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5. Your outline plan for this operstion should be prepared and submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as early as possible and not 

later than I August 1943. 

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C.C.S. 251/1 

PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING COMBINED PLANNING 

Reference: 

CCS 96th Meeting, Item (5) 

C.C.S. 251 was circulated 24 May 1943 for consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

In their 96th Meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the 

proposals put forward by the Combined Staff Planners, subject to certain 

amendments which have been incorporated in C.C.S. 251/1. 

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C.C.S. 251/1 25 May 1943 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING COMBINED PLANNING 

Note by the Secretaries 

The attached merrorandum by the Combined Staff Planners is in the 

form as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 

96th Meeting. 

H. REDMAN, 

J. R. DEANE, 

Combined Secretariat. 

PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING COMBINED PLANNING 

Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners 

1. The attached proposal is submitted for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

2. An immediate planning problem is before us and, subject to the 

approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we propose to.tackle it as 

follows : 

PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

To meet the Combined Chiefs of Staff requirerent for an appreciation leading up to an outline plan for the defeat of Japan, we propose 

that a IJ. S. Planning Team should visit London to discuss the grand 

stretegy of the war against Japan, and in varticular to assist the 

British Joint Planners in preparing the British part of this paper. 

Subsequently, a British Planning Team should visit Washington to assist 

in the completion of the outline plan. 

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ENCLOSURE 

PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING COMBINED PLANNING 

Report by the Combined Staff Planners 

1. As a result of our experiences at the Trident Conference, the Combined Staff Planners have considered whether any steps can be taken to 

improve combiied planning in the future. 

2. The early days of this present Conference were devoted almost entirely to an exchange of strategic thought, much of which was new to 

both sides. Had it been possible for the Joint Planning teams on both 

sides of the Atlantic to have kept each other informed beforehand of the 

details of the strategic operations under consideration, we feel that 

the task of the Conbined Chiefs of Staff at the present Conference would 

have been easier. 

3. We, therefore, submit for the consideratia, of the Codined Chiefs 

of Staff that the following neasures, designed to promote the continual 

exchange of strategic thought between London and Washington, should be 

authorized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff: 

a. That planning papers affecting corbined strategical operations 

in the vorious theaters of war should be mutually exchanged, as appropriate, and should be discussed between the U. S. Planners and the 

British Planners in Washington. This interchange of information 

would, of course. be understood as in no way committing the Chiefs of 

Staff of the country concerned. 

b. That Army, Naval and Air Force Staff Officers should be exchanged at frequent intervnls between the American Joint Planners in 

Washington and the British Joint Planners in London in order to keep 

planning activities properly related to the existing and continuously 

changing situation. Such officers would not act merely as Liaison 

Officers, but would work as an integral part of the Joint Planning 

Staff in the consideration of plans of combined interest. 

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C. That it should be the aim for the Directors of Plans or their 

representatives to meet from time to time. These meetings would 

probably take place alternately in the United States and in the 

United Kingdom. This might involve the Directors of Plans of each 

nation being absent from their respective capital for a period of two 

to three weeks every four months. Some of these meetings will imediately precede or coincide with C.C.S. Conferences. 

24 8 
MINUTES 

OF 

MEETINGS 

24 9 
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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

TRIDENT 

MINUTES 

1ST MEETING, THE WHITE HOUSE, 2:30 P.M., 12 MAY 1943 

PRESENT 

British 

The Prime Minister 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Mmiral of the Fleet 

Sir Dudley Pound 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

u. s. 

The President 

Admiral Wm. D. Leahy 

General G. C. Marshall 

Mmiral E. J. King 

1.t. Gen. J. T. hkNarney 

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins 

SECRETARIES 

Brig. General J. R. Deane 

Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob 

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THE PRESIDEN7 welcomed Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs of 

Staff. He recalled that it was less than a year ago when they had 

all met in the White House, and had set on foot the moves leading up 

to TORCH. It was very appropriate that they should meet again just 

as that operation was coming to a satisfactory conclusion. The meeting 

at Casablanca had set on foot operation HUSKY, and he hoped that this 

wou13 meet with similar good fortune. He thought that the keynote 

of our plans at the present time should be an intention to employ 

every resource of men and munitions against the enemy. Nothing that 

could be brought to bear should be allowed to stand idle. 

He then asked the Prime Minister to open the discussion. 

THE PRIME MINISTER recalled the striking change which had taken 

place in the situation since he had last sat by the President’s desk, 

and had heard the news of the fall of Tobruk. He could never forget 

the manner in which the President had sustained him at‘ that time, and 

the Shermans wnich had been handed over so generously had made their 

reputation in Africa. The British came to the present meeting adhering 

to the Casablanca decisions. There might have to be adjustments made 

necessary by our success, which also enabled us to take a longer forward 

view. TORCH was over, HUSKY was near, what should come next’ He would 

put forward some views which had been formed by careful study. These 

would not be in the shape of fixed plans, but rather of ideas for the 

common stock. We had been able by taking thought together to produce 

a succession of brilliant events which had altered the whole course of 

the war. We had the authority and prestige of victory. It was our 

duty to redouble our efforts, and to grasp the fruits of our success. 

The only questions outstanding between the two Staffs were questions 

of emphasis and priority. He felt sure that these could be solved by 

mutual agreement. 

He did not propose to deal with the U-boat war, and the aerial 

bombardment of Germany. There were no differences of opinion on these 

subjects, though there might be a few points of detail to be cleared 

up between the two Staffs. He would like to put forward for consideration a number of objectives, and questions which might focus subsequent 

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study. The first objective was in the Mediterranean. The great prize 

there was to get Italy out of the war by whatever means might be the 

best. He recalled how in 1918, when Germany might have retreated 

to the Meuse or the Rhine and continued the fight, the defection of 

Bulgaria brought the whole of the enemy structure crashing to the 

ground. The collapse of Italy would cause a chill of loneliness over 

the German people, and might be the beginning of their doom. But even 

if not immediately fatal to Germany, the effects of Italy coming out 

of the war would be very great, first of all on Turkey, who had always 

measured herself with Italy in the Mediterranean. The moment would 

come when a Joint American-Russian-British request might be made to 

Turkey for permission to use bases in her territory from which to bomb 

Ploesti and clear the Aegean. Such a request could hardly fail to be 

successful if Italy were out of the war, and the moment were chosen 

when Germany could take no powerful action against Turkey. Another 

great effect of the elimination of Italy would be felt in the Balkans, 

where patriots of various nationalities were with difficulty held in 

check by large Axis forces, which included 25 or more Italian Divisions. 

If these withdrew, the effect would be either that Germany would have 

to give up the Balkans, or else that she would have to withdraw large 

forces from the Russian Front to fill the gap. In no other way could 

relief be given to the Russian Front on so large a scale this year. 

The third effect would be the elimination of the Italian fleet. This 

would immediately release a considerable British squadron of battleships and aircraft carriers to proceed either to the Bay of Bengal or 

the Pacific to fight Japan. 

Certain questions presented themselves in relation to the Mediterranean. Need we invade the soil of Italy, or could we crush her by 

air attack? Would Germany defend Italy? Would Italy be an economic 

burden to us? He did not think so. Would arguments against a general 

conquest of Italy apply equally against a toe and heel operation to 

establish contact with Yugoslavia? Finally, there was a large political 

question for the British and United States Governments. What sort of 

life after the war should we be willing to accord to Italy if she placed 

herself unreservedly in our hands? He might observe that if Italy made 

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a separate peace, we should have the use of Sardinia and the Dodecanese 

without having to fight for them. 

The second objective was the taking of weight off Russia. He was 

much impressed by Stalin's attitude, in spite of the stopping of the 

Arctic convoys. For the first time, in his recent speech, Stalin had 

acknowledged the efforts and victories of his Allies. But we should 

never forget that there were 185 German Divisions on the Russian Front. 

We had destroyed the German Army in Africa, but soon we would not be 

in contact with them anywhere. The Russian effort was prodigious, and 

placed us in their debt - a position from which he would like to emerge. 

As he had already mentioned, the best way of taking the weight off the 

Russian Front in 1943 would be to get, or knock, Italy out of the war, 

thus forcing the Germans to send a large number of troops to hold down 

the Balkans. 

The third objective had already been mentioned by the President 

in his opening remarks. It was to apply to the greatest possible extent 

our vast Armies, Air forces, and munitions to the enemy. All plans 

should be judged by this test. We had a large Army, and the Metropolitan Fighter Air Force in Great Britain. We had our finest and most 

experienced troops in the Mediterranean. The British alone had 13 

Divisions in that theater. Supposing that HUSKY were completed by the 

end of August, what should these troops do between that time and the 

date 7 or 8 months later, when the cross-Channeloperation might first 

be mounted? They could not possibly stand idle, and he could not contemplate so long a period of apparent inaction. It would have a serious 

effect on relations with Russia, who was bearing such a disproportionate 

weight. 

The objectives he had so far mentioned all led up to BOLERO, 

SLEDGEHAMMER, and ROUNDUP. By BOLERO, he meant the administration 

arrangements necessary for the movement and reception of large American 

forces in the United Kingdom. He could not pretend that the problem 

of landing on the Channel coast had been solved. The difficult beaches, 

with the great rise and fall of tide, the strength of the enemy's defenses, the number of his reserves, and the ease of his communications, 

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all made the task one which must not be underrated. Much, however, 

would be learned from HUSKY. The question arose whether anything could 

be done this year before the weather broke in August or September. All 

the British landing craft had gone from the United Kingdom to HUSKY, 

and owing to priority having been rightly given to SICKLE, only one 

U. S. Division was so far available in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, plans were being made for an operation to provoke an air 

battle, and we were standing ready to exploit a German collapse, should 

this by any chance take place. He wished to make it absolutely clear 

that H. M. Government earnestly desired to undertake a full-scale invasion of the continent from the United Kingdom as soon as possible. 

They certainly did not disdain the idea if a plan offering reasonable 

prospects of success could be made. 

The fifth objective was aid to China. As a result of Casablanca, 

Field Marshal Wave11 had prepared the best plan he could for operation 

ANARIM, and he thought that it had some prospect of success. The difficulties of fighting in Burma were apparent. The jungle prevented the 

use of out modern weapons. The monsoon strictly limited the length of 

the campaigning season, and there was no means of bringing sea power 

to bear. Should, however, ANAKIM be successfully carried out, he was 

advised that it would not be till 1945 that the Burma Road could be 

reopened, and even then its capacity would not be more than 20,000 tons 

a month. Nevertheless, he had not gone back on the status of ANAKZM. 

He attached the same degree of importance as before to activity in the 

Indian Ocean theater of war. Was there any means by which China could 

be helped in 1943 other than the air route? How could this be improved? 

The British readily shouldered their responsibility to establish and 

guard the air facilities required in Assam. If further study showed 

that it would be better to by-pass Burma, he was anxious that another 

means should be found of utilizing the large forces standing in India. 

He thought that this alternative might well be found in an operation 

against the tip of Sumatra and the waist of Malaya at Penang. He was 

most anxious that we should find in that theater some means of making 

be of those advantages which had been so valuable in TORCH. In that 

operation, sea power had played its full part: complete surprise had 

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been possible; we had been able to seize a territory of importance 

which not only brought in a new Army on our side, but forced the enemy 

to fight in a place most disadvantageous to him. These conditions 

might apply to an attack on the area he had described. The fleet to 

cover the operation would come from the Mediterranean after the elimination of Italy. This meant that the operation could not be launched 

before March, 1944, which would, however, be a suitable moment from 

the point of view of weather. 

He felt that the time had now come to study the long-term plan 

for the defeat of Japan. He would like once more to state the British 

determination to carry the struggle home to Japan. The only question 

was how best to do it. He thought that the United States Chiefs of 

Staff should lead in a joint study, on the assumption that Germany 

would be out of the war in 1944, and that we could concentrate on the 

great campaign against Japan in 1945. If the underlying strategic 

conception was agreed, then operations could be planned to fit in, and 

the requisite specialized apparatus could be got ready in time. 

If, of course, Russia could be brought in against Japan, that 

would prove the best solution of all. Stalin had shown plain indications that Russia would want to be in at the death, but the timing of 

Russian action must obviously depend upon what happened to Hitler, 

and when. 

In conclusion, the Prime Minister said that he hoped his remarks 

would be of use in framing an Agenda for Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Conferences, and would be some guide as to the emphasis and priorities 

which should be assigned to the various theaters of operation as well 

as to their relationship and reciprocal reactions. 

THE PRESIDENT expressed his gratitude to the Prime Minister for 

the open manner in which he had presented his views. He said that the 

Combined Staffs must approach their problems with open minds,giving full 

consideration to the priorities and relative importance of the many 

problems which they would consider in the course of the conferences. 

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THE PRESIDENT stated that he has always been a firm believer in 

attrition as an effective weapon. He pointed to the North African 

campaign and suggested that it might not have been so successful had 

sufficient force been sent to capture Tunisia on the initial landing. 

As a result of the Tunisian campaign there will be perhaps some 200,000 

enemy casualties. He felt there would have been considerably less had 

Tunisia been taken at the outset. 

He pointed out that the United Nations are now out-producing both 

the Germans and the Japanese and that if we break even in our losses 

of airplanes and other munitions we are, in effect, forging ahead. 

THE PRESIDENT then said that with the large armies and naval 

forces that are available to the United Nations every effort should 

be made to keep them engaged with the enemy. He felt that the United 

Nations were losing ground when their forces remain idle. 

THE PRESIDENT expressed optimism as far as the situation in Turkey 

was concerned. When the Prime ?Minister went on his fishing trip after 

the Casablanca Conferences he, the President, had been surprised by the 

cordial reception that the Prime Minister had received. He felt that 

Turkey was now in a better political position than she had ever been 

before. Perhaps Turkey could be brought to a favorable attitude toward 

the United Nations by diplomacy alone. If so, this would permit the 

use of her airfields for combined air operations against Ploesti and 

the Germans’ right flank and their lines of communication. If Turkey 

could be brought into the war.there would be the possibility of combined operations toward the Adrianople line,thus threatening Bulgaria, 

and inducing that country to withdraw from the war. He felt that the 

Russians would welcome any effort on the part of the United Nations 

which muld result in breaking the Germans’ lines of communication. He 

pointed out also that attrition would be at work during any operations 

from Turkey. 

THE PRESIDENT then asked “Where do we go -from HUSKY?” He said 

he had always shrunk from the thought of putting large armies in Italy. 

This might result in attrition fof the United Nations and play into 

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Germany's hand. He indicated that a thorough investigation should be 

made of what an occupation of Italy proper, or of the heel or toe 

of Ttaly, would mean as a drain on allied resources. At the same time, 

he pointed out that the Mediterranean area contained large armies of 

the IJnited Nations, perhaps about a total of 25 divisions, and that 

these must be kept employed. He said there was not much time in 1943, 

because planning future operations is a lengthy procedure. The question 

to be decided quickly, is how to use the Mediterranean troops this year. 

He said that conditions in Italy are known to be precarious. Italy 

might drop into the lap of the United Nations, who would then have the 

responsibility of supplying the Italian people. Everyone was agreed 

that Italy must be reconstituted, but that the mistakes regarding possession of the Northern Adriatic, which occurred at the peace table 

after the last war, must not be repeated. 

Summing up, the PRESIDENT said a survey should be made to determine the cost of occupying Italy or parts of it as opposed to the cost 

of achieving the same result3 by air offensives frorr Sicily or the 

heel and toe of ItRly. 

THE PRESIDENT said that regardless of operations undertaken in 

the Mediterranean there would be a surplus of manpower. He said that 

this surplus should be used to build up BOLERO. Preparations for such 

build-up should begin at once. He felt that all were agreed that no 

ROLIh'DUP or SLEDGEHAMMER was possible of accomplishment this year, but 

if one or the other were to be mounted in the srring of 1944, preparations should begin now. ROUNDUP and SLEDGEHAMMER have been talked 

about for two years but as yet none of these operations had been accepted as a concrete plan to be carried out at a certain time. Therefore he wished to emphasize that SLEDGEHAMMER or ROUNDUP should be 

decided upon definitely as an operation for the spring of 1944. 

THE PRESIDENT then directed his remarks toward the Pacific. He 

said that at the present time a landing was being made in the Aleutians, 

on the Island of Attu. Approximately 3,000men had already been put 

ashore. By this operation it was hoped to put Kiska in a bow between 

Attu and Amchitka which would also result in imposing attrition on 

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the enemy. So far, the operations in the Aleutians had resulted in a 

net gain to the United Nations. The operations in the Solomons and in 

New Guinea had had the same result. 

THE PRESIDENT said that while things are apparently going along 

all right in the Pacific, attention must be devoted to the length of 

the Japanese supply lines. He likened them to a segment of pie in 

which Japan proper was at the apex, and the line from the Solomons 

through the Dutch East Indies to Rurma represented the outer crust. 

While there was some attrition going on against the mter crust, the 

most effective way to get at the Japanese shipping was to strike at 

the apex. So far the United Nations have done me11 in sinking Japanese 

merchant tonnage. Proof of this has been in the fact that the Japanese 

have been taking shipping from the Yangtze and using it, together with 

junks they are building, for coastal runs, in order to release coastal 

shipping for ocean work. Since the war stsrted the Japanese have 

suffered a net loss of 1,000,000 tons of shipping or approximately 

one-seventh of the shipping which they had available at.the beginning 

of the war. If thev continue to lose shipping at this rate they can 

not maintain the outer rim of the pie and will have to contract 

in their operations. The PRESIDENT said that the same was true with 

regard to sircraft. Attrition suffered by the Japanese air forces has 

resulted in their having less strength available now than at the beginning of the war. 

THE PRESIDENT repeated that the most effective way to strike the 

JaDanese shipping was to strike it leaving Japan proper. This could 

best be done from bases either in China, or from China and Russia. 

Therefore much depends upon keeping China a going concern. He said 

he did not believe the Chinese were crying wolf when reporting the 

critical condition which exists in their country today. He said that 

the conference could not jllstify overlooking the possibility of a 

Chinese collapse. This brought up the question of the priority for 

aid to China with regard to 1943 and 1944. 

ANAKIM and similar plans proposed at Casablanca might not have 

an effect which would be immediate enough to keep China in the war; 

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the results of ANAKIM would not be felt until March or April of 1944 

and the Burma Road would not be fully open to traffic until 1945. The 

necessity was for doing something for China now. The PRESIDENT said 

that the question resolves itself to assisting China by air. 

THE PRESIDENT said that to assist China by air it was essential 

to reconstruct and maintain the security of the airfields in Assam to 

the west of the mountains. They must be made secure regardless of the 

cost in manpower and materiel, and they must also be protected. On the 

east side of the mountains the Chinese are building landing fields and 

now have five or six fields in good condition. General Stilwell has 

two divisions in training for the protection of these fields. The 

PRESIDENT said that the Generalissimo does not fear a ground attack in 

Yunnan. 

He said that air in China would accomplish three objectives: 

it would be able to harass Japanese troops South of Hankow or those 

advancing from the South against Chungking: it could harass Japanese 

attacks against Chungking from the North: and it could stop Japanese 

attacks against Chungking which might be made up the Yangtze. The 

PRESIDENT said he doubted if reliance could be placed on the Chinese 

army, excepting those troops being trained in Yunnan and Ramgarh. 

However, he thought it important to give the Generalissimo, who is 

the head of both the Army and the State, what he wants at this time. 

This, he said, is a strong build-up of the American-Chinese Air forces. 

Such an air force can be built up to strike ageinst Japanese shipping 

and against Japan itself. He emphasized that the Chiefs of Staff 

must bear in mind the Political fact that China is in danger of collapse. 

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that aid to China at the present time 

does not hsve an immediate effect of taking weight off Russia but that 

it would have an ultimate effect when Russia joins up with the United 

Nations in their war against Japan. This he predicted would take place 

within 48 hours after Germany has been defeated. 

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THE PRESIDENT said, with regard to taking weight off Russia, that 

the United Nations continue with strategy which would compel the Germans 

to fight. It was for that reason that he questioned the occupation of 

Italy, feeling that this might result in releasing German troops now in 

that country. He said he felt the most effective way of forcing Germany 

to fight was by carrying out a cross-Channel operation. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he did not feel that an occupation 

of Italy would be necessary. In the event of an Italian collapse, the 

United Nations would occupy the necessary ports and air bases from which 

to carry on operations against the Balkans and Southern Europe, but they 

should let an Italian Government control the country, subject to supervision on the part of the United Nations. 

THE PRESIDENT and the PRIME MINISTER then indicated that the 

possibility of securing the use of the Azores was under consideration. 

An attempt would be made to accomplish this by diplomacy, and, if 

necessary, the diplomacy might be coupled with threats or an actual 

surprise arrival of forces. They thought that an arrangement might 

be made with Portugal whereby the use of the Azores could be obtained 

on a rental basis. However, they indicated that the question was 

largely political. 

FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL asked if consideration had been 

given to the present attitude of Spain. 

Both the PRESIDENT and the PRIME MINISTER indicated that they 

felt that Spain was much relieved by the turn of events in Afri’ca, 

that it was becoming more favorably disposed toward the United Nations, 

and that it had in mind constantly the threat of the American forces 

facing Spanish Morocco. 

THE PRESIDENT announced that the next meeting would be on Friday, 

14th May, at 2:OO P.M., at which time it was desired to have the Commanders in Chief, India, and Generals Stilwell and Chennault present to 

to discuss conditions in the Burma-China Theater. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

TRIDENT 

REVISED MINUTFS 

2ND MEETING, THE WHITE HOIJSE, 2:OO P.M., 14 MAY 1943 

PRESENT 

British 

The Prime Minister 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Field Marshal Sir Archibald 

Wave I1 

General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Dudley Pound 

Mmiral Sir James Somerville 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Richard Peirse 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

U.S. 

The President 

Admiral Wm. D. Lenhy 

General G. C. Marshall 

Admiral E. J. King 

Lt. Gm. J. W. Stilwell 

Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney 

Maj. Gen. C. L. Chennault 

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins 

SECRETARIES 

Brig. General J. R. Deane 

Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob 

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THE PRESIDENT said that thi-s Conference had been called to talk 

about the local situation in the India-Burma-ChinaTheater because that 

area presented problems which were extremely difficult. The lJniteA 

Nations were now on deadcenter with regard to operations in that area. 

The thought on the subject must be simplified. He said the problem 

should be divided into two main subdivisions: first, operations to be 

carried out forthwith and, second, operations to be carried out at the 

end of the present monsoon season. The two should not be confused. 

Preparations for operations in November and December of 1943 must certainly start now, but preparations for operations to be carried out 

forthwith must be rushed. 

THE PRESIDENT indicated that China is now in a dangerous political condition. The United Nations could not let China go to pieces. 

It should be remembered, when discussing demands of the Generalissimo, 

that he was the head of the Army and of the State. It was imperative 

that the United Nations not be put in the position of being responsible 

in any way for the collapse of China. It was no longer possible to 

simply tell China to take what she was given. There must be active 

cooperation on the part of the United Nations. An attitude of It can’t 

be done could not be tolerated because it was certain that something must 

be done. He said there would have to be a 1943 affirmative. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there must be a 1943 and a 1944 

a f firma t ive . 

THE PRESIDENT then asked those present to express their convictions freely on the subject of China and asked the Prirre Minister to 

present his views. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said he felt that the President had put the 

case very clearly. He himself had once been keen on action of the 

ANAKIM type and two years ago had written a memorandum on the subject, 

a copy of which he had given to Admiral King at Casablanca, in which 

he had proposed an operation through Rangoon on Bangkok. A decision 

had been made at Casablanca that ANAKIM was to be mounted. AccordingJy, 

Field Marshal Wave11 had prepared a plan which was in his opinion the 

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best method for accomplishing the recapture of Burma. THE PRIME MINISTER 

said he now gathered that Field Marshal Wavell considered the outlook 

for the accomplishment of this plan to be bleak, but he still held it 

feasible if and when the necessary material was provided. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that operations in Burma so far had not 

been effective. However, they had taught lessons. He said when he 

looked at Field Marshal Wavell's plan, in the light of results to date, 

he did not like the looks of it. He questioned the value of trying to 

retake Burma now, and asked if it could not be by-passed. If so, would 

not the construction and defense of air fields be'sufficient to insure 

a flow of supplies into China? The question was how to construct these 

air fields quickly and to insure their protection. He said that, for 

himself, he had little inclination to go to swampy jungles in which 

operiltions could be conducted for only five months of the year, country 

infested with malaria, where modern equipment could not be used. The 

idea of making four attacks from the sea, to say nothing of the advance 

up the Rangoon River to Rangoon, subject to attack from shore defenses 

of various kinds, did not present a favorable outlook. All of these 

factors, together with the long lines of communications, made the prospects for ANAKIM, as now planned, extremely gloomy, a view that was 

shared by his military advisers. 

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated that he could not see how operations 

in the swamps of Burma would help the Chinese. The factor that had 

turned him against the plan, more than any other, was that only 20,000 

tons could be transported over the Burma Road, and then only in early 

1945, even though ANAKIM were completely successful. He questioned what 

would happen to the Chinese in the interval. He felt that the above 

considerations indicRted that there should be a passionate development 

of air transport into China, and the build-up of air forces in China, 

as the objectives for 1943. 

THE PRIME MINISTER then turned the discussion to 1944. He indicated an Asiatic 'IORCH should be sought. A blow should be struck where 

it could be accomplished with complete surprise. It would, of necessity, 

have to be an operation which would attract enemy reaction and thus take 

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the pressure off China and the South Pacific. He suggested the possibility of seizing the northern tip of Sumatra. It would be much better 

to baffle the enemy by surprise than to continue with the development 

of the obvious. 

THE PRESIDENT said that in the TORCH operation the objective had 

been to drive the Axis forces out of Africa, or at least to form a 

junction between Generals Alexander and Montgomery in the East and 

General Eisenhower's forces in the West. Our objectives in China should 

be: first, to save China and keep it going and, second, to continue to 

increase the rate of attrition on Japan in ships and airplanes. He 

said that until now the United Nations have met with considerable success in their battle of attrition against Japan, but the pace would have 

to be stepped up. He then asked Field Marshal Wave11 to express his 

views on the Burma and ANAKIM operation. 

FIELD MARSHAL WAVEU said that he had had the Burma campaign and 

Burma cmstantly in mind for two years. He considered it to be the most 

important pivot in the war against Japan. After war had been declared, 

it became impossible to defend Burma once the United Nations had lost 

control of the seas. He had been thinking of the reconquest of that 

country ever since. He said he was convmced that a reconquest could 

not be accomplished by land operations alone but must be combined with 

amphibious operations and naval action. He had always realized the 

political effect that the loss of Burma had on China and also upon 

India. The moral effect on both countries was also of extreme importance. 

FIELD NARSHAL WAVELL said that the more he had planned for reconquest the more difficult it had become. Communications to northeast 

India, which must be a base for land operations, are extremely difficult. They are dependent upon a railroad which has small capacity and 

is often out of operation for long periods. Air fields must have 

metal or concrete surfaces. To illustrate the difficulties in communications, he said that his troops at Manipur had never been on full rations 

during the last mnsoon period because of the effect of rain on the roads. 

Current operations have shown that the Japanese have good troops for 

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defensive fighting, whereas the Indian forces, accustomed to the open 

plains, require intensive training for this type of warfare. 

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that when he was asked to produce a 

plan to conquer Burma in the next dry season, he had had prepared what 

he thought was the best plan possible. Even so, it was a hazardous one 

and difficult of accomplishment. He felt it had a reasonable chance 

of success if his troops were fully trained and equipped. The plan 

required a considerable increase of supplies which had to be sent to 

the theater at once. It was necessary that 180,000 tons per month be 

sent to India. Actually, in March and April only 65.000 and 70,000 

tons respectively had been shipped. He felt that therefore the operation could not start in November as originally planned. Unless the 

operation could start in November, it could not succeed in the coming 

dry season. It would be necessary to get land-based air cover on the 

Arakan coast first, then capture Rangoon, while, at the same time, 

conducting operations in the north with British and Chinese troops. 

The Chinese forces from the north and the British-Indian forces from 

the south would then attempt to form a junction. After that it would 

be necessary to repair the railroads and bring supplies in through 

Rangoon and ship them north in order to start repair of the Burma Road. 

His administrative experts had informed him that the road could not be 

fully opened to traffic until the middle of 1945. 

THE FIELD MARSHAL indicated that relief to China would therefore 

not be effective until 1945, but that the moral effect, on the other 

hand, would be considerable at once to both China and India. If success was assured, it would be worth hazarding the losses. He said, 

however, that an unsuccessful expedition would be much worse than none 

at all. 

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that his Planners had been examining 

alternatives. He said that, in the long run, it was probable that more 

supplies could be sent into China by air alone in the next 18 months 

than would be the case if the air transport was required to use much 

of its capacity for operations leading to the construction of the Burma 

Road. 

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The possibility of using troops in the India Theater for some 

other operation was being examined. An effort was being made to determine the effect of creating a break or landing somewhere in the semicircle from Burma through the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, and Java. Possible objectives were Bangkok via the Kra Isthmus, northern Sumatra, 

and Malaya, or the Sunda Straits. Bangkok was considered to be impracticable because there was no adequate port or routes across the Kra 

Isthmus. Sunda Straits was an attractive objective because it threatens 

the Palembang oil fields. This, however, was not possible within the 

resources available. An operation which did appear to be promising was 

one which would seize three or four air fields in northern Sumatra and 

from there drive on into the Malayan Peninsula at Penang, where there 

were four or five additional air fields. The object of such an expedition would be to place large air forces in Sumatra and Malaya from where 

they could attack Bangkok, Singapore, the Palembang oil fields, and 

Japanese shipping. If it were possible to place strong air forces on 

northern Sumatra and protect them, a bad situation would be created 

for the Japanese and cause them considerable air losses. The expedition would probably require about the same forces as would be required 

by ANAKIM. It would have the advantage that the Operation would not 

be dependent on the monsoon. It would be an expensive operation in 

aircraft because of the distance from air bases and it would also require considerable shipping. The proposed operation, if feasible, 

however, would cause considerable attrition to Japanese air power and 

shipping. The Japanese would have to react to the IJnited Nations’ 

operations and this would bring on air battles. Considerable further 

study would be required before an opinion could be given as to the 

possibility of the operation. 

In reply to a question by the Prime Minister, the FIELD MARSHAL 

said the operation proposed could not take place until 1944. 

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that there were many naval problems 

involved in the capture of Rangoon. He questioned whether sufficient 

carriers could be made available. 

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ADMIRAL SOMERVILLE said that the Rangoon operation was not attractive. Even to seize the air fields on the Arakan coast would 

require carriers standing off from one to three weeks,which was too long 

against Japanese land-based air attack. Seizure of Rangoon was not 

feasible unless it could be covered to some extent by land-based aircraft from the Arakan coast. 

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR DUDLEY POUND indicated that carriers 

could not be made available until they could be released from the 

b%diter ranean. 

ADMIRAL SOMERVILLE said that the naval approach to Rangoon was 

narrow and could be easily defended. He doubted if the operation was 

feasible from the naval point of view. 

AIR CHIEF MARShAL PEIRSE said that, from an airman’s point of 

of view, air development appeared to meet the requirements, which were 

a. to defeat the enemy air forces: 

b. to assure military aid to China; and 

c. to bring support in the form of supplies at the earliest date. 

One thing was essential and that was that we should have adequate air 

forces operating from India to neutralize Japanese air forces which 

might interfere with the air route. He pointed out that it had become 

clear that the development of land operations through Assam into China 

and development of the facilities required both for the Royal Air Force 

and the American Ferry Command were mutually antagonistic. He continued 

that, in his opinion, if all the eifort was put into building up the 

air forces operating under General Chennault and the air transport into 

olina, much more could be done than is at present planned. He felt that 

the tmnage over the air transport route to China could be considerably 

increased. He further considered that, for the defense of this air 

route, it was not necessary to reconquer Burmese territory, provided 

that Allied Air Forces were adequate for the neutralization of the enemy 

air forces. 

Referring to ANAKIM, AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PEIRSE said that he had 

never considered the plan to be sound since the sea-borne exredition 

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and the landings could not be supported by land-based aircraft. The 

plan was based on the assumption that the enemy might have 300 to 350 

aircraft and that of these, 100 might attack any landing operation. 

Clearly the defense which one or two carriers could oppose would be 

quite inadequate to a scale of attack of this order. 

THE PRESIDENT asked how many airports there were in the area from 

Assam to Chittagong. 

AIR CHIEF.HARSHAL PEIRSE said that at the present moment he 

was operating 14 squadrons from forward airdromes between northeast 

Assam and Chittagong, exclusive of those used by the American Air 

Force. 

THE PRESIDENT asked if the runways were long enough for bombers. 

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PEIRSE replied that there were six sir fields 

with hard runways from which medium and heavy bombers could operate. 

For the most part, heavy bombers operated from air fields further back. 

He said that the plan to capture Sumatra has considerable merit because it extends our air cover eastwards and interferes with the Japanese shipping lanes. The radius of bomber aircraft operating from 

Malaya to northern Sumatra will extend far enough to meet that of bombers operating through southern (hina. He considered that air operations 

undertaken from Malaya in conjunction with offensive air operations 

undertaken from China would be bound to draw considerable enemy air 

forces into these areas to oppose them. Such air forces the enemy 

could ill spare. 

GENERAL STILWELL said that the weight of opinion was apparently 

against him. To his mind China represented a base which the United 

Nations wanted. They wanted it both for its geographic position and for 

the use of Chinese manpower. He felt that ultimately the United Nations 

must meet the Japanese Army on the mainland of Asia. If China were 

allowed to fall now, it would be a long road back before the United 

Nations would be in a position to meet Japan on Chinese soil. He said 

that to keep China in the war it was essential to retain control of 

Yunnan. 

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GENERAL STILWELL said that he had been worried for a long time 

over the possibilities of a Japanese attack against Eunming, particularly one from the south. The Japanese have the forces available in 

Indo China to make such an attack, He said that if we are to hold 

Yunnan, ground forces must be trained to do it, and they must be Chinese 

forces. 

GENERAL STILWELL said that there are now 32 divisions in training 

which will be available for the defense of Yunnan. At the present time 

they have a strength of about 8,100. However, it is planned to inactivate one out of each three divisions so as to bring the remainder to a 

total strength of 10,000each. This will cesult in 22 divisions being 

available as soon as their equipment is received and the others will be 

brought up to strength later. He felt that if this force could be 

trained and equipped, it would be capable of defending Yunnan Province. 

Sufficient equipment would be available if 10,000 tons capacity were 

utilized for this purpose over the air transport route between now and 

September. 

GENERAL STILWELL indicated that it was absolutely essential to 

open land communications to China. Even though the initial supplies 

were small, they would have a tremendous moral effect on China and 

munitions thus transported would be used to build up a second group of 

30 divisions which had been promised by the Generalissimo. He saicl that 

under this program there would ultimately be a force capable of fighting the Japanese. If supplies for these ground forces were not sent 

at once, it would be impossible to train and equip the Chinese Yunnan 

forces and the Chinese Army would disappear. He admitted that if all 

supplies were devoted to building up the Chinese Air Forces, it would 

have an effect on the Japanese shipping lanes, and it would he a shot in 

the arm to Chinese norale, but he felt that it would not lead to decisive results. He said as soon as the build-up of American forces 

begins to sting the Japanese too much. they will launch an attack from 

Indo China to capture the Kunming Area. If that proved to be the case, 

the eistern terminal of the air route would disappear and China would 

be out of the war. It was imperative, therefore, that Yunnan Province 

be defended and the only way this could be accomplished was by the 

build-up of Chinese Ground Forces. 

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THE PRESIDENT said that he had never accepted such a low tonnage 

figure for the air route, that it must be divided up between Air and 

Ground equipment. Why should not sufficient be conveyed for both? 

GENERAL STILWELL said that up to the present, 3,400 tons had been 

the maximum conveyed in any one month. Increased quantities were certainly possible on paper, but it must always be remembered that we were 

fighting the conditions of the rountry, the monsoon, and inadequate 

air fields, and there was always the danger that the Japanese would 

interfere with the route. 

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that there was no great danger to the 

Assam air fields from land attack. rhe warning system was reasonably 

adequate, giving 13 minutes warning. 

GENERAL STILIYELL thought that the warning system required improvement. He thought that all possible steps had already been taken 

by Field Marshal Wave11 to speed up the development of the air fields. 

Labor had dready been switched from the Led0 Road. 

In response to an inquiry by the President, GENERAL STILWELL said 

that his requirements for the Chinese Army in Yunnan were 2,000 tons a 

month in the next five months; and GENERAL CHENNAULT said that he required 4,700 tons a month for four months, and after that 7,000 tons 

a month. 

THE PRESIDENT suggested that the immediate objective for the air 

route should therefore be 7,000 tons a month. 

In further discussion, it was pointed out that the plan was already to achieve 10,000 tons per month by November, though something 

might be done to speed up matters so as to try to achieve 7,000 tons a 

month by July. 

GENERAL STILWELL said that the only way of getting large quantities of material into China was by road. We might, by a great effort, 

achieve 10.000 tons by air, but a land route would ultimately be 

essential. 

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THE PRESIDENT said that it must be borne in mind that the Generalissimo was head of the State, as well as Commander in Chief. General 

Stilwell and General Channault were thus in a sense under him when they 

were in his territory. It was difficult from the psychological point 

of view to tell the Generalissimo that we thought things should be done 

in some manner different from his ideas. 

GENERAL CHENNAULT agreed that it was necessary to listen to what 

the Generalissimo said. His own plan was first to use his air forces 

to protect the terminal base in Yunnan, and then to operate from another 

area farther east from which Japanese shipping could be attacked in the 

Hong Kong-Fo-rmosaarea. He doubted whether the Japanese could advance 

across-country and capture Yunnan. They had never yet succeeded in such 

an operation. They had always advanced up rivers which they used for 

their line of communication, and the traffic on the rivers was thus 

open to air attack. The Generalissimo certainly feared an attack up 

the Yangtze, but yite a small force, say two Fighter squadrons and one 

Bomber squadron, would be enough to prevent such an advance. 

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that if all efforts now concentrating 

on the Ledo Road and on supporting the troops in Burma were concentrated 

on developing the air fields,the progress might be more rapid, and the 

higher tonnage might be achieved earlier. 

FIELD MARSHAL WAVEU said that a certain amount of resources might 

be saved from the Led0 Road, though it was in itself of some importance 

for improving the warcling system. ‘Air fields already had first priority. 

GENERAL MARSHAL said that several steel mats for air fields were 

on their way, and General Wheeler’s demand for two or three more Engineer Battalions was under examination. It might be possible to supply 

these from the Middle East. 

THE PRESIDENT inquired what would be the effect on the Generalissimo if Operation ANAKIM were not carried out. 

GENERAL STILWELL said that the effect was unpredictable, but there 

was no doubt that the Generalissimo was relying on the operation. 

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GENERAL CHENNAVLT said that the Generalissimo always wanted definite commitments on dates and size of forces. He believed that if 7,000 

tons a month were flown in the Generalissimo would be satisfied. 

FIELD MARSHAL DILL pointed out that the Generalissimo knew about 

the plan for 10.000 tons a month, and was expecting this to be carried 

out in addition to ANAKIM. A 7,000 ton project would thus not be anything new to him. 

GENERAL STILWELL said that the Gen%ralissimo felt that he had been 

himself concerned in the making of the ANAKIM plan, and was committed 

to it. He expected the operation to be carried out as planned. If it 

were not, he would feel deserted. Operations against Sumatra or Malaya 

would have no bearing on the opening of the Burma Road, and woul3 thus 

greatly prolong the period during which no steps were being taken to 

reopen it. The Chinese were suspicious of the British, and it would be 

necessary for the British to prove to them that they were in earnest. 

The effect of the cancellation of ANAKIM would be very bad on the Chinese people, and the development of the air supply route would not be 

regarded as an adequate substitute. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was not prepared to undertake 

something foolish purely in order to placate the Chinese. He was not 

prepared to make war that way. He would do anything that was sensible 

to help the Chinese in exactly the same way as he would do anything 

that was sensible to help the Russians; but he did not see any particular value in carrying out costly operations to no purpose. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the Burma Road was a symbol to the Chinese, 

and operations in Burma would make them feel that at any rate the reopening was on the way. 

THE PRESIDENT suggested that a possible alternative solution would 

be to make use of the forces designed for ANAKIM for an advance towards 

China, opening the Road as the advance progressed. 

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that this possibility had been carefully studied. The question was how could a force advancing in this 

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manner be sustained? The railhead in Assam was already overloaded. 

Beyond that there were 200 miles of hill road already completed. Then 

came 80 miles of partly made hill road to a point still west of the 

Chindwin River. After that point there was no all-weather road at all 

in Upper Burma north of Mandalay. The Japanese had built a dry-weather 

road towards the Chin hills, but it was separated from the end of our 

road by 120 miles. We should have to build 250 miles of all-weather 

road in 4/5 months - an engineering effort entirely beyond the capacity 

of the line of communication through Assam to support. Upper Burma was 

the most malarial country in the world, and if operations were continued 

there in the rainy season, 25% casualties per month must be expected. 

It might be better to go down to Mandalay, rather than to try to go 

due east, but after we got to Mandalay, we should then be trying to 

maintain our forces over 300 miles of road of which 150 miles were 

not all-weather. We could not possibly meet the Japanese on even terms 

as they would have behind them the railway, the road, and the river. He 

did not think it would be possible to cut their line of communication 

decisively by air. 

GENERAL STZLWELL, in reply to a question by the President, said 

that he agreed with Field Marshal Wave11 that an attack on Rangoon would 

be very hazaidous. He thought it might be better to go in through 

Bassein. 

ADMIRAL SOMERVZLLE observed that an attack on Bassein was open to 

the same objection,that for two or three weeks air support would have 

to be provided by carriers. 

THE PRIME MZNZSTER. reverting to General Stilwell's statement 

about the attitude of the Chinese, said that he was sorry to hear that 

the Chinese were suspicious of the British. The British had asked 

nothing of the Chinese and were prepared to do anything that would 

really contribute to their safety. He was not prepared, however, to 

undertake months of unprofitable operations in order to remove the unfounded suspicions of the Chinese. The United States would realize 

that it was not a question of saving the expenditure of British blood. 

The British were perfectly prepared to fight in true brotherhood with 

their Allies. 

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GENERAL STILWELL explained that it was only because China was 

essential ultimately as a base that it was so necessary to undertake 

operations to open the way thereto. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was not at present convinced that 

this was so. However, he saw no reason openly to abandon the operation 

at present. He thought that moves in preparation should continue provided they did not hamper the development of the air route. Further 

study would be necessary before a decision could be taken on the actual 

operation to be carried out. 

THE PRESIDENT said that he thought the two objectives should be 

to get 7,000 tons a month' by air into China by July; and, secondly, to 

open land communication with China. It was for the Military advisers to 

suggest the best way in which the latter objective could be carried out. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY thought that the task for the staffs was to find 

out the most promising operation to open the way to China irrespective 

of any agreement actually to carry it out in the immediate future. 

GENERAL MARSHALL urged that no suggestion be made to the Generalissimo that 7.000 tons per month was the target as this would appear to 

the latter as a reduction from the 10,000 tons per month which he knows 

to be the objective. He said that in the developnent of ANAKIM, RAVENOUS 

had been the first approach. Field Marshal Wave11 had objected to 

RAVENOUS as being unsound for supply reasons, Sir Alan Brooke had 

objected because of the insecurity of the south flank, and the Generalissimo had objected because it was not coupled with naval action. 

Finally, ANAKIM in its present form had been agreed upon by all. This 

was now considered to be impracticable. He said that the plan proposed 

by General Stilwell was new in many of its features and should be 

thoroughly explored. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

TRIDENT 

MINUTES 

3RD MEETING, THE WHITE HOUSE, 6:OO P.M., 19 MAY 1943 

PRESENT 

British u. s. 

The Prime Minister The President 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill Admiral Wm. D. Leahy 

General Sir Alan F. Brooke General G. C. Marshall 

Admiral of the Fleet Admiral E. J. King 

Sir Dudley Pound Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

SECRETARIES 

Brig. General J. R. Deane 

Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob 

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1. PROGRESS OF CONFERENCE 

THE PRESIDENT inquired what progress had been achieved in the Cnnferences between the Chiefs of Staff. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that hk hoped that it would be possible to 

furnish the President and the Prime Minister with some tentative conclusions in time for theweek end. ANAKIM had only been dealt with in a 

very general way up to the present, but would be considered in more 

detail the following day. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was entirely in favor of carrying 

out whatever operations might be possible in Burma without trenching 

too deeply on shipping and naval resources. Of course any troops who 

could be placed in contact with the enemy should not be allowed to stand 

idle. 

GENERAL BROOKE agreed. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he very much hoped it would be possible in time to arrange for some British squadrons to take part in the 

operations in China. SIR CHARLES PORTAL agreed that it would be very 

desirable. 

GENERAL McNARNEY said that logistical difficulties would prevent 

any employment of British squadrons in the near future. 

THE PRESIDENT drew attention to the importance of political and 

personal considerations in planning action in China. 

2. THE U-BOAT WAR AND THE USE OF PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS 

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether in the opinion of the.First Sea 

Lord the U-boat war was proceeding reasonably well. 

SIR DUDLEY POLIND said that results recently had been fairly satisfactory. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the air operations against submarines 

were being extended and it was hoped to increase not only the total 

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sinkings by this means but also the rate of sinkings per aircraft employed. 

GENERAL MARSHALL inquired whether the President had yet considered 

the possibility of securing the use of the Azores. 

THE PRESIDENT said that he had been considering the matter and he 

thought that one method of procedure might be to ask President Vargas of 

Brazil to make a secret approach to the Portuguese Government. The 

President then read to the meeting a telegram drafted by the Secretary 

of State putting the matter to President Vargas. He said that he had 

mentioned the idea to President Vargas when he had last seen him, and 

had suggested that if a token Brazilian force were sent to the Islands, 

the Portuguese might be enabled to transfer back to the mainland some 

of the good troops which they had serving in the Islands. This might 

be an added inducement to the Portuguese to allow the United Nations to 

make use of bases in their Island territory. 

In the discussion that followed the following were the main points 

made: 

a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were all agreed as to the great 

military advantages which would follow the occupation of the Azores 

and considered that no time should be lost in carrying it out. 

b. NR. HOPKINS thought the chances of the Portuguese willingly 

conceding the use of bases in the Azores were extremely remote. 

He thought therefore that before any approach was made we should 

be quite sure in our minds that we were prepared to occupy the ISlands by force if our request was refused. 

C. Although on the face of it it might appear to be an action 

savoring somewhat of German or Japanese technique, the occupation 

by force of the Azores could hardly be condemned when it is remembered that Portugal, together with the other small nations depended 

for their very existence upon the victory of the United Nations, and 

that as long as the latter were debarred from making use of the 

Azores, their shipping was subjected to damaging attacks, against 

which a proper defense could not be provided. In the last war it 

had been found necessary to make a technical breach of neutrality by 

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occupying the Piraeus, but the incident had eventually been settled 

to everyone's satisfaction. It should not be forgotten that it was 

on the margin of shipping that the Allies depended for their warmaking capacity. 

d. Probably the best way of'handling the matter would be to have 

ample force available off the Islards, and to inform the Portuguese 

Government that the Islands would be occupied the following morning 

and that resistance would be hopeless. Solid inducements would be 

offered, and if the Portuguese desired it, the Brazilians could ostensibly provide the occupying troops. 

In conclusion, it was agreed that the Prime Minister should telegraph proposals on these lines to the British Governlrent for their canments, ad ttmt in the meamvhile the Conbined Chiefs of Staff should 

have a plan prepared for carrying out the operation as soon as pcssible. 

The plan shmld be ready for examination by the President and Prime 

Minister on Maday, 24 hy. 

THE PRIHE MINISTER asked how the discussions regarding the Mediterranean and BOLERO had been progressing. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had today 

reached an agreement which provided for a build-up in England of a 

sufficient force to secure a bridgehead on the Continent from which 

further offensive operations could be carried out. This was to involve approximately nine divisions in the assault and a bulld-up of 

twenty additional divisions. At the same time, the Chiefs of Staff 

had agreed that the Commander in Chief, North Africa, should be instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as would be 

best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and contain the maximum number of German forces. These operations would, of course, be 

subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General 

Eisenhower was to be told that he might use for this purpose those 

forces available in the Mediterranean Theater except that four American 

divisions and three British divisions would be held in readiness from 

the first of November onward for withdrawal to take part in the operations frun the United Kingdom. SIR ALAN BROOKE said it was also agreed 

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that these decisions would be reviewed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

at a meeting in July or early in August in order that the situation 

might be reexamined in the light of the results of HUSKY and the situation then existing in Russia. 

THE PRESIDENT asked what the situation concerning the troops in 

Syria was at the present time. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE informed the President that there were not many 

divisions available in Syria at this time. Most of them were being 

trained for HUSKY either in Syria or in Egypt. There were two Polish 

divisions now in Iraq. 

THE PRIME MINISTER observed the Polish troops would be much improved if they could be actively engaged. 

THE PRESIDENT asked what use could be made of Yugoslav troops. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there was only a handful of these 

troops, about a battalion. He said the Greeks had also organized one 

brigade. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he thought September of this year 

would be a good time to urge Turkey to permit the United Nations to 

use air bases in that country. He felt that the relations with Turkey 

would have been considerably strengthened by that time because of having 

supplied them with considerable munitions of war and that they might be 

receptive to such an approach. 

In reply to a question from the President, SIR CHARLES PORTAL 

said that weather for flying conditions out of Turkey was not too 

reliable after the late summer. 

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated that it would be desirable, of 

course, to obtain Turkey's permission to use her air bases prior to 

September and thought it might be possible if Italy were to be eliminated from the war. In tk latter case, we should get free access to 

Rhcdes and the Dodecanese. 

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THE PRESIDENT then indicated to General Marshall that he had sent 

him a message cmcerning General Eisenhower’s proposals that pre-HUSKY 

propaganda should contain a promise of peace with honor to Italy. 

THE PRESIDENT and the PRIME MINISTER both agreed that such a promise 

should not be made. 

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated his pleasure that the Conference was 

progressing as well as it was and also that a cross-Channel operation 

had finally been agreed upon. He had always been in favor of such an 

operation and had to submit to its delay in the past for reasons beyond 

control of the United Nations. He said that he thought Premier Stalin 

would be disappointed at not having an invasion of northern France in 

1943 but was certain that Mr. Stalin would be gratified by the results 

from HUSKY and the further events that were to take place this year. 

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that the next meeting 

of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be held at 5:GO P.M. on Friday, 

21 ?thy. 

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CCMBINED 

4TH MEETING, THE WHITE 

British 

The Prime Minister 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Dudley Pound 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

TRIDENT 

MINUTES 

HOUSE, 5:OO P.M., 21 MAY 1943 

PRESENT 

u. s. 

The President 

Admiral Wm. D. Leahy 

General G. C. Marshall 

Admiral E. J. King 

Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney 

SECRETARIES 

Brig. General J. R. Deane 

Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob 

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INTERIM REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE 

The Meeting had before them a draft of agreed decisions prepared 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and submitted to the President and the 

Prime Minister (C.C.S. 242). The draft was considered paragraph by 

paragraph. 

1. AZORES ISLANDS 

THE PRIME MINISTER reiterated the view which he had expressed at 

the previous meeting that nothing would be gained by a diplomatic approach to the Portuguese Government which was not backed up immediately 

by force. In his opinion, the Portuguese should be presented with the 

fact of an imminent occupation with only sufficient time in which to 

send a mssnge to order that there should be no resistance. He therefore 

suggested that if the Zombined Chiefs of Staff were in agreement, it 

would be better to omit from this paragraph of the agreed decisions 

the following words: 'yb) That an effort should first be made to secure 

the use of these Islands by diplomatic means without making military 

commitments to the Portuguese"and also in the last sentence of the 

paragraph the words "in case diplomatic efforts should fail." 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would certainly agree to the omission of these words which had only been inserted 

because it was understood that it was the wish of the Governments to 

proceed in this manner. 

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that the question of the diplomatic 

approach should be left to the President and himself and he hoped shortly to have the views of the British Government on the subject. At the 

same time it would be necessary to have on record a statement by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff showing the reasons why it was of such importance to occupy the Islands without delay. This could be achieved by 

expanding paragraph 1 (a). 

It was agreed that in their final report the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff should expand their recommendation in the manner suggested by the 

Prime Minister and should omit the words quoted above. 

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2. THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGIWM 

GENERAL McNARNEY gave the meeting a short account of the process 

which had been gone through in building up the plan for the combined 

bomber offensive. In view of the expansion of the German fighter forces, 

it haa been found necessary to include in the plan attacks on the 

manufacturing plants. According to a conservative estimate based on 

experience, it was hoped to reduce the German fighter strength down to 

500 as against the 3,000 to which it would otherwise rise in the middle 

of 1944. 25% of the bomber effort would go on submarine targets. About 

425,000 ground personnel would be required to implement the plan. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that this figure included the 

ground personnel for ROUNDHAMMER. 

THE PRIME MINISTER asked whether the figure could not be reduced. 

He recalled that when he had asked Monsieur Maisky why the Russians had 

refused the 20 squadrons for the Caucasus, the latter had pointed to 

the large number of ground personnel who would have to accompany the 

aircraft and the complication this would cause to the Russian communications. Every man brought to the U. K. on the ground staff of the Air 

Force would exclude a soldier. He earnestly hoped there could be a 

reduction. 

GENF”AL MARSHALL said that he had appointed a special group under 

an experienced and capable officer whose duty it was to survey the establishments of the Army and of the Air Corps. General Arnold had already made an arbitrary cut in the numbers of ground personnel for the 

United Kingdom and it was hoped that a further reduction might be 

secured, though the figure was already lower than that set by General 

Arnold. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he attached the greatest importance 

to this combined plan. There had not yet been an opportunity for the 

American scheme of daylight bombing to be applied in full, and he had 

been from time to time critical of the account of the few occasions 

when the bombers could go out and the comparatively small loads thus 

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delivered on Germany; but he could see in the future, when several raids 

could be made in one day, most deadly results would be produced. He 

therefore welcomed the plan and hoped that it could be developed to 

the full. 

GENERAL MARSHALL observed that in the latest raid which the t'. S. 

B-17.q had carried nut from England three serirate forces had been employed on three different objectives. One had had 6% cisualties, and the 

other had had nil. The over-aJl loss had been 3-1/2%. This was as indication of what might be achieved jn the future. He 3ssured the Prime 

Linister that he was just as anxious as he was to reduce the number of 

ground personnel to be transported to the Ihited hingdow. 

THE PRIJlE MINISTER thanked General 3,;arshall for this assurance. 

THE PRESIDENT drew attention to the value of occasional raids, 

say 5% of the effort, on the smaller towns where factories were known 

to exist. It would greatly depress the Germans if they felt that even 

the smaller towns could not escape. 

General agreement was expressed with this view. 

3. DEFEAT OF AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE 

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the forces listed in paragraph 

3 (a) would be sufficient to hold the Prest Peninsula. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that they should be sufficient to enable 

this area to be held and extended. The latter would be most necessary 

in order to secure more ports for the build-up. 

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired what would be the build-up after that 

shown in this paragraph. Could not something be added to indicate the 

subsequent rate? 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he would very much like to include 

something to show the subsequent build-up. It would be purely a matter 

of shipping and this was being examined. The probable rate would be 

three to four divisions per month. 

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In response to an inquiry by the Prime Minister, it was pointed 

out that the “Air Forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY”consisted of certain British and American air reinforcements which had 

been specially lent to the ?.iediterranean Theater from the United Kingdom 

for a short period immediately around the HUSKY date. 

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that it would be desirable to include a statement to show what Army forces would be available in the 

!!editerranean Theater for use after HUSKY. He did not think it would 

be right to leave North Africa entirely in the hands of the French, 

some of whom should certainly move forward in the general advance. 

THE PRESIDENT said that no French Division was shown as taking 

part in the first attack on the Continent: he thought that politically 

it might be very desirable that one should be included. He agreed that 

a statement of forces which would be available in the Vediterranean 

Are- should be drawn up. For example, it would be well to know what 

would be available to send into, say Salonika, if the Germans withdrew 

from the Dalkans. One would also want to know what could be done supposing Italy collapsed immediately after HUSKY. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that this matter had been considered, 

and a survey of the troops in the Mediterranean kea, and of the various 

garrisons require?, had been drawn up. 

After further discussion it was agreed that the final report 

should include a statement of the troops which would be available in 

the hediterranean Area after HUSKY, excluding the American and Eritish 

Civiqions earmarked for the United Kingdom. 

It was also agreed that the words “Italy and” should be inserted 

before the word ‘2ussia”at the end of paragraph 3 (c). 

THE PRIME MINISTER drew attention to the need for a new code word 

to cover post-HUSKY operations in general. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the security staffs had already been instructed to propose code words for a number of different operations and 

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final suggestions would be put forward by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

4. BURMA-CHINA THEATER 

THE PRESIDENT read the Combined Chiefs of Staff's decision concerning the Burma-China Theater. At the conclusion,he questioned the 

statement given in paragraph 4 d with regard to interruption of Japanese sea comunications into Burma. He wished to know if it implied an 

operation against Rangoon. 

ADMIRAL KING replied that it did not, that actually it envisaged 

submarine operations against Japanese communications in the Bay of 

Bengal and the approaches to all the ports of Burma. 

THE PRIME MINISTER then stated that he was in agreement with 

paragraph 4 of the Chiefs of Staff's report on the proposed Burma operations, but was unhappy that it did not include any mention of offensive 

action against Kra, Sumatra, or Penang. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE informed the Prime Minister that the whole conception for the defeat of Japan was now the subject of study by the 

Combined Staff Planners and all of the operations which the Prime Minister had referred to would be considered in this study: the present 

report included only the operations proposed for Burma. 

THE PRESIDENT was concerned about the failure to mention Rangoon 

in the decision. He thought the Chinese would be much happier if some 

mention of Rangoon was included and thought it would be wise to do so 

if only for political reasons. 

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that paragraph 4 c might be amended 

to read: "The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious 

operations with possible exploitation toward Ranyoon." After some 

discussion it was agreed that the words "toward Rangeon" should be deleted from the amendment suggested by the Prime Minister in order that 

it would not be interpreted as a promise by the Chinese. 

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THE PRIME MINISTER informed Admiral King that as soon as the 

Italian Fleet had been neutralized the First Sea Lord intended to send 

six or seven battleships, with necessary auxiliaries, from the Indian 

Ocean to operate in coordination with the United States Fleet in the 

Pacific. 

ADMIRAL KING felt that mounting operations against Sumatra, Kra, 

or Penang, would depend upon the availability of shipping. He doubted 

if they could be mounted in conjunction with the operations planned in 

the report under consideration. IIe pointed out that the shortage of 

shipping also limited the use of troops from India in the Rurma Theater. 

He said, however, that he felt some such operation as an attack on 

Sumatra or the Era Peninsula was eventually indispensable to induce 

the Japanese to split their naval forces. If this could be accomplished, 

an augmented Indian CL.ran Fleet, operating in coordination with the 

U. S. Pacific Fleet, might inflect severe damage on the enemy. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Chiefs of Staff had shown in 

their report that they had considered all of the operations that are 

essential. He felt that subsidiary plans should also be worked out in 

order to be prepared to take advantage of opportunities that might 

present themselves. 

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR DUDLEY POUND said that the program under 

discussior. would probably take all of the resources available. As a 

matter of fact the Planners were now investigating to see whether or 

not the operations envisaged could actually be carried out with the 

resources available. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the relating of resources to the opera 

tions would occur on Saturday and Sunday and the results would be ir.­

cluded in the final report to be submitted to the President and the 

Prime Minister on Monday. 

5. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC 1943-44 

THE PRESIDENT, after reading paragraph 5, concerning operations 

in the Pacific, commented that it included no sub-paragraph concer&.lg 

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air coverage for U. S. convoys, or regarding patrolling for enemy submarines. 

ADMIRAL KING said that aircraft were being sent to the Pacific 

for this purpose as rapidly as possible but there are not sufficient 

numbers available to give the complete cover everywhere. He pointed 

out that other operations, particularly HUSKY, absorb many aircraft 

of the types necessary for this work. 

THE PRESIDENT said that while everything possible was being done 

in this regard nothing was said concerning it in the report. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the submarine situation in the 

Pacific was difficult to explain. He could not understand why the 

Japanese had not attacked our West Coast. He felt that they had great 

potentialities which they were not using, and indicated that he was 

concerned constantly over the possibility of a Japanese submarine effort 

carried out in accordance with a well conceived plan. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he thought the President had made a good point 

and suggested adding paragraph 5 b (7) which would make provision for 

the protection of the U. S. lines of communications. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the question of security to lines 

of communications would be covered in a paper that was being prepared 

on global strategy. 

THE PRIME MINISTER thought perhaps it would be better to leave 

the question of protection of the lines of communications out of the 

report under consideration as most of the decisions recorded were conceptions of the offensive. 3efensive measures, therefore, might more 

properly be included in the global strategy paper. He asked Sir Dudley 

Pound how many submarines had been sunk in the last four days, to which 

the ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET replied that the United Nations had been maintaining an average of about one per day. 

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6. RE-ARMING OF THE FRENCH IN NORTH AFRICA 

After the President had read a paragraph on this subject, the 

PRIME MINISTER asked for further information. He pointed out that 

large quantities of captured material had been taken from the Germans 

and suggested that investigation be made to determine whether it would 

be worthwhile to start manufacturing a limited amount of amunition of 

German calibers. 

GENERAL MARSHALL informed the Prime Minister that General Smith, 

the Chief of Staff at Allied Force Headquarters, had informed him that 

a rapid survey was being made to determine what captured material could 

be used for equipping the French forces. 

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked Admiral King if ammunition was being 

manufactured for use on the Richelieu. When Admiral King replied in the 

affirmative, the PRIME MINISTER suggested that something of similar 

nature might be accomplished with regard to manufacturing ammunition 

for captured German weapons. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said he would have General Somervell make an 

immediate investigation of the possibilities in this connection. 

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked how many French Divisions were to 

be armed. 

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that it was proposed to rearm a maximum 

of eleven. At the present time three and a half divisions have been 

reequipped, including two and a half infantry divisions and one armored 

division. 

THE PRESIDENT asked if use was being made of French pilots. 

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that the British have provided airplanes 

for one French squadron, and the United States has equipped another. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that the British were also supplying the French with airplanes for patrolling purposes off the coast of 

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West Africa. However, apart from the one squadron which they had already given the French toward the build-up of a French Air Force, the 

entire project was in the hands of the United States. 

7. BOMBING OF PLOESTI 

After reading a paragraph on this subject, the PRESIDENT asked 

how far the Ploesti oil fields were from North Africa. 

GENERAL McNARNEY replied that Ploesti was 895 miles from Tobruk 

and 875 miles from Aleppo. 

THE PRIME MINISTER asked when it was envisaged conducting the 

proposed ope rat ion. 

GENERAL NcNARWEY said that it should be accomplished either in 

June or early July because of the excellent weather conditions which 

obtain in those months, and also because a blow struck then would coincide with the summer campaign in Russia. He said it would require 

two 8-24 groups to be taken From the United Kingdom for a period of 

about four weeks, that is, two weeks prior to mounting the operation 

and two weeks after it had been completed. Additionally, one B-24 

group on its way to the United Kingdom would be diverted to this operation and thus be about two weeks late in its arrival in Great Britain. 

He said that officers with special sights for low level bombing which 

would be required for the attack on Ploesti were now on their way to 

England and North Africa to give instructions in the use of these 

sights. Those going to North Africa were to present the plan to the 

Comnander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, who was then to submit 

his canrents to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that there were two considerations which 

were of paramount importance in deciding whether the proposed bombing of 

Ploesti should be undertaken. The first was whether or not aircraft 

should be diverted from pre-HUSKY preparation. The British Chiefs of 

Staff were doubtful if this should be done. The second consideration 

was that unless the operation was fully successful, it would make c” 

sequent operations from more suitable bases, which might later beco 

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available, more difficult. This could be attributed to the additional 

defenses that the enemy would install. He added, however, that since 

the prize was so great and because of weather conditions, the subject 

should be thoroughly explored before a decision was made. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if there was a fair degree of success, 

an attack against Ploesti would be a staggering blow to the enemy, probably the greatest single blow that could be struck. 

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that even if the operation were not 

successful, it would result in diverting considerable German anti-aircraft equipnent from the Russian Front. 

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked the Chiefs of Staff to consider the 

subject report in the light of the discussion that had taken place, with 

a view to making appropriate amendments. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE informed the Prime Minister that the report submitted included only those decisions which had been agreed upon thus 

far. They were still to be related with the resources that are available. When this was done, the items which had been considered would be 

incorporated in a final report, which would be submitted on Monday. 

THE PRESIDENT called attention to a news report concerning the 

German evacuation of Norway and suggested that the staffs might consider 

what action should be taken in the event such report proved true. 

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER both expressed their gratification regarding the work accomplished by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff and regarding the decisions which had been reached. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that what appealed to him most was the 

spirit of the offensive that permeated the paper, and the provisions 

which it made for the full utilization of our troops and resources. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

TRIDENT 

MINUTES 

5TH MEETING, THE WHITE HOIJSE, 4:45 P.M., 24 MAY 1943 

PRESENT 

British 

The Prime Minister 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Dud1 ey Pound 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

u. s. 

The President 

Admiral Wm. D. Leahy 

General G. C. Marshall 

Admiral E. J. King 

Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney 

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins 

SECRETARIES 

Brig. General J. R. Deane 

Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob 

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REPORT To THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

(C.C.S. 2421’3) 

THE PRESIDENT indicated his satisfaction and that of the Prime 

Minister with regard to the unanimity of opinion and the satisfactory 

decisions that had been arrived at by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

He was particularly grateful that so much had been accomplished in 

such a short time. He said the Prime Minister recalled that in the 

last war decisions were made with undue speed. There was no organized 

group which corresponded to our Combined Chiefs of Staff which was 

able to provide continuity in the strategic direction of the war. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that “today we meet in the presence of 

a new fact”; namely, what might prove to be decisive progress in the 

anti-U-boat war. There were indications that there might be as many 

as 30 sinkings in May. If this continued, a striking change would 

come over the scene. 

THE PRESIDENT then read the draft report contained in C.C.S. 

242/3. There was complete agreement on all items until he came to 

paragraphs 6 and 7 under Section 111. These were amended slightly. 

SECTION III. PARAGRAPH 9 - REARMAMENT OF FRENCH FORCES 

With regard to paragraph 9 under Section 111, ADMIRAL KING 

pointed out that the original paper provided only for the equipment 

of French Army Forces in North Africa. At his suggestion the paragraph wds cknged to apply to French Forces in Africa. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that Admiral Codfroy had received an 

order from Vichy to scuttle his ships in Alexandria. He had replied 

that he had definitely thrown in his lot with General Giraud’s forces. 

As a result of this action the British Government would probably lift 

the pay ban on Godfroy’s squadron. It was now Admiral Godfrov’s desire that his heavy ships would proceed around the Cape, call at Dakar, 

and then proceed to the United States for refitting. 

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SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 1 a - OPERATION TO SEIZE THE AZORES 

THE PRIME MINISTEk said that the political considerations involved in the seizure of the Azores must be considered. There was a 

possibility that the Islands might be secured without the necessity of 

utilizing a force as strong as 9 battalions. He suggested that a smaller force night approach the Azores in June. From 7 to 10 hours before 

its arrival, the Portuguese Government might be approached diplomatically and told that the force was en route. If they were received 

without opposition, the Portuguese Government would be reimbursed by 

whatever figure might be set. He thought the chances were possibly 3 

to 1 that the Portuguese Government would submit. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he personally favored an expedition 

in sufficient force to take the Islands. His government, however, had 

not as yet authorized him to approve such action. The British cabinet 

members felt that the matter should be further discussed on his return. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if a smaller force could be assembled 

in June which would act as a threat to back up a diplomatic approach, 

he would favor such action. He thought the present success in the 

anti-submarinewarfare made it even more imperative that the use of the 

Islands be obtained as soon as possible. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that if President Salazar refused to 

give his assent and the smaller force failed to attack, the Allied 

Forces would be in a bad position. They would have the humiliation of 

withdrawing; the Germans would know of the diplomatic approach and, as 

a result, would stiffen the resistance of the Islands. 

THE PRESIDENT said that he had never liked the ideaof being put 

in a position of permitting President Salazar to call our bluff. 

He was inclined to favor the approach with sufficient force to take 

the Island’s in the event that President Salazar refused to permit a 

peaceful occupation. 

GENERAL McNARNEY suggested the possibility of reinforcing the 

bluff by timing it with the sailing of a HUSKY convoy from the United 

Kingdom. 

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THE PRIME MINISTER said that the earlier operation would have a 

good prospect of success as the Portuguese would have no way of knowing 

how strong the force was with which they were threatened. 

GENERAL ISMAY said that a plan was being examined to see if sorething less than a full-scale operation could be mounted. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was content to leave paragraph 1 a 

of Section IV as it was written, and that he would discuss the matter 

with his government upon his return to England and let the President 

know the outcome of these discussions. IIe suggested the addition of the 

following sentences to the end of the paragraph: ‘The possibility of 

an earlier move will receive further study. The political decision involved will be settled in the meanwhile by the two governments.” 

THE PRESIDENT suggested that in his discussions with the Cabinet 

the Prime Minister might bear in mind the alternative of an approach to 

the Portuguese Government by the U.S.A. and Frazil. In any case, the 

idea that Brazil might provide the occupying force would be a strong 

factor in influencing the Portuguese Government to submit. 

SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 2 b - CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS 

THE PRESIDENT then read paragraph 2 of Section IV regarding the 

combined bomber offensive from the United Xingdom and the cross-Channel 

operations. He asked if the decision as written in paragraph 2 b precluded the use of French Divisions in the assault to be made on the 

Continent. 

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the use of French Forces might 

be covered if the last subparagraph of paragraph 2 b could be changed 

to read “that the follow-up divisions might come from the United States 

or elsewhere. ” 

THE PRESIDENT said, however, that he was considering the advisability of having a French Division as either one of the 9 assault divisions, or, at least, as one of the first 20 build-up divisions. He 

thought that politically it was of great importance to have the French 

represented in the first attempt to reconquer French soil. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL asked if there was any possibility of this decision being communicated to the French. 

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he thought that would be extremely 

dangerous. General Giraud and General DeGaulle were soon to have another meeting. He felt that this meeting might result in violent disputes. General Giraud had become stronger because of the Tunisian 

victories while DeGaulle would think, of course, that he was about to 

regain control. The important thing was not to let these two French 

generals create discord between the United States and the British. He 

did not feel reassured regarding the outcone of the Grad-DeGaulle conference. He thought it extremely important not to inform the French of 

our decisions when there was the prospect of a split. 

THE PRESIDENT said he thought it was entirely satisfactory to 

leave any mention of the utilization of French Forces in the assault on 

the Continent out of the paper which was under consideration provided 

it was recorded in the minutes of the present meting and if it was 

understood by the Staffs that serious Consideration should be given to 

the participation of sane French Forces early in the operation. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the decision regarding cross-Channel 

operations, as set forth in paragraph 2 b of Section IV, failed to make 

any mention of the month by month planning that was being undertaken 

by General Morgan in London for the purpose of insuring readiness on 

the part of such forces as were available in the United Kingdom in the 

event of the German crackup. 

THE PRESIDENT agreed that it would be a good idea to put agreed 

decisions concerning month by month planning in the report. He pointed 

out that it was impossible to tell when a break in the German resistance 

might take place. In the last war the first element of the German 

Forces to crack was the submarine crews. He felt that at the rate they 

were now losing submarines, that is, one a day, the crews would be unable to stick it. German submarine losses in 1918 were not as great 

as those they are now experiencing and yet they had induced a break in 

the German morale. Recently airplanes have entered two theaters of 

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operations with definite objectives. These had failed to reach their 

objective by 10 or 20 miles, but it is known that the reports they 

rendered when they returned to their bases stated that the objectives had 

been reached. He thought that this was indicative of a bad state of 

morale and efficiency in the Gertmn Air Force. These conditions were 

bound to spread. As soon as the German groud forces learned that they 

did not have adequate air protection and that the U-boat campaign had 

failed, the news would spread rapidly and a serious break in morale might 

corn unexpectedly. For these reasons it was essential that the Allies be 

prepared to take advantage of such conditions whenever they might occur. 

THE PRESIDENT also said that there had been rumors of a German evacuation of Norway. He thought that plans should be under preparation to 

take advantage of such a contingency. 

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that a subparagraph be put into the 

paper at the end of paragraph 2 b of Section IV which would read as 

follows: ‘Meanwhile preparations will be continously kept up to date 

in order to take advantage of a collapse of the enemy in France, or, 

alternatively, for the occupation of Norway in the event of a German 

withdrawal. ” 

In reply to a question by the President, SIR CHARLES POR7AL said 

that for bombing operations, air bases in Norway would not be of great 

assistance. It would be more economical.to utilize those in England 

than it would be to build new ones in Norway, especially since Norway 

would not greatly extend the bombing range. He added, however, that 

it would have a very beneficial effect if fighters could be based on 

air fields in southern Norway. 

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that if Norway could be occupied, 

it would reopen our communications with Russia. This fact, in itself, 

would make it imperative that immediate advantage be taken of the 

situation. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Unite+ States authorities would 

be kept informed of studies being made by General Morgan’s Staff in this 

regard. 

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SECTION IV,PARAGRAPH 2 c - OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN TO 

ELIMINATE ITALY FROM THE WAR 

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether the Poles were included in the 

forces detailed in this paragraph as available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE confirmed that these were included in the 19 

British or Allied Divisions. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he hoped that it was not the intention of this paragraph to commit us to carrying out particular operations. For example, he would be very much opposed to any idea of an 

operation to capture Sardinia as a sequel to HUSKY. This would be an 

eccentric operation, which would have no influence on the securing of 

the great prize open to us if we could take the toe and heel of Italy, 

and gain touch with the insurgents of the Balkan countries. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that it was stated in the paragraph that 

each specific operation would be subject to the approval of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that General Eisenhower would not be able to 

tell which operation he could do after HUSKY until the situation had 

declared itself. The idea, therefore, was to plan several operations 

and to decide, at the meeting to be held after HUSKY had been launched, 

which of them to carry out. 

THE PRESIDENT said that it was certainly difficult to foretell 

what the conditions would be. For example, it might be that a movement in Sardinia to separate from Mussolini’s regime might gain way, 

and consequently comparatively small forces could gain possession of 

the island. Or again, as one report suggested, the Germans might 

decide to withdraw their forces behind the Po, in which case entry 

into southern Italy would be easy. It might be better to widen the 

instructions to General Eisenhower, and to tell him to prepare operations aeainst all parts of southern Europe. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL said that General Eisenhower would prepare a 

number of different operations, and which of them was adopted would be 

determined when we saw how HUSKY went. General Eisenhower had already 

put in summaries of plans against the heel and toe of Italy, and against 

Sardinia, and had expressed a preference for Sardinia. Air Chief 

Marshal Tedder had dissented from this conclusion, mainly on account 

of the difficulties of staging an attack on Sardinia with adequate air 

support. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that Air Chief Marshal Tedder had also 

thought that the value of northern Italy as a base from which to bomb 

Germany had been underrated. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the prime factor which should be 

kept in mind was the position in the Balkans, where 34 Axis Divisions 

were held in play by rebels, who would become much more active if we 

could gain touch with them through Durazzo, or any other suitable point. 

Of course, if Italy went out of the war, then the Italian Divisions 

would have to withdraw, and Germany would either have to fill the gap, 

or retire to the Danube. The effect on Turkey would be very important. 

None of these effects could possibly accrue from an operation against 

Sardinia. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that General Eisenhower would be 

instructed to prepare those operations which were best calculated to 

eliminate Italy. It was the elimination of Italy which would place 

these prizes within our grasp, and the right operation to bring this 

about would depend upon the situation after HUSKY. Moreover, much 

would depend upon events on the Russian Front. It might be that the 

presence of large numbers of Germans in the toe and heel would make 

a direct assault on this unprofitable - in which case Sardinia would 

be a better choice. 

THE PRIME MINISTER did not agree that Sardinia could be an acceptable alternative. Operations in the general direction of the Balkans 

opened up very wide prospects, whereas the capture of Sardinia would 

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merely place in our possession a desirable island. There was nothing 

in the paper which would indicate to General Eisenhower that we held a 

view on this matter. The politico-strategic aspect would not be present 

in his mind. 

THE PRESIDENT said he did not feel ready to make up his mind on 

this matter. Certainly there were greater advantages in going to places 

other than Sardinia, but he did not think we were ready yet to say 

where. 

Discussion then took place on the exact meaning of the word to 

mount an operation. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that to mount an operation meant to draw up 

the plans, to allocate the forces, and to give them the necessary special training. HUSKY, for example, had been mounted during VULCAN. It 

was quite possible to mount more than one operation at a time, as considerable changes could always be made, and, indeed, had been made quite 

recently in the HUSKY plan. 

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that the word mount meant the fixing 

on a particular operation for execution to the exclusion of others. He 

did not think more than one operation at a time could be mounted with 

the same resources. 

After some further discussion, THE PRIME HINISTER suggested that 

he should take further time to consider this paragraph, and said that 

he would propose certain amendments for consideration. 

SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 2 d - THE EQMBING OF PLOESTI 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he hoped the bombing of Ploesti would 

not be carried out if it meant a considerable inroad into the preparatory aerial bombardment for HUSKY. 

GENERAL McNARh'EY said that the bombers which would be taken from 

the North African Theater to bomb Ploesti would only be away for four or 

five days. It was the units which would come from the United Kingdom 

which would be absent for a longer period. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the type of aircraft to be 

used was the R-24, which was not of such value for the HUSKY preparatory borobardment as the B-17. He thought that if Ploesti could be 

seriously damaged, it would be a blow of tremendous importance in support of operations on the Russian Front. The decision depended upon 

the comments and recommendations of the Commander in Chief, North 

African Theater. 

SECTION 14 PARAGRAPH 3 a - OPERATIONS IN THE BURMA-CHINA THEATER 

THE PRESIDENT asked Mr. Hopkins wnat he thought the Generalissimo’s reactions would be to these proposals. 

MR. HOPKINS replied that he did not think that the Ceneralissimo should he told of the decisions reached in the Conference. He 

predicted that if he were told, he would not agree with them, although secretly he would not be unhappy about them. Ec would resent 

more than anything else not having been consulted. Mr. Hopkins suegested that Mr. Soong be told t.omorrow that ANAKIM is to go on. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he thought the Chinese would have to 

be told a little more about the operations than was proposed by Mr. 

Hopkins. The Chinese were constantly pressing to see him concerning 

the decisions that were made, and he felt it wise to tell them everything except the details concerning the capture of Akyab and Ramree 

Islands. 

THE PRESIDENT said in this regard they simply should be told that 

an occupation of a base on the Burma Coast by amphibious operations was 

included in the decision but that the details would have to be worked 

out after further consideration. 

THE PRIME MINISTER proposed that the Chinese should be informed 

as follows: 

‘Further study of ANAKIM has lead to the following plan: 

“1. A large scale build-up of air combat forces ad a rapid buildup of the air transport route to China. 

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‘2. A vigorous offensive in the northern part of Burma with the 

purpose of opening the Burma Road and regaining contact with China. 

‘3. Amphibious operations against the coast of Burma with the 

view to controlling communications in the Bay of hngal.” 

THE PRIME MINISTER, however, indicated that he would prepare a 

written sugkestion as to what should be told to the Chinese. 

SECTION VI. PARAGRAPH 1 - EOUIPHENT FOR TURKEY 

THE PRIME MINISTER said he wished it definitely understood that 

the Turks would be informed regarding the origin of any equipment that 

was given to them from United States production. !;e felt that the same 

rule should apply to equipment given to Russia. 

GENERAL M.4RSHAL.L said that in discussing the paragraph regarding 

equipment for Turkey, the United States Chiefs of Staff had been concerned more with the availability of the equipment and its effects on 

our training than they were with who received the credit for giving it 

to the Turks. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said he understood the situation perfectly. 

THE PRESIDENT went on to consider the remainder of the paper which 

was agreed to in all its details by both him and the Prime hiinister. 

THE PRIME MINISTER then said that he would like to give further 

consideration to the paper. He proposed to submit a suggestion regarding the post-HUSKY operations in the Lediterranean and also a proposal regarding the information that was to be given to the Chinese 

concerning the Burma decisions. He suggested, therefore, that the 

meeting adjourn at this time to meet again at 1130 on Tuesday morning, 

25 May 1943. 

This was agreed to. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

TRIDENT 

MINUTES 

6TH MEETING, THE WHITE HOUSE, ll:30 A.M., 25 MAY 1943 

PRESENT 

British 

The Prime Minister 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Dudley Pound 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles F. A. Portal 

Lt. Gem. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

u. s. 

The President 

Admiral h. D. Leahy 

General G. C. Marshall 

Admiral E. J. King 

Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney 

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins 

SECRETARIES 

Brig. General J. R. Deane 

Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob 

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1. EMPLOYMENT OF THE POLES 

THE PRIME MINISTER slid that he hnd had a strong appeal from General Sikorski for the employvent of the Folish troops in bettle in the 

near future. FIe hoped that these good troops could be Fade use @f. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the Polish troops in the United Tinzdom, which amounted to one armored division and one brigade, had been 

included in the forces earmarked for ROUNDHAMMER; and the two Polish 

Divisions and certain minor formations now in Iraq had been included 

in the 19 British and Allied Divisions available for further operations 

in the Mediterranean. 

2. FINAL REPORT BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF To THE PRESIDENT AND 

PRIME MINISTER (C.C.S. 242/4); AND AMENDMENTS THERETO SUGGESTED 

BY THE PRIME MINISTER (C.C.S. 242/5) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF reported that they were in entire 

agreement with the amendments proposed by the Prime Vinister and would 

incorporate these in the final edition of the report. 

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that it would be necessary to give 

a version of the report to the Russians. This version could be drawn 

up in suitable form for handing to the Russians through the normal 

official channels. This would obviate the necessity for an explanatory 

telegram from the President and himself. The message could simply be 

sent saying that a full report would be reaching them through the 

American and British representatives in Moscow. 

THE PRESIDENT and the PRIME MINISTER:­

a. Gnve final approval to the report by the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff, as amended in accordance with the Prime Minister's suggestions. 

b. Instructed the Secretaries to prepare for their approval 

a version of the report suitable for comnunicationto 

the Russians through the normal official channels. 

3. COMMUNICATION OF CERTAIN DECISIONS To THE CHINESE 

THE CONFERENCE had before them a suggested phraseology to ' ­

employed in communicating to the Chinese the decisions regardi. 

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operations in the Burma-China Theater, which had been suggested by the 

Prime Minister. (Shown in the Annex to these Minutes.) 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had certain minor modifications to propose (which he read to the President and 

the Prime $!inister), apart from which they were in entire agreement 

with the Prime hiinister’s suggestion. 

After further discussion, it was agreed:-

That the President and General Marshall should make use of 

the form of words contained in the Annex to these minutes 

in conversation with Dr. Soong and General Chu respectively, and should hand them copies of khe document for their 

retention. 

4. OFFICIAL STATEMENT FOR THE PRESS 

THE PRESIDENT said that it would be necessary to consider the 

terms of a statement to be given to the Press at a suitable moment 

after the Prime Minister had left Washington. 

MR. HARRY HOPKINS said that he had drafted a statement, and he 

proceeded to read his draft to the Conference. 

General agreement was expressed with the terms of the draft, and 

h’r. Popkins was asked to prepare it in final form for issue. 

5. VISIT OF GENERAL STILWELL AND GENERAL CHENNAULT To THE UNITED 

KINGLM3M 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that it would be of very great value if 

General Stilwell and General Chennault, with their unrivaled knowledge 

of the Burma-China Theater, could return to their posts via London. 

He understood that the route through London was actually three days 

shorter than the route across the Southern Atlantic: and since Field 

hlarshal Wave11 and Admiral Somerville would also be going to London, 

the visit of the two generals would serve to give a great impetus to 

the work necessary to enable the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff for operations in the Burma-China Theater to be implemented. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was entirely agreeable to this suggestion and would issue the necessary orders. 

6. POST-HUSKY OPERATIONS 

THE PRESIDENT said that the Prime Minister would shortly have an 

opportunity of talking to the Conunanders in Chief in North Africa on 

post-HUSKY policy, and had suggested that it would be of great value 

if General Marshall could accompany him. He (the President) had accordingly spoken to General Marshall, and asked whether he could defer 

his visit to the Southwest Pacific in order to fall in with the Prime 

Minister’s request. General Marshall had said that he was perfectly 

willing to do this. 

THE PRIME YINISTER explained that he would feel awkward in discussing these matters with General Eisenhower without the presence of 

a United States representative on the highest level. If decisions 

were taken, it might subsequently be thought that he had exerted undue 

influence. It was accordingly a source of great gratification to him 

to hear that General Marshall would accompany him; and he was sure that 

it would now be possible to arrange everything satisfactorily in 

Algiers, and for a report to be sent back to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff for their consideration. 

7. CODE NAMES FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS 

ADMIRAL LERHY said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommended 

the adoption of certain code names, a list of which he handed to the 

President. 

In discussion, certain modifications to the list were agreed 

upon. 

The final list as approved has been given to those immediately 

concerned. 

8. THE PLWCH XHEYE 

GENERAL MARSHALL read to the Conference a report which he had 

received upon the state of training and readiness for action of the 

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force which had been specially set aside and trained for the PLOUGH 

scheme. It was the firm opinion of all the United States and British 

officers concerned in the matter that this force, which numbered some 

2,500 men, should be given battle experience as soon as possible. The 

force, which had been given amphibious training in addition to the 

special training for the PLOUGH scheme, had been worked up to a high 

pitch of readiness, and provided it were not uselessly dissipated, it 

would greatly benefit by coming into action. It could be reassembled 

for its proper role before the winter. There were a number of possible 

places where the force might be utilized, such as the Aleutians, or 

post-HUSKY operations, or for commando raids from the U.K. or even in 

the Azores. It was perhaps a pity that they had not been employed in 

the operations against Attu, but an oppor.tunity might occur for using 

them in another operation in that area. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that the value of the force would be 

greatly increased by early participation in battle. 

GENERAL McNARNEY said that the improved type of vehicle for use 

by the force would be ready about the middle of October. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this force had been designed for a 

particular type of warfare and it would be a great pity to dissipate 

it if there were a chance of its real role coming to the fore. Nevertheless, he thought that it would.be quite easy to create an opportunity for its employment if it was sent to the United Kingdom. It might 

be possible, for example, to repeat a raid on the coast of Norway of 

the type of the raid on the Lofoeten Islands. 

THE PRESIDENT suggested that it would be necessary also to consider the utilization of the Norwegian battalion now in the United 

States. 

THE PRIYE YINISTER agreed. He suggested that the British Chiefs 

of Staff should consider this matter immediately and make specific 

proposals to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

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This suggestion was agreed to. 

9. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS 

THE PRESIDENT asked whether any steps had been taken to concert 

measures with the Russians in case of an attack by Japan on Russia. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that an attempt had been made to discuss 

this eventuality with the Russians, and General Fradley had been sent 

to hioscow for the purpose. After three months' negotiation, it had 

been rgreed that he should survey the air fields in Siberia, but the 

Russians had then reversed the decision and the whole proposal had 

fallen to the ground. 

THE PRESIDENT said that the Russians naturally did not wish to 

permit any act which might compromise them in the eyes of the Japanese. 

Nevertheless, it would be a pity if the occasion arose and no plans 

had been made. It might be desirable, for example, to send forces to 

help the Russians to hold Kamchatka. 

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed, but thought the Russians would be 

unlikely to be forthcoming. He suggested that one way of making progress would be to say to the Russians that we would be prepared to send 

them so many squadrons of aircraft so many days after the outbreak of 

the war with Japan. We could tell the Russians that they could count 

on this reinforcement in making their plans. This might lead them on 

to discussion. 

GENERAL McNARNEY said that this proposal had in fact been made, 

but the only Russian response had been to suggest that the aircraft 

should be given to them so that they could fly them themselves. 

ADMIRAL KING said that a running study was in existence of the 

possibilities presented by a Russo-Japanese war, and this had been 

reviewed three months previously. Little, however, could be done without additional data. 

THE CONFERENCE took note of the above discussion. 

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10. ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONFERENCE 

The Trident Conference then adjourned, the Prime Minister expressing his gratitude for the warm welcome which he had received and 

his appreciation of the work which had been accomplished. 

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ANNEX 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

PROPOSALS To BE MADE To GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK 

The following are the proposals which will be made to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek with regard to operations in the ANAKIM Theater: 

First, the concentration of available resources as supreme priority within the Assam-Burma area on the building up and increasing 

of the Air Route to China to a capacity of10,OOO tons monthly by 

early fall, and the development of Air facilities in ASSAM with a view 

to: 

a. Intensifying Air operations against the Japanese in BURMA; 

b. Maintaining increased American Air forces in CHINA; and 

C. Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to CHINA. 

Secondly, vigorous and aggressive land and Air operations will 

be begun at the end of 1943 monsoon from ASSAM into BURMA via LED0 and 

IMPHAL in step with an advance by Chinese forces from YUNNAN, with the 

object of containing and engaging as mahy Japanese forces as possible, 

covering the Air Route to CHINA, and as an essential step towards the 

opening of the BURMA Road. 

Thirdly, amphibious operations against the Burmese coast with 

the purpose of interrupting Japanese communications between the coast 

and their northern front. 

Fourthly, the interruption of Japanese sea communications into 

BURMA. 

For the above purposes all possible measures will be taken to 

secure the Naval Command of the Bay of Bengal by an adequate force. 

No limits, except those imposed by time and circumstances, will be 

placed on the above operations, which have for their object the relief of the seige of CHINA. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 83rd Meeting 

TRIDENT 

Minutes of Meeting held in 

The Board of Governors Room, 

Federal Reserve Building, 

on Thursday, 13 Ma,y 1943, 

at 1030. 

PRESENT 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Sir Dudley Pound 

Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

ALSO PRESENT 

Commander W. L. Freseman, USN Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Comnander V. D. Long, USN Lieutenant General 

Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Brigadier General J. R. Deane, USA 

Comnander R. D. Coleridge. RN 

Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup 

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ADMIRAL LEAHY, on behalf nf the !jnit.erl States Chiefs of Staff, 

expressed his pleasure at having the British Chiefs of Staff present 

for this series of meetings. He appreciatd that they have come so far 

and left their duties for this purpose. He felt that it was important 

that by personal conferences the problems which had arisen since their 

last meeting should be resolved. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he would like to outline brief proposals with 

regard to the conduct of the Conference. He suggested the meetings 

should take place daily, including Sundays, from 10:30 to 12:45, followed by a luncheon in the Map Room of the Public Health Building. If 

acceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff, the United States Chiefs of 

Staff would like to have with them at these meetings their three senior 

planning officers, together with one member of the Joint Strategic 

Survey Committee, and two officers responsible for supply problems. 

These officers would not take part in the discussion nor sit at the 

table. He felt that many of the problems could be more quickly resolved if those involved were present and could hear at first hand the 

views of the Chiefs of Staff. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that the number should be kept 

down as much as possible but agreed with Admiral Leahy’s suggestions. 

He would like the British Directors of Plans also to be present. 

SIR JOHN DILL suggested that to assist the representatives of 

the British Chiefs of Staff in their duties after the Conference itself had ceased, it would be helpful if they also could attend. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed that this was an excellent suggestion. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY further suggested that with regard to the recording 

of decisions, nothing in the minutes should be regarded as an agreed 

decision unless it were recorded as such in the conclusions. Agreed 

decisions should be taken as the first item at the subsequent meeting. 

With regard to the final report to the President and the Prime Minister, 

he suggested that any preliminary reports presented should be regarded 

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as tentative only and that in the final report an effort should be made 

to arrange approved existing and projected strategic undertakings in 

their order of priority. He suggested the first two sessions should 

be given up to a general discussion and exchange of ideas on global 

strategy, both in Europe and the Pacific: after that, post-HUSKY operations in 1943 and beyond, both in the Mediterranean and Western Europe; 

and finally a review of the China situation, operation ANAKIM and the 

Pacific. At the conclusion of these first two general discussions, the 

Combined Planners should be asked to prepare a detailed agenda. The 

war against Japan should perhaps be discussed first since the Commanders 

in Chief in the Far East might wish to return to their posts. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY :’.en read out a memorandum giving the views of the 

United States Chiefs of Staff on the global strategy of the war (Annex 

I‘ A ”to these minutes). 

SIR ALAN BROOKE thanked Admiral Leahy for the warm welcome which 

he had given to the British Chiefs of Staff. He felt it was appropriate 

that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should meet at the conclusion of the 

successful operations in North Africa. It was also appropriate that he 

should choose this moment to express the admiration of the British 

Chiefs of Staff .“i General Eisenhower’s conduct of these operations, 

and above all, for his success in obtaining and maintaining the utmost 

cooperation and harmony throughout his command and complete absence of 

friction. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he was in entire agreement with the proposals 

for the Conference suggested by Admiral Leahy. With regard to the memorandum on global strategy which Admiral Leahy had read, the British 

Chiefs of Staff would like time to consider this paper, since it embodied the fomdations of our future strategy. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE then read out a memorandum by the British Chiefs 

of Staff containing their views on the conduct of the war in 1943-1944 

(attached as Annex “B”to these minutes). In reading this memorandum, 

he amplified in certain respects that part of paragraph 2 dealing with 

the directive to General Morgan. This directive included instructions 

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to prepare for a feint designed to bring about an air battle on the 

western front, an operation (a reverse Cunkirk) in which all available forces should be put forth onto the Continent by any possible 

method to take advantage of a crack in German morale, and finally, 

instructions to prepare for a full-scale assault against opposition. 

Shipping remained the stranglehold on all our operations. It would be 

necessary to keep this factor in mind in all considerations. It was 

suggested, however, that the desirability of possible operations from 

a military viewpoint should first be assessed, and when agreement had 

been reached on this, the possibilities of carrying them out should be 

related to the shipping position. As regards the order of discussion, 

he suggested that since there was no immediate urgency for the return 

of the Commanders in Chief to India, the global strategy should first 

be discussed, then European strategy (since Germany was agreed to be the 

main enemy) and finally the Pacific. 

In reply to a question by General Marshall, SIS ALAN BROOKE said 

that if HUSKY was launched on the 10th of July, it was estimated that 

the operation should be completed within one month. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Planners had estimated that the revised HUSKY might take until the middle of September. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he considered that the new plan with 

its stronger lodgments should not take much longer than the old one 

since our air superiority should be able to cut the enemy’s lines of 

reinforcement. 

SIR JOHN DILL suggested that the rapid collapse of the Axis forces 

in Tunisia might be taken as indicative of what the future held for us. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the weakness of the new planlay in 

its failure to seal the island to reinforcements. He agreed, however, 

that with our large air superiority, if sufficient pressure could be 

maintained, it would not be easy for the Axis to reinforce since they 

would find difficulty in keeping their ports open. The impression from 

General Eisenhower’s signal on the revised plan was that it inferred 

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that he anticipated but little delay due to the changes made. 

GENERAL MARSHALL asked the views of the British Chiefs of Staff 

on the results to be expected on Germany by the progressive and curnulative effect of the combined bomber offensive this summer up to the fall. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he built great hope on these attacks 

if the build-up could be maintained. It was hoped to have between eight 

and nine hundred United States heavy bombers and four hundred United 

States medium bombers in the United Kingdom by the 30th of June. 

GENERAL McNARNEY confirmed that this number of heavy bombers would 

be available, though there might be a slight diminution in the number 

of mediums. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the effect of some thousand day 

bombers and between 1,000 and 1,200 night bombers would be considerable. 

The results of day bombing had been most encouraging and must achieve 

the withdrawal of German fighters from other fronts since the Germans 

could not afford to ignore the material and morale effect of these 

attacks. The American day bombing plan aimed not only to shoot down 

enemy fighters but to destroy fighter factories. 

GENERAL MARSHALL asked for the Chief of Air Staff’s views on the 

effect of concentrating all available air power in support of a land 

battle. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that this largely depended on the targets 

offered. Our air superiority would be overwhelming within a circle of 

120 to 150 miles. The Germans could only provide some two to three 

hundred bombers and five to six hundred fighters, whereas the British 

had some 1,500 fighters and the United States would have about a thousand. If replacements were available, this superiority after a few 

days would defeat the German fighter defense and enable the bombers to 

attack their targets relatively unmolested. The essential problem was 

to insure that the German Air Force gave battle. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL then raised the question of the results of turning our air power in h'orth Africa onto the Italian fleet once bases 

were available in Sicily. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the present task of the Air in North 

Africa was to insure air superiority over Sicily. The northern Italian 

ports were out of range from the United Kingdom in the summer. The 

attack must be based either on Sicily or North Africa. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that if they were bombed out of Spezzia, 

the Italian fleet might make for Toulon. The modern Italian battleships of the Littorio class had left Spezzia after the last bombing, 

but had then returned. The older battleships were at Taranto and were 

immobilized for the present since the necessary destroyers had been 

used for ferrying troops to Tunisia. There thev had sustained considerable losses, but he believed that there were still enough destroyers 

available to escort the Italian fleet to sea. 

ADMIRAL KING agreed with Sir Dudley Pound that it was desirable 

to drive the Italian fleet into the Adriatic but doubted if those in 

the northwestern Italian ports would run the gauntlet through the 

Straits. 

In reply to a question by General Marshall, SIR CHARLES PORTAL 

said that the Italian fleet in the north was only vulnerable to day 

attack by U.S. bombers since the short nights did not permit of British 

night bombers being used. He did not believe that the Italian fighter 

defense was good but ships were difficult to sink, particularly since 

the vessels of the Littorio class had heavy deck armor. 

GENERAL McNARNEY said that all Italian ports, including Toulon 

and Trieste, were in easy range of R-17 and B-24 aircraft based on 

North Africa. American bombers were developing a new technique for 

low altitude attacks. Experience in the South Pacific went to show 

that good results could be achieved in spite of heavy anti-aircraft 

fire, though the question of defense against fighters was another ~nltter and must be taken into account since the Italian ships would t 

ports out of range of our escorting fighters. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL then asked for an estimate on a time basis of 

the vulnerability of the Ploesti oil fields to attack by aircraft based 

either on Aleppo or Libya. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he did not believe that an adequate scale 

of attack could be brought to bear except from Turkey or the mainland 

of Italy or Greece. Only E-24’s based on North Africa could reach the 

oil fields, and these were neither numerous enough nor were they as well 

able as the E-17’s to beat off an attack. If Turkish, Italian or Greek 

bases could be used, an attack should produce a very serious effect on 

the refineries, and hence on Germany’s petroleum situation. 

GENERAL McNARNEY said that a plan which had great possibilities 

had been worked out fo- attacking Ploesti oil fields by low level bombing attacks from bases in Bengasi, using 500-pound delay action bombs, 

the force to consist of 153 Heavy Bombers. He believed that such an 

attack would render any further operations against the refineries unnecessary for a period of some six months. This attack could be carried 

out without waiting for the Turkish or Italian air fields to be nvnilable, and the numbers required could easily be built up of E-24’s with 

some additional B-17’s temporarily diverted from the IJnited kingpiom. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said it was important in considering our future 

strategy to carefully assess the possibilities and destructive capacity 

of air attacks. We should take advantage of this strength in planning 

our future operations, particularly in the Mediterranean where it should 

be possible to use air power rather than additional ground forces. The 

enemy must not be allowed to relax, however. Damage to the Italian 

fleet might prove sufficient to release British surface vessels for employment in the Far East. The plan for Ploesti outlined by General 

McNarnev seemed well worth the gamble. The destructive power against 

fighters shown by the B-17’s had been encouraging, as had also their 

accuracy in bombing which had forced enemy fighter reaction to their 

attacks. Attacks on the Italian fleet, and on the oil fields of Ploesti 

could be undertaken. These muld not be too heavy a logistical burden. 

All these possibilities had a bearing on what could be achieved to 

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hasten the collapse of Italy by air action alone. An Italian collapse 

might have a political reaction on the Turks which would enable us to 

get the use of their air bases. The results of our air superiority in 

Tunisia had proved crippling to the enemy. 

Operation HUSKY should provoke further air fights which would 

weaken the enemy and might leave us in a position to bomb Italy almost 

unmolested. Since correct application of air power was all important, 

the Chiefs of Staff would deeply regret any failure to exploit a favorable opportunity which might be presented to use its cumulative effect 

in the Mediterranean at this time. Effective use of air power might 

enable us to economize in the use of ground forces in the Mediterranean 

Area. They would also deeply regret not being ready to make the final 

blow against Gernany, if the opportunity presented itself, by reason 

of having dissipated ground forces in the Wediterranean Area. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked for an estimate as to how long it would require to establish ourselves in a position in Turkey or in the heel of 

Italy to undertake air attacks on Ploesti. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he estimated that from seven to nine weeks 

would be required before we could operatefrom Turkish air fields or from 

three to four weeks if a Turkish acceptance could be taken for granted 

and the necessary concentrations in Syria made beforehand. Air fields in 

Turkey sufficient to operate 25 squadrons were now available and air 

fields for another 20 squadrons should be ready by October. It was 

difficult to estimate the time factor if the heel of Italy was used, 

A considerable amount of shipping would be required, and the timing 

would depend on the amount of land forces engaged and requirements for 

tactical air forces which would take up the air fields otherwise available for the strategic bombing force. Broadly, he felt that it was 

unlikely that an air attack on Ploesti could take place from Italian 

bases sooner than from seven to nine weeks after the launching of the 

land operations against the heel. He feared that an initial ineffective 

attack on Ploesti might lead to great strengthening of the defenses. 

It was unwise to underestimate the meteorological and geographical 

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difficulties in attacking this target. A very high degree of training 

and good luck with regard to the weather were essential. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY emphasized the importance of the time element in 

bombing of the Ploesti fields. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the Russians might undertake an attack on 

Ploesti since they had large air forces and bases near the target. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said this had been suggested to the Russians, 

but he believed their air forces were too closely committed to the 

ground battle. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that permission had been sought from the 

Russians, prior to the first Ploesti raid, for the 1I.S. aircraft to 

land in Russia. This permission, however, had been received a week 

too late to be of any use, and the Russians had never agreed to permit 

U.S. aircraft to take off for the raid from Russian fields. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the British Chiefs of Staff had 

brought with them their study on the possibility of bombing Ploesti 

and the results which would be achieved. He suggested that the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff should instruct the Combined Staff Planners to prepare 

a report on this matter. 

ADMIRAL KING suggested that the Russians should again be approached on the desirability of bombing Ploesti or the use of their qir 

fields by U.S. or British bombers for this purpose. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL concurred. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that full use must be made of air power in 

the Mediterranean but considered that this must be examined in relation 

to the whole picture of the value of knocking Italy out of the war. 

GENERAL MARSHALL felt that in looking at the whole picture we 

should direct our attention to knocking Germany out of the war. 

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SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the enemy were certain to resist to 

the best of their ability our plans for putting shipping through the 

Mediterranean, and this should produce heavy air attacks. The enemy’s 

one hope of victory lay in the success of his operations by submarine 

and air against our surface ships. The capture of Sicily would helr 

us to open the Mediterranean route, but even then Axis air based on 

Sardinia would endeavor to cut the line of communication. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff doubted 

if bombing by air alone would cause the collapse of Italy. If Italy 

collapsed, Germany would be faced with the necessity of taking over 

the garrisoning of the Balkans from the Italians. Sone 43 Italian 

divisions were now employed on this task. The Germans might use fewer. 

If they used only 20, it would mean 20 less on the Russian Front. 

Further, unless Germany allowed us to occupy the whole of Italy, including her northern airports, Germany would have to send troops to resist 

our attacks. The Balkans were economically valuable to Germany. Troops 

could not be withdrawn from them altogether since Mihailovitch in 

Yugoslavia would rise and Greece and Albania would be inflamed. If we 

could knock out Italy and thus divert at least 20 divisions from the 

Russian Front, and if the Russians could keep up the pressure during 

1943, the Germans might crack. It was essential, therefore, that we 

must use every means to insure a collapse of Italy. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that if Italy should crumble as a result 

of HUSKY, we must consider what action should be taken. Troops for 

the occupation of Italy would be necessary. He did not believe that 

Germany would try to control an Italy which was not fighting. Continental communications were designed for an east and west flow of 

traffic. Communications north and south were bad, as were lateral 

communications along the southern outposts of German power in the 

Mediterranean. German resistance in Tunisia had crumbled more quickly 

than we had been lead to expect from our previous knowledge of German 

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troops. They had suffered a terrific defeat with loss of some 150,000 

men. None of their North African troops were available to increase the 

defenses of Sicily. Operation HUSKY might be easier than we thought, 

and on the completion of a successful HUSKY, the Germans might be forced 

to divert troops to the various islands and threatened points in southern Europe. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he believed that German strategy on 

the Eastern Front would be mainly an offensive-defensive. They now 

only had 185 divisions on this front. No Italian divisions were left 

there and far fewer Hungarians and Foumanians. Action of ours in the 

Mediterranean, which would force the collapse of Italy, would necessitate the Germans withdrawing additional troops from Russia to meet 

Italian commitments, including the 7 Italian Civisions in southern 

France which would then be threatened by the Allies. .4n Anti-Fascist 

Government might request our support against the Germans or a state of 

anarchy might exist. The first alternative would be more difficult to 

deal with. In any event, German commitments resulting from the collapse 

of Italy would help our final re-entry into northern France, since 

only fran there or from the Russian Front could the necessary additional 

troops be found. 

The capture of Corsica and Sardinia would assist an attack on 

southern France, and since German forces would have to be diverted for 

the protection of this coast, the re-entry into north France would be 

assisted. He was entirely in agreement that air forces should be used 

to the milxirmm but linked with appropriate ground forces. 

In reply to a question by General Marshall, SIR DUDLEY POUND said 

that the Germans now had a strong force including the 7IRPITZ. SCHARNHORST, one pocket battleship, and one 8-inch cruiser concentrated in 

the north of Norway. An additional battle cruiser would not be fit for 

service for many months, and the aircraft carrier GRAF ZEPPELIN, although completed, would probably not be operationally fit for several 

months. Admiral Doenitz, on assuming command, had stated that the whole 

German Navy would be used for an attack on shipping. This might mean 

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that the crews of the surface ships might be used to reinforce the submarines or that the surface fleet itself would be used against our convoys. In this latter event the fleet could be more easily used to 

attack Russian convoys than to break out into the Atlantic. They were 

at present concentrated in the north in expectation of another convoy 

being run. The short nights of summer made it difficult for them to 

elude our very long range aircraft if they tried to break out in the 

Atlantic. No German tankers were known to have gone to sea, and this 

was usually the prelude to a breakout. He did not believe that a breakout was likely until the autumn. The degree of cooperation between the 

German and Japanese fleets was not known, but it was possible that the 

Japanese had cmvinced the Germans that the most useful purpose which 

their fleet could serve was to remain in harbor thus containing a superior British force. 

Reverting to the revised HUSKY plan, ADMIRAL KING said that he 

appreciated the arguments in its favor. He was anxious, however, as to 

the lack of ports available in the early stages through which our forces 

could be maintained. The revised plan, however, had the merit of simplicity and concentration. He did not believe that the Italian fleet 

would try to pass through the Sicilian narrows though it was possible 

that it might attempt a passage through the Straits of Messina. He felt 

it unwise to overlook enemy naval potentialities in the Mediterranean. 

He asked for information with regard to the rehabilitation of the French 

fleet. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND agreed with Admiral King as to the advantages of 

the new plan in that only one end of the island required cover. He believed that two French 6-inch cruisers and a few contre-torpilleurs 

were being repaired. 

ADMIRAL KING, referring to ROUNDUP, stated that the results of 

SICKLE might prove to be overwhelming. We must be ready to exploit this 

by cross-Channel operations. It appeared to him that our large air 

forces could be used for destruction of critical bridges such as those 

across the Seine, amunition and supply dumps and lines of communication. We must therefore be very firm in our determination to mount 

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ROUNDUP in April, 1944. He believed that the vast concentration of air 

forces available in the United Kingdan might prove the determining factor 

in the success of Continentsloperations. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that it was generally agreed that the elimination of Italy would have extremely valuable results. but he agreed with 

Admiral King’s thought that it might be unwise to divert to or maintain 

in the Mediterranean forces which could be used in a cross-Channel 

sssault or as a prelude to such an attack. If we weakened our potentialities for a cross-Channel assault by continuing to confine forces to the 

Mediterranean. it might preclude a major effort agninst Germany on the 

Western Front. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he believed that if we did not continue 

operations in the Mediterranean, then no possibility of an attack into 

France would arise. Even after a bridgehead had been established, we 

could get no further. The troops employed would for the most part be 

inexperienced. The force available, some 15 to 20 divisions, was small 

and could not be regarded in the same category as the vast Continental 

armies which were counted in 50’s and 100’s of divisions. Before undertaking operations across the Channel, it was essential that we should 

create the right situation to insure its success. 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated thnt the discussion was now getting to the 

heart of the problem. Experience in HUSKYhad shown that initial estimates of requirements were always exceeded. The only limit to TORCH had 

bem the availability of shipping. The Tunisian campaign had sucked in 

more and more troops. Operations invariably created a vacuum in which it 

was essential to pour in more and more means. Once undertaken the 

operation must be backed to the limit. He felt deeply concerned that the 

landing of ground forces in Italy would establish a vacuum in the Mediterranean which would preclude the assembly of sufficient forces in the 

United Kingdom to execute a successful cross-Channel operation and 

Germany would not collapse unless this occurred from air bombardment 

alone. If further Mediterranean operations were undertaken,then in 1943 

and virtually all of 1944 we should be committed, except for air attacks 

on Germany, to a Mediterranean policy. This would entail a very serious 

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state of affairs in the Pacific. It would mean a prolongation of the war 

in Europe, and thus a delay in the ultimate defeat of .Japan. which the 

people of the U. S. would not tolerate. We were now at the crossroads-­

if we were committed to the Mediterranean, except for air alone, it meant 

a prolonged struggle and one which was not acceptable to the United 

States. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Pacific could not be neglected; it was 

too vital to the United States. Immediate action was necessary to 

maintain China in the war. The war in Europe mst be brought to a rapid 

decisive close at the earliest possible date. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he agreed that the European war must be 

ended as fast as possible. He believed, however, that to cease Mediterranean operations on the conclusion of HUSKY would lengthen the war. The 

seizure of the Brest Peninsula, which was all we could now achieve, would 

merely lock up 20 divisions. Russia was the only Ally in possession of 

large ground forces, and our strategy must aim to help her to the maximum 

possible extent. Only by continuing in the Mediterranean could we 

achieve the maximum diversion of German forces from Russia. The transshipment of Allied Divisions from the Mediterranean to England was a 

difficult shipping canmitment. A lodgment in the Brest Peninsula would 

not be a decisive blow. There were only some ten to twelve British 

Divisions available in England. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if a maximum effort was made, some 

eleven U. S. Divisions could be made available in the United Kingdom by 

April, 1944. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that these cmbined forces would only 

be sufficient to hold a bridgehead and would not be large enough to 

debouch into the Continent. Now was the time when action was required to 

relieve the pressure on Russia. No major operations would be possible 

until 1945 or 1946, since it must be remembered that in previous wars 

there had always been some 80 French Divisions available on our side. 

Any advance towards the Ruhr would necessitate clearing up behind the 

advancing Army and would leave us with long lines of cmmunications. Our 

air force in U.K. was at present largely on a static basis though it was 

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being converted now for use with the expeditionary force. The British 

manponer position was weak, and to provide the necessary rearward services for continental warfare, two of our twelve divisions now in U.K. 

would probably have to be cannibalized. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it appeared that ROUNDUP was still 

regarded as a vague conception. Did this mean that the British Chiefs of 

Staff regarded Mediterranean operations as the key to a successful 

termination of the European war? 

SIR CHARLES mRTAL explained that the British Chiefs of Staff did 

not believe that a force of some 20 to 25 divisions could achieve important results across the Channel on the Continent of Europe unless almost 

the entire bulk of the German Army was in Russia or the Balkans. Our 

ability to operate across the Channel later was dependent on the extent 

to which we coild help Kussia now. This in turn was dependent on the 

possibilities of knocking out Italy this year. If this could be achieved, 

then in 1944 a successful re-entry into northwest Europe might well be 

possible, but a re-entry now with some 12 to 15 divisions against the 

German forces available could achieve nothing. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he did not visualize an increase in the 

existing ground forces in the Mediterranean. The only cost would be in 

shipping to mount subsequent operations. 

GENERAL MARSHALL, referring again to the build-up for ROUNDUP, 

stated that if we were ever to get the forces in the United Kindan, we 

must begin now. Further operations in the Mediterranean would, in his 

opinion, create a vacuum which would constitute a drain on our available 

resources. 

ADMIRAL LEA'HY asked if it was believed that the Russians would be 

satisfied with an attack on Italy if this meant postponement of ROUNDUP. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he was convinced that a Russian failure 

would prolong the war for many years. He believed it far better, from 

tht Russian point of view, that we should attack Italy now rather than 

start prepsring for cross-Channel operations which could not be of any 

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real importance until 1944. What the Russians wished us to achieve was a 

withdrawal of German forces from their front. The problem was how this 

could best be done. tIe believed that only by attacking in the Mediterranean could we achieve immediate results and that this was more valuable 

than building up for a1944 ROUNWP which might not even then be possible. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he thought that Sir Alan Brooke forgot 

the fact that there would be continual air operations in the Mediterranean. Germany would not know when we were about to strike a blow, and 

her troops would be contained in the area. We had built great hopes of 

crippling Germany by air attack, and he felt, therefore, that this would 

be more successful against Italy where the resistance would be less. He 

believed that land operations in the Mediterranean Aren would prolong,the 

European war and hence the time when a decision could be achieved in the 

Pacific. The build-up of forces in Great Britain for BOLERO would constitute a threat which would demand a German reaction. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he would be satisfied with this plan 

if he believed that Italy could be knocked out by air alone end that we 

could thus gain the Italian air fields on the plains of Lombardy and the 

occupation of Sardinia and Corsica. He was doubtful, however, if air 

alone would achieve the desired result. It had never been claimed that 

Germany could be knocked out by air alone, but rather that it would 

reduce her power to such an extent that her forces available against 

Russir and ourselves would be so weakened as to permit of her defeat. 

Our object was to assist !h~ssia,and we must achieve this object as early 

as possible. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that operations in the Mediterranean were 

important from the Turkish point of view. The Turkish attitude depended 

both on Russian successes and our operations against Italy. The additional shipping for operations in the Mediterranean could only be found 

at the expense of BOLERO. The reduction in BOLERO build-up resulting 

from the undertaking of operations in the Mediterranean would only be 

some three to four divisions in 1943 and none in 1944. Operations in the 

Mediterranean were not an unlimited comnitment. We must take immediate 

advantage of the deterioration in Italian morale. Even if we occupied 

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all Italy, a serious shipping comnitment would not arise since the Italian ships would themselves be sufficient to bring nearly all the necessilry food to Italy, and only some 10 ship a month would be required 

for coal. 

ADMIRAL KING reminded the Chiefs of Staff of the danger of the 

lines of communication to the Mediterranean passing through the Straits 

of Gibraltar. The Germans had not yet taken action in this area. but 

we might be faced with a difficult position if they concentrated submarines in the approaches. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that on a previous occasion when the Gerrrans 

had operateo in the actual approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar, they 

had suffered serious losses. 

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that 

the advantages of obtaining the Azores were obvious. An examination had 

been made of possible German reactions. A German advance into Spain and 

Portugal would require some 15 to 20 divisions and would be met with 

resistance, if only guerrilla. The Germans would then be faced with a 

difficult economic situation and the logistic problem of bnd communications and different rail gauge. The British Chiefs of Staff did not 

believe that Germany would undertake this operation. A difficult situation, however, existed with regard to Portugal. If we ask the Portuguese to allow us the use of the Azores, she might well require a guarantee from us that she would be defended. This would be difficult to 

give since it would entail keeping forces ad ships ready to meet this 

commitment. It would therefore be desirable, if possible. to give 

Portugal no guarantee and to Assure her that the risk of a German reaction was very remote. 

AE'IIRAL LEAHY said that this seemed largely a political question. 

It was unwise to offer guarantees and better to take the islands without 

previous notice, at the same time giving assurance that they would be 

returned to Portugal at the end of the war. 

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SIR HASTINGS ISMAY said that the British were in a difficult position since they had entered into negotiations with the Portuguese and 

had staff conversations with a view to assisting Portugal in defending 

the islands against attack. It might therefore be better for the thited 

States to occupy these islands. 

GENERAL HARSHALL suggested that a possible timing for the occupation of the Azores might be just after HUSKY had been launched in 

order to utilize the shipping returning from this operation. There 

were sufficient troops in Northwest Africa for use in Portugal. 

SIR HASTINGS ISMAY said that a telegram had just been receivtd 

from the British Cabinet stating that the Foreign Secretary belicved 

that the Portuguese might agree to an occupation of the islands He 

offered to circulate to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a British study on 

the whole problem. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed: 

(1) That nothing be considered as an agreed decisio.1 during 

the Trident Conferences which does not appear in the conclusions of the minutes. 

(2) That during the Trident Conferences the conchs: :.I: of each 

meeting be read and approved as the first item < the succeeding meeting. 

(3) That when any Summaries of Conclusions are given to the 

President and the Prime Minister during the period of the 

Conference, it should be explained to them that these would 

only be tentative and that, at the end of the Conference,a 

final Agreed Summary of Conclusions would be submitted. 

(4) That in the preparation of the Final Summary of Conclusions, effort should be made to set out can order of priority of existing and projected strategic undertakings. 

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(5) That at the end of the 84th Meeting the Combined Staff 

Planners should be directed to prepare a detailed agenda 

for the remaining Conferences. 

b. Agreed that the possibilities of launching R decisive air sttack on the Fl~oestiOil Fields from Russia should be explored 

by the Combined Staff Planners. 

c. Took note that a paper that had been prepared by the Fritish 

Chiefs of Staff on the subject of the use of Portuguese Islands in the Atlantic would be circulated to the Combined 

Chiefsof Staff es R basis of future discussion. 

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ANNEX "A 'I 

GLOBAL STRATEGY OF THE WAR 

(Views of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff) 

1. It would appear that the first steps in an approach to our problem should cover the broad field of global strategy. Our two principal 

enemies, widely separated and constituting threats to our home theaters 

that differ in imminence and gravity, present problems that are inextricably interrelated. We are compelled, therefore,to view the 

problem as a whole, ad in that light to test all proposals. 

2. The United States concept of the global strategy of the war, 

reduced to its simplest terms, is to win the war as decisively and 

speedily as possible. We have stated this more formally, as follows: 

a. In cooperation with Russia and the lesser Allies, to force 

an unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe. 

b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with our Allies, to maintain 

and extend unremitting pressure against Japan in the Pacific and 

from China. 

c. Thereafter, in cooperation with the other Pacific Powers and 

if possible with Russia, to combine the full resources of the United 

States and Great Britain to force the unconditional surrender of 

Japan. 

3. The United States accepts the strategic concept that the war 

will be won most speedily by first defeating Germany, and thereafter 

by completing the defeat of Japan. 

From our standpoint the concept of defeating Germany first involves making a determined attack against Germany on the Continent 

at the earliest practicable date; and we consider that all proposed 

operations in Europe should be judged primarily on the basis of the 

contribution to that end. Similarly, we believe that all proposed 

operations now or later in the Pacific should be judged primarily 

on the basis of their contribution to defeating Japan in the shortest 

practicable time. 

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It is the opinion of the United States Chiefs of Staff that a 

cross-Channel invasion of Europe is necessary to an early conclusion 

of the war with Germany, and that an early opening of communications 

with China is necessary in order to keep China in the war and to bring 

to a successful conclusion the war with Japan. 

4. We recognize that we have before us a difficult problem in how 

best to employ our resources .in support of these concepts. Any major 

course of action against one enemy has a direct effect upon the timing, 

scope, and objective of action against the other. The global concept 

must, therefore, be kept constantly in mind. 

5. We believe that keeping Russia and China actively in the war 

effort is essential to our successful conclusion of the war in any 

reasonable time. 

6. We are confident that this Conference will find common ground 

upon which to reach sound solutions for this basic global problem, 

and the more specific problems which will appear in connection therewith. 

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ANNEX "E" 

CONDUCT OF THE W4R IN 1943-44 

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 

1. We have asked for this meeting because we think the time has 

come to carry a stage further the combined plans agreed upon at Casablanca. We have no intention of suggesting any departure from the 

principles underlying the decisions taken at that Conference (see 

C.C.S. 155/1 and 170/2). We feel, however, that their application 

requires review and development in the light of the progress of the 

war in the last four months, the detailed studies which have been 

carried out, and the experience which has been gained. 

OPERAT IONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 

2. 'The decisions reached a.t Casablanca (see C.C.S. 155/1, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5) were as follows:­

"Cperations in the F.uropean Theater will be conducted with 

the object of defeating Germany in 1943 with the maximum forces 

that can be brought to bear upon her by the Vnited ?'ations. 

The main lines of offensive acticn will be:-

In the Mediterranean 

(a) The occupation of Sicily with the object of:­

(i)Making the Mediterranean line of communication more 

secure. 

(ii) Diverting German pressure from the Russian Front. 

(iii) Intensifying the pressure on Italy. 

(b) To create a situation in which Turkey can be enlisted 

as an active Ally. 

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In the United Kingdom 

(c) The heaviest possible bomber offensive against the German 

war effort. 

(d) Such limited offensive operations as may be practicable 

with the amphibious forces available. 

(e) The assembly of the strongest possible force (subject to 

(a) and (b) above and paragraph 6 below (Cperations in the Pacific 

and Far East)) in constant readiness to re-enter the Continent as 

soon as German resistance is weakened to the required extent. 

"In order co insure that these operations and preparations 

are not prejudice(. by the necessity to divert forces to retrieve 

an adverse situation elsewhere, adequate forces shall be allocated 

to the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters." 

3. So far as amphibious operations from the United Kingdom are concerned, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have since approved a directive 

to General Morgan to prepare plans, among other things, for a "full 

scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as possible." 

So far as operations in the Mediterranean were concerned, the Casablanca Conference did not look beyond the capture of Sicily. It is 

therefore now for consideration what action should be taken in the 

European Theater between the capture of Sicily and the mounting of 

the full scale offensive in 1944 - a period of anything upto nine or 

ten months - for the furtherance of the objects agreed at Casablanca 

which have just been referred to. 

4. It seems to us unthinkable that we should be inactive during 

these critical months when Russia is engaging about 185 German divisions.* This is just the tire when we ought to be exerting all 

the pressure that we can, It would be fatal to give Germany so long 4 

breathing space in the west, and thus possibly enable her to avert 

collapse. 

* This does not include 14 G.A.F. divisions on the Eastern Front. 

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5. In our view, the main task which lies before us this year in the 

European Theater is the elimination of Italy. If we could achievethis, 

it is our opinion that we should have gone a very long way towards defeating Germany. The break-up of the Axis would inevitably have a most 

serious effect on the psychological and material strength of Germany. 

The effects would be.­

(a) The withdrawal of some 35 Italian Divisions from Greece, 

k’ugoslavia, and southern France. Germany would either have to let 

go of one or more of these countries, with all that this implies 

in loss of raw materials and prestige, and in the extension of the 

range of the Allied bomber offensive, or alternatively she would 

have to substitute German for Italian troops at substantial cost 

to the Russian Front. 

(b) The elimination of the Italian Navy would enable us to transfer very considerable naval forces from the Mediterranean to the 

Pacific or to the Indian Ocean, whichever is thought preferable. 

If we were able to take over the Italian Fleet, the naval position 

would be still more favorable. 

(c) We should be able to mount a threat through Sardinia and 

Corsica against the south of France in the spring of 1944, which 

would greatly increase the chances of success of cross-Channel 

operations from the United Kingdom. 

(d) The collapse of Italy would have a big effect on Turkey, 

and hasten her readiness to make common cause with the Allies. 

6. It is of course possible that we might eliminate Italy after 

the fall of Sicily by air action alone. We think, however, that it 

would be most unwise to bank on this or to transfer any substantial 

part of our bomber force from the United Kingdom. We therefore consider it essential that we should follow up a successful HUSKY by amphibious operations against either the Italian islands or the mainland, 

backed up, if possible, by operations in other parts of the Mediterranean. Only in this way can we reap the full benefit of our victories 

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in Africa and in'HUSKY, and employ the powerful and experienced AngloAmerican forces gathered in the Mediterranean Theater and their assault 

craft. We have considered various alternatives, and have formed provisional views as to which should be undertaken. We will explain these 

in detail later on. 

7. The provision of the shipping required to deliver a second amphibious blow in the Mediterranean this year will of course have repercussions elsewhere and will affect BOLERO. But even if Italy collapses as 

a result of the first blow CHUSKY), we shall still need considerable 

shipping in the Mediterranean to exploit this success by installing air 

bases on the Italian Mainland and Islands, by increasing supplies to 

the Balkan resistance groups, and by speeding up our aid to Turkey. 

In either case some delay is likely to be caused to the build-up of 

BOLERO, but we believe that this disadvantage will be greatly outweighed by the fact that successful Mediterranean operations, and 

still more the elimination of Italy, will ease the task confronting 

an army landing in Europe from the United Kingdom. 

8. We do not believe that there is any method of giving effectual 

help to the Russian Front throughout this year other than a continuance 

of Mediterranean operations, and the intensification of our bomber 

offensive. It was decided at Casablanca that the heaviest possible 

bomber offensive against the German war effort should be a feature of 

the campaign of 1943. Nothing has occurred in the interval to alter 

the wisdom of this decision, and we think that SICKLE should continue 

to have a high priority. 

PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATER 

9. At Casablanca it was agreed that certain operstions should take 

place in the Pacific Theater (see C.C.S. 170/2paragraph 5(a)), and 

that subject to certain reservations, plans and preparations should 

be made for the recapture of Burma to take place in the winter of 

1943-44. The 15th November was approved as the provisional date for 

�he ANAKIH assault. We do not knowwhether the experience of the last 

four months, and the studies which have been made by the U.S. Chiefs 

of Staff have caused them to confirm or modify the program for Pacific 

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operations which was drawn up. We should like to hear their views on 

this. As to ANAKIM, the position is that after Casablanca, the Commander in Chief, India, was at once invited to frame the best possible 

plan, and to state his requirements. We are prepared to explain this 

plan and its implications in detail if the U.S. Chiefs of Staff so 

desire. We think the plan represents the best that can be made having 

regard to the resources which will be available. But it is necessary 

to say straight away that we are of the opinion that the full operation 

should not be attempted in the winter of 1943-44. Our train reasons 

are: ­

(a) The magnitude of the assault and the scope of the operations 

to which it would be the prelude, are such that we do not feel able 

to undertake them at a critical period in the war with Germany, on 

whom we cannot afford to relax the pressure. 

(b) We are very doubtful of the feasibility of the operation at 

the present time. For any reasonable prospect of success it would 

demand a sufficiency of forces specially trained and equipped, and 

backed up by ample reserves of men and material. These conditions 

cannot be fulfilled in the coming winter. 

(c) Until long-term plans for the ultimate defeat of Japan have 

been decided upon, it cannot be assumed that the re-coniuest of 

Burma, however desirable the political effect, especially on China 

and India, is indispensable from the military point of view. 

(d) Operation ANAKIM, even if successful in 1943-44, would not 

be likely to reopen the Burma Road until the middle of 1945. 

10. Although we cannot do ANAKIM this year, we recommend that everything possible should be done, with the resources available to keep up 

the pressure on Japan from the west and to support China. We have 

various alternatives to propose, and would welcome discussion of any 

suggestions which the U.S. Chiefs of Staff may desire to put forward. 

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11. The results of our examination of ANAKIM make us feel that we 

should together exarrine more closely the rrethod by which the defeat 

of Japan is ultimately to be brought about. This is essential so that 

all preliminary operations can be arranged to fit into the ultimate 

design, and so that Commanders in Chief in the Far East Theater and 

Indian Ocean may have a firm basis on which to frame their long-term 

olans and preparations. This will insure that the right sort of equipment of all kinds will be available in the necessary quantities when 

the time comes. 

SHIPPING 

12. It is clear that the availability of shipping will be one of 

the main governing factors as to what can and what cannot be dane in 

1943 and also in 1944. Ue suggest, however, that before going into 

details on shipping, we should clear our minds on the strategical 

issues, and decide, on merits, on the course of action at which we 

should aim. Thereafter we should examine the extent to which the 

shipping available will enable us to fulfill our program. We think 

it essential that the shipping question should be examined in detail, 

and settled before the Conference breaks up. 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

12 May, 1943 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 84th Meeting 

TRIDENT 

Minutes of Meeting held in 

The Board of Governors Room, 

Federal Reserve Building, 

on Friday, 14 May 1943, 

at 1030. 

Admira W. D. ‘ahv. USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA 

PRESENT 

General Sir A n Brooke 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Dudley Pound 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

Lt. Cen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen S. D. Embick, USA 

Lt. Gen. J. W. Stilwell, USA* 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN 

Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, USA 

Maj. Gen. C. L. Chennault, USA* 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr.. USN 

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Col. J. E. Smart, USA 

Comdr. W. L. Freseman, USN 

Comdr. V. D. Long, USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell* 

Admiral Sir James Somerville* 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse* 

Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Air.Marsha1 Sir R. Welsh 

Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN 

Brig. W. Porter 

Air Commodore W. Elliot 

Brigadier M. W. h4. Macleod 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN 

Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup 

* For discussion of Burma operations only. 

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1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING 

Without discussion, the COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAEF accepted the 

record and cmclusions of the 83rd Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. 

2. GLOBAL STRATEGY 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had examined the views of the U S. Chiefs of Staff on the Global Strategy of 

the War.* There were certain points in this paper with which they were 

not in entire agreement. They adhered to the views sgreed to at Case 

bhnca as set out in C.C.S. 155/1. 

The British Chiefs of Staff had two main points of difference 

which he would like to mention. Firstly, paragraph 2 b of the U. S. 

Chiefs of Staff paper referred to an extension of pressure against Japan. 

Such extension might well cause a vacuum into which forces would have to 

be poured and would thereby depart from the object set out in paragrnph 

2 a of the same paper, i.e., to force an unconditional surrender of the 

Axis in Europe. Action in the Pacific must be coordinated with that in 

Europe and must not prejudice the defeat of Germany or the war would 

drag on indefinitely. 

The second point of difference was in connection with paragraph 3 

of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff paper, i.e., ROUNDUP and its possibilities. 

The British Chiefs of Staff believed that the possibilities of ROUNDUP 

were dependent on the success or failure of the Russians on the Eastern 

Front. Allied cross-Channel operations could only form a very small 

part of the whole continental land war, and our effort must be aimed 

therefore at supporting Russia and thereby creating a situation in which 

ROUNDUP was possible. 

The views of the British Chiefs of Staff with regard to ROUNDUP 

might be sumned up as follows: 

* Annex "A" to C.C.S. 83rd Meeting. 

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It was their firm intention to carry out POlKDIP at the first 

manent when the conditions were such that the operations would contribute decisively to the defeat of Germany. These conditions might arise 

this 'year, tut in any case, it was the firm belief of the British Chiefs 

of Staff that they would arise next year. They could be created only 

by the Fussian Army. Our action, therefore, must consist of: 

a. Continuing our increasing bombardment of Germany: and 

h. Drawing off from the Rissian Front as many forces as possible. 

On the basis of this definition of ROUNDUP the British Chiefs of Staff 

had put forward their views on operations in the b!editerranean. 

Paragrarh 5 of the U. S. paper pointed out how essential it was 

that Russia should be kept in the war. The Rritish Chiefs of Staff looked on the matter differently and regarded it as essential not only that 

Russia should be kept in the war but that we should create a situation 

whereby Russian victories could be achieved. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he was unable to see that the U. S. conception of global strategy differed materially from that set out at 

Casablanca. The intention was now and was then to prepare for and launch 

cross-Channel operations. The African venture was undertaken in order 

to do something this year while Preparing for cross-Channel operations. 

Little preparations for the latter had. in fact, been made, since all 

available U. S. resources had been sent to horth .4frica. The North African campaign was now completed. If we launched a new campaign in the 

Mediterranean, then we should continue to use our resources in that area. 

This would again postpone help to Russia since we should not be able to 

concentrate forces in the U. K. and thus cause a withdrawal of German 

troops to western Europe. If new operations in the Mediterranean were 

the best uiy to bring the European war to a conclusion, then they must 

be undertaken; but if these operations would have the effect of prolonging the war, he saw great difficulties in comnitting U. S. resources 

to them. 

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In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, SIRALAN BROOKE confirmed 

that, in the British view, Mediterranean operations would shorten the 

European war. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the U. S. Planners in reporting to the 

U. S. Chiefs of Staff had pointed out the necessity of shortening the 

war in the Pacific and thus preventing Japan from consolidating her 

gains. 

ADHIRAL LEAHY then read out a paper* giving the views of the U. S. 

Chiefs of Staff on global strategy. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had prepared two papers - one on operations in the Furopean Theater and one on 

operations from India for 1943-1944, which he would like to hand over 

to the U. S: Chiefs of Staff at the conclusion of the meeting.** 

ADHIRAL LEAHY drew attention to paragraph 11 of the British Oliefs 

of Staff paper contained in Annex ftBn to C.C.S. 83rd Meeting with regard to a combined examination of the method by which the defeat of 

Japan was ultimately brought about. He thought it would be helpful if 

Field Marshal Wavell and General Stilwell were asked to give their views 

on this subject. An examination should be made of each plan and of what 

it would accomplish. He suggested that there should also be a combined 

examination as to how to bring about the ultimate defeat of Germany. He 

would like to have the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on the Pacific campaign as a whole. 

E. OPERATIONS IN BURMA 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that after the Casablanca Conference, Plans 

had beendrawn up for operations from India. Field Marshal Wavell would 

outline the plan which had been decided on as being the best; but this 

plan did not, in his opinion, hold out great hopes. Even when Burma was 

cleared and the Burma Road opened, it would take from six to nine months 

to develop it to a capacity of 10,000 tons per month. Was ANAKIH the 

best plan? He believed that we should examine other lines of approach to 

* C.C.S. 219 

** C.C.S. 224 and C.C.S. 225 

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the problem and whatever action was decided on from India this should 

be coordinated as part of a complete plan for the defeat of Japan. One 

Possibility was to seize the Kra Isthmus and to punch through to Eangkok, thereby cutting the main Japanese line of communications to Burma 

and obtaining bases from uhich to threaten Japanese oil traffic. There 

was no communication by rail with Bangkok from the west coast of the 

Kra Peninsula, and the roads were poor; but the principal difficulty 

was the lack of adequate port facilities on the Kra Isthnus. 

Another alternative was to capture northern Sumatra and Penang. 

This operation again would give us air bases to cover the Japanese oil 

routes. 

The third alternative would be to take the whole of Sumatra and 

then Java, the latter either from the east or west. 

Only preliminary examination had been given to these plans. It 

was essential to decide whether one of these or operation ANAKIM held 

out the best hopes. The latter might prove to be the most valuable, but 

the very poor lines of communication through Assam must be remembered. 

The Brahmaputra River had to be crossed by train ferries since there 

was no bridge, and the only railways available were single track meter 

gauge. It was planned to use more shipping on the Brahmaputra when it 

could be returned from Iraq. Rather than undertake ANAKIH, it might be 

better to develop new airports and to increase the capacity of the air 

ferry service into China to the maximum. 

Land operations would have to take place down the two roads from 

Imphal and Led0 at the end of ahich roads. when built, our forces would 

have to be maintained through the monsoon season, when no operations 

could take place. A thrust from the north would have to be accompanied 

by landings on the wst coast designed to secure air fields. These landings would require carrier-based air support, and only relatively small 

forces could infiltrate over the mountains. To capture southern Eiurma 

an assault on Rangoon would be necessary. Owing to the delta and mangrove swamps, no landings on the coast werepossible, so that a hazardous operation up the Irrawaddy was required. Even when Rangoon was cap34 7 
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tured, there would be a continuous threat on our eastern flank; and once 

committed in this area, we might be drawn on into further operations 

against Thailand and the consequent difficulties of maintaining ourselves. 

If on examination operation ANAKIW proved to be the best answer, 

it must be done; but any action we took must be coordinated with United 

States thrusts from the east. In any event, the air route to China 

should be developd. It must be remembered, too, that successful operations against Germany in Europe might well bring Russia to our assistance in the Far East. 

ADMIRAI, LEJHY pointed out that the object of the Burma Campai~gn 

was to assist China by opening the Burma Road. Alternative operations 

di~dnot appear to afford immediate relief to China. 

SIR ALAN EROOKE agreed thTt unless the Rurma Road was opened, no 

immediate relief to China vmld be given except by air. He corisi~dered 

that the moral effect of recapturin,g Burma would be great both in China 

and in India; and it was, therefore, desirable to do this operation 

if possib1.e; but from the material point of view we must consider whether operations to open the %rma Road wou1.d produce sufficient result to 

warrant the scale of effort which would be necessary anrl the commitments 

whi.ch would arise. The actual supplies which the Road could take through 

to China were relatively small. 

AD,NIRAL LEA.HY said that it was essential to do something for 

China. We must maintain the air route whose capacity was now relatively 

small and which would fall further during the monsoon season. 

SIR ALAN HROOKE said that it was important to appreciate the fact 

that operations to recapture Burma would interfere with developing facilities for increasing the capacity of the air route. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he understood that air fields in Assam were 

now being developed though slowly. As in Europe, where Russia’s geographical and manpower position were regarded as vital to the defeat of 

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Germany, so China's geographical position and ranpower werp vital to the 

defeat of Japan and must be used. A collapse of China would vastly prolong the war and vitally affect the whole situation vis-a-vis Jspqn. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he fully appreciated this point. "he value 

of Russian bases for use against Japan was also great. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he was rttracted toward the L'nngkok opration, but it must be remembered that this was of no direct assistance 

to China. The Japanese attitude townrd the Puppet Government in Nanking 

had changed, and the people in the occupied area wzere being offered supplies and facilities which were not available to Free Chin?. Morale was 

weakening, and if Ciina went out of the war, the task of the United 

Kations in defeating Japan would be terrific. 

(At this point, Field Marshal Wavell, Admiral 

Somerville, and the Air Chief !,arshal Peirse entered the meeting) 

ADMIRAL ZEAHY stated that the Chiefs of Staff had just been discussing the Burma situation. They would like very much to hear Field 

Marshal H'avell's idea on the best methods of procedure. 

FIELD k.'A;'.SkAL WAVELL said that, considering such operations, the 

first thing necessary to make clear was the administrative situation in 

India, which would of necessity be used as a base for operations in 

�?urma. The communications in eastern India and Assam are very poor. One 

means of communicition is the Prahmaputra River, but the value of the 

river ports is limited by the fact that the seasonal rise and fall is T 

much as 25 feet. On the other hand, the river constitutes a formidable 

barrier, as it is unbridged throughout its length anr! frenuent changes 

of course make it difficult if not impossible to bridge. The result is 

that the bottleneck of transportation from India to Assam is the ferries 

which operate across this river. It has railroads on either side which 

are of meter gauge, single line, and in por condition. A yerr ago this 

railroad carried only three or four trains a day, had no modern methods 

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for operation, and few crossings. Improvements have made it possible to 

operate 14 pairs of trains a day up as far as Manipur Road. Beyond that 

point 12 pairs a day is the maximum capacity. Unless this rail route is 

double tracked, which would be a tremendous undertaking and would take 

from two to three years, the present volume of traffic cannot be increased. There is one stretch of the railroad north of theBrahmaputra 

which runs along the south of the Himalayas. This part of the road is 

frequently broken by floods. Last year it was out of action for five 

months during the monsoon season. The only other approach to Assam was 

through Bengal, which is a single-track route. There were no satisfactory road communications between India and Assam. Such as there were, 

were poor in the dry season and impossible during the wet season. This 

necessitated sending by rail all vehicles for use in Assam or Burma. 

Before the Japanese entered the war, one of the principal tasks for 

India was to establish a line of communications to Russia through Iraq. 

Therefore, most of the steamers from the Brahmaputra were sent into 

Iraq for this purpose. It is now difficult and a long haul to get them 

back, but an effort was being made. The ultimate result is that the 

amount of supplies which can be sent into northeast Assam is limited. 

The scope of the operations which can be conducted is in turn dependent 

upon this volume of supplies. 

In referring to conditions in Assam and northern Burma, GENERAL 

WAVELL stated that it was one of the rainiest spots in the world. Recently over 22 inches of rain fell in a period of three weeks, in the 

dry season. During the wet season it rains continuously. There are few 

roads, and those which do exist are in poor condition. There is very 

little stone or other suitable building material which could be used for 

the purpose of constructing roads or airdromes, and such as there is 

usually has to be carried great distances. The entire country is intensely malarial resulting in a high casualty rate. At present they are 

very short of engineer equipment such as bulldozers, rollers, etc., as 

well as qualified personnel to operate this machinery. 

When the Japanese entered the war, there were approximately thirty 

air fields in India. Last year over 200 were constructed at a very great 

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effort, which demanded practically all of the resources which could be 

made available in India. The original layout of these air fields had to 

be defensive and therefore further back than now required. There were 

only a limited number in the forward area including Assam. The conditions there are therefore unfavorable for offensive operations. 

Work is going on on three or four projects, but each of these 

projects demands the same thing. There are two bases being bonstructed, 

also the road from Manipur to Imphal and on to Tamur. This was originally a one-way road as far as Imphal only. It has now been made two-way 

as far as Imphal; and work is in hand to extend it as a two-way, allweather road as far as Tamu. Beyond Tamu and into Burma it is at present 

a fair-weather road only. This project is not completed. Malaria is intense in the area. "he road to Imphal, over 200 miles, all requires fill. 

It would have to be doubled in some places in order to bear the traffic. 

When this road gets into Burma, it will still have another seventy miles 

to go to get into the Chindwin Valley, across a route which a year ago 

was nothing more than a mule track. 

The other base is at Led0 from which it is intended to construct 

a road by the Hukaung Valley to Myitkyina. Here again a road needs to 

be constructed approximately 200 miles in length, for most of which 

there has formerly been not even a mule track, although a road alignment 

had been surveyed for. part of the way. 

General Wheeler had taken over the construction of this road and 

had at present gone about 50 miles. In the Hukaung Valley section the 

only way to get a road through was to stick to the hills; otherwise in 

the rainy season this section will be covered with water. Whether or not 

a road could be constructed to open the line of communication from India 

to Chin? was open to doubt. Honrever. General Stilwell, who has recently 

seen General Wheeler, could give a more accurate report. The moral effect on the Chinese would be good if such a project were undertaken, 

even though the carrying capacity mighe prove small. 

They had tried to run two roads from Imphal into the Chindwin 

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Valley. One is through, but the other is considered as being a much 

gr ea ter under taking. 

With regard to air fields, the original requirement had been three 

fields in the northeast corner of Assam. These were in use but not quite 

completed but had encountered various delays, particularly because of 

labor and ewipment shortages. These air fields now are operating with 

runnays complete. However, the standings are limited; and with the increase in the nuwbers of aircraft, the demands for standings are increisino, rroportionately. bfter the visit of Generals Arnold and SowerveJ1, three more air fields had been reouested. The sites had been 

selected. The target date for their comrletion was 1 October, but a 

great deal will depend on monsoons and the avsilability of labor. It 

was difficult to get native labor to work during the rainy sesson. It 

was proposed to use on these fields steel mats, which in turn mean In 

added burden on the railway - 6,000 tons per runway. 

He had had another administrative survey made just before leaving 

India; the concJusion reached was that the facilities were not available 

both to establish communications for the maintenance of the large force 

necessary to invade Ebrma successfully and to provide sufficient air 

fields for the support of China. He had left instructions to put the 

construction of the air fields on top priority. 

The land route to Akyab was extremely difficult. The sea landing 

could hsve been successfully made, but he did not have the shipping, 

landing craft, and other essential equipment available. Therefore he 

tried the operation overland down the coast. The essence of this operation should have been speed in order to arrive at Akyab before the Japanese were able to reinforce. However, the conditions encountered proved 

extremely difficult and provided the time necessary for the Japanese to 

reinforce and eventually drive the British out. Operations-on a small 

scale against Akyab could nct have had any major effect. The original 

plan was to have been coordinated with a Chinese offensive beginning in 

March. He had not been told that the Chinese had abandoned their ope.?­

tion until well into February, when his arrangements were already unt. 

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way. He had continued with the operation, but the Japaneqe had &en able 

to move reinforcements from Upper Burma and use therr against his force. 

While Akyab had not been captured, the Japanese had suffered heavily, 

and sir operations against thew hxi been effective. 

Further north, it had been the intentior thst one brigade should 

idvance from the Fourth Corps Area and penetrate deeply beyond the 

Chindain Valley to cover work taking place on the road and to helq 

Chinese operations. This brig7de had been specially trained to live on 

the country and operate without communicntions. When he had learned that 

the Chinese did not intend to take any action, he hrtl decided to send 

the brigsde in to gain experience in this form of fighting.. They crossed 

the Chindwin early in February and went through to the Trrawaddy. cut 

the rrilway in 75 places, and put it out of action for several Iinnths. 

The commander of the brigide then decided to try to operate =gainst 

Japanese communications near Lashio. However, in crossing the Irrawarldy. 

he had lost many of his transport animals and some of the reminder 

had died of disease. After being in action with the Japanese, he decided 

to break up the brigrde into small columns, as hail been arranged, and 

UF to date some 1,500 of the original 2,500 hid gotten back. Of the remainder, some were still on their way back whii~rsnrir 'were making for 

China. Casualties amounted to some 1P percent. The brigde consisted of 

British, Burmese and Churka troops. The Burmese had been included to 

assist the command with their local knowledge, and some had been deliberately left behind for future use. As a result of the experience 

gained, it had been decided to train one or possibly more brigades for 

this type of fighting. 

The operations on the Arakan coast had proved disappointing, and 

we had failed to capture Akyab. This failure, together with the possible 

loss of Maungdaw, had strategic disadvantages in that it gave the Japanese an advance base for air attack on India and denied us bases. 

In view of the difficulties of warfsre in tipper Burma, it would 

never be possible to complete the conquest by land ?lone and a sen-borne 

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invasion of Lower &rma was essential. Landings on the Arakan Coast down 

to Cape Negrais would be cut off from the mainland by the Arakan Hills, 

through which there was only one bad road to Prome. It was impossible 

to land in the delta of the Irrawaddy; and, though landing at Moulmein 

was possible, these forces would be separated from Rangoon by big rivers 

and a flank guard against Siam would be essential. 

Operations down the Arakan coast were designed to obtain air bases 

to give air cover for successive landings and finally for assault on 

Rangoon, but the latter town could not thus be captured in one season. 

When Generals Arnold and Somervell had arrived from Casablanca 

with the proposal that a plan to capture krma in one campaigning season should be drawn up, it was decided that the object could only be 

achieved in one way. 

An advance by land must be made in Upper Burma to contain Japanese 

forces. This must be followed by landings on the Arakan coast to provide 

bases for air cover for a direct assault on Rangoon by going up the 

river. Forces from Assam and the Chinese from Yunnan would join up. The 

final assault up the Rangoon River was extremely difficult and hazardous. 

Though the river was not at present heavily defended, this could quickly 

be done if the Japanese learned of our intentions. 

Certain conditions were essential if this plan was to be successful. Sufficient forces must be available, fully trained and fully equipped with all the necessary supplies and specialized equipnent, and 

be ready to start operations at the beginning of the dry season during 

the first fortnight of November. Planning and Operational staffs were 

gotten together to prepare for the operation; and it was estimated that 

180,000 tons of supplies a month, loading during March, April, May and 

June, were essential in order to mount the operation. In fact, in March 

and April only 70,000 and 65,000 tons respectively had been loaded. 

This was approximately half the normal maintenancerequirements. and the 

operation was thus put back from two to three months. 

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The operations on the Arakan coast had proved that the Japanese 

were as good in defense as in attack and that our troops would require 

careful and lengthy training. Training in India was a difficult process 

due to the climate, and took longer than elsewhere. It was unlikely that 

the necessary shipping or naval forces would be available and therefore 

ANAKIM as originally planned was not possible of execution in full during the coming cold weathcr season. He was prepared to undertake the 

operation only if fully trained and equipped troops were available with 

the necessary amphibious transport assault and landing ships and specialized equipment. However much shipping was sent now it would not 

be in time for the forces to be ready in early November. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked Field Marshal Wave11 what he considered to be 

the best practicable action which could be taken to keep China in the 

war. 

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that he fully realized the political 

importance of the recapture of Burma, both on China and on India. Even 

if operation ANAKIM was undertaken in full and was successful the Burma 

Road was unlikely to attain a capacity of 20,000 tons per month until 

June 1945. He believed the U. S. Air Force was now ferrying some 6,000 

tons per month into China and hoped to work up to 10,000 tons per month. 

This was a greater capacity than the road would have for a long time and 

it might be possible to raise even this figure. He believed that the 

best way to help China was to increase the strength of General Chennault’s forces and that this, together with an increase of air-borne 

supplies, would have more material results than operation ANAKIH. An 

unsuccessful operation into Burma would be almost worse than no operation at all. General Chennault’s forces could bring pressure to bear 

both against Japanese air and their shipping and port facilities. These 

were their weak links. It was not easy to construct more air fields in 

Assam since the requirements of gasoline and of construction material, 

including steel tracks, were heavy. If large-scale operations into Wrma 

were not undertaken, then it would be easier to construct the air fields 

required to increase the flow into China. Thus it would be feasible to 

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increase General Chennault's forces which could then achieve bigger 

resiil ts. 

ADillZRAL LEAHY thanked Field Marshal Wavell for his description of 

the position in Runna, 

ADMIRAL LEAHY explained tht it was essential that we should find 

snme method of giving assistance to China so tht we could take advantage 

of Chinese manpon'er and eventually have bases in China for direct attack 

against Tapan pro?er. Ve asked General Stilwell for his views on this 

s ub jec t . 

hENERAL STILWELL stated that in his opinion it was nbsolutely 

necessary that ue give the Chinese assistance in the near future. Their 

economic sj tuation is rapidly deteriorating and the morale of the pople 

ad the army is bad. At present there is a great need to build up ground 

forces to make the route safe to the bases in China we hope eventually to 

establish. l'e had been worried since last summer lest the Japanese 

shnuld undertake operations for the purpose of seizing Kunming. If the 

Taynese could successfully accomplish this, even a recaptured Rurma 

wndd be of no use to us, and China would be lost. We was firmly of the 

oninion that Yiinnan Province must be held and at present saw no way to 

accomnlish this except by the use of the Chinese Army. He felt that if a 

route for supplying China could be made safe, everything else would 

follow; and cmversely, if the route were lost, all of China would be 

lost. Therefore, the fundamental necessity was to insure the retention 

of our present route and its terminals and to conduct offensive operations to imprnve the supply situation. t'e stated that other things which 

we might undertake against the Japanese from China, such as conducting 

air offensives ageinst their shipping and ground installations, would 

hurt the Tapanese to come extent, but could not be decisive. On the 

other hand, they might provoke violent and fatal reaction on the part of 

the TaFnese. In referring to Field Marshal Wavell's statement with 

reference to 6,000 tons per mnnth being mnved into China by air, he 

stated that 3,400 tons per month was the grentest air load yet shinped 

over the hiimp, and tht was under the most favorable conditions. We was 

of the opinion tht this volume could not be materially increased withi.2 

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the next six months. If all the tonnage of tbe sir tran5:yort were devoted to sir effort, that is, for use by thc 14th .Air Force, it ulould 

hearten the Chinese to sore extent, but with the means available, nothing really effective could be done to help the Chinese. I?e believed that 

the 14th Air Force should continue on a defensive mission in order that 

the minimum essential equipment could be supplied the Chinese troops in 

Yunnan. There were non 32 divisions in Yunnan, and the goal set wss to 

try to carry 10,000 tons of equipvent for this force. That, together 

with what coul~dbe scraped together in China, would enable this force 

to be put in the field it least partly equipped by the fall. He was 

firm1.y of the opinion that the best wny to help the Chinese situition 

wis to reassure the Chinese that 3 rain effort was being mlde to reopen 

the supply route from Tndis. If this were not done, he believed the 

Chinese reaction would be very serious. There were certain pro- Japanese 

elements in Chins that were taking advantage of an increasing feeling 

in the rinds of some Chinese t;iat no mrterial help could be made available. Unless this condition cou1.d be remdied rrorntly, the situatirn 

would becope Anngerous. Delay might make it impossible for us to seize 

the bases which we needed in south and east China. 

ADMIRAL LEAAIIY asked General Stilwell what he meant by “solnething 

must be done. ’1 

GENERAL STILWELL replied that we must open the road to Chinr-­

under take opera tion ANAKIM. 

In reply to a question asked by Sir AJin Brooke as to &en he considered it essentiil to have the road opened, GENFRAL STILWELL replied, 

by Jqnuary, ‘44 or as soon ?s possible. [he .limiting date is a year 

from now. China can not be expected to hold out for wotller year and a 

half, if for that long. 

ADMIRAL KING suggested that General Stilwell meant that although 

the road might not actually be completed or in a condition to carry on 

aprreciable volume of traffic, the psychological reaction on China in 

allaying their feirs would keep them from cracking. 

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GENERAL STILWELL agreed. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE asked whether or not it was correct that if we 

were to undertake operations to open the Burma Road, the cost would have 

to be borne by the air effort in China and if he recommended undertaking 

such operations at the expense of the air effort. 

GENERAL STILWELL replied that the air effort could be supported 

with 3,000 tons a month. That amounted to only one train a day at most. 

The bases at Imphal and redo were pretty well stocked by now, and he did 

not see why any material reduction in the air effort should be caused. 

If 10,000 tons per month could be made available to the Chinese Divisions in Yunnan, they would be in suitable state for use in the fall. 

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELI, stated that he had never intended to convey 

that limited ground operations could not be carried out at the same time 

as full-scale air operations. 

In answer to a question by Admiral Leahy as to whether or not limited operations would help the situation in China, GENERAL STILWELL 

strted that such operations would helr materially. Any way in which the 

line of communications &uld be improved would provide appreciable assistance. It was his opinion that operations to clear Burma, north of a 

northeast and southwest line through Lashio, should be undertaken. 

FIELD MARSHAL llilVFLL said that he gravely doubted the ability to 

maintain forces in that area during the rainy season unless they were 

able during the dry season, in addition to conducting the offensive, to 

build approximately 200 miles of road. 

GENERAL S7ILWELL stated that he was fully aware of this condition 

and that the plans called for building the road. 

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL pointed out the enormous effort involved and 

stated that it would utilize practically all of the engineering personnel and equipment. He stated that the basic objection to seizing northern Burma was that once occupied it could not be maintained, especially 

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if we were to go as far as Mandalay. The Japanese have railroad, river, 

and road communications from Rangmn and can develop and support a much 

larger force. Also they mould be operating out of a dry area, which extends to the north of Prome, where movement and operations are possible 

during the wet season. We, on the other hand, could reach only the 

northern edge of this dry area from which the Japanese would be operating and would be confronted with immense supply problems: in addition, 

we would have no air support unless air fields could be constructed in 

northern Burma. This aould be a gigantic undertaking. 

AIR MARSHAL PEIRSE pointed out that the movement of supplies for 

the air force used in support of the ground operations in north Burma 

would be of such volume that it would cut downmaterially supplies by 

air to China. 

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that part of the plan called for a pipeline to Imphnl and Led0 to supply gasoline for the support of the operations. This would effect a great reduction in the load on rail, river 

and road and also on the amount of trucking. However, at present there 

was only a limited amount of pipe available. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that a limited operation for the purpose of opening a road in northern Burma would require practically the 

whole of the force involved to protect the road and in turn demand a 

greater volume of supplies over the road for the support and maintenance 

of troops. He believed that the only effective way of opening a supply 

route to China was to recapture the whole of Burma. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that if the present air route could be 

shifted further to the south, ahere the mountains were not so high, each 

of the planes could carry a greater load and therefore materially increase the volume of supplies. 

AMIRAL LEAHY stated that, of course, we could expect the Japanese 

to attack the road, but would they have enough troops available to attack it in greater strength than we could support in the same area? 

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ADMIRAL KING, referring to a possible operation sgainst k'angkok 

previously wentimed by Sir Alan Brooke, stated that he felt that such 

an operqtion would get at the root of the Tapanese communications, and 

if undertaken, would cut their surply. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he believed thst an operation against 

Sangkok would develop a vacuum, md that we should not launch such an 

operstion until we were ready to carry it through to completion. we 

agreed with Admiral King that it waS s vital spot in the center of the 

Japanese rommuni ca ti oils sy s t em. 

GENERAL MdRSHALI, said that the whole problem of maintaining China 

in the war vss one of loiistic difficulties which must be linked to our 

capabilities of overcoming thew. He w0uJ.d like Field Marshal Wave11 to 

prepire his views on this so that the U. S. Planners, Generrl Stilwell 

an.! General Somervell could examine them. The object of the U. 5. Chiefs 

of Staff was to mintqin Chins in the war since they assigned immense 

strategic importance to this in relation to the ultimate outcome of the 

wgr wjth Japan. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that all of this discussion on Burma had been 

very interesting. It was clearly indicated that we had a very difficult 

problem before us and that we must do something to improve the conditions in China. This resolved itself into a study of the logistic problems incident to her supply. He agreed with General Marshallthat the 

best line of approach would be to study these logistic problem which 

should indicate a line of action to be followed. 

4. FUTURE BUSINESS 

SIR ALAN BROOKE, in anqw'er to a question by Admiral Leahy, suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff have one more meeting before 

directing the Planners to prepare an agenda. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed that after the discussion with the Fresident 

and the Prime Minister that afternoon, the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

would be better able to give the Planners instructions for the preraration of the agenda. It ray well prove desirable to discuss the Oriental 

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problem first. He suggested that the question of the sgenda be taken as 

the first item at tomorrow's meeting. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY expressed his appreciation to Field Marshal Wavell 

and General Stilwell for the information presented at the Conference. 

THF COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: 

a. Approved the conclusions of the P3rd teetins 1s recorded in the 

in the minutes. 

b. Agreed: 

(1) That, with reference to Conclusion a(5) of the 83rd Meeting, the Combined Planners would require general directions 

to enable them to prepare an agenda for the remaining Tonf e r enc e s. 

(2) That these directions should be considered at the beginning 

of their next meeting. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 85th Meeting 

TRIDENT 

Minutes of Meeting held in 

The Board of Governors Room, 

Federal Reserve Building, 

on Saturday, 15 May 1943, 

at 1030. 

PRESENT 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General C. C. Marshall, USA Admiral of tb Fleet 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Sir DuIley Pound 

Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

Lt. Gen. Sir &stings L. Ismy 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Vice Admiral F. J. Horm, USN Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Vice Admiral Russell Willson, Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

UFN Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh 

Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN 

UFA Brigadier W. Porter 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., Air Comnodore W. Elliot 

USN Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod 

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Col. J. E. Snrart, USA 

Condr. W. L. Fiesenran, USN 

Comdr . V. D. Long, USN 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redmn 

Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, UFA 

Candr. R. D. Coleridge, RN 

Lt. Colorpl R. L. Vittrup 

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1. CCJNCLUSIONSOF THE PREVIOLS ;MEETING 

"FIE CChmINED CHIEFS CF ST.4lT:­

ipproved the conclusions of the 84th Meeting as recorded in the 

Minutes. 

2. FUTURE VORX OF THE COWITTEE 

AOI1IR.U LFAHY said tht the Comnittee had not yet directed the 

Planners to prepare an ageda for future work. He suggested tht the 

Conbined Chiefs of Staff shculd first consider various courses of action 

open to achieve the defeat of the Axis in Europe ad then similarly the 

defeat of Japan. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff held much 

the sane views. He felt tht ROUNDUP should first be considered, and 

for this it would be desirable to have expositions of the U.S. conception of this operation and a study of coditions and feasibility: 

next, operations in the Mediterranean might be discussed based on the 

British Chiefs of Staff memoradum: ad, lastly, the war with Japan, 

considering operations in tk Indian Ocean and the Pacific, and their 

coordination. 

When the scope ad requirenents of operations in the theaters had 

been defined, tk Combined Chiefs of Staff would then proceed to examine 

the extent to which an demnds for shipping resources could meet what 

was proposed. After that, the Committee would consider the global 

strategy in terms of concrete facts ad deal with miscellaneous points 

such as tk Portuguese islards ad Ploesti. 

4DMIRAL KING felt that the first step should be to set out agreed 

basic furdamntals: for irstance, the vital importance of Atlantic and 

Pacific lines of communications, security of tk citadel of Britain, 

and the fact that the full weight must be thravn first on the defeat 

of Germany. To this might be added others. Was Chim essential as a 

basis for the defeat of Japn? These fundamentals, wkn agreed, would 

constitute a point of departure ad yardsticks by which our strategy 

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could be judged. bny of these points had been contained in previous 

papers, but he felt it important that a fresh statement should be got 

out as early as possible. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed with Admiral King’s views ad suggested 

that the Planners should be instructed to prepare a docurrent on those 

lines. 

THE CCfBIND CHIEFS CF STAFF: ­ \greed: 

a. That the Combined Staff Planners should prepare for considerat ion on Monday morning, 17 by: 

(1) A statenent of agreed essentials for the effective prosecution of the war, which wmld serve as a background for the 

formulation of future plans, e.g., security of essential 

sea comrunications; security of tte citadel of Britain: etc. 

(2) A draft ageda for the remining conferences in the light 

of the discussion which had taken place. 

3. OPERATIONS IN BURMA 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that at the White House the previous day it 

had been agreed that the staffs should, in consultation with the U.S. 

and British comnders in the area, examine the best means of expanding 

the air route to China and of opening a land rate from Itbia. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he considered it important that the 

comnders concerned should be consulted so that the orders the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff would give as a result of their deliberations would be 

related to practical possibilities. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that it would be desirable that tte Combined Chiefs of Staff should offer Dr. T. V. Soong and General Chu an 

opportunity to express the views of General Chiang Kai-shek at an early 

date. 

THE CCMMI7TEE then discussed a draft directive to the Combined 

Planners with reference to a study of operations in Burma. 

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THE COMBIWD CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed : 

a. Tbt the Combined Staff Planners, in consultation as necessary 

with the British and U.S. Comders in Chief, India and China 

Theaters, should examine and report on: 

(1) The potentialities of the air route from Assam to China 

given complete priority for its development except for the 

minimum requirements of the forces deferding the air field 

areas, and whether any further steps can nau be taken to 

enable these potentialities to be realized. 

(2) The most promising operation, hving regard to the various 

considerations brought to light in previous discussions, 

for the opening of a land route to China, and what resources ad conditions are necessary for carrying it out 

without prejudicing the development of the air route. 

b. That Dr. T. V. Soong ard Major Gemral Shih-ming Chu should 

be invited to appear at the meeting on Monday, 17 May, and 

express the views of the Generalissimo regarding operations in 

the &Irma-China Theater. 

4. OPERATIONS IN EUROPE 

SIR ALAN BROOKE considered the possibilities of undertaking ROUNDUP should be examined in relation to the results which would accrue from 

the shutting davn of future operations in the Mediterranean. United 

States views on the possibilities of the BOLERO build-up and their conception of the scope and results of cross-Channel operations would be 

of value. Similarly, operations in the Mediterranean should be examined 

with the British Chiefs of Staff paper as a basis for discussion. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed the acceptance of 

General Eaker’s plan for the build-up of SICKLE as one of the fundamentals of cur agreed strategy. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE believed that at this stage SICKLE should not 

be accepted as a fundamental since it might on further examination be 

foud to tie cur hands with regard to future plans. 

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Rfter further discussion, the COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF were in 

general agreement that SICKLE should not at this stage be accepted as 

a fundamental, thcugh it was obvious that the intensity of our air bombardment would have a wterial effect on any land operations, whether 

undertaken across the Charnel or in the Mediterranean and should not 

therefore be redlced except after critical examination. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the most important point was to 

decide whether the defeat of Germany would be brought nearer by immediate Mediterranean operations at some expense to BOLERO, or, alternatively, by stopping operations in the Mediterranean in order to build up 

at the nsximum rate for cross-Channel operations. The Planners should 

examine this problem with a view to a conbined assessment of tk effect 

on Germany of the two alternatives. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that both the U.S. ad British Chiefs of 

Staff were agreed that ROUNDUP must be undertaken as early as possible, 

but in the British view it was mcessary, before ROUNDUP could be successful, to create a suitable situation by diversion of Serman forces. 

The United States view was that the war could be won by cross-Channel 

operations in 1944, but he was not clear as to the exact plan by which 

decis ive results wmld be achieved. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that great faith was being pinned to the 

results of the bomber offensive. We must be ready to take advantage 

of these results. He was concerned lest any delay in building up forces 

in the United Kingdom would result in our not being ready when the 

moment presented itself. The British believed that operations in the 

Mediterranean would not materially slow up the BOLERO movement. The 

exact results of the air attacks might be problematical, but the availability of tonnage to move troops could be calculated. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it was estiwted that further operations 

in the Mediterranean would only result in some three to four fewer U.S. 

Divisiors being available in the United Kingdom. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had last 

year considered the necessity of undertaking operation SLEDGEHAMMER to 

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relieve pressure on the Russian Front, but the situation there was now 

very different. The landing of 25 divisions in France at that time 

might have been suicidal, but now there was the possibility of concentrating our vast air superiority in direct support of the land forces 

in the bridgehead, thereby nnterially altering the balance of force in 

in our favor. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that our air power could be withdrawn from 

attacks on German idustry ad transferred to the direct aid of our land 

forces, but even if the area of ground operations could thereby be 

isolated, the pnetration of these forces inland could not be assisted 

since the British Air Force was not yet fully on a mobile basis. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that certain U.S. fighter units in the U.K. 

were on a fully mobile basis. He stressed the psychological effect of 

a landing in France. He did not believe that the effect of overwhelming air superiority on the Continent hd been appreciated, wkreas great 

stress had been laid on its value in the Mediterranean. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that in considering the results to be expected from air support of ground operations, it must be remembered 

that, in North Africa, though we hd had air superiority since El Alamein, Rome1 had been able to move his army back into Tunisia relatively 

intact. Similarly in Tunisia the enemy had been able to reinforce by 

som 100.000 men. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out the outstand ing results achieved by 

the use of air power in Tunisia as soon as the weather had improved. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out with regard to air power that 

fighter cover was essential. 

GENERAL McN.ARNEY agreed but said that he believed that a bridgehead in France wmld enable us to mow forward the necessary fighter 

cover. Air power must be related to our grourd power. For instance, 

it might well be that the correct application of air power right halve 

the number of divisions required to overcome a given resistance. The 

seizure of the bridgehead would insure that the fighter line could u 

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advanced and air power applied at the correct mowent in support of 

ground operations. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he entirely agreed in the abstract 

with General McNarney's last statement but it was important that in 

considering the seizure of, say, the Brest Peninsula, the Planners 

should carefully work out the rate at which fighter cover could be 

developed in that area in order that the plan could be assessed on a 

sound tactical and logistic basis. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out the further limitations of port capacity in the bridgehead. 

ALMIRAL LUHY agreed to the stdy suggested by Sir Charles Portal. 

The U. S. Chiefs of Staff hsd prepared a brief mtlim plan for ROUNDUP 

which would be circulated for the informtion of the British Chiefs of 

Staff. He believed that the results expected frorr the air borrbardment 

of Germany should be taken into consideration both in cornection with 

cross-Channel ad Mediterranean operations. 

SIR CHARLES POYPTAL said that one of the nain features of the air 

plan outlined by General Eaker was not only its trerrendous effect both 

on production ad morale, but also, and perhaps most important, the 

elimination of the German fighter force. This would have an immense 

effect on any operations against Germany, whether acrcss the Charnel. 

in the Mediterranean, or on the Russian Front. He did not mintain that 

the utmost priority should continuously be accorded to SICKLE, but it 

must be realized that its value was fundamental. The longer the destruction of the German fighter force was delayed, the longer would the 

ultimate defeat of Germany be delayed. 

ALJMIRAL KING said that operation ROUNDUP must be carefully examined. While it had origimlly been believed that cross-Charnel operations could be undertaken in 1943, April of 1944 nm appeared to be the 

earliest possible date. This must be fixed as a firm date, or we should 

never come to grips with Germny by cross-Channel operations in 1944. 

He appreciated the value of operations in the Mediterranean, but they 

wmld, he believed, render cross-Chamel operat iom in 1944 impossible. 

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SIR ALAN BROOKE said that only by Mediterranean operations to 

draw off and hold Germn forces could a sitvation be achieved in which 

a successful ROUNDUP is possible. Otherwise at best only SLEDGEHAMMER 

could be undertaken ad we should then be comnitted in France and pinned 

down to a bridgehead. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that all were agreed that ROUNDUP was 

essential ad that a strategy should be adopted which would produce the 

earliest possible successful invasion of the Continent. The British 

believed that Mediterranean operations were first necessary, wkreas 

the United States Chiefs of Staff believed in piling up forces in the 

United Kingdom to give more strength to the blow. The British Chiefs 

of Staff believed that the balance of force on the Continent would alter 

more rapidly in our favor if Mediterranean operations were undertaken. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he did not believe it would be possible 

to build up sufficient forces in the United Kingdom if Mediterranean 

operatiom were undertaken, since tkse would cause a vacmm into which 

our forces would be sucked. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said it must be remembered that this vacuum 

would suck in not only Allied Forces, but also Axis Forces. 

With regard to General Morgan's plans, GENERAL MARSHALL said that 

these, without forces to implement them,were of little value. He feared 

that unless we cpncentrated on the United Kingdom build-up, we should 

lack the necessary punch to dertake cross-Channel operations when the 

critical moment arose. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE undertook to circulate a note giving an estimate 

of the shipping cmitment to meet the economic situation that would 

arise in the event of an Italian collapse. 

ADMIRAL KING drew attention to the dangers of tying down forces 

and equipment to await eventualities. If a definite date was not decided on for ROUNDUP, valuable equipment, such as landing craft, which 

was urgently required in the Pacific, would be lying idle in England. 

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SIR CHARLES poR7AL said that this also applied to air-borne forces 

which were also essentially of fens ive ard absorbed much air power which 

might well be used in active attack, but he believed that both with 

lading craft ad air-borne troops their use was so essential to achieve 

success at the critical momnt that their imctivity until this moment 

arrived must be accepted. 

GENERAL McNARNEY said that he regarded SLEDGEHAMMER as a preliminary to ROUNDUP. Even a bridgehead was valuable in that it would 

bring ground and air forces into active contact with the enemy, diverting German forces from the Russian Front ad inducing attrition. When, 

during operation TORCH, it had been obvicus to the Germans that no 

cross-Channel operatio- were possible, they had sent part of their 

garrison from Western France to the Eastern Front at a critical moment. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the commitment of our forces to a 

bridgehead such as the Brest Peninsula would enable the enemy to concentrate rather than force him to discerse. 

GENERAL MARSMLL said that on two previous occasions the forces 

which it had been believed would be available for cross-Channel operations had dwindled to very small numbers due to the demands of operations TORCH ad HUSKY, which had exceeded expectations. Unless BOLERO 

build-up was now given priority over operations in the hkditerranean. 

similar results might be expected ad no forces would be available to 

undertake the owration at the critical moment. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that it hd always been agreed that 

the build-up in the United Kindom should take place subject to the 

requirements of the agreed operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean. These requirements had not greatly exceeded expectations but 

rather the availability of shipping had not proved so large as had been 

expected. 

THE COM3INE.D CHIEFS OF STAFF: ­ a. Agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should prepare for 

consideration on Morday mornirg, 17 May, two papers as follows: 

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(1) A plan for the defeat of Germany (showing the course of 

operations ad their feasibility) by concentrating on the 

biggest possible invasion force in the U.K. as soon as possible. This paper to be prepared by the U.S. planners in 

consultat ion with the British. 

(2) A plan for the defeat of Germany (showing tk course of 

operations and their feasibility) which accepts tk elimination of Italy as a necessary preliminary. This paper to 

be prepared by the British Planners in comultat ion with 

the U. S. 

In tk prepration of the above plans cognizance should be 

be taken of the effects of a full-scale SICKLE. 

In submitting tk above two papers, the Conbined Staff Planners 

should mke slrh recomnendations as they feel able to on the 

respective plans. 

b. Took note that a paper which had been prepared by the British 

Chiefs of Staff on the economic -esults of the defeat of Italy 

would be circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

5. DIRECTIVE To ALLIED AUIHOIUTIES IN THE FAR EAST 

THE CXINBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed the terms of a directive 

to the U.S. ad British authorities in the Far East on the expansion 

of the capacity of the air route to China. 

In the course of discussion, GENERAL HARSHALL outlined certain 

steps which General Wheeler, in cooperation with the British authorities 

concerned, was taking for the improvement of these facilities. He 

mentioned the difficulties with which General Stilwell was faced, and 

in this connection paid tribute to the outstanding success achieved by 

Sir John D,ill on his visit to Chungking, in convincing the Chinese of 

British good will. 

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TIE CUBIh'ED CHIEFS OF STAFF: - Agreed : 

That the following telegram shmld be despatched forthwith by the 

appropriate Chiefs of Staff to the appropriate Commanders in 

Chief : 

"Give first priority to effort to prepare Assam air fields in 

order that not less than 7,000 tors per month may be transported to China by 1 July 1943. 

"It is considered essential that facilities for the monthly 

transportation of 10,000 tors should be provided at tke earliest practicable date and not later than 1 September, and that 

adequate defensive measures for the air field area must be 

maintained." 

6. THE AZORES 

AWIRAL. KING, in stressing the urgency of action with. regard to 

the Azores as a vital factor in tk battle of the Atlantic, asked if 

any further developments had taken place. 

7. GENERAL. ISUAY stated that the British Chiefs of Staff had prepared 

a paper on this subject which hd been submitted to the Prime Minister 

ad which he bd invited them to discuss with the United States Chiefs 

of Staff. This paper will be circulated. The military desirability 

of obtaining these islands was generally agreed. He believed that the 

Prime Minister and President were discussing means of achieving our 

object . 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: - Agreed that the paper on the Portuguese Atlantic Islands, by the 

British Chiefs of Staff, which is now being circulated to the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, should be corsidered at the meeting on 

Motday. 17 May. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 86th Meeting 

TRIDENT 

Minutes of Me,eting held in 

The Board of Governors Room, 

Federal Reserve Building, 

on Monday, 17 May 1943, 

at 1030. 

PRESENT 

Admi a1 W. D. Leahy, USN General Sir Alan Br oke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Admiral E. .I. King, USN Sir Dudley Pound ~ 

Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somrve11, USA 

Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN 

Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA 

Maj. Gm. St. Clair Streett, LSA 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemyer, LSA 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen. Sir &stings L. Ismay 

Admiral Sir Rrcy Noble 

Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Air Marshal Sir R. !Velsh 

Capt. C. E. Jambe, RN 

Col. J. E. Smart, USA Brigadier W. Porter

Codr. W. L. Freseman, 

Condr. V. D. Long, USN 

USN Air Camnodore W. 

Brigadier M. W. 

Elliot 

M. Maclecd 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Brig. Cen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Cdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN 

Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup 

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1. VISIT TO ANNAPOLIS 

ADHIRAL KING invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to visit Annapolis on Sunday, 23 by, leaving Washington at approximte,ly 9 A.M. 

2. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS HEETING 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that with reference to Item 5 of the 85th 

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British Chiefs of Staff, 

in telegraphing to tk appropriate British authorities in the Far East, 

had thought it wise to add to the last sentence of the draft telegram 

the words "including air fields necessary for maintaining air superiority. * 

THE OOHEINEI) CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved the conclusions of the 85th Meeting as recorded in the Minutes. 

b. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff, in telegraphing the British authorities in the Far East, 

had added to the last sentence of the draft telegram 

contained in the conclusion to Item 5 of C.C.S. 85th 

Meeting the words "including air fields necessary for 

maintaining air superiority. 

(At this point Dr. T. V. Soong and 

General Shih-Ming Chu entered the 

meeting. ) 

3. SITUATION IN CHINA 

ADHZRAL LEAHY asked Dr. Soong to give the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff tk benefit of his views on the Chinese situation, with prticular 

recference to Chinese needs ad the opening of a land route to China. 

DR. SOONG said that it must be remembered that China had been in 

a state of siege for five years. The Japanese had seized the Chinese 

coast, then Id0 China and finally, with the occupation of Burma, the 

investment had been completed save for the air route. The resultant 

economic pressure, detterioration of morale and lack of supplies made 

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the situation very grave. After Casablanca Generalissimo Chiang Kairhek had been informd in a message fran the President and Prime Minister, firstly, that the U.S. Air Force urder General Chennault would 

be strengthened with a view not only to attacking the Japanese in China 

but also Japan itself, and secondly, that a conhined all-out assault on 

Burm by naval, ground and air forces would be undertaken at the conc lusion of this year’s monsoon. These assurances were naturally very 

welcome to the Generalissimo. 

It was appreciated that the existing air route, with a capacity 

of only a few thousand tons per month, would not permit the implementation of a strong air offensive from China and, at the same time, the 

supply of the Chinese troops in Yimnan. The Generalissimo had therefore 

asked the President that for the next three months all supplies cqrried 

by the air route should be those for General Chennault’s air force. 

The General had worked out a plan fm attacking the Japanese air forces, 

their lines of canmunication, ad most important of all, for providing 

air support for the Chinese ground forces. So far these forces had 

received no air support, and this was vitally important. The Japanese 

not only had better lines of communication hut also better equipnent, 

and were assisted by their air. Recent Japanese attacks in the neighborhood of Ichang had enabled them to capture territory on the south 

of the Yangtze. This provided them with an excellent line of comnunication via the Yangtze; ad unless they were dislodged, it would enable 

them to attack Chang Sha ad Chungking itself, since their logistic 

situation was far more favorable than tkt of the Chinese, whose lines 

of canmunication,now that the use of the Yangtze could be denied them 

hy Japanese air power, were Over most difficult mountainous country. 

Air power, and air power alone, would be of any vnlue in the present 

situation, and it was for this reason that the Generalissimo asked 

that, for three months, supplies to General Chennault’s air feces 

should take priority over everything else so that these could be used 

in support of the Chinese Army. 

The situation was, frankly,very bad. General Chiang hi-shek’s 

military views had been guided over a priod of years not only by United States and British advisers but by a series of outst3nding German 

and Russian general officers. General Chiang Nai-shek was the Supreme 

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Comnarder in the Chinese Theater of War, and for this theater he was 

responsible. On him depnded the safety of China. His military views, 

therefore, must, unless he were absolved of this responsibility, be 

given overriding cons ideration. 

With regard to the first promise made by the President and Prime 

Minister, i.e., the strengthening of General Chennault’s air forces, 

the Generalissimo regarded this as all-important. Japan had changed 

her policy vjs-i-vis China. She had now given the puppet governmnt 

in Nanking many concessions, including the control of currency. She 

had restored factories in the occupied area. This new policy of cmciliation was far harder for the national government to canhat than her 

previous line of action ad called for strong positive steps. 

With regard to the second promise, i.e., that tk United Nations 

would udertake a full-scale offensive in Burm tavards the end of 1943 

tk official record of the meting held in Calcutta between the British, American and Chinese representatives gave a clear picture of tk 

s ituat ion. 

This discussion was regarded as me to insure that the decisions 

reached at Casablanca ad Chungking should he perfectly clear to all 

concerned. General Ho had outlined the action to he taken hy the Chinese forces. All had agreed thit the provision of naval forces was 

essential ad that success would he impossible without them. The 

importarre of air superiority had heen emphasized and General Arnold 

had pointed out that, even if the Japanese Air Force were as strong as 

believed by the Chinese representatives, the British/American air force 

would be considerably stronger. The Chinese representatives hd agreed 

to provide three extra air fields at the China end and additionalfncilit ies to match those provided by the British at the, Indian end. Field 

Marshal Wave,ll had said he had not had time to work out details. He 

must consider the needs of his own troops in the area who were dependent on difficult lines of comunication. The Generalissimo might 

he assured that he would do his utmost to meet his request. He was 

confident that it would be possible to carry up to the air fields 2s 

as much as the ferry service could carry forward. 

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From all this it was clear ttat the Burma plan for 1943 was a 

definite U.S./British commitment and he must therefore ask for its 

fulfillmnt and would be inte'rested to know further details of it. 

As a background to this request the Chinese situation must be 

borne in mind. Inflation kd taken place; there was economic distress; 

China had borne long years of war; and the Japanese were adopting the 

policy of wheedling rather than terrorizing the people. Throughout the 

Chinese Army ad indeed the people, tk plan to retake Burma in 1943 

was an open secret. If not undertaken, they wmld believe themselves 

abandmed by tk Allies ad suspect tht the latter did not intend to 

achieve the unconditional surrender of Japan by force of arms. 

Prior to the Casablanca Conference other plans had been suggested for limited operations and General Stilwell, who had a profound 

knowledge of China, had in January proposed the launching of an offensive by Chinese troops in North Burma at the beginning of hkrch, 

with the object of opening an all-land route to China. The Generalissimo, however, both the,n ad nav, was in disagreement with this plan 

believing it to be logistically impracticable s ince, while the Allied 

forces would be operating from very limited lines of communication from 

Ledo onwards, the Japanese wmld have the use both of the Irrawaddy 

River and the railroad. The Generalissimo felt that even if this plan 

achieved initial success, we should eventually be faced with the Japanese being able to maintain stronger forces at tk ends of their god 

lines of communication than could we. 

With regard to the state of preparedness of the Chinese troops, 

everything possible had been done. to fulfill their commitment for a 

full-scale attack m Burma, and forces had been drawn fran mny parts 

of the area, some heving marched 2,OOC kilometers. The troops required 

for the full Burmese operation were now all available within one week's 

march of Kunming. The promised air fields in China had been built, 

ad though painfully constructed by manual labor, tk preparations at 

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the Chinese end were further forward than those in India. General 

Chen-Cheng, considered by General Stilwell as the ablest Chinese comnander under the Generalissimo, had been placed in command of the Chinese forces in Yunnan. The general situation in China was bad. The 

Yangtze had been cut; Chang ?ha, and Chungking which was of immense 

economic, moral and military importance, were threatened. The Chinese 

would do everything possible to meet their share of the operation. He 

hoped to be informed of the availability of the Allied forces. He asked 

only that the decisions taken at Casablanca “ith regard to the offensive 

in Burma be implemented. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY thanked Dr. Soong for his most interesting talk on 

the situation in China. lie asked how many Chinese troops would be 

available for the Burma operation. 

DR. SOONG said that there would be 32 divisions, though these 

would not be at full strength and would amount to the equivalent of some 

22 full-scale divisions, i.e., about 220,CCC men. In addition, there 

were the Chinese forces training at Rangarh and further troops held in 

readiness for holding operations to prevent the Japanese attacking Kunmine from the south. 

In reply to a question by General Marshall, DR. SOONC said that 

the operations near Ichang were being undertaken by the 5th and 6th 

Armies. These forces were short of artillery since the Chinese had received no additional guns except Polish artillery captured by the Russians. In spite of the general lack of artillery, the Chinese ground 

forces would be able to undertake their part in the proposed operations, 

and their degree of readiness was evinced by the fact that in January 

General Stilwell had been prepared to launch an offensive in March. 

ADMIRAI. LEAHY asked General Chu if he wished to add anything to 

Dr. Soong’s statement. 

GENERAL CHU stated that he had nothing to add at this time but 

would be available later if the need should arise. 

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4. PORTUGUESE ISLANQS 

(C.C.S. 226) 

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that paragraph 7 of C.C.S. 226, with a 

short preamble explaining the vital military needs for these islands as 

aids to maintaining the security of our Atlantic communications, should 

be used as a basis of a recommendation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

to the President and Prime Minister. 

ADMIRAI POUND presented a chart showing the vital role which the 

Portuguese Islands would play in maintaining the securitv of our sea 

routes. 

ADMI.i'A1. LEANY suggested alternatively that it might we wiser to 

delay the approach to the Portuguese Government until such tine as sufficient forces were available in the U.K. to seize the Islands in the 

event of Fortugwesc refusal. If necessary, a European front in Portugal 

could be opered. 

ADMIRAL KIflG suggested that since all were agreed on the strategic 

irrcortance of the Islands and since time was of the essepce, the Cowbined Chiefs of Staff should make plans and agree. during the course of 

the Conference, that the Islands rust be seized by force if diplonatic 

action failed. 

SIR ALAN RROOKF, agreed that this possibility should he exatrined 

and a decision taken as to whether the operation was better undertaker 

by U.S. or British forces and as to the strength of the forces required. 

With regard to the mening of a second front in Portugal. he saw rertain 

advantages in this course, but it must be considered in relation to 

Froiected oreraticns in the whcle of the European Theater. 

{DMIRAI. KING then enc1aine:l that his proposal had been that the 

p-ssibjlity of seizing the Islands without diplomatic nepotiaticns 

should be considered since this course might render it easier for tkr 

Fortuguese to say that action had been taken against their will, an:' 

therefore action in defense of Portugal itself might he avoided. Thc 

time factor was vital. More and more traffic would he routed throu7.h 

the Mcditerravean. The Portuguese Jslands were very important to the 

security of the U.S.-U.K. sea lane, hiit vital to the U.S.-Meditrr.rancan 

route. 

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In reply to a question by General Marshall, SIR DUDLEY POUND said 

that he could see no advantage in postponing action with regard to the 

Islands. They were vitally important at all tixes of the year but more 

particularly so in the winter. The use of the southern route, with its 

better weather, was important and only escort carrier air protection 

could be given unless we held the Azores. 

Discussion then took place on the strength and source of forces 

required in the light of possible resistance. 

THE COMEINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: 

a. Agreed to recommend to the President and the Prime Minister: 

(1) That the acquisition of the Azores Islands qhould be accomplished as soon as possible and, in any event,early enough 

for them to be utilized by the United Nations during the 

winter of 1943-1944. 

(2) That an effort should first be made to secure the use of 

these islands by diplomatic means without making military 

commitmepts to the Portuguese Government. 

b. Agreed: 

(1) That the British Chiefs of Staff should bring before the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for the occupation of the 

Azores Islands. This plan, when approved, should be submitted to the President and Prime Minister with a covering 

note showing suggested timings, and the effect of the plan 

on other military commitments now in view. 

(2) That as soon as these plans have been approved preparations 

should be made to implement them in case diplomatic efforts 

should fail. 

c. Directed that the secretaries, in consultation with the Chief 

of the British Air Staff, should prepare for the approval of 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff a draft letter for submission to 

the President and the Prime Minister which would include the 

above recommendations and proposals. 

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5. AGREED ESSEKTIALS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 

(C.C.S. 85th Meeting, Item 2 a (1)) 

(C.C.S. 232) 

THE COMMITTEE considered a report by the Combined Staff Planners. 

The British Chiefs of Staff presented a menorandurr, suggesting certain 

amendments to the paper. In the course of discussion op. paragraph 2 h 

of the paper, on the desirability of relating the extension of unremitting pressure against Japan to the agreement that the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe must be brought about at the earliest 

possible date, ADMIRAL LELHY said that he believed that this British 

suggestion would not be acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

The defeat of Japan was a matter of vital importance to the United 

States. A situation might arise in which an extension of effort again, 

Japan, if necessary, even at the expense of the European Theater, wr 

be essential to rraintain the integrity of the United States and her 

interests in the Pacific. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the so-called adequate forces for 

the Pacific had always been a matter susceptible to differences of opinion. It must be reEembered that while the Casablanca Conference dealt 

only with operations in 1943, the present deliberations aimed at deciding on the strategy to be adopted to bring the war as a whole to a successful conclusion. In his view, C.C.S. 155/1 did, in fact, visualize 

the extension of pressure against Japan. 

ADMIRAL LEARY said that operations in the Pacific had actually 

been extended since Casablanca and there was no doubt that adequate 

forces for further extension were available. The only shortage was of 

shipping. If an unfavorable situation arosp in the Pacific, all would 

realize that whatever agreements were in existence, the United States 

would have to divert forces to meet this eventuality. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that shipping alone prohibited an equal 

effort in the Pacific Theater. He was convinced that it was not possible to achieve the defeat of both Germany and Japan at the same time. 

and the maximurr effort mist be made against one or the other. There 

was no possibility of holding Germany while concentrating on Japan, and 

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therefore it was essential that the defeat of Germany should first be 

accomplished. This would be the best method of ending the war as a 

whole at the earliest possible date. 

With regard to paragraph 3 b, it was generally agreed that this 

paragraph should be recast in order to clarify its intention. 

With regard to paragraph 3 rl, GENERAL McNARNEY agreed on the importanre of both the air offensive against the Axis Powers and of 

relieving pressure on the Russian Front, but ronsidered that concentration of air effort was essential. The British proposals left the way 

oDen to a dispersal of air forces from Norway to Greece which, while it 

might take pressure from the Russians, would not be the best application 

of our air power. 

THE COMBINFD CHlEFS OF STAFF: 

a. Agreed to the following changes in C.C.S. 232: 

(1) In the third line of paragraph 3 delete the word wfixedn 

and substitute the word 'first" therefor. 

(2) Delete the captions "Priority Graip 1" and "Priority Group 2" 

immediately preceding paragraphs 3 a and 3 e, respectively. 

(3) Delete the words tiin the Atlantic and Pacificn from paragraph 3 C. 

b. Agreed that paragraphs 2 b, 3 b, 3 d, and 3 fof C.C.S. 232 

should be considered further. 

c. Directed the secretaries to publish an amendedversion of C.C.S. 

232 which will show the items of agreement and disagreement. 

(Subsequently published as C.C.S. 232/1.) 

6. AGENDA FOR THE REMAZNDER OF THE CONFFRENCE 

(C.C.S. 233) 

THE COMMITEE had before them a notebythe Combined Staff Planners 

setting forward a tentative agenda for the remainder of the conference. 

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With regard to Item 6, SIR JOHN DILL rerrinded the Committee of the 

importance of discussing the artion being taken with regard to rearwing 

Turkey in relation to our plans for the conduct of the war in Europe. 

THE COMBlNED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed to the agenda for the remainder of the conference shown 

in C.C.S. 233, with the following exceptions: 

(1) gelete paragraph (l), discussion on Global Strategy. 

(2) Delete reference to the report of the Knuffman-Mansfield 

Committee under the heading of U-boat Carpaign in paragraph (4). 

(3) Insert a new item immediately following paragraph (5) entitled **T,irkishSituation, General Piscussion.' 

(Revised agenda subsequently published as C.C.S. 233/1.) 

b. Agreed that the papers being prepared by the U.S. and British 

Planners on 'The Defeat of Germany* would, in order to save 

time, be rirculated as C.C.S. papers without receiving prior 

approval of their respective Chiefs of Staff. 

c. Agreed that if necessary the Combined Chiefs of Staff would 

meet in an afternoon conference on Friday, 21 May, to consider 

papers receiving their attention which have no special reference to the subject matter of the Trident Conference. 

(At this point the following left the meeting: 

Genera 1 Somerve 11 

Admiral Horne 

Genera 1 Fa irchild 

General Streett 

Admiral Cooke 

General Wedemeyer 

Colonel Smart 

Commander Freseman 

Commander Long 

Admir a1 Noble 

Lt. General Macready 

Air Marshal Welsh 

Captain Lambe 

Brigadier Porter 

Air Commodore Elliot 

Brigadier Macleod) 

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7. OPERATION "HUSKY" 

SIR ALAN BROOKE informed the Committee of certain information 

which pointed to the desirability of advancing the date of Operation 

'HUSKY. 

The Committee discussed the advisability of asking General 

Eisenhower to consider the mounting of an earlier operation against 

'HVSKYland,but it was pointed out that General Eisenhower had already 

given his view on this matter and had received all the available information referred to above. It was generally agreed that any specific 

action to draw General Eisenhower's attention to this information might 

suggest a lack of confidence in his judgment, which most certainly did 

not exist. 

THE COiBIh'ED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that they should take no action on this matter. 

8. OPERATION "UPKEEP" 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL outlined Cperation UPKEEP and the results 

which it was hoped had been attained. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note with interest of this statement. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 87th Meeting 

TRIDENT 

Minutes of Meeting held in 

The Board of Governors Room, 

Fede ra 1 Reserve Build ing , 

on Tuesday, 18 May 1943, 

at 1030. 

PRESENT 

Admiral W. D. Leahy. USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Sir Dudley Pound 

Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Cen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Lt. Gen. S. D. Embick. USA 

Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN 

Maj. Gen. W. B. Smith, USA 

Maj. Gen. St. CJair Streett, USA 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Brig. Cen. A. C. Wedemyer, USA 

Col. J. E. Smart, USA 

Comdr. W. L. Fresemsn, USN 

Codr. V. D. Long, USN 

Field brshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

1.t. Gen. G. N. Nacready 

kir Marshal Sir R. Welsh 

Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN 

Brigadier W. Porter 

Air Commodore W. Elliot 

Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN 

Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup, USA 

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1. CONCLUSIONS OF 7HE PREVIOUS MEETING 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the U. S. Chiefs of Staff dicl not consider 

that the conclusion to Item 5 of the 86th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs 

cf Staff was correctly worded. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had not 

approved C.C.S. 232 subject to the deletion of certain paragraphs, but 

rather had accepted certain paragraphs, had amended others, and agreed 

to reconsider those upon which there was disagreement. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 86th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, held on Monday, 17 May 1943, 

except that the conclusions under Item 5 were changed to reed as 

follows: 

"THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed to the following changes in C.C.S. 232: 

(1) In the third line of paragraph 3 delete the word 'fixed' 

ad substitute the word 'first' therefor. 

(2) Eelete the captions 'Priority Group 1' nnd 'Priority 

Group 2' immediately preceding paragrayhs 3 a snd 3 e 

respectively. 

(3) Pelete the words 'in the Atlantic and Pacific' from paragraph 3 c. 

b. Agreed that paragraphs 2 b, 3 b, 3 d, and 3 f of C.C.S. 232 

should be considered further. 

c. Eirected the Secretaries to publish an amended version of 

C.C.S. 232 which will show the items of agreement an$ disagreement. (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 232/1. ).'I 

2. PORTUGUESE ISLANDS 

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 85th Meeting, Item 6) 

(C. C. S. 226/1) 

THE COMMITTEE had before them a draft memorandum for the Presidei.. 

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and Prime Minister prepared by the Secretaries in collaboration with the 

British Chief of the Air Staff. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he considered that the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff should decide who should be responsible for providing the necessary forces and preparing a plan for seizing the Islands should this 

be necessary. The Azores were in a British sphere of responsibility. 

There was available a British Royal Marine Division which could undertake the task though the availability of landing craft and shipping 

~ouldhave to be further considered. If the IT. S. Chiefs of Staff accepted British responsibility for the planning of this operation and for 

the provision of the troops, then he suggested that conclusion b (1) of 

Item 4 of the 86th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be 

altered to read: 

"That the British Chiefs of Staff should bring before the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff a plan for the occupation of the Azores Islands. 

This plan, when approved, should be submitted to the President and 

Prime Minister with a covering note showing suggested timings, and 

the effect of the plan on other military commitments now in view." 

ADMIRAL KING suggested that in view of the British alliance with 

Portugual, it might, for diplomatic and Psychologic21 reasons, be better 

for U. S. troops to undertake the operation even though the kores were 

in a British sphere of responsibility. 

The U. S. Chiefs of Staff agreed that the Eritish should undertake 

this commitment, but GENERAL. McNARNEY pointed out in connection with the 

alternative conclusion suggested by Sir Alan Brooke that, since the 

Azores should be put to the earliest possible use, plans must be prepared to provide the necessary facilities in the Islands. He suggested 

therefore that the words "and use" should be inserted after the words 

"for the occupation" in the draft. 

In discussing the draft memorandum to the President, it was generally agreed that the urgency of obtaining facilities in the Portuguese 

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Islands should be stressed and that it should be made cleer that the Combined chiefs of Staff proposed thet, while the diplomatic approach was 

being made, they should prepare forces for the prompt seizure of the 

of the Islands in the event of this approach failing. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.­

a. Agreed to amend the conclusion in paragraph b (1) OfIter 4 of the 

Minutes of the 86th hketing to read as follows: 

"That the British Chiefs of Staff should bring before the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for the occupation and use of the 

Azores Islands. This plan, when approved, should be submitted 

to the President and Prime Minister with a covering note showing suggested timings and effect of the plan on other military 

commitments now in view. '' 

b. Approved the draft memorandum to the President and the Prime Minister, shown in C.C.S. 226/1, subject to the following chanrres: 

(1) Insert the words "earliest possible" before the word "use" 

at the beginning of line 3. 

(2) Change the first sentence of the second paragraph to read: 

"In submitting this recommendation the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff propose that while the diplomatic approach is being 

made, forces should be prepared for the prorpt seizure and 

use of the Azores if diplomacy fails.#' 

(Amended version, as prepared for the signature of Sir Alan 

Brooke ad Admiral Leahy, subsequently published as C.C.S. 

226/2. ) 

3. FUTURE WORK OF THE COMMI7TEE 

With regard to future discussions on the essentials to the conduct 

of the war, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he believed the Committee should 

consider ad first agree on European and Pacific strategy,and it would 

then be found that global strategy and agreed essentials could more easily 

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and quickly be set out. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he believed it was wise to qgree on the 

essentials prior to considering theater strategies. 

ADMIRAL KING said thnt he considered that it was necessary that the 

U. S. views on the existing points of difference with regard to the essentials should ;rt least be stated as early as possible. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff would wish to discuss C.C.S. 232/1 at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to 

be held on Wednesday, 19 May 1943. 

4. POLICY FOR COMING OPERATIONS REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE 

AC7IVI TIES 

(C.C.S. 185/3) 

ADMIRAL LEMY suggested that this matter was one of urgency and 

should receive the consideration of thecombined Chiefs of Staff as early 

as possible. It might be necessary to consult the Foreign Office and State 

Department. The views of the theater commander must, he felt, be given 

full weight. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to consider C.C.S. 185/3 at their meeting to be held on the 

following day. 

5. DEFEAT OF THE AXIS PUWERS IN EUROPE 

(C.C.S. 234) 

THE COMMITTEE had before them a memorandum by the British Joint 

Planning Staff prepared after consultation with the U. S. Joint Planners. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff were in general agreement with the views set out in this paper. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in the short time he had had to examine 

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this paper he hesitated to bring out points of detail. The general impression he received uws that in the early part of the paper it was pointed 

out that a cross-Channel operation in April 1944 would be impossible, not 

only on nccount of the shortage of landing craft, but also because the 

risks would be unacceptable. Iater on, however, it arpeared thqt if iediterrmean operations were undertaken in the intervql, a target date for 

April 1944 should be agreed on for cross-Channel operations. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it was believed that April 1944 as a target date would not be possible of achievement unless Mediterranean operations were undertaken. These would influence the strength of the opposition and should create a situation rermitting cross-Channel operations. 

Landing craft alone were not the bottleneck, and one of the difficulties 

was the provision of the necessary personnel to man them. The rate of 

build-up of German forces in western Europe would greatly exceed our own 

build-up on the Continent unless Mediterranean operations were first under. 

taken to divert or occupy German reinforcements. If these orerations were 

undertaken, April 1944 might well be right for a target date, though the 

actual operation, would be more likely to be possible of achievement in 

May or June. The knocking of Italy out of the war would be the greatest 

factor in using up Germany's reserves and enabling our own build-up to 

exceed the enemy's. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he appreciated that it was the British 

view that by conthuing SICKLE ad by undertaking Mediterranean operations, 

a situation would be created permitting of a reasonable chance ofsuccessful cross-Channel operations in the spring of 1944. The point on which he 

was extremely doubtful was whether if these Mediterranean oper~tionswere 

undertaken, sufficient forces would be avai.lable in the United Bingdom 

to exploit the situation which the Eediterranean operations might have 

created. It wight well be that operations in the Vediterranean would of 

necessity exceed in magnitude those now visualized, and that therefore 

the forces available in the United Kingdom would be correspondingly diminished. Thus when the moment to strike across the Channel arrived, we 

should be unable to reap the benefits of the effect of Mediterranean 

operations ad of the vast concentration of air forces, and our resources in the U. K. would permit of nothing more than an unopposed 

landing. 

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ALAN BmKE pointed out that the cost of Mediterranean operations on the build-up in the United Kingdom was estimated to be no 

than from three and a half to four divisions, and this he believed was 

a cheap price to pay for the immense advantages and consequent diversion of Germn troops which knocking out Italy would insure. Italy might 

drop out of the war as a result of a successful HUSKY, but at any rate 

the elimination of Italy was, he believed, the best and only way of 

helping Russia this year. If we caused the Gerrrans to disperse their 

forces and therefore to slow up their possible rate of build-up against 

cross-Channel operations, the loss of three ad a half divisions would 

be more than counterbalanced. The Mediterranean operations visualized 

were not interdependent, and each or any of them could be undertaken 

separately as the situation developed. For instance, it might be desirable, though perhaps not essential, to gn into westrrn Grepce with the 

object of rallying General Mihailovitch qnrl the partisans. The cost 

value of each opration could be assessed at the araroprinte time. Iandings in Italy or in Sardinia were alternatives. if the situqtion on the 

Russian Front was bad ad the Germans stronger in the Mediterranean, we 

might have to forego a direct attack on Italy and capture Sardinia and 

possibly Corsica instead. These latter would prove valuable air bases 

for increasing the air bombardment O� Italy, as well as being stepping 

stones for an invasion of southern France. In any event, a11 calculations had been made on the basis of the SICKLE build-up remaining unaf f ect ed. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he would like further time to examine 

the figures given in the British paper. He feared that the cost had 

been assessed too low since the wish might have been the father to the 

thought. If the ends could be achieved as cheaply as was visualized in 

the British paper, then the plan was worthy of further consideration, 

but he feared that the momenturr consequent on the launching of Mediterranean oprations would be difficult to check. 

Both ADMIRAL LEAHY and GENERAL MARSHALL said that they wished 

further time to consider the British paper before expressing definite 

opinions and to have available to them at the same time the United 

States paper with regard to cross-Channel operations. 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS 0; STAFF:-

Deferred action on this paper pending further study by the United 

States Chiefs of Staff. 

6. RE-ARMING OF 1HE FRENCH IN NORW AFRICA 

ADMIRAL LEAKY said that it was his personal opinion that in order 

to utilize the French forces to the maximum, they should be provided 

with equipment and instructed in its use as rapidly as possible. At 

present somewhat more than three divisions had been equipped, but the 

remrrinder of the existing 11 divisions were almost without modern equipment. Early action to supply these seerred wise in view of their potentin1 value in the invasion of France. 

SIR ALAN EROOKE agreed as to the importance of re-arming the 

French, but considered that it was a ratter of timing and of the availability of shipping. French forces fighting in North Africa had shown 

themselves to be good soldiers. They would certainly prove useful in 

continental onerations, but particularly as garrison troops in iiorth 

Africa, Corsica and Sicily. It was important, however, not to use shipping to reequip the French at the expense of a build-up of Allied forces 

for irrpor tant ope rat i ons . 

GENERAL MARSHALL reminded the Committee of the Presidential memorandum given to General Giraud, which the latter had in some ways misinterpreted. He asked General Smith to give his views on the reequipment 

of the French. 

GENERAL SMITH said that Allied Force Headquarters had been guided 

by the ANFA decisions. 25,000 tons of shipping per month had been made 

available for reequipping the French forces ad 35,000 tons a month for 

civilian supplies. A possible use for French troops was for the assault 

of Corsica, if this and an attack on Sardinia were undertaken simultaneously. For this operation there would be available two divisions, 

one of them trained in mountain warfare. No armored division would be 

fit for combat duty until September, and no other troops could be rrepared for offensive fighting in 1943. Captured German and Italian equipment was being issued to accelerate the rate of reequipment and certain 

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of this was found to be of French manufacture. It was hoped that the 

lines of communications and the majority of the anti-aircraft defenses 

in North Africa could be manned by the French at an early date. French 

troops used in the recent fighting had not been issued new equipment 

from America, but had had their existing ewipmnt made up by allotvents 

from the British and (Jnited States forces. In general, the French had 

fought excellently. 

General Giraud used the equipment shipped to train and equip those 

divisions which were not actively engaged in operations. General Eisenhower’s policy was, in general, to eyiF as many French troops as possible for garrison and line of comnunication duties. French Divisions 

were being provided with equipment on a 50 to 60 percent basis for train 

ing. General Giraud, on the other hand, was naturally anxious to equip 

on Rn expeditionary force basis. He (General Smith) believed that in 

three to four months sufficient French Divisions would be available to 

undertake the defense of Morocco. Equipment was arriving at a rate sufficient to provide 50 percent of the equipment for one division every 

convoy. Though this rate did not satisfy General Giraud, it was the 

maximum which, at present, could be achieved. He believed that though 

the French must be equipped as rapidly as possible, it would be unwise 

to sacrifice any tonnage required for our own forces for the benefit of 

the French since it was unwise to count on an adequate return in combat 

value in the near future. 25,000 tons per month was the maximum which 

could be found from the shipping resources allocated to General Eisenhower. Unless the Combined Shipping and Adjustment Roard could provide 

additional tonnage, General Giraud’s requirements of 100,OGO tons per 

month could not be vet. 

GENERAL MAUSHALL pointed out that in the event of the U. S. Divisions being moved to the U. K., their equipment would be turned over 

to the French. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that in general the correct policy was 

initially to equip the French forces for a static role to enable them 

to relieve Allied forces for offensive operations. At a later stage the 

French could be equipped as an expeditionary force. 

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GENERAL SIWZTH pointed Out that in general this was being done but 

that General Giraud was not anxious that all his troops should be assigned to defensive roles. Coast and A.A. defenses were being taken over 

by the French. 

SIR JO/IW DILL asked if the possibility had been considered of 

supplying captured material to the Turks, particularly that of French 

manufacture, since they already possessed ammunition of this type. 

THE COMBINE^ CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that the rearming and reequipping of the French forces in 

North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipwent will allow, but as a secondary 

commitwent to the renuirements of British end [I. S. forces in 

the various theaters. 

7. PLAN FOR COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINCt'M 

(C.c.s.217) 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that the Cowbined Chiefs of Staff 

should consider giving their approval to General Eaker's plan for the 

combined bonber offensive outlined in C.C.S. 217. He invited General 

McNarney to explain the main points of this plan. 

GENERAL McNARNEY explained that a committee of Industrial and 

Engineering Experts with first-hand experience of Germany had thoroughly 

surveyd the German industrial organization with a view to selecting 

systems of targets which, if destroyed, would produce the maximum reduction of the German war potential. A plan based on this survey had 

then been worked out by General Eaker and had been shown to and agreed 

with by the Royal Air Force Staff in London. To imrlement the plan 

certain minimum forces were required. These were set out in paragraph 

4 of C.C.S. 217. The most ivortant feature of the plan was the reduction of the German fighter force which would be achieved not only by 

air fighting but by systematic precision bombing of air fields, aircraft mnnufscturing plants, and ball-bearing factories. Fifty percent of 

German ball-bearing manufacturing capacity was in two plants, one in 

Germany and one in Paris. 

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The plan was in four phases which were described in maps 1, 2, 3 

and 4 and legends thereon, C.C.S. 217. The whole plan was based on 6 

raids per rronth backed up by R.A.F. night bombing on the same objectives.The United States Planners had estimated that the necessrry forces 

cmld be made available except for a rrinor deficiency in the first phase 

One iTortant point was, that, unless the plcln was approved and put into 

immediate effect, the Gerrran fighter strength would expand. The Germans 

had switched over much of their productive capacity from bombers to 

fighters, and unless the German fighter potential was attacked at once, 

not only the task of the bombers in carrying out the plan would become 

more difficult but also German air strength would render all our operations against them more hazardous. The ground echelons required for this 

plan were estimated to amount to some 375,000 men by the first of April, 

1944. He believed, however, that this figure might be exceeded and the 

total ground echelons for air forces in the U. K. might amount to some 

400,000 to 425,000 men. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that General Eaker's plan had been 

based on all the information available to the Air Ministry. He (General 

Eaker) had worked out the plan himself and had then put it to the Air 

Ministry for consideration. In spite of the most critical examination 

by all available experts, the Air Ministry was convinced that, if given 

the resources asked for,General Eaker would achieve the results he 

claimed. He (Sir Charles Portal) was one hlndred percent in favor of the 

plan. The figure of 6 raids per month had been based on weather statistics collected over a period of years, but it was hoped that by the use 

of special equipment (H2S) which General Eaker proposed to fit to his 

leading barbers, attacks through overcast or cloud could be made on targets the size of a city. Raids undertaken under these conditions would 

be in nddition to the 6 precision attacks per month in clear weather. He 

had no doubt thclt the result of a salvo of bods falling from sone one 

hundred unseen R-17's in daylight would be tremendous. General Eaker 

hoped to use these methods beginning in the autumn. It must be remembered that when boding from above the clouds, reaction from Cermn fighters was to be expected, with resulting fighter attrition. A somewhat 

similar device to the C2S was already in use for night bombing but, 

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since once discovered by the enemy it would have no further value to us, 

it was only enployed in Mosquito aircraft used to lead in night attacks. 

GENERAL McNARNEY suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

should give their approval to the plan for the codired boder offensive 

set out in C.C.S. 217 and agree to the provision of the necessary forces 

to implement it. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the plan for the combined bomber offensive from the 

United Kingdom which is set forth in C.C.S. 217. 

8. BOMBING OF PLOESTI 

Referring to the plan for the attack on the refineries at Ploesti 

by heavy bombers operating from North Africa or the Middle East, GENERAL 

McNARNEY stressed the importance of timing in particular reference to 

the Germn comitment on the Russian Front. An early and successful 

attack on the refineries would, he felt, be the greatest single contribution which could be made to assist the Russians this year. If we 

waited to capture bases nearer the objective, the delay would detract 

from the decisive value of the operation. The ranges from Ploesti of 

possible bases now available were: 

Tobruk.. .............857 miles 

Aleppo.. ............ .835 miles 

Alexandria. .......... 963 miles 

Cyprus. ............. .755 miles 

Tripoli.. ..........1,080 miles 

From all these bases Ploesti was within range of B-24 D’s with a load 

of 6,000 pounds; B-24 C’s with 3,000 pounds and B-17 F’s. It was estimated thst a total of 155 aircraft were required. More than sufficient 

were available in North Africa and the United Kingdan. An early decision to carry out the attack was necessary since not only was the weather best in June and early July, but also an attack at this time would 

interfere less with air prepsrations for HUSKY ad possible subsequent 

ocerations. The exact defenses of Plesti were not known but it was 

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believed that only a few, if any, fighters were available and the train 

defense was provided by a balloon barrage, mainly to the south. If 

bovbers operated frotr Tobruk, it was estimrted that they cculd nass 

northorar'4 nrit of radar range of Crete 2nd might thus achieve surrrise 

without interference from fighters. If the nttacl. took rlice at -lush 

they could return in darkness. 

The trethcwi of attack would probably be low level bombing with fielqy action bombs. If command of these forces vere given to General 

Poolittl~e,who WRS availible and in wholr he had great confidence, he, 

General GNIVprney, was convinced that success would be achieved. I-osses 

might be heavy, but would be more than offset by results. If the raid 

could be carried out prior to HUSKY, this exavle of overwhelming 411ierl 

nir oowr'r would hnve Frofound effects, both on the Russisn rront and 

Italian morale. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAI said th2t he would be yrerared to recomren? 

the operation if he mere certrin thpt a large nrorortion of the attacking aircraft armed with F,@@C round bolrbs would reqch the oblective 

before Ausl., but he VRS doubtful if this could tx achieved since the 

oreration was essentially dependent on accurate weather forecasting. 

GENERAL. McNARNEY said that this point had been carefully considered and it was believed that in June or early July a forecast could be 

made of the weather at Ploesti and en route twenty-four 1ioi1rs ihead with 

P5 ?Percent accuracy. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that if this accuracy of forecasting could 

be achieved, the operation should have good rrosyects of success. Its 

effect. however, on HUSKY and other operations must be borne in mind. 

He wnrild like to ask the commanders in the theater for their views on 

the advisability of undertaking this operation in the light of the 

necessity for concentrating our air resources in surrort of operatior. 

HUSKY. 

SIR ALAIV BROOKE also stressed the disadvantage of the dispersal 

of nir forces ~rinrto operation HUSKY ;Ind the great results it was 

hoped to achieve by the concentration of our air pou'er on Italy. If 

Italy could be knocked out, bases closer to the Ploesti objective could 

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be obtained, enabling us to undertake sustrlined bombing of the refineries. 

GENERAL McNdRNEY pointed out that the attainment of these bases 

in Italy might be delayed for some six or seven months, and by then the 

weather warld be far less fworable. 

7HE COMMITTEE then discussed the availability of aircraft qnd the 

periods during which they would be diverted either from the Ihited Kingdom or their tasks in the Mediterranean. 

SIR CHARLES POR7dL said that if the operation succeeded, it would 

certainly have more effect than almost any other on softening UF Gemany 

for operations in 1944. There was, therefore, a case for careful exanination of this project, even though it might reduce our air preparations prior to HUSKY. 

GENERAL McNdRNEY undertook immediately to arrange for the necessary special sights to be sent to North Africa together with personnel 

fully conversant with the plan who could discuss it with General Eisenhower, Air Karshal Tedder, and their staffs. 

7HE COMBINED CHIEFS OF S7AFF:­

a. Agreed that the United States Arny Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander in 

Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared 

concerning the bombing of the Roumanian Oil Fields, and that 

the Commander in Chief of the North African Theater should be 

asked to submit appropriate coments and recommendations to the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

b. Took note that special bomb sights and instructor personnel 

needed for such an operation would be sent to the North African 

Theater by the IJnited States Army Air Forces as soon as pract icable. 

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9. OPERATION "UPKEEP" 

AOMIRAL LEAHY, on behalf of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff offered Sir 

Charles Portal congratulations on the success of the R.A.F. force in 

this operation. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL, in thanking Admiral Leahy, said that the 

success attributed to the oyeration in the newspapers was borne out by 

aerial photographs. 

10. MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

ADMIRAL LEAHY informed the Cowmittee that the President and Prime 

Minister wished to meet the Combined Chiefs of Staff It 6 P.M. tonwrrow, 

Wednesday, 19 May,for a shcrt discussion on the schedule fnr the future 

work of the Conference The F'rirne Minister and President also wished to 

meet the Corrbined Chiefs of Staff on Friday, 21 May, and for finil meetings on Monday and Tuesday, the 24th and 25th. 

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COMBINED CHI EFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 88th Meeting 

TRIDENT 

Minutes of Meeting held in 

The Board of Governors Room, 

Federal Reserve Buiilding, 

on Wednesday, 19 May 1943, 

at 1030. 

PRESENT 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General C. C. Marshall, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Sir Dudley Pound 

Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

ALSO PRESEh'T 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somrvell, USA 

Vice Admiral F. J. Horne. USN 

Vice Admiral Russell Willson, USN 

Maj. Gen. W. B. Smith, USA 

Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, USA 

Rear Adrriral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Col. J. E. Smart, USA 

Condr. W. L. Freseman, USN 

Condr. V. D. Long, USN 

SECRETARIAT 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh 

Maj. Gen. N. G. Rolmes 

Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN 

Brigadier W. Porter 

Air Commodore W. Elliot 

Brigadier H. W. M. Maclecd 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Brig. Zen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Condr. R. D. Coleridge, RN 

Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup. USA 

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1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING 

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that it might be preferable to eliminate 

the words "and in the light of the probable operation and employment of 

the French forces" in the conclusion to item 6 of the 87th Meeting. 

THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF agreed with this view. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: 

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 87th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held on Tuesday, 18 May 1943, 

subject to the deletion of the words "and in the light of the 

probable operation and employment of the French forces" at the end 

of the conclusion to item 6. 

2. AGREED ESSENTIALS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 

(C.C.S. 87th Mtg., Item 3) 

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff wished 

to defer consideration of C.C.S. 232/1. 

3. DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE 

(C.C.S. 234 and 235) 

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked for the comments of the British Chiefs of 

Staff on the United States Planners' paper, C.C.S. 235. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it appeared from the two papers before 

the Committee that there were certain basic factors on which the U. S. 

and British Staffs were in agreement. On others there were differences of opinion which must be eliminated. 

With regard to the target date far cross-Channel operations, April 

1 had been selected for two reasons. This date coincided with the conclusion of the fourth phase of the bomber offensive, and it was the 

earliest practicable from the point of view of weather. He would like 

to suggest, however, that April 1 might be too early a date to select. 

at that time the Fussian Front was likely to be static since it was the 

period of the thaw. The weather conditions in western Europe woulr' not 

be as favorable on that date as later, say the end of May or early T 3 ' 

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which would also coincide with the end of the thaw in Russia. If the 

first of by or the first of June was accepted as the target date, the 

build-up in the United Kingdom would also be further advanced. 

Though in the United States paper the elimination of Italy was 

considered and accepted as a possibility, yet no appreciation was given 

as to the steps necessary to deal with this or to take advantage of it. 

We might be called upon by some political party other than the Fascists 

to enter Italy, or we might be confronted with complete collapse and a 

state of chaos. In either case we should be faced with a decision as to 

what action was necessary to take advantage of this situation, and the 

result such action would have on other operations. There were obvious 

advantages in going intoItaly which could be used as a naval and an air 

base, but how far we should be drawn in was a matter for discussion. 

There were great advantages in obtaining the northern plains for use as 

an air base. German air defense was not organized on this sector, and 

its occupation would force the Germans to detach forces to protect the 

northern and western frontiers of Italy. We should also examine the 

possibility of limiting the extent of our occupation of Italy and examine the magnitude of the commitments and the action required to implement our plans. 

The next point in the 1Jnite-d States proposals was the period of 

inactivity on land for a period of some six to seven months after HUSKY. 

In paragraph 5 c it was pointed out that Germany intended to concentrate on the defeat of the Russian armed forces in 1943 and that Germany would either fail or succeed in R.ussia this summer. This year was 

the most critical time for Russia, and we must take all possible steps 

to assist her. It would, he felt, be most difficult to justify failure 

to use available forces for this plrpose. 

Viithout crippling ROUNDUP in 1944, we could, he believed, with the 

forces now available in the IJediterranean achieve important results and 

provide the greatest measure of assistafice to Russia in this critical 

period and at the same time create a situation favorable for crossChannel operations in 1944. 

It was difficult from paragraph 17 of the paper to visualize the 

shape of operations to defeat Germany, but it appeared that it was proposed to capture ports to enable a direct build-up from the United 

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States. This concept, he believed, would present considerable difficulties since a stuiy of this problem had shown that the sustenance of the 

forces used to cover these ports would absorb the larger part of their 

capacity. After the capture of e bridgehead,Cherbourg might be seized, 

but the provisionofthe necessary forces to cover this would be difficult 

unless the Germans were greatly weakened or unable to find reserves. For 

this reason active Russian operations were essential. If the Russians 

suffered defeats in 1943, the possibility of any landing was bad. 

In conclusion,he felt that the first of May or the first of June 

was a better target date for ROUNDUP since this would be the period when 

the sumner fighting in Russia would be starting. By maintaining pressure 

with limited forces in the Mediterranean, German troops estimated at some 

20 to 30 divisions would, by the elimination of Italy, be dispersed and 

tied down. 

He would like to add one minor point. The United States’ build-up 

envisaged would, he believed, require at an early date additional S.O.S. 

troops, possibly even at the expense of SICKLE, to prepare the depots to 

receive them. This was necessary since the manpower situation in England 

was very serious. 

ADWIRAL LEAHY said that he understood the British proposal to be 

for Mediterranean operations and a magnified SLEDGEHAMMER. He was 

interested to know what effect the British proposals had on the ANAKIM 

operation since he believed some form of operation to help China to be 

essential. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British proposals for Mediterranean operations Contemplated only a deduction of some 3-1/2 to 4 

divisions from the forces available for ROUNDUP. Landing craft was a 

critical item, ad the shortage would anyhow necessitate the assault 

going in on a relatively narrow front. In any event it was not proposed 

to move any forces from the Mediterranean for use in ANAKIM since all 

the troops required were already in India, but any operations in Burma 

would be hampered by a shortage of shipping, naval covering forces, and 

landing craft. If it was decided only to open the Led0 Road to China, 

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then, of course, naval operations could be dispensed with, but this 

operation would probably be at the expense of the capacity of the air 

route. Before discussing Burmese operations in detail, he felt it wise 

to await the report of the Combined Staff Planners. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he personally believed that the postponement of the target date for ROUNDUP to the first of May would be 

acceptable in view of its relation to Russian operations, and the extra 

time given for the build-up. He agreed also that the action required in 

the event of the collapse of Italy must be studied and preparations made 

to meet it. 

He agreed with Sir Alan Brooke’s view on the importance of helping 

Russia in 1943, but he believed tkt it would take some time to mount any 

operation subsequent to HUSKY which itself might not be completed until 

September. We should, therefore, be helping Russia up until the end of 

the period of the German campaign. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that he considered that operations in the 

Mediterranean, with a consequent diversion of German forces, were important throughout the entire year. 

GENERAL MARSHALL, commenting further on the British plan, believed 

that the calculated build-up through the ports was pessimistic. Experience had shown that estimated port capacities were likely, in practice, 

to be doubled. 

In general he believed that the British plan magnified the results 

to be obtained by Mediterranean operations and minimized the forces which 

would have to be used and the logistic requirements. It was too sanguine 

with regard to the results of enemy reaction, and in this connection it 

must be remembered that in North Africa a relatively small German force 

had produced a serious factor of delay to our operations. A German 

decision to support Italy might make intended operations extremely 

difficult and time cmsming. 

GENERAL MARSHALL, then turned to detailed comments of the British 

plan. Paragraph 2 o visualized it as essential for invasion that the 

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initial assault must be on a sufficiently large scale to enable the rate 

of our build-up to compete with that of the enemy. In this connection a 

deteriorating German situation was visualized earlier in the paper. As 

he saw it, the first step was aimed, not at the immediate defeat of the 

German Army, but at the establishment of a bridgehead which would have 

results not only psychologically, but on the U-boat campaign, and would 

provide air fields, giving better bases for operations against the enemy 

which in turn would result in the destruction of a growing percentage of 

the enemy’s air fighting capacity. These were immediate and important 

results, ad these, rather tbn an imediate advance to the Rhine, should 

be our first objective. He did not believe that the British paper gave 

sufficient weight to the devastating effect of our air bombardments with 

the resulting diminution not only of Germany’s power but of her ability 

rapidly to build up forces in western Europe. The effects of the bombing 

offensive were becoming more and more apparent daily. 

Paragraph 7 of the British paper, while showing the limitations 

imposed on cross-Channel operations by lack of landing craft, did not 

sufficiently stress the expenditure of these craft in Mediterranean 

operations. The limitations of landing craft production in the United 

States must be remembered. In addition, the need for these craft for 

operation ANAKIM was not brought out. 

In paragraph 27 it was suggested that Ploesti could not be attacked 

except from bases in Italy. This matter had, of course, been discussed 

at the previous meeting when it had been agreed that an attack could be 

carried out from bases already in our hands. 

In paragraph 35 he believed that the Italian people’s will to deal 

with the Allies was overestimated. If Germany decided to pupport her to 

the full, serious delay might be imposed on our plans, our resources 

would be sucked into the Mediterranean, and we should find ourselves 

completely involved in operations in that theater to the exclusion of all 

else. 

With regard to the proposal in paragraph 38, that, during the 

period of confusion after the collapse of Italy, we should secure a 

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bridgehead at Durazzo, he believed timt such an operation would so commit 

us that through shipping ard larding craft limitations no otkr important 

operations would be possible. 

The summary of commitments contained in paragraph 42 might be an 

accurate estimate but it was axiomatic that every commander invariably 

asked for more troops than were originally estimated as being necessary. 

We should, he believed, if Mediterranean operations were undertaken, find 

ourselves overwhelmed with demands for resources over and above our 

original estimates. 

Fe had read the British estimate on the shipping requirements to 

sustain Italian economy in the event of her collapse. He believed that 

these were too optimistic and that some 32 to 40 sailings a month would 

be required. It must be remembered that there was a large Italian element in the United States who were politically powerful ad who would not 

permit the undue curtailment of supplies to Italy. 

He believed timt the shipping requirement for the BOLERO build-up 

was larger than had been estimated. Even if the personnel and cargo 

shipping required was available, the limitations of escorts would curtail 

the full BOLERO build-up if operations in the Mediterranean continued. 

If operations in any magnitude were undertaken in the Mediterranean after 

HUSKY there would, in all probability. be no landing craft available to 

be returned to the United Kingdom for cross-Charnel operations. 

In general, he considered that the British paper throughout was 

over-pessimistic with regard to the possibilities of cross-Channel operations, particularly in so far as the results of our vast air power and 

its relation to ground operations. On the other hand, in considering 

Mediterranean operations, the British paper was very optimistic with 

regard to the forces required, the Axis reaction and the logistic problem. 

ADMIRAL KING, with reference to the suggestion that the target date 

for ROUNDUP should be postponed to the 1st May or 1st June, agreed that 

the weather would be better at a later date but considered that to 

achieve the maximum results in relation to the operations on the Eastern 

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Front, it should take place before the thaw finished. The target date 

was seldom met, but he believed tht it would be wise to plan the target 

date for 1 May which would be reasonable in all the circumstances. 

(At this point a11 officers with the exception of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff themselves, left the meting;) 

After a full discussion the Secretaries were recalled. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF .STAFF:­

a. Informed the Secretaries of the lines on which draft resolutions 

were to be drawn up. 

b. Instructed the Secretaries to prepare these draft resolutions 

for their consideration at a meeting to be held later that day. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 89th Meeting 

TRIDENT 

Minutes of Meeting held in 

The Board of Governors Room, 

Federal Reserve Building, 

on Wednesday, 19 May 1943, 

at 1630. 

PRESENT 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall. IlSA Admiral of the Fleet 

kddrriral 4'. J. Xing, USN Sir Dudley Pound 

Lt. Gener.11 J. T. McNarney, USA lir Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

Field hl?rsh?l Sir Tohn Dill 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN FUROPE 

(C.C.S. 237) 

(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 88th Meeting, Item 3) 

THE COMMITTEE considered the draft resolutions contained in C.C.S. 

237 and agreed to certain amndments which are incorporated below. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Resolved : 

a.That forces and equipment shall be established in the United 

Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 

1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the 

operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces 

being present and available for use in the United Kingdon by 

1 May 1944: 

Assault: 5 Infantry Divisions (Simultaneously loaded in 

landing craft) 

2 Infantry Divisions - Follow-up 

-

2 Air -borne Divisions

Total 9 Divisicns in the Assault 

Build-up 20 Divisions available for movement into lodgment 

- area

Total 29 Divisions 

b.%at the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, should be 

instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as 

are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Each specific operation will be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use 

for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British Divisions 

which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels reauired will be approved by the 

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Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY will 

not be considered available. 

c. The above resolution shall be reviewed by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff at a meetine. in Tuly or early in August, the date to be 

decided later, in order that the situation may be examined in 

the light of the result of HI'SKY and the situation in Russia. 

(These resolutions to be subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 237/1.) 

(At this point the Secreraries entered the meeting.) 

2. OPERATIONS FROM INDIA 

In reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal, AD,NIRAL LEA'HY said 

thrt he understood the term ANAKIM to mean ooerntions in Burma and not to 

cover other operations based on India against such places as Sumatra or 

the Malayan Peninsula. The Chinese believed that they had received a firm 

promise that the British and Americans would, towards the end of 1943. 

undertake operations in Burmn aimed at opening a road to China. He personally now accepted that the original operations which included the capture of Rangoon were impracticable, but he believed nevertheless that an 

operation to open a land route to China must be undertaken. This might 

take the form of attacking in North Burma with a view to capturing Mandalay and opening a route through Ledo. at the same time seizing Akyab and 

Ramree Island. 

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that 

the Andaman Islands contained only one small air field and their capture, 

except as part of large scale operations, was not worth while. 

3. PROVISION OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFI' FOR HUSKY 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that despite the additional aircraft promised there was still a deficiency of 80 transports for the new HUSKY plan. 

He had discussed the subject with General Smith who was most anxious that 

every possible step should be taken to provide them. If trained crews 

were the bottleneck the Royal Air Force could provide them. He suggested 

that this matter might be further discussed at a future meeting, say 

Friday, of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

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GENERAL McNARNEY said that crews were not the limiting fnctor. The 

additional 80 aircraft required could only be provided at the expense of 

the South Pacific. He believed that if the air-borne troops visualized 

were essential to the success of the plan, these could all be dropped by 

using the same aircraft for two drops. He fully appreciated the timing of 

these drops would not be perfect, but was convinced that by this means all 

the air-borne troops required could be put across. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the theater commander must be and had 

been backed to the limit but in this case the limit had been reached and 

the aircraft required were not available. 

GENERAL McNARNEY agreed. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 90th Meeting 

TRIDENT 

Minutes of Meeting held in 

The Board of Governors Room, 

Federal Reserve Building, 

on Thursday, 20 May 1943, 

at 1030. 

PRESEhT 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall. USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Admiral E. J. King, L6N Sir hdley Pound 

Lt. Gen. J. T. kkrney, USA Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. J. W. Stilwll, USA Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA Field Marshal 

Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, L6N Sir Archibald Wave11 

hkj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, WA Admiral Sir James Somrville 

Maj. General C. L. Chennault, USA Air Chief Marshal 

bj. General M. S. Fairchild, USA Sir Richard Peirse 

kj. Gen. W. B. Smith, USA Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr.. USN Lt. Gen. G. N. bcready 

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA Air hrshal Sir R. Welsh 

Col. C. P. Cabell. SA Maj . Gen. N. G. Holms 

Condr. W. L. Freseman, WN Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN 

Cdr. V. D. Long, USN Brigadier W. Porter 

.4ir Commodore W. Elliot 

Brigadier M. W. M. Maclecd 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redmn 

Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, lfijA 

Condr. R. D. Coleridge, RN 

Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup, USA 

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1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETINGS 

THE COMRINED CHlEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 88th 

and 89th Meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held on Wednesday, 19 May. 

2. POLICY FOR COMING OPERATIONS REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE 

ACTIVITIES 

(C.C.S. 185/3) 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that at the meeting at the White House on the 

previous day, the President and Prime Minister had signified tbeir 

disagreerrept with certain points in General Eisenhower’s proposals put 

forward in NAF 221. 

The U. S. Chiefs of Staff recorrmended therefore that General 

Eisenhower should be informed that his proposals were not approved an4 

that he should continue to base his propaganda policy on the previous 

directive. 

SIR AI.AN BROOKE said that this matter had been referred to the 

Foreign Office and he would like to await their reply before giving 

any instructiops to General Eisenhower. Until such instructions were 

issued General Eisenhower would, of course, continue to act on his 

previous directive. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to defer action on C.C.S. 185/3 pending the receipt of 

the views of the Foreign Office. 

3. STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 

(C.C.S. 220) 

SIR AIAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had examined 

this plan with great interest. The plan was, however, not in any great 

detail. The ways and weans of achieving the various courses outlined 

had not been examined nor their possibilities assessed. fle suggested 

that rrachinery should be set up at once to examine the proposals and 

to draw up a mnre detailed plan. 

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ADHIRAL LEAHY explained that C.C.S. 220 was not intended to be 

a detailed plan. He suggested that it might be accepted as a basis 

for study and elaboration. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it was very important to examine 

carefully this great field of operations. He believed that a full 

appreciation should be prepared. The facts should be assembled, the 

objects set out, together with alternative courses of action to achieve 

these objects with full facts and arguments for and against each course. 

Only by starting from first principles could we decide on the most 

advantageous plan. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he was in entire agreement with Sir 

Charles Fortal's views. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Accepted C.C.S. 220 as a basis for a combined study and elaboration for future plans. 

b. Directed the Combined Staff Planners to initiate a study and 

prepare for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff an 

appreciation leading up to an outline plan for the defeat of 

Japan including an estimate of the forces required for its 

implementation. 

4. OPERATIONS IN BURMA TO OPEh AND SECURE AN OVERLAND ROUTE TO CHINA 

(C.C.S. 231) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said the British Chiefs of Staff believed there 

was great danger in extensive operations from Led0 and Imphal, which 

would be dependent on two very precarious roads, whereas the Japanese 

forces would be supplied by road, rail and river, and would be operating out of a relatively dry area. The maintenance of our forces at 

the ends of their lines of canmunication would be particularly difficult during the monsoon season. Even if a road to China were opened, 

he believed that the Japanese could bring stronger forces to bear than 

we could maintain to defend it. With regard to operations on the coast, 

he believed that the capture of Akyab and Ramree was feasible but we 

had not the resources or the necessary landing craft to undertake the 

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two more southerly amphibious assaults. The danger, as he saw it, was 

that by aiming both to build up the air route to the maximum capacity 

and to undertake a land offensive,we should do neither very efficiently. The undertaking of land operations would limit the amount of supplies which could be taken up to the air bases. He believed that the 

right cmrse was to expand the air route to the maximum in order to increase the strength of the air forces operating in China and to provide 

limited maintenance of the Chinese ground forces. Dr. T. V. Soong, in 

his memorandum, had emphasized the necessity for maintaining General 

Chennault's force at the highest possible level. Sir Alan Rrooke believed that operations aimed at the capture of Mandalay were not possible of achievement and that instead we should concentrate on building 

up the air route and at the same time undertake limited operations from 

Led0 and Impha1 in order to protect it, and capture Akyab and Ramree. 

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said he had only had a short time to examine 

the paper under discussion and was therefore not in a position to 

comment in detail. In general, however, he believed the possibilities 

outlined in the paper to be far too optimistic. He reminded the Committee of the administrative difficulties in connection with operations 

in Burna. The lines of communication were had, heavy casualties had 

to be expected from malaria, trained lorry drivers were scarce, and, 

in general, the administrative difficulties invariably exceeded paper 

calculations of their magnitude. A margin of some 50 to 100 per cent 

bad to be allowed on thls account. 

There were obviously great advantages to be derived from the capture of bndalay and the control of Upper Burma to the northward of it. 

A land route would be open to China with consequent effect on Chinese 

morale, though it would be but an indifferent route and would carry but 

little for a long time. He was quite certain that even if Mandalay 

could be captured, it would be impossible, certainly during the monsoon 

season, to maintain there forces large enough to withstand the scale of 

at tack which the Japanese, with their better lines of communication, 

could bring against them. 

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In planning, his personal tendency had always been to be optimistic, but after 18 months' experience in the area, he felt it only 

right to warn the Committee that he believed it unlikely to be feasible to maintain forces as far south as Mandalay. In his opinion, 

the correct and possible courses of action were: Firstly, to make 

every effort to increase the air ferry route to its maximum capacity 

and to build up our own air superiority over Burma. These two objects 

should be our first charge. Then if the required resources, engineering 

facilities, boats and vehicles were made available, it should be possible to make attacks by land into Upper Burma from Yunnan on Lashio, 

from Led0 on Myitkyina and Bhamo, and from Imphal into the Chindwin 

Valley whence touch would be gained to the eastward with the Chinese 

moving in from Yunnan. These three advances must keep step, and our 

first objective should be a line from a point where the Burma Road 

crossed the Burma-Chinese border, through Bhamo, Katha, Pinlebo, Kalewa, 

and thence to the west. To gain a line of that kind might well be 

possible, and it would give sufficient cover to the Myitkyina air 

fields and the route to Burma. If on achieving this line the Japanese 

were weakened, we should then consider the possibility of going further 

south, but any idea, at this stage, that the capture of and subsequent 

maintenance of our forces in Mandalay was possible was likely to be 

falsified. We must decide our future operations in the light of events. 

With regard to coastal operations, he believed we should rrost 

certainly try to capture Ramree and Akyab, though this was a difficult 

proposition since it was now heavily defended. It was not, in his view, 

worthwhile to endeavor to capture Sandoway and Taungup since they would 

be difficult to maintain during the monsoon owing to sea conditions and 

would be cut off from the rest of Burma by the Arakan range. -The paper 

suggested the use of the long-range penetration brigade on An and 

Mimbua. He would examine this, but he believed that a better use for 

this unit would be in Upper Burma to maintain contrlct between the 

Chinese and the British. The possibility of an-attack on Rangoon 

through Bassein had been examined by his Planning Staff, but they had 

reported adversely on its practicability, since it entailed a long and 

difficult advance through thick jungle country interspersed with creeks. 

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Another possibility was to proceed up the railroad from Bassein to 

Henzada, using trucks on the railway, but from that point there were 40 

miles of difficult jungle before the god road north of Rangoon was met. 

It had been judged that a direct assault on Rangoon up the river was 

less hazardous and more likely to succeed than either of these two 

plans. 

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PEIRSE said that he wished to emphasize that 

wherever operations in Burma were undertaken air superiority was essential, both to defend the air route and to assist in land operations. 

Additional air fields for the fighting air force would therefore be 

required. If land operations were undertaken stronger air forces would 

be required including transport aircraft to maintain ground forces, 

particularly during the monsoon season. This necessity would probably 

cause a diversion of transports from the air ferry route. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that as he understood it, the British proposals 

consisted of a maximum concentration on the air route and limited ground 

operations, including the capture of Ramree and Akyab. 

GENERAL MARSllALL said that he was impressed both with General 

Wavell’s comments on the nagnitude of the logistic problem and Air 

Marshal Peirse’s on the air diversion resulting from lapd operations. 

In his view, however, a great increase in the air route alone without 

offensive ground operations would produce a strong Japanese reaction. 

He believed ground operations to be essential for their effect both on 

Chinese morale and on operations in the South and Southwest Pacific. 

If no aggressive actior were undertaken in Burma the results on Pacific 

operations would be most unfortunate. Similarly, if no aggressive 

action were taken in the Pacific it would have a serious effect on the 

Burmese operations. 

Operations in New Guinea and Guadalcanal under somewhat similar 

conditions, with disease, monsoon and logistic difficulties had been 

successfully accomplished. Bombers had been used for supplies when 

transports had not been available. 

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He believed that lack of real aggressive action in Burma would 

be unfortunate for the South and Southwest Pacific and fatal to China. 

He did not believe that we should bank all on the attractive proposition of do everything by air. He realized that full-scale ground 

operations might limit supplies to China by air, but the Japanese must 

be threatened on the ground and this could only be achieved by hard 

fighting. Results on other theaters must be considered. Adequate 

shipping must be provided to build up the necessary resources. He was 

in no doubt as to the difficulties of the operations but equally he was 

in no doubt as to their vital importance. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he believed that without aggressive action 

by ground forces we should lose the air route. How far it was possible 

to go was a matter of sope doubt but he believed that we should direct 

our attack on Mnndalay in order to occupy the Japanese to the full, to 

save the air route and to insure Japanese withdrnwals from other theaters. It must always be remembered that Jnpanese conununications were 

open to sea and air attack. The two Governpents were, he believed, 

decided that operations in North Burma must be undertaken. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the main difference of opinion 

sppeared to be as to whether or not limited land operations could 

succeed in insuring the safety of the air route. He believed that the 

maximum effect against the ,Japanese could be achieved by air superiority 

and the build-up of the air route into China, thus freeing our lines 

of communications and our air forces from the need to support and feed 

troops engaged in extensive ground operations. He firmly believed that 

we should put all our resources into the air and that the problem as a 

whole must be regarded as a military one, the object of which was to 

achieve the maximum effect on the Japanese. 

GENERAL McNARNEY said that he had always been surprised that the 

Japanese had not made more effort to cut the air supply route, particularly Myitkyina where it was very exposed to fighter attack. He believed that they would do this as soon as the air effort being built up 

in China was sufficient to cause therr serious worry. To prevent the air 

line being cut, it was necessary to advance our fighter bases as far as 

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Myitkyina and the air warning line still further. Unless Mandalay and 

Lashio were captured, we should not have sufficiently far advanced bases 

for the air warning system to cover the fighters at Myitkyina. He did 

not believe that the necessity for supplying ground forces by air would 

necessarily limit the supplies taken into China. There were some 90 

C-47’s in India used for this purpose, and this number could possibly 

be increased. Further, heavy bombers could be used for this purpose. 

FIELD HARSHAL WAVELL pointed out that he was concerned not only 

with the problem of maintaining the supplies to our forces as far south 

as Mandalay, but also with the fact that the Japanese could bring and 

maintain stronger forces to bear at that pint. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL, with regard to the vulnerability of the air 

route to China, said that he believed if adequate airdromes were available in Assam, the Japanese fighters could be bombed out of their bases. 

GENERAL CHENNAULT said that he believed it to be practicable to 

defend the two terminals of the air route with the air forces now 

available, since these could prevent the.Japanese from concentrating 

and maintaining heavy air forces within range of these terminals. The 

major attack which had occurred at the Chinese end was against Kunming 

on the 8th of May. when 40 fighters and 36 bombers had attacked. Out 

of these, 13 fighters and 2 bombers had been shot down, with 10 further 

probables. No confirmed attacks on transports had been made. Occasional fighter patrols were flown from both ends, with an overlap at the 

center. The Japanese could, in any event, only maintain sporadic 

attacks on the route, and the forces available to the 10th and 14th 

Air Forces could reach ail the Japanese airdromes within range of the 

route. If attacks developed, the route could be moved some 60 miles 

further north in the area of Myitkyina, which, though over higher 

mountains, would only increase the distance by 15 miles. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that General Chennault had expressed his 

own views exactly. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he was in entire agreement that some sort of 

aggressive action was required and the forces available used, but, if 

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operations were carried beyond a certain point, we should face a possible defeat with its consequent bad effects both on China and in the 

Pacific. An advance far to the south would put us at a severe logistic 

disadvantage with regard to the Japanese. In Assam we were relatively 

safe since the Jaganese would have to operate over bad lines of communication to reach our own forces. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the Japanese now possessed an 

air barrier from Bougainville to Burma, along which they could rapidly 

effect concentrations in any area. The Japanese had not yet conrentrated at the Burma end, but he believed that when powerful borrbinF 

from China was undertaken, the Japanese reaction against the air route 

would be strong, unless the Japanese air forces were tied down by active 

operations elsewhere. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said the Japanese must be prevented from attacking 

the air line to China. The maintenance of China was essential to successful operations against Japan, and therefore we must conduct operations toward bndalay. 

GENERAL SWERVELL said that General Wavell’s calculated requirements were some 180,000 tons per month. A large part of this, however, 

had no relation to the operations envisaged. There were 33 divisions 

in India, with a further 10% overseas, but only 12 engaged in the operation. He believed there was no real justification for a tonnage greater 

than 90,000 per month for ANAKIM. 27,000 tons a month of the requirement was for civilian supplies. 

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL and SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that India 

must be maintained and this could not be divorced from the operational 

requirement. India’s requirements had already been cut in order to mahe 

good the British import program. If the so-called civilian requirerrents 

were not met, India’s output of munitions could not be maintained. 

With the aid of a map, GENERAL SOMERVELL then outlined the amounts 

which he believed could be supplied over the various routes. 

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GENERAL SOMERVELL said that he believed that the industrial capacity of India could be maintained without the figure of 180,000 tons per 

month being met. Many of the requirements would not bear examination 

in detail and some could be cut in half. For instance, the Indian requirenent of 4,000 amphibious or special vehicles appeared excessive. 

It was greater than the number available to the entire United States 

Army. 

He believed that the river route to Ledo had not been expanded to 

its maximum capacity. He outlined his views on the logistic possibilities of the routes to Mandalay ard Lashio. The Japnese had only some 

four or five divisions in Burma and he saw no reason why stronger forces 

could not be maintained on the Mandalay line against them. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he could not agree with this estimate. 

The Japamse had excellent lines of communication available to them. 

It was not wise to decide on operations which were not feasible. These 

operations had to be carried out by the British. He believed that the 

maximum possible land operations shouid be undertaken but it must be 

appreciated that these would encroach upon the air route tonnage. An 

advance to a line through Bhamo and Kalewa was as far as the Commander 

in Chief considered possible. 

In reply to a question, GENERAL STILWeLL said that if they moved 

at all, he believed that the Chinese forces could get as far as Mandalay. He could see no object in stopping operations on the edge of 

the good road network. If the British forces could be supplied at 

Katha ad Kalewa, the two rivers would permit their supply at Mardalay. 

The Chinese had been promised a major effort in Burma. Generalissimo 

Chiang Kai-shek would probably make any action by his forces conditional 

on the recapture of the whole of Burma. 

ADMIRAL LEACY suggested that the Chiefs of Staff should project 

the campaign towards the seizure of Mandalay, and proceed as far as 

possible with this object in view. The Japanese might stop us. but he 

believed it to be a wasted effort to limit the objective to Kalewa. 

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FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that he was prepared to go as far as he 

could while maintaining a force equal to the Japanese. If the Japanese 

proved weaker than was expected, or, if he found he could maintain a 

stronger force than he believed, he was naturally prepared to advance 

further, but he believed it useless to accept a liability until he was 

certain he could carry it out. Any operations he undertook were dependent on the action taken by the Chinese forces since,if they did not 

advance,his eastern flank would be exposed. The Chinese and British 

mus t keep in step. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: 

Agreed to postpme further discussion on this matter until a later 

meeting to be held in closed session at 3:30 p.m. the same day. 

5. POTENTIALITIES OF THE AIR ROUTE FROM ASSAM TO BURMA 

(C.C.S. 229) 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that all reference to the expansion of the air 

route to more than 10,000 tons should be deleted from the paper. The 

possibilities of any increase above 10,000 tons was problematical. 

In reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal as regards the lirriting factor to the expansion of the air route, GENERAL YcNARNEY said that 

the Planners’ estimate had been based solely on the availability of aircraft from factories and not in relation to other demands for them. It 

would be dangerous to put forward a figure of 20,000 tons based on the 

premise that no other commitments existed for these aircraft. Further, 

an examination had shown that to increase the air route to 20,000 tons 

would mean getting sane 50,000 tons per month into Assam which would 

require a large number of additimal transports. The total requirements 

were hieher than rould be net by the end of December. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that although there might he a limit to 

the aircraft, he considered it wise for the terminals to be developed 

on the basis of a load of 20,000 tons/month. The developrent of the 

air route terminals would take far loneer than the provision of additional transport aircraft. It might be ~os~ible for tbe Gritish to nrovide certain of these. 

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ADMIRAL KIM3 said that it appeared to be the suggestion that the 

Generalissbo should be offered 20,000 tons a month by air as an alternative to the opening of the Burma Road. His fear was that the increased bomber effort from China; resulting from the increased capacity 

of the air route, would force the Japanese to take strong action and the 

terminal points would be attacked. Even if the bases in Assam were 

secure those in Kunming were open to attack. The retention of China as 

a base for the defeat of Japan was as essential as the continuance of 

Russia in the war as a factor in the defeat of Germany. 

GENERAL NcNARNEY said that he saw PO objection to expandhg the 

facilities for the air route to 20,000 tons. The present limiting 

factor was hard standings rather than air fields. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL agreed that the date for the achievement of 

20,000 tons might be optimistic, but believed that it should be laid 

down as the ultimate objective. 

ADMIW KING pointed out that the Resident had laid down, and the 

Prime Minister concurred in, a figure of 10,000 tons a month for the 

air route being achieved by November. Anything we could do above this 

figure would provide a cushion which could be used for the support of 

ground operations against Mandalay. Though the opening of the Burma 

Road was a symbol to China, it might be possible to convince them that 

an air route would achieve the same results. 

THE COHBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to consider C.C.S. 229 further at 3:30 p.m. that afternoon 

in closed session. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 91st Meeting 

TRIDENT 

Minutes of the Meeting held in 

The Board of Governors Room, 

Federal Reserve Building, 

on Thursday, 20 May 1943, 

at 1530. 

PRESENT 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, lSN 

General C. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. Erg, USN 

Lt. General J. T. Mckrney, llsA 

AL90 PRESENT 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redmn 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Dudley Pound 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

Field Marshal 

Sir John Dill 

Brig. General J. R. Deane, USA 

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF met in closed session and resolved on: 

a. The concentration of available resources as first priority withip 

the Assam-Burma Theater on the building up and increasinE of tke 

air route to China to a capacity of 10,CCG tons a month by early 

fall, and the developtwnt of air facilities in Assam vith a view 

to ­ (1) Intensifying air operations against the JaFanese in Ourma: 

(2) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China: 

(3) Maintaining the flow of air-borne suppl.ies to China. 

b. Vigorous and agressive land and air operations from Assam into 

PLirma via Led0 and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese 

forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as aany Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and 

as an essential step towards the owning of the Burma Road. 

c. The capture of Akyab and of Kamree Island by avrhibious operat ions. 

d. The interruption of Japanese sea comrrunications into Burma. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF also directed that C.C.S. 229, C.C.S. 

231, and C.C.S. 238 be withdrawn from the agenda. 

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COMRINED CIiIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 92nd Meeting 

TRIDENT 

Minutes of Meeting held in 

The Board of Governors Room, 

Federa 1 Reserve Build ing, 

on Friday, 21 May 1943, 

at 1030. 

PRESEhT 

Admiral W. 1). leahy, USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Admiral E. J. King, IlJN Sir hidley Pound 

Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, IISR 4ir Chief Marshal 

Sir Cha r le s Portal 

ALSO PRESEKT 

Commander V. TI. IonE, USN Field p;];larshsl Sir John Dill 

It. Cen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

(For Items 4 and 5) 

Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

(For Items 4 and 5) 

It. Gen. C. N. Mncready 

(For Items 4 and 5) 

Air Marshal Sjr R. Weish 

(For Item 4 and 5) 

Field Marshal Sir Archj~bald 

Wave11 

(For Item 4) 

Admiral Sir James Soaerville 

(For Item 4) 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Richard Feirse 

(For Item 4) 

Capt. C. E. Iaabe, RN 

(For Item 4) 

Rrigadier W. Porter 

(For Item 4) 

Air commodore W. Elliot 

(For Item 4) 

SECRETAEIA 7 

Brigadier �1. Redman 

Brig. Cen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN 

It. Colonel R. L. Vittrup, I!% 

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1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE MINUTES OF THE 90TH AND 9IST MEETINGS 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: ­ a. Approved the conclusions of the Minutes of the 90th Meeting 

subject to substituting the words "an outline plan" for the 

words "a plan" in paragraph b, Item 3. 

b. Approved the conclusions of the 91st hteeting. 

2. SELECTION OF CODE NAMES 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed that for purposes of theTrident Conference only, the 

word ROUNDItAMMER should be used to designate cross-Channel 

operations. 

b. Directed the Secretaries to obtain recommendations from 

appropriate military security agencies in the U.S. and U.K. 

regarding code names for all operations agreed upon in the 

Trident Conferences. 

3. MILITARY SUPPLIES FOR TURKEY 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that at the ANFA Conference (C.C.S. 63rd 

Meeting), it was agreed that Turkey lay within a theater of British 

responsibility and that all matters connected with Turkey should be 

handled by the British. It was also agreed that the British should 

be responsible for framing and presenting to both Assignnents Boards 

all bids for equipment for Turkey. He pointed out that no decision 

has been recorded by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the priority 

to be accorded to the supply of equipment for Turkey as compared with 

other commitments and no instructions have yet been issued by the 

Amemican Chiefs of Staff to their representatives on the various 

Assignments Committees in Washington as to the attitude tobe adopted 

towards British bids for equipment on behalf of Turkey. As a result, 

there had been some inclination to treat Turkish requirements as unimportant. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that in C.C.S. 206, dated 30 April, the 

representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff informed the American 

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Chiefs of Staff of the British view with regard to the provision of 

equipment for Turkey, and enclosed a list of the proposed supplies. 

This list has recently been somewhat increased. 

GENERAL WARSHALL questioned what was included in the words "important commitments" in the conclusion proposed by the British. He 

said the proposal was acceptable to him with the understanding that 

requirements for training of U.S. forces and the rearmament of French 

forces were considered as "important commitments." 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Took note of the action already taken or proposed by the 

British Chiefs of Staff with regard to the provision of 

military supplies for Turkey. 

b. Agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of the equipment as proposed by the 

British Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least possible delay. 

(At this point the 

Field Marshal Dill 

General Ismay 

Admiral Noble 

General Macready 

Air Marshal Welsh 

following entered the meeting: 

Admiral Somerville 

Air Chief Marshal Peirse 

Captain Lambe 

Brigadier Porter 

Air Commodore Elliot 

Field Marshal Wave11 Commander Long) 

4. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR E4ST IN 1943-44 

ADMIRAL KING first related C.C.S. 239 to C.C.S. 168 and C.C.S. 

155/1. and then gave a statement of the proposed strategy in the 

Pacific . 

ADNIRAL KING stated that the remarks he would make would give 

a general. outline of the situation in the Pacific and the-scope of 

the operations visualized in the paper which had been submitted for 

consideration (C.C.S. 239). 

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U. S. SECRET 

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During the past 30 or 40 years, since acquisition of the Philippines, the United States had been studying the possible courses 

of action which might have to be undertaken in the Pacific. Agreat 

number of studies prepared at the Naval War College had been premised 

on the necessity for supporting or recovering the Philipnines. Hriefly, there were three routes, one straight through from the Vawaiian 

Islands, the others detouring to the north or south of that line. 

The increase in the capabilities of aircraft had necessitated a revision of some of the previous plans. In any case, decisive action 

against the Japanese Fleet and the seizure of the Marianas Islands 

were of primary importance. 

On December 30, 1941, when he took office as Commander in Chief 

of the United States Fleet, there were numerous plans in existence 

for operations in the Pacific. He had, however, immediately sent a 

dispatch to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet stating that 

his mission was first to hold the Hawaiian-Midway line and the communications with the Pacific Coast, and, secondly, to hold the remainder 

of the line of comunications to Australia and New Zealand. Prior to 

the fall of the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies, plans for 

the employment of naval forces presumed fueling in that area; however, 

with their loss, it was essential to establish safe bases elsewhere. 

One of the most urgent uses of naval forces during the early stages 

of the war in the Pacific had been in the support ofnthe lines of 

communication from Hawaii to Australia. The U.S. h’avy had, therefore, 

established refueling points in Rora Rora, in the Fijis and in Few 

Caledonia. Ground forces had been sent for the protection of these 

bases. Operations during the recent months had rendered these lines 

of communication to Australia relatively safe, except in the case of 

Samoa, which was still exposed to some possibility of attack. 

All operations in the Pacific should be directed toward severing 

the Japanese lines of communication and the recapture of the Philippines. The Philippines could be captured by a flank action, whereas 

the capture of the Fetherlands East Indies must of necessity be the 

result of a frontal attack. The intermediate objectives should be 

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Rabaul, Truk and thence to the Marianas. Regardless of which route 

might be taken, the Marianas are the key to the situation because of 

their location on the Japanese lines of communication. 

In referring to the situation in the Aleutians, he stated that 

the United States had bided its time in undertaking the operation 

against Attu. He considered that there was little danger to Alaska 

or the western part of the North American continent unless the Japanese 

should succeed in reaching Kodiak Island. This probability, in his 

opinion, was remote. An effort on our part to reach Japan by way of 

the northern route and the Kurile Islands would be beset with difficulties because of the rugged nature of the latter. According to 

reports received from our submarines, the Japanese were now actively 

encaged in fortifyin, the Kurile Islands. 

The ultimate defeat of Japan would be accomplished by blockade, 

bombing, and assault. Of these measures, attacks on warships and 

shipping along enemy lines of communication were inherent in all 

offensive operations. It has been our purpose to work toward positions of readiness from which Japan can be attacked. Allied offensive 

measures comprise continued and intensified attacks on enemy ships 

and shipping, in cutting or threatening to cut enemy lines of communication between Japan and Japanese holdings and in attack on enemy sea, 

air, and ground forces, thereby obliging them to fight to retain their 

holdings and to retain their lines of communication. The scope and 

intensity of the Allied war effort in the Pacific must insure that 

the means at hand are actively employed to the best advantage. 

The general capabilities of the Allied effort comprise: 

a. Keep Japan from further expansion and from consolidating 

and exploiting her current holdings. 

b. Maintain the vital Midway-Hawaii line (key to the Pacific). 

C. Secure the lines of communication to Australia and New Zealad. 

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d. Block the enemy approaches to Australia from the northward by 

way of Rabaul and from the northwestwardbyway ofthe Malay barrier. 

e. Attain positions which menace enemy lines of communication 

with the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines,and the South China Sea. 

f. Open the line of communications with China by way of Burma. 

g. Make ready to support Russia in case of war with Japan. 

h. Continue to intensify attrition of enemy strength by land, 

air. and sea (including submarine\ action. 

In referring to Japan's potentialities for offensive action, he 

listed as possibilities: 

a. The Maritime Provinces, Eastern Siberia-Russia. 

b. Alaska by way of the Aleutians. 

c. Midway-Hawaii line (key to the Pacific). 

d. The Hawaii-Samoa-Fiji-NewCaledonia line which covers the 

line of communication to Australia and New Zealand. 

e. Australia and New Zealand - - by way of the Bismarck Archipelago and/or the Solomons. 

f. Australia by way of Malay barrier. 

g. India - - by way of Burma. 

h. China. 

He summed up his comments on Japan's potentialities and their 

probable courses of action with the general statements: 

a. That there was an impending threat to the Maritime Provinces; 

why action had not been precipitated only the Japanese could answer. 

b. That the developing situation may dictate that the Japanese 

undertake completion of the conquest of China. 

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C. That it was unlikely that the Japanese would undertake major 

operations against Alaska. 

d. That, since the decrease in the scale of activity in the 

Solomon area, Japan had not given any definite indication of where 

she would strike next. Her reserve potentialities were certainly 

great enough to permit offensive action. It was, therefore, necessary that the United Nations be alert to anticipate the direction 

of this attack. 

He stated that it was necessary to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan, particularly by intensifying action 

to cut her lines of comnunication ad to attain positions of readiness 

from which a full-scale offensive could be launched as soon as the 

full resources of the United Nations could be made available. The 

yardstick which must be used in measuring any operation undertaken 

in the Pacific was: 

a. Would it further threaten or cut Japanese lines of communication; 

b. Would it contribute to the attainment of positions of readiness from which a full-scale offensive could be launched against 

Japan. 

It was with these objects in mind that the conclusions reached in 

C.C.S. 239 have been set out; namely, offensive operations in the 

Facific and Far East in 1943-44 have the following objectives: 

a. Conduct of air operations in and from China. 

b. Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China. 

C. Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians. 

d. Seizure of the Marshalls and Caroline Islands. 

e. Seizure of the Solomons-Bismarck Archipelago and Japanese 

held New Guinea. 

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To these should be added: "Intensification of operations against 

Japanese lines of communication." 

ADMIRAL KING, in response to several questions, explained briefly 

the methods used by the Japanese in employing their submarines and the 

results which had been attained by the United States submarines operating against Japanese shipping. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved C.C.S. 239 subject to the following amendments: 

Deletion of the word "etain" on pages 1 and 2; 

Deletion of subparagraph 2 b (6) on page 2 and substitution 

for it of: 

I!(6) Intensification of Operafiions against Enemy Lines of 

Communication 

"All the foregoing operations are essential to the attainment of positions which enable the intensification and expansion of attacks on the enemy lines of communication in 

the Pacific." 

Addition of subparagraph 3 a (6) as follows: 

"(6) Intensiflcabion of Operabions against Enemy Lines of 

CommunI'cabion." 

(At this point the following withdrew from the meeting: 

Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wave11 Captain C. E. Lambe, RN 

Admiral Sir James Somerville Brigadier W. Porter 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse Air Commodore W. Elliot) 

5. REPORT TO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Directed the Secretaries to prepare a report to the President 

and Prime Minister on the results of the Conference thus far. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 93rd Meeting 

TRIDENT 

Minutes of Meeting held in 

The Board of Governors Room, 

Federal Reserve 

on Saturday, 22 

at 1030. 

PRESENT 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. S. D. Embick, USA 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Smervell, USA 

Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, USA 

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Col. C. P. Cabell, USA 

Comdr. W. L. Freseman, USN 

Cdr. V. D. Long, USN 

Major F. S. Wildman, USA 

Building, 

May 1943, 

General Sir Alan Brooke 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Dudley Pound 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Capt. C. E. Lambe, RN 

Brigadier W. Porter 

Air Commodore W. Elliot 

Brigadier M. W. M. Macleod 

SECRFXARIAT 

Brigadier ~ 

H. Redman

Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, I(N 

Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup, USA 

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1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE MINUTES OF THE 92ND MEETIK 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: -

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 92nd 

Meeting held on Friday, 21 May. 

2 - ANTI-U-BOAT WARFARE 

(C.C.S. 241 and 241/1) 

ADMIRAL LU'HY said that the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, 

after examining the British paper (C.C.S. 241), were contained in 

C.C.S. 241/1. 

ADMIRAL POUND, in discussing the British proposals, emphasized 

the importance of the support groups and of their flexibility. He 

believed that the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, since they were 

continually examining the situation, were in the best position to 

advise on the transfer of the support groups north or south of 40' 

North. They could, of course, only make recommendations and the final 

decisions for such transfers would rest with Admiral King and himself. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he accepted the importance of the principle of flexibility, but he did not believe the Allied Anti-Submarine 

Survey Board should be charged with the responsibility for recommending transfer of support groups, nor that the Admiralty and Navy Department should await such recommendations before taking action. 

ADMIRAL LEARY said that he believed that the Admiralty and Navy 

Department, rather than the Survey Board, were in the best position to 

review the situation and decide on the necessary allocation of means. 

He considered the duties of the Survey Board were to study and make 

recommendations with regard to facilities and methods of attack. 

ADMIRkL POUND said that it had been suggested that unified control over the whole of the North Atlantic should be instituted by the 

appointment of a supreme commander. This was, however, in his view, 

impracticable since no one commander could have sufficiently detailed 

knowledge of all the areas concerned. The Allied Anti-Submarine Survey 

Board, on the other hand, since it could continually travel and thus 

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cover the whole area, should have an intimate knowledge of conditions 

throughout, and would be in a better position to assess the requirements of all areas and recommend the transfer of forces. He believed 

this to be an important part of their functions, but, of course, their 

recommendations would not tie either Admiral King or himself, with 

whom the final decision would rest. While the Admiralty and Admiral 

King’s headquarters each had an intimate knowledge of the requirements 

and conditions on their own side of the Atlantic, neither was in a 

position to assess completely the situation on the other’s side. The 

whole picture, however, was available to the Allied Anti-Submarine 

Survey Board 

ADMIRAL KING said that he could not agree with Admiral Pound’s 

views. The Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board had done, and would 

continue to do, most useful work but they were in no better position 

than the First Sea Lord and himself to assess the transfer of forces. 

He was apprehensive that, if the responsibility for recommending transfers was placed on the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, the Admiralty and Navy Department would feel tied down by their recommendations, 

and no action to transfer would be taken without such recommendations. 

The function of the Board was to survey conditions and not to exercise 

the function of comrrand as regards the allocation of forces. The 

Survey Board was not an executive agency. As he saw it, the British 

proposal tended to delegate executive responsibility to the Board. 

ADMIRAL POUND said that this was not the intention. It would not 

be necessary for the executive authorities to await recommendations 

from the Board before taking action to transfer forces. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out with regard to V.L.R. aircraft that 

the arguments-put forward in the British paper were misleading since 

the 26,000hours flown in the Gulf and Eastern Sea Frontiers in February were largely done by short-range aircraft and those of the civilian air patrols. Only 4,500 hours had been flown by L.R. and V.L.R. 

aircraft. Further, he was in general opposed to a mixed command which 

was envisaged in the British paper. 

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SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he appreciated that only 4,500 of 

the 26,000 hours flown in the Gulf and Eastern Sea Frontiers in February had been flown by V.L.R. or L.R. aircraft. Even on the figure 

of 4,500 there was, however, still a case for the transfer of aircraft 

from this area to the Bay. He would be interested to know in which 

areas it was proposed to relieve British aircraft in order that these 

could then operate in the Bay. He appreciated the advantages derived 

from the maintenance of homogeneous forces, but a ‘irm decision to 

insist on this would be disappointing since it would cut across the 

principle of flexibility. A committee was now drawing up a sivple 

standard procedure for the operation of A/S aircraft which should 

increase the efficiency of mixed forces and thus improve flexibility. 

There were disadvantages in mixed cmands but he did not feel that too 

much importance should be attached to these. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he agreed that homogeneous forces were not 

essential, but mixed forces, ip his opinion, should be avoided as much 

as possible. 

ADMIRAL POUND explained that after a review of the advantages of 

an increased air effort.over the Bay of Biscay, all possible British 

aircraft had been transferred to this duty. Squadrons had been removed 

from the East Coast and the North of Scotland. No further aircraft 

could be provided except at the expense of Bomber Command, a diversion 

from which, he believed, was not justifiable. 

ADMIRAL KING said that it was essential to maintain a certain 

irreducible minimum of A/S air forces on the East Coast of Arrerica, 

even though their proportion of sightings was lower than that in other 

areas. The locality of submarine activity codd be more rapidly transferred than could aircraft. Certain U.S. F’BM’s were not yet operational 

but drastic measures were being taken to render them effective. When 

this had been done, they could be used to release aircraft for the Bay. 

He was fully in agreement with the principle that the Bay provided 

an excellent hunting ground for anti-submarine operations. 

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ADHIRAL LEAHY then suggested certain amendments to paragraph 4 of 

the U. S. Chiefs of Staff paper (C.C.S. 241/1). 

ADMIRAL POUND explained that the British proposals with regard to 

the Ray offensive should not be taken to mean that action would only be 

~ffectiveif the full number of 72 aircraft were provided. Every aircraft would be of great value. 

THE: COMRINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

L'eferred action on these papers urtil the next weetin?. 

3. POLICY FOR COMING OPERATIONS REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND SIiBI'ERSJVE 

ACTIVITIES 

(C.C.S. 185/3) 

SIR ALAN RROOKF explained that this was largely a political 

matter. The views of the Prime Minister had not yet been received. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the President had expressed the following 

views. We certainly cou1.d not tell the Italians that if they ceased 

hostilities they would have peace with honor: we could not get away from 

unconditional surrender: all we could tell them was that they would be 

treated by the United States ar!d the t3ritish with humanity and with the 

intention that the Italian people should be reconstituted into a nation 

in accordance with the principles of self-determination: this latter 

would, of course, not include any form of Fascism or dictatorship. 

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that on receipt of this message from 

the President, he had prepared a draft telegram to General Eisenhower 

based on the President's views and instructing General Eisenhower 

to adhere to his original directive wit!] regard to propaganda. He 

would like to send this message to the President for his approval. 

GEA'ERAI. ISMAY explained that this matter had also been put in 

very similar terms to the Prime Minister whose decision was awaited. 

SIR C/IARLES PORTAL explained that the Foreign Cffice considered 

that, if tm soft a line were taken now, its effects would wear off 

before operation IIIISKY and even further promises would then be required. 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that he should send the President the 

draft reply to General Eisenhower with a notation that it had not as 

yet received the concurrence of the British Chiefs of Staff nor of the 

Prime Minister. 

THE WMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed to defer action on this paper pending reference to the 

the Prime Minister and the President by General Ismay and General 

Marshall respectively. 

4. SONIC WARFARE 

(C.C.S. 240) 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that it was important that this form 

of warfare should be designeted by a code name. 

ADMIRAL KING said he believed that it might be found necessary 

that sonic warfare should be used for the first time in operation HUSKY. 

THE WMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved the recomendations contained in this paper. 

b. Directed the secretaries to request the security authorities to 

recornend a code name to cover this type of warfare. 

5. MOVEMENT OF THE "QUEENS" 

ADMIRAL POUND said that from his experience on the trip over, he 

was convinced that the Queens should not be allowed to pass through the 

submarine area except in dark periods. This would entail the cycle for 

the Queens being opened out to 28 days. The loss in troop lift which 

this would entail had been estimated at 15,000 for the third quarter of 

the year and 31,000 for the fourth quarter, making a total of 46,000 

for the remainder of the year. If one of these ships were torpedoed, 

the resulting loss to our troop lift would far exceed 46,000. 

In reply to a question by General Marshall as to the extra degree 

of safety which could be expected from his proposal, ADMIRAL POUND 

said that, when considering the possibilities of the Prime Minister 

travelling in one of these ships, he had taken the view that, while 

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it was a fair risk during a dark period of the moon, he would have 

strongly advised against it being undertaken during a light period. 

Similar considerations applied to the movement of 15,000 troops. In 

an emergency, he believed that one of these ships could be used in a 

light period, but only as a very special case. Boats were available 

for only 3,000 of the 15,000 passengers carried. Owing to the congestion on board and the fact that there might be no vessels capable 

of rescuing the personnel within several hundred miles, the loss of 

life, if a Queen were sunk, would be appalling. 

The United States Chiefs of Staff stated that they would like 

to exarrine the implications of the British proposal. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would present a paper 

recommending a change in the cycle of military transport vessels 

of the Queen type with a view to lessening the risk of passage. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 94th Meeting 

TRIDENT 

Minutes of Meeting held in 

The Board of Governors Room, 

Federal Reserve Building, 

on Sunday, 23 May 1943, 

at 1400. 

PRESENT 

Admiral W. D. Leahy. USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Sir Dudley Pound 

Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Ckrles Portal 

ALS PRESENT 

Lt. Cen. S. D. Embick, US.4 

Lt. Gen. 8. B. Somervell, USA 

Vice Admiral F. J. Home, USN 

Rear Admiral C. M. Codke. Jr., USN 

Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, USA 

Brig. Cen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Col. C. P. Cabell, E.9 

Condr. W. L. Freseman, USN 

Comdr. V. D. Long, SN 

Mr. Lewis Douglas, WSA 

(For Item 1-5) 

The Right Aon. Lord Leathers 

(For Items 1-5)

The Right Hon. Lord Cherwell 

(For Items 1-5) 

Field hkrshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Admiral Sir F’ercy Noble 

Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh 

Maj. Gen. N. G. Holmes 

Capt. C. E. Iambe, RN 

Brigadier W. Porter 

Air Comnodore W. Elliot 

Brigadier M. W. M. %Cleo3 

SERETAR IAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Condr. R. D. Coleridge, RN 

Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup, USA 

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1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE YINUTES OF THE 93RD MEETING 

THE COMEINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: -

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 93rd 

Meeting held on Saturday, the 22nd May. 

2. ANTI-V-B)AT WARFARE 

(C.C.S. 241 and 241/1) 

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 93rd Meeting, Item 2. 

ADMIRAL LE4HY suggested tht C.C.S. 241 and 241/1 should each be 

altered in certain respects and then noted by the Conbined Chiefs of 

Staff. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested a minor amendment to paragraph 4 of 

C.C.S. 241/1. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY read out a draft conclusion with reference to the 

work of the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Took note of C.C.S. 241 and deleted the phrase "and that the 

Allied Anti-Subimrine Survey Board should be responsible for 

recomnending any such transfer" at the end of the last paragraph of page 1. (Subsequently plbliskd as C.C.S. 241/3.) 

b. Took note of C.C.S. 241/1 and directed that the words "relieve 

British planes in certain areas" should be deleted ad the 

words "provide planes" substituted. (Subsequently publiskd 

as C.C.S. 241/4.) 

c. Agreed that in view of the fact that the directive under which 

the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board operates requires them 

to report on any aspect of the Allied Anti-Submarine Organization in which they consider the Allied resources are not being 

used to the best advantage, it is not considered necessary that 

the Board should have any special responsibility laid on them 

in the case quoted in C.C.S. 241. 

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3. MOVEMENTS OF THE “QUEENS” 

(C.C.S. 246) 

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 93rd Meeting, Item 5. 

Without discussion, 

TUE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Accepted the proposals for the future movement of the “QL’EENS” 

as set mt in paragraph 6 of C.C.S. 246. 

4. POLICY FOR COMING OPERATIONS REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE 

ACTIVITIES 

(C.C.S. 1851’4) 

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 93rd keting, Item 3. 

GENERAL. ISMAY informed the Combired Chiefs of Staff that the Prime 

Minister lrad agreed to the draft telegram to General Eisenhower, contained in C.C.S. 185/4. 

THE ODMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Took note that the President and Prime Minister had decided 

that the policy set forth in C.C.S. 185/2/D shouid be adhered 

to. 

b. Agreed to send the mssage contained in C.C.S. 185/4 to General 

Eisenhouer . 

5. IMPLENENTATION OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943-1944 

(C.C.S. 244) 

THE COMMITTEE had before them C.C.S. 244 together with an addendum 

and corrigendum to it containing Annex VII, and a sumry of conclusions 

and a corrigendum to Annex 11. 

Certain amendments to the paper were suggested and accepted. 

LOUD LEATHERS said that Annex VII represented the agreed views of 

himself, Mr. Lewis Dmglas ard General Somervell and was a submission of 

the shipping position for the pericd under discussion. He and his 

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colleagues believed the deficiencies were relatively smll and. if 

properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect would not 

be unmanageable. The requirer.ents set cut in the paper had, in most 

cases, been cut as far 9s was possible. The deficiency was only a 

smll percentage of the total. This smll percentage of deficiency 

when taking into consideration the various assumptions, including 

losses, building rates, etc., was so small that it could be spread and 

absorbed and gave, in his opinion, no grounls for anxiety. 

LORD LEATHERS then suggested a minor amendment to the note following paragraph 3 of Annex VII. Part I. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the reduced troop lift due to the 

proposed opening out of the cycle of movement for the "QUEENS" had been 

taken into account the bottleneck was dry cargo and not personnel 

shipping. 

In reply to a question by General Marshall, LORD LEATHERS explained that shortly after the Casablanca Conference the loss rate had 

been carefully examined ad agreed rates accepted. These were 2.39 

percent per month for the first half of the year and 1.9 percent per 

month for the secad half. The present paper had been based on these 

calculations, though in fact the loss rate so far this year had worked 

out at slightly less than 1.9 percent. An agreed ad accurate loss 

rate was a most important factor in all calculations dealing with shipping requirements and availability. He agreed with Admiral King that 

tk loss rate should be subjected to frequent review. 

MR. DOOGLAS said that he agreed with Lord Leathers that the 

deficit with regard to dry cargo shipping was not unwnageable. 

In reply to a question by General Marshall, GENERAL SOMERVELL 

said that he agreed with Lord Leathers and hfr. Douglas that shipping 

was available for the undertakings set out in C.C.S. 244. subject to the 

slight deficit which he considered could be absorbed by spreading it 

over the entire period. 

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SIR ALAN BROOKE said that k felt sure the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff would wish to express appreciation of the excellent work accomplished in so short a time by the Corrbined Staff Planners and shipping experts, both civil ard military. All present agreed. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved C.C.S. 244, as amended in Annex "B" to these Minutes,* 

except that paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Sumnary of Conclusions 

shculd be taken note of as recomnendatiom only. 

6. DESPATCH OF U. S. SERVICE AND ENGINEER TROOPS TO THE UNTTED 

KINGDOM 

SIR ALAN BROOKE read out a brief mmorandum** on the importance of 

the early despatch of certain service ad engineer troops to the United 

Kingdom. This movenent would not interfere with the scheduled SICKLE 

build-up but was essential due to the shortage of mnpaver in England. 

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that he entirely agreed with Sir 4lan 

Brooke's view that the early arrival of S.O.S. and engineer troops was 

essential to prepare for the arrival of the fighting forces. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the present plan already provided for 

the movement of 40.000 men per division which included a large proportion of service units. The required priority could be arranged for 

early sailing of necessary service elements. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he was prepared to accept this movement provided that it was not at the expense of SICKLE, the priority 

of which must not be disturbed. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the picture as a whole must be considered. 

It might prove necessary for the SICKLE movement to be modified slightly 

in the light of these requirements. 

LORD LEATHERS pointed out the necessity for port battalions for 

dischnrging the ships at the landing points. 

* Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 244/1. 

** Annex "A" to these minutes. 

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Both General MtNarney and Sir Charles Portal pointed out that 

SICKLE was an essential prelude to and an integral prt of cross-Channel 

operations as a whole ad that the grod operations could not be dertaken without it. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that the necessary service troops for the build-up of the 

BOLERO force will be given priorities in sailings as necessary to 

service the build-up of the combat troops without prejudice to 

SICKLE. 

(At this point Lord Leathers, Lord Cherwell, and Mr. Douglas left 

the meeting. ) 

7. WFXATION “BRISK” 

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 87th Meeting, Item 2. 

THE COMMITTEE had before them a draft report by the British Planning Staff. (J.P.(T) 17 (Final)) 

In the course of discussion it was pointed out that the Prime 

Minister and President had mde it clear that the decision with regard 

to diplomatic action should rest with them, and had asked the Corhined 

Chiefs of Staff to prepare a statement of the military reasons necessitating the occupation of the Portuguese Islands, a military plan to 

effect their capture and to give a target date on which this operation 

could be urdertaken. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed certain alternative 

proposals for obtaining the use of these Islands at an earlier date than 

that indicated in the plan. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: - Took note that the British Staff Planners were preparing a statemnt for inclusion in the final report to the President and Prime 

Minister, which would set forth the urgent military reasons for 

this operation. 

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8. THIRD SOVIET PROTOCOL 

(C.C.S. 243) 

Without discussion, 

THE aDMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that this mtter should be comidered after the conclusion 

of the TRIDENT Conferences. 

1. In order to obtain the maximum intake of U.S. troops and their 

equipment into the United Kingdom, it is essential that certain Service 

and Engineer troops should be desptched between now and November. 

2. The troops required are as follavs: 

a. Army Service Force personnel to activate existing depots. 

b. Engineer personnel to construct new depots. (This will take 

about six months. ) 

C. Port battalions to assist in the discharge of SICKLE/BOLERO 

vessels. 

3. The rate at which these troops must be despatched fran U.S.A. 

if the maximum flow of SICKLE/BOLERO movement is to be obtained is as 

f ollavs : 

Month Number Detail 

June 14,000 -) A.S.F. troops required to operate 

) at maximum capacity 16 million 

July 

)- - 12,000 -) 

square feet of depot space now in 

existence for U. S. forces. 

August 52,000 5 Port Battaliom required. 

September 

--) 

48,000 )

)--

10 Engineer Battalions required to 

put in hand extra depots during 

-) August and September 

October 29,000 

November 45,000 

4. The above allocation does not interfere with the scheduled SICKLE 

build-up. 

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AMENDMENTS AGREED UPOR BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

TO C.C.S. 244 

1. On the cover sheet delete the last paragraoh with regard to 

Annex VII. 

2. Page 3, paragraph V(6) 

At the end of the sentence add the words "with due regard to other 

important commitments. 1' 

3. Page 4, paragrafih 1, second subparagraph 

insert the words "the equivalent strength of" between the words 

"t0" and "36. '1 

4. Page 5. paragraph 5 

Delete the word "latter" in the third line ad substitute the word 

"Indian" therefor. 

5. Page 6, paragraph 6 

In the listing of American Divisions delete the figure "14" and 

substitute "12%" therefor. 

Under "American" insert an extra item: "1 ex Iceland." 

Delete the figures "33 - 37" in the grand total and substitute 

"32% - 3ffh." 

6. Page 6, paragraph 7, line 4 

Delete the word "three" ad substitute the word "two." 

7. Page 10, paragraph 1, line 5 

Delete the words "the resumption of" and after the word "convoys" 

insert the words "should they be resumd." 

a. Page 11 

At the erd of paragraph 6 add a new sentence to read as follows: 

"The above is depndent on the losses sustained in HUSKY." 

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U. S. SECRET 

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9. Page 14 

Delete all Appendices lis :d excer "A," "B" and "El"; delete the 

Appendices themselves and all subsequent references to them in the 

bdy of the paper. 

10. Page 14, paragraph 2 

At the end of the last sentence insert a coma ad add "snd for 

other purposes. 

11. Page 18, Appendix "A," line 3 

Insert the words "night fighter" after the word "TEF." 

12. Page 18, lines 4 and 5 

Delete ''for cross-Channel operations" and substitute "in the u. K. 

by 1 by 1944 subject to the provision of accommnlation, which requires 

further study. 1' 

13. Page 19 

In the last column of tk first table, the first entry should read 

"1846" rather than "1826." 

14. Page 20 

In the table in subparagraph C(k), bracket the first two items and 

opposite the bracket imert the word 'squadrons." Bracket the next four 

items and opposite the bracket irsert the word "aircraft." 

15. Page 25, Appendix "Eln 

In the next to the last column, change the first entry from "67" 

to "91." 

16. Page 32 

Delete paragraph 6. 

17. Page 37, last paragraph in 43) 

Delete the whole paragraph ad substitute tk follawing therefor: 

"Lending craft in adequate numbers can only be furnished provided the 

correct projected rate of production can be mintained." 

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18. Page 43, Note (Annex VII) 

Insert at the beginning of the note the words "the foregoing is 

based on the assucption that" before the words "each BOLERO cargo 

ship.. ." 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 95th Meeting 

TRIDENT 

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 240, 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building, 

on Monday, 24 May 1943, 

at 1130. 

PRESENT 

Admiral W. D. leahy, LEN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, LS4 Admiral of the Fleet 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Sir Ddley Pound 

Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney. LEA Air Chief hbrshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

ALSO PRESENT 

Lt. Gen. B. B. Somrvell, LEA Field Wirshal Sir John Dill 

Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismy 

Vice Admiral R. Willson, LEN Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., LEN Lt. Gen. G. N. hlacready 

bj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, USA Air hbrshal Sir R. Welsh 

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, LEA bj.Gen. N. G. Holms 

Col. C. P. Cabell, USA Capt. C. E. Iambe, RN 

Condr. W. L. Freseman, LEN Brigadier W. Porter 

Condr. V. D. Long, USN Air Comnodore W. Elliot 

Brigadier M. W. M. kcled 

SECRETARIAT 

Rr igad ier H. Redman 

Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Condr. R. D. Coleridge, RN 

Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup, LSA 

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1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 94TH MEETING 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: - Approved the conclusiors of the minutes of tte 94th meeting except 

that the conclusion under Item 6 was changed to read as follows: 

"Agreed that the necessary service troops for the build-up of 

the BOLERO force will be given priorities in sailings as necessary to service the build-up of the combat troops, without 

prejudice to SICKLE." 

2. DRAFT REPORT 'I0 PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 

K.C.S. 242/2) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered C.C.S. 242/2 paragraph by 

paragraph ard agreed to certain amendments. 

ADMIRAL LE4'HY pointed out that the British p-oposal relating to 

the extension of pressure in the Pacific for the earliest defeat of the 

Axis was, in his opinion, unacceptable since, should the situation in 

the Pacific becom dangerous to U. S. interests or to U. S. itself, it 

would be necessary to supplement U. S. forces in this theater even at 

tk expense of the early defeat of Germany. 

SIR CWLES PORTAL said that the British proposal was not intended 

to restrict operations in the Pacific but rather to insure that any 

surplus forces which might becane available could be concentrated on 

the early defeat of Germany, thus bringing the war as a whole to an 

erd more rapidly. 

GENERAL MRSIulLL said that with regard to air forces, the Conbiced 

Chiefs of Staff had agreed to pt into the United Kingdom tk maximum 

nunber of groups which could be mintained there. If, therefore, there 

was a surplus of air forces he believed that tky should be sent to the 

Southwest Pacific which at present was operating on a shoestring and 

where great results could be achieved by relatively small additions to 

the forces in that area. 

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The U. S. Air Staff were more than anxious to implement the SICKLE 

plan since they believed that air superiority properly applied would 

produce devastating results. They were reluctant, therefore, to divert 

forces elsewhere at the expense of SICKLE. On the other hand, in the 

Pacific the Japapese with their good interior lines of communication 

could more rapidly concentrate their air forces and it was essential, 

therefore, to hve a numerical as well as a combat ascendancy. No major 

concentration of Japanese forces had yet taken place in the Pacific: 

but if this should occur, our avn forces might find themelves in a 

most difficult situation from which they would have to be retrieved. 

Public opinion in the United States would not perlrit the acceptance of 

major reverses in the Pacific. If, therefore, tkere was any surplus of 

forces above those required to undertake agreed operatiom, he believed 

that they should be sent to the Southwest Pacific to exploit and improve 

our position in that area. 

SIR C'MRLES PORTAL said that h? entirely agreed that any surplus 

forces, which might exist, should be sent to the Pacific, either for 

agreed operatiom or to defend the United States; but what h? had meant 

to inply was that if operations in the Pacific were going well, it would 

be wiser, in order to eliminate Germany from the war, to send any surplus there might be either to the United Kingdom or to the Mediterr anean. 

THE CONNITTEE then accepted the addition of certain words to 

paragraph I1 b suggested by Sir Drdley Poud. 

In discussing the subparagraph of paragraph I11 dealing with the 

concentration of maximum resources in a selected area, SIR CHARLES 

PORTAL said tht the words "in a selected area" might prove restrictive, 

since, as regards air forces, a saturation point might be reached in the 

United Kingdan. He believes that if additional forces were available 

they should attack the citadel of Europe frcm bases on all sides. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that it had already been agreed that 

the air offensive in Europe shculd be intensified without restricting 

the bases from which the forces should operate. He believed that all 

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the decisions of the Conference must be reviewed at the next meeting or 

earlier if necessary, since, should Russia fall or mke peace with 

Germany, it would be impossible to accomplish ROUNDHAMMER. It might 

therefore be necessary to reorient our strategy with a view to undertaking the defeat of Japan prior to that of Germany. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed as to the necessity of reviewing.at the 

next conference all the decisions now taken, since it was vital to exploit any opportunities which arcse. The position in southern Europe 

might well be such that we sharld take advantage of it. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that paragraph VII b dealing with the next 

meeting of the Conbined Chiefs of Staff should be amended to make it 

clear that the decisions reached at the present conference should be 

examined in the light of the situation then existing. 

GENERAL NAKSHALL suggested certain amendments to the Annex aimed 

at strengthening the case, on military grounds, for obtaining the 

Islands. 

In discussing the amendment to pragraph I11 i of the Annex, which 

pointed out that the Islarrls provided the most direct all-weather air 

supply routes to Europe, Africa ad the Far East, SIR CHARLES POhTAL 

said that he would like it to be agreed that the requirements of antiU-boat warfare must take first priority. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Agreed to the draft report to the President and Prime Minister 

as amended in C.C.S. 242/3. 

b. Agreed that with reference to Section IV, paragraph3 a (S), 

no additional administrative (I logistic cmitments would be 

entered into without the prior approval of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff. 

c. Agreed that the security control agencies of the U. S. and 

U. K. should arrange for the necessary machinery for the production of deception policy ad the coordination of cover plans 

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for operations in the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters (Including Burma ). 

d. Agreed, with regard to pragraoh 3 i of the Annex to C.C.S. 

242/2, that when the use of the Azores is obtained, first 

priority must be given to the needs of anti-submarine warfare. 

3. DIRECTIVE ON ORGANIZATION AND OPWATIONS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT 

FOR HUSKY 

(C.C.S. 247) 

Without discussion, 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Agreed that consideration of this mtter should be deferred until 

after the Trident Conference. 

4. PROVISION OF NEW L.S.I.(L)'S 

(C.C.S. 248) 

SIR DUDLEY FOUND asked that the following amendmnts should be 

made to this paper: 

Paragraph 5 b (l), first sentence, to read: 

'the allocation for use by the British services of as mny 

Jay ships as are suitable for conversion to L.S.I.(L)'s." 

The final sentence of pragraph 5 b (2) to read: 

"and tkn after conversion temporarily allocated to British 

control. n 

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would 

like further time to consider this *per. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: - Agreed: 

a. That certain amendments should be made to C.C.S. 248 as incorporated in C.C.S. 248/1. 

b. That action on this pper should be deferred 

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5. REQUIREMENTS To EXPAND THE CAPACITY OF THE AIR ROUTE TO CHINA 

GENERAL MARSHALL presented a memorandum setting out certain requirements to enable the capacity of the air route to China to be expanded. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that in view of the fact that a directive 

setting out the priority to be accorded to the expansion of the air 

rmte had already been sent to the U. S. ad British authorities con­

(cerned in India and China, these requiremnts should also be transmitted 

(to the authorities concerned. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF SIAFF: 

Agreed that the suggestion at x above should be implenented by the 

U. S. ard British Air Staffs in direct collaboration. 

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

C.C.S. 96th Meeting 

TRIDENT 

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 240, 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building, 

on Tuesday, 25 May 1943, 

at 1030. 

PRESENT 

Admiral W. D. Leahy, USN General Sir Alan Brooke 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Admiral of the Fleet 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Sir Dudley Pound 

It. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Charles Portal 

ALSO PRESENT 

It. Gen. B. B. Somervell, USA 

Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN 

Maj. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, USA 

Rear Adm. C. M. Cooke, Jr.. USN 

Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, USA 

Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, USA 

Col. C. P. Cabell, USA 

Comdr. W. L. Freseman, USN 

Comdr. V. D. Long, USN 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Admiral Sir Percy Noble 

Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready 

Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh 

Maj. Cen. N. C. Holmes 

Capt. C. E. Lambe, l?N 

Brigadier E. I. C. Jacobs 

Brigadier W. Porter 

Air Commodore W. Elliot 

Brigadier M. W. M. kcleod 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier H. Redman 

Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, USA 

Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN 

Lt. Colonel R. L. Vittrup 

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1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE MINUTES OF THE 95TH MEETING 

ADMIRAL KING suggested an amendment to Conclusion c of Item 2. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the Conclusions of the 95th Meeting as recorded in the 

Minutes, but with the substitution of the word "Pacific" for 

"Indian" in Conclusion c of Item 2 and the addition of the words 

"(including Burma)" after the words "Far Eastern Thenters." 

2. FINAL REPORT TO PRESIDENT AND PRIWE MINISTER 

(C.C.S. 242/4 and 242/5) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them C.C.S. 242/4, together with certain amendments suggested by the Prime Minister (C.C.S. 

242 /S ). 

Certain other minor amendments were suggested and approved. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-

Approved the final report to the President and Prime Minister, as 

modified by C.C.S. 242/5 and as amended in the course of discussion. 

3. IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS REACHED AT THE TRIDENT CONFERENCE 

(C.C.S. 250) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum by the 

Conhined Staff Planners covering suggested directives and instructions 

to General Eisenhower and General Morgan, prepared in the light of the 

decisions reached at the TRIDENT Conference. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested nn amendment to pnrngraph 1 c of the 

Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered certain amendments to the 

draft directives contained in &closures "A" and "B. " 

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GENERAL MARSHALL presented a proposal that an additional statement 

be added at the end of paragraph 1 of C.C.S. 250 to the effect that 

shipping available for Post-HUSKY Mediterranean operations would amount 

to 15 combat loaders and 90 cargo ships. 

SIR CHARLES PORTAL indicated that he thought that before the 

British Chiefs of Staff could agree to specify an axact number of ships 

the matter would have to be explored further. 

ADMIRAL KING suggested adding the statement nt the end of paragraph one: "Further instructions will be issued as to the availability 

of conhat loaders and cargo ships." 

ADMIRAL KING'S proposal wqs agreed to. 

ADllIRAL LEAHY suggested that the recommendations in the coverjng 

Memorandum to the Combined Staff Planners, as amended, be approved, but 

that the final directives be prepared by the Secretariat in the light of 

the discussion and of the latest decisions. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:­

a. Approved the covering memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners 

as amended in the course of discussion. 

b. Approved the draft directive to General Eisenhower (Enclosure 

"A") and the draft supplementary directive to the Chief of 

Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate) (Enclosure "E"), 

subject to the incorporation therein by the Secretaries of the 

agreed decisions that had been arrived at subsequent to the 

preparation of these draft directives. 

4. SUGGESTED STATEMENT TO BE MADE To THE CHINESE 

(Unnurrbered C.C.S. Memorandum dated 25 by 1943) 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that since he had a meeting with the Chinese 

Representatives at 3 p.m. that afternoon he would like guidance from the 

Corrbined Chiefs of Staff as to the form in which the decisions of the 

Conference should be conveyed to the Chinese. He urged that the de463 
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cisions of he Combined Chie,fs of Staff with reference to Burma be 

presented as proposals since it would be improper to imply a decision 

had been made regarding the use of the Generalissimo’s forces. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF were of the opinion that the formal 

transmission of the decisions to the Chinese should be made by the 

President and Prime Minister to the Generalissimo. 

Certain amendments to the draft contained in the memorandum under 

discussion were then inserted in order to conform to this conception. 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF S7AFF:-

Approved with minor amendments, the suggested statement* to be 

made to the Chinese. 

5. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVIRG COMBINED PLANNING 

(C.C.S. 251) 

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered a Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners containing certain proposals for improving Combined 

P laming. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested an amendment to paragraph 2 a of the 

Memorandum designed to make it clear that the war against Japan should 

be considered as a whole. 

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that paragraph 2 b should be eliminated 

since, in his view, the function of the Combined Staff Planners was to 

advise the Combined Chiefs of Staff on plans prepared by theater commanders and not to personally assist theater commanders. He felt that 

the presence of the Combined Staff Planners at theater headquarters 

might interfete with the function of theater comanders and their staffs. 

ADMIRAL COOKE and CAPTAIN LAMBE explained that this paragraph 

hsd been inserted since it was believed that the Combined Staff Planners 

could, if they visited General Eisenhower‘s headquarters, prove useful 

* Subsequently rublished as Annex to the White House Minutes, 25 May1943 

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by imrarting information ad ditn as regards resources which would 

assist him in drawing UF his rlans and, at the same time, themselves 

learn at an early stage of the possible plans and requirements. 

TNF COMDINED CYIFFS OI FTbF1:-

Approved the proposals put forward by the Combined Staff planners, 

subject to certain amendments which have been incorporated in 

c.c.s. 251/1. 

6. C@WLUSION CF TI:,? COKFEFTWCE 

SIR ALAN :sROC'X'.E said that, on behalf of the !Iritish Chiefs of 

of Staff, he would like to exrress most heartfPlt thanks for the kindness, both official 2nd unofficiel, whj~chthe Fritish Chiefs of Staff 

had received during their visit. They had been met in a sy'irit of cooperation which had proved most helyful. The fundamental value of the 

exchange of views between the Chiefs of Staff of the two ?;ations had 

been proved by the fact that they had agreed to hold the next Conference 

at an early date. Short periods between meetings were, he felt, essential. If the lapse of time between successive meetings was too long, 

the views of each nation were mre likely to become divergent. 

SIR PLAN 6ZOOK.E paid tribute to the Combined Staff Flamers who 

had worked at great pressure and whose high standard of work hid gone 

far to assist the Conbined Chiefs of Staff in reaching rapid decisions. 

Kith regard to the results of the Conference, agreement had been 

reached on all vital points and through the process of reaching agreement, each side had achieved a clearer appreciation of the outlook and 

conception of the other. Finally, the Conference had strengthened those 

ties of friendship between the two Staffs, which was so essential to 

true cooperation in the war. 

CIMIkAL LFAKY, on behalf of the If. S. Chiefs 'of Staff, said that 

they too had an eoual appreciation of the value of this conference and 

looked forward with assurance to equally successful results from future 

conferences. Frequent meetings were. in his o?inion, essential. It had 

been a great pleasure to hiv to assist, for the first time, in personal 

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consultation with the Dritisli Chiefs of Staff. 'This Conference had 

en2ble.l the Chiefs of Stqff to clarify the outJook for the immediate 

future and subsequent ronferences would enable then to deal as successfully c:i th future problers. 

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MINUTES OF A MEETING 

held at 

GENERAL EISENHOWER’S VILLA, ALGIERS, 

at 1700 hours, 29 May 1943. 

PRESENT 

British u. s. 

The Prime Minister General G. C. Marshall 

General Sir Alan F. Brooke General D. D. Eisenhower 

Admiral of the Fleet Major General W. B. Smith 

Sir Andrew B. Cunninghan- Brig. General L. W. Rooks 

General Sir Harold Alexander 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Arthur Tedder 

Lieut. General Sir Hastings L. Ismy 

Major General Humphrey Gale 

Major General J. F. M. Whiteley 

Brigadier C. S. Sugden 

Conmodore R. M. Dick 

SERETAR IES 

Lieut. Colonel Frank McCarthy 

Major Carter L. Burgess 

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1. HOBGOBLIN 

GENERA1 EISENHOWER explained that HO.9GOBL.IN was the code name of 

the island and that the code name of the operation for capturing it 

was CORKSCREW. 

THE PRIME MIRI,5TFR said that a telegram had been received frorr 

the British Vice Chiefs of Staff asking a nurrber of questions ahout 

the operation what was the date? What were its military advantages? 

Nould it prejudice surprise in HUSKY?, etc. 

GENERAL EISENtlOWES said that the date was 11 June; the military 

advantages of capturing KORCORL.IN were obvious from a glance at the 

map; the possession of the airfield was almost essential to enable 

the necessary air cover to be given to the southern assault on t'LSKY: 

there was no reason to suppose that it would prejudice surprise in 

'I'USKY, since the operation could be represented as a necessary step 

in clearing the Sicilian narrows. General Eisenhower continuing said 

that the result of failure at t;Ok'GOMIP would be very had, materially 

and morally, and he described the various precautions which were being 

taken to insure lhat failure did not occur. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that his present plan was to use 

6-inch cruisers, but he was ready to bring in a 14-inch battleship 

if this appeared desirable. 

THE PRIIE MINISTER thought that the operation would provide a 

very useful experiment as to the extent to which coast defenses could 

could be neutralized by aerial bombardment. There was a school of 

thought in the United Kingdom which thought that air forces could 

knock out coast defenses sufficiently to admit of practically unopposed landings. SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the difficulty lay in 

the fact that there was a tire lag between the end of the aerial horrbardment and the arrival of the assaulting troops and that this the 

lag gave the enemy time to recover. THE PRIME MINISTER drew attention 

to the possibility of following up the bombardment by dropping harmless bombs which would deceive the enemy into thinking that they were 

still under fire and thus keep their heads down. 

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SIR ANDFEW CC’KNI’KGH4M said that eight destroyers would go right 

in with the landing craft and cover the landings at point-blank range. 

BRIGACIE.? SLGDEP, in reply to the questions of the Prime hinister, 

said that nineteen Shermap tanks were included in the assaulting force 

in the hope that their morale effect would be considerable. The Italians’ strength was alleged to be about 10,000, including coast defense 

troops, together with about 100 tanks, but this inforrration was based 

on deduction, not on direct evidence. 

2. HUSKY 

GENERAL EITEFWOWFR, in reply to a question from the Frime Minister, said that all resources required for HI’SKk seemed to be coming 

forward pu?ctually and in adequate numbers. He then gave a brief 

description of the plan. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that five American and four or five 

British cruisers, together with a considerable number of destroyers, 

would be used to cover the assault. There would also be numerous small 

gunboats and three large monitors. 

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER, in reply to a question from the Prime Minister, 

said that the principal preoccupation of the Air Force would be to obtain and retain command of the air over the convoys and landings. 

3. FOST-HUSKY OPERATIONS 

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that he had had a long talk with Sir Alan 

Brooke on the subject of the war situation as a whole and that Sir Alan 

had emphasized that the Russian Army was the only land force that could 

yield decisive results. Any Anglo-American force that could be put 

upon the Continent was merely a drop in the bucket. Sir Alan Brooke 

had therefore urged that the efforts of our armies must he directed 

towards diverting German strength from the Russian Front in order to 

enable the Russian Armies to inflict a decisive defeat upon them. He 

himself (General Eisenhower) thought that if we had command of the air, 

an Anglo-American force of, say, fifty divisions would probably be able 

to hold a force of seventy-five German divisions on the Continent. 

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If it was generally accepted that a Second Front in Western Europe is 

unnecessary and that our main object was to divert German strengtb from 

the Russian Front, the conceptior of sending seven divisions away from 

the Mediterrarean seem-ed to him. to be somewhat faulty. If we were 

goinE to knock out Italy, we oueht to do so immediately after KCISKY 

and with all the means at our disposal. MUSKY would give a gnd indication of the type of resistance likely to be encountered on the mainland of Italy itself: and if HUSKY proved to he an easy proposition, 

we ought to go directly into Italy. This would yield far greater 

prizes than any attack on the islands. 

THE PRIME .MINISTER said that there was no chance of our putting 

into Europe an Anglo-American Army in any way comparable in size to 

that of the Russians, who are now holding 218 Cirman divisions on their 

front. By the first of May, 1944, we should have an expeditionary 

force of twenty-nine divisions in the United Kingdom, seven of which 

would have come from North Africa. Continuing, the Frime Minister 

said that the United Kingdom must be the assembly point of the largest 

force which we could accumulate, and it was necessary to have plans 

ready to cross the Channel in force at any time in case the Germans 

were to crack. As General Marshall had frequently pointed out, Northern 

France was the only theater in which the vast British Metropolitan 

Air Force and the U.S. Air Forces in the United Kingdom could be brought 

into full play. It was not, in any event, intended that the AngloAmerican force in the United Kingdom should continue to accumulate 

beyond May, 1944, and it was our intention to launch a considerable 

operation which was likely tG be accompanied by very heavy fighting 

and casualties at that time. The Frime Minister emphasized that both 

the British people and the British Ar.my were anxious to fight across 

the Channel. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that a definite date for the cross-Channel 

operation had been settled by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and that 

five divisions would be used in the assault phase. The difficulty in 

the accumulation of the tremendous Air Force required lay not so much 

in the number of airplanes that could be delivered, but in the ability 

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of t!ie United KinEilom to ahsorh them. General Eisenhower had asked 

for infornation as to when he should submit his plan for knocking Italy 

out of the war. The {!.S. Chiefs of Staff fclt that no decision cou~cl 

he made until the result of HllSKY had been deterained and the situation 

in Icussia was known. The logical approach would be to set up two 

forces, each with its OWP staff, in separate places. Cne force would 

train for an operation against the islands of Sardinia and Corsica, 

and the other for an operation on the aainland of Italy. When the 

situation was sufficiently clear to enable a decision to be taker as 

to which of these orerations was to go forward, the necessary air 

forces, landing craft, etc., would be made over to the force charged 

with implementing the selected plan. 

THE PRIM MINISTER foresaw that if HldSKY went too quickl.y, there 

might be a long interlude of inactivity. GENERAL EISENIlCWER said that 

if IlUSKYwere polished off easily, he would be willing to go straicht 

to Italy. 

SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER thought that if the HUSKY struggle were 

bitter and prolonged, we should be fighting hard in the island and 

there would not be any inactive interlude. If, however, HUSKY proved 

easy, we should inmediately establish a bridgehead in Italy. 

SIR AL.AN BROOKE said that a hard struggle between the Russians 

and Germans was imminent and that we should do all in our power to help 

the former and disperse the latter. The Germans were subjected to 

threats in mrlny points in Europe. We had already caused a dispersal 

of their forces by our presence in North Africa and the skillful use 

of cover plans. HUSKY would be another step in the right direction. 

The Germans were faced with operations in Russia, with possible trouble 

in the Balkans. and with dangers in Italy, France and Norway. Their 

forces were already widely stretched and they could not further decrease 

their strength either in Russia or in France. The place where they 

could most conveniently reduce their comaitments is Italy. We should, 

therefore, base our decisions on the result of HUSKY and on the situation then existing. If the foot of Italy were packed with troops, we 

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should try elsewhere. If Italy were to be knocked out of the war, 

Cernany would have to replace the twenty-six Italian divisions in the 

BaJlcans. They would also require additional strength in the Brenner 

Pass, along the Riviera, and on the Spanish and Italian frontiers. 

This dispersal of German forces is just what we require for a crossChannel operation and we should do everything in our power to aggravate it. The defenses on the coast of France would present no difficulty unless they were held by determined men and the Germans had 

mobile reserves with which to counterattack. 

i;ENEJIAL EISENt!OWER said that the discussiop had seemed to simFlify 

his problem. If FUSKY were to succeed, say, within a week, he would 

at once cross the Straits and establish a bridgehead. The coast 

defenses of Southern Italy would probably be easier KO crack than those 

of HUSKY. 

THE PPIME IIIINISTEF expressed the personal view that EL'SKY would 

be finished by August 15. 

GENERAL MARSIIAIL said that we ought to have a good idea of how 

long the operations would last by the end of July. In the meanwhile, 

we should prepare for various operations, give our troops the best of 

training, and postpone the final decision until the result of 'h'1;SKY 

was known. 

TEE PRIME MINISTER said that if HL!SKY had proved successful by 

August and the strain had not been too heavy, we should at once go for 

the toe of Italy, provided that not too manyGerman divisions had been 

moved there. He thought that the Balkans represented a greater danger 

to Germany thar? the loss of Italy. In case of trouble in the former, 

Turkey might react to our advantage. Continuing, b,e said that he liked 

the idea of two forces and two staffs, and of preparing for alternative 

operations. He suggested that further consideration should be given 

to the matter and that there should be another meeting next iiionday. 

GENERA1 EXSENHOWEX drew attention to the fact that going to 1tal.y 

after EWKY would mean the execution of yet another amphibious operation. 

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SIR ALAN BROOKE asked what should be done if during HUSKY we 

should receive evidence of a crack-up in Italy. Certainly we should 

have some definite scheme. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that such a scheme would be largely a 

naval proposition. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE felt that General Eisenhower should give some 

thought to this matter and suggested consideration of armistice terms 

and how far up into Italy we should go. 

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that there are nine U.S. divisions in 

North Africa, including an airborne division. Seven divisions, including some British and U.S., will soon begin to leave around the first 

of November. There are two and one-half well-armed Polish divisions 

in Persia, and they wish to take part in any move directed against 

Italy. The New Zealand Parliament agreed that their division should 

be available by September, and that an armored brigade would be ready 

by October. The Poles and the New Zealanders would thus provide four 

divisions. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the strength would amount to twentyseven British and Allied Divisions, nine U.S. Divisions and four French 

Divisions; allowing ten percent casualties for HUSKY and subsequent 

operations, the total would be thirty-six. This would further be 

reduced by the seven divisions to be sent to the United Kingdom and 

two to cover the British commitment to Turkey. The final total would 

thus be twenty-seven divisions in the Mediterranean area. (Re C.C.S. 

244) Sir Alan Brooke then stated what the total liabilities would be 

for these divisions. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said it probably would not be necessary to 

leave much strength in HUSKY, since its inhabitants were known to be 

disloyal to Mussolini. The Prime Minister called attention to the 

fact that the strength of our division is almost double that of the 

German Division, which is little more than a glorified brigade group. 

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THE PRIME MINISTER again stated that it would be bad if nothing 

happened between August or September and next May. Unless we should 

be repulsed at the beaches in HUSKY, we should make plans and decide 

which to use when HUSKY has been started. 

BRIGADIER SUGDEN stated that landing craft and shipping might 

impose a limitation on our further movements in the Mediterranean. 

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that we should be in good condition 

once we seized ports. Distances are short in the Mediterranean. and 

it is just as easy to feed troops in HUSKY as in North Africa. 

THE PRIME MINISTER added that he hoped that he and General 

Marshall could make a report to the President within the next few days. 

THE CONFERENCE:­

a. Took note of General Eisenhower's opinion that there are three 

possibilities to be provided for. These are: 

(1) A quick Sicilian collapse. In this event, inmediate operations against the Italian Mainland would be undertaken as a 

logical follow-up of HUSKY without awaiting formal decision. This is being planned by AFHO. 

(2) Stubborn resistance encountered in HUSKY but success foreseeable by, say, August 15. The specific post-HUSKY operation in this eventuality cannot be decided in advance. 

Accordingly, it was his intention to designate two separate Headquarters, each with its own staff, to plan and, 

so far as possible, to mount post-'HUSKY operations. Cne 

of these Headquarters primarily will plan and partially 

mount operations to the west of HUSKY (BRIMSTONE - FIREBRAND) and secondarily support bridgehead operations from 

SICILY. The other Headquarters will plan and partially 

mount operations against the Mainland of Italy, primarily 

the toe and ball. 

The recommendation of the Commander in Chief, Allied 

Forces, is to be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of 

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Staff as soon as possible after the launching of HUSKY in 

order to have the advantage of experiences gained in the 

initial phases of the HUSKY Operation and the decision of 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff may be taken in the light of 

the general situation existing at the time. As soon as the 

decision has been taken as to which operation is to be 

launched, the Air Forces, landing craft, etc., necessary 

to implement the selected operation will be turned over 

to the force charged with its execution. The inplications 

of the above are immediately to be studied by General 

Eisenhower's staff to determine how far it is practicable 

to carry this plan into effect with the means available. 

(3) Prolonged and bitter resistance which will tie down our 

aircraft and landing craft for an indefinite period. This 

would leave no resources available for any immediate postHUSKY Operation which can now be determined upon. 

It will be seen from the above that it is only in the 

second eventuality that a formal decision by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff will be required. 

b. Agreed that the Conference would reassemble at 1700 Monday, 

31 May, to discuss the results of the above examination. 

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MINUTES OF A MEETING 

held at 

GENERAL EISENHOWER'S VILLA, ALGIERS, 

at 1700 hours, 31 May 1943. 

PRESENT 

British 

The Prime Minister 

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

General Sir Harold Alexander 

Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Arthur Tedder 

Lieut. General 

Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Brigadier C. S. Sugden 

Commodore R. M. Dick 

Captain T. M. Brownrigg, RN 

0. s. 

General G. C. Marshall 

General D. D. Eisenhower 

Major General T. T. Handy 

Major General W. B. Smith 

Brig. General L. W. Rooks 

Secretaries 

Lieut. Colonel Frank McCarthy 

Major Carter L. Burgess 

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THE PRIME NINISTER opened the meeting by asking General r ' -isenhower for his comments on the completeness of the decisions of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff during the Trident Conference in Washington. 

GENERAL EISENHOWER stated that as far as he was concerned, there was 

nothing to be added or subtracted. He and his forces would be ready 

to do all they could in exploitation of HUSKY. In case of rapid destruction of enemy forces in HUSKY, there could be only one course 

of action; namely to cross the Straits of Messina and seize the largest 

possible bridgehead. The final decision, however, as to whether we 

should go on further into Italy or to Sardinia must depend upon circumstances and must be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

THE PRIME MINISTER stated his most sincere wish and hope was 

that we should be able to go from HUSKY directly into Italy. He had 

circulated some notes (Appendix "A"), which gave his own views, as a 

background for today's conference. 

GENERAL EISENHOWER stated that the term "quick collapse "had 

often been used and that he wished to define the term. He understood 

a quick collapse as being a situation which would not require the use 

of all the forces which we had set up for HUSKY. He estimated that 

we should be able to predict the outcome of HUSKY fairly accurately 

within ten days after the initial assault, although some enemy forces 

might hold out in mountain fastnesses considerably after that time. 

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed generally, stating that an accurate 

prediction might not be made until a fortnight after the first blow. 

At least it wculd not be necessary to make a prediction on the basis 

on the first day's action. His heart lay in an invasion of southern 

Italy, but the fortunes of battle might necessitate a different course. 

At any rate, the alternative between southern Italy and Sardinia involved the difference between a glorious campaign and a mere conveni ence . 

GENERAL MARSHALL requested clarification of the meaning of "quick 

decision". 

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GENERAL EISENHOWER said that by the word "decision" he did not 

mean conclusion of action, but rather the arrival of a time at which 

a fairly accurate forecast could be made. 

THE PRIME MINTSTER said that if, by the first of August, we 

could predict that the conquest of HUSKY would be complete by 15 

August, an attack on the mainland of Italy should be made. 

GENERAL MARSHALL introduced the view that a much better decision 

could be made as to post-IUSKY after the initial phases of HUSKY had 

been completeo. He felt it would be necessary to know something of 

the German reactions to HUSKY in order to determine whether there would 

be real resistance in southern Italy; whether the Germans would withdraw to the Po for example; whether they could organize and handle 

the Italians with any finesse; of the preparations that might have 

been made on Sardinia, Corsica, or in the Balkan Peninsula; what readjustments they would make on the Russian Front. All of these things 

would be factors in deciding our post-HUSKY plans. There were two or 

three different ways in which Italy might fall, and careful consideration would have to be given to the matter of what would be done with 

such divisions, along with their transport, as might not be used there; 

how far north we should go in Italy and the rate at which we should 

become involved. It was his opinion that we should not commit ourselves until we knew as much as possible, but at the same time we 

should take measures to avoid a serious delay in exploiting HUSKY. 

Rhile the minutes of the meeting of 29 May explained clearly what 

alternatives we might have after HUSKY. a great deal could happen 

between now and July. He, General Eisenhower, and the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff were fully aware of the Prime Minister's feelings regarding 

a movement into Italy, but their only desire was to select the postHUSKY alternative which would be productive of the largest result-. 

We should choose that alternative only after the experiences and intelligence resulting from HUSKY enabled us to make the best possible 

decision. 

GENERAL EISENHOWER wished it understood that small detachments 

might be sent across the Straits of Messina as a test, and he hoped 

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that the action of putting out these detachments would not be considered 

in exploitation of 'HUSKY, but rather a part of the operation itself. 

7HE PRIME MlNIS7ER said that the conclusions of the minutes of 

the last meeting did not represent his whole feeling, since he very 

pssionately wanted to see Italy out of the war and Rome in our possession. He would be willing to send eight additional divisions if these 

were needed for the realization of this result. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the additional divisions would 

not be full divisions, but equivalent divisions satisfactory for garrisoning and the like. 

GENERAL JlARSHALL asked what extra service and anti-aircraft 

troops would be needed for use in Italy if we held HUSKY and moved on 

to the mainland. 

GENERAL SMITH replied that a flash estimate indicated a requirement of 30,000 United States troops and 33,000 British troops, to be 

provided from outside the North African Theater of operations for 

operations in the toe and ball, but not in the heel, of Italy. These 

would be supporting and administrative units and would include about 

six United States and five British anti-aircraft battalions. The toe 

and ball area could be defined as extending from Reggio to a point 

somewhat beyond hlt. Etna. 

GENERAL MARSHALL in-quired why the total of divisions in North 

Africa prior to the ROUNUHAMMER build-up was set at thirty-six and 

asked whether this limitation was imposed by shipping or by availability of defense. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE answered that both factors influenced the limitation and reminded that many of the divisions within this quota would 

be equivalent rather than actual. 

GENIRAL MMSHALL remarked that the need for 63,000 troops above 

those already scheduled for the impending operations had not been 

mentioned before and seemed to involve a new shipping commitment. He 

asked Sir Harold Alexander to comment. 

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SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER stated that the figure seemed high, but 

that we should be well prepared for whatever decision might follow 

a quick success in HUSKY. 

GENERAL MAKSHALL asked what difference there would be in the 

need for troops other than those which would be in the Korth African 

Theater if HUSKY were to come into our hands very quickly. 

BRIGADIER SUGDEN replied that there woiild be very little difference as far as North Africa is concerned, since enemy air threats 

would still exist at mny points. SIR AR7HUR 7EDDER concurred in 

this view. 

SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER expressed the opinion that, while there 

might not be a great difference in the need for anti-aircraft, there 

should be a difference in the need for other troops, since forces 

on HUSKY would leave there and move on to other places. 

GENERAL SMITH, in answer to a question by General Marshall, 

stated that in earlier Flanning for a move against Sardinia, it had 

been estimated that 67,000 troops other than those already in the 

Korth African Theater would be required. 

GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the understanding that General Fisenhower was to have available for post-HUSKY all troops in the Korth 

African Theater at the time of HUSKY except seven divisions which were 

to move to the United Kingdom beginning 1 November; air force loaned 

for HUSKY with the understanding that they would be withdrawn, and 

possibly certain naval warcraft whose availability was to be decided 

after the completion of HUSKY. He inquired whether the figure of 

63,000 was to apply exclusive of these exceptions. 

GENERAL SMI7H answered in the affirmative. Some of these additional troops might be found in the Middle East. There was a great 

need for additional autiaircraft ur,less we proposed to take longer 

risks in North Africa, where we are already cutting down. However, 

he pointed out that the figure of 63,000 was only an approximation. 

About one-third would be anti-aircraft and the remaining two-thirds 

would be Services of Supply and Signal troops. 

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THE PRIME MZNISTER stated that if we secured more ports, we 

must certainly have more anti-aircraft. It would be absolutely essential to guard ports used for our forward movements. As the enemy 

rolled away, however, we should be able to lessen the anti-aircraft 

in ports which became more remote as a result of their retreat. It 

would be possible to secure sane anti-aircraft from the Eastern Mediterranean, and this matter should be looked into carefully, along with 

the proposition of taking more anti-aircraft strength from England 

itself. He would be willing to take additional punishment at home in 

order to see the operations through successfully. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE commented that anti-aircraft strength in the 

United Kingdom had already been considerably lessened, as it had been 

in Suez, in West Africa, and in a number of other places. He pointed 

out that the cost of the operations planned would be colossal if we 

were not prepared to reduce defenses in the rear as we move forward. 

GENERAL SMITH re-emphasized the point that a maximum of protection would be necessary at points of departure for landing craft. On 

the Tunisian coast, for instance, it would be necessary to double the 

present anti-aircraft strength, as anti-aircraft units intended for 

the operation would be ineffective while loading and during shipment. 

Once the landing craft had sailed, however, it would be possible to 

strip down port anti-aircraft defenses considerably. Airdromes have 

already been stripped in the interest of port protection. 

GENERAL MARSHALL raised the point that meeting the requirement 

for 63,000 additional troops would raise a new shipping problem and 

one which had not previously been considered. 

GENERAL SMITH stated that the staff would break down the 63,000 

service troop item ad see what could be secured from the Middle East. 

THE PRIHE MINISTER indicated that certain divisions, including 

some of those of the 8th Army, had moved back without taking all of 

their service troops and said he believed that some of these could be 

used as a part of the 63,000. For example, the 8th Army had motor 

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transport sufficient to maintain it over an immense stretch of comnunications, and it should be possible to make some of this available. He 

also suggested that we should be able to draw upon some of the administrative services, particularly signal units, of the First Army when 

that organization was disbanded. 

BRIGADIER SUGDEN said that the IX Corps signal units were being 

absorbed in North Africa and that all of them would be used in HUSKY. 

The need for troops Over and above those already set up for North Africa 

was due to the fact that if post-HUSKY was to continue immediately upon 

HUSKY, there would be no time for reorganizing units used during HUSKY 

and throwing them immediately into the next operation unless there was 

to be a time lag between HUSKY and post-HUSKY. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE reiterated his view that a movement into the toe 

of Italy should be considered a part of HUSKY and that the same troops 

which went into the latter could continue their advance into the former. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if it took until 14 August to foresee a successful conclusion of HUSKY by 28 August, we should not wait 

until the latter date to start post-HUSKY, but should rather start it 

on 14 August. If we found it necessary to deliver extra strength to 

the North African Theater for the purpose of effecting post-HUSKY, we 

should do it. Some of the additional anti-aircraft units needed could 

be secured from the United Kingdom and it would not be thought unreasonable to take for this purpose certain of the units which were 

being held for ROUNDHAMMER. These units could be used for post-WJSKY 

and still be brought back for their rendezvous in May 1944. THE PRIME 

MINISTER added that if General Eisenhower wished to move from HUSKY 

into Italy, there should be no interval between the two operations 

which would permit the enemy to pull himself together and prepare himself for the second. 

GENERAL MARSHALL spoke of the careful planning which lay behind 

the shipping arrangements made at the Trident Conferences in Washington 

and to the small deficit in shipping which had been encountered. He 

reminded his colleagues that the ball and toe of Italy, which it was 

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proposed to take, was only a small part of the entire nation. The 

shipping situation was so serious that, under plans already formulated 

and without provision for the 63,000 additional troops, it would be 

necessary for us to let some divisions fall below strength and for 

the British to consider the elimination of certain units. He wished 

to be perfectly sure that the price in shipping was carefully considered and that it did not involve resources in an operation calling 

for more ships than we could actually secure. Me re-emphasized that 

we should not set our hearts too fully on one operation or another 

until the early results of HUSKY had been tabulated. 

THE PRIME MINISTER stated it would be hard for him to ask the 

British people to cut their rations again, but he would gladly do so 

rather than throw away a campaign which had possibilities of great 

success. He could not endure to see a great army stand idle when they 

might be engaged in eliminating Italy from the war. Parliament and 

the people would become impatient if the Army were not active, and he 

was willing to take almost desperate steps in order to prevent such 

a calamity. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was not arguing against the broad 

commitment made in Washington to ain at the fall of Italy. He only 

wished to emphasize that we must exercise great discretion in the 

selection of an operation to follow HUSKY, calculating closely what 

would be required and basing calculations upon an accurate knowledge 

of what was to be faced. 

IR. EDEN, upon the question of the Prime Minister, commented on 

the Turkish situation. He said it should be borne in mind that prospects for bringing Turkey into the war througl. persuasion were not good 

and that perhaps the time had arrived for more forceful measures. 

:<necking Italy out of the war would go a long way towards bringing the 

Turks in. They would become much more friendly when our troops had 

reached the Balkan area. 

7HE PRIME MINISTER intervened to observe emphatically that he 

was not advocating sending an army into the Balkans now orin the near 

future. 

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MR. EDEN said that it would not be necessary to put an army into 

the Balkans, since the Turks would begin to show favorable reactions 

as soon as we were able to constitute an actual and immediate threat 

to the Balkans. Continuing, he said that a feeling was growing up 

among the Italians that Germany was not giving them the help that 

their plight necessitated. If this state of affairs continued, there 

was a good chance of Italy going out of the war. 

SIR ALAN BROOKE gave an analysis of the problem of the Germans 

as he saw it. A great battle in Russia was imminent, with the Russians 

well situated and probably planning to attack if the Germans did riot 

do so, although they would actually prefer to wait for colder weather 

before assuming the offensive. It was reported that there had been 

some minor successes in the Kuban. He did not anticipate a large withdrawal of German troops from Russia. On the other hand, the Germans 

must certainly have foreseen the signs of an attack to be made by Great 

Britain and the United States. As a result of the arrival of our landing craft and of other signs pointing to offensive action on our part, 

the Germans were probably nervous about committing themselves heavily 

in Russia. Falling back in Russia would cause them to expose some 

vital areas to Russian bombing. Thus it appeared that they would 

either give up Italy or withdraw from the Balkans. It appeared unlikely 

that they would choose the former course. He felt that their problem. 

was a very difficult one. 

THE PRIME MINl'STER said that certain units were already being 

moved away from HUSKY and that the Germans may have already made up 

their minds as to what they should abandon. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said he believed the units moved from 

HUSKY were motor torpedo units. They were moved to the southern coast 

of France but they might return. While suchmovement might be a straw 

in the wind, it was a small straw, since there would be no use for 

these units along the French coast and since HUSKY was the only place 

where they would be of any value. It seemed likely that the Germans 

had moved their main repair bases to France and that the motor torpedo 

units were going in for repairs. 

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SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER, upon the request of the Prime Minister, 

stated his general impression regarding our forthcoming operations. 

After examininE intelligence on the defense of HUSKY and after recent 

fighting against Germans and Italians, he was optimistic. The fighting value of our troops and equipment was excellent. Our chances 

of success were excellent, although it might take a fortnight of very 

bitter fighting to attain it. Once we joined battle, he continued, 

the slogging generally lasts from ten days to a fortnight or even three 

weeks. Then the end comes quickly. He said that the most important 

points in connection with HUSKY were the air fields, in the southeast 

corner of the island, and the ports. Once we had a firm grip on these, 

we could ignore the remainder of the island for the time being. It 

should be possible to cross the Straits of Messina and secure a foothold on the opposite shore, which was the very windpipe of HUSKY He 

repeated his statement made in the meeting of 29 May that securing a 

bridgehead on the Italian mainland should be considered as a part of 

HUSKY. It would be impossible for us to win a great victory unless 

we should exploit HUSKY by moving ahead, preferably up into Italy. 

All this, however, will be clarified as the HUSKY operation moves 

along. It is not impossible, although it seems unlikely, that the 

toe or Italy will be SO strongly held as to require a complete restaging of operations. We should be prepared, however, to continue 

moving with no stop at all once HUSKY is inaugurated. Modern warfare 

allows us to forge ahead very rapidly with radio controlling troops 

at a great distance and with air providing protection and support over 

a great area. 

The going may become more difficult as we move up the Italian 

mainland, but this is no argument against going as far as we can on 

the momentum of the HUSKY drive. He stated that none of the possibilities he had discussed could be accurately foreseen. In war the 

incredible often occurred. A few months ago it would have been impossible for him to believe what has actually happened to Rommel and 

his Afrika Korps. A few weeks ago he would have found it difficult 

to believe that 300,000 Germans would collapse in a week. The enemy 

air forces had been swept out of the skies so completely that we could 

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have a parade, if we chose, of all our North Africa forces on one 

field in Tunisia without any danger from enemy aircraft. 

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER said that we could not, in the initial phase 

of HUSKY, expect the degree of air superiority which had been attained 

in the final phase of the Tunisian campaign. The air threat to the 

shipping and landing craft should however be greatly eased once we 

have seized the air fields. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, in answer to the Prime Minister's request 

that he offer comments on HUSKY and post-HUSKY, stated his view that 

we had every chance for success; that, after backing and filling, a 

good plan had been produced, and that sufficient time had been allowed 

for preparation. He agreed with Sir Harold Alexander that if all went 

well with HUSKY, we should go directly across the Straits. He pointed 

out that HUSKY was different from Tunis in that it will be impossible 

to put an absolute stop to enemy supply. There was no doubt that we 

should lose some ships, but because of our excellent air support he 

did not fear bombing as much as he feared the action of E-boats. Enemy 

air attacks would probably not pay because of the high degree of confidence which the crews of our small ships had developed in aerial 

support. They themselves had shot down many enemy aircraft. There 

did not seem to be much cause to worry about losses in naval vessel$. 

he said, and although we might feel losses in merchant ships, they 

should not be too large. 

SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER stated that at the moment the Germans did 

not have much strength in the places we proposed to attack, although 

they did have some artillery and tanks. Communications in Italy, he 

said, were bad and getting worse. It was his feeling that if the 

Germans did not move quickly into Italy in larger force, they might 

be too late. 

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER said that the air forces had been blasting 

Italian communications for weeks, the pressure on the enemy windpipe 

of which Sir Harold had referred was already being exerted. We knew 

that the enemy was already in serious difficulties in maintaining his 

supplies and reinforcing. 

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7HE PRIME MINISTER said he thought the German High Command might 

have gone to Hitler and advised him they did not wish another Tunisia 

in Sardinia. He added that the discussions in Algiers had enabled him 

to form an opinion and provided material for a report to his Government. 

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that he thought everything was well understood and that he appreciated the trip which the Prime Minister and 

General Marshall had made to clarify for him what the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff had done. He understood it was his responsibility to get 

information regarding the early phases of HUSKY and forward them to 

to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in time for the latter to make a decision regarding a plan which would follow upon HUSKY without a break 

or a stop. He would send not only information, but also strong recommendations based upon the conditions of the moment. He hoped that his 

three top commanders would hve an opportunity to comment more formally 

on these matters, although he concurred completely in what they had 

said thus far. 

I1 was agreed that there would be another meeting at General 

Eisenhower’s villa on Thursday afternoon, 3 June, at an appropriate 

time. 

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APPENDIX " A " 

31 May 1943 

B ACKGROUND NOTES 

BY 

THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE 

1. The troops in the table attached (Annex I) are in the Mediterranean. Of these the British or British controlled units which are 

under General Eisenhower's Command or earmarked for HUSKY are shown 

in Annex 11. 

From 1 November three British and four United States Divisions 

must begin their successive movement into the BOLERO area. Apart from 

sending drafts to existing units His Majesty's Government is prepared 

to reinforce General Eisenhower's Command, at such dates as may be 

found convenient or necessary, by the units shown in Annex 111. 

2. His Majesty's Government feel most strongly that this great 

force, which comprises their finest and most experienced divisions, 

and the main part of their army, should not in any circumstances remain idle. Such an attitude could not be justified to the British 

nation or to our Russian allies. We hold it our duty to engage the 

enemy as continuously and intensely as possible, and to draw off as 

manyhostiledivisions as possible from the front of our Russian allies. 

In this way, among others, the most favorable conditions will be established for the launching of BOLERO in 1944. 

3. Compelling or inducing Italy to quit the war is the only objective 

in the Mediterranean worthy of the famous campaign already begun and 

adequate to the allied forces available and already in the Mediterranean 

basin. For this purpose the operation HUSKY is an indispensable preliminary, and the invasion of the mainland of Italy and the capture 

of Rome are the evident steps. In this way the greatest service can be 

rendered to the allied cause and the general progress of the war, both 

here and in the Channel Theater. 

Appendix "A 'I 

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4. We cannot tell at Fresent what degree of resistance the enemy 

will oppose to our action. Germany may make the strongest effort to 

defend HUSKYLAND and ITALY. We are told one Division a week could be 

transported to HUSKYLAND or the southern part of ITALY. It is desirable that this possibility should be reviewed in the light of the 

latest information, and stated in precise terms, i.e., the strength, 

gross and net, of the German Divisions, the number of guns, tanks 

and vehicles accompanying them, the areas from which they would most 

likely be drawn during the next 12 weeks and whether they will come 

by rail, march or sea. There are no signs at present of any movement 

of this character or on this scale. In order to have six Divisiops 

in HUSKYLAND before the operation, the enemy decisions and preparations 

must already have been made and their movement should already now be 

apparent. Moreover, if these six Divisions are to move to HUSKYLAND 

the southern parts of Italy must remain denuded. It is asked that 

the most searching re-examination of the German movements and capacity 

to move in the direction mentioned should be made by the Staffs. 

5. If the Germans decide to move forces of the order of between 6 

and 12 Divisions into HUSKYLAND and ITALY we shall certainly have 

achieved part of our task in drawing, directly or indirectly, forces 

off our Russian allies. If they do not do so, but only send one or 

two Divisions to stimulate Italian effort the tasks mentioned in 

paragraph 3 should not be beyond our strength in the next three or 

four months. If, on the other hand, the Germans elect to fight a 

major battle for HUSKYLAND or for the Italian toe, or both, our armies 

will be fully engaged and we shall bring about that intensity of air 

fighting which from our growing relative strength is so greatly to 

our advantage. If after we have established ourselves in the southern 

parts of Italy, Italy still continues to fight and the Germans send 

belated reinforcements on a large scale we might have to withdraw 

towards the tip, forcing them to attack successive prepared positions 

at heavy cost with all the advantages of a procured diversion and of 

the air battle aforesaid. There would be no reason to regard this as 

a disaster. As long as we are fighting heavily with the Germans or 

even with the Italians we shall be playing our part. 

Appendix " A 'I 

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6. The present believed distribution of the Italian Army is set out 

in Annex IV. (Not included in this volume.) It will be seen that 

there are only 11 Italian Divisions in the mainland of Italy, about 6 

in HUSKYZAND and 5 along the Riviera, and that no fewer than 28 are 

tied up inYugoslavia, Albania and Greece. To these 28 must be added 

8 Roumanian and 11 German Divisions, making a total of 47 held in the 

Balkan Peninsula by the guerrilla activities of the Serbian Michailovitch, the Croatian partisans, the general disorders in Greece and the 

unrest in these enslaved countries. 

7. Should Italy be made to quit the war, the following practical advantages would be gained by US. The Germans would be forced to provide 

troops to occupy the Riviera, to maintain a new front along the Po or 

on the Erenner and, above all, to fill the void in the Balkans caused 

by the demobilization and withdrawal of Italian Divisions. Up to the 

present the guerrillas, etc., have only been nourished by parachute 

packets dropped from less than a dozen airplanes. Nevertheless, they 

are accomplishing the prodigious feat of immobilizing 47 enemy Divisions. The occupation of the southern prts of Italy, or even merely 

of the whole of the toe or heel would give us access to the Adriatic 

and the power to send shiploads of munitions to Adriatic ports, and 

also Agents and possibly small Commando bands. Re should not have the 

troops to engage in any serious operations there, and His Majesty’s 

Government do not contemplate or desire the provision of any organized 

armed force for the Balkan theater, either this year or in any period 

with which we are now concerned. Nevertheless, the aiding within the 

limits proposed of the patriot bands in Yugoslavia, the fanenting of 

revolt in Greece and Albania are measures of high importance all of 

which, together with our main operations, will influence the action of 

Turkey when, (provided the necessary conditions are established) she 

is subjected to our demands later in the year. In this way the utmost 

aid in our power will be given to Russia and also to BOLERO. It is 

only when and if these prospects are decisively closed to us that we 

should consider secondary or minor alternatives for Mediterranean 

action. 

Appendix I‘ A” 

491 
U. S. SECRET 

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8. All attempts to forecast the German action in the Mediterranean 

are, of course, highly speculative. Importance should however be 

attached to the painful impression certainly sustained by the German 

High Command of the complete destruction of an Army of over a quarter 

of a million men. In the light of this event it may be doubtful 

whether they would court the repetition in HUSKYLAND of a similar 

disaster though on a smaller scale. Cur situation has vastly improved. 

First by the inspiring of the allied armies through their recent victories. Secondly, by the fact that only a few hundred of the enemy 

escaped from TUNISIA to HUSKYLAND. Thirdly, the psychological effects 

prodaced on Spain and Fortugal, on Metropolitan France, ip Italy and 

in Turkey and, indeed, throughout the whole area of the war. The 

German position has proportionately deteriorated. The series of immense battles impending on the Russian front must absorb their main 

strength. If the Germans do not attack, the Russians certainly will, 

and may indeed even forestall their enemy. We cannot foretell the 

results of these battles, but there is no reason to suppose that the 

conditions are not more favorable to the Russians than they were this 

time last year. It must therefore be considered unlikely: 

a. that the Germans will attempt to fight a major battle in 

HUSKYLAND: or 

b. that they will send strong forces into the leg of Italy. 

They would be wiser to fight only delaying actions, stimulating 

the Italians in these regions and retiring to the line of the Po, 

reserving their strength to hold the Riviera and the Balkans, which 

are of value as a supply area. If the battle goes against them in 

Russia and if our action upon or in Italy is also successful the 

Germans may be forced by events to withdraw to the Alps and the 

Danube, as well as making further withdrawal on the Russian front 

and possibly evacuating Norway. All these results may be achieved 

within the present year by bold and vigorous use of the forces at 

our disposal. No other action of the first magnitude is open to 

us this year in Europe. 

Appendix "A " 

4 92 
U. S. SECRET 

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ANNEX I TO APPENDIX " A " 

Reference Para 1 of " BACKGROUND Notes" 

31 May 1943 

TROOPS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

Notes:- 1. This list includes troops in NORTH AFRICA, TRIPOLITANIA, 

CYRENAICA, EGYPT, PALESTINE, SYRIA AND CYPRUS. plus forrnations allotted ex U.S.A. and U.K. for HUSKY, and one division 

on call from PAIC. 

2. Certain divisions including those marked * will not become 

available for operations until a later date. 

3. No account is taken of the possibility of having to break 

up one or more British divisions to provide reinforcements. 

Equivalent Di ,,isions 

Subtotal rota1 

a. US. 

Inf. Divs. 1, 3, 9, 34, 36, 45 6 

Armd. Divs. 1, 2 2 

Airborne Div. 82 1 9 

b. French 

Inf . Divs. three 3* 

Ard. Bdes. one 1/3 3 1/3 

c. British and British Controlled 

Inf . Divs. 1, 5, 46, 50, 51, 56, 78, 

1 Cdn. 4 Ind, 8 Ind, 10 

Ind, 3 Carpathian,* 5 Polish,* Free French 14 

Divs. 4, N.Z.* 2 

Ard. Divs. 1, 6, 7, 10, 6 S.A.* 

31 Ind. 6 

Airborne Div. 1 1 

Independent Inf. 

Bdes. 231, 1 Greek, 2 Greek, 

Belgian, SDF, Libyan Arab 

Force 2 

(Table Contihued on Next Page) 

4 93 
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Independent Tank 

Bdes. 1 Cdn, 1 & 25 Army 

Tank Ekies, 8 & 23 

Ard. Bdes, 4 Lt. 

Ard. Me, 2 

Polish* 2-1/3 27-1/3 

Independent 

Para. Bde. 4 1/3 1/3 

Grand Total 40 

Annex I to Appendix " A " 

ANNEX I1 TO APPENDIX " A 

Reference Para 1 of "BACKGROUND 

ERITISH AND BRITISH-CONTROLLED UNITS 

EISENHCWER'S COMMAND OR EARMARKED 

Inf. Divs. 1, 5, 46, SO, 51, 78, 1 Cdn 

Div. 4 

Armd. Div. 6 

Airborne Divisions 1 

IndeFendent Inf. Rde. 231 

Independent Tank Bdes. 1 Cdn, 25 Arvy Tank Bde. 

Independent Para. Bde. 4 

" 

Notes " 

31 May 1943 

UNDER GENERAL 

FOR HUSKY 

Total 

Equivalent 

Divisions 

7 

1 

1 

1 

1/3 

2/3 

1/3 

Total 11-1/3 

Note:- Three of the above divisions will be earmarked for return to 

U. K. after HUSKY. 

Annex I1 to Appendix 'I A 'I 

4 94 
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ANNEX I11 TO APPENDIX " A " 

Reference Para 1 of " BACKGROUND Notes " 

31 May 1943 

BRITISH AND BRITISH-CONTROLLED UNITS WHICH COULD BE 

TRANSFERRED TO GENERAL EISENHOWER'S CCMMAND 

Note: Allowance has been made in this table for internal security and 

other commitments of Middle East Command, but as there has been 

no opportunity to discuss these requirements with representatives 

of Middle East, figures and in particular nominations must be 

taken as approxiwate. 

Total 

Equiva 1, 

Divis 

Inf. Divs. 56, 4 Ind, 8 Ind, 3 CarDivs. 

pathian, 5 Polish 

N.Z. 

5 

1 

Ard. Divs. 1 1 

Independent Tank Bdes. 1 Army Tank Me, 4 1.t. Ard, 

8 and 23d Armd, 2 Polish 1-2/3 

Total 8-2/3 

Annex I11 to Appendix " A' " 

4 95 
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MINUTES OF A MEETING 

held at 

GENERAL EISENHOWER'S VILLA, ALGIERS, 

at 1700 hours, 3 June 1943 

PR E SEN 7 

British 

The Frime Minister 

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden 

Admiral of the Fleet 

Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 

General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

General Sir Harold Alexander 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder 

General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery 

Lieutenant General 

Sir Hastings L. Ismay 

Brigadier C. S. Sugden 

Commodore R. M. Dick 

U.S. 

General G. C. Marshall 

General D. 3. Eisenhower 

Major General T. T. Handy 

Major General W. B Smith 

Brig. General L. W. Rooks 

SECRETARIES 

Lieut. Colonel Frank McCarthy 

Major Carter L. Burgess 

497 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

1. OPERATION ’‘ SOAPSUDS 

GENERAL ISMAY said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had asked 

for General Eisenhower’s recommendations on SOAPSUDS and inquired 

whether the conclusions of these vinutes should be submitted to them. 

GENERAL EISENHOWER replied in the affirmative. 

After a general discussion of the proposed operation, 

THE CONFERENCE:­

a. Agreed: 

(1) That SOAPSUDS is an important and desirable operation 

which should be undertaken by General Eisenhower at the 

earliest possible moment provided that: 

(a) It does not detract from the weight of ‘HUSKY; and 

(b) Adequate time is allowed for training and preparation. 

This would not be possible by .June. The precise moment 

for this execution must be left to GeneralEisenhower. 

(2) That two groups of B-24’s now in the U.K. and one group of 

B-24’s now enroute to the U.X. from the United States by 

Africa should be assembled in North Africa as swn as possible for training. That during this period they will be 

available for operational use. 

(3) That it is inadvisable to withdraw for SOAPSUDS a heavy 

bombardment group from India. 

b. Took note that the Prime Minister and General Marshall would 

present their conclusion to the British War Cabinet and the 

U.S. Chiefs of Staff, respectively, and that General Eisenhower’s recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff would 

conform thereto. 

2. MARSHALLING YARDS AT ROME 

THE PRIME MINISTER requested Sir Arthur Tedder to comment upon 

air force activities in connection with HUSKY. 

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U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER stated that our air forces were trying to keep 

enemy aircraft down and press them back. We are attacking the enemy's 

main bases. Several days ago we attacked Bari, from which he moved to 

Foggia. Pe has now moved farther away to Fiazensa. We are interfering 

with his shipping and supply lines by hitting ports and railroads. Cur 

attacks are telling. Recent photographs indicate that the enemy is 

using ferries for taking supplies into Italy. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said he understood it was our object to build 

up in a steady crescendo, employing eventually all the air forces for 

bombing HUSKY. 

TEE PRIME MINISTER, upon inquiry from General Marshall, stated 

his feeling that some discussion of a proposal to bomb the marshalling 

yards near Rome would be appropriate. After seeing Archbishop Spellman, 

he had told the Fresident that we would not bomb Rome for the present 

because of possible political repercussions. He now felt, however, 

that there was no tenable objection to the proposition, and for his own 

part he was ready to agree to bombing the marshalling yards. He pointed 

out that since daylight precision bombing was quite accurate, it was 

probable the yards could be attacked with small chance of damage to Rome 

itself and none to the Vatican. He not only would raise no objection to 

the bombing, but he would even suggest that it should be done. 

MR. EDEN said that Rome, like Naples, was on the HUSKY supply 

line. He inquired as to the location of the marshalling yards with 

respect to Vatican City. 

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER replied that, as he remembered, the marshalling 

yards were to the Southeast. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM indicated that since the yards and Vatican 

City were on different sides of the Tiber, there was a clear line between them. 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that he cmsidered the marshalling yards 

a purely military objective, and that while their destruction would 

be of material benefit to the 'HUSKY operation, the psychological effect 

499 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

would he even more important. The bombing should be executed by a very 

large force of aircraft. 

HR. EDEN said he was amazed at the accuracy of the bombing of 

Tunis and at the fact that very few bombs dropped anywhere except in 

the port area. 

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that he would like to see the British 

War Cabinet and the President empower General Eisenhower to go ahead 

with the bombing whenever such action would assist HUSKY. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that if we were to bomb the marshalling 

yards, we should be prepared to have Cairo bombed in retaliation. 

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that a declaration of war by Egypt might 

follow a bombing! of Cairo. He recalled he had often said to Farliament 

that we were in no way inhibited from bombing Rome althouch we had not 

yet done it. He doubted actually whether there would be a bombing of 

Cairo. There had never been any agreement to refrain frotr bombing Rome 

if the enemy refrained from bombing Cairo. 

GENERAL EISENHOWER suggested that consideration might be given to 

the proposition of bombing other rail junctions further south in order 

to make the marshalling yards useless without direct attack and inquired 

as to the actual military value of destroying the yards. 

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER replied that the operation would constitute 

another step in pushing the enemy farther back and making the maintenance of his communications more difficult. 

THE CONFERENCE: ­ a. Agreed: 

(1) That marshalling yards of Rome are an important and necessary military objective within our bombardment plan. 

(2) That there is no valid reason for refraining frotr bornbing 

this target, provided that the attacks be made by day and 

that he care is taken to prevent dawage elsewhere. 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

b. Took note that the Prime Minister and General Marshall would 

report the above conclusions to the British War Cabinet and 

the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, respectively, with a view of getting 

authority from the U.S. and British Governments empowering 

General Eisenhower to take action against the marshalling 

yards at the moment that he thinks best for the successful 

prosecut ion of HUSKY. 

3. OPERATION "HUSKY " 

SIR BERNARD MONTGOMERY, upon request of the Prime Minister, outlined his views on HUSKY. He said that all his commanders had complete 

confidence in the present plan, and that troops would be filled with 

enthusiasm when they stepped ashore. Risks were invoived, but they had 

been gone into very carefully and he felt that they were justified. 

He pointed out that although he had two airborne divisions, he had only 

enough air transport for one. In the early stages, he would be able to 

employ only about one-third of his airborne strength: the remainder to 

be brought in on D +Z or D+3. With 140 more aircraft, he could employ another airborne brigade at the very first. However, he understood 

that these were not available and the limitation was accepted. His 

officers were completely happy about the whole thing. As regards postHUSKY. he felt it important that we decide in what direction we wanted 

to go and use our military strength to make the battle move that way. 

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether there was any great danger 

that bad weather might seriously interfere with the operation. 

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM stated that although we now usually had a 

number of calm, flat days in succession, there might possibly be a 

strong northwesterly breeze which would necessitate postponing the 

operation for a day. 

SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER said it would be dangerous to put the operation off, and SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM replied that, in the event of unfavorable weather, it would be even more dangerous to put it on. He 

stated the belief that the enemy would see a vast armada of hundreds 

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U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

of ships and would know by 1800 hours the night before the attack that 

the ships were going to HUSKY. In answer to an inquiry by the Prime 

Minister, he said that it would be possible to mark time if the weather 

were not suitable for landing, provided the decision were taken 24 hours 

in advance. A fairly god prediction of weather conditions should be 

possible 24 hours before the landings. 

4. POST-HUSKY 

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed his satisfaction at the great measure 

of agreement which he had found in these meetings. He did not think we 

should attempt to draw up a formal post-HUSKY plan at this time. It was 

understood that post-HUSKYwould be in General Eisenhower’s hands and 

that he would reconmend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff whichever operation seemed best. However, he felt everyone agreed that it would be 

best to put Italy out of the war as soon as possible. The capture of 

Rome, with or without the elimination of Italy from the war, would be 

a very great achievement for our Mediterranean forces. We could only 

tell about thz possibilities of this project after the launching of 

HUSKY, when General Eisenhower would report to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. If there should arise differences as to post-HUSKY, they would 

be settled between the two Governments. He had not been conscious of 

expressing in the meetings of 29 May, 31 May, ad today, anything not 

in harmony with his background notes, and that the minutes should be 

read with this understanding. During these meetings he had been most 

solidly encouraged and he would take home a feeling of confidence and 

comradeship which characterized actions in this Theater. He had never 

received so strong an impression of cooperation and control as during 

his visit here. It would be impossible to embark on an undertaking 

under better augury. He should not like to go away without reaffirming 

his full confidence in General Eisenhower and without expressing his 

admiration of the manner in which the General had handled his many great 

problems. 

GENERAL EISENHOWER replied that any praise which might be given 

belonged to the officers around the table and stated that, while there 

might be differences of opinions and discussions in his Headquarters, 

5 02 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

these were never based upon national differences. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff concurred in 

the Prime Minister's statement of the accomplishments and the success of 

General Eisenhawer and his officers. The fine support given to General 

Eisenhower by the British, and especially by Admiral Cunningham. General 

Alexander, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, General Montgomery, and General 

Anderson, was deeply appreciated. He felt the greatest discomfort the 

Germans must have exprierwed came not so much fran their loss of troops 

as frorr the fact that Great Britain and the United States have worked 

so well as a team. 

GENERAL BROOKE said that he particularly appreciated the manner 

in which General Eisenhower and his staff had cooperated with the British War Office. 

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he, Mr. Eden, and General Brooke 

would report these discussions to the British Government upon their 

return to London, and he understood that General Marshall would report 

orally to the President and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that he would also give an account of the 

discussions to the Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington. 

503 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ANNEX TO MINUTES, AFHQ 

3 June 1943 

PARAPHRASE OF A TELEGRAM FROM 

WAR CABINET OFFICE. LONDON 

Joint Intelligence Staff appreciate situation as follows,: 

1. Axis obtain 3 million tons per annum fron: Roumania of which 2 

million tons goes to Germany and 1 million tons to Italy. 

2. Capacity of 6 main active Ploesti refineries is 5 rrillion tons 

per annum and present production thereof is 4 million tons per annum. 

3. If 6 major Ploesti oil refineries were destroyed, Germany would 

endeavor to transfer load to other oil refineries in Roumania and occupied Europe. In absence of firm information about present serviceability of these other refineries, difficult to estimate total delay 

involved, but we think that no Roumanian oil supplies via these other 

refineries can be recommenced before 6 weeks and only half date for 

next 6 weeks. Result would be loss to Axis supplies of about 550,000 

tons over three months after raid. 

4. Following estimate however, of strategic effect assumes that effect of attack is to deny at least 250,000 tons over three months. The 

attack 1st July might have any of following strategic effects: 

a. To cripple Italy’s war effort. 

b. To frustrate any German offensive then current in Russia. 

c. To prevent such offensive from taking place. 

d. Tocause German failure to resist a Russian offensive which 

might otherwise have been withstood. 

5. Not possible to calculate strategic effect with certainty since it 

would depend on other elements in total situation at the time especially 

5 04 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

degree of Russian activity. We remain of opinion that whatever the 

situation a really successful attack on Floesti could not fail to have 

a major effect either on German strategy or on the outcome of her operations then in progress. 

6. Substantial increase in Germany's synthetic capacity may well not 

take place before 1944 though this cannot be confirmed without further 

photographic reconnaissance now pending. In any case an unexpected 

major curtailment of supply during operations as result of attack 

whether on 1st July or 1st September coupled with apprehension which 

it would induce about effect of further attacks against Roumanian and 

other oil targets must in our opinion have effects described above. 

7. If Italy goes out of the war before the attack effect will require 

recalculating in light of all changed factors including diversion to 

Germany of Roumanian suppliesat present going to Italy. 

505 
5 06 
u. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRE 

INDEX 

A 

AGENDA 

FOT ~eminingConference, 77, 364. 384 

AIR FORCES ~SII oiso Forces, U.N. I 

British Planners‘ Report re 

Air Forces Available in the Mediterranean, 99 

United Nations Fighter FOTCBS NeceSS&rY for 

Defense in the Mediterranean and Italy, 100 

C.C.S. Discussion on Allocations of Surplus, 456 

C.P.S. Report On the Provisian of Air FOTCES fa 

Operations in 1943-44, 203 

AIR OFFENSIYE 

See Combined Bomber Offensive 

AIR OPERATIOUS ISII also Anti-U-Boat WaTfareI 

Buma-China Theater 

u. 5. Planners Report on Plans for Defeat Of 

iapan, 131 

European Theater 

Combined Bomber Offensive, 6 

u. 5. Planners Study on Air F0~c.s Required 

for Cross-Channel Operations in 1944, 110 

wditerranean Area 

British Planners Estlmte of Forces Available 

in the Mediterranean for Operations after 

HUSKY, 95 

Pacific Area 

U. 5. Planners Report on Plans for Defeat of 

Japan, 133 

Ploesti Oii Fields, 174, q2. 305. 398. 498, 504 

Portuguese Atlantic Islands Based, 58 

AIR TRAUSPORT ROUTE 

ASS~WBUT~~ 

C.P.5. Report On Aval labi llty of ReSOYTCeS for 

Operations of Route, 189 

Directive to 1\11 led Commander, Far East re 

Program far SuppI ies to China, 372. 376 

Final Report to the P~esidentand Prime Mini*ter, 175 

Potentialities of the Air Route fmm Assaim to 

Burm, 69, 425. 428 

Requirements to Expand the Capacity Of the Air 

Route to China, 460 

White HWS~ Discussion re Supplies for China, 

272 

AIRCRAFT 

Axis iSee nlro Charts and Tables1 

Gemany 

Production Rate, 12 

Strength, 12, 285 

Strength in France and the Low CountrlcSZO, 

86, 108 

J~FE~WEB 

Strength in South and Southwest Pacific, 137 

United Nations 

Strength Required Or Available for: 

Assam-B~rm Route, 212 

lisslstan~eto Portugal, 61 

Assistance to Turkey, 100, 21 I 

B~Yof eiscw, 165, 439 

China, 132, 150, 204, 422 

Combined Bomber Offensive, 7, 23, 110, 206, 

3’9 

RUSKI. 413, 501 

Mediterranean after HUSKY, 120. 209. 210 

Mediterranean for Operations against Itaiy, 

208 

Newf 0“ nd Iand , I65 

North Pecific, 144 

Pioesti, 202. 321. 398. 498 

Re-Arming Of French, 291 

South and Southwest Pacific, 135, 138, 150, 

205 

U.K. after HUSKY, 95, 113 

AKYAB 

Ssr Bum 

ALBANIA 

Relief and Suppiies for after Occupation, 67 

ALEUTIAU ISUUDS 

Operations in the North Pacific, 143 

ALGIERS CONFERENCE 

Concluding Remarks, 503 

Discussion Of Operations: 

HOBGOBLIN, 468 

HUSKY, 469. 50i 

Post-HUSKY. 469. 478. 509 

SOAPSUDS, 498 

Mrshal I ing Yards at Rome, 498 

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT CRAFT (See also Landing Craft1 

British Planners Statement Of Requirements for 

RUUNDUP. 83 

C.P.S. Report anAvaIlabIIlty, 213 

Final Report to the President and Prime Minister. 117 

U. S. Planners Estimate of Craft Available in 

the United Kingdom by Aprl I 1944, I19 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

ANAKIN iSer also Burma, China1 B 

j,ir chief M ~ ~i4ii~i ~ views ~ re ~Feasibility ~ I BALKANS of seabcrne Expedition, Without Land-Based Aircraft, $69 

C.C.S. O ~ ~ C ~ of S SOperations ~ O ~ in Burma, 346 

~ ~ caciiities ~ for k operation. i ~ 214 ~

Field Marshal Wave1 1'5 views On ReCOnqUe*t of 

Burma, 266 

operations in Burma to Open and Secure an Overiand Route tc China, 71, 417. 418 

Operations in the Burma-China Theater, 125, 115 

Operations from India, 1943-1944 iBritish Memo 

on Operations as Agieed in Casiblan~~ Conference.), 52, 413 

Prime Minister's Statement re Aid to China, 255, 

264 

ANTI-AIRCRAFT STRENGTH iSer ~iriForces, U.N. 1 

For Garrisoning in North Africa and Mediterranean. 4 8, 

ANTI-U-BOAT WARFARE ~SIIolra Submarine1 

Air Coverage for U. S. Convoys in the Pacific, 

289 

British Chiefs Suggested Basis for Ois~~ssian, 

16C. $78. 446 

Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, 172 

U. 5. Chiefs Statement in Reply to British Suggestions re Anti-U-Boat Warfare, 164, 438. 446 

ASSAULT SHIPPING 

See Amphibious Assault Craft 

ATTRITION 

President's Statement re Value as Effective 

weapon, 257 

AXIS iSee also European Theater1 

Defeat Cf Axis PoweTs in Europe 

Concentration of Largest Possible Force in 

U.K.. 104, 371, 404. qll 

Eliminatian of Italy First, 82, 371. 391 

~igiersCarference Discussions, 469. 478 

Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, 172 

Resolutions of the C.C.S., 122, 404. 4~s 

U. 5. Planners Estimate of Axis Capabilities in 

Spring of 1944, 101 

White House Discussion on Defeat of AXIS Pawers 

in Europe, 286 

AZORES ISLANOS 

See Portuguese Atlantic Islands 

Prim Minister's Statement re Effect on Balkans 

of Eliminating Italy from the war, 253 

BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVERALL STRATEGIC 

CONCEPT 

Final Report to the President and PrimeMinister, 170 

BAY OF BISCAY OFFEIISIVE 

SIP Anti-U-Boat Warfare 

BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO 

operations in, 150 

BOGUE GROUP 

See Anti-U-Raat Warfare 

BOLERO ~SPDalso Cross-Channei Operatiansi 

British Planners Statement re BOLERO Bui Id-up 

and Forces Available for Cross-Channel Operations in Apri I 1964, 93 

C.P.S. Report on Forces Operationally AVaildbie 

I May 1944, 195 

Despatch of U. 5. Service and Engineer Troops to 

the U.K., 449. 452 

President's Statement re use of Surplus wanpower 

for Build-up of, 258 

U. S. Planners Estimate of Build-up in the U.K. 

for CTOIS-Channel Operations, 110, I14 

BOMBER OFFENSIVE 

See Combined Bomber Offensive 

BR iHSTONE 

Operations after HUSKY, 40 

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Memoranda: 

Suggested Rasis for Discussion of knti-u-~oat 

Warfare, 16C 

Conduct of the War in 1943-1944. 336 

Movements of the "QUEENS".ZJO 

Operations in the European Theater Between 

HUSXY and ROUXDUP. 46 

Operations from India, 194Fi94A. 52 

Provision of ~ewL.s.1. iti's. 252 

Use of Portuguese Atlantic Islands, 58 

BRITISH JOINT STAFF PLANNERS 

Defeat Of the Axis Powers in Europe iEliminatian 

of italy First 1, 82 

BROOKE. SIR ALAN 

Statement re German Intentiam for 1943, 485 

BUILD-UP FOR INVASION 

See BOLERO. invasion 

508 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

BURMA iSee also ANAKIXI 

C.C.S. Discussion Of Operations in Burma, 346, 

~~ 

965

C.P.S. Report on Avaiiabi i lty of Resources for 

Operations in E~rma, 185, 196 

Directive to A1 I ied Commander, Far East, re 

Program for Supplies to China, 372. 376 

Field MnrshdI Waveid Is Views on Reconquest Of 

Burma. 266. 349 

Final Report to the President bnd Prime Minister, 175 

Operations: 

In Burma, 1943.1944. 125, 288. 498 

In Burma to Open and Secure an Overland Route 

to China 71, 417. 4z8 

From India, 194?4944, 52, 413 

In the Pacific and Far East in 1943-44, 131 

Potentialities of the Air Route from A15arn to 

Burma, 69, 425, 428 

Recapture of, 35 

Dr. Soong’s Statement to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. 376 

White House Conference re Situation in IndiaBurma-China Theater, 264 

White House Discussion re C.C.S. Resolutions on 

Burma-China Theater 288. 304 

BURW ROAD 

Tonnage Capacity. 265 

BUTTRESS 

Operations after Husrr. 30 

C 

C.C.S. DEClS IDUS 

See Decisions 

CAIRO 

see Egypt 

CAUU IBAL 

See BURMA 

CARGO SHlPPlUG 

See Dry Cargo Shipping 

CAROLIUE ISLANDS 

Operations in, 152 

CASABLAUCI COXFEREUCE 

Reference, Resoiutions re Operations from India 

into Burma and China During 1943-1944. 52 

CELEBES SEA 

Line of Comnunicetians from Hawaii to, 36 

CHARTS AUQ TABLES 

Air Requirements far Operations in Assam and 

Burma, 212 

Comparison of Germ” Bomber and Fighter PrDduction and Operational Strength, Facing Page 24 

Disposition of German Fighter Planes, Facing 

Page 24 

German Fighter Plane Production and Wastage, 

Facing Page 24. 

Provision of Ships and Landing Craft far Operations in the European Theater, Facing Page 211 

Two Projections of German Fighter Strength, 

Facing Page 24 

u. 5. ~lioc~tion~ o f Landing Craft, Facing page 

214 

u. s. Troop Movements, Facing Page 226 

CHEUHAULT, GEWERLL C. L. 

Statement re Air Force Operations in China, ~73 

Visit to the United Kingdom, 309 

CHIANG KAI-SHEK, GENERALISSIMO 

Communication of Certain Decisions tOtkChime, 

308. 463 

CHIUA ISee olro Burmai 

C.C.S. Discu~sionon Operations in Burma, 346, 

3 65 

Communi~ation of Certain Decisions to the 

Chinese, 308. 463 

Directive to Aii ied Commander, Fa7 East, re 

Program forsupplies to China, 372. 376 

Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, 175 

Fo~cesavailable for operations in Burma, 272, 

380 

Operations in Burma to Open and Secure an Overland Route to China, 71, 417. 428 

Operations fmm India, 1943-1944, 52, 413 

Operations in the Pe.clf’#c and Far East ‘8” 1943­

44, 128 

Potentiaiities of the Air Route from Assam to 

Burma, 69, 425 

President’s Statement re Aid to China, a-50 

Prlme Minister’s Statement re Aid to China, 255 

Requirements for the Chinese Army in Yunnan, $71 

Dr. Soong’s Statement to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff, 376 

Strategic Concept for Aid to China, 28 

Supplies forChina, 272 

White House Conference re Situation in indiaBurma-China Theater, 164 

White House Discussion re C.C.S. Resolutions on 

Burma-China Theater, 288. 304 

NOTE: Italic n~rneml,wfer to pdgc~in minutes of mrctingr. 

Plain “YmerdJI rclrr (0 P”CI in c. c. s. Psporr 

509 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

CODE NAMES 

For Future Operations, 235, 310. 430 

CCUBAT LOADERS 

Provisi~nof New L.S.I. ILi's, 232 

COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE (See also SICILEJ 

Effect of, an invasion of the continent from the 

U.K. 2 

Plan far Combined Bomber Oflensivc fmn the U.K., 

6, 172, 396 

Requirements for u. 5. Aircraft In the U.K., 1, 

17 

White House Oiswssion of, 185 

COMBINED PLANNING 

Pmposals for improving Combined Planning, 246, 

4 64 

COMBINED STAFF PLANNERS 

Report on Implementation of Assumed Basic Undertakings and Specific Operations far the Conduct 

of the War in 1943-1944, 184 

Report on Proposals tor lmprovlng Combined Pianning, 246 

CONDUCT OF THE WAR 

Admiral ~ing'sStatement re Ail ied Ca' bilitiee, 

433 

Agreed Essentials in the, 74, 364. 383. .18. 404 

In 1943-1944, 26, 317. 336 

Algiers ConferenCe DiSCY5510~ Te OPeratl""* 

after HUSKY. 469 

President's Stafewnt re Globai Strategy, 256 

Views of the British Chiefs of Staff, 336, 317 

CONVOY 

Portuguese Atlantic Islands, Aircraft Base for 

Convoy Protection, 58 

Provision of ~av.1 Forces for impiemsntatlon of 

Assumed Basic Undertakings and Specific Operations, 199 

CMIKSCREW 

See HOBGOBLIN 

CRITICAL ITEMS, SUPPLY OF' 

C.P.S. Report on AVailabiiity of, 215 

Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, i17 

CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS isee also BOLEROI 

C.C.S. Di5cY**io.: 

Cross-Channe I Operations Versu~ Operations 

against Italy, 3~7,366. 404 

Operations In Europe, 366. 391 

C.P.S. Report on Availability of Resources to 

Meet, 193 

Directive to General Morgan for Implementation Of 

Trident Decisions, 241 

Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, 

I73 

French Part Facilities for Build-up, 3 

Prim Minister's Statement at Algiers Conference, 

470 

ReSOiUtions Of the C.C.S., 122, 404, 410 

Target Date, 4, 109. 404. 409. 4~2 

U. 5. Chiefs Estimate of United Nations Oivlsioos 

Available by i April 1944, 3 

u. s. Planners: 

Concept Of Operations. 104 

Report on Availability of United Nations FOTCeS 

for, 110 

White House Discussion on, 286, 908 

CUNNINGHAM, ADMIRAL A. B. 

Views re Operations after HUSKY, 38 

CYCLES 

Movements Of the "Vuoens", 230 

D 

DECEPTION 

Far Operations in the Pacific and Far Eastern 

Theaters Including Burma, 458 

Use Of SONIC Warfare Equipment for, 158, 44s 

DEFEAT OF EUROPEAN AXIS 

See Axis 

DECISIONS 

Agenda for the Conference, 333. 361. 365 

Algiers Conference Resolutions: 

Bombing Of Marshalling Yards at none, 500 

Operation Soapsuds, 498 

Post-UUSIY operations into Italy, 474, 50s 

Anti-U-Boat narfare, 446 

BOLERO: 

Despatch af U. 5. Service and Engineer TrMpf 

to the United Kiogdom, 450 

Burma-Ch ina Theater 

Potentialities of the Air Route from Assam to 

China. 366 

Invitation to Or. Soong and wjor Chu, 366 

Directive to Ailled Authorities in the FIT 

East, 372. 460 

R.*OiYtlO". re operation* i", 428 

Chine. 

Communlcatian of Certain Decisions to the 

Chinese, 308; 463 

Code Names far Future Operations, 3x0. 430 

5 10 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

DECISIONS iCont. i DIRECTIVES 

Combined Bomber Offensive Implementation of Decisions Reached at the TriDisCUSSlon, 286 dent Conference, 238. 462 Agreement Following White HoY~~ 

on organization aod Operations of Military C.C.S. Approval of Plan, 398 ~ovsrnment for HUSKY. 459 

Conduct of the Conference, 332 To All led Authorities in the Far East, 372, 376 

Conduct of the War, Agreed Essentials, 384 

Deception DOOECANESE 

Policy far Pacific and Far East Theaters, In- Opera<ions in the European Theater Betreen HUSKY 

cluding Burma, 458 and ROUNDUP, 48 

Defeat of Axis Powers in Europe DOUGLAS, LEUiS W. 

Agreement Foiiaing White Nouse Discussion, 187 Statement re Dry cargo Shipping, Avaii~blesand 

Resolutions of the C.C.S., 410. 4x2 Requi TemntS, 228 

European Theater DRY CARGO SHIPPING 

Directive to the U. 5. and British Planners for c.P.8. Report on, 218 

Preparation Plans for the Defeat of Germany, 

372 E French 

Re-Arming of the French in North Af~ica, 396 EAKER, GENERAL 

imPiementatlon Sir Combined Bomber Offensive 

Assumed Basic Undertakings and Specific Operation* for the Conduct Of the Wair in 19451944, EDEN, ANTHONY 

449 Statement re Prospects of Bringing Turkey into 

the War, 484 Decisioos Reached at the Trident Conference, 

4 63 EGYPT 

Landing Craft Bombing of Calm in RetallltiDn for Bombing of 

Provision of ~ewL.S.I. iLi*s, 459 Rome, 500 

Pacific EISEMHOWER, GENERAL 0. 0. 

Operations in the Pacific and Far East, 136 Bvitish Chiefs Cornendation On Conduct of OperaPlan" ing tions in North Africa, 317, 502 

P~oPosaIsfar Improving, 465 Coment on Decisions Reached During Trident Conference. 478 Plaestl Oil Fields Directive to implement Decisions Reached at Tri­ lm@leme"tation of Plans, 400 dent Conference, 239 

Plough Scheme views re Operatlans after HUSKY, 38, 469 

Employment of Trained Forces, 3x0 

Portuguese Atlantic Islands ESCORT, NAVAL \See stso Convoy) 

Provision of ~ev.1 Forces for implementation of 

Agreement Following White House Di5cusSion. Assumed Basic Undertakings and Specific Opera279. 184 tions, 199 

Recornendations to the President and Prime Minister, 382 EUROPEAN AXIS 

Pro pagan da See AXIS 

Policy for Combined Operations, 447 EUROPEAN THEATER 

Movements of, 447 Defeat Of Axis Pwers in Europe 

sonic Warfare, qq* Concentmtion Of Largest Possible Force in the 

Japan U.K., 104, 371, 404, 412 

Strategic Plan for the Defeat Of, 417 Elimination Of Italy First, 82, 391 

Turkey Algiers Conference DiSCUSfions, 470. 478 

Agreement Follwing White House Discussion re Invasion fmm the U.K., 2, 122 

Equipment for Turkey, 305 Opemtions in, 366 

Assignment of Equipment to, 43, OpevatiOrs In, between HEKY and ROUNDUP. 46 

Strategic Concept for Operations, 27 

511 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

F 

FAR EAST THEATER lSer also Burma, China, Japan1 

Directive to Aiiied Authorities in the, 372, 376 

Operations in the Pacific and Fsr East in 1943­

44, 128, 43> 

Or. Saang's Statement to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff, 376 

Strategic Concept for Operations, ZB 

FIREBRAND 

Operations after HUSKY, 40 

FORCES, IlNlTED NATIONS 

Additionat Troop Requirements for Post-HUSKY 

Operations, 480 

Allocation of Surplus Air Forces, 456 

Anti-Aircraft Forces Required for Garrisoning in 

NOI-th Africa and Mediterranean, 481 

British Planners statement re: 

Air Forces Available in the Mediterranean, 99 

Avsi lable for Crass-Channel Operations in Apri I 

1944, 94 

Commitments in the Mediterranean After the 

Elimination of Italy, 96 

Fighter Forces Necessary foT Defense in the 

Mediterranean and Italy, 100 

Chinese Forces to be Avaiiable for Operations in 

Burma, 27>, 380 

Combined Staff Planners Report On Availabi IIty 

of Forces to ~eethe Requirements of Critical 

Strategy, 1943-44, I84 

Despatch of U. 5. Service and Engineer TTOOPS to 

the U.K.. 449 

Estimated Requirements for Operations in the 

Pacific and Far East 1943-44, 145 

Final Report to the President and Prime Mi"­

ister, 176 

Flexibility of, 172 

Polish and New Zealand Troops Available for 

operations against itaiy, 473 

Prime Minister's "Background Notel" Tabling 

Troops in and Available for Operations in the 

Mediterranean, 493 

To be Established in the U. K. for Cross-Channel 

operation*, 122, 4x9 

u. 5. Pl8nncr4 Report on Avaiiabiilty Of U.N. 

Forces for Cross-Channel Operations, I10 

FRANCE 

British Chiefs statement TB invasion fmm Corsica 

and Northern Itsly, 49 

German Amy Strength in, 2 

NOTE: italic numrrdli r&r 

Plain type "YrnO,dII 

FRENCH, COMBATANT 

For Crms-Channel Operations, 287, 2qq 

Rearming of the French in North Africa, 178, 291, 

4.394 

Strategic Concept for Aid to, 29 

G 

GERMANY 

Army Strength in France and the La* Countries, 

Bomber Strength, 12 

British Planners Estimate of Strength In France 

and the Low Countries in 1946, 85 

Combined Bomber Offensive against, 6 

Defeat Of the Axis Pwers in Europe 

Concentration of Largest Possible Force in 

U.K.. 104. 371, 405. 412 

Elimination of Italy First, 82. 392 

Fighter Strength, 12 

Prime Minister's "bckground Notes" Stating Passibiiity of ReSistBnCe in Italy, 490 

Sir Alan Brooke's Statement re German Intentions 

for 1943, 485 

U. 5. Planners Estimate of Axis Capabilities in 

E~rope, Spvlng of 1944, 101 

GLOBAL STRATEGY 

Algiers Conference Discussions re Operations 

after HUSKY, 469 

Discussion in 1st C.C.S. TRIDENT Meeting, 3x7 

President's Statement onl ~57 

Prime Minister's Statement on, ~59 

Views Of the British Chief8 of Staff, 344 

Views of the u. 5. Chiefs of Staff, 26, 3x7, 334 

GOBLET 

Operations after HUSKY. 39 

GREAT BRITAIN 

See United Kingdom 

GREECE 

An AsaUlt 00, from the West, 48 

Relief and Supplies for, after Occupation, 66 

use af Troops, 16, 

H 

HARDIHOOD 

See Turkey 

HOBGOBLIN 

Discussion Of Operation, in Algiers, 466 

to pager in minutes of mrrlingr. 

refer to pager in c. c. 5. Paper9. 

512 

2 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

HOMO KOWG 

seizure Of. I 35

~~ 

HUSKY (Also see Port-HUSKY1 

Additional Troop Requirements for Post-HUSKY 

ODerations. I_ 

a80

Alternative PoSSibilitieS in and Subsequent to 

operation, 474 

Aigiers Conference Oi~cus~ion of PISO for Operatian, 501 

British Pianners Statement re United nations 

Forces in the Mediterranean e,tConCIYSIon of 

HUSKY, 96 

Date of Operation, 386 

Directive on Organization and Operations of Military Government for HUSKY, 459 

Estimated Dates for Completion of BOSIY. 472 

General Alexander's Statement re Forthcoming 

Operations, 486 

General Eisenhower's Statement re Resources for, 

469 

HOBGOBLIN, Advantage of Operation In Reiation to, 

468 

New Plan for HUSKY, 

PAdrniral Kingls Comnents, 5-26 

Air Chief Marshal Partai's views On, 318 

Operations after, 38, 3'0. 325 

Operations in the European Theater Between HUSKY 

and ROUNDUP. 46 

Transport Aircraft for, 413 

I 

IBER IAM PEW INSULA 

Invasion of, by Axis, 60 

iHPLEYENTATlOW 

Of Assumed Basic Undertakings and Specific Operations for the Conduct af the War, 1943-44, 184, 

447 

Of Decisions Reached at the TRIDEhT Conference, 

2 38, 4 62 

INDIA 

Operations from, 1943-1944. 52, 413 

white muse conference re Situation in IndiaZurma-China Theater, 264 

IWDlAW OCEAN 

Floating Dock Requirements for Landing Craft, 214 

IMVASIOM iScr also Cross-Channei Operations 1 

British Planners Statement re: 

Assa.uIt and Landing Craft, Requirements, 84 

Enemy Strength on Cross-Channel Operation, 85 

Rate of Build-up for ROUNDUP, 84 

NOTE: itdiiC nYmcra~Jr&r 

Plain ypp""rnC,d!l 

OBfeat of the Aria Pn*er+ in Europe, 104 

Of the European Contint from the U.K., 2 

Of Japm, 32 

U. S. Planners Statement re Rate af Buiid-up and 

Amphlbiaus As~a~lt Craft for ROUNDUP. 112 

ITALY 

Additional Troop Requirements for Past-HUSKY 

Operations, 480 

Aigiers Conference: 

Oisc~ssionsre "Knocking Italy Out of the War", 

470. 478 

Resolution re Bombing Marshalling Yards Of 

Rome, 498 

c .c .5, o iIc YSS i0 n on C Toss-Cha nne i Opera t ions 

versus operations against itaiy, 327. 366, 

404 

Defeat of Axis PWerS in Europe 

Elimination of Italy First, 82, 324. 391 

EstiMted Enemy Strength in, 487 

Final Report to the President and Prime MinIster, 174 

Operations after BUSKY. 39. 301 

OpeTations against the Mainland of, 4% 122 

Polish and New Zealand Troops Ava'labie for 

Operations against, 473 

President's Statenent re Occupation of Italy, 261 

Prime Minister's "8ackground Notes" Stat lng Depioymeot of the Italian Army and Practical 

Advantages of Eliminating itaiy from the WaT, 

489 ISII 01ro 9531 

Propaganda for 

President's Comment on General Eisenhower's 

Proposal for Pre-HmRY Propaganda, 282 

C.C.S. Discussion On Pre-HUSKY Propaganda, 

391. 4~6,441, 447 

Relief and Suppiies for itaiy after Occupation, 

66 

J 

JAPAN 

Attacks Against Enemy Shipping, 259 

Finsi Report to the President and Prime Minister, 

i 15 

President's Statement re Attrition &gainst Shipping, 257 

Prime Minister's Statement re Defeat of Japan, 

256 

Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan, 32, 4~6 

to wgcr in ~WYIPIoi mrrtiw 

rde, 10 pa9e I" c.c. 5. Papem. 

513 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

K 

IRA PEIINSULA 

see BYrm i0perations in 1943-19441. Pacific Area 

1 

LAUDING CRAFT 

British Chiefs Memo re Provision of ~e*L.S.I. 

ill's, 232, 459 

British Planners Statement of Requirements far 

ROUNDUP, 84, 92 

C.P.S. Report On Availability Of, 184 1Appendix 

"A" Facing Page 2141 

Critical Shortage for Contemplated Operations, 

406 

Dock Requirements for, in Indian ocean, 214 

Final Report to the President and ?rime Minister, 

I77 

U. 5. Planners Estimate of Craft Avai iable in the 

U.K., by Apri I 1944, 119 

LEATHERS, LORD 

Statement re Dry Cavga Shipping, Availables and 

Requ lrements, 226 

LIBERATED TERRITORIES 

Relief and Supplies for, 66 

LOGISTICS 

C.C.S. ~~~oiutions re Commitments Burma-China 

Theater, 175, 457 

LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT 

see very tong Range Aircraft 

LOSS KATE 

See Shipping 

M 

MALACCA, STRAIT OF 

Line of Communications Through, 36 

MANPOWER 

President's Statement re Use of Surplus for 

BOLERO Bu iI d-up, 158 

PAPS 

Four Phases of Combined Bomber Offensive Plan, 

Facina" . Paae 24 

strategic ~ocaiionof the ~artugueseAtlantic 

ISIE"dS, 181 

MARSHALL ISLAYDS 

Operations in, 152 

MARSHALLING YARDS 

see name 

HEDITERRAPEAN isee also PostdUSKYJ 

A I g iers Conference Di 4cus.s ion re Post-HUSKY 

Operations, 469. 478 

British Planners Statement re Forces in the 

Mediterranean after ConcIuSio~Of HUSKY, 96, 

4 P3 

C.P.S. Report on ReIOYrCeS Available for operations in the Mediterranean, 208 

Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, 

I92 

Operations in the Mediterranean to Eiiminate 

Italy from the War, 82, 301, 391 

U. 5. Planners EstirnateofFarces Required in the 

Mediterranean Foliowing a Successful HUSKY. 120 

MIDDLE EAST 

Additional Troops for Post-HUSKY Operations, 481 

WORGAN. GEUERAL 

Directive Implementing the Decision Reached re 

ROUNDRAMXER, 24 I 

MUSKET 

Operations after HUSKY, 39 

N 

NAVAL FORCES isee olra ~orces, U.N., 

British Naval Forces Available for the Pacific 

After Eliminating Italy from the War, 253, 289 

C.P.S. Report on the Provision of Naval Forces 

for Operations in 1943-44, 199 

or HUSKY, statement by sir Andrew Cunningham, 

469 

NEW GlllNEA 

Operations in, 151 

NEW ZEALAUD 

Troops Auailable for operations Against Italy, 

473 

NORWAY 

Employment of Battalion Now in the U.S., 310 

Use of, far Air Bases, 300 

0 

OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 

Relief and Supplies for, 66 

OIL 

C.P.S. Report on, 187 

Effect of Bombing PloeIti antheAxis War Effort, 

504 

Final Report tothe President and Prime Minister, 

118 

514 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

OPERATIONS 

ANdKIN, 125, 196 

BRIMSTONE. 40 

BRISK, 450 

Burma, 1943-1944, 125, 428 

Burma, to Open and Secure an Overland Route to 

China, 71, 417 

BUTTRESS. 38 

European Theater Between HUSKY and RODPDl!P, "6 

Field Marshal Wavell'S Statement re FedBibilitY 

of Operations from India, 266 

Final Report tOthePresident and Prime Minister, 

196 

FIREBR4ND. 40 

From India, !BbJ--bb, 52, 4?3 

GOBLET, 39 

HOBGOBLIB. 468 

HUSKY. 38, 302. 501 

MUSKET. 39 

Partuguese 4t \antic lilinds, 50 

specific Operations for 1943-an in Execution of 

Overall strategic concept, 180 

strrtegic Plan for the Defeat of ~apan, 32, 4x6 

OVERALL SIRATEGIC CONCEPT 

Final Report tothepresident and Pr8me Minister, 

i 84 

United Nations, 26, 7d 

P 

PACIFIC AREA 

~dmralKingls Statement re Plans for Qefensive 

and offensive Operations in the Pacific, 431 

C.C.S. oiscussioo of operations in Burma, 346. 

365 

Final Report tothePres8dent an* Prime Minister, 

197 

Operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943­

ad, 120, 43' 

Prime Minister's statement re: 

Additional Naval Forces for the Pacific after 

Eliminating Italy from the *ar, 2'3, 285 

Alternate operations to Aid China, 255 

mgoonOperat ion, 26a 

PAWIELLERIA 

Srr HOBGOBLIN 

PENANG 

See Burma, iOperatians in 1943-441 

PERSONNEL SHIPPING 

C.P.5. Report On, 222 

Movements of the "Queens", 230 

PLOESTI. RUMANIA 

Algiers Conference ResOlutiOn re operation 

SOIYSU'US. 498 

C.C.S. Resalutions re Plan for Bombing Ploesti, 

3-1, 398 

Fffect of operation SOAPSUDS on 4xis War Effort, 

504 

Final Report tothepresident and Prime Minister, 

174 

White HO"5e Discussion 0" Bombing of, zyz. 303 

PLOllGH SCHEME 

Report on, 910 

POLES 

Employment of the Poles, 181, 301. 308 

Troops 4vailable for Operations "gainst Italy, 

4 73 

PORT FACILITIES 

For Cross-Channel Build-up, 3 

PORTAL, AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR CHARLES 

Concurrencewith Combined Bomber Offensive Plan, 

7 

PORTI'GUESE ATLAYTIC ISLANDS 

Memo to President and Prime Minister re AC. 

quisition 01, 58 

Operation BRISK. 450 

Qiequirements far operation, 215 

use Of PortugueIe Atlantic Islands, 58, 111, 

179, 331, 373, 381, 388 

white House Discussion re Acquisition of the 

Azores, 161 

POST-HUSKY ,See also Mediterranean) 

ndmiral cunninghamla statement re HUSKY and 

operations into Italy, 48, 

Algiers Conference, Concluding Remarks re, 502 

Alternative Possibilities in and Subsequent to 

operatian HUSKY. 474 

"Background Notes" by the Prime Minister, Outlining Feasibility of Operations into Italy 

after KUSRY. 489 

Discussion During Conferenceatnlgiers, 469. 478 

Operations after HUSKY. 3a, 30~,324, 352 

Operations in the European Theater between HUSKY 

and ROUNDUP. 46 

515 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

PRESIDEFT OF THE IlNlTEO STATES 

Final Report to, 169 

Memo re POfiugueIe Atlantic ISlandS, 63 

statement re: 

Attrition, 257 

Global Strategy, 257 

Objectives to liid China, 276 

Situation in Turkey, 257 

Use Of Surplus Manpower fov BOLERO Build-up, 

258 

PRESS 

Official statement for, 309 

PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN 

Rackground Notes Ovti ining: 489 

Feasibility of Post-HUSKY Movement Into Italy, 

PoSSibIity of Resistance 

Deployment of the Italian Army 

Practical Muantages of Eliminating ltdly 

from the war lSea also =531 

United Nations Troops in and Available for 

Operations in the Mediterranean 

British and Rritish-ControI led Units under 

General Eisenhower's Command or Earmarked 

for HUSKY 

Additional British Units which Could be 

Transferred to General Eisenhower,* Command 

Final Report to, 169 

Memo re Portuguese Atlantic Islands, 63 

statement re: 

Cros*-C"annel operations, 470 

Global Strategy, 252 

operations in Burma, 278 

PROPAGANDA 

President's Comment on General Eisenhoverls 

Proposal for Pre-HUSKY Propaganda, 282 

C.C.S. Considerat ion on Pre-HUSKY Propaganda, 

391. 416. 441, 447 

0 

"r)UEENS" 

Movements of, 230, 442. 447 

R 

RANGOON 

see 0urma loperations in 1943-441, Pacific Area 

RATE OF BUILD-UP FCR INVASIOU 

See IrlV.Si0" 

RE-ARMING OF FRENCH 

Sar French, Combatant 

RESOLUTIONS 

Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, 

169 

operations in BW~, 1943-1944, 125, 4ga 

Re Cross-Channel OperltiOnS, May 19M. 122 

RESMIRCES 

Availauiiity of, to 

Basic Undertakings 

Execution of OveiaiI 

176, 184 

General Eisenhower's 

HUSKY, 469 

ROME, ITALY 

Algiers Conference 

Marshal I ing Yards 

Meet the Requirements of 

and Specific Operations in 

Strategic Concept, 1943-44, 

Statement re Reio~rcesfor 

Re~~I~tions re Bombing of

at, 498 

ROUNDUP [SIP also Cross-Channel Operationsi 

British Planners Statement re Requirements of 

Assault and Landing Craft, Rate of Buiid-UP, 

Enemy Strength for, 02 

Invasion Of the Continent from the U. K. 1943-44, 

2 

Operations in Europe, 366 

Operations in the European Theater Between HOSKY 

and ROUNDUP. 46 

Port Facilities for Build-up, 3 

U. 8. Planners Estimate of Build-up for CrassChannel Operations, 114 

u. 5. Planners Statement of Forces Opposing, 101 

ROUUOHAMMER 

Sie Crass-Channel Operations 

RUSSll 

Algiers conference Discussion re operations for 

Aid to, q6q 

Assistance in Case of an Attack by Japan, 312 

Consultations with the Russians, 312 

Prime ~inister'sStatement re Effect on Russia 

of Eliminating italy from the War, 253 

Strateglc Concept for Aid to, 28 

Third Soviet Protocol, 43, 

S 

SARDINIA 

Capture of, 41, 309 

Operations after HOSKY. 30 

SHIPPING 

C.P.S. Report on, is4 

516 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

SHIPPING ICant'dI 

Final Report to the President ad Prime Minister, 

171 

Lass Rate for, 448 

SICKLE lSar also BOLERO1 

C.C.S. Discussion re Suiid-up of SICXLE, 366. 369 

Despatch of u. s. service and ~~~i~~~~ ~r~~~~to 

the U.K.. 449. 451. 457 

SLEDGEHAMMER 

See Crass-Channel OperdtlOnS 

SOAPSUDS 

Sea Plaesti, Rumnia 

SONIC WARFARE, 158, 449 

SOONG, Or. T. V. 

Situation in China, 376 

SOVIET PROTOCOL 

C.C.S. Deferment of Paper. 452 

STILWELL, GEUERAL J. W. 

Statement re Aid to China, 356. 470 

Visit to the United Kingdom, 309 

STRATEGIC CONCEPT 

SIC overal I strategic Concept 

STRATEGIC PLANS 

See Operations 

SUBMARINE ~SII olra Anti-U-Beat Warfarel 

uperationsin Bay of Bengal, against Japanese 

communiCat i 2a8

Admirai King's Statement re Enemy Submarine Situation: 

in the Mediterranean, 33' 

In the Pacific, 289. 436 

SUBVERSIVE ACTIV IT1 ES 

Sor Propaganda 

SUMATRA 

see 8"rrna ,operations in 1943-441, Pacific Area 

SUPPLIES 

For China, 472 

For mcupied ad Liberated Terrltaries, 66 

For Turkey, 178, 305. 430 

Of criticai Items, 215 

SUPPLY ROUTES 

Sea Aiv Transport Route 

T 

TABLES 

See Charts and Tables 

TARGET DATE 

For HUSKY, 386 

Recommended Target Date for Invasion of continent 

from the U.K., 4, i09, 404, 407. 4x2 

TARGETS, BMlBlNG 

Combined Bomber Offensive Plan from the u.K.. 8 

TEDOER, AIR CHIEF MARSHAL A.W. 

Views re operations after XUSKY, 43 

TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT 

For HUSKY. 413 

TRIDENT CONFERENCE 

Adjournment Of, 3x3 

Agenda for, 18 

Conclusion of Conference. 465 

Conduct of Confererce, 3~6 

Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, 

I69 

General Eisenhower's Comnent on Decisions Reached 

@"ring conference. q78 

implementation of Decisions ~eached, 238 

TROOP LlFT 

C.P.S. &part on Personnel Shipping Position, 222 

Movements of the "Cueens",23@. 442. 447, 

TROOPS 

Sea Forces, U.N. 

TURKEY 

Assignment Of Equipment to. 178 

C.P.S. Report on Availability of All ReSOUTCeS 

for AsSistanCe to Turkey, 211 

Equipment for Turkey, 305 

MII itary suppl ies for Turkey. 430 

Mr. Eden's Statement re Prospecto for Bringing 

~~~k~~ into the war, 4a4 

The President's Statement re Situation in Turkey 

and Advantage to the A11 ies Of, 957 

prime ~i~ister,~ Statement re Effect on Turkey 

of Eliminating Ital) from the war, 253 

U 

U.S.S.R. 

See Russia 

U-BOAT WARFARE 

see Anti-U-8oat Warfare 

UUITED KINGDOM 

Defeat of AX~SP-~S in ~urope 

Concentration Of Largest Possible Force in 

U.K.. 104 

Invasion of the European Continent from the U.K., 

2 

51 7 
U.S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

INDEX 

UNITED KINGOOH ICont'di 

Plan for Conblned Bomber Offensive from the U.K., 

6 

UNITED MTlONS 

Overall Objectives, 26, 74 

U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Statement in Reply to British SUggestion re Anti­

+Boat Warfare, 164 

Vim5 on Global Strategy of the war, 334 

U. S. STAFF PLANNERS 

Conduct of the War in 1943-1944, 26 

Defeat of Axis Powers In Europe, ICancsntration 

of Largest Posible Force in U.K. I, 104 

InVdSion of the European Continent from the U.K., 

in 1943-1944. 2 

Operations in Burma to Open and Secure an Overland Route to China, 71 

Potentialities of Air Route from Assam to China, 

69 

Strategic Plan fN the Defeat Of Japan, 32 

UPKEEP 

Rewarms on S"CC.*I of operation, 401 

V 

VERY LOUG RANGE AIRCRAFT 

Anti-U-Boat Warfare, 161, 165 

Operations from Portuguese Atlantic islands, 58 

W 

WAR 

See Conduct of the war 

WAVELL, FIELD WRSHAL SIR ARCHIBALD 

Statement re Feasibi Iity of Operations from 

India, 266. 349 

Y 

YUGOSLAVIA 

Relief and Supplies for, after Cc~up8tion. 67 

use Of rroaps, 282 

518