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i 

61–736 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–97] 

PRESIDENT OBAMA’S NEW PLAN FOR 

MISSILE DEFENSES IN EUROPE AND 

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 1, 2009 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

BOB DEGRASSE, Professional Staff Member 

RUDY BARNES, Professional Staff Member 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

ZACH STEACY, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, October 1, 2009, President Obama’s New Plan for Missile Defenses 

in Europe and the Implications for International Security .............................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, October 1, 2009 ...................................................................................... 51 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 1, 2009 

PRESIDENT OBAMA’S NEW PLAN FOR MISSILE DEFENSES IN 

EUROPE AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Armed Services ............................................................ 3 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Cartwright, Gen. James E., USMC, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ......... 11 

Flournoy, Hon. Miche`le A., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense ............................................................................................. 6 

O’Reilly, Lt. Gen. Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency, U.S. 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 8 

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 

International Security, U.S. Department of State ............................................ 16 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Cartwright, Gen. James E., joint with Hon. Miche`le A. Flournoy ............... 55 

O’Reilly, Lt. Gen. Patrick J. ............................................................................ 63 

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O. ................................................................................... 73 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 89 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 87 

(1) 

PRESIDENT OBAMA’S NEW PLAN FOR MISSILE DEFENSES IN EUROPE AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, October 1, 2009. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:07 a.m., in room HVC– 

210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. Committee meets today to receive 

testimony on the President’s new plan for missile defenses in Europe and the implications for international security. 

Joining us today is a formidable panel of witnesses, General 

James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the 

Honorable Miche`le Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; 

the Honorable Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms 

Control and International Security; and Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly, Director of the Missile Defense Agency. 

I have to give a special welcome to our friend, former colleague, 

Ellen Tauscher. It is a thrill to have you back. And we know that 

you are doing exceedingly well. We appreciate you. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. We thank each of you for appearing. 

Two weeks ago, the President announced that he had accepted 

the unanimous recommendations of Defense Secretary Gates and 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to restructure the plan for missile defense 

in Europe. He said, ‘‘Our new missile defense architecture in Europe will provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and American allies.’’ 

And I must say, the new plan sounds familiar. It sounds like 

very much it came from the bipartisan direction provided by Congress. In 2006, our bill established the policy of the United States 

to accord priority to developing, testing, fielding the near-term effective missile defense systems, including Aegis, Ballistic Missile 

Defense (BMD), and Standard Missile-3 (SM–3) interceptor Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and Patriot Advanced 

Capability-3 (PAC–3) system. 

In our bill two years ago, we made it the policy of the United 

States to develop, test, and deploy effective missile defenses for our 

forward-based forces, our allies, and our homeland against the 

threat of Iran’s existing and potential ballistic missiles. 
2 

Last year, we told the Department to buy more SM–3s and 

THAAD interceptors to defend against short- and medium-range 

missiles. In a nutshell, that is what the President and Secretary 

Gates announced two weeks ago. 

In my view, the new plan is comprehensive, it is flexible, it is designed to counter the most immediate threats posed by Iran first, 

and more quickly protect our allies and our forward-deployed 

troops in the region than previously planned. 

And, notably, it contains important hedges, so if our intelligence 

estimates are wrong, we will be in a position to fortify the defense 

of Europe as well as our homeland. 

We know that Iran is deploying significant numbers of shortrange missiles more quickly than we had previously expected, and 

deploying some medium-range systems, such as the Shahab-3, that 

can reach Israel. Also, Iran is developing medium- and intermediate-range missiles that can reach Europe. 

We have a moral responsibility to do more rapidly and to deploy 

defenses that can protect our North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) allies and our forward-deployed forces in places like 

Aviano Air Base in Italy against the growing threat. 

On the other hand, Iran’s ability to field an ICBM—that is, an 

intercontinental ballistic missile—that can reach the United States 

is still in the future, according to our intelligence professionals, 

maybe as far away as 2020. 

That said, we know that intelligence estimates can be wrong. For 

that reason, I am pleased that the plan continues the testing of the 

two-stage Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptor that 

would have been deployed in Poland under the previous plan. And 

the Administration plans to continue negotiating with the Poles 

and the Czechs to reach cooperative agreements to base missile defense systems in those nations in the third or fourth stage of the 

plan. 

Finally, before turning to our ranking member, as well as our 

witnesses, let me just make a few comments about how this new 

plan might affect our relations with Russia. While I find it unlikely 

that calculations concerning our relations with Russia played no 

part in the decision, I am hopeful, as Secretary Gates wrote in the 

New York Times, that ‘‘if Russia’s leaders embrace this plan, then 

that will be an unexpected—and welcome—change of policy on 

their part.’’ 

It would be an additional benefit if the new plan opens the door 

to cooperation with Russia on missile defense. Russian cooperation 

could send a powerful signal to Iran, a point of great importance 

on the day when negotiations are to begin with Iran. 

So a key question for our witnesses this morning is whether the 

Russians will support this new approach and whether the decision 

will help create a united front in negotiations with Iran. 

Before calling on our distinguished panel, let me recognize my 

good friend, the Ranking Member, Mr. McKeon from the State of 

California. 

Mr. McKeon. 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is a privilege to welcome our distinguished witnesses here 

today: General Cartwright, Secretary Flournoy, General O’Reilly. 

In particular, I would like to extend a warm welcome back to the 

gentlelady from California, our colleague and now Under Secretary 

of State, Ellen Tauscher, and my native Californian friend. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. MCKEON. Our hearing today focuses on the Administration’s 

decision to scrap plans for deploying a European missile defense capability in Poland and the Czech Republic to protect Europe and 

the United States. 

My colleague has voiced broad support for the Administration’s 

new proposal. Let me say I am skeptical. I think it has some merit 

but, as I weigh all the costs and benefits of the decision, both quantitative and qualitative, I do not come to the same conclusion. I 

think there are questionable assumptions, a lot of ‘‘ifs,’’ and considerable geopolitical consequences. 

A key justification for the Administration’s decision is a new 

threat assessment, which suggests that the threat from Iran’s 

longer-range ballistic missiles has been slower to develop, while its 

short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) are growing 

more rapidly than previously expected. It is a sudden change and 

inconsistent with the frequent briefings, intelligence reports, and 

testimony the committee has received from intelligence and defense 

officials. 

In March of 2009, General Craddock, then-Commander of U.S. 

European Command, testified before the committee. And I quote, 

‘‘By 2015, Iran may also deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile 

capable of reaching all of Europe and parts of the U.S.’’ 

In May 2009, an unclassified intelligence report issued by the 

National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) stated, ‘‘With 

sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could develop and test an ICBM 

capable of reaching the United States by 2015.’’ 

Despite this expert testimony and information, there seems to be 

this certainty within the Administration that the Iranians can’t develop an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) or ICBM by 

2015, and that these are not real threats to be worried about. 

Does this certainty consider foreign assistance? Because, as we 

all know, Iran continues to work closely with North Korea who, 

themselves, appear to be pursuing ICBMs. 

Does this certainty account for uncertainty? Intelligence is a fickle business, especially when a country is determined to mask its activities. Friday’s revelation that Iran is building a covert uranium 

enrichment facility is a case in point. A December 2007 National 

Intelligence Estimate (NIE) judged that covert uranium enrichment 

efforts were ‘‘halted.’’ Less than two years later, they are not. The 

NIE also highlighted intelligence information gaps and shortfalls. 

So I am skeptical when I hear Administration officials talk in such 

absolute terms that the long-range missile threat isn’t as quick to 

develop. 
4 

We are all concerned by the proliferation and growth in shortand medium-range missiles. They are a threat to our allies, particularly in the Middle East and Asia, and to our forward-deployed 

troops. Thus, increasing our theater missile defenses is incredibly 

important. 

However, as I understood the previous plan, the 10 interceptors 

in Poland and radar in Czech Republic would be complemented by 

expanding theater missile defense capabilities such as Aegis, 

THAAD, Patriot, and Allied systems to cover the shorter-range 

areas. All NATO heads of state and governments signed on to this 

basic approach at the April 2008 Bucharest summit. 

The testimony submitted by our witnesses also emphasized that 

the new Phased, Adaptive Approach is more cost-effective, with 

proven technology, and provides more comprehensive coverage of 

Europe sooner than the previous plan. I would like to understand 

these assertions because, frankly, with the information I have before me, I am having a hard time believing them. 

According to a 2008 independent report required by this committee, the Czech and Polish proposal was the most cost-effective 

solution to protect the U.S. and Europe. Another study done earlier 

this year by the Congressional Budget Office examined sea- and 

land-based alternatives and came to the same conclusion. 

As I understand it, Phase One and Phase Two of the new approach provide only modest coverage of Europe. Of course, this depends on the number of ships available and locations where those 

ships would be deployed. Given the demands on the Navy’s surface 

fleet and United States Central Command (CENTCOM), United 

States Pacific Command (PACOM), and United States African 

Command (AFRICOM) and others, dedicating those ships to the 

European theater will be challenging, to say the least. 

These phases also require the development and acquisition of 

new sensor technologies. 

Let’s make one thing clear about this policy: if this new approach 

is to match its predecessor in terms of dedicated coverage, we will 

either need new ships or we will have to take ships away from 

other missions. Protections for most of Europe against mediumand intermediate-range ballistic missiles isn’t provided until 2018, 

and protection of the U.S. against ICBMs until 2020. 

Protection of the U.S. requires a new interceptor, the SM–3 

Block IIB that I would characterize as a ‘‘paper’’ missile. Should 

Iran have an IRBM or ICBM capability by 2015, or even 2018, this 

new approach could leave parts of Europe and the U.S. vulnerable 

for several years. Are we offering Tehran an open invitation to 

focus on longer-range missile development? 

Aside from the technical and cost concerns, I am particularly 

troubled by the geopolitical consequences of the Administration’s 

decision, starting with its effect on our relationship with friends 

and allies. The Czech Republic and Poland, who have troops in Afghanistan fighting alongside U.S. forces, went out on a limb. The 

U.S. Government made a commitment, and we backed out. I can’t 

express how strong my disappointment is over this. 

So how did the Administration inform Prague and Warsaw of its 

decision? Reportedly by late-night phone calls and hastily assembled diplomatic envoys. Apparently the Czech Prime Minister was 
5 

woken out of bed after midnight, and the Polish Prime Minister refused to answer the phone, suspecting what the news might be. 

On top of all this, the announcement came on the 70th anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Poland at the start of World War II. 

For a President who has repeatedly stressed the importance of 

multilateralism and diplomatic reengagement with the world, this 

unilateral action was abrupt and sloppy, occurring without the consultations promised to both governments. 

What will be the second- and third-order effects of this decision? 

There is what we believe, and then there is what others perceive. 

The headline of a daily paper in the Czech Republic read, ‘‘No 

Radar. Russia Won.’’ An editorial in a respected pro-business Czech 

newspaper said, ‘‘An ally we rely on has betrayed us and exchanged us for its own, better relations with Russia, of which we 

are rightly afraid.’’ 

Are we signalling to allies that we are willing to compromise our 

relationships with them in order to better our relationship with 

Russia or, perhaps, Iran or North Korea? Will allies and friends 

view U.S. commitments more skeptically in the future? Will Russia 

and Iran use this decision as an opening to be more assertive in 

their foreign policy? 

The Administration’s Russia ‘‘reset’’ policy now seems to have 

morphed into a Russia ‘‘retreat’’ policy that unsettles our allies and 

does nothing to discipline Russian behavior. Though the administration has stated this decision is not a concession to Russia, it 

sure looks like one. Whether the timing was intentional or not, on 

the eve of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations 

in Geneva, the Administration gave Russia the concession it wanted and got nothing in return. 

The President has also sought Russian assistance to stop Iran’s 

nuclear programs, signalling that such assistance would lessen the 

need for the Czech and Polish sites that Moscow has opposed. Yet 

we have no indications that Russia will cooperate on Iran, and history should teach us to have very low expectations. 

In fact, Prime Minister Putin remarked the day after, ‘‘The latest 

decision by President Obama . . . has positive implications, and I 

very much hope that this very right and brave decision will be followed by others.’’ What is clear is that the Kremlin expects shifts 

in U.S. policy without taking any equivalent action. Ceding to Russia in areas that affect our national security interests is dangerous 

and unwise. 

During his April 5th speech in Prague, the President stated, ‘‘As 

long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a 

missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven.’’ Let’s take 

stock of where we are at. The threat clearly persists, and I am as 

yet unconvinced that the new approach is lower-risk and more costeffective at protecting the U.S. and Europe. Meanwhile, the geopolitical implications resulting from the decision are significant. 

Finally, perhaps the ultimate litmus test for the Administration’s 

new approach will be whether it is funded. Will program investments match the Administration’s new policy? They are not off to 

a good start, with a $1.2 billion reduction to the missile defense 

program in this year’s budget. I wait with keen interest the fiscal 

year 2011 budget request. 
6 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

We are in the mechanical age today. We have to punch the right 

button. 

I understand the order of witnesses today was requested by the 

witnesses, who will be out of the proper seniority manner. But we 

will follow the suggestions of the witnesses today and will be in 

this order: Secretary Flournoy, General O’Reilly, General Cartwright and, finally, Secretary Tauscher. Again, thank you for being 

with us. 

Secretary Flournoy. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHE` LE A. FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Thank you, Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon, and other distinguished members of the committee. 

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Administration’s new 

approach to missile defense in Europe with you today. 

We are confident that our new approach represents a dramatic 

improvement over the program of record. Under the old plan, we 

were not going to be able to deploy a European missile defense system capable of protecting against Iranian missiles until at least 

2017. Under the new plan, we will be able to protect vulnerable 

parts of Europe, and the tens of thousands of U.S. troops stationed 

there, by the end of 2011. And we will also be creating a far more 

flexible missile defense system, one that can be adapted to provide 

better protection against emerging threats. 

As you know, the previous administration had planned to deploy 

10 ground-based interceptors (GBIs) in Poland, a European midcourse radar in the Czech Republic, and a Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance-Model 2 (AN/TPY–2) radar elsewhere in 

the region. The decision to move forward with that particular configuration was made nearly three years ago, based on threat information and the technologies available at the time. 

But circumstances have changed since then. First, the intelligence picture has evolved. And second, we have made major 

strides in missile defense technologies and capabilities in the last 

few years. We are now in a position to put in place a far more effective missile defense system more rapidly than just a few years ago. 

Let me just start by discussing our current threat assessment. 

The intelligence community now assesses that the threat from 

Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is developing far 

more rapidly than previously projected, while the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missiles has been somewhat 

slower to develop than previously estimated. 

In the near term, what this means is that the greatest missile 

threats from Iran will be to U.S. allies and partners, as well as to 

our deployed personnel, military and civilian, and their families in 

the Middle East and in Europe. And, needless to say, this concern 

is all the more urgent in light of Iran’s continued uranium enrichment program. 
7 

I just want to underscore, this is the key change in the intel assessment that drove our action: the very real threat of short-range 

and medium-range ballistic missiles that is developing faster and 

must be dealt with sooner. 

However, as Secretary Gates has noted, we understand—particularly, he understands, given his background—that intelligence projections can be wrong. Iran’s priorities and capabilities may change 

in ways that we can’t predict. So our new approach does not discount the potential future threat of an Iranian ICBM. In fact, it accounts for that possibility, the possibility that threats from Iranian 

long-range missiles will evolve more rapidly than we currently predict. 

We will have 30 GBIs deployed in the United States by the end 

of 2010, which will provide the United States with full protection 

of the homeland against an Iranian ICBM threat for many years 

to come. 

What is more, the information for the European forward-based 

TPY–2 radar that remains part of our Phase One plan will significantly enhance the performance of our existing U.S.-based GBIs. 

And we will also continue to upgrade the GBI over time. 

Let me turn to highlight some of the technological changes that 

have allowed us to develop an improved approach to missile defense. As General O’Reilly and General Cartwright will describe in 

more detail, improved interceptor capabilities developed in the last 

few years now offer more flexible and capable missile defense architectures. And we have also significantly improved our sensor technology. This means we have a better variety of options to detect, 

track, and engage enemy missiles. And, as a result, we have new 

missile defense options that were simply not previously available. 

Our new approach, which the President adopted on the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, will rely on a distributed network of sensors and 

SM–3 interceptors which can be fired from both Aegis-capable 

ships and from land. This means greater geographic flexibility, 

greater survivability, and greater scaleability in response to an 

evolving threat. That is exactly what we mean by a Phased, Adaptive Approach. 

Before I close, let me just say a few words about how our new 

approach has been received by our allies. For us, one of the many 

advantages of the new architecture we are building is that it greatly increases our ability to work with our European allies and partners, and to strengthen extended deterrence and mutual defense. 

The new architecture provides many more opportunities for alliance-building and burden-sharing between the United States and 

our NATO partners. 

Indeed, the reactions we have gotten from our allies have been 

quite supportive. NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen has hailed 

the decision as a positive step, while Polish Prime Minister Tusk 

described the offering as ‘‘a real chance to strengthen Europe’s security.’’ 

We have already begun our discussions with both Poland and the 

Czech Republic about their potential new roles in the new architecture. And our Polish allies know, they understand that they have 

the option of replacing the GBIs from the previous plan with land- 
8 

based SM–3 interceptors in the new plan. We will, thus, continue 

to work with our Polish friends to seek ratification of the Missile 

Defense Basing Agreement and the Supplemental Status of Forces 

Agreement. 

We are also in discussions with the Czech Republic to ensure 

that they continue to play a leadership role in missile defense within the alliance. We have several joint projects that are already 

under way, and those will continue, with our Czech partners. And 

we are discussing several more, including the possibility of having 

the Czech Republic host some of the new system’s command and 

control elements. 

We certainly welcome Russian interest in the new approach, as 

well as potential Russian cooperation in sharing data from their radars. But this is not about Russia; it never has been about Russia. 

Regardless of the Russian reaction, we will continue to do whatever 

it takes to ensure our security and those of our partners and allies. 

Let me end here by underscoring this point. And this is a point 

that was absolutely critical to Secretary Gates, who had previously, 

as you recall, championed the program of record. And this point 

was critical to his deciding to support what he believes is a better 

new way forward. And that is this: our new approach to missile defense in Europe allows us to provide coverage to vulnerable parts 

of Europe much faster than the old approach. And when fully deployed in Phase Four, it will be even more capable than the program of record, both for European missile defense and for U.S. 

homeland defense. 

And let me be clear: our new approach allows us to augment our 

current protection of the U.S. homeland against the long-range ballistic missile threats that may evolve in the future, starting in 

Phase One with the addition of the forward-based radar. 

So, in sum, we are not scrapping missile defense in Europe; we 

are strengthening it. And we look forward to working with this 

committee to make this ballistic missile architecture a reality. 

Thank you once more for this opportunity to testify, and we look 

forward to your questions. I am going to hand it over to General 

O’Reilly. Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Flournoy and General 

Cartwright can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General O’Reilly, please. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. PATRICK J. O’REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

General O’REILLY. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman 

McKeon, distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the 

opportunity to testify before you today on the technical aspects of 

the President’s decision to use the Phased, Adaptive Approach for 

missile defense in Europe. 

This new proposal is a more powerful missile defense of NATO. 

It enhances U.S. homeland defense and is deployable to theaters 

around the world and is more adaptable to respond to threat uncertainties. 

The previous proposed missile defense of Europe consisted of four 

components: a command and control system; 10 ground-based 
9 

interceptors, or GBIs, in Poland; an X-band discrimination radar in 

the Czech Republic; and an X-band precision tracking radar forward-based in southeastern Europe. 

Assuming a shot doctrine of two interceptors against each threat 

missile, this previous missile defense architecture had a maximum 

capability to engage five intermediate-range ballistic missiles or 

medium-range ballistic missiles aimed at Europe, or five intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed at the United States from the Middle East. 

The most valuable component of the previous architecture to the 

defense of the U.S. homeland was a forward-based sensor in southeastern Europe, which would provide early and precise tracks of 

threat missiles from the Middle East heading towards the United 

States, thus increasing the accuracy of the fire control instructions 

at our GBIs based at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air 

Force Base, California. 

We remain concerned about the future Iranian ICBM threat. 

Therefore, we are retaining the forward-based sensor component in 

our new Phased, Adaptive Approach proposal to enhance the defense of the U.S. homeland. Moreover, we also continue to develop 

the GMD system, Ground-based Midcourse Defense, and begin testing against ICBM targets using representative Iranian trajectories. 

A significant limitation of the previous European architecture 

was that the GBIs were used in intercontinental ballistic missile, 

intermediate-range ballistic missile, and medium-range ballistic 

missile defense roles. Given the current threat estimate, by 2017 

the European-based GBIs could rapidly be consumed by an attack 

of five Iranian medium-range ballistic missile or intermediaterange ballistic missiles aimed at NATO countries, leaving no GBIs 

to contribute to U.S. ICBM defense. 

Therefore, the previously proposed European defense architecture was insufficient to protect NATO and our forward-based forces 

and provide redundant coverage of the United States homeland. 

Fortunately, we have made significant advances over the last 

several years in missile defense technologies that enable a Phased, 

Adaptive Approach to defending Europe. The area of greatest potential is developing faster and more accurate command and control, battle management, and communications systems using a network of many different sensors, especially sensors that can track 

missiles in the early phases of their flight. 

For example, our intercept of the ailing satellite in February 

2008 was made possible by combining data from sensors around 

the world to provide a highly accurate track of the satellite to a 

modified Aegis weapons system and its SM–3 Block IA missile 

prior to the ship’s radar even seeing the satellite. Although this 

was only a very limited capability against an inoperable satellite, 

it demonstrated the significant benefit of networking sensors in a 

missile defense architecture. 

Another example is the most recent intercept test of the Groundbased Midcourse Defense System last December, when we combined the tracks of satellites, early warning radars, Sea-Based XBand radars, and forward-based radars on land and sea to provide 

the GMD System with a very accurate track. 
10 

Additionally, earlier this year, we demonstrated unmanned aerial 

vehicles (UAVs) as highly accurate forward-based missile defense 

sensors and intercept tests. 

Furthermore, last Friday, we successfully launched a pair of 

demonstration Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) 

satellites that will detect and track ballistic missiles over their entire flight for the first time. 

Finally, at our External Sensors Laboratory at Schriever Air 

Force Base, Colorado, we continue to develop new algorithms and 

demonstrate combining new sensor data to achieve even more accurate tracks than any individual sensor could produce. 

We propose the Aegis Standard Missile-3 Block IA as our primary interceptor in this architecture. It is a very capable interceptor due to its high acceleration, velocity, its proven track record, 

and our ability to rapidly increase to over 80 interceptors at any 

one site. 

Since we began testing the operationally configured SM–3 Block 

IA missile in June 2006, we have successfully intercepted a target 

in eight out of nine times that we have launched the interceptor. 

Of note, the SM–3s are also more affordable than Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense interceptors since you can buy four to seven 

production variants of the SM–3 for the cost of one GBI. 

Finally, a key attribute is that we can launch SM–3s from sea 

or sites on land, which gives us great flexibility in placing the interceptor launcher between the threat and the area you are trying 

to protect, a key enabler in intercepting threat missiles early in 

flight. 

We are developing a new kill vehicle for the SM–3 interceptor, 

the SM–3 IB, which uses the same rocket motor as the SM–3 but 

has a more advanced seeker and fire control system that uses external sensors as well as the Aegis radar. We have already demonstrated the higher-risk components of the new kill vehicle and 

are planning the first intercept test in the winter of 2011. A more 

advanced variant of the SM–3, the SM–3 IIA, has been under develop since 2005. This interceptor will have more than twice the 

range of an SM–3 Block IB. 

We propose defending NATO in phases. Phase One would consist 

of Aegis ships with SM–3 Block IA missiles deployed in the eastern 

Mediterranean Sea and a forward-based sensor in southeastern Europe. We propose, by 2015, the development and deployment of the 

SM–3 Block IB missile, which will have greater capacity to use a 

network of sensors and greater ability to discriminate threat objects. Scores of SM–3 IBs could be deployed at land- and sea-based 

locations. 

By 2018, the deployment of the SM–3 IIA missile, which could 

defend all of NATO from two land-based site locations and one seabased location. By 2020, our goal is to develop a higher velocity 

SM–3 IIB missile to destroy MRBMs, IRBMs, and ICBMs early in 

their flight from interceptor launch locations within the theater of 

the threat launch location. 

Two land-based SM–3 Block IIB sites would protect all of NATO. 

The timeline I have presented allows for these missile defense technologies to be tested and proven prior to deployment decisions. An 
11 

additional advantage of the Phased, Adaptive Approach is its applicability to missile defenses outside of Europe. 

Finally, the addition of radars at Armavir, Russia, and Gabala, 

Azerbaijan, and cooperative development of missile defense technologies by Russia and other countries are not necessary, but 

would be welcome. 

We are committed to fully funding this program as we prepare 

for the next budget submission to Congress. However, it is important that we have relief from rescissions and the flexibility to 

spend unused fiscal year 2009 Research, Development, Test, and 

Evaluation (RDT&E) and some MILCON—military construction— 

dollars associated with the previous European site proposal. 

I note that both the House and Senate authorizing committees 

have very presciently included provisions in this year’s national defense authorization bill that permit the Department to use fiscal 

year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 funding for an alternative architecture once the Secretary of Defense certifies that this architecture 

is as cost-effective, technically reliable, and operationally available 

as the previous program. 

With this relief and some redirections in the fiscal year 2010 

funds, we can pursue this new architecture with our fiscal year 

2010 budget request. 

Executing this approach will be challenging. There will likely be 

setbacks. But this architecture is no more challenging than the development of other missile defense technologies in which we have 

been successful. The engineering is executable, and the development risks are manageable. 

I thank you and look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General O’Reilly can be found in the 

Appendix on page 63.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

General Cartwright. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General CARTWRIGHT. Thank you, Chairman Skelton and Congressman McKeon. And thank you for this opportunity. 

I have had the privilege of working on the missile defense architecture and the war fighting requirements for over 10 years now, 

on the Joint Staff as a combatant commander and, now, as the Vice 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. 

The congressionally directed Ballistic Missile Defense Review has 

provided the opportunity to review our objectives, the threat, the 

combatant commanders’ needs, and the technologies available. Our 

recommendations are not a departure from the objectives. The 

needs of the combatant commanders, however, reflect an adjustment to the balance of our capabilities in response to the threats 

that they actually face today and the threats that are clearly visible on the horizon. 

My colleagues have laid that case before you. Allow me to address the architecture and the broader implications of our recommendations across all of the combatant commanders. 

The objectives have not changed, as I said. They remain: defense 

of the homeland, defense of our deployed forces, friends, and allies. 
12 

We still have a three-tier approach here. We defend the homeland, 

and the principal weapons systems that we use to defend the 

homeland are the ground-based interceptors currently based in 

Alaska and California. We defend the theaters. And this is probably the newest capability that we are starting to field, with the 

Standard Missile-3 and with the Theater High Altitude Air Defense 

missile, called THAAD. And we defend point defenses, which are 

our critical bases, infrastructure where our forces are, population 

centers, things like that, with the Patriot system. So we have a 

three-layered approach: the homeland, the theater, and the point 

defense for critical assets. That is still in place. 

What we have now, with the emergence of SM–3 and the 

THAAD system, is a robust capability at the theater level, which 

we did not have before. Each of these systems tend to bleed over 

into each other, so the GBI can, in fact, work at the theater level, 

which is what would have happened with the system that we 

would have put in Europe. It would have had the capabilities to 

work against medium-range ballistic missiles and defend that theater. But it is principally designed in a very sophisticated capability to defend the homeland. THAAD and SM–3 can, in fact, defend the homeland if we put them there; can, in fact, defend at the 

theater level; and can, in fact, defend at the point level at bases 

and stations. 

So each has a bleed-across. And that is some of the redundancy 

that is absolutely essential and is critical in the capability that the 

combatant commanders are asking for. In other words, they don’t 

want to be required to rely on one system for each approach. 

The emergence of the PAC–3 and these theater capabilities really 

started about three years ago. And we started to shift, with the 

help of this committee, our investment structure across into SM– 

3 and THAAD, most recently as it has started to emerge. And so 

the buying out of the PAC–3, so our forces had sufficient of those. 

Now the investment heavily in SM–3 quantities and in THAAD is 

critical to our ability to field these Phased, Adaptive Approaches. 

We look at the threat from the basis of three points, also. It is 

a military thing; we have to do everything in threes. But, primarily, we start with the terminal defense, the ability to defend 

something at the end game. So, as the missile reenters the atmosphere and goes toward the target, that is the terminal phase, principally handled by Patriot, by THAAD, and by SM–3. 

The midcourse is the most challenging, generally done outside of 

the atmosphere for long-range ballistic missiles. That is the terrain 

of the ground-based interceptor. That is where it works. That is a 

very difficult place to work because you have to navigate and be 

able to operate in the atmosphere, leave the atmosphere, deploy 

the weapon, and then close on the target at very, very high speeds, 

without the advantage of the air. 

And then the terminal is the reentry, a very difficult phase. And 

we use the Patriot in principle to work that end, along with the 

SM–3 and the THAAD. 

The boost is where we have the most opportunity to be effective. 

And it is the most difficult to field as a capability. The boost is considered that phase from launch until we generally leave the atmosphere. If you can catch a missile in the boost phase, from an oper-
13 

ational standpoint, it is before it can do much of anything. Any 

threat missile is most vulnerable in the boost phase. There are 

many studies out there talking about the boost phase. But it is 

very short. It is a very kinetically active point; in other words, the 

missile motors are running at that time. They are staging through. 

It is a very difficult phase to be in, and you have to close very, very 

quickly. 

What is standing before us out in the 2020 time frame is an 

operationally relevant capability to start to close the boost phase. 

That, as the congressman said, is to some extent paper today. But 

we are on the breadboard. We are testing the sensors, and we are 

testing the missiles that we believe will give us the capability as 

a Nation to get at these missiles in the boost phase. 

In the boost phase, the missile doesn’t care whether it is a shortrange, medium-range, intermediate-range, or intercontinental 

range. It doesn’t matter. If you can catch it in the boost phase, you 

can do something about it there very early in the game. And that, 

for us, holds the greatest possibility. We are focusing our Research 

and Development (R&D) to try to come up with a relevant way— 

an operationally relevant way—to get at the boost phase. That is 

the thrust of a lot of our work as we move to the future. 

We still remain and seek the capability, though, to go after missiles that are either on a pad, which is probably the easiest target 

and for which most ICBMs—all ICBMs right now associated with 

Iran and North Korea are pad-launched. In other words, they are 

very visible, they are up above the ground, and you can go after 

them before launch if you so desire. We are not advocating preemptive, but it is a physical capability that we possess. 

There is also the silo-based. That is a very difficult way and generally reserved for ICBMs of sophisticated countries. But you put 

them in the ground, and you launch them from silos, and they 

come out of the ground. It is very difficult to go after that. They 

can be hardened, and that is a difficult target. 

And the more prevalent, now, direction that we see countries 

going is the mobile capability. In other words, we put these missiles on a tail, drive them around to a point of advantage, and then 

launch them from someplace remote. 

So we still retain, and want to retain, the capability to go after 

pad-based, mobile-based, and silo-based missiles. We believe that is 

essential, from the combatant commander’s perspective, to be able 

to get at all three types of missiles. This architecture allows us to 

do that. 

And probably, for the combatant commander, the most significant change in the intelligence that is relevant to them and important to them is this idea of raid, the number of missiles. The systems that we have today, such as Patriot, were designed to engage 

three, maybe five missiles coming in. Same for our ground-based 

interceptor. And yet what we are facing today in the short-range 

fight is hundreds. And what we think we are going to face in the 

medium-range fight in the very near future is hundreds. 

None of the systems that we have today were really built for 

hundreds. And that includes the SM–3 system, which is the Aegis 

radar; that includes the Patriot radar and the THAAD radars. 

What is fundamentally different here is that we have added radar 
14 

sensors in to take the existing weapons systems and make them effective against raids, to be able to sort out and make sure that you 

are not wasting rounds, multiple rounds against the same target 

because you are in different locations, et cetera, but to actually distinguish against raids. 

This is what the combatant commanders most seek. And this is 

what this radar in the southeastern part of Europe, the same radar 

that we deployed two years ago into Japan and the radar we deployed this year into Israel, that is the capability of this X-band 

radar, is to sort through large raid numbers, provide then to either 

the Patriot or the SM–3 or the THAAD or the GBI exactly which 

target is assigned to which missile. That is absolutely critical and 

something we have never had before. That is fundamentally different. And that is why it is so essential to the combatant commanders. 

Let me talk a little bit about adaptive and responsive. The command and control system that we have put together is not a command and control system for Europe only. It is a command and 

control system that is global. 

One of the biggest challenges we have today in the physical infrastructure and the physical industrial ability to field these systems is that the missiles have far greater range than the sensors 

that are organic to them. So an Aegis system and the SM–3, the 

SM–3 can fly much further than that system can see and guide it. 

The same is true for Patriot, the same is true for THAAD; obviously, for the GBI because it goes around the Earth. 

What we are able to do today in this command and control system is use a sensor that is dislocated from the weapon to actually 

guide it to the interceptor. That is the capability that will be fundamentally put together as we field this system in 2011, mature as 

we get to 2015. So, a sensor completely dislocated from the system. 

That is what we demonstrated when we shot down the errant satellite. The sensor on the ship never saw that satellite until the last 

second or two. Okay? 

And being able to do that means that we do not now have to try 

to build on every ship or airplane or land base a huge, as we call 

it, ‘‘aperture’’ in order to see targets that are very, very far away. 

We can use netting of these sensors in a way that we could never 

do, because we are in this digital age, and move that data to the 

missile in an operationally relevant way. That is absolutely critical. 

We want to be able to continue to hold that risk, all of those targets that are fixed or relocatable or mobile, but we also want to 

bring those attributes to our own capability. Once you fix a site, it 

can only address a certain range of threats, whether it is the missile or the sensor. And so, the system that we are looking at today 

in differentiation from the ground-based interceptor is called 

‘‘relocatable.’’ In other words, these SM–3s that would be landbased, can be moved over, probably, think in terms of a couple of 

months and relocated if the threat has been relocated. So we can 

move them around. 

By putting the system on the mobile platform, which is the Aegis 

system and the ship, we can move to that threat if it emerges 

someplace that the intelligence didn’t predict it would emerge. And 

I love my intelligence counterparts, but the one thing I have to live 
15 

by as a rule is I can’t rely on it. I have a thinking enemy out there. 

They have a vote. They may emerge in someplace that we don’t 

predict. By having the system on Aegis, on the ship, we can close 

with the threat wherever it emerges, no matter what the intelligence may have thought two or three years prior. And that is just 

a fact of life. We have to be able to do that. You will hold me accountable for doing that if we have to defend this Nation. 

And so we have to have a mixture between mobile, relocatable, 

and fixed sites. The fixed sites, actually, are the cheapest. Once you 

build them, it is much easier to, in fact, sustain them. And I think 

the congressman’s point about ships and the cost of ships and their 

multiple missions is a fair point. But understand that most of the 

Aegis systems—depends on which one you look at—have about 140 

tubes. And in those tubes can be this kind of missile, can be cruise 

missiles, can be all sorts of different armaments. It is a very 

versatile and capable ship. It depends on what mission you assign 

it to, as to what it goes and does, but it is almost always ready to 

go do two or three other types of missions at any point in time. 

We do not like to anchor a mobile ship to a fixed location for any 

extended period of time because it does, in fact, diminish its capability broader on a global scale. But if that is what we need, if that 

is what we need to get redundancy, if that is what we need to move 

to a threat we didn’t predict, it is the most capability that we have. 

Let me talk just a little bit more about weapons and sensors. 

There is another thing here that is very fundamentally different for 

the combatant commander about this approach to weapons and 

sensors. It is the ability to pair the right weapon with the right 

sensor and not have them owned by any one service, not have them 

owned by any one country, not have them owned by any one who 

may have been an ally yesterday, may not be an ally today. We can 

mix and match in ways that, historically, we have never been able 

to do. 

We are trying to move to a system that we call ‘‘any weapon, any 

sensor.’’ We are not there yet. But that is where we want to be for 

the vagaries of the intelligence that we have to deal with, the reallife fact that the enemy gets a vote in this, and the reality that we 

are never sure who we are going to have to defend against tomorrow. I mean, I would not have predicted that we were going to be 

in Afghanistan 5, 10 years ago. It is a fact that we have to deal 

with on the combatant commander side. 

The other part of this that is very powerful, from our perspective, 

is today many countries own the Patriot system. Those Patriots can 

be integrated into these sensors and this command and control 

very easily. Many countries own the Aegis system. We can integrate these missiles and their fire controls into this system very 

easily. 

And the reality is many countries have sensors, radars, et cetera, 

and have weapons that we can bring in. For instance, in Israel we 

are integrating their Arrow weapon into this system. We are integrating other countries’ radars into this system. We talked briefly 

about the potential to get the two Russian radars. 

This system is agnostic to the source. It basically converts the 

data into something that can be used, no matter how it was developed and off of what system. The bulk of our radars that we are 
16 

using for this system were fielded in the 1970s. And we are using 

them today for modern weapons and modern threats because we 

can do that in the digital age. 

And this starts to realize for us the ability to bring allies together in fundamentally different ways. Think about a system that 

you could not afford as a single nation but, because you can band 

together with your neighbors, you can build a defense. That is a 

different way of thinking about deterrence. That is what this system starts to offer us. 

It takes all three parts: it takes the command and control, it 

takes the weapons, it takes the sensors. But as we now start to 

talk to our partners in the Pacific, and you watch the Japanese 

field their Aegis systems, which are basically joining into this, as 

you watch the South Koreans do the same, it sends a very powerful 

message to the North Koreans. As you watch the same thing in the 

Gulf states, as we now deploy the Patriot systems and as we deploy 

the SM–3, it is fundamentally changing how they think about their 

neighbor and how they think about collective defense vis-a`-vis Iran. 

That is a very powerful approach. NATO has embraced this for 

that very reason. It is not a U.S.-only approach. It allows them to 

build their indigenous systems, it allows them to decide who they 

want to partner with, but it builds a collective defense that no one 

nation is going to be able to afford. 

I appreciate this opportunity. We stand ready for your questions. 

I really do believe, as do the chiefs, that this is the way to the future. It is also the way to the present and the threats that the combatant commanders are facing today. Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Cartwright and Secretary Flournoy can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you so much. 

The gentlelady from California, who made a multiyear study of 

this subject and did so well while she was a Member here, we 

would love to hear from you, Secretary Tauscher. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you, Chairman Skelton and Ranking 

Member McKeon. Thank you very much for the warm welcome. 

To my distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, it is an honor to testify before you today. Let me say before 

the questions start that I miss you professionally and personally 

very much, and I thank you very, very much for your service. And 

I thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the 

President’s approach to missile defense in Europe. 

I know that the President’s decision has prompted much discussion, especially on the cable talk shows and on some editorial 

pages. Besides restating what my very distinguished colleagues 

from the Department of Defense have already said, I want to bring 

a sense of balance to this discussion and focus my remarks on the 

foreign policy implications of this initiative. 

Let me begin by stating very strongly that the Obama Administration is fully committed to deploying operationally effective and 

cost-effective missile defenses to protect the United States, our de-
17 

ployed forces overseas, and our allies. After months of review and 

with the full support of his national security team, President 

Obama decided to bolster our national security and renew our approach to missile defense in Europe today based on the latest intelligence and what we understand the threat to be today. 

The Intelligence Community found that the threat of a potential 

Iranian ICBM had been slower to develop than previously estimated, while the threat from Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is developing more quickly than previously projected. 

The Iranian missile launches earlier this week visibly demonstrate 

the nature of this threat. Our approach provides more effective defenses today against the threat. 

The allegations that we decided to cancel or shelve plans for U.S. 

European based missile defense deployments are simply not true. 

From a foreign policy perspective, our new approach has a number 

of advantages over the previous plan. 

First, as the threat evolves, the system will evolve to protect all 

of our European NATO allies. We can’t protect some and leave others vulnerable. 

Second, our plan will put more interceptors in Europe. Instead 

of 10 interceptors in 2018, this new plan will deploy scores more. 

Under the previous plan, if two interceptors were fired at each Iranian ICBM, Iran would need only six missiles to overwhelm the 

system. The greater number of interceptors under our new plan 

will complicate Iran’s plans to use or threaten to use their balance 

missiles as coercive weapons. 

Third, this system is more mobile and can be deployed more 

quickly than the previous system, plus we can tailor the number 

of deployed interceptors to the threat. 

Fourth, placing an emphasis on proven capabilities, such as the 

SM–3 interceptor, will increase the credibility of the United States’ 

commitment in the eyes of our allies and, I might say, our adversaries. Deploying missile defenses with a demonstrated track 

record of success means that our allies will not have to wonder 

whether a system can be reliable in defending against a threat. 

Again, this new architecture provides an improved opportunity 

for other allies to participate in the defense of Europe, so it is not 

a surprise that foreign leaders like Chancellor Merkel, President 

Sarkozy and Prime Minister Brown have praised our new approach. 

We believe the response from the Polish and Czech governments 

has been positive since our trip to Europe. We will continue our efforts to strengthen our strategic relationship with them. Our bilateral relationships have expanded in both depth and breadth, and 

we consider both countries, both of whom have participated in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, to be among our closest and 

staunchest allies. We remain committed to implementing a range 

of security and defense dialogues and we have offered both countries the opportunity to participate in elements of our new missile 

defense architecture. 

When we visited Warsaw last month, we offered Poland the opportunity to host a land based SM–3 interceptor site. We will further demonstrate our commitment to Poland by ensuring in the 

near future that we have boots on the ground, which is what the 
18 

Polish government really wants. This could include plans to rotate 

a U.S. Army Patriot unit to Poland. 

With respect to the Czech Republic, the United States will continue to identify areas where our military cooperation could be 

strengthened and broadened. We hope to conclude soon an agreement that will provide a means for defense cooperation in many 

areas, and we will continue to work on ballistic missile defense research with the Czech industry. 

I want to make a final point regarding Russia. Nothing that we 

did had anything to do with Russian saber-rattling or their consternation about the ground-based interceptors or the Czech radar. 

The decision was not part of any trade-off or quid pro quo. As 

someone who participated in the senior level interagency meetings 

as part of the decision-making process, I can tell you that President 

Obama based his decision on the latest intelligence, which calls for 

a stronger missile defense program that can be deployed sooner. If, 

as a consequence of President Obama’s decision, relations with 

Russia improve, then we should embrace that benefit. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McKeon, the Obama Administration has made the right choice for the right reasons. As we implement this new program, including the fiscal 2011 budget, I hope 

you will support our efforts. 

I thank you much for your time and I would be happy to take 

any questions you have. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Tauscher can be found in 

the Appendix on page 73.] 

Chairman SKELTON. I certainly thank you. 

I will limit my questions because there are so many here who 

wish to ask of you today. 

As I understand it, three of you, excluding General Cartwright, 

were part of a delegation to Europe two weeks ago to discuss the 

President’s decision with Polish and Czech and NATO officials. Can 

you give us a summary of that discussion and the issues raised, 

particularly by the Poles and the Czechs? 

Secretary Flournoy, we will ask you to lead off on that. If the 

others have comments, we would appreciate it. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yes, we did go over to Europe and went 

first to Prague—I am sorry, went first to Warsaw and then to 

Prague and then to brief the North Atlantic Council. 

I think one of the things we had to deal with when we arrived 

is that there had been a number of leaks in the press, or erroneous 

and speculative stories in the press, so that we found—despite previous consultations—we found our allies expecting something different than what we were actually going to suggest to them. 

So I think part of our meetings was really focused on explaining 

the new approach to them and correcting misimpressions of what 

exactly the proposal was. 

I think once they understood that, particularly in Poland, we 

very quickly got into discussions about how they could participate 

in the new architecture and reaffirmed to them that other elements 

of previous agreements related to, say, the Patriot rotation and 

other aspects of our security cooperation remained fully valid and 
19 

we, in fact, planned to pursue even broader and deeper cooperation 

with them. 

I think in the Czech Republic, I think that we certainly delivered 

the news to them that the radar would not be part of the new architecture, but we also hastened to reaffirm the fact that the agreement for cooperation on missile defense would continue, we have 

a number of ongoing projects with them, and that we would welcome finding new ways for them to participate in the new architecture, and we are already having follow-on discussions with them to 

identify specific ways that they could play a leadership role in the 

new system. 

Lastly, when we went to the NAC, the North Atlantic Council, 

I would say that the response was uniformly positive. I think people understood the benefits of the system, they saw greater opportunities for countries to participate, and they saw a real potential 

for linking and integrating what we are proposing with the work 

that NATO has already begun on their own missile defense command and control architecture. 

I would defer to General O’Reilly and Secretary Tauscher to see 

if they have anything to add. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, I was part of the negotiating teams for 

the last couple of years and the personnel that we met with in both 

countries—Poland and the Czech Republic—were the same that I 

have been sitting across the table from for years. I believe they 

were greatly comforted from the fact that what we are proposing 

is very minor changes to the ballistic missile defense agreements 

that we have already agreed to that we are waiting ratification for. 

In the case of Poland, it is changing literally the reference to a 

ground-based interceptor, capital letters, to a ground-based interceptor, lower case, and other than the annexes, that is the gist of 

the changes in order for us to continue on with Poland participating in the architecture. 

In the Czech Republic, again, we no longer see a requirement for 

the radar, but there are many opportunities, including facilities 

which they could host as we have a more distributed system across 

Europe, especially in our area of command and control, and we 

have been following up with discussions with the Czech government as they ask more questions about that and seem very interested. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. I think that my colleagues won’t be surprised to find out that the press got it wrong and that the press 

speculation, which was generated beginning in the United States 

and then into Europe, was completely wrong about what the 

Obama Administration was going to do. So when we arrived very 

early in the morning in Poland, we found ourselves having to reorient everyone to the fact that we were not killing missile defense 

in Europe but, in fact, enhancing it and improving it. So that took 

a couple of minutes. 

But I think what you can see, I met with my Polish counterparts 

just earlier this week. They are in town to finish the negotiations 

on both the agreement on the basing and on the supplemental Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which are important for not only 

PAC–3 installations, but for this future SM–3 installation that we 

hope they are going to agree to, and they are increasingly enthusi-
20 

astic about this. Our friends in the Czech Republic are very interested in the number of different things that we are talking to them 

about. 

But I think the most important thing was very late in the day, 

after now going to two cities, we arrived in Brussels to meet with 

the NAC, and I think what you see is that our North Atlantic 

Council members, our NATO allies, are very happy to see we are 

NATO-izing this system. They are seeing that this is a system that 

is now not going to protect some in NATO but all of NATO, and 

it is going to do it sooner against the current threat with proven 

technologies. And I think it is very clear that they are enthusiastic 

about this, that they are happy to see that the command and control system that they are developing dovetails very nicely with 

what we are proposing. 

So I think there is a net benefit to everyone. It is being recognized. I think the statements out of Prime Minister Tusk in Poland 

and Foreign Minister Sikorsky really state that this is something 

that they are very, very happy to see and that we are working 

closely with them to go forward and provide more information. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I will limit my questions on that 

until later. 

Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Chairman, I will hold my questions until later 

to give our colleagues an opportunity to ask theirs now. 

The CHAIRMAN. John Spratt. 

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I have been following ballistic missile defense since the days of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). 

I will tell you how long that has been. General O’Reilly was a Captain at West Point teaching physics in the photon lab when I first 

started taking an interest in it. You have come a lot farther than 

I have, sir, with three stars on your shoulder. 

This is one of the finest presentations I have heard from both the 

policy making, foreign policy making realm and from the military 

realm as well. It is an excellent presentation. Let me just hit the 

highlights with you as to the cost-effectiveness of the decision you 

are making. 

It is my understanding that the GMD has a cost of around $70 

million a copy, is that correct? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SPRATT. And the SM–3 IA, Block IA, you ought to come up 

with a different designation for that so it is easier is easier to get 

out. In any event, the cost per copy is $10 to $15 million apiece? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. The IA versions are $10 million, they 

are slightly less than that, actually, and then the projected cost of 

the II series, the IIA and IIB would be $15 million. 

Mr. SPRATT. The IIB would be $15 million? It is still about three 

or four times less expensive than the GMD. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SPRATT. So the cost of the chosen system is substantially 

less. Are you confident in that cost? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir, we are, because we have produced 

the SM–3 IA, we are in production now, and a lot of that missile 

is being duplicated in the IB, and we have a lot of history that we 
21 

can rely on for the accuracy of our cost estimates for the projected 

cost. 

Mr. SPRATT. And is the sea-based variant about the same cost as 

the land-based mobile variant? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, they are two different variants obviously, 

but they are identical in their fire control system and the radar 

and the launcher components. They are the same. There is some 

integration costs we spend when we integrate it onto a ship. It is 

about $45 million to upgrade an Aegis ship, of which there are over 

80 today, to upgrade them to have ballistic missile defense capability. And a land-based SM–3, to prepare the site, there is about 

$150 million for site preparation. And then to buy the same components in total, it is about $350 million for one of those sites without 

the missiles, which right now we are projecting a minimum of 24 

missiles at each site. So that would be $240 million additional. 

Mr. SPRATT. In terms of mobility and the effectiveness associated 

with being able to move, the GMD, as I understand it, is about 25 

tons and the SM–3 is about 2 tons? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. The GMD is a 25-ton missile. It is 50 

feet long. The SM–3 I series missiles are 1.2 tons and the SM–3 

II would be a 2-ton missile. All of those SM–3 variants will fit and 

be integrated into today’s Aegis weapons system. 

Mr. SPRATT. Are you confident we can find locations in southeastern Europe where these can be optimally deployed? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir, because the actual capability that we 

believe we have, our simulations verify that, and our independent 

assessments show that it actually covers parts of the water around 

Europe, so that means we have flexibility of where we can place 

them. It doesn’t have to be in one particular country, it just needs 

to be in the southeastern part of Europe and in the north-central 

part of Europe, and it can be in many different countries. We have 

options. 

Mr. SPRATT. This is because you have got forward-based radar 

and sensors? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir, that is key, having that forward 

based radar in the southeastern part, or airborne sensors, which 

we are developing, or satellites. 

Mr. SPRATT. For some time we have talked about having a midcourse discrimination system, tracking and discrimination system, 

Space-Based Infrared System-Low (SBIRs-Low) at one time, I think 

the acronym now is STSS, and you just launched two STSS’s. Does 

that mean that some of the many problems we have coped with 

with respect to these SBIRs-Low and the later variants have been 

overcome now? And to what extent is the STSS a key component 

of your forward based sensor system? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the STSS is a demonstrator system. We 

want to demonstrate the engineering required in order to build another system which would be far simpler. The STSS was designed 

against an old threat, designed where there would be hundreds of 

ICBMs in the air at any one time, and it was able to cover the entire Earth. We are using these satellites now because they are 

available, the two of them, to be doing an extensive amount of testing over the next couple of years to verify the requirements to build 

a much simpler system that is focused on missile defense and 
22 

would only cover certain bands of the Earth that we are concerned 

about, which cover the threat, obviously, as we see it. That would 

be a far simpler system and we believe much more producible, 

much more reliable. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you all for your testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Akin, the gentleman from Missouri. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of quick questions. I guess it was a little more than a year ago that we were 

on the ships and I asked the question, can that SM–3 stop an 

ICBM? And they said maybe 1 in 100, if you are lucky but, really, 

you can’t do that. So to stop an intercontinental, really long-range, 

three-stage kinds of missiles, you have to go to your SM–3 Block 

IIB that you are planning? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. And that missile is going to be ready about what time, 

2020? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we have used very conservative planning 

factors, that we completely test that system. We would start testing 

the booster portion of it in 2013, 7 years ahead of time. So we have 

laid in an extensive amount of time to test and deploy this. But we 

would conduct much of the testing in the 2016 timeframe, a decision in 2018, and then two more years we are projecting before we 

would deploy it. It is very conservative. 

Mr. AKIN. So in a way, the first thing I am hearing is that there 

is a gamble in what you are proposing, and the gamble is that Iran 

isn’t going to develop an ICBM before 2020? 

General O’REILLY. No, sir. We have the Ground-based Midcourse 

Defense System in Alaska and Vandenberg to protect us today 

against an Iranian threat. 

Mr. AKIN. Will the GBIs in Alaska or California, can they protect 

against a launch from Iran to hitting our country? Could they go 

that other way? I thought they were mostly aimed toward—they 

can go both ways? 

General O’REILLY. They can go both ways. Sir, if you look at the 

Earth from a polar projection from the North Pole, you will see 

that actually the closest part of the United States to Iran is Alaska, 

and it is in a prime location for both threats. And that forwardbased sensor, that is why it was proposed in the previous architecture and we are keeping it in this one, significantly contributes to 

our ability to track anything coming out of Iran for missiles being 

launched, interceptors out of Alaska. 

Mr. AKIN. Would the missile, if the missile were launched at, 

say, a European ally from Iran, would that be an ICBM or would 

that be more just a ballistic missile? 

General O’REILLY. The southeastern part of Europe today is 

within the range of medium range ballistic missiles. Literally, the 

range is between 1,000 to 2,000 kilometers, is that class of missile, 

and that stretches over more than half of NATO. 

The threats that we see, the ones we are most concerned about 

right now, are 2,000 kilometer threats, which today cover most of 

southeastern Europe. And that is the threat we want to address, 

as General Cartwright said. 

Mr. AKIN. The SM–3 works okay for that? 
23 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. The second question I had is, it seems like it is tremendously effective, I mean it is very expensive to have whatever 

it is, five or six ships on station all the time providing this kind 

of coverage. It seems like that would be far more expensive. 

I have been here nine years, and I keep hearing, ‘‘boy, we don’t 

have the ships that we need.’’ And particularly our Aegis class, our 

missile destroyers, Aegis on the destroyers, there is a tremendous 

number of requirements for having those working in different 

places. And now, all of a sudden, we are absorbing, what is it, six 

of these ships in order to do this particular proposal, as opposed 

to a ground-based kind of approach. 

Doesn’t that seem to be very cost-ineffective? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I will jump in, if it is all right, sir. For the 

last five years, we have been doing this in the Sea of Japan. We 

don’t put them on station permanently. Because what we are dealing with is a pad launch system, we can see that very visibly, and 

so we give ourselves a cushion. We generally send two ships out. 

It only takes us a couple of days to get them out there, so we don’t 

tie down a mobile system, which is very versatile. We put it there 

when we know we need it. 

The two ships are there, one is on station and the other one is 

protecting the ship, and they just swap back and forth for relief. 

But that is generally the way we approach it. 

We intend to do the same for this 2011 system; have three different sites, have them able to close in a couple of days to the site 

once we see something moved to the pad. 

Mr. AKIN. You are assuming you are going to have a day or twowarning so you can get in position. 

General CARTWRIGHT. What we have seen to date, even with the 

most responsive systems, is we generally have five or six days. 

Mr. AKIN. One last question. That is, my understanding was that 

you were going to network all of these sensors and radars anyway 

in SM–3. Is this anything new than what we were planning to do 

anyway? 

General CARTWRIGHT. It is only a maturation of the technology 

now to move it towards a production capability and an operational 

capability versus a pure testing. 

Mr. AKIN. So this has always been on the drawing board to do 

this. 

General CARTWRIGHT. The scale has changed. And the one thing 

that has technically changed, as you alluded to earlier, is the 2020 

capability, that is new. The ability to get at the boost, or the early 

flight phase, is new. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Tauscher, good to see you again. We also miss you 

around here. This place has never been the same since you left. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Let me ask both Secretaries if you believe there is a 

potential opportunity for cooperation with Russia, including the 

possibility of Russia providing radar data, and do you believe that 
24 

such cooperation would be in the best interests of us and NATO? 

Do you think there is a possibility now that we know they do have 

missiles, the Iranians? So if you could elaborate a little bit on that? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz. 

I want to restate that nothing that we did had anything to do 

with Russia, but we were obviously knowledgeable of the ancillary 

benefits of working more closely with Russia. 

The Russians have an agreement with us right now to go forward on a joint threat assessment and a number of things that 

President Medvedev and President Obama agreed to when they 

met in July. I will be meeting with my Russian counterparts in 

about 10 days in Moscow to talk about a number of things, but 

missile defense is one of those issues. 

We have a Russian NATO council that has been moribund but 

now has been restarted. Our NATO allies are very interested in 

working and engaging with Russia. Russia shares the same threat 

we do from short- and medium-range and long-range from Iran. So 

there are a number of pieces from this. 

But I want to make it very clear that while we have an ambitious agenda with Russia, we are negotiating a New START Treaty 

right now, it is very clear that nothing that we did had anything 

to do with getting something from Russia. There was no quid pro 

quo. But it is obvious as there are many things happening that 

there are ancillary benefits to them. 

Clearly the ‘‘reset button’’ that Secretary Clinton had talked 

about and the relationship between President Medvedev and President Obama is one where we are going to try to work cooperatively 

on those things we can, and missile defense is one of those things, 

and we will be talking to them about it in the next few weeks. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I would just invite General O’Reilly 

perhaps to comment on the technical aspects of what would be 

gained from data from Russian radars as part of this system. 

General O’REILLY. Sirs, I visited Gabala two years ago and had 

a firsthand review of the capability of that very large and powerful 

radar. The frequency is one that allows a great amount of surveillance. It is a very good surveillance radar for an extensive part of 

that part of the world, very powerful, very large aperture. It is very 

good for observing missile tests. It is very good for preliminary 

tracking. 

More detailed tracking, you require a more precise radar, and 

the Russians are building one in Armavir, Russia, and that capability is similar to what we have in the U.K. and our other early 

warning radars. 

So our architecture was designed without those radars in consideration, but they are in a very good location for observing any missile activity in southwest Asia and conducting tracking on the same 

order of capability, especially from Armavir, early in a missile’s 

flight heading towards the United States. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Miller. 

Mr. Turner. 
25 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First off, I want to 

thank all of you for being here. I want to recognize Secretary Tauscher. We do miss you, and we are glad to have you here. 

I want to start off with talking of some differences and some 

agreement. I talked to General Cartwright yesterday and I told 

him that I agree with what the two generals are saying, I just don’t 

agree with the conclusion. And I think that it is important for us, 

though, when we have a difference of conclusion, that we at least 

go down the things that we agree on. I think some of the disagreement comes from, also, a lack of understanding because the terms 

get confused. 

We have short-range and medium-range and intermediate-range 

and ICBM missiles that are faced towards us. We have Aegis and 

THAAD and SM–3, IA, IB, IIA and IIB that don’t quite exist yet, 

and the ground-based interceptors. The problem is you get in a discussion of what matches with us what and I think that confuses 

the discussion somewhat. 

So let’s go with what we agree on. I think we all agree that Iran 

has a missile program. They are seeking ICBM missile technology 

that would reach the United States. They are seeking missiles that 

are capable of reaching the major population centers of Europe. We 

all agree. I think we all agree, and I think we believe, that Iran 

is seeking nuclear weapon capability. So we are looking at the future of missile technology that, perhaps, is nuclear capable. 

General Craddock testified that he believed the intelligence indicated that by 2015, they could have the ICBM technology that 

reaches the United States. Now, I have read the new National Intelligence Estimate that, supposedly, all this new threat assessment is based upon, and I think we could all agree that there is 

nothing in that intelligence that says that they won’t get that by 

2015. They could get it earlier, and the intelligence certainly says 

that. 

For the ground-based missile system, General O’Reilly, you previously testified that, upon ratification, it is four years for the 

radar to go in, five years for the interceptors to go in. I believe nobody believes that that has changed. 

So we can all agree that, under the best scenarios, we could have 

had that system in place by 2015. I believe it could have been 2014 

if we had moved a little quicker, but at least by 2015. So the 2015 

for GBI and the 2015 for Iran’s possible capability match. 

Let’s go further, then. The White House plan, though, doesn’t address ICBMs until 2020. It is right up on their web site. Now, that 

is not accounting for existing systems and existing programs; that 

is just the alternate system to the one that was scrapped. That is 

the comparative. The comparative is what is being scrapped, 2015, 

and what is going to be provided as an alternative, and by the 

White House’s own statements, that is 2020. Major European population centers don’t receive protection until 2018. Again, their 2020 

of the White House and 2018 is all compared to 2015. 

Now, I love the words ‘‘proven’’ and ‘‘tested.’’ We hear that all the 

time, we need systems that are ‘‘proven’’ and ‘‘tested.’’ We all know 

the SM–3 Block IIA has not been completed and has not been tested. It is intended in this new proposal to be the population centers 

for Europe protection. And we also know the SM–3 Block IIB, 
26 

which is supposed to provide the protection to the United States, 

doesn’t even currently exist. Again, the comparative being to the 

GBI that would have been going into Europe, which does exist, is 

a tested system and expected in the two states to have its completed testing by 2012. 

We all know, and we agree, that the International Atomic Energy Agency says that Iran has the capability to produce a nuclear 

weapon. They issued their statement on the same day that the 

President scrapped this system. We all agree that the missile defense assets that we have in Alaska were intended to be 40 previously, has been cut this year to 30, so as a backup for our protection from ICBMs from Iran it has been reduced from 40 to 30. Its 

capability has been reduced. And we all agree that it is not really 

sufficient to protect the United States solely, or the alternative 

from the White House wouldn’t include another plan that bolsters 

it. The White House is still proposing a system that would, with 

the SM–3 IIB, that would support it. 

So what I want to know is in the 2009 budget, if you look to the 

2009 budget, what is new, and what is not new, in what you are 

proposing? Because it looks as if that what was forecast in 2009 includes substantially what the White House is now touting as a new 

system. Could you do that comparative for me, please? 2009 until 

now, and this system. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. First of all, the way our architecture 

is laid out, the GBIs in Alaska are not the backup; they are actually the primary system to defend the United States, the homeland 

defense. 

Second, in 2009, we were not investing in the technologies such 

as the sensor ones that we have referred to several times as so critical, our UAVs and our integration of that with the rest of our 

sensored network. 

We also were not procuring the THAADs and the Aegis systems, 

and the number of Aegis systems and numbers of missile that we 

are investing in now. The investment was $400 million less than 

it is in the fiscal year 2010 budget for procuring those missiles 

alone, and then another $200 million for further investment into 

the Aegis system. So there is an acceleration that wasn’t there before that is now, in a greater quantity of both of those. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome all of you 

and thank you for the work you do for the United States. Of course, 

I have a couple of questions for our former Member and Under Secretary. 

You know, a lot has been said in the papers, and I have been 

really reading them, about how this is a new direction, how President Obama is changing everything. I think in the 13 years I have 

sat on this committee, 11 of them have been on the Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee. The last three years or so were chaired by 

you, Ms. Tauscher. And I think the Congress actually began to 

change the course of what was going on with respect to missile defense and, in particular, our short- and medium-range partners and 

seeking partners. 
27 

I remember going to Russia, to Poland and to the Czech Republic 

with you to discuss these issues with our allies and with those that 

we wanted to help with this real threat of short and medium range 

missiles coming to Europe or to the southern portion of Russia. So 

as I read the newspapers, it surprises me that people think this is 

a new direction. 

I am sorry, I missed part of this because I am also on Homeland 

and we have had some other meetings going on. But could you just 

talk a little to what were the last three years and how the Congress actually changed this direction, rather than just one man 

walking into the room and making a change? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Well, Congresswoman, I will say that President Obama does stand for change and, in the end, it is the President’s decision to make the change that has been made. And I 

think that the Congress certainly in a bipartisan way over the last 

few years realized that there was a current threat of short- and 

medium-range missiles targeting our NATO allies, our forward-deployed troops and our friends and family members, and that is why 

the Congress, who looked at the previous administration’s budget 

submission, made some changes in the investment strategy to increase both the investment in THAAD and in targets and in SM– 

3. 

But I think the reality is that, when this new Administration 

came in, there were two factors that were real change agents for 

what has become this new architecture. The first was the intelligence. Every administration comes in and orders a new intelligence assessment on many different things. There are lots of reviews that go on. The President ordered new intelligence and he ordered a new Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). 

When he did that, it was very clear that there were two new data 

points. The first was that the assumptions that the Intelligence 

Committee had made about the maturation of the long-range ballistic missile capabilities of Iran had not moved as expected. In 

fact, the short- and medium-range had moved dramatically further 

than the long- and medium-range. 

Knowing we are protected by Fort Greely and by Vandenberg for 

both the Korean and the Iranian threat, the other second piece was 

that the maturation of the technology—especially sensor technology—over the arch of the last few years, made it clear that 

there was a way to protect now with current proven technology, 

current threats, our NATO allies indivisibly as opposed to about a 

third of them being left out in the previous system. 

So I think it was the intelligence and the ballistic missile review 

that really took the President to the place where—the review also 

included for the first time the combatant commanders, which I 

think was very fundamentally new. And as General Cartwright has 

spoken, the combatant commanders have a list of requirements 

that they wanted to have missile defense meet. 

So I think that those are the three different things that caused 

us to look at a change, and I think the President was compelled 

by the fact that you could take the architecture to meet the threat, 

to do it faster, to do it more cost-effectively, you could bring NATO 

in, you could do all of NATO and you could do it in a way that still 
28 

protected the United States against the current threats and the 

emerging threats. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And, Ms. Tauscher, were there meetings held all 

along for the last two, three or four years with our allies, with our 

NATO allies, with Poland, with the Czech Republic, at the congressional, at the administration level, to talk about some of these 

changes that might occur if, in fact, the data came back and told 

us there might be a smarter way to do this, or did our allies just 

get surprised by this? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Well, as I said in my testimony, I think 

that there was lots of pre-consultation, and there was also lots of 

speculation and there was also lots of fueling by domestic press and 

others that, potentially, there might be a change. I think people got 

ahead of themselves, and the reality is that this is a better system 

for the current threat and the future threat, one that protects the 

United States and our allies in a way that is more cost-effective. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to have you 

all here today. This is for either one of the Under Secretaries. 

To an outside observer, the timing of this announcement is curious. It was done before the Administration’s Ballistic Missile Defense Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review were completed. 

It occurred on the eve of negotiations with Russia on the START 

follow-on treaty, and we know that President Medvedev has suggested progress on START could hinge on the U.S. giving up its 

European missile defense plans. 

Why didn’t we wait to make this announcement until after the 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review or the Quadrennial Defense Reviews were complete? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, let me take a stab at that. I think the 

most pressing reason was that we felt that there had been extensive interagency discussion and the architecture that General 

O’Reilly and General Cartwright have described so well was really 

emerging as the strongest possible option, and we realized we had 

an opportunity to not only shape the fiscal year 2011 budget, but 

to also try to influence where things are right now. 

We didn’t want to miss either of those budget opportunities. The 

truth is, if we had waited all the way into early next year when 

things were formally due, we wouldn’t have the same opportunity 

to make sure the money is flowing in the right direction in support 

of a new architecture. So that was the primary driver. 

But with regard to relationship to START, I think that both 

President Obama and, actually, it was agreed by Medvedev in 

issuing instructions to the START negotiators, there is no linkage 

between START and ballistic missile defense. We refused to acknowledge or accept that linkage from the get-go in these negotiations. 

The truth is, any time between now and December is a bad time 

in terms of that perceived linkage, because the START negotiations 

are ongoing, and any time we roll out this decision between now 

and the end of the review, there are some people who would link 

it to START, even though that is not what drove the decision. 
29 

So there was no good time from that perspective. What we did 

is we said, ‘‘look, it is too important not to miss the window.’’ It 

is very important not to miss the window on influencing the 2010 

and 2011 budgets appropriately in this regard. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Under Secretary Tauscher. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. START is a strategic offensive weapons negotiation, not defensive, and we have a very, very big bright white 

line that stops anybody from going on that side, and START expires on December 5th. So we are good Americans, we can 

multitask. Things are happening in a very crowded channel. But 

we made it very clear that START was not an environment or 

forum to discuss missile defense, and that is the way we have kept 

it. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. Now, you have referred to the budget 

several times. I have a budget question. Why couldn’t we have 

funded both the 10 interceptors in Poland and the radar in the 

Czech Republic and continued, at the same time, because we can 

multitask, with expanded theater missile defense? These are not 

mutually exclusive programs. 

If it is a budgetary issue, why are we cutting missile defense by 

$1.2 billion in the fiscal year that is just starting today, when in 

the last fiscal year that ended yesterday, we have an annual deficit 

of about $2 trillion, 1,500 times this $1.2 billion. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Let me clarify. I think the timing of the decision to go ahead and roll out this piece was influenced by the 

budget calendar. The architecture was not driven by budgetary considerations. It was driven by what General Cartwright and General 

O’Reilly have described is what best meets both the needs of the 

combatant commanders and the needs of the Nation in the most 

cost-effective way possible. 

But I will defer to either of you, if you want to add comment on 

that. 

General CARTWRIGHT. My sense here is that from a budget 

standpoint, to lose a year by not giving you the opportunity to review gave us a window that we wanted to get this to you. Did it 

have to be the exact day? No. As the other members here have 

said, the little bit of the misinformation that got out there drove 

us to believe we needed to clear up some misperceptions. 

But we clearly have taken several issues out of the QDR, out of 

the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and out of the space review, 

and brought them forward to get us to not lose a year in the debate 

in moving to any direction change that the department might want 

to take. 

So that really gave us this opportunity. We took advantage of it 

from the standpoint of the budget calendar, not from the standpoint of cost. 

To your issue of concern about should we do both. We are conscious. Even though our numbers are large, we are conscious about 

being good stewards of the resources that you give us. We are going 

to continue, or we plan to continue, to do the testing necessary to 

ensure that that two-stage ground-based interceptor, in fact, is 

real, not just paper, and that if all else fails, as Congressman Turner talked about, we do, in fact, have a way to look at this which 

was along the lines of the original program. 
30 

Also, that radar that we were going to put in the Czech Republic 

physically exists. It is sitting on Kwajalein Island. We understand 

the technology to take it from its current technology to what we 

need if we had to deploy it. So we have not ceded or given up, but 

we have, in fact, changed our focus. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

Mr. SPRATT [presiding]. Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To our former colleague, 

we miss you too, but we are terribly proud of the job you are doing 

in your new position. Welcome to all of you and thanks for your 

work. 

I have a question for both General Cartwright and General 

O’Reilly. The United States has already deployed a forward-based 

radar in Israel, and we have cooperative missile defense programs 

with that country. The main missile threat to Israel comes from 

Iran’s growing number of medium range missiles. The new architecture is intended to defend against these same kind of Iranian 

missiles. 

So my questions are, overall, how would you describe the impact 

of this new strategy, the new architecture, on Israel’s security? 

That is number one. And, number two, can you tell us whether the 

new architecture will help improve the ability to defend Israel 

against an Iranian missile threat or missile attack? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I will start, and then I will let General 

O’Reilly chime in. 

The system was put there last year to allow us to begin to do 

the testing and the integration work that is going on, not only with 

the Patriot systems that we have historically deployed to Israel, 

but as we start to move, as we speak today, the command and control system for the THAAD has also now been moved out so we can 

start to integrate those pieces and the Aegis piece. 

So what that radar brings to the capability to defend Israel as 

we move to the future is, as I talked about in my statement, this 

ability to get at the large raids, number one, so multiple missiles 

coming in towards Israel; and then, number two, to be able to see 

further than the organic sensors of any of those systems. 

So now they can see out much farther, assign inbound threats to 

specific weapons and specific sensors within Israel’s footprint, and 

defend the country much more effectively. That would also reduce 

the number of missiles that we have to build, because now we don’t 

have to build two and three for every threat coming in. We can actually be much more efficient. So from a warfighting standpoint, 

that is what this is going to do. 

The second piece is as we looked at the future, that ability to see 

further than the organic sensors is the testing and the integration 

that will go on. So a sensor not necessarily associated with a weapon, being able to see farther, pass that information to the weapon 

or the sensor that supports that weapon, and get that missile off 

sooner so that it is destroyed before it gets anywhere near the 

friendly nation is the second piece that brings. 

I will defer, then, to General O’Reilly. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, I would just like to add the fact that this 

architecture, one of the fundamental capabilities and attributes of 

this architecture to protect Europe is applicable to any theater in 
31 

the world. It is mobile, and our capability on Aegis ships can quickly move into that region. We are already proposing them to be in 

the eastern Mediterranean, and they can provide an entire additional layer of defense over Israel, as well as the enhanced sensor 

capability that General Cartwright was referring to. 

Mr. REYES. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the 

panel. You are obviously very engaged and very expert on this information. I thank you for your preparedness on this. 

I hear what you are saying, and I will let you sort out who 

should answer this question, by the way. I hear what you are saying about, perhaps, the lagging development of ICBMs from Iran 

and also the need to kind of shift towards the mid-range. But, you 

know, our intelligence has never been 100 percent, and there needs 

to be a margin of error. I hear what you are saying about, we have 

got the backup systems in Alaska. We also know that no system 

is 100 percent, things do get through. 

So that brings us to the question of North Korea. Some believe 

that North Korea is pursuing ICBM capability. It has also been reported that North Korea supplied Iran with 18 BM–25 IRBMs in 

2005. Does this new threat assessment account for the possibility 

that Iran could receive foreign assistance and that that, through 

osmosis, could occur a lot faster than predicted, and do you believe 

North Korea would share any IRBM or ICBM technology it has developed with Iran? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I would be happy to start and then let 

members join in here. 

For the ICBM threat, our primary capability still resides in Alaska and California. That we have never ceded and are not going to. 

The systems that the Iranians and the North Koreans have demonstrated thus far are pad-based. So in other words, there is only 

a certain number of pads, two in North Korea, three or four in 

Iran, so their ability to generate large numbers is still very nascent 

and will take time. 

The capability to move from where they are today, even with assistance—and I am a worry wart, so I am where you are on worrying about this—the next steps are extremely visible. In other 

words, they have to occur up above the atmosphere where everybody in the world can watch them. Those are the steps that allow 

you to take that last stage, separate a weapon from that last stage, 

get it to a stable configuration, find a place over the Earth to penetrate the atmosphere, survive that penetration with both the reentry vehicle (RV), the vehicle and the contents, and that is a very 

violent activity, survive the heat in the reentry, and then actually 

find something you would impact. Each of those steps is very visible, so we will know when they move forward. 

The one that I probably worry the most about is their ability to 

move from a pad system to a mobile system, to an erector. Then 

they can be in places that we don’t necessarily watch every day. 

So if I am to worry about something, that would be it. But, again, 

they would have to go through these other steps before they can 

move to the mobile configuration. 
32 

As we set this new system up—— 

Dr. FLEMING. Could I clarify something? When you say it is very 

visible, are you talking about in terms of testing and predicting? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. So, unlike what we have done up 

until today, where much of this engineering occurs in labs or in 

test places, this is something that has to be a launch, it has to 

occur, it is very visible, and everybody in the world can pretty 

much watch it and watch the progress there. 

Because we can see that, and because this system is leading anything else that we have had, the system we are proposing, by five 

to seven years, I am much more comfortable that if they surprise 

us, one, we will see it, two, we will have the lead time to actually 

field it. And I will let General O’Reilly jump in, but we are being 

conservative. If we field, much as we did with the GBI because of 

the threat earlier than all testing is complete, then we will have 

to do that. I will certainly come here and recommend that, because 

something is better than nothing to defend. But the next steps tend 

to be very visible. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. If I could just add, given my boss’s background in the intelligence world, he asked exactly these questions: 

What if the intelligence is wrong? What if they gain assistance and 

the ICBM threat emerges earlier? So he was very keen on, A, ensuring that the GBI defense we have of the homeland now remains; 

two, that we go ahead and put forward in Phase One, the earliest 

part of this new architecture, the forward-based radar to enhance 

seeing what is coming from Iran; and, three, that we really focus 

on developing this new capability in Phase Four that should give 

us the ascent phase capability, which is a game changer. 

And, finally, that we keep the development of GBI, the two-stage 

GBI on the books as a hedge in case things come earlier, in case 

there is any kind of technological challenge with the later models 

of the SM–3. 

So those things together are what made him comfortable in answering your question and going forward with this new architecture. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Cartwright, I am not surprised but heartened to hear 

that you are a worry wart. I am glad we have a panel of worry 

warts that are eminently qualified. Certainly our friend and colleague, Secretary Tauscher, welcome back. 

The public record of our intelligence suggests that Iran has not 

demonstrated the capability to use an intermediate range missile. 

Let’s assume that that is wrong. Let’s assume we are completely 

wrong about that and that Iran either is quickly developing that 

capability or has it now. 

I want to compare the old plan that we were operating under to 

meet our obligations to our interests and allies in Europe—Central 

Europe—and then the new plan under which we are going to meet 

our obligations to our allies and interests in Central Europe. 

If it were 2012 and the Iranians launched an intermediate-range 

missile with a nuclear warhead at Central Europe, under the old 

plan, what could we do about it? 
33 

General CARTWRIGHT. Nothing. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Nothing. My understanding is, the reason for that 

is that the deployment date for the old plan was around 2017, is 

that correct? 

General CARTWRIGHT. We started originally at the 2015 timeline. 

Because of challenges that we have had in basing and other things, 

2017 to 2018 now would be realistic. 

Mr. ANDREWS. There is a history of slippage on that date, isn’t 

there? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir, there is. 

Mr. ANDREWS. And under the new plan you are proposing, we 

would have deployable capability in 2011, is that correct? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ANDREWS. So we would have in place in 2012 some assets 

that would help us deal with this threat, if I understand it. So let’s 

talk about what those assets are. 

It is my understanding that under the old plan, it was essentially 

10 missile silos, is that correct? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Ten silos that would be based in Poland 

was the plan. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Ten silos based in Poland. And the new plan relies upon Aegis ships, which have SM–3 block IA missiles, it relies 

on the AN/TPY–2 radar and a THAAD element as well. Is that essentially correct? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ANDREWS. So it is sea-based and it is mobile land-based. 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Which of those two do you think is more vulnerable to attack from the enemy if, in fact, it had the ability to do 

these intermediate changed missiles? 

General CARTWRIGHT. A fixed site. 

Mr. ANDREWS. So the fixed site wouldn’t be deployed until 2017 

or 2018 and, in your opinion, it is more vulnerable than the seabased and mobile land-based system. I want to ask you, is that a 

fair statement? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Then the other thing I want to ask you is about 

cost. Now, I will say this to you. It is my view—and I think it is 

almost universally held here—that if there is an imminent threat 

to this country and its people and its interests and its allies, cost 

should not be a consideration. We need to do what we need do. 

But since there are options that we have, it is my understanding—and maybe Secretary Tauscher would be the best person 

to answer this—that is there is a qualitative difference in cost between the new plan that you are presenting and the old plan. My 

understanding is that the cost is about $70 million per missile? Or 

is it per silo? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Actually, it is General O’Reilly that is better at this, but it is about $70 million for the GBIs. 

Mr. ANDREWS. And it is about $10 million—— 

Secretary TAUSCHER. $10 million to $15 million for the Block IIA, 

yeah. 

Mr. ANDREWS [continuing]. For the new plan. 
34 

I want to talk about flexibility, as well. My understanding is that 

the weight of the missiles under the old plan, the system under the 

old plan, is about 25 tons. Is that right? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ANDREWS. And the new? What does the new one weigh? 

General O’REILLY. 1.2 tons for an SM–3 Block I series and 2 tons 

for an SM–3 II. 

Mr. ANDREWS. So if the Iranians ramped up their capability in 

a hurry and we had to be more flexible in a hurry to deal with that 

capability, which of these two options is best, from your point of 

view, General O’Reilly? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the new option. 

And the reason I proposed as my recommendation to go forward 

with this Phased, Adaptive Approach was the rigidity, which you 

are referring to, of the previous approach. The threat does change, 

and our ability to react to it. If there are intermediate-range missiles, even if we had the system in 2012, the first five missiles 

would consume those GBIs. 

Mr. ANDREWS. And the final question I would ask is that this is 

the first phase of, if I understand, a four-phased approach that 

would further buttress and bulk up this. Is that right, Secretary 

Tauscher? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Yes, it is. This is why it is phased and 

adaptive, is to deal with not only the threat but the emerging technologies and to match those as best we can. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I thank all of you for being here. General Cartwright, I have 

just a profound respect for you. And, General O’Reilly and Secretary Flournoy and, of course, Secretary Tauscher, I am grateful 

that you are here. 

I want you to know that I believe all of you are committed to the 

cause of human freedom in America, and so I hope you will grant 

me diplomatic immunity. There is no intent on my part to challenge anyone’s motivation here because I believe you are all committed to this country. 

Let me just start by saying, General Cartwright, I completely 

embrace all that you are saying, in terms of the geometric increase 

in the threat of short- and medium-range missiles and the complexity and the array that we face, and some of the array challenges. That is one of the reasons why some of us have been a little 

bit upset that one of our boost-phase systems in Airborne Laser 

(ABL) has been cut back. That is a real system turned into a paper 

one. It is almost the opposite of what we have been talking about 

today. 

But I think probably the thing that is of the greatest concern to 

me today is that this new approach has been juxtaposed with the 

old approach. And I think that is a false dynamic, because the new 

approach was essentially anticipated by the previous administration. We have been moving in this direction. I find, quite sincerely, 

very little in the new approach that is truly new. I think we have 
35 

been moving in this direction, again, thanks a lot to General Cartwright and the philosophy that he has embraced, and along with 

General O’Reilly. And so I don’t see a great deal of new. 

I think really what the debate here is, is the elimination of the 

GBI site in Europe which, essentially, was to provide a redundancy 

protection for the U.S. homeland. And to be able to throw in some 

potential protection for Europe was a freebie and a good thing. 

And my greatest concern is Iran’s march toward becoming a nuclear-armed nation. And I truly believe that one of their great 

goals, of course, strategically and tactically, is to be able to threaten and hold at risk American assets, American homeland. And that 

if, indeed, we were able, within the timeline offered, to demonstrate 

to them that we could intercept those both at the level of Poland— 

which, if you draw a line right between Iran and New York, you 

go right across Poland. And that may say something about your 

physics, Mr. O’Reilly. They may have been correct. 

The reality is that I believe that this new system that we talk 

about that was already on the books will still come too late to play 

much role in the calculus that Iran has in moving forward with 

their nuclear program. And I think that the European site would 

have devalued their program to an extent that perhaps—perhaps— 

some of our sanctions might have had some effect. 

So I guess then the concern that I have—let me just quote General O’Reilly. ‘‘The ballistic missile defense system is daily becoming more global. The defense of deployed forces, allies, and friends 

against short- to medium-range ballistic missiles in one region, theater, will be buttressed by additional standard SM–3 interceptors, 

more Aegis BMD engagement-capable warships, the addition of initial THAAD fire units, additional sea-based terminal interceptors.’’ 

Tying these assets together, as Mr. Cartwright said, ‘‘will be a global command and control battle management and communications 

capability.’’ 

And, of course, the Bush Administration’s budget turned over to 

the Obama transition team includes plans to field over 400 SM–3 

and THAAD interceptors by 2016. And I don’t see in this new approach that there is going to be a lot above that by 2016. 

So my greatest concern is simply this: in terms of protecting the 

homeland, the European site would have offered us some redundancy protection from long-range Iranian missiles. I think we all 

agree with that. 

And I am asking you, General O’Reilly, in terms of the timeline, 

are we having an additional risk to this country for any period of 

time because of the loss of the European site? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, no, I don’t believe we are at greater risk 

because of the insufficiency, as I just testified, I believe, of our previous architecture. 

Mr. FRANKS. Let me interrupt you. You testified that 2015 in the 

last situation. So you think that this new system is going to be able 

to provide the redundancy that the European site would by 2015? 

General O’REILLY. I don’t think the old system would provide the 

redundancy that you are referring to. It is very questionable. And 

the concern is, as the intelligence assessments are showing, the 

number of intermediate-range missiles and medium-range missiles 

has grown to an extent that just having 10 interceptors over there 
36 

would very quickly be consumed. And the secondary launch at the 

United States, those GBIs would—I am very concerned that they 

would ever be available for us. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Spratt mentioned that his history with this issue went back 

to SDI. And I have to acknowledge that my history goes back to 

my father having General O’Reilly’s job when I was in Vietnam 

and right after I got back from Vietnam. So my history is longer; 

certainly not as informed as Mr. Spratt’s. But I have been in favor 

of missile defense for years and years now, and I happen to be a 

Democrat. 

And I think the good news that comes from this debate is kind 

of like mayors—I was a former mayor—we used to talk about how 

there is not a Republican or a Democrat way to fill a pothole. The 

good news that comes from this debate and that should be clearly 

understood by the country is that both Democrats and Republicans 

are in favor of missile defense. The technology has matured to the 

point where we don’t argue about whether we should spend our 

money doing this. We argue about what is the best system, how 

should we spend our money doing this? 

I think it is extremely unfortunate that the Administration made 

the mistake—well, I guess it wasn’t the Administration. I think we 

here in the House made the mistake of cutting the Administration’s 

request for missile defense for this year’s budget. That was a real 

tactical error. Because, you know, to ordinary folks out there, it 

simply suggests that the current Administration, or at least the 

current Congress, isn’t as committed as the prior Congress was to 

the subject of missile defense. And that is just not so. But there 

is no way you can explain the cut any other way, at least to ordinary Americans, than this current Congress is just not as committed. So it is really unfortunate that we did that. 

It would be great if somehow we could reverse that in the, sort 

of, waning days here and free up the money to let you all do what 

you want to do. I accept from this testimony that you are all sincere, that you sincerely think this is the direction we should be 

headed in. 

And, frankly, General Cartwright, you have been in your post 

now for, what, three years? So you were a pre-Obama Administration person. Ms. Flournoy—you know, General O’Reilly, you have 

been doing this, and so you are pre-Obama Administration. And I 

accept that you are sincere in your description of having rethought 

all of this. I just think it is really unfortunate that we managed 

to cut the budget. 

If I could, I would like to ask how the new architecture—and I 

know this is focused principally on Europe—how the new architecture protects us from an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) threat, a 

Scud missile launch from a scow somewhere in the ocean. I think 

that that is something that we really need to be thinking about a 

lot. 

It is one of the reasons why I requested language in the current 

authorization bill asking that the Department of Defense conduct 

a study of putting small nukes, nuclear power facilities, hardened 
37 

nuclear power facilities, in all of our military bases around the 

country. I think that can be done, actually, with the private sector 

paying for it if they are sized in a way that gives power back into 

the grid. So I think it is a win-win, basically, for America. But from 

a national security perspective, I think it is very important, given 

the EMP threat. 

So, comments about what the, sort of, new world that you all are 

talking about here that most folks couldn’t possibly understand unless they spent years studying this subject, this new world will enable us, as far as protection against EMP threats, rogue missiles, 

just one missile. 

General CARTWRIGHT. I would like to touch on, kind of, both of 

those issues, and then I will cede to the other members here. 

I worry about this because the reality is, the spectrum that we 

are dealing with is an ICBM to a terrorist. The weapon and the 

lethality is now exportable at both ends. And it is actually easier 

to deliver, unfortunately, at the more rudimentary end. And so, 

much of what we are trying to accomplish in the Quadrennial Defense Review is to make sure that we are, in fact, looking at both 

ends of this spectrum. 

At the terrorist end, which is generally the most challenging, 

how do you handle someone who really doesn’t value their own life, 

much less the value of anyone else’s life? And, generally, Clausewitz, you know, Sun Tzu, it is ‘‘take that objective away from the 

enemy.’’ And so, much of what we are doing we put in the role of 

consequence management, of protection, just by the daily way we 

do business, how we build our buildings now, these kinds of initiatives that would talk about protected and hardened power, protected and hardened communications that would allow us to make 

sure that, even if—God forbid, that occurs—any enemy of the 

United States would understand that would not change our resolve 

or our ability to carry out that resolve. 

And that is the way I approach every day. Much of what we are 

doing in the Quadrennial Defense Review on this side of the equation goes to these issues about, how do you take the objective 

away? 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Wilson, please. 

There is a series of votes, a 15-minute and two 5-minutes. These 

will not be the last votes for the day, however. There is a possibility we can finish. But, if not, we will come right back. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership in 

this important hearing. 

Madam Secretaries, General, thank you for being here. 

Under Secretary Tauscher, I was grateful to be the first Member 

of Congress in the Congressional Record to praise your confirmation. 

I am just so concerned. I support a strong missile defense. I was 

taught by my predecessor, the late Congressman Floyd Spence, 

chairman of this committee, Armed Services Committee, that we 

have real threats; they need to be addressed. I believe, as Ronald 

Reagan said, that we can develop a bullet to hit a bullet. I am concerned this Administration is weakening missile defense. 
38 

At the same time, Iran is proving its capabilities of developing 

nuclear weapons. Over the weekend, what a message, as they sent 

missiles with their new technology. I believe the fanatics who have 

hijacked the country of Iran—a great country, a historic country, 

ancient Persia—when they carry signs that say, ‘‘Death to Israel, 

Death to America,’’ they mean it. 

And I am particularly concerned—particularly Secretary Tauscher knows—I have a deep, personal affection for the people of 

Bulgaria, Romania, for Greece, for India. And with the missile tests 

this week, all of them are at risk. They are concerned. Ordinary 

Americans, as Congressman Marshall said, are concerned. Why are 

our enemies rejoicing? 

I would like to point out—and, Madam Secretary, I understand 

you recently returned from a trip to Europe to discuss missile defense. And while you were there, I would like to know the concerns 

of NATO officials, particularly from Eastern Europe, our new courageous allies. 

I have a personal interest. My daughter-in-law, Jennifer 

Miskowitz-Wilson, from New Jersey, is a very proud Polish-American. 

What did our allies, our great courageous allies, say? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Well, Congressman Wilson, let me first say, 

I don’t think that this should be a question of false choices. Let me 

say that what President Obama has put forward is a system that 

will deal with current threats now, will deal with our European allies now and protect them against what we saw just this week is 

a robust Iranian short- and medium-range threat. 

The sense that we either have GBIs or we have this, is a false 

choice. The United States is currently protected against a longrange—and the North Korean threat by this system that is in Fort 

Greely and in Vandenberg. So, as General O’Reilly testified last 

year, the GBIs in Poland were a redundancy. The system is going 

to include the opportunity to deal with a future Iranian long-range 

threat against the United States as a redundancy. 

So I think that these false choices have got to be put aside in 

favor of what we think is a very robust system that deals with the 

current threat now and protects NATO allies first, in a phased 

way, and then indivisibly. 

When we saw our European allies, it was very clear that they 

had no idea what the Obama Administration’s plan was going to 

be. We explained it to them. And, as you can see from the comments by Chancellor Merkel, President Sarkozy, our NAC members 

were very, very enthusiastic about it. 

Our Polish and Czech friends had to absorb what we told them, 

and we are in consultations with them. We have offered the Poles 

a future piece of the SM–3 deployment. The Czechs we are working 

on on a number of different things. 

So I think that what you see is, universally, our European allies 

have moved past the debate about what is going on and have absorbed and really appreciate what we are doing. And I think that 

that is really the opportunity for us to move forward on a system 

that can deal with current threats now. 

Mr. WILSON. General O’Reilly, our missile defense cooperation 

with Israel and with India have been mutually beneficial with tech-
39 

nology. We know how talented the people are of Israel and India— 

large number of engineers. 

In your view, will the new missile defense architecture improve 

our ability to defend Israel and India from an Iranian missile attack? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, yes, from the point of view that this is a 

mobile system and it is very flexible. So it has applicability for deployments around the world. 

What is key is our ability to integrate with the host-nation command and control systems and what they are trying to contribute 

to missile defense. 

And, in the case of Israel, we have clearly shown over the last 

year that we have a fully interoperable system, between our radar 

and their Arrow system. And we have shown that again off the 

coast of California earlier this year when we were testing, with all 

of our systems that we are proposing here working with the Israeli 

systems. 

Mr. WILSON. I am concerned for Israel and India. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

We will recess until the third vote is over and come right back, 

and we will take up and hopefully finish very quickly. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania is recognized. 

We are back in session. So you are recognized for five minutes, Mr. 

Sestak. 

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I hope I am not redundant on these questions. I had to 

step over to the Education Committee. 

Can I ask you a question? You had spoken about, when missiles 

take off they are pretty similar. It is kind of like a telephone pole 

going up. It is a pretty easy shot. 

Now, let’s say that this system that the Bush Administration 

wanted to have in Europe—which, it wasn’t going to shoot it as it 

goes up. When the Russians shoot a missile, they have a lot of decoys in them. 

My understanding is that, if the Iranians happened to put a 

bunch of decoys on this missile and you don’t get it in the ascent 

phase, that the Bush Administration’s proposal in the Czech Republic and Poland wouldn’t be able to handle that threat. Is that 

correct? 

General CARTWRIGHT. The radar, first in the—— 

Mr. SESTAK. The combination of the radar—the 2017 system. 

General CARTWRIGHT. You are exactly right, in that in the ascent 

phase you can’t really deploy a bunch of decoys, and that is why 

the missile is so vulnerable—I mean, among other things. It is relatively predictable. 

In the system that was originally planned, which would be the 

ground-based interceptors in Poland and the radar in the Czech 

Republic, the radar in the Czech Republic had one function, and 

that was to discriminate between the RV and decoys as it left the 

atmosphere when they would be deployed. 
40 

And so that was the value of that radar at the time. It really had 

no other function. And just to put one more piece on there, that 

intercept had to occur while it was in the range of that radar. 

Mr. SESTAK. Correct. Well, my understanding is you would have 

had to need a second radar site in order to do that discrimination, 

not just one. Is that correct, General? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Only from the standpoint that that radar 

has to be queued. And that is what the radar down in the southeastern part—— 

Mr. SESTAK. Correct. So you would have had to have had two 

radar sites. So the system you were originally going to plan would 

have had to have another radar, then, for that discrimination. 

General CARTWRIGHT. When we got to the point at which the Iranians would be able to—— 

Mr. SESTAK. To do that. 

General CARTWRIGHT [continuing]. Decoys. 

Mr. SESTAK. The second question I have is multi-mission tasking. 

My understanding is Navy ships tend to be able to handle submarine threats, missile threats from aircraft, surface threats, and 

others. Is this just one more threat that a well-planned crew could 

do, multi-mission? 

General CARTWRIGHT. It is. But to be fair also, when you dedicate the radar, when they set up the—technical, but when they set 

up the energy fences, this mission consumes all of the radar’s activity. So that is why we keep the second ship out there, is to make 

sure that we have—— 

Mr. SESTAK. And if I am not wrong, is it a flip of the switch, basically, that switches it from—— 

General CARTWRIGHT. Speed of light. 

Mr. SESTAK. Speed of light. So it is a nanosecond to go from one 

mission to the other. 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes. 

Mr. SESTAK. My third question is, General, you had mentioned 

there was a shoot-shoot-look-shoot strategy. You know, I think you 

take two shots or something? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. This architecture supports that. And 

our focus is to have that first shot as early as possible. 

Mr. SESTAK. I guess my question is, as you go further down the 

road—you have 30 GBIs in Alaska, correct? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SESTAK. If you wanted to, I mean—to get those two shots, 

if you had to, could you just add another 30 to get 3 shots? Or do 

you just want to get the ascent phase? 

General O’REILLY. What you are referring to are two different 

systems, sir. The one in Alaska is a midcourse system that only engages after apogee. 

Mr. SESTAK. I understand. 

General O’REILLY. So it only engages at the end. The GBI system 

that we were proposing for Europe also is a midcourse. We would 

have to wait until after the apogee, the highest part of the flight 

of a missile even coming into Europe. So if we had two opportunities, the first opportunity is a very limited one, only against certain 

trajectories towards the United States that you could have had that 

intercept. 
41 

Again, as I testified before, I am very concerned about having 

those missiles available, because there is a very large number of 

missiles that are threatening Europe now that you would want to 

use every missile you possibly had. And under the old architecture, 

you would be engaging those shorter-range missiles actually with 

the GBIs. And it is very quick to set up a scenario where they 

wouldn’t be there for either shot. 

Mr. SESTAK. So if I were to walk out of this hearing—I think I 

have only have four seconds—I could walk out saying that in the 

first two years we will now cover Israel, the Middle East, troops, 

southeastern Turkey, from short-range and medium-range, which 

we wouldn’t do under the 2017 system of the Bush Administration. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, southeastern Europe—not just Turkey, 

but Europe. 

Mr. SESTAK. Southeastern Europe. And that we are going to basically use a multi-task ship that, with a nanosecond, can go from 

one mission to the other. 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SESTAK. And that radar is only against missile threats. You 

could still move around and use its other systems for antisubmarine at the same time, even if you are doing ballistic missile 

threats. Correct? 

General CARTWRIGHT. That is correct. 

Mr. SESTAK. And then move them anywhere you want in the 

world. 

General CARTWRIGHT. That is correct. 

Mr. SESTAK. And then the key is the second radar site for the 

discrimination. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In looking at the maps for the coverage of Phase One in 2011, 

Phase Two in 2015, the coverage that would provide for Europe, do 

Phases One and Two provide full coverage to those European countries within range of Iran’s short- and medium-range missiles? 

General O’REILLY. For the short- and medium-range during this 

period of time, yes, the coverage would be there. 

Mr. COFFMAN. You wouldn’t need Aegis in the Black Sea to be 

able to provide that coverage? 

General O’REILLY. Not for the NATO countries that we are referring to. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Uh-huh. Given Moscow’s nonsensical concern that 

ground-based interceptors in Poland could be fitted with nuclear 

warheads and pose a threat to Russia, what is to say they are not 

going to be concerned with having a greater inventory of mobile 

SM–3 interceptors capable of intercepting all ranges of ballistic 

missiles deployed throughout Europe? Will this new approach be 

equally problematic for Russia? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, if you are referring to the ability to—their 

concern that these GBIs could be used offensively? 

Mr. COFFMAN. No. Let me go in another direction. 

Tell me if—the Administration’s focus has now shifted over to address the intermediate-range concerns, saying that they are the 
42 

first capability that Iran will have. So now you have shifted in that 

direction. 

Now, tell me what the environment will look like when you go 

to long-range—I mean, when they do develop long-range ballistic 

missiles, which we have intelligence that they are developing, then 

what, then, are you proposing to address that threat scenario? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I think, you know, kind of start from a 

technical side, is the SM–3 IIB, in particular, because it will have 

a capability of getting them before they get out of the ascent phase. 

So that is the first shot. 

The second shot, then, is to be able to use this missile, the 

ground-based interceptors that are in the United States, to catch 

them in the exo-atmospheric portion of the architecture. 

If we were very convinced and very threatened in the United 

States—in other words, they fielded a large number of them very 

quickly—we could add the SM–3 or the Patriot or the THAAD to 

defending the United States in areas that we felt were appropriate 

for that, based on the threat. 

So we would be able to cover it in all three regimes of flight. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Let me just add, though, I would not characterize this as a shift of focus. We are pursuing what we think 

will be a more effective enhancement of the homeland defense 

piece, both with the radar in Phase One and the ascent phase capability in Phase Four. But, in the meantime, to deal with threats 

that are already in existence, we are adding a more responsive set 

of systems that can deal with the shorter- and medium-range 

threats that are there now. 

Mr. COFFMAN. What will the Administration be asking for in subsequent budgets, in terms of missile defense? What can the Congress expect to see? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I defer to General O’Reilly. He is the keeper of our program. 

General O’REILLY. Well, sir, we are in development, as I said, in 

the preparation for this next budget. But you will see investment 

continue that we started in the fiscal year 2010 proposal for the 

sensors and the networks and the SM–3 variants and the development of the unmanned aerial vehicles that are key to this architecture, continued development in that area. At the same time, expanded testing of the land-based SM–3 options and of the SM–3 IB 

will begin flight-testing a year from now. 

And in the area of developing the SM–3 IIA, we will continue 

that work. We are having a flight test. Our work with the Japanese 

is to have our first flight test in 2014. So there will be funding for 

that program, as well as the other aspects of the missile defense 

capability, including enhancing the capability of the GMD system 

in Alaska and Vandenberg. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Ms. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to all of you for being here and for your expertise. 

And, of course, I also want to welcome, as all my colleagues have, 

our great friend and colleague, Secretary Tauscher. And I know she 

knows how prideful I feel in her being here. 
43 

And it is great to have you all. 

I want to turn for a second, because we are very pleased, I think, 

that we have this interagency approach today. And there is a 

strong diplomatic piece to it, and we understand that. And I wonder, then, if, Secretary Tauscher, you could particularly, I think, respond, and if others want to join in. 

We know, through your prepared remarks quoting NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen, the role that NATO will be playing. 

And I think part of the question is, how is that going to be different? What has changed? What do we anticipate in their involvement? And, also, what role do we think the NATO allies will be 

playing in a kind of cost-sharing effort to ensure the wealthier nations are contributing to the success of this strategy? Could you 

comment on that for us? 

Thank you. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you, Congresswoman Davis. 

I want my colleagues from the defense department to talk about 

some of the burden-sharing opportunities, which are important. 

But I think, suffice it to say, there was a lot of criticism of the 

Bush Administration for what was considered to be bilaterally negotiating with the Poles and the Czechs. We are very grateful that 

the Poles and the Czechs stepped up. 

That was a criticism, I think, that was overblown. The truth of 

the matter is that we have Article V considerations that are very, 

very important to us. We believe that the defense of New York is 

the same as the defense of Warsaw. An attack on Prague is an attack on Peoria. 

So we know now, because of the threat analysis that we have 

and the assessment that we have, that these short- and mediumrange threats that are holding at risk American forward-deployed 

troops, American assets and NATO allies are significant. Just the 

test this week of the Iranian short- and medium-range missiles 

show that we have risks right now that we have got to put assets 

against. 

And I think that we have a very robust engagement with our 

NATO allies. So NATO-izing this process not only gives us a 

chance to use indigenous technologies developed by our allies, but 

also burden-sharing, but the kind of centralized command and control that is very necessary to protect our assets, to work with our 

allies, and to have, we hope, future cooperation with Russia, 

through the Russia-NATO Council, so that we have a very big network system that can protect everybody, including our forward-deployed troops, against these threats. 

Perhaps Miche`le would add. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I would just add, I mean, one of the real 

strengths, or appeals, of this new system is that it has a broad variety of ways that other countries can participate. 

There are NATO countries that already have the Aegis ships. 

They could choose to upgrade those with ballistic missile defense 

capability and contribute that way. There are countries who are interested in acquiring the kind of UAVs that could be used as sensor 

platforms. There are countries that may step up and become SM– 

3 missile sites. 
44 

There are countries that are already contributing to NATO’s 

command and control system, the all-BMD system that is being designed, which is going to link the, sort of, lower-tier defense to the, 

sort of, middle- and upper-tier defense. And, of course, there is opportunity for a co-development of systems going forward, as other 

countries in Asia have already participated with us. 

So there are just a lot of different ways that countries can chip 

in, both individually and as part of—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. One of the questions might be whether we, in fact, 

gain greater leverage with this new architecture in bringing—certainly, there are many technologies already in place and efforts. 

But I think what would be helpful to know is whether—and we 

may not know that for a while—but whether this really does even 

truly enhance, as you are saying, the relationships in a new way. 

I don’t know whether—— 

Secretary FLOURNOY. We got very strong feedback from the NAC 

that they like the fact that this is truly about the indivisibility of 

NATO in terms of a defense for all. I don’t want to name names 

because it is premature, but there were a number of representatives who came up and said, ‘‘We want to be part of this and we 

want to talk about how.’’ So I think that was very positive. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And do we know whether that changes the message 

that this is also sending to our adversaries? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Absolutely. I mean, I think General Cartwright has spoken before about how this contributes to deterrence. 

I don’t know if you want to jump in on that point. 

General CARTWRIGHT. If you are a single country and everybody 

around you is contributing to a defensive capability, it has to affect 

you. That is point one. 

And then point two is their opportunity to contribute in ways 

that are so different than a U.S.-only system. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Langevin. 

I have Mr. Langevin, Dr. Snyder, Mr. Taylor and, I believe, Mr. 

McKeon, who withheld his questions earlier, should be recognized. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to welcome the panel here today. And thank you all 

for your very thoughtful, comprehensive testimony and for this 

very flexible and comprehensive plan on missile defense that you 

presented to us today. 

I particularly, like my other colleagues, want to welcome back 

Secretary Tauscher and thank her for her great service on this 

committee for so many years. And I am honored to have followed 

her as the chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee and 

hope to follow in the very high standard that you set, Secretary. 

So, welcome. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. We have touched on a number of important 

things already that I had questions about, or concerns, and some 

of them have been already answered, in particular how we will 

interact now with Poland and with Czechoslovakia. And, clearly, 

you laid out that there will be ongoing involvement on missile defense with them, so that should allay any fears that people have 
45 

that we are not continuing on in our cooperation with missile defense with them. 

We have also talked about cost. And I want to talk a little more 

about capabilities of the system and comparisons. Just to recap 

again, for one GBI, $70 million; for an SM–3, depending on which 

version, anywhere from $10 million to $15 million. 

Could we also talk about, in terms of the site, if it was a landbased SM–3 site versus a GBI site, the cost and personnel required 

for either one of those sites? I think that is something important 

to highlight. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the previous GBI site that was proposed, 

it was a large complex, it was a missile field, had missile assembly 

buildings and so forth, had a large contractor support team that 

was there. So the total number of the site personnel was around 

450 people at any one time manning that site. 

In contrast, the land-based SM–3 site is much smaller. As far as 

site prep goes, it is pads of concrete, primarily and fences, security, 

and so forth. Its population—and this is very early—but our estimate is it is somewhere around 70 people. So it is a significantly 

smaller footprint even though you could have upwards of 80 interceptors at the same site where we previously had 10. 

To build one of those missile fields, for example, a GBI is a fiveyear construction period. This, to prep the site, would be less than 

a year. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And let’s talk about, were there to be an attack— 

obviously we are primarily concerned about Iran—but if there were 

to be an attack, they are obviously not going to launch one, two, 

or three missiles. You talk again about the number of short- and 

intermediate-range missiles and how quickly the system could be 

overwhelmed if we only had 10 GBIs. You laid out how we would 

launch two GBIs for each missile that is launched, so how quickly 

it would be overwhelmed and what flexibility the SM–3 system 

would offer to meet the threat. 

General CARTWRIGHT. Well, the raid size issue is something that 

we worry about, particularly from the standpoint that it would 

overwhelm the sensors and then overwhelm the weapons very 

quickly and then leave them vulnerable, or leave that area vulnerable. 

The new system, both in the affordability side of the equation but 

more from an operational standpoint and the ability to address 

large raids, as we have watched the Prophet series exercises which 

are ongoing right now in Israel—I am sorry, in Iran—you generally 

are seeing half a dozen or so, similar to what we see on the 4th 

of July from North Korea, where they will launch half a dozen to 

a dozen missiles. That could quickly overwhelm the GBI system. 

And what we will be able to do with the SM–3 in the early stages 

is to address those weapons with SM–3s in Europe. When we move 

to the 2020 system, we will not only be able to address them in the 

terminal phase and in the exo-atmospheric, trans-atmospheric 

areas, but we will start to go after them in the ascent phase, very 

early in the game, which allows the problem to be simplified substantially and allows us to get at those systems very early in the 

flight, which means we don’t waste second and third missiles going 

after them. 
46 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General O’Reilly, could I ask you, the testing— 

where and how you test the SM–3 missile as its development continues. And do you have the range facilities and authorities you 

need to conduct the planned testing? And can you talk about how 

this would protect Hawaii, if that is a test site? 

General O’REILLY. Well, sir, Hawaii is where we do most of our 

testing in the Pacific. And that would be the likely location for this, 

because we want to integrate that testing with THAAD and Aegis 

on ships and our GMD system. So all of those systems come together in the central Pacific, so the Pacific Missile Range would be 

an ideal site for this testing. 

And, as you said, it has a redundant—or it has an additional attribute, that if you are there and you have this capability you are 

testing, it would be there for other uses for defense also, as we 

have done in the past with our systems that we test there in the 

Pacific. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. As I have listened to this this 

morning and read through the testimonies earlier, it brings home, 

once again, that you all are doing a great job in working through 

this very difficult challenge. 

But the reality for Iran is they are not safer by pursuing the nuclear program, they are not safer by pursuing their missile program. You know, I am one of those people that think there is a lot 

that, eventually, Americans and Iranians will do together as people 

that will be very, very productive. But somehow they are off on this 

tangent that it will somehow help their national aspirations for 

their people by pursuing these programs. And I think it is very 

clear from the work you all are doing that it will not help them. 

And I think that is the unfortunate side of what they are doing. 

But I hope at some point their leadership will recognize they are 

not safer by pursuing these programs. 

General O’Reilly, in his written and oral statement, used the 

phrase that what you are all about is that this will enhance U.S. 

homeland defense. And there are some people on the committee 

today that have said they are concerned it will weaken it. I don’t 

get that. I just don’t see where what you are saying here in any 

way puts us at risk of weakening U.S. homeland defense. 

Somehow we think that when we set up a program, even though 

it is a—all these programs are multiyear, that we can never learn 

from a changing world or changing technology, I mean, I just don’t 

get it, why we would think that somehow you all are going to make 

changes that you are going to sit there and testify, after years and 

years of service to your country, that this enhances U.S. homeland 

defense when, in fact, it weakens it. I don’t get it. I mean, I don’t 

get it. I think a lot of this is just technological change. 

I wanted to ask, Secretary Tauscher, I think I will address you, 

put these questions to you, with regard to the discussion that has 

been going on about Poland and Russia. And I understand what 

you all have testified to, that you have reached out to folks, that 

there was some misinformation, and you feel like it is moving in 

the right direction. 
47 

But there are clearly some voices being heard from Poland that 

think they were mistreated. And so, would you explain to me why 

they might think that? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Well, Congressman Snyder, I can’t speak 

for them, but I will tell you that every effort was made to pre-consult and to consult, but there was a lot of leaking going on. And 

there was a sense that, once the President made the decision, that 

we had to get out there and do it. And, literally, within hours of 

the President making the decision, we were on planes going to see 

them. 

We are enormously grateful that the Polish Government and the 

Czech Government worked with the previous administration on 

what was called the program of record. But things have changed. 

They have changed significantly. The threat has changed. We have 

a big commitment to our NATO allies and forward-deployed troops. 

It is clear that the current threat is from short- and medium-range. 

The United States is currently protecting—— 

Dr. SNYDER. And I understand all that. But I want us to be— 

I mean, when some of us met yesterday, and we have had discussions through the last several weeks with Poles, and there are, at 

a minimum, some misunderstandings that are persisting. 

And so I want to understand better why they may have the 

view—which you all don’t agree with, and you are going to try to 

rectify and, I think, will get straightened out—I think the relationship between Poland and the United States is and will be very 

strong for decades to come—but why they might be thinking that 

this was not helpful to their foreign policy. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Well, I will tell you that, under the previous administration, the Polish Government and the Czech Government stepped up smartly to support the United States in our 

ambitions to put both the 10 GBIs in Poland and the radar site in 

the Czech Republic against public opinion. Public opinion in both 

countries was significantly against it. So both governments used a 

lot of political capital to support the ally, the United States, and 

have had a lot of dissension politically domestically. 

Dr. SNYDER. So they took their political hits domestically. They 

also took some hits from Russia, which wasn’t very excited about 

these missiles there. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. That is right. 

Dr. SNYDER. So is the basic underlying problem they paid the 

price and now we are backing off? Is that how you perceive the—— 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Well, I think what happened was, in anticipation of the BMD Review being released, there was a lot of domestic U.S. speculation as to what the characterization of that would 

be, and they were wrong. The characterization coming out of the 

United States, picked up by the press in Europe, was that we were 

canceling the program. If you remember, in the first 24 hours, 

there was completely misinformation disseminated, and it was affecting the political environment in Poland. 

Dr. SNYDER. Which gets back to the basic point that this, in fact, 

enhances security both for Europe and the United States. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Exactly. And I think that is the message 

that everyone has now. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. 
48 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, like everyone else, I want to welcome back our former colleague. And I, as an American, think we are very lucky to have you 

first as a congresswoman and now serving in this capacity. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. You know, in the past 20 years, under both Democratic and Republican presidents, we have seen the Spanish ask us 

to give up a huge air base at Torrejon. We have seen the Philippine 

Government ask us to give up tens of billions of dollars of infrastructure in their country. The Panamanians asked us to give up 

tens of billions of dollars of infrastructure in their country. Our fellow Americans in Puerto Rico asked us to give up Vieques, and 

then we made the decision, ‘‘Well, there is no reason to have Roosevelt Roads if we can’t have Vieques.’’ And, most recently, the 

Government of Ecuador that, just 10 years ago, begged us to build 

an airfield at Manta is now asking us to give that airfield back to 

them. 

And in each instance they are our host, and in each instance as 

the guest, when they ask us to leave, as the good guys we are as 

a Nation, we leave. And we leave all those things behind. 

So, going to the decision for more mobile units, initially going to 

a sea-based unit, I commend you. Because these nations that are 

now asking us to spend a lot of money in their countries are one 

regime away from asking us to leave. Those huge investments on 

the part of the American people, just like we saw in Spain, the 

Philippines, Panama, Puerto Rico, which are fellow Americans, just 

go to waste. 

Obviously, I come from shipbuilding country. Obviously, I support putting as many of these things on ships as you can because 

you don’t have to ask someone’s permission to use the ocean. And 

if you look at every potential threat out there, it is on an ocean. 

And for my colleagues who are rightfully concerned about Iran, 

I would remind you that the Iranians don’t have any carriers anywhere near our country. The Iranians don’t have any submarines 

anywhere near our country. The Iranians don’t have troops on two 

countries bordering our country. And I would think that the Iranians are very much aware of the three things that I just said and 

that that should be on their thoughts every day if they ever think 

of doing something as foolish as sending a missile towards the 

United States of America or any of our troops. 

So having said that, I am just curious how much, if any, did 

those things we gave up in Spain, Panama, the Philippines, Puerto 

Rico, play into the decision not to make huge capital investments 

in somebody else’s country where they could ask us to leave at any 

moment? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I will start, Congressman. 

For me, diversity is just absolutely essential, because you do not 

know tomorrow where you will be, who your friend will be, exactly 

what the right posture towards a threat will be. The mobile aspect 

of this and then the relocatable aspect of this gives us a really powerful blend. 
49 

And we are talking today about Europe, but I am equally focused 

on the Pacific. The North Korean threat, obviously, is a part of this 

dialogue. But there is not a lot of land mass out there. And to be 

in the right place to defend this country is going to, probably, have 

to be from the sea. 

And so, as we look at the entire globe, these mobile systems, both 

in their flexibility to adjust to changes in the geopolitical side of 

the house but also to adjust to changes in the threat and where 

that threat will come from, are absolutely an essential element 

that, for me, can’t be compromised. 

We have to have a mobile—yes, a mobile system costs more than 

a fixed-base infrastructure. But that investment is generally easily 

returned in its flexibility. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you. 

Ms. Tauscher, do you want to comment on that? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Well, Mr. Taylor, thank you for those warm 

remarks. But I think that I can only echo what General Cartwright 

has said. 

But I will say that, once again, we are very aware of how our 

allies have stepped up, and we are very aware of our Article V commitments to our NATO allies. The program of record would not 

have protected, even in its final stages, all of our European allies. 

And our system begins to protect them now. 

So I think that we shouldn’t get into the job of picking false 

choices. This is a very comprehensive, flexible system that is adaptive, that deals with the current threat, with proven technology 

now. And I think that that is a characteristic that the President 

understood. I think that we hope that we get support from the Congress. 

But, in the end, it gives us the kind of flexibility not only to deal 

with the basing issues but also to the threat, which is really, I 

think, what the American people need to have confidence in. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. McKeon, the gentleman from California, wrap it up. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think this has been a very, very good hearing. And I think 

there are lots of things we agree on, as Mr. Turner pointed out. I 

think there are lots of things we disagree on, as has also been 

pointed out. But, as Mr. Spratt and Mr. Marshall said, I think we 

have come a long way on the debate. 

I remember when Reagan talked about SDI and how loony-tune 

he was and how crazy he was. It would be very interesting if he 

could come back and hear the debate we just had today and how 

both sides are supporting missile defense. 

We still have differences. Sadly, I think some of them are partisan. Sometimes I sit here thinking, could a Republican say something, one thing nice about President Clinton, could a Democrat 

say one thing nice about President Bush that they did in their 

eight years, respectively? 

I still have some concerns, and, you know, we will work on those, 

we will address those as we move forward. I do have concerns 

about how we treated Poland and Czechoslovakia in this. I know 

the Poland Ambassador yesterday said that he felt they had been 
50 

knifed in the back. So we haven’t completely salved that problem 

yet. I think we still need to work on that, and hopefully we will. 

I think people that are our allies should feel good about being 

our allies. And I understand that sometimes you have to move in 

ways that don’t take care of all the problems. But I hope we can 

reach out to them and make sure that they fully have bought into 

this and can feel good about it. And I hope that we can continue 

talking about this and move forward. 

I, again, like Mr. Marshall, wish that we had not cut missile de- fense by $1.2 billion in the budget if these new programs—as General Cartwright just said, the mobile system is going to cost more. 

Now, there has been a lot of talk about it is cheaper, but it is going 

to cost more. And if there was a change made in direction, we 

should have kept the money in there and put it toward that, because we haven’t totally handled all of the money situation. 

So thank you. Thank you for what you are doing. Thank you for 

your service to America. And we will continue to talk about this. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McKeon, thank you very much. 

A special thanks to the panel for your outstanding remarks today 

in answering the questions. I think that this has been one of the 

best hearings that we have had. 

We have one 15-minute vote and two 5-minute votes. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to indicate that I will 

be sending a letter expressing concern about the new plan for 

Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, the Philippines, and Taiwan. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. With that, we thank you again. 

[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

OCTOBER 1, 2009 

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OCTOBER 1, 2009 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

OCTOBER 1, 2009 

(87) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. As we discuss the current threat of ballistic missile attacks in Eastern Europe and the Middle East or Persian Gulf, how will the redeployment of seabased missile defense systems from the Pacific affect the United States’ ability to 

protect its interests in the Pacific, such as Guam, and its allies, including the countries of Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan? What feedback have you 

received from government officials in these countries since President Obama’s decision to recommit missile shields from the Pacific? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The new European-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) 

program—the Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA)—in no way abandons or degrades 

our commitments to our important friends and allies in East Asia, nor does it compromise the missile defense capabilities provided to our military commanders in the 

Pacific. The PAA will leverage missile defense assets that in some cases have yet 

to be permanently assigned to a particular region and, in other cases, will be purchased in future budget requests. European-based BMD would not rely on assets 

and capabilities already in place in the Pacific. 

The decision to pursue this new European BMD architecture was driven, in part, 

by early conclusions from the ongoing Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The 

BMDR, which will be presented to Congress in January 2010, will address the central aspects of our ballistic missile defense program, including the methodology for 

the allocation of BMD assets. As we move forward with decisions on where to deploy 

those assets, we will ensure that the Combatant Commanders in the Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere are fully involved. We will also continue to 

consult with our Allies. 

Mr. WILSON. Further, the United States has over 325,000 American military personnel, not to mention their dependents, stationed in the Pacific. I am concerned 

that the re-allocation of sea-based missile defense platforms away from our nation’s 

largest area of responsibility jeopardizes their safety. As the President’s new missile 

defense architecture was developed, what consideration was given to the safety of 

Americans in the Pacific Theater, including in Guam, Alaska, and Hawaii? It would 

be a severe risk management mistake to sacrifice security in the Pacific in order 

to attempt to realize the potential cost savings attributed to a new missile defense 

architecture, some elements of which are not even invented yet. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The new European-based missile defense program in no way 

abandons or degrades our commitments to our important Allies in East Asia, nor 

does it compromise the missile defense capabilities provided to our commanders in 

the Pacific. Missile defenses in Europe will leverage assets that in some cases have 

yet to be permanently deployed to a particular region or, in other cases, will be purchased with future budget requests. European-based missile defense will not rely on 

assets and capabilities already fielded in the Pacific. 

Mr. WILSON. As we discuss the current threat of ballistic missile attacks in Eastern Europe and the Middle East or Persian Gulf, how will the redeployment of seabased missile defense systems from the Pacific affect the United States’ ability to 

protect its interests in the Pacific, such as Guam, and its allies, including the countries of Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan? What feedback have you 

received from government officials in these countries since President Obama’s decision to recommit missile shields from the Pacific? 

General O’REILLY. As head of the Missile Defense Agency, I am responsible for 

technical aspects of the Ballistic Missile Defense System including the development, 

testing, and fielding of the architecture’s components. I defer to my colleagues in 

Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of State who are in a better 

position to respond to questions that have policy or diplomatic implications. 

Mr. WILSON. Further, the United States has over 325,000 American military personnel, not to mention their dependents, stationed in the Pacific. I am concerned 

that the re-allocation of sea-based missile defense platforms away from our nation’s 

largest area of responsibility jeopardizes their safety. As the President’s new missile 

defense architecture was developed, what consideration was given to the safety of 

Americans in the Pacific Theater, including in Guam, Alaska, and Hawaii? It would 

be a severe risk management mistake to sacrifice security in the Pacific in order 
88 

to attempt to realize the potential cost savings attributed to a new missile defense 

architecture, some elements of which are not even invented yet. 

General O’REILLY. As head of the Missile Defense Agency, I am responsible for 

technical aspects of the Ballistic Missile Defense System including the development, 

testing, and fielding of the architecture’s components. I defer to my colleagues in 

Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of State who are in a better 

position to respond to questions that have policy or diplomatic implications. 

Mr. WILSON. As we discuss the current threat of ballistic missile attacks in Eastern Europe and the Middle East or Persian Gulf, how will the redeployment of seabased missile defense systems from the Pacific affect the United States’ ability to 

protect its interests in the Pacific, such as Guam, and its allies, including the countries of Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan? What feedback have you 

received from government officials in these countries since President Obama’s decision to recommit missile shields from the Pacific? 

General CARTWRIGHT. The new European-based BMD program—the Phased, 

Adaptive Approach (PAA)—in no way abandons or degrades our commitments to our 

important Allies in East Asia, nor does it compromise the missile defense capabilities provided to our military commanders in the Pacific. At this point, no redeployment decisions have been made, and no orders have been given to redeploy Pacificbased ships based on the Presidential decisions on European Missile Defense. 

The decision to pursue this new European BMD architecture was driven in part 

by early conclusions from the ongoing Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The 

BMDR, which will be presented to Congress in January 2010, will address the central aspects of our ballistic missile defense program, including the methodology for 

the allocation of BMD assets. As we move forward with decisions on where to deploy 

those assets, we will ensure that the Combatant Commanders in the Pacific, Europe, Middle East, and elsewhere are fully involved. 

Mr. WILSON. Further, the United States has over 325,000 American military personnel, not to mention their dependents, stationed in the Pacific. I am concerned 

that the re-allocation of sea-based missile defense platforms away from our nation’s 

largest area of responsibility jeopardizes their safety. As the President’s new missile 

defense architecture was developed, what consideration was given to the safety of 

Americans in the Pacific Theater, including in Guam, Alaska, and Hawaii? It would 

be a severe risk management mistake to sacrifice security in the Pacific in order 

to attempt to realize the potential cost savings attributed to a new missile defense 

architecture, some elements of which are not even invented yet. 

General CARTWRIGHT. At this point, no redeployment decisions have been made, 

and no orders have been given to redeploy Pacific-based ships based on the Presidential decisions on European Missile Defense. Future decisions regarding the deployment of Missile Defense assets will be made in full consideration of all U.S. responsibilities for the defense of citizens, forces, friends and allies, and with input 

from the Combatant Commanders in the Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere. 

Mr. WILSON. As we discuss the current threat of ballistic missile attacks in Eastern Europe and the Middle East or Persian Gulf, how will the redeployment of seabased missile defense systems from the Pacific affect the United States’ ability to 

protect its interests in the Pacific, such as Guam, and its allies, including the countries of Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan? What feedback have you 

received from government officials in these countries since President Obama’s decision to recommit missile shields from the Pacific? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Our plans will in no way reduce our missile defense capabilities in the Pacific. The Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) does not take sea-based 

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities deployed in the Asia/Pacific region and 

re-deploy them to Europe. Under the President’s plan, we will substantially increase 

the deployment of proven missile defense capabilities to counter the most likely missile threats. The President’s FY 2010 budget requests increased funding beyond the 

Bush Administration’s plan for key missile defense assets to include making six additional Aegis ships BMD-capable. 

We have received positive feedback from government officials in the Pacific region 

about the President’s plan. We believe that the proposed ‘‘Phased, Adaptive Approach’’ architecture has applicability to other regions of the world. The United 

States will discuss with our allies and friends worldwide about how we can further 

enhance regional security and stability by countering the threat of ballistic missiles 

with effective, timely, and responsive defensive capabilities. 

Mr. WILSON. Further, the United States has over 325,000 American military personnel, not to mention their dependents, stationed in the Pacific. I am concerned 

that the re-allocation of sea-based missile defense platforms away from our nation’s 

largest area of responsibility jeopardizes their safety. As the President’s new missile 
89 

defense architecture was developed, what consideration was given to the safety of 

Americans in the Pacific Theater, including in Guam, Alaska, and Hawaii? It would 

be a severe risk management mistake to sacrifice security in the Pacific in order 

to attempt to realize the potential cost savings attributed to a new missile defense 

architecture, some elements of which are not even invented yet. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. I understand, and fully share, your concern for the protection of U.S. citizens who live in the Pacific region and our military forces deployed 

there. Our plans will in no way reduce or degrade our missile defense capabilities 

in the Asia/Pacific region. We will maintain our Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska and California to protect the continental United States and Alaska and Hawaii 

against long-range missile attacks from Iran or North Korea. The Phased Adaptive 

Approach (PAA) does not take sea-based Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities deployed in the Asia/Pacific region and re-deploy them to Europe. Under the 

President’s plan, we will substantially increase the deployment of proven missile defense capabilities to counter the most likely missile threats. The President’s FY 

2010 budget requests increased funding for key missile defense assets to include 

making six additional Aegis ships BMD-capable. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. In the analysis supporting the decision on a new four-phased approach: 

a. What were the specific locations (or are the planned locations) for missile defense assets in Europe, including ship stations and land-basing sites, and interceptor inventories required to provide coverage for each of the four phases? 

b. What level of coverage (e.g., percentage) is provided for Europe in each of the 

four phases? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The new European-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) 

program—the Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA)—will be fielded over four phases 

between now and 2020. 

Phase I, to be deployed in 2011, will use existing missile defense systems to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Phase I will focus on the 

protection of Southern Europe by utilizing sea-based Aegis missile-defense-capable 

ships and interceptors (the SM–3 Block IA). The first phase will also include a forward-based radar that will augment homeland defense capabilities already in place 

in Alaska and California. 

Phase II, to be deployed in the 2015 timeframe, will enhance our capabilities by 

fielding a more advanced interceptor (the SM–3 Block IB) and additional sensors. 

In addition to sea-based locations, Phase II will include a land-based site in Southern Europe. 

Phase III, to be deployed in the 2018 timeframe, will improve coverage against 

medium- and intermediate-range threats. Phase III will rely on an upgraded Standard Missile-3 (the SM–3 Block IIA), which is already under development, at seaand land-based sites, and will extend coverage to all of Europe. 

Phase IV, to be deployed in the 2020 timeframe, will provide a capability against 

a potential intercontinental ballistic missile threat to the United States. This phase 

will leverage yet another upgrade to the Standard Missile-3, the Block IIB. All four 

phases will include upgrades to the missile defense Command and Control system. 

Although specific interceptor inventories and locations for the sea- and land-based 

sites have yet to be determined, the Administration is working these matters as 

part of several internal processes, including the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, 

studies on the global allocation of ballistic missile defense assets, and formulation 

of the Administration’s budget request for fiscal year 2011. Although it is premature 

to discuss the specific force structure of missile defense capabilities around the 

world, it is important to understand that the PAA will field a significantly larger 

number of interceptors and sensors in Europe by leveraging proven, mobile, and 

more cost-effective platforms like AN/TPY–2 radars, airborne infrared sensors, and 

Standard Missile (SM)-3s. 

Mr. TURNER. In the analysis supporting the decision on a new four-phased approach, were any cost estimates on the new approach conducted? If so, what are the 

estimated costs of the new four-phased approach? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Several factors were taken into consideration when revising 

the approach to European-based ballistic missile defense, including the cost of the 

system in relation to the capabilities it will provide. The bottom line is that given 

the capabilities required to be responsive to the threat that we face today, the re-
90 

vised approach utilizes mature, proven sea-based and land-based missile defense capabilities that are more cost-effective than the components of the previous plan. 

As General Cartwright and General O’Reilly stated in testimony before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee on September 24th and the House Armed Services Committee on October 1st, the Standard Missile-3 (SM–3), at around $10 million apiece, 

is much cheaper than the Ground-Based Interceptor, which costs approximately $70 

million per interceptor. The SM–3 also provides the flexibility to deploy the system 

on sea, land, or both. Inherent in this flexibility is the ability to manage the costs 

associated with maintaining a deployed system more effectively. 

Mr. TURNER. Given the increased reliance on Aegis ships in the European theater, 

what additional requirements are expected to be placed on the U.S. Navy and what 

impact would this increased reliance have on the Navy’s ability to meet its worldwide missions and needs? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The new European missile defense program in no way abandons or degrades our commitments to other important friends and allies around the 

world. In particular, the revised approach in Europe does not compromise the missile defense capabilities provided to our military commanders in the Pacific, where 

Aegis ships and Standard Missile-3s are an integral part of our missile defense architecture. 

As the Department works through the global allocation of missile defense assets 

to meet the warfighter’s needs, the Military Departments, including the Navy, and 

the Combatant Commanders responsible for individual regions around the world are 

all fully involved in the planning for employing these assets. We are also working 

closely with the Military Departments—in particular the Navy—to ensure that their 

mission requirements are fully funded. 

Mr. TURNER. Secretary Flournoy and General Cartwright, you both indicated that 

development and testing of the two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) that was 

planned for Poland will continue. For how long (or until what specific milestones) 

does the Department plan to continue development and testing of the two-stage 

GBI? Will it be a hedge should the SM–3 Block IIA or IIB interceptors run into 

problems or delays, and if so, will there be a down-select in the future between the 

two-stage GBI and SM–3 Block IIA or IIB interceptors based on the progress made 

on each? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Development and testing of the 2-stage Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) will continue in order to provide a hedge against long-range threats 

that could potentially emerge in the future. However, we believe, as does the Joint 

Staff and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), that the Standard Missile-3s (SM–3) 

currently under development, as well as the SM–3 Block IIB that will be developed 

as part of the European-based missile defense system, will provide a sufficient capability against all ranges of ballistic missile threats. 

Although MDA can better address the specific development and testing schedules 

for the 2-stage GBI, I will note that there is currently no plan for a ‘‘down-select’’ 

between it and the SM–3 Block IIA or IIB, primarily because there is no plan at 

this time to enter into production of the GBIs. Currently, all planned activities for 

the 2-stage GBI are developmental in nature. 

Mr. TURNER. NATO’s missile defense architecture efforts to-date assumed that the 

previous approach would be ‘‘linked’’ with other NATO missile defense efforts. What 

is the schedule and plan for revising NATO’s missile defense architecture to incorporate this new approach and, with the U.S. now providing ‘‘more comprehensive’’ 

coverage of Europe, what role and contribution will our European allies have? Does 

the Administration intend to seek NATO support for its new approach similar to 

that expressed in the April 2008 Bucharest Summit declaration? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Work is underway at NATO to examine the possible expansion of the scope of NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 

(ALTBMD) system beyond the defense of deployed forces, to include the defense of 

Allies’ territory and populations. The U.S. plan for gaining NATO support includes 

asking Allies at the December Meeting of Foreign Ministers to affirm that missile 

defense for NATO territories and populations is an appropriate and viable mission 

for the Alliance and, in the same spirit as the Bucharest Summit declaration, that 

the new U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) is a valuable contribution to that 

mission. The role and contribution of European Allies would be to expand 

ALTBMD’s common-funded C2 backbone to include coverage of NATO territory and 

populations into which U.S. and other Allied national contributions would be connected. An Alliance decision on the expansion of ALTBMD could come at the fall 

2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon. The United States will encourage Allied contribution 

of national systems already acquired or that may be acquired in the future, such 

as various types of interceptors, sensors, and sites for the deployment of missile defense assets. 
91 

Mr. TURNER. In the analysis supporting the decision on a new four-phased approach: 

a. What were the specific locations (or are the planned locations) for missile defense assets in Europe, including ship stations and land-basing sites, and interceptor inventories required to provide coverage for each of the four phases? 

b. What level of coverage (e.g., percentage) is provided for Europe in each of the 

four phases? 

General O’REILLY. With the exception of Poland, which has recently agreed to 

begin negotiations over hosting a land-based site during Phase 3 of the European 

Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), determinations for specific locations for European missile defense components are pending conclusion of consultations with potential host nations and NATO. It would be premature to announce EPAA locations 

prior to the completion of these discussions. Similarly, specific interceptor inventories necessary to provide missile defense capabilities in each of the four phases 

are subject to internal Defense Department deliberations which will closely consider 

operational, programmatic and budgetary requirements for the EPAA. 

Assuming continued growth in Iranian ballistic missile capabilities, the EPAA will 

unfold in the following stages over the coming years: 

• Phase 1—2011 timeframe; existing/maturing systems v. SRBM/MRBM threat 

Æ Use ship-based SM–3 Block IA interceptors operating in the Mediterranean 

Sea to provide missile defense coverage for Southern Europe. 

Æ Deploy an AN/TPY–2 sensor in the region to detect, identify and track incoming threats. 

• Phase 2—2015 timeframe; enhanced missile defense systems v. SRBM/MRBM 

threat 

Æ Use the more advanced SM–3 Block IB interceptor, deployed in the Mediterranean Sea and on a land-based site in Southern Europe, to enhance coverage of Southern Europe. 

Æ Begin deploying a distributed network of sea-, land-, and air-based sensors 

to augment the AN/TPY–2 or the Airborne Early Infrared Sensor. 

• Phase 3—2018 timeframe; improved area coverage v. MRBM/IRBM threat 

Æ Use SM–3 Block IIA interceptors, deployed on sea and on two land-based 

sites (this phase adds a second site, which Poland has agreed to host), to provide coverage for all of Europe. 

Æ Continue to deploy forward based sensor(s). 

• Phase 4—2020 timeframe; capability v. potential ICBM threat 

If the ICBM threat evolves: 

Æ Use SM–3 Block IIB interceptors, deployed on two land-based sites, to augment the defense of the U.S. against a potential ICBM threat and protect all 

of Europe. 

Æ Sea-based SM–3 Block IIA would provide surge capacity 

Mr. TURNER. In the analysis supporting the decision on a new four-phased approach, were any cost estimates on the new approach conducted? If so, what are the 

estimated costs of the new four-phased approach? 

General O’REILLY. MDA is currently building the FY11–15 Future Year Defense 

Plan (FYDP) and out-year funding profiles to reflect the new architecture. These 

will be available with the release of PB11. The below chart reflects MDA’s proposed 

plan for FY09 and FY10 RDT&E European Component funding. 

Section 235 of the FY 2010 National Defense Authorization act authorizes MDA 

to use RDT&E funds for the President’s new Phased Adaptive Approach that were 

authorized and appropriated in FY09 and requested in FY10 for the former European Missile Defense program of record, following the submission of a report to Congress from the Secretary of Defense certifying certain conditions. 

FY09 RDT&E Unobligated Funds $M 

European Interceptor Site 173 

European Midcourse Radar 64 
92 

FY09 RDT&E Unobligated Funds $M 

European Communication Support 22 

FY10 RDT&E Budget Request 

European Component 51 

FY09 Unobligated and FY10 Request Total 309 

Current FY10 RDT&E Requirements $M 

Aegis Ashore Development and Test 244 

Systems Engineering 26 

Total Current FY10 RDT&E Required 270 

Mr. TURNER. Given the increased reliance on Aegis ships in the European theater, 

what additional requirements are expected to be placed on the U.S. Navy and what 

impact would this increased reliance have on the Navy’s ability to meet its worldwide missions and needs? 

General O’REILLY. As head of the Missile Defense Agency, I am responsible for 

technical aspects of the new architecture including the development, testing, and 

fielding of the architecture’s components. I defer to my colleagues in the Department 

of the Navy who are responsible for answering questions that concern the Navy’s 

ability to meet its missions. 

Mr. TURNER. NATO’s missile defense architecture efforts to-date assumed that the 

previous approach would be ‘‘linked’’ with other NATO missile defense efforts. What 

is the schedule and plan for revising NATO’s missile defense architecture to incorporate this new approach and, with the U.S. now providing ‘‘more comprehensive’’ 

coverage of Europe, what role and contribution will our European allies have? Does 

the Administration intend to seek NATO support for its new approach similar to 

that expressed in the April 2008 Bucharest Summit declaration? 

General O’REILLY. As head of the Missile Defense Agency, I am responsible for 

technical aspects of the Ballistic Missile Defense System including the development, 

testing, and fielding of the architecture’s components. I defer to my colleagues in 

Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of State who are in a better 

position to respond to questions that have policy or diplomatic implications. 

Mr. TURNER. In the analysis supporting the decision on a new four-phased approach: 

a. What were the specific locations (or are the planned locations) for missile defense assets in Europe, including ship stations and land-basing sites, and interceptor inventories required to provide coverage for each of the four phases? 

b. What level of coverage (e.g., percentage) is provided for Europe in each of the 

four phases? 

General CARTWRIGHT. a. Specific asset locations were not determined during the 

development of the four-phased approach. The flexibility inherent in the approach 

allows for a range of options regarding asset placement and ship stations. Specific 

shore locations will be determined during bilateral and NATO negotiations. Similarly, interceptor inventories were not specified, as these can be adjusted to provide 

the desired capacity as the threat evolves. 

b. Coverage areas vary based on threat missile type and launch site. However, 

NATO strictures direct 100% protection of all member nations from anticipated 

threats and the four-phased approach to missile defense in Europe is designed with 

that goal in mind. 

Phase I, to be deployed in 2011, will use existing missile defense systems to defend against the assessed threat from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. 

Phase I will focus on the protection of Southern Europe by utilizing sea-based Aegis 

missile-defense-capable ships and interceptors (the SM–3 Block IA) and a forwardbased radar that will augment homeland defense capabilities already fielded in 

Alaska and California. 
93 

Phase II, to be deployed in the 2015 timeframe, will field a more advanced interceptor (the SM–3 Block IB) and additional sensors. In addition to sea-based locations, Phase II will include a land-based site in Southeast Europe. 

Phase III, to be deployed in the 2018 timeframe, will improve coverage against 

medium- and intermediate-range threats with a second land-based site and an upgraded Standard Missile-3 (the SM–3 Block IIA), and will extend coverage to all of 

Europe. 

Phase IV, to be deployed in the 2020 timeframe, will provide a capability against 

a potential intercontinental ballistic missile threat to the United States. This phase 

will leverage yet another upgrade to the Standard Missile-3, the Block IIB. 

Mr. TURNER. In the analysis supporting the decision on a new four-phased approach, were any cost estimates on the new approach conducted? If so, what are the 

estimated costs of the new four-phased approach? 

General CARTWRIGHT. The initial stages of the four-phased approach were designed to be met within current FYDP allocations for MDA and the Services. In coordination with the Joint Staff, Military Services, Missile Defense Agency, and other 

missile defense stakeholders, the Department of Defense is currently building next 

year’s budget request. The fiscal year 2011 budget request that will be released to 

Congress in February will include estimated funding profiles through fiscal year 

2015 to reflect the new European missile defense architecture. The below chart reflects MDA’s proposed plan for FY09 and FY10 RDT&E European Component funding. 

Section 235 of the FY 2010 National Defense Authorization act authorizes MDA 

to use RDT&E funds for the President’s new Phased Adaptive Approach that were 

authorized and appropriated in FY09 and requested in FY10 for the former European Missile Defense program of record, following the submission of a report to Congress from the Secretary of Defense certifying certain conditions. 

FY09 RDT&E Unobligated Funds $M 

European Interceptor Site 173 

European Midcourse Radar 64 

European Communication Support 22 

FY10 RDT&E Budget Request 

European Component 51 

FY09 Unobligated and FY10 Request Total 309 

Current FY10 RDT&E Requirements $M 

Aegis Ashore Development and Test 244 

Systems Engineering 26 

Total Current FY10 RDT&E Required 270 

While we are still working through the total estimated costs for the revised European-based missile defense system, we will begin buying many of the components 

in the Administration’s budget request for fiscal year 2011. 

Mr. TURNER. Given the increased reliance on Aegis ships in the European theater, 

what additional requirements are expected to be placed on the U.S. Navy and what 

impact would this increased reliance have on the Navy’s ability to meet its worldwide missions and needs? 

General CARTWRIGHT. The new European missile defense program in no way 

abandons or degrades our commitments to other important Allies around the world. 

In particular, the revised approach in Europe does not compromise the missile defense capabilities provided to our military commanders in the Pacific, where Aegis 

ships and Standard Missile-3s are an integral part of our missile defense architecture. 
94 

As the Department works through the global allocation of missile defense assets 

to meet the Warfighter’s needs, the Military Services, including the Navy, and the 

Combatant Commanders responsible for individual regions around the world are all 

fully involved in the planning for employing these assets. We are also working closely with the Services—in particular the Navy—to ensure that their mission requirements are fully funded. 

Mr. TURNER. Secretary Flournoy and General Cartwright, you both indicated that 

development and testing of the two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) that was 

planned for Poland will continue. For how long (or until what specific milestones) 

does the Department plan to continue development and testing of the two-stage 

GBI? Will it be a hedge should the SM–3 Block IIA or IIB interceptors run into 

problems or delays, and if so, will there be a down-select in the future between the 

two-stage GBI and SM–3 Block IIA or IIB interceptors based on the progress made 

on each? 

General CARTWRIGHT. MDA intends to continue to develop and test the two-stage 

GBI. Future decisions on the program will be informed by the results of those tests. 

The SM–3 program is a separate effort from 2-stage GBI. There are currently no 

plans to make adjustments to the SM–3 development program based on the results 

of 2-stage GBI testing or development, primarily because there is no plan to enter 

into production of 2-stage GBI’s. 

Mr. TURNER. NATO’s missile defense architecture efforts to-date assumed that the 

previous approach would be ‘‘linked’’ with other NATO missile defense efforts. What 

is the schedule and plan for revising NATO’s missile defense architecture to incorporate this new approach and, with the U.S. now providing ‘‘more comprehensive’’ 

coverage of Europe, what role and contribution will our European allies have? Does 

the Administration intend to seek NATO support for its new approach similar to 

that expressed in the April 2008 Bucharest Summit declaration? 

General CARTWRIGHT. The United States will provide Phased Adaptive Approach 

(PAA) capabilities over time and will seek a NATO decision to provide a C2 backbone through expansion of the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 

(ALTBMD) program to link Allies’ missile defense assets. If NATO adopts the mission of missile defense of Allies’ territory and populations, the PAA would be the 

U.S. contribution to that effort. Allies will have opportunities to contribute national 

systems already acquired, or that may be acquired in the future, such as Aegis seabased systems, PATRIOT, MEADs, THAADs additional upper-tier interceptors, sensors, sites for the deployment of missile defense assets, and support or defense functions for PAA assets. The PAA is consistent with the Strasbourg-Kehl tasking to address threats in a prioritized manner and aligns to 2008 and 2009 NATO summit 

declarations, and we therefore anticipate support for the PAA in NATO communique ́

language from the upcoming NATO Foreign Ministerial in December 2009. 

Mr. TURNER. In the analysis supporting the decision on a new four-phased approach: 

a. What were the specific locations (or are the planned locations) for missile defense assets in Europe, including ship stations and land-basing sites, and interceptor inventories required to provide coverage for each of the four phases? 

b. What level of coverage (e.g., percentage) is provided for Europe in each of the 

four phases? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. The Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) is responsive to the 

existing threat and will incorporate relevant technologies quickly and cost-effectively 

to respond to evolving threats. Upon completion of Phases One and Two, the PAA 

will be able to defend NATO members threatened by short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Phase Three will counter the threat from intermediate-range ballistic 

missiles and enhance protection against short- and medium- range ballistic missiles. 

Phase Four will add coverage against the potential future intercontinental ballistic 

missile threat to the United States. 

Details regarding specific locations of Ballistic Missile Defense assets, the required inventory of interceptors, and the level of defensive coverage provided to Europe would need to be provided by the Department of Defense in a closed session. 

Mr. TURNER. In the analysis supporting the decision on a new four-phased approach, were any cost estimates on the new approach conducted? If so, what are the 

estimated costs of the new four-phased approach? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. The Department of Defense is working through the total estimated costs for the four-phased approach, which will be reflected in the President’s 

Budget Request for FY 2011. 

Mr. TURNER. Given the increased reliance on Aegis ships in the European theater, 

what additional requirements are expected to be placed on the U.S. Navy and what 
95 

impact would this increased reliance have on the Navy’s ability to meet its worldwide missions and needs? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. The Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) does not take seabased Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities deployed in the Pacific and redeploy them to Europe. Under the President’s plan, we will substantially increase 

the deployment of proven missile defense capabilities to counter the most likely missile threats. The President’s FY 2010 budget requests increased funding for key missile defense assets to include making six additional Aegis ships BMD-capable. 

Mr. TURNER. NATO’s missile defense architecture efforts to-date assumed that the 

previous approach would be ‘‘linked’’ with other NATO missile defense efforts. What 

is the schedule and plan for revising NATO’s missile defense architecture to incorporate this new approach and, with the U.S. now providing ‘‘more comprehensive’’ 

coverage of Europe, what role and contribution will our European allies have? Does 

the Administration intend to seek NATO support for its new approach similar to 

that expressed in the April 2008 Bucharest Summit declaration? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. At the April 4, 2009 NATO Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl, 

Heads of State and Government tasked NATO to develop recommendations comprising architectural alternatives for a possible NATO missile defense system. They 

also requested an evaluation of the policy, military, and technical work related to 

a possible expanded role of the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense 

(ALTBMD) program beyond the protection of deployed forces to include territorial 

missile defense. This work remains on schedule; responses to these taskings will be 

considered at the Lisbon Summit in 2010. 

We have offered the Phased Adaptive Approach as a U.S. contribution to a potential NATO missile defense effort. At the upcoming NATO Foreign Ministerial on December 3–4, we will seek NATO endorsement of the PAA. We have asked NATO 

members to consider contributing their own missile defense capabilities to a potential missile defense system for the protection of NATO territory and populations. 

Æ