J-S44017-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF : I.O.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.G., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 15 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered November 30, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0001109-2017, 

CP-51-DP-0000832-2016, FID: 51-FN-002865-2013

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.N.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.G., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 17 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered November 30, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000972-2016, 

CP-AP-0001110-2017, FIN: 51-FN-002865-2013

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JULY 27, 2018

M.G. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights 

to her children, I.O.S. and D.N.S., born March 2016 (collectively, Children) 1, 

____________________________________________

1 Children’s older sibling, J.G., is not subject to this appeal.
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pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

2

 After careful review, we affirm.

The family first became involved with the Philadelphia Department of 

Human Services (DHS) in July 2013, following an allegation that Mother had 

unnecessarily performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on her threeweek-old child, J.G. Mother stated that J.G. was bleeding and she was afraid 

he was not breathing. The report averred that Mother had a seizure disorder 

and mental health issues, and that her family was attempting to obtain 

emergency mental health treatment for her. After being discharged from the 

hospital, J.G. was removed from Mother’s care and placed with a paternal 

aunt. In March 2015, Dr. William Russell performed a parenting capacity 

evaluation of Mother.

Children, who are the subject of the instant appeal, subsequently were 

born prematurely and in respiratory distress in March 2016. The day after 

their birth, DHS received a report that: 1) Mother had tested positive for 

phencyclidine (PCP); 2) Mother had been diagnosed with paranoid 

schizophrenia and substance abuse; and 3) Mother was non-compliant with 

prenatal care. The report further specified that Mother was undergoing oneon-one observation in a psychiatric ward as she was experiencing auditory 

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2 J.S. (Father) voluntarily relinquished his parental rights. See N.T., 

11/30/17, at 4. Father is not a party to this appeal, nor did he file a separate

appeal. 
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and visual hallucinations. In April 2016, Mother admitted to DHS that she 

suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and could not care for Children.

In April 2016, DHS obtained an Order for Protective Custody (OPC) for 

Children. They were placed with a maternal aunt and adjudicated dependent 

in May 2016.3 In December 2016, the court ordered Children to remain in 

placement, with Mother allowed supervised visits. However, throughout most 

of the history of this case, Mother has resided in Florida and failed to attend

visits with Children.

In February 2017, the Community Umbrella Agency (CUA) held a Single 

Case Plan (SCP) meeting. The objectives identified for Mother were to: 1) 

continue mental health treatment; 2) comply with all clinical evaluation 

recommendations; 3) attend supervised weekly visits with the Children when 

offered; 4) comply with all court orders; 5) complete parenting classes; 6) 

enter drug and alcohol treatment; and 7) maintain negative random drug 

screens.

Mother’s parental rights to J.G. were terminated in January 2017. In 

November 2017, due to Mother’s failure to meet her objectives, DHS filed a 

petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Children and change their 

permanency goal to adoption. At that time, Children had been in pre-adoptive 

kinship care for over fifteen months.

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3 Children were not placed with Father because he did not have adequate 

housing; he lived next door to Mother and there were concerns that he was 

allowing her to see J.G. and Children unsupervised. See N.T., 11/30/17, at 

6-7.
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In November 2017, the court convened a hearing. DHS presented the 

testimony of Melissa Urrutia, the CUA case manager. See N.T., 11/30/17, at 

2-4. All parties stipulated to DHS’ statement of facts as included in the petition 

to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Id. at 5, 22. Mother was represented 

by counsel and testified on her own behalf. Id. at 3. Children were 

represented by a guardian ad litem (GAL), Jalaine Stokes, Esquire, and legal 

counsel, Jeffrey Bruch, Esquire. Id. at 1. 

Following the conclusion of DHS’ case in chief, the court granted the 

petition pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and 

terminated Mother’s parental rights. The court proceeded to a permanency 

review hearing and entered orders changing Children’s permanency goals to 

adoption.

On December 26, 2017, Mother contemporaneously filed a timely notice 

of appeal and a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The trial court filed its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

opinion on March 8, 2018.

On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of [Mother] pursuant to [23 

Pa.C.S.A. §] 2511(a)(1) where [Mother] presented evidence that 

she made efforts to perform her parental duties.

2. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of [Mother] pursuant to [23 

Pa.C.S.A. §] 2511(a)(2) where Mother presented evidence that 

she made efforts to remedy any incapacity or neglect.
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3. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of [Mother] pursuant to [23 

Pa.C.S.A. §] 2511(a)(5) and (a)(8) where evidence was provided 

to establish that the children were removed from the care of 

Mother, however Mother is currently capable of caring for the 

children and the conditions which led to removal have been 

remedied.

4. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of [Mother] pursuant to [23 

Pa.C.S.A. §] 2511(b) where evidence was presented that Mother 

has a parental bond with the children that would be detrimental 

to sever.

Mother’s Brief at 8.4

We review cases involving the termination of parental rights according 

to the following standards.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted).

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4 Mother challenged the goal change to adoption in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

Statement, 11/3/17, at 1. However, Mother appears to have abandoned this 

claim on appeal and does not discuss it in her brief. Accordingly, she has 

waived this claim on appeal. See Krebs v. United Refining Co. of 

Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006); see also Pa.R.A.P. 

2101; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b)-(c). 
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The court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). When reviewing a termination petition, 

the trial court must engage in a bifurcated analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). To 

affirm, we need only agree with any one of the subsections of 2511(a), as well 

as subsection (b), to affirm. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc). Instantly, we focus our analysis on Subsection (a)(2) and 

(b). 

The relevant sections of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 provide that:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

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(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party

must prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes 

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” 

See In Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa. Super. 1998). The 

grounds for termination are not limited to affirmative misconduct, but concern 

parental incapacity that cannot be remedied. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 

1117 (Pa. Super. 2010). Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward 

the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties. Id.

Mother claims that the court erred in terminating her rights under 

Section 2511(a)(2) because she has engaged in mental health treatment in 

Florida, although she admittedly did not provide documentation to the court. 

See Mother’s Brief at 17-18. Mother additionally claims the court failed to 

consider that with further treatment and therapy, she “may have the potential 

to have the capacity” to provide safety and permanency to Children. Id.
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Aside from Mother’s self-serving testimony, the record is devoid of any 

evidence that Mother received mental health treatment in Florida. Indeed, 

the evidence showed otherwise, as the CUA case manager and Mother herself

testified that 1) Mother was not compliant with her objectives, including 

mental health treatment, random drug screens, or attending a substance 

abuse program; 2) Mother visited Children only once in the last year, and her 

only explanation was that she had moved to Florida; 3) Mother did not call to 

inquire about Children or perform any parental duties for Children; and 4) 

although Mother had moved back to Philadelphia one month prior to the 

hearing, she had not visited Children or received substance abuse treatment. 

See N.T., 11/3/17, at 23-29. 

The parenting capacity evaluation, performed in March 2015 and

introduced into the record at the termination hearing, reflects numerous

concerns. Dr. William Russell noted that Mother has a family support system,

stable housing, and has expressed a willingness to seek full time employment. 

See DHS Exhibit 8, at 10. However, at the time of the evaluation, Dr. Russell 

did not recommend reunification due to Mother’s “inconsistency in treatment, 

following prescribed medication protocols, endorsement of positive symptoms 

of psychosis, chronic exposure to domestic violence, and lack of understanding 

regarding ongoing DHS involvement.” Id. Further, because her symptoms 

are chronic and often difficult to treat, and because Mother did not arrange 

treatment for her neurological disorder, it was Dr. Russell’s opinion that 

Mother had not, and likely would not, develop the capacity to provide for 
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Children’s safety and permanency in the future. Id. Significantly, at the time 

of the hearing in November 2017, over two and a half years later, Mother’s 

incapacity had not changed. See N.T., 11/30/17, at 20-22.

Accordingly, the trial court properly found by competent, clear, and 

convincing evidence that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), as her continued incapacity caused Children 

to be without essential parental care, and the causes could not be remedied. 

See Lilley, 719 A.2d at 330; Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1117.

Next, we must consider Children’s needs and welfare pursuant to 

Subsection 2511(b). See Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). “In this 

context, the court must take into account whether a bond exists between child 

and parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary 

and beneficial relationship.” Id. The court is not required to use expert 

testimony, and social workers and caseworkers may offer evaluations as well. 

Id. Ultimately, the concern is the needs and welfare of a child. Id. Where 

there is no evidence of a bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable 

to infer that no bond exists. In re: K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa. Super. 

2008).

We have noted:

[b]efore granting a petition to terminate parental rights, it is 

imperative that a trial court carefully consider the intangible 

dimension of the needs and welfare of a child—the love, comfort, 

security, and closeness—entailed in a parent-child relationship, as 

well as the tangible dimension. Continuity of relationships is also 

important to a child, for whom severance of close parental ties is 
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usually extremely painful. The trial court, in considering what 

situation would best serve the child[ren]’s needs and welfare, 

must examine the status of the natural parental bond to consider 

whether terminating the natural parents’ rights would destroy 

something in existence that is necessary and beneficial.

Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (quoting In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1202 (Pa. Super. 

2000)). 

Here, the trial court accepted as credible the social worker’s testimony 

that Mother had seen Children only once in the past year, and that she had 

moved to Florida while Children remained in Pennsylvania. See N.T., 

11/30/17, at 22-24. Children had been in care for their entire lives. Id. at 

26. Ms. Urrutia opined that it was in Children’s best interests to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights and change their permanency goals to adoption

because 1) Mother was no closer to reunification than she had been when 

Children were placed; 2) there would be no irreparable harm to Children; 3) 

Children were healthy and thriving in their placement; and 4) Children were 

in kinship care with a foster parent who wished to adopt them along with their 

older brother, J.G. Id. at 26-27. On this record, indicating that there was no 

bond between Mother and Children, clear and convincing evidence supports 

the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights with respect to Section 

2511(b), where adoption would best serve Children’s needs and welfare. See

Z.P., 994 A.2d at 11126-27. 

For all of the above reasons, we affirm the termination of Mother’s 

parental rights to Children.

Orders affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/27/18