[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13044

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

SHAQUILLE KIERAN ALLEN, 

Petitioner, 

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Agency No. A063-101-734

____________________

USCA11 Case: 23-13044 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2024 Page: 1 of 5
2 Opinion of the Court 23-13044

Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Shaquille Allen petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) affirmance of the Immigration Judge’s 

(“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), 

and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture 

and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). He admits that his petition 

was untimely filed but argues that we should review the petition 

anyway because he failed to receive a copy of the BIA’s decision 

and a hurricane prevented him from timely filing. He also moves 

to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The government moves for 

summary disposition, arguing that this Court should dismiss Allen’s petition as untimely under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). It also moves 

to stay the briefing schedule. 

We determine de novo whether we have subject matter jurisdiction. Guzman-Munoz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 733 F.3d 1311, 1313 

(11th Cir. 2013). “Federal courts are obligated to inquire into subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.” 

Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 881 F.3d 860, 866 (11th Cir. 2018) 

(quotation marks omitted). 

USCA11 Case: 23-13044 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2024 Page: 2 of 5
23-13044 Opinion of the Court 3

A petition for review of an order of removal must be filed 

no later than “30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” 

INA § 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). An order of removal is final 

when the BIA affirms the order or when the time to appeal the order to the BIA expires, whichever is earlier. INA § 101(a)(47)(B), 8 

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). 

Prior to 1996, § 1105a(a)(1) governed the time to file a petition for review, providing that a petition “may be filed not later 

than 90 days after the date of the issuance of the final deportation 

order, or, in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony . . . , not later than 30 days after the issuance of such order.” 

INA § 106(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(1) (1995). The statute also required that review of an order regarding a motion to reconsider or 

reopen be consolidated with the review of the underlying agency 

order. Id. § 1105a(a)(6). 

In Stone v. INS, the Supreme Court declined to infer from 

§ 1105a(a)(6)’s consolidation requirement that a motion for reconsideration of a deportation order suspended the order’s finality. 

514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995). It reasoned that “[j]udicial review provisions” like § 1105a(a) “are jurisdictional in nature and must be construed with strict fidelity to their terms.” Id. The Court explained 

that “[t]his is all the more true of statutory provisions specifying 

the timing of review, for those time limits are, as we have often 

stated, mandatory and jurisdictional, and are not subject to equitable tolling.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted) (citing 

Cheng Fan Kwok v. I.N.S., 392 U.S. 206, 212 (1968) (“Section 106(a) 

USCA11 Case: 23-13044 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2024 Page: 3 of 5
4 Opinion of the Court 23-13044

is intended exclusively to prescribe and regulate a portion of the 

jurisdiction of the federal courts. As a jurisdictional statute, it must 

be construed both with precision and with fidelity to the terms by 

which Congress has expressed its wishes.”). We have relied on 

Stone in stating that the deadline in § 1252(b)(1) is also jurisdictional 

and not subject to equitable tolling. Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 371 

F.3d 771, 773 n.3 (11th Cir. 2004). 

In 2006, the Supreme Court adopted the clear-statement 

rule, holding that a statute is jurisdictional only if clearly indicated. 

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 502 (2006). The Supreme 

Court applied the clear-statement rule, in Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, in determining whether the exhaustion requirement in 

§ 1252(d)(1) is jurisdictional. 598 U.S. 411, 415-17 (2023). It concluded that, because exhaustion requirements are usually claims 

processing rules and the statute did not specify any jurisdictional 

bar, § 1252(d)(1) is not jurisdictional. Id. at 417-19. It held that 

Stone could not be read to establish that the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional because it predated Arbaugh and did not address the exhaustion requirement. Id. at 421-22. 

Under the prior panel precedent rule, we must follow a prior 

binding precedent “unless and until it is overruled by this [C]ourt 

en banc or by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Martinez, 606 

F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). As to 

subsequent Supreme Court decisions, a later panel may depart 

from an earlier decision based on an intervening Supreme Court 

decision only if the intervening decision is “clearly on point.” 

USCA11 Case: 23-13044 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2024 Page: 4 of 5
23-13044 Opinion of the Court 5

Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 496 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 

2007) (quotation omitted). Therefore, “that the reasoning of an intervening high court decision is at odds with that of our prior decision is no basis for a panel to depart from our prior decision.” Id. 

We lack jurisdiction to consider Allen’s petition because it is

untimely, as he filed the petition more than 30 days after the time 

to appeal the BIA’s August 1 ruling expired. INA § 242(b)(1), 8 

U.S.C. 1252(b)(1); Dakane, 399 F.3d at 1272 n.3. Under the prior 

panel precedent rule, we are obligated to follow Dakane because 

Santos-Zacaria is not clearly on point, as it examined § 1252(d)(1). 

Townsend, 496 F.3d at 1284; Dakane, 399 F.3d at 1272 n.3; Santos-Zacaria, 598 U.S. at 417-19, 421-22. That the Supreme Court’s 

reasoning in Santos-Zacaria may be at odds with our reasoning in 

Dakane due to its reliance on Stone is no basis to depart from Dakane. Townsend, 496 F.3d at 1284. Notably, the Supreme Court 

has not overruled either Dakane or Stone. See Stone, 514 U.S. at 

405; Dakane, 371 F.3d at 773 n.3. While Allen states that he did not 

receive a copy of the BIA’s decision and a hurricane prevented him 

from timely filing his petition, § 1252(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling. Dakane, 399 F.3d at 1272 n.3. 

Accordingly, we DISMISS the petition as untimely. Because 

we lack jurisdiction, we DENY as moot the government’s motions 

for summary disposition and to stay the briefing schedule and Allen’s motion to proceed IFP. 

DISMISSED. 

USCA11 Case: 23-13044 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2024 Page: 5 of 5