18 April 2011

Special Operations

Joint Publication 3-05
i 

PREFACE 

1. Scope 

This publication provides overarching doctrine for special operations and the 

employment and support of special operations forces across the range of military operations. 

2. Purpose 

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other 

joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and 

training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their 

appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC 

from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most 

appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication apply to the Joint Staff, commanders of 

combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate 

components of these commands, and the Services. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate 

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of 

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of 

a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine 

and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the 

United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s 

doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and 

doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

 WILLIAM E. GORTNEY 

 Vice Admiral, USN 

 Director, Joint Staff 
Preface

ii JP 3-05

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UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER 

7701 TAMPA POINT BOULEVARD 

MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5323

iii 

Joint Publication (JP) 3-05 Joint Special Operations is the culmination of a major 

collaborative effort within the joint community. This publication has captured our best 

characterization yet of the functions, organization, employment, and synchronization of 

Special Operations Forces (SOF). 

USSOCOM is responsible for the development of special operations doctrine as 

assigned in US Code, Title 10, and DoD Directive 5100.01. JP 3-05 and the five other joint 

publications for which USSOCOM is designated as the lead agent are fundamental to this 

effort. USSOCOM is also developing SOF-specific doctrine, mirroring the responsibilities 

of the military departments to develop service-specific doctrine. 

Joint Special Operations doctrine provides the foundation for common understanding 

of key terms and concepts that help SOF work effectively with the joint force, partner 

nations, and other stakeholder agencies. While recognizing that no published doctrine 

exactly matches operational circumstances, this document is provided as a primary reference 

to guide the Joint Force Commander’s employment of SOF. 

ERIC T. OLSON 

Admiral, U.S. Navy 
Memo 

iv JP 3-05 

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v 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-05, DATED 17 DECEMBER 2003 

• Subsumes sections of special operations and the principles of war, special 

operations and the principles of military operations other than war, and the nature 

of special operations into one discussion of special operations across the range of 

military operations. 

• Discusses the following as part of command and control of special operations forces 

(SOF): SOF as the lead for a joint task force, integration and interoperability of 

conventional forces and SOF, interorganizational coordination, and multinational 

coordination. 

• Introduces the concept Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) through 

which United States Special Operations Command will present all theater SOF 

under one special operations commander. 

• Incorporates a stand-alone section on geospatial information and services support 

of SOF into a general discussion of support considerations. 

• Adds sections on operational contract support, host-nation support, protection, 

maritime support, information operations support, and multinational support. 

• Deletes an appendix on SOF education and training. 

• Implements the change from the term “psychological operations” (PSYOP) to 

“military information support operations” (MISO). 

• Revises and updates numerous definitions in accordance with current directives 

and practice. 

• Deletes discussion of SOF truths. 

• Reflects the development of a United States Marine Corps SOF capability. 
Summary of Changes 

vi JP 3-05 

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vii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... ix 

CHAPTER I 

OVERVIEW OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS 

 Introduction ................................................................................................................ I-1 

 Special Operations ..................................................................................................... I-1 

 Special Operations Across the Range of Military Operations ................................... I-2 

CHAPTER II 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND THEIR CORE ACTIVITIES 

 Introduction ...............................................................................................................II-1 

 Designated Special Operations Forces .....................................................................II-1 

 Characteristics of Special Operations Forces ...........................................................II-2 

 Special Operations Core Activities ...........................................................................II-5 

CHAPTER III 

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 

 Introduction ............................................................................................................. III-1 

 Assignment of Special Operations Forces .............................................................. III-2 

 Command and Control of Special Operations Forces in Theater ........................... III-4 

 Special Operations Forces as the Lead for a Joint Task Force ............................. III-10 

 Integration and Interoperability of Conventional Forces and 

Special Operations Forces .................................................................................... III-11 

 Coordination and Liaison Elements ...................................................................... III-12 

 Joint Special Operations Area .............................................................................. III-13 

 Interorganizational Coordination .......................................................................... III-15 

 Multinational Coordination .................................................................................. III-15 

CHAPTER IV 

SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 

 Introduction ............................................................................................................. IV-1

 Intelligence Support ................................................................................................ IV-1 

 Operational Contract Support ................................................................................. IV-3 

 Host-Nation Support ............................................................................................... IV-4 

 Logistic Support ...................................................................................................... IV-4 

 Health Service Support ........................................................................................... IV-5 

 Communications Systems Support ......................................................................... IV-7 

 Public Affairs Support ............................................................................................ IV-8 

 Combat Camera Support ......................................................................................... IV-8 

 Legal Support .......................................................................................................... IV-9 
Table of Contents 

viii JP 3-05 

 Protection ................................................................................................................ IV-9 

 Fire Support .......................................................................................................... IV-10 

 Air Support ........................................................................................................... IV-10 

 Maritime Support .................................................................................................. IV-10 

 Space Support ....................................................................................................... IV-11 

 Meteorological and Oceanographic Support ....................................................... .IV-12 

 Cyberspace Support .............................................................................................. IV-13 

 Information Operations Support ........................................................................... IV-13 

 Multinational Support ........................................................................................... IV-15 

APPENDIX 

A References ................................................................................................. A-1 

B Administrative Instructions ........................................................................B-1 

GLOSSARY 

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................. GL-1 

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-5 

FIGURES 

I-1 Range of Military Operations ...................................................................... I-3 

II-1 Five Special Operations Forces Mission Criteria .......................................II-4 

II-2 Special Operations Core Activities ............................................................II-6 

II-3 Characteristics of Foreign Internal Defense .............................................II-11 

II-4 Civil Affairs Operations Relationships ....................................................II-18 

III-1 Command and Control of Special Operations Forces in Theater ............. III-3 

III-2 Notional Joint Force Special Operations Component 

Command and Control ............................................................................. III-5 

III-3 Notional Special Operations Forces Command and Control ................... III-8 

III-4 Notional Special Operations Liaison Element Functions ...................... III-14 

IV-1 Examples of Special Operations Forces Intelligence Requirements ........ IV-2 

IV-2 Strategic Special Operations Forces Patient Movement .......................... IV-7 

IV-3 Space-Based Support to Special Operations Forces .............................. IV-12 
ix 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

 Provides an Overview of Joint Special Operations

 Describes Special Operations Forces and Their Core Activities

 Describes Command and Control of Joint Special Operations 

 Discusses the Support of Joint Special Operations 

Overview of Special Operations 

United States Special 

Operations Command 

deploys and sustains special 

operations forces (SOF) to 

facilitate operations with 

conventional forces (CF), to 

promote synergy among all 

SOF elements, and to 

provide more efficient 

command and control (C2) 

structures. 

Special operations (SO) differ from conventional 

operations in degree of physical and political risk, 

operational techniques, modes of employment, and 

dependence on detailed operational intelligence and 

indigenous assets. SO are conducted in all 

environments, but are particularly well suited for denied 

and politically sensitive environments. SO can be 

tailored to achieve not only military objectives through 

application of special operations forces (SOF) 

capabilities for which there are no broad conventional 

force requirements, but also to support the application 

of the diplomatic, informational, and economic 

instruments of national power. 

Special Operations and Their Core Activities 

Designated SOF SOF are those forces identified in Title 10, United 

States Code (USC), Section 167 or those units or forces 

that have since been designated as SOF by Secretary of 

Defense (SecDef). Generally, SOF are under the 

combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) 

of the Commander, United States Special Operations 

Command (CDRUSSOCOM), or the respective 

geographic combatant commander (GCC) to which they 

are assigned. SOF are those Active Component and 

Reserve Component forces of the Services specifically 

organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support 

SO. 

Characteristics of SOF SOF are inherently joint. When employed, SOF are 

presented with their command and control (C2) 
Executive Summary 

x JP 3-05 

structure intact, which facilitates their integration into 

joint force plans, retains cohesion, and provides a 

control mechanism to address SO specific concerns and 

coordinate their activities with other components and 

supporting commands. 

SOF are distinct from conventional forces (CF).

Most SOF personnel undergo a careful selection 

process and mission-specific training beyond basic 

military skills to achieve entry-level SO skills. 

SOF Capabilities. SOF can be formed into versatile, 

self-contained teams that provide a joint force 

commander (JFC) with a flexible force capable of 

operating in ambiguous and swiftly changing scenarios. 

SOF are not a substitute for CF. In most cases SOF 

are neither trained, organized, nor equipped to conduct 

sustained conventional combat operations and, 

therefore, should not be substituted for CF that are able 

to effectively execute that mission. 

Most SO missions require non-SOF support. 

Five SOF Mission Criteria It must be an appropriate mission or activity for SOF. 

The mission or activities should support the JFC’s 

campaign or operation plan, or special activities. 

Mission or tasks must be operationally feasible, 

approved, and fully coordinated. 

Required resources must be available to execute and 

support the SOF mission. 

The expected outcome of the mission must justify the 

risks.

Special Operations Core 

Activities 

SOF are specifically organized, trained, and equipped 

to accomplish the 11 core activities: direct action, 

special reconnaissance, counterproliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction, counterterrorism, unconventional 

warfare, foreign internal defense, security force 

assistance, counterinsurgency, information operations 

(IO), military information support operations (MISO), 

and civil affairs operations. 
Executive Summary 

xi 

Command and Control of Special Operations Forces 

C2 of SOF normally should 

be executed within a SOF 

chain of command. 

SOF may be assigned to either CDRUSSOCOM or a 

GCC. The identification of a C2 organizational 

structure for SOF should depend upon specific 

objectives, security requirements, and the operational 

environment. 

Liaison Liaison among all components of the joint force and 

SOF, however they are organized, is vital for effective 

SOF employment, as well as coordination, 

deconfliction, synchronization, and the prevention of 

fratricide. 

SOF in the United States Unless otherwise directed by SecDef, all SOF based in 

the continental United States are assigned to United 

States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and 

under the COCOM of CDRUSSOCOM. USSOCOM is 

a unified command (Title 10, USC, Section 167) that 

has the responsibilities of a functional combatant 

command and responsibilities similar to a Military 

Department in areas unique to SO. 

SOF in Theater SOF assigned to a GCC are under the COCOM of the 

respective GCC. A GCC normally exercises 

operational control of all assigned and attached SOF 

through the commander, theater special operations 

command (CDRTSOC) or a subordinate JFC. The 

CDRTSOC also may be designated as the joint force 

special operations component commander (JFSOCC) 

by the GCC. 

Theater Special Operations 

Command 

The theater special operations command (TSOC) is the 

primary theater SOF organization capable of 

performing broad continuous missions uniquely suited 

to SOF capabilities. The TSOC is also the primary 

mechanism by which a GCC exercises C2 over SOF. 

SOF Operational C2 The JFSOCC is the commander within a unified 

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task 

force (JTF) responsible to the establishing commander 

for making recommendations on the proper 

employment of assigned, attached, and/or made 

available for tasking SOF and assets; planning and 

coordinating SO; or accomplishing such operational 

missions as may be assigned. The JFSOCC is given the 
Executive Summary 

xii JP 3-05 

authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks 

assigned. 

A joint special operations task force (JSOTF) is a 

JTF composed of SO units from more than one Service, 

formed to carry out specific SO or prosecute SO in 

support of a theater campaign or other operations. A 

JSOTF may have CF tasked to support the conduct of 

specific missions. 

SOF Subordinate C2 Organizations. A JSOTF, by its 

joint designation, has SOF from more than one of the 

Services: Army SOF, Navy SOF, Air Force SOF, or 

Marine Corps SOF, and these designations typically 

denote their forces and subordinate units, not a 

headquarters. 

SOF as the Lead for a Joint 

Task Force 

Such a construct calls for a 

SOF joint force 

commander, not as a joint 

force special operations 

component commander 

/commander joint special 

operations task force, but as 

the commander, joint task 

force. 

In some cases, a C2 construct based on SO expertise 

and influence may be better suited to the overall 

conduct of an operation (i.e., superiority in the 

aggregate of applicable capabilities, experience, 

specialized equipment, and knowledge of and 

relationships with relevant populations), with the JTF 

being built around a core SO staff. Such a JTF has both 

SOF and CF and the requisite ability to command and 

control them. SOF and their unique capabilities are 

particularly well-suited for such complex situations 

because of their regional familiarity, language and 

cultural awareness, and understanding of the social 

dynamics within and among the relevant populations 

(i.e., tribal politics, social networks, religious 

influences, and customs and mores).

Integration and 

Interoperability of CF and 

SOF 

Effective SOF-CF integration facilitates the 

synchronizing of military operations in time, space, and 

purpose; maximizes the capability of the joint force; 

allows the JFC to optimize the principles of joint 

operations in planning and execution; and may produce 

an operating tempo and battle rhythm with which the 

enemy is unable to cope. It may also reduce the 

potential for fratricide. Accordingly, focus should be 

placed on three key areas: operations, command 

relationships, and liaisons. 

Coordination and Liaison 

Elements 

SOF commanders have specific elements that facilitate 

liaison and coordination. They include the special 
Executive Summary 

xiii 

operations command and control element (SOCCE) to 

command and control, and coordinate SOF activities 

with CF; the special operations liaison element (SOLE) 

to provide liaison to the joint force air component 

commander (JFACC) or appropriate Service component 

air C2 facility; and SOF liaison officers placed in a 

variety of locations as necessary to coordinate, 

synchronize, and deconflict SO within the operational 

area. 

Joint Special Operations 

Area 

The JFC may establish a joint special operations 

area (JSOA), which is a restricted area of land, sea, 

and airspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of a 

joint SO force to conduct SO activities. When a JSOA 

is designated, the JFSOCC (or commander, joint special 

operations task force [CDRJSOTF]) is the supported 

commander within the designated JSOA. 

Interorganizational 

Coordination 

Interagency coordination is as integral to SO as it is 

conventional operations, and fostering personal 

relationships between SOF commanders and 

interorganizational leaders and professional relations 

between both staffs should be a routine objective during 

military engagement activities. 

Multinational Coordination SOF operate with multinational forces, i.e., forces 

belonging to a coalition or alliance, on a routine and 

recurring basis. US SOF assess, train, advise, assist, 

and operate with a plethora of multinational foreign SO 

units. 

Support Considerations for Special Operations Forces 

SOF support must be 

tailored to specific mission 

requirements, yet flexible 

enough to respond to 

changing employment 

parameters. 

The joint character of SO requires support 

arrangements across Service lines with emphasis on 

unique support required in order to sustain independent 

and remote operations. Further, SOF must be able to 

exploit information derived from the full range of 

available multinational, national, theater, and tactical 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support 

systems. 

Intelligence Support All-source, fused intelligence is vital in identifying 

relevant targets, course of action development, and 

mission planning/execution. SO require detailed 
Executive Summary 

xiv JP 3-05 

planning, often by relatively small units. Consequently, 

intelligence requirements are normally greater in scope 

and depth than that of CF. Joint intelligence preparation 

of the operational environment provides the foundation 

for SO intelligence production. 

Operational Contract 

Support 

The continual introduction of high-tech equipment, 

coupled with force structure and manning limitations, 

and high operating tempo mean that SOF may be 

augmented with contracted support, including 

contingency contractor employees and all tiers of 

subcontractor employees who are specifically 

authorized through their contract to accompany the 

force and have protected status in accordance with 

international conventions (i.e., contractors authorized to 

accompany the force). 

Host-Nation Support Host-nation support (HNS) is that civil and/or military 

assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within 

its territory based on agreements mutually concluded 

between nations. For SO, HNS must be weighed 

against operations security considerations, mission 

requirements and duration, and the operational 

environment. 

Logistic Support GCCs and their Service component commanders, in 

coordination with the CDRTSOC, are responsible for 

ensuring that effective and responsive support systems 

are developed and provided for assigned/attached SOF. 

Health Service Support SOF teams frequently operate in remote areas and 

therefore, are exposed to health threats not normally 

seen in the other areas of the respective host nations. 

Point-to-point movement to designated Medical 

Treatment Facilities is standard while medical 

regulating and strategic aeromedical evacuation might 

be required and should be part of the contingency 

planning process. 

Communications Systems 

Support 

Communications systems support to SOF normally are 

global, secure, and jointly interoperable. It must be 

flexible so that it can be tailored to specific SO 

missions and it must add value to the SOF operational 

capability. SOF must be able to communicate 

anywhere and anytime using the full range of national 

capabilities required to support the mission. 
Executive Summary 

xv 

Public Affairs Support The diplomatic and political sensitivity of many SO 

mandates that thorough and accurate public affairs 

guidance be developed during the operational planning 

stage and approved for use in advance of most SO. 

Combat Camera Support Combat camera provides still and video documentary 

products that support MISO and other SO missions. 

Many combat camera teams supporting SOF are 

specially equipped with night vision and digital image 

transmission capabilities. 

Legal Support SO missions frequently involve a unique set of complex 

issues. There are federal laws and executive orders, 

federal agency publications and directives, the law of 

armed conflict, and rules of engagement that may affect 

SO missions as well as the SO joint planning and 

targeting processes. 

Protection Protection focuses on conserving the SOF fighting 

potential, whether operating independently, or as part of 

a larger joint force in a major operation/campaign. For 

force protection, typically each GCC has tactical 

control of US forces in their area of responsibility. 

Fire Support SOF may require long-range, surface-based, joint fire 

support in remote locations or for targets well beyond 

the land, maritime, and amphibious operational force 

area of operations. SOF liaison elements coordinate 

fire support through both external and SOF channels. 

SOF liaison elements (e.g., SOCCE and SOLE) provide 

SOF expertise to coordinate, synchronize, and 

deconflict SOF fire support. 

Air Support In addition to their organic air capabilities for 

infiltration, exfiltration, resupply, and precision fire 

support, SOF often require conventional air support that 

requires timely and detailed planning and coordination. 

Air support is typically provided by the JFACC (or an 

Air Force component commander), and the 

JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF normally provides a SOLE to the 

JFACC at the joint air operations center. 

Maritime Support Maritime support is provided by the joint force 

maritime component commander, the Navy component 

commander, and/or the Marine Corps component 
Executive Summary 

xvi JP 3-05 

commander. Maritime support includes fire support, 

seabasing operations, deception, and deterrence. 

Space Support Space based support to SOF can include: precision 

navigation and/or geopositioning, global 

communications, global intelligence collection, 

surveillance and warning, meteorological support, 

imagery for geospatial support and targeting, blue force 

tracking data, and denying adversary use of space-based 

capabilities. 

Meteorological and 

Oceanographic Support 

This [meteorological and oceanographic support] 

information can be used by the commander to choose 

the best windows of opportunity to execute, support, 

and sustain specific SOF operations. 

Cyberspace Support Cyberspace operations in support of SO can often be 

conducted remotely, thus reducing the SOF footprint 

and contributing to freedom of action within a given 

operational area. 

Information Operations 

Support 

IO is a SOF core activity, and also integral to the 

successful execution of many SO. SO may require 

support from any combination of core, supporting, or 

related IO capabilities, so the JFC’s IO cell should 

include a SOF representative. 

Multinational Support Multinational support to SOF complements HNS and 

depends on mission and capability requirements. 

Common examples include information and 

intelligence sharing; providing liaison teams and 

support to planning efforts; materiel assistance; basing, 

access, and overflight permission; humanitarian 

assistance; and linguists and cultural advice and 

awareness. 

CONCLUSION 

This publication provides overarching doctrine for SO 

and the employment and support of SOF across the 

range of military operations.
I-1

CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for the Services, 

combatant commanders(CCDRs), and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) to prepare

for and conduct special operations (SO). It describes those military operations and provides 

general guidance for military commanders to employ and execute command and control (C2) 

of special operations forces (SOF) assigned/attached to a geographic combatant commander 

(GCC), subordinate unified commander, or a commander, joint task force (CJTF). Other 

specific SO operational guidelines are provided in Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1, Joint 

Special Operations Task Force Operations; JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support

Operations, JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, and JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

Additionally, SOF maintain core competencies in counterinsurgency (COIN) and 

counterterrorism (CT) operations that are discussed in detail in JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency 

Operations, and JP 3-26, Counterterrorism. This chapter introduces SO, the nature of SO, 

and how they relate to the principles of joint operations and the range of military operations. 

Chapter II, “Special Operations Forces and Their Core Activities,” focuses on the SOF and 

particularly the 11 SOF core activities. Chapter III, “Command and Control of Special 

Operations Forces,” discusses C2 and coordination, and Chapter IV, “Support 

Considerations for Special Operations Forces,” outlines numerous support considerations for 

SOF.

2. Special Operations

SO are conducted in all environments, but are particularly well suited for denied and 

politically sensitive environments. SO can be tailored to achieve not onlymilitary objectives 

through application of SOF capabilities for which there are no broad conventional force 

requirements, but also to support the application of the diplomatic, informational, and 

economic instruments of national power. SO are typically low visibility or clandestine 

operations. SO are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be 

conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces (CF) or 

other government agencies (OGAs), or host nations (HNs)/partner nations (PNs), and may 

include operations with or through indigenous, insurgent, and/or irregular forces. SO differ 

“Today we see a bewildering diversity of separatist wars, ethnic and religious 

violence, coups d’état, border disputes, civil upheavals, and terrorist attacks, 

pushing waves of poverty-stricken, war-ridden immigrants (and hordes of drug 

traffickers as well) across national boundaries. In the increasingly wired global 

economy, many of these seemingly small conflicts trigger strong secondary effects 

in surrounding (and even distant) countries. Thus a “many small wars” scenario is 

compelling military planners in many armies to look afresh at what they call 

“special operations” or “special forces”—the niche warriors of tomorrow.”

Alvin and Heidi Toffler

War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century 1993
Chapter I

I-2 JP 3-05

from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, 

modes of employment, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous 

assets.

a. SO are often conducted at great distances from major operating bases with operating 

units widely separated in a distributed manner across the operational area(s). SOF employ 

sophisticated communications systems and special means of infiltration, support, and 

exfiltration to penetrate and return from hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.

b. SO typically are an integral part of theater campaigns. While SO can be conducted 

unilaterally in support of specific theater or national objectives, the majority of SO are 

designed and conducted to enhance the likelihood of success of the overall theater campaign. 

SO must complement—not compete with nor be a substitute for—conventional operations.

c. The successful conduct of SO rely on individuals and small units proficient in 

specialized skills trained to be applied with adaptability, improvisation, and innovation. 

While organized for independent operations, SOF effectiveness can often be enhanced when 

SOF are supported by non-SOF organizations. SO normally require precise tactical-level 

planning, detailed intelligence, and knowledge of the culture(s) and language(s) of the areas 

in which the missions are to be conducted. Rigorous training and mission rehearsals are 

integral to the conduct of most SO. SO conducted by small-size SOF units with unique 

capabilities and self-sufficiency (for short periods of time) provide the United States with 

additional options for feasible and appropriate military responses. These responses may 

result in lower degrees of political liability or risk of escalation than are normally associated 

with employment of larger and more visible CF.

d. SO can be conducted directly against an adversary in a single engagement,such as 

direct action (DA) against critical communication nodes, or indirectly, by organizing, 

training, and supporting insurgent forces through unconventional warfare (UW) against a 

hostile government or occupying force, or supporting an HN force in support of a friendly 

government through foreign internal defense (FID) and/or security force assistance (SFA).

Other indirect methods include military information support operations(MISO) to influence 

the adversary military or local civilian populace and civil affairs operations (CAO) to 

provide essential support to a JFC responsible for civil-military operations (CMO). The 

results of SO are consistently disproportionate to the size of the units involved.

e. Deployed SOF for some mission profiles will require key CF enablers to maximize 

their operational effectiveness. These enablers are categorized by battlefield operating 

systems: maneuver; mobility, countermobility, and survivability; fire support; air defense; 

intelligence; combat service support; and C2. These CF enablers that enhance SOF 

capabilities vary by the SOF mission requirements and the SOF disposition in relation to CF 

(varying in scope from collocation with CF to complete isolation).

3. Special Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

a. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, states the nature of joint operations requires a JFC to 

organize and employ joint forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives. Each joint 
Overview of Special Operations

I-3

operation (and special operation) has a unique political and strategic context, so the balance 

and nature of military activities applied will vary according to the unique aspects of the 

mission and operational environment. 

b. Military operations, to include SO, vary in scope, purpose, and combat intensity. A 

fundamental construct that provides context to the intensity of conflict that may occur during 

joint military activities is the range of military operations: from recurring military 

engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities (typically no conflict to lowintensity conflict), to crisis response and limited contingency operations (low to high), and if 

necessary, to major operations and campaigns (high intensity) as depicted in Figure I-1.

(1) Use of SOF and SO, concurrent with CF capabilities in military engagement, 

security cooperation, and deterrence activities help shape the operational environment and 

keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed 

conflict, which serves to maintain US global influence.

(2) SOF, whether employed independently or complementing CF, participate in 

many of the missions associated with crisis response and limited contingencies, such as 

CMO, FID, and SFA.

(3) Individual major operations and campaigns often contribute to a larger, longterm effort (e.g., Operation ENDURING FREEDOM). For those large scale efforts, SOF 

and SO are typically part of the shaping of the operational environment, and may conduct 

significant activities (e.g., CT and COIN) as part of the campaign or operational effort. The 

nature of the security environment may require US joint forces, including SOF, to engage in 

several types of operations simultaneously across the range of military operations. For these 

missions, commanders synchronize offensive, defensive, and stability operations and 

activities as necessary to achieve objectives.

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Military 

Engagement, 

Security 

Cooperation, 

and Deterrence

Crisis 

Response and 

Limited 

Contingency 

Operations

Major 

Operations 

and 

Campaigns

Figure I-1. Range of Military Operations
Chapter I

I-4 JP 3-05

c. The commander for any particular operation determines the emphasis to be placed on 

each type of mission or activity. Although specific types of operations are under the various 

joint military categories in the range of military operations, each type is not doctrinally fixed 

and could shift within that range. For example, a COIN operation could escalate from a 

security cooperation activity into a major operation or campaign.

d. SO can be conducted across the range of military operations at all levels of war and 

throughout all phases of a campaign or operation. While SO can be applied tactically, 

commanders and planners should focus SO on strategic and operational objectives and end 

states to maximize efficiency. Some SO are especially suitable for military engagement 

without conflict. SO provide options which in appropriate circumstances can prove to be the 

most viable means of achieving certain objectives. GCCs may leverage the theater special 

operations command (TSOC) to ensure full integration of SOF capabilities when developing 

theater plans. SO are most effective during crisis when SOF has had enough time (months to 

years) to conduct pre-crisis activities, build relationships, and build HN/PN SOF capacity as 

part of shaping operations (Phase 0) of theater campaign and contingency plans. Longer 

term preparations for SO provide options for decision makers in times of crisis that would 

otherwise not be available. Also, pre-crisis SO preparations may provide situational 

awareness that permits identification of a potential crisis prior to requiring a US military 

response, thus allowing a whole-of-government solution be applied to de-escalate the 

situation by dissuading, deterring, or disrupting the parties involved or through mediation.

(1) The President designates national objectives and sanctions the military 

means to achieve them. In pursuit of those objectives, some SO may be conducted under the 

direct supervision of the President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef).

(2) Theater objectives are established by each GCC, based on national strategic 

guidance, and are an integral part of a theater campaign plan. The GCC should consider 

integration of SO into the full range of military operations that supportsthe theater campaign 

plan and other theater plans.

(3) Operational objectives established by subordinate JFCs support theater 

objectives and lead directly to theater success. SO provide the JFC with a selective, 

flexible deterrent option or crisis response capability to achieve operational objectives.

(4) When required to achieve the JFC’s objectives, SO may be conducted in 

support of CF and vice versa.

e. CF and SOF Integration:

(1) Exchange and use of liaison and control elements are critical when CF and SOF 

conduct operations in the same operational area against the same threat.

(2) A thorough understanding of a unit’s capabilities and limitations enhances 

integration and interoperability planning.
Overview of Special Operations

I-5

(3) During mission planning, options should consider how to integrateCF and SOF 

maneuver elements. Detailed planning and execution coordination is required throughout the 

process.

(4) Successful integration and interoperability of CF and SOF are dependent upon 

understanding each other’s systems, capabilities, and limitations.

f. Presentation of Special Operations Forces. United States Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM) deploys and sustains SOF to facilitate operations with CF, to 

promote synergy among all SOF elements, and to provide more efficient C2 structures. For

military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations, forward based and 

distributed C2 nodes under the operational control (OPCON) of the TSOC provide the 

necessary C2 for assigned and attached SOF. For crisis response, contingency, and major 

operations and campaigns, SOF may deploy a special operations joint task force (SOJTF) 

where all SOF report to one SO commander and the packaged force includes all enabling 

capabilities (organic to SO formations and those Service-provided CF capabilities) required 

to optimize the effectiveness of the SOJTF. A SOJTF is an operational level organization 

that may have one or more subordinate joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs).

For a detailed discussion of the range of military operations, including the relationship to 

the instruments of national power, levels of war, and the categories of joint military 

activities, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-0, Joint 

Operations.
Chapter I

I-6 JP 3-05

Intentionally Blank
II-1 

CHAPTER II 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND THEIR CORE ACTIVITIES 

1. Introduction 

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, characterizes traditional 

warfare (or regular warfare), as a confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances 

of nation-states involving small to large scale, force-on-force military operations in which 

adversaries employ a variety of conventional military capabilities against each other in the 

air, land, maritime, and space physical domains and the information environment (which 

includes cyberspace). JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-0, 

Joint Operations, both address irregular warfare (IW) as the pervasive form of warfare of 

choice by many state adversaries and transnational violent extremists, because of the 

superiority of the United States in traditional warfare. From the United States perspective, 

IW encompasses a level of conflict that is less than traditional warfare and involves an 

adversary seeking to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more 

powerful, conventionally armed military force, often representing the regime of a nation. 

However, the strategic objectives of IW are no less significant than those of traditional 

warfare. Unlike the force-on-force orientation of traditional warfare, IW focuses on the 

strategic purpose of gaining and maintaining control or influence over, and the support of a 

relevant population through political, psychological, and economic methods. IW requires a 

different mindset and different capabilities than those focused on the conventional military 

defeat of an adversary. The SOF mindset and capabilities make them particularly well suited 

for all forms of IW. Further, SOF capabilities complement those of CF, whom the 

Department of Defense (DOD) also has tasked with gaining a core competency in IW. This 

chapter focuses on who SOF are, their unique characteristics, and the activities they conduct 

to help attain US strategic objectives. 

2. Designated Special Operations Forces 

SOF are those forces identified in Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 167 or 

those units or forces that have since been designated as SOF by SecDef. Generally, SOF are 

under the combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of the commander, United 

States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM), or the respective GCC to which 

they are assigned. SOF are those Active Component and Reserve Component (RC) forces of 

the Services specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support SO. 

“Special Operations Forces are contributing globally well beyond what their 

percentage of the total force numbers would indicate. Every day they are fighting 

our enemies, training and mentoring our partners, and bringing value to tens of 

thousands of villagers who are still deciding their allegiances.” 

Admiral Eric T. Olson 

Commander, United States Special Operations Command 

Statement to the House Armed Services Committee 

2 April 2009
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-05 

a. US Army. Special forces (SF), Ranger, Army SO aviation, SO MISO, and SO civil 

affairs (CA) units. 

b. US Navy. SEAL, SEAL delivery vehicle, and special boat teams. 

c. US Air Force. SO flying units (includes unmanned aircraft systems), special tactics 

elements (includes combat control, pararescue, SO weather, and select tactical air control 

party [TACP] units), and aviation FID units. 

d. US Marine Corps. Marine SO battalions which can be task organized to conduct 

specific SO missions in support of USSOCOM or a supported GCC. 

e. Certain CF receive enhanced training and/or equipment to support SO and have 

developed habitual relationships with SOF units to conduct these missions. 

3. Characteristics of Special Operations Forces

a. SOF are inherently joint. SOF regularly conduct joint and combined training, both 

within the SOF community and with CF. When employed, SOF are presented with their C2 

structure intact, which facilitates their integration into joint force plans, retains cohesion, and 

provides a control mechanism to address SO specific concerns and coordinate their activities 

with other components and supporting commands. Across the range of military operations, 

SOF can conduct the broad range of SO including a surgical, rapid, worldwide strike 

capability. Additionally, SOF routinely operate closely with OGAs, intergovernmental 

organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other nations’ forces. 

The complex and sometimes clandestine/low visibility nature of SO and the demanding 

environments in which such operations are conducted require carefully selected, highly 

trained and educated, and experienced warriors. SOF require unique training and education, 

and may also require the development, acquisition, and employment of weapons and 

equipment not standard for other Armed Forces of the United States. 

b. SOF are distinct from CF. Commanders should be familiar with these 

characteristics as well as the SOF capabilities and limitations to better select missions and 

tasks compatible with their capabilities. 

(1) Most SOF personnel undergo a careful selection process and mission-specific 

training beyond basic military skills to achieve entry-level SO skills. These programs make 

rapid replacement or regeneration of personnel or capabilities unlikely. 

(2) SOF organizational structures tend to be populated by mature and seasoned 

personnel, many of whom maintain high levels of competency in more than one military 

specialty. 

(3) Selected SOF are regionally, culturally, and linguistically oriented for 

employment; extensive language and cross-cultural training are a routine part of their 

development. 
Special Operations Forces and Their Core Activities 

II-3 

c. SOF Capabilities. SOF can be formed into versatile, self-contained teams that 

provide a JFC with a flexible force capable of operating in ambiguous and swiftly changing 

scenarios. They can: 

(1) Be task-organized quickly and deployed rapidly to provide tailored responses to 

many different situations. 

(2) Gain access to hostile or denied areas. 

(3) Provide limited medical support for themselves and those they support. 

(4) Communicate worldwide with organic equipment. 

(5) Conduct operations in austere, harsh environments without extensive support. 

(6) Survey and assess local situations and report these assessments rapidly. 

(7) Work closely with regional military and civilian authorities and populations. 

(8) Organize people into working teams to help solve local problems. 

(9) Deploy with a generally lower profile and less intrusive presence than CF. 

(10) Provide unconventional options for addressing ambiguous situations. 

d. SOF Limitations

(1) SOF cannot be quickly replaced or reconstituted nor can their capabilities be 

rapidly expanded. Improper employment of SOF (e.g., in purely conventional roles or on 

inappropriate or inordinately high-risk missions) runs the risk of rapidly depleting these 

resources. 

(2) SOF are not a substitute for CF. In most cases SOF are neither trained, 

organized, nor equipped to conduct sustained conventional combat operations and, therefore, 

should not be substituted for CF that are able to effectively execute that mission. 

(3) Most SO missions require non-SOF support. SOF are typically provided to 

GCCs and are not structured with robust means of logistic and sustainment capabilities. SOF 

must rely on the supported GCC’s Service component commands for most support except for 

those SOF-unique assets that are required to be supplied by USSOCOM. 

e. SOF Mission Criteria. The employment of SOF is facilitated by five basic criteria 

that provide guidelines for both SOF and CF commanders and planners when considering the 

employment of SOF (see Figure II-1.) 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-05 

(1) It must be an appropriate mission or activity for SOF. SOF should 

normally be employed against targets with strategic or operational relevance. SOF 

should be used to create effects that require SOF’s unique skills and capabilities. If the 

mission or task does not require those skills and capabilities, SOF should not be employed. 

(2) The mission or activities should support the JFC’s campaign or operation 

plan, or special activities. If not, shortfall in SOF capabilities should be pointed out and 

appropriate SOF missions recommended. 

(3) Mission or tasks must be operationally feasible, approved, and fully 

coordinated. SOF are not structured for attrition or force-on-force warfare and should not 

be assigned missions nor employed beyond their capabilities. For example, during planning 

and execution JFCs and SOF commanders and their staffs must consider the vulnerability of 

SOF units to larger, more heavily armed or mobile forces, particularly in a hostile 

environment. They should also synchronize their operations with those of other components 

within the operational area and coordinate the timing and location of support requirements 

with the appropriate commanders. 

FIVE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES MISSION CRITERIA

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Must be an appropriate special operations forces (SOF) 

mission or activity.

Mission or tasks should support the joint force 

commander’s campaign or operation plan, or special 

activities.

Missions or tasks must be operationally feasible, 

approved, and fully coordinated.

Required resources must be available to execute and 

support the SOF mission.

The expected outcome of the mission must justify the 

risks. 

Figure II-1. Five Special Operations Forces Mission Criteria 
Special Operations Forces and Their Core Activities 

II-5 

(4) Required resources must be available to execute and support the SOF 

mission. Some SOF missions require support from other forces for success, especially for 

long-term operations, and those operations supporting HNs with limited supporting assets. 

Such support involves aiding, protecting, complementing, and sustaining the employed SOF, 

and can include airlift, intelligence, communications, information operations (IO), medical, 

logistics, space, weather, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense, 

and other types of support. Although a target may be vulnerable to SOF, mission support 

deficiencies may affect the likelihood for success or may entirely invalidate the feasibility of 

employing SOF. 

(5) The expected outcome of the mission must justify the risks. SOF are highvalue assets and limited in numbers and resources. Commanders should ensure that the 

benefits of successful missions are measurable and in balance with the risks in the mission 

assessment. Risk management analysis should consider not only the potential loss of SOF 

units and equipment, but also the risk of adverse effects on US diplomatic and domestic 

political interests if the mission fails. While the use of SOF may present the potential for a 

proportionally greater influence on the JFC’s campaign or operation, there are some 

operations that SOF can execute that will make only a marginal contribution while 

presenting a high risk of personnel and material loss. When contemplating SO, commanders 

must balance potential SOF losses against the potential operational gain. 

4. Special Operations Core Activities 

SOF are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish the 11 core 

activities listed in Figure II-2. The core activities represent the collective capabilities of 

all joint SOF rather than those of any one Service or unit. While CF also conduct many 

of these activities (e.g., FID, SFA, COIN, and CT), SOF conduct them using specialized 

tactics, techniques, and procedures, and to unique conditions and standards in a manner that 

complement CF capabilities. Use of SOF with CF creates an additional and unique 

capability to achieve objectives that may not be otherwise attainable. SOF can arrange and 

package their capabilities in combinations to provide DOD options applicable to a broad 

range of strategic and operational challenges. Additionally, SOF can perform other activities 

of a collateral nature such as counterdrug operations and noncombatant evacuation 

operations. SOF also conduct preparation of the environment as a type of shaping activity 

supporting core activities that may be conducted in the future. 

a. Direct Action. DA entails short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive 

actions conducted as SO in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments, and 

which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or 

damage designated targets. DA differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of 

diplomatic or political risk, the operational techniques employed, and the degree of 

discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives. In the conduct of these 

operations, SOF may employ raids, ambushes, or other direct assault tactics (including closequarters combat); emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from 

air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided 

munitions; conduct independent sabotage; conduct anti-ship operations, as well as ship 

boarding and seizure (e.g., maritime interception operations). 
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-05 

(1) Normally limited in scope and duration, DA usually incorporates an immediate 

withdrawal from the planned objective area. These operations can provide specific, welldefined, and often time-sensitive results of critical significance at the operational and 

strategic levels of war. 

(2) SOF may conduct DA independently or as part of larger conventional or 

unconventional operation or campaign. Although normally considered close combat DA 

also includes sniping and other standoff attacks by fire delivered or directed by SOF. 

Standoff attacks are preferred when the target can be damaged or destroyed without close 

combat. SOF employ close combat tactics and techniques when the mission requires precise 

or discriminate use of force or the recovery or capture of personnel or materiel. 

(3) DA missions may also involve locating, recovering, and restoring to friendly 

control selected persons or materiel that are isolated and threatened in sensitive, denied, or 

contested areas. These missions usually result from situations that involve political 

sensitivity or military criticality of the personnel or materiel being recovered from remote or 

hostile environments. These situations may arise from a political change, combat action, 

chance happening, or mechanical mishap. DA usually differs from personnel recovery by 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS CORE ACTIVITIES























Direct action

Special reconnaissance

Counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction

Counterterrorism

Unconventional warfare

Foreign internal defense

Security force assistance

Counterinsurgency

Information operations

Military information support operations

Civil affairs operations

Figure II-2. Special Operations Core Activities 
Special Operations Forces and Their Core Activities 

II-7 

the former’s use of dedicated ground combat elements, unconventional techniques, precise 

survivor-related intelligence, and indigenous assistance. 

(4) DA, whether unilateral or combined, are short-duration, discrete actions. The 

SOF command executes DA to achieve the supported commander’s objectives. 

b. Special Reconnaissance (SR). SR entails reconnaissance and surveillance actions 

conducted as SO in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments to collect or 

verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities 

not normally found in CF. These actions provide an additive collection capability for 

commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. 

SR may include collecting information on activities of an actual or potential enemy or 

securing data on the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a 

particular area. SR may also include assessment of chemical, biological, residual nuclear, 

radiological, or environmental hazards in a denied area. SR includes target acquisition, area 

assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance, and may be accomplished by air, land, or 

maritime assets. 

(1) SR complements national and theater intelligence collection assets and systems 

by obtaining specific, well-defined, and time-sensitive information of strategic or operational 

significance. SR may also complement other collection methods constrained by weather, 

terrain-masking, or hostile countermeasures. Selected SOF conduct SR when authorized, to 

place “eyes on target” in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive territory. SR typically 

provides essential information to develop a commander’s situational awareness necessary for 

a command decision, follow-on mission, or critical assessment. 

(2) Using SOF for SR enables the JFC to enhance situational awareness and 

facilitate staff planning and execution of joint operations, whether by CF, SOF, or integrated 

CF-SOF elements. However, CF-SOF integration does not mean that SOF will become 

dedicated reconnaissance assets for CF. Rather, the JFC typically tasks SOF through their 

JSOTF or TSOC to provide SR within a joint special operations area (JSOA), and/or the JFC 

may task SOF on a case-by-case basis to conduct SR within a CF’s operational area. 

(3) SOF may also employ advanced reconnaissance and surveillance sensors and 

collection methods that utilize indigenous assets. 

c. Counterproliferation (CP) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). CP refers 

to actions taken to defeat the threat and/or use of WMD against the United States, our forces, 

allies, and partners. WMD are chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons 

capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude the means of 

transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part 

from the weapon. The major objectives of combating WMD policy, which include 

nonproliferation, CP, and consequence mitigation activities, are to prevent the acquisition of 

WMD and delivery systems, to stop or roll back proliferation where it has occurred, to deter 

and defeat the use of WMD and their delivery systems, to adapt US military forces and 

planning to operate against the threats posed by WMD and their delivery systems, and to 

mitigate the effects of WMD use. The continued spread of WMD technology can foster 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-05 

regional unrest and provide terrorist organizations with new and potent weapons. SOF 

provide the following capabilities for this core activity: 

(1) Expertise, materiel and teams to supported combatant command teams to 

locate, tag, and track WMD, as required. 

(2) Capabilities to conduct DA in limited access areas, as required. 

(3) Build partnership capacity for conducting CP activities. 

(4) Conduct IO and MISO to dissuade adversary reliance on WMD. 

(5) Other specialized capabilities to combat WMD. 

For further information on CP of WMD, refer to JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction. 

d. Counterterrorism. Terrorism has evolved over several decades from a tactic of 

inducing fear in select populations to a transnational threat of strategic proportions, 

particularly against the United States, Western societies, and emerging democracies 

perpetuated primarily by groups of violent extremists. Today, whether the extremists are 

local insurgents or members of an international terrorist network, they are generally viewed 

as terrorists if they use terrorist tactics. Furthermore, the threat to US interests posed by 

violent extremists will increase as the continued proliferation of WMD presents an 

opportunity for terrorists to acquire and use them. CT is a form of IW. 

(1) CT is defined as actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly 

to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. 

In addition to being a SOF core activity, CT is part of the DOD’s broader construct of 

combating terrorism (CbT), which is actions, including antiterrorism and CT, taken to 

oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat continuum. 

(2) The United States Government (USG) policy on CbT is to defeat violent 

extremism and create a global environment that is inhospitable to violent extremists. The 

broad USG strategy is to continue to lead an international effort to deny violent extremist 

networks the resources and functions they need to operate and survive. The DOD strategy 

for CbT implements the following objectives from the National Strategy for Combating 

Terrorism, objectives that are derived from the National Security Strategy (NSS): 

(a) Thwart or defeat terrorist attacks against the US, our PNs, and our interests. 

(b) Attack and disrupt terrorist networks abroad so as to cause adversaries to 

be incapable or unwilling to attack the US homeland, allies, or interests. 

(c) Deny terrorist networks WMD. 

(d) Establish conditions that allow PNs to govern their territory effectively and 

defeat terrorists. 
Special Operations Forces and Their Core Activities 

II-9 

(e) Deny a hospitable environment to violent extremists. 

(3) CDRUSSOCOM is responsible for synchronizing planning for global 

operations against terrorist networks, in coordination with other combatant commands, the 

Services and, as directed, appropriate USG agencies. 

(4) Success in the global CT effort requires interorganizational coordination to 

maximize the effectiveness of all the instruments of national power of the United States and 

PNs. USSOCOM, as the integrating command for global CT planning efforts, supports a 

global combating terrorism network (GCTN)—a growing network of relationships and 

liaison partnerships, a supporting technical infrastructure, and the use of information sharing 

policies. Along with interagency partners, this network draws upon an increasing number of 

countries, regional organizations, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector to achieve unified 

action. 

(5) The DOD global campaign plan for the war on terrorism requires integration of 

both the direct and indirect approaches. The ability to manage both approaches and harness 

their synergistic effects is vital to the success of both near- and long-term CT objectives, 

whether within the scope of a theater operation/campaign of a GCC, or the global campaign. 

(a) Direct Approach. The direct approach consists of actions taken against 

terrorists and terrorist organizations to disrupt or defeat a specific threat through 

neutralization or destruction of the network (including individuals, resources, and support 

structures) and to prevent the reemergence of a threat. This approach may include the use of 

SOF core activities such as CT, SR, DA, MISO, IO, CAO, and CP. 

(b) Indirect Approach. The indirect approach consists of the means by which 

the GCTN can influence the operational environments within which CT 

operations/campaigns are conducted. This approach usually includes actions taken to enable 

GCTN partners to conduct operations against terrorists and their organizations as well as 

actions taken to shape and stabilize their operational environments as a means to erode the 

capabilities of terrorist organizations and degrade their ability to acquire support and 

sanctuary. The indirect approach includes use of the SOF core activities such as FID, SFA, 

IO, MISO, and CAO. These activities combined with stability operations, 

counterintelligence, CMO, and strategic communication produce synergies to enable partners 

to combat terrorist organization, deter tacit and active support for terrorism, and erode 

support for terrorist ideologies. 

For further information on CT, refer to JP 3-26, Counterterrorism. 

e. Unconventional Warfare. UW are those activities conducted to enable a resistance 

movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power 

by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. 

The United States may engage in UW across the spectrum of armed conflict from major 

campaigns to limited contingency operations. The US has conducted UW in support of 

insurgent movements attempting to overthrow an adversarial regime as well as in support of 

resistance movements to defeat occupying powers (e.g., the Nicaraguan Contras and the 
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-05 

Afghan Mujahedeen). UW was also successfully used against the Taliban in the initial 

stages of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. UW can be an effective way 

of putting indirect and direct pressure on a hostile government or occupying power. 

(1) Military leaders must carefully consider the costs and benefits prior to making a 

recommendation to engage in UW. Properly coordinated and executed UW may help set 

conditions for international crisis resolution on terms favorable to the United States or allies 

without the need for an overt US CF commitment. 

(2) The conduct of UW can have a strategic military-politico utility that can alter 

the balance of power between sovereign states, and there is potentially significant political 

risk both at home and abroad. The paramilitary aspect of UW may place DOD in a 

supporting role to interorganizational partners. The necessity to operate with a varying mix 

of clandestine/covert means and ways places a premium on operations security (OPSEC) and 

all-source intelligence. In UW, as in all conflict scenarios, US military forces must closely 

coordinate their activities with interorganizational partners to enable and safeguard sensitive 

operations. 

(3) A JFC typically tasks SOF to conduct the military aspect of UW. It will usually 

require support relationships with some interagency partners and some Service components. 

A JFC and staff must be able to conduct/support UW operations simultaneously during both 

traditional warfare and/or IW. 

(4) While each UW mission is unique, US-sponsored UW generally includes seven 

phases: preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, build-up, employment, and 

transition. These phases may occur concurrently in some situations or may not be required 

in others. For example, a large established resistance movement may only require initial 

contact and build up of logistical support to begin UW activities, thereby bypassing the other 

earlier phases of preparation, infiltration, and organization. The phases also may occur out 

of sequence, with each receiving varying degrees of emphasis, such as when members of an 

indigenous irregular force are moved to another country to be trained, organized, and 

equipped before being infiltrated back into the designated operational area, either with or 

without US SOF. 

(5) Senior civilian leaders and JFCs should understand that UW operations require 

time to mature and reach maximum effectiveness, especially when all of the insurgent or 

resistance underground networks have to be established. 
Special Operations Forces and Their Core Activities 

II-11 

f. Foreign Internal Defense. From the US perspective, FID refers to the US activities 

that support a HN’s internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy designed to protect 

against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security, 

stability, and legitimacy. As shown in Figure II-3, characteristics of FID involve the 

instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) through 

which elements of that power (e.g., financial, intelligence, and law enforcement) can be 

applied to support a HN’s IDAD program. The US FID effort is tailored to the needs of the 

individual nation or region. 

(1) SOF units typically contribute to a FID effort under the OPCON of a TSOC 

commander, conducting FID operations other than combat, and may require the participating 

SOF chain of command to have a direct coordination relationship with the chief of mission 

(COM) or another designee at the appropriate US embassy. In smaller FID operations, SOF 

units may compose the majority, if not the entire US force. The opposite may be true in a 

large-scale FID operation, where limits on total troop numbers may result in a smaller 

number of SOF personnel than CF. In some cases, long-term FID operations may be 

initiated by SOF, then handed over to CF. 

(2) SOF may conduct FID operations unilaterally in the absence of any other 

military effort, or in support of other ongoing military (i.e., CF) or civilian assistance efforts. 

CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE













Involves all instruments of national power.

Can occur across the range of military operations.

Is conducted by both conventional forces and special 

operations forces.

Supports and influences a host nation’s internal 

defense and development program.

Includes training, materiel, technical and organizational 

assistance, advice, infrastructure development, and 

tactical operations.

Generally, the preferred methods of support are through 

assistance and development programs.

Figure II-3. Characteristics of Foreign Internal Defense 
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 3-05 

FID also supports stability operations designed to promote and protect US national interests 

by influencing adversarial, political, and information operational variables in a region or 

country through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities, and 

coercive crisis response actions when necessary. 

(3) All SOF Service components have capabilities that can contribute to a FID 

effort. The primary roles of SOF in FID are to assess, train, advise, and assist HN military 

and paramilitary forces with activities that require the unique capabilities of SOF. As 

previously mentioned, SOF may also conduct specialized missions in support of combat 

operations. The goal is to enable HN forces to maintain the internal stability, to counter 

subversion and violence in their country, and to address the causes of instability. Each of 

these key activities plays a role in the accomplishment of the HN IDAD strategy through HN 

military assistance, population security, and COIN. 

(4) FID operations are planned at the national, regional, and especially with SOF 

units at the local level. FID should involve the integration of all instruments of national 

power down to the local level. FID operations fall under two major categories—those under 

the responsibility of DOD and those under the responsibility of the Department of State 

(DOS) and OGAs. FID has certain aspects that make planning for it complex. Basic 

imperatives to successfully integrate FID into strategies and plans include the planner having 

an understanding of US foreign policy; a focus to maintain or increase HN sovereignty and 

legitimacy; and an understanding of the long-term or strategic implications and sustainability 

of US assistance efforts. SOF support of FID programs should be tailored to operational, 

environment, and HN needs. Because FID is a national-level effort involving numerous 

USG agencies, unity of effort is important. 

For further information on FID, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. 

g. Security Force Assistance. USG security sector reform (SSR) activities focus on 

the inextricably linked governmental sectors of security and justice. DOD’s primary role in 

SSR is supporting the reform, restructuring, or reestablishment of the armed forces and the 

defense sector, which is accomplished through SFA. SFA specifically pertains to those DOD 

activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the 

capacity and capability of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions. 

FSF include but are not limited to military forces; police forces; border police, coast guard, 

and customs officials; paramilitary forces; interior and intelligence services; forces peculiar 

to specific nations, states, tribes, or ethnic groups; prison, correctional, and penal services; 

and the government ministries or departments responsible for the above services. The US 

military engages in activities to enhance the capabilities and capacities of a PN (or regional 

security organization) by providing training, equipment, advice, and assistance to those FSF 

organized under the equivalent of a national ministry of defense (or an equivalent regional 

military or paramilitary force), while other USG agencies focus on those FSF assigned to 

other ministries such as interior, justice, or intelligence services. 

(1) USSOCOM is the designated joint proponent for SFA, with responsibility to 

lead the collaborative development, coordination, and integration of the SFA capability 

across DOD. This includes development of SFA joint doctrine; training and education for 
Special Operations Forces and Their Core Activities 

II-13 

individuals and units; joint capabilities; joint mission essential task lists; and identification of 

critical individual skills, training, and experience. Additionally, in collaboration with the 

Joint Staff and United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), and in coordination with 

the Services and GCCs, USSOCOM is tasked with developing global joint sourcing 

solutions that recommend the most appropriate forces (CF and/or SOF) for a SFA mission. 

(2) SFA includes activities of organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and 

advising various components of FSF. SOF/CF performing SFA conduct initial assessment of 

the FSF they will assist and then establish a shared way to continue assessing them 

throughout their development. The HN/PN determines the structure of its military forces, to 

include approving all organizational designs. These may include changing the numbers of 

forces, types of units, and internal organizational designs. 

(3) Conducting successful SFA operations requires an advisor’s mindset and 

dedication to working through or with FSF. The responsible CCDR tasking US forces to 

conduct SFA must emphasize that legitimacy is vital for both the US and its partners. 

(4) FID and SFA are similar at the tactical level where advisory skills are 

applicable to both. At operational and strategic levels, both FID and SFA focus on preparing 

FSF to combat lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, terrorism, and other internal threats to 

their security; however, SFA also prepares FSF to defend against external threats and to 

perform as part of an international force. Although FID and SFA are both subsets of security 

cooperation, neither are considered subsets of the other. 

For further information on FID and SFA, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. 

h. Counterinsurgency. COIN refers to the comprehensive civilian and military efforts 

taken to defeat insurgency and to address any core grievances. The combat skills, 

experience, cultural awareness, and language skills of SOF allow them to conduct a wide 

array of missions working through or with HN security forces or integrated with US CF, 

which make them particularly suitable for COIN operations or campaigns. 

(1) Operational Approaches. There are three primary operational approaches to 

COIN: direct, indirect, and balanced. The direct approach focuses on protecting US and HN 

interests while attacking the insurgents. The indirect approach focuses on establishing 

conditions (a stable and more secure environment) for others to achieve success with the help 

of the US. The balanced approach is a combination of the direct and indirect methods. 

Commanders adjust their approach as circumstances change, but the COIN approach 

should strive to move from direct to balanced, and ultimately to indirect. However, the 

scale of effort for any approach will vary according to operational requirements and overall 

objectives for the COIN operations or campaign. 

(a) Direct. A direct approach may be required where an HN government is 

losing ground in its struggle with an insurgency or there is no viable HN government. The 

first task in this situation is to establish security and control in as wide an area and extent as 

possible. 
Chapter II 

II-14 JP 3-05 

(b) Indirect. An indirect approach utilizes more development and diplomatic 

efforts than military efforts to address the insurgency. This approach is best suited to early 

intervention but requires that the HN be viable and viewed as legitimate. 

(c) Balanced. The balanced approach is a more even blend of US diplomatic, 

developmental, and military efforts. Military efforts are secondary and subordinate to 

diplomatic and development activities when using this approach. 

(2) SOF Contributions to COIN. The SOF contribution to COIN is critical 

through all approaches. Their role as warfighters in the direct approach provide the 

capabilities for urgent, necessary, and largely lethal activities, often with immediate 

impact—and to create time for the balanced and indirect approaches. SOF are well suited for 

the balanced and indirect approaches as combat trainers and advisors as well as warfighters. 

SOF assistance can increase the capability and capacity of HN specialized or irregular units, 

which helps mitigate manpower and leadership problems common among HN forces in 

COIN operations or campaigns. SOF also bring the unique capability to quickly adapt their 

skills with very little additional training to provide decision makers with a responsive tool to 

achieve US national objectives while avoiding the large footprint that would accompany CF. 

CA can provide key development assistance in contested areas. All SOF Service 

components have capabilities that can contribute to a COIN effort. 

(3) Relationship of Other Core Activities to COIN. COIN is normally 

conducted as part of a larger FID program supporting the HN government. SOF can also 

perform a number of other core activities in support of COIN operations seeking to gain 

credibility with the relevant population. US applications of MISO and CAO can help 

reinforce the HN’s legitimacy and capabilities and reduce insurgent influence over the 

population. SFA can range from standing up ministries to improving the organization of the 

smallest security unit and as such is integral to successful COIN operations. CT can be 

conducted when terrorism is used in an insurgency. COIN also involves SR and DA 

operations conducted against insurgents and their bases. 

(4) Defining the Operational Environment. One of the key contributions of 

SOF during the preparatory phases of a COIN operation is to help define the operational 

environment and prepare for the entry of CF and supporting governmental agencies. This 

is accomplished through assessments, shaping, and intelligence activities, some derived 

from nontraditional sources. SOF assist in the development of cultural intelligence, 

measure perceptions and attitudes of the population, gain situational awareness through 

area reconnaissance, and can operate covertly/clandestinely in areas where CF cannot. 

(5) Center of Gravity. The typical COIN strategic center of gravity is the 

indigenous population—thus the need to protect the population and gain and maintain 

popular support. When conducting operations, US forces adhere to the principle of 

measured and precise use of force—employing proportionality and discrimination. SOF, by 

their training, regional familiarity, cultural awareness, and understanding of social dynamics 

within relevant populations focus on establishing cooperative relationships with indigenous 

populations and with HN security forces to enhance the legitimacy of the government with 

the population in accordance with the HN IDAD plan. 
Special Operations Forces and Their Core Activities 

II-15 

For more information on COIN, refer to JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations. 

i. Information Operations. IO are the integrated employment, during military 

operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to 

influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential 

adversaries while protecting our own. When properly coordinated, integrated, and 

synchronized as a part of the overall operation, IO affect the quality, content, and availability 

of information available to decision makers. IO also influence the perceptions and 

motivations of targeted key audiences with the goal of convincing them to act in a manner 

conducive to established objectives and desired end states. IO are conducted throughout all 

operational phases, across the range of military operations, and at every level of war. 

(1) IO play a key role in the successful accomplishment of SO missions and 

promote other SOF core activities. For example, electronic warfare (EW) and computer 

network operations (CNO) disrupt adversary communications and networks while protecting 

our own fundamental conditions for successful SO missions. Similarly, OPSEC denies the 

adversary information needed to correctly assess SOF capabilities and intentions. MISO, a 

vital component of IO and a key SOF activity, can be employed to optimize the 

psychological impacts (positive or negative) of other SO activities (e.g., CT or COIN) on a 

variety of target audiences (TAs) and undermine an adversary’s will to fight. Military 

deception (MILDEC) deliberately misleads adversary decision makers as to friendly military 

capabilities, intentions, and operations. When interwoven with EW and CNO, MILDEC can 

drive an adversary to take specific actions (or not take action), ultimately contributing to the 

efficacy of SOF activities (e.g., DA). 

(2) In a similar fashion, other SOF activities complement IO and provide assistance 

toward the accomplishment of strategic and operational IO-related objectives. For example, 

SR and DA may identify, observe, target, disrupt, capture, or destroy specific capabilities 

tied to an adversary’s C2 (i.e., decision making) processes. Further, successful FID, UW, 

COIN, and SFA can have a significant psychological impact on an adversary’s morale or 

deliver a detrimental blow to the adversary’s ability to recruit and finance operations. SOF 

may also play a key role in MILDEC by replicating the tactical impact of a much larger force 

presence. 

(3) SOF leaders and staffs must integrate IO throughout all phases of an operation 

to protect critical capabilities and information, reduce overall risk to the mission and forces, 

and increase the prospect of mission success. The role of the IO planner is to coordinate, 

integrate, deconflict, and synchronize IO, and the supporting and related capabilities, 

whether CF- or SOF-provided, in accordance with the commander’s objectives and selected 

courses of action (COAs). Likewise, the IO cell within the SOF headquarters (HQ) performs 

the critical function of optimizing the combined effects of SO activities and IO within the 

information environment; as related to stated SOF objectives, as well as larger operational 

and strategic end states. 

(4) USSOCOM plays a broader, integrating role for IO in support of SOF across 

the combatant commands. As directed by the Unified Command Plan, USSOCOM 

integrates and coordinates DOD MISO capabilities to enhance interoperability, and supports 
Chapter II 

II-16 JP 3-05 

United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) with its IO responsibilities and other 

CCDRs with MISO planning and execution. Additionally, USSOCOM supports the strategic 

and operational planning, oversight, and execution of IO and provides IO functional 

expertise and leadership by assisting in the development of policy, doctrine, future force 

plans, as well as conducting oversight/coordination of IO requirements for SOF. This 

includes development, education, joint IO training, experimentation, and advanced 

technology initiatives. 

For further information on IO, refer to JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

j. Military Information Support Operations. MISO are planned operations to convey 

selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, 

objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, 

groups, and individuals. The purpose of MISO is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and 

behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. 

(1) MISO should be integrated during all phases of operations/campaigns, with 

both SOF and CF. Effective MISO require the commander’s emphasis and active 

involvement. SO MISO forces and staff planners support the commander by integrating 

MISO throughout the operation. MISO are executed within carefully reviewed and approved 

programs and under mission-tailored approval guidelines that flow from national-level 

authorities. 

(2) MISO planners follow a deliberate but responsive process that aligns 

commander’s objectives with a thorough analysis of the environment; select relevant TAs; 

develop focused, culturally and environmentally tuned messages and actions; employ 

sophisticated media delivery means and produce observable, measurable behavioral 

response. However, MISO is most successful when fully synchronized and integrated with 

complementary actions by the larger joint force and other USG capabilities. The US military 

message must be congruent with US military actions if TAs are to be persuaded by MISO to 

modify short-term attitudes and perceptions and long-term behavior. 

(3) Effective MISO are continuously planned and conducted across the range of 

military operations and throughout all phases of operations. In peacetime and limited crises 

response operations, MISO forces and activities are usually planned and coordinated through 

the TSOC. In permissive or uncertain environments not involving combat operations, MISO 

activities are planned and integrated with other operations and with other USG efforts to 

further national defense strategies through the GCC’s theater campaign plan. In major 

contingencies, the JFC may establish a separate JSOTF known as the joint military 

information support operations task force (JMISOTF) to conduct MISO. 

(4) MISO may be employed within the US under limited circumstances. During 

natural disasters or national security crises, MISO forces may deploy civil authority 

information support elements (CAISEs) supporting the designated lead federal agency to 

support civil authorities. SOF and CF MISO specialists, as part of CAISEs, may provide 

MISO for civil support (i.e., defense support of civil authorities) following natural disasters 

or other major crises. 
Special Operations Forces and Their Core Activities 

II-17 

(a) When authorized for employment in this manner, MISO forces inform 

rather than influence by utilizing their media development, production, and dissemination 

capabilities to deliver administrative and command information to populations in the 

operational area. Messages typically include information such as the location of relief sites, 

how to obtain essential services, disease prevention tips, current civil authority instructions, 

and similar messages. MISO dissemination assets such as radio broadcast systems, print 

production, and loudspeaker teams also can augment civilian commercial broadcast 

capabilities. 

(b) All CAISE efforts are coordinated with ongoing military and lead federal 

agency public affairs (PA) activities as required. 

(5) MISO play a key role in SO and in relation to each of the other SOF core 

activities; particularly in irregular conflicts that focus on ideological and social-political 

dimensions such as FID, COIN, CT, and UW. For example, MISO military information 

support teams may deploy to support approved COIN operations, demining, or foreign 

humanitarian assistance programs under either JFC or US diplomatic control. MISO staff 

planners and supporting MISO units provide the detailed planning and execution to reduce 

operational risk, enlist the aid of key populations, and optimize the impact of SO on the 

achievement of command objectives and USG policy. 

(6) USSOCOM retains the preponderance of active duty MISO forces under United 

States Army Special Operations Command. USSOCOM also gains Air RC MISO forces 

through Air Force Special Operations Command when those Air National Guard assets are 

mobilized. To provide a strategic level MISO capability, USSOCOM established the Joint 

Military Information Support Command (JMISC), a joint subordinate command to serve as a 

key contributor in DOD’s ongoing efforts to erode adversary power, will, and influence. 

JMISC plans, coordinates, integrates, and manages the execution of transregional 

information programs to achieve operational, strategic, and national goals and objectives. 

USSOCOM is the designated DOD proponent for MISO with the responsibility of 

coordinating the collaborative development and integration of DOD MISO. 

For further information on MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support 

Operations. 

k. Civil Affairs Operations. CAO are operations conducted by CA forces that enhance 

the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military 

forces are present. This requires coordination with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, indigenous 

populations and institutions, and the private sector. It involves application of CA functional 

specialty skills that are normally the responsibility of civil government to enhance planned 

CMO. All CMO must be synchronized and support the commander’s intent and operational 

concept. All CA core tasks support the JFC’s CMO objectives. 

(1) CAO performed in support of SO are characterized by actions conducted by 

small CA teams or elements generally without the support of larger military formations, in 

isolated, austere, and in many cases politically-sensitive environments. Such CAO are 

unique and require flexibility and ingenuity from CA teams. Successful employment 
Chapter II 

II-18 JP 3-05 

requires planning and support from the CA staff at the supported TSOC. Additionally, these 

operations require a greater level of planning and coordination with multiple civilian and 

military partners for decentralized execution. 

(2) CA personnel, leaders, and forces receive advanced skills training specific to 

CAO. CA teams are trained to identify critical (civil) vulnerabilities, conduct civil 

reconnaissance, engage HN and interagency counterparts, create country or region specific 

supporting plans, develop a series of activities to ensure unity of effort to achieve JFC and 

TSOC objectives, oversee projects, and eventually close activities and actions with 

assessments and targeting refinement. CA team members should be organized, trained, and 

prepared to serve as the senior SOF representative in countries with a limited SOF footprint. 

Figure II-4 depicts the relationship of CAO to overall unified action. 

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS RELATIONSHIPS





Joint and multinational operations coordinated 

and integrated with the activities of local, state, 

and federal government agencies and 

intergovernmental and nongovernmental 

organizations

Takes place within unified commands, 

subordinate unified commands, and joint task 

forces under the direction of those commanders

Unified Action





The responsibility of a joint force commander

Normally planned by civil affairs (CA) personnel, 

but implemented by all elements of the joint 

force

Civil-Military Operations (CMO)

Civil Affairs Operations







Conducted by CA forces

Provides specialized support of CMO

Applies functional skills normally provided 

by civil government

Figure II-4. Civil Affairs Operations Relationships 
Special Operations Forces and Their Core Activities 

II-19 

(3) CAO consist of those actions taken to coordinate with HN military and civilian 

agencies, OGAs, NGOs, or IGOs, in order to support US policy or the military commander’s 

assigned mission. CA core tasks include: 

(a) Populace and resources control, 

(b) Foreign humanitarian assistance, 

(c) Nation assistance, 

(d) Support to civil administrations, and 

(e) Civil information management. 

(4) CAO are conducted by CA forces organized, trained, and equipped to provide 

specialized support to commanders conducting CMO. Commanders having responsibility 

for an operational area typically will also have responsibility for the civilian populace 

therein. Commanders conduct CMO to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations 

between military forces and civilian authorities (governmental and nongovernmental) and the 

civilian populace in a permissive or hostile operational environment to facilitate military 

operations and to consolidate operational objectives. CA forces may assist in performance of 

activities and functions by military forces that are normally the responsibility of local 

government. CMO may be conducted before or during military operations and especially 

during stability operations. 

For further information on CAO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 
Chapter II 

II-20 JP 3-05 

Intentionally Blank 
III-1

CHAPTER III

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

1. Introduction

a. Command is the most important function undertaken by a JFC as it is the exercise of 

authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached 

forces. C2 is the means by which a JFC synchronizes and/or integrates joint force activities 

to achieve unity of command, ties together all the operational functions and activities, and 

applies to all levels of war and echelons of command across the range of military operations.

Effective C2 is a force multiplier that allows commanders to employ their forces toward a 

common effort. C2 should have a feedback process, or reciprocal influence, that allows 

commanders to best adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. 

b. SOF may be assigned to either CDRUSSOCOM or a GCC. C2 of SOF normally 

should be executed within a SOF chain of command. The identification of a C2 

organizational structure for SOF should depend upon specific objectives, security

requirements, and the operational environment. Command relationships should be fashioned 

to provide the necessary guidance given an uncertain, noncontiguous, and asymmetric 

operational environment without unnecessarily restricting the initiative and flexibility of 

subordinate commanders. In all cases, commanders exercising command authority over SOF 

should:

(1) Provide for a clear and unambiguous chain of command.

(2) Avoid frequent transfer of SOF between commanders.

(3) Provide for sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and 

support the operations.

(4) Integrate SOF early in the planning process.

(5) Match unit capabilities with mission requirements.

c. SOF are most effective when SO are fully integrated into the overall plan. The 

ability of SOF to operate unilaterally, independently as part of the overall plan, or in support 

of a conventional commander requires a robust C2 structure for integration and coordination 

of the SOF effort. Successful SO require centralized, responsive, and unambiguous C2 

through an appropriate SOF C2 element. The limited window of opportunity and sensitive 

nature of many SOF missions requires a C2 structure that is, above all, responsive to the 

“If officers desire to have control over their commands, they must remain habitually 

with them, industriously attend to their instruction and comfort, and in battle lead 

them well.”

General Thomas Jonathan “Stonewall” Jackson

Letter of Instruction to Commanding Officers

Winchester, Virginia, 1861
Chapter III

III-2 JP 3-05

needs of the operational unit and provides the most flexibility and agility in the application 

of SOF. SOF C2 may be tailored for a specific mission or operation.

d. Liaison among all components of the joint force and SOF, however they are 

organized, is vital for effective SOF employment, as well as coordination, deconfliction,

synchronization, and the prevention of fratricide.

2. Assignment of Special Operations Forces

a. SOF in the United States. Unless otherwise directed by SecDef, all SOF based in 

the continental United States are assigned to USSOCOM and under the COCOM of 

CDRUSSOCOM. USSOCOM is a unified command (Title 10, USC, Section 167) that has 

the responsibilities of a functional combatant command and responsibilities similar to a 

Military Department in areas unique to SO. When directed as a supported commander by the 

President or SecDef, CDRUSSOCOM plans and conducts certain SO missions worldwide, in 

coordination with the applicable GCCs.

(1) In its role as a functional combatant command and when directed, USSOCOM 

provides US-based SOF on a temporary basis to other GCCs for operational employment. 

When transferred, the forces are attached to the gaining combatant command with the GCC 

normally exercising OPCON over them.

(2) When directed by the President or SecDef, CDRUSSOCOM can establish and 

employ task forces as a supported commander.

b. SOF in Theater

(1) The Armed Forces are predominantly CF and tend to operate as an integrated 

joint team across the range of military operations using a C2 structure centered on the JFC’s 

mission and concept of operations, available forces and staff capabilities, location, and 

facilities. The JFC is typically a CF commander, and C2 is guided by principles of 

simplicity, span of control, unit integrity, and interoperability. This classic C2 framework is 

based on the preponderance of forces and the capability to control them.

(2) SOF assigned to a GCC are under the COCOM of the respective GCC. A GCC 

normally exercises OPCON of all assigned and attached SOF through the commander, 

theater special operations command (CDRTSOC) or a subordinate JFC. The CDRTSOC 

also may be designated as the joint force special operations component commander 

(JFSOCC) by the GCC (see Figure III-1). TSOCs and their subordinate SOF organizations 

and C2 coordination and liaison elements ensure that SO are responsive to the needs of the 

supported JFC, whether the JFC is a GCC or a CJTF.

(3) When a GCC establishes and employs multiple joint task forces (JTFs) and 

independent task forces, the TSOC commander may establish and employ multiple JSOTFs 

to manage SOF assets and accommodate JTF/task force SO requirements. Accordingly, the 

GCC, as the common superior commander, normally will establish supporting or tactical 

control (TACON) command relationships between JSOTF commanders and JTF/task force 

commanders.
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces

III-3

c. SOF under control of a non-US command. When directed by the President or 

SecDef through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GCCs may place SOF units under 

the control of a non-US multinational force commander. In such instances, OPCON of US 

SOF units will be retained by a US SOF commander within the multinational command 

structure.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS 

FORCES IN THEATER

LEGEND

combatant command (command authority)

* Functional component commanders report to the establishing JFC (GCC or CJTF).

** CDR TSOC may also function as a JSOTF and/or CDR of a JSOTF, JMISTOF, and/or a JCMOTF.

AFFOR Air Force forces

ARFOR Army forces

CDR commander

CJTF commander, joint task force

GCC geographic combatant commander

JCMOTF joint civil-military operations task force

JFACC joint force air component commander

JFC joint force commander

JFLCC joint force land component commander

JFMCC joint force maritime component 

commander

JMISOTF joint military information support 

operations task force

JSOTF joint special operations task force

MARFOR Marine Corps forces

NAVFOR Navy forces

TSOC theater special operations command

Geographic Combatant 

Commander

Commander,

Joint Task Force

(if designated)

Army 

Component 

Command

ARFOR

JFLCC

JMISOTF

Marine Corps 

Component 

Command

MARFOR

JFACC

JCMOTF

Air Force 

Component 

Command

AFFOR

JFMCC

TSOC**

Navy 

Component 

Command

NAVFOR

JSOTF

Functional 

Components*

JSOTF

Figure III-1. Command and Control of Special Operations Forces in Theater
Chapter III

III-4 JP 3-05

3. Command and Control of Special Operations Forces in Theater

C2 of SOF normally should be executed within a SOF chain of command. C2 of MISO

and CA forces will usually be through the SOF chain of command unless the force has been 

attached to a CF for a specific period or to perform a specific function. The identification of 

a C2 organizational structure for SOF should depend upon specific objectives, security 

requirements, and the operational environment. C2 of SOF is executed through one or more 

of the following:

a. Theater Special Operations Command. To provide the necessary unity of 

command, each GCC (except Commander, US Northern Command) has established a TSOC 

as a subunified command within their geographic combatant command. US Northern 

Command maintains an SO division within its operations directorate that serves as a theater 

SO advisor to the commander. The TSOC is the primary theater SOF organization capable 

of performing broad continuous missions uniquely suited to SOF capabilities. The TSOC is 

also the primary mechanism by which a GCC exercises C2 over SOF. The TSOC 

commander has three principal roles.

(1) Joint Force Commander. As the commander of a subunified command, the 

CDRTSOC is a JFC. As such, he has the authority to plan and conduct joint operations as 

directed by the GCC and exercises OPCON of assigned commands and forces and normally 

over attached forces as well. The CDRTSOC may establish JTFs that report directly to him, 

such as a JSOTF, joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF), or JMISOTF, in order 

to plan and execute these missions.

(2) Theater SO Advisor. The CDRTSOC advises the GCC, Service component 

commanders, and designated functional component commanders on the proper employment 

of SOF. The CDRTSOC may develop specific recommendations for the assignment of SOF 

in theater and opportunities for SOF to support the overall theater campaign plan. The role 

of theater SO advisor is best accomplished when the GCC establishes the CDRTSOC as a 

special staff officer on the theater staff (in addition to his duties as a commander—i.e., “dual 

hatted”). In this case, the CDRTSOC may appoint a deputy as his representative to the 

theater staff for routine day-to-day staff matters.

(3) Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander. When designated 

by the GCC, the CDRTSOC will function as a JFSOCC. This will normally be the case 

when the GCC establishes functional component commanders for operations, absent the 

establishment of a JTF. The CDRTSOC can also be designated the JFSOCC within a JTF if 

the scope of the operations warrant it (see Figure III-2).

b. Within a GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR), there may be several different 

command relationships regarding SOF. The JFC who is the establishing authority must 

designate appropriate command relationships among the SOF commanders, CJTFs, and 

Service and functional component commanders.

(1) The GCC may directly exercise OPCON over one or more JSOTF.
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces

III-5

(2) Typically, a GCC will designate a CDRTSOC or a JFSOCC to exercise 

OPCON over one or more JSOTFs.

(3) A JFC, subordinate to the GCC (i.e., a CJTF), may have one or more JSOTFs. 

In this case the JFC would exercise OPCON through a commander, joint special operations 

task force (CDRJSOTF) or may establish/designate a JFSOCC to exercise OPCON over 

multiple JSOTFs.

(4) A CDRJSOTF may exercise OPCON over subordinate special operations task 

forces (SOTFs), and a CDRJSOTF typically exercises OPCON over their assigned SOF and 

OPCON or TACON of attached SOF.

(5) For the purpose of a C2 discussion a JMISOTF and a JCMOTF should be 

considered in the same context as a JSOTF for establishing command relationships. 

However, JMISOTFs and JCMOTFs may include both SOF units and CF units which should 

be a consideration for the JFC when establishing command relationships.

See JP 3-57, Joint Civil-Military Operations, for additional details regarding CA, 

JCMOTFs, and CMO, and JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations, for 

additional details regarding JMISOTFs.

NOTIONAL JOINT FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS 

COMPONENT COMMAND AND CONTROL

Joint Force

Special Operations 

Component Commander

Joint

Special Operations

Task Force

North

Joint

Special Operations

Task Force

South

Joint

Special Operations

Air Component

Figure III-2. Notional Joint Force Special Operations Component

Command and Control
Chapter III

III-6 JP 3-05

c. SOF Operational C2

(1) JFSOCC. The JFSOCC is the commander within a unified command, 

subordinate unified command, or JTF responsible to the establishing commander for making 

recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for 

tasking SOF and assets; planning and coordinating SO; or accomplishing such operational 

missions as may be assigned. The JFSOCC is given the authority necessary to accomplish 

missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander (i.e., a GCC or CJTF). The 

CDRTSOC or a CDRJSOTF will normally be the individual functioning as the JFSOCC. 

When acting as a JFSOCC, they retain their authority and responsibilities as JFCs. A 

JFSOCC may have OPCON over one or more JSOTFs. The CDRTSOC will normally be 

established as a JFSOCC if there is more than one JSOTF to command (see Figure III-2). If 

only one JSOTF is established (i.e., within a JTF), the CDRJSOTF could also be designated 

as the JFSOCC by the establishing JFC. When a joint force special operations component 

(JFSOC) is established and combined with elements from one or more foreign nations, it 

becomes a combined forces special operations component (SOC), and its commander 

becomes a combined forces SOC commander, who would likely control or manage 

employment of those elements in unified action.

(2) JSOTF. A JSOTF is a JTF composed of SO units from more than one Service, 

formed to carry out a specific SO or prosecute SO in support of a theater campaign or other 

operations. A JSOTF may have CF tasked to support the conduct of specific missions.

(a) A JSOTF, like any JTF, is normally established by a JFC (e.g., a GCC, a 

subordinate unified commander such as a CDRTSOC, or a CJTF). For example, a GCC 

could establish a JTF to conduct operations in a specific joint operations area of the theater. 

Then either the GCC or the CJTF could establish a JSOTF, subordinate to that JTF, to plan 

and execute SO. Likewise, a CDRTSOC could establish a JSOTF to focus on a specific 

mission or operational area assigned by the GCC. A JSOTF may also be established as a 

joint organization and deployed as an entity from outside the theater, in coordination with 

that GCC.

(b) A JSOTF is established to conduct operations in a specific operational area 

or to accomplish a specific mission. If geographically oriented, multiple JSOTFs will 

normally be assigned different operational areas (e.g., separate JSOAs).

(c) When a JSOTF is formed to directly support a GCC, the CDRTSOC 

normally acts as the CDRJSOTF. Regardless of whom it is, a CDRJSOTF is a JFC and 

exercises the authority and responsibility assigned by the establishing authority. A JSOTF 

staff is normally drawn from the TSOC staff or an existing O-6 level HQ from an existing 

SOF component with augmentation from other SOF or conventional units and/or personnel 

as appropriate.

(d) When a JSOTF is established and combined with elements from one or 

more foreign countries, it typically becomes a combined JSOTF and its commander becomes 

a combined CDRJSOTF.
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces

III-7

For further detailed information on a JSOTF, refer to JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations 

Task Force Operations.

d. SOF Subordinate C2 Organizations. A JSOTF, by its joint designation, has SOF 

from more than one of the Services: Army special operations forces(ARSOF), Navy special 

operations forces (NAVSOF), Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF), or Marine 

Corps special operations forces (MARSOF), and these designations typically denote their 

forces and subordinate units, not an HQ. In the context of generic Service SOC HQ, they are 

the Army special operations component (ARSOC), Navy special operations component

(NAVSOC), the Air Force special operations component (AFSOC), and the Marine Corps 

special operations command (MARSOC), respectively. Normally, the only SOF functional 

component under a CDRTSOC/JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF is a joint special operations air 

component (JSOAC). A notional depiction of a JSOAC under a JFSOCC is shown in Figure 

III-2, and a notional depiction of JSOTF elements (including a JSOAC) is shown in Figure

III-3.

(1) ARSOF. The ARSOC, as the Army Service force component of a JSOTF, is 

usually designated as a SOTF and consists of one or more of the following forces: SF, 

Rangers, and Army special operations aviation (Army SOA). The SOTF is normally 

commanded and manned by an SF or a Ranger battalion commander and staff. The SOTF 

normally has MISO and CA forces if they are not part of a separate JMISOTF or JCMOTF, 

respectively.

(a) SOTF. If there is an SF group or SF battalion, or the Ranger Regiment in 

the tasked ARSOF, it may be designated a SOTF. The CDRJSOTF may establish multiple 

subordinate SOTFs, with each SOTF organized around the nucleus of an SF or Ranger unit 

and may include a mix of ARSOF units and their support elements. The CDRJSOTF may 

assign each SOTF an area within the JSOA or a functional mission.

(b) Special Forces. SF units are task-organized as SF groups and battalions, 

both of which have organic HQ and support elements. When deployed, an SF group or 

battalion may be designated a SOTF.

(c) Rangers. The C2 of Rangers normally is exercised through command 

posts collocated with other SOF or conventional units. They do not have the organic 

capability to establish their own forward operations bases. If the Ranger Regiment is 

deployed, it will normally form a SOTF.

(d) Army SOA. The Army SOA are organic ARSOF assets with OPCON 

normally exercised by the CDRJSOTF through either the Service component, ARSOC,

commander, or a joint special operations air component commander (JSOACC), depending 

on the situation. For example, when a JSOACC is established as a functional component 

commander by the CDRTSOC/JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF, the Army SOA may be under 

TACON, or tasked in support of the JSOACC.
Chapter III 

III-8 JP 3-05 

(2) NAVSOF. The NAVSOC task organization is based on operational 

requirements. The NAVSOC may include SEALs, submersible platforms, combatant craft, 

and supporting forces. 

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Special forces

Ranger

Civil affairs

MISO units

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Air Force SOA units

Special tactics

Foreign internal 

defense units

 Army SOA units

 MSOB units

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Navy aviation units 

supporting SOF

Forces made 

available

Forces that might 

include:

Forces that might 

include:

Forces that might 

include:

Forces that might 

include:

Forces that might 

include:

Forces that might 

include:

Other Air 

Assets Army SOA

NOTIONAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 

COMMAND AND CONTROL

LEGEND

AFSOC Air Force special operations 

component

JSOAC* joint special operations air 

component (typically AFSOC)

AFSOF Air Force special operations 

forces

ARSOC Army special operations 

component

JFSOCC joint force special operations 

component commander

MARSOC US Marine Corps Forces, 

Special Operations Command

SOA special operations aviation 

(Army)

MISO military information support 

operations

MSOB Marine special operations 

battalion

NAVSOC Navy special operations 

component

JFSOCC

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Combatant Craft

Submersible 

Platforms

NAVSOC MARSOC

AFSOF

JSOAC*

ARSOC AFSOC

Figure III-3. Notional Special Operations Forces Command and Control 
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces

III-9

(a) Naval Special Warfare Task Force. For a major operation or campaign, the

NAVSOC is referred to as a naval special warfare task force (NSWTF) and is commanded 

by a SEAL captain (O-6). An NSWTF has one or more subordinate naval special warfare

task groups (NSWTGs).

(b) NSWTG. The NAVSOC may be an NSWTG commanded by a SEAL 

commander (O-5). An NSWTG has one or more subordinate naval special warfare task units 

(NSWTUs).

(3) AFSOF. The AFSOC (not to be confused with the Air Force Special 

Operations Command that is the Air Force component of USSOCOM) is the Air Force 

component, normally composed of a special operations wing, special operations group, or 

squadron, and an element of an Air Force special tactics group. A JSOACC, if designated by 

the JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF, is typically the AFSOC commander. When subordinate AFSOF 

units deploy to forward operations bases or advanced operations bases, the AFSOC 

commander may establish one or more provisional units as follows:

(a) Air Force Special Operations Detachment (AFSOD). The AFSOD is a 

squadron-size AFSOF HQ that could be a composite organization composed of different US 

Air Force assets. The AFSOD normally is subordinate to an AFSOC, JSOAC, JSOTF, or a 

JTF depending upon the size and duration of the operation, and the joint organizational 

structure.

(b) Air Force Special Operations Element (AFSOE). The AFSOE contains 

selected AFSOF units that are normally subordinate to an AFSOC or AFSOD.

(4) MARSOF. MARSOC is the Marine Corps Service component of USSOCOM. 

Although MARSOC HQ is nondeployable, when tasked by CDRUSSOCOM, MARSOC 

units deploy as needed in support of USSOCOM to form, deploy, and employ a JSOTF. The 

MARSOF of a JSOTF may be one of the following subordinate commands.

(a) Marine SO Battalions. There are three Marine SO line battalions, each 

with four companies. These companies can be task organized to conduct SR, DA, SFA, and 

FID missions in support of USSOCOM or a supported GCC, whether under a CDRJSOTF or 

a CJTF. These companies may also provide tailored military combat skills training and 

advisor support for identified foreign forces.

(b) Marine SO Support Group. It provides specified support capabilities for 

SO missions as directed by the MARSOC.

(5) JSOAC. JSOAC collectively refers to the commander, staff, and assets of a SO 

functional air component of a subordinate unified command, a JFSOC or a JSOTF. A

CDRTSOC/JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF may designate a JSOACC to be responsible for the 

centralized planning and direction and the execution of joint SO air activities, and for 

coordinating conventional air support for the SOF with the JFC’s designated joint force air 

component commander (JFACC). The JSOACC will normally be the commander with the 

preponderance of air assets and/or the greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, 

control, and support the assigned/supporting air assets. There may be circumstances when 
Chapter III

III-10 JP 3-05

the SOF commander may elect to place selected SO aviation assets under separate control. 

A JSOACC may be subordinate to a single CDRJSOTF or tasked to support multiple 

CDRJSOTFs within a JFSOC (see Figure III-2). A JSOAC may be a standing organization 

or can be formed in response to a contingency or other operation.

4. Special Operations Forces as the Lead for a Joint Task Force

With the increased IW nature of operations and a whole-of-government effort in unified 

action to defeat global, networked, and transnational irregular adversaries, there may be 

cases where the C2 construct based on preponderance of forces may not be the primary 

consideration in establishing a JTF. In some cases, a C2 construct based on SO expertise and 

influence may be better suited to the overall conduct of an operation (i.e., superiority in the 

aggregate of applicable capabilities, experience, specialized equipment, and knowledge of 

and relationships with relevant populations), with the JTF being built around a core SO staff. 

Such a JTF has both SOF and CF and the requisite ability to command and control them. 

SOF and their unique capabilities are particularly well-suited for such complex situations 

because of their regional familiarity, language and cultural awareness, and understanding of 

the social dynamics within and among the relevant populations (i.e., tribal politics, social 

networks, religious influences, and customs and mores). SOF also maintain special 

relationships with other participants within unified action. Given the SOF expertise and the 

special operations form of “maneuver,” SOF may be best suited to lead US forces in some 

operational areas. Accordingly, an optimal construct can be one having a SOF chain of 

command supported by CF and their enabling functions. Such a construct calls for a SOF 

JFC, not as a JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF, but as the CJTF.

a. TSOC-Based JTF. An example of this C2 construct is a JTF staff built around a 

TSOC, integrating SOF and CF with appropriate enabling functions. If needed, the TSOC 

can be enhanced by a deployable joint task force augmentation cell (DJTFAC). 

CDRUSSOCOM maintains a DJTFAC, currently identified as JTF Sword—a joint, multidisciplined group of SO planners and staff experts capable of establishing a SOF C2 element 

or integrating with a forming or formed SOF HQ to rapidly establish a JTF HQ providing C2 

for conducting operations within IW. USSOCOM also has a robust global reach-back 

capability for additional SOF, staff expertise, and special operations-peculiar (SO-peculiar) 

support. SO-peculiar support is explained in Chapter IV, “Support Considerations for 

Special Operations Forces.”

b. USSOCOM JTF. Another example is a unique JTF resourced by and under the C2 

of CDRUSSOCOM. The USSOCOM JTF, currently identified as JTF 487, is a separately 

established, deployable, scalable, senior-level HQ that can take command of a complex 

“direct-indirect” force structure in ambiguous conflict environments to conduct operations

within IW. This JTF is not built around a TSOC, nor does it compete with an Army corps or 

TSOC; however, it can integrate with an established HQ, and can augment a TSOC or other 

deployed organization. Additionally, the USSOCOM JTF provides a minimal footprint and 

streamlined leadership hierarchy, using the USSOCOM Global Mission Support Center—a 

single point of entry providing SOF customers a reach-back, push-forward, and think-ahead 

capability for operational and emerging requirements.
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces

III-11

5. Integration and Interoperability of Conventional Forces and 

Special Operations Forces

SOF and CF often share the same operational environment for extended periods. While 

SOF-CF integration poses challenges, there are also great opportunities the JFC may exploit. 

This integration often creates additional options for achieving objectives. Integration and 

interoperability enable the JFC to take advantage of both SOF and CF core competencies and 

Service or SOF unique systems. Effective SOF-CF integration facilitates the synchronizing 

of military operations in time, space, and purpose; maximizes the capability of the joint 

force; allows the JFC to optimize the principles of joint operations in planning and 

execution; and may produce an operating tempo and battle rhythm with which the enemy is 

unable to cope. It may also reduce the potential for fratricide. Accordingly, focus should be 

placed on three key areas: operations, command relationships, and liaisons.

a. Operations

(1) As CF now perform some traditional SOF roles, such as providing advisor 

teams to FSF, it is especially important that SOF and CF start planning and integrating

operations, beginning with the first efforts at mission development and concluding with the 

achievement of the desired end state.

(2) SOF and CF units should integrate early, prior to deployments, to build and 

foster relationships, understand each others’ planning processes, and defuse any 

misconceptions or friction points. When possible, units should attend training events 

together, exchange briefings on capabilities and limitations, and coordinate staff actions.

(3) During operations, SOF and CF commanders should understand each other’s 

mission planning cycles, intelligence and operations cycles, and mission approval processes. 

Mission type orders (task and purpose) are optimal to convey the commander’s intent to 

permit flexibility, initiative, and responsiveness.

b. Command Relationships

(1) Properly established and clearly articulated command relationships can directly 

support decentralization (i.e., decentralized planning and execution for individual missions), 

foster trust, and aid synergy. These command relationships can broaden the mindset from a 

very “vertical” focus on receiving and accomplishing activities from the higher commander 

to a “horizontal” focus, working much more closely with partners.

(2) Successful execution of SO requires clear, responsive C2 by an appropriate 

SOF C2 element. The limited window of opportunity normally associated with the majority 

of SOF missions, as well as the sensitive nature of many of these missions, requires a C2 

structure that is responsive to the needs of the operational unit. As will be covered in 

Chapter IV, “Support Considerations for Special Operations Forces,” SOF C2 may be 

uniquely tailored for a specific mission or operation.

c. Liaisons. Liaison between SOF and all components of the joint force is essential for 

effective force employment to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict SO with CF 
Chapter III

III-12 JP 3-05

operations—effective liaison can prevent fratricide, maximize opportunities, and ensure 

mutual understanding.

For further information on CF-SOF integration and interoperability, refer to USSOCOM 

Publication 3-33, v.3, CF/SOF Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 

Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability, and JP 

3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

6. Coordination and Liaison Elements

SOF commanders have specific elements that facilitate liaison and coordination. They 

include the special operations command and control element (SOCCE) to command and 

control, and coordinate SOF activities with CF; the special operations liaison element 

(SOLE) to provide liaison to the JFACC or appropriate Service component air C2 facility; 

and SOF liaison officers (LNOs) placed in a variety of locations as necessary to coordinate, 

synchronize, and deconflict SO within the operational area. All of these elements 

significantly improve the flow of information, facilitate concurrent planning, and enhance 

overall mission accomplishment of the joint force.

a. SOCCE. The SOCCE is the focal point for the synchronization of SOF activities 

with conventional force operations. It performs C2 or liaison functions according to mission 

requirements and as directed by the establishing SOF commander (JFSOCC or CDRJSOTF 

as appropriate). Its level of authority and responsibility may vary widely. The SOCCE 

normally is employed when SOF conduct operations in support of a conventional force. It 

collocates with the command post of the supported force to coordinate, synchronize, and 

deconflict SO with the operations of the supported force and to ensure communications 

interoperability with that force. The SOCCE can receive SOF operational, intelligence, and 

target acquisition reports directly from deployed SOF elements and provide them to the 

supported component HQ. The JFSOCC, CDRJSOTF, or JSOTF component commanders 

may attach liaison teams from other SOF elements to the SOCCE as required. The SOCCE 

remains under the OPCON of the establishing SOF commander. The SOCCE performs the 

following functions:

(1) As directed, facilitates or exercises C2 of SOF tactical elements attached to, or 

placed in direct support of, the supported CF commander.

(2) Advises the CF commander on the current situation, missions, capabilities, and 

limitations of supporting and supported SOF units.

(3) Advises the supporting SOF commander(s) of the supported force commander’s 

current situation, missions, intentions, and requirements.

(4) Provides required secure communications links.

(5) Coordinates and deconflicts SO activities with operations of the CF.

(6) When linkup between SOF and CF becomes imminent, assists the supported CF

commander and staff with SOF linkup planning and execution. 
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces

III-13

b. SOLE. A SOLE is typically a joint team provided by the JFSOCC to the JFACC (if 

designated) or appropriate Service component air C2 organization, to coordinate, deconflict, 

and integrate special operations air, surface, and subsurface operations with conventional air 

operations. The SOLE director works directly for the JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF as a liaison and 

has no command authority for mission tasking, planning, and execution. The SOLE director 

places SOF ground, maritime, and air liaison personnel in the joint air operations center 

(JAOC) to coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize SOF with conventional air operations. 

The SOLE also provides coordination for the visibility of SOF operations in the air tasking 

order and the airspace control order. The SOLE must also coordinate appropriate fire 

support coordination measures between the JAOC and the SOF HQ to help prevent potential 

for fratricide. A SOLE is tailored as appropriate (see Figure III-4).

c. SOF LNOs. SOF LNOs report to the SOF commander or SOF component 

commander and are dispatched to applicable conventional JTF components to ensure the 

timely exchange of necessary operational and support information to aid mission execution 

and preclude fratricide, duplication of effort, disruption of ongoing operations, or loss of 

intelligence sources. SOF LNOs may assist in the coordination of fire support, overflight, 

aerial refueling, targeting, deception, MISO, CAO, and other operational issues based on 

current and future SO missions. These efforts are crucial to the JFC’s unity of effort, tempo, 

and coordination of limited resources and assets.

7. Joint Special Operations Area

a. Coordination and deconfliction with CF are always critical concerns for SOF 

commanders. SOF are often employed prior to the arrival of CF. Effective coordination is 

vital in the transition from advance force operations involving SOF to follow-on operations 

and in ensuring that the timing and tempo of the overall campaign is maintained.

b. The JFC may establish a JSOA, which is a restricted area of land, sea, and airspace 

assigned by a JFC to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct SO 

activities. The commander of SOF may further assign a specific area or sector within the 

JSOA to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the 

SOF mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence 

the number, composition, and sequencing of SOF deployed into a JSOA. It may be limited 

in size to accommodate a discrete DA mission or may be extensive enough to allow a 

continuing broad range of UW operations. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate 

simultaneous use of CF and SOF in the same general operational area. When a JSOA is 

designated, the JFSOCC (or CDRJSOTF) is the supported commander within the designated 

JSOA.

c. Establishment of a designated JSOA for SOF to conduct unilateral operations assists 

in the ease of control of SO and the prevention of fratricide.
Chapter III

III-14 JP 3-05

NOTIONAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS LIAISON ELEMENT FUNCTIONS

AMD air mobility division

ATO air tasking order

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance

JAOC joint air operations center

JFACC joint force air component commander

JFC joint force commander

JPRC joint personnel recovery center

JSOAC joint special operations air 

component

JSOTF joint special operations task force

JTAC joint terminal attack controller

SO special operations

SOF special operations forces

SOLE special operations liaison element

SPINS special instructions

Strategy Division

Combat Plans Division

Combat Operations Division

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division

Other Coordination

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Coordinates and synchronizes SO strategy and targets with other components 

to meet combatant commander objectives and guidance.

Nominate SOF targets for inclusion in the joint integrated prioritized target list.

Provides SOF input for JFC apportionment recommendation decisions.

Coordinates SOF air requirements within the master air attack plan.

Coordinates with JSOTF/JSOAC on ATO inputs and ensures distributed ATOs 

are merged with the master ATO.

Provides SO input for inclusion in SPINS.

Coordinates airspace requirements and deconfliction for future operations.

Represents the SO components on the targeting effects team in the JAOC.

Monitors and coordinates current day flying operations with other components.

Deconflicts ongoing SO surface operations in real time with other components.

Maintains updated list of team locations for deconfliction.

Coordinates support for and prosecution of SOF-monitored targets to include 

time-sensitive targets.

Coordinates airspace management with JAOC airspace manager.

Coordinates ISR requirements for SOF in the field.

Provides intelligence support for combat plans and operations division.

Coordinates requirements for airfield surveys supporting force basing (AMD).

Coordinates JTAC support for SOF when required.

Coordinates logistic requirements including supply, transportation, and 

contracting (AMD).

Coordinates communications requirements, as necessary, for SOF in the field 

(communications representative).

Coordinates with JPRC.

SOLE Director: Liaison to JFACC

LEGEND

Figure III-4. Notional Special Operations Liaison Element Functions
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces

III-15

8. Interorganizational Coordination

a. Interagency coordination is as integral to SO as it is conventional operations, and 

fostering personal relationships between SOF commanders and interorganizational leaders 

and professional relations between both staffs should be a routine objective during military 

engagement activities.

b. A proven model in attaining unity of effort with interorganizational partners is the 

complementary character of the DOS embassy mission strategic plans and country 

operational plans, and a GCC’s theater campaign plan.

c. Interpersonal communication skills that emphasize consultation, persuasion, 

compromise, and consensus are the means to obtain unified action in a military-civilian 

effort. Successful commanders and staff build personal relationships to inspire trust and 

confidence. The challenges of gaining harmony and creating synergy among the engaged 

USG agencies and multinational partners are greater as there are no clear authorities 

directing the relationship. If tasked by the GCC/CJTF, a CDRJSOTF may be the 

coordinating authority for some form of interorganizational coordination at what could be 

characterized as the operational level, and responsible for the unified action down through 

the tactical level.

For further information on interagency considerations, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational 

Coordination During Joint Operations.

9. Multinational Coordination

SOF operate with multinational forces (MNFs), i.e., forces belonging to a coalition or 

alliance, on a routine and recurring basis. US SOF assess, train, advise, assist, and operate 

with a plethora of multinational foreign special operations units. They also do the same with 

many multinational conventional force units, in both supported and supporting relationships.

a. SOF training or operating with MNFs is typically the result of tasking by a CCDR in 

coordination with the appropriate DOS representatives and other interagency partners. 

Coordination of national level direction among the MNF partners should be anticipated at the 

national and theater levels.

b. Command Considerations. Any control of SOF operating elements transferred to a 

foreign commander must include an appropriate SOF command element in the chain of 

command for direct C2 of the SOF operating elements.

c. For MNF operations, rules of engagement (ROE) may be different for the non-US 

military units, than for US units. That could result in some form of operating limitations. 

US military forces may have to follow more restrictive ROE (US or multinational) 

dependent upon agreed command relationships; however, they always retain their right to 

self-defense per US ROE. ROE typically is coordinated with all MNF participants. US 

ROE must be coordinated by the supported JFC.
Chapter III

III-16 JP 3-05

d. SOF may be tasked to liaise with and advise units of a MNF, providing the primary 

means of communications and C2 with the MNF operational HQ. This could mean the SOF 

would require significant additional communications equipment to facilitate the C2 and 

coordination responsibilities.

e. MNF operations typically require some degree of US logistics support to be 

coordinated.

f. Although capable in many foreign languages, for MNF operations the SOF may 

require interpreters to facilitate communication and coordination.

g. Foreign disclosure will always be a consideration for coordination and release of 

intelligence and other information.

h. There should be a multinational coordination center, especially if the MNF is 

operating under a parallel command structure, to facilitate most, if not all coordination 

efforts among the MNF.

For further information on multinational coordination and operations, refer to JP 3-16, 

Multinational Operations.
IV-1

CHAPTER IV

SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

1. Introduction

SOF support must be tailored to specific mission requirements, yet flexible enough to 

respond to changing employment parameters. The joint character of SO requires support 

arrangements across Service lines with emphasis on unique support required in order to 

sustain independent and remote operations. Further, SOF must be able to exploit 

information derived from the full range of available multinational, national, theater, and 

tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support systems.

2. Intelligence Support

All-source, fused intelligence is vital in identifying relevant targets, COA

development, and mission planning/execution. SO require detailed planning, often by 

relatively small units. Consequently, intelligence requirements are normally greater in scope

and depth than that of CF. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

(JIPOE) provides the foundation for SO intelligence production. Like CF operations, SO 

intelligence analysis focuses on the operational area and the area of interest (AOI); however, 

the strategic nature of SO frequently incorporates an expanded AOI. SO planning typically 

requires a comprehensive analysis of the geopolitical and socioeconomic situation in the 

operational area and AOI to ensure all factors that may affect mission accomplishment are 

considered. SO, having a reduced margin of error due to the small size of teams, require 

greater depth in target intelligence and greater detail in JIPOE to ensure success and avoid 

casualties.

a. Interface with National and Theater Intelligence Assets. The ability to interface 

with theater/national intelligence systems and assets is critical for SO mission success. The 

combatant command joint intelligence operations center (JIOC) is the focal point for 

intelligence activities in support of joint operations with additional support from the Defense 

Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC). Joint force requests for information 

(RFIs) are forwarded to the combatant command JIOC. If the JIOC is unable to respond, 

RFIs are forwarded to the DIOCC. The DIOCC will then interface with other DOD 

intelligence agencies or the national intelligence community through the National 

Intelligence Coordination Center (NICC) to provide support. If the DIOCC determines that 

the information required has not been produced by any agency in the intelligence 

“The operational effectiveness of our deployed forces cannot be, and never has 

been, achieved without being enabled by our joint Service partners. The support 

Air Force, Army, Marine, and Navy engineers, [explosive ordnance disposal] 

technicians, intelligence analysts, and the numerous other professions that 

contribute to SOF [special operations forces], have substantially increased our 

capabilities and effectiveness throughout the world.”

Admiral Eric T. Olson

December 2008
Chapter IV

IV-2 JP 3-05

community, the DIOCC will coordinate with the combatant command JIOC and NICC to

recommend an appropriate strategy to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate the 

required information. A JSOTF, when formed, will have access to these same theater and 

national interfaces through the combatant command JIOC and the DIOCC. Additionally, a 

JSOTF may be augmented with a national intelligence support team comprised of 

representatives from many national intelligence and combat support agencies.

b. All-Source Intelligence. The nature of many SO objectives and tactics requires allsource intelligence support that is often more detailed than that required in conventional 

operations. SOF often use intelligence information to avoid adversary forces, regardless of 

size or composition, as opposed to intelligence information that would allow CF to engage 

the adversary (see Figure IV-1).

c. Expanded Focus. Intelligence support for SOF conducting military engagement, 

security cooperation, crisis response, or limited contingencies requires various intelligence 

disciplines to widen their focus. This includes political, informational, economic, and 

cultural institutions and relationships as well as adversary, friendly force, and target specific 

data including the use of civil information management and other open-source information 

avenues. This is particularly true during FID and when tasked to participate in 

noncombatant evacuation operations.

EXAMPLES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Geographic Information:

Target-Specific Items:

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Terrain, cultural, and demographic factors

Ingress, egress, or cross-country movement analysis

Options for terminal area and evacuation operations

Graphics

Imagery

Textual explanation

Figure IV-1. Examples of Special Operations Forces Intelligence Requirements
Support Considerations for Special Operations Forces

IV-3

d. Sensitivity to HN and Adversary Collection Efforts. SO missions are particularly 

sensitive to HN and adversary collection efforts. Counterintelligence support and OPSEC 

assist in protecting sensitive SO missions.

e. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) Support. GEOINT support can provide timely, 

complete, and accurate information to help SOF with the visualization of the operational 

environment. SOF commanders use GEOINT to help determine friendly and adversary 

COAs and to plan for deployment of SOF and key weapons systems. GEOINT contingency 

planning identifies the AOI and determines GEOINT requirements for SO activities and 

weapons systems. It also determines current availability for resources to meet those 

requirements, determines risk, and then develops a production strategy to address shortfalls. 

During crisis action planning (CAP), the requirement to plan GEOINT support for crisis 

response operations depends greatly upon the scope of the mission, how much GEOINT can 

be adapted from existing contingency plans, and the total time available for GEOINT to be 

included in the CAP process. When plans call for working in a multinational force or with 

HN forces, early consideration should be given to developing and using releasable 

intelligence products, to the maximum extent consistent with security considerations. This 

will facilitate a common operational picture.

f. SOF Support to National and Theater Human Information Requirements.

While SO can be informed by national and theater intelligence assets, SO fill a critical gap in 

providing information that is not available through technical means. SOF’s presence in 

denied or politically sensitive areas can provide enhanced situational awareness to a JFC that 

would not otherwise be available. 

For further information on intelligence support, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National 

Intelligence Support to Military Operations, JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 

Operational Environment, and JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

For further information on GEOINT, refer to JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to 

Joint Operations.

3. Operational Contract Support

Operational contract support is as integral to SO as it is to conventional operations. The 

continual introduction of high-tech equipment, coupled with force structure and manning 

limitations, and high operating tempo mean that SOF may be augmented with contracted 

support, including contingency contractor employees and all tiers of subcontractor 

employees who are specifically authorized through their contract to accompany the force and 

have protected status in accordance with international conventions (i.e., contractors 

authorized to accompany the force). To do this, contract support integration and contractor 

management must be integrated into military planning and operations. Early integration of 

these planning considerations also allows for any unique security clearance or OPSEC 

concerns related to the SO. 

For more information regarding operational contract support, see JP 4-10, Operational

Contract Support.
Chapter IV

IV-4 JP 3-05

4. Host-Nation Support

Host-nation support (HNS) is that civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to 

foreign forces within its territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. 

For SO, HNS must be weighed against OPSEC considerations, mission requirements and 

duration, and the operational environment. HNS is a key common-user logistics area of 

concern.

a. HNS may often play an important role in reducing the military logistic footprint in 

theater, thus allowing the deployment of increased combat capabilities early in the operation. 

HNS can also provide long-term logistic support, thus freeing up key military logistic 

capabilities for other contingencies. 

b. Some considerations for HNS:

(1) Authority for negotiations must be obtained through the supported JFC (to 

include the supported GCC) and through the appropriate US COM channels.

(2) Whenever possible, HNS agreements should include the authority for the 

CDRJSOTF to coordinate directly with the HN for support, acquisition, and use of facilities 

and real estate.

(3) Every effort should be made to obtain language support for negotiations with 

local nationals.

(4) A legal advisor experienced in HNS should be involved in the HNS agreements 

process.

(5) It is critical to determine a lead agency to contract and negotiate HNS.

(6) To optimize effective HNS, there should be centralized planning and 

coordination of HNS functions (i.e., identification of requirements and procurement).

(7) Especially for SOF, the movement/distribution and security of applicable HNS 

items must be considered, based on the operational environment.

For additional information regarding HNS, see JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task 

Force Operations, and JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. Refer to DODD 2010.9, Acquisition and 

Cross-Servicing Agreements, for policy for the acquisition from and transfer to authorized 

foreign governments of logistics support, supplies, and services.

5. Logistic Support

GCCs and their Service component commanders, in coordination with the CDRTSOC, 

are responsible for ensuring that effective and responsive support systems are developed and 

provided for assigned/attached SOF. The CDRTSOC, or the JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF, when a 

JTF is established, validates logistic requirements for SOF in theater for the GCC. To the 

extent possible, SOF logistic requirements should be identified during the contingency 
Support Considerations for Special Operations Forces

IV-5

planning process. Logistic support for SOF units can be provided through one or more of the 

following:

a. Service Support. The logistic support of SOF units is the responsibility of their 

parent Service, except where otherwise provided for by support agreements or other 

directives. This responsibility exists regardless of whether the SOF unit requiring support is 

assigned to the Service component, the TSOC, JFSOCC, or a JSOTF. SOF Service-common 

logistic support includes equipment, material, supplies, and services adopted by a military 

Service for use by its own forces and their activities. These include standard military items, 

base operating support, and the supplies and services provided by a Service to support and 

sustain its own forces, including those forces assigned to the combatant commands. Items 

and services defined as Service-common by one Service are not necessarily Service-common 

for all other Services.

b. Joint In-Theater Support. The majority of SOF missions require joint logistic 

planning and execution. When a theater Service component cannot satisfy its Service SOF 

support requirements, the GCC will determine if another Service component can do so 

through common or joint servicing arrangements. Joint logistic arrangements may also be 

used when more effective than normal Service support.

c. Nonstandard Support. When operations involving SOF impose time, geographic, 

and/or resource constraints on the theater support infrastructure, making it impractical for the 

theater to provide the requisite support to SOF, the GCC may request from CDRUSSOCOM 

the deployment of organic USSOCOM combat service support assets.

d. SO-Peculiar Support. SO-peculiar logistic support includes equipment, materials, 

supplies, and services required for SO missions for which there is no Service-common 

requirement. These are limited to items and services initially designed for, or used by, SOF 

until adopted for Service-common use by one or more Service. Modifications are approved 

by CDRUSSOCOM for application to standard items and services used by the Services, and 

items and services identified as critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a 

special operations mission. This support will be provided via USSOCOM Service 

component logistic infrastructures and in coordination with theater Service components.

e. HNS. Countries with or without a government infrastructure may only be able to 

provide limited logistics support. 

For further information on SOF logistic support, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and JP 3-

05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

6. Health Service Support

SOF teams frequently operate in remote areas and therefore, are exposed to health 

threats not normally seen in the other areas of the respective HNs. As a consequence, 

proactive force health protection is critical for mission success and preservation of highvalue SOF assets. SOF will often operate in theaters that are underdeveloped with little or 

no health care support structure. Point-to-point movement to designated Medical Treatment 
Chapter IV

IV-6 JP 3-05

Facilities is standard while medical regulating and strategic aeromedical evacuation (AE)

might be required and should be part of the contingency planning process.

a. Austere SOF Support Structure. SOF health service support is characterized by an 

austere structure and a limited number of medical personnel with enhanced medical skills. 

SOF medical personnel often provide emergency treatment and a basic level of medical care 

at the operational team level with organic medical assets. Additional medical support and 

patient movement (see Figure IV-2) provided to SOF units in the operational area can be

planned and conducted by SOF medical personnel. Not all SOF missions require SOFtrained medical assets. SOF medical assets are limited and may require support from 

conventional units. Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) for SOF personnel is the transport of 

casualties by any expedient means possible. SOF medical personnel perform CASEVAC 

missions, forward of the intermediate staging base (ISB), on opportune aircraft or other 

means of transport, back to the ISB or a predetermined point where AE assets are located. 

Requests for medical regulating should be submitted to the appropriate patient movement 

requirements center after competent medical authority attests to the need to move the patient. 

AE is conducted once the casualty is regulated into the patient movement system. AE is 

performed using fixed-wing aircraft and AE trained medical crews. It is the movement of 

patients under medical supervision to and between medical treatment facilities. SOF units 

have varying degrees of first responder (Role 1) capabilities and limited forward 

resuscitative (Role 2) capabilities. SOF do not have organic theater hospitalization (Role 3)

or definitive care (Role 4) capabilities readily available to them and must rely on either 

available theater health service support assets or local HN capabilities when access to theater 

hospitalization (Role 3) care is an urgent necessity.

b. Conventional Support Structure. Provision of medical support beyond SOF 

capabilities depends on the thoroughness of advanced planning so that the conventional 

medical support structure umbrella is extended to cover the limited organic capability or to 

meet requirements for additional medical assets (such as surgical intervention, evacuation, 

and expanded medical logistics). SOF medical units deploy with initial assets to support 

operational planning requirements. Deployed medical resupply is the responsibility of the 

theater medical logistics system. SOF and theater medical planners need to establish a 

responsive medical logistics resupply process utilizing the theater medical logistics system.

Certain operations may also require special security requirements to be put in place to not 

compromise the identification of SOF personnel upon entry into the conventional medical 

system.

For further information on health service support, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support, 

and JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.
Support Considerations for Special Operations Forces

IV-7

7. Communications Systems Support

a. Global Support. Communications systems support to SOF normally are global, 

secure, and jointly interoperable. It must be flexible so that it can be tailored to specific SO 

missions and it must add value to the SOF operational capability. Communicationssystems 

support the full range of SO worldwide. SOF must be able to communicate anywhere and 

anytime using the full range of national capabilities required to support the mission. 

Therefore, SOF operational units have a variety of methods for communicating, reporting, 

and querying available resources, regardless of geographic location.

b. Multiple and Varied Systems. SOF communications support consists of multiple 

and varied groups of systems, procedures, personnel, and equipment that operate in diverse 

manners and at different echelons, from the national to the tactical levels. Communications 

systems have to support discrete as well as collective functions. SOF missions are normally 

controlled at the lowest operational level that can accomplish the needed coordination, 

although political considerations may require control at the national level. SOF 

communications systems are set up to offer seamless connectivity.

STRATEGIC SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PATIENT MOVEMENT

Casualty 

Evacuation

Medical 

Evacuation

Aeromedical 

Evacuation

Fixed 

Hospital

Mobility/ 

Intermediate 

Staging Base

Forward 

Staging Base

Mission 

Tasking 

Package

Mobile Staging 

Facility

Medical 

Treatment 

Facility

Figure IV-2. Strategic Special Operations Forces Patient Movement
Chapter IV

IV-8 JP 3-05

c. Interoperable Systems. SOF communications systems employed for a given 

operation should be selected based on their ability to be interoperable at the appropriate 

security level with the systems deployed by US CF, joint commands, multinational units, and 

US commercial networks to facilitate the seamless transport of critical information and 

common services. They should also have the flexibility to integrate not only with state-ofthe-art systems, but also be capable of integrating with less sophisticated equipment often 

found in less developed nations. Interoperability includes attaining commonality, 

compatibility, and standardization of communications systems.

d. CDRUSSOCOM Responsibilities. CDRUSSOCOM, as do each of the Services, 

has the following communications responsibilities:

(1) To provide, operate, and maintain communication facilities organic to SOF, 

including organic Service elements.

(2) To provide, operate, and maintain interoperable and compatible 

communications systems.

(3) To provide the capability for interface of non-Defense Information Systems 

Network facilities.

(4) To provide the combatant commands with SO communications systems and 

connectivity for SOF assigned to that command for inclusion in contingency planning.

For further information on communications support of SOF, refer to JP 3-05.1, Joint Special 

Operations Task Force Operations, and JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

8. Public Affairs Support

a. Diplomatic and Political Sensitivity of SO. The diplomatic and political sensitivity 

of many SO mandates that thorough and accurate PA guidance be developed during the 

operational planning stage and approved for use in advance of most SO.

b. Accurate Reflection of the SO Mission. PA planning must accurately reflect the 

objective of the mission to domestic audiences consistent with the overall MISO and CMO 

effort, and with strategic, operational, and tactical OPSEC requirements. The commander 

should develop proposed PA guidance that is coordinated with supporting commands and 

government agencies, as appropriate, prior to forwarding that guidance to the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) for approval.

For further information on PA support, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs, and JP 3-05.1, Joint 

Special Operations Task Force Operations.

9. Combat Camera Support

a. Combat camera provides still and video documentary products that support MISO

and other SO missions. Many combat camera teams supporting SOF are specially equipped 

with night vision and digital image transmission capabilities. Combat camera also provides 
Support Considerations for Special Operations Forces

IV-9

gun camera image processing for theater and national use. Combat camera imagery is used 

to portray the true nature of US operations to multinational partners and civilian populaces, 

as well as adversaries, and to counter adversary disinformation with on-screen or gun camera 

evidence. The SOF link to combat camera support normally is through the supported GCC’s 

IO cell and the visual information planner.

b. Visual Information. The coordination of visual information is an important function 

that leverages this extensive cross-element support. Each of the following contributes some 

type of imagery—all of which are combined to shape a comprehensive visualization package 

for special operations missions. Visual information is derived from a variety of sources such 

as unmanned aircraft collected imagery, photo journalist collected imagery, PA imagery, 

intelligence related imagery, satellite imagery, individual soldier collected imagery, gun 

camera imagery, as well as combat camera products. The visual information function 

supports the overall planning and implementation of SO and is especially valuable to a 

commander’s communications strategy. The communication strategy is the JFC’s strategy 

for coordinating and synchronizing themes, messages, images, and actions to support 

objectives and to ensure the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest 

tactical level.

10. Legal Support

SO missions frequently involve a unique set of complex issues. There are federal laws 

and executive orders, federal agency publications and directives, the law of armed conflict, 

and ROE that may affect SO missions as well as the SO joint planning and targeting 

processes. These guidelines become especially critical during sensitive contingency 

missions when international and domestic laws, treaty provisions, and political agreements 

may affect mission planning and execution. SOF commanders must seek legal review during 

all levels of planning and execution of SO missions, to include planning of the ROE.

For further information on legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support, and JP 3-05.1, 

Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

11. Protection

a. The protection of the force is an essential consideration. Protection focuses on 

conserving the SOF fighting potential, whether operating independently, or as part of a larger 

joint force in a major operation/campaign. The four primary ways: active defensive 

measures that protect the joint force, its information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and 

lines of communications from an adversary’s attack; passive defensive measures that make 

friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy; applying 

technology and procedures to reduce the risk of fratricide; and emergency management and 

response to reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to accidents, health threats, and 

natural disasters. As the JFC’s mission requires, the protection function also extends beyond 

force protection to encompass protection of US civilians; the forces, systems, and civil 

infrastructure of friendly nations; and OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. For force protection, 

typically each GCC has TACON of US forces in their AOR.
Chapter IV

IV-10 JP 3-05

b. Protection considerations include basic force security; active and passive air and 

missile defense; OPSEC; computer network defense (CND); information assurance (IA);

electronic protection; personnel recovery; CBRN operations; antiterrorism support; combat 

identification; survivability; safety; and force health protection.

c. SOF planners should ensure their planning and supported theater plans include as 

adequate provisions for protection as they would for intelligence, sustainment, 

communications, etc.

For more detailed information regarding protection, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

12. Fire Support

SOF may require long-range,surface-based, joint fire support in remote locations or for 

targets well beyond the land, maritime, and amphibious operational force area of operations. 

SOF liaison elements coordinate fire support through both external and SOF channels. SOF 

liaison elements (e.g., SOCCE and SOLE) provide SOF expertise to coordinate, synchronize, 

and deconflict SOF fire support. Interoperable communications and detailed procedures 

between fire support providers and SOF operating deep within enemy territory must be 

considered. Comprehensive fire support planning between SOF and supporting elements 

will facilitate rapid, responsive, and accurate mission execution. 

For further information on fire support, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

13. Air Support

In addition to their organic air capabilities for infiltration, exfiltration, resupply, and 

precision fire support, SOF often requires conventional air support that requires timely and 

detailed planning and coordination. Air support is typically provided by the JFACC (or an 

Air Force component commander), and the JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF normally provides a SOLE 

to the JFACC at the JAOC. In addition to helping to deconflict and coordinate SO with the 

JFACC, the SOLE helps coordinate SO requests for air support. Air support can include 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, airlift, close air support, air refueling, EW, 

etc., and the use of SOF or CF joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs), TACPs, and/or the 

elements and capabilities of an Air Force air support operations center (ASOC) located with 

an Army component command. JTACs/TACPs can work directly for SOF units supporting 

various missions. ASOCs can help the SOF commander integrate and synchronize use of air 

power to support SO. Elements provided to SOF units may require additional training or 

equipment to effectively and safely facilitate air support during SO.

14. Maritime Support

Maritime support is provided by the joint force maritime component commander, the 

Navy component commander, and/or the Marine Corps component commander. Maritime 

support includes fire support, seabasing operations, deception, and deterrence. Maritime 

support, such as SOF helicopters landing on Navy ships, typically requires advanced 

planning and coordination because of technical and safety issues. Additionally, the 
Support Considerations for Special Operations Forces

IV-11

commander, amphibious task force and the commander, landing force, may also provide 

amphibious support for the MARSOF and other SOF units. The unique nature of SOF 

equipment and operational requirements (e.g., communications, weapons, and the need for 

compartmentalized planning spaces) further reinforce the requirement for early coordination.

For more information on helicopter employment from Navy ships, see JP 3-04, Joint 

Shipboard Helicopter Operations.

15. Space Support

With the exception of intelligence provided by national technical means, space support 

for SOF is provided through the USSTRATCOM Joint Functional Component Command for 

Space upon request by the supported CCDR. 

a. For theater level support, Services assign space operators to various joint and Service 

echelons. JFCs may assign space experts to the joint component commanders’ staffs. JFCs 

and their components request space services and capabilities early in the planning process to 

ensure effective and efficient use of space assets. Each GCC has a network of space 

technicians and subject matter expert staff officers, resident on staffs at multiple echelons,

who serve as theater advisors for space capabilities (national, military, civil, commercial, and 

foreign). These individuals concentrate primarily on working the detailed activities of 

theater space operations based on coordination with the JFC’s space coordinating authority 

in developing, collecting, and prioritizing space requirements. Several DOD and national 

agencies deploy theater support teams that can provide additional space services and 

capabilities.

b. Space support personnel can assist SOF commanders and staff in understanding the 

capabilities, limitations, and effective application of space systems, and ensure that SOF 

support requirements are clearly understood. Space based support to SOF can include: 

precision navigation and/or geopositioning, global communications, global intelligence 

collection, surveillance and warning, meteorological support, imagery for geospatial support 

and targeting, blue force tracking data, and denying adversary use of space-based capabilities 

(see Figure IV-3). Satellite threat advisories can provide additional mission security by 

influencing SOF operational timing.

For further information on space support, refer to JP 3-14, Space Operations, and JP 

3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.
Chapter IV

IV-12 JP 3-05

16. Meteorological and Oceanographic Support

a. Use of Environmental Data. Environmental information should be integrated in the 

SOF commander’s decision-making process from initial planning to execution (e.g., joint 

operational planning process and intelligence preparation of the battlespace). Meteorological 

and oceanographic (METOC) data can provide information such as studies of general 

climatology, operational climatology, hydrography, and specific weather forecasts such as 

mission execution forecast for the operational area focused on operationally significant 

METOC thresholds. This information can be used by the commander to choose the best 

windows of opportunity to execute, support, and sustain specific SOF operations. 

b. Exploitation of METOC Conditions. Potentially, an execution decision may be 

based on exploiting certain weather and METOC conditions to provide the best advantages 

in conducting operations while avoiding environmental conditions that will adversely impact 

operations. SOF units train to exploit every advantage, and operating at the limits of their 

capabilities, frequently require extraordinarily precise, fine-scale METOC products.

c. Environmental Effects on Space Operations. With increased military reliance on 

space capabilities, the SOF commander must also be kept informed of environmental effects 

SPACE-BASED SUPPORT TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Precision navigation and/or geopositioning

Global communication

Global intelligence collection

Surveillance and warning

Meteorological support

Imagery for geospatial support and targeting

Blue force tracking

Figure IV-3. Space-Based Support to Special Operations Forces
Support Considerations for Special Operations Forces

IV-13

on space operations. METOC support personnel can provide information that will allow the 

SOF commander to plan for the possibility of the loss of one or more critical space-based 

systems, such as precision navigation, timing, and communications systems.

For further information on METOC support, refer to JP 3-59, Meteorological and 

Oceanographic Operations, and JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

17. Cyberspace Support

Cyberspace crosses all the physical domains and provides military advantage to both 

SOF and adversaries alike. Cyberspace operations in support of SO can often be conducted 

remotely, thus reducing the SOF footprint and contributing to freedom of action within a 

given operational area. The Services maintain cyberspace forces, some of whom are 

dedicated to providing specific support to SOF. In some cases, those forces are apportioned 

to SOF directly, while in others, they are simply aligned in a supporting role to SOF.

18. Information Operations Support

IO are integral to successful military operations and especially when conducting SO. 

The full impact of IO on friendly, neutral, and hostile forces should be considered in the 

communication strategy of the supported JFC with the goal of achieving and maintaining 

information superiority for joint and friendly forces. IO are described as the integrated 

employment of the core capabilities of EW, CNO, MISO, MILDEC, and OPSEC, in concert 

with specified supporting and related capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp 

adversary human and automated decision making while protecting our own.

a. IO is a SOF core activity, and also integral to the successful execution of many 

SO. MISO is a SOF core activity and a core IO capability, as is the IO related capability of 

CMO, often involved with CA operations, another SOF core activity. SO may require 

support from any combination of core, supporting, or related IO capabilities, so the JFC’s IO 

cell should include a SOF representative. SOF require IO support, whether SOF are 

employed independently or in conjunction with CF.

(1) OPSEC and MILDEC are key parts of setting the conditions for operational 

success of SO. These efforts are central to achieving surprise, helping to isolate the target 

area, and will also be important enablers for gaining control of the operational environment 

and neutralizing enemy forces. 

(a) OPSEC attempts to deny critical information about friendly forces to the 

adversary. SOF preparing for deployment can have distinct signatures. Masking the 

movement of forces to staging bases and to the operational area is essential. These 

movements may not be totally hidden; however, such detail as the composition of the forces 

or the time and location of the deployment or infiltration should be concealed. The object is 

to surprise, confuse, or paralyze the enemy. OPSEC procedures must be planned, practiced, 

and enforced during training, movement, and operations.

For further details on OPSEC, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.
Chapter IV

IV-14 JP 3-05

(b) MILDEC misleads the adversary as to friendly military capabilities, 

intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or 

inactions) that may contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. MILDEC 

operations must be closely coordinated with the overall operational scheme of maneuver and 

other IO efforts. The deception operation will have little effect if it is compromised by poor 

OPSEC or conflicts with concurrent MISO. Successful military deceptions require sufficient 

resources, leadership, and linked objectives and goals from the strategic to tactical level.

For further details on MILDEC, refer to JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.

(2) EW includes any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and 

directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The JFC’s 

plan must be developed to ensure complementary use of assets and weapons systems to 

effectively disrupt and/or destroy enemy C2 and weapons systems, while protecting joint 

force capabilities.

See JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, for additional detail on EW.

(3) CNO stems from the use of networked computers and supporting information 

technology infrastructure systems by military and civilian organizations. CNO are 

cyberspace operations that may very easily be used in support of SO. CNO, along with EW, 

is used to attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, exploit, and defend electronic information 

and infrastructure. For the purpose of military operations, CNO are divided into computer 

network attack (CNA), CND, and related computer network exploitation (CNE) enabling 

operations. CNA consists of actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, 

deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the 

computers and networks themselves. CND involves actions taken through the use of 

computer networks to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity 

within DOD information systems and computer networks. CND actions not only protect 

DOD systems from an external adversary but also from exploitation from within, and are 

now a necessary function in all military operations. CNE is enabling operations and 

intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather 

data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks. However, it must 

be understood that many irregular adversaries use the Internet as a means of C2 and for 

planning purposes, so for example, one form of CNO (e.g., CNE) may be possible when 

another (e.g., CNA) would not.

b. A goal of a JFC is to shape the information environment to achieve information 

superiority. The JFC should strive to create and/or sustain desired and measurable effects on 

foreign TAs; while protecting and defending the JFC’s own forces, actions, information, and 

information systems. As part of IO, the JFC ensures SOF IO requirements are worked into 

the overall IO planning and execution. SO planning should include considerations for IO 

support based on the communication strategy of the supported JFC.

c. IO capabilities will also play an integral role in isolating a SO target, whether that 

isolation is from nearby enemy military forces, or from enemy C2 nodes and centers, both 
Support Considerations for Special Operations Forces

IV-15

inside and outside the operational area. For example, synchronized CNO and EW, supported 

by physical attack on a C2 network, could play a decisive role in this isolation.

d. Supporting IO capabilities (IA, physical security, physical attack, counterintelligence, 

and combat camera) have military purposes other than IO, but they either operate in the 

information environment or have impact on the information environment.

e. Related Information Operations Capabilities

(1) Defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) consists of activities and 

measures taken by DOD components, not solely in the area of IO, to support and facilitate 

public diplomacy efforts of the USG. DSPD requires coordination among interagency 

partners and should be part of the JFC’s communication strategy. 

(2) PA activities are separate, but not isolated from IO. Planning for SO, both by 

the JFC and SOF, should include PA considerations based on the desired and actual effects 

of the SO. PA planning should anticipate the potential detection by the enemy and the media 

of all military operations, with the possible exception of small covert operations. Likewise, 

PA planning should anticipate potential responses to an unsuccessful operation or adverse 

effects such as collateral damage. 

(3) Properly executed CMO in an operational area can reduce potential friction 

points between the civilian population and the joint force, specifically by minimizing civilian

interference with military operations and limiting the impact of military operations on the 

populace. CMO encompass the activities taken by a commander to establish and maintain 

effective relations between military forces and civil authorities, the general population, and 

other civil institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas where those forces are employed. 

CA forces and units are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct CA 

operations in support of CMO.

For further details on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

19. Multinational Support

Multinationalsupport to SOF complements HNS and depends on mission and capability 

requirements.

a. Support may range from broad assistance to highly structured and integrated support 

from multinational CF and multinational SOF. Common examples include information and 

intelligence sharing; providing liaison teams and support to planning efforts; materiel 

assistance; basing, access, and overflight permission; humanitarian assistance; and linguists 

and cultural advice and awareness. Multinational CF and multinational SOF have proven 

invaluable in aiding and augmenting troop rotation, supporting strategic movement, 

providing medical evacuation, conducting FID, and participating in multinational support 

teams.

b. Planners must anticipate requirements and prepare for multinational support SOF, 

sometimes years in advance and on a recurring basis. Various means of preparation include 
Chapter IV 

IV-16 JP 3-05 

establishment of HQ multinational coordination cells; establishment and use of senior 

national representatives and defense attachés; specialized predeployment/interoperability 

training; various agreements (e.g., communications security and cross servicing agreements); 

and combined training and exercises. In some cases, a joint exchange combined training 

program might be used to share skills and improve operational capabilities between US and 

HN forces. 
A-1 

APPENDIX A 

REFERENCES 

The development of JP 3-05 is based upon the following primary references. 

1. General 

a. Title 10, USC, as amended. 

b. Unified Command Plan.

2. Department of Defense 

a. DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major 

Components. 

b. Department of Defense Instruction 6000.11, Patient Movement.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

a. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01G, Joint Strategic 

Capabilities Plan (JSCP). 

b. CJCSI 3110.05D, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the JSCP. 

c. CJCSI 3110.06, Special Operations Supplemental to JSCP. 

d. CJCSI 3110.12D, Civil Affairs Supplement to the JSCP. 

e. CJCSI 3210.01A, Joint Information Warfare Policy.

f. CJCSI 3214.01, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations.

g. Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 71-87, Mission and Functions of the US Special 

Operations Command.

h. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

i. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

j. JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations.

k. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

l. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 

m. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

n. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-05 

o. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

p. JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

q. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

r. JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

s. JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations.

t. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.

u. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

v. JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

w. JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.

x. JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

y. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security. 

z. JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.

aa. JP 3-14, Space Operations.

bb. JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

cc. JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations.

dd. JP 3-26, Counterterrorism.

ee. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

ff. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

gg. JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

hh. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

ii. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

jj. JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations.

kk. JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

ll. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

mm. JP 4-02, Health Service Support.
 References 

A-3 

nn. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

oo. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

pp. JP 6-0, Communications System Support.

4. United States Special Operations Command and Service Publications 

a. US Army Field Manual 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces. 

b. US Air Force Doctrine Document 3-05, Special Operations. 

c. USSOCOM Publication 1, Special Operations.

d. USSOCOM Publication 3-11, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 

Special Operations Forces in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environments.

e. USSOCOM Document 525-7, Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE). 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-05 

Intentionally Blank 
B-1

APPENDIX B

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 

116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address 

content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Special Operations Command. 

The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-05, 17 December 2003, Doctrine for Joint Special 

Operations.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CDRUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//SOOP-PJ-D//

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD//

CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JW100//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Joint Force Development (J-7), 

JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000, with info copies to the 

USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that 

directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. 

The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint 

Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS

____________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________
Appendix B

B-2 JP 3-05

5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. 

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be in accordance 

with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program.

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System at 

https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil (SIPRNET) and on the JEL at 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant 

commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or 

foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to 

DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Bolling AFB, Washington, DC 

20340-5100.

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the 

Joint Staff/J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs.
GL-1 

GLOSSARY 

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

AE aeromedical evacuation 

AFSOC Air Force special operations component 

AFSOD Air Force special operations detachment 

AFSOE Air Force special operations element 

AFSOF Air Force special operations forces 

AOI area of interest 

AOR area of responsibility 

ARSOC Army special operations component 

ARSOF Army special operations forces 

ASOC air support operations center 

C2 command and control 

CA civil affairs 

CAISE civil authority information support element 

CAO civil affairs operations 

CAP crisis action planning 

CASEVAC casualty evacuation 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CbT combating terrorism 

CCDR combatant commander 

CDRJSOTF commander, joint special operations task force 

CDRTSOC commander, theater special operations command 

CDRUSSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations Command 

CF conventional forces 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJTF commander, joint task force 

CMO civil-military operations 

CNA computer network attack 

CND computer network defense 

CNE computer network exploitation 

CNO computer network operations 

COA course of action 

COCOM combatant command (command authority) 

COIN counterinsurgency 

COM chief of mission 

CP counterproliferation 

CT counterterrorism 

DA direct action 

DIOCC Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center 

DJTFAC deployable joint task force augmentation cell 

DOD Department of Defense 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-05 

DOS Department of State 

DSPD defense support to public diplomacy 

EW electronic warfare 

FID foreign internal defense 

FSF foreign security forces 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GCTN global combating terrorism network 

GEOINT geospatial intelligence 

HN host nation 

HNS host-nation support 

HQ headquarters 

IA information assurance 

IDAD internal defense and development 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

IO information operations 

ISB intermediate staging base 

IW irregular warfare 

JAOC joint air operations center 

JCMOTF joint civil-military operations task force 

JFACC joint force air component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFSOC joint force special operations component 

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander 

JIOC joint intelligence operations center 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

 environment 

JMISC Joint Military Information Support Command 

JMISOTF joint military information support operations task force 

JP joint publication 

JSOA joint special operations area 

JSOAC joint special operations air component 

JSOACC joint special operations air component commander 

JSOTF joint special operations task force 

JTAC joint terminal attack controller 

JTF joint task force 

LNO liaison officer 

MARSOC Marine Corps special operations command 

MARSOF Marine Corps special operations forces 
Glossary 

GL-3 

METOC meteorological and oceanographic 

MILDEC military deception 

MISO military information support operations 

MNF multinational force 

NAVSOC Navy special operations component 

NAVSOF Navy special operations forces 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NICC National Intelligence Coordination Center 

NSWTF naval special warfare task force 

NSWTG naval special warfare task group 

OGA other government agency 

OPCON operational control 

OPSEC operations security 

PA public affairs 

PN partner nation 

RC Reserve Component 

RFI request for information 

ROE rules of engagement 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SF special forces 

SFA security force assistance 

SO special operations 

SOA special operations aviation (Army) 

SOC special operations component 

SOCCE special operations command and control element 

SOF special operations forces 

SOJTF special operations joint task force 

SOLE special operations liaison element 

SO-peculiar special operations-peculiar 

SOTF special operations task force 

SR special reconnaissance 

SSR security sector reform 

TA target audience 

TACON tactical control 

TACP tactical air control party 

TSOC theater special operations command 

USC United States Code 

USG United States Government 

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-05 

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

UW unconventional warfare 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 
GL-5 

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

aeromedical evacuation. The movement of patients under medical supervision to and 

between medical treatment facilities by air transportation. Also called AE. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 4-02) 

Air Force special operations base. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

Air Force special operations detachment. A squadron-size headquarters that could be a 

composite organization composed of different Air Force special operations assets, 

normally subordinate to an Air Force special operations component. Also called 

AFSOD. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

Air Force special operations element. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

Air Force special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Air Force 

forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, 

and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called AFSOF. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

architecture. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

area assessment. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

area oriented. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

armed reconnaissance. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

Army special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Army forces 

designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and 

equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called ARSOF. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

beach landing site. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

blocking position. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

bridgehead. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

campaign plan. A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at 

achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

casualty evacuation. The unregulated movement of casualties that can include movement 

both to and between medical treatment facilities. Also called CASEVAC. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 4-02) 

center of gravity. The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of 

action, or will to act. Also called COG. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 3-05 

civil administration. An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly 

territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise 

certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, 

occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, 

legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be 

established. Also called CA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, 

trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civilmilitary operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

civil affairs operations. Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) 

enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where 

military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency 

organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, 

indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve 

application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil 

government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. Also called CAO. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, 

or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian 

organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile 

operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve 

operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by 

military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, 

regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or 

subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of 

other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated 

civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other 

forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority 

established by Title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, Section 164, exercised 

only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise 

directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command 

authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to 

perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and 

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving 

authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics 

necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command 

(command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate 

organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force 

commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant 

command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ 

commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish 
Glossary 

GL-7 

assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command 

authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 

combating terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism and counterterrorism, taken to 

oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CbT. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-26) 

combined joint special operations task force. None. (Approved for removal from JP 

1-02.)

conventional forces. 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear 

weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. Also called 

CF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

counterinsurgency. Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an 

insurgency and to address any core grievances. Also called COIN. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-24) 

counterterrorism. Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to 

influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist 

networks. Also called CT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-26) 

covert operation. An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of 

or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

cutout. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or 

falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the 

enemy’s interests. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.4) 

denied area. An area under enemy or unfriendly control in which friendly forces cannot 

expect to operate successfully within existing operational constraints and force 

capabilities. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

direct action. Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a 

special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments and which 

employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or 

damage designated targets. Also called DA. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in 

any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated 

organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, 

terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-22) 

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of 

forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-05 

of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short 

duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 

guerrilla. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

guerrilla force. A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along 

military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or 

denied territory. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

in extremis. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

insurgency. The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that 

seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer 

to the group itself. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-24) 

intelligence preparation of the battlespace. The analytical methodologies employed by 

the Services or joint force component commands to reduce uncertainties concerning the 

enemy, environment, time, and terrain. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace 

supports the individual operations of the joint force component commands. Also called 

IPB. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-01.3) 

internal defense and development. The full range of measures taken by a nation to 

promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, 

terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called IDAD. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-22) 

irregular forces. Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed 

forces, police, or other internal security forces. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-24) 

joint combined exchange training. A program conducted overseas to fulfill US forces 

training requirements and at the same time exchange the sharing of skills between US 

forces and host nation counterparts. Also called JCET. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02.) 

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, 

subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing 

commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, 

attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air 

operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint 

force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions 

and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified 

commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command 

(command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 
Glossary 

GL-9 

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified 

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the 

establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of 

assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and 

assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational 

missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander 

is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the 

establishing commander. Also called JFSOCC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

joint servicing. That function performed by a jointly staffed and financed activity in 

support of two or more Services. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

joint special operations air component commander. The commander within a joint force 

special operations command responsible for planning and executing joint special 

operations air activities. Also called JSOACC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

joint special operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force 

commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special 

operations activities. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action 

mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of 

unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations units 

from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or 

prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. Also 

called JSOTF. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

Marine Corps special operations forces. Those Active Component Marine Corps forces 

designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and 

equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called MARSOF. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-05.1) 

multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an 

alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 1) 

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by 

forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or 

alliance. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-16) 

multinational warfare. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

national security. A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign 

relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. a military or 

defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. a favorable foreign 

relations position; or c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or 

destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02 with JP 1 as the source JP.) 
Glossary 

GL-10 JP 3-05 

naval mobile environmental team. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

naval special warfare. A naval warfare specialty that conducts special operations with an 

emphasis on maritime, coastal, and riverine environments using small, flexible, mobile 

units operating under, on, and from the sea. Also called NSW. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

naval special warfare special operations component. None. (Approved for removal from 

JP 1-02.) 

noncombatant evacuation operations. Operations directed by the Department of State or 

other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, whereby 

noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by 

war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens as designated by the Department of 

State. Also called NEOs. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-68) 

nongovernmental organization. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization 

dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, 

economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution: 

and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also 

called NGO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08) 

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any 

echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in 

combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. 

Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over 

subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning 

tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish 

the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of 

military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the 

command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of 

subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate 

joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. 

Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces 

and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary 

to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative 

direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or 

unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 

operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences 

that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. 

Also called OE. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently 

analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. 

identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. 

determine indicators that adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be 
Glossary 

GL-11 

interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to 

adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an 

acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also 

called OPSEC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.3) 

overt operation. An operation conducted openly, without concealment. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 2-01.2)

paramilitary forces. Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any 

country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-24) 

personnel recovery. The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and 

execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. Also called PR. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-50) 

preparation of the environment. An umbrella term for operations and activities conducted 

by selectively trained special operations forces to develop an environment for potential 

future special operations. Also called PE. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

Rangers. Rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized and trained to conduct 

highly complex joint direct action operations in coordination with or in support of other 

special operations units of all Services. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

resistance movement. An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a 

country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to 

disrupt civil order and stability. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-05 

as the source JP.) 

SEAL delivery vehicle team. United States Navy forces organized, trained, and equipped 

to conduct special operations with SEAL delivery vehicles, dry deck shelters, and other 

submersible platforms. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

SEAL team. United States Navy forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special 

operations with an emphasis on maritime, coastal, and riverine environments. 

(Approved for replacement of “sea-air-land team” and its definition in JP 1-02.) 

security force assistance. The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified 

action by the United States Government to support the development of the capacity and 

capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Also called SFA. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-22) 

special activities. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

special boat team. United States Navy forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct 

or support special operations with combatant craft and other small craft. Also called 

SBT. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-12 JP 3-05 

special forces. US Army forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special 

operations with an emphasis on unconventional warfare capabilities. Also called SF. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

special forces group. The largest Army combat element for special operations consisting of 

command and control, special forces battalions, and a support battalion capable of long 

duration missions. Also called SFG. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02. ) 

special forces operations base. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

special operations. Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, 

equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 

environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, 

clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring 

regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. Also called SO. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

special operations command. A subordinate unified or other joint command established by 

a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct and support joint special 

operations within the joint force commander’s assigned operational area. Also called 

SOC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

special operations command and control element. A special operations element that is the 

focal point for the synchronization of special operations forces activities with 

conventional forces activities. Also called SOCCE. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02.)

special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military 

Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and 

equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-05.1) 

special operations liaison element. A special operations liaison team provided by the joint 

force special operations component commander to the joint force air component 

commander (if designated), or appropriate Service component air command and control 

organization, to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations air, surface, and 

subsurface operations with conventional air operations. Also called SOLE. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-05)

special operations-peculiar. Equipment, material, supplies, and services required for 

special operations missions for which there is no Service-common requirement. Also 

called SO-peculiar. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

special operations weather team. A task organized team of Air Force personnel organized, 

trained, and equipped to collect critical environmental information from data sparse 

areas. Also called SOWT. (Approved for replacement of “special operations weather 

team/tactical element” and its definition in JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-13 

special reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special 

operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify 

information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not 

normally found in conventional forces. Also called SR. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02.) 

special tactics. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

special tactics team. An Air Force task-organized element of special tactics that may 

include combat control, pararescue, tactical air control party, and special operations 

weather personnel. Also called STT. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

subordinate unified command. A command established by commanders of unified 

commands, when so authorized by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with 

the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be 

established on an area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified 

commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of 

unified commands and exercise operational control of assigned commands and forces 

within the assigned operational area. Also called subunified command. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 1) 

subversion. Actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or 

political strength or morale of a governing authority. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-24) 

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or 

military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed 

direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary 

to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational 

control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the 

level of combatant command. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for 

controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets 

within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 

task-organizing. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

terrorism. The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce 

governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other 

ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.2) 

theater special operations command. A subordinate unified command established by a 

combatant commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations. 

Also called TSOC. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

unconventional warfare. Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or 

insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by 
Glossary 

GL-14 JP 3-05 

operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied 

area. Also called UW. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

weapons of mass destruction. Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons 

capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude the means 

of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible 

part from the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-40) 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATIONS

PLANS SYSTEM

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the

development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-05 Operations