Department of Homeland Security

Office of Inspector General 

DHS' Efforts to Improve the Homeland 


Security Information Network 


OIG-09-07 October 2008 
 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528

 October 29, 2008 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the Homeland Security 

Information Network. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant 

agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our 

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is 

our hope that this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical 

operations. We express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation 

of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 


Inspector General 

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 


Executive Summary..........................................................................................................1 


Background.......................................................................................................................2
 

Results of Audit ................................................................................................................4
 

Increased HSIN Use Reported But Limited Nationwide Sharing ..............................4 


Improved Training Delivery Methods ........................................................................5 


Stakeholder Involvement and Communications Challenges ......................................5 


Information Sharing Process Not Defined..................................................................7 


Stakeholder Dissatisfaction.........................................................................................8 


Performance Measures Not Developed ......................................................................8
 

Recommendations.............................................................................................................9 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ...................................................................11 


Appendices

 Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.......................................................13 


Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report .......................................15 


Appendix C: Major Contributors to this Report ........................................................20 


Appendix D: Report Distribution...............................................................................21 


Abbreviations 

COI Community of Interest 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

HMCC HSIN Mission Coordination Committee 

HSIN Homeland Security Information Network 

HSIN-AC HSIN Advisory Council 

HSIN Next Gen HSIN Next Generation 

HS SLIC Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community 

I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

IT Information Technology 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 


OMB Office of Management and Budget 

OPS Office of Operations Coordination 

SLC System Life Cycle 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 
OIG
 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

We evaluated the Homeland Security Information Network’s 

(HSIN) support of information sharing as a followup to our June 

2006 audit report, Homeland Security Information Network Could 

Support Information Sharing More Effectively. The audit 

objectives were to determine: 1) progress toward addressing our 

recommendations from the June 2006 HSIN report; 2) the status of 

information sharing among select HSIN stakeholders; and 3) 

challenges and barriers to HSIN’s use and implementation. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) made some progress 

in addressing our recommendations, and is taking steps to upgrade 

the current version of HSIN. To be successful, however, DHS’ 

planned future upgrades of HSIN need to address a number of 

concerns identified in the previous audit. 

Specifically, DHS needs to identify HSIN’s users and determine 

their information sharing requirements. Lacking a good 

understanding of the HSIN user community, DHS has been unable 

to define the information sharing process or provide adequate user 

support. In addition, although HSIN stakeholders report increased 

use of the tool within states, nationwide information sharing 

remains limited. Finally, DHS has not developed performance 

measures to enable it to track or assess information sharing using 

HSIN. 

We are recommending that DHS: 

�	 Provide sufficient resources to improve stakeholder 

relations, ensure adequate stakeholder involvement and 

communication, and meet the needs of its customers at the 

federal, state and local, tribal, and private industry levels; 

Develop scenario-based training for stakeholders and 

communicate the availability of existing training; 

Ensure that system performance and information sharing 

metrics are included in any and all future HSIN 

developments; and 

Define and communicate DHS’ information sharing 

process to ensure that users understand what information to 

share and what DHS does with the information. 

�	 

�	 

�	 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 1 

Background 

A critical aspect of the DHS mission is information sharing. This 

responsibility requires a robust information-sharing environment. 

HSIN is the department’s sensitive but unclassified level, internetbased, information sharing tool designed to support this facet of 

DHS’ mission. DHS obtained the system in 2003 to establish a 

secure communications and information technology (IT) 

infrastructure. HSIN enables the department and its intelligence, 

law enforcement, and emergency management partners to collect, 

analyze, and disseminate information in order to detect and deter 

threats to the security of the homeland. 

In February 2008, the department reported to the Congress that 

DHS has spent approximately $69 million on HSIN over the past 5 

years. Additionally, the department reported to the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) an estimated annual cost of $21 

million for the HSIN program for budget year 2008. 

The DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS) 

manages the HSIN program. OPS is responsible for monitoring 

the security of the United States on a daily basis and coordinating 

activities within the department and with governors, homeland 

security advisors, law enforcement partners, and critical 

infrastructure operators in all 50 states and more than 50 major 

urban areas nationwide. In order to achieve these goals, OPS 

developed and maintains HSIN as the primary means for 

communication, collaboration, situational awareness, and 

information sharing. 

In February 2008, DHS announced that it planned to upgrade the 

current version of HSIN to meet the needs of its growing user base 

in state and local governments and private sector communities. 

The upgrade, referred to as the Next Generation of HSIN (HSIN 

Next Gen), will be phased-in after the May 2008 contract award 

for HSIN Next Gen. The effort will involve upgrading current 

HSIN system capabilities to support DHS’ objective to 

significantly increase information interoperability and security 

with security partners and their systems. 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 2 

 

HSIN Next Gen will follow best practices for system 

implementation and integration, including the use of a System Life 

Cycle (SLC) framework for system acquisition and development 

efforts. DHS’ SLC, though still in draft, identifies specific steps to 

take prior to beginning the system development process, including 

the gathering of data requirements, development of a concept of 

operations, and definition of business processes. DHS developed 

the SLC to ensure that IT resources are managed effectively, and 

that solutions meet user requirements and support DHS’ strategic 

goals and objectives. Following the SLC framework during the 

creation of HSIN Next Gen should help ensure that stakeholders 

are involved in the process and, therefore, will better understand 

how they can use HSIN to support nationwide information sharing. 

Further, the HSIN Next Gen requirements document for the 

planned upgrade recognizes the importance of being able to 

monitor and evaluate system effectiveness. The system will be 

able to produce performance reports relating to: 

�	 System use, showing how end users interact with the 

system; 

�	 System health or availability, showing the operational state 

of the system; and 

�	 System content, to track trends in information sharing using 

HSIN. 

Building these metrics into HSIN Next Gen will provide a basis for 

program management to monitor and evaluate the tool’s 

information sharing effectiveness. 

In June 2006, we reported that DHS did not define HSIN’s 

relationship to existing systems, obtain and address user 

requirements, provide adequate user guidance, or develop 

performance measures for HSIN.1

 These system planning and 

implementation issues limited HSIN’s ability to effectively support 

state and local information sharing. 

To improve the effectiveness of HSIN in support of the 

department’s information sharing environment, we recommended 

that DHS:2 

1

 DHS OIG, Homeland Security Information Network Could Support Information Sharing More Effectively,
 

OIG-06-38, June 2006. 


2

 Recommendations 1, 3, 4, and 5 were assigned to DHS’ Office of Operations Coordination.
 

Recommendation 2 was assigned to DHS’ Office of Intelligence and Analysis. 


DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 3 

�	 Clarify and communicate HSIN’s mission and vision to 

users, its relation to other systems, and its integration with 

related federal systems. 

�	 Define the intelligence data flow model for HSIN and 

provide clear guidance to system users on what information 

is needed, what DHS does with the information, and what 

information DHS will provide. 

�	 Provide detailed, stakeholder-specific standard operating 

procedures, user manuals, and training based on the 

business processes needed to support homeland security 

information sharing. 

�	 Ensure crosscutting representation and participation among 

the various stakeholder communities to determine business 

and system requirements, and encourage community of 

interest advisory board and working group participation. 

�	 Identify baseline and performance metrics for HSIN, and 

begin to measure effectiveness of information sharing using 

the performance data compiled. 

DHS made progress in addressing the issues identified in our June 

2006 report. Specifically, increased use of HSIN within the states 

is reported and training delivery methods have improved; however, 

challenges remain. Because the department has decided to devote 

resources to the new HSIN Next Gen initiative, we are closing our 

previous report recommendations. Further, in the following 

sections, we identify a number of areas where DHS can improve 

HSIN Next Gen’s information sharing effectiveness, and we make 

new recommendations to address those areas. 

Results of Audit 

Increased HSIN Use Reported But Limited Nationwide Sharing 

HSIN users indicated that their use of HSIN has increased, but this 

use appears to be restricted to within their respective state 

boundaries. Staff at six of the eight fusion centers we contacted 

said that HSIN use has increased over the past year, and that 

information sharing effectiveness through HSIN has also 

increased.3

 For example, a Tennessee fusion center official said 

3

 A fusion center is a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provides resources, expertise, and 

information to the center with the goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, and respond to criminal 

and terrorist activity. 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 4 

that the center uses HSIN daily, and HSIN has become crucial to 

the center’s operations. The center successfully used HSIN to 

share information when tornadoes struck Tennessee in February 

2008. 

However, only three of the eight centers use HSIN for sharing 

information with federal partners; the remaining five use HSIN for 

sharing information mainly within their state. Additionally, only 

three of the eight centers reported using HSIN as their primary 

information sharing tool. DHS could not produce user statistics to 

verify whether HSIN use has increased, decreased, or remained the 

same. 

Improved Training Delivery Methods 

DHS has improved its user support and guidance since our last 

audit by developing internet-based training on how to use HSIN, 

and job aids that provide quick reference tips on how to navigate 

through the HSIN portals. DHS also has provided on-site, systemspecific training; but stakeholders receive training only if they 

request it. However, many users are unaware that training is 

available. For example, officials at five of the eight fusion centers 

we contacted did not know that HSIN training was available. 

During one site visit, we observed “train-the-trainer” training. The 

HSIN Outreach Team delivers the training, upon request, to fusion 

center employees who then train local law enforcement employees 

about HSIN. The trainers discussed why stakeholders should use 

HSIN, and they demonstrated the functionality of HSIN. The 

trainers also provided examples of how HSIN was used to track 

activities and provide situational awareness during catastrophic 

events. 

However, the training did not include teaching stakeholders what 

type of information should be entered into HSIN, nor did it provide 

specific scenarios illustrating when and how the stakeholders 

should use HSIN. A former HSIN program manager said that the 

absence of a clear HSIN mission and vision, coupled with the lack 

of a complete concept of operations and data flow model, impeded 

DHS’ ability to create scenario-based training to help users 

understand how to perform their information sharing duties. 

Stakeholder Involvement and Communications Challenges 

DHS does not have a sufficient understanding of HSIN's 

communities of interest (COI), which include law enforcement 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 5 

agencies, emergency management and first responder agencies, 

intelligence agencies, private sector infrastructure stakeholders, 

DHS components, and international partners. As of 

October 2007, there were over 700 COIs, of which only 

approximately 300 were actively used. According to HSIN 

Outreach Team members, there is no documented definition of 

HSIN COIs and, in the past, if HSIN users wanted to develop a 

COI, they simply did so. 

The Outreach Team, which is composed of stakeholder 

relationship managers and trainers, was established to improve 

communications with HSIN stakeholders. It is responsible for 

interacting with stakeholders to communicate not only systemspecific functionality, but also information about the HSIN 

program in general. Initially, the team had up to 32 members to 

provide program support and focused its efforts primarily on 

actively recruiting potential stakeholders. As the number of COIs 

increased, the team was realigned to focus its efforts on the 

existing COIs, but its resources were reduced to four or five 

members. One team member said that the current resource 

limitations have hindered the team's communication and 

coordination with stakeholders. 

DHS has developed two additional groups, the HSIN Advisory 

Council (HSIN-AC) and the HSIN Mission Coordination 

Committee (HMCC), to increase stakeholder representation and 

participation. For stakeholders outside of DHS, the HSIN-AC is a 

key body for addressing state, local, and private sector issues. 

HSIN-AC was formed to assist in the development of nonfederal 

user requirements, and provides recommendations on the 

improvement of operational requirements. Its purpose is to 

generate recommendations for the improvement of policy, business 

processes, governance structures, and training programs to enhance 

information sharing between federal, state, local, and private sector 

communities. Although established in January 2006, HSIN-AC 

did not hold its first meeting until October 2007. According to a 

program official, this lag time occurred because of a lack of 

leadership support, lack of agreement about HSIN’s goals, and the 

lengthy process required to select members. 

The HMCC focuses on HSIN issues within DHS. The goal of 

HMCC is to identify and validate operational enhancements to 

HSIN that are critical to the successful accomplishment of the 

mission of DHS components and the federal external partners they 

represent. Although HMCC’s first meeting was held in March 

2007, the HMCC charter has not been ratified and a permanent 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 6 

chair has not been appointed, resulting in ineffective leadership 

and a lack of focus. 

As we reported in June 2006, DHS did not sufficiently involve 

stakeholders during the development of HSIN and, therefore, did 

not clearly understand their needs. Despite their concurrence with 

our previous recommendations and the existence of several bodies 

designed to facilitate this effort, almost 2 years later DHS has yet 

to adequately identify HSIN users or determine their information 

sharing requirements. 

Information Sharing Process Not Defined 

DHS has not defined and communicated its homeland security 

information sharing process to HSIN stakeholders. Without this 

guidance, HSIN users do not know what information they should 

share or, once provided, what DHS does with the information. 

None of the eight fusion centers we contacted had received any 

guidance about what information to enter into HSIN or what 

information DHS would provide to them. Individuals responsible 

for HSIN’s planning, development, and implementation said that 

the lack of clearly defined business processes that serve the 

stakeholders has been a significant problem because users are 

unsure about how HSIN should be used. Stakeholders and 

advisory committee members we spoke with echoed the same 

sentiment. 

Additionally, some users do not know or trust who has access to 

the information in HSIN. Individuals from five of the eight fusion 

centers we spoke with expressed concern about who can access the 

information they enter in HSIN. For example, users at one fusion 

center said that they are reluctant to share sensitive information 

with states that have laws that may require the release of such 

information in response to freedom of information requests. These 

concerns have perpetuated the existence of barriers to information 

sharing. 

The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) provides 

homeland security intelligence to the department, various 

components of DHS, and other partners within the intelligence 

community at the federal, state, local, tribal, and the private sector 

levels. In order to better define the process, I&A initiated a pilot 

project to collect information on current processes, analyze the 

processes for deficiencies, recommend improvements, and observe 

the implementation of those improvements to enhance the 

intelligence information exchange between I&A and the fusion 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 7 

centers. I&A has also conducted an internal study of how it 

disseminates intelligence information. Despite these efforts, an 

I&A program official said that I&A has not been able to define an 

intelligence data flow model for HSIN, nor has DHS’ information 

sharing process been defined and disseminated to users. 

Stakeholder Dissatisfaction 

Because HSIN does not address all of their needs, some 

stakeholders are developing alternative systems. For example, 

I&A, which is a primary HSIN stakeholder, has developed a 

separate, secure portal, the Homeland Security State and Local 

Intelligence Community (HS SLIC), for the state and local 

intelligence community. I&A officials said that HS SLIC grew 

from the intelligence community’s lack of confidence in HSIN’s 

ability to provide a secure, trusted environment in which they 

could share sensitive information. Although these stakeholders 

provided their requirements for additional security to the HSIN 

program office, the HSIN platform was unable to meet their needs. 

Intelligence analysts said that their business needs were solicited 

before the HS SLIC portal was deployed, and they have received 

communications on a daily basis from the I&A staff supporting the 

portal. They also expressed their confidence that the information 

they entered in HS SLIC was protected and used by DHS. 

Other stakeholders are looking for alternatives to HSIN as well. 

Although the Florida fusion center uses HSIN as its primary 

method of sharing documents within the state, two of the seven 

regions in Florida are considering moving away from HSIN. 

These regions are looking for a system that will allow them to 

maintain more local control over their information and newer 

technology that may provide them with alerting capabilities and 

Internet messaging to groups. 

Performance Measures Not Developed 

DHS has not developed performance goals and measures for 

HSIN, and cannot readily obtain the data needed to track 

performance. Specifically, the system does not provide statistics 

for HSIN usage. During our 2006 audit, HSIN program 

management provided us with data on HSIN usage such as: 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 8 

 

�	 Number of monthly HSIN logons, 

�	 Number of HSIN account holders per month, 

�	 Number of account holders who logged onto HSIN daily 

per month by COI, 

�	 Total number of HSIN users per month by COI, and 

�	 Number of account holders who posted documents to HSIN 

per month by COI. 

However, when we requested the same information during this 

audit, the department was not able to provide it. A DHS operations 

official said that the HSIN program office does not, at present, 

have the capability to report data readily at this level of detail. 

Although a former manager said that obtaining such data is 

possible, it must be collected through a laborious manual process. 

Further, DHS cannot track other important program performance 

information. For instance, there are no automated mechanisms to 

track information sharing statistics that would reveal how often 

posted documents are shared and with whom. HSIN program 

officials believe that this type of information, if available, would 

provide tangible evidence to support the effectiveness of HSIN’s 

role in information sharing. 

Obtaining such information is difficult because system 

performance and information sharing tracking capabilities were not 

built into HSIN. Without performance goals and measures, DHS 

cannot determine HSIN’s effectiveness as an information sharing 

tool or identify issues that should be addressed to improve system 

performance and increase information sharing through HSIN. 

Recommendations 

To enable DHS to achieve its vision for HSIN Next Gen to be the 

homeland security community’s information sharing tool of 

choice, we recommend that the Director, Office of Operations 

Coordination and Planning: 

Recommendation #1: Provide sufficient resources to 

improve stakeholder relations, ensure adequate stakeholder 

involvement and communication, and meet the needs of its 

customers at the federal, state and local, tribal, and private 

industry levels. 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 9 

Recommendation #2: Develop scenario-based training for 

stakeholders and communicate the availability of existing 

training. 

Recommendation #3: Ensure that system performance 

and information sharing metrics are included in any and all 

future HSIN developments. 

We also recommend that the Under Secretary for the Office of 

Intelligence & Analysis: 

Recommendation #4: Define and communicate DHS’ 

information sharing process to ensure that users understand 

what information to share and what DHS does with the 

information. 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 10 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from the 

Director of Operations Coordination and Planning and the Under 

Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis. We have included a copy 

of the comments in their entirety at Appendix B. 

In the comments, the Director of Operations Coordination and 

Planning and the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis 

expressed appreciation that we acknowledged progress made and 

closed the recommendations from our June 2006. They also 

acknowledged the need for improved stakeholder relations and 

procedures for defining the information sharing process. 

In response to recommendation 1, the Director of Operations 

Coordination and Planning concurred with our recommendation 

and stated that resource shortfalls will be augmented through 

“over-guidance” provisions in their fiscal year 2010 budget 

submission to the Congress. These provisions request funding 

specifically to support increasing staffing levels dedicated to 

building and strengthening stakeholder relationships with DHS’ 

information sharing partners in the federal, state, local, and private 

sectors. Additionally, the Director stated that as evidence of their 

plans to improve stakeholder relations, involvement, and 

communication opportunities, their Outreach Team’s strategic plan 

would be revised to provide goals for increased awareness and 

collaboration. These goals specify improved awareness of HSIN 

mission and capabilities, by mission areas, at all levels; 

establishment of mission models; and increased internal 

collaboration within DHS components as well as collaboration 

with external information sharing partners. 

In response to recommendation 2, the Director of Operations 

Coordination and Planning stated that HSIN’s current training 

engagement model provides for the delivery of mission-based 

training. Training is delivered in five different methods; and, at 

least three of those methods allow HSIN mission advocates to 

tailor training to meet the needs of the specific stakeholder 

community for which the training is being delivered. In addition to 

training provided to individual communities of interest, the HSIN 

program manager is also developing a strategy for providing 

training that transcends mission areas and highlights HSIN as a 

transparent information sharing tool. The response also introduces 

plans for making HSIN training availability more visible to the 

stakeholder communities. 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 11 

In response to recommendation 3, the Director of Operations 

Coordination and Planning further acknowledged the need for an 

automated means of measuring HSIN system performance and 

information sharing activities, and that information sharing data, in 

particular, is not currently being measured. However, the Director 

related that the future version of HSIN, the HSIN Next-Generation 

platform, will provide for enhanced information sharing 

capabilities, and an automated means of gathering mission-critical 

data. Specifically, HSIN Next-Generation’s functional 

requirements document targets the collection of statistics such as 

data specific to the performance of HSIN, as well as what 

information is shared, how and with whom the information is 

shared, and the nature or content of information being shared. 

Finally, to address recommendation 4, the Under Secretary for 

Intelligence and Analysis reiterated their commitment to 

information sharing that is “functionally-oriented.” Therefore, the 

Under Secretary proposed the creation of shared mission 

communities which would serve to help define policies, 

workflows, and data standards for information sharing. The Under 

Secretary envisions the establishment of shared mission 

communities as a means of further defining an information sharing 

process for the department that includes and addresses the unique 

needs and concerns of each community of stakeholders; thereby 

establishing trust in the overall information sharing process. 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 12 

Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

We began our followup audit work by reviewing the five open 

recommendations from our June 2006 report, Homeland Security 

Information Network Could Support Information Sharing More 

Effectively (OIG-06-38). Additionally, we reviewed followup 

documentation provided by the HSIN program office and the 

program office’s 90-day responses to the first audit. Furthermore, 

our background research included reviews of reports issued since 

the last audit related to HSIN prepared by the OIG, Government 

Accountability Office, other federal agencies, public interest 

groups, and the Congress. We also reviewed records of 

congressional testimony that occurred since the issuance of the 

first report. 

To obtain information on the current status of information sharing 

and to identify challenges to HSIN’s use and implementation, we 

obtained internal DHS correspondence that established policies 

and procedures relative to HSIN and future information sharing 

initiatives. We also researched the department’s internal website 

to obtain relevant information about HSIN since the last audit. 

Due to the high visibility of the HSIN program, we researched 

media articles that pertained to HSIN specifically and information 

sharing in general. We also researched legislation that established 

the nation’s information sharing environment and imposed 

additional business and technical requirements on the HSIN 

program. 

We conducted our audit fieldwork from November 2007 to March 

2008 at HSIN Program Office headquarters in Washington, D.C. 

We met with key department officials responsible for HSIN’s 

planning, implementation, and program management to obtain 

information on the progress made toward addressing previous 

recommendations, assess the current status of information sharing 

among select HSIN stakeholders, and identify new challenges to 

HSIN’s use and implementation. These officials included 

members of DHS’ Office of Operations Coordination, the Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis, and the Office of the Chief Information 

Officer. Additionally, we met with members of stakeholder 

working groups and advisory boards; specifically the HSIN-AC 

and the HMCC. 

We also visited stakeholders at the following select fusion centers; 

Santa Fe, New Mexico; Los Angeles, California; Richmond, 

Virginia; Sacramento, California; and Woodlawn, Maryland; and 

conducted telephone conferences with the Florida, Tennessee, and 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 13 

Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Vermont Fusion Centers. We conducted this performance audit in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. 

The principal OIG points of contact for this audit are Frank Deffer, 

Assistant Inspector General for Information Technology Audits, 

and Richard Harsche, Director, Information Management. Major 

OIG contributors to the audit are identified in Appendix C. 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 14 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 15 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 16 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 17 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 18 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 19 

Appendix C 

Major Contributors to the Report 

Information Management Division 

Richard Harsche, Director 

Beverly H. Bush, Audit Manager 

Steve Ressler, Auditor 

Swati Nijhawan, Auditor 

Melissa Keaster, Auditor 

Kristina Hayden, Referencer 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 

Page 20 
Appendix D 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Director, Office of Operations Coordination and Planning 

DHS Office of Operations Coordination Liaison 

Program Manager, Homeland Security Information Network 

Office of Information Sharing and Collaboration 

Under Secretary, Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

Under Secretary for Management 

Chief Information Officer 

Chief Information Security Officer 

Executive Secretariat 

General Counsel 

Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary, Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary, Office of Legislative Affairs 

Director, GAO/OIG Audit Liaison Office 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

DHS’ Efforts to Improve the Homeland Security Information Network 


Page 21 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4199, 

fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal 

misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.