14 October 2011

Joint Interdiction

Joint Publication 3-03
i 

PREFACE 

1. Scope 

This publication provides doctrine for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing 

joint interdiction operations. 

2. Purpose 

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other 

joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and 

training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their 

appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC 

from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most 

appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders of 

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of 

these commands, and the Services. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate 

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of 

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of 

a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine 

and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the 

United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s 

doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and 

doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

WILLIAM E. GORTNEY 

VADM, USN 

Director, Joint Staff 
Preface 

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iii 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION TO JOINT PUBLICATION 3-03 

DATED 03 MAY 2007 

• Includes more detailed discussion of interdiction in the maritime domain, to 

include introducing the terms “air interdiction of maritime targets” and “maritime 

air support.” 

• Adds discussion about the execution of interdiction in irregular warfare (IW). 

Specifically examines the role of collateral damage and nonlethal means (such as 

interdiction operations in cyberspace and military information support 

operations), and their impact on interdiction operations in an IW or 

counterinsurgency environment. 

• Includes increased discussion of interagency support to interdiction operations. 

Specific topics include a summary of other government agency capabilities, the 

means to conduct integrated planning with other departments and agencies, and 

the method to communicate the whole of government plan. 

• Adds discussion of military interdiction operations in support of law enforcement 

and homeland defense missions. 

• Examines legal considerations when conducting interdiction in multiple 

environments, to include legal bases for maritime interdiction, and legal 

restrictions on certain interdiction methods and weapons. 

• Provides greater detail on weapons of mass destruction interdiction. 

• Provides a more concise description of full spectrum superiority and its 

relationship to successful interdiction operations. 

• Refines the description of the use of unmanned aircraft in interdiction operations. 

 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-03 

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v 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii 

CHAPTER I 

FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERDICTION 

• Introduction ................................................................................................................ I-1 

• Interdiction in Joint Operations ................................................................................. I-1 

• Purpose of Interdiction Operations ............................................................................ I-2 

• Interdiction Objectives ............................................................................................... I-4 

• Elements of Effective Interdiction ............................................................................. I-9 

CHAPTER II 

JOINT INTERDICTION CAPABILITIES 

• Interdiction-Capable Forces ......................................................................................II-1 

• Complementary Operations ....................................................................................II-11 

CHAPTER III 

JOINT INTERDICTION PLANNING 

• Overview ................................................................................................................. III-1 

• Command Relationships ......................................................................................... III-2 

• Integrating Interdiction and Maneuver ................................................................... III-6 

• Planning Joint Interdiction ...................................................................................... III-7 

• Targeting ............................................................................................................... III-10 

• Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Strategy and Planning ............... III-12 

• Interdiction Planning Considerations ................................................................... III-12 

• Joint Interdiction Preparation ............................................................................... III-16 

CHAPTER IV 

JOINT INTERDICTION EXECUTION 

• Command and Control of Joint Interdiction Operations ........................................ IV-1 

• Operational Area Geometry and Coordination ....................................................... IV-5 

• Coordinating Measures ........................................................................................... IV-7 

• Assessment ........................................................................................................... IV-10 

APPENDIX 

A References ................................................................................................. A-1 

B Administrative Instructions ........................................................................B-1 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-03 

GLOSSARY 

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................. GL-1 

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-4 

FIGURE 

I-1 Elements of Effective Interdiction Operations .......................................... I-10 

II-1 Interdiction-Capable Forces .......................................................................II-2 

III-1 Joint Interdiction Plan ............................................................................ III-10 

IV-1 Key Air Force and Army Components of the 

Theater Air Control System—Army Air-Ground System ....................... IV-3 

IV-2 Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas ................................. IV-6 

IV-3 Linear Versus Nonlinear Operations (Depicted as a 

Corps Area of Operations) ....................................................................... IV-7 

IV-4 Notional Joint Operations Area with Designated Land and/or 

Maritime Area of Operations ................................................................... IV-8 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

 Presents the Fundamentals of Interdiction 

 Discusses Joint Interdiction Capabilities 

 Explains Joint Interdiction Planning, to Include Command Relationships, 

Integrating Interdiction and Maneuver, and Targeting 

 Describes Joint Interdiction Execution, to Include Command and Control, 

Linear and Nonlinear Operations, Coordinating Measures, and Assessment 

Fundamentals of Interdiction 

Joint force commanders 

(JFCs) may employ 

interdiction operations as a 

principal means to achieve 

intended objectives. 

Interdiction operations are actions to divert, disrupt, 

delay, or destroy an enemy’s surface capabilities 

before they can be used effectively against friendly 

forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. In support 

of law enforcement, interdiction includes activities 

conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, intercept, board, 

detain, or destroy, under lawful authority, vessels, 

vehicles, aircraft, people, cargo, and money. 

Interdiction in Joint 

Operations 

Joint force commanders (JFCs) integrate and 

synchronize operations and employ military forces 

and capabilities, as well as nonmilitary resources, 

across the range of military operations resulting in 

greater combat power and operational effectiveness. 

JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions 

to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy 

vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for 

future operations. Interdiction can create 

opportunities for commanders to exploit and should 

be integrated with other operations of the joint force. 

Purpose of Interdiction 

Operations 

The purpose of interdiction operations is to prevent 

the adversary from using assets at the time and place 

of his choosing. 

Diversion. Interdiction can divert enemy forces or 

assets from areas where there are critical operational 

requirements for them. 
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Disruption. Joint force actions supporting disruption 

will interrupt or impede enemy or enemy capabilities 

or systems, upsetting the flow of information, 

operational tempo, effective interaction, or cohesion 

of the enemy force or those systems. 

Delay. Joint force actions can delay the time of 

arrival of enemy forces or capabilities or alter the 

ability of the enemy or adversary to project forces or 

capabilities. 

Destroy. Joint force actions supporting destruction 

will damage the structure, function, or condition of a 

target so that it can neither perform as intended nor 

be restored to a usable condition, rendering it 

ineffective or useless. 

Interdiction Objectives Interdiction may be planned to create advantages at 

any level from tactical to strategic with 

corresponding effects on the enemy and the speed 

with which interdiction affects frontline enemy 

forces. Interdiction deep in the enemy’s rear area can 

have broad operational effects; however, deep 

interdiction may have a delayed effect on land and 

maritime operations. Interdiction closer to land and 

maritime forces will be of more immediate 

operational and tactical concern to maneuver forces. 

During major operations and campaigns the effects of 

interdiction are typically more influential when 

directed against an enemy’s ability to command, 

mass, maneuver, supply, and reinforce available 

conventional combat forces. 

Elements of Effective 

Interdiction 

Effective interdiction operations share a number of 

common elements, which lead to the attainment of 

interdiction objectives. The mix of elements in each 

operation depends on such variables as the nature of 

the conflict, geographic location, weather, and enemy 

characteristics. Elements normally required to 

successfully prosecute interdiction operations are full 

spectrum superiority, synchronization with 

maneuver; sustained and concentrated pressure; 

accurate, reliable, and timely intelligence; and 

effective resource planning, positioning, and 

allocation. 
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Joint Interdiction Capabilities 

Interdiction-Capable Forces Interdiction operations can be conducted by all 

components of the joint force, across the range of 

military operations employing both lethal and 

nonlethal means. 

Air forces employ such weapons as projectiles, 

missiles, unguided munitions, precision munitions, 

land and/or sea mines, electronic warfare systems, 

and sensors from airborne platforms. 

Maritime forces employ assets such as surface 

combatants, carriers, amphibious shipping, aircraft, 

helicopters, submarines, landing forces, and special 

forces, and weapons such as missiles, munitions, 

torpedoes, and mines, capable of conducting a variety 

of air, land, and sea operations. 

Land forces employ such assets as attack 

helicopters, missiles, artillery, and those forces 

capable of conducting conventional airborne, air 

assault, and amphibious operations. 

Special operations forces may support conventional 

interdiction operations by providing terminal 

guidance for precision-guided munitions, or may act 

independently when the use of conventional forces is 

inappropriate or infeasible. 

Other government agencies work with military 

forces in a “whole of government” approach to 

interdiction capabilities and forces. Military 

elements work with our interagency partners 

(Department of the Treasury, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, etc.) to interdict threat finance and 

foreign fighter streams. 

Complementary Operations Joint interdiction operations are most effective when 

fully integrated with other air, land, sea, space, 

information, and special operations of the joint force. 

In addition to counterair and maneuver, other 

operations notable for their specialized roles which 

can complement joint interdiction operations include 

the following: strategic attack operations; 
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intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; space 

operations; information operations; air refueling; and 

strike coordination and reconnaissance.

Joint Interdiction Planning 

Unity of effort, centralized 

planning, and decentralized 

execution are key to success 

in joint and interagency 

interdiction operations. 

The manner in which the JFC plans, organizes, and 

directs forces affects the responsiveness and 

versatility of joint interdiction operations. JFCs 

employ forces to accomplish their objectives; the 

principal challenge is to combine force capabilities 

and operations to create effects that support 

achievement of those objectives. Joint interdiction 

typically focuses on operational level objectives as 

delineated in the JFC’s operation or campaign plans. 

It must also support strategic level objectives by 

working in concert with other efforts to neutralize or 

destroy the enemy’s centers of gravity or other key 

target systems. 

Operations extended in depth, 

in time as well as space, shape 

future conditions and can 

disrupt an opponent’s 

decision cycle. 

Interdiction is one manner in which JFCs add depth 

to operations at the operational level. The intent of 

deep operations is to bring force to bear on the 

opponent’s entire structure, at the tactical, 

operational, and strategic depths, in a near 

simultaneous manner. Although it has usually been 

the case that interdiction closer to surface forces was 

designed to affect the battle over a shorter term than 

actions deeper in the enemy’s territory, the most 

important aspect in planning interdiction operations 

is the effect desired, which may be measured in time. 

The JFC should not apply strict geographic 

boundaries to interdiction, but should plan for its 

theater/joint operations area (JOA)-wide application. 

Command Relationships 

It is important to note that 

joint interdiction can be 

conducted inside an area of 

operations (AO) in direct 

response to JFC tasking, and 

JFCs typically conduct joint interdiction operations 

through component commanders. All elements of the 

joint force can be called upon to perform interdiction 

operations. The JFC structures the joint force to 

ensure that diverse component capabilities, 

operations, and forces complement each other to 

achieve the desired results effectively and efficiently. 

To ensure unity of command and effort of air 

operations throughout a theater/JOA, the JFC 

normally delegates the planning and execution of 

theater/JOA-wide air interdiction operations to the 
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may not be in support of the 

AO commander. 

component commander, with the preponderance of 

air interdiction assets with theater/JOA-wide range 

and the ability to control them. The joint force air 

component commander (JFACC) is normally the 

supported commander for the JFC’s overall air 

interdiction effort, while land and maritime 

component commanders are supported 

commanders for interdiction in their areas of 

operations (AOs). 

Integrating Interdiction and 

Maneuver 

Maneuver and interdiction could be conducted 

relatively independent of each other in certain 

circumstances. However, integrating interdiction and 

maneuver, as well as their joint fires, enhances the 

ability for each to more fully contribute to a 

successful outcome of a campaign or major 

operation. Interdiction and maneuver are 

complementary operations that should normally be 

integrated to create dilemmas for the enemy.

Planning Joint Interdiction 

Components may conduct 

interdiction operations as part 

of their specific mission in 

addition to, or in lieu of, 

supporting the theater/joint 

operations area-wide 

interdiction effort. In such 

situations as these, command 

and control for the operation 

is normally conducted 

according to the component’s 

procedures. 

The JFC establishes broad planning objectives and 

guidance for interdiction of enemy forces as an 

integral part of a joint campaign or major operation. 

Subordinate commanders recommend to the JFC how 

to use their combat power more effectively to this 

end. With this advice, the JFC sets interdiction 

priorities, provides targeting guidance, and makes 

apportionment decisions. The JFACC’s air 

interdiction employment guidance, based on the 

JFC’s air apportionment decision, is used by the joint 

air operations center for input into the air tasking 

order. Land and maritime commanders, as supported 

commanders within their AOs, the land and maritime 

force commanders are responsible for integrating and 

synchronizing maneuver, fires, and interdiction 

within their AOs. 

Targeting During target development, the targeting process 

must relate specific targets to objectives, desired 

effects, and accompanying actions. Interdiction 

should focus on those systems that will result in the 

greatest payoff and achieve the objectives. The goal 

for interdiction targeting is to execute a connected 

series of missions and attacks to achieve the JFC’s 

interdiction objectives. 
Executive Summary 

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Dynamic interdiction missions respond to targets 

that require time sensitive or immediate attention. 

The same quick-responsive nature of dynamic 

interdiction that allows it to take advantage of 

fleeting opportunities can also have a negative impact 

on individual mission success. 

Deliberate interdiction requests allow joint 

interdiction forces more time to study target imagery 

and to align attack axes to optimize weapons effects. 

Detailed study can reduce threat exposure and allow 

mission planners to optimize the weapon’s fusing for 

maximum effect. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance Strategy and 

Planning 

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance forces 

support interdiction planning through the collection 

of and collaboration on a broad range of information. 

Priority intelligence requirements are developed to 

support interdiction operations. To that end, joint 

interdiction targets must be identified and then 

prioritized to facilitate collection management and 

mission accomplishment. 

Interdiction Planning 

Considerations 

The nature of the mission or a target set may 

determine its suitability for interdiction and what 

forces and weapon systems should be employed. 

Target area environmental considerations include 

restrictive terrain, time of day, adverse weather, as 

well as seasonal and temperature effects. 

Interdiction operations in urban areas can be 

problematic and require special considerations during 

planning. To begin with, collateral damage in cities 

or towns that have not been evacuated will represent 

a great risk that must be considered and minimized. 

Planners and operators should take great care in 

choosing the correct delivery method, munition, and 

fusing option when employing fires in an urban 

environment. 

Joint forces operate in accordance with applicable 

rules of engagement, conduct warfare consistent 

with international laws recognized by the US, and 

operate within restraints and constraints specified 

by their commanders. 
Executive Summary 

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Joint forces should be prepared for operations with 

forces from other nations within the framework of 

an alliance or coalition. 

Joint Interdiction Execution 

Command and Control of 

Joint Interdiction Operations 

The joint operations center is the focal point for 

integrating joint operations at the macro level to 

include interdiction. Joint interdiction operations 

require an integrated, flexible, and responsive 

command and control (C2) structure to process 

interdiction requirements and a dependable, 

interoperable, and secure communications 

architecture to exercise control. 

The theater air control system (TACS) is the Air 

Force component commander’s mechanism for 

controlling component air interdiction assets. 

The Army air-ground system (AAGS) provides for 

interface between Army and tactical air support 

agencies of other Services in the planning, 

evaluating, processing, and coordinating of air 

support requirements and operations. 

The Navy tactical air control system (NTACS) is 

the principal air control system afloat. 

The Marine air command and control system 

(MACCS) consists of various air C2 agencies 

designed to provide the Marine air-ground task force 

aviation combat element commander with the ability 

to monitor, supervise, and influence the application 

of Marine and supporting air assets. 

When all elements of the TACS, AAGS, MACCS, 

and NTACS integrate, the entire system is labeled the 

Theater air-ground system [TAGS].

Operational Area Geometry 

and Coordination 

JFCs may employ various control and coordinating 

measures to facilitate effective joint operations. 

These measures may include establishing boundaries, 

objectives, coordinating altitudes to deconflict air 

operations, air defense areas, amphibious objective 

areas, and submarine operating areas. 
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Joint interdiction may be conducted in 

conjunction with friendly forces operating in an 

AO. In order to integrate joint fires and avoid 

fratricide, fire support coordination measures 

(FSCMs) must be established. When air operations 

are involved, airspace coordinating measures will 

normally be used along with FSCMs. 

Linear and Nonlinear 

Operations 

In linear operations, commanders direct and 

sustain combat power toward enemy forces in 

concert with adjacent units. Linear perspective 

refers primarily to the conduct of operations along 

lines of operations with identified forward lines of 

own troops (FLOTs). 

In nonlinear operations, forces orient on 

objectives without geographic reference to 

adjacent forces. Nonlinear operations emphasize 

simultaneous operations along multiple lines of 

operation from selected bases. 

Coordinating Measures There are two important constructs to understand 

when discussing coordinating measures. 

 The forward boundary defines a component’s 

outer AO and is the farthest limit of an 

organization’s responsibility. 

 The FLOT is a line that indicates the most 

forward positions of friendly forces during linear 

operations at a specific time. 

Fire Support Coordination 

Measures 

Within their AOs, land and naval force commanders 

employ permissive and restrictive FSCMs. FSCMs 

are necessary to facilitate the rapid engagement of 

targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for 

friendly forces. Permissive FSCMs facilitate 

attacks and include coordinated fire lines, free fire 

areas, fire support coordination lines (FSCLs), and 

kill boxes. Restrictive measures safeguard 

friendly forces and include no-fire areas, restrictive 

fire areas, restrictive fire lines, and airspace 

coordination areas. 
Executive Summary 

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Fire Support Coordination 

Line 

When appropriate, an FSCL will be established and 

adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force 

commanders within their assigned boundaries in 

consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, 

and affected commanders. The purpose of the FSCL 

is to facilitate the expeditious attack of surface targets 

of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. 

Attacks on surface targets short of the FSCL during 

the conduct of joint interdiction operations must be 

controlled by and/or coordinated with the appropriate 

land or amphibious force commander. Joint 

interdiction forces attacking targets beyond the FSCL 

must inform all affected commanders in sufficient 

time to allow necessary reaction to avoid friendly 

casualties. 

Kill Box A kill box is a three-dimensional area used to 

facilitate the integration of joint fires. When 

established, the primary purpose of a kill box is to 

allow lethal attack against surface targets without 

further coordination with the establishing commander 

and without terminal attack control. 

Assessment Commanders continuously assess the operational 

environment and the progress of operations, and 

compare them to their initial vision and intent. 

Joint interdiction operations should include both preand post-interdiction target reconnaissance efforts in 

order to facilitate combat assessment. Information 

gained from combat assessment provides input for 

follow-on interdiction efforts. 

CONCLUSION 

This publication provides doctrine for planning, 

preparing, executing, and assessing joint interdiction 

operations.
Executive Summary 

xvi JP 3-03

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I-1 

CHAPTER I 

FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERDICTION 

1. Introduction 

This publication provides a basis for the planning, execution, and assessment of 

interdiction operations. Interdiction operations are actions to divert, disrupt, delay, or 

destroy an enemy’s surface capabilities before they can be used effectively against 

friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. In support of law enforcement, 

interdiction includes activities conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, intercept, board, 

detain, or destroy, under lawful authority, vessels, vehicles, aircraft, people, cargo, and 

money. Interdiction also can be used to prevent an adversary from achieving a variety of 

objectives affecting the US populace, economy, or national interests. With regard to military 

operations in conventional terms, they are conducted at such distance from friendly surface 

forces that detailed integration of each mission with the fire and maneuver of those forces is 

not required. Interdiction operations may support theater/joint operations area (JOA)-

wide priorities or component operations. Doctrine for joint interdiction operations can be 

applied across the range of military operations. Due to the nature of modern conflict that 

involves nation states, non-state actors, and other threats to the US, interdiction operations 

can span from US shores, across the open seas, and into theaters or JOAs. These operations 

may complement, support, or be supported by maneuver operations. When directed, other 

government agencies (OGAs) may support joint interdiction operations or conduct their own 

interdiction activities. Interdiction-capable forces are discussed in Chapter II, “Joint 

Interdiction Capabilities.” Joint force commanders (JFCs) may employ interdiction 

operations as a principal means to achieve intended objectives. 

2. Interdiction in Joint Operations 

To fully appreciate the dynamics of interdiction and the role it fulfills in joint campaigns 

and operations, one first needs to place it in the context of operational design. JFCs integrate 

and synchronize operations and employ military forces and capabilities, as well as 

nonmilitary resources, across the range of military operations resulting in greater combat 

power and operational effectiveness. Further, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions 

to achieve concentration in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties to achieve 

military objectives. JFCs also gain decisive advantage over the enemy through leverage. 

Leverage can be achieved in a variety of ways. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical 

“An army can be defeated by one of two main alternative means—not necessarily 

mutually exclusive: we can strike at the enemy’s troops themselves, either by 

killing them or preventing them from being in the right place at the right time; or we 

can ruin their fighting efficiency by depriving them of their supplies of food and war 

material of all kinds on which they depend for existence as a fighting force.” 

Wing Commander J. C. Slessor 

Air Power and Armies, 1936 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-03 

actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve 

freedom of action for future operations. 

a. The history of joint operations highlights the enormous lethality of asymmetrical 

operations and the great operational sensitivity to such threats. Asymmetrical operations are 

particularly effective when applied against enemy forces not postured for immediate tactical 

battle but instead operating in more vulnerable aspects—operational deployment and/or 

movement, extended logistic activity (including rest and refitting), or mobilization and 

training (including industrial production). Thus, JFCs must aggressively seek opportunities 

to apply asymmetrical force against an enemy in as vulnerable an aspect as possible—air 

attacks against enemy ground formations in convoy (e.g., the air and special operations 

forces [SOF] interdiction operations against German attempts to reinforce its forces in 

Normandy), naval air attacks against troop transports (e.g., US air attacks against Japanese 

surface reinforcement of Guadalcanal), and land operations against enemy naval, air, or 

missile bases (e.g., allied maneuver in Europe in 1944 to reduce German submarine bases 

and V-1 and V-2 launching sites). 

b. Interdiction can create opportunities for commanders to exploit and should be 

integrated with other operations of the joint force. It can significantly affect the course of a 

campaign or major operation. However, the use of interdiction must be tailored to the 

situation and should be closely integrated in the JFC’s overall strategy. Interdiction against 

an enemy with a rigid, top-down command and control (C2) structure differs from the rapid, 

agile interdiction required against a decentralized, networked terrorist organization or 

insurgency. Interdiction can be particularly effective when the enemy must rapidly move 

major forces and their sustaining supplies. 

3. Purpose of Interdiction Operations 

The purpose of interdiction operations is to prevent the adversary from using assets at 

the time and place of his choosing. The terms are not mutually exclusive. Actions 

associated with one desired effect may also support the others. For example, delay can result 

from disrupting, diverting, or destroying enemy capabilities or targets. 

a. Diversion. Interdiction can divert enemy forces or assets from areas where there are 

critical operational requirements for them. Its purpose is to consume resources or 

capabilities critical to enemy operations in a way that is advantageous to friendly operations. 

It may divert enemy ground forces to a location more favorable to the JFC or divert enemy 

naval, engineering, and personnel resources to the tasks of repairing and recovering damaged 

equipment, facilities, and lines of communications (LOCs). It can draw the attention of 

enemy forces away from critical friendly operations. These diversions prevent enemy forces 

and their support resources from being employed for their intended purpose. Diversions can 

also cause more circuitous routing along LOCs, resulting in delays for the enemy. Diversion 

may be effective in the interdiction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) material. 

b. Disruption. Joint force actions supporting disruption will interrupt or impede enemy 

or enemy capabilities or systems, upsetting the flow of information, operational tempo, 

effective interaction, or cohesion of the enemy force or those systems. Interdiction can 
Fundamentals of Interdiction 

I-3 

disrupt the enemy’s C2 systems, intelligence collection capability, transportation systems, 

supply lines, industrial base, and psychological will. Interdiction thus disrupts the movement 

and routing of the enemy’s information, materiel, and forces. Disruption can result from 

degradation or destruction of these enemy capabilities. Disruption of enemy surface forces 

can be accomplished in a number of ways. A key task during interdiction planning is 

analyzing the enemy for critical vulnerabilities that, if attacked, will have a disruptive effect 

across significant portions of the enemy force. 

(1) The enemy’s combat operations may be disrupted with attacks on their C2 

nodes or key commercial infrastructure components, such as electrical power and 

transportation, which support and sustain enemy operations. Such attacks may force the 

enemy to use less capable, less secure backup communications systems that can be more 

easily exploited by friendly forces. Regimes that possess a rigid, top-down C2 structure can 

be particularly vulnerable to interdiction. 

(2) Interdiction can disrupt by attacking enemy LOCs, forcing the enemy to use 

less capable transportation modes to communicate and sustain its forces. These disruptive 

effects can severely affect the tempo of enemy operations and ultimately force the enemy to 

culminate earlier than anticipated. 

(3) Interdiction attacks can also produce a psychological impact which could 

significantly reduce enemy capabilities and morale. Uncertainty as to whether or not forces, 

materiel, or supplies will arrive can directly affect enemy commanders, their staffs, and 

forces. 

(4) Disruption can also be achieved through nonlethal means in support of 

counterterrorism, combating WMD, law enforcement, or national and/or international 

sanction activities. The purpose of these nonlethal actions is to impede unlawful activities or 

activities that pose a threat, whether in the context of a conflict with an enemy or in civil 

support actions. In modern complex operations, the adversary is often neither easily 

recognized nor a uniformed, armed combatant. In such an environment, activities such as 

boarding, diverting and seizing, if feasible, are frequently more appropriate than lethal 

attacks. 

c. Delay. Joint force actions can delay the time of arrival of enemy forces or 

capabilities or alter the ability of the enemy or adversary to project forces or capabilities. 

(1) When interdiction delays the enemy, friendly forces gain time. What JFCs do 

to improve their situation in the time gained is critical to any assessment of interdiction’s 

contribution. However, an interdiction plan that focuses on delay and is effectively executed 

does not guarantee a major impact on operations. For delay to have a major impact, either 

the enemy must face urgent movement requirements, or the delay must enhance the effect(s) 

of planned friendly operations. 

(2) It is advantageous for friendly forces to pressure their opponent to attempt timeurgent movement. Ideally, if the joint force maintains the initiative the opponent is forced to 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-03 

make unplanned time-urgent movements, at times and places that maximize their 

vulnerability to interdiction. 

(3) The intent of interdiction may be to lengthen the time during which enemy land 

or naval forces are at risk of attack. When vehicles mass behind a damaged route segment, 

or ships are trapped in a harbor because of mines, a more concentrated set of targets and a 

longer period of exposure results. If there are follow-on strikes, this makes the enemy easier 

to destroy or render ineffective. 

d. Destroy. Joint force actions supporting destruction will damage the structure, 

function, or condition of a target so that it can neither perform as intended nor be restored to 

a usable condition, rendering it ineffective or useless. The destruction of enemy forces, 

cargoes, support elements, and resources is the most direct form of interdiction. This level of 

interdiction may not always require follow up missions or a sustained campaign. Destroying 

transportation systems is usually not an end in itself, but contributes to the delay, diversion, 

and disruption of enemy forces and materiel. It may also produce unintended or undesirable 

effects. It may cause the enemy to mass air defense assets, which may be useful elsewhere, 

around critical transportation nodes. It may force the enemy to use alternate, less efficient 

routes or disperse critical assets. The enemy may have to divert engineering resources from 

other tasks to prepare alternate routes in anticipation of possible attacks. This may be true 

even when transportation systems remain largely undamaged. However, destruction may 

also inhibit friendly freedom of action. For example, destruction of key enemy 

transportation infrastructure in and around land and naval areas of operations (AOs) could 

hinder subsequent friendly surface operations. Appropriate coordination of interdiction 

helps to preserve friendly freedom of action. Knowledge of the enemy helps the JFC to 

anticipate the reactions and consequences of a destruction-oriented interdiction upon all 

stakeholders — enemies, populace, friends, allies, and sympathizers. Additionally, collateral 

damage and other unintended effects may influence the commander’s decision to use these 

types of fires in urban areas. 

4. Interdiction Objectives 

a. The effectiveness of interdiction is dependent on a number of factors to include: the 

distance between interdiction operations and the location of intended effect; the means and 

rate of movement (ships, trains, aircraft, trucks); the physical target (forces, 

cargo/passengers, supplies, fuel, munitions, infrastructure); the level of enemy activity; 

enemy tactics; and the resilience, adaptability, persistence, and resourcefulness of the enemy 

or its targeted force or system. Interdiction may be planned to create advantages at any level 

from tactical to strategic with corresponding effects on the enemy and the speed with which 

interdiction affects frontline enemy forces. Interdiction deep in the enemy’s rear area can 

have broad operational effects; however, deep interdiction may have a delayed effect on land 

and maritime operations. Interdiction closer to land and maritime forces will be of more 

immediate operational and tactical concern to maneuver forces. Thus, JFCs vary the 

emphasis upon interdiction operations and surface maneuvers, depending on the strategic and 

operational situation confronting them. During major operations and campaigns the effects 

of interdiction are typically more influential when directed against an enemy’s ability to 

command, mass, maneuver, supply, and reinforce available conventional combat forces. 
Fundamentals of Interdiction 

I-5 

Interdiction is more difficult against an enemy that employs a covert force structure, a simple 

logistic net, and unconventional tactics. However, with timely, accurate intelligence and 

persistent operations, interdiction can disrupt supply operations, destroy weapons caches and 

deny sanctuary. Additionally, most of the basic concepts for combat interdiction apply in 

noncombat environments. Whether the joint force is involved in major operations and 

campaigns or crisis response and limited contingency operations, interdiction actions such as 

direct attrition of enemy capabilities, constriction of enemy logistic systems, disruption of 

enemy C2 systems, forcing urgent movement upon the enemy, channeling enemy 

movements, denying enemy threat potential, and aiding in the enforcement of sanctions can 

create effects that achieve objectives. When developing interdiction objectives, consider the 

relationship between targets and what second or third order effects may be created, paying 

particular attention to potential unintended or undesired effects. 

b. Direct Attrition of Enemy Capabilities. Interdiction against massed enemy forces 

can tip the operational advantage in favor of the friendly force. Attriting dispersed enemy 

forces and materiel may be difficult to execute because it requires locating individual targets. 

Modern weapons systems and sensors, however, can make this option more viable. In some 

cases, circumstances such as enemy deployment or limiting rules of engagement (ROE) may 

make fielded forces a more viable target than supporting infrastructure. Resources, terrain, 

weather, enemy actions, and characteristics are just a few variables to consider when 

developing interdiction targets. 

(1) While a direct attack on individual enemy forces may be possible, it may not 

be the most efficient approach in terms of munitions and forces available. Although the 

direct destruction of individual enemy forces has an immediate impact on enemy combat 

power, it usually requires more assets due to the larger number of individual targets—

especially if they are dispersed, concealed, or fortified. Isolating large enemy formations by 

destroying logistic nets, supplies, and supporting infrastructure can create the same effects 

with fewer resources. 

(2) Terrain and weather affect the ability to attrite enemy forces. Attacking an 

enemy in open terrain in good weather significantly differs from striking an enemy in rough 

wooded terrain under a layer of foul weather. As an example, during Operation DESERT 

STORM, exposed Iraqi forces in open desert terrain were more vulnerable to interdiction by 

coalition airpower than dispersed Serbian forces that benefited from trees, valleys, and poor 

weather conditions during Operation ALLIED FORCE. 

(3) Enemy characteristics influence the adopted concept of operations (CONOPS). 

The enemy’s operational vulnerability and ability to replace losses—or adapt operations to 

mitigate them—must be weighed against the expected results of targeting supporting 

infrastructure. The enemy’s movement also influences the ability to destroy fielded forces. 

Friendly maneuver can force an enemy to react and become predictable, making interdiction 

both viable and more effective. 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-03 

c. Constricting the Enemy Logistic System. Combat creates demands on fielded 

forces and speeds consumption of vital war materiel. This in turn increases the effects of 

interdiction operations by straining the support systems and reducing stockpiles. For surface 

combat to take place, soldiers and their weapons, ammunition, food, and communications 

equipment must get to the battle. When the enemy consumes large quantities of supplies 

because of heavy combat or extensive movement, interdiction operations have an accelerated 

impact for two reasons. First, when opponents are under heavy pressure, they may be forced 

to use up stockpiles reserved for ongoing or future operations. Second, high consumption 

drives an enemy to use more direct routes, making it more vulnerable to interdiction attacks. 

The nature of ground combat also determines which supporting elements are most critical at 

any given time. Historically, an enemy army fighting under static conditions is more 

affected by the destruction of munitions, while a highly mobile enemy is more disrupted by 

the loss of fuel and transportation. 

(1) The less surplus capacity the enemy’s logistic systems have, the less they can 

compensate for damage. For any type of interdiction in a combat or noncombat 

INTERDICTION OPERATIONS IN THE BATTLE FOR AL KHAFJI 

During the evening of 29 January 1991, the Iraqi Army sent elements of three 

divisions in motion southward out of their static positions in occupied 

Kuwait. While their ultimate objectives are not known, there is no question 

that all three advances were aimed at engaging coalition forces, with the 

largest ground battle developing in the Saudi town of Ra’s Al Khafji. 

While coalition forces engaged the Iraqi 5th Mechanized Division at Al Khafji, 

the two northern lines of the Iraqi advance suddenly found themselves very 

exposed, with their own movement serving to highlight themselves as 

targets. While Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) 

located, tracked, and provided vectors to the columns of advancing Iraqi 

vehicles, coalition air interdiction missions took full advantage, using a 

variety of night vision devices and precision-guided munitions to inflict 

devastating damage and stop the Iraqi advance. After losing hundreds of 

vehicles and taking thousands of casualties, the Iraqis abandoned the attack 

as a costly failure. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets like 

the E-8 JSTARS (shown on the left) were vital in achieving the results 

depicted in the photograph to the right. 

SOURCE: Stephen T. Hosmer, Psychological Effects 

of US Air Operations in Four Wars, 1941-1991 
Fundamentals of Interdiction 

I-7 

environment, degrading the mobility of the enemy’s distribution system hinders its ability to 

redistribute assets to effectively counter friendly operations. When attacking the enemy’s 

logistic systems, it is normally prudent to concentrate efforts on a small number of limiting 

factors such as concentrations of supplies; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; storage and 

resupply systems; or soft vehicles. When a critical vulnerability is identified within the 

enemy’s logistic systems, it is usually beneficial to employ parallel attacks against that 

vulnerability. 

(2) The enemy’s transportation system must also be broken down into components 

when analyzing for weaknesses to attack. Most transportation systems consist of the actual 

conduit for travel (roads, rail, etc.), vehicles used to transport troops or supplies along the 

conduit, energy required for those vehicles to operate (typically petroleum or electricity), C2 

to run the transportation system, and repair facilities to keep the system operating. The 

loading and unloading points in the transportation system may prove especially lucrative, as 

large concentrations of enemy forces or supplies are often found there. Examples include 

rail yards, harbors, and airfields. If forces or supplies are critically needed at the front, the 

enemy may not have the luxury of dispersing them during loading or unloading, which 

increases their vulnerability to interdiction. In many cases, the enemy will use the same 

transportation system for both forces and supplies. Under such circumstances, destroying or 

degrading the enemy’s LOCs will affect both mobility and resupply capability. When 

analyzing an enemy transportation network for importance to its overall strategy, all possible 

uses for such a system must be considered. The analysis of the enemy’s transportation 

network should include its surplus capacity and reconstitution capability. 

d. Disrupting Enemy C2. The enemy’s combat operations may be disrupted with 

strategic or interdiction attacks on their C2 nodes; the level of C2 disruption must be 

A thorough assessment of the enemy’s reconstitution capability is required. 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-03 

commensurate with overall objectives. Attacks on the C2 structure may seek to isolate 

enemy combat forces from higher headquarters, or to force the enemy to use less capable and 

secure backup communications systems that can be more easily exploited. When the enemy 

employs a rigid, top-down C2 doctrine, it can be particularly vulnerable to the disruptive 

effects of C2 interdiction. This is especially true when the enemy has not had a long 

preparation period to exercise its plan, or when the conflict has moved beyond the initial 

stages. Conversely, an enemy that practices a high degree of C2 autonomy will likely be less 

affected by attacks on its C2 network. In some circumstances—such as a plan that includes 

forcing the enemy to react to friendly maneuver—complete destruction of the enemy C2 

architecture could be counterproductive. The capability to affect the enemy through 

nonlethal information operations (IO) must also be considered, as this approach may lead to 

better overall results while freeing up conventional interdiction assets to prosecute alternate 

objectives. 

e. Forcing Urgent Movement Upon the Enemy. The enemy may execute time urgent 

movement for several reasons: an attempt to achieve surprise, the need to attack before 

reinforcements or supplies arrive, the requirement for rapid reinforcement of threatened 

defensive positions, the attempt to exploit offensive operations, or when driven to urgent 

movement by interdiction. Rapid movement of enemy forces and supplies often makes them 

more vulnerable to interdiction. They generally become more concentrated while traversing 

more exposed and predictable avenues, foregoing time-consuming camouflage, concealment, 

and deception efforts. However, movements are normally limited in duration due to a desire 

to limit exposure. For friendly forces to capitalize on such opportunities, the JFC must deny 

the enemy mobility when it needs it most. Close coordination is required among all forces to 

take full advantage of the situation. Additionally, commanders require access to information 

systems able to process real-time and near real-time intelligence in order to exploit the 

capabilities of interdiction and the opportunities these operations create. Friendly forces 

must take full advantage of all reconnaissance and surveillance assets to detect when these 

movements occur. 

f. Channeling Enemy Movements. Interdiction channels the enemy’s movements. 

This is made easier by the lack of transportation routes, and man-made and natural obstacles. 

The fewer routes available to handle enemy supplies and reinforcements, the greater the loss 

or delay caused by severing those routes. Attacks on enemy lateral LOCs can channel 

movement, impair reinforcement, reduce operational cohesion, and create conditions for 

defeating the enemy in detail. Minefields may be employed to channel enemy maritime and 

ground movements, although our decision to use mines must be balanced against any 

potential that friendly forces or civilians may need to move through the targeted area. 

Geography may also restrict or channel surface movement, creating chokepoints and 

concentrated targets. Geography influences the rate of enemy movement, the size of the 

force to be moved, where it can move, and the means required to move the force. In cases 

where geography favors rapid movement of enemy forces, artificial and/or temporary 

chokepoints can be created by such means as delivery of large numbers of scatterable mines. 

A detailed discussion of the integration of barriers, obstacles, and mines is included in Joint 

Publication (JP) 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations. 
Fundamentals of Interdiction 

I-9 

g. Denying Enemy Threat Potential. The presence or threat of effective interdiction 

operations can result in deterring a potential enemy’s actions. Fear of interdiction can result 

in a less than optimum use of resources by the enemy. For example, an enemy that has faced 

or witnessed air interdiction (AI) may be reluctant to move reserve troops to the front lines 

where they are critically needed. The threat of interdiction operations is also a strong 

deterrent to the movement and proliferation of WMD. WMD interdiction encompasses 

operations directed toward weaponized chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

devices/warheads and delivery vehicles; dual-use items required to produce 

devices/warheads, their precursors, or related items; related technology; financial and 

transportation intermediaries which facilitate trade in WMD; and individuals associated with 

all of the above. Actions to interdict/intercept WMD materiel occur throughout the 

operational area. The perceived effectiveness of friendly interdiction capabilities may 

provide a powerful deterrent to the proliferation of WMD or an enemy decision to employ 

WMD. 

See Appendix B of JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, for more information 

on WMD interdiction operations. 

h. Enforcement of Sanctions. Sanction enforcement operations employ coercive 

measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items or information into 

or out of a nation or specified area. Maritime interception operations (MIO) are a form of 

interdiction used for sanction enforcement that are military or legal in nature, and serve both 

political and military purposes. The political objective is to compel a country or group to 

conform to the objectives of the initiating body, while the military objective focuses on 

establishing a barrier that is selective, allowing only authorized goods or persons to enter or 

exit. Depending on the geography, sanction enforcement normally involves some 

combination of air and surface forces. MIO can be used across the range of military 

operations. It can be used to enforce sanctions or national policies imposed unilaterally, 

multinationally, or as directed by an intergovernmental organization (e.g., the United Nations 

Security Council) or other regional authority. MIO may include the following:

(1) Send armed boarding parties to visit merchant ships bound to, through, or out of 

a defined area. 

(2) Examine merchant ships’ documentation and cargo. 

(3) Search for contraband. 

(4) Divert vessels failing to comply with guidelines set by the sanctioning body. 

(5) Seize vessels and cargo. 

5. Elements of Effective Interdiction 

Effective interdiction operations share a number of common elements that lead to the 

attainment of interdiction objectives. The mix of elements in each operation depends on 

such variables as the nature of the conflict, geographic location, weather, and enemy 
Chapter I 

I-10 JP 3-03 

characteristics. Elements normally required to successfully prosecute interdiction operations 

are shown in Figure I-1 and are discussed below. 

a. Full Spectrum Superiority. The cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, 

maritime, and space domains and information environment (which includes cyberspace) 

permits the conduct of joint operations without effective opposition or prohibitive 

interference. 

b. Synchronization with Maneuver. An important factor for success is the 

synchronization of interdiction operations and maneuver. Planning and conducting 

interdiction and maneuver operations within a coherent framework creates a synergistic 

effect. The benefits of integrating these operations are discussed in more detail in Chapter 

III, “Joint Interdiction Planning.” 

c. Sustained and Concentrated Pressure. Successful interdiction operations have 

highlighted the importance of sustained, concentrated efforts. Since interdiction is often 

directed against replaceable systems or assets (vehicles, weapons, aircraft, ships, 

illegal/dangerous cargoes or persons, communications equipment) and reparable systems 

(engineering features, such as bridges and rail lines), sustained, concentrated pressure, 

sufficient to impede efforts to replace or repair affected assets, is required. This applies 

particularly to operations of long duration, because time allows the enemy to restore losses. 

Eventually, resourceful enemies can circumvent even the most enduring effects of 

interdiction. Success or failure often comes down to the balance between the enemy’s ability 

to mitigate interdiction effects versus friendly ability to sustain interdiction actions. Attacks 

on key enemy repair and replacement assets may be advisable in many circumstances. 

Effective employment of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets provides 

critical information to the JFC on the results of interdiction and on the enemy’s ability to 

reconstitute. 

Figure I-1. Elements of Effective Interdiction Operations 

Full Spectrum Superiority

Synchronization with Maneuver

Sustained and Concentrated Pressure 

Accurate, Reliable, and Timely Intelligence

Effective Resource Planning, Positioning, and Allocation

ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE INTERDICTION OPERATIONS
Fundamentals of Interdiction 

I-11 

d. Accurate, Reliable, and Timely Intelligence. Information about the enemy’s plan 

of operations, LOCs, tactical dispositions, and capabilities is imperative to provide 

information about the enemy’s probable course(s) of action (COA[s]), identify contraband 

shipments (as related to combating WMD) or interrelated target systems and allow the 

commander to anticipate enemy actions or counteractions and respond accordingly. A 

prerequisite for planning joint interdiction operations is an understanding of the capabilities 

and limitations of the enemy and how they are most likely to operate. Accurate, reliable, and 

timely intelligence allows commanders to develop achievable objectives, select appropriate 

targets, apply the appropriate weapon and delivery systems, and keep abreast of the enemy’s 

response, as applicable. 

(1) Intelligence can provide interdiction operations with crucial input on target 

development by assessing enemy characteristics. Intelligence also supports interdiction 

planners with environmental assessments. Conversely, interdiction may enhance intelligence 

collection if, for example, the destruction of primary communications nets causes the enemy 

to use systems which are more vulnerable to exploitation. 

(2) Accurate, reliable, and timely intelligence is extremely important to maritime 

domain awareness (MDA). National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-41/Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-13, Maritime Security Policy, defines MDA as “the 

effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could 

impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.” While an 

emerging capability, MDA is critical in enhancing our ability to identify threats in the 

maritime domain as early and as distant from our shores as possible by integrating 

intelligence, surveillance, observation, and navigation systems into a common operational 

picture throughout the United States Government (USG) and involved foreign nations. By 

networking maritime regions and resources into a common “global” maritime picture, useful 

data can be presented in a form that supports a wide range of planning, decision, execution, 

and assessment requirements to include those supporting interdiction operations. Given the 

nature of these operations, it is important that information be shared within the interagency 

and international communities to the maximum extent possible. 

e. Effective Resource Planning, Positioning, and Allocation. Ensuring the 

appropriate resources (units, munitions, vessels, etc.) are allocated and positioned to conduct 

effective interdiction operations requires detailed planning. Interdiction objectives will 

affect the movement and positioning of appropriate interdiction platforms and weapons. 

Proper weapon planning and employment are important factors for effective combat 

interdiction operations. Matching the correct weapon (system) to the target minimizes the 

time and resources required to achieve the objective. Mismatching available munitions or 

assets with targets and/or target systems can greatly increase the time and resources required 

to achieve the objectives of the interdiction operation, and unduly risks valuable personnel 

and weapon systems through additional strikes against the same undamaged/undestroyed 

target. Munitions and fuse settings should be tailored to the desired effect — target 

destruction, neutralization, or suppression. Although precision-guided munitions (PGMs) 

have become a primary weapon of choice, planners should realize that general purpose and 

cluster munitions may, consistent with application of ROE, create better effects in some 

situations. Planners should also consider the possibility of adverse weapons effects against 
Chapter I 

I-12 JP 3-03 

friendly forces, such as the employment of time-delayed munitions against an enemy near 

advancing friendly forces. Additionally, planners should consider adverse effects of enemy 

munitions or weapons material collocated at a target site. Some WMD targets may have 

restrictions due to the danger of releasing contamination. PGMs are uniquely valuable in 

attacking hardened point targets or for minimizing collateral damage. These highly accurate 

munitions provide rapid strike capability with maximum flexibility, while standoff precision 

weapons allow joint interdiction forces to remain outside the most heavily defended areas 

with the same accuracies. Precision attack of key infrastructure, transportation, and C2 

targets may cripple an enemy force’s ability to maneuver. Furthermore, when the number of 

PGMs available is high enough, interdiction operations can inflict devastating losses on a 

mechanized enemy force. Such a strategy must consider the number of weapons required, 

the time required to achieve objectives, and whether more lucrative target sets exist. 
II-1 

CHAPTER II 

JOINT INTERDICTION CAPABILITIES 

1. Interdiction-Capable Forces 

Interdiction operations can be conducted by all components of the joint force, across the 

range of military operations employing both lethal and nonlethal means. During interdiction 

operations, components may support or be supported by another component commander to 

achieve theater/JOA-wide interdiction objectives or they may conduct interdiction operations 

as part of their component mission. Forces that can conduct or be employed in interdiction 

operations include those listed in Figure II-1 and described below. 

a. Air forces employ such weapons as projectiles, missiles, unguided munitions, PGMs, 

land and/or sea mines, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and sensors from airborne platforms 

in the AI role. 

(1) AI is defined as air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the 

enemy’s military surface capabilities before it can be brought to bear effectively against 

friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. AI is generally conducted at such 

distances from friendly forces that detailed integration of each AI mission with the fire and 

movement of friendly forces is not normally required. Some characteristics or 

considerations of AI follow. 

(a) AI can be executed as a supported mission or it can provide support to 

surface commanders. AI contributes by disrupting the enemy’s ability to command, mass, 

maneuver, withdraw, supply, and reinforce available combat power and by weakening the 

enemy physically and psychologically. 

(b) AI can contribute to or achieve JFC objectives independent of surface 

forces. AI operations outside surface AO and conducted against enemy forces, LOCs, C2 

systems, and other enemy resources can significantly alter the course of an operation. 

(c) AI creates opportunities for friendly commanders to exploit. AI may 

support a surface scheme of maneuver within a surface commander’s AO. By using JFC 

priorities, a surface component nominated target list, and a thorough understanding of the 

surface component’s scheme of maneuver, AI can create effects that facilitate and support 

surface maneuver. 

(d) AI is inherently less complicated to execute than close air support (CAS) 

because it does not require detailed integration with the fire and movement of friendly forces. 

Detailed integration requires extensive communications, comprehensive deconfliction 

procedures, and meticulous planning. Therefore, if the enemy surface force presents a 

“The line that connects an army with its base of supplies is the heel of Achilles—its 

most vital and vulnerable point.” 

John S. Mosby, War Reminiscences, 1887 
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-03 

lucrative target, AI conducted before friendly land forces make contact can significantly 

degrade the enemy’s fighting ability and reduce the number of CAS sorties required. The 

CAS/AI relationship has a parallel within the maritime domain. Like CAS, maritime air 

support (MAS) refers to air action against hostile surface targets—at sea—that requires 

detailed integration with the fire and movement of maritime forces. AI of maritime targets 

differs from MAS in that detailed tactical integration with naval surface forces is not 

required. 

(2) Each Service’s air forces’ flexibility, range, speed, lethality, precision, and 

ability to mass at a desired time and place contribute significantly to the overall joint 

interdiction effort. Air forces offer the versatility and capability to deliver combat power 

against the enemy when and where needed to attain objectives across the range of military 

operations. The ability of aircraft to employ PGMs offers a distinct advantage over other 

weapon systems in many cases. PGMs can correct for ballistics, release, and targeting errors 

in flight. Explosive loads can also be more accurately tailored for the target, since planners 

can assume most bombs will strike in the manner and place expected. Unless using timedelayed munitions, manned and unmanned aircraft (UA) can offer the advantage of 

providing immediate attack assessment. Also, stealth aircraft and air-launched conventional 

Figure II-1. Interdiction-Capable Forces 

INTERDICTION-CAPABLE FORCES

Air forces employ such weapons as projectiles, missiles, unguided 

munitions, precision munitions, land and/or sea mines, electronic warfare 

systems, and sensors from airborne platforms.

Maritime forces employ assets such as surface combatants, carriers, 

amphibious shipping, aircraft, helicopters, submarines, landing forces, and 

special forces, and weapons such as missiles, munitions, torpedoes, and 

mines, capable of conducting a variety of air, land, and sea operations.

Land forces employ such assets as attack helicopters, missiles, artillery, 

and those forces capable of conducting conventional airborne, air 

assault, and amphibious operations.

Special operations forces may support conventional interdiction 

operations by providing terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions, 

or may act independently when the use of conventional forces is 

inappropriate or infeasible.

Other government agencies work with military forces in a “whole of 

government” approach to interdiction capabilities and forces. Military 

elements work with our interagency partners (Department of the Treasury, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, etc.) to interdict threat finance and 

foreign fighter streams. 
Joint Interdiction Capabilities 

II-3 

standoff weaponry reduce the risk of detection and loss of aircraft and aircrews while 

increasing the probability of successful attacks. 

(3) Technological advancements have given the joint force UA armed with PGMs. 

UA have the benefit of lower cost, lower radar and visual signatures, and extended loiter 

times compared with most manned aircraft and provide the JFC another interdiction option, 

especially in heavily defended target areas. UA can be employed over suspected or known 

enemy strongholds to locate and engage targets of opportunity for longer periods of time. 

Armed UA have been used extensively in this capacity during Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). 

(4) Employment of cluster munitions against land-based targets can increase the 

effectiveness of attacks. They allow a single aircraft to create desired effects on multiple 

pieces of equipment in a single pass. They also allow joint forces to channel the enemy into 

kill zones or deny access to an area. Sea mines can also be delivered by aircraft, deterring 

enemy ships from entering an area of the sea or sinking them. Often, mines are more 

effective for interdiction than bombs, because delayed effects munitions continue to be 

effective after the delivery aircraft have left the area. Enemy uncertainty regarding the 

presence of these munitions can result in excessive delays, diversion of resources into timeconsuming countermeasures, and reduced enemy morale. However, the use of cluster/mine 

munitions may also present several disadvantages to the joint force to include: collateral 

damage, danger to civilians, post conflict cleanup cost, adverse coalition public relations 

implications, and denial of friendly access to the targeted area. Programmable self-destruct 

munitions may mitigate some of these disadvantages. The use of mines and cluster mines is 

Air interdiction assets, such as this F-15E Strike Eagle, provide lethality, flexibility, and 

precision capabilities to the joint force. 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-03 

governed by rigorous safeguards to ensure compliance with international law and the 

national security needs of the United States. US policy in this area is under constant review 

and modification. Employment must only be executed in accordance with the ROE 

approved for the operation. Additionally, the use of cluster/mine munitions may be 

problematic in an environment where multinational members have ratified international 

conventions against these munitions. 

(5) Cruise missiles such as the conventional air-launched cruise missile (CALCM) 

can be effective interdiction assets and provide a potent employment option to the joint 

force. Several variants provide single warhead unitary blasts or a hardened target penetration 

warhead. Low risk, accuracy, and range make missiles most viable in the planning of 

interdiction contingency operations against stationary targets. CALCMs are capable of 

conducting short-notice strikes launched from aircraft operating outside the range of enemy 

threats. They are ideal for use against targets in heavily defended areas where the probability 

of the loss of manned aircraft is too high. CALCMs are also capable of neutralizing enemy 

air defenses to facilitate a much larger attack by land- and sea-based airpower. 

(6) Joint forces employ EW in the form of electronic attack, electronic protection, 

and EW support to achieve the JFC’s objectives, guidance, and intent. Examples of 

interdiction by EW systems include degrading, denying, and exploiting enemy C2 links with 

electromagnetic jammers, antiradiation missiles, and use of specialized sensors. EW systems 

may also intercept, maintain, and update enemy electronic order of battle data for use in 

subsequent operations. JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, provides in-depth guidance for EW 

operations. 

b. Maritime forces employ missiles, torpedoes, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, 

mines, naval fires and boarding parties to support naval, air, and ground forces. Ships 

performing surface warfare and submarines performing antisubmarine warfare are examples 

of interdiction actions to establish and maintain sea control. Interdiction in the maritime 

domain can isolate an enemy from outside support, halt undesired maritime activity, and 

enforce legal sanctions. It can also enhance free use of the sea LOCs for such friendly 

operations as deployment of forces and can provide security for other naval operations. 

Interdiction in the maritime domain can be significantly different from operations in other 

domains due to the complexity of international law of the sea. Especially when conducting 

homeland security (e.g., United States Coast Guard [USCG] under Title 14, United States 

Code [USC]) or homeland defense interdiction operations, maritime forces may be tasked to 

intercept, interdict, disable, stop, and board vessels prior to use of lethal means of 

interdiction. 

(1) Missiles such as the Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM) can be effective 

interdiction assets and provide a potent employment option to the joint force. TLAM is a 

long range, subsonic cruise missile used for land attack warfare, launched from surface ships 

and submarines. Low risk, accuracy, and range make missiles a viable option against 

stationary, non-hardened targets. TLAMs are capable of conducting short-notice strikes, 

without aircraft support, against targets in heavily defended areas where the probability of 

the loss of manned aircraft is too high. TLAMs are also capable of neutralizing enemy air 

defenses to facilitate a much larger attack by land- and sea-based airpower. In theater, the 
Joint Interdiction Capabilities 

II-5 

maritime operations center—maritime headquarters Tomahawk strike and mission planning 

cells provide the joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) with the capability to 

plan new missions or modify selected missions in the AO. 

(2) Maritime interdiction can deny the enemy free movement into or within an 

objective area prior to an amphibious assault by landing force elements. Naval fires may 

also be used for interdiction along littoral LOCs. 

(3) Interdiction of waterways can disrupt enemy infiltration, movement, and 

resupply along and across major waterways in an AO. Mines have a wide application to 

interdiction operations in both the littoral regions and the open ocean. They are effective in 

harbors, coastal regions, and strategic chokepoints of the ocean. Harbors can be vital to 

maintaining both a viable economy and an effective maritime force. A lack of adequate 

ports to resupply naval vessels may reduce the effectiveness of enemy forces. Ports may also 

be essential in sustaining a military campaign. Disrupting the flow of ships in and out of a 

port—or shutting it off altogether—can be an effective way to cripple an enemy. 

(4) The general purpose of MIO is to interdict goods or persons prohibited by a 

lawful sanction. However, not every individual MIO action or boarding results in 

interdiction, because the vast majority of vessels boarded in these operations are free of 

prohibited goods or persons. While a primary mechanism for initiation of MIO has been 

United Nations Security Council resolutions, other rationales exist for MIO, including: 

(a) consensual boarding (permission granted by the ship’s captain); 

(b) a flag state authorized boarding; 

(c) an interception as a condition of port entry; 

(d) the belligerent right of visit and search; 

(e) an interception made in accordance with Article 110 of the Law of the Sea 

Convention to verify the vessel’s flag and to determine if the voyage is in compliance with 

international law as it pertains to universal crimes (e.g., piracy, slave trade [quasi-universal 

crime] and unauthorized broadcasting); or

(f) an interception made pursuant to the right of self-defense. 

(5) Bilateral ship boarding agreements—such as those negotiated between nations 

that have endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of Interdiction Principles—

can assist in the timely interdiction of vessels. The tactics, techniques, and procedures for 

the conduct of MIO are provided in Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

(NTTP)/Coast Guard Publication 3-07.11, Maritime Interception Operations, which 

describes detailed visit, board, search, and seizure operations. 
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-03 

(6) Expanded maritime interception operations (EMIO) are authorized by the 

President and directed by the Secretary of Defense to deter, degrade, and/or disrupt or gather 

intelligence to prevent attacks against the US and its allies. EMIO involves interception of 

vessels identified to be transporting terrorists and/or terrorist-related materiel that pose an 

imminent threat to the United States and its allies. EMIO may be implemented without 

sanctions and may involve multinational forces or OGAs. The legal rationales required to 

permit boarding include those listed in subparagraph (4), above. 

(7) Law enforcement operations (LEO) are a form of interdiction operations. The 

basis and mission of LEO, however, is different from MIO. Title 14, USC, gives the USCG 

statutory authority to make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and 

arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction for the 

prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of the laws of the United States. USCG 

vessels routinely conduct LEO independent of naval operations; however, Navy vessels may 

embark USCG law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) for boardings. Navy ships carrying 

LEDETs support federal law enforcement efforts, but Navy and other Department of Defense 

(DOD) personnel are generally prohibited from direct involvement in law enforcement 

activity, such as boarding, arrest, or seizure. Counterdrug and alien migrant interdiction 

operations are examples of LEO. 

(8) Riverine operations facilitate interdiction in coastal and inland waterways. In 

areas with limited land transportation, but numerous waterways, rivers provide natural 

transportation routes and are logical population centers. In some developing countries, 

inland waterways are major arteries for economic circulation, and military operations may be 

Tomahawk land attack missile launch from a Navy cruiser.
Joint Interdiction Capabilities 

II-7 

needed to keep waterways open to maintain the local economy. Water routes are 

strategically and tactically important to an insurgent or enemy force, particularly in situations 

where an external aggressor supports and directs insurgency. Such a situation dictates a 

doctrine and strategy of interdiction and control of waterways. 

(a) A thorough understanding of the riverine environment is needed to plan 

and conduct riverine operations. In a riverine area, watercraft are the principal means of 

transport. In such areas, indigenous personnel often settle along the waterways because they 

are the only usable means of travel between villages. Civilian traffic and settlements conceal 

the enemy’s movements and mining and ambush operations. Control of waterways is 

necessary in riverine areas. 

(b) Riverine operations are joint operations undertaken primarily by ground 

and naval forces. Participating forces must coordinate and integrate efforts to achieve a 

common objective. Interdiction may be an objective of riverine operations, while other 

objectives may be to seize key terrain, strike, raid, or facilitate freedom of navigation. 

Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, and support available—time available are the 

basis for the task organization. Considering the total forces available, riverine operations 

require a balance between types of forces. A special consideration in task organization for 

riverine operations is the amount of troop lift and fire support available from the air or 

maritime component or Army forces. The major factors determining maritime support 

requirements are: 

1. The extent to which navigable waters permit moving naval support to, 

within, and around the AO. 

2. The size of ground forces needed in the objective area, the availability 

of other means of transportation, and the desirability of using other means to deliver them. 

3. The maritime commander having tactical control (TACON) of the 

movement and maneuver of watercraft under the operational control (OPCON) of the ground 

force commander being supported. 

4. The maritime force commander having responsibility for moving 

subordinate joint force ships and watercraft between riverine bases and support facilities 

outside the riverine area. The land force commander in the riverine area is responsible for 

the security of ships within the area. 

c. Land forces employ such assets as attack helicopters, missiles, artillery, and 

forces capable of conducting conventional airborne, air assault, and amphibious 

operations. Operational-level commanders isolate the AO by interdicting enemy military 

potential before its effective use against friendly forces. Firepower employed by land forces 

may be either direct or indirect. It is usually combined with maneuver for greatest effect and 

can be integrated with EW systems and other assets to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the 

enemy’s military potential. 

(1) Attack helicopters provide a commander with an effective and versatile means 

of interdicting enemy forces. They may use them for rapid reaction operations and where 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-03 

terrain restricts or prohibits ground force occupation or engagement of the enemy’s forces. 

Attack helicopters are capable of employing precision-guided weapons and providing 

terminal guidance for other interdiction forces. They are capable of operating during the day 

or night and in adverse weather conditions. 

(2) Missile systems such as Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) are very 

effective assets for interdicting high value, well-defended targets, day or night, in all weather 

conditions. ATACMS provides the joint force with a flexible employment option which can 

complement and enhance the theater/JOA-wide interdiction effort. They can conduct shortnotice strikes without airborne aircraft support against targets in heavily defended areas 

where the probability of the loss of manned aircraft is too high. Missile systems are usually 

employed against soft, stationary targets. These targets include unhardened surface-tosurface missile sites, emplaced artillery batteries, air defense sites, logistic sites, and C2 

facilities. Current technology for missile system warhead guidance allows missiles to target 

mobile armor formations and small point targets such as buildings or other non-hardened 

targets. 

(3) Although artillery primarily provides close supporting fires to the maneuver 

force, it can also provide a significant contribution to interdiction operations. Artillery can 

create obstacles to enemy maneuver and cover the friendly force’s advance with smoke and 

AH-64 Apache attack helicopters are an organic Army asset 

that can be used for interdiction missions.
Joint Interdiction Capabilities 

II-9 

fire. Artillery can suppress enemy defensive systems to facilitate ground and air operations, 

and can be used to promote deception, keep the enemy off balance, interdict enemy 

counterattack routes, and test its responses. Appropriate artillery target areas include 

mobility corridors which form chokepoints on the enemy supply route and areas through 

which hostile weapon systems and equipment must pass. Artillery systems such as the 

multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) can be extremely effective against a variety of 

targets, and are capable of keeping up with fast-paced maneuver advances. Guided MLRS 

rockets and 155-millimeter Excalibur projectiles provide a commander a coordinate seeking 

weapon to use when precision is required for a specific target. 

(4) Airborne and air assault forces provide the joint force with an interdiction 

capability, using forcible entry operations in the form of raids to seize key terrain or 

chokepoints to achieve interdiction objectives. During Operation DESERT STORM, 

elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps, in the largest air assault in military history, penetrated 

260 kilometers into Iraqi territory to the Euphrates River. The purpose of this operation was 

to cut the Iraqi LOCs along Highway 8 to Baghdad, effectively isolating Iraqi forces in the 

Kuwait theater of operations. 

d. Special Operations Forces. SOF are employed as an interdiction force when the use 

of conventional forces is inappropriate or infeasible. SOF may also be used in conjunction 

with conventional forces to enhance interdiction operations. SOF are generally 

unconventional in nature and often clandestine in character, which makes them uniquely 

qualified to conduct interdiction against irregular threats. SOF may conduct coastal or 

riverine interdiction operations using a variety of special operations ships and craft. In a 

This night multiple launch rocket system attack shows the overwhelming firepower that can 

be directed at interdiction targets. 
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-03 

linear operational environment, SOF may be inserted in the enemy’s rear operations area for 

their disruptive effect or to take out key transitory targets. Such direct action operations 

typically involve an attack on critical targets such as LOCs. SOF may employ organic 

weapon systems such as fixed- or rotary-winged gunships. Additionally, SOF may enlist the 

support of local friendly forces who may interdict from within the enemy’s infrastructure in 

areas presumed to be safe from attack. SOF may also degrade or obstruct the warmaking 

capability of a country by damaging, destroying, or diverting war materiel, facilities, utilities, 

and resources. This sabotage may be the most effective or only means of attacking specific 

targets that lie beyond the capabilities of conventional weapon systems. SOF are a potent 

interdiction force in their own right, as discussed earlier. However, their greatest 

contribution to joint interdiction operations may be in their use as a force enabler and 

multiplier. SOF complement and support conventional interdiction operations by 

providing intelligence, target cueing, guidance for PGMs, and post attack assessment. 

(1) The use of SOF in terminal guidance operations (TGO) can significantly 

enhance interdiction. TGO are actions that provide additional information regarding a 

specific target location to approaching aircraft and/or weapons by electronic, mechanical, 

voice, or visual communications. This combination of SOF TGO and joint interdiction 

aircraft was used extensively during OEF. 

(2) SOF special reconnaissance (SR) missions are another means of supporting 

interdiction operations. SR is reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special 

operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify 

information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not 

normally found in conventional forces. These actions provide an additive capability for 

commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. 

Even with today’s sophisticated long-range sensors and overhead platforms, some 

information can be obtained only by visual observation or other collection methods in the 

target area. SOF’s highly developed capabilities of gaining access to denied and hostile 

areas, worldwide communications, and specialized aircraft and sensors enable SR against 

targets inaccessible to other forces or assets. SR is further divided into two mission subsets: 

(a) Target Acquisition (TA). TA includes all activities to acquire and collect 

information in support of planning for or interdiction of a specific target. These actions can 

be in support of a follow on SOF mission or in support of other strike assets. 

1. Reconnaissance. These are operations with the primary purpose of 

locating targets of opportunity, e.g., enemy materiel, personnel, and facilities in assigned 

general areas or along assigned ground communication routes, and LOCs. Reconnaissance is 

not conducted for the purpose of attacking specific identified targets. 

2. Target and Threat Assessment. These are operations conducted to 

detect, identify, locate, and assess a target to determine the most effective employment of 

weapons. This type of operation might include the assessment of the potential effects (to 

include collateral damage) of a strike or an attack on a chemical, biological, radiological, 

nuclear, or toxic industrial material site. 
Joint Interdiction Capabilities 

II-11 

(b) Specific Data Collection. Specific data collection consists of all activities 

to collect data for purposes other than targeting. 

1. Environmental Reconnaissance. These are operations conducted to 

collect and report critical hydrographic, geological, and meteorological information. 

2. Post Strike Reconnaissance. SOF can gather a variety of postinterdiction information, including general atmospherics, impact on population behavior, and 

detailed battle damage assessment (BDA) on target structures. 

e. Other Government Agencies. Often, DOD will either support or be supported by 

OGAs. Supporting combatant commands or government agencies can provide capabilities in 

support of interdiction. When these capabilities are synchronized with global ISR and IO, 

they play a key role in the interdiction of WMD and other forms of interdiction. USG 

departments such as the Department of State, Department of Energy, Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of the Treasury bring significant resources to the 

table in the effort for interdiction. The JFC should coordinate through the combatant 

commander to access these resources. 

See JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, for further 

information. 

2. Complementary Operations 

Joint interdiction operations are most effective when fully integrated with other air, land, 

sea, space, information, and special operations of the joint force. In addition to counterair 

AC-130 Gunship
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 3-03 

and maneuver, other operations notable for their specialized roles which can complement 

joint interdiction operations include the following: 

a. Strategic Attack Operations. A strategic attack is a JFC-directed offensive action 

against a target—whether military, political, economic, or other—that is specifically selected 

to achieve national or military strategic objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the 

enemy’s ability or will to engage in conflict or continue an action and as such, could be part 

of a campaign, major operation, or conducted independently as directed by the President. 

Additionally, these attacks may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having to 

achieve operational objectives as a precondition. Suitable targets may include but are not 

limited to enemy strategic centers of gravity (COGs). Strategic attack and interdiction 

operations complement one another. As an example, strategic attack may focus on halting 

production and storage of critical war materiel, while interdiction concentrates on cutting off 

the flow of this materiel. Strategic attack and interdiction operations also create a synergistic 

effect with simultaneous attacks against the enemy in depth, which places maximum stress 

on the enemy, allowing them no respite. 

b. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is an activity that synchronizes and 

integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and 

dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an 

integrated intelligence and operations function, and comprises a joint mission to produce 

relevant information from all sources in a comprehensive, responsive, timely manner, so that 

military decision makers may gain and maintain an information advantage over an enemy. 

c. Space Operations. Space operations facilitate and enhance interdiction operations.

Space systems support joint interdiction target analysts, planners, and combat forces by 

providing capabilities for C2; sea, land, and space surveillance; intelligence collection; 

tactical warning and combat assessment; navigation; geospatial information and services; 

and environmental monitoring. Denying the enemy access to its space capabilities and 

attacking the enemy’s capabilities to deny US and partner nation space capabilities must be 

integrated into joint interdiction plans and operations. Planning must take into account 

possible reliability and vulnerability issues of space-based systems. Joint force reliance on 

these systems makes them a lucrative target for an enemy with the means to attack them. 

Also, many space-based systems, such as global positioning system signals, are susceptible 

to EW techniques and environmental interference, and these factors must be taken into 

account during the planning process. 

JP 3-14, Space Operations, provides further amplification on the role of space forces in joint 

operations. 

d. Information Operations. IO are the integrated employment of the core capabilities 

of EW, computer network operations, military information support operations (MISO), 

military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related 

capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated 

decision making while protecting our own. IO complements interdiction through a 

variety of means and can be used to accomplish interdiction objectives, ideally 

achieving the goals before friendly forces engage the enemy. The growing dependence on 
Joint Interdiction Capabilities 

II-13 

information, information technology systems, and cyberspace by all forces and functions 

creates opportunities to use IO against the enemy. Use of IO to attack C2, logistic, or 

intelligence functions may lead to confusion, uncertainty, or lack of confidence in 

information systems and may contribute directly to collapse of enemy capability and will. 

Disrupting the enemy’s communications and other systems within the operational 

environment cripples the enemy’s ability to direct organized operations or leverage 

information systems to its advantage. Additionally, the synergistic effects of MISO 

conducted in parallel with interdiction operations can attack the enemy’s will to fight 

simultaneously. The psychological shock of massed joint interdiction and IO can be 

overwhelming to the enemy’s fielded forces, especially when those forces have already been 

strained by surface combat. The nonlethal nature of many IO capabilities allows their 

use prior to and after hostilities, extending contact across time, thereby giving the 

friendly force greater opportunity to influence events and outcomes favorably. 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.01, Joint Information 

Operations Policy, and JP 3-13, Information Operations, discuss the role of IO in joint 

warfare. 

e. Air refueling provides the JFC the ability to maneuver and mass interdiction forces, 

using surprise and economy of force, at a time and location where the enemy is least 

prepared, to deter, dissuade, or destroy. Station times will be increased for airborne, on call 

AI missions, providing decreased response times. While technically a “support” asset, air 

refueling has become such an integrated part of interdiction force packaging that it would be 

difficult to imagine operating without the enhanced capabilities it provides. For example, 

enemy antiship defenses may force an aircraft carrier to stand off from the target area, 

Air refueling is a key part of most air interdiction operations and extends the range, 

payload, and endurance of air interdiction assets, thereby increasing their effectiveness.
Chapter II 

II-14 JP 3-03 

requiring refueling support to get carrier aviation to the fight. When air superiority is in 

dispute and enemy aircraft and missiles threaten air bases close to the fight, air refueling may 

be the only way to get interdiction missions to the target area. 

f. Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR). SCAR is a mission flown for 

the purpose of detecting targets and coordinating or performing attack or reconnaissance on 

those targets. SCAR missions are flown in a specific geographic area and are an element of 

the C2 interface to coordinate multiple AI flights, detect and attack targets, neutralize enemy 

air defenses, and provide BDA. The area may be defined by a box or grid where potential 

targets are known or suspected to exist, or where mobile enemy surface units have relocated 

because of surface fighting. SCAR coordinators perform a similar function for AI missions 

that forward air controller (airborne) (FAC[A]) provides for CAS aircraft. Typical SCAR 

tasks include cycling multiple attacking flights through the target area and providing 

prioritized targeting guidance and enemy air defense updates to maximize the effect of 

each sortie. SCAR in the maritime environment is directed by a SCAR coordinator 

(airborne or surface based) as specified by the surface warfare commander (SUWC). 

Although fighter aircraft often accomplish SCAR missions, the Joint Surveillance Target 

Attack Radar System (JSTARS) can perform SCAR tasks such as locating, verifying, and 

E-3 airborne warning and control aircraft are invaluable in the sequencing of 

air interdiction assets to strike coordination and reconnaissance missions.

“Both Afghanistan and Iraq were air mobility wars. Every single flight into these 

areas of operation needed some kind of air refueling—fighters, bombers, lifters, 

and even other tankers needed air refueling.” 

General John W. Handy, 

Commander, United States Transportation Command, 

October 2001–September 2005 
Joint Interdiction Capabilities 

II-15 

cross-cueing other assets to positively identify moving targets; procedurally controlling and 

sequencing aircraft; and passing target updates. Additionally, the control and sequencing of 

aircraft are best performed by an E-3 airborne warning and control system, an E-2C carrier 

based C2 aircraft, or a ground-based control and reporting center. Even though some SCAR 

responsibilities are similar to that of a FAC/FAC(A), unless specifically qualified, SCAR 

coordinators do not have the authority to control CAS. Detailed SCAR procedures are 

outlined in Field Manual (FM) 3-60.2, Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-23C, 

NTTP 3-03.4.3, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP[I]) 3-

2.72, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Strike Coordination and 

Reconnaissance. 

 
Chapter II 

II-16 JP 3-03 

Intentionally Blank 
III-1 

CHAPTER III 

JOINT INTERDICTION PLANNING 

1. Overview 

The JFC directs the actions of air, land, maritime, space, and SOF to achieve objectives 

through an integrated joint campaign and major operations. The manner in which the JFC 

plans, organizes, and directs forces affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint 

interdiction operations. Unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution are 

key to success in joint and interagency interdiction operations. 

a. Joint Force Objectives. JFCs employ forces to accomplish their objectives; the 

principal challenge is to combine force capabilities and operations to create effects that 

support achievement of those objectives. The planning, coordination, and integration of joint 

interdiction with other operations, such as maneuver, can yield unique advantages. This 

integration of effort begins with the JFC’s theater/JOA-level objectives, guidance, and intent. 

Likewise, the JFC’s theater/JOA campaign or operation plan facilitates such integration and 

helps to ensure that interdiction operations are part of a larger design aimed at achieving the 

JFC’s objectives. Centralized planning and decentralized execution of joint interdiction 

operations ensure coherence and aid in the effective use of force; enhance the exploitation of 

tactical events; avoid fragmented, duplicated, and conflicting efforts; and accommodate the 

Service and functional components’ different employment concepts and procedures. 

b. Joint interdiction typically focuses on operational level objectives as delineated in the 

JFC’s operation or campaign plans. It must also support strategic level objectives by 

working in concert with other efforts to neutralize or destroy the enemy’s COGs or other key 

target systems. Additionally, joint interdiction complements maneuver force operations. 

Successful joint interdiction requires close integration with other operations, available 

resources, and anticipated effects. Strategic and operational level objectives are best 

described in terms of desired outcomes rather than specific targets. 

c. Simultaneity in planning refers to the simultaneous application of military and 

nonmilitary power against the enemy’s critical capabilities/requirements and COGs. 

Simultaneity in joint force operations contributes directly to an enemy’s collapse by placing 

more demands on enemy forces and functions than can be handled. To the degree possible 

within the constraints of the principles of economy of force and mass, joint force operations 

should be conducted across the full breadth and depth of the operational area, creating 

competing and simultaneous demands on enemy commanders and resources. Just as with 

simultaneity, the concept of depth seeks to overwhelm the enemy throughout the operational 

area; creating competing and simultaneous demands on enemy commanders and resources 

and contributing to the enemy’s speedy defeat. Interdiction is one manner in which JFCs add 

depth to operations at the operational level. This also forms the foundation of deep 

“A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week.” 

George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947 
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-03 

operations theory. The intent of deep operations is to bring force to bear on the opponent’s 

entire structure, at the tactical, operational, and strategic depths, in a near simultaneous 

manner. The goal is to compel the enemy to comply with our will by diminishing its 

freedom to act and to resist our intentions through a continual erosion of its own capabilities 

and will. Operational reach enables early detection and identification of threats and 

increases the opportunity for interdiction. 

d. Geographic distance (that is, “close” versus “deep”) should not constitute the primary 

distinction between different forms of interdiction. The concept of depth applies to time as 

well as space. Operations extended in depth, in time as well as space, shape future 

conditions and can disrupt an opponent’s decision cycle. Although it has usually been the 

case that interdiction closer to surface forces was designed to affect the battle over a shorter 

term than actions deeper in the enemy’s territory, the most important aspect in planning 

interdiction operations is the effect desired, which may be measured in time. Once 

objectives, guidance, intent, and desired effects are known, commanders can make 

appropriate targeting decisions. 

e. Immediacy of Interdiction Operations. The relative immediacy of the impact of 

interdiction may depend on several factors: the distance between interdiction operations and 

the location of intended effect, the means and rate of enemy movement (ships, trains, 

aircraft, trucks, tanks, or foot), the type of interdiction targets (forces, supplies, fuel, 

munition, or infrastructure), the level of enemy activity, and the strength and resilience of the 

attacked force or system. The JFC should not apply strict geographic boundaries to 

interdiction, but should plan for its theater/JOA-wide application. 

2. Command Relationships 

JFCs typically conduct joint interdiction operations through component commanders. 

All elements of the joint force can be called upon to perform interdiction operations. For 

example, SOF may conduct limited interdiction operations deep in enemy territory, and land 

or maritime force commanders may employ interdiction assets within their AOs. Planning 

and coordinating interdiction operations occurs at many levels of command within a joint 

force. The flexibility and capability of interdiction-capable assets allow them to be 

employed in a multitude of situations. Subordinate commanders possess organic assets 

which can contribute to interdiction operations. These assets may also be employed in 

support of the JFC’s operation or campaign objectives, or to support other components of the 

joint force, which benefits the joint force as a whole. Normally, air assets tasked in support 

of the theater/JOA-wide interdiction effort are also heavily tasked to conduct or support 

other joint operations, such as CAS, counterair, strategic attack, IO, and maritime support. 

a. Unity of Effort in Joint Interdiction Operations. The capabilities of forces used 

for joint interdiction, as well as the magnitude of their potential contribution, must be 

considered while planning and conducting the joint interdiction effort. The JFC structures 

the joint force to ensure that diverse component capabilities, operations, and forces 

complement each other to achieve the desired results effectively and efficiently. To ensure 

unity of command and effort of air operations throughout a theater/JOA, the JFC 

normally delegates the planning and execution of theater/JOA-wide AI operations to 
Joint Interdiction Planning 

III-3 

the component commander, with the preponderance of AI assets with theater/JOAwide range and the ability to control them. The joint force air component commander 

(JFACC) is normally the supported commander for the JFC’s overall AI effort, while 

land and maritime component commanders are supported commanders for 

interdiction in their AOs. 

b. The JFC establishes JFACC authority and command relationships. JFACC 

authorities and command relationships typically include exercising OPCON over assigned 

and attached forces (through the Service component commander) and TACON over other 

military capabilities and/or forces made available for tasking. However, the JFC may decide 

that direct support is a more appropriate command authority for certain capabilities and/or 

forces. 

c. JFC Staff Option. There may be situations in which designation of a JFACC is not 

required when a conflict or situation is of limited duration, scope, or complexity. If this 

option is exercised by the JFC, the JFC’s staff will assist in planning and coordinating 

interdiction operations for JFC approval. 

Refer to JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, for a detailed discussion 

of command relationshipsinvolving joint air operations. For more information on command 

relationships and authorities, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

d. The Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) plan for the National 

Strategy for Maritime Security provides guidance for an integrated network of 

national-level maritime command centers to achieve coordinated, unified, timely, and 

effective planning and mission accomplishment by the USG. This integrated network 

consists of existing command or operations centers of the MOTR agencies, at the national 

level, to ensure a coordinated response consistent with desired national outcomes. MOTR 

addresses the full range of maritime security threats, including actionable knowledge of acts 

of terrorism, piracy, and other criminal or hostile acts committed by state and nonstate 

actors. In the maritime arena, the MOTR plan: 

(1) Directs the establishment of an integrated network of national-level maritime 

command centers to achieve coordinated, unified, timely, and effective planning and mission 

accomplishment. 

(2) Sets forth lead and supporting federal agency roles and responsibilities for 

MOTR based on existing law, desired USG outcome, greatest potential magnitude of the 

threat, the response capabilities required, asset availability, and authority to act. Some of the 

applicable interdiction roles and responsibilities of the MOTR plan include: 

(a) DOD is the pre-designated lead MOTR agency for tactical response and 

resolution of nation-state threats within the maritime domain. 

(b) DOD is the pre-designated lead MOTR agency for maritime terrorist 

threats that occur in the forward maritime areas of responsibility. DOD will be prepared to 

take a lead or supporting role for response to maritime terrorist threats globally as part of the 

USG’s active, layered defense of the US. 
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 3-03 

(c) DHS is the pre-designated lead MOTR agency for the interdiction of 

maritime threats in waters where DHS normally operates, except as otherwise noted in the 

plan. 

(d) These pre-designated leads can shift to another MOTR agency dependent 

on changes in desired outcome or availability of assets. 

(3) Directs clear coordination relationships and operational coordination 

requirements among the lead and supporting MOTR agencies. The MOTR coordination 

process is conducted through a virtual network of interagency national and operational 

command centers. This process includes protocols for interagency coordination, 

consultation, and assessment throughout MOTR execution. The MOTR protocols and 

procedures allow rapid response to short-notice (pop-up) threats and require interagency 

partners to begin coordination activities (i.e., MOTR conference calls) at the earliest possible 

opportunity when one of the following triggers is met: 

(a) Any terrorist or foreign state threat exists and US agency response is 

anticipated. 

(b) More than one federal department or agency has become or must become 

substantially involved in responding to the threat. 

(c) A single agency or department either lacks capability, capacity, or 

jurisdiction to address the threat. 

(d) Upon resolving the threat, the initial responding federal department or 

agency cannot execute the disposition of cargo, people, or vessels acting under their own 

authority. 

(e) The threat poses a potential adverse effect on the foreign affairs of the 

United States. 

(4) This coordination process determines which agency is the right choice for 

leading the USG’s response and what other agencies are needed to support the response 

effort. Additionally, this process includes protocols for transition of the lead from one 

agency to another and dispute resolution (i.e., if the USG’s desired outcome cannot be 

resolved at the lower levels of government [e.g., operational level], the characterization of a 

particular threat could ultimately be elevated for Presidential resolution). At the tactical 

level, it is important to realize that the MOTR process exists not only to achieve the USG’s 

desired outcome, but to coordinate and assist in bringing additional capabilities to bear on a 

threat. 

e. USCG. Although a part of DHS, USCG is a military Service and a branch of the 

Armed Forces of the United States (Title 14, USC, Section 1 and Title 10, USC, Section 

101). The USCG is at all times an “armed force” under Title 14, USC. The USCG does not 

require Title 10, USC, authority to participate in the national defense of the United States. 

Upon declaration of war, or when directed by the President, the USCG transfers to the 

Department of the Navy (Title 14, USC, Section 2). Even after transfer, the USCG retains 
Joint Interdiction Planning 

III-5 

full Title 14, USC, authorities. Absent such declaration or direction, the Service operates 

under the auspices of DHS and closely cooperates with the Navy regarding maritime security 

issues (Title 14, USC, Section 145) and assists DOD in the performance of any activity for 

which the USCG is especially qualified. 

f. Component commanders develop interdiction priorities to enhance mission 

accomplishment. The land and maritime force commanders are the supported commanders 

within the AOs designated by the JFC. Within their designated AOs, land and maritime 

component commanders integrate and synchronize joint maneuver and fires functions, and 

interdiction missions. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, such commanders 

have the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing of fires within their AOs. 

Within their AOs, commanders attempt to strike interdiction targets with organic assets first 

when practical and feasible. Coordination with the JFACC in these instances may be 

necessary to prevent redundant targeting and joint interdiction mission disruption. 

Interdiction targets which the land or maritime force commander is unable to strike, due to 

lack of organic assets or for which joint force interdiction assets are best suited, are 

nominated to the joint targeting process as individual targets, categories of targets, or in 

terms of desired effects. Once validated, the targets may be prosecuted by another 

component commander or another component commander’s assets may be made available 

for tasking to the air, land, or maritime force commander. However, forwarding desired 

effects rather than strict target nominations gives those responsible for conducting joint 

interdiction maximum flexibility to exploit their capabilities. 

(1) The supported commander should clearly articulate the concept of 

maneuver operations to commanders who apply joint interdiction forces within the 

commander’s designated AO. In particular, supported commanders should provide 

supporting commanders as much latitude as possible in planning and executing their 

operations. When coordinating maneuver operations, supported commanders should clearly 

state how they envision interdiction supporting their maneuver operations, what they want to 

accomplish with interdiction, as well as those actions they want to avoid, such as the 

destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain munitions in a specific area. 

(2) Supported commanders can determine specific targets for interdiction 

conducted within their AOs or, most preferably, give supporting commanders mission-type 

instructions in order to provide the other components as much leeway as possible. For 

example, the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) could indicate to the JFACC 

that an advancing enemy tank division is automatically the highest priority. The JFACC can 

then determine how best to support the JFLCC—without knowing in advance the exact 

location or timing of the priority target. By judiciously employing fire support 

coordination measures (FSCMs), commanders can facilitate the joint interdiction effort 

within their assigned AOs.

(3) It is important to note that joint interdiction can be conducted inside an 

AO in direct response to JFC tasking, and may not be in support of the AO 

commander. The JFC may, for example, have designated certain high-payoff targets that 

are located inside a subordinate commander’s AO. Any commander executing such a 

mission within a land or maritime AO must coordinate the operation to avoid adverse effects 
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-03 

and fratricide. If those operations would have an adverse impact within a land or maritime 

AO, the commander assigned to execute the mission must readjust the plan, resolve the issue 

with the land or maritime component commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution. 

3. Integrating Interdiction and Maneuver 

a. Interdiction and maneuver operations are potent entities in their own right. Both 

maneuver and interdiction operations include the movement of forces and weapon systems, 

and delivery of fires (lethal and nonlethal) which create effects to support objectives at all 

levels through the range of military operations. Maneuver and interdiction could be 

conducted relatively independent of each other in certain circumstances. However, 

integrating interdiction and maneuver, as well as their joint fires, enhances the ability 

for each to more fully contribute to a successful outcome of a campaign or major 

operation. 

b. Interdiction and maneuver are complementary operations that should normally 

be integrated to create dilemmas for the enemy. Synchronizing AI with a ground 

movement toward the enemy flank forces the enemy into the dilemma of either absorbing a 

potentially deadly flanking ground attack or repositioning and exposing themselves to a 

much more effective air attack. Accordingly, integrating interdiction and maneuver provides 

one of the most dynamic concepts available to the joint force. Interdiction and maneuver 

should not be considered as separate operations against a common enemy, but rather as 

complementary operations designed to achieve the JFC’s objectives. 

(1) Maneuver can play a major role in enabling conditions for effective 

employment of interdiction. Maneuver can place sustained pressure on the enemy, forcing 

the enemy to increase consumption of logistics, increasing resupply rates and thereby 

increasing frequency of exposure to interdiction. As a result, interdiction may destroy 

enemy forces and assets at a faster rate than they can be repaired, replaced, or resupplied. 

Actual or threatened maneuver can force an enemy to respond by attempting rapid 

repositioning or resupply. Close coordination among the components will help ensure 

that conditions occur in which the enemy force is made most vulnerable to interdiction. 

(2) Joint interdiction can also facilitate maneuver operations. It may, but does 

not have to, occur at the same place and time as the maneuver to be effective. Joint 

interdiction can control the time of engagement to that point most advantageous to friendly 

GULF WAR COALITION INTERDICTION 

Coalition air interdiction operations placed Iraqi forces on the horns of a 

dilemma: if they remained in position, they would be struck either from the 

air or by the advancing Coalition ground forces; if they tried to move, they 

made themselves extremely vulnerable to patrolling Coalition aircraft, 

including attack helicopters. 

SOURCE: Department of Defense Final Report to Congress 

on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War 
Joint Interdiction Planning 

III-7 

forces. Joint interdiction can be a major contributor and enabler for land and naval force 

operations. Interdiction can give surface forces the time and protection they need to 

maneuver. The psychological effects of interdiction efforts can greatly reduce the will of 

enemy forces to continue, especially when faced with the prospect of having to defend 

against subsequent maneuver operations. In a forced entry scenario, joint interdiction may 

support land and amphibious maneuver operations by denying the enemy supply or resupply 

of equipment and forces to the objective area. It may also interfere with their means of C2 or 

provide a diversionary screen. Joint interdiction can isolate enemy forces, control the 

movement of enemy forces into or out of a land or maritime AO, and set conditions for 

maneuver forces. When joint interdiction is conducted in support of land or maritime forces, 

it should be properly integrated with the scheme of maneuver of the supported force. Within 

the AO, the supported land or maritime commander is responsible for the integration of 

maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders 

designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs. 

c. The JFC ultimately approves the integration of joint interdiction operations 

with the execution of other joint force operations. JFACC controlled interdiction 

operations conducted over maritime and littoral areas may require close coordination 

between the JFACC and the JFMCC. Additionally, in the case of AI operations short of the 

fire support coordination line (FSCL), all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack 

operations are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander. 

Coordination between the JFACC and the JFLCC, as well as coordination between aircrews 

and friendly surface forces, is required through the appropriate air C2 agencies. 

4. Planning Joint Interdiction 

a. The JFC establishes broad planning objectives and guidance for interdiction of enemy 

forces as an integral part of a joint campaign or major operation. Subordinate commanders 

recommend to the JFC how to use their combat power more effectively to this end. With this 

advice, the JFC sets interdiction priorities, provides targeting guidance, and makes 

apportionment decisions. The JFC should clearly designate where the weight of the joint 

interdiction should be applied. Weight of effort may be expressed in terms of percentage of 

total available resources; by assigning priorities for resources used with respect to other 

aspects of the theater/JOA campaign or operation; or as otherwise determined by the JFC. 

This is a particularly important consideration for commanders who must determine the 

correct number and types of forces and weapon systems within their AO, including the 

effects of joint interdiction. Likewise, effective interdiction planners must have a thorough 

understanding of the JFC’s CONOPS. Once the JFC establishes campaign or major 

operation objectives, component commanders develop operation plans that accomplish (or 

contribute to the accomplishment of) the theater/JOA-wide strategic and operational 

objectives. Commanders should consider how planned operations can complement joint 

interdiction objectives and vice versa. These operations may include such actions as 

deception operations, withdrawals, lateral repositioning, and flanking movements that are 

likely to cause the enemy to maneuver large surface forces which may make them more 

vulnerable to interdiction. 
Chapter III 

III-8 JP 3-03 

b. Component Organic Interdiction Operations. Components may conduct 

interdiction operations as part of their specific mission in addition to, or in lieu of, supporting 

the theater/JOA-wide interdiction effort. For example, maritime forces charged with seizing 

and securing a lodgment along a coast may include the interdiction of opposing land and 

maritime forces as part of the overall amphibious operation. Within an assigned AO, a 

ground commander can interdict enemy forces to enhance the effects of the friendly scheme 

of maneuver with the use of such organic assets as ATACMS, organic fixed- and rotarywing aircraft, and artillery. In such situations as these, C2 for the operation is normally 

conducted according to the component’s procedures. 

c. Joint Force Air Component Commander. The JFACC recommends theater/JOAwide air targeting priorities as assigned and, in coordination with other component 

commanders’ interdiction priorities, forwards the air apportionment recommendation to the 

JFC. The JFC provides target priorities and air apportionment guidance to the JFACC and 

other component commanders. The JFACC, using priorities established in the JFC’s air 

apportionment decision, then plans and executes the overall AI effort, using air assets 

assigned or made available. 

(1) Theater/JOA AI capabilities and forces made available for tasking are 

determined by the JFC, in consultation with component commanders. They are based on 

JFC-assigned objectives and the CONOPS. Following the JFC’s air apportionment decision, 

the JFACC allocates and tasks the capabilities/forces made available. The JFACC’s AI 

employment guidance, based on the JFC’s air apportionment decision, is used by the 

joint air operations center (JAOC) for input into the air tasking order (ATO). Aircraft 

or other capabilities and forces not allocated for tasking should be included in the ATO for 

coordination purposes. These may be redirected only with the approval of the JFC or 

affected component commander. The ATO process assists the JFACC in synchronizing, 

planning, and executing the overall air effort. The air apportionment process and the air 

tasking cycle are discussed further in JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air 

Operations. 

(2) The JFC is the only individual who has the authority to change the air 

apportionment decision. However, the JFACC may divert, cancel, or change apportioned AI 

target assignments to adapt to a changing situation, consistent with the JFC’s intent. 

Although such changes are not considered “changing the air apportionment,” the JFACC 

coordinates changes with affected commanders whenever possible to minimize impact on 

other joint force operations. The JFC may give the JFACC the authority to redirect joint air 

operations, but the JFC or affected component commander must approve all requests 

for redirection of direct support air assets. Affected component commanders will be 

notified by the JFACC upon redirection of joint sorties previously allocated in the joint ATO 

for support of component operations. 

d. In the maritime domain, lead agency planning responsibilities during MOTR 

execution include: 

(1) Leading interagency planning for mission execution. 
Joint Interdiction Planning 

III-9 

(2) Planning and coordinating the range of maritime security activities and 

responses required to execute effective MOTR activities under this plan in order to achieve 

the USG’s desired outcome. 

e. Land and Maritime Commanders. As supported commanders within their AOs, 

the land and maritime force commanders are responsible for integrating and 

synchronizing maneuver, fires, and interdiction within their AOs. Accordingly, land and 

maritime commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction 

operations within their AOs. They may designate priority of attacks to focus allocated 

interdiction assets on the targets or target systems essential to achieving the land or maritime 

force commanders maneuver objectives. The supported commander specifies desired effects 

to defeat threats to the maneuver force, to position the enemy for defeat by maneuver forces, 

and to avoid fratricide or hindrance to friendly maneuver. Timing of operations is 

synchronized to mass effects at the desired place and time to achieve the objective. 

Synchronization requires explicit coordination and unity of purpose among the units and 

components in any operation. Failure to properly coordinate attack of targets within AOs 

may result in a duplication of effort or increase the risk of fratricide. Maneuver force 

commanders are assisted in this integration by such elements as the Army’s battlefield 

coordination detachment (BCD) and Marine liaison officer and naval and amphibious liaison 

element at the JAOC, joint air component coordination element, tactical air control parties, 

and air liaison officers who provide advice to the maneuver force commander and staff on 

the capabilities, limitations, and employment of air assets, to include interdiction. 

f. Detailed planning facilitates a coherent interdiction effort involving diverse forces 

using different employment procedures and reduces the potential for fratricide. Interdiction 

coordination procedures must not inhibit timely application of firepower in the conduct of 

other operations. Commanders should consider component capabilities for speed, range, 

maneuver, weapon system characteristics, ability to operate in a potentially contaminated 

area, IO, intelligence gathering, and ability to receive and distribute information available 

from space-based assets. Commanders at all levels must ensure interdiction operations are 

integrated with other ongoing operations. At the joint force level, the joint operations center 

is the focal point for integrating joint operations at the macro level to include interdiction. 

Normally, subordinate commanders establish planning cycles for operations based on JFC 

guidance. This practice permits the coordination of applicable operations, including 

interdiction, between component commanders early enough and in sufficient detail to allow 

integration of those operations. Certain time-sensitive targets (TSTs)—highly lucrative, 

fleeting targets designated by the JFC as high priority—and other targets of opportunity may 

preclude the use of normal coordination procedures. In such cases, appropriate coordination 

measures, prior coordination, on-scene command, and ROE should allow rapid attack of 

these targets. TSTs and other targets of opportunity should be coordinated between affected 

“For our air offensive to attain its full effect, it is necessary that our ground 

offensive should be of a character to throw the greatest possible strain upon the 

enemy’s communications.” 

Winston Churchill, 1917 
Chapter III 

III-10 JP 3-03 

component commanders prior to attack. When mission objectives, desired effects, and 

general deconfliction and time sequencing have been jointly planned and integrated at the 

JAOC for AI operations, details such as attack tactics and individual mission deconfliction 

can be worked out by those responsible for execution. To ensure a coherent and coordinated 

effort, a plan for conducting joint interdiction should address two principal areas: a general 

CONOPS and a description of the planning and coordination cycle required for the phasing 

of joint interdiction (see Figure III-1). 

5. Targeting 

The JFC is responsible for all aspects of planning and targeting, from establishing 

objectives, coordination, and deconfliction between component commanders, to assessment 

Figure III-1. Joint Interdiction Plan 

JOINT INTERDICTION PLAN

The concept of operations should include:













Identification of objectives and resource requirements necessary to 

sustain activities

An orderly schedule of anticipated decisions needed to shape and direct 

the conduct of joint interdiction

Phases for related joint interdiction operations

Arrangements for orchestrating the operations of air, land, maritime, 

and special operations forces to ensure an integrated effort

Scheme of support operations needed to assist and protect forces 

engaged in joint interdiction operations

Provisions for feedback or analysis concerning the effectiveness of joint 

interdiction operations

The planning and coordination cycle should:

















Emphasize simplicity

Emphasize mission-type orders when appropriate

Ensure availability of appropriate forces and capabilities for employment

Ensure that component efforts support and reinforce each other to 

minimize duplication and conflicting actions

Arrange tasking and coordination of support operations to assist and 

protect forces engaged in joint interdiction

Preclude adverse effects on other friendly forces and operations

Ensure the continuance of effective operations during periods of 

degraded communications

Provide flexibility to adapt to changing conditions and priorities
Joint Interdiction Planning 

III-11 

of operations. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the 

appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. 

Targeting proceeds from the definition of the problem to an assessment of the results 

achieved by the executed COAs. During target development, the targeting process must 

relate specific targets to objectives, desired effects, and accompanying actions. Interdiction 

should focus on those systems that will result in the greatest payoff and achieve the 

objectives. The targeting process is complicated by the requirement to deconflict duplicative 

efforts, to prevent fratricide, to ensure compliance with the law of armed conflict (LOAC), to 

perform collateral damage estimation, and to synchronize and integrate the interdiction of 

those targets with other activities of the joint force. 

a. The goal for interdiction targeting is to execute a connected series of missions and 

attacks to achieve the JFC’s interdiction objectives. A highly effective coordination tool or 

organization to facilitate this process is the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB). The 

JTCB is a group formed by the JFC to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that 

may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting 

guidance and priorities, and refining the joint integrated prioritized target list. The board is 

normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if 

required, component subordinate units. 

Additional details on the JTCB and targeting doctrine can be found in JP 3-30, Command 

and Control for Joint Air Operations, and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

b. Joint interdiction assets are limited resources. Nominated targets will usually 

outnumber available assets. A component commander’s number one priority may be the 

JFC’s tenth priority (based on the JFC’s scheme of maneuver, objectives, or CONOPS for a 

given period or phase of the campaign). Interdiction operations within AOs occur 

simultaneously with joint interdiction operations that have a theater/JOA-wide range. 

Coordination, communication, and feedback between components regarding targeting 

decisions are essential and enhance trust between supported, supporting, and subordinate 

commanders and forces. Under most circumstances, the ATO achieves the desired 

coordination for planned AI missions. 

c. Dynamic interdiction missions meet specific requests which arise during an 

operation, and by their sudden nature are not planned in advance. Dynamic interdiction 

missions respond to targets that require time sensitive or immediate attention. The same 

quick-responsive nature of dynamic interdiction that allows it to take advantage of fleeting 

opportunities can also have a negative impact on individual mission success. Deliberate 

interdiction requests allow joint interdiction forces more time to study target imagery and to 

align attack axes to optimize weapons effects. Detailed study can reduce threat exposure and 

allow mission planners to optimize the weapon’s fusing for maximum effect. Deliberate 

interdiction allows better packaging of interdiction and support assets when required. The 

bottom line for dynamic targeting is that it should be used in those cases when the need 

for a short reaction time outweighs the reduced effectiveness that may result when 

compared with deliberate operations. Moreover, opportunity costs must be considered. 

Commanders should ensure the benefits of diverting interdiction assets away from a planned 

target outweigh the costs by pondering several variables. Is it affordable to delay striking a 
Chapter III 

III-12 JP 3-03 

planned target? What are the priorities? Will diverting assets to a target of opportunity 

create greater effects or is it less efficient? In short, the payoff of interdicting a target of 

opportunity should be worth the cost of diverting planned assets. 

Additional information on time-sensitive targeting can be found in the FM 3-60.1, MCRP 3-

16D, NTTP 3-60.1, AFTTP(I) 3-2.1, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 

Targeting Time-Sensitive Targets.

6. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Strategy and Planning 

ISR forces support interdiction planning through the collection of and collaboration on a 

broad range of information. Commanders require information systems that facilitate 

exploitation, sharing, and appropriate dissemination of real-time and near real-time 

intelligence. Planners must ensure that information collection is focused in the most critical 

areas (collection management) and that the information is analyzed, disseminated, shared, 

and collaborated into a useful product that supports effective interdiction planning and 

targeting operations against what is many times, a “fleeting target set.” 

a. Priority intelligence requirements are developed to support interdiction operations. 

To that end, joint interdiction targets must be identified and then prioritized to facilitate 

collection management and mission accomplishment. 

Collection management relationships are discussed further in JP 2-01, Joint and National 

Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 

b. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) is the 

analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence 

assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the JFC’s 

decision-making process. JIPOE is a continuous process which enables JFCs and their 

staffs to visualize the full spectrum of adversary capabilities and potential COAs across all 

dimensions of the operational environment. 

JIPOE is discussed further in JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational 

Environment. 

7. Interdiction Planning Considerations 

The nature of the mission or a target set may determine its suitability for interdiction and 

what forces and weapon systems should be employed. For example, a pipeline in the jungle 

might best be attacked by SOF elements whereas clandestine river transportation of weapons 

or illegal cargo may best be interdicted by shallow draft boats. The fewer the routes and 

depots in an enemy transportation system, and the more the enemy depends on that system, 

the more that system may be vulnerable to interdiction. Conversely, an enemy who 

possesses a varied, dispersed transportation system is usually much less affected by LOC 

interdiction. Mobile or easily concealed targets may require an approach different from that 

employed in attacking fixed emplacements. 
Joint Interdiction Planning 

III-13 

a. Target area environmental considerations include restrictive terrain, time of 

day, adverse weather, and seasonal and temperature effects. These conditions may 

camouflage or conceal targets, reduce visibility, and degrade weapon systems and force 

capabilities. Terrain features may affect acquisition of the target, requiring specialized 

weapons and attack tactics. For example, heavily forested emplacements or staging areas 

may be more suited to SOF direct action missions than laser-guided weapons. 

(1) Adverse target weather conditions to include humidity and temperature effects, 

solar activity, lunar illumination, and passive defense measures such as smoke, may conceal 

targets, reduce visibility, and degrade weapon systems and overall interdiction capabilities. 

The rate and extent of enemy maneuver may also be influenced by weather conditions. 

These, in turn, can provide greater interdiction opportunities (for example, when enemy 

maneuver is restricted to a few major routes or by seasonal conditions, it results in the 

concentration of forces). Accurate weather information facilitates the joint force’s ability to 

maximize the performance of its personnel and systems, such as forecasting the electrooptical environment (thermal crossover periods and other TA data) for employing advanced 

weapon systems. Accurate weather information can increase the probability of successful 

interdiction and enables friendly forces to exploit weather-induced limitations of enemy 

forces and systems. 

(2) Technology has enhanced detection and identification of obscured targets. For 

example, night vision devices and electronic sensors can greatly reduce the concealment 

previously provided by limited visibility. More importantly, assets equipped with advanced 

sensors, such as JSTARS and UA systems, can direct interdiction assets onto immediate, 

high-value TSTs which might otherwise be undetectable. 

(3) Target defenses may distract or target aircrews, reducing the effectiveness of 

AI. Detection assets, such as JSTARS and UA or the use of all-source intelligence, may 

enhance TA. However, enemy air defenses may not allow interdiction aircrew adequate time 

or avenues to acquire their target visually due to high speeds, low or medium altitudes, or 

restricted ingress routing necessary to minimize the risk of engagement. Effective force 

packaging can reduce the impact of enemy air defenses and achieve local air superiority. 

b. Interdiction operations in urban areas can be problematic and require special 

considerations during planning. To begin with, collateral damage in cities or towns that 

have not been evacuated will represent a great risk that must be considered and minimized. 

One real, alleged, or staged collateral damage or fratricide event can have strategic impact, 

affecting world opinion, ROE, and host nation restrictions on operations. Planners should 

integrate public affairs and MISO into interdiction operations from strategy development 

through mission execution. Next, planners need to account for weather effects caused by the 

urban environment. Factors include increased pollution and aerosols affecting target 

detection, warmer temperatures affecting infrared signatures, and variable wind speeds 

affected by building layout. Finally, urban operations, by their very nature, involve 

significant LOAC considerations. In particular, commanders must determine the military 

necessity of an operation, the proportionality of the damage that will be caused, and whether 

the potential harm to civilians outweighs the importance of the operation. Interdiction forces 

must give extra attention to the axis of attack and target designation; the problem may be 
Chapter III 

III-14 JP 3-03 

similar to attacking enemy forces in steep mountainous terrain. Larger urban areas with 

more vertically developed buildings add increased target elevation issues to the targeting 

problem, and the combination of tall buildings and narrow streets can cause an “urban 

canyon” effect leading to masking issues for line-of-sight munitions and targeting sensors. 

Munitions effects will vary greatly depending on whether the enemy can be attacked in the 

open versus inside buildings, requiring both patience and flexibility for mission success. 

Planners and operators should take great care in choosing the correct delivery method, 

munition, and fusing option when employing fires in an urban environment. 

For additional information on joint collateral damage procedures, see CJCSI 3160.01, NoStrike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology. For additional information on 

collateral damage risk to civilians, civilian structures, and properties associated with CAS 

attacks, see JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support.

c. While there are many similarities between air operations over land and sea, important 

differences exist: 

(1) Maritime rules of engagement. The maritime environment encompasses 

historical laws of the sea that impact ROE (e.g., territorial waters versus high seas). 

(2) Maritime airspace control. Nearly every combatant has a powerful radar 

sensor/weapons system; as a result, maritime airspace control tends to be more positive vice 

procedural. This emphasis on positive control involves more controlling agencies within the 

maritime domain. 

d. Limitations. Joint forces operate in accordance with applicable ROE, conduct 

warfare consistent with international laws recognized by the US, and operate within 

restraints and constraints specified by their commanders. Military objectives are justified by 

political, military, and legal necessity and achieved through appropriate and disciplined use 

of forces. ROE/rules for the use of force are applied by JFCs as a primary means to 

ensure that operations adhere to the LOAC and USC. Many factors influence ROE, 

including national and international law, national command policy, mission, operational 

environment, commander’s intent, and international agreements regulating conduct. ROE 

always recognize the inherent right of self-defense. Properly developed ROE must be 

clear, tailored to the situation, reviewed for legal sufficiency, and included in training. 

ROE typically will vary from operation to operation and may change during an operation. 

DOD forces operating under USCG TACON per Memorandum of Agreement between the 

Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security for Department of 

Defense support to the United States Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Security operate 

in accordance with Coast Guard Use of Force Policy. The JFC may prohibit or restrict joint 

force attacks on specific targets or objects without specific approval based on political 

considerations, military risk, the LOAC, and ROE. Targeting restrictions fall into two 

general categories. Items on the no-strike list are those designated by the appropriate 

authority upon which attacks are prohibited. Restricted targets are legitimate targets that have 

specific restrictions imposed to avoid interfering with military operations, and any actions 

that exceed those restrictions are prohibited until coordinated and approved by the 

establishing headquarters. Targets may have certain restriction caveats associated with them 
Joint Interdiction Planning 

III-15 

that should be clearly documented in the restricted target list (for example, do not strike 

during daytime; strike only with a certain weapon, etc.). Some require special precautions 

(e.g., chemical, biological, or nuclear facilities, proximity to no-strike facilities). Many 

traditional interdiction targets such as bridges, power generation systems, dams, and other 

infrastructure may be placed on the restricted list to avoid indiscriminate effects on the 

civilian population and a lengthy rebuilding process when major combat operations (MCOs) 

are complete. In addition, structures such as bridges may be vital for use by tactical forces 

during MCOs; attacking them in this case is counterproductive. 

For additional information, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

e. JFCs must consider the potential requirements for interagency coordination as a part 

of their activities across the range of military operations. Early inclusion of interagency 

considerations in assessments, estimates, and plans for military operations will facilitate 

civil-military integration of effort, focus the appropriate military participation, and 

assist the military effort to obtain the best available support from other interagency 

participants. At the same time, DOD must be prepared to support other federal, state, 

and local agencies as appropriate. No activity—not major combat against a near peer 

competitor, interdiction of WMD in international waters, or enforcing sanctions—is totally a 

military operation. Interagency participants, from the Department of State to the DHS have 

interest in and requirements to participate in planning military interdiction operations. For 

example, maritime interdiction/interception actions against a vessel with suspected WMD 

cargo en route to a US port could easily involve US Navy (DOD), US Coast Guard (DHS), 

DOS, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, and Department of Justice 

activity. Two tools that JFCs and their staffs can use to facilitate interagency coordination 

are: annex V (Interagency Coordination) to operation plans designed to enhance interagency 

planning and coordination with partner agencies in carrying out assigned missions; and the 

joint interagency coordination group. 

For more information on interagency activities, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational 

Coordination During Joint Operations. 

f. Today’s security environment is extremely fluid, with continually changing 

coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new (both national and transnational) threats 

constantly appearing and disappearing. Joint forces should be prepared for operations 

with forces from other nations within the framework of an alliance or coalition. When 

conducting interdiction, JFC and staff must consider the inherent complexity of coordinating 

with multinational partners.

(1) Participation in multinational operations may be complicated by varying 

national obligations derived from international agreements (i.e., other members in a coalition 

may not be signatories to treaties that bind the United States, or they may be bound by 

treaties to which the United States is not a party). Uneven capabilities of allies and 

coalition partners complicate the integration of multinational partners and the 

coordination and synchronization of their activities during multinational operations. 
Chapter III 

III-16 JP 3-03 

(2) Alliances typically have compatible C2 structures and weapon systems but 

many multinational partners will not. This can have a detrimental effect on multinational 

operations to include interdiction. As we increasingly digitize the operational 

environment, we must take into account the capabilities of our multinational partners 

and the possible limiting effects of their C2 structure. 

(3) Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity—

the result of language, values, religion, and economic and social outlooks. Language 

differences often present the most immediate challenge. Information lost during 

translation can be substantial, and miscommunication or misunderstanding can have 

disastrous effects.

(4) An ability to share valuable information helps build trust and confidence, 

and is beneficial to effective integration of the complex interactions required to succeed 

in any operations against an enemy. Therefore, it is incumbent on the JFC to develop 

processes and procedures that facilitate the sharing of information. In addition, the 

Commander, Joint Task Force, should consider establishing a civil-military operations center 

to ensure maximum unity of effort and ease coordination for development of processes and 

procedures. 

8. Joint Interdiction Preparation 

a. Positioning of Interdiction Forces. Interdiction forces must be positioned in a 

manner that will allow attack on enemy vulnerabilities. During the earliest stage of planning, 

JFCs must ensure that the correct mix of interdiction assets will be in place. Forces should 

be positioned within operational reach of enemy decisive points to support the JFC’s 

CONOPS and exploit unforeseen opportunities. Commanders must remain flexible and 

use every available option to ensure success. For example, a host nation might deny basing 

and overflight rights to joint aircraft. To circumvent this obstacle, air refueling might be 

required to support interdiction aircraft, unrestricted multinational interdiction aircraft might 

be utilized or surface forces may need to maneuver to a position where organic weapons are 

in range of critical interdiction targets. 

b. Operations Rehearsal. Preparing for interdiction operations includes organizing 

and, where possible, training forces to conduct operations throughout the JOA. When it 

is not possible to train forces in the theater of employment, as with US-based forces with 

multiple taskings, maximum use should be made of regularly scheduled and ad-hoc exercise 

opportunities. Realistic joint training during peacetime will dramatically increase the 

lethality of the joint force. Staffs should be identified and trained for planning and 

controlling joint operations. JFCs and the composition of their staffs should reflect the 

composition of the joint force to ensure that those responsible for employing joint 

forces have thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. The training focus 

for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives should be the combatant commander’s 

joint mission essential task list. 
IV-1 

CHAPTER IV 

JOINT INTERDICTION EXECUTION 

1. Command and Control of Joint Interdiction Operations 

At the highest level, the JFC is responsible for the execution of theater strategy and 

operations. The joint operations center is the focal point for integrating joint operations at 

the macro level to include interdiction. Interdiction of enemy forces and infrastructure is an 

integral part of a joint campaign or major operation. Joint interdiction operations require 

an integrated, flexible, and responsive C2 structure to process interdiction 

requirements and a dependable, interoperable, and secure communications 

architecture to exercise control. The JFC exercises C2 through functional or Service 

component commanders. Each component may perform interdiction as part of their internal 

mission, employing their organic C2 assets in accordance with their particular tactics, 

techniques, and procedures. 

a. The JFC normally delegates the planning and execution of theater/JOA-wide 

interdiction operations involving joint air assets to the JFACC (if established). The 

JFACC directs, coordinates, and deconflicts joint AI operations from an operations center 

which is normally designated a JAOC. The JAOC is structured to operate as a fully 

integrated facility. JAOC operations rely on expertise from other component liaisons to 

coordinate requests or requirements and maintain an up-to-date status of the other component 

operations. The JFACC staff will normally task and allocate most joint AI operations using 

host component organic C2 architecture. Reliable, secure communications are required to 

exchange information among all participants. In joint operations, components provide and 

operate the C2 systems, which have similar functions at each level of command. The 

JFACC tasks joint AI assets made available for theater/JOA-wide tasking through the JAOC 

and appropriate Service component C2 systems to ensure the proper integration of 

interdiction with the surface scheme of maneuver. 

b. Theater Air Control System (TACS). The TACS is the Air Force component 

commander’s mechanism for controlling component AI assets. It consists of airborne and 

ground elements to conduct tailored C2 of AI operations. The structure of the TACS should 

reflect sensor coverage, component liaison elements, and the communications systems 

required to provide adequate support. As an organic Air Force system, the TACS remains 

under OPCON of the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR). The air and space 

operations center (AOC) is the senior C2 element of the TACS and includes personnel and 

equipment of necessary disciplines to ensure the effective planning and conduct of 

“I will tell you that a commander without the proper C2 assets commands nothing 

except a desk. You must have the ability to communicate with the forces under 

your command. You must have the ability to exchange information with them 

freely, frequently, and on a global basis.” 

General Ronald R. Fogleman 

Former Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, 1995–1997 
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-03 

component air and space operations. The AOC is designed to expand with augmentation to 

form the JAOC when the COMAFFOR is designated by the JFC as the JFACC.

c. Army Air-Ground System (AAGS). Closely related to, and interconnected with, 

the TACS is the AAGS. The AAGS provides for interface between Army and tactical 

air support agencies of other Services in the planning, evaluating, processing, and 

coordinating of air support requirements and operations. Utilizing organic staff 

members and communications equipment, the AAGS works in conjunction with the TACS 

to coordinate and integrate both Army component aviation support and Air Force component 

support with Army ground maneuver. Army airspace C2 elements are at the senior Army 

echelon and extend down through all tactical command levels to the maneuver brigade. The 

air defense airspace management/brigade aviation element (ADAM/BAE) cell is located at 

the brigade combat team. The ADAM/BAE coordinates airspace requirements with higher 

headquarters as well as joint or multinational forces.

(1) Primary coordination between the TACS and the AAGS starts with the Army’s 

BCD in the JAOC and the air component coordination element liaison at the Army 

component commander’s headquarters. The air support operations center (ASOC) is the 

next level of Air Force-Army integration. While the JAOC provides control of air power, 

the ASOC provides primary control of air power in support of the Army. Integration 

then continues down through the Air Force component liaisons aligned with land combat 

forces. When integrated, the TACS and AAGS are collectively known as the TACS-AAGS 

(see Figure IV-1). 

(2) During linear operations, the ASOC normally controls all airspace short of the 

FSCL while the JAOC controls airspace beyond the FSCL. ASOC capabilities should be 

defined and planned for before operations begin. Considerations include, but are not limited 

to, physical location of the ASOC, terrain, and FSCL depth. AI missions conducted short of 

the FSCL in an Army force AO, whether or not in support of the Army force, must be 

coordinated with the ASOC. 

d. The Navy tactical air control system (NTACS) is the principal air control system 

afloat. The NTACS is comprised of the United States Navy (USN) tactical air control center 

(TACC), tactical air direction center, and helicopter direction center. The TACC is the 

primary air control agency within the AO from which all air operations supporting the 

amphibious task force are controlled. 

e. Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS). The MACCS consists of 

various air C2 agencies designed to provide the Marine air-ground task force aviation 

combat element commander with the ability to monitor, supervise, and influence the 

application of Marine and supporting air assets. Marine aviation’s philosophy is one of 

centralized control and decentralized execution. The Marine force’s focal point for tasking 

and exercising OPCON over Marine Corps air forces is the tactical air command center, 

which performs similar duties for organic Marine aviation that the JAOC performs for joint 

air component operations. The direct air support center (DASC) is roughly equivalent to the 

Air Force’s ASOC. 
Joint Interdiction Execution 

IV-3 

f. Special Operations. Theater special operations are normally under the control of the 

joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC). If designated by the 

JFSOCC, control of SOF airpower is normally exercised by a joint special operations air 

component commander (JSOACC). If a JSOACC has not been designated, then SOF 

airpower is controlled by its Service component within the joint force special operations 

command. The JFSOCC provides a special operations liaison element (SOLE) to the 

JFACC. The SOLE director reports directly to the JFSOCC and does not have operational 

Figure IV-1. Key Air Force and Army Components of the Theater Air Control SystemArmy Air-Ground System 

KEY AIR FORCE AND ARMY COMPONENTS OF THE

 THEATER AIR CONTROL SYSTEMARMY AIR-GROUND SYSTEM

TACS-AAGS Connectivity

JFC

JAOC

AWACS

CRC FAC(A) JSTARS

Land 

Component

WOC

(WG, GP, SQN)

BCD

GLO

XXX

A2C2

TACP ASOC

Corps XX

X

II

A2C2

A2C2

TACP

TACP

TACP

Division

Air Force Air Request Net (AFARN)/JARN

Brigade

Battalion

A2C2 

AAGS

ACCE 

ASOC 

AWACS 

BCD

CRC

FAC(A)

GLO 

GP

joint air operations center

joint air request net

joint force commander

Joint Surveillance Target Attack 

 Radar System

squadron

tactical air control party

theater air control system

wing

wing operations center

Army airspace command and control

Army air-ground system

air component coordination element

air support operations center

Airborne Warning and Control System

battlefield coordination detachment

control and reporting center

forward air controller (airborne)

ground liaison officer

group

JAOC

JARN

JFC 

JSTARS

SQN 

TACP

TACS

WG

WOC

ACCE

Air 

Component

A2C2

Coordination

Command and Control

Legend
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-03 

control of any SOF assets. The role of the SOLE is to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate 

special operations air, surface, and subsurface operations with conventional air operations. 

The SOLE can provide timely operational environment awareness which can enhance 

interdiction operations. 

g. Theater Air-Ground System (TAGS). The digitalization of the modern operational 

environment has improved the JFACC’s ability to command and control joint interdiction 

airpower. The speed and nonlinear aspects of modern warfare, as well as the precision of 

today’s weapons, dictate close coordination on the AO among the JFC’s components. The 

JFACC must ensure all elements of the TAGS are in place and the various liaison 

positions throughout the command chain filled prior to, or as soon as possible after, the 

start of an operation or campaign. When all elements of the TACS, AAGS, MACCS, and 

NTACS integrate, the entire system is labeled the TAGS. 

h. Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS)

(1) JADOCS facilitates the integration of joint/multinational fires. Digital 

integration of US and multinational fires systems enables timely execution of TSTs, highpayoff targets, and high-value targets. 

(2) The joint management function provides the ability to rapidly change and 

display operational graphics and FSCMs while conducting joint fire support. 

(3) The AI planning and execution function provides more effective employment of 

AI assets through timely and improved information flow for the identification, assignment, 

and nomination of AI targets. 

For more information on JADOCS, see JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

i. Navy and Coast Guard forces may have specific targets for interdiction or they may 

operate in patrol areas. The distances involved and the ambiguity of possible threats at sea 

require operational flexibility. C2 may be through a task force, other military chain of 

command, or in some instances of MOTR plan execution, directly through national level 

authorities. Both USN and USCG may respond under Title 10, USC, authority. However, 

unless the situation involves a major and immediate threat requiring emergency USN 

response as the only/most capable available force, USCG will respond if mission 

requirements dictate, under Title 14, USC, law enforcement authority. 

j. Within the maritime domain, authority for control of AI of maritime target assets is 

derived from the JFMCC as the supported commander. The JFACC may allocate sorties, via 

the ATO, to provide reconnaissance and surveillance—often referred to as surface 

surveillance coordination—and AI in the maritime AO. These sorties play a critical role in 

targeting and establishing/maintaining a common operational picture. In most cases, the sea 

combat commander or the SUWC will be authorized to designate surface contacts for strike 

during AI of maritime target execution. 
Joint Interdiction Execution 

IV-5 

2. Operational Area Geometry and Coordination 

a. JFCs may employ various control and coordinating measures to facilitate 

effective joint operations. These measures may include establishing boundaries, objectives, 

coordinating altitudes to deconflict air operations, air defense areas, amphibious objective 

areas, and submarine operating areas. Boundaries require special emphasis because of their 

implications on the integration of interdiction and maneuver. Boundaries define areas in 

order to facilitate integration and deconfliction of operations. In land and maritime 

operations, a boundary is a line that defines areas between adjacent units or formations. A 

boundary may be designated for maritime operations adjacent to the area of land conflict to 

enhance coordination and execution of maritime operations. Integration of efforts and 

synchronization of activities within the land or maritime operational boundaries is 

particularly important. 

(1) The JFC may use lateral, rear, and forward boundaries to define AOs for land 

and maritime forces. These are sized, shaped, and positioned to enable land or maritime 

forces to accomplish their mission while protecting forces. Theater air sorties are not 

constrained by land boundaries, per se. However, since the airspace above surface areas is 

used by all components of the joint force, JFCs promulgate airspace control measures to 

deconflict the necessary multiple uses required (see JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control). 

(2) Boundaries are based on the JFC’s CONOPS and the land or naval force 

commander’s requirement for depth to maneuver rapidly and to fight at extended ranges. 

b. Operational Environment Geometry. Joint interdiction may be conducted in 

conjunction with friendly forces operating in an AO. In order to integrate joint fires and 

avoid fratricide, FSCMs must be established. When air operations are involved, airspace 

coordinating measures will normally be used along with FSCMs. Before discussing 

coordinating measures, a brief background on operational environment geometry will 

provide a better understanding for the types of FSCMs required in interdiction operations. 

(1) Operational areas may be contiguous or noncontiguous (see Figure IV-2). 

When they are contiguous, a boundary separates them. When operational areas are 

noncontiguous, they do not share a boundary; the CONOPS links the elements of the force. 

A noncontiguous operational area normally is characterized by a 360-degree boundary. The 

higher headquarters is responsible for the area between noncontiguous operational areas (JP 

3-0, Joint Operations). 

(2) Operations may be linear or nonlinear in nature (see Figure IV-3). In linear 

operations, commanders direct and sustain combat power toward enemy forces in concert 

with adjacent units. Linear perspective refers primarily to the conduct of operations along 

lines of operations with identified forward lines of own troops (FLOTs). In linear 

operations, emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of the land force in relation to 

other friendly forces. This positioning usually results in contiguous operations where surface 

forces share boundaries. Linear operations are normally conducted against a deeply arrayed, 

echeloned enemy force or when the threat to LOCs requires control of the terrain around 

those LOCs. In these circumstances, linear operations allow commanders to concentrate and 
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-03 

integrate combat power more easily. World War I, World War II, and the Korean War offer 

multiple examples of linear operations while more recent examples include maneuver during 

Operation DESERT STORM and the drive to Baghdad during OIF. 

(3) In nonlinear operations, forces orient on objectives without geographic 

reference to adjacent forces. Nonlinear operations are usually characterized by 

noncontiguous operations. Nonlinear operations emphasize simultaneous operations along 

multiple lines of operation from selected bases. Nonlinear operations place a premium on 

intelligence, mobility, and sustainment. OEF is an excellent example of nonlinear 

operations. Joint forces orient more on their assigned objectives (for example, destroying an 

enemy force or seizing and controlling critical terrain or population centers) and less on their 

geographic relationship to other friendly forces. 

Figure IV-2. Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas 

CONTIGUOUS AND NONCONTIGUOUS 

OPERATIONAL AREAS

AO

ARFOR

JSA

area of operations

Army forces

joint security area

CONTIGUOUS

Adjacent, subordinate commands 

operational areas share boundaries. 

In this case, the higher headquarters 

has assigned all of its operational 

area to subordinate commands.

MARFOR

AO ARFOR

AO

JSA

NONCONTIGUOUS

Subordinate commands operational 

areas that do not share boundaries. 

The higher headquarters retains 

responsibility for the unassigned 

portion of its operational area to 

subordinate commands.

JSOA

MARFOR

joint special operations area

Marine Corps forces

JSOA

MARFOR

AO

JSA

ARFOR

AO

Legend
Joint Interdiction Execution 

IV-7 

For additional information on nonlinear operations, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

3. Coordinating Measures 

a. There are two important constructs to understand when discussing coordinating 

measures (see Figure IV-4). 

Figure IV-3. Linear Versus Nonlinear Operations (Depicted as a Corps Area of Operations) 

LINEAR VERSUS NONLINEAR OPERATIONS 

(DEPICTED AS A CORPS AREA OF OPERATIONS)

CONTIGUOUS AREAS OF 

OPERATION

Linear Operations

Nonlinear Operations

NONCONTIGUOUS AREAS OF 

OPERATION

Linear Operations

Nonlinear Operations

XX XX

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX XXX

XXX

XXX

FLOT FLOT

FEBA FEBA

XXXXX XX

REAR

AREA

REAR

AREA

XX

XX

XX

FEBA forward edge of the battle area FLOT forward line of own troops

Legend
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-03 

(1) The forward boundary (FB) defines a component’s outer AO and is the farthest 

limit of an organization’s responsibility. The organization is responsible for deep operations 

to that limit. Within the JOA, the next higher headquarters is responsible for coordinating 

deep operations beyond the FB. In offensive operations, the FB may move from phase line 

to phase line, depending on the AO situation. 

Figure IV-4. Notional Joint Operations Area with Designated Land and/or 

Maritime Area of Operations 

NOTIONAL JOINT OPERATIONS AREA WITH DESIGNATED 

LAND AND/OR MARITIME AREA OF OPERATIONS

FSCL

Forward 

Boundary

Joint 

Interdiction 

Targets

FLOT

CAS Targets

= Troops in Contact

= Designated Land and/or Maritime Areas of 

Operations

= Joint Operations Area

CAS

FLOT

FSCL

close air support

forward line of own troops

fire support coordination line

Legend
Joint Interdiction Execution 

IV-9 

(2) The FLOT is a line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces 

during linear operations at a specific time. The FLOT normally includes the forward 

location of covering and screening forces. The zone between the FLOT and the FSCL is 

typically the area over which friendly ground forces intend to maneuver in the near future 

and is also the area where joint AI operations are normally executed through the 

ASOC/DASC. 

b. FSCM. Within their AOs, land and naval force commanders employ permissive and 

restrictive FSCMs. FSCMs are necessary to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets 

and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Permissive FSCMs 

facilitate attacks and include coordinated fire lines, free fire areas, FSCLs, and kill 

boxes. Restrictive measures safeguard friendly forces and include no-fire areas, 

restrictive fire areas, restrictive fire lines, and airspace coordination areas. 

(1) The FSCL is a significant consideration during interdiction operations. When 

appropriate, an FSCL will be established and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious 

force commanders within their assigned boundaries in consultation with superior, 

subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. The purpose of the FSCL is to facilitate 

the expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. 

The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapon systems using any type of 

ammunition against surface targets. The FSCL does not divide an AO by defining a 

boundary between close and deep operations or a zone for CAS. 

(2) The FSCL is primarily used to establish C2 procedures for planning and 

execution purposes—it does not define mission types. Interdiction can occur both short of 

and beyond the FSCL. Attacks on surface targets short of the FSCL during the conduct of 

joint interdiction operations must be controlled by and/or coordinated with the appropriate 

land or amphibious force commander. While conducting AI short of the FSCL, mission 

updates through a TACS or amphibious TACS agency can help ensure that those targets are 

still valid, eliminate redundant targeting, and reduce the potential for fratricide. An example 

of this type of coordinating agency is an ASOC, DASC, or TACC. 

(a) Interdiction of targets short of the FSCL is controlled by the appropriate 

land or amphibious force commander. Coordination is normally conducted through such 

agencies as the Army fires cell and fire support coordination center. This coordination is 

facilitated by C2 platforms or centers such as JSTARS, BCD, ASOC, DASC, TACC, or 

SOLE. 

(b) Joint interdiction forces attacking targets beyond the FSCL must inform all 

affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid friendly 

casualties. SOF operations beyond the FSCL and outside the land force AO are particularly 

at risk and require detailed coordination. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to 

inform affected commanders will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. 

However, failure to coordinate this type of attack increases the risk of fratricide and could 

waste limited and hard to replace resources. 
Chapter IV 

IV-10 JP 3-03 

(c) The decision on where to place (or even to use) an FSCL requires careful 

consideration. Placement of the FSCL should strike a balance so as not to unduly inhibit 

operational tempo while maximizing the effectiveness of organic and joint force interdiction 

assets. The optimum placement of the FSCL varies with specific AO circumstances, but 

considerations include the ground force positions and anticipated scheme of maneuver 

during the effective time period of the FSCL and their indirect fire support systems’ 

range limits where typically the preponderance of lethal effects on the AO shifts from 

the ground component to the air component. In this way, the FSCL placement maximizes 

the overall effectiveness of the joint force, and each component will suffer only a small 

reduction in efficiency. The proper location for the FSCL may also shift from one phase of 

the war operation (or campaign) to the next, depending on the scale and scope of each 

component’s contribution during that phase. 

See JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, for further discussion of the FSCL. 

c. Kill Boxes

(1) Definition. A kill box is a three-dimensional area used to facilitate the 

integration of joint fires. 

(2) Purpose. When established, the primary purpose of a kill box is to allow lethal 

attack against surface targets without further coordination with the establishing commander 

and without terminal attack control. When used to integrate air-to-surface and surface-tosurface indirect fires, the kill box will have appropriate restrictions. The goal is to reduce the 

coordination required to fulfill support requirements with maximum flexibility, while 

preventing fratricide. 

(3) Establishment. A kill box is established and adjusted by supported component 

commanders in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected 

commanders, and is an extension of an existing support relationship established by the JFC. 

See FM 3-09.34/MCRP 3-25H/NTTP 3-09.2.1/AFTTP(I) 3-2.59, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Employment, for further information.

4. Assessment 

a. Assessment is used to measure progress of the joint force toward mission 

accomplishment. Commanders continuously assess the operational environment and the 

progress of operations, and compare them to their initial vision and intent. 

Commanders adjust operations based on their assessment to ensure objectives are met and 

the desired end state is achieved. 

b. At the tactical level, combat assessment typically focuses on task accomplishment 

and target engagement. Joint interdiction operations should include both pre- and postinterdiction target reconnaissance efforts in order to facilitate combat assessment. When 

combat assessment is linked to current and reliable intelligence, the JFC can accurately 

assess what was accomplished, the overall effect on the enemy and whether or not the 
Joint Interdiction Execution 

IV-11 

enemy has accomplished system reconstitution or an effective workaround solution. 

Information gained from combat assessment provides input for follow-on interdiction efforts. 

For a more in depth explanation of the assessment process, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 

Appendix C, The Assessment Process. 

 
Chapter IV 

IV-12 JP 3-03 

Intentionally Blank 
A-1 

APPENDIX A 

REFERENCES 

The development of JP 3-03 is based upon the following primary references. 

1. General 

a. NSPD-17/HSPD-4, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

b. NSPD-41/HSPD-13, Maritime Security Policy.

c. Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department 

of Homeland Security for Department of Defense support to the United States Coast Guard 

for Maritime Homeland Security. 

2. Department of Defense 

a. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.1, Functions of the Department of 

Defense and Its Major Components. 

b. DODD 1400.31, DOD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency Planning 

and Execution. 

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

a. CJCSI 3520.02A, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Activity Program. 

b. CJCSI 5120.02B, Joint Doctrine Development System. 

c. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

d. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 

e. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

f. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 

g. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

h. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats. 

i. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations. 

j. JP 3-05, Special Operations. 

k. JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations. 

l. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-03 

m. JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

n. JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare. 

o. JP 3-14, Space Operations. 

p. JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations. 

q. JP 3-18, Forcible Entry Operations. 

r. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 

s. JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction.

t. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control. 

u. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

v. JP 3-61, Public Affairs. 

w. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 

x. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

y. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 
B-1 

APPENDIX B 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

1. User Comments 

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint 

Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting 

Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Support Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 

23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, 

and organization), writing, and appearance. 

2. Authorship 

The lead agent for this publication is the US Air Force. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor 

for this publication is the operations directorate of a joint staff. 

3. Supersession 

This publication supersedes JP 3-03, 03 May 2007, Joint Interdiction. 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

 TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// 

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint and 

Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Support 

Division and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JEDD. 

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change 

source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a 

proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other 

organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents 

reflected in this publication are initiated. 

5. Distribution of Publications 

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. 

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be 

in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET) and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil (SIPRNET), 

and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-03 

b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the CCMDs, 

Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or foreign 

nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, 

Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, 

Washington, DC 20340-5100. 

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, 

the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CDROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally 

reproduced for use within the combatant commands and Services. 
GL-1 

GLOSSARY 

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

AAGS Army air-ground system 

ADAM/BAE air defense airspace management/brigade aviation 

 element 

AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction) 

AI air interdiction 

AO area of operations 

AOC air and space operations center (USAF) 

ASOC air support operations center 

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System 

ATO air tasking order 

BCD battlefield coordination detachment 

BDA battle damage assessment 

C2 command and control 

CALCM conventional air-launched cruise missile 

COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces 

CAS close air support 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

COA course of action 

COG center of gravity 

CONOPS concept of operations 

DASC direct air support center 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

EMIO expanded maritime interception operations 

EW electronic warfare 

FAC(A) forward air controller (airborne) 

FB forward boundary 

FLOT forward line of own troops 

FM field manual (Army) 

FSCL fire support coordination line 

FSCM fire support coordination measure 

HSPD homeland security Presidential directive 

IO information operations 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-03 

JADOCS Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System 

JAOC joint air operations center 

JFACC joint force air component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFLCC joint force land component commander 

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander 

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

 environment 

JOA joint operations area 

JP joint publication 

JSOACC joint special operations air component commander 

JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 

JTCB joint targeting coordination board 

LEDET law enforcement detachment (USCG) 

LEO law enforcement operations 

LOAC law of armed conflict 

LOC line of communications 

MACCS Marine air command and control system 

MAS maritime air support 

MCO major combat operation 

MCRP Marine Corps reference publication 

MDA maritime domain awareness 

MIO maritime interception operations 

MISO military information support operations 

MLRS multiple launch rocket system 

MOTR maritime operational threat response 

NSPD national security Presidential directive 

NTACS Navy tactical air control system 

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures 

OEF Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

OGA other government agency 

OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

OPCON operational control 

PGM precision-guided munition 

ROE rules of engagement 

SCAR strike coordination and reconnaissance 

SOF special operations forces 

SOLE special operations liaison element 
Glossary 

GL-3 

SR special reconnaissance 

SUWC surface warfare commander 

TA target acquisition 

TACC tactical air control center (USN) 

TACON tactical control 

TACS theater air control system 

TAGS theater air-ground system 

TGO terminal guidance operations 

TLAM Tomahawk land attack missile 

TST time-sensitive target 

UA unmanned aircraft 

USC United States Code 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USG United States Government 

USN United States Navy 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 
GL-4 JP 3-03 

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

air interdiction. Air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s 

military surface capabilities before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly 

forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives that are conducted at such distances from 

friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement 

of friendly forces is not required. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

axis of advance. A line of advance assigned for purposes of control; often a road or a group 

of roads, or a designated series of locations, extending in the direction of the enemy. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-03 as the source JP.)

battlefield coordination detachment. An Army liaison located in the air operations center 

that provides selected operational functions between the Army forces and the air 

component commander. Also called BCD. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

command center. None (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

diversion. 1. The act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the 

principal operation; an attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention. 2. A change made in 

a prescribed route for operational or tactical reasons that does not constitute a change of 

destination. 3. A rerouting of cargo or passengers to a new transshipment point or 

destination or on a different mode of transportation prior to arrival at ultimate 

destination. 4. In naval mine warfare, a route or channel bypassing a dangerous area by 

connecting one channel to another or it may branch from a channel and rejoin it on the 

other side of the danger. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

forward line of own troops. A line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly 

forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. Also called FLOT. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

interdiction. 1. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military surface 

capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise 

achieve objectives. 2. In support of law enforcement, activities conducted to divert, 

disrupt, delay, intercept, board, detain, or destroy, under lawful authority, vessels, 

vehicles, aircraft, people, cargo, and money. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

maritime interception operations. Efforts to monitor, query, and board merchant vessels 

in international waters to enforce sanctions against other nations such as those in support 

of United Nations Security Council Resolutions and/or prevent the transport of restricted 

goods. Also called MIO. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-03 as the 

source JP.) 

poststrike reconnaissance. None. (Approved for removal from from JP 1-02.)

precision-guided munition. A guided weapon intended to destroy a point target and 

minimize collateral damage. Also called PGM, smart weapon, smart munition. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-5 

strike coordination and reconnaissance. A mission flown for the purpose of detecting 

targets and coordinating or performing attack or reconnaissance on those targets. Also 

called SCAR. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

tactical air support. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

tactical diversion. None. (Approved form removal from JP 1-02.)

terminal guidance. 1. The guidance applied to a guided missile between midcourse 

guidance and arrival in the vicinity of the target. 2. Electronic, mechanical, visual, or 

other assistance given an aircraft pilot to facilitate arrival at, operation within or over, 

landing upon, or departure from an air landing or airdrop facility. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-03.)

time of attack. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

use of force policy. Policy guidance issued by the Commandant, US Coast Guard, on the 

use of force and weapons. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-03 as the 

source JP.) 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 3-03 

Intentionally Blank 
Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development









JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first

draft (FD)

PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system

J adjudicates FC comment

matrix

FC joint working group

oint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS)

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins

24-27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years

after publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #1 - Initiation













Joint doctrine development

community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts frontend analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

JS J-7 approves and releases PD to

lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant

command, JS directorate)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT

DOCTRINE

JP 1

LOGISTICS COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS PLANS SYSTEM

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

OPERATIONS

JP 3-0

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below

illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint

Publication (JP) 3-03 Operations