24 June 2011

Interorganizational Coordination

During Joint Operations

Joint Publication 3-08
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i 

PREFACE 

1. Scope 

This publication provides joint doctrine for the coordination of military operations with 

US Government agencies; state, local, and tribal governments; intergovernmental 

organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. 

2. Purpose 

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other 

joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and 

training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their 

appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC 

from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most 

appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders of 

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of 

these commands, and the Services. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate 

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of 

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of 

a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine 

and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the 

United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s 

doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and 

doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

WILLIAM E. GORTNEY 

VADM, USN 

Director, Joint Staff 
Preface

ii JP 3-08 

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iii 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-08 

DATED 17 MARCH 2006 

• Changes the publication title from Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, 

and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations to 

Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations

• Reorganizes the publication from two volumes into a single volume

• Revises the discussion on organizing for successful interagency, intergovernmental 

organization, and nongovernmental organization coordination

• Updates the discussion on the National Security Council, Homeland Security 

Council, and National Security Staff

• Updates the discussion for federal interagency coordination during homeland 

defense and civil support

• Updates descriptions of federal agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and 

nongovernmental organizations

• Adds a discussion on a whole-of-government approach

• Adds a discussion on strategic communication 

• Adds a discussion of the private sector

• Adds coverage on forming a joint interagency task force

• Adds appendices: “Joint Interagency Coordination Group,” “Joint Interagency 

Task Force,” “Provincial Reconstruction Team,” “The Interagency Management 

System for Reconstruction and Stabilization,” “The Interagency Conflict 

Assessment Framework,” “Example Guidelines for Relations Between the Armed 

Forces of the United States and Other Organizations,” “United States Agency for 

International Development Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy,” and “Joint 

Force Headquarters-State”

• Modifies the definitions of the terms “disaster assistance response team,” 

“interagency,” and “joint interagency coordination group”
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-08 

• Adds definitions for the terms “development assistance” and “interorganizational 

coordination”

• Removes the terms “chancery,” “civil affairs activities,” “complex contingency 

operations,” “developmental assistance,” “diplomatic and/or consular facility,” 

“resolution,” and “US Defense Representative” from Joint Publication 1-02, 

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
v 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... ix 

CHAPTER I

FOUNDATIONS OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION

Section A. Foundations of Interorganizational Coordination ........................................... I-1 

• Purposes of Interorganizational Coordination ........................................................... I-1 

• The Need for Unity of Effort ..................................................................................... I-4 

• Whole-of-Government ............................................................................................... I-6 

• Coordinating Efforts .................................................................................................. I-6 

• Working Relationships and Practices ........................................................................ I-8 

• Considerations for Effective Cooperation ............................................................... I-10 

Section B. Key Considerations for Interorganizational Coordination ........................... I-13 

• United States Agency Engagement ......................................................................... I-13 

• Organizational Environments .................................................................................. I-15 

• Strategic Communication ........................................................................................ I-17 

CHAPTER II

CONDUCTING INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION

• General ....................................................................................................................II-1 

• The National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council .......................II-1 

• Whole-of-Government Approach .............................................................................II-2 

• Joint Operation Planning and Interorganizational Coordination ..............................II-3 

• Interorganizational Coordination and Collaboration ..............................................II-11 

• Intergovernmental Organizations ...........................................................................II-15 

• Nongovernmental Organizations ............................................................................II-15 

• The Private Sector ...................................................................................................II-16 

• Joint Task Force Considerations .............................................................................II-17 

• Other Joint Task Force Considerations ...................................................................II-20 

• Information Management and Sharing ...................................................................II-25 

• Training and Readiness ...........................................................................................II-27 

CHAPTER III

DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS

• The Homeland Security Council ............................................................................ III-1 

• Key Roles of United States Government Stakeholders .......................................... III-1 

• Homeland Defense and Civil Support .................................................................... III-4 

• Joint Force Considerations ................................................................................... III-11 
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vi JP 3-08 

• State, Local, and Tribal Considerations ................................................................ III-16 

• Nongovernmental Organizations .......................................................................... III-18 

• The Private Sector ................................................................................................. III-18 

• Interorganizational Coordination with Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas ......... III-19 

CHAPTER IV

FOREIGN CONSIDERATIONS

• The National Security Council System ................................................................... IV-1 

• Structure in Foreign Countries ................................................................................ IV-2 

• Intergovernmental Organizations ........................................................................... IV-7 

• Nongovernmental Organizations .......................................................................... IV-11 

• The Private Sector ................................................................................................. IV-14 

• Foreign Operations ............................................................................................... IV-15 

• Joint Task Force Considerations ........................................................................... IV-23 

• Civil-Military Operations Center .......................................................................... IV-25 

• Provincial Reconstruction Teams ......................................................................... IV-32 

• Strategic Communication ..................................................................................... IV-33 

APPENDIX

A United States Government Agencies ......................................................... A-1 

B Intergovernmental Organizations ...............................................................B-1 

C Nongovernmental Organizations ................................................................C-1 

D Joint Interagency Coordination Group ...................................................... D-1 

E Joint Interagency Task Force ..................................................................... E-1 

F Provincial Reconstruction Team ................................................................ F-1 

G The Interagency Management System for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization ............................................................... G-1 

H The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework ................................... H-1 

J Example Guidelines for Relations Between the Armed Forces of the 

United States and Other Organizations ....................................................... J-1 

K United States Agency for International Development Civilian-Military 

Cooperation Policy .................................................................................... K-1 

L Joint Force Headquarters-State .................................................................. L-1 

M References ................................................................................................. M-1 

N Administrative Instructions ....................................................................... N-1 

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................. GL-1 

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-9 

FIGURE

I-1 Comparison of United States Agency Organizational Structures ............. I-14 
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vii 

II-1 Joint Task Force Establishing Authority Responsibilities .......................II-18 

III-1 Model for Coordination Among Military and 

Nonmilitary Organizations—Domestic Civil Support ........................... III-12 

III-2 North American Aerospace Defense Command, United States 

Northern Command, and Canada Command Relationships ................... III-20 

IV-1 Notional Structure for Coordination Among Military and 

Nonmilitary Organizations—Foreign Operations .................................. IV-18 

IV-2 Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center ............... IV-28 

IV-3 Civil-Military Operations Center Functions .......................................... IV-30 

A-K-1 National Security Council System ........................................................ A-K-2 

A-K-2 Participation in National Security Council System Activities .............. A-K-4 

B-A-1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Civil and Military Structure ...... B-A-2 

B-A-2 Allied Command Operations ................................................................. B-A-6 

B-B-1 United Nations Charter ...........................................................................B-B-2 

C-A-1 The Emblems of the International Red Cross and 

Red Crescent Movement ....................................................................... C-A-2 

D-1 Integrating the Interagency Community ................................................... D-2 

D-2 United States Government Operational Level Planning ........................... D-3 

D-3 Notional Joint Interagency Coordination Group Structure ..................... D-10 

H-1 Conceptual Framework for Diagnosing a Conflict ................................... H-4 

L-1 Example of Joint Force Headquarters-State Organization Model.............. L-2 

L-2 National Guard Unified Action .................................................................. L-4 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

• Describes the Foundations of Interorganizational Coordination 

• Addresses Key Considerations for Interorganizational Coordination 

• Covers Conducting Interorganizational Coordination 

• Presents Domestic Considerations for Interorganizational Coordination 

• Provides Foreign Considerations for Interorganizational Coordination 

Foundations of Interorganizational Coordination

A commitment to 

interorganizational 

coordination will help to 

achieve desired end states 

by facilitating cooperation 

in areas of common 

interest or avoiding 

unintended negative 

consequences when 

working in the same space 

as other stakeholders. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts 

interorganizational coordination across a range of 

operations, with each type of operation involving different 

communities of interests and structures. This is especially 

pronounced for domestic and foreign operations, which are 

governed by different authorities and have considerably 

different US Government (USG) governing structures and 

stakeholders. Interorganizational coordination aids in this 

by enabling participants to do one or more of the following:

Facilitate Unity of Effort. Achieving national strategic 

objectives requires the effective and efficient use of 

diplomatic, informational, military, and economic 

instruments of national power supported by 

interorganizational coordination. 

Achieve Common Objectives. Successful 

interorganizational coordination enables the USG to build 

international and domestic support, conserve resources, and 

conduct coherent operations that more effectively and 

efficiently achieve common objectives. 

Provide Common Understanding. Interorganizational 

coordination is critical to understanding the roles and 

relationships of participating military commands and 

relevant stakeholders as well as their interests, equities, and 

insight into the challenges faced. Such common 

understandings will be essential to enable stakeholders to
Executive Summary 

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operate effectively in the same space, identifying 

opportunities for cooperation and avoiding unnecessary 

conflict. 

Interagency Coordination Within the context of DOD involvement, interagency 

coordination is the coordination that occurs between 

elements of DOD and engaged USG agencies for the 

purpose of achieving an objective. Interagency 

coordination forges the vital link between the US military 

and the other instruments of national power. 

Interorganizational 

Coordination 

Similarly, within the context of DOD involvement, 

interorganizational coordination is the interaction that 

occurs among elements of the DOD; engaged USG 

agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign 

military forces and government agencies; 

intergovernmental organizations (IGOs); nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs); and the private sector. 

The Need for Unity of 

Effort 

Meeting the challenges of current and future operations 

requires the concerted effort of all instruments of US 

national power plus foreign governmental agencies and 

military forces and civilian organizations. Problems arise 

when each USG agency interprets National Security 

Council (NSC) and Homeland Security Council (HSC) 

policy guidance differently, sets different priorities for 

execution, and does not act in concert. Consequently, there 

is a need to conduct integrated planning to effectively 

employ the appropriate instruments of national power. 

Coordinating Efforts Providing Strategic Direction. Strategic direction is the 

common thread that integrates and synchronizes the 

activities of the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, 

and combat support agencies. As an overarching term, 

strategic direction encompasses the processes and products 

by which the President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provide 

policy and strategic guidance to DOD. Strategic direction 

is provided in a number of national level documents, some 

of which include the National Security Strategy, National 

Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, National 

Strategy for Combating Terrorism, National Strategy for 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, National 

Response Framework (NRF), National Strategy for 

Maritime Security, National Incident Management System, 

and Unified Command Plan. 
 Executive Summary 

xi 

Because the solution to a problem seldom resides within 

the capability of one agency, joint campaign and operation 

plans should be crafted to recognize and leverage the core 

competencies of other agencies while providing support, as 

appropriate. Each interorganizational partner brings its 

own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, expertise, and 

skills to the task of coordination. Each USG agency has 

different authorities, which govern the operation of the 

agency and determine the use of its resources. 

Working Relationships 

and Practices 

Within the USG, military and civilian agencies perform 

in both supported and supporting roles. However, this is 

not the support command relationship described in Joint 

Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 

States. Relationships between military and civilian 

agencies cannot be equated to military command 

authorities (e.g., operational control, tactical control, 

support). Although there is no equivalent command 

relationship between military forces and civilian agencies 

and organizations, clearly defined relationships may foster 

harmony and reduce friction between the participants. The 

incident command system is a standardized on-scene 

emergency management construct specifically designed to 

provide for the adoption of an integrated organizational 

structure that reflects the complexity and demands of single 

or multiple incidents, without being hindered by 

jurisdictional boundaries. 

Considerations for 

Effective Cooperation 

Military policies, processes, and procedures are very 

different from those of civilian organizations. 

Cooperation between IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector is 

often based on a perceived mutually supportive interest, 

rather than a formalized agreement. Many NGOs are 

signatory to various codes of conduct that include the 

responsibility to share information for effectiveness, safety, 

and other reasons. Private sector entities might only 

coordinate if such coordination supports their business 

model. 

Key Considerations for Interorganizational Coordination 

United States Agency 

Engagement 

One difficulty of coordinating operations among US 

agencies is determining appropriate counterparts and 

exchanging information among them when habitual 

relationships are not established. Carefully crafted 

memorandums of agreement can specify detailees’ rating 

and reviewing chains, tasking authority, and other clauses 
Executive Summary 

xii JP 3-08 

that are explicitly designed to overcome this potential 

source of friction. 

Organizational 

Environments 

To facilitate success, the interests, resources, efforts, and 

goals of all the engaged military and civilian organizations 

must be drawn together. This cohesion is often more 

complex than the multidimensional nature of military 

combat operations. The essence of interorganizational 

coordination is the effective integration of multiple 

stakeholders with diverse perspectives, authorities, 

capabilities, and objectives. 

Strategic Communication The USG uses strategic communication (SC) to coordinate 

use of the informational instrument of national power in 

specific situations. SC is focused USG efforts to 

understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, 

or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of 

USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of 

coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and 

products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of 

national power. 

Conducting Interorganizational Coordination 

The continually changing 

global security 

environment requires 

increased and improved 

communications and 

coordination among the 

numerous agencies and 

organizations working to 

achieve national security 

objectives. 

When campaign planning, deliberate planning, or crisis 

action planning (CAP) is required, the degree to which 

military and civilian components can be integrated and 

harmonized will bear directly on its efficiency and success. 

To the extent feasible, joint planning should include key 

participants from the outset. Within the area of 

responsibility (AOR) and the joint operations area (JOA), 

appropriate decision-making structures are established at 

combatant command, joint task force (JTF) headquarters 

(HQ), and tactical levels to coordinate and resolve 

military, political, humanitarian, and other issues. 

The National Security 

Council and the 

Homeland Security 

Council Systems 

The NSC is the President’s principal forum for 

consideration of national security policy issues requiring 

Presidential determination. The NSC also serves as the 

President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies 

among various government agencies. The HSC is an entity 

within the Executive Office of the President of the United 

States to advise the President on homeland security (HS) 

matters. 
 Executive Summary 

xiii 

Whole-of-Government 

Approach 

A whole-of-government approach integrates the 

collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the 

USG to achieve unity of effort. Under unified action, a 

whole-of-government approach identifies combinations of 

the full range of available USG capabilities and resources 

that reinforce progress and create synergies. 

Joint Operation Planning 

and Interorganizational 

Coordination 

The joint operation planning process (JOPP) is used by 

combatant commanders (CCDRs) and subordinate joint 

force commanders (JFCs) to translate national or theater 

strategy into operational concepts through the development 

of an operation plan. The commander should coordinate 

with relevant entities throughout the JOPP to consider all 

the instruments of national power. The joint interagency 

coordination group (JIACG) is an interagency staff group 

that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working 

relationships between civilian and military operational 

planners. 

Interorganizational 

Coordination and 

Collaboration 

The crux of interorganizational coordination is in 

understanding the civil-military relationship as 

collaborative rather than competitive. While the military 

normally focuses on reaching clearly defined and 

measurable objectives within given timelines under a 

command and control (C2) structure, civilian organizations 

are concerned with fulfilling changeable political, 

economic, social, and humanitarian interests using 

dialogue, bargaining, risk taking, and consensus building. 

They may be more adept at negotiation, bargaining, and 

consensus decision making, thus potentially acting as 

agents of change within that society. 

Intergovernmental 

Organizations 

An IGO is an organization created by a formal agreement 

(e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. IGOs 

may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis 

for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. They are 

formed to protect and promote national interests shared by 

member states. 

Nongovernmental 

Organizations 

NGOs are independent, diverse, flexible, grassrootsfocused organizations that range from primary relief and 

development providers to human rights, civil society, and 

conflict resolution organizations. Their mission is often 

one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting the 

military in accomplishing its objectives. 
Executive Summary 

xiv JP 3-08 

The Private Sector The private sector is an umbrella term that may be applied 

in the United States and in foreign countries to any or all of 

the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, 

specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and 

other scholastic institutions, and selected NGOs. The 

private sector can assist the USG by sharing information, 

identifying risks, performing vulnerability assessments, 

assisting in deliberate planning and CAP, and providing 

other assistance as appropriate. 

Joint Task Force 

Considerations 

When it is necessary to engage the military instrument of 

national power, and to establish a JTF, the establishing 

authority is normally a CCDR. Depending on the type of 

operation, the extent of military operations, and degree of 

interagency, IGO, and NGO involvement, the focal point 

for operational- and tactical-level coordination with civilian 

agencies may occur at the JTF HQ, the joint field office, 

the civil military operations center (CMOC), or the 

humanitarian operations center. 

Other JTF considerations are intelligence collection and 

dissemination, force protection, logistic support, and legal 

issues. 

Information Management 

and Sharing 

Other USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs on scene are an 

important source of information that may contribute to the 

success of the military operation or transition to a desired 

end state. However, the cultures of non-USG 

organizations, in particular, differ markedly from the 

military and there may be a desire on their part to maintain 

a distance from military activities. By attempting to 

accommodate these concerns and sharing useful 

information and resources, the commander, joint task force 

(CJTF), can help encourage active IGO and NGO 

cooperation in resolving the crisis. 

Domestic Considerations 

The Homeland Security 

Council 

The HSC is made up of the President, the Vice President, 

the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, 

SecDef, and such other individuals as may be designated by 

the President. For the purpose of more effectively 

coordinating the policies and functions of the USG relating 

to HS, the HSC assesses the objectives, commitments, and 

risks of the United States in the interest of HS and makes 

resulting recommendations to the President; oversees and 
 Executive Summary 

xv 

reviews HS policies of the USG and makes resulting 

recommendations to the President; and performs such other 

functions as the President may direct. 

Key Roles of United States 

Government Stakeholders 

As the primary agency for HS, the Department of 

Homeland Security leads the unified national effort to 

secure America by preventing and deterring terrorist 

attacks and protecting against and responding to threats and 

hazards to the Nation. Within DOD, SecDef has overall 

authority for DOD and is the President’s principal advisor 

on military matters concerning homeland defense (HD) and 

civil support (CS). Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs 

within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy provides the overall direction and supervision for 

policy, program planning and execution, and allocation of 

DOD resources for HD and CS. The two geographic 

combatant commanders (GCCs) with major HD and CS 

missions are US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) 

and US Pacific Command (USPACOM), as their AORs 

include the United States and its territories. CJCS has 

numerous responsibilities relating to HD and HS. These 

include advising the President and SecDef on operational 

policies, responsibilities, and programs; assisting SecDef in 

implementing operational responses to threats or an act of 

terrorism; and translating SecDef guidance into operation 

orders to provide assistance to the primary agency. CJCS 

ensures that HD and CS plans and operations are 

compatible with other military plans. 

Homeland Defense and 

Civil Support 

Military operations inside the US and its territories, though 

limited in some respects, fall into two mission areas: HD—

for which DOD serves as the lead federal agency and 

military forces are used to conduct military operations in 

defense of the homeland; and CS—for which DOD serves 

in a supporting role to other agencies by providing defense 

support to civil authorities at the federal, state, tribal, and 

local level. HD is the protection of US sovereignty, 

territory, domestic population, and critical defense 

infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or 

other threats as directed by the President. 

Joint Force 

Considerations 

When an event occurs and the President or SecDef 

approves defense support of civil authorities, the 

appropriate GCC is designated as the supported 
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xvi JP 3-08 

commander. In most situations, the Commander, 

USNORTHCOM, or Commander, USPACOM, will be 

designated as the supported commander. 

State, Local, and Tribal 

Considerations 

When a disaster threatens or occurs, a governor may 

request federal assistance. If DOD support is required as 

part of that federal assistance, then DOD may support local 

and state authorities in a variety of tasks. However, the 

majority of DOD assistance will typically be provided in 

support of a primary agency in accordance with the NRF. 

For federal assistance for disaster situations taking place on 

tribal lands, state governors must request a Presidential 

disaster declaration on behalf of a tribe under the Stafford 

Act. However, federal departments and agencies can work 

directly with tribes within existing agency authorities and 

resources in the absence of such a declaration. 

Nongovernmental 

Organizations 

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster 

(http://www.nvoad.org) is the forum where organizations 

share knowledge and resources throughout the disaster 

cycle—preparation, response, and recovery—to help 

disaster survivors and their communities. 

The American Red Cross is a support agency under the 

NRF in a number of emergency support functions (ESFs), 

most notably ESF #6 – Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, 

Housing, and Human Services. 

The Private Sector Critical infrastructure protection is a shared responsibility 

among federal, state, local, and tribal governments and the 

owners and operators of the Nation’s critical infrastructure 

and key resources. Partnership between the public and 

private sectors is essential, in part because the private 

sector owns and/or operates approximately 85% of the 

Nation’s critical infrastructure. 

Interorganizational 

Coordination with 

Canada, Mexico, and the 

Bahamas 

Canada. The North American Aerospace Defense 

Command, USNORTHCOM, and Canada Command share 

the task of defending North America and seek cooperative 

approaches to ensure the security of North America. 

Mexico. USNORTHCOM works in partnership with the 

Mexican military and civil response partners to increase 

mutual long-term capacity building to enhance our ability 
 Executive Summary 

xvii 

to counter common security threats to both the US and 

Mexico and build an effective consequence management 

capability. 

Bahamas. USNORTHCOM works in partnership with the 

Royal Bahamas Defence Force and the National 

Emergency Management Agency civil response partners to 

increase mutual long-term capacity building to enhance our 

ability to counter common security threats to both the US 

and the Bahamas and build an effective consequence 

management capability. 

Foreign Considerations 

The National Security 

Council System 

DOD Role in the National Security Council System 

(NSCS). SecDef is a regular member of the NSC and the 

NSC Principals Committee. The NSCS is the channel for 

the CJCS to discharge substantial statutory responsibilities 

as the principal military advisor to the President, SecDef, 

and the NSC.

CJCS acts as spokesperson for the CCDRs, especially on 

their operational requirements, and represents combatant 

command interests in the NSCS through direct 

communication with the CCDRs and their staffs. CCDRs 

and their staffs can coordinate most of their standing 

requirements with the chief of mission (COM) and their 

JIACG (or equivalent organization). 

Structure in Foreign 

Countries 

The Diplomatic Mission. The US bilateral representation 

in the foreign country, known as the diplomatic mission, is 

established in accordance with the Vienna Convention on 

Diplomatic Relations, of which the US is a signatory. The 

Department of State (DOS) provides the core staff of a 

diplomatic mission and administers the presence of 

representatives of other USG agencies in the country. A 

diplomatic mission is led by a COM, usually the 

ambassador, but at times the chargé d’affaires (the chargé), 

when no US ambassador is accredited to the country or the 

ambassador is absent from the country. The bilateral COM 

has authority over all USG personnel in country, except for 

those assigned to a combatant command, a USG 

multilateral mission, or an IGO. The COM provides 

recommendations and considerations for CAP directly to 

the GCC and CJTF. While forces in the field under a GCC 

are exempt from the COM’s statutory authority, the COM 
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xviii JP 3-08 

confers with the GCC regularly to coordinate US military 

activities with the foreign policy direction being taken by 

the USG toward the host nation (HN). 

DOS Plans. Each US mission prepares an annual mission 

strategic resource plan (MSRP) that sets country-level US 

foreign policy goals, resource requests, performance 

measures, and targets. 

The Country Team. The country team, headed by the 

COM, is the senior in-country interagency coordinating 

body. It is composed of the COM, deputy chief of mission, 

section heads, the senior member of each US department or 

agency in country, and other USG personnel as determined 

by the COM. The country team system provides the 

foundation for rapid interagency consultation and action on 

recommendations from the field and effective execution of 

US programs and policies. 

Geographic Combatant Commands. To effectively bring 

all instruments of national power to theater and regional 

strategies as well as campaign and operation plans, 

geographic combatant commands are augmented with 

representatives from other USG agencies. 

Intergovernmental 

Organizations 

The United Nations (UN). Coordination with the UN 

begins at the national level with DOS, through the US 

ambassador to the UN, officially titled the Permanent 

Representative. The ambassador has the status of cabinet 

rank and is assisted at the US Mission to the UN by a 

military assistant who coordinates appropriate military 

interests primarily with the UN Department of 

Peacekeeping Operations and UN Office for the 

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). USG 

coordination with UN peace operations missions or 

agencies in-theater is through the US country team. 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

NATO is an alliance of 28 countries from North America 

and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North 

Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with the treaty, the 

fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and 

security of its member countries by political and military 

means. The alliance is committed to defending its member 

states against aggression or the threat of aggression and to 

the principle that an attack against one or several members 

would be considered an attack against all. NATO’s most 
 Executive Summary 

xix 

important decision-making body is the North Atlantic 

Council, which brings together representatives of all the 

Allies at the level of ambassadors, ministers, or heads of 

state and government. 

Nongovernmental 

Organizations 

The Role of NGOs. Working alone, alongside the US 

military, with other US agencies, or with multinational 

partners, NGOs are assisting in many of the world’s trouble 

spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed. 

Many NGOs view their relationship with the military under 

the UNOCHA Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil 

Defense Assets in Disaster Relief, commonly referred to as 

the “Oslo Guidelines,” that emphasize the principle of 

“humanitarian space” (humanitarianism, neutrality, and 

impartiality). Some organizations employ a more strident 

interpretation of these nonbinding guidelines, applying 

them not just to humanitarian assistance, as specifically 

referenced, but also to advocacy, development, and civil 

society work. The extent to which specific NGOs are 

willing to cooperate with the military can thus vary 

considerably. 

Military Support of NGOs. SecDef may determine that it 

is in the national interest to task US military forces with 

missions that bring them into close contact with (if not 

support of) IGOs and NGOs. In such circumstances, it is 

mutually beneficial to closely coordinate the activities of all 

participants. 

The Private Sector A number of DOD instructions (DODIs) regulate the 

conduct of private military and security companies 

operating with DOD. These include DODI 3020.41, 

Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US 

Armed Forces; DODI 3020.50, Private Security 

Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations; 

and DODI 5525.11, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians 

Employed by or Accompanying the Armed Forces Outside 

the United States, Certain Service Members, and Former 

Service Members.

Foreign Operations Within the executive branch, DOS is the lead foreign 

affairs agency, assisting the President in foreign policy 

formulation and execution. As such, DOS oversees the 

coordination of DOD external political-military (POLMIL) 

relationships with overall US foreign policy. In addition to 

DOS, the US Agency for International Development 

(USAID) is the lead agency for development and carries 
Executive Summary 

xx JP 3-08 

out programs that complement DOD efforts in stabilization, 

disaster response, foreign internal defense, and security 

force assistance. 

The GCC implements DOD external POLMIL relationships 

within the AOR. GCC’s theater campaign plan, containing 

nested country plans, should complement DOS MSRP and 

other plans developed by the country teams and USG 

interagency partners in the GCC’s AOR. In a crisis 

response and limited contingency operation, coordination 

between DOD and other USG agencies will normally occur 

within the NSC interagency policy committee and, if 

directed, during development of the USG strategic plan. 

Joint Task Force 

Considerations 

A valuable tool in the mission analysis process is the 

deployment of a JTF assessment team to the projected JOA. 

The purpose of the assessment team is to establish liaison 

with the ambassador or COM, country team, HN, and, if 

present, multinational members, UN representatives, and 

IGO and NGO representatives. USAID, because of the 

extensive contacts it develops in carrying out development 

work at the community level, can provide key situational 

awareness for JTF assessments. The CJTF should consider 

the establishment of C2 structures that account for and 

provide coherence to the activities of all elements in the 

JOA. In addition to military operations, these structures 

should include the political, civil, administrative, legal, and 

humanitarian elements as well as IGOs, NGOs, and the 

media. An assessment team’s mission analysis will assist 

the CJTF in the establishment of an executive steering 

group, CMOC, and liaison teams. 

Civil-Military Operations 

Center 

The CMOC is a mechanism for the coordination of 

civil-military operations that can serve as the primary 

coordination interface and provide operational and tactical 

level coordination between the JFC and other stakeholders. 

Despite its name, the CMOC generally does not set policy 

or direct operations. Conceptually, the CMOC is the 

meeting place of stakeholders. For foreign operations, the 

CMOC may be the focal point where US military forces 

coordinate any support to NGOs.

Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams (PRTs) 

A provincial reconstruction team (PRT) is an interim 

interagency organization designed to improve stability in a 

given area by helping build the legitimacy and 

effectiveness of an HN local or provincial government in 

providing security to its citizens and delivering essential 
 Executive Summary 

xxi 

It is vitally important that 

the PRT leadership ensure 

that the guidance provided 

by multiple agencies is 

carefully coordinated and 

mutually reinforcing, and 

that they report to higher 

headquarters when there 

are inconsistencies or 

when difficulties occur. 

government services. PRTs operate by combining security 

forces for protection with other military and civilian 

personnel for support, development, and governance into 

one cohesive team. PRTs can be led by either a military or 

DOS officer depending on the situation. DOD personnel 

comprise the security element and personnel from 

appropriate USG agencies comprise the civilian element. 

Strategic Communication SC is a whole-of-government effort involving much more 

than military activities, and therefore requires a high level 

of coordination and synchronization among interagency 

partners to achieve unity of effort. CCDRs should provide 

input into theme, message, and story development and 

delivery through their CJCS representative to the NSC, in 

coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

JFCs oversee execution of actions and communication of 

themes and messages. CCDRs and staffs should include 

SC considerations in planning for joint operations and in 

the interagency process. Each of the communication 

activities under the direction of the CCDR has the ability to 

influence and inform key foreign audiences through words, 

images, and actions to foster understanding of US policy 

and advance US interests. 

CONCLUSION 

This publication provides joint doctrine for the 

coordination of military operations with USG agencies; 

state, local, and tribal governments; IGOs; NGOs; and the 

private sector. 

 
Executive Summary 

xxii JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank 
I-1 

CHAPTER I

FOUNDATIONS OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION

This publication provides information to guide interorganizational coordination during 

joint operations among engaged stakeholders. These stakeholders are inclusive of the Armed 

Forces of the United States; United States Government (USG) departments and agencies; 

state, territorial, local, and tribal government agencies; foreign military forces and 

government agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs), and entities of the private sector. Further, the term interagency 

coordination is limited to the interaction between USG departments and agencies. The 

Department of Defense (DOD) conducts interorganizational coordination across a range of 

operations with each type of operation involving different communities of interests and 

structures. This is especially pronounced for domestic and foreign operations, which are 

governed by different authorities and have considerably different USG governing structures 

and stakeholders. 

SECTION A. FOUNDATIONS OF 

INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION

1. Purposes of Interorganizational Coordination 

A commitment to interorganizational coordination will help to achieve desired end states 

by facilitating cooperation in areas of common interest or avoiding unintended negative 

consequences when working in the same space as other stakeholders. Interorganizational 

coordination aids in this by enabling participants to do one or more of the following: 

a. Facilitate Unity of Effort. The translation of national strategic objectives into 

unified action is essential to unity of effort and ultimately mission success. Achieving 

national strategic objectives requires the effective and efficient use of diplomatic, 

informational, military, and economic instruments of national power supported by 

interorganizational coordination. At the President’s direction, military power is integrated 

with the other instruments of national power to advance and defend US values, interests, and 

objectives. To accomplish this integration, DOD agencies interact with non-DOD agencies 

gaining a mutual understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military 

and civilian actions. They also identify the ways in which military and civilian capabilities 

best complement each other. The National Security Council (NSC) and the Homeland 

Security Council (HSC) play key roles in the integration of all instruments of national power 

“When the United States undertakes military operations, the Armed Forces of the 

United States are only one component of a national-level effort involving all 

instruments of national power. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is 

necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a number of Federal departments 

and agencies. In certain operations, agencies of states, localities, or foreign 

countries may also be involved.”

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
Chapter I

I-2 JP 3-08 

by facilitating mutual understanding and cooperation. Further, the unified actions of military 

and civilian organizations in sharing information, cooperating, and striving together to 

accomplish a common goal is the essence of interorganizational coordination that makes 

unity of effort possible. 

b. Achieve Common Objectives. A large number of civilian agencies and 

organizations—many with indispensable practical competencies and significant legal 

responsibilities—interact with the Armed Forces of the United States and its multinational 

counterparts. Joint and multinational operations must be strategically integrated and 

operationally and tactically coordinated with the activities of participating USG agencies, 

IGOs, NGOs, host nation (HN) agencies, and the private sector to achieve common 

objectives. Within the context of DOD involvement, interagency coordination is the 

coordination that occurs between elements of DOD and engaged USG agencies for the 

purpose of achieving an objective. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the 

US military and the other instruments of national power. Similarly, within the context of 

DOD involvement, interorganizational coordination is the interaction that occurs among 

elements of the DOD; engaged USG agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; 

foreign military forces and government agencies; IGOs; NGOs; and the private sector. 

Successful interorganizational coordination enables the USG to build international and 

domestic support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that more effectively 

and efficiently achieve common objectives.

KEY TERMS

interagency—Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and 

departments, including the Department of Defense. 

intergovernmental organization—An organization created by a formal 

agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be 

established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or 

narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national 

interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union.

nongovernmental organization—A private, self-governing, not-for-profit 

organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting 

education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, 

human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment 

of democratic institutions and civil society.

private sector—An umbrella term that may be applied in the United States 

and in foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial 

individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of 

academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental 

organizations.
Foundations of Interorganizational Coordination 

I-3 

c. Provide Common Understanding

(1) Sometimes, the joint force commander (JFC) draws on the capabilities of 

external organizations; at other times, the JFC provides capabilities to those organizations or 

the JFC deconflicts his activities with them. These same organizations may be present 

during some or all phases of a joint operation or campaign. In any case, interorganizational 

coordination will be critical to understand the roles and relationships of participating 

military commands and relevant stakeholders as well as their interests, equities, and 

insight into the challenges faced. Such common understandings will be essential to 

enable stakeholders to operate effectively in the same space, identifying opportunities 

for cooperation, and avoiding unnecessary conflict.

(2) It is important that DOD speak with a single voice in exchanges with other 

stakeholders to minimize confusion. DOD elements—including Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), DOD agencies and field activities, Military 

Departments, and combatant commands—should develop a common position on the 

appropriate military role in interagency coordination before broadening the discussion to 

include other agencies, departments, and organizations. DOD’s established common culture, 

procedures, and hierarchical structure, may facilitate consensus building and development of 

a DOD position prior to engaging in interagency coordination, especially at the strategic 

level. However, this DOD internal consensus building may still require significant effort and 

some degree of compromise. OSD and the Joint Staff (JS) have a key role in 

interorganizational coordination efforts, as DOD’s representatives to the NSC, HSC, and 

given their roles in developing national security policy. In order to facilitate increased 

interagency coordination at all levels, it is critical that the JFCs work with and through their

JS and OSD (particularly the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

[OUSD{P}]) counterparts, establishing an ongoing dialogue on issues of interest. OUSD(P) 

and JS involvement helps to ensure that engagement with other stakeholders is consistent 

with existing policy and priorities. Greater visibility of DOD-wide engagement with other 

USG agencies will enable the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to better balance competing 

global requirements and ensure DOD presents a unified position. 

(3) Combatant commanders (CCDRs) and other subordinate JFCs must consider 

the potential requirements for interorganizational coordination as a routine part of their 

activities. 

unified action—The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the 

activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military 

operations to achieve unity of effort.

unity of effort—Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, 

even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or 

organization—the product of successful unified action.
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I-4 JP 3-08 

2. The Need for Unity of Effort

a. Meeting the challenges of current and future operations requires the concerted effort 

of all instruments of US national power plus foreign governmental agencies and military 

forces and civilian organizations. Within the USG alone, achieving unity of effort is often 

complicated by organizational “stovepiping,” crisis-driven planning, and divergent 

organizational processes and cultures. These differences have certain benefits, but are not 

well-suited for addressing the range of conventional and irregular challenges that cut across 

available organizational expertise. Problems arise when each USG agency interprets NSC 

and HSC policy guidance differently, sets different priorities for execution, and does not act 

in concert. These issues are exacerbated by the competing interests and practices of 

participating foreign governments and military forces, IGOs, NGOs, and private sector 

entities.

b. Consequently, there is a need to conduct integrated planning to effectively employ 

the appropriate instruments of national power. A comprehensive approach seeks to stimulate 

a cooperative culture within a collaborative environment, while facilitating a shared 

understanding of the situation. In its simplest form, a comprehensive approach should 

invigorate existing processes and strengthen interorganizational relationships. This approach 

should forward the respective goals of all parties, ensuring stakeholders do not negate or 

contradict the efforts of others. Several factors contribute to success in this effort:

(1) Continual dialogue among national leadership, agencies, and departments in 

ascertaining the problem, defining success, and developing feasible direction and acceptable 

courses of action (COAs). 

(2) Collective recognition of the complex, interconnected nature of the operational 

environment. 

“Secretary Gates and I are here together because our departments’ missions are 

aligned and our plans are integrated. The foreign policy of the United States is 

built on the three D’s: defense, diplomacy, and development. The men and 

women in our armed forces perform their duties with courage and skill, putting their 

lives on the line time and time again on behalf of our Nation. And in many regions, 

they serve alongside civilians from the State Department and USAID [United 

States Agency for International Development], as well as other government 

agencies, like USDA [United States Department of Agriculture].

We work with the military in two crucial ways. First, civilians complement and build 

upon our military’s efforts in conflict areas like Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, they 

use diplomatic and development tools to build more stable and peaceful societies, 

hopefully to avert or end conflict that is far less costly in lives and dollars than 

military action.”

Hillary Rodham Clinton

Secretary of State

Senate Testimony, 30 April 2009
Foundations of Interorganizational Coordination 

I-5 

(3) Including all stakeholders promotes a common understanding of the 

environment, problem, issues, goals, and objectives. Stakeholders have unique perspectives 

and expertise. Together they build a more enriched overall assessment. Including civilian 

stakeholders from the beginning in assessment, estimates and planning, or military 

participation in civilian processes facilitates a more complete understanding of the nature of 

the problem to be solved and actions required to solve it. 

(4) Collective recognition that the commander is ultimately accountable for the 

assigned mission, regardless of the resources provided and the degree of support by others.

c. In military (e.g., joint) operations, unity of effort is ensured by establishing unity of 

command. Unity of command is based on the designation of a single commander with the 

authority to direct and coordinate the efforts of all assigned forces in pursuit of a common 

objective. Commanders exercise military command and control (C2) to ensure that military 

operations are planned and conducted in accordance with the guidance and direction received 

from the President and SecDef in coordination with other authorities (i.e., alliance or 

multinational leadership). In operations involving interagency partners and other 

stakeholders, where the commander may not control all elements, he seeks cooperation and 

builds consensus to achieve unity of effort. 

(1) Unity of command can be difficult to achieve when working with multiple 

stakeholders. To compensate, commanders concentrate on working with the participating 

national forces to obtain unity of effort. Consensus building is the key element to unity of 

effort.

(2) Commanders must be prepared to accommodate differences in operational and 

tactical capabilities by nations within a multinational force (MNF). The commander must 

clearly articulate his intentions, guidance, and plans to avoid confusion that might occur due 

to differences in language, culture, doctrine, and terminology. Detailed planning, exchange 

of standing operating procedures and liaison officers (LNOs), and rehearsals help overcome 

procedural difficulties among nations. 

d. While unity of command and the exercise of C2 apply strictly to military forces and 

operations, unified action among all interorganizational participants is necessary to achieve 

unity of effort in military operations involving engaged civilian organizations and foreign 

military forces or military participation in civilian-led operations. Unified action is the 

DOD doctrinal term that represents a comprehensive approach. It begins with national 

strategic direction from the President and includes a wide scope of actions including 

interorganizational coordination techniques, information sharing, collaborative planning, and 

the synchronization of military operations with the activities of all the civilian stakeholders. 

Interorganizational coordination depends on a spirit of cooperation, while military efforts 

depend on C2 and doctrine. However, some of the techniques, procedures, and systems of 

military C2 can facilitate unified action when adjusted to the dynamics of interorganizational 

coordination and different organizational cultures. Military leaders should work with 

civilian stakeholders with skill, tact, and persistence. Unified action is promoted through 

close, continuous coordination and cooperation, which are necessary to overcome 
Chapter I

I-6 JP 3-08 

confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and 

personnel limitations.

e. Achieving unity of effort requires the application of a comprehensive approach that 

includes coordination, consensus building, cooperation, collaboration, compromise, 

consultation, and deconfliction among all the stakeholders toward an objective. An inclusive 

approach of working closely with stakeholders is often more appropriate than a military C2 

focused approach. Taking an authoritative, military approach may be counterproductive to 

effective interorganizational relationships, impede unified action, and compromise mission 

accomplishment. Gaining unity of effort is never settled and permanent; it takes constant 

effort to sustain interorganizational relationships. 

3. Whole-of-Government 

a. Within the USG, elements aspire to a whole-of-government approach. This approach

implies the integration of USG efforts with a plan that identifies and aligns USG goals, 

objectives, tasks, and supporting structures, with designation of lead, primary, coordinating, 

cooperating, and supporting federal agencies. 

b. This approach may also be used to refer to formally USG-agreed structures and 

processes intended to facilitate whole-of-government efforts. These include the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) processes, and 

reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) structures.

c. Well-integrated USG operations and relationships, preferably using a whole-ofgovernment approach, will facilitate USG engagement with non-USG stakeholders, fostering 

a broader comprehensive approach to security. 

4. Coordinating Efforts

a. Providing Strategic Direction. Strategic direction is the common thread that 

integrates and synchronizes the activities of JS, combatant commands, Services, and combat 

support agencies. As an overarching term, strategic direction encompasses the processes and 

products by which the President, SecDef, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 

provide policy and strategic guidance to DOD. The President, assisted by the NSC and HSC, 

also provides strategic direction to guide the efforts of USG agencies that represent other 

instruments of national power. Strategic direction is provided in a number of national level 

documents some of which include, among others, the National Security Strategy (NSS), 

National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, National Strategy for Combating 

Terrorism, National Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, National 

Response Framework (NRF), National Strategy for Maritime Security, National Incident 

Management System (NIMS), and the Unified Command Plan. 

(1) Within the USG, the NSS guides the development, integration, and coordination 

of all the instruments of national power to accomplish national security objectives. The 

President signs the NSS, and the NSC is the principal forum responsible for coordinating

the strategic-level implementation of the NSS. This effort provides strategic guidance for 
Foundations of Interorganizational Coordination 

I-7 

the combatant commands, Services, and DOD agencies, and forms the foundation for 

operational and tactical level guidance.

(2) The NRF presents the guiding principles that enable all response partners to 

prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and emergencies. The NRF 

establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response.

For additional information, see the National Strategy for Homeland Security; Joint 

Publication (JP) 3-27, Homeland Defense; and JP 3-28, Civil Support.

(3) The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction states that 

“weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—nuclear, biological, and chemical—in the 

possession of hostile states and terrorists, represents one of the greatest security challenges 

facing the United States. We must pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat in 

all of its dimensions.” A systematic interagency approach is required to respond to the 

growing volume and complexity of the WMD trade. 

(4) The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and the DOD 

Implementation Plan provides procedures to ensure interorganizational coordination to 

mitigate the effects of a novel influenza strain.

b. Applying the Military Component. Military forces have long coordinated with 

USG agencies to include, but not limited to, the Department of State (DOS), Department of 

Justice (DOJ), Department of Transportation (DOT), United States Agency for International 

Development (USAID), and the intelligence community (IC), along with the adjutants 

general (TAGs) of the 50 states, District of Columbia, and three territories. Increasingly, 

relationships are being developed and institutionalized with state and local government 

agencies, additional USG agencies (e.g., DHS), multinational partners, IGOs such as the 

United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NGOs, and HN 

agencies.

(1) Because the solution to a problem seldom resides within the capability of 

one agency, joint campaign and operation plans should be crafted to recognize and 

leverage the core competencies of other agencies while providing support, as 

appropriate. Annex V (Interagency Coordination) of specific joint operation plans

(OPLANs) is the section that captures much of this information. Additionally, other sections 

(e.g., annex A [Task Organization], annex B [Intelligence], annex C [Operations], annex G 

[Civil Affairs], and annex W [Contingency Contracting]) also should contain pertinent 

interagency information.

See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03C, Joint Operation 

Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II, Planning Formats, for sample formats.

(2) In a national emergency, civil support (CS) operation, or crisis response and 

limited contingency operation, DOD often serves in a supporting role. Thus, commanders 

and their staffs may need to adjust and adopt procedures, especially planning and reporting,

to coordinate and harmonize military operations with the activities of other agencies and 

organizations to optimize the military’s contributions and support. Communication, 
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I-8 JP 3-08 

coordination, and cooperation with external agencies and organizations by DOD commands 

is normally accomplished with the appropriate knowledge, approval, assistance, and 

cooperation of the chief of mission (COM) in foreign lands and DHS (e.g., Federal 

Emergency Management Agency [FEMA]) in the homeland. DOS, USAID, and DHS may 

facilitate military interaction with IGOs, NGOs, state, local, and tribal authorities, and the 

private sector.

c. Capitalizing on Organizational Diversity. Each interorganizational partner 

brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, expertise, and skills to the task of 

coordination. This diversity can be made into an asset through a collective forum and 

process that considers the many views, capabilities, and options of the interagency partners.

d. Gathering the Right Resources. A challenge to commanders is to recognize what 

resources are available and how to work together to effectively apply them. Despite 

potential philosophical, cultural, and operational differences, efforts should be coordinated to 

foster an atmosphere of cooperation that ultimately contributes to unity of effort. Pursuit of 

interorganizational coordination as a process should be viewed as a means to mission 

accomplishment.

e. Determining the Authorities. Each USG agency has different authorities, which 

govern the operation of the agency and determine the use of its resources. These authorities 

derive from several sources: the US Constitution, their federal charter, Presidential 

directives, congressional mandates, and strategic direction. It is important that early in the 

joint operation planning process (JOPP) the definition of these authorities be clearly 

understood and documented. Congress provides funding to the agencies for various 

activities under titles of the United States Code (USC). This controls what the agencies, 

including DOD, can and cannot do. IGO authorities are based on their formal agreement 

among member governments. NGOs are independent of the USG; each has its own unique 

and individual governance system. Other private sector organizations respond to various 

forms of authority. 

f. Providing Command Focus. JFCs ensure that joint operations are integrated 

and synchronized (as much as possible) in time, space, and purpose with the actions of 

supporting or supported MNFs and civilian partners. Activities and operations with 

civilian organizations may be complex and require considerable coordination by JFCs, their 

staffs, and subordinate commanders. The extent of cooperation and coordination from 

civilian agencies and organizations with the joint force will vary and be contingent on the 

nature of the agency or organization mission and role (e.g., offensive/defensive operations, 

peacekeeper, humanitarian).

5. Working Relationships and Practices

a. Supported and Supporting Roles. Within the USG, military and civilian 

agencies perform in both supported and supporting roles. However, this is not the 

support command relationship described in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 

United States. Relationships between military and civilian agencies cannot be equated 

to military command authorities (e.g., operational control [OPCON], tactical control 
Foundations of Interorganizational Coordination 

I-9 

[TACON], support). During combat operations such as Operation DESERT STORM or in 

foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations such as Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, 

DOD was the lead agency and wassupported by other USG agencies. When DOD is tasked 

to provide CS, its forces typically perform in a supporting role such as after Hurricane 

Katrina. When military support is requested by civil authorities and approved by the 

President or SecDef, DOD and its responsible combatant commands—United States

Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and/or United States Pacific Command 

(USPACOM)—will typically support FEMA or another civilian agency (e.g., Department of 

Health and Human Services [DHHS] in support of NRF Emergency Support Function [ESF] 

#8, Public Health and Medical Services). Whether supported or supporting, close 

coordination between USG agencies is key.

b. Coordination. Although there is no equivalent command relationship between 

military forces and civilian agencies and organizations, clearly defined relationships may 

foster harmony and reduce friction between the participants. Civilian agencies tend to 

operate via coordination and communication structures, rather than C2 structures. However, 

when the incident command system (ICS) is used, it is typically under a unified command 

structure used when more than one agency has incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross 

political jurisdictions. The ICS is a standardized on-scene emergency management construct 

specifically designed to provide for the adoption of an integrated organizational structure that 

reflects the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered 

by jurisdictional boundaries. NGOs do not operate within military, governmental, or IGO 

hierarchies. However, the Armed Forces of the United States and NGOs often occupy the 

same operational space and there is an increased risk of confusion if that space is in a hostile 

or uncertain environment. 

c. Collaboration. Effective joint operations require close coordination, cooperation, 

and information sharing among multiple organizations. The most common technique for 

promoting this collaboration is the identification or formation of centers, groups, bureaus, 

cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups, and planning teams and other enduring or 

temporary cross-functional staff organizations that manage specific processes and 

accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment. They facilitate planning by the 

staff, decision making by the commander, and execution by the headquarters (HQ). They 

mostly fall under the principal oversight of the joint force staff directorates. This 

arrangement strengthens the staff effort in ways that benefit the JFC in mission execution. 

Inclusion of participating civilian agency and organization representatives in the various 

cross-functional staff organizations enhances collaboration. JFCs should consider selective 

integration of participating civilian agencies into day-to-day operations. 

d. Liaison. Direct, early liaison is a valuable source of accurate, timely information on 

many aspects of a crisis area, especially where involvement by civilian agencies and 

organizations is likely to precede that of military forces and presents an opportunity to 

significantly enhance early force effectiveness. A key additional benefit is an opportunity to 

build working relationships based upon trust and open communications amongst all 

organizations. For that reason, ongoing liaison and exchange of liaison personnel with 

engaged organizations is equally important. 
Chapter I

I-10 JP 3-08 

For further details concerning LNOs, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

6. Considerations for Effective Cooperation

a. Military policies, processes, and procedures are very different from those of 

civilian organizations. These differences may present significant challenges to 

NOTIONAL RANGE OF INTERACTION TERMS

The following terms are a range of interactions that occur among 

stakeholders. There is no common interorganizational agreement on these 

terms, and other stakeholders may use them interchangeably or with varying 

definitions. A consensus of dictionary definitions is provided as a baseline 

for common understanding. 

Coordination can be described as the process of organizing a complex 

enterprise in which numerous organizations are involved and bring their 

contributions together to form a coherent or efficient whole. It implies 

formal structures, relationships, and processes.

Consensus can be described as a general or collective agreement, accord, 

or position reached by a group as a whole. It implies a serious treatment of 

every group member’s considered position.

Cooperation can be described as the process of acting together for a 

common purpose or mutual benefit. It involves working in harmony, side by 

side and implies an association between organizations. It is the alternative 

to working separately in competition. Cooperation with other agencies does 

not mean giving up authority, autonomy, or becoming subordinated to the 

direction of others.

Collaboration can be described as a process where organizations work 

together to attain common goals by sharing knowledge, learning, and 

building consensus. Be aware that some attribute a negative meaning to the 

term “collaboration” as if referring to those who betray others by willingly 

assisting an enemy of one’s country, especially an occupying force.

Compromise can be described as a settlement of differences by mutual 

concessions without violation of core values; an agreement reached by 

adjustment of conflicting or opposing positions, by reciprocal modification 

of an original position. Compromise should not be regarded in the context 

of win/lose.

Consultation can be described as seeking the opinion or advice of other 

organizations, which may include discussion, conferring, and deliberation.

Deconfliction can be described as the elimination of undesirable overlap 

among entities, especially where two or more entities perform the same 

function or occupy the same physical space.
Foundations of Interorganizational Coordination 

I-11 

interorganizational coordination. The various USG agencies often have different, and 

sometimes conflicting, goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques, which 

make unified action a challenge. Still more difficult, some IGOs and NGOs may have 

policies that are explicitly antithetical to those of the USG, and particularly the US military. 

In addition, many NGOs may not be hostile to DOD goals but will not cooperate with DOD 

or USG efforts in order to maintain the NGO’s perception of neutrality. 

b. The military relies on structured and hierarchical decision-making processes; detailed 

planning; the use of standardized tactics, techniques, and procedures; and sophisticated C2 

systems to coordinate and synchronize operations. Civilian agencies may employ similar 

principles, but may not have the same degree of structural process as the US military, and 

their organizational structure is more horizontal. Decision processes may be more ad hoc, 

collaborative, and collegial. Cooperation between IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector is 

often based on a perceived mutually supportive interest, rather than a formalized agreement. 

Many NGOs are signatory to various codes of conduct which include the responsibility to 

share information for effectiveness, safety, and other reasons. Private sector entities might

only coordinate if it supports their business model. A continuous information exchange 

among engaged departments and agencies is necessary to avoid confusion over objectives, 

differences in procedures, resource limitations, and shortfalls or overlaps of authorities. 

Action will follow understanding. 

c. The Armed Forces of the United States have unique capabilities that provide 

significant contributions to the overall USG effort. These include established military-tomilitary working relationships, extensive resources (e.g., logistics), and trained and ready 

personnel able to rapidly respond to multiple global crises. Additional unique military 

capabilities include C2 resources supported by worldwide communications and intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance infrastructures; robust organizational and planning 

processes; civil affairs (CA) personnel and their unique civilian-acquired skills; training 

support for large numbers of individuals on myriad skills; and air, land, and sea mobility 

support for intertheater or intratheater requirements. 

d. Operations involving extensive USG and multinational involvement represent an 

enormous coordination challenge. Successful execution is dependent on a mutual 

understanding of mission objectives and clear lines of authority. Normally, existing 

authorities dictate the primary or lead coordinating agency. In cases where the USG lead is 

unclear, an agency may be designated by the President or NSC.

e. An inclusive view and a desire to leverage comparative advantage should guide a 

JFC’s collaboration with civilian counterparts of USG agencies. Each agency has special 

expertise, authorities, access, and resources that can be brought to bear to support JFC 

activities. The reciprocal also applies. The contributions of US military forces can reinforce 

the initiatives undertaken through diplomatic, development, law enforcement, and other 

activities. The challenge lies in leveraging comparative advantages and then integrating 

efforts under a coherent strategy with synergy as a result. A proven model is the 

complementary character of DOS embassy mission strategic resource plans (MSRPs) and 

geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) theater campaign plans (TCPs). 
Chapter I

I-12 JP 3-08 

f. Interpersonal communication skills that emphasize consultation, persuasion, 

compromise, and consensus contribute to obtaining unified action in a military-civilian 

effort. Successful commanders and staff build personal relationships to inspire trust and 

confidence. The challenges of gaining consensus and creating synergy among the engaged 

USG agencies and multinational partners are greater, as there are no clear authorities 

directing the relationship. Commanders and their staffs can mitigate this risk by developing 

personal relationships, using liaison elements, and making conscious decisions on the degree 

of reliance on those stakeholders for critical tasks. Personal relationships are essential. 

Inspiring trust and confidence is a conscious act that does not just happen—it must be 

planned, actively built through words and actions, and continually reinforced. Development 

of strong personal relationships and the requisite trust and confidence that the engaged 

stakeholders will respond when their help is needed to accomplish assigned tasks is key. 

THE VALUE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

General Jacob Devers, US Army commander of the 6th Army Group in World 

War II, wrote that in coalition operations the personalities and the ambitions 

of the senior commanders of each of the Armed Services of the Allied 

Powers under his command were critical toward making the coalition work. 

General Norman Schwarzkopf and Saudi Arabia’s Lieutenant General Khaled 

were able to forge the bonds of mutual respect and create an atmosphere 

that permeated both of their staffs and impacted on every action and every

decision.

The Combined Civil Affairs Task Force, which assisted in the reconstruction 

of Kuwait after the Gulf War, was able to obtain interagency cooperation 

based largely on personal relationships. Colonel Randall Elliot, US Army 

Reserve (USAR), who put the organization together, was also the senior 

analyst in the Near East Division of the Department of State’s Bureau of 

Intelligence and Research. He knew the US Ambassador-designate to 

Kuwait, Edward “Skip” Gnehm, and was able to recruit Major Andrew 

Natsios, USAR, whose civilian job was Director of United States Agency for 

International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of US Foreign Disaster 

Assistance. Major Natsios brought Mr. Fred Cuny from INTERTEC, a 

contractor specializing in disaster relief, into the task force. Thus, USAID 

and its contractors were integrated into the operation based on these 

personal relationships.

US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and the top US military commander in 

Iraq, General David Petraeus, benefited from a close personal and 

professional relationship. 

Successful interagency cooperation rests in no small part on the ability of 

those on the ground, the ambassador, the geographic combatant 

commander, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of 

the US Government departments and agencies to personally work together.

Various Sources
Foundations of Interorganizational Coordination 

I-13 

Recognize that it is not necessary to “own” every asset to ensure access. The long-term 

institutionalization of personal relationships should be a goal. 

SECTION B. KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR 

INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION

7. United States Agency Engagement 

a. One difficulty of coordinating operations among US agencies is determining 

appropriate counterparts and exchanging information among them when habitual 

relationships are not established. Organizational differences exist between the US military 

and USG agencies’ hierarchies, particularly at the operational level where counterparts to 

the JFC seldom exist. Further, overall lead authority in a crisis response and limited 

contingency operation is likely to be exercised not by the GCC, but by a US ambassador or 

other senior civilian, who will provide policy and goals for all USG agencies and military 

organizations in the operation. 

b. Decision making at the lowest levels is frequently thwarted because field 

coordinators may not be vested with the authority to speak for parent organizations. Physical 

or virtual interagency teaming initiatives such as joint interagency task forces (JIATFs), joint 

interagency coordination group (JIACG), or routine interagency video teleconferences 

improve reachback and expedite decision making. Figure I-1 depicts comparative 

organizational structures using the three levels of war. 

c. Combatant commands engage civilian agency representatives in a variety of formal 

and informal venues. There are, however, two primary engagement venues. The first is 

through a representative (part- or full-time depending on position requirements), where the 

individual retains parent agency identity and a direct reporting relationship to that agency 

while representing the parent agency to the CCDR as a LNO or as a member of an 

organizational entity, such as a member of one of the CCDR’s cross-functional staff 

organizations such as the JIACG (or equivalent organization). The second is through an 

arrangement where the individual is directly assigned (i.e., civilian agency detail) to the 

command, serving in a combatant command billet (in the same capacity as a DOD 

employee). In this case, the individual brings the skill sets of a parent agency, but reports 

through the military chain of command. USG agencies may deploy relatively junior 

personnel compared to their military counterparts to fill key positions. This difference

should not be allowed to cause unnecessary friction. Carefully crafted memorandums of 

agreement (MOAs) can specify detailees’ rating and reviewing chains, tasking authority, and 

other clauses that are explicitly designed to overcome this potential source of friction.

d. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) officers serve as special 

operations support team (SOST) members with other federal agencies or organizations 

principally in the National Capital Region. Pursuant to the Interagency Partnership Program, 

senior grade military officers are assigned to a SOST at numerous governmental agencies 

and organizations. The SOST contributes to a synergistic network of USSOCOM personnel 

working with each other and their assigned agencies to accomplish mutually assigned tasks
Chapter I

I-14 JP 3-08 

in the President’s National Implementation Plan. SOST members work within the 

interagency community, leverage requirements in the IC, facilitate reporting, and process 

information requests. 

Figure I-1. Comparison of United States Agency Organizational Structures

COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES AGENCY 

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

Secretary of Defense 

Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Combatant Commander (1)

Combatant Commander

Commander, Joint Task 

Force (CJTF) (2)

Defense Coordinating 

Officer/Defense 

Coordinating Element

CJTF

Army Corps, Divisions

Navy Carrier Strike Groups

Air Force Wings

Marine Expeditionary Force

National Headquarters

Department Secretaries

Ambassador/Embassy (3)

Country Reconstruction and 

Stabilization Group

Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) 

National Response 

Coordination Center

Ambassador/Embassy United 

States Agency for International 

Development (USAID) Mission 

Director Liaisons (4)

Federal Coordinating Officer

Regional Office Integration 

Planning Cell

FEMA Regional Response 

Coordination Center

Ambassador/Embassy 

Field Office

USAID Office Director

Office of Foreign Disaster 

Assistance (OFDA)/Disaster 

Assistance Response Team 

(DART)/Liaison (5) Response 

Team

US Refugee Coordinator

Advance Civilian Team FEMA 

Joint Field Office

Governor

State Adjutant 

General

Office of Emergency 

Services

Department/Agency

1. The combatant commander, within the context of unified action, may function at both the strategic and operational levels in coordinating the 

application of all instruments of national power with the actions of other military forces, United States Government (USG) agencies, 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and the private sector toward theater strategic 

objectives.

2. The CJTF, within the context of unified action, functions at both the operational and tactical levels in coordinating the application of all 

instruments of national power with the actions of other military forces, USG agencies, NGOs, IGOs, and the private sector toward theater 

operational objectives.

3. The ambassador and embassy (which includes the country team) function at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and may support 

joint operation planning conducted by a combatant commander or CJTF, or may lead an integrated planning team.

4. Liaisons at the operational level may include the Central Intelligence Agency liaison officer, or any other US agency representative assigned 

to the Joint Interagency Coordination Group or otherwise assigned to the combatant commander’s staff.

5. USAID’s OFDA provides its rapidly deployable DART in response to international disasters. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety 

of disaster relief skills, to assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of USG response to disasters.

STRATEGIC

OPERATIONAL

TACTICAL/ 

FIELD-LEVEL

ARMED FORCES OF THE

UNITED STATES

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS 

AND AGENCIES

NOTES

STATE AND LOCAL 

GOVERNMENT

State Coordinating 

Officer

National Guard Units

County Commissioner

Mayor/Manager

County, City (e.g., 

Police Department)
Foundations of Interorganizational Coordination 

I-15 

8. Organizational Environments

a. To facilitate success, the interests, resources, efforts, and goals of all the engaged 

military and civilian organizations must be drawn together. This cohesion is often more 

complex than the multidimensional nature of military combat operations. When other 

instruments of national power—e.g., diplomatic, informational, and economic—are applied, 

the complexity and the number and types of interactions expand significantly. The essence 

of interorganizational coordination is the effective integration of multiple stakeholders 

with diverse perspectives, authorities, capabilities, and objectives.

b. The Nature of Interagency Coordination. The executive branch of the USG is 

organized by function with each department performing certain core tasks. In executing 

national security policy, the NSC and HSC play a critical role in unifying the efforts of the 

interagency community through a strategic collaborative process. Both the NSC and HSC 

principals and deputies are supported in their policy functions by the National Security Staff. 

Combatant commands must be proactive in seeking OSD and JS assistance to access the 

National Security Staff to enable interagency coordination. 

(1) Core Values and Authorities. Each agency has specific core values and 

authorities that scope their operations. These authorities and values influence how the 

agency functions. In any interaction, all participants must be constantly aware that each 

agency will continuously cultivate and create external sources of support and maneuver to 

protect its core values.

(2) Agency Focus. Individual agency perspectives and agendas complicate policy 

development. Pursuit of institutional objectives is an important driver of the various 

USG agencies’ positions, which may not always coincide with a common approach to 

international security issues. It is important to note that this issue applies equally to DOD 

personnel, especially when operating in nontraditional environments. Military personnel 

must understand the context of their role and ensure they do not assume lead decisionmaking responsibilities when DOD is not the lead or primary agency and they are in a 

supporting role. 

(3) Reduction of Uncertainty. Generally agencies are not set up to handle crises 

as their core or defining missions. Crises require participating agencies to divert attention, 

resources, and personnel away from other priorities and to work out accommodations with 

other agencies to achieve overall USG goals. Differing agency perspectives, capabilities, 

and interests will cause conflicts on how best to execute a mission and carry out policy in a 

crisis. Sharing such information among agency participants is critical to ensure that no 

participating agency is handicapped by a lack of situational awareness, that uncertainties 

inherent in crisis dynamics are reduced as much as possible, and that interagency decision 

making is empowered by a common operational picture (COP). 

c. Unified DOD Position. Before attempting to gain consensus in the interagency 

arena, a unified position must first be attained within DOD. 
Chapter I

I-16 JP 3-08 

d. Establishing Unifying Goals. Reaching consensus on unifying goals is an 

important prerequisite for success. Consensus must be constantly nurtured, which is much 

more difficult if the goals are not clear or change over time. At the national level, this 

consensus is usually attained by the National Security Staff and usually results in an NSC or 

HSC committee meeting statement of conclusions, a Presidential policy directive (PPD), or a 

political-military (POLMIL) USG strategic plan which establishes the goals of an operation 

and interagency responsibilities. The objective is to ensure all USG agencies clearly 

understand NSC or HSC policy objectives and responsibilities. Some compromise that 

limits the freedom of individual agencies may be required to gain consensus. A zeal for 

consensus should not concede the authority, roles, or core competencies of individual 

agencies. The greater the number of agencies and the more diverse the goals, the more 

difficult it is to reach consensus. Because a common unifying goal is so important, a great 

deal of time should be spent on clarifying and restating the goals. When a common 

threat brings an MNF together, the differences often revolve around ways and means. Many 

techniques that have been developed in previous MNFs may be useful in facilitating 

interagency, IGO, NGO, and private sector cooperation. 

e. Mutual Needs and Interdependence. In determining the needs of all 

participating agencies and stakeholders, a full appreciation and clear understanding of 

the other agencies is required. Organizations strive to maintain their interests, policies, and 

core values. These must be considered to facilitate interagency cooperation. Functional 

interdependence means that one organization relies upon another to employ its 

resources to attain the objective. This interdependence facilitates a strong working 

relationship among agencies, departments, and organizations. For example, IGOs and 

NGOs effectively conducted relief operations in Somalia and the early evolutions in the 

Balkans in the 1990s with the security provided by the Armed Forces of the United States. 

Similarly, DOS facilitates DOD overseas deployment by negotiating transit and basing 

agreements. Resource interdependence is based on one organization providing certain 

capabilities that another organization lacks. This support includes such resources as 

manpower, logistics, training augmentation, communication, and money, and establishes a 

framework for cooperation. These interdependencies can develop over time and lead the 

way to true interagency cooperation. Working together to enable individual efforts creates a 

synergy that increases with each operation. Ensuring that all organizations share the 

responsibility for the job and receive appropriate recognition strengthens these bonds 

of interdependence. The purpose of such recognition is to encourage each stakeholder to 

participate in the process by validating and reinforcing their roles and responsibilities. 

Sharing of resources among USG agencies is governed by law (e.g., the Economy Act), 

policy, and regulation. The staff judge advocate (SJA) and comptroller should be involved 

to ensure compliance. Appendicesin this publication describe the authority, responsibilities, 

organization, capabilities and core competencies, and pertinent contact information for many 

of these agencies, departments, and organizations. 

f. Long-Term and Short-Term Objectives. The relationship between long- and 

short-term objectives provides continuity between the strategic and operational levels. 

At the strategic level, OSD and JS work with the HSC and NSC interagency policy 

committees (NSC/IPCs) setting long-term policy goals. The GCC addresses short-term 
Foundations of Interorganizational Coordination 

I-17 

operational objectives through coordination with ambassadors, their country teams, 

multinational and agency staffs, and task forces. 

g. An understanding needs to be forged between civilian and DOD/military 

counterparts. When both the military and civilian agencies share the same operational 

environment, tension may exist due to numerous factors. Military commanders strive for 

immediate results that reduce the risk of violence. Development specialists often focus on 

repairing the structural faults in recipient country institutions, which have or could produce, 

a crisis in government legitimacy leading to the need for US military involvement. These 

approaches are not necessarily compatible, and tension between the two often leads to 

disjointed programming and disparate results. 

(1) During a US intervention, there will frequently be a contest between near-term 

military imperatives and those actions that support longer-term development objectives. To 

the extent possible, military activity should support the objectives established by the 

development community without compromising the military mission. The commander may 

consider creating an integrated planning team or other temporary entity to address how 

military activities may be better synchronized and complement the work of the development 

community. 

(2) On the other hand, military commanders should accept that not all development 

resources can be allocated to achieving short-term results, and recognize that investments 

that seek to repair underlying structural faults are essential if short-term gains are to be 

sustainable. These longer-term efforts need to begin at the same time as the short-term 

interventions if they are to be properly synchronized and sequenced. 

9. Strategic Communication

The USG uses strategic communication (SC) to coordinate use of the informational 

instrument of national power in specific situations. SC is focused USG efforts to understand 

and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the 

advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated 

programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all 

BUILDING AN UNDERSTANDING IS NECESSARY

“Not only do UN [United Nations], international organizations, and 

nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations not understand the 

military organization, we likewise do not understand them. They often have 

exaggerated impressions as to our capabilities, and little or no 

understanding of our limitations and restrictions. On the other hand, the US 

military personnel did not realize that those organizations do not have a real 

chain of command as we are used to—we simply never had any idea who to 

listen to...and they lacked one voice that could speak for all subordinates.”

SOURCE: Operation SUPPORT HOPE After Action Review,

Headquarters, United States European Command
Chapter I

I-18 JP 3-08 

instruments of national power. For its part, DOD must be a full participant in developing a 

government-wide approach that implements a more robust SC capability. This is primarily 

accomplished through public affairs (PA), defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD), and 

information operations (IO). 

See Chapter IV, “Foreign Considerations;” JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning; and US Joint 

Forces Command (USJFCOM) Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication and 

Communication Strategy, for more information on SC. 
II-1 

CHAPTER II

CONDUCTING INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION

1. General

a. The continually changing global security environment requires increased and 

improved communications and coordination among the numerous agencies and organizations 

working to achieve national security objectives. This cooperation is best achieved through 

active interagency involvement, building on the core competencies and successful 

experiences of all. While portions of this chapter are described in other JPs, this material is 

captured here to provide a common frame of reference that reflects all levels of interagency 

involvement. 

b. When campaign planning, deliberate planning, or crisis action planning (CAP) is 

required, the degree to which military and civilian components can be integrated and 

harmonized will bear directly on its efficiency and success. To the extent feasible, joint 

planning should include key participants from the outset. The CCDR, through his 

strategic concept, works with the engaged civilian organizations to build annex V 

(Interagency Coordination) of the joint operation plan. Subordinate JFCs also build civilian 

organization participation into their OPLAN, and increasingly, participate in integrated civilmilitary campaign planning with the embassy. Within the area of responsibility (AOR) and 

the joint operations area (JOA), appropriate decision-making structures are established at 

combatant command, joint task force (JTF) HQ, and tactical levels in order to coordinate and 

resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues. This chapter will suggest 

meaningful tools for the commander to organize for successful interorganizational 

coordination, whether in domestic or foreign operations, and focus on the operational level 

and below. 

2. The National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council 

a. The NSC is the President’s principal forum for consideration of national security 

policy issues requiring Presidential determination. The NSC also serves as the President’s 

principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies. 

b. The HSC is an entity within the Executive Office of the President of the United 

States to advise the President on homeland security (HS) matters. The HSC is the 

President’s principal forum for HS issues. 

"The Department’s vision is to support maturation of whole of government 

approaches to national security problems. Solutions to address strategic and 

operational security challenges will be based on employing integrated flexible, 

mutually-supporting interagency capabilities.”

Quadrennial Roles and Missions

Review Report, 2009
Chapter II

II-2 JP 3-08 

For more information on the HSC and its membership, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed 

Forces of the United States.

3. Whole-of-Government Approach

a. A whole-of-government approach integrates the collaborative efforts of the 

departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort. Under unified action, a 

whole-of-government approach identifies combinations of the full range of available USG 

capabilities and resources that reinforce progress and create synergies. This approach 

facilitates all USG capabilities and resources being shared, leveraged, synchronized, and 

applied toward the strategic end state. In order to do this, interagency members must, to the 

greatest degree possible, resist seeing their resources (e.g., financial, diplomatic, military, 

development, intelligence, economic, law enforcement, consular, commerce) as belonging to 

a single agency, but rather as tools of USG power. 

b. Whole-of-government planning refers to NSC/HSC-sponsored processes by which 

multiple USG departments and agencies come together to develop plans that address critical 

challenges to national interests. The NRF commits the USG, in partnership with local, tribal, 

and state governments and the private sector, to complete both strategic and operational 

plans for the incident scenarios specified in the National Preparedness Guidelines. Wholeof-government planning is distinct from the contributions of USG departments and 

agencies to DOD planning, which remains a DOD responsibility. 

c. It is imperative that all stakeholders in an operation participate in the planning and 

consultation processes to optimize the use of various instruments toward achievement of the 

operation’s goals. Maximum inclusion of all stakeholders (i.e., federal, state, local, and 

tribal governments, IGOs, NGOs, the private sector, HN partners, as applicable) is desired 

whether the operation is USG-only or multinational. Typically, policy and strategy are

determined through a civilian-led process which is supported by military participants 

wherein the USG defines its strategic objectives, integrates them with partners (federal, state, 

local, tribal, multinational, and HNs, as applicable), and collaborates with IGOs, NGOs, and 

the private sector to achieve coherency.

d. A primary challenge for integrating civilian and military planning into a whole-ofgovernment process is addressing the different planning capacity and culture in civilian 

agencies in contrast to DOD. Individual agency initiatives along with the broader 

interagency process seek to address many of the cultural differences and resource constraints 

to sustained civilian presence in planning. For example, DOD uses JOPES, while DHS uses 

the Integrated Planning System (IPS). While different, both of these systems are evolving to 

improve interagency planning efforts. 

e. Successful whole-of-government planning and operations require: 

(1) A designated lead or primary agency with all USG instruments of national 

power represented, actively participating, and integrated into the process; 

(2) A common understanding of the environment and the problem USG activities 

are seeking to solve;
Conducting Interorganizational Coordination 

II-3 

(3) A shared USG goal and clearly stated objectives to achieve results through 

comprehensive integration and synchronization of activities at the implementation level; 

(4) A common determination of what resources and capabilities are to be aligned to 

achieve the planning objectives; and 

(5) A defined desired strategic end state.

f. Application of a whole-of-government approach ensures that: 

(1) Commanders and civilian decision makers consider all possible USG 

capabilities to achieve identified objectives;

(2) Planning groups include necessary personnel from all relevant sectors and 

agencies;

(3) Planners approach problems in a holistic way and avoid stovepiped responses;

(4) Ongoing or existing policies and programs are reassessed and integrated into 

new objectives and desired outcomes; and 

(5) Planners consider and incorporate interagency capabilities, activities, and 

comparative advantages in the application of the instruments of national power. 

4. Joint Operation Planning and Interorganizational Coordination 

a. JOPP is used by CCDRs and subordinate JFCs to translate national or theater strategy 

into operational concepts through the development of an OPLAN. Joint operation planning 

may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and 

WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT PLANNING

By law, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) conducts strategic 

operational planning for counterterrorism (CT) activities across the United 

States Government (USG), integrating all instruments of national power. 

NCTC ensures effective integration of CT plans and synchronization of 

operations across more than 20 government departments and agencies 

engaged in the War on Terrorism, through a single and truly joint planning 

process. 

NCTC’s planning efforts include broad, strategic plans such as the landmark 

National Implementation Plan for the War on Terrorism (NIP). First approved 

by the President in June 2006 and then again in September 2008, the NIP is 

the USG’s comprehensive and evolving strategic plan to implement national 

CT priorities into concerted interagency action. NCTC also prepares far 

more granular, targeted action plans to ensure integration, coordination, and 

synchronization on key issues. 

SOURCE: National Counterterrorism Center
Chapter II

II-4 JP 3-08 

available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the President or 

SecDef selects the COA during CAP. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated 

military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. Thus, a campaign 

plan is an essential tool for laying out a clear, definable path linking the mission to the 

desired end state.

(1) Strategic Guidance. CCDRs develop intermediate objectives based on 

strategic guidance provided by the President and SecDef. CCDRs, in conjunction with 

their counterparts in DOS, USAID, and other USG agencies, and other non-USG 

organizations and sectors, will determine how to coordinate planning and operations, 

actions, and activities and resources at the theater strategic and operational level to 

achieve strategic objectives.

(2) The commander should coordinate with relevant entities throughout the 

JOPP to consider all the instruments of national power. The commander is guided by the 

interagency provisions of the USG strategic guidance and planning and disseminates that 

guidance to the joint force in annex V (Interagency Coordination) of the CCDR’s OPLAN. 

Appendix V (Planning Guidance, Annex V—Interagency Coordination) to CJCSM

3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II, Planning 

Formats, is an essential ingredient at the NSC and IPC in conducting POLMIL planning. It 

notes that interagency participation could be involved at the earliest phases of the operation 

or campaign starting with flexible deterrent options(FDOs). Linking the interagency actions 

with the phases of the operation assists in the scheduling and coordination. Crucially 

important to the plan is the orderly flow of operations to the desired end state and an efficient 

end of direct US military involvement. The development of annex C should enhance early 

operational coordination with planners from the other USG agencies that will be involved in 

the operation’s execution or its policy context. During planning, CCDR involvement, 

participation, and coordination will be critical to success. Increasingly, integrated civilmilitary plans are being co-developed by a JFC and US embassy. 

(3) FDOs are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to send the 

right signal and influence an adversary’s actions. The basic purpose of FDOs is to bring an 

issue to early resolution without armed conflict. They can be established to dissuade actions 

before a crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a crisis. FDOs are developed for 

each instrument of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—but 

they are most effective when used to combine the influence across instruments of national 

power. FDOs facilitate early strategic decision making, rapid de-escalation, and crisis 

resolution by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths. 

For additional information on FDOs, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

b. Plan Development and Coordination. Although deliberate planning is conducted 

in anticipation of future events, there may be crisis situations which call for an immediate 

US military response (e.g., noncombatant evacuation operation or FHA). CCDRs 

frequently develop COAs based on recommendations and considerations originating in one 

or more US embassies. In this regard, the country team is an invaluable partner because of 

its interagency experience and links to Washington. The JIACG (or equivalent 
Conducting Interorganizational Coordination 

II-5 

organization), in conjunction with the integration planning cell if deployed, can provide 

additional collaboration with operational planners and USG agencies. Emergency action 

plans in force at every embassy cover a wide range of anticipated contingencies and crises 

and can assist the commanders in identifying COAs, options, and constraints to military 

actions and support activities. The GCC’sstaff also consults with JS and other key agencies 

to coordinate military operations and support activities. Maintaining a dialogue with OSD 

and JS counterparts is especially important in CAP, as they will serve as the decision-making 

representatives to HSC and NSC meetings at the Washington HQ level.

(1) Initial concepts of military operations may require revision based on 

feasibility analysis and consideration of related activities by USG agencies, IGOs, or 

NGOs, particularly regarding logistics. For example, primitive or damaged seaport and 

airport facilities may constrain operations by limiting the throughput of the envisioned 

amounts of personnel and supplies. Such information is frequently provided by the country 

team that, in turn, may be in contact with relief organizations in country. Directly or 

indirectly, refinement of the military mission should be coordinated with USG agencies, 

IGOs, and NGOs to identify the required capabilities in order to achieve unity of effort 

across all organizations involved. 

(2) Planning conducted by the combatant command should be coordinated with 

all stakeholders and USG departments and agencies, through the OSD and the JCS. 

Planning for military activities will align with wider USG policy and, in coordination with 

US diplomatic missions, seek to complement or synchronize with parallel interagency 

activities. Contingency plans, where possible, will identify assumed contributions and 

requested support of interagency partners while complying with the guidance issued in the 

Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) related to incorporating interagency input into 

DOD planning. Planning will focus on: 

(a) Identifying any requests for additional policy direction;

(b) Operational capabilities, security cooperation activities, and development 

and diplomacy efforts of interagency partners; 

(c) Legal and administrative agreements with interagency partners that must be 

in place before executing operations; 

(d) Requirements (e.g., resources, people, and authorities) to improve 

interagency contributions or effectiveness (done in consultation with OSD, JS, and 

interagency partners); and 

(e) Criteria for shifting between DOD supported and supporting roles, as 

appropriate. 

(3) Interagency Involvement in DOD Plan Development. The quality of DOD 

campaign and contingency planning will improve with the early and regular participation of 

other US departments and agencies. USG departments and agencies, however, currently 

only have the capacity to support development of a limited number of DOD plans. During 

planning, CCDRs and their staffs: 
Chapter II

II-6 JP 3-08 

(a) Develop options, tasks, and coordination requirements for specific 

operations and activities directly with affected COM and/or state and local authorities.

(b) Share information with and rely on the subject matter expertise of LNOs 

and representatives from other departments and agencies detailed to the combatant 

command. 

(c) Conduct internal planning with LNOs and representatives from other 

departments and agencies detailed to the combatant command. 

(4) In coordination with the CJCS, CCDRs will seek SecDef intent/guidance before 

beginning development of OPLANs with other departments and agencies. 

(5) OUSD(P) and JS Joint Staff Operational Plans and Joint Force Development 

Directorate (J-7) will facilitate and support combatant command planning conferences and 

workshops involving multiple USG agencies or departments. OUSD(P) via JS J-7 may 

authorize direct liaison between combatant command planners and their HQ-level 

counterparts in other USG agencies for campaign and joint operation planning. The Promote 

Cooperation process ensures that DOD speaks with one voice as well as ensuring that plan 

content sharing/release with other USG agencies is fully vetted and authorized. Combatant 

commands will work through OUSD(P) and JS to organize and coordinate these 

conferences/meetings. Efforts to integrate other agencies into DOD planning efforts are 

complementary to whole-of-government planning, which is directed by the NSC or HSC, or 

a designated lead agency.

(6) With SecDef’s approval in coordination with the CJCS, combatant commands 

will work in coordination with OUSD(P) and JS to involve other USG departments and

agencies in DOD campaign plan development. 

c. The GEF translates the national security objectives and high-level strategy into DOD 

priorities and comprehensive planning direction. The GEF identifies SecDef’s strategic 

priorities and policy, and provides direction in the form of force allocation and defense 

posture guidance. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) implements the strategic 

INTEGRATING INTERAGENCY PLANNING

We will continue to work with other US Departments and Agencies, state 

and local governments, partners and allies, and international and multilateral 

organizations to achieve our objectives. A whole-of-government approach is 

only possible when every government department and agency understands 

the core competencies, roles, missions, and capabilities of its partners and 

works together to achieve common goals. Examples such as expanding US 

Southern Command’s interagency composition and the establishment of US 

Africa Command will point the way. In addition, we will support efforts to 

coordinate national security planning more effectively, both within DOD and 

across other US Departments and Agencies.

SOURCE: National Defense Strategy 2008
Conducting Interorganizational Coordination 

II-7 

policy guidance provided in the GEF and initiates the planning process for the development 

of campaign, contingency, and posture plans. Together, the GEF and JSCP provide guidance 

and task CCDRs and staffs to develop TCPs, global campaign plans, and support plans that 

integrate posture plans, security cooperation (Phase 0 and other military engagement 

activities), contingency plans, and crisis action plans. Posture plans seek to align and 

synchronize access and needs across GCC areas of TCPs, contingency plans, and crisis 

action plans. The linking of security cooperation, military engagement, deterrence activities, 

deliberate planning, and CAP products within the campaign plans allows CCDRs to 

efficiently allocate resources and direct operations in alignment with theater strategic and 

national strategic objectives. JOPES provides planning policy and procedures that support 

the formal interaction between Joint Planning and Execution Community members during 

deliberate planning and CAP and execution. 

d. USG agencies do not want to react to a military plan after the fact. USG agencies 

want a seat at the table to conduct strategic assessment, policy formulation, and planning. 

(1) Annex V (Interagency Coordination) should be consistent with the planning 

requirements contained in CJCSM 3122.03, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

(JOPES), Volume II, Planning Formats. A supported commander is responsible for 

developing annex V for each OPLAN. Annex V should specify for participating USG 

agencies the following: the capabilities desired by the military, the shared understanding of 

the situation, and the common objectives required to accomplish the mission. Annex V also 

provides a single location in a plan to capture potential contributions of USG agencies, 

identify potential DOD supporting roles to USG departments and agencies, and frame 

mutually agreeable integrating relationships (coordination and collaboration processes), 

linkages, and methods. This enables interagency planners to rigorously plan in concert with 

the military, to determine better their support requirements, and to suggest other USG 

activities or organizations that could contribute to the operation. This implies a 

collaboratively produced, releasable annex V.

(2) DOD plans are endorsed by SecDef (or his designee). While they are not 

“cosigned” by other departments and agencies, DOD typically seeks inputs from other 

departments and agencies to avoid developing a military plan in isolation. 

(3) The military plan may be in support of a wider USG effort. In this case, annex 

V may approach the same level of effort and importance as annex C (Operations).

(4) The following considerations should guide annex V development: 

(a) Coordination with interagency partners should occur early in the process;

(b) Annex V should be collaboratively developed, reflecting an integrated 

approach involving all instruments of national power; 

(c) Annex V should capture DOD and interagency cooperative activities 

toward mutual goals and objectives; 

(d) Aim for greater specificity; and
Chapter II

II-8 JP 3-08 

(e) Where possible, an unclassified and releasable annex V should be 

developed and shared with agency and coalition partners. Classified annexes should be 

developed and maintained separately when needed. 

e. In concert with the NSC or HSC as appropriate, DOD, and JS, CCDRs should: 

(1) Recognize all USG agencies, departments, IGOs, NGOs, and the private 

sector that are or should be involved in the operation. In most cases, initial planning and 

coordination with USG agencies will have occurred within the NSC, HSC, DOD, the 

Services, and JS. 

(2) Understand the interagency, IGO, NGO, and private sector relationships,

to include the lead or primary agency identified at the national level. Understand the 

differences between roles and responsibilities of DOD, the CJCS, JS, combatant commands, 

and the Services in domestic and foreign operations. Understand the different command 

arrangements in domestic and foreign operations. 

(3) Define the objectives of the response. These should be broadly outlined in the 

statement of conclusions from the relevant NSC, HSC, NSC/Principals Committee (PC), or 

NSC/Deputies Committee (DC) meetings that authorized the overall USG participation. 

Within the military chain of command, they are further elaborated in tasking orders that 

include the commander’s intent. 

BEYOND ANNEX V

Joint force commanders today are working hand-in-hand with civilian 

agencies to move beyond the traditional annex V construct in campaign 

planning. In Iraq, beginning in 2007, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) 

Commander General David Petraeus and the Iraq Chief of Mission 

Ambassador Ryan Crocker published a Joint Campaign Plan for Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM with both of their signatures. This document, developed 

collaboratively by the MNF-I staff and the country team (led by a special 

office in the embassy—the Joint Strategic Plans and Assessment office—

stood up specifically to conduct collaborative planning with the Department 

of Defense), served as the comprehensive, government-wide plan to guide 

US efforts in Iraq. Rather than relegating “interagency” tasks to annex V, the 

entire plan was integrated and responsibilities, lead and supporting, for 

execution were assigned. On 10 August 2009, Ambassador Eikenberry and 

General McChrystal signed the “United States Government Integrated 

Civilian–Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan,” which provides 

guidance from the US Chief of Mission and the Commander of US ForcesAfghanistan to US personnel in Afghanistan. The plan represents the 

collaborative effort of all the US Government departments and agencies 

operating in Afghanistan and the range of different equities, resources, and 

approaches.

Various Sources
Conducting Interorganizational Coordination 

II-9 

(4) Define COAs for the assigned military tasks, while striving for unity of effort 

with other USG agencies. 

(5) Cooperate with each agency, department, or organization and obtain a clear 

definition of the role that each plays. In many situations, participating agencies, 

departments, and organizations may not have representatives either in theater or colocated 

with the CCDR’s staff. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) can identify and make 

contact with the appropriate agency or department. It may then be advisable for the CCDR 

to request temporary assignment of agency representatives or LNOs from the participating 

agencies, departments, and organizations to the combatant command or JTF HQ. In some 

cases, it may also be useful or even necessary for the military to send LNOs to select other 

organizations. Obtaining representatives from agencies or offices within departments is 

often key. 

(6) Identify potential obstacles arising from conflicting departmental or agency 

priorities or authorities. Early identification of potential obstacles and concurrence as to 

solutions by all participants is the first step toward resolution. Too often these obstacles are 

assumed to have been addressed by another agency, department, or organization. If the 

obstacles cannot be resolved they must immediately be forwarded up the military chain of 

command for resolution.

(7) Military and civilian planners should identify resources relevant to the 

situation. Determine which agencies, departments, or organizations (to include HN) are 

committed to providing resources in order to reduce duplication, increase coherence in the 

collective effort, and identify what additional resources are needed. 

(8) Define the desired end states, plan for transition between phases, and 

recommend termination criteria.

(9) Maximize the joint force assets to support long-term goals. The military’s 

contribution should optimize the varied and extensive resources available to complement and 

support the broader, long-range objectives of the local, state, national, or international 

response to a crisis.

“In Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the US military and the UN [United Nations] and 

NGO [nongovernmental organization] community in-theater literally ‘met on the 

dance floor.’ Given that a JTF [joint task force] commander’s concern will be to 

ensure unity of effort (not command!), too brief a time to establish relationships can 

exacerbate the tensions that exist naturally between and among so many 

disparate agencies with their own internal agenda and outside sponsors. The 

commander, therefore, will find that, short of insuring the protection of his force, his 

most pressing requirement will be to meet his counterparts in the US 

g[G]overnment, UN, and NGO hierarchies and take whatever steps he thinks 

appropriate to insure the smooth integration of military support...” 

Lieutenant General Daniel R. Schroeder, US Army

Commander, JTF SUPPORT HOPE
Chapter II

II-10 JP 3-08 

(10) Coordinate the establishment of interagency assessment teams that can 

rapidly deploy to the area to evaluate the situation. These can include ad hoc multilateral 

teams or teams organized under the auspices of an IGO such as the UN or Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 

(11) Develop and implement an information sharing strategy, methods, and 

tools that enable the interagency coordination process to occur. Information sharing is 

critical to successful planning and execution. Identify and resolve interoperability issues to 

assure seamless sharing of information. 

(12) Incorporate, support, and participate in interagency planning processes,

such as the IPS and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) to the greatest 

extent possible. 

f. The JIACG is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and 

collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. 

Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR and tailored to meet 

the requirements of a supported CCDR, the JIACG (or equivalent organizations) provides 

the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian 

agencies and departments. JIACGs (or equivalent organizations) complement the 

interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the DOD and the NSC 

and HSC systems. Members participate in deliberate planning and CAP, and provide links 

back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize JTF operations with the efforts of 

civilian USG agencies and departments. 

(1) JIACG is a common DOD term across combatant commands. The operational 

environment and differing missions for each combatant command has resulted in unique 

organizations (e.g., interagency partnering directorate, interagency group), but with similar 

functions. 

(2) If augmented with other partners such as IGOs, NGOs, and/or multinational 

representatives, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) enhances the capability to 

collaborate and coordinate with those organizations and the private sector. 

(3) When activated under the interagency management system (IMS), the 

integration planning cell is a civilian planning cell integrated with the relevant GCC’s HQ. 

The cell can be organized or tailored to operate 24/7 to assist in and support interagency 

planning and/or coordination in crisis and/or contingency situations. During such situations 

the cell will enable a coherent, efficient, and responsive planning and coordination effort 

through “focused or targeted” participation by interagency subject matter experts and 

dedicated agency representatives. The relationship between the JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) and the integration planning cell should be developed and documented in 

standard operating procedures. Procedures should be developed to facilitate the rapid 

reception and integration into the GCC’s staff of the members of the cell. The JIACG (or 

equivalent organization) can “host” the integration planning cell: receiving them, providing 

office space and administrative support, providing a guide/assistant, and facilitating their 

linkup with various staff entities. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) can invite the 
Conducting Interorganizational Coordination 

II-11 

integration planning cell to attend their daily battle rhythm event with the embassies and 

other interagency participants. Integration planning cell members can also informally confer 

with the agency representatives assigned to the GCC’s staff and resident within the JIACG 

(or equivalent organization). 

For additional information on planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

5. Interorganizational Coordination and Collaboration 

a. The Civil-Military Relationship. The crux of interorganizational coordination is in 

understanding the civil-military relationship as collaborative rather than competitive. The 

most productive way to look at this relationship is seeing the comparative advantages of each 

of the two communities—military and civilian. While the military normally focuses on 

reaching clearly defined and measurable objectives within given timelines under a C2 

structure, civilian organizations are concerned with fulfilling changeable political, economic, 

social, and humanitarian interests using dialogue, bargaining, risk taking, and consensus

building. Civilian organizations may have a better appreciation of the political-socialcultural situation, and have better relief, development, and public administration. They may 

be more adept at negotiation, bargaining, and consensus decision making, thus potentially 

acting as agents of change within that society. While the ways and means between military 

and civilian organizations may differ, they share many purposes and risks, and the ultimate 

overall goal may be shared. Harnessing the power of disparate organizations with different 

priorities and procedures is a daunting task. The following basic steps support an orderly 

and systematic approach to building and maintaining coordination and collaboration: 

(1) Forge a Collective Definition of the Problem in Clear and Unambiguous 

Terms. Differences in individual assumptions and organizational perspectives can often 

cloud a clear understanding of the problem. A shared understanding is difficult because 

operational environments can be complex, ambiguous, confusing, and dynamic. Appropriate 

representatives from relevant agencies, departments, and organizations, to include field 

offices, should be involved at the onset of the planning process and share their perspectives. 

This may include the deployment of an interagency assessment team to the affected area. 

Stakeholders should be included to the maximum extent during planning, execution, and 

assessment. 

(2) Understand the Objectives, End State, and Transition Criteria for Each 

Involved Organization or Agency. Commanders and decision makers should establish a 

clearly defined end state supported by attainable objectives and transition criteria. Not all 

agencies and organizations will necessarily understand or agree to clearly define the 

objective with the same sense of urgency or specificity as military planners. 

(3) Develop a common, agreed set of assumptions that will drive the planning 

among the supported and supporting agencies. Collectively amend the assumptions as 

necessary throughout the planning and execution of operations. 

(4) Understand the differences between US national objectives, end state and 

transition criteria, and the objectives of other governments, IGOs, NGOs, the private 
Chapter II

II-12 JP 3-08 

sector, and the parties to the conflict. Although IGOs and NGOs may participate at some 

level in defining the problem, their goals and objectives may not align with those of DOD.

(5) Understand and appreciate the differences between federal, state, tribal, 

private sector, and NGO objectives and desired end states when US military forces 

perform homeland defense (HD) or CS missions on US territory. After a major disaster, 

there may be hundreds of different federal, state, tribal, and/or local governments, agencies, 

and organizations involved, as well as many private sector organizations (i.e., 85% of the US 

critical infrastructure is owned and/or operated by the private sector) and NGOs. The 

disparate jurisdictions, objectives, viewpoints, and cultures can present severe challenges to 

effective coordination and collaboration in support of assigned missions and efforts. 

(6) Establish a Common Frame of Reference. Differences in terminology and—

in the case of foreign organizations—the lack of a common language complicates 

coordination. The meaning of terms such as “safe zone,” “impartial,” or “neutral” to a JFC 

may have completely different connotations to another organization’s representative. The 

operational implication of this potential for misunderstanding is grave. The semantic 

differences commonly experienced among the Services grow markedly in the interagency, 

IGO, and NGO arenas. Terms such as “shaping,” “pre-conflict,” and “irregular warfare” can 

have negative effects on relationships. To mitigate this problem, commanders and their 

staffs must anticipate confusion and take measures to clarify and establish common terms 

with clear and specific usage. A good start is to provide common access to JP 1-02, 

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, and the Services’ 

supplements. This clarification is particularly important for the establishment of military 

objectives. Combatant command staffs should also strive to learn terminology used by other 

departments, agencies, and organizations. A good start is to review the USAID Primer at 

http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/primer.html and/or the US Department of State and 

USAID Strategic Plan at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86291.pdf. 

(7) Capitalize on Experience. Review the after-action reports and lessons learned 

using the joint and Services lessons learned systems, Center for Complex Operations, the 

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and the US Army 

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute to develop proposed COAs. Although 

usually less formal, organizations outside DOD frequently have their own systems in place, 

which should be reviewed whenever possible to capitalize on operational experience. 

(8) Develop Courses of Action or Options. A good COA accomplishes the 

mission within the commander’s guidance, and positions the joint force for future operations. 

It also provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution. Additionally, it gives 

components the maximum latitude for initiative. Resource-sensitive problems require a 

flexible and unified approach to planning to develop viable options. A robust information 

exchange within the interagency, IGO, and NGO community facilitates the formulation of 

viable options. Synchronization is achieved when interagency coordination includes 

consideration from all stakeholders. The military planner or commander’s voice will be but 

one among many at the interagency, IGO, and NGO table.
Conducting Interorganizational Coordination 

II-13 

(9) Support a Comprehensive Approach. In broad terms, develop unified action 

by building a strategy to integrate all instruments of national power with multinational 

partners, HNs, and other participants. Identify the key objectives necessary to attain the

strategic end state. In military terms, this is the development of a shared concept of 

operations (CONOPS). The pursuit of multiple objectives needs a coherent plan to 

simultaneously guide military and civilian agency efforts. 

(10) Establish Responsibility. A common sense of ownership and commitment 

toward resolution is achievable when all participants understand what needs to be done and 

agree upon the means to accomplish it. The resources required for a mission must be clearly 

identified, with specific and agreed upon responsibilities assigned to the providing agencies. 

To receive proper reimbursement from USG agencies or IGOs for materiel support, detailed 

lines of authority and accounting procedures must be established.

Refer to JP 1-06, Financial Management in Support of Joint Operations, and Department of 

Defense Instruction (DODI) 4000.19, Interservice and Intragovernmental Support.

(11) Establish an interorganizational coordination office, staff element, or 

process tailored to the mission and situation. Organizations such as JIACGs (or 

equivalent organization), interagency coordination directorates, special staff offices, civilmilitary operations centers (CMOCs), JIATFs, and other recognized structures and processes 

are organizational elements focused on enabling interagency, IGO, NGO, and private sector 

coordination and shared situational awareness. Under the IMS for R&S, participation in 

structures such as the country reconstruction and stabilization group (CRSG), integration 

planning cell, and the advance civilian team (ACT) help integrate personnel from all relevant 

agencies. They serve as a “middle ground” or “meeting place” for non-DOD representatives 

and joint force personnel to enhance communication, collaboration, and cooperation, and 

find/work toward common mission objectives and end states. A continuously operating 

center, forum, or process that serves as the “focal point” of information for all the 

stakeholders enhances planning and execution. This is not necessarily a military-run 

function and can help overcome bureaucratic impediments to typical coordination tasks.

(12) Plan for the Transition of Key Responsibilities, Capabilities, and 

Functions. In most multiagency operations, civilian organizations remain engaged long 

after the military has accomplished its assigned tasks and departed the operational area. 

Therefore, prior to employing military forces, it is imperative to plan for the transition of 

responsibility for specific actions or tasks from military commanders to civilian 

authorities. This process must begin at the national level. When interagency, IGO, NGO, 

and private sector transition planning does not occur, military involvement may be 

needlessly protracted. As campaign plans, OPLANs, and orders are developed, effective 

transition planning should also be a primary consideration. Commanders and their staffs 

should anticipate the impact of transition on the local populace and other organizations. 

(a) Transitions should be carefully planned in detail with a clear articulation of 

responsibilities (who, what, where, when, and how), be it military or civilian led. Eliminate 

as much ambiguity as possible while retaining a degree of flexibility as conditions will 

undoubtedly change during execution. As the lead transitions from the military to the civil 
Chapter II

II-14 JP 3-08 

authorities, significant military resources may be diverted to support civil operations, and 

there may be a requirement to provide military staff augmentation to the civilian HQ. 

(b) Unity of effort is particularly important in the latter phases of a campaign, 

but is very difficult to achieve as more and more organizations get involved in the transition 

process. Important to success during transitions is continuity on the military side. 

(13) Direct All Actions Toward Unity of Effort. Unity of effort is achieved when 

all actions are being directed to a common purpose. Because DOD will often be in a 

supporting role, it may not be responsible for determining the mission or specifying the 

participating agencies and organizations. Effective organization, communications, exchange 

of information, and most important, an understanding of the objectives all contribute to unity 

of effort.

(14) Develop an Information Sharing Strategy. Effective information sharing is 

a critical enabler for success. Identify, acquire, and implement information sharing 

strategies, methods, and tools that support and enable the interagency process. Information 

sharing is making information available to participants (people, processes, or systems). 

Information sharing includes the cultural, managerial, and technical behaviors by which one 

participant leverages information held or created by another participant. Improving DOD’s 

ability to share information helps to realize the power of information as a strategic asset. 

Benefits include, but are not limited to: 

(a) Achieving unity of effort across mission and multinational operations, 

(b) Improving the speed and execution of decisions, 

(c) Achieving rapid adaptability across mission and multinational operations, 

and

(d) Improving the ability to anticipate events and resource needs, providing an 

initial situational advantage, and setting the conditions for success. 

b. The following are key focus areas for interorganizational coordination to foster a 

comprehensive approach:

THE NEED FOR TRANSITION PLANNING

In Rwanda, after the 1994 genocide, the provision of potable water was 

critical to saving thousands of lives. While the Armed Forces of the United 

States perhaps have the greatest capacity to purify water, this service could 

not be provided indefinitely. Effective interagency coordination enabled the 

identification of other sources of reverse osmosis water purification units, 

associated equipment, support funding, and mutually agreed-upon timelines 

and procedures for transitioning from military support to intergovernmental 

organization and nongovernmental organization control. 

Various Sources
Conducting Interorganizational Coordination 

II-15 

(1) Dialogue. Continual dialogue with national leadership helps identify national 

objectives, desired end states, risks, and feasible policy direction. Continue commander and 

staff dialogue with national and international leaders, and then translate what they see, hear, 

and feel into solid, logical combatant command level objectives. This takes much effort and 

never ends. National and international positions and objectives change. GCC’s HQ 

recognizes this and should maintain a dialogue to ensure they remain nested within these 

national and international objectives. 

(2) Analysis. Recognize the complex, interconnected, and largely unpredictable 

nature of the environment and the need to work to better understand it and the problem. Be 

inclusive with our partners in gaining a common understanding of this environment, the 

associated often changing problem, and determination of necessary conditions or desired 

outcomes to achieve success. This analysis helps provide common visualization and better 

achieve unity of effort with our partners—it bridges the gap between all instruments of 

national and international power. 

(3) Actions. Harmonize military actions with those of the stakeholders. Use 

mission type orders coupled with guidance and intent to empower decentralized military 

operations that are synergized with those of our partners. Establishing a command climate 

and organizational capability that facilitates inclusion is important.

(4) Accountability. The commander is ultimately held accountable for success of 

military operations in the end, regardless of earlier higher direction, lack of resources, or 

absence of support by others. 

6. Intergovernmental Organizations 

An IGO is an organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or 

more governments. IGOs may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis

for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. They are formed to protect and promote 

national interests shared by member states. Examples include the UN, NATO, Organization 

of American States (OAS), and the African Union. NATO and the OSCE are regional 

security organizations, while the European Union (EU), the African Union (formerly the 

Organization of African Unity), and the OAS are general regional organizations. A new 

trend toward sub-regional organizations is also evident, particularly in Africa where, for 

example, the Economic Community of West African States has taken on some security 

functions. These organizations have defined structures, roles, and responsibilities, and may 

be equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in complex interagency, IGO, and 

NGO coordination. 

7. Nongovernmental Organizations 

a. NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in both the domestic and 

international arenas. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are 

frequently on scene before the US military. They may have a long-term established presence 

in the crisis area. NGOs frequently work in areas where military forces conduct military 

engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities. They will most likely remain 
Chapter II 

II-16 JP 3-08 

long after military forces have departed. NGOs are independent, diverse, flexible, 

grassroots-focused organizations that range from primary relief and development 

providers to human rights, civil society, and conflict resolution organizations.

b. NGOs provide assistance to over 250 million people annually. Because of their 

capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military 

resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Although 

philosophical differences and divergent agendas may exist between military forces and 

NGOs, short-term objectives are frequently very similar. Discovering common ground with 

NGOs is essential; they will likely object to any sense that their activities have been co-opted 

for the achievement of military objectives. For US forces, there are legal restrictions on the 

provision of support to NGOs, which must be carefully considered in any military-NGO 

cooperation. Their mission is often one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting the 

military in accomplishing its objectives. Ultimately, activities and capabilities of NGOs 

must be factored into the commander’s assessment of conditions and resources and 

integrated into the selected COA. 

8. The Private Sector 

a. The private sector is an umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and in 

foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, 

specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and 

selected NGOs. Such organizations can be large and multinational or small with limited 

resources and focused on one country. In addition there may be a plethora of small private 

sector entities and NGOs in a country. Inside the US, the private sector owns and/or operates 

some 85% of our Nation’s critical infrastructure. The private sector can assist the USG by 

sharing information, identifying risks, performing vulnerability assessments, assisting in 

deliberate planning and CAP, and providing other assistance as appropriate. The scope in 

which private organizations can be involved includes theater security cooperation, combat 

support, and reconstruction. 

For more information, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, and National 

Infrastructure Protection Plan.

b. Multinational Corporations (MNCs). MNCs are separate and distinct entities from 

the “not-for-profit” NGOs. MNCs may offer civil-military operations (CMOs) much in the 

way of local insight, in-country equipment and resources, preestablished organization, and a 

means by which to assist with reconstruction of devastated areas. During an operation, 

MNCs existing in-country prior to the event which initiated DOD intervention are often 

well-postured to advise the COM and JFC on matters of working with the local government, 

culture, terrain, and logistics needs. The Department of Commerce (DOC) can be 

instrumental in providing advice and contacts in dealing with MNCs. In addition, MNCs 

will likely be highly motivated to protect their investments and revive their own business 

operations. Although CMO should avoid being driven by an MNC’s agenda or profit 

motives, these motives will not often be far removed from the overarching objectives of all 

civilian and military operational planners—resolving the crisis, helping the region to recover, 

and building a more secure future. Coordinating operations with MNCs will be inherently 
Conducting Interorganizational Coordination 

II-17 

complex and possibly radically different in scope and objective than the typical NGO 

interaction. While NGOs may have a limited mission and a small “footprint” in-country, 

MNCs could be very complex operations as MNCs are often integrated with national, 

regional, and local governments, with many investments and holdings, and with a large and 

diverse work force. At times, MNCs may be candidates for providing CMO with contracted 

services or may be brought into the country as contracted entities after the operation begins. 

Many examples exist outside of purely military operations.

c. Academia. Universities, think tanks, and research organizations are an important 

resource for DOD. The work these organizations provided in conjunction with DOD in Iraq 

to recover archeological items and protect historical sites is a good example. In the US, 

academic organizations and consortiums, such as the Homeland Security/Defense Education 

Consortium, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Institute for Defense and 

Business, and the University of Colorado Natural Hazards Center, provide a means for 

research, a source of knowledge and ideas, and a means of establishing common dialogue 

between DOD and academia.

d. Operational Contract Support. Military forces will often be significantly 

augmented with contracted support. Successful operational contract support is the ability to 

orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contract support and management of 

contractor personnel providing that support to the joint force in a designated operational area. 

This is a complex and very challenging process. Commanders and their staffs need to have a 

working knowledge of key joint contract support integration and contractor management 

related terms, since these terms are not widely known outside of the professional acquisition 

community. Contracting is commonly used to augment organic military and other sources of 

support, such as multinational logistic support, HN support, and to provide support where no 

organic capability exists. However, contracting is often not properly planned for or 

integrated into the overall joint force logistic support effort. Operational contracts may also 

support stability operations through local awards, which strengthen the local economy. Time 

permitting, operational contracts should be coordinated among relevant DOD, USG agencies 

(e.g., DOS, USAID), IGOs, and NGOs to minimize risk, inefficiencies, duplication, and 

competition between agencies. 

For more information, refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

e. The Department of Labor (DOL) provides the interface of government with the 

workforce. DOL can provide advice on how to increase effectiveness of the organizations’ 

ability to meet the needs of the indigenous population and any foreign workers in the 

operational area.

9. Joint Task Force Considerations 

a. When it is necessary to engage the military instrument of national power, and to 

establish a JTF, the establishing authority is normally a CCDR (see Figure II-1). The 

CCDR develops the mission statement and CONOPS based upon direction from SecDef as 

communicated through the CJCS. If developed, the NSC’s interagency plan may affect the 

mission statement. The CCDR appoints a commander, joint task force (CJTF), and, in 
Chapter II

II-18 JP 3-08 

conjunction with the CJTF, determines the necessary military capabilities required to 

accomplish military objectives. A CJTF has the authority to organize forces and the JTF HQ 

as necessary to accomplish the objectives.

Figure II-1. Joint Task Force Establishing Authority Responsibilities

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Appoint the commander, joint task force (CJTF), assign the mission and 

forces, and exercise command and control of the joint task force (JTF).

In coordination with the CJTF, determine the military forces and other 

national means required to accomplish the mission.

Allocate or request forces required.

Provide the overall mission, purpose, and objectives for the directed 

military operations.

Define the joint operations area (JOA) in terms of geography or time. (Note: 

The JOA should be assigned through the appropriate combatant 

commander and activated at the date and time specified.)

Ensure freedom of action, communications, personnel recovery, and 

security for forces moving into or positioned outside the JOA.

Ensure the development and approval of rules of engagement or rules for 

the use of force tailored to the situation.

Monitor the operational situation and keep superiors informed through 

periodic reports.

Provide guidance (e.g., planning guidelines with a recognizable end state, 

situation, concepts, tasks, execute orders, administration, logistics, media 

releases, and organizational requirements).

Promulgate changes in plans and modify mission and forces as necessary.

Ensure administrative and sustainment support.

Recommend to higher authority which organizations should be responsible 

for funding various aspects of the JTF.

Establish or assist in establishing liaison with US embassies and foreign 

governments involved in the operation.

Determine supporting force requirements.

Prepare a directive that indicates the purpose, in terms of desired effect, 

and the scope of action required. The directive establishes the support 

relationships with amplifying instructions (e.g., strength to be allocated 

to the supporting mission; time, place, and duration of the supporting 

effort; priority of the supporting mission; and authority for the cessation 

of support).

Approve CJTF plans.

Delegate directive authority for common support capabilities (if required).

JOINT TASK FORCE ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY 

RESPONSIBILITIES
Conducting Interorganizational Coordination 

II-19 

b. JTF Attributes. The JTF organization resembles traditional military organizations 

with a commander, command element, and the forces required to execute the mission. The 

JTF construct provides organizational flexibility, is task organized, reflects the mission’s 

requirements and the unique and necessary capabilities of the Service and functional 

components, and provides for the phased introduction of forces and the rapid deployment of 

personnel and equipment. A JTF is normally designated when the mission has a specific 

limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. The mission 

assigned to a JTF will require not only the execution of responsibilities involving two or 

more Military Departments but, increasingly, the mutual support of numerous USG 

agencies, and collaboration with IGOs and NGOs. Normally, a JTF is dissolved when the 

purpose for which it was created has been achieved. The JTF HQ commands and controls 

the joint force and coordinates military operations with the activities of other government 

agencies, MNFs, IGOs, NGOs, and the HN forces and agencies. 

c. JTFs in the Interagency Process. Unlike the military, most USG agencies are not 

equipped and organized to create separate staffs at the strategic, operational, and tactical 

levels, with the result that JTF personnel interface with individuals who are coordinating 

their organization’s activities at more than one level. The USG interagency process requires 

the JTF HQ to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of USG 

agencies, IGOs, the HN, and NGOs. The JTF HQ provides an important basis for a unified 

effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution. Depending on the 

type of operation, the extent of military operations, and degree of interagency, IGO, 

and NGO involvement, the focal point for operational- and tactical-level coordination 

with civilian agencies may occur at the JTF HQ, the joint field office (JFO), the CMOC, 

or the humanitarian operations center (HOC). JTF personnel may also participate 

actively or as observers in a civilian-led functional coordinating group, concentrating on a 

specific issue or project.

(1) Upon activation of a JTF overseas, its role must be clarified with the CCDR 

regarding direct liaison authority with the affected COM(s) and with the senior defense 

official (SDO) in terms of speaking with one voice to the COM and the country team. 

(2) Sending LNOs to an embassy is a negotiated process; it is not automatic. There 

are a number of reasons that a COM may not want additional military in and around the 

embassy.

(3) Avoid overwhelming interagency partners with JTF coordination and planning 

demands by channeling most communications through the LNO team. 

(4) Designate the staff office responsible for interagency coordination. Many JTFs 

designate their plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5) or CMOC with this responsibility. 

Provide appropriate resources for this function. 

(5) Where both a large country team or JFO and a military JTF exist side-by-side, 

detailed procedures should be developed for staff coordination. 
Chapter II

II-20 JP 3-08 

(6) For CS operations, the JTF HQ is ideally colocated with the JFO per NRF 

guidance. All ESFs are represented in the JFO.

(7) Consider also how to integrate military elements that may not be part of core 

JTF (e.g., special operations forces, to include those conducting train and advise missions). 

For further guidance on the forming and composition of a JTF, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task 

Force Headquarters.

d. A JIATF may be formed when the mission requires close integration of two or more 

USG agencies. Formation of a JIATF requires significant coordination among the 

participating agencies. Refer to Appendix E, “Joint Interagency Task Force.” 

e. A joint support force (JSF) may be formed when the mission is a CS operation and 

DOD is operating in support of one or more USG agencies. Although the JSF is organized 

similar to a JTF with a commander, command element, and forces, the title is more agreeable 

to the interorganizational community.

10. Other Joint Task Force Considerations

a. Intelligence Collection and Dissemination. The primary function of joint 

intelligence is to provide information and assessments to facilitate accomplishment of the 

mission. Information sharing is critical and the architecture for intelligence dissemination 

must facilitate joint, multinational, and interagency consumers.

(1) The CCDR, if required, should request a national intelligence support team 

(NIST) to support the JTF during a crisis or contingency operation. NIST is a nationally 

sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from Defense 

Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency 

(NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and other IC agencies as required. 

The support provided by a NIST provides commanders access to national-level databases 

and to agency-unique information and analysis. 

(2) Collection of intelligence during military operations is conducted in accordance 

with JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. Managing 

the intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination for a JTF may be 

complicated by non-USG civilians, especially members of IGOs and NGOs, who may be 

sensitive to the perception that they are being used to gather intelligence. Intelligence 

gathering may be regarded as an act of direct participation in hostilities under the law of war 

and the involvement or perception of involvement by NGOs may result in them losing their 

protection from attack, and if captured, they may be prosecuted for their belligerent acts 

under the domestic law of the captor. However, general information provided by personnel 

from IGOs and NGOs may corroborate intelligence gained from other sources. Generally, 

the best approach to information sharing with the NGOs and international civilian 

community is to keep the focus on complete transparency in sharing operational information 

and developing a shared situational awareness and understanding of the objectives to 

accomplish the mission. However, classified information will only be shared with or 
Conducting Interorganizational Coordination 

II-21 

released to official representatives of foreign governments with the appropriate security 

clearance and need to know. 

(3) Procedures for control and disclosure of classified information, as practiced by 

DOD and other USG agencies, normally do not exist with IGOs and NGOs. Under the USC, 

it is unlawful to disclose classified information to foreign governments without proper 

authorization. Classified military information shall not be disclosed to foreign nationals 

until the appropriate designated disclosure authority receives a security assurance from the 

recipient foreign government on the individuals who are to receive the information. 

Guidance for the disclosure of classified military information to foreign governments is 

contained in Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified 

Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations. 

(a) In most multinational operations, the JFC will be required to share 

intelligence with foreign military forces and to coordinate the receipt of intelligence from 

those forces. Release procedures should be established in advance, and the JFC participating 

in the MNF must tailor the policy and procedures for that particular operation based on 

national and theater guidance. In order to share critical intelligence information with 

multinational partners efficiently, US intelligence information should be written for release

at the lowest possible classification level and given the fewest possible dissemination 

restrictions within foreign disclosure guidelines. The intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

(J-2) must establish procedures and training programs for separating intelligence from 

sources and methods to downgrade the classification of information but not necessarily 

declassify it. Intelligence production agencies often print highly classified reports in such a 

manner that compartmented information is separated from intelligence that can be widely 

disseminated by a “tear line” (the J-2 and component intelligence staff officers keep 

information above the tear line and disseminate the intelligence below). Having intelligence 

production agencies use such tear lines will greatly facilitate intelligence sharing.

(b) Consideration must also be given to control of sensitive or classified 

information in fora such as the CMOC that include representatives of non-USG agencies.

(c) The joint force J-2, or delegated representative, obtains all the necessary 

foreign disclosure authorization from DIA, national agencies, and other originators of 

controlled classified information as soon as possible to effect seamless transfer of 

information to foreign partners engaged in joint operations. All JS personnel should be 

knowledgeable of the specific foreign disclosure policy, procedures, and regulations for the 

operation. The efficient flow of classified and sensitive information will be enhanced by the 

assignment of formally trained personnel who are knowledgeable of foreign disclosure. The 

foreign disclosure officer may also be required to train all newly assigned personnel on 

techniques and procedures for disclosure of classified, unclassified, and FOUO (for official 

use only) information.

b. Force Protection (FP). FP planning considerations are based on joint intelligence 

preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE), the multinational nature of the 

operation, and the nonmilitary organizations operating in an operational area. The COM’s 
Chapter II

II-22 JP 3-08 

regional security office sets FP standards for all country team personnel. Other aspects of FP 

that the CJTF must consider are: 

(1) Other nations do not necessarily execute FP in the same manner as the US 

military. If a joint force is under the OPCON of a MNF commander, the JFC is still 

responsible for implementing the appropriate FP measures in accordance with CCDR 

directives.

(2) Special measures may be required for joint force personnel who must 

interact with local populations and NGOs. Unfamiliar procedures, lack of a common 

language, and differing operational terms of reference increase the risk to these joint force 

personnel. 

(3) Because US forces often assume the leadership role in multinational operations, 

joint force personnel can potentially be a greater target.

(4) In addition to actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against the 

joint force, the JFC may provide security for other personnel and assets. These 

requirements must be clearly stated in the mission. An MOA may be required to document 

protection of: 

(a) Personnel and equipment belonging to USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs; 

(b) Affected country personnel and assets; 

(c) Relief convoys, supplies, and main supply routes; 

(d) Relief distribution centers;

(e) Stocks of supplies; and 

(f) Ports and airfields. 

For further information, refer to JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, and JP 3-10, Joint Security 

Operations in Theater.

c. Logistic Support. Logistic requirements, resource availability, and financial 

authority determination are vital to sustain a joint force operation. 

(1) USG agencies, the UN, IGOs, NGOs, and MNFs are responsible to provide for 

their own logistic support. However, US military logistic capabilities are frequently 

requested and provided to these organizations. Pursuant to the Economy Act, the JTF 

may be asked to assume all or part of the burden of logistics for these organizations 

after arrival. This support may include intertheater and intratheater airlift, ground 

transportation of personnel, equipment and supplies, and management of air, land, or sea 

transportation nodes. In situations where there is limited or denied access and civilian 

transportation infrastructure is degraded or otherwise limited, DOD-provided transportation 

may be the only viable mode. Identifying USG agency, IGO, and NGO intertheater and 
Conducting Interorganizational Coordination 

II-23 

intratheater movement requests to a GCC’s responsible organization and deconfliction of all 

movement executions are vital to ensure the needs of all operational partners are met. An 

MOA should be crafted between two agencies whenever resources are changing hands, and 

should comply with relevant DOD instructions and the Economy Act. 

For additional information on intertheater and intratheater movement processes, see JP 3-

35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

(2) Unity of effort is essential to coordinate logistic operations in joint and 

multinational environments, requiring coordination not only between Services and US 

agencies, but also among all relief and humanitarian organizations in theater. Authority for 

logistics matters should be clearly stated in the OPLAN and supporting plans and the JFC 

should validate these on a continual basis throughout the operation, making changes when 

and where required. If the JTF has been designated in the OPLAN as the primary source of 

movement support, then the CJTF is responsible for establishing movement priorities 

between JTF requirements and those of USG agencies, the country team, multinational 

or UN forces, NGOs, and any international joint logistic center (e.g., UN Joint Logistic 

Center) that may be established. The GCC’s joint deployment and distribution operations 

center (JDDOC) or equivalent logistics management organization is the joint capability that 

integrates, synchronizes, and optimizes strategic and theater deployment and distribution 

operations within a GCC’s AOR. The JDDOC is critical to control of the theater segment 

and must coordinate and synchronize distribution that is responsive to the needs and 

capabilities of the tactical segment of intratheater movement. Close communications should 

be established with all elements (e.g., USG agency, IGO, NGO) to ensure that their 

movement requirements are fully understood by the JTF to enable effective planning and 

security for materiel movement.

(3) Normally, joint forces are supported through a combination of scheduled US 

resupply, contingency contracting, HN support, and UN logistic support. 

(4) When joint forces participate in a UN operation, many of the costs incurred by 

the US are reimbursable by the UN.

(5) In a multinational, non-UN sponsored operation, a single nation may be 

responsible for planning and coordinating logistic support for all forces on a reimbursable 

basis.

(6) Operational contract support is commonly used to augment organic military and 

other sources of support such as multinational logistic support, HN support, and to provide 

support where no organic capability exists. Normally, the JFC establishes contracting related 

boards. In order to facilitate CMO, other agencies and organizations operating in the JOA 

with contracting interests should be represented at these boards. 

For additional information on contracting, refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

(7) Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements are agreements negotiated on a 

bilateral basis with multinational partners that allow US forces to exchange most common 

types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment. 
Chapter II

II-24 JP 3-08 

See DODD 2010.9, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements; Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 2120.01A, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements;

and JP 4-08, Logistic Support of Multinational Operations, for more information on 

acquisition and cross-servicing agreements. 

(8) Economy Act. The Economy Act provides agencies the authority to provide 

services to, or secure the services of, another executive agency for in-house performance or 

performance by contract where there is no other statutory authority. The head of an agency 

or major organizational unit within an agency may place an order with a major 

organizational unit within the same agency or another agency for goods or services if the 

agency has available funds; the order is in the best interests of the USG; the agency filling 

the order can provide, or acquire by contract, the ordered goods or services; and the head of 

the agency decides that the ordered goods or services cannot be provided by contract as 

conveniently or cheaply by a commercial enterprise (see Title 31, USC, Section 1535[a]).

(a) The FAR [Federal Acquisition Regulation] Subpart 17.5 and the DFARS 

[Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement] Subpart 217.5 govern use of the 

Economy Act. It can be a valuable tool if used correctly; however, violations may result in 

criminal penalties.

(b) The regulations require two primary documents. The first is a 

determination and findings that establishes the Economy Act as the authority for the 

transaction. The second document is the order constituting the agreement between the 

requiring and servicing agencies on the statement of work, payment for supplies or services, 

and related terms and conditions. 

d. Legal Issues. Legal services are provided to the JFC and staff by the SJA. The SJA 

should possess a comprehensive understanding of the regulations and laws applicable to 

military forces as well as familiarization with regulations and laws applicable to other 

governmental and nongovernmental entities, domestic and international, and be a point of 

contact (POC) with IGOs and NGOs, a negotiator with foreign officials, and a draftsman for 

command policies, orders, and international agreements. The SJA must be an active 

participant in the interagency mechanisms to obtain the firsthand knowledge necessary 

to identify and resolve interagency and multinational legal issues including but not 

limited to: 

(1) Legal authority for US military and USG agency participation and support; 

(2) International law;

(a) Dislocated civilians, immunity and asylum, arrests and detentions; 

(b) War crimes, status-of-forces agreements, law of war;

(3) Military justice system;

(4) Environmental law; 
Conducting Interorganizational Coordination 

II-25 

(5) Intelligence oversight; 

(6) Disaster relief and claims;

(7) Contract and fiscal law;

(8) Rules of engagement and rules for use of force; 

(9) Authorization for, and limitations on, use of military forces to support civilian 

authorities; 

(10) State, local, and tribal laws and jurisdictional issues; and 

(11) Cooperative military agreements and other authorizations for, and limitations 

on, assistance to foreign militaries and vice versa.

11. Information Management and Sharing

a. All military operations are information intensive. Other USG agencies, IGOs, and 

NGOs on scene are an important source of information that may contribute to the success of 

the military operation or transition to a desired end state. However, the cultures of non-USG 

organizations, in particular, differ markedly from the military and there may be a desire on 

their part to maintain a distance from military activities. By attempting to accommodate 

these concerns and sharing useful information and resources, the CJTF can help encourage 

active IGO and NGO cooperation in resolving the crisis. Locally stationed IGO and NGO 

personnel are usually well-qualified individuals who understand the local culture and 

practices and have a comprehensive understanding of the needs of the people. Commanders 

at all levels should determine and provide guidance on what information needs to be shared 

with whom and when. DOD information should be appropriately secured, shared, and made 

available throughout the information life cycle to appropriate mission partners to the 

maximum extent allowed by US laws and DOD policy. Commanders, along with their 

staffs, need to recognize the criticality of the information sharing function at the outset of 

complex operations, and not as an afterthought. The relief community is an important source 

of information regarding the following: 

(1) Historical perspective and insights into factors contributing to the situation at 

hand. 

(2) Local cultural practices that will bear on the relationship of military forces with 

the populace. 

(3) Local political structure, political aims of various parties, and the roles of key 

leaders.

(4) Security situation.

(5) Role and capabilities of the HN government. 
Chapter II

II-26 JP 3-08 

b. This kind of information is frequently not available through military channels. 

Therefore, it is important to not compromise the position of the IGOs and impartiality 

of the NGOs and to avoid the perception by their workers that their organizations are 

part of an intelligence gathering mechanism. Handled improperly, the relief community 

can be alienated by a perception that, contrary to its philosophical ideals, it is considered no 

more than an intelligence source by the military.

c. Information sharing is critical to the efficient pursuit of unity of effort and a common 

purpose. A collaborative information environment (CIE) facilitates information sharing. 

Constructing a CIE is not primarily a technology issue—effective, low-cost network 

equipment and data management systems exist today, and more are being developed. The 

least common denominator among them with respect to communication capability is the 

Internet. Rather, the challenges are largely social, institutional, cultural, and organizational. 

These impediments can limit and shape the willingness of civilian and military personnel and 

organizations to openly cooperate and share information and capabilities. 

d. The components of civil-military coordination consist of information and task 

sharing and collaborative planning—all of which depend on communications and 

management of data and information. The following issues, however, often complicate 

effective civilian-military coordination:

(1) A lack of understanding about the information culture of the affected nation; 

(2) Suspicions regarding the balance between information sharing and intelligence 

gathering;

(3) Tensions between military needs for classification (secrecy) of data for 

operations security (OPSEC) and “need to know” versus the civilian need for transparency;

(4) Differences in the C2 style of military operations versus civilian activities; and

(5) The compatibility and interoperability of planning tools, processes, and civilmilitary organization cultures.

e. The sharing of information is particularly critical because no single responding 

source—whether it is an NGO, IGO, assisting country government, or host government—can 

be the source of all of the required data and information. Making critical information widely 

available to multiple responding civilian and military elements not only reduces duplication 

of effort, but also enhances coordination and collaboration and provides a common 

knowledge base so that critical information can be pooled, analyzed, compared, contrasted, 

validated, and reconciled. Civil-military collaboration networks need to be designed to 

dismantle traditional institutional stovepipes and facilitate the sharing of information among 

civilian and military organizations.

f. The JFC should be equipped with the capability to access the Internet to ensure 

effective collaboration with the external mission participants (e.g., IGOs, NGOs). The JFC 

establishes interoperable and compatible communications by using available commercial 

telecommunications networks, military satellite channels, C2 radio and radar coverage, and 
Conducting Interorganizational Coordination 

II-27 

conventional military communications systems to support the exchange of orders, directions, 

and information among all participants. Establishment of direct communications between 

commanders, interagency partners, NGOs, IGOs, indigenous populations and institutions 

(IPI), and the private sector facilitates effective coordination and decision making. 

Information protection for nonsecure communications must be implemented. Additionally, 

communications systems planning must consider the termination or transition of US 

involvement and the transfer of responsibility to the UN, regional organizations, another 

military force, or civilian organizations.

g. The DOD Information Sharing Strategy provides the common vision, goals, and 

approaches that guide the many information sharing initiatives and investments for DOD. 

The Information Sharing Strategy guides DOD’s exchange of information within DOD and 

with federal, state, local, tribal, coalition partners, foreign governments and security forces, 

international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector. 

h. The Information Sharing Environment (ISE) (http://www.ise.gov) supports five 

communities (i.e., intelligence, law enforcement, defense, HS, and foreign affairs) by 

leveraging existing capabilities and aligning policies, standards, and systems to ensure those 

responsible for combating terrorism have access to timely and accurate information. 

For more information, see Annex P, “Office of the Director of National Intelligence,” to 

Appendix A, “United States Government Agencies.”

i. National Operations Security Program (http://www.ioss.gov) is a means to identify, 

control, and protect unclassified information and evidence associated with US national 

security programs and activities. Adversaries or competitors working against the interests of 

the United States can exploit this information if it is not properly protected. The NSA is the 

executive agent for interagency OPSEC training and is responsible for the Interagency 

Operations Security Support Staff (IOSS). IOSS acts as a consultant to USG agencies by 

providing technical guidance and assistance that will result in self-sufficient OPSEC 

programs for the protection of US operations. IOSS members assess OPSEC programs, 

assist in OPSEC program development, conduct surveys, and provide training. 

For more information, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

12. Training and Readiness

a. While numerous humanitarian and complex crises during the previous several years 

have provided opportunities for military and civilian agencies to exercise their mission skills, 

there is a clear requirement for continuous integrated interagency, IGO, and NGO 

planning and training in order to synchronize all components of a US response. 

Interagency training and training with non-USG stakeholders should provide for individual 

military and civilian instruction, military unit and civilian agency instruction, and combined 

military and civilian agency training in a formal joint program.

b. CCDRs should coordinate interagency, IGO, NGO, and private sector 

involvement as a part of routine training and exercise participation and as training for a 

specific operation. The training audience should include members of the humanitarian 
Chapter II

II-28 JP 3-08 

assistance coordination center (HACC), CMOC, joint logistics operations center (JLOC), the

liaison section, NGOs, the UN, and USG agencies. This training before deployment will 

greatly enhance operational capability. Commanders may also avail their commands to the 

training offered by some government agencies, IGOs, and the FHA community. 

Interagency, IGO, and NGO training should focus on identifying and assessing military and 

agency capabilities and core competencies, and identifying procedural disconnects. 

Rotations and visits to a command improve mutual awareness of agency missions, 

objectives, cultures, corresponding activities, and programs. Even short rotations prove 

beneficial, enhancing reachback capability and facilitating staff position agreements.

c. To improve USG readiness by maximizing the benefit of multiagency participation in 

training, education, exercises, and experiments, JS J-7 chairs a DOD interagency working 

group, which coordinates DOD interagency participation requirements/opportunities and 

presents them to the Interagency Training Coordinator Working Group. This facilitates 

interagency participation in the CJCS’s Exercise Program and requirements for DOD 

participation in the National Exercise Program.

d. USAID is the USG agency that maintains the most direct relationship with NGOs, 

many of which receive USAID funding to carry out programs. First, it maintains an 

Advisory Committee of Private Voluntary Aid, established after World War II by 

Presidential directive to serve as a link between the USG and NGOs engaged in economic 

development or relief efforts. Also, with some exceptions, most NGOs must register to 

receive USAID funding to ensure they meet certain standards; currently 568 US and 70 

international NGOs are registered with USAID.

e. Interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination is also available to US NGOs through a 

consortium called InterAction which helps represent NGO interests at the national level. 

InterAction coordinates with various USG agencies and involves NGOs in realistic peace 

operations (PO) simulation conducted by the Joint Readiness Training Center. The military 

and participating NGOs benefit from this training by gaining a better understanding of each 

organization’s culture, capabilities, and procedures. InterAction has also briefed CA units 

and US military schools to improve their understanding of NGO activities. The use of NGOs 

as role players falls well short of meeting their desire to make more useful contributions to 

training. This is seen by them as an indication of a lack of understanding of their activities 

and experience. It is important to recognize that for NGOs, this is not the best use of either 

their knowledge or the limited time available for activities outside of their normal work. 

This use also assumes that the scenario being acted out by the role players (often prepared 

without NGO input) reflects real-life situations. NGO personnel should participate in afteraction reviews when the opportunity arises. This would allow feedback in an open forum 

and contribute to developing ways to avoid polarization of positions. 

f. Increasingly, interagency, IGO, and NGO training is also available through the senior 

Service schools (including the DOS’s Foreign Service Institute [FSI]) and other civilian 

institutions. For example, the United States Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability 

Operations Institute provides courses on interagency and whole-of-government planning. 

Interagency training is also provided on the job through exchange programs between DOD 

and other USG agencies. 
Conducting Interorganizational Coordination 

II-29 

(1) National Defense University is responsible for providing interagency, IGO, and 

NGO training for civilian and military personnel assigned or pending assignment to a 

combatant command JIACG (or equivalent organization). The National Defense University 

provides educational events including policy simulations and exercises to members of the 

Executive branch strategic decision-making community in the National Capital Region and 

at the combatant command JIACGs (or equivalent organization). The Institute for National 

Strategic Studies uses simulations that stress regional and functional crisis management and 

conflict resolution issues, as well as after-action review, to provide participants a nonthreatening environment in which to discuss and test innovative approaches to complex 

crises and also encourage interagency cooperation.

(2) The FSI is the USG primary training institution for officers and support 

personnel of the US foreign affairs community, preparing American diplomats and other 

professionals to advance US foreign affairs interests overseas and in Washington. At the 

George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center, the FSI provides several courses 

with an interagency focus to enrollees from DOS and more than 40 USG agencies, including 

the military. 

For more information, refer to The Department of State’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and 

Development Review at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/125956.htm. 

g. The UN conducts training and education at various levels to improve the 

responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency of international humanitarian relief operations. 

Training is available to leaders of the military, civil defense, and civilian relief organizations, 

or for personnel of countries and organizations with no prior experience in international 

emergency and disaster response situations. One example is the UN-Civil-Military 

Cooperation Course that trains individuals in interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination and 

how to effectively manage the employment of military and civilian resources.

h. Joint Special Operations University educates special operations executive, senior, and 

intermediate leaders and selected other national and international security decision makers, 

both military and civilian, through teaching, research, and outreach in the science and art of 

joint special operations. The Joint Special Operations University’s Interagency Division 

runs several courses each year.

i. The Center for Complex Operations (http://www.ccoportal.org) is a network of 

civilian and military educators, trainers, and lessons learned practitioners dedicated to 

improving education and training for complex operations. Principal roles of the center are to 

serve as an information clearinghouse and to cultivate a civil-military community of practice 

for complex operations training and education. 

j. Established in May 2007 by Executive Order 13434, the National Security 

Professional Development program (http://www.cpms.osd.mil/lpdd/nspd/nspd_index.aspx) 

is a government wide initiative to develop a cadre of national security professionals who 

possess a broad understanding of our Nation’s national security objectives beyond their own 

agency’s missions, and the knowledge, skills, and experience necessary to lead and execute 

coordinated, effective national security operations. 
Chapter II

II-30 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
III-1 

CHAPTER III 

DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS

1. The Homeland Security Council

The HSC is an entity within the Executive Office of the President of the United States to 

advise the President on HS matters and is the principle policy-making forum responsible for 

the strategic level implementation of the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The HSC

is made up of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 

Attorney General, SecDef, and such other individuals as may be designated by the President. 

The CJCS (or, in his absence, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) may, in the 

role of the CJCS as principal military advisor to the HSC and subject to the direction of the 

President, attend and participate in meetings of the HSC. The day-to-day work of the HSC 

and NSC is accomplished by the combined National Security Staff who work in the 

Executive Office of the President. For the purpose of more effectively coordinating the 

policies and functions of the USG relating to HS, the HSC assesses the objectives, 

commitments, and risks of the United States in the interest of HS and makes resulting 

recommendations to the President; oversees and reviews HS policies of the USG and makes 

resulting recommendations to the President; and performs such other functions as the 

President may direct. Both the NSC and HSC principals and deputies are supported in their 

policy functions by the National Security Staff and their individual departmental or agency 

staffs.

2. Key Roles of United States Government Stakeholders

a. As the primary agency for HS, DHS leads the unified national effort to secure 

America by preventing and deterring terrorist attacks and protecting against and responding 

to threats and hazards to the Nation. Within DOD, SecDef has overall authority for DOD 

and is the President’s principal advisor on military matters concerning HD and CS. The 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs 

(ASD[HD&ASA]) within OUSD(P) provides the overall direction and supervision for 

policy, program planning and execution, and allocation of DOD resources for HD and CS. 

Responsibilities include: strategic planning; employment policy, guidance, and oversight; 

support to civil authorities in accordance with the NRF; assistance to civilian agencies 

conducting HS missions; and serving as the principal staff assistant delegated the authority to 

manage and coordinate HS and CS functions at the SecDef level. The two GCCs with major 

HD and CS missions are USNORTHCOM and USPACOM, as their AORs include the 

United States and its territories. USNORTHCOM and USPACOM HD missions include 

conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the 

United States, its territories, and interest within the assigned AOR; and, as directed by the 

“I believe that the challenges confronting our Nation cannot be dealt with by 

military means alone. They instead require whole of government approaches...” 

Robert M. Gates

Secretary of Defense Senate Testimony, 30 April 2009
Chapter III

III-2 JP 3-08 

President or SecDef, provide military assistance to civil authorities. GCCs who have 

responsibility for HD of the United States and have US territory in their AOR may also have 

a senior DHS representative assigned to the command as an HS advisor. The senior DHS 

representative advises the commander and staff on HS and CS issues and requirements, and 

helps facilitate information sharing and coordination/collaboration between the command 

and the operational agencies (e.g., FEMA, United States Customs and Border Protection 

[CBP], United States Coast Guard [USCG]) of DHS.

b. Secretary of Defense. Authority for the conduct and execution of the HD mission 

resides with SecDef. For CS missions, SecDef retains approval authority for the use of 

federal military forces, personnel, units, and equipment. SecDef has the primary 

responsibility within DOD to provide the overall policy and oversight for CS in the event of 

a domestic incident.

c. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security 

Affairs. The Office of the ASD(HD&ASA) is established within the OUSD(P). 

ASD(HD&ASA) is responsible for the overall supervision of all DOD HD and CS activities. 

ASD(HD&ASA) ensures internal coordination of DOD policy direction, assists SecDef in 

providing guidance, through CJCS, to CCDRs for HD and CS missions and conducts 

coordination with DHS. 

d. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity 

Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD[SO/LIC&IC]). ASD(SO/LIC&IC) 

provides civilian oversight for special operations core tasks. This oversight includes 

supervision of policy, program planning, and allocation and the use of resources. 

ASD(SO/LIC&IC) also represents SecDef on combating terrorism matters outside the DOD.

e. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD[RA]). ASD(RA) is 

responsible for monitoring Reserve Component readiness. In coordination with 

ASD(HD&ASA), JS, the Services, and the National Guard Bureau (NGB), ASD(RA) 

provides policy regarding the appropriate integration of reserve and National Guard forces 

into HD and CS operations. 

f. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD[PA]). ASD(PA) is 

responsible for coordinating PA planning with ASD(HD&ASA) and DHS prior to an HD or 

CS response. In coordination with ASD(HD&ASA), JS, and the Services, ASD(PA) ensures 

appropriate DOD PA capabilities and forces are identified for potential response.

g. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CJCS has numerous responsibilities relating 

to HD and HS. These include advising the President and SecDef on operational policies, 

responsibilities, and programs; assisting SecDef in implementing operational responses to 

threats or an act of terrorism; and translating SecDef guidance into operation orders to 

provide assistance to the primary agency. CJCS ensures that HD and CS plans and 

operations are compatible with other military plans. CJCS also assists CCDRs in meeting 

their operational requirements for executing HD missions and for providing CS that has been 

approved by SecDef. In the CS area, CJCS serves as the principal military advisor to SecDef 

and the President in preparing for and responding to chemical, biological, radiological, and 
Domestic Considerations 

III-3 

nuclear (CBRN) incidents, ensures that military planning is accomplished to support the 

primary agency for incident response, and provides strategic guidance to the CCDRs for the 

conduct of counterdrug operations. 

h. Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CDRNORAD). 

By international agreement (The North American Aerospace Defense Command [NORAD] 

Agreement and Terms of Reference, and the Canadian/US Basic Security Document 

100/35), CDRNORAD leads a binational command composed of Canadian and US forces 

with the mission to conduct persistent aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime 

warning in the defense of North America. NORAD’s relationship with USNORTHCOM is 

unusual in that while they have separate missions defined by separate sources, a majority of 

USNORTHCOM’s AOR overlaps with NORAD’s operational area. NORAD and 

USNORTHCOM are two separate commands, and neither command is subordinate to the 

other, but they share staff and work very closely together. 

i. Commander, US Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM). 

CDRUSNORTHCOM has specific responsibilities for HD and for assisting civil authorities. 

USNORTHCOM is also responsible for theater security cooperation with Canada, Mexico, 

and the Bahamas, synchronizing DOD global pandemic influenza planning, and supporting 

combating WMD efforts. USNORTHCOM’s mission is to conduct HD, CS, and security 

cooperation to defend and secure the United States and its interests. USNORTHCOM 

embodies the principles of unity of effort and unity of command as the single, responsible, 

designated DOD commander for overall C2 of DOD support to civil authorities within the 

USNORTHCOM AOR. CDRUSNORTHCOM takes all operational orders from and is 

responsible to the President through SecDef. 

j. Commander, US Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM). CDRUSPACOM serves 

as DOD’s principal planning agent and supported commander for HD in Hawaii, Territory of 

Guam, Territory of American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, US 

administrative entities, and US territorial waters within USPACOM. CDRUSPACOM is the 

supported commander within the designated AOR for HD missions. CDRUSPACOM is also 

responsible for combating terrorism actions, FP, and performing defense critical 

infrastructure protection. This command is also responsible for support planning for 

pandemic influenza and combating WMD. When directed by the President, 

CDRUSPACOM is responsible for conducting combat operations within the AOR to deter, 

prevent, and defeat an incursion of sovereign territory. CDRUSPACOM is also responsible 

for planning for CS operations within the AOR. 

k. Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB). Provides liaison and serves as the channel 

of communications among the National Guard joint force headquarters-state (NG JFHQState), JS, the combatant commands, the Military Departments, and DOD components when 

the NG JFHQs-State are operating under the authority of a governor. The NGB Joint 

Coordination Center provides mutual, shared situational awareness among the NG JFHQsState, the NGB, USNORTHCOM, and USPACOM during a CBRN incident or other major 

or catastrophic incidents. It enables the NGB to coordinate National Guard assistance to the 

supported state on a national level. Sourcing solutions are coordinated through the Army 

National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG) with state ARNG and ANG.
Chapter III

III-4 JP 3-08 

3. Homeland Defense and Civil Support

a. Mission Areas. Military operations inside the US and its territories, though limited 

in some respects, fall into two mission areas: HD—for which DOD serves as the lead federal 

agency (LFA) and military forces are used to conduct military operations in defense of the 

homeland; and CS—for which DOD serves in a supporting role to other agencies by 

providing defense support to civil authorities at the federal, state, tribal, and local level. The 

President and SecDef determine when DOD will be involved in the HD and CS missions. 

The interorganizational coordination process is essential when HD and/or CS operations are 

to be conducted in proximity to our domestic population and critical infrastructure. While 

the HD and CS missions are distinct, some department roles and responsibilities overlap, and 

operations require extensive coordination between lead and supporting agencies. HD and CS 

operations may occur in parallel and require extensive integration and synchronization. In 

addition, operations may also transition from HD to CS to HS or vice versa (e.g., maritime 

security) with the lead depending on the situation and USG’s desired outcome. While the 

lead may transition, a single agency has the lead at any given time for a particular 

activity. However, in the areas of overlapping responsibility, the designation of federal 

agency with lead responsibility may not be predetermined. In time-critical situations, onscene leaders are empowered to conduct appropriate operations in response to a particular 

threat. The interrelationship between HD, HS, and CS operations, and the potential for 

transition between the missions, creates a dynamic environment where interorganizational 

coordination becomes an essential focal point. 

b. Homeland Defense. HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic 

population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or 

other threats as directed by the President. DOD is responsible for the HD mission, and 

therefore leads the HD response, with other departments and agencies in support of 

DOD efforts. DOD’s capability to respond quickly to any threat or situation places a high 

demand on the same resources. For example, the same trained and ready force constituted to 

achieve strategic objectives outside the homeland may also be required to execute HD 

missions within the homeland. For HD missions the President authorizes military action to 

counter threats to and within the United States. An example of an ongoing HD operation is 

Operation NOBLE EAGLE, which provides enhanced air defense of the United States. 

(1) HD operations may be conducted in a complex environment characterized by 

numerous and varied threats, multiple jurisdictions (i.e., federal, state, tribal, and local), 

nontraditional partners (e.g., IGOs, NGOs, and private sector), and international 

partnerships. This environment makes coordination with interagency and multinational 

partners imperative to ensure synchronized and integrated operations. DOD must be 

prepared to operate in concert with other USG forces that are conducting HS or other law 

enforcement activities to counter threats to the homeland. This may mean HD operations 

will be coincidental in time or geography to DHS forces to counter terrorist threats, such as 

those of a hijacked commercial aircraft or attempts to perpetrate attacks using WMD carried 

on maritime conveyances, among others. The overlap in departmental roles, responsibilities, 

authorities, and capabilities amongst USG organizations requires an approach that promotes 

early identification of the desired USG outcome and subsequent collaboration with 

operational partners. 
Domestic Considerations 

III-5 

(2) Within the US homeland, DOD and US military forces must effectively deal 

with time compression of actions, potential impacts on the US domestic population and 

defense critical infrastructure, and unique legal and policy guidelines. These forces face 

continuous media scrutiny, must be sensitive to sovereignty and jurisdictional as well as civil 

rights and civil liberties considerations, and mindful of political dimensions of a domestic 

response, yet responsive enough to deal with the varied threats to the homeland. This 

environment necessitates an effective interagency process and program.

(3) DOD Requests for Interorganizational Assistance in Support of the HD 

Mission. HD missions may result in DOD requesting assistance or support from other USG

agencies. This process occurs under the authorities of the Economy Act, which provide for 

USG department/agency to department/agency support. It is important to train and exercise 

the HD mission and the requirements process for interorganizational assistance, in order to 

ensure an expedited, coordinated, and collaborative response to HD threats. 

Refer to JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, for more information on HD. 

c. Civil Support

(1) The Armed Forces of the United States are authorized under certain conditions 

to provide assistance to US civil authorities. This assistance is CS and will always be in 

support of a primary agency. Requests for assistance from another agency may be 

predicated on mutual agreements between agencies or stem from a Presidential designation 

of a federal disaster area or a federal state of emergency. The military typically only 

responds after the resources of other federal agencies, state, local, and tribal governments 

have been exhausted or when specialized military assets are required.

(2) Within the CS mission area, circumstances may arise that fall into the realm of 

emergency and temporary nonemergency incidents. In emergency circumstances, such as 

managing the consequences of a terrorist attack, natural disaster, critical 

infrastructure protection, or other events, DOD could be asked to provide capabilities 

that other agencies do not possess, cannot employ in a timely manner, or that have been 

exhausted or overwhelmed. The provision of defense support is evaluated by its legality, 

lethality, risk, cost, appropriateness, and impact on readiness. When federal military and 

civilian personnel and resources are authorized to support civil authorities, command of 

those forces will remain with SecDef. However, control may be delegated in accordance 

with DOD policy, doctrine, and standing agreements. In the absence of delegated control,

DOD elements in the incident area of operations and National Guard forces under the 

command of a governor will coordinate closely with response organizations at all levels.

For further guidance on CS, see JP 3-28, Civil Support.

d. Planning Considerations for Interorganizational Coordination. DOD works 

closely with other federal agencies, in particular DHS and its subordinate organizations, 

when planning. The purpose of the IPS is to further enhance the preparedness of the United 

States by formally establishing a standard and comprehensive approach to national planning. 

IPS incorporates lessons learned from both the development of the former National Planning 
Chapter III

III-6 JP 3-08 

and Execution System and the planning process and elements of the FEMA Comprehensive 

Preparedness Guide 101 Developing and Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local 

Government Emergency Plans (http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/ 

cpg_101_layout.pdf). The supported GCCs are DOD principal planning agents and have 

the responsibility to provide joint planning and execution directives for peacetime assistance 

rendered by DOD within their assigned AORs. Thorough joint operation planning requires 

that a GCC’s operations and activities align with functional and theater national security end 

states contained in the National Defense Strategy and the GEF. In addition to participating 

in interagency steering groups and councils, DOD has responsibilities under the NRF. The 

GEF prioritizes these theater strategic end states for each GCC who then develops a TCP. 

The salient frameworks and directives that will guide CS operations are the following: 

(1) The President implements the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 

Emergency Assistance Act, which provides the authority for the USG to respond to a 

presidentially declared major disaster or emergency. The act gives the President the 

authority to establish a program for disaster preparedness and response support, which is 

delegated to DHS. The NRF, which is applicable to Stafford Act and non-Stafford Act 

incidents, is a guide that details how the Nation conducts all-hazards response—from the 

smallest incident to the largest catastrophe. It establishes a comprehensive, national, allhazards approach to domestic incident response. The NRF identifies the key response 

principles, as well as the roles and structures that organize national response. It describes 

how communities, states, the USG, private sector, and US NGO partners apply these 

principles for a coordinated, effective national response. In addition, it describes special 

circumstances where the USG exercises a larger role, including incidents where federal 

interests are involved and catastrophic incidents where a state would require significant 

support. It lays the groundwork for first responders, decision makers, and supporting entities 

to provide a unified national response. In addition to releasing the NRF base document, the 

ESF Annexes and Support Annexes are available online at the NRF Resource Center 

(www.fema.gov/nrf). The 23 annexes provide a CONOPS, procedures, and structures for 

achieving response directives for all partners in fulfilling their roles under the NRF.

(2) The NIMS and its associated ICS, provides a systematic, proactive approach to 

guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, NGOs, and the private sector to 

work seamlessly to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the 

effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, in order to reduce the 

loss of life and property and harm to the environment. NIMS works hand in hand with the 

NRF. NIMS provides the template for the management of incidents, while the NRF provides 

“This Joint Operation (i.e., Hurricane IKE Civil Support) is the example of how 

DOD [Department of Defense] can and must mobilize to support states during 

catastrophic disasters and exemplified the spirit and intent of the National 

Response Framework. Their support to the State of Texas as Hurricane Ike made 

landfall and immediately following this devastating disaster directly resulted in 

hundreds of lives being saved.”

Ed Brickey

Texas Search and Rescue Coordinator
Domestic Considerations 

III-7 

the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy for incident management. NIMS is a 

tested system that interagency partners utilize and practice regularly. Leaders must have a 

full understanding of its principles, structures, and techniques. 

(3) To ensure DOD planning supports the needs of those requiring CS, DOD 

coordinates with interagency partners and the states/territories—for National Guard 

matters—through the NGB. Coordination will align with the NRF, NIMS, and interagency 

coordination guidelines provided in the GEF. 

(4) The domestic operating environment for military CS presents unique challenges 

to the JFC. It is imperative that commanders and staffs at all levels understand the 

relationships, both statutory and operational, among all USG agencies involved in the 

operation. Moreover, it is equally important to understand DOD’s role in supporting other 

USG agencies. DOD will provide defense assistance to the primary agency upon request 

by the appropriate authority and approval by SecDef or President. The NRF, and 

associated concept plans (CONPLANs) and OPLANs (as specified by the IPS), detail the 

roles and missions of various USG departments and agencies in the event of a domestic 

crisis. There are also specific USNORTHCOM and USPACOM domestic plans (e.g., 

defense support to civil authorities, civil disturbance operations) where the responsibilities of 

various USG entities are described in detail.

(5) While not all-inclusive, the following provide examples of plans associated 

with CS:

(a) The United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism 

Concept of Operations Plan is designed to provide overall guidance to federal, state, and 

local agencies concerning how the USG would respond to a potential or actual terrorist threat 

or incident that occurs in the United States, particularly one involving WMD. The plan 

outlines an organized and unified capability for a timely, coordinated response by USG 

agencies to a terrorist threat or act.

(b) Operation Plan Vigilant Sentry is a comprehensive DHS contingency 

plan for a unified response to a mass migration event in the Caribbean. This plan’s success 

depends upon full interagency cooperation and coordination, including assistance from the 

State of Florida and local agencies.

(c) The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency 

Plan (Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations [CFR], Part 300), more commonly called the 

National Contingency Plan is the USG’s blueprint for responding to both oil spills and 

hazardous substance releases. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) serves as the 

ESF Coordinator and as one of two primary agencies (i.e., EPA for incidents on land and 

DHS/USCG for incidents on water) within the national response team. In the case of a 

release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant, where the release is on, or the 

sole source of the release is from, any facility or vessel under the jurisdiction, custody, or 

control of DOD, then DOD will be the lead agency. 
Chapter III

III-8 JP 3-08 

(d) The National Search and Rescue (SAR) Plan provides for the effective 

use of all available resources in all types of civil SAR missions to enable the United States to 

satisfy its humanitarian and national and international legal obligations. These resources 

include aircraft, vessels, pararescue and ground rescue teams, and monitoring emergency 

locator transmitter signals. Under the plan, the USCG is responsible for the coordination of 

SAR in the maritime region, the CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible in the inland region of 

the contiguous US, and CDRUSPACOM is responsible for the noncontiguous regions. To 

carry out these responsibilities, the USCG and USNORTHCOM have established rescue 

coordination centers to direct SAR activities within their regions. The National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides satellite alerting in support of the National 

SAR Plan.

(e) The Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan provides a 

coordinated USG response to threats against the United States and its interests in the 

maritime domain. The MOTR agencies use the network of integrated national-level 

maritime command centers, as designated by the MOTR agencies, for coordinated, unified, 

timely, and effective information flow, in support of MOTR execution, including interdiction 

and disposition. Threats include terrorism, piracy, and other criminal, unlawful, or hostile 

acts committed by foreign states and non-state groups/individuals. DHS is the lead MOTR 

agency for the interdiction of maritime threats to the homeland. DOJ, through the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), is the lead MOTR agency for investigations of terrorist acts or 

terrorist threats by individuals or groups inside of the US, or as directed at US citizens or 

institutions abroad, where such acts are within the federal criminal jurisdiction of the US. 

DOD is the lead for nation-state threats and overseas.

(f) The Interagency Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Database of 

Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities (INDRAC) Web site provides the 

combating WMD community a Web-based strategic level reference for understanding 

combating WMD roles, authorities, and capabilities of the DOD and USG departments and 

agencies. INDRAC is designed to be a strategic reference tool to aid coordination and 

collaboration among USG departments and agencies, integrating and synchronizing 

applicable interagency-wide combating WMD efforts to include planning, advocacy, 

training, and exercises. The INDRAC system contains USG department and agency 

validated information that is available to USG authorized users at http://indrac.dtra.mil and 

https://indrac.dtra.smil.mil. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency also makes available 

upon request at http://www.dtra.mil/staffoffices/gc/index.cfm, the Foreign Consequence 

Management Legal Deskbook, which outlines joint and interagency coordination 

responsibilities and authorities, as well as legal references associated with foreign 

consequence management, and the Domestic WMD Incident Management Legal Deskbook,

which identifies legal authorities available to USG departments and agencies responding to a 

WMD event involving terrorism or an accident. To submit a request for hard copies or 

electronic versions of the deskbooks, visit www.dtra.mil or e-mail 

dtra.publicaffairs@dtra.mil.

(6) Per the Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and 

the Department Of Homeland Security for Department of Defense Support to the United 

States Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Security, SecDef has authorized 
Domestic Considerations 

III-9 

CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSPACOM, and Commander, US Joint Forces Command 

(CDRUSJFCOM) to transfer forces to operate under TACON of Commandant USCG, 

USCG Atlantic Area, and USCG Pacific Area for maritime HS operations in the 

USNORTHCOM and USPACOM AORs, as described in the annexes attached to the MOA. 

This authority may be further delegated to appropriate flag officer/general officer 

commanders subordinate to CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSPACOM, Commander, US 

Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), and CDRUSJFCOM.

e. Under certain circumstances, military commanders are allowed to take 

necessary action under immediate response authority.

(1) DOD components and agencies are authorized to perform “immediate 

response” to save lives, protect property and the environment, and mitigate human suffering 

under imminently serious conditions, as well as to provide support under their separate 

established authorities, as appropriate. As soon as practical, the military commander, or 

responsible official of a DOD component or agency rendering such assistance, reports the 

request, the nature of the response, and any other pertinent information through the chain of 

command to the National Military Command Center.

(2) Responses to requests from civil authorities prior to receiving authority from 

the President or chain of command are made when immediate support is critical to save lives, 

prevent human suffering, or to mitigate great property damage. Under these circumstances, 

support elements advise the DOD Executive Secretary (EXECSEC) through command 

channels by the most expeditious means available and seek approval or additional 

authorizations. The EXECSEC will notify SecDef, the CJCS, and any other appropriate 

officials. Typically, if this support continues beyond 48 to 72 hours, then such support 

should fall under the coordination of the appropriate GCC (i.e., USNORTHCOM supporting 

in the contiguous 48 states, Alaska, and the Caribbean territories, or USPACOM supporting 

in Hawaii and Pacific island territories). 

f. Military forces may also conduct missions to help DOJ or other federal law 

enforcement agencies (LEAs) assist federal, state, or local LEAs when required 

guidelines, discussed below, are met. This includes military assistance in response to civil 

disturbances. In addition to emergency or disaster assistance, DOD assistance may be 

requested from other agencies as part of HS. Such assistance may be in the form of 

information and intelligence sharing, mapping, or damage assessment assistance. Other 

types of operations include counterdrug, combating terrorism, general support such as 

training civilian law enforcement officials, and infrastructure protection. Military 

commanders should review, with the assistance of legal counsel when appropriate, each 

request for domestic aid to ensure that it conforms with statutory limitations, especially 

in law enforcement assistance to civil authorities. SecDef must personally approve any 

request to assist LEAs in preplanned national events. Requests for DOD assets in support of 

law enforcement will require careful review during the planning phase to ensure that DOD 

support conforms to legal guidelines and does not degrade the mission capability of CCDRs. 

However, the US Constitution, federal laws, and USG policies and regulations all affect the 

employment of the military in domestic operations. For this reason, requests should be 
Chapter III

III-10 JP 3-08 

coordinated with the supporting organization’s legal counsel or SJA. Examples of laws that 

may impact this type of support include: 

(1) The Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18, USC, Section 1385) and DODD 5525.5, 

DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, provide the authority and define 

the conditions under which military forces can be employed, as well as criminal penalties 

and the legal constraints intended to prevent misuse of military force. With the exception of 

members of the USCG and members of the National Guard in state service (Title 32, USC,

or state active duty), military personnel are normally prohibited under either the Posse 

Comitatus Act or DOD policy from direct participation in the execution of civil laws in 

the United States unless the President otherwise authorizes such participation. Several 

other statutes authorize DOD assistance to civilian law enforcement, including Insurrection 

Act (Title 10, USC, Sections 331–335), counterdrug assistance (Title 10, USC, Sections 

371–381), case of crimes involving nuclear materials (Title 18, USC, Section 831), and 

emergency situations involving chemical or biological WMD (Title 10, USC, Section 382). 

The restrictions in the Posse Comitatus Act do not apply to the USCG when not operating 

under DOD authorities (Title 14, USC), which is not a DOD component. Under the 

provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act and DOD policy, military personnel are prohibited 

from: 

(a) Interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other similar activity. 

(b) A search or seizure. 

(c) An arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, or similar activity. 

(d) Use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as 

undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators. 

(2) Significant national events may be perceived by adversaries as terrorist targets. 

The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the NSC/HSC, has the authority to 

designate important public events, such as the Olympic Games or the Presidential 

inauguration, as national special security events. Once so designated, an event becomes the 

focal point for interagency planning and the primary agency may request support from DOD.

Refer to DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials; DOD 

5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect 

Joint Task Force Los Angeles (JTF-LA) was formed following a Presidential 

Executive Order, which also invoked the Insurrection Act, on the evening of 

1 May 1992. The Executive Order federalized units of the California National 

Guard (CANG) and authorized active military forces to assist in the 

restoration of law and order. JTF-LA formed and deployed within 24 hours, 

assembled from US Army and Marine Forces. It operated in a domestic 

disturbance environment, while working with city, county, state, federal

agencies, and the CANG.

Various Sources
Domestic Considerations 

III-11 

United States Persons; and DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons 

and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense.

g. CBRN Consequence Management. Managing the consequence of a CBRN 

incident is a USG level effort generally described as the preparation for and response to 

CBRN incidents. The US military has acquired experience and developed expertise in 

protecting its members from CBRN hazards and in operating in a contaminated environment. 

This experience and expertise is available when requested by domestic civil authorities and 

approved by the President or SecDef.

For more information, refer to CJCSI 3125.01B, Defense Support of Civil Authorities 

(DSCA) for Domestic Consequence Management (CM) Operations in Response to a 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Incident,

and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear Consequence Management.

h. For domestic missions, the focus on effective SC will be to “inform” and not 

“influence” our domestic audiences. Additionally, for HS and CS missions, DOD will 

typically be in support of other federal lead agencies, and our SC and PA programs will need 

to be coordinated with them, especially if they focus on domestic audiences. Civil authority 

information support elements under direction and authority of a designated LFA are legally 

authorized to provide support to civil authorities only by broadcasting and disseminating 

public information. Federal law prohibits conducting influence activities against a domestic 

audience, not the use of IO assets and capabilities. Conversely, if the focus is on foreign 

audiences, even for domestically related missions (e.g., HD), then the methods and 

objectives of SC can be more flexible and more in line with those methods discussed for 

foreign missions. 

4. Joint Force Considerations 

a. When an event occurs and the President or SecDef approves DSCA, the appropriate 

GCC is designated as the supported commander. In most situations, the 

CDRUSNORTHCOM or CDRUSPACOM will be designated as the supported commander. 

As necessary, the GCC activates and deploys an initial C2 element and follow-on JTF to 

serve as the C2 node for the designated DOD forces responding to an event or incident. 

Figure III-1 provides a model for coordination among military and nonmilitary 

organizations. 

(1) While DOD response to domestic emergencies is normally coordinated through 

SecDef, the military may also respond when an interdepartmental MOA is in effect. 

For example, the US Navy (USN) agrees to rapid deployment of oil containment and 

recovery equipment to the USCG under an interdepartmental MOA. The MOA bypasses 

negotiations at the HQ level and sets forth procedures for deployment and employment of 

equipment and personnel and for reimbursement of operational costs. Once a decision to 

employ military assets is made, the supported GCC uses the capabilities of each component 

to accomplish the mission. The organization of the joint force will be based on the 

capabilities required for the optimum response. Frequently, the response will require 
Chapter III

III-12 JP 3-08 

Figure III-1. Model for Coordination Among Military and Nonmilitary Organizations—

Domestic Civil Support

MODEL FOR COORDINATION AMONG MILITARY AND 

NONMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS—DOMESTIC CIVIL SUPPORT

command

direction and supervision

coordination

LEGEND

S

T

R

A

T

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G

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C

O

P

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R

A

T

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N

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Request for Assistance

Disaster/Emergency 

Declaration

JOINT 

INTERAGENCY 

COORDINATION 

GROUP

STATE

COORDINATING

OFFICER

FEDERAL

COORDINATING

OFFICER

STATE AND COUNTY

DEPARTMENTS

AND AGENCIES

DEFENSE

COORDINATING

OFFICER

CIVIL-MILITARY 

OPERATIONS CENTER

STATE

ADJUTANT

GENERAL

NONGOVERNMENTAL

ORGANIZATIONS

JOINT TASK

FORCE

COMMANDER,

JOINT TASK 

FORCE

MUNICIPAL 

DEPARTMENTS AND 

OFFICES

COMBATANT

COMMANDER COMBATANT COMMAND STAFF

INTERAGENCY

PLANNING

CELL

LIAISON

SECTION

JOINT 

INFORMATION

CHIEF

NATIONAL

GUARD

BUREAU

JOINT DIRECTOR

OF MILITARY

SUPPORT

JOINT

STAFF

CHAIRMAN OF

THE JOINT CHIEFS

OF STAFF

ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

 (HOMELAND DEFENSE) AND 

AMERICAS’ SECURITY AFFAIRS

SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE

OTHER

AGENCIES

DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY

PRESIDENT GOVERNOR
Domestic Considerations 

III-13 

nontraditional or innovative uses of military resources, such as land forces fighting wild land 

fires.

(2) DHS, the FEMA regions, and their associated regional interagency steering 

committees, which typically meet on a quarterly or monthly basis, provide supporting GCCs 

with an additional opportunity to interface with USG agencies and their regional and state 

partners through regional interagency steering committees for planning, coordinating, and 

supporting preparations for disaster and relief efforts. In the USNORTHCOM AOR, 

regional interagency steering committee meetings are typically attended by the defense 

coordinating officer (DCO)/defense coordinating element personnel who are already located 

at or colocated at the FEMA region offices.

(3) The USCG and many other federal, state, tribal, and local response agencies 

and organizations have adopted ICS as their standard response system for nonmilitary 

incident management. Non-DOD entities, including local civil authorities and first 

responders, are generally not familiar with US military terms and doctrine. When working 

with non-DOD entities/partners, especially in an emergency, clear, effective, and mutually 

understandable communication is essential. DOD elements will be able to work more 

seamlessly, efficiently, and productively by employing operational concepts and terms that 

other departments, agencies, and authorities already understand. The main sources of these 

concepts and language include the NRF, NIMS, ICS, and other federal and national 

standards. US military forces that might be involved in emergency or major disaster 

operations should be prepared to provide CS in accordance with the NRF, NIMS, and ICS. 

b. USNORTHCOM through its Army Service component, US Army North, has prestaged DCOs/defense coordinating elements at the FEMA regions to facilitate coordination 

and collaboration between DOD and FEMA for DSCA. During disaster operations, the 

supported GCC normally activates a DCO upon receipt of a request for assistance (RFA)

from the primary agency sent through the CCDR to the DOD EXECSEC. The DCO is 

normally the initial DOD representative on-site. The DCO serves as DOD’s single POC

at the JFO for requesting assistance from DOD. Upon federal declaration of a disaster, 

FEMA sets up a JFO in or near the affected area to coordinate federal recovery activities 

with those of state and local governments. The DCO works with the federal coordinating 

officer (FCO) and state coordinating officer at the JFO to integrate DOD efforts in support of 

the operation and serves as the on-scene military POC for the FCO and principal 

representatives of other USG agencies and NGOs. The DCO is the primary interface for US 

military support to the unified coordination group at a JFO. The DCO coordinates DOD 

support to civilian agencies through the FCO at the JFO. When a JTF is employed during 

CS operations, it is essential for commanders to understand the relationship between the JFO 

and the JTF. The JFO is the primary federal incident management field structure normally 

located close to a specific disaster location, and it functions as an interagency element, while 

the JTF is the deployed joint HQ for federal military forces in support of the CS operation. 

The NRF states that if a JTF is established, consistent with operational requirements, its C2 

element will be colocated at the JFO to ensure coordination and unity of effort. The 

colocation of the JTF C2 element does not replace the requirement for a DCO as a part of the 

JFO coordination staff and it will not coordinate requests for assistance for DOD. The DCO 

normally colocates in the JFO, and is the DOD single POC at the JFO. Depending on the 
Chapter III

III-14 JP 3-08 

size or area of a disaster site, there may be more than one JFO coordinating federal disaster 

response and support (e.g., there were three JFOs operating in support of Hurricane Katrina 

response operations—one each in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana). The JFO is a 

temporary federal facility that provides a central location for the coordination among federal, 

state, tribal, and local governments, NGOs and the private sector with primary responsibility 

for response and recovery. The DCO normally colocates in the JFO. When a DOD C2 HQ 

is deployed (e.g., JTF), its commander accepts OPCON of the DCO if the GCC directs. 

However, the DCO remains the POC for the FCO in the JFO in accordance with the NRF. 

Once DOD forces have been deployed, requests from civilian agencies are coordinated 

through the DCO under the procedures delineated in the NRF. Some factors in the provision 

of DSCA include: 

(1) Federal agencies or state, tribal, and local governments request DOD 

capabilities to support their emergency response efforts by using a formal RFA process. 

DOD handles RFAs depending on various factors, such as Stafford Act or non-Stafford Act 

situation and evaluated by the factors of legality, lethality, risk, cost, appropriateness, and 

impact on readiness.

(2) In general, the FCO at the incident site receives RFAs from civil authorities and 

submits them to the DCO for initial validation in accordance with the factors discussed in 

paragraph 4.b(1) above. The RFA, once validated by the DCO, is designated a Mission 

Assignment (if the primary agency is a FEMA request) and flows via automated systems 

through the CCDR to the Joint Director of Military Support to OSD for approval. Once

SecDef approves the request, an order is issued to combatant commands, Services, and/or 

DOD agencies to accomplish the mission.

(3) If a JTF is activated, it is important to understand the roles and responsibilities 

of the FCO, DCO, CJTF, and CCDR relative to a Presidential disaster or emergency 

declaration under the Stafford Act when interacting with the JTF. The DCO continues to 

perform his duties of liaison, situational awareness and reporting, and RFA validation, even 

when a JTF is established. The CJTF is normally a member of the Unified Coordination 

Group at the JFO during CS operations. The CJTF should provide robust liaison to the DCO 

to help share situational awareness, and ascertain current and future support requirements. 

(4) An understanding of the NIMS framework is essential, specifically how the 

incident command posts and area command centers relate to the multiagency coordination 

centers for operational information sharing and resource coordination (particularly the RFA

process).

(5) The JFO is a scalable organization (i.e., the management, operations, planning, 

logistics, and finance/administration sections). A clear understanding of this structure 

enhances DOD integration within the JFO.

(6) Offer assistance to the FCO with JTF staff planning, monitoring, and 

assessment capabilities in the JFO. This staff support may often be provided along ESF 

lines.
Domestic Considerations 

III-15 

(7) Use an existing or establish a common unclassified information sharing 

mechanism to collaborate and share information with other stakeholders. DHS uses the 

Homeland Security Information Network as one of its main information networks. 

c. The JTF is the command element through which personnel, equipment, and 

supplies to a disaster area for an approved mission assignment are provided. Through 

the DCO, the JTF is oriented on identifying tasks; generating forces; prioritizing assets 

against requirements; assisting federal, state, tribal, and/or local authorities; and providing 

disaster response support to the local government based on FEMA mission assignments. 

d. Organizational tools that may assist interagency support of civil authorities include:

(1) Interagency Planning Cell. An interagency planning cell is activated upon 

receipt of the CJCS warning or alert order or at the direction of the GCC. The interagency 

planning cell is established to provide timely advice to the supported CCDR about the 

resources and requirements of other agencies in the relief effort. It is typically a 

planning cell of the JIACG (or equivalent organization). An interagency planning cell will 

enable a coherent and efficient planning and coordination effort through the participation of 

interagency subject matter experts. Moreover, the burden of coordination at the JTF level 

could also be lightened. Consideration should also be given to establishment of interagency 

planning cells on the staffs of supporting CCDRs, such as Commander, US Transportation 

Command (USTRANSCOM). The interagency planning cell should not be confused with 

the integration planning cell deployed under the IMS or the NSC IPC. 

(2) Liaison Section. Liaisons provided to the primary agency and other USG 

agencies, as necessary, act as spokespersons for the CCDR, to clarify operational concepts 

and terminology, and to assist in the assessment of military requirements. The LNO can 

better articulate the intrinsic capabilities of military units to perform in nontraditional roles 

and better describe the military contribution to the federal response. NGB LNOs colocated 

with the DCO maximizes the efficiency and effectiveness of coordinated federal and state 

military support to civil authorities. Conversely, agency liaisons working with the military 

can assist the commander in maximizing agency core competencies and concentrating the 

resources of engaged agencies. 

(a) Emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLOs) are reserve officers 

performing planning and liaison responsibilities between DOD components and USG 

agencies, USG regional HQ, and state or US territory emergency service HQ, including 

interface with the civil sector, as directed by their DOD component through the Service 

planning agent. Each Military Department is authorized to assign one or more EPLOs at 

FEMA national and regional HQ, at military HQ that serve as the DOD, Service, or regional 

planning agents for domestic emergency support, and state or US territorial HQ. EPLOs:

1. Provide DOD and Service liaison with USG agencies and organizations, 

and between the Services.

2. Facilitate planning, coordination, and training for military support to 

civil authorities and national security emergency preparedness.
Chapter III

III-16 JP 3-08 

3. Advise USG agencies and organizations on DOD and Service 

capabilities and resources.

4. Advocate mutual support required by DOD. 

5.

(b) Supported commanders, such as CDRUSNORTHCOM or 

CDRUSPACOM, are responsible for a liaison structure at the state level within their 

respective AORs.

 On order, augment DOD response to domestic emergency operations. 

(3) Media Operations Center (MOC). A MOC may be established at each 

echelon of command with representatives from all agencies involved to provide information 

to the public. The primary goal is to disseminate accurate and timely information to assist 

the public in dealing with the event. Promoting the federal effort is also important, but as a 

secondary goal. DOD media operations should be complementary to and supportive of the 

primary agency’s and/or joint information center’s media plan or effort. 

5. State, Local, and Tribal Considerations 

a. When a disaster threatens or occurs, a governor may request federal assistance. If 

DOD support is required as part of that federal assistance, then DOD may support local and 

state authorities in a variety of tasks. However, the majority of DOD assistance will 

typically be provided in support of a primary agency in accordance with the NRF. Any 

incident can have a mix of public health, economic, social, environmental, criminal, and 

political implications with potentially serious long-term effects. Significant incidents require 

a coordinated response across agencies and jurisdictions, political boundaries, sectors of 

society, and multiple organizations. 

b. National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State. NG JFHQ-State gives DOD, 

through the NGB, a focused communication channel between OSD, JS, and CCDRs (e.g., 

CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSPACOM) and the non-federalized National Guard; joint C2 

for non-federalized National Guard operations; and a contingent joint C2 capability in each 

state for Title 10, USC (federal) HD, CS, and other related operations. In this respect, NG 

JFHQ-State is able to bridge the state and federal levels of government.

c. Army and ANG forces have primary responsibility for providing military assistance 

in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia in civil 

emergencies, and are under the command of the governor through the state or territory TAG. 

National Guard personnel may be employed for civil emergencies in a volunteer status, be 

ordered to active duty for annual training, or be called to active duty under the authority of 

the governor or the President. DOD support is generally provided in the form of 

assistance or augmentation of skills and resources to the USG agency field office or to a 

state or local agency having responsibility for a particular activity.

d. Each US state and territory has an office of emergency services (OES) or an 

equivalent office responsible for preparedness planning and assisting the governor in 

directing responses to emergencies. The OES coordinates provision of state or territorial 
Domestic Considerations 

III-17 

assistance to its local governments through authority of the governor or TAG. The OES 

operates the state emergency operations center during a disaster or emergency and 

coordinates with federal officials for support, if required. The state will usually designate a 

state coordinating officer, with similar authorities to the FCO to coordinate and integrate 

federal and state activities.

e. DOD counterpart relationships to those of DCO, FCO, and state coordinating officer 

are established at lower echelons to facilitate coordination.

f. The emergency management assistance compact (EMAC) is an interstate agreement 

that enables entities to provide mutual assistance during times of need. The EMAC mutual 

aid agreement and partnership between member states exist because—from hurricanes to 

earthquakes, wildfires to toxic waste spills, and terrorist attacks to CBRN incidents—all 

states share a common enemy: the threat of disaster. Since its ratification and signing into 

law in 1996 (Public Law 104-321), 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, 

and the US Virgin Islands have enacted legislation to become EMAC members. EMAC is 

administered by the National Emergency Management Association, which provides the dayto-day support and technical backbone for EMAC education and operations. 

g. The United States recognizes certain Indian tribes as domestic dependent nations 

under its protection, recognizes the right of Indian tribes to self-government, and supports 

tribal sovereignty and self-determination. Federal agencies shall respect Indian tribal selfgovernment and sovereignty, honor tribal treaty and other rights, and strive to meet the 

responsibilities that arise from the unique legal relationship between the USG and Indian 

tribal governments. For federal assistance for disaster situations taking place on tribal lands, 

state governors must request a Presidential disaster declaration on behalf of a tribe under the 

Stafford Act. However, federal departments and agencies can work directly with tribes 

within existing agency authorities and resources in the absence of such a declaration. 

Federal departments and agencies comply with existing laws and executive orders mandating 

that the USG deal with Indian tribes on a government-to-government basis, reflecting the 

federally recognized tribes’ right of self-government as sovereign domestic dependent 

nations. A tribe may opt, however, to deal directly with state and local officials. Federal 

departments and agencies involved in potential or actual incidents requiring a coordinated 

federal response shall consult and collaborate with tribal governments on matters affecting 

the tribes and must be aware of the social, political, and cultural aspects of an incident area 

that might affect incident management operations. Federal departments and agencies 

recognize the unique political and geographical issues of tribes whose aboriginal and 

contemporary territory is on or near the current international borders of Canada and Mexico. 

Federal departments and agencies shall include tribes in all aspects of incidents requiring a 

coordinated federal response that affect tribes and incident management operations. For 

incidents that directly impact tribal jurisdictions, a tribal representative shall be included in 

the unified coordination group, as required. A tribe may appoint a member of the tribe to 

serve as a tribal liaison in the JFO.
Chapter III 

III-18 JP 3-08 

6. Nongovernmental Organizations 

a. National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (http://www.nvoad.org) is 

the forum where organizations share knowledge and resources throughout the disaster 

cycle—preparation, response, and recovery—to help disaster survivors and their 

communities. It is a leader and voice for the nonprofit organizations and volunteers that 

work in all phases of disaster—preparedness, response, relief, recovery, and mitigation. It is 

the primary POC for voluntary organization in the National Response Coordination Center 

(at FEMA HQ). Inside the US, the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters has 

a membership of 50 national member organizations, and 55 state and territory equivalents. 

b. The American Red Cross (ARC) (http://www.redcross.org) is a support agency 

under the NRF in a number of ESFs, most notably ESF #6 – Mass Care, Emergency 

Assistance, Housing, and Human Services. The ARC works with state, tribal, and local 

authorities to function as a direct provider of disaster relief services including emergency 

sheltering, feeding, basic first aid support, mental health counseling, and disaster assessment. 

Under ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services, the ARC serves to support the DHHS 

in the provision of blood products. 

7. The Private Sector 

a. Critical infrastructure protection is a shared responsibility among federal, state, local, 

and tribal governments and the owners and operators of the Nation’s critical infrastructure 

and key resources. Partnership between the public and private sectors is essential, in part 

because the private sector owns and/or operates approximately 85% of the Nation’s critical 

infrastructure. Additionally, government agencies have access to critical threat information, 

and both the government and private sector control security programs, research and 

development, and other resources that may be more effective if discussed and shared, as 

appropriate, in a partnership setting. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan provides 

the overarching framework for a structured partnership between government and the private 

sector for protection of critical infrastructure and key resources. Information sharing and 

analysis centers (ISACs), sector coordinating councils, and state and local fusion centers play 

a key part in information sharing and security efforts for the various key sectors of our 

Nation’s critical infrastructure. It is imperative that DOD include the private sector in 

planning and collaboration for CS. 

b. Private sector authorities have sector, facility, and installation responsibilities for 

security. They play a role in protecting critical infrastructure and telecommunications 

systems. DOJ has overall primary ESF #13 responsibility (i.e., ESF coordinator and 

primary agency), and along with DHS, state and local authorities and police, and state 

National Guard, assists the private sector in protecting our Nation’s critical infrastructure. 

DOD also assists the private sector by supporting security efforts at those facilities, which 

are identified as part of the Nation’s Defense Critical Infrastructure. These entities are 

coordinated through DHS/Office of Infrastructure Protection during a response. The private 

sector under ESF #14 – Long-Term Community Recovery, defines and addresses risk 

reduction and long-term community recovery priorities, and supports the community 

recovery planning process. 
Domestic Considerations 

III-19 

c. Information Sharing and Analysis. The DHS takes the lead in evaluating 

vulnerabilities and coordinating with other federal, state, local, and private entities to ensure 

the most effective response. Much of this task involves assessing critical infrastructure, the 

physical and virtual assets, systems, and networks so vital that their incapacitation or 

destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, public 

health, or safety. Central to this task is collecting, protecting, evaluating, and disseminating 

information to the American public, to state and local governments, and to the private sector.

(1) Many of the critical infrastructure sectors have established formal processes and 

structures to support sector-wide information sharing activities.

(2) Some sectors have designated ISACs, which are private sector operational 

organizations, as key channels for information sharing, to collect, distribute, analyze, and 

share sensitive and/or proprietary information regarding threats, vulnerabilities, alerts, and 

best practices.

(3) Other sectors have developed alternate mechanisms to communicate with their

members, their government partners, and other sectors about threat indications, 

vulnerabilities, and protective strategies. Many of these information sharing mechanisms 

work together to better understand cross-industry dependencies and to account for them in 

emergency response planning.

(4) State and regional fusion centers have a primary role for geographically 

relevant information sharing with the critical infrastructure owners and operators in their 

jurisdictions. Many of the fusion centers currently have infrastructure analyst staff 

embedded in their centers to produce risk analyses germane to their regions or local areas. 

8. Interorganizational Coordination with Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas 

a. Canada. NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada Command share the task of 

defending North America and seek cooperative approaches to ensure the security of North 

America. North American defense is a collaborative effort among the three commands and 

other mission partners. USNORTHCOM and Canada Command are national commands 

reporting to their respective governments while NORAD is a binational command reporting 

to both governments (see Figure III-2). The commands have complementary missions and 

work closely together to meet their individual and collective responsibilities for the defense 

and security of North America. NORAD has mission responsibilities in the aerospace and 

maritime domains while the national commands have responsibilities in the air, land, and 

maritime domains, including extensive responsibilities to support civil authorities when 

directed. Unity of effort, situational awareness, and coordination with a variety of mission 

partners are important to all commands. 

(1) The commanders establish close relationships among themselves, their staffs, 

and supporting and partner agencies. In this way, the commands ensure a timely and 

coordinated response to defense and security challenges to North America, respecting 

national sovereignty while leveraging the capabilities and common cause they share.
Chapter III

III-20 JP 3-08 

(2) The Canada-United States Civil Assistance Plan serves as the framework for 

forces from one nation providing support to forces of the other nation providing timely, 

effective, and efficient support to their respective civil authorities. NORAD also provides 

tailored air defense for national special security events in the United States and similar 

events in Canada. 

b. Mexico. USNORTHCOM works in partnership with the Mexican military and civil 

response partners to increase mutual long-term capacity-building to enhance our ability to 

counter common security threats to both the US and Mexico and build an effective 

consequence management capability. This is accomplished primarily through 

USNORTHCOM’s TCP, and executed through normal security cooperation and disaster 

preparation/response programs. Taken together, these efforts serve to strengthen the 

Mexican security and response forces’ operational capacity and improve security and disaster 

preparation/response in the Western Hemisphere. While there is no formal military 

Figure III-2. North American Aerospace Defense Command, United States Northern 

Command, and Canada Command Relationships

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 

UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND, AND CANADA 

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Commander United States Northern Command is dual-hatted as Commander North American 

Aerospace Defense Command

Secretary of 

Defense

President Prime Minister

Chief of the 

Defence Staff

Minister of 

National Defence

Canada 

Command

North American 

Aerospace Defense 

Command

United States 

Northern 

Command Dual-hatted
Domestic Considerations 

III-21 

agreement between the US and Mexico, USNORTHCOM works closely with the Mexican 

Armed Forces and civil agencies through coordination with the embassy country team, 

LNOs, and interagency partners. These relationships facilitate a whole-of-government 

approach to a wide range of programs, events, and activities that strengthen the bilateral 

relationship and the collective defense of our respective homelands. It is important to note 

there are broad Mexican law enforcement and intergovernmental cooperation and 

collaboration for HS and humanitarian support activities. 

c. The Bahamas. USNORTHCOM works in partnership with the Royal Bahamas 

Defence Force and their National Emergency Management Agency civil response partners to 

increase long-term capacity-building to support the Government of the Bahamas’ strategy to 

counter security threats to both the Bahamas and the US and build cooperative consequence 

management capabilities.

(1) Goals are accomplished primarily through USNORTHCOM’s Theater 

Campaign Plan; Building Partnership Capacity Program; Overseas Humanitarian and Civic 

Assistance Program; and Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, which provides equipment, 

training, and intelligence support to the Royal Bahamas Defence Force to strengthen its

operational capacity and improve security in the northern Caribbean and southeastern 

maritime approaches to the United States.

(2) Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos is a cooperative counterdrug mission 

supported by Royal Bahamas Defence Force, Royal Bahamas Police Force, USCG, CBP, 

and US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), with USNORTHCOM assistance. 
Chapter III

III-22 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
IV-1 

CHAPTER IV

FOREIGN CONSIDERATIONS

1. The National Security Council System

a. DOD Role in the National Security Council System (NSCS)

(1) Key DOD players in the NSCS come from within the OSD and JS. SecDef 

is a regular member of the NSC and the NSC/PC. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is a 

member of the NSC/DC. If appointed, an Under Secretary of Defense may chair an 

NSC/IPC.

(2) The NSCS is the channel for the CJCS to discharge substantial statutory 

responsibilities as the principal military advisor to the President, SecDef, and the NSC. 

CJCS regularly attends NSC meetings and provides advice and views in this capacity. The 

other members of the JCS may submit advice or an opinion in disagreement with that 

of the CJCS or advice or an opinion in addition to the advice provided by the CJCS.

(3) The Military Departments, which implement but do not participate directly in 

national security policy-making activities of the interagency process, are represented by the 

CJCS.

b. The Joint Staff Role in the NSCS

(1) CJCS acts as spokesperson for the CCDRs, especially on their operational 

requirements, and represents combatant command interests in the NSC system through direct 

communication with the CCDRs and their staffs.

(2) JS provides operational input and staff support through the CJCS (or 

designee) for policy decisions made by the OSD. It coordinates with the combatant 

commands, Services, and other agencies and prepares appropriate directives, such as 

warning, alert, and execute orders, for SecDef approval. These orders include definitions of 

command and interagency relationships. 

(3) Within JS, the offices of the CJCS, Secretary of the Joint Staff, and the 

Operations Directorate (J-3), Logistics Directorate (J-4), J-5, and J-7 are focal points 

“We also can’t do this alone. This is an effort that is going to be important for all of 

us to be engaged in. We are going to look for broad and deep contributions, not 

only across the US Government, but also from other sectors, from NGOs

[nongovernmental organizations], from think tanks, from the private sector and also 

from our allies and international partners abroad.”

Michèle Flournoy

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

US Strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan

21 April 2009
Chapter IV

IV-2 JP 3-08 

for NSC-related actions. The J-3 provides advice on execution of military operations, the 

J-4 assesses logistic implications of contemplated operations, and the J-5 often focuses on a 

particular NSC matter for policy and planning purposes. Each of JS directorates coordinates 

with the Military Departments to solicit Service input in the planning process. SecDef may 

also designate one of the Service Chiefs or functional CCDRs as the executive agent for 

direction and coordination of DOD activities in support of specific mission areas.

For more information, refer to CJCSI 5715.01B, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency 

Affairs.

c. The CCDRs’ Role in the NSCS. Although JS represents combatant command 

equities at the NSC/HSC, they may, as necessary, selectively request and leverage combatant 

command participation at key NSC/HSC forums, including IPCs, NSC/DCs, NSC/PCs, and 

other events such as cabinet-level exercises. Execution of TCPsrequires a more robust daily 

interaction with interagency partners based on standing authorities. JS and OSD will 

coordinate required permissions through the NSC/HSC systems. CCDRs and their staffs can 

coordinate most of their standing requirements with the COM and their JIACG (or 

equivalent organization). 

2. Structure in Foreign Countries

a. The Diplomatic Mission. The US has bilateral diplomatic relations with 190 of the 

world’s other 193 independent states. The US bilateral representation in the foreign country, 

known as the diplomatic mission, is established in accordance with the Vienna Convention 

on Diplomatic Relations, of which the US is a signatory. DOS provides the core staff of a 

diplomatic mission and administers the presence of representatives of other USG agencies in 

the country. A diplomatic mission is led by a COM, usually the ambassador, but at times the 

chargé d’affaires (the chargé), when no US ambassador is accredited to the country or the 

ambassador is absent from the country. The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is second in 

charge of the mission and usually assumes the role of chargé in the absence of the COM. 

For countries with which the US has no diplomatic relations, the embassy of another country 

represents US interest and at times houses an interests section staffed with USG employees. 

In countries where an IGO is headquartered, the US may have a multilateral mission to the 

IGO in addition to the bilateral mission to the foreign country. 

(1) The Ambassador. The ambassador is the personal representative of the 

President to the government of the foreign country or to the IGO to which accredited and, as 

such, is the COM, responsible for recommending and implementing national policy 

regarding the foreign country or IGO and for overseeing the activities of USG employees in 

the mission. The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the 

ambassador. While the majority of ambassadors are career members of the Foreign Service, 

many are appointed from outside the Foreign Service. The ambassador has extraordinary 

decision-making authority as the senior USG official on the ground during crises. 

(a) The bilateral COM has authority over all USG personnel in country, except 

for those assigned to a combatant command, a USG multilateral mission, or an IGO. The 

COM may be accredited to more than one country. The COM interacts daily with DOS’s 
Foreign Considerations 

IV-3 

strategic-level planners and decision makers. The COM provides recommendations and 

considerations for CAP directly to the GCC and commander of a JTF. While forces in the 

field under a GCC are exempt from the COM’s statutory authority, the COM confers with 

the GCC regularly to coordinate US military activities with the foreign policy direction being 

taken by the USG toward the HN. The COM’s political role is important to the success of 

military operations involving the Armed Forces of the United States. Generally, each COM 

has a formal agreement with the GCC as to which DOD personnel fall under the security 

responsibility of each. 

(b) The COM has full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and 

supervision of all USG executive branch employees, regardless of their employment 

categories or location, except those under command of a US area military commander or on 

the staff of a foreign organization. All executive branch agencies under COM authority, and 

every element of the Mission, must keep the COM fully informed at all times of their current 

and planned activities. The COM has the right to see all communications to or from Mission 

elements, however transmitted, except those specifically exempted by law or Executive 

decision. The COM has full responsibility for the security of the Mission and all personnel, 

whether inside or outside the chancery gate. The COM reviews programs, personnel, and 

funding levels regularly, and ensures that all agencies do likewise. Every executive branch 

agency under COM authority must obtain approval before changing the size, composition, or 

mandate of its staff. All USG personnel other than those in country under command of a US 

area military commander or on the staff of an international organization must obtain country 

clearance before entering the country on official business. 

(2) The Deputy Chief of Mission. The DCM is chosen from the ranks of career 

foreign service officers through a rigorous selection process to be the principal deputy to the 

ambassador. Although not appointed by the President, the DCM wields considerable power, 

especially when acting as the COM while in chargé. The DCM is usually responsible for the 

day-to-day activities of the embassy.

(3) The Embassy. The HQ of the mission is the embassy, located in the political 

capital city of the HN. Although the various USG agencies that make up the mission may 

have individual HQ elsewhere in the country, the embassy is the focal point for interagency 

coordination. The main building of the embassy is termed the chancery; the ambassador’s 

house is known as the residence. The chancery and residence usually enjoy extraterritorial 

privileges (i.e., exemption from the jurisdiction of local law). Each embassy has an 

associated consular section, frequently located in the chancery, to provide services to US 

citizens and to issue visas to foreigners wishing to travel to the US.

(4) Consulates. The size or principal location of commercial activity in some 

countries necessitates the establishment of one or more consulates—branch offices of the 

mission located in key cities, often at a distance from the embassy. A consulate is headed by 

a principal officer. In addition to providing consular services, the consulate is usually a 

mirror of the embassy, albeit on a much smaller scale. It is the focal point of interagency 

coordination for the assigned consular district. 
Chapter IV

IV-4 JP 3-08 

b. DOS Plans. Each US mission prepares an annual MSRP that sets country-level US 

foreign policy goals, resource requests, performance measures, and targets. The MSRP is a 

concise, streamlined document that facilitates long-term diplomatic and assistance planning. 

They are coordinated among the agencies represented on the country team, both in their 

embassy and in the Washington, DC interagency community. DOS bureau strategic resource 

plans (BSRPs) cover geographic regions that are not consistent with the GCC’s AORs. 

However, the differences between geographic combatant command, DOS, and USAID 

regional boundaries create challenging seams and may pose significant coordination 

problems. Each DOS bureau geographic region and the countries included in each region 

can be viewed at the DOS Web site (http://www.state.gov/p/) by clicking on the respective 

bureau or “Countries & Regions” and selecting the region. Although unclassified, BSRPs

are available for review on the DOS Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET)

Web site (http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Mission Strategic Plans).

c. The Country Team. The country team, headed by the COM, is the senior in-country 

interagency coordinating body. It is composed of the COM, DCM, section heads, the senior 

member of each US department or agency in country, and other USG personnel as 

determined by the COM. Each member presents the position of his or her parent 

organization to the country team and conveys country team considerations back to the parent 

organization. The COM confers with the country team to develop and implement foreign 

policy toward the HN and to disseminate decisions to the members of the mission.

(1) The country team system provides the foundation for rapid interagency 

consultation and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of US 

programs and policies. Under the country team construct, agencies are required to 

coordinate their plans and operations and keep one another and the COM informed of their 

activities. Country team members who represent agencies other than the DOS are routinely 

in contact with their parent agencies. Issues arising within the country team can become 

interagency issues at the national level if they are not resolved locally or when they have 

broader national implications. Prior to providing any DOD logistical support, the 

reimbursement mechanism and policies must be clearly specified, understood, and 

“No organization has more competent leaders than the Department of Defense 

(DOD). But when you’re in the wars that we’re in now in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

where it’s not a traditional battlefield, you also need some followers, not just 

leaders. You need to recognize the civilian police training expertise of some of the 

people in the State Department. You need to recognize the rule of law expertise at 

the Department of Justice. There are other very good leaders in areas that are 

outside DOD’s expertise, and DOD also needs some good followers who are 

willing to enable the experts in the civilian area to do their jobs, because you can’t 

build a courthouse in Iraq or Afghanistan without some military support—not 

military direction or leadership, but military support.”

The Honorable Thomas A. Schweich

Ambassador in Residence, Washington University

March 2009
Foreign Considerations 

IV-5 

coordinated with the supporting comptroller per DODI 4000.19, Interservice and 

Intragovernmental Support. 

(2) In almost all bilateral missions, DOD is represented on the country team by 

the SDO as the principal DOD official in US embassies. The SDO is the US defense 

attaché (DATT) and chief of the security cooperation organization (SCO). The SCO is 

called by various names (e.g., the office of defense cooperation, the security assistance 

office/organization, the military group); largely governed by the preference of the receiving 

country. The SDO/DATT is the COM’s principal military advisor on defense and national 

security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned to a US 

diplomatic mission, and the single POC for all DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD 

elements assigned to or working from the embassy. All DOD elements assigned or attached 

to or operating from US embassies are aligned under the coordinating authority of the 

SDO/DATT. Where separate SCO and DATT offices currently exist, they will remain 

separate with distinct duties and statutory authorities. SDO/DATT duties include the 

following: 

(a) Act as the in-country focal point for planning, coordinating, supporting, 

and/or executing US defense issues and activities in the HN, including theater security 

cooperation programs under the oversight of the GCC. 

(b) Serve as the principal embassy liaison with HN defense establishments and 

actively participate in national security and operational policy development and coordination.

(c) Represent SecDef and DOD components to HN counterparts and foreign 

diplomats accredited to the HN, and act as the principal in-country DOD diplomatic 

representative of SecDef and DOD components. 

(d) Present coordinated DOD views on all defense matters to the COM and act 

as the single DOD POC to the COM to assist in carrying out the COM’s responsibilities. 

(e) Represent SecDef and the appropriate CCDR for coordination of 

administrative and security matters for all DOD personnel not under the command of a US 

area military commander.

(f) Carry out the duties and instructions as set forth in CJCSI C-3310.01C, 

Representational Responsibilities of the Defense Attaché System. 

(g) Exercise coordinating authority over DOD elements under the direction 

and supervision of the COM. This shall not preempt the authority exercised over these 

elements by the COM, the mission authority exercised by the parent DOD components, or 

the command authority exercised by the GCC under the Unified Command Plan. 

(h) As required, provide information to USG officials on the general scope of 

in-country activities for all DOD component command elements assigned to the mission. 

This includes the missions, locations, organization, and unique security requirements. 
Chapter IV

IV-6 JP 3-08 

(3) Sending LNOs to an embassy is a negotiated process and requires close 

coordination with the COM. There are a number of solid reasons why a COM may not want 

additional military in and around their embassy—including in-country political concerns 

(e.g., a nation might balk at the notion as many nations limit the number of military members 

allowed in US embassies as a quid pro quo to how many are allowed into their embassies in 

the US), space and communications limitations, and confusing new coordination 

requirements.

For more information, refer to DODD 5105.75, Department of Defense Operations at US 

Embassies; DODI C-5105.81, Implementing Instructions for DOD Operations at US 

Embassies (U); and CJCSI 5205.01B, Implementing Instructions for Defense Attaché 

Offices and Security Assistance Organizations (U).

d. Geographic Combatant Commands. To effectively bring all instruments of 

national power to theater and regional strategies as well as campaign and operation plans, 

GCCs are augmented with representatives from other USG agencies.

(1) GCCs and, increasingly, JTF commanders are assigned a policy advisor 

(POLAD) by DOS. The POLAD provides USG foreign policy perspectives and diplomatic 

considerations and establishes linkages with US embassies in the AOR or JOA and with 

DOS. The POLAD supplies information regarding objectives of DOS that are relevant to the 

GCC’s theater strategy or CJTF’s plans. The POLADs are senior DOS officers (usually 

flag-rank equivalent) detailed as personal advisors to leading US military 

leaders/commanders to provide policy support regarding the diplomatic and political aspects 

of the commanders’ military responsibilities. Therefore, the POLAD is directly responsible 

to the CCDR or CJTF and can be of great assistance in interagency coordination. 

(2) USAID has also placed senior development advisors at most GCCs to 

coordinate overall relations with USAID HQ and field missions. Senior development 

advisors are senior USAID Foreign Service officers (usually flag-rank equivalents like 

POLADs), who provide information about USAID programs and processes that should be 

considered during planning and operations. 

(3) Appointing non-DOD civilian deputies to the GCC and designing integrated 

staff sections throughout the HQ is the model used by USSOUTHCOM, US Africa 

Command, and now US European Command (USEUCOM). 

(4) The JIACG (or equivalent organization) participates in deliberate planning and 

CAP. Representing USG agencies at the HQ of the geographic and selected functional 

combatant commands, each JIACG (or equivalent organization) is a multifunctional, 

advisory element that represents the civilian departments and agencies and facilitates 

information sharing across the interagency community. It provides regular, timely, and 

collaborative day-to-day support for planning, coordination, preparation, and 

implementation of interagency activities. It may provide products and inputs that feed 

planning, assessment, and the CCDR’s decision cycle.

See Appendix D, “Joint Interagency Coordination Group,” for more information. 
Foreign Considerations 

IV-7 

(5) Other USG agencies may detail liaison personnel to combatant command 

staffs to improve interagency coordination. For example, intelligence representatives may 

be assigned to staffs of geographic combatant commands to facilitate intelligence and 

antiterrorism support. 

(6) Combatant commands’ “think tanks” and centers (e.g., USEUCOM’s Marshall 

Center, USPACOM’s Asia-Pacific Center, and US Strategic Command’s Global Innovation 

and Strategy Center) are formal venues for communication with interagency and 

multinational partners, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector. Symposia, conferences, 

strategic advisory groups, defense contractors, and training with industry are other fora for 

coordination. 

(7) Two interagency tools that support whole-of-government planning for stability 

operations include DOS’s IMS for post-conflict reconstruction/stabilization efforts and 

USAID’s ICAF that addresses conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization activities.

(a) The purpose of the IMS is to provide a whole-of-government process for 

planning and implementing a response to an international crisis when the President and 

Congress determine that a response is in the national strategic interest. The NSC, NSC/PC, 

or NSC/DC can activate the IMS operating through the Secretary of State who acts as the 

“custodian” of the IMS process.

Refer to Appendix G, “The Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and 

Stabilization.”

(b) The ICAF is a framework that can be used to help different USG 

departments and agencies work together to reach a shared understanding of a country’s 

conflict dynamics and consensus on potential entry points for additional USG efforts. This 

assessment will provide for a deeper understanding of the underlying conflict dynamics in 

the country or region. 

Refer to Appendix H, “The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework.”

3. Intergovernmental Organizations 

The following describes formal or informal United States ties between the United 

Nations and NATO. 

a. The United Nations. Coordination with the UN begins at the national level with 

DOS, through the US ambassador to the UN, officially titled the Permanent Representative. 

The ambassador has the status of cabinet rank and is assisted at the US Mission to the UN by 

a military assistant who coordinates appropriate military interests primarily with the 

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and UN Office for the 

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). USG coordination with UN PO 

missions or agencies in-theater is through the US country team. In some countries, US UN 

military observers attached to some UN PO missions may be a discreet source of information 

and advice through the US country team.
Chapter IV

IV-8 JP 3-08 

INTERAGENCY PARTICIPATION DURING THE 

2008 GEORGIA-RUSSIA CONFLICT

The US Government (USG) deployed several personnel from multiple 

agencies to support the national response to the military conflict between 

the Republic of Georgia and Russia and its aftermath in early August 2008. 

This engagement, at one time involving interagency staffs at the national, 

geographic combatant command, and embassy/country levels, is the closest 

example of the use of the Interagency Management System (IMS) through the 

formation of the three main structures similar to the Country Reconstruction 

and Stabilization Group, Integration Planning Cell, and Advance Civilian 

Team. It is also an example of ongoing interagency participation in USG 

operations during times of crisis in lieu of officially establishing an IMS. 

In August 2008, a decision was taken to create a coordinating body to 

support Washington leadership called the Georgia Coordinating Group 

(GCG), involving a staff composed of several USG agencies. The GCG was 

responsible for supporting leaders in Washington, DC, as well as 

coordinating interagency communications. The GCG tracked actions, 

cables, and answered requests for information. The GCG also developed a 

Web portal based on the Georgia Crisis Portal and established a common 

operational picture for all interagency participants. 

The USG had officers from interagency participants located at US European 

Command (USEUCOM) headquarters operating in information and liaison 

roles, interacting with the necessary staff in USEUCOM, and participating in 

joint task force planning. The USG also deployed a team to Tbilisi, Georgia, 

consisting of a team leader, two experienced government planners, and one 

conflict prevention officer. In the team's three week deployment in support 

of the USG efforts in Georgia, it accomplished a variety of valuable actions 

assisting the embassy to include:

Documents and information needed for parallel planning with the GCG and 

Washington, DC, planners;

The most up-to-date breakdown of the $1 billon Georgia assistance package; 

and

Additional guidance on conditionality issues related to possible cash 

transfers. 

The interagency capability to support USG planning and operations for 

conflicts and crises goes beyond the capacity of IMS. The USG has and 

continues to deploy numerous interagency staff officers from across the 

USG to work together in IMS-like structures to assist with a variety of 

conflicts/crises to include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Yemen, and Haiti. 

SOURCE: After Action Review

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

Georgia Engagement - August 11 through October 31, 2008

January 30, 2009
Foreign Considerations 

IV-9 

(1) The UN normally conducts PO under the provisions of a resolution or 

mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly. FHA is conducted under 

standing authority from the General Assembly and does not require a resolution to authorize 

each response. Mandates are developed through a political process which generally requires 

compromise, and sometimes results in ambiguity. As with all military operations, UN 

mandates are implemented by US forces through orders issued by SecDef through the CJCS. 

During such implementation, the political mandates are converted to workable military 

orders.

(2) As part of a broader UN strategy, the Integrated Mission Planning Process 

(IMPP) provides guidelines for a comprehensive and inclusive UN system approach to the 

planning of integrated PO (hereafter “integrated missions”). IMPP is the authoritative basis 

for the planning of all new integrated missions, as well as the revision of existing integrated 

mission plans, for all UN departments, offices, agencies, funds, and programs. 

(a) If a UN peacekeeping mission is authorized, UNDPKO is responsible for 

providing UN peacekeeping operations with policy guidance and strategic direction. In the 

field, the head of mission (HOM) exercises operational authority over the UN peacekeeping 

operation’s activities, including military, police, and civilian resources. In the case of 

military personnel provided by member states, these personnel are placed under the OPCON

of the UN force commander or head of military component, but not under UN command. In 

integrated missions, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)/HOM is a 

civilian who reports to the Secretary-General (SYG) through the Under-Secretary-General 

for Peacekeeping Operations at UN Headquarters. The SRSG/HOM is given significant 

delegated authority to set the direction of the mission and to lead its engagement with the 

political process on the ground. The SRSG/HOM is responsible for coordinating the 

activities of the entire UN system in the field.

(b) Prior to a UN peacekeeping mission being authorized or if no such mission 

is launched, the UN will provide a resident coordinator (RC). In the initial stages of a 

complex emergency or natural disaster, the UN RC plays a critical role in coordinating the 

policies, programs, and actions in all countries with a UN presence. The RC is typically the 

most senior UN representative in-country. The RC is appointed by the SYG and represents 

all organizations of the UN unless they have a presence on the ground. As such, the RC 

often represents UNOCHA in the early warning and initial response phase of an emergency. 

The RC is also typically the resident representative for the United Nations Development 

Programme (UNDP) and usually in place and familiar with the nature of the crisis when an 

emergency occurs. In his or her coordinating role, the RC convenes regular meetings of the 

UN country team, composed of the representatives of the operational UN agencies on the 

ground. In a crisis, the RC will also organize broader coordination forums comprised of 

NGOs, the Red Cross Movement, donors, and other IGOs, including subcommittees that help 

coordinate humanitarian relief in a particular sector or region. If a UN peacekeeping mission 

is authorized, an integrated mission is launched under the leadership of an SRSG and in that 

case the RC will be designated the deputy of the SRSG and is responsible for the 

coordination of both humanitarian operations and UN development operations, and for 

maintaining links with governments and other parties, donors, and the broader humanitarian 

and development communities for this purpose. 
Chapter IV

IV-10 JP 3-08 

(c) In certain situations the UN SYG may appoint a special representative 

who reports directly to the SYG but also advises UNDPKO and UNOCHA at UN HQ. 

The special representative may direct day-to-day operations.

(3) United States Military Support. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the 

United Nations Participation Act of 1945, and Executive Order 10206 (Support of Peaceful 

Settlements of Disputes) authorize various types of US military support to the UN, either on 

a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis.

(a) US military operations in support of the UN usually fall within Chapter VI 

(Pacific Settlement of Disputes) or Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, 

Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter. 

See Annex B, “United Nations,” of Appendix B, “Intergovernmental Organizations,” for

details regarding the UN Charter. 

(b) UN conducts operations employing military forces as contingent units 

under the OPCON of the head of the military contingent, as staff augmentation to the 

mission HQ, or as “experts on mission” as UN military observers. The US has provided 

military forces and personnel to each of these categories. Additionally, the US can support 

the UN by conducting parallel missions (called hybrid missions by the UN) under Chapter 

VIII of the UN Charter under US OPCON in collaboration with UN forces such as was done 

in Haiti in 2004 or as the UK did in Sierra Leone in 2000, Operation PALLISER. In the later 

circumstance, the US military structure that is used to conduct multinational operations 

normally is a JTF. The CJTF should expect to conduct operations as part of an MNF. US 

forces may participate across a range of military operations in concert with a variety of USG 

agencies, military forces of other nations, local authorities, IGOs, and NGOs. 

(c) The chain of command from the President to the lowest US 

commander in the field remains inviolate. On a case-by-case basis, the President may 

place US forces participating in multilateral PO under UN control under the OPCON of UN 

mission in accordance with the memorandum of understanding (MOU) agreed between the 

US and the UN. The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over US 

forces. OPCON for UN multilateral PO is given for a specific time frame or mission and 

includes the authority to assign tasks to US forces already deployed by the President and to 

US units led by US officers. Within the limits of OPCON, a foreign UN commander cannot 

change the mission or deploy US forces outside the operational area agreed to by the 

President. Nor may the foreign UN commander separate units, divide their supplies, 

administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization. 

(d) US UN Military Observers. A potentially important source of 

information and advice for both the US country team and JFCs are US UN military observers 

attached to UN PO missions. US UN military observers are of great strategic and 

operational importance in that they directly represent the commitment of US national interest 

in these missions, fostering their legitimacy and encouraging the participation of other 

nations. Through a discreet relationship with the US country team, they can help improve 

understanding of the situation and the international intervention on the ground. Being both 
Foreign Considerations 

IV-11 

observers and members of the UN military staff, they also act as strategic and operational 

enablers through professional military contributions to the UN mission and provide advice 

and coordination assistance to the US country team. US UN military observers are not under 

the command of a GCC or the authority of a COM. They are OPCON to the Commander, 

US Military Observer Group – Washington, a joint command. 

b. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO is an alliance of 28 countries 

from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic 

Treaty. In accordance with the Treaty, the fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the 

freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means. It provides a 

forum in which countries from North America and Europe can consult together on security 

issues of common concern and take joint action in addressing them. The Alliance is 

committed to defending its member states against aggression or the threat of aggression and 

to the principle that an attack against one or several members would be considered as an 

attack against all. NATO remains an IGO in which each member country retains its 

sovereignty. All NATO decisions are taken jointly by the member countries on the basis of 

consensus. NATO’s most important decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council 

(NAC), which brings together representatives of all the Allies at the level of ambassadors, 

ministers, or heads of state and government. NATO has no operational forces of its own 

other than those assigned to it by member countries or contributed by partner countries for 

the purpose of carrying out a specific mission. It has a number of mechanisms available to it 

for this purpose – the defense planning and resource planning processes that form the basis 

of cooperation within the Alliance, the implementation of political commitments to improved 

capabilities, and a military structure that combines the functions of a MNF planning 

organization with an Alliance-wide system of C2 of the military forces assigned to it. 

For more information, refer to Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(C), Allied Joint Doctrine,

and Annex A, “North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” to Appendix B, “Intergovernmental 

Organizations.”

4. Nongovernmental Organizations 

a. The Role of NGOs. Working alone, alongside the US military, with other US 

agencies, or with multinational partners, NGOs are assisting in many of the world’s trouble 

spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed. NGOs may range in size and 

experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in 

developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a 

particular emergency or disaster. The capability, equipment and other resources, and 

expertise vary greatly from one NGO to another. NGOs are involved in such diverse 

activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, 

development programs, human rights, and conflict resolution. The sheer number of lives 

they affect, the resources they provide, and the moral authority conferred by their 

humanitarian focus enable NGOs to wield a great deal of influence within the interagency 

and international communities. In fact, individual organizations are often funded by national 

and international donor agencies as implementing partners to carry out specific functions. 

Similarly, internationally active NGOs may employ indigenous groups as local 

implementing partners.
Chapter IV

IV-12 JP 3-08 

b. The Increasing Number of NGOs. A JTF or MNF may encounter scores of 

NGOs in a JOA. In 1999 in Kosovo, more than 150 IGOs and NGOs had applied to be 

registered in the province. Over 350 such agencies are registered with the USAID. 

InterAction, a US-based consortium of NGOs, has a membership of over 160 private 

agencies that operate in 180 countries. The International Council of Voluntary Agencies 

(ICVA) has a predominantly European membership numbering in the hundreds. Over 1,660 

NGOs around the world are registered with the UN’s Department of Public Information, 

while over 3,000 have consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council

(ECOSOC). 

c. Military and NGO Relations. In a hostile or uncertain environment, the military’s 

initial objective is stabilization and security for its own forces. NGOs seek to address 

humanitarian needs first and are often unwilling to subordinate their objectives to 

achievement of an end state, which they had no part in determining. Many NGOs view 

their relationship with the military under the UNOCHA Guidelines on the Use of Military 

and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief, commonly referred to as the “Oslo Guidelines,” 

that emphasize the principle of “humanitarian space” (humanitarianism, neutrality, and 

impartiality) as defined in the “Oslo Guidelines.” Some organizations employ a more 

strident interpretation of these nonbinding guidelines, applying them not just to humanitarian 

assistance, as specifically referenced, but also to advocacy, development, and civil society 

work. The extent to which specific NGOs are willing to cooperate with the military can thus 

vary considerably. NGOs desire to preserve the impartial character of their operations, 

accept only minimal necessary assistance from the military, and ensure that military actions 

in the relief and civic action are consistent with the standards and priorities agreed on within 

the civilian relief community. In a permissive environment, military engagement, security 

cooperation, and deterrence activities may coincide with NGO objectives.

(1) The extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various 

nations make NGOs valuable sources of information about local and regional affairs and 

civilian attitudes, and they are sometimes willing to share such information on the basis of 

collegiality. Virtually all NGO operations interact with military operations in some way—

they use the same (normally limited) lines of communications; they draw on the same 

sources for local interpreters and translators; and they compete for buildings and storage 

space. Effective two-way communication between the US military and NGOs promotes US 

national interests/policy and objectives. CMO, through establishing and maintaining 

communications, is one of the best ways to unify military and public and private partnerships 

and best practices to improve the HN’s internal security and promote stability operations in 

the operational area. The private sector, even in some developing countries, possesses the 

skills and expertise to contribute to the overall US objectives. Thus, sharing of operational 

information in both directions is an essential element of successful CMO. 

(2) While some organizations will seek the protection afforded by armed forces or 

the use of military transport to move relief supplies to, or sometimes within, the operational 

area, others may avoid a close affiliation with military forces, preferring autonomous, 

impartial operations. This is particularly the case if US military forces are a participant in a 

conflict in the operational area. Many NGOs are outfitted with very little, if any, equipment 

for communications and personal security, preferring instead to rely upon the good will of 
Foreign Considerations 

IV-13 

the local populace for their safety; however many larger NGOs have very capable 

communications capabilities. Some NGOs provide considerable support and assistance in 

the security arena. Any activity that strips an NGO’s appearance of impartiality, such as 

close collaboration with a particular military force, may well eliminate that 

organization’s primary source of security. Therefore, it is essential that the military 

recognize an NGO’s request for independence in order to avoid compromising their security. 

NGOs may also avoid cooperation with the military out of suspicion that military forces 

intend to take control of, influence, or even prevent their operations. Commanders and their 

staffs should be sensitive to these concerns and consult these organizations, along with the 

competent national or international authorities, to identify local conditions that may impact 

effective military-NGO cooperation.

(3) During large scale operations, dealing directly with myriad NGOs may be 

impractical. Some NGOs may be reluctant to coordinate directly with the military. Under 

some circumstances military coordination with NGOs may be facilitated by USAID as an 

intermediary due to their established relationships with NGOs in the operational area. 

(4) PA planning should include the identification of POCs with NGOs that will 

operate in the JOA. Military spokespersons should comment on NGO operations based on 

approved PA guidance and make referrals of media queries to the appropriate organization’s 

spokesperson. 

d. Military Support of NGOs. SecDef may determine that it is in the national interest 

to task US military forces with missions that bring them into close contact with (if not 

support of) IGOs and NGOs. In such circumstances, it is mutually beneficial to closely 

coordinate the activities of all participants. A climate of cooperation between IGOs, NGOs, 

and military forces should be the primary goal. The secondary goal would be establish as 

good a rapport as possible with NGOs maintaining neutrality. The tertiary goal (although 

often critical) is to monitor openly hostile NGOs and, when applicable, develop mitigation 

strategies. The creation of a framework for structured civil-military interaction, such as a 

CMOC, allows the military and NGOs to meet and work together in advancing common 

goals. Taskings to support IGOs and NGOs are normally for a short-term purpose due to 

extraordinary events. In most situations, logistics, communications, and security are those 

capabilities most needed. It is, however, crucial to remember that in such missions the role 

of the armed forces should be to enable, not perform, IGO and NGO tasks. Military 

commanders and other decision makers should also understand that mutually beneficial 

arrangements between the armed forces and other organizations may be critical to the 

success of the campaign or operation plan. 

e. The Guidelines for Relations between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental 

Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments agreed by the 

DOD, InterAction, and the United States Institute of Peace should facilitate interaction 

between the Armed Forces of the United States and NGOs. They were developed by a 

working group, which included InterAction, OSD, JS, DOS, and USAID, and facilitated by 

the US Institute of Peace. The guidelines seek to mitigate friction between military and 

NGO personnel over access and freedom for humanitarian organizations to assess and meet 

humanitarian needs in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. They are an example of guidelines 
Chapter IV

IV-14 JP 3-08 

that may be helpful even though they are not joint doctrine, or expressed in correct doctrinal 

terms. They also serve as an example for civil-military relations in other types of operations 

and a baseline for the development of guidelines for a specific operation in hostile or 

uncertain environments. During operations in a permissive environment, documents such as 

Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief,

commonly referred to as the “Oslo Guidelines” may be more applicable. When developing 

guidelines for a specific operation, the following considerations apply: 

(1) How should the liaison arrangements between the humanitarian community and 

the military be conducted: in confidence or transparently? 

(2) What would the implications be of public knowledge of such liaison 

arrangements on the perception of the impartiality of humanitarian activities?

(3) How can transparency of the civil-military liaison arrangements be ensured 

while maintaining the understanding of a clear distinction between the military and 

humanitarian organizations? 

(4) How can incorrect perceptions and conclusions be prevented regarding the 

nature and purpose of civil-military liaison arrangements?

(5) Which circumstances call for formal liaison arrangements? When is it better to 

maintain liaison on an ad hoc basis? 

(6) What is the appropriate size and structure of the civil-military liaison 

component? 

(7) When, if ever, should the LNOs of the humanitarian and military communities 

be colocated?

See Appendix J, “Example Guidelines for Relations Between the Armed Forces of the United 

States and Other Organizations,” and Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex 

Emergencies, for more information. See Appendix C, “Nongovernmental Organizations,” for 

more information. 

5. The Private Sector

A number of DODIs regulate the conduct of private military and security companies 

operating with DOD. These include DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to 

Accompany the US Armed Forces, which establishes and implements policy and guidance, 

assigns responsibilities, and serves as a comprehensive source of DOD policy and 

procedures concerning DOD contractor personnel authorized to accompany the Armed 

Forces of the United States. DODI 3020.50, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating 

in Contingency Operations, regulates the selection, accountability, training, equipping, and 

conduct of personnel performing private security functions under a covered contract during 

contingency operations. It also assigns responsibilities and establishes procedures for 

incident reporting, use of and accountability for equipment, rules for the use of force, and a 

process for administrative action or the removal, as appropriate, of PSCs and PSC personnel. 
Foreign Considerations 

IV-15 

DODI 5525.11, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed by or Accompanying the 

Armed Forces Outside the United States, Certain Service Members, and Former Service 

Members, provides policy for exercising extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over civilians 

employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States.

6. Foreign Operations

a. The Political-Military Dimension. Within the Executive Branch, DOS is the lead 

foreign affairs agency, assisting the President in foreign policy formulation and execution. 

As such, DOS oversees the coordination of DOD external POLMIL relationships with 

overall US foreign policy. In addition to DOS, USAID is the lead agency for development 

and carries out programs that complement DOD efforts in stabilization, disaster response, 

foreign internal defense, and security force assistance. External POLMIL relationships of 

DOD include:

(1) Bilateral military relationships.

(2) Multinational military forces.

(3) Multilateral mutual defense alliances.

(4) Treaties and agreements involving DOD activities or interests, such as 

technology transfer, armaments cooperation and control, international aviation, law of the 

sea, nuclear regulation, and environmental pollution. 

(5) Use of US military assets for FHA or PO (including those conducted under UN 

auspices).

b. Theater Focus. The GCC implements DOD external POLMIL relationships within 

the AOR. Thorough joint operation planning requires that a GCC’s operations and activities 

align with functional and theater national security end states contained in the National 

Defense Strategy and the GEF. The GEF prioritizes these theater strategic end states for 

each GCC who then develops a TCP. GCC TCP–nested country plans should complement 

the current DOS/USAID Joint Strategic Plan, BSRPs, and applicable MSRPs. The GCC’s 

regional focus is similar to the regional focus of DOS’s regional bureaus, though the 

geographic boundaries differ and DOS regional bureaus are located in Washington, DC, and 

practice a more bilateral approach. Most other USG foreign affairs agencies are regionally 

organized as well, again with varying geographic boundaries. Within a theater, the GCC is 

the focal point for planning and implementation of regional and theater military 

strategies that require interagency coordination. In contrast, the DOS focal point for 

formulation and implementation of regional foreign policy strategies requiring interagency 

coordination is the regional bureau headed by an assistant secretary at DOS HQ in 

Washington, DC. USAID has a similar structure, with geographic bureaus headed by 

assistant administrators in Washington, DC. Although the GCC will often find it more 

expeditious to approach the US bilateral COMs for approval of an activity in regional HNs, 

often the political effect of the proposed US military activity goes far beyond the boundaries 

of the individual HN. In such cases, the GCC should not assume that the approval of the 
Chapter IV

IV-16 JP 3-08 

COM corresponds to region-wide approval of DOS. The GCC’s DOS foreign POLAD can 

assist in ascertaining whether the activity has regional bureau approval. 

c. Theater Campaign Plans, Crisis Response, and Limited Contingency 

Operations. GCC’s TCP–nested country plans should complement DOS MSRP and other 

plans developed by the country teams and USG interagency partners in the GCC’s AOR. In 

a crisis response and limited contingency operation, coordination between DOD and other 

USG agencies will normally occur within the NSC/IPC and, if directed, during 

development of the USG strategic plan. During lesser operations and operations not 

involving armed conflict, the GCC’s staff may deal directly with a COM or members of the 

country team regarding issues that do not transcend the boundaries of the HN. In some 

operations, a special envoy of the President or an SRSG may be involved. 

FOCUS COUNTRY INITIATIVE

In August 2008, the United States Agency for International Development 

(USAID) initiated a Focus Country Initiative in conjunction with its new CivilMilitary Policy. USAID regional bureaus each nominated one country where 

USAID and the Department of Defense (DOD) share strategic interests, and 

gained geographic combatant commander (GCC) concurrence and buy-in 

from the Department of State (DOS), DOD, and the Joint Staff. Under this 

initiative, country teams host 1-2 working group meetings with the senior 

defense official/security cooperation organization, the GCC, and USAID to 

identify sectors where DOD and USAID objectives overlap; identify activities 

that the Mission and DOD can undertake jointly in shared space; establish 

regular consultations between DOD and US missions within respective 

program cycles; and develop best practices for coordination in other 

Missions. Ultimately the Focus Country Initiative seeks to institutionalize the 

link between the DOD Guidance for Employment of the Force and DOS and 

USAID strategic planning, USAID participation in GCC’s theater campaign 

plans, and whole-of-government planning and execution. The desired 

outcome is more efficient use of US Government resources to meet foreign 

policy goals.

Various Sources

“Interaction with the US Department of State [DOS] and the United Nations was 

critical throughout the operation. Ambassador Oakley and I spoke regularly to 

coordinate the efforts of the DOS and our military operations in the ARFOR [Army 

forces] sector. His support for our operation was superb and he played a key role 

in communicating with the leadership of the Somali clans. We followed his lead in 

operations, just as we fully supported the operations of the DOS.”

Major General Steven L. Arnold, US Army

Operations Other Than War in a Power Projection Army:

Lessons From Operation RESTORE HOPE and Hurricane Andrew Relief Operations,

Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1994
Foreign Considerations 

IV-17 

d. The GCC and staff should be continuously engaged in interagency, IGO, and 

NGO coordination by establishing working relationships with relevant organizations 

and agencies and conduct joint operation planning long before CAP and military 

resources are required. As situations requiring CAP develop, the normal flow of DOS and 

other agencies reporting from the field will increase significantly. This may be amplified by 

informal contacts between the CCDR’s staff (e.g., POLAD, senior development advisor, 

JIACG [or equivalent organization]) and appropriate embassies as well as the relevant 

bureaus at DOS. Such informal communications greatly facilitate the development of viable 

COAs, but should not be used to circumvent established, authoritative planning, and 

direction processes (see Figure IV-1). Military operations vary in size, purpose, and combat 

intensity within a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and 

deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, 

major operations and campaigns. 

e. Crisis Action Organization. The combatant command crisis action organization is 

activated upon receipt of the CJCS warning or alert order or at the direction of the CCDR. 

Activation of other crisis action cells to administer the specific requirements of task force 

operations may be directed shortly thereafter. These cells support not only functional 

requirements of the JTF such as logistics, but also coordination of military and nonmilitary 

activities and the establishment of a temporary framework for interagency coordination. 

Liaison and coordinating mechanisms that the CCDR may elect to establish to facilitate 

the synchronization of military and nonmilitary activities include: 

(1) Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST). Early in a developing 

crisis, an assessment may be required to determine what resources are immediately required 

to stabilize a humanitarian crisis. The supported CCDR may organize and deploy a 

HAST to acquire information for planning. This information may include an assessment 

of existing conditions and requirements for FHA force structure. Before deploying, the 

HAST should be provided the current threat assessment; current relevant intelligence; 

geospatial information and services support; and embassy, DOS, and USAID points of 

contact. The disaster assistance response team (DART) and USAID mission can provide a 

great deal of this information to the HAST. Once deployed, the HAST can assess the 

relationship with and authority of the government of the affected country; identify primary 

points of contact for coordination and collaboration; determine the threat environment and 

survey facilities that may be used for FP purposes; and coordinate specific support 

arrangements for the delivery of food and medical supplies. The HAST works closely with 

the DART to prevent duplication of effort. 

(2) USAID and its Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) DART is 

the lead for foreign disaster response. OFDA may deploy a DART into the crisis area to 

assist coordination of the FHA effort and activate an on-call Washington, DC-based response 

management team. DART provides specialists trained in a variety of disaster relief skills to 

assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of the USG response to a 

foreign disaster. The DART will also work closely with the US military during FHA 

operations. DARTs assess and report on the disaster situation and recommend follow-up 

actions.
Chapter IV

IV-18 JP 3-08 

Figure IV-1. Notional Structure for Coordination Among Military and Nonmilitary

Organizations—Foreign Operations

NOTIONAL STRUCTURE FOR COORDINATION AMONG MILITARY 

AND NONMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS—FOREIGN OPERATIONS

command direction and supervision coordination

LEGEND

S

T

R

A

T

E

G

I

C

O

P

E

R

A

T

I

O

N

A

L

T

A

C

T

I

C

A

L

LIAISON 

TEAMS

FOREIGN MILITARY 

LIAISON

UN MILITARY FORCE 

HEADQUARTERS

CIVIL-MILITARY 

OPERATIONS CENTER

COUNTRY

TEAM

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

OTHER US GOVERMENT AGENCIES

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AGENCIES

HOST NATION AGENCIES AND BUSINESSES

OTHER INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

US AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT / OFFICE OF FOREIGN 

DISASTER ASSISTANCE / DISASTER ASSISTANCE RESPONSE TEAM

JOINT TASK

FORCE

COMMANDER,

JOINT TASK 

FORCE

EXECUTIVE 

STEERING GROUP

COMBATANT

COMMANDER COMBATANT COMMAND STAFF

HUMANITARIAN 

ASSISTANCE 

SURVEY TEAM

HUMANITARIAN 

ASSISTANCE

COORDINATION 

CENTER

LOGISTICS 

OPERATING 

CENTER

LIAISON 

SECTION

JOINT 

INTERAGENCY 

COORDINATION 

GROUP

AMBASSADOR

CHIEF OF MISSION

JOINT

STAFF

CHAIRMAN OF

THE JOINT CHIEFS

OF STAFF

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE

SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE

SECRETARY 

OF STATE

OTHER

AGENCIES

PRESIDENT

UN MILITARY FORCE 

HEADQUARTERS
Foreign Considerations 

IV-19 

For further guidance on FHA, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

(3) Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center. The supported GCC may 

establish a HACC to assist with interagency coordination and planning. The HACC 

provides the critical link between the GCC and USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs that 

may participate in an FHA operation at the theater strategic level. Normally, the HACC is 

a temporary body that operates during the early planning and coordination stages of the 

operation. Once a CMOC or civilian HOC has been established, the role of the HACC 

diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through the normal organization of the 

GCC’s staff and crisis action organization. Staffing for the HACC should include a director 

appointed by the supported GCC, a CMO planner, an OFDA advisor or liaison if available, a 

public affairs officer (PAO), an NGO advisor, and other augmentation (e.g., POLAD, a 

preventive medicine physician, veterinarian) when required. Liaisons from USG agencies, 

US Army Corps of Engineers, key NGOs, IGOs, and HN agencies also may be members of 

the HACC in large-scale FHA operations. 

(4) Joint Logistics Operations Center. The JLOC supports the GCC’s joint 

operations center (JOC) and the operations planning teams. The CCDR reviews 

requirements of the joint forces and establishes priorities to use supplies, facilities, mobility 

assets, and personnel effectively. The GCC may also be responsible for provision of 

supplies for certain interagency personnel. Formed at the discretion of the GCC and 

operated by the GCC’s J-4 current operations division, a JLOC functions as the single POC 

for coordinating timely and flexible logistic response into the AOR, relieving the JTF, if 

formed, of as much of this function as possible. The JLOC may also perform continuous 

coordination with strategic-level providers such as the Defense Logistics Agency, 

USTRANSCOM, the Services, and the GCC’s staff to ensure the required flow of support to 

the JTF.

For further details on the JLOC, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

(5) Liaison Section. The liaison section in foreign operations is crucial to 

coordination with USG agencies, NGOs, and IGOs. A liaison section assists the JFC in 

coordinating military activities among MNFs, other USG agencies, engaged IGOs and 

NGOs, the HN, and indigenous populations. Military forces, engaged agencies, and the HN 

should consider exchanging liaison personnel in order to maximize information flow and 

interagency coordination. Information should flow in both directions. NGO liaisons should 

have the opportunity to brief military commanders on NGO capabilities, plans, and 

infrastructure as well as disposition in the JOA. The CMOC facilitates coordination and 

exchange of information. Alternatively, the HN may establish a coordination center to 

organize and provide liaison personnel. 

(a) Area-qualified CA personnel are well suited for liaison tasks. Commanders 

should be aware that close participation of civilian agencies with uniformed military in 

hostile and uncertain environments may result in those same civilian organizations being 

targeted by adversaries. This can lead to hesitation by some organizations to meet and liaise 

with the military. In situations where open civilian organizational contact with the military 
Chapter IV

IV-20 JP 3-08 

may cause a concern for security, coordination, cooperation, and information sharing can still 

be attempted through less visible means of communication to achieve unity of effort. 

(b) Establishing liaison relationships. Liaison is that contact or 

intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to 

ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. Various types of liaison 

coordination models may be used, depending upon level of commonality between 

stakeholders (is relationship cooperative or based on coexistence?). In establishing the 

liaison relationship, the JFC should be clear on the liaisons’ roles and authorities, and ability 

to speak for their home agency or organizations. Liaisons should not replace standing DOD 

processes, especially at the strategic level, but they can help to flatten bureaucratic structures 

by streamlining information flows. Liaisons can assist by providing advice and information, 

translation between organizational cultures, and reachback to a home agency or organization. 

DOD should consult with interagency coordination cell/JIACG (or equivalent organization). 

(c) Types of liaison relationships to consider: 

1. Colocation: this is the most intimate liaison relationship. Care should 

be given to understand the liaison’s role and authorities. 

2. Liaison Exchange: temporary or permanent exchange of LNOs. 

3. Limited Liaison: exchange of officers for a limited time period; 

normally limited to meetings or specified hours. 

4.

(6) The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) program is a 

cooperative multinational effort to facilitate the rapid and effective establishment and/or 

augmentation of a multinational task force HQ. The MPAT provides responsive 

multinational expertise in CAP. It is a validated process for integration of other nation’s 

militaries, IGOs, and NGOs. This structure reinforces the use of a trained cadre that have 

worked with IGOs and NGOs prior to a crisis within an AOR and that deploys to the task 

force HQ once a crisis occurs. The MPAT program develops and practices multinational 

planning and execution procedures for operational level task forces. By necessity, this 

includes coordination, collaboration, and cooperation with USG organizations, IGOs, NGOs, 

and HN government agencies. MPAT exercises, workshops, and deployments to actual 

disaster responses have validated the MPAT program and its comprehensive, integrated 

approach to multinational, multiagency, and humanitarian community crises responses. 

 Interlocutor: using appropriate bridge organization liaison or 

coordination officers to bridge or buffer civilian and military members.

For more information, see JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, and http://www1.apaninfo.net/mpat. 

(7) When IMS is activated, an integration planning cell may deploy from the 

CRSG and colocate with the designated GCC’s HQ. The integration planning cell should be 

established in conjunction with the development of a US strategic plan. It supports the GCC 

in integrating the military plan with the civilian components of the US strategic and 
Foreign Considerations 

IV-21 

implementation plans and serves as the representation of all participating agencies and the 

CRSG to the GCC.

(8) There is an implicit assumption that a HN has a functioning national 

government with which to liaise. Under crisis or other military operations, this may or may 

not be the case. Also, HN liaison may be required at multiple levels of government (e.g., 

national, regional, local) and involve informal structures (e.g., tribes, clans). 

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

“The 24th MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit] had a unique mission and 

reporting relationship. We fell under NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization] ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] and were 

operating in the Task Force Helmand AO [area of operations]; consequently 

“CIMIC” [civil-military cooperation] (CA) [civil affairs] and PRT [provincial 

reconstruction team] responsibility for Helmand Province belonged to the 

British. On the military side, the CA coordination involved ISAF 

headquarters in Kabul, Regional Command South (RC South) in Kandahar, 

Task Force Helmand and also the PRT in Lashkar Gah. Outside the military 

channels were USAID [US Agency for International Development] (the major 

redevelopment entity in Afghanistan), the United Nations (UNICEF [United 

Nations Children’s Fund], WHO [World Health Organization] and UN [United 

Nations] Assistance Mission to Afghanistan ‘UNAMA’) and the International 

Committee of the Red Cross. Also operating in Afghanistan are hundreds of 

NGOs [nongovernmental organizations]. In addition to all these actors, the 

Afghan government itself is in the early stages of its redevelopment and its 

ministries, which control most programs centrally from Kabul, are fledgling 

enterprises with varying degrees of competency.

We hit the ground in Kandahar somewhat blind of this highly complex 

mixture of governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations 

involved in stabilization and reconstruction/redevelopment activities. It was 

only near the end of the deployment did I fully ascertain the depth and 

breadth of agencies and plans at play in Afghanistan.

The impact to any unit deploying to Afghanistan is that there needs to be 

awareness of the agencies, organizations, plans, and programs that are or 

will be in play within an area of operations. This is no small task as there is 

no entity wholly responsible for all these actors and programs; 

consequently, activities can occur within an AO without knowledge of the 

PRT or even the responsible Ministry. Interagency coordination is a 

constant endeavor and will be essential to ensuring unit efforts are 

integrated with big-picture plans.”

SOURCE: After Action Review

Detachment 4-3 

4th Civil Affairs Group

2 October 2008
Chapter IV

IV-22 JP 3-08 

f. Interorganizational Roles and Relationships. USG agency, IGO, and NGO 

preparation, planning, and participation in operations should occur at the earliest phases of 

an anticipated operation. 

(1) The NSC, through the interagency committee system, using IMS if 

activated, designates a lead government agency (normally DOS) for the mission to 

ensure coordination among the various USG agencies. The USG, via the NSC, NSC/PC, 

or NSC/DC, may develop and promulgate a plan for an operation. CCDRs and subordinate 

JFCs participate in POLMIL planning through JS. 

(2) Within the theater, the GCC is the focal point for planning and implementation 

of regional military strategies that require interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination. In 

developing joint operation plans, CCDRs may also (and on OPLANs are directed to) develop 

annex V (Interagency Coordination) to request and guide interagency, IGO, and NGO 

activities with military operations. GCCs should coordinate with OSD and JS to develop 

annex V with the relevant USG agencies. Annex V is moving toward a product, which is 

developed in collaboration with other relevant USG agencies, which participate at the onset 

of the planning process. COAs developed by the GCC’s staff should consider, and 

incorporate as appropriate, relationships that have been developed with USG agencies, IGOs, 

and NGOs.

(a) When developing joint operation plans, planners should seek to identify 

opportunities to support and promote a unified USG approach to achieving national security 

objectives.

(b) Where appropriate, joint operation plans will synchronize the CCDR’s 

military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities with the major national 

security engagement operations, activities, and actions of USG agencies in the AOR. 

(c) When developing and assessing joint operation plans, planners should 

consider analysis of the effectiveness of USG military engagement, security cooperation, and 

deterrence activities by country in meeting US national security policy objectives. Planners 

should identify where the application of DOD resources could be used to address shortfalls 

in achieving priority policy objectives, to include conflict prevention. 

(d) During the development of contingency plans, planners should identify 

decision points and desired interagency preparatory activities required to transition from a 

DOD-supporting to DOD-supported role. 

(e) Contingency plans will establish a framework for estimating interagency 

support to DOD activities and DOD support to civilian activities and then validating, by 

agency, projected support with regard to agency capacity and intentions. 

g. Public Affairs and Media Support. The JFC’s PAO plays a major role in keeping 

USG agencies and NGOs informed on the capability and intent of the joint force and 

coordinating public information activities to ensure consistency of messages. 
Foreign Considerations 

IV-23 

(1) At the national level, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public 

Affairs) (OASD[PA]) interfaces with USG agencies in the NSC/DC and issues PA guidance.

(2) At the theater level, PA planning includes coordination with USG agencies, 

NGOs, the ambassador, the country team (particularly the embassy PAO), the HN, national

and international media, and media elements of member forces. It is essential that the overall 

OPLAN be developed with consideration given to the public communication requirements of 

the operation and associated capabilities needed for execution. Additionally, a PA and 

media plan should be developed before the operation begins. A MOC may be established to 

facilitate the dissemination of information and media coverage of operations and promote 

coordination and responsiveness. When a MOC is established, it is often appropriate to 

include media and PA representatives from the aforementioned organizations. 

(3) Public Affairs Planning with Intergovernmental Organizations. The 

OASD(PA) provides overall PA guidance and coordinates PA actions affecting IGOs. 

Planning for support to UN missions will normally include coordination with UN press 

office personnel through OASD(PA). JTF PA efforts should include the identification of 

POCs and authorized spokespersons within each IGO. 

For additional information on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

7. Joint Task Force Considerations 

a. Mission Analysis

(1) JTF Assessment Team. A valuable tool in the mission analysis process is the 

deployment of a JTF assessment team to the projected JOA. The purpose of the assessment 

team is to establish liaison with the ambassador or COM, country team, HN, and, if present, 

multinational members, UN representatives, and IGO and NGO representatives. USAID, 

because of the extensive contacts it develops in carrying out development work at the 

community level, can provide key situational awareness for JTF assessments. The JTF 

assessment team is similar in composition to the HAST and, if provided early warning of 

pending operations, may be able to conduct assessment in association with the HAST. The 

CJTF determines the composition of the assessment team and should include staff members 

who are subject matter experts and representatives from Service and functional components 

expected to participate in the actual operation. USG agency representation may include the 

USAID/OFDA DART for purposes of FHA operations. Special operations force personnel 

who possess necessary cultural, language, and technical skills may be included. The 

assessment team may also assist in clarifying the mission and determining force 

requirements and force deployment sequences for the JTF. 

(2) Coordinated Operations. Operations by USG agencies, the equivalent 

agencies of other national governments, IGOs, and NGOs, in concert with or supplementing 

those of HN entities, will normally be in progress when US forces arrive in a JOA. 

(3) Priority Task. This may be a military action, a humanitarian task, or a 

combination of both. In certain situations, interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination must be 

a top priority of the CJTF. 
Chapter IV

IV-24 JP 3-08 

(4) Regional Strategy. In further analyzing the mission, consider how the regional 

strategy will affect joint force planning and operations in the projected JOA. The NSC, 

DOS, COM, and the GCC will provide the regional strategy and an appreciation for how the 

regional strategy affects the countries involved in projected operations. This may affect 

COA development, SC themes and messages, and planning and execution activities. A welldefined regional strategy will delineate the military mission and assist in determining force 

requirements and defining the end state.

(5) Political Considerations. The assessment team should include sufficient 

expertise to realistically evaluate the political situation. The JFC should quickly establish 

a relationship with the COM, the country team, the USAID mission director, and USG 

agency representatives in country. To the extent that USG agencies are not present, 

consideration should be given to placing representatives of relevant USG agencies on the 

assessment team.

(a) Situation permitting, the JFC and key staff members should meet with the 

regional and functional elements of the involved USG agencies, JS, and the embassies (in 

Washington, DC) of the nations involved. Establishing an effective working relationship 

with the COM will help in any foreign endeavor. Each US mission, as well as the various 

DOS geographic and functional bureaus involved, will likely provide different perspectives 

and issues to consider. 

(b) Information-sharing relationships between the JTF, local and national 

authorities, the country team, USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs should be established at the 

earliest stages of planning. One of the most important ways to develop confidence and 

facilitate mutually beneficial information exchange with non-USG agencies is to establish a 

clear intent to share information. In this regard, clear guidelines are promulgated to the JFC 

staff in order to avoid over-classification of information and to allow information to be 

declassified as early as operational conditions permit. Commanders should consider local 

and organizational sensitivities to information-gathering activities by joint forces—

especially those that may be interpreted as ‘intelligence collection.’ Additionally, 

commanders may consider providing the appropriate means (e.g., accessible portal, 

communication equipment, and technical support) to IGOs and NGOs to allow for better 

information sharing. It is also desirable to share a COP with personnel from non-DOD 

agencies. Because most COPs are classified, commanders should seek technological 

solutions that offer an unclassified version of the COP to share with participants who do not 

have security clearances. The capacity to access classified information is an issue for USG 

agencies such as USAID. Classified computers may be limited in US embassies and not all 

staff may have access to them.

(6) JTF HQ. The location of the JTF HQ, whether afloat or ashore, is important. 

Not only should it be defensible, it should be geographically positioned to work with the HN 

political and private sectors, relief organizations, the media, and MNFs, if present. 

Proximity to the American embassy or US diplomatic mission may enhance interagency, 

IGO, and NGO coordination. 
Foreign Considerations 

IV-25 

b. Organizational Tools for the JTF. The CJTF should consider the establishment of 

C2 structures that account for and provide coherence to the activities of all elements in the 

JOA. In addition to military operations, these structures should include the political, civil, 

administrative, legal, and humanitarian elements as well as IGOs, NGOs, and the media. 

The CJTF should ultimately consider how joint force actions and those of engaged 

organizations contribute toward the desired end state. This consideration requires extensive 

liaison and routine contact with all involved parties as well as reliable communications. An 

assessment team’s mission analysis will assist the CJTF in the establishment of an executive 

steering group (ESG), CMOC, and liaison teams. 

(1) Executive Steering Group. The ESG is composed of senior military 

representatives from the JTF, principals of the embassy (e.g., ambassador, DCM, political or 

POLMIL counselor), the HN, IGOs, and possibly NGOs present in the JOA. It is the highlevel outlet for the exchange of information about operational policies and for resolution of 

difficulties arising among the various organizations. The ESG is charged with interpreting 

and coordinating strategic policy. The ESG should either be co-chaired by the CJTF and 

ambassador or assigned outright to either individual, depending on the nature of the US 

mission. A commander at any echelon may establish an ESG to serve as a conduit through 

which to provide information and policy guidance to engaged agencies. 

(2) Civil-Military Coordination Board. This board is the CJTF’s vehicle for 

coordinating civil-military support. Membership is typically restricted to key representatives 

from the JTF staff sections involved in CMO. The board can assist commanders in refining 

their intent for CMO in their commander’s intent or recommend a separate intent statement 

just for CMO. CMO is a commander’s responsibility, not the responsibility of the CA 

staff/unit assigned to the JTF. Under certain conditions, the civil-military coordination board 

may include representatives from key IGOs and NGOs.

c. JFCs are responsible to conduct CMO but they may establish a joint civil-military 

operations task force (JCMOTF) when the scope of CMO requires coordination and 

activities beyond that which the organic CMO capability could accomplish. By design, the 

US Army CA command and brigade, the USN maritime CA group, or the Marine Corps CA 

group organizational structure can provide the operational C2 system structure to form a 

JCMOTF. NGOs in the operational area may not have a similarly defined structure for 

controlling activities. Further, many of these organizations may be present in the operational 

area at the invitation and funding of the HN. As such, they may be structured to conform 

with HN regulations or restrictions which may conflict with military operations. 

For additional information on the JCMOTF, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

8. Civil-Military Operations Center

a. The ability of the JTF to work with all organizations and groups is essential to 

mission accomplishment. A relationship normally should be developed between military 

forces, USG agencies, civilian authorities, IGOs, NGOs, and the population. The CMOC is 

a mechanism for the coordination of CMO that can serve as the primary coordination 

interface and provide operational and tactical level coordination between the JFC and other 
Chapter IV

IV-26 JP 3-08 

stakeholders. Despite its name, the CMOC generally does not set policy or direct operations. 

Conceptually, the CMOC is the meeting place of stakeholders. In reality, the CMOC may be 

physical or virtual and conducted collaboratively through online networks. The organization 

of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent—flexible in size and composition. A 

commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC. In fact, more than one CMOC may be 

established in an operational area, and each is task organized based on the mission. 

(1) A CMOC is formed to: 

(a) Carry out guidance and JFC decisions regarding CMO. 

(b) Exchange Information. Sharing information is a key function of the 

CMOC, but military staff must be careful to avoid the impression that stakeholder 

organizations are being used for intelligence gathering. 

(c) Perform liaison and coordination between military capabilities and other 

agencies, departments, and organizations to meet the needs of the populace. 

(d) Provide a forum for military and other participating organizations. It is 

important to remember that these organizations may decide to attend CMOC meetings but 

may choose not to consider themselves members of the CMOC to better maintain their 

impartiality. Many of these organizations consider the CMOC as a venue for informal 

stakeholder discussions but not as a stakeholder coordination forum. 

(e) Receive, validate, and coordinate requests for support from NGOs, IGOs, 

IPI, the private sector, and regional organizations. The CMOC then forwards these requests 

to the joint force for action. 

(2) CMOCs are tailored for each mission. When a CMOC is established, the 

CJTF should invite representatives of other agencies, which may include the following: 

(a) USAID/OFDA representatives.

(b) DOS, country team, and other USG representatives. 

“Our relations with the United Nations/nongovernmental organization (NGO) 

community were furthered greatly by the operations of our three Civil-Military 

Operations Cells (CMOCs). A CMOC gives a deployed commander great 

flexibility. At Entebbe, the CMOC became essentially a part of the Joint Task 

Force (JTF) staff, in Kigali, the CMOC was a separate command, and in Goma, it 

was a part of the JTF staff once more. A CMOC gives a US unit an invaluable 

asset in opening relations with the relief community, which, at least in our 

experience, is extensive. Parts of the NGOs, notably the World Food Programme

and the International Committee of the Red Cross (and others) are well organized 

and experienced in working in this kind of environment. A CMOC gives the JTF 

commander the capability to coordinate and work with these agencies.”

Operation SUPPORT HOPE 1994 After Action Report

Headquarters, United States European Command
Foreign Considerations 

IV-27 

(c) Military liaison personnel from participating countries.

(d) HN or local government agency representatives.

(e) Representatives of IGOs, NGOs, IPI, the private sector (as appropriate), 

and regional organizations. 

(3) For foreign operations, the CMOC may be the focal point where US military 

forces coordinate any support to NGOs. In many cases, however (particularly in FHA), an 

IGO may have already established coordination centers such as the UN cluster system. In 

these cases, the JFC should consider how to leverage such extant structures to perform 

CMOC functions rather than trying to duplicate coordination structures. A JFC may employ 

a CMOC if needed, or provide CMOC capabilities to support HN or civilian partners if 

required to accomplish coordination. If possible, NGO LNOs should be identified to work 

within the CMOC. Often, NGO representatives who are unwilling to come to a military or 

USG facility are more comfortable engaging at a UN or HN run site. As private

organizations, NGOs are very unlikely to place themselves in a supporting role to the 

military. They may, however, accept grant funding from IGOs or USG agencies like 

USAID, thereby taking the role of “implementing partners.” While this relationship is not as 

strong as command authority or even a contract, it does give the granting agency some 

oversight authority over how the funds are spent for the activities specified in that 

agreement.

For additional information on the CMOC, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

b. During large-scale FHA operations, US forces may organize using the CMOC (see 

Figure IV-2). When possible, if both are established, the CMOC should colocate with the 

HOC to facilitate operations and assist in later transition of any CMOC operations to the 

HOC.

c. In FHA operations, the UN organizes along key “clusters” for FHA response. 

Coordination meetings hosted by UN elements may supplant the need for a US-military run 

CMOC. Commanders should be careful to complement rather than compete with the UN 

cluster meetings; NGOs are far more likely to participate in UN-sponsored meetings than 

US- (especially US military) sponsored coordination and deconfliction meetings. 

(1) The UN cluster approach provides the coordination and decision-making 

structures to enhance humanitarian response capacity, predictability, accountability, and 

partnership. The cluster approach aims to ensure that, within the international humanitarian 

response, there is a clear system of leadership and accountability for all the key sectors or 

“Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you 

create a political committee, a civil-military operations center—CMOC—to interface 

with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as 

opposed to a combat or fire support operations center.”

General A. C. Zinni, US Marine Corps

Commander, US Central Command
Chapter IV

IV-28 JP 3-08 

areas of humanitarian activity. The cluster approach is intended, therefore, to strengthen 

rather than to replace sectoral coordination under the overall leadership of the humanitarian 

coordinator, with a view to improve humanitarian response in emergency situations. The 

global clusters include: agriculture; camp coordination/management; early recovery; 

education; emergency shelter; emergency telecommunications; health; logistics; nutrition; 

protection; and water, sanitation, and hygiene. Some or all clusters may be used or modified 

based on the situation. 

(2) The UN may also form a combination of a UN disaster assessment and 

coordination (UNDAC) team, an on-site operations coordination center (OSOCC), or a 

Figure IV-2. Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center

NOTIONAL COMPOSITION OF A

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

ACT advance civilian team

CMOC civil-military operations center

DART disaster assistance response team

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOJ Department of Justice

IGO intergovernmental organization

NGO nongovernmental organization

OFDA Office of US Foreign Disaster 

Assistance

PRT provincial reconstruction team

TREAS Department of the Treasury

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

USAID United States Agency for International 

Development

USG United States Government

LEGEND

CMOC

IGO

Military

NGO

PRT Interagency

United Nations

UNICEF

United Nations 

World Food 

Programme

African Union

United Nations 

High 

Commissioner 

for Refugees

USAID (OFDA/DART)

DOJ, TREAS, ACT, DHS

Red Cross 

Movement

Other Relief 

and Benefit 

Organizations

Field Advance Civilian Team

Civil Affairs Team
Foreign Considerations 

IV-29 

humanitarian operations coordination center (HOCC). These operations centers assist the 

local emergency management authority of the HN to coordinate international relief efforts. 

In NATO or multinational operations the CMOC may be called CIMIC [civil-military 

cooperation]. 

For more information, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

d. The CJTF must carefully consider where to locate the CMOC. Security, FP, and 

easy access for agencies and organizations are all valid considerations. The location should 

be distinct and separate from the joint force operations center, regardless if geographically 

colocated. If security conditions permit, every effort should be made to locate the CMOC 

“outside the wire” in order to maximize participation by IGOs and NGOs that want to 

minimize the appearance of close association with military operations.

e. Political representatives in the CMOC may provide the CJTF with avenues to satisfy 

operational considerations and concerns, resulting in consistency of military and political 

actions. Additionally, the CMOC forum provides stakeholders a single point of coordination 

with the military, which facilitates the unified efforts of a joint force and the relief 

community. 

(1) It is incumbent on the military not to dictate what will happen but to coordinate 

a team approach to problem resolution. 

(2) A JFC cannot direct interagency cooperation among engaged agencies. 

However, working together at the CMOC on issues like security, logistic support, 

information sharing, communications, and other items can build a cooperative spirit among 

all participants. 

f. A CMOC usually conducts daily meetings to identify participants capable of 

fulfilling needs. Validated requests go to the appropriate JTF or agency representative for 

action. Figure IV-3 depicts some of the CMOC functions. 

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER IN PROVIDE COMFORT

Humanitarian relief organizations operating in southern Turkey and northern 

Iraq coordinated their activities with those of the JTF through the CivilMilitary Operations Center (CMOC). The CMOC was colocated with the 

Humanitarian Operations Center that coordinated the activities of the UN and 

other humanitarian relief organizations. The CMOC was coequal with the 

traditional J-staff sections. CMOC military officers coordinated activities 

with both State Department officials and relief workers. The CMOC in Turkey 

demonstrated the efficiency and effectiveness of the concept. It provided a 

focal point for coordination of common civil-military needs and competing 

demands for services and infrastructure, rather than relying on random 

encounters between relief workers and staff officers.

SOURCE: Operations Other Than War, Vol. 1, Humanitarian Assistance, 

Center for Army Lessons Learned, December 1992
Chapter IV

IV-30 JP 3-08 

For further guidance on CMOC, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

g. Liaison Teams. Once established in the JOA and operating primarily from the 

CMOC, or HOC, if established, liaison teams work to foster a better understanding of 

mission and tactics with other forces, facilitate transfer of vital information, enhance mutual 

trust, and develop an increased level of teamwork. 

(1) Liaison is an important aspect of joint force C2. Liaison teams or 

individuals may be dispatched from higher to lower, lower to higher, laterally, or any 

combination of these. In multinational operations, liaison exchange should occur between 

senior and subordinate commands and between lateral or like forces. 

(2) The need for effective liaison is vital when a JTF is deployed and operating 

in conjunction with MNFs. The likelihood that a JTF may operate with not only traditional 

allies, but also with nations with which the US does not have a long history of formal 

military cooperation, requires the CJTF to plan for increased liaison and advisory 

requirements.

Figure IV-3. Civil-Military Operations Center Functions

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

Providing nonmilitary agencies with a focal point for activities and matters 

that are civilian related

Coordinating relief efforts with US or multinational commands, United 

Nations, host nation, and other nonmilitary agencies

Assisting in the transfer of operational responsibility to nonmilitary 

agencies

Facilitating and coordinating activities of the joint force, other on-scene 

agencies, and higher echelons in the military chain of command

Receiving, validating, coordinating, and monitoring requests from 

humanitarian organizations for routine and emergency military support

Coordinating the response to requests for military support with Service 

components

Coordinating requests to nonmilitary agencies for their support

Coordinating with Disaster Assistance Response Team deployed by 

USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

Convening ad hoc mission planning groups to address complex military 

missions that support nonmilitary requirements, such as convoy escort, 

and management and security of refugee camps and feeding centers

Convening follow-on assessment groups

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

CENTER FUNCTIONS
Foreign Considerations 

IV-31 

(3) Qualifications of a JTF LNO assigned to a national or multinational 

operation include a solid knowledge of doctrine, force capabilities, language proficiency, 

regional expertise, and cultural awareness. CA or multinational support teams may be 

available to serve as LNOs. The use of contracted interpreters to augment a liaison team 

may be another option. 

h. Humanitarian Operations Center. During large-scale FHA operations, when it 

becomes apparent that the magnitude of a disaster will exceed a HN’s capacity to manage it 

unilaterally, the HN may want to establish a HOC to facilitate the coordination of 

international aid.

(1) Although the functions of the HOC and CMOC are similar, there is a 

significant difference. The CMOC is established by and works for the CJTF. The HOC is 

normally established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the 

UN, or possibly OFDA during a US unilateral operation. HOCs, especially those established 

by the UN, are horizontally structured organizations with no command or control authority, 

where all members are ultimately responsible to their own organizations or countries. The 

US ambassador or designated representative will have a lead role in the HOC. Additionally, 

the HOC operates at the senior, national level to coordinate strategic and operational unity 

of effort, while the CMOC works at the local level coordinating US actions to achieve 

operational and tactical unity of effort. 

(2) The HOC membership should consist of representatives from the affected 

country, the US embassy or consulate, joint force (most likely from the CMOC), OFDA, 

UN, IGOs, NGOs, and any other major organizations. 

(3) The HOC coordinates the overall relief strategy, identifies logistic requirements 

for the various organizations, and identifies, prioritizes, and submits requests for military 

support to appropriate agencies. Requests for military support may be submitted to the JTF 

through the CMOC. 

(4) An end state goal of the HOC should be to create an environment in which the 

HN is self-sufficient in providing for the population’s humanitarian needs, and no longer

requires external assistance.

For further information on HOC, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

i. CMOC–JIACG (or Equivalent Organization) Relationship. A CA command has 

the capabilities to provide theater-level analysis of civil considerations in coordination with 

the JIACG (or equivalent organization) and to develop strategic-level civil input to the 

supported JFC. A CMO staff section plans, coordinates, and provides staff oversight of 

CMO and civilian component issues through direct coordination with the supported unit’s J3. Throughout the process, this staff section’s plans officer continuously ensures the fusion 

of the civil inputs received from subordinate CA elements, maneuver elements, USG 

agencies, NGOs, IGOs, and HN sources (private/non-private sectors) to the JFC COP. The 

integration of CMO into the staff or working group is imperative. The capabilities of the 
Chapter IV

IV-32 JP 3-08 

private sector partnership when orchestrating interagency coordination can and may prove to 

be highly valuable.

9. Provincial Reconstruction Teams

a. A provincial reconstruction team (PRT) is an interim interagency organization 

designed to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and 

effectiveness of an HN local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens 

and delivering essential government services. PRTs vary in structure, size, and mission. 

PRTs extend the reach, capability, and capacity of governance and facilitate reconstruction. 

While the PRTs are primarily concerned with addressing local conditions, they also work on 

CLUSTER SYSTEM IN HAITI

Following the devastating earthquake in Haiti on January 12, 2010, the 

international humanitarian community has made significant progress in 

establishing humanitarian coordination structures. USAID [US Agency for 

International Development] Disaster Assistance Response Team 

(USAID/DART) staff highlight the critical role of the internationally 

recognized humanitarian cluster system in coordinating response efforts.

Clusters provide a forum for humanitarian organizations to coordinate 

response efforts by sector and are led by designated agencies with relevant 

technical expertise. The cluster system seeks to ensure greater 

predictability and accountability in response efforts, while simultaneously 

strengthening partnerships between agencies. Application of the cluster 

system has contributed to significant progress on a range of issues, 

including broadened partnerships with NGOs [nongovernmental 

organizations]; agreement on common sector standards, tools, and 

guidance; development of common training modules; creation of common 

stockpiles; and development of surge deployment rosters. 

OCHA [Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs] activated twelve 

sector-specific clusters within the first ten days following the crisis. The 

active clusters include: Camp Coordination and Camp Management; 

Education; Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Items; Food Aid; Logistics; 

Nutrition; Protection; WASH [water, sanitation, and hygiene]; Agriculture; 

Early Recovery; Emergency Telecommunications; and Health. Ten 

international humanitarian agencies and the Government of Haiti (GoH) are 

currently serving as lead agencies managing the twelve clusters.

Most NGOs operating in Haiti are participating in the cluster coordination 

structure, due in large part to a consistent message from the UN [United 

Nations], donors, other NGOs, and the GoH that if agencies want to be 

involved in the response, participation in the coordination and planning 

structure is critical.

Various Sources
Foreign Considerations 

IV-33 

building and improving communication and linkages among the central government, 

regional, and local agencies. 

b. In an uncertain environment, a PRT is a civil-military organization that assists with 

development and governance below the national level. PRTs operate by combining security 

forces for protection with other military and civilian personnel for support, development, and 

governance into one cohesive team. PRTs can be led by either a military or DOS officer 

depending on the situation. DOD personnel comprise the security element and personnel 

from appropriate USG agencies comprise the civilian element. PRTs facilitate campaign 

plans in a collapsed state setting or the internal defense and development strategy in an HN.

c. It is vitally important that the PRT leadership ensure that the guidance provided by 

multiple agencies is carefully coordinated and mutually reinforcing, and that they report to 

higher HQ when there are inconsistencies or when difficulties occur. The PRT is an 

important “ground truth” check on interagency coordination at higher levels; if differing 

guidance cannot be integrated at the PRT level, it may indicate disjointed coordination or 

planning at the regional or national level. The PRT’s activities are developed through a 

common assessment of the situation and integrated implementation plan. 

See Appendix F, “Provincial Reconstruction Team,” for a detailed discussion of PRTs. 

d. Other civil-military teams of interagency experts can be formed to conduct specific 

missions such as agricultural, economic, and counterterrorism (CT). The field advance 

civilian teams (FACTs) described in the IMS are one example; JIATFs are another (see 

Appendix E, “Joint Interagency Task Force.” 

10. Strategic Communication

a. SC is a whole-of-government effort involving much more than military activities, and 

therefore requires a high level of coordination and synchronization among interagency 

partners to achieve unity of effort. This is a continuous process that occurs at all levels and 

across the range of interagency operations in order to communicate with friends, general 

populaces, governments, adversaries, and domestic audiences alike, within statutory 

restrictions. The NSC is the overall mechanism by which SC is coordinated across the 

interagency community. CCDRs should provide input into theme, message, and story 

development and delivery through their CJCS representative to the NSC, in coordination 

with OSD. JFCs oversee execution of actions and communication of themes and messages.

b. Effective communication by the United States must build upon coordinated actions 

and information at all levels of the USG to maintain credibility and trust. This will be 

accomplished through an emphasis on accuracy, consistency, veracity, timeliness, and 

transparency in words and deeds. Such credibility is essential to building relationships that 

advance our national interests. 

c. All departments and agencies throughout the USG share responsibility for effective 

SC. Efforts led by the DOS improve the integration of information as a vital instrument of 

national power. This includes developing the most effective processes for communication 

assessment and analysis, and for delivering information to key audiences, both internal and 
Chapter IV

IV-34 JP 3-08 

external. The predominant military activities that support SC themes, messages, images, and 

actions are IO, PA, and DSPD. While CCDRs directly control assigned PA and IO assets, 

they do not direct those assets engaged in public diplomacy, which are the responsibility of 

DOS or the local US embassy. This highlights the interagency nature of SC. 

d. The synchronized application of IO enables the JFC to affect and influence a 

situation by enabling joint forces freedom of operation across the information environment. 

While IO is focused on creating effects against adversaries for the JFC and preventing 

adversaries from doing the same to us, there is a broader set of DOD information activities 

that serve USG interests. For example, DOD may collaborate with other agencies for public 

diplomacy programs that directly support DOD’s mission.

e. What the media reports has a substantial influence on public attitudes about 

operations, which in turn can drive policy decisions. Most USG agencies have media 

engagement representatives dedicated to reporting their activities, each with multiple sources 

within the respective organization. DOD primary representatives for this effort are PA. At 

the slightest indication of a potential operation, the media will be asking for information and 

having a dramatic influence on the interagency, IGO, and NGO process—whether at the 

strategic decision-making level of the NSC or in the field as IGOs and NGOs vie for public 

attention and necessary charitable contributions. Responding to competing or contradictory 

news reports can divert valuable resources from planning and execution. It is imperative 

for commanders and their staffs to consider the impact that information has on the 

operation and in the interagency process, to ensure that plans adequately address PA, 

and that there is substantial PA expertise involved in crisis planning for operations. 

The White House Office of Global Communications facilitates White House and interagency 

efforts to communicate with foreign audiences. The DOS Bureau of International 

Information Programs is the international communications service for the US foreign affairs 

community. Commanders and their staffs should plan for PA activities to function in 

coordination with national-level communication initiatives. All participating agencies and 

organizations need to establish and agree early in the planning process on procedures for 

media access, issuing and verifying credentials, briefing, escorting, and transporting of 

media members and their equipment. Planners must include the development of PA 

guidance as part of the interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination before executing the plan. 

This guidance provides a common reference for all military and USG organizations. Clearly 

established responsibility for interaction with the media ensures, to the extent possible, the 

media hears a constant theme. Commanders should identify appropriate spokespersons, and 

plans should include when, how, and from which locations they will address media. 

f. The need for clear and coordinated whole-of-government themes is paramount. 

Equally important is that the subordinate themes, messages, or story are appropriately 

delivered and tailored to the target audience. Cultural understanding and knowledge of the 

key communicators within the operational area are essential. For example, it is imperative to 

understand (or at least have an appreciation for) the values system of the target audience. 

This understanding enables a better connection with the people and gives us an advantage 

with which to discredit adversary IO. What worked in one environment will not necessarily 

work due to central versus decentralized government, different value systems, completely 

different media and communication means, and the sophistication level of the population. 
Foreign Considerations 

IV-35 

With the greater dispersion of units and the decentralized nature of operations, more junior 

leaders will be engaging with the leaders in the indigenous population and with the media. 

Execution of SC includes synchronizing themes, messages, images and actions; selecting the 

proper delivery vehicle; optimizing types of media; and integrating beliefs and attitudes that 

influence the intended audience. Leaders should work to understand the media landscape, 

but also consider the impact of timing and tempo of any information released to the media, 

and how the information will be received by the intended and unintended audiences. 

g. CCDRs and staffs should include SC considerations in planning for joint operations 

and in the interagency process. Each USAID country mission also has a communications 

and outreach strategy. Each of the communication activities under the direction of the 

CCDR have the ability to influence and inform key foreign audiences through words, 

images, and actions to foster understanding of US policy and advance US interests. 

Collaboratively, they can help shape the operational environment. CCDRs plan, execute, 

and assess these activities to implement security cooperation plans in support of US 

embassies’ information programs, public diplomacy, and PA programs directly supporting 

DOD missions. However, as for any mission or operation, close coordination with the 

CCDR’s legal office, and affected staff office (e.g., PA) or agency representative (e.g., DOS, 

DHS) is prudent. 

h. DSPD are those activities and measures taken by the DOD components to support 

and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the USG.

(1) DSPD ensures DOD supports a coherent and compelling DOS “diplomacy of 

deeds” in concert with other USG agencies. DOS maintains the lead for public diplomacy 

with the DOD in a supporting role. Through DSPD, DOD collaborates with other USG 

agencies for public diplomacy programs that directly support the DOD mission. It is critical 

that all DOD information activities be conducted in concert with the broader USG SC effort 

and support the NSS. 

(2) DSPD can collaboratively shape the operational environment in support of USG 

information activities through security cooperation efforts. 

(3) DSPD activities can also collaboratively shape the operational environment in 

support of USG information activities through efforts that may include, but are not limited 

to, humanitarian and civic assistance, FHA, counterdrug activities, and activities supporting 

global CT. 

(4) DSPD activities should be documented in paragraph 3.b.(5) of annex Y, 

(Strategic Communication), of the joint operation plan. 

(5) DSPD activities include: 

(a) Identify target audiences, assign responsibility, and outline specific plans 

for communicating key public diplomacy programs and policies to target audiences. 

(b) Identify partners with whom DOD works. 
Chapter IV

IV-36 JP 3-08 

(c) Identify subject matter experts who can explain and advocate US policy. 

(d) Identify workers who speak foreign languages and could 

translate/participate in interviews. 

(e) Recommend envoys to advance public diplomacy efforts. 

(f) Outline current activities and programs that can be linked to support global 

public diplomacy. 

(g) Develop criteria to evaluate effectiveness.

For more information, refer to the US National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic 

Communication and Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication.
A-1 

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

 Annex A Department of Agriculture 

 B Department of Commerce 

 C Department of Defense 

 D Department of Energy 

 E Department of Homeland Security

 F Department of Justice 

 G Department of State 

 H Department of Transportation 

 I Department of the Treasury 

 J Central Intelligence Agency 

 K National Security Council 

 L Peace Corps 

 M United States Agency for International Development 

 N Environmental Protection Agency 

 O General Services Administration

 P Office of the Director of National Intelligence

 Q Department of Labor 

 R Department of Health and Human Services

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

1. This appendix provides descriptions of USG agencies with which DOD has frequent 

interaction or that a deployed joint force may encounter during operations. 

2. The description of individual agencies is limited to those components that DOD may 

normally encounter. Issues of mutual interest and considerations are highlighted. 

3. The Snapshot of Emerging US Government Civilian Capabilities to Support Foreign 

Reconstruction and Stabilization Contingencies, Institute for Defense Analyses document D3269, provides a May 2006 snapshot of the emerging civilian capabilities of the USG to plan 

and conduct R&S operations during interventions in foreign nations. 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
A-A-1 

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A 

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

1. Overview

The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) (http://www.usda.gov) provides leadership 

on food, agriculture, natural resources, and related issues based on sound public policy, the 

best available science, and efficient management. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. Within the USDA, most day-to-day international responsibilities are exercised by the 

Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). FAS has the primary responsibility for USDA’s 

international activities—market development and agricultural trade agreements, food aid 

programs, and agricultural development assistance. 

b. The agency is represented by agricultural counselors and attachés working with US 

embassies throughout the world. FAS has a global network of agricultural economists, 

marketing experts, negotiators, and other specialists that few organizations can equal. FAS 

agricultural counselors, attachés, trade officers, and locally employed FAS staff stationed in 

over 90 countries support US agricultural interests. In addition to agricultural affairs offices 

in US embassies, agricultural trade offices also have been established in a number of key 

markets and function as service centers for US exporters and foreign buyers seeking market 

information. FAS overseas offices serve as the USDA’s “eyes and ears” for monitoring 

international issues. FAS counselors and attachés work hand-in-hand with the country’s 

ambassador and other members of the country team. They work to ensure that agriculture’s 

market access, food aid, capacity building, biotechnology, and information gathering remain 

at the forefront.

3. Organizational Structure

For field coordination, initial contact should be made through the FAS agricultural 

counselor or attaché, or directly to FAS, Office of Capacity Building and Development 

(OCBD), if there is no agricultural office. To coordinate agricultural development and 

emergency technical assistance, the FAS/OCBD has major responsibilities. The Deputy 

Administrator for FAS/OCBD has the authority to accept funding and implementation 

responsibilities on behalf of the USDA technical agencies, and to assist in the

implementation process. FAS/OCBD also coordinates USDA relations with a variety of 

governmental organizations, IGOs, and NGOs. 

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. FAS carries out a broad array of international training, technical assistance, and other 

collaborative activities with developing and transitional countries to facilitate trade and 

promote food security. In order to increase the benefits to developing nations participating 

in global agricultural markets, FAS offers numerous trade capacity-building programs. 
Annex A to Appendix A 

A-A-2 JP 3-08 

b. FAS helps nations understand and prepare for meeting World Trade Organization 

requirements. FAS helps countries focus on the critical role science and technology can play 

in raising agricultural productivity in an environmentally sustainable way. This includes 

assistance in developing appropriate policies and institutions to facilitate research and 

technology transfer in order to increase incomes, reduce hunger, and improve nutrition. 

c. The FAS Cochran Fellowship Program brings agriculturists to the United States to 

give them exposure to such areas as US economic policies, agricultural business practices 

and products, and biotechnology benefits and safeguards. 

d. Around the globe, FAS responds to special needs as they arise, such as contributing 

to reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, including helping them develop appropriate 

agricultural institutions and policies.

5. Department of Defense/United States Department of Agriculture Coordination

USDA maintains surveillance of agricultural products and guards against potential plant 

or animal infestations entering the United States through global distribution ports of 

debarkation. All forces and materiel returning to the United States and its territories through 

the global distribution network require USDA inspection. Retrograde and return planning 

must include arrangements for cleaning and USDA inspection prior to shipment from the 

theater. Failure to do so may result in serious delays to the shipment and significant costs to 

the shipper Service. Coordination with USDA will be especially important in the event of 

exposure to a CBRN environment. USDA also provides ongoing agricultural technical 

assistance in many overseas areas and can develop coordinated DOD CMO and USDA 

projects for given countries or regions. 
A-B-1 

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX A 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

1. Overview

The mission of DOC is to promote job creation, economic growth, sustainable 

development, and improved living standards for all Americans by working in partnership 

with businesses, universities, communities, and workers to: 

a. Build for a future and promote US competitiveness in the global marketplace, by 

strengthening and safeguarding the Nation’s economic infrastructure. 

b. Keep America competitive with cutting-edge science and technology and an 

unrivaled information base. 

c. Provide effective management and stewardship of our Nation’s resources and assets 

to ensure sustainable economic opportunities. 

2. Capacity Building Roles

a. DOC is the primary USG agency for challenges and opportunities in the following 

areas:

(1) Building government to government relationships with HN ministry level 

representatives from trade, industry, and economic development related ministries. 

(2) Resolving international trade issues.

(3) Understanding the economic impact of weather and protecting maritime 

resources.

(4) Advising HNs on government economic statistical reporting, census, and 

measures of standards and weights.

(5) Developing private sector economic growth and job creation strategies. 

(6) Developing telecommunications policies to encourage infrastructure 

development and to leverage e-commerce, e-government, and educational goals. 

b. DOC has an international presence through several different bureaus. The 

International Trade Administration (ITA) has Foreign Commercial Service officers in most 

embassies and has resident country desk expertise. The NOAA has worldwide weather 

monitoring capability and participates in a wide variety of international, scientific, technical, 

policy, and political forums. Internationally, NOAA supports and promotes national policies 

and interests in ecosystem-based management, climate change, earth observation, and 

weather forecasting and will seek to maximize the mutual benefits of international exchange 

with its global partners. NOAA also has Uniformed Services personnel who can provide 

liaison support to DOD. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration
Annex B to Appendix A 

A-B-2 JP 3-08 

(NTIA) routinely participates in US delegations globally and works directly with foreign 

colleagues around the world, particularly with respect to information sharing and technical 

assistance.

c. The DOC has a number of intelligence and national security functions to include 

overseeing the export of sensitive technology, reviewing the Coastal Zone Management Act 

for national security impact, assessing the financial health and economic competitiveness of 

US industries that support defense capabilities and requirements under the Defense 

Production Act of 1950 and its amendments, and supporting measures to prevent the 

proliferation of WMD. 

3. Organizational Structure

DOC has numerous agencies that are capable of supporting R&S operations in a GCC’s 

area:

a. ITA’s mission is to help assure the continued ability of US firms and workers to 

compete and win in the global marketplace and to create prosperity by strengthening the 

competitiveness of US industry, promoting trade and investment, and ensuring fair trade and 

compliance with trade laws and agreements.

b. NOAA is an environmental science agency whose mission is to understand and 

predict changes in the Earth’s environment and conserve and manage coastal and marine 

resources to meet the Nation’s economic, social, and environmental needs. The DOC works 

to advance the Nation’s role in the global economy through NOAA’s responsibilities for 

maintaining and improving the viability of marine and coastal ecosystems; delivering 

valuable weather, climate, and water information and services; understanding the processes 

and consequences of climate change; and supporting the global commerce and transportation 

upon which everyone depends. 

c. Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP) helps achieve economic US foreign 

policy goals in developing and post-conflict countries through commercial legal reforms 

accomplished with direct government-to-government technical assistance programs 

developed by CLDP in collaboration with the HN to affect meaningful and lasting change to 

the legal and judicial environment in those countries. 

d. Economics and Statistics Administration’s mission is to: help maintain a sound 

federal statistical system that monitors and measures America’s rapidly changing economic 

and social arrangements; improve understanding of the key forces at work in the economy 

and the opportunities they create for improving the well-being of Americans; develop new 

ways to disseminate information using the most advanced technologies; and support the 

information and analytic needs of the DOC and the Executive Branch.

e. National Institute of Standards and Technology’s mission is to advance 

measurements and standards so that the next wave of innovation can peak and reach its full 

potential in the marketplace and in terms of practical application and social utility.
Department of Commerce 

A-B-3 

f. NTIA is responsible for the development of domestic and international 

telecommunications and information policy for the Executive Branch, for ensuring the 

efficient and effective use of the federal radio spectrum, and for performing state-of-the-art 

telecommunications research, engineering, and planning. In addition, Congress has assigned 

to NTIA significant roles in the transition to digital television, the development of public 

safety interoperable communications, and most recently the deployment of broadband 

services under the authority of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 

NTIA’s policy, spectrum management, research, and grant programs support emerging 

technologies and uses of spectrum resources for affordable, alternative communications 

services. NTIA programs support an environment that fosters private sector innovation in 

telecommunications. 

g. Bureau of Industry and Security’s mission is to advance US national security, foreign 

policy, and economic objectives by ensuring an effective export control and treaty 

compliance system and by promoting continued US strategic technology leadership. 

h. US Patent and Trademark Office fosters innovation and competitiveness by 

providing high quality and timely examination of patent and trademark applications, guiding 

domestic and international intellectual property policy, and delivering intellectual property 

information and education worldwide. 

i. Economic Development Administration’s (EDA) mission is to lead the federal 

economic development agenda by promoting innovation and competitiveness, preparing 

American regions for growth and success in the worldwide economy. EDA gives funding 

priority to investment proposals that support: long-term, coordinated, and collaborative 

regional economic development approaches; innovation and competitiveness; 

entrepreneurship; and connecting regional economies with the worldwide marketplace.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. ITA can conduct capacity building in the HN by encouraging economic reforms that 

foster private sector development, economic growth, and job creation. ITA has staff in most 

embassies. ITA comprises the following divisions: 

(1) Market Access and Compliance Division is focused on obtaining market access 

for American firms and workers and achieving full compliance by foreign nations with trade 

agreements signed with the ITA and is a key player in promoting trade initiatives aimed at 

fostering economic growth and stability in a region. Creating market access for American 

firms in a region often means working to strengthen the overall business climate including 

the rule of law, thus clearing the way for improved bilateral and multilateral commercial 

relationships. Market Access and Compliance Division has been involved with 

reconstruction opportunity zones and reconstruction investment task forces in post-conflict 

and fragile countries. Market Access and Compliance Division houses in-country and issue 

experts whose primary focus is on gaining market access for American firms and workers.

(2) Manufacturing and Services Division has ITA’s industry sector expert desks 

where industry experts and economists perform strategic research and analysis in order to 
Annex B to Appendix A 

A-B-4 JP 3-08 

shape and implement trade policy, create conditions that encourage innovation, lower the 

cost of doing business, and promote US economic growth. 

(3) US and Foreign Commercial Service Division is the trade promotion unit of 

ITA that has a presence in most embassies. Services provided include business counseling, 

“matchmaking” with HN businesses, direct introduction to key decision makers, and 

advocacy assistance for US companies. It publishes “country commercial guides” for doing 

businesses in countries where they have a presence.

(4) Import Administration Division has a Subsidies Enforcement Office that 

consults with developing countries on ways that they can setup laws and establish certain 

economic policies that do not run afoul of World Trade Organization subsidies obligations. 

The Office of Policy conducts technical exchanges on trade remedies with trading partners, 

including developing countries. The purpose of these exchanges is to engage trade law 

authorities in other countries on the implementation and administration of trade law 

remedies, including antidumping and countervailing duty laws. Many of these exchanges are 

held with developing countries to promote familiarity with rule of law principles and 

transparency. Import Administration Division also has expertise on privatization of stateowned enterprises and market mechanisms. Import Administration Division has extensive 

knowledge of general business practices, including product flow (e.g., distribution 

chain/logistics), marketing practices, export strategies, international subsidy disciplines, and 

management and accounting practices, for a wide range of foreign industries, including both 

manufacturing and agriculture. 

b. NOAA

(1) National Weather Service (NWS) provides weather, hydrologic, and climate 

forecasts and warnings for the United States, its territories, adjacent waters, and ocean areas 

for the protection of life and property and enhancement of the national economy. NWS data 

and products form a national information database and infrastructure which can be used by 

other governmental agencies, the private sector, the public, and the global community. 

Several specialized organizations within the NWS provide support to DOD.

(a) The Aviation Weather Center delivers consistent, timely, and accurate 

weather information for the world airspace system to enhance safe and efficient flight.

(b) The Climate Prediction Center delivers climate prediction, monitoring, and 

assessment products for timescales from weeks to years to the Nation and the global 

community for the protection of life and property, and the enhancement of the economy. 

(c) The Hydro-meteorological Prediction Center provides nationwide forecast, 

guidance, and analysis products and services in support of the daily forecasting activities of 

the NWS and its customers, and tailored weather support to other government agencies in 

emergency and special situations.

(d) The Ocean Prediction Center (OPC) primary responsibility is the issuance 

of marine warnings, forecasts, and guidance in text and graphical format for maritime users. 

Also, the OPC quality controls marine observations globally from ship, buoy, and automated 
Department of Commerce 

A-B-5 

marine observations for gross errors prior to being assimilated into computer model 

guidance. The OPC also provides forecast points in coordination with the National 

Hurricane Center. OPC originates and issues marine warnings and forecasts, continually 

monitors and analyzes maritime data, and provides guidance of marine atmospheric variables 

for purposes of protection of life and property, safety at sea, and enhancement of economic 

opportunity. 

(e) The Space Weather Prediction Center delivers space weather products and 

services that meet the evolving needs of the Nation.

(f) The Storm Prediction Center exists solely to protect life and property of the 

American people through the issuance of timely and accurate watch and forecast products 

dealing with tornadoes, wildfires, and other hazardous meso-scale weather phenomena.

(g) The National Hurricane Center mission is to save lives, mitigate property 

loss, and improve economic efficiency by issuing the best watches, warnings, forecasts, and 

analyses of hazardous tropical weather, and by increasing understanding of these hazards. 

Through international agreement, the center has responsibility within the World 

Meteorological Organization to generate and coordinate tropical cyclone analysis and 

forecast products for twenty-four countries in the Americas, Caribbean, and for the waters of 

the North Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and eastern North Pacific Ocean. 

Its products are distributed through a close working relationship with the media and 

emergency management communities.

(h) Central Pacific Hurricane Center issues tropical cyclone warnings, watches, 

advisories, discussions, and statements for all tropical cyclones in the Central Pacific from 

140 Degrees West Longitude to the International Dateline. 

(i) The NWS operates the West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center, 

Pacific Tsunami Warning Center, and International Tsunami Information Center. The 

International Tsunami Information Center monitors and recommends operational 

improvements to the Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific, and by working with countries 

to increase tsunami awareness and preparedness, and promote education and research. 

(j) NOAA shares weather and climate data with a number of countries and is 

actively involved in the Global Earth Observing System of Systems. 

(2) National Marine Fisheries Service is responsible for the management and 

conservation of living marine resources within the US Exclusive Economic Zone. It also 

provides critical scientific and policy leadership in the international arena and plays a key 

role in the management of living marine resources in coastal areas under state jurisdiction. 

The service implements science-based conservation and management measures and actions 

aimed at sustaining long-term use and promoting the health of coastal and marine 

ecosystems. It is responsible for conducting environmental permitting or consultations 

related to the Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, Essential Fish 

Habitat under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, and other 

statutes. It can also apply its expertise in restoration planning, technology, and 
Annex B to Appendix A 

A-B-6 JP 3-08 

implementation to serious ecological challenges, including ecological risk assessment of 

contamination in key areas, recommend appropriate remedial actions, and provide training 

and capacity building. 

(3) National Ocean Service provides science-based solutions through collaborative 

partnerships to address evolving economic, environmental, and social pressures on our 

oceans and coasts. 

(a) The Center for Operational Oceanographic Products and Services collects 

and distributes oceanographic observations and predictions to ensure safe, efficient, and 

environmentally sound maritime commerce, sound coastal management, and recreation. 

(b) The National Geodetic Survey develops and maintains a national system of 

positioning data needed for transportation, navigation, and communications systems; land 

record systems; mapping and charting efforts; and defense operations. The centerpiece of 

this system is the National Spatial Reference System. It is a national coordinate system that 

defines position (latitude, longitude, and elevation), distances, directions between points, 

strength of gravitational pull, and how these change over time. 

(c) The Office of Coast Survey is the Nation’s nautical chart maker. It 

promotes safe navigation, meets the challenges of providing navigational products to deep 

draft ships and those that carry hazardous cargo, and provides data for geographic 

information system analysis, coastal stewardship, management decisions, shoreline change 

analysis, and marine boundary issues. It produces hydrographic surveys that support 

commercial shipping, fishing industry, USN and USCG operations, state and local 

governments, geographic information system users, and recreational boaters throughout the 

US. 

(d) The Office of Response and Restoration provides scientific support to 

prepare for and respond to oil and chemical spills and marine debris. It determines injury to 

natural resources from contaminant releases; protects and restores marine and coastal habitat 

at hazardous waste sites; assesses the environmental impact of marine debris on our trust 

resources and navigational waterways; and applies scientific expertise to address 

environmental challenges on a local and regional level. 

(4) The Office of Marine and Aviation Operations operates a wide variety of 

specialized aircraft and ships to complete NOAA’s environmental and scientific datagathering missions. The Director of the Office of Marine and Aviation Operations is also the 

director of the NOAA Commissioned Officer Corps. 

(a) NOAA’s Aircraft Operations Center located at MacDill Air Force Base in 

Tampa, Florida is the home to NOAA’s fleet of aircraft. These aircraft support NOAA’s 

atmospheric, marine resource, coastal mapping, and hurricane surveillance/research 

programs. 

(b) NOAA’s ship fleet provides hydrographic survey, oceanographic and 

atmospheric research, and fisheries research vessels to support NOAA’s missions. The 
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A-B-7 

vessels are home-ported in various locations throughout the US. The ships are managed by 

the Marine Operations Centers in Norfolk, Virginia, and Seattle, Washington. 

(c) The NOAA Commissioned Officer Corps is one of seven Uniformed 

Services of the United States. The Service, consisting of approximately 320 commissioned 

officers, provides a cadre of professionals trained in engineering, earth sciences, 

oceanography, meteorology, fisheries science, and other related disciplines. Officers operate 

ships, fly aircraft, manage research projects, conduct diving operations, and serve in staff 

positions throughout NOAA. The Corps provides officers technically competent to assume 

positions of leadership and command in NOAA and DOC programs. Statutory authority 

exists to transfer NOAA Corps Officers to the Armed Forces during times of war or national 

emergency (Title 33, USC, Section 3061). 

(5) The National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service is 

dedicated to providing timely access to global environmental data from satellites and other 

sources to promote, protect, and enhance the Nation’s economy, security, environment, and 

quality of life. 

(a) The Search and Rescue Satellite Aided Tracking program is an integral part 

of a worldwide SAR system. NOAA operates the system to detect and locate mariners, 

aviators, and recreational enthusiasts in distress almost anywhere in the world at anytime and 

in almost any condition. The US mission control center sends distress alerts to rescue 

coordination centers in the US operated by the USCG and United States Air Force (USAF) 

and other SAR authorities.

(b) The Office of Satellite Operations manages and directs the operation of 

NOAA’s environmental satellites and the acquisition of remotely sensed data. The Office 

has operational responsibility for the Satellite Operations Control Center at Suitland, 

Maryland, and the Command and Data Acquisition facilities at Wallops, Virginia, and 

Fairbanks, Alaska, to control the satellites, and to acquire their data. The Office of Satellite 

Operations supports the launch, activation, and evaluation of new satellites and the in-depth 

assessment of satellite and ground systems anomalies. In addition, it operates the polar 

orbiting satellites in the Defense Meteorology Satellite Program under a MOA between the 

USAF Space Command and the National Satellite and Information Service Integrated 

Program Office.

(c) The Cooperative Operational Processing Centers are the principal agents of 

the Interdepartmental Committee for Meteorological Services and Supporting Research. As 

such, they work to coordinate the open exchange of information concerning numerical 

weather and ocean prediction modeling efforts; data resources or problems; and atmospheric, 

oceanographic, and satellite products. It represents the three components of the USG most 

engaged in the coordination of the operational ingest and processing of environmental data; 

as well as data assimilation, analysis, and prediction efforts. The standing committee is 

comprised of members from NOAA, represented by the National Centers for Environmental 

Protection and NOAA’s Office of Satellite Data Processing and Distribution; the USN 

represented by the Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center and the Naval 

Oceanographic Office; and the USAF represented by the USAF Weather Agency.
Annex B to Appendix A 

A-B-8 JP 3-08 

c. CLDP has extensive capacity development initiatives in developing regions. CLDP 

has partnered with several agencies to conduct programs. CLDP uniquely provides 

government-to-government, regulator-to-regulator technical assistance across a broad 

spectrum of commercial law issues. CLDP programming is demand driven, led by foreign 

language fluent attorneys and responds to the needs of key legislators and regulators to 

enable them to reach their economic reform goals. CLDP programs include lawmakers, 

regulators, judges, lawyers, and educators from around the world. Examples of technical 

assistance programs conducted are intellectual property protection, commercial law 

consultations, model investment law, alternative dispute resolution, judicial training and 

court management, model regional ethics code, and promoting doing business with the US 

seminars. 

d. Economics and Statistics Administration

(1) The Bureau of Economic Analysis produces economic accounts statistics that 

enable government and business decision makers, researchers, and the American public to 

follow and understand the performance of the Nation’s economy. It has provided advice and 

training for economists and statisticians from HNs on topics related to national economic 

accounting such as measures of gross domestic product. 

(2) The US Census Bureau has aided HNs in developing and ensuring sound 

statistical practices that include data collection on the Nation’s people and its economy. 

Technical assistance has included assisting countries in preparing for a national census. 

e. The National Institute of Standards and Technology promotes US innovation and 

industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in 

ways that enhance economic security and improve our quality of life. The agency’s technical 

contributions open the way to progress in areas ranging from nano-technology and solar 

energy to fire protection, HS protection, and cybersecurity. In addition, it is an integral 

component of the global trading system. Along with its counterpart national measurement 

institutes in other countries, it forms the foundation of the international measurement system. 

The institute can coordinate internally and with the American National Standards Institute as 

the primary interface for the US private sector standards and conformity assessment systems 

to identify US based standards developers that have expertise and/or standards to contribute 

to the reconstruction effort, particularly in the building and construction sectors. 

f. NTIA serves as the President’s principal advisor on telecommunications and 

information/communications policies. NTIA manages the federal use of the 

telecommunications spectrum; performs cutting-edge telecommunications research and 

engineering, including resolving technical telecommunications issues for USG and private 

sector; and administers infrastructure and public telecommunications facilities grants. The 

Office of International Affairs develops and implements policies to enhance US companies’ 

ability to compete globally in the information and communication technology sectors. In 

consultation with USG agencies and the private sector, the office participates in international 

and regional forums to promote policies that open information and communication 

technology markets and encourage competition. NTIA is an active partner in 

telecommunications policy and economic development activities in many emerging markets. 
Department of Commerce 

A-B-9 

NTIA serves on the board and provides instructors for the US Telecommunications Training 

Institute. NTIA serves on the US delegation with DOS and the Federal Communications 

Commission to the International Telecommunication Union, discussing issues of global 

importance. NTIA serves on US delegations to the International Telecommunications 

Satellite Organization, which oversees its provisioning of life-line connectivity to developing 

countries. NTIA is also active on telecommunications policy development projects in the 

International Telecommunication Union’s Development sector, and serves on the US 

delegation to the quadrennial assembly. NTIA can assist HNs in the drafting of regulations 

for an independent telecommunications regulator, establishing universal service or access 

goals, understanding issues relating to Internet governance, and building capacity in 

cybersecurity. NTIA advises HNs in granting of wireless service licenses.

g. The Bureau of Industry and Security can send export control professionals to the 

HN to assist in the development of an effective export control system. It works with the HN 

on its compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons 

Convention. It will also create expedited licensing processes or amend its regulations to 

allow other USG agencies to export dual-use items to the HN with minimal delays, 

particularly if the destination is subject to an embargo. The bureau has conducted export 

control training for HNs. 

h. US Patent and Trademark Office administers the patent and trademark laws of the 

US and promotes improved protection for intellectual property rights (patents, trademarks, 

copyrights, designs, plant varieties, trade secrets, etc.) worldwide. Improved intellectual 

property systems serve as a tool for economic, cultural, and social development and 

stimulate domestic and foreign investment and technology transfer. In support of the US 

Trade Representative and other USG agencies, it assists in the negotiation of intellectual 

property rights provisions of free trade and other international agreements. The office also 

coordinates, organizes, and participates in intellectual property rights training, trade capacity 

building, and technical assistance programs throughout the world to aid the development of 

effective legal regimes. The office’s Global Intellectual Property Academy conducts 

approximately 35 domestic-based educational programs annually for foreign government 

officials responsible for national intellectual property office administration, copyright 

administration, intellectual property and trade policy, law enforcement, and/or judicial 

administration. 

i. EDA was established to generate jobs, help retain existing jobs, and stimulate 

industrial and commercial growth in economically distressed areas of the US. In fulfilling its 

mission, EDA is guided by the basic principle that distressed communities must be 

empowered to develop and implement their own economic development and revitalization 

strategies. EDA works in partnership with state and local governments, regional economic 

development districts, public and private nonprofit organizations, and Indian Tribes. EDA 

helps distressed communities address problems associated with long-term economic distress, 

as well as sudden and severe economic dislocations including recovering from the economic 

impacts of natural disasters, the closure of military installations and other federal facilities, 

changing trade patterns, and the depletion of natural resources.
Annex B to Appendix A 

A-B-10 JP 3-08 

5. Interagency Relationships

a. DOC is assigned as the support agency for several ESFs within the NRF. The type of 

assistance provided by DOC is determined by the nature of the emergency.

b. DOC is a participant in the whole-of-government approach to R&S operations led by 

S/CRS. DOC, along with other executive agencies, is identifying its R&S capabilities, 

bureau expertise, and potential resources that can be contributed to an integrated USG R&S

response. 

c. DOC provides ongoing technical assistance in many countries and can develop 

coordinated DOD CMO and DOC projects for given countries or regions. NOAA is engaged 

with the USN in the Global Fleet Station pilot program, SAR satellite aided tracking rescue 

coordination centers with the USN and USAF, and providing scientific support to the USCG

and USN on oil spill cleanup and recovery for both inland and coastal areas. EDA has 

developed economic recovery strategies for communities impacted by base closings. 

d. DOC has demonstrated its ability to support post-conflict operations through its 

actions in Iraq and Afghanistan: 

(1) Iraq/Afghanistan Investment and Reconstruction Task Force. 

(2) US Commercial Service post in Baghdad and the “Iraq-in-Amman” unit. 

Supported trade missions to Iraq and Afghanistan. 

(3) Advisors to the Coalition Provisional Authority advising the transitional Iraqi 

government on free market reforms. The Office of General Counsel provided assistance that 

liberalized Iraq’s rules on foreign investment. The US Patent and Trademark Office advised 

on the amendments made to Iraqi laws on trademarks, patents, and copyrights. NTIA 

advised on establishing an independent telecommunications regulator, the Iraqi 

Communications and Media Commission. NTIA advised on the licensing of three wireless 

service operators in Iraq leading to the first major foreign investment in Iraq.

(4) ITA continues to develop trade policy and capacity-building initiatives for Iraq 

and Afghanistan. CLDP is providing technical assistance to Iraqi authorities on laws and 

regulations governing Iraq’s oil and gas sector to ensure that they comply with international 

legal standards. Office of General Counsel continues to advise an NSC-led interagency 

lawyers group on economic legal issues of Iraq’s economic transformation. 

e. DOC has significant capacity building capabilities that have been and can be used to 

promote “smart power” when working with HNs in the pursuit of national security 

objectives.

f. DOD use of DOC capacity building efforts may be on a reimbursable basis.
A-C-1 

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

1. Overview

a. The mission of DOD is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to 

protect the security of our country. 

b. The purpose of the Armed Forces is to fight and win the Nation’s wars. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. As prescribed by higher authority, DOD will maintain and employ Armed Forces 

to fulfill the following aims: 

(1) Support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all 

enemies, foreign and domestic.

(2) Ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United 

States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interests.

(3) Uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.

b. The President of the United States. The President exercises authority and 

control of the Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command. 

One branch runs from the President, through SecDef, to the commanders of combatant 

commands for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The other branch, used 

for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant 

commands, runs from the President through SecDef to the Secretaries of the Military 

Departments.

c. Secretary of Defense. SecDef is the principal assistant to the President for all 

DOD matters, with authority, direction, and control over the entire DOD. 

d. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CJCS is the principal military advisor to 

the President, the NSC, and SecDef. CJCS functions under the authority, direction, and 

control of SecDef, transmits communications between SecDef and CCDRs, and oversees 

activities of CCDRs as directed by SecDef.

e. The Military Departments. The authority vested in the Secretaries of the 

Military Departments in the performance of their role to organize, train, equip, and 

provide forces runs from the President through SecDef to the Secretaries. Then, to the 

degree established by the Secretaries or specified in law, this authority runs through the 

Service Chiefs to the Service component commanders assigned to the combatant 

commands and to the commanders of forces not assigned to the combatant commands. 

This administrative control provides for the preparation of military forces and their 

administration and support, unless such responsibilities are specifically assigned by 

SecDef to another DOD component. 
Annex C to Appendix A

A-C-2 JP 3-08 

f. Combatant Commanders. CCDRs exercise combatant command (command 

authority) over assigned forces and are directly responsible to SecDef for the 

performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform 

assigned missions.

3. Organizational Structure

a. DOD is composed of the OSD, the JCS and JS, the Military Departments and the 

Services within those Military Departments, the unified combatant commands, the 

defense agencies and DOD field activities, and other offices, agencies, activities, and 

commands that may be established or designated by law or by the President or SecDef.

b. Office of the Secretary of Defense. OSD is the principal staff element in the 

exercise of policy development, planning, resource management, fiscal, and program 

evaluation responsibilities. 

c. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCS includes the CJCS, the Vice Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The collective 

body of the JCS is headed by the CJCS (or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

in the CJCS’s absence), who sets the agenda and presides over JCS meetings. CJCS is 

the principal military advisor. The other members of the JCS are military advisors to the 

President, the NSC, and SecDef. JS assists the CJCS in his responsibilities to assist the 

President with national strategic direction and unified operation of the Armed Forces. 

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the CJCS, JS also assists other members 

of the JCS in carrying out their responsibilities.

d. Military Departments. The Military Departments are the Departments of the 

Army, Navy (including the Marine Corps), and Air Force. Each Military Department is 

separately organized under a civilian Secretary, who supervises the Chief (or Chiefs) of 

the Service in matters of a Service nature. The Secretaries of the Military Departments 

exercise authority, direction, and control (through the individual Chiefs of the Services) 

of their forces not specifically assigned to CCDRs. The Military Departments are 

responsible for training, organizing, providing, and equipping forces for assignment to 

combatant commands. 

e. Unified Combatant Commands. A unified combatant command has a broad 

continuing mission under a single commander and is composed of significant assigned 

components of two or more Military Departments. Combatant commands typically have 

geographic or functional responsibilities. 

f. Defense Agencies and DOD Field Activities. These organizations provide 

support and services in specific functional areas to the unified combatant commands and 

the rest of the DOD.

(1) The DOD agencies perform selected support and service functions on a 

DOD-wide basis. DOD agencies that are assigned wartime support missions are 

designated as combat support agencies.
Department of Defense

A-C-3 

(2) DOD field activities are established to perform selected support and service 

functions of a more limited scope than DOD agencies.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. The Armed Forces fulfill unique and crucial roles, defending the United States 

against all adversaries and serving the Nation as a bulwark and the guarantors of its 

security and independence. When called to action, the Armed Forces support and defend 

national interests worldwide. The Armed Forces embody the highest values and 

standards of American society and the profession of arms. The Armed Forces fulfill their 

roles, missions, and functions within the American system of civil-military relations. 

b. The nature of the challenges to the United States and its interests demand that the 

Armed Forces operate as a fully integrated joint team across the range of military 

operations. These operations may take place with the military forces of multinational

partners, US and foreign government agencies, state and local government agencies, 

IGOs, and NGOs. The challenges are best met when the unified action of the Armed 

Forces elicits the maximum contribution from each Service and DOD agency and their 

unique but complementary capabilities. The resulting synergy from their synchronized 

and integrated action is a direct reflection of those capabilities.

c. Joint warfare is team warfare. Effective integration of joint forces exposes no 

weak points or seams to an adversary. Joint forces rapidly and efficiently find and 

exploit the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities and other weak points as they contribute 

most to mission accomplishment. This does not mean that all forces will be equally 

represented in each operation. JFCs may choose the capabilities they need from the 

forces at their disposal.

d. As the military instrument of national power, the Armed Forces must ensure their 

adherence to US values, constitutional principles, and standards for the profession of 

arms. The United States wields the military instrument of national power at home and 

abroad in support of its national security goals in a variety of military operations. 

(1) Integrity is our foremost value. It is the cornerstone for building trust. 

American Service men and women must be able to rely on each other, regardless of the 

challenge at hand; they must individually and collectively say what they mean and do 

what they say. Integrity inspires confidence in others to carry out assigned tasks and is a 

fundamental requirement for building effective teams. 

(2) Competence is at the core of the profession of arms and of the relationship 

of the profession with the American people. Competent performance includes both the 

technical competence to perform the relevant task to standard as well as the ability to 

integrate that skill with others according to joint doctrine. The American people and 

multinational partners expect US military competence in every aspect of warfare. 

Service men and women deserve no less from those who lead them into battle. 

Successful joint action relies on each of the Services to deliver trained and ready, 

competent and confident forces and leaders, able to fight decisively under JFCs. For the 
Annex C to Appendix A

A-C-4 JP 3-08 

dedicated professional, building Service competence is an intense, lifelong affair. 

Moreover, many serve in assignments requiring additional competency in joint skills, and 

all members of the Armed Forces must understand their fellow Services to the extent 

required for effective operations. Those who will lead joint operations must develop skill 

in integrating forces into smoothly functioning joint teams.

(3) Physical courage, throughout the history, has defined warriors. The United

States of America is blessed with its Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast 

Guardsmen, whose courage knows no boundaries. Even in warfare characterized by 

advanced technology, individual fighting spirit and courage remain the inspiration for 

teamwork.

(4) Moral courage is also essential in military operations. This includes the 

willingness to stand up for what one believes to be right even if that stand is unpopular or

contrary to conventional wisdom. Other aspects of moral courage involve risk taking 

and tenacity: making bold decisions in the face of uncertainty, accepting full 

responsibility for the outcome, and holding to the chosen course despite challenges or 

difficulties. Competence is an essential foundation for moral courage. Competence 

separates the professional from the foolhardy. Military power must be wielded in an 

unimpeachable moral fashion, with respect for human rights and adherence to the Geneva 

Conventions. This morality should not be a matter of legality, but of conscience. Moral 

behavior is essential for gaining and maintaining the positive worldwide reputation of 

American fighting men and women as well as the confidence and support of the 

American people, a basic source of American military strength.

(5) Teamwork is the cooperative effort by the members of a group to achieve 

common goals. The Armed Forces of the United States—every military organization to 

the lowest level—are a team. Deterring adversaries, and when necessary, winning the 

Nation’s wars are the team’s common goals. Americans respond to and respect 

teamwork as an important value. This societal approval provides to the Armed Forces of 

the United States a solid basis upon which to build effective joint teams. 

(a) Trust and confidence are central to military unity of effort. A highly 

effective team is based on the team members having trust and confidence in each other. 

This trust does not result from good feelings or devout wishes. Trust is based on the 

mutual confidence resulting from honest efforts to learn about and understand the 

capabilities each member brings to the team. Trust and confidence within a joint force 

are built the same way as within a Service tactical unit, by hard work, demonstrated 

competence, and planning and training together.

(b) Successful teamwork requires delegation of authority commensurate 

with responsibility. This is a necessary part of building and maintaining the trust based 

on competence that characterizes the successful team. Over supervision disrupts 

teamwork. Delegation unleashes the best efforts and greatest initiative among all 

members of military teams. Delegation is especially important in joint warfare where 

Service expertise is an essential building block.
Department of Defense

A-C-5 

(c) Successful teamwork also requires cooperation. While this aspect of 

teamwork can be at tension with competition and both are central human characteristics, 

the nature of modern warfare puts a premium on cooperation within the team in order to 

compete successfully with the adversary. Higher echelons should never have to mandate 

cooperation. Cooperation requires team players and the willingness to share credit with 

all team members.

(6) When the members of the Armed Forces of the United States internalize and 

embody these values of joint warfare, their attitude about joint warfighting produces a 

synergy that multiplies the effects of their individual actions. A freely developed 

cooperative attitude is the key to the most productive integration of all force 

competencies and capabilities, and to the effective prosecution of the campaign. 

5. Interagency Relationships

DOD has a major role in the interagency arena. It interacts with almost every 

government agency and department and is involved in interagency coordination at the 

strategic, operational, and tactical levels. SecDef is a member of the NSC, and CJCS 

serves as an advisor to the NSC. DOD is significantly involved in the entire NSC 

interagency process, with representatives (i.e., OUSD[P] and JS) assigned to all NSC 

subgroups (i.e., NSC/PC and NSC/DC) and most NSC/IPCs. 
Annex C to Appendix A

A-C-6 JP 3-08 

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A-D-1 

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

1. Overview 

The Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) (http://www.energy.gov) overarching mission is 

to advance the national, economic, and energy security of the United States; to promote 

scientific and technological innovation in support of that mission; and to ensure the 

environmental cleanup of the national nuclear weapons complex. DOE’s strategic goals to 

achieve the mission are designed to deliver results along five strategic themes. 

a. Energy Security: Promoting America’s energy security through reliable, clean, and 

affordable energy. 

b. Nuclear Security: Ensuring America’s nuclear security. 

c. Scientific Discovery and Innovation: Strengthening US scientific discovery, 

economic competitiveness, and improving quality of life through innovations in science and 

technology. 

d. Environmental Responsibility: Protecting the environment by providing a 

responsible resolution to the environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production. 

e. Management Excellence: Enabling the mission through sound management. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities 

DOE brought together not only most of the government’s energy programs, but also 

science and technology programs and defense responsibilities that included the design, 

construction, and testing of nuclear weapons. A principal DOE mission assigned by the NRF 

is maintaining continuous and reliable energy supplies for the United States through 

preventive measures and restoration and recovery actions. 

3. Organizational Structure 

a. The Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence provides the Secretary, his staff, 

and other policymakers within DOE timely, technical intelligence analyses on all aspects of 

foreign nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and energy issues worldwide. 

b. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is a separately organized 

agency within DOE responsible for the management and security of the Nation’s nuclear 

weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs. It also responds to nuclear 

and radiological emergencies in the United States and abroad. Additionally, NNSA federal 

agents provide safe and secure transportation of nuclear weapons and components and 

special nuclear materials along with other missions supporting national security. 

(1) The NNSA’s national security missions are: 
Annex D to Appendix A 

A-D-2 JP 3-08 

(a) To enhance United States national security through the military application 

of nuclear energy; 

(b) To maintain and enhance the safety, reliability, and performance of the 

United States nuclear weapons stockpile, including the ability to design, produce, and test, in 

order to meet national security requirements; 

(c) To provide the USN with safe, militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants 

and to ensure the safe and reliable operation of those plants; 

(d) To promote international nuclear safety and nonproliferation; 

(e) To reduce global danger from WMD; and 

(f) To support national leadership in science and technology. 

(2) Defense Programs. One of the primary missions of NNSA is to maintain and 

enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the US nuclear weapons stockpile. NNSA, 

through its Office of Defense Programs, ensures that the US nuclear arsenal meets the 

country’s national security requirements and continues to serve its essential deterrence role. 

In partnership with the DOD, NNSA’s Defense Programs provides the research, 

development, secure transportation, and production activities necessary to support the US 

nuclear weapons stockpile. Robust security protects weapons and weapons material both at 

each facility and through securely transporting materials and weapons between facilities and 

military locations. 

(3) Nuclear Nonproliferation. One of the gravest threats the United States and the 

international community face is the possibility that terrorists or rogue nations will acquire 

nuclear weapons or other WMD. Their continued pursuit of these weapons, along with 

related technologies, equipment, and expertise, increases the urgency of NNSA’s efforts to: 

detect nuclear and radiological materials, and WMD-related equipment; secure vulnerable 

nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear and radiological materials; and dispose of 

surplus weapons-usable nuclear and radiological materials. NNSA, through its Office of 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, works closely with a wide range of international partners, 

key US federal agencies, the US national laboratories, and the private sector to detect, 

secure, and dispose of dangerous nuclear and radiological material, and related WMD 

technology and expertise. 

(a) Detect. NNSA is taking steps to deter and detect illicit transfers of 

weapons-usable nuclear and radiological materials and equipment, prevent the spread of 

sensitive nuclear weapons technology and develop cutting-edge nuclear detection 

technologies. NNSA’s work enhances the capabilities of our foreign partners to interdict 

illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials by deploying radiation detection 

systems at high-risk border crossings, airports, and seaports. NNSA is particularly 

concerned that terrorists could use the global maritime shipping network to smuggle nuclear 

and radiological materials or warheads. By installing radiation detection systems at major 

seaports throughout the world, NNSA strengthens the detection and interdiction capabilities 

of our partner countries. NNSA also provides export control and WMD-awareness training 
Department of Energy 

A-D-3 

to both domestic and foreign export control and customs officials, which strengthens the 

ability to deter and detect WMD-related technology transfers. The tools that NNSA provides 

to partnering countries help prepare officials to recognize and identify dangerous materials 

and technologies that could be diverted for use against the United States and its allies. In the 

area of nuclear detonation detection, NNSA provides operational hardware and software for 

national security systems. 

(b) Secure. Preventing terrorist access to WMD remains one of NNSA’s 

highest priorities. NNSA helps to keep the world’s most dangerous materials out of the 

hands of the world’s most dangerous people by securing nuclear weapons and nuclear and 

radiological materials at their source, and improving security practices around the world. 

NNSA’s weapons and materials security programs have focused principally on Russia. 

NNSA will continue work at sites recently added to the program, and will continue to work 

cooperatively with Russia to ensure the long-term sustainability of the systems and 

procedures already in place. NNSA is working with other partners to secure weapons-usable 

nuclear materials in other parts of the world and to strengthen security at civil nuclear and 

radiological facilities. NNSA converts research reactors around the world from highly 

enriched uranium to low enriched uranium fuel and returns highly enriched uranium to the 

country of origin, either the US or Russia. Further, NNSA is also working to remove or 

secure significant quantities of excess, vulnerable radiological materials that exist worldwide 

and could be used to make a dirty bomb. 

(c) Dispose. An integral part of NNSA’s strategy to meet nonproliferation 

challenges has been to eliminate dangerous material altogether by encouraging other states to 

stop producing it, and to dispose of excess nuclear and radiological material. 

(4) Countering Nuclear Terrorism and Trafficking. The convergence of 

heightened terrorist activities and the ease of moving materials, technology, and information 

across borders have made the potential for terrorism involving WMD the most serious threat 

facing the United States and the international community as a whole. Preventing WMD 

from falling into the hands of terrorists is a top national security priority. NNSA’s Office of 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs reflect the need to protect the United States and 

its allies from this threat. 

(5) Border and Port Security. NNSA strengthens the capability of foreign 

governments to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive 

materials across international borders and through the global maritime shipping system. 

NNSA works collaboratively with foreign partners to equip border crossings, airports, and 

seaports with radiation detection equipment. NNSA also provides training in the use of the 

systems for appropriate law enforcement officials and initial system sustainability support as 

the host government assumes operational responsibility for the equipment. 

(6) Interdiction. NNSA provides real-time technical and policy support for efforts 

by the USG to facilitate a wide range of counterproliferation and CT interdiction options. 

NNSA’s Nonproliferation and International Security program has developed a 

comprehensive capability to extract actionable information dealing with proliferation 

networks, technology transfers, and the involvement of entities and persons of interest in 
Annex D to Appendix A 

A-D-4 JP 3-08 

proliferation and terrorism. The backbone of this capability is comprised of various 

customized electronic database applications that exploit information and provide rapid, realtime technical support to the USG on illicit transfers of proliferation-sensitive technology 

and commodities; technology assessments at NNSA, the DOE, and US industry; updates on 

proliferation network off-shoots; support to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

role of investigating proliferation networks; and evaluation of the impact of proliferation 

networks on global safeguards and export controls systems. 

(7) Controlling WMD Materials and Expertise. Keeping WMD out of the hands 

of state and non-state actors requires a coordinated effort on the part of suppliers of 

proliferation-sensitive materials, equipment, and technologies. NNSA prevents and counters 

WMD proliferation by strengthening export control systems in other countries and 

transitioning WMD expertise and infrastructure in partner countries to peaceful purposes. 

(8) Emergency Operations. NNSA ensures that capabilities are in place to 

respond to any NNSA and DOE facility emergency. It is also the Nation’s premier 

responder to any nuclear or radiological incident within the United States or abroad and 

provides operational planning and training to counter both domestic and international nuclear 

terrorism. 

(a) NNSA houses the nuclear incident team (NIT), which is responsible for 

deploying assets at the request of coordinating agencies in response to a nuclear or 

radiological incident. The NIT’s mission is to coordinate NNSA assets for deployment, 

continually monitor deployment activities, and provide situational awareness of activities to 

NNSA management. The NIT is staffed and fully operational within two hours of 

notification. 

(b) NNSA’s nuclear/radiological advisory team (NRAT) provides an 

emergency response capability for on-scene scientific and technical advice for both domestic 

and international nuclear or radiological incidents. The NRAT’s mission is to provide 

nuclear and radiological expert advice to the coordinating agency in charge of the 

radiological or nuclear incident. The NRAT is the NNSA part of the interagency advisory 

team that deploys with the Domestic Emergency Support Team in support of the FBI, or the 

foreign emergency support team when deployed under the auspices of the DOS. The NRAT 

is also the primary NNSA team for conducting sophisticated radiological search and 

identification operations aboard ships at sea. 

(9) Responding to Emergencies. NNSA protects the public, environment, and 

emergency responders from both terrorist and non-terrorist events by providing a responsive, 

flexible, efficient, and effective radiological emergency response framework and capability 

for the Nation. When the need arises, NNSA is prepared to respond immediately to any type 

of nuclear or radiological accident or incident. NNSA provides technical support to the 

DHS, DOJ, DOS, and DOD for nuclear terrorism events and domestic nuclear weapon 

accidents and incidents. The NNSA emergency response assets also provide support to 

nuclear site and facility accidents and incidents. The goal of the Nuclear/Radiological 

Incident Response program is to respond to and mitigate nuclear and radiological incidents 

worldwide. This is accomplished through the seven unique emergency response assets. 
Department of Energy 

A-D-5 

These assets encompass four core competencies: core knowledge of US nuclear weapons, 

“dirty bombs” and crude nuclear devices; core knowledge of use and interpretation of 

specialized radiation detection equipment; core technical operations; and core technical 

support requirements. The seven emergency response assets follow: 

(a) The Aerial Measuring System characterizes ground-deposited radiation 

from aerial platforms. These platforms include fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircrafts with 

radiological measuring equipment, computer analysis of aerial measurements, and equipment 

to locate lost radioactive sources, conduct aerial surveys, or map large areas of 

contamination. 

(b) The Accident Response Group provides technical guidance and responds to 

US nuclear weapons accidents. The team assists in assessing weapons damage and risk, and 

in developing and implementing procedures for safe weapon recovery, packaging, 

transportation, and disposal of damaged weapons. 

(c) National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC). The NARAC’s 

mission is to provide timely and accurate real-time assessment advisories to emergency 

managers for rapid decision making during an emergency response involving a CBRN 

release. The NARAC’s computer-based system provides realistic plots and maps of 

radiation dose and exposure assessments, and estimates the amount of radiation contaminants 

released into the environment. For sites with NARAC supported direct interactive services, 

radiation contamination plots can be provided as soon as five minutes after the incident 

information is received. For nonsupported sites, the time to deliver radiation contamination 

plots is between approximately one and two hours. 

(d) Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). 

FRMAC is an interagency entity that coordinates federal offsite radiological monitoring and 

assessment activities for nuclear accidents or incidents. FRMAC is responsible for providing 

a single source of compiled, quality controlled monitoring and assessment data to the LFA 

involved in the incident response. 

(e) Radiological Assistance Program (RAP). RAP provides advice and 

radiological assistance for incidents involving radioactive materials that pose a threat to the 

public health and safety or the environment. RAP can provide field deployable teams of 

health physics professionals equipped to conduct radiological search, monitoring, and 

assessment activities. The RAP mission is to provide first response radiological assistance to 

protect the health and safety of the general public and the environment. They assist federal, 

state, tribal, and local agencies in the detection, identification, analysis, and response to 

events involving the release of radiological materials in the environment. The primary 

responsibility for the incident remains with the owner of the radioactive material. 

(f) Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS). 

REAC/TS provides medical advice, specialized training, and onsite assistance for the 

treatment of all types of radiation exposure accidents. REAC/TS’s mission is to maintain 

24-hour response operations to provide assistance and/or deploy personnel and equipment 

for provision of direct medical care in support of a radiological emergency. 
Annex D to Appendix A 

A-D-6 JP 3-08 

(g) Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST). NEST provides technical 

assistance to a primary agency to deal with incidents, including terrorist threats, which 

involve the use of nuclear materials. NEST has been structured to address threats by 

domestic and foreign terrorists that may have the will and means to employ WMD. NEST 

would assist in the identification, characterization, rendering safe, and final disposition of 

any nuclear weapon or radioactive device. 

1. The NEST mission is to provide specialized technical expertise to the 

federal response in resolving nuclear or radiological terrorist incidents. This expertise is 

provided by well-trained personnel who form specialized response teams to work in 

coordination with teams from other federal agencies to resolve a nuclear terrorist crisis. The 

NEST specialized response teams include coordination, liaison, advisory teams, search 

teams, technical operations teams, and planning support teams. These teams have been 

structured to provide a rapid, flexible response and to seamlessly integrate with the LFA or 

the DOD to help resolve all technical aspects of the crisis. 

2. NEST capabilities include search and identification of nuclear 

materials, diagnostics and assessment of suspected nuclear devices, technical operations in 

support of render safe procedures, and packaging for transport to final disposition. NEST 

capabilities are drawn from the Nation’s nuclear weapons complex. Response teams vary in 

size from a five person technical advisory team to a tailored deployment of dozens of 

searchers and scientists who can locate and then conduct or support technical operations on a 

suspected nuclear device. NEST personnel and equipment are ready to deploy worldwide at 

all times. 

3. Because a nuclear terrorist incident could arise with little or no warning, 

NEST response teams are prepared to deploy rapidly upon notification. DOE HQ directs all 

response team activations and deployments after coordination with other concerned agencies. 

This interagency process may involve strict operational security to protect classified or 

sensitive details of the response operation. The FBI or DOS coordinates USG assistance to 

support the resolution of the crisis with state and local officials or foreign governments. A 

NRAT deploys as part of an FBI led domestic emergency support team or as part of a DOS 

led foreign emergency support team for an incident overseas to provide nuclear scientific and 

technical advice to the LFA. A senior energy official, responsible for coordinating activities 

with the LFA, will deploy with the NRAT. 

(h) In addition to the above seven assets, a “home team” capability called 

Triage provides 24/7 on-call analysis support to first-response teams. Typical response times 

are 10 minutes to begin an analysis and 30-60 minutes for an answer back to the field. This 

capability not only minimizes the cost of a false alarm, but also accurately identifies real 

threats so that, if needed, additional resources can be appropriately utilized. 

(10) Counterterrorism. NNSA’s Nuclear CT Program, in concert with other 

offices in the DOE, as well as other domestic and international government agencies, 

develops and implements preemptive strategies to eliminate terrorist improvised nuclear 

device threats through assessment of vulnerabilities and through identification and 
Department of Energy 

A-D-7 

development of appropriate protective measures. The Nuclear CT Program contributes to 

this effort by: 

(a) Anticipating and preventing nonessential dissemination of improvised 

nuclear device design information; 

(b) Identifying and characterizing potential improvised nuclear device material 

and designs that pose a threat to US citizens, assets, and infrastructure; 

(c) Characterizing the improvised nuclear device threat through intelligence 

and material security analysis; 

(d) Identifying signatures of sensitive improvised nuclear device designs and 

developing technologies to detect and characterize these threats; and 

(e) Identifying vulnerabilities in sensitive improvised nuclear device designs 

and developing technologies for render-safe and consequence mitigation. 

(11) Engaging the International Community. NNSA engages the international 

community by working with more than 60 foreign governments and 10 IGOs, plus several 

regional organizations, to improve nuclear emergency management systems worldwide. It 

provides direct emergency management assistance or participates and collaborates to provide 

effective early warning and notification, and consistent emergency plans and procedures 

worldwide. NNSA sponsors cooperation and projects aimed at harmonizing differences 

between worldwide emergency plans, procedures, systems, and capabilities. 

 
Annex D to Appendix A 

A-D-8 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank 
A-E-1 

ANNEX E TO APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

1. Overview 

The DHS’s mission is to lead the unified national effort to secure America; to 

prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards 

to the Nation; and to secure US national borders while welcoming lawful immigrants, 

visitors, and trade. While DHS was created to secure the United States against those who 

seek to disrupt the American way of life, its charter also includes preparation for and 

response to all hazards and disasters (http://www.dhs.gov). 

2. Department of Homeland Security Organization 

DHS has several components, which interact with DOD. Its structure is outlined at 

http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0644.shtm. 

a. The Directorate for National Protection and Programs works to advance DHS’s 

risk-reduction mission. Reducing risk requires an integrated approach that encompasses 

both physical and virtual threats and their associated human elements. Within the 

directorate, four divisions impact on DOD. 

(1) The Office of Cybersecurity and Communications has the mission of 

assuring the security, resiliency, and reliability of the Nation’s cyberspace and 

communications infrastructure. 

(2) The Office of Infrastructure Protection leads the coordinated national effort 

to reduce risk to US critical infrastructures and key resources posed by acts of terrorism. 

In doing so, DHS increases the Nation’s level of preparedness and the ability to respond 

and quickly recover in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency. 

(3) The Office of Intergovernmental Affairs has the mission of promoting an 

integrated national approach to HS by ensuring, coordinating, and advancing federal 

interaction with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. 

(4) The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is a federal LEA that provides 

integrated security and law enforcement services to federally owned and leased buildings, 

facilities, properties, and other assets. The FPS mission is to render federal properties 

safe and secure for federal employees, officials, and visitors in a professional and cost 

effective manner by deploying a highly trained and multi-disciplined police force. As the 

federal agency charged with protecting and delivering integrated law enforcement and 

security services to facilities owned or leased by the General Services Administration 

(GSA), FPS employs 1,225 federal staff (including 900 law enforcement security 

officers, criminal investigators, police officers, and support personnel) and 15,000 

contract guard staff to secure over 9,000 buildings and safeguard their occupants. FPS 

provides comprehensive coverage for these facilities nationwide. 
Annex E to Appendix A

A-E-2 JP 3-08 

b. The Office of Health Affairs coordinates all medical activities of DHS to ensure 

appropriate preparation for and response to incidents having medical significance. 

Within the office, the Weapons of Mass Destruction and Biodefense office integrates the 

bio-monitoring activities of USG departments including biosurveillance, aerosol 

detection, clinical syndrome detection, mailroom observation, and suspicious substance 

management. In conjunction with the Science and Technology Directorate, the Weapons 

of Mass Destruction and Biodefense office leads responsibilities for veterinary and agrodefense activities, covering animal and zoonotic diseases and agricultural security issues 

related to livestock, food, and water. 

c. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis is a member of the national IC and 

ensures that information related to HS threats is collected, analyzed, and disseminated to 

the full spectrum of HS customers in DHS, at state, local, and tribal levels, in the private 

sector and in the IC. It works closely with DHS component intelligence organizations as 

well as state, local, tribal, and private sector entities to ensure nontraditional streams of 

information are fused with traditional IC sources to provide a complete assessment of 

threats to the Nation. Many states and larger cities have created fusion centers, which 

provide state and local officials with situational awareness. DHS provides personnel and 

tools to the fusion centers to enable the National Fusion Center Network. The office has 

five analytic thrusts, aligned with the principal threats to the homeland addressed by 

DHS. 

(1) Threats related to border security. 

(2) Threat of radicalization and extremism. 

(3) Threats from particular groups entering the United States. 

(4) Threats to the homeland’s critical infrastructure and key resources. 

(5) WMD and health threats. 

d. The Office of Operations Coordination is responsible for monitoring the security 

of the United States on a daily basis and coordinating activities within DHS and with 

governors, HS advisors, law enforcement partners, and critical infrastructure operators in 

all 50 states and more than 50 major urban areas nationwide. The Office works to deter, 

detect, and prevent terrorist acts by coordinating the work of federal, state, territorial, 

tribal, local, and private sector partners and by collecting and fusing information from a 

variety of sources. The Office is responsible for: 

(1) Conducting joint operations across all organizational elements; 

(2) Coordinating activities related to incident management; 

(3) Employing all DHS resources to translate intelligence and policy into 

action; and 
Department of Homeland Security

A-E-3 

(4) Overseeing the National Operations Center which collects and fuses 

information from more than 35 federal, state, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector 

agencies. 

e. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office works to enhance the nuclear detection 

efforts of federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local governments and the private sector 

and to ensure a coordinated response to such threats. It works to improve the Nation’s 

capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or 

transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the Nation, and to further 

enhance this capability over time. 

3. Operational Components 

a. United States Coast Guard. The USCG (http://www.uscg.mil) is the Nation’s 

primary maritime operating agency with resources organized, trained, and equipped to be 

“multi-mission capable.” The USCG is unique as it is a branch of the Armed Forces at 

all times and an agency within DHS. The USCG may also operate under the Department 

of the Navy during time of war or when directed by the President. The USCG protects 

the public, the environment, and US economic interests—in the Nation’s ports and 

waterways, along the coast, on international waters, or in any maritime region as required 

to support national security. There are two senior operational commanders in the Atlantic 

Area (Portsmouth, Virginia) and Pacific Area (Alameda, California). Under these two 

commanders are nine district offices (operational commanders for their geographic areas) 

and two maintenance and logistics commands (Atlantic and Pacific). USCG operational 

units include: 25 air stations (with over 200 fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft), three 

Polar Class icebreakers, 12 high endurance cutters, 28 medium endurance cutters, over 

100 - 110 foot and 87 foot patrol boats, approximately 90 other types of cutters (vessels 

over 65 feet in length, including buoy tenders), and over 1,400 boats (vessels less than 65 

feet in length). Additionally, the USCG manages the National Pollution Funds Center in 

Arlington, Virginia; the National Strike Force Coordination Center in Elizabeth City, 

North Carolina; and the USCG Academy in New London, Connecticut. The USCG’s 

major roles in support of national security are: maritime safety, maritime law 

enforcement, maritime environmental protection, ports, waterways, and coastal security, 

and national defense. Through an agreement between DOD and DHS, the USCG’s 

unique defense capabilities in support of the National Military Strategy include: maritime 

interception operations; deployed port operations, security and defense; environmental 

defense operations, and peacetime military operations. Interagency agreements between 

the USCG and other USG agencies are listed in Commandant, USCG, Instruction 

P5850.2, Legal Authorities. The USCG’s roles include the following: 

(1) Naval, coastal, and harbor defense. 

(2) Port security, including the deployment of port security units, cutters, and 

patrol boats for overseas military operations to perform the port and harbor security 

mission (waterside patrols, vessel escort, surveillance, and interdiction). 
Annex E to Appendix A

A-E-4 JP 3-08 

(3) Ports, waterways, and coastal security for the protection of the US maritime 

domain and the US Marine Transportation System and those who live, work, or recreate 

near them; the prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks, sabotage, espionage, or 

subversive acts; and response to and recovery from those that do occur. 

(4) Conduct Alien Migrant Interdiction and Counterdrug Operations. The 

USCG has broad maritime law enforcement authority, including the power to stop, board, 

investigate, inspect, examine, search, and seize any vessel subject to US jurisdiction 

wherever located. USCG law enforcement officers are also officers of the customs and 

are, therefore, able to stop persons and vessels to conduct a warrantless border search at 

the US border or its functional equivalent. Operations can be conducted in waters subject 

to US jurisdiction, foreign waters with HN consent, and in international waters. 

(5) Living Marine Resources Enforcement within the Nation’s EEZ [Exclusive 

Economic Zone] and conservation and management of living marine resources and their 

environments, including protected species, protected areas, and critical habitats. 

(6) SAR operations. 

(7) Flood relief and removal of hazards to navigation. 

(8) Enforcement of applicable federal laws and treaties and other international 

agreements, including maritime interception operations to enforce sanctions. 

(9) Investigation of suspected violations of such laws and international 

agreements. 

(10) Support of the National Drug Control Strategy as the lead agency for 

maritime drug interdiction. 

(11) Enforcement of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Title 33, USC, 

Section 1251) and various other laws relating to the protection of the marine environment 

that prohibit foreign vessels from entering US waters unless they have insurance release 

for delivery or other guarantees that potential pollution liability for cleanup and damages 

will be met. 

(12) Provision of a National Response Center to receive reports of terrorism and 

oil and hazardous substance spills, investigate spills, initiate subsequent civil penalty 

actions, and coordinate federally funded spill response operations. 

(13) Administration of the Port Safety Program through the USCG captains of 

the port to enforce rules and regulations governing the safety of ports and anchorages as 

well as the movement of vessels and prevention of pollution in US waters. 

(14) Supervision of cargo transfer operations. 
Department of Homeland Security

A-E-5 

(15) Inspection of harbor patrols and waterfront facilities; establishment of 

security zones as required. 

(16) Administration of a licensing and regulatory program governing the 

construction, ownership (international aspects), and operation of deepwater ports on the 

high seas to transfer oil from tankers to shore. 

(17) Provision of personnel, equipment, and expertise to the harbor defense 

commands. These are co-staffed by USCG and USN personnel that exercise C2 of naval 

coastal warfare forces, supplying port safety and security, vessel traffic control and 

safety, SAR, surveillance and interdiction, and aids to navigation capabilities. 

(18) Establishment and maintenance of the US aids to navigation system, 

including lights, buoys, day beacons, fog signals, marine radio beacons, and radio 

navigation aids such as Differential Global Positioning System. 

(19) Broadcast and publication of marine information as well as local Notice to 

Mariners and Light Lists. 

(20) Operation of the Nation’s icebreaking vessels to facilitate maritime 

transportation and aid in prevention of flooding and to support logistics to US polar 

installations, and to support scientific research in Arctic and Antarctic waters. 

(21) Support peacetime military and civil engagement activities of the National 

Military Strategy. 

(22) Assist DOD in performance of any mission for which the USCG is 

especially qualified (Title 14, USC, Section 141). 

b. Federal Emergency Management Agency. The primary mission of FEMA 

(http://www.fema.gov) is to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation 

from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made 

disasters, by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive 

emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and 

mitigation. FEMA prepares the Nation for hazards, manages federal response and 

recovery efforts following any national incident, and administers the National Flood 

Insurance Program. FEMA has more than 4,000 full-time employees. They work at 

FEMA HQ in Washington DC, at regional and area offices across the country, the Mount 

Weather Emergency Operations Center, and the National Emergency Training Center in 

Emmitsburg, Maryland. FEMA also has nearly 8,000 standby disaster assistance 

employees who are available for deployment after disasters. Often FEMA works in 

partnership with other organizations that are part of the Nation’s emergency management 

system. These partners include state and local emergency management agencies, 27 

federal agencies and the ARC. FEMA’s functions include: 

(1) Service to Disaster Victims. Responsive and compassionate care for 

disaster victims is FEMA’s top priority. FEMA provides rapid, ready, clear, and 

consistent access to disaster assistance to all eligible individuals and communities. 
Annex E to Appendix A

A-E-6 JP 3-08 

(2) Integrated Preparedness. FEMA works closely with federal, tribal, state 

and local governments, voluntary agencies, private sector partners, and the American 

public to ensure the Nation is secured and prepared to respond to and recover from 

terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. 

(3) Operational Planning and Preparedness. Working closely with federal, 

state, local, and tribal partners, FEMA’s operational planners assist jurisdictions in 

developing planning capabilities and writing area- and incident-specific operational plans 

that will guide local response activities. 

(4) Incident Management. With a forward-leaning posture, FEMA can 

respond more swiftly and decisively to all hazards with around-the-clock support. The 

agency continues to professionalize its workforce by training and certifying staff in 

emergency management skills and techniques. FEMA also works closely with external 

partners to improve and update standards, and support the enduring efforts of America’s 

first responders. 

(5) Disaster Logistics. FEMA implements 21st century logistics and 

procurement systems to help efficiently and effectively plan, identify, track, and 

distribute supplies needed by disaster victims, emergency responders, and other users on 

the ground. Working with an array of public and private strategic partners, donors, and 

prearranged contractors, a businesslike FEMA provides improved logistics integration 

and customer support. 

(6) Hazard Mitigation. FEMA works proactively to reduce the physical and 

financial impact of future disasters through improved risk analysis and hazard mitigation 

planning, risk reduction, and flood insurance. FEMA helps implement effective hazard 

mitigation practices in order to create safer communities, promote rapid recovery from 

floods and other disasters, and reduce the financial impact at the federal, tribal, state, and 

local levels. 

(7) Emergency Communications. FEMA is a leader in emergency 

communications by working with federal, tribal, state, and local partners to establish and 

facilitate consistent disaster emergency communications standards, plans, and 

capabilities. As part of this leadership role, FEMA works to forge an integrated 

operational link before, during, and immediately after an event and is an advocate for 

disaster emergency communications at the national level on behalf of first responders. 

(8) Public Disaster Communications. FEMA coordinates all hazards 

messaging before, during, and after national emergencies using three strategies: public 

risk communications, partnership management, and employee communications. By 

successfully managing these elements, FEMA supports operational efforts and ensures 

clear, consistent, and effective information for disaster victims and emergency 

management partners and stakeholders. 

(9) Continuity Programs. FEMA supports upgrades to and implementation of 

the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System. It is the lead agent for the Nation’s 
Department of Homeland Security

A-E-7 

programs in ensuring the continuity of government operations and essential functions and 

the endurance of the US constitutional form of government in a catastrophic event. 

c. The United States Secret Service (http://www.secretservice.gov) safeguards the 

Nation’s financial infrastructure and payment systems to preserve the integrity of the 

economy and protects national leaders, visiting heads of state and government, 

designated sites, and national special security events. 

(1) When an event is designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security as a 

national special security event, the Secret Service assumes its mandated role as the lead 

agency for the design and implementation of the operational security plan. The Secret 

Service has developed a core strategy to carry out its security operations, which relies 

heavily on its established partnerships with law enforcement and public safety officials at 

the local, state, and federal levels. The goal of the cooperating agencies is to provide a 

safe and secure environment for Secret Service protectees, other dignitaries, the event 

participants, and the general public. There is a tremendous amount of advance planning 

and coordination in preparation for these events, particularly in the areas of venue and 

motorcade route security, communications, credentialing, and training. 

(2) The agency’s primary investigative mission is to safeguard the payment and 

financial systems of the United States. This has been historically accomplished through 

the enforcement of counterfeiting statutes to preserve the integrity of United States 

currency, coin, and financial obligations. The Secret Service’s investigative 

responsibilities also include crimes that involve financial institution fraud, computer and 

telecommunications fraud, false identification documents, access device fraud, advance 

fee fraud, electronic funds transfers, and money laundering as it relates to the agency’s 

core violations. 

d. CBP (http://www.cbp.gov) protects US borders from terrorism, human and drug 

smuggling, illegal migration, and agricultural pests while simultaneously facilitating the 

flow of legitimate travel and trade. 

(1) CBP’s priority mission is to prevent terrorists and terrorists’ weapons, 

including WMD, from entering the United States. CBP apprehends people for attempting 

to enter the country illegally or for other crimes. CBP deploys 20,000 officers at 327 

points of entry, including land, air, and sea ports, as well as more than 11,000 Border 

Patrol agents charged with securing almost 7,000 miles of border between ports of entry. 

(2) CBP prevents the introduction of harmful pests into the United States that 

would cripple or destroy segments of US farming or food production industry. CBP 

agricultural specialists are trained to prevent the entry of organisms that could be used for 

biological warfare. These specialists also are prepared to protect against the introduction 

of such harmful diseases as Avian Flu. 

(3) The CBP Air and Marine, the world’s largest law enforcement air force, 

protects the American people and Nation’s critical infrastructure through the coordinated 

use of integrated air and marine forces to detect, interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism 
Annex E to Appendix A

A-E-8 JP 3-08 

and the unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs, and other contraband toward or 

across the borders of the United States. This specialized law enforcement capability 

allows CBP Air and Marine to make significant contributions to the HS efforts of DHS, 

as well as to those of federal, state, local, and tribal agencies. To accomplish this 

mission, CBP Air and Marine utilizes over 700 pilots and 267 aircraft including the use 

of unmanned aircraft systems, over 130 mariners, and over 200 vessels. CBP Air and 

Marine has the following missions: 

(a) Provide support to CBP’s antiterrorism mission at US borders, 

including air-to-ground interception of people and contraband illegally crossing land 

borders, air-to-air interception of aircraft, and air-to-water interception of transportation 

vessels. 

(b) Provide support for CBP’s traditional work, such as border 

interceptions unrelated to terrorism and other DHS missions as well. 

(c) Conduct air operations in support of other federal, state, and local 

needs, such as disaster relief. 

(4) CBP attachés are critical to the success of CBP’s strategy of extending 

America’s zone of security beyond the US borders. These individuals are the CBP 

subject matter experts at US embassies around the world. They serve as advocates for 

several CBP international programs (e.g., Capacity Building, Container Security 

Initiative, Immigration Advisory Program, Customs-Trade Partnership Against 

Terrorism, Proliferation Security Initiative). 

(a) CBP representatives support CBP in the planning, organization, 

administration, and coordination of all CBP international activities, and are recognized as 

the experts on CBP policies and activities. 

(b) They represent CBP in negotiations with foreign officials regarding 

controversial issues, and provide advice and guidance to CBP management on matters of 

mutual cooperation between CBP and HN agencies. 

(c) They coordinate CBP programs that provide training and technical 

assistance on border security, and cargo and passenger security. 

(d) They assist foreign governments in developing and strengthening their 

own security initiatives. 

(e) They serve as liaisons between the embassy and their foreign 

counterparts to ensure that cooperation and solid working relationships are established 

and maintained. 

e. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (http://www.ice.gov) 

primary mission is to protect national security, public safety, and the integrity of the US 

borders through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing border 

control, customs, trade, and immigration. ICE has approximately 19,000 employees in 
Department of Homeland Security

A-E-9 

over 400 offices, including 63 Attaché offices in 44 countries around the world. The 

agency’s law enforcement authorities encompass more than 400 US federal statutes that 

ICE is responsible for enforcing in its commitment to ensuring national security and 

public safety. Within ICE, the Office of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is the 

principal criminal investigative arm of DHS. ICE’s HSI directorate comprises the offices 

that are primarily devoted to criminal investigation, which also includes the Office of 

Intelligence and Office of International Affairs. This directorate has responsibility for 

ICE’s national security programs and ICE’s investigative authority over criminal 

violations of US law relating to illicit trade, travel, immigration, and finance. In addition, 

HSI investigates violations of employment verification laws and visa violations in the US 

and abroad. ICE gathers information, provides assistance, and investigates the illicit 

trans-border movement of people, material, and finances throughout the world. 

f. The Transportation Security Administration (http://www.tsa.gov) protects the 

Nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and 

commerce. 

g. US Citizenship and Immigration Services (http://www.uscis.gov) is the 

government agency that oversees lawful immigration to the United States. Refugee 

status or asylum may be granted to people who have been persecuted or fear they will be 

persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, and/or membership in a particular 

social group or political opinion. US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 

officers conduct interviews overseas, so the military could be interacting with them in 

some joint operations. For example, officers were interviewing Iraqi nationals, many of 

whom had associations with the USG and the US military in particular, for refugee 

resettlement to the United States. In some cases a USCIS officer may believe a refugee 

has information that the military should hear, or USCIS may request information from the 

military that might support an applicant’s refugee claim or identify a ground of 

ineligibility. USCIS asylum officers posted to one of eight domestic asylum offices 

interview aliens physically present in the United Sates who are applying for asylum 

status. 

4. Maritime Domain Awareness 

a. Maritime domain awareness (http://www.gmsa.gov) is the effective understanding 

of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could impact the United 

States’ security, safety, economy, or environment. A range of federal departments and 

agencies must coordinate closely to identify threats as early and as distant from US 

shores as possible. Unifying USG efforts and supporting international efforts will help 

achieve maritime domain awareness across the USG, with the private sector and civil 

authorities within the US, and with US allies and partners around the world. Maritime 

domain awareness is the integration of global maritime intelligence and global maritime 

situational awareness. 
Annex E to Appendix A

A-E-10 JP 3-08 

b. Global maritime intelligence is the product of legacy, as well as changing 

intelligence capabilities, policies, and operational relationships used to integrate all 

available data, information, and intelligence in order to identify, locate, and track 

potential maritime threats. 

c. Global maritime situational awareness results from the persistent monitoring of 

maritime activities in such a way that trends and anomalies can be identified. 
A-F-1 

ANNEX F TO APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

1. Overview

DOJ enforces the law and defends the interests of the United States according to the 

law; ensures public safety against threats foreign and domestic; provides federal 

leadership in preventing and controlling crime; seeks just punishment for those guilty of 

unlawful behavior; and ensures fair and impartial administration of justice for all 

Americans. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities

The Attorney General is the head of DOJ and chief law enforcement officer of the 

USG. He represents the United States in legal matters generally and gives advice and 

opinions to the President and to the heads of the executive departments of the USG when 

so requested. In matters of exceptional gravity or importance, the Attorney General 

appears in person before the Supreme Court. 

3. Organizational Structure

a. DOJ personnel include nearly 8,000 attorneys located primarily in the Antitrust, 

Civil, Civil Rights, Environment and Natural Resources, and Tax Divisions. The bulk of 

the remaining litigation is performed by the nearly 100 US attorneys and their staffs 

dispersed throughout the country. 

b. The Criminal Division develops, enforces, and supervises the application of all 

federal criminal laws except those specifically assigned to other divisions. The Criminal 

Division and the 93 US attorneys have the responsibility for overseeing criminal matters 

under the more than 900 statutes as well as certain civil litigation. Criminal Division 

attorneys prosecute many nationally significant cases. In addition to its direct litigation 

responsibilities, the Criminal Division formulates and implements criminal enforcement 

policy and provides advice and assistance. For example, the Criminal Division approves 

or monitors sensitive areas of law enforcement such as participation in the Witness 

Security Program and the use of electronic surveillance; advises the Attorney General, 

Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, and the White House on matters of 

criminal law; provides legal advice and assistance to federal prosecutors and investigative 

agencies; and provides leadership for coordinating international as well as federal, state, 

and local law enforcement matters.

(1) The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 

(ICITAP) works with foreign governments to develop professional and transparent law 

enforcement institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce the 

threat of transnational crime and terrorism. ICITAP supports both national security and 

foreign policy objectives. ICITAP works in close partnership with DOS, USAID, DOD, 

and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. These agencies fund ICITAP’s programs. 

ICITAP programs are designed in partnership with the HN, and program implementation 
Annex F to Appendix A

A-F-2 JP 3-08 

methods include on-the-ground, preprogram assessments; program planning, 

management, and review; curriculum development; classroom training, seminars, and 

workshops; internships; equipment donations; donor coordination; and on-the-job 

training and mentoring provided by embedded long-term advisors. 

(2) Domestic Security Section safeguards the security of US citizens here and 

abroad by prosecuting international crimes of violence committed by and against them. It 

is DOJ’s central POC regarding Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act investigations 

and prosecutions. Through the Act, the section coordinates, investigates, and prosecutes 

federal crimes committed overseas. The section has developed strong relationships with 

LEAs within the DOD and the DOS to ensure that individuals employed by or 

accompanying the US military overseas who commit murder, sexual crimes, and other 

serious federal felony offenses are brought to justice where jurisdiction exists. 

(3) The Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and 

Training develops and administers technical assistance designed to enhance the 

capabilities of foreign justice sector institutions and their law enforcement personnel, so 

they can effectively partner with the DOJ in combating terrorism, trafficking in persons, 

organized crime, corruption, and financial crimes. It carries out justice sector institution 

building, including technical assistance, and skills development support, to enhance 

foreign justice sector cooperation. The rule of law and the rights of individuals are the 

cornerstones of any free society. Crime and misuse of the public trust undermine 

confidence in government and discredit free market economies. The effective and fair 

administration of justice offers to the state and its citizens the greatest protection from 

lawlessness and support for basic human rights, and, when extant in foreign countries, 

provides the US with a stronger base of foreign cooperation in the fight against organized 

crime, illegal narcotics, and terrorism.

c. National Security Division merges the primary national security elements of 

DOJ. The National Security Division consists of the CT and Counterespionage Sections; 

the Office of Intelligence, which consists of three sections (i.e., Operations Section, 

Oversight Section, and Litigation Section); the Law and Policy Office; the Office of 

Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism; and an Executive Office. 

(1) The Counterespionage Section supervises the investigation and 

prosecution of cases affecting national security, foreign relations, and the export of 

strategic commodities and technology. The Counterespionage Section has executive 

responsibility for authorizing the prosecution of cases under criminal statutes relating to 

espionage, sabotage, neutrality, and atomic energy. It provides legal advice to US 

attorney’s offices and investigative agencies on all matters under its responsibility, which 

includes 88 federal statutes affecting national security. It also coordinates criminal cases 

involving the application of the Classified Information Procedures Act. In addition, the 

Counterespionage Section administers and enforces the Foreign Agents Registration Act 

of 1938 and related disclosure statutes. 

(2) The CT Section is responsible for the design, implementation, and support 

of law enforcement efforts, legislative initiatives, policies, and strategies relating to 
Department of Justice

A-F-3 

combating international and domestic terrorism. The CT Section seeks to assist, through 

investigation and prosecution, in preventing and disrupting acts of terrorism anywhere in 

the world that impact on significant United States interests and persons.

d. The DEA is the primary narcotics enforcement agency for the USG. The mission 

of the DEA is to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United 

States and bring to the criminal and civil justice system of the United States, or any other 

competent jurisdiction, those organizations and principal members of organizations, 

involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances appearing 

in or destined for illicit traffic in the United States; and to recommend and support nonenforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of illicit controlled substances 

on the domestic and international markets. In carrying out its mission as the agency 

responsible for enforcing the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United 

States, the DEA’s primary responsibilities include:

(1) Investigation and preparation for the prosecution of major violators of 

controlled substance laws operating at interstate and international levels. 

(2) Investigation and preparation for prosecution of criminals and drug gangs 

who perpetrate violence in our communities and terrorize citizens through fear and

intimidation.

(3) Management of a national drug intelligence program in cooperation with 

federal, state, local, and foreign officials to collect, analyze, and disseminate strategic and 

operational drug intelligence information. 

(4) Seizure and forfeiture of assets derived from, traceable to, or intended to be 

used for illicit drug trafficking. 

(5) Enforcement of the provisions of the Controlled Substances Act as they 

pertain to the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of legally produced controlled 

substances. 

(6) Coordination and cooperation with federal, state, and local law enforcement 

officials on mutual drug enforcement efforts and enhancement of such efforts through 

exploitation of potential interstate and international investigations beyond local or limited 

federal jurisdictions and resources. 

(7) Coordination and cooperation with federal, state, and local agencies, and 

with foreign governments, in programs designed to reduce the availability of illicit abusetype drugs on the United States market through nonenforcement methods such as crop 

eradication, crop substitution, and training of foreign officials. 

(8) Responsibility, under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State and US 

ambassadors, for all programs associated with drug law enforcement counterparts in 

foreign countries. 
Annex F to Appendix A

A-F-4 JP 3-08 

(9) Liaison with the UN, International Criminal Police Organization 

(INTERPOL), and other organizations on matters relating to international drug control 

programs. 

e. The FBI’s (http://www.fbi.gov) mission is to uphold the law through the 

investigation of violations of federal criminal law; to protect the United States from 

foreign intelligence and terrorist activities; to provide leadership and law enforcement 

assistance to federal, state, local, and international agencies; and to perform these 

responsibilities in a manner that is responsive to the needs of the public and is faithful to 

the Constitution of the United States. 

(1) In executing the following priorities, the FBI will produce and use 

intelligence to protect the Nation from threats and to bring to justice those who violate 

the law. 

(a) Protect the United States from terrorist attack. 

(b) Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and 

espionage. 

(c) Protect the United States against cyberspace-based attacks and hightechnology crimes. 

(d) Combat public corruption at all levels. 

(e) Protect civil rights. 

(f) Combat transnational/national criminal organizations and enterprises. 

(g) Combat major white-collar crime. 

(h) Combat significant violent crime. 

(i) Support federal, state, local, and international partners. 

(j) Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI’s mission. 

(2) National Security Branch. The FBI’s national security mission is to lead 

and coordinate intelligence efforts that drive actions to protect the United States. The 

FBI’s goal is to develop a comprehensive understanding of the threats and penetrate 

national and transnational networks that have a desire and capability to harm us. Such 

networks include: terrorist organizations, foreign intelligence services, those that seek to 

proliferate WMD, and criminal enterprises. In order to be successful, the FBI must 

understand the threat, continue to integrate our intelligence and law enforcement 

capabilities in every FBI operational program, and continue to expand our contribution to 

the IC knowledge base. Because national security and criminal threats are often 

intertwined, our ability to integrate intelligence and investigations makes us uniquely 

situated to address our Nation’s threats and vulnerabilities. The branch is composed of 
Department of Justice

A-F-5 

the CT Division, Counterintelligence Division, Directorate of Intelligence, Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Directorate, and Terrorist Screening Center.

(a) The CT Division provides a centralized, comprehensive, and 

intelligence-driven approach to address both international and domestic terrorism-related 

matters. It works with its trusted partners from the intelligence and law enforcement 

communities, and oversees the joint terrorism task forces, which are multiagency task 

forces around the country that the FBI established to address terrorism. 

(b) The Counterintelligence Division is charged with the prevention and 

investigation of foreign intelligence activities within the United States. It targets both 

traditional and emerging nontraditional, asymmetric threats, integrating both intelligence 

and law enforcement techniques, and investigating espionage activities. 

(c) The Directorate of Intelligence is the FBI’s dedicated national 

intelligence workforce with responsibility for all FBI intelligence functions. It carries out 

its functions through embedded intelligence elements at FBI HQ and in each field 

division through the Field Intelligence Groups. The groups also have personnel 

embedded in fusion centers around the country to share information with the FBI’s 

federal, state, and local law enforcement and intelligence partners.

(d) The Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate is charged with 

preventing and disrupting the acquisition of WMD capabilities and technologies for use 

against the US homeland by terrorists and other adversaries, including nation-states. The 

directorate integrates and links all the necessary CT, intelligence, counterintelligence 

(CI), and scientific and technical components to accomplish the FBI’s overall WMD 

mission. The Terrorist Screening Center consolidates the government’s approach to 

terrorist screening and creates a single comprehensive watchlist of known or suspected 

terrorists. The center ensures that local, state, and federal terrorist screeners have ready 

access to information and expertise.

(3) International Offices. The threats posed by criminal and terrorist 

organizations that cross borders require the FBI to work seamlessly with law enforcement 

and intelligence agencies around the world. The critical work of coordinating these 

activities is primarily conducted in the FBI’s 62 international offices known as legal 

attachés, or “legats,” and 14 legat sub-offices.

(a) Each legat works with law enforcement and security agencies in their 

HN to coordinate investigations of interest to both countries. The rules for joint activities 

and information sharing are generally spelled out in formal agreements between the 

United States and the legat’s HN. 

(b) In addition to the routine work of legats, the FBI now routinely deploys 

agents and crime scene experts to assist in the investigation of attacks, such as the May 

2003 bombings in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, and the July 2005 bombings in London. 

Agents, analysts, and forensics experts stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan work directly 

with our international partners. 
Annex F to Appendix A

A-F-6 JP 3-08 

f. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) is a 

principal LEA within the DOJ dedicated to preventing terrorism, reducing violent crime, 

and protecting our Nation. The men and women of ATF perform the dual responsibilities 

of enforcing federal criminal laws and regulating the firearms and explosives industries. 

ATF is committed to working directly, and through partnerships, to investigate and 

reduce crime involving firearms and explosives, acts of arson, and illegal trafficking of 

alcohol and tobacco products. 

g. The International Criminal Police Organization, United States National 

Central Bureau (INTERPOL-USNCB)—serves as the United States’ representative to 

the INTERPOL. The INTERPOL-USNCB is the central POC for all INTERPOL matters 

in the United States, including secure communications with police authorities in 

INTERPOL’s 187 member countries and access to INTERPOL’s various databases 

containing information on wanted persons, terrorists, missing persons, stolen and lost 

passports and travel documents, stolen vehicles, and other law enforcement information. 

On a daily basis, the INTERPOL-USNCB coordinates and transmits requests for criminal 

investigative and humanitarian assistance between United States federal, state, and local 

law enforcement authorities and their foreign counterparts. 

h. The United States Marshals Service is the Nation’s oldest and most versatile 

federal LEA. The US Marshals Service is the enforcement arm of the federal courts, and 

as such, it is involved in virtually every federal law enforcement initiative. 

(1) Presidentially appointed US marshals direct the activities of 94 districts—

one for each federal judicial district. More than 3,320 deputy marshals and criminal 

investigators form the backbone of the agency. Among their many duties, they 

apprehend more than half of all federal fugitives, protect the federal judiciary, operate the 

Witness Security Program, transport federal prisoners, and seize property acquired by 

criminals through illegal activities. 

(2) The Tactical Operations Division carries out special missions that are 

related to the Marshals Service’s broad federal law enforcement and judicial security 

responsibilities. They respond to national emergencies as well as crises involving HS. 

The division directs, coordinates, manages, and supports the following Marshals Service 

entities: the Special Operations Group, Office of Emergency Management, Office of 

Inspection, Emergency Operations Center, and the Marshals Service Communications 

Center. 

(a) The Special Operations Group is a highly trained force of deputy 

marshals with the responsibility and capability of responding to emergency situations 

where federal law is violated or where federal property is endangered. 

1. Specially trained deputy marshals provide security and law 

enforcement assistance to DOD and the USAF when Minuteman and cruise missiles are 

moved between military facilities. 
Department of Justice

A-F-7 

2.

(b) Office of Emergency Management is the primary POC when the 

Marshals Service is involved in sensitive and classified missions. It has primary 

responsibility over the agency’s actions involving HS, national emergencies, and 

domestic crises. 

 The Special Operations Group participates in the International

Stabilization and Reconstruction and Rule of Law programs working closely with DOD, 

DOJ, and DOS personnel in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation

ENDURING FREEDOM. In these endeavors, it has designed and constructed courts, 

judicial housing, and witness protection safe sites in Iraq and the Central Narcotics 

Judicial Center in Afghanistan. It provides technologically advanced security equipment 

and programs to improve judicial and witness security in order to provide a more 

democratic judicial system and assist in the stabilization. 

(c) The Office of District Affairs temporarily assigns deputy marshals 

when a district’s permanently assigned deputies need assistance in carrying out their 

missions. For example, hundreds of deputies from across the country augmented the 

manpower of districts hit hard by hurricanes. These mobilization orders come from the 

Attorney General.

(3) Investigations Operations Division. The Marshals Service has memoranda 

of understanding to assume fugitive investigations for most federal LEAs to include the

various investigative services within the DOD. The Marshals Service has been 

designated by the DOJ as the primary agency to apprehend fugitives that are wanted by 

foreign nations and believed to be in the United States. Fugitive apprehension efforts 

have expanded abroad with Marshals Service offices in Mexico, Jamaica, and the 

Dominican Republic. Also, the Marshals Service is the primary agency responsible for 

tracking and extraditing fugitives who are apprehended in foreign countries and wanted 

for prosecution in the United States. 

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

Some of DOJ’s key interagency components include the following: 

a. The Office of Intelligence advises the Attorney General on all matters relating to 

the national security activities of the United States. The Office of Intelligence prepares 

all applications for surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 

assists USG agencies by providing legal advice on matters of national security law and 

policy, and represents DOJ on a variety of interagency committees, such as the National 

Foreign Intelligence Council.

b. The FBI has six priority investigative areas: organized crime, drugs, CT, white 

collar crime, foreign CI, and violent crime. The FBI has extensive intelligence and 

operational assets available, both domestically and overseas.

c. The US Marshals Service, through its Special Operations Group, can respond to 

a number of emergency circumstances, including civil disturbances, terrorist incidents, 

and riot and mob-violence situations. 
Annex F to Appendix A

A-F-8 JP 3-08 

d. The DEA operates with the Customs Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the 

USCG, and the 11-agency National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee. It also 

manages the El Paso Intelligence Center, using personnel from 13 USG agencies.

e. The Department of Justice Mission in Iraq. DOJ has been actively engaged in 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM since May 2003. DOJ leadership is actively engaged in 

this mission, and the Deputy Attorney General has appointed a Rule of Law Counselor 

who reports directly to him and coordinates with leadership in the Embassy in Baghdad. 

Working closely with the DOS, DOJ is assisting in a variety of efforts to promote 

freedom and security, from reconstruction programs to facilitating capacity development 

activities, with the ultimate goal of establishing the rule of law throughout Iraq. DOJ 

officials are engaging with their Iraqi and American counterparts in a variety of tasks 

including: rebuilding the judicial infrastructure; providing guidance in the investigation 

and prosecution of major crimes and acts of terrorism; providing technical assistance to 

Iraqi law enforcement entities; and training justice personnel on issues ranging from 

corrections procedures to international human rights laws. 

f. ICITAP and the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and 

Training (OPDAT) are two key offices that focus on HN capacity building within the 

criminal justice sector. As result their program implementation activities are closely 

coordinated with partner agencies and departments, embassies in countries they are 

implementing programs, and with official representatives of a HN. OPDAT carries out 

its mission in close coordination with the ICITAP. Both OPDAT and ICITAP consider 

overseas criminal justice training and development as an integrated whole. Other 

components of DOJ are also engaged in providing technical assistance and training 

overseas. Among them, the FBI and DEA are the most active. 

g. OPDAT establishes judicial and prosecutorial assistance programs that are 

appropriate for particular countries. The appropriateness of a program for a particular 

country is determined through consultation with host country officials, DOS and USAID, 

other DOJ officials, and those familiar with the country’s criminal justice infrastructures. 

Based upon this determination OPDAT prepares a project implementation plan that 

describes the nature, goals, duration, and cost of the proposed project. 

h. Working with DOS, ICITAP ensures that US foreign assistance advances both 

the international rule of law and the strategic law enforcement priorities of the United 

States, by placing federal law enforcement development experts in US embassies 

overseas. These ICITAP experts serve as highly valued resources in the embassies’ 

policy and planning processes. They use their knowledge of US law enforcement 

interests in the region; their expertise in assessing the needs of the host country; their 

experience in implementing law enforcement assistance programs; and their ability to 

develop collaborative relationships with host country law enforcement officials to help 

both the host country and the United States achieve their peace and security objectives.

 (1) ICITAP engages other USG and international organizations in program 

activities (such as training events and internships), and creates opportunities for 

professional relationships to develop with HN law enforcement. They collaborate with 
Department of Justice

A-F-9 

representatives of the DOS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs and Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) in US embassies.

 (2) ICITAP also teams with law enforcement attachés in US embassies—

including federal prosecutors and agents of the FBI; US DEA; US Marshals Service; 

ATF; DHS; and Internal Revenue Service—to improve the relevance and effectiveness of 

capacity-building programs in the host country. 
Annex F to Appendix A

A-F-10 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
A-G-1 

ANNEX G TO APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. Overview

DOS is the department of the USG responsible for planning and implementing the 

foreign policy of the United States. As the lead US foreign affairs agency, DOS

formulates, represents, and implements the President’s foreign policy. The Secretary of 

State, the ranking member of the Cabinet and fourth in line of presidential succession, is 

the President’s principal advisor on foreign policy and the person chiefly responsible for 

US representation abroad. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. Under the Constitution, the President has the authority to make treaties, to receive 

foreign emissaries, to appoint diplomatic and consular officials, and to exercise other 

authority provided by legislation. To assist the President in the exercise of these duties, 

Congress created the DOS in 1789, with the Secretary of State as its head. DOS’s 

mission is to advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the 

international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and 

prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their 

people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system. 

b. DOS manages America’s relationships with foreign governments, international 

organizations, and the people of other countries. The management of all of these 

relationships is called diplomacy. DOS diplomats carry out the President’s foreign policy 

and help build a more free, prosperous, and secure world. DOS is a vital part of the USG 

because it: 

(1) Represents the United States overseas and conveys US policies to foreign 

governments and international organizations through American embassies and consulates 

in foreign countries and diplomatic missions; 

(2) Negotiates and concludes agreements and treaties on issues ranging from 

trade to nuclear weapons; 

(3) Coordinates and supports international activities of other US agencies, hosts 

official visits, and performs other diplomatic missions; 

(4) Leads interagency coordination and manages the allocation of resources for 

foreign relations; and 

(5) Promotes mutual understanding between the people of the United States and 

the people of other countries around the world. 

c. DOS has four main foreign policy goals:

(1) Protect the United States and Americans; 
Annex G to Appendix A

A-G-2 JP 3-08 

(2) Advance democracy, human rights, and other global interests; 

(3) Promote international understanding of American values and policies; and

(4) Support US diplomats, government officials, and all other personnel at 

home and abroad who make these goals a reality. 

3. Organizational Structure

a. Department of State Headquarters. The DOS’s HQ provides policy guidance 

to DOS and USAID. 

(1) Subordinate to the Secretary of State are two deputy secretaries and the 

under secretaries, who are responsible for management and coordination of the foreign 

policy process. There is an under secretary for each of the following: 

(a) Political Affairs. Responsible for the general conduct of political 

relations and for representing DOS and the Secretary of State at the NSC deputies level.

(b) Economic, Energy, and Agricultural Affairs. Responsible for 

foreign policy decisions in these areas. 

(c) Arms Control and International Security. Charged with the 

responsibility for policies in these areas, including all policy matters relating to arms 

control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. 

(d) Democracy and Global Affairs. Responsible for all matters on global 

issues, including democracy, human rights, and labor; environment, oceans, health, and 

science; population, refugees, and migration; women’s issues; and trafficking in persons 

and avian and pandemic influenza. 

(e) Management. Responsible for DOS’s resource management, including 

personnel. 

(f) Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Leads America's public 

diplomacy outreach, which includes communications with international audiences, 

cultural programming, academic grants, educational exchanges, international visitor 

programs, and USG efforts to confront ideological support for terrorism. 

(2) The Director of US Foreign Assistance is charged with directing the 

transformation of the USG approach to foreign assistance. The Director of US Foreign 

Assistance holds a rank equivalent to deputy secretary and is responsible for the effective 

use of foreign assistance to meet broad foreign policy objectives. 

(3) To address the diverse issues in US foreign relations, DOS is organized into 

regional and functional bureaus. The six regional bureaus, responsible to the Under 

Secretary for Political Affairs, formulate and implement regional foreign policy and 
Department of State

A-G-3 

bilateral policy toward each individual country of the world. These bureaus are headed 

by assistant secretaries:

(a) African Affairs.

(b) East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

(c) European and Eurasian Affairs. 

(d) Near Eastern Affairs.

(e) Western Hemisphere Affairs.

(f) South and Central Asian Affairs.

(4) Two additional bureaus responsible to the Under Secretary for Political 

Affairs are the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, which 

develops policies and programs to combat international narcotics and crime, and the 

Bureau of International Organization Affairs, which formulates and implements 

multilateral foreign policy toward IGOs, particularly the agencies of the UN, and 

provides guidance and support for US participation in IGOs, peacekeeping and 

humanitarian operations, human rights, economic and social affairs, technical agencies, 

international development, US citizen employment in international organizations, and 

international conferences. 

(5) The other bureaus in DOS are functionally oriented; their assistant 

secretaries are responsible to other under secretaries for specific matters. Bureaus are 

subdivided into offices headed by directors. The offices of the six regional bureaus are 

organized by country or group of countries (e.g., the Office of Mainland Southeast Asia 

Affairs, the Office of Canadian Affairs). Regional office directors are often also called 

country directors, and they supervise the work of desk or country officers. Country (or 

“desk”) officers are responsible for the day-to-day coordination with the US mission, and 

the other elements of the DOS and the broader interagency community. Directors head 

the offices of the other bureaus for the specific function they perform. 

(6) DOS relies on the Foreign Service, a corps of career foreign affairs experts, 

to operate its overseas missions, formulate foreign policy, and perform diplomatic 

engagement. Foreign Service officers of the United States hold Presidential commissions 

and are recruited through a difficult examination and entry process, with an up-or-out 

promotion system akin to that of military officers. Foreign Service officers serve on an 

assignment basis, frequently serving two to four years at a US mission or in DOS. In 

addition to the Foreign Service officer corps, there is a wide range of Foreign Service 

specialists with expertise in security, communications, information technology, medical 

specialties, management, and budgeting. 

b. Functional Bureaus and Offices. Several bureaus and offices have frequent 

interaction with DOD. 
Annex G to Appendix A

A-G-4 JP 3-08 

(1) The mission of S/CRS is to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize USG 

civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize 

and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a 

sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy. The Coordinator for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization reports directly to the Secretary of State. The Secretary 

of State may direct the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to lead and 

coordinate integrated USG efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct R&S activities, 

including ensuring harmonization with any planned or ongoing military operations. 

(a) The Conflict Prevention Office oversees a broad-based global 

monitoring program to identify states at risk of instability, coordinates conflict prevention 

and mitigation efforts within the USG, and actively consults with NGOs and international 

partners on best practices and new policy tools to help define policies and programs to 

strengthen fragile states.

(b) The Planning Office works with USG civilian and military agencies, 

nongovernmental, and multilateral partners to refine and implement the whole-ofgovernment approach to the reconstruction, stabilization, and conflict transformation of 

fragile and failed states.

(c) The Office of Civilian Readiness and Response is responsible for the 

hiring, management, readiness, deployment, logistical support, and after-action 

coordination for the Civilian Response Corps (CRC). 

(d) The Conflict Prevention Office, the Planning Office, and the Civilian 

Readiness and Response Office interface with four regional coordination teams to assure 

functional and geographic integration across S/CRS.

(2) The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) is the DOS’s principal link to 

DOD. PM provides guidance and coordinates policy formulation on national security

issues including regional stability, military operations and arms transfers, and defense 

trade. It is the DOS lead for defense trade controls, defense relations, security

cooperation, military operations and exercises, diplomatic clearance approvals for foreign 

ships and aircraft entering the US and its territories, conventional weapons destruction

including humanitarian demining assistance, man-portable air-defense systems threat 

reduction, and analyzing broad trends in international security affairs to determine their 

effect on US policies. It ensures effective coordination of related policies and joint 

operations plans, oversees operations and programs, and advises and supports senior

officers of DOS in their formal relationships with the OSD and JCS. It serves as 

principal liaison with the DOD on policy issues, including security cooperation, and on 

coordination of US military related activities with US foreign policy implications. It is 

responsible for developing, managing, and implementing military security cooperation

programs and providing advice on crisis management, military operations, base access 

and pre-positioning of US materiel, and other aspects of US defense relations. It provides 

overall direction for the fulfillment of DOS’s responsibilities for the State-Defense 

Exchange Program and for POLADs assigned to military commands, the Pentagon, and 

JIACGs (or equivalent organization). 
Department of State

A-G-5 

(3) The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism heads USG efforts to 

improve CT cooperation with foreign governments. The Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism chairs the Interagency Working Group on Counterterrorism and the 

DOS’s task force to coordinate responses to international terrorist incidents. The 

Coordinator for Counterterrorism has primary responsibility for developing, coordinating, 

and implementing American CT policy. The office leads the Regional Strategic Initiative 

which seeks to create a flexible network of coordinated country teams, to deny terrorists 

safe haven.

(a) The goals are to identify key CT issues and concerns across a region; 

develop a common strategic approach to address CT issues; pool resources and tasks to 

generate unified effort across the USG; create ongoing interagency partnerships to 

address CT issues; form a basis for closer cooperation between regional partner nations; 

and leverage resources from such partners as the Group of Eight Counterterrorism Action 

Group, and other IGOs. 

(b) To maximize the impact of USG CT efforts, S/CT has initiated the 

Regional Security Initiative, a series of regionally-based, interagency, strategy planning 

activities, hosted by US embassies. The key concepts underpinning the Regional 

Strategic Initiative are to bring all instruments of statecraft to bear, in a calibrated 

fashion, through coordinated interagency strategy; create a shared diagnosis as a basis for 

interagency self-synchronization; build trusted networks to displace enemy networks; 

promote field-driven interagency cooperation; and operate as theater, not-bureau-based.

(4) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, drawing on all-source 

intelligence, provides value-added independent analysis of events to DOS policymakers; 

ensures that intelligence activities support foreign policy and national security purposes; 

and serves as the focal point in DOS for ensuring policy review of sensitive CI and law 

enforcement activities. Its primary mission is to harness intelligence to serve US 

diplomacy. The bureau also analyzes geographical and international boundary issues. 

The bureau is a member of the IC. The humanitarian information unit (HIU) is an 

element of the bureau. HIU serves as a USG interagency center to identify, collect, 

analyze, and disseminate unclassified information critical to USG decision makers and 

partners in preparation for and response to humanitarian emergencies worldwide, and to 

promote best practices for humanitarian information management. To accomplish this 

mission, the HIU performs the following tasks: 

(a) Identifies key sources of geospatial and geo-referenced data best suited 

to meet the information requirements of our consumers; 

(b) Collects timely, verifiable, and relevant data utilizing an extensive 

network of information partnerships; 

(c) Analyzes data using multiagency expertise and applying proven 

technologies to determine significant trends and relationships; and 
Annex G to Appendix A

A-G-6 JP 3-08 

(d) Disseminates information of value to all levels of consumers, from 

national-level policymakers to operational field managers.

(5) The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation is responsible for 

managing a broad range of nonproliferation, counter proliferation, and arms control 

functions. It leads US efforts to prevent the spread of WMD (i.e., nuclear, chemical, and 

biological weapons) and their delivery systems. The bureau spearheads efforts to 

promote international consensus on WMD proliferation through bilateral and multilateral 

diplomacy. It addresses WMD proliferation threats posed by non-state actors and 

terrorist groups by improving physical security, using interdiction and sanctions, and 

actively participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative. The bureau also coordinates 

the implementation of key international treaties and arrangements, working to make them 

relevant to today’s security challenges; and works closely with the UN, the Group of 

Eight, NATO, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the IAEA, and 

other international institutions and organizations to reduce and eliminate the threat posed 

by WMD. The bureau also supports efforts of foreign partners to prevent, protect 

against, and respond to the threat or use of WMD by terrorists. 

(6) Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. The mission of the bureau 

is to provide protection, life-sustaining relief, and durable solutions for refugees and 

conflict victims, working through the multilateral humanitarian system to achieve the best 

results for refugees and conflict victims on behalf of the American taxpayer. The bureau 

has primary responsibility within the USG for formulating policies on population, 

refugees, and migration, and for administering US refugee assistance and admissions 

programs. It coordinates DOS’s policy on global population, refugees, and migration 

issues and manages migration and refugee assistance appropriations. The bureau is at the 

center of a cooperative effort among the DOS, USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs to 

implement a more comprehensive international population policy, including broadening 

of population assistance programs to cover a wider range of reproductive health services; 

provide assistance to refugees in first-asylum countries and admit refugees to the United 

States for permanent resettlement; and develop bilateral and multilateral approaches to 

international migration issues.

(7) The Bureau of Diplomatic Security is the security and law enforcement arm 

of DOS and is responsible for providing a safe and secure environment for the conduct of 

US foreign policy. Overseas, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develops and 

implements effective security programs to safeguard all personnel who work in every US 

diplomatic mission around the world. In the United States, the Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security personnel protect the Secretary of State and high-ranking foreign dignitaries and 

officials visiting the United States, investigates passport and visa fraud, and conducts 

personnel security investigations. 

(8) The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs advises 

the President, Secretary of State, other bureaus in DOS, and other USG departments and 

agencies on the development of policies and programs to combat international narcotics 

and crime. Its programs support two of the DOS’s strategic goals: to reduce the entry of 

illegal drugs into the United States; and to minimize the impact of international crime on 
Department of State

A-G-7 

the United States and its citizens. Counternarcotics and anticrime programs also 

complement CT efforts, both directly and indirectly, by promoting modernization of and 

supporting operations by foreign criminal justice systems and LEAs charged with the CT

mission.

c. The DOS Overseas. The United States has diplomatic relations with some 180 

of the 191 countries in the world and with many IGOs. DOS takes the leading role in 

maintaining and improving relationships with these countries and organizations. DOS is 

represented by its core staff of Foreign Service personnel at every one of the nearly 260 

US embassies, consulates-general, consulates, and missions to international diplomatic 

organizations overseas. 

(1) A US mission is the basic unit for the conduct of bilateral diplomacy with 

foreign governments overseas. They are headed by a COM, normally an ambassador—

who is a Presidential appointee and the President’s personal representative. As such, the 

COM is the senior US official in the country. By law, COMs coordinate, direct, and 

supervise all USG activities and representatives posted in the foreign country to which 

they are accredited. COMs do not; however, exercise control of US personnel attached to 

and working for the head of a US mission to an IGO (e.g., US Ambassador to NATO) or 

US military personnel operating under the command of a GCC. Generally, each COM 

has an agreement with the GCC delineating which DOD personnel fall under the 

responsibility of each for security. 

(2) Overseas, the Foreign Service is assisted by another 10,000 career Foreign 

Service National employees, who are mostly citizens of the HN. Also, more than 1,300 

US Marines are under OPCON of DOS COMs as Marine security guards.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. As the lead foreign affairs agency, DOS has the primary role in: 

(1) Leading interagency coordination in developing and implementing foreign 

policy. 

(2) Managing the foreign affairs budget and other foreign affairs resources. 

(3) Leading and coordinating US representation abroad, conveying US foreign 

policy to foreign governments and IGOs through US embassies and consulates in foreign 

countries and diplomatic missions to international organizations. 

(4) Conducting negotiations and concluding agreements and treaties on issues 

ranging from trade to nuclear weapons. 

(5) Coordinating and supporting international activities of other US agencies 

and officials.

b. All foreign affairs activities—US representation abroad, foreign assistance 

programs, countering international crime, foreign military training programs, the services 
Annex G to Appendix A

A-G-8 JP 3-08 

DOS provides, and more—are paid for by the foreign affairs budget, which represents 

little more than 1% of the total federal budget. This small investment is key to 

maintaining US leadership, which promotes and protects the interests of our citizens by: 

(1) Promoting peace and stability in regions of vital interest.

(2) Creating jobs at home by opening markets abroad. 

(3) Helping developing nations establish stable economic environments that 

provide investment and export opportunities. 

(4) Bringing nations together to address global problems such as cross-border 

pollution, the spread of communicable diseases, terrorism, nuclear smuggling, and 

humanitarian crises.

c. The services DOS provides include: 

(1) Protecting and assisting US citizens living or traveling abroad. 

(2) Assisting US businesses in the international marketplace.

(3) Coordinating and providing support for international activities of other US 

agencies (local, state, or USG), official visits overseas and at home, and other diplomatic 

efforts.

(4) Keeping the public informed about US foreign policy and relations with 

other countries and providing feedback from the public to administration officials.

d. A key DOS function is assembling coalitions to provide military forces for USled multinational operations. In coordination with the NSC and DOD, DOS contacts 

foreign governments at the highest level to request participation of their forces in a 

planned multinational operation. When forces are offered, DOS formally accepts them 

from the foreign government and arranges for military-to-military contact between the 

foreign and US forces. Once a foreign government has committed its forces to the 

multinational effort, DOS includes its representatives in a political forum to ensure that 

the foreign government remains informed of the direction of the effort and committed to 

participation. 

5. Interagency Relationships

a. The DOS’s principal roles in its relationship with DOD are to ensure that defense 

activities support national foreign policy and to facilitate defense activities overseas. In 

performance of the first role, DOS attends interagency meetings, responds to requests 

from JS and OSD for a foreign policy review of DOD proposed activities, and alerts 

DOD to defense activities of foreign policy concern that have come to DOS attention. In 

its role as facilitator of defense activities overseas, DOS approaches foreign governments 

through high-level visits, diplomatic representations by US missions overseas, or contact 
Department of State

A-G-9 

with foreign government representatives in the US to negotiate agreements or obtain 

authorization for defense activities in the sovereign territory of the foreign country. 

b. In recognition of the impact that DOD activities have on US foreign affairs, 

DOS has assigned a single bureau, PM, to be its primary interface with DOD. PM 

manages POLMIL relations throughout the world, including training and assistance for 

foreign militaries, and works to maintain global access for US military forces. PM 

promotes responsible US defense trade, while controlling foreign access to militarily 

significant technology, through export controls. PM also coordinates US programs that 

help rid countries of landmines and other conventional weapons. PM helps protect 

national security by leading interagency efforts to plan for future crises — including 

planning US responses to cyberspace-attacks against vital computer networks or to 

CBRN attacks overseas.

c. DOS is also the coordinator of the process for interagency consideration of 

proposals to enter into treaties or other formal agreements with foreign governments, 

known as the Circular 175 process (US Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual, 

Volume 11— Political Affairs, chapter 720). No USG agency is permitted to enter into a 

formal agreement of any kind with a foreign government, nor even propose an 

agreement, until it has received Circular 175 authorization. 

d. Overseas, DOS provides the support structure for the representatives of DOD, 

DOC, USDA, DOJ, and DHS; the Peace Corps; USAID; and other USG foreign affairs 

agencies to enable them to conduct US relations with foreign governments and IGOs. In 

missions that conduct bilateral affairs with the government of a foreign country, the COM 

coordinates the efforts of the interagency country team, composed of the chief in-country 

representative of the foreign affairs agencies, to achieve a unified, consistent foreign 

policy toward the HN. 
Annex G to Appendix A

A-G-10 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
A-H-1 

ANNEX H TO APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

1. Overview

DOT serves the United States by ensuring a fast, safe, efficient, accessible, and 

convenient transportation system that meets our vital national interests and enhances the 

quality of life of the American people, today and into the future. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. The national objectives of general welfare, economic growth and stability, and 

security of the United States require the development of transportation policies and 

programs that contribute to providing fast, safe, efficient, and convenient transportation at 

the lowest cost consistent with those and other national objectives, including the efficient 

use and conservation of the resources of the United States. 

b. DOT is necessary in the public interest and to: 

(1) Ensure the coordinated and effective administration of the transportation 

programs of the USG; 

(2) Make easier the development and improvement of coordinated 

transportation service to be provided by private enterprise to the greatest extent feasible;

(3) Encourage cooperation of federal, state, and local governments, carriers, 

labor, and other interested persons to achieve transportation objectives; 

(4) Stimulate technological advances in transportation, through research and 

development or otherwise; 

(5) Provide general leadership in identifying and solving transportation 

problems; and 

(6) Develop and recommend to the President and Congress transportation 

policies and programs to achieve transportation objectives considering the needs of the 

public, users, carriers, industry, labor, and national defense. 

3. Organizational Structure

a. DOT consists of the Office of the Secretary, the Surface Transportation Board, 

and 10 operating administrations that are organized generally by mode of travel (e.g., air, 

rail, and other methods): Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); Federal Highway 

Administration; Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration; Federal Railroad 

Administration; Federal Transit Administration; Maritime Administration (MARAD); 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; Saint Lawrence Seaway Development 

Corporation; Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration; and Research and 

Innovative Technology Administration. 
Annex H to Appendix A

A-H-2 JP 3-08 

b. The Office of the Secretary oversees the formulation of national transportation 

policy and promotes intermodal transportation. Other responsibilities range from 

negotiation and implementation of international transportation agreements, assuring the 

fitness of US airlines, enforcing airline consumer protection regulations, issuance of 

regulations to prevent alcohol and illegal drug misuse in transportation systems, and 

preparing transportation legislation.

c. Federal Aviation Administration. The mission of the FAA is to provide the 

safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world. 

(1) The safety mission of the FAA is first and foremost and includes the 

issuance and enforcement of regulations and standards related to the manufacture, 

operation, certification, and maintenance of aircraft. The agency is responsible for the 

rating and certification of airmen and for certification of airports serving air carriers. It 

also regulates a program to protect the security of civil aviation, and enforces regulations 

under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act for shipments by air. The FAA, which 

operates a network of airport towers, air route traffic control centers, and flight service 

stations, develops air traffic rules, allocates the use of airspace, and provides for the 

security control of air traffic to meet national defense requirements. Other 

responsibilities include the construction or installation of visual and electronic aids to air 

navigation and promotion of aviation safety internationally. The FAA, which regulates 

and encourages the US commercial space transportation industry, also licenses 

commercial space launch facilities and private sector launches.

(2) The FAA is responsible for all DOD flight inspection requirements. 

Through a MOA, the USAF maintains a staff of active and reserve aircrews to perform 

flight inspection missions worldwide, including missions in support of combat and 

contingency operations. The DOD Flight Inspection office coordinates flight inspection 

requirements and develops national policy for the conduct of flight inspection of all 

navigation aids and air traffic control facilities owned or controlled by the military 

departments of the USG throughout the world. 

(3) The FAA leads and supports the development of civil aviation systems 

worldwide (e.g., Afghanistan). Civil air traffic control systems have numerous military 

applications and provide significant economic advantages to a partner nation. 

d. Maritime Administration. MARAD promotes development and maintenance of 

an adequate, well-balanced, United States merchant marine, sufficient to carry the 

Nation’s domestic waterborne commerce and a substantial portion of its waterborne 

foreign commerce, and capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war 

or national emergency. MARAD also seeks to ensure that the United States enjoys 

adequate shipbuilding and repair service, efficient ports, effective intermodal water and 

land transportation systems, and reserve shipping capacity in time of national emergency. 

(1) Military Cargoes. The MARAD initiates and recommends regulations and 

procedures for the DOD to follow in administering cargo preference. Program efforts 

concentrate on meetings and discussions with DOD component commands, contractors, 
Department of Transportation 

A-H-3 

suppliers, freight forwarders, and shipping companies to focus attention on meeting the 

needs of all constituents within the context of US-flag carriage requirements. Cargo 

shipping for DOD is subject to the Military Cargo Preference Act of 1904 which requires 

that items procured for, intended for use by, or owned by military departments or defense 

agencies, must be carried exclusively (100 percent) on US-flag vessels, if available at 

reasonable rates. Most DOD containerized cargo is booked on US-flag vessels by the 

Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command for the various DOD shipper 

services as part of the Defense Transportation System. Shipping via the system allows 

DOD shippers access to pre-negotiated ocean shipping contracts providing cost and 

convenience benefits.

(2) NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping. The MARAD is the United 

States representative to NATO’s Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS). 

Additionally, MARAD’s Office of Emergency Preparedness provides the Secretariat for 

PBOS and the Assistant Administrator currently serves as the Chairman of PBOS. PBOS

is responsible for developing and maintaining plans for civil shipping support to the 

Alliance in crisis and war. PBOS planning takes into account the international character 

of merchant shipping and seeks to facilitate access to worldwide shipping. Its planning 

responsibilities include planning for the provision of shipping resources to support 

military lift requirements through appropriate shipping crisis management arrangements, 

and planning for the availability of marine war risks insurance for merchant ships 

supporting the alliance. PBOS plans for the use of merchant shipping in crises or wars 

affecting the interests of the Alliance. All other sealift activities in peacetime are solely a

national responsibility. 

(3) Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement. The Voluntary Intermodal 

Sealift Agreement (VISA) program is a partnership between the USG and the maritime 

industry to provide the DOD with “assured access” to commercial sealift and intermodal 

capacity to support the emergency deployment and sustainment of US military forces. 

Intermodal capacity includes dry cargo ships, equipment, terminal facilities, and 

intermodal management services. The VISA program provides for a time-phased 

activation of state-of-the-art commercial intermodal equipment to coincide with DOD 

requirements while minimizing disruption to US commercial operations. The VISA 

program can be activated in three stages as determined by DOD with each stage 

representing a higher level of capacity commitment. In Stage III participants must 

commit at least 50 percent of their capacity. Dry cargo vessels enrolled in the Maritime 

Security Program must commit 100 percent during Stage III. 

(4) Maritime Security Program. The Maritime Security Program is a fleet of 

active, commercially viable, militarily useful, privately-owned vessels to meet national 

defense and other security requirements. Participating operators are required to make 

their ships and commercial transportation resources available upon request by SecDef 

during times of war or national emergency. The program maintains a modern US-flag 

fleet providing military access to vessels and vessel capacity, as well as a total global, 

intermodal transportation network. This network includes not only vessels, but also

logistics management services, infrastructure, terminals facilities, and US citizen 

merchant mariners to crew the government owned/controlled and commercial fleets.
Annex H to Appendix A

A-H-4 JP 3-08 

(5) Office of Ship Operations. The Office of Ship Operations formulates 

national policies and programs for the operation, maintenance, and repair of governmentowned or acquired merchant ships especially the maintenance and readiness of the 

National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF). It develops and administers programs, policies, 

and activities for the maintenance and readiness of Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships in 

order to ensure that these ships can be activated within 4, 5, 10, or 20 days of notification; 

preservation work plans for each reserve fleet site; and the acquisition, allocation, and 

operation of merchant ships in time of national emergency. It administers ship 

preservation programs for the NDRF and conducts fleet service activities and engineering 

studies for improved methods, techniques, equipment, and materials. 

(a) The NDRF serves as a reserve of ships for national defense and national 

emergency purposes. NDRF vessels are located at the James River, Beaumont and 

Suisun Bay anchorages, and at designated port facility berths. The program primarily 

consists of dry cargo ships with some tankers and military auxiliaries. In addition to 

maintaining ships for USTRANSCOM logistics, the Missile Defense Agency sponsors 

two ships for missile tracking. There are five additional ships that are dedicated for 

military and HS training. There are 30 vessels in retention status, which are preserved in 

a way that keeps them in the same condition as when they entered the fleet. In response 

to hurricane Katrina and Rita landfalls in 2005, FEMA used the MARAD’s vessels to 

support relief efforts. Nine ships supported the recovery mostly with messing and 

berthing for refinery workers, oil spill response teams, and longshoremen. 

(b) The RRF program is a subset of the MARAD’s NDRF to support the 

rapid worldwide deployment of US military forces. As a key element of DOD strategic 

sealift, the RRF primarily supports transport of Army and Marine Corps unit equipment, 

combat support equipment, and initial resupply during the critical surge period before 

commercial ships can be marshaled. The RRF provides nearly one-half of the 

government-owned surge sealift capability. Management of the RRF program is defined 

by a MOA between DOD and DOT. 

1. The RRF now consists of 51 ships including: 35 roll-on/roll off 

vessels with eight fast sealift ships, four heavy lift or barge carrying ships, six auxiliary 

craneships, two tankers, two aviation repair vessels, and two special mission ships. Most 

RRF ships are berthed at various US ports. These outported locations are coordinated 

with military planners and chosen to minimize sailing time to strategic loadout ports. 

Outported RRF ships are also used as training platforms for cargo handling by USN and 

Army units and for HS training by various LEAs.

2. RRF ships are expected to be fully operational within their assigned 

5- and 10-day readiness status and sail to designated loading berths. Commercial US 

ship managers provide systems maintenance, equipment repairs, logistics support, 

activation, manning, and operations management by contract. Ships in priority readiness 

have reduced operating status maintenance crews of about 10 commercial merchant 

mariners that are supplemented by additional mariners during activations. Readiness of 

the RRF is periodically tested by DOD directed activations of ships for military cargo 

operations and exercises.
Department of Transportation 

A-H-5 

4. Interagency Relationships

a. DOT maintains relationships with many components of DOD. 

b. DOT has considerable expertise involving the civilian and military use of the 

Nation’s transportation system. For this reason, DOT can redirect the Nation’s 

transportation assets and change priorities, usually through Presidential executive order 

or emergency decrees.

c. The FAA and DOD have significant mutual interests with regard to military 

aviation, aeronautical charts and publications, Notices to Airmen, military airport 

operations and certification, airspace management during national crises, and airspace 

control and certification of expeditionary aviation facilities overseas during military 

contingency operations. 
Annex H to Appendix A

A-H-6 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
A-I-1 

ANNEX I TO APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 

1. Overview 

The Department of the Treasury (TREAS) (http://www.ustreas.gov) serves the 

American people and strengthens national security by managing the USG’s finances 

effectively, promoting economic growth and stability, and ensuring the safety, soundness, 

and security of the US and international financial systems. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities 

TREAS is the executive agency responsible for promoting economic prosperity and 

ensuring the financial security of the United States. TREAS is responsible for a wide 

range of activities such as advising the President on economic and financial issues, 

encouraging sustainable economic growth, and fostering improved governance in 

financial institutions. TREAS operates and maintains systems that are critical to the 

Nation’s financial infrastructure, such as the production of coin and currency, the 

disbursement of payments to the American public, revenue collection, and the borrowing 

of funds necessary to run the USG. TREAS works with other federal agencies, foreign 

governments, and international financial institutions to encourage global economic 

growth, raise standards of living, and to the extent possible, predict and prevent economic 

and financial crises. TREAS also performs a critical and far-reaching role in enhancing 

national security by implementing economic sanctions against foreign threats to the US, 

identifying and targeting the financial support networks of national security threats, and 

improving the safeguards of our financial systems. 

3. Organizational Structure 

a. TREAS is organized into two major components: the departmental offices and the 

operating bureaus. The departmental offices are primarily responsible for the formulation 

of policy and management for TREAS as a whole, while the operating bureaus carry out 

the specific operations assigned to TREAS. The bureaus make up 98% of the TREAS 

work force. 

b. The basic functions of the TREAS include: 

(1) Managing federal finances. 

(2) Collecting taxes, duties, and monies paid to and due to the US and paying 

all bills of the US. 

(3) Currency and coinage. 

(4) Managing government accounts and the public debt. 

(5) Supervising national banks and thrift institutions. 
Annex I to Appendix A 

A-I-2 JP 3-08 

(6) Advising on domestic and international financial, monetary, economic, 

trade, and tax policy. 

(7) Enforcing federal finance and tax laws.

(8) Investigating and prosecuting tax evaders, counterfeiters, and forgers. 

c. The mission of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence is to marshal

TREAS’s policy, enforcement, regulatory, and intelligence functions in order to sever the 

lines of financial support to international terrorists, proliferators of WMD, narcotics 

traffickers, and other threats to our national security. There are financial networks that 

underlie all of these threats, and those networks are sources of valuable intelligence and 

present vulnerabilities that can be exploited. 

(1) The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers and enforces 

economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and national security goals 

against targeted foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, international narcotics 

traffickers, those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of WMD, and other 

threats to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. OFAC 

acts under Presidential national emergency powers, as well as authority granted by 

specific legislation, to impose controls on transactions and freeze assets under US 

jurisdiction. Many of the sanctions are based on UN and other international mandates, 

are multilateral in scope, and involve close cooperation with allied governments. 

(2) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis is responsible for the receipt, 

analysis, collation, and dissemination of foreign intelligence and foreign CI information 

related to the operation and responsibilities of TREAS. The office is a member of the US 

IC. Its mission is to support the formulation of policy and execution of TREAS 

authorities by providing expert analysis and intelligence production on financial and 

other support networks for terrorist groups, proliferators, and other key national security 

threats; and timely, accurate, and focused intelligence support on the full range of 

economic, political, and security issues. 

(a) The Iraq Threat Finance Cell is jointly led by TREAS and United States 

Central Command (USCENTCOM) in Baghdad. It performs financial intelligence 

analysis concerning insurgent and terrorist elements in Iraq. It collects, processes, and 

disseminates financial intelligence to support efforts to detect, identify, and disrupt 

insurgent or terrorist elements. Assignments to the cell are voluntary and provide 

valuable opportunities to work with military, diplomatic, IC, and law enforcement 

elements while serving overseas.

(b) Liaison Positions. In order to enhance integration and collaboration 

with other IC elements, Office of Intelligence and Analysis deploys personnel to 

organizations such as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), FBI, 

CIA, USCENTCOM, USPACOM, and USEUCOM. These liaisons serve as valuable 

points of contact at their respective posts and provide guidance, advice, and expertise to 

these organizations regarding TREAS-related matters.
Department of the Treasury

A-I-3 

(c) Treasury attachés enable TREAS to collaborate with foreign counterpart 

agencies in order to advance US policies in the economic and illicit financing arenas. An 

attaché represents TREAS for a one to three year period and assists the US ambassador 

by providing analytical support and policy advice regarding TREAS issues. TREAS 

currently has positions established throughout the world including in Europe, Asia, South 

America, and the Middle East. 

(3) Protecting charities from terrorist abuse is a critical component of the global 

fight against terrorism. Charities provide essential services, comfort, and hope to those in 

need around the world. Unfortunately, terrorists have exploited the charitable sector to 

raise and move funds, provide logistical support, encourage terrorist recruitment, or 

otherwise support terrorist organizations and operations. This abuse threatens to 

undermine donor confidence and jeopardizes the integrity of the charitable sector, whose 

services are indispensable to the world community. The charitable sector is one that has 

consistently faced a high risk of abuse from terrorists and terrorist organizations. 

Charities operating overseas in areas of high risk are especially vulnerable to this abuse. 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has designated 

several charities worldwide as supporting terrorist activity. A list of these charities can 

be found at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement. In addition, the United States has 

designated several foreign terrorist organizations that have operated under various names 

that appear as potential fundraising front organizations for terrorist activity. Terrorist 

abuse of the charitable sector can take many forms, including:

(a) Establishing front organizations or using charities to raise funds in 

support of terrorist organizations; 

(b) Establishing or using charities to transfer funds, other resources, and 

operatives across geographical boundaries; 

(c) Defrauding charities through branch offices or aid workers to divert 

funds to support terrorist organizations; and

(d) Leveraging charitable funds, resources, and services to recruit members 

and foster support for terrorist organizations and their ideology. 

d. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network supports law enforcement 

investigative efforts and fosters interagency and global cooperation against domestic and 

international financial crimes. It also provides US policy makers with strategic analyses 

of domestic and worldwide trends and patterns. The networks International Programs 

Division works to establish and strengthen mechanisms for the exchange of information 

globally, and to engage, encourage, and support international partners in taking necessary 

steps to construct regimes to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other 

financial crimes.

(1) The network offers a wide array of technical assistance to foreign 

governments, providing policy recommendations and guidance, analytical training, 

technological advice, and staff support in order to foster the implementation of anti-
Annex I to Appendix A 

A-I-4 JP 3-08 

money laundering and CT financing regimes worldwide. The network supports US 

bilateral and multilateral efforts to join with other nations in a concerted fashion to 

combat transnational crime.

(2) The International Programs Division responds to requests from Egmont 

financial intelligence units, as well as acts as a conduit for requests from domestic law 

enforcement to foreign financial intelligence units. Financial intelligence units offer 

LEAs around the world an important avenue for information exchange. There are 

currently 108 countries with recognized operational units, with others in various stages of 

development. Financial intelligence units, at a minimum, receive, analyze, and disclose 

information by financial institutions to competent authorities of suspicious or unusual 

financial transactions. Most financial intelligence units can exchange information with 

foreign counterparts. 
A-J-1 

ANNEX J TO APPENDIX A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

1. Overview 

a. The CIA is an independent agency responsible for providing national security 

intelligence to senior US policymakers. The CIA’s primary mission is to collect, 

evaluate, and disseminate foreign intelligence to assist the president and senior USG 

policymakers in making decisions relating to the national security. The CIA does not 

make policy; it is an independent source of foreign intelligence information for those who 

do. The CIA may also engage in covert action at the president’s direction in accordance 

with applicable law. 

b. The CIA is the Nation’s first line of defense. The CIA accomplishes what others 

cannot accomplish and goes where others cannot go. The CIA carries out its mission by: 

(1) Collecting information that reveals the plans, intentions, and capabilities of 

US adversaries and provides the basis for decision and action. 

(2) Producing timely analysis that provides insight, warning, and opportunity to 

the President and decision makers charged with protecting and advancing America’s 

interests. 

(3) Conducting covert action at the direction of the President to preempt threats 

or achieve US policy objectives. 

c. As a separate agency, CIA serves as an independent source of analysis on topics 

of concern and also works closely with the other organizations in the IC to ensure that the 

intelligence consumer—whether Washington policymaker or battlefield commander—

receives the best intelligence possible. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities 

a. The CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947. The Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 restructured the IC by abolishing the 

position of Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 

and creating the position of Director of the CIA (D/CIA). The act also created the 

position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), which oversees the IC and the 

NCTC. 

b. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The D/CIA serves as the head of 

the CIA and reports to the DNI. The D/CIA is nominated by the President and confirmed 

by the Senate. The D/CIA manages the operations, personnel, and budget of the CIA and 

acts as the National Human Source Intelligence Manager. 
Annex J to Appendix A

A-J-2 JP 3-08 

c. CIA Responsibilities. The CIA, under the direction of the President or the NSC, 

is responsible for the following: 

(1) Collecting intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate 

means, except that it shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or

internal security functions. 

(2) Correlating and evaluating intelligence related to the national security and 

providing appropriate dissemination of such intelligence. 

(3) Providing overall direction for and coordination of the collection of national 

intelligence outside the United States through human sources by elements of the IC 

authorized to undertake such collection and, in coordination with other departments, 

agencies, or elements of the USG which are authorized to undertake such collection, 

ensuring that the most effective use is made of resources and that appropriate account is 

taken of the risks to the United States and those involved in such collection. 

(4) Performing such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting 

the national security as the President or the DNI may direct. 

3. Organizational Structure

The CIA is separated into four basic components: the National Clandestine Service

(NCS), the Directorate of Intelligence, the Directorate of Science and Technology, and 

the Directorate of Support. They carry out the process of collecting, analyzing, and 

disseminating intelligence to top USG officials.

a. The NCS has responsibility for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence, 

primarily human source intelligence. The NCS serves as the national authority for 

coordination, deconfliction, and evaluation of clandestine human source intelligence

operations across the IC, consistent with existing laws, executive orders, and interagency 

agreements. The NCS is the front-line source of clandestine intelligence on critical 

international developments ranging from terrorism and weapons proliferation to military 

and political issues. To gather this important intelligence, CIA operations officers live 

and work overseas to establish and maintain networks and personal relationships with 

foreign “assets” in the field.

b. The Directorate of Intelligence analyzes all-source intelligence and produces 

reports, briefings, and papers on key foreign intelligence issues. This information comes 

from a variety of sources and methods, including US personnel overseas, agent reports, 

satellite photography, foreign media, and sophisticated sensors. The directorate is 

responsible for timeliness, accuracy, and relevance of intelligence analysis that is of 

concern to national security policymakers and other intelligence consumers. While the 

CIA does not make foreign policy, its analysis of intelligence on overseas developments 

feeds into the informed decisions by policymakers and other senior decision makers in 

the national security and defense arenas.
Central Intelligence Agency

A-J-3 

c. The Directorate of Science and Technology accesses, collects, and exploits 

information to facilitate the execution of the CIA’s mission by applying innovative, 

scientific, engineering, and technical solutions to the most critical intelligence problems. 

The directorate incorporates over 50 different disciplines ranging from computer 

programmers and engineers to scientists and analysts. It partners with many other 

organizations in the IC, using best practices to foster creative thinking and working level 

coordination. The directorate continually seeks to push the boundaries of the state-ofthe-art, infusing cutting-edge technologies with effective targeting and tradecraft. 

d. The Directorate of Support provides support that is critical to the CIA’s 

intelligence mission. The directorate delivers a full range of support, including: 

acquisitions, communications, facilities services, financial management, information 

technology, medical services, logistics, and the security of CIA personnel, information, 

facilities, and technology. Its services are international in focus, clandestine in nature, 

and offered on a 24/7 basis. Its responsibilities extend well beyond the CIA, into the 

greater IC. 

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. The CIA’s reconnaissance and intelligence assessment capabilities are essential 

ingredients to interagency strategic and operational planning. They provide real-time 

response in the quest for essential information to form the basis for interagency action. 

b. The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) provides the full range of the CIA’s 

intelligence and operational capabilities to support deployed US forces. The Office is 

composed of CIA personnel from all directorates and of military detailees from all the 

uniformed Services. The OMA is the only CIA component with the exclusive mission of 

supporting military plans and operations and has the mandate to coordinate overall IC

support to military customers.

5. Interagency Relationships

The CIA is involved with other agencies of the USG on a regular basis, to include 

the following: 

a. National Intelligence Council (NIC). The NIC, managed by a Chairman and 

Vice Chairman for Evaluations and a Vice Chairman for Estimates, is comprised of 

national intelligence officers—senior experts drawn from all elements of the IC and from 

outside the USG. The national intelligence officers concentrate on the substantive 

problems of particular geographic regions of the world and of particular functional areas, 

such as economics and weapons proliferation. They produce national intelligence 

estimates.

b. National Intelligence Support Team. A NIST provides national level, allsource intelligence support from throughout the IC to deployed commanders during crisis 

or contingency operations. NISTs are comprised of intelligence and communications 

experts from DIA, CIA, NGA, NSA, and other agencies as required to support the 

specific needs of the JFC. DIA’s Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center is 
Annex J to Appendix A

A-J-4 JP 3-08 

the NIST program’s executive agent and has delegated the NIST mission to the

Deployable Support Branch. The Deployable Support Branch manages daily operations 

and interagency coordination for all NISTs. The NIST’s reach back capability can 

provide answers to time-sensitive requests for information, special assessments, 

indications and warnings, immediate access to national databases, direct geospatial 

production support, and deployed/resident agency analyst coordination. 

For more information, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to 

Military Operations.
A-K-1 

ANNEX K TO APPENDIX A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1. Overview

The NSC is the President’s principal forum for considering national security and 

foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. 

Since its inception under President Truman, the NSC’s function has been to advise and 

assist the President on national security and foreign policies. The NSC also serves as the 

President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government 

agencies. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. The NSC gives advice on integrating foreign, economic, and military policies as 

they relate to national security. It develops policy options, considers implications, 

coordinates operational problems that require interdepartmental consideration, develops 

recommendations for the President, and monitors policy implementation. The national 

security staff is the President’s principal staff for national security issues. NSC 

documents are established to inform USG departments and agencies of Presidential 

actions. 

b. Each administration typically adopts different names for its NSC documents. For 

example, The Reagan Administration used the terms NSDD [national security decision 

directive] and NSSD [national security study directive]. The George H. W. Bush 

Administration used NSR [national security review] and NSD [national security 

directive], while the Clinton Administration used the terms PDD [Presidential decision 

directive] and PRD [Presidential review directive]. The George W. Bush Administration 

used NSPD [national security Presidential directive] and homeland security Presidential 

directive [HSPD]. The Obama Administration uses the terms PPD and PSD [Presidential 

study directive]. 

c. The NSC was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 235 - 

61, Statute 496; Title 50, USC, Section 402), amended by the National Security Act 

Amendments of 1949 (Title 50, USC, Section 401). Later in 1949, as part of the 

Reorganization Plan, the NSC was placed in the Executive Office of the President.

For more information on the NSC and its membership, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed 

Forces of the United States.

3. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. The NSC (Figure A-K-1) is responsible for managing the interagency process 

with respect to all national security related issues. At its core, the purpose of the 

interagency process is to advance the President’s policy priorities and, more generally, to 

serve the national interest by ensuring that all agencies and perspectives that can 

contribute to achieving these priorities participate in making and implementing policy. 
Annex K to Appendix A

A-K-2 JP 3-08 

Those who participate in the interagency process—regardless of position—do so as 

representatives of their respective agencies. They also serve the Nation’s greater interests 

by being participants in a unique process to resolve common problems and advance 

common policies. The interagency process therefore must advance the interests of the 

Administration as a whole and all participants should engage in the process from that 

perspective. The NSC’s role is to manage an interagency process that is strategic, agile, 

transparent, and predictable—all in order to advance the national security interests of the 

United States. 

b. NSC Functions. The NSC advises and assists the President in integrating all 

aspects of national security policy—domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and 

economic (in conjunction with the National Economic Council [NEC])—enabling the 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM

direction and supervision coordination

LEGEND

National Security 

Council

Principals 

Committee

Deputies 

Committee

Interagency 

Policy 

Committees

National Security 

Council Staff

Figure A-K-1. National Security Council System 
National Security Council

A-K-3 

military services and the other USG departments and agencies to cooperate more 

effectively in national security matters. Along with its subordinate committees, the NSC 

is the President’s principal means for coordinating executive departments and agencies in 

the development of national security policy. The NSC subsequently monitors the 

implementation of national security policy. The NSC assesses and appraises the 

objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and 

potential military power; and considers policies on matters of common interest to the 

departments and agencies of the USG concerned with national security, and makes 

recommendations to the President. 

c. NSC Organization. The members of the NSC constitute the President’s 

personal and principal staff for national security issues. The council tracks and 

directs the development, execution, and implementation of national security policies for 

the President. It takes a central coordinating or monitoring role in the development of 

policy and options depending on the desires of the President and the National Security 

Advisor. There are three levels of formal interagency committees for coordinating 

and making decisions on national security issues as listed below. Participation among 

USG agencies in the NSCS and these advisory bodies are depicted in Figure A-K-2. The 

advisory bodies include: 

(1) The NSC/PC is the senior Cabinet-level interagency forum for 

consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/PC meets at the call 

of and is chaired by the National Security Advisor. 

(2) The NSC/DC is the senior sub-Cabinet-level (deputy secretary-level) 

interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The 

NSC/DC prescribes and reviews the work of the NSC interagency process including

NSC/IPCs. The NSC/DC shall also help ensure that issues being brought before the 

NSC/PC or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision. The 

NSC/DC shall focus significant attention on policy implementation. Periodic reviews of 

the Administration’s major foreign policy initiatives shall be scheduled to ensure that 

they are being implemented in a timely and effective manner. Such reviews should 

periodically consider whether existing policy directives should be revamped or rescinded. 

Finally, the NSC/DC shall be responsible for day-to-day crisis management, reporting to 

the NSC. Any NSC principal or deputy, as well as the National Security Advisor, may 

request a meeting of the NSC/DC in its crisis management capacity. The NSC/DC meets 

at the call of and is chaired by the Assistant to the President and Deputy National 

Security Advisor.

(3) NSC/IPCs are the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of 

national security policy. NSC/IPCs manage the development and implementation of 

national security policies by multiple agencies of the USG, provide policy analysis for 

consideration by the more senior committees of the NSCS, and ensure timely responses 

to decisions made by the President. The NSC/IPCs shall be established at the direction of 

the NSC/DC, and be chaired by the NSC (or NEC, as appropriate); at its discretion, the 

NSC/DC may add co-chairs to any NSC/IPC if desirable. The NSC/IPCs shall convene 
Annex K to Appendix A

A-K-4 JP 3-08 

PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL SECURITY

COUNCIL SYSTEM ACTIVITIES

ASST assistant

DNI Director of National Intelligence

DIR director

REP representative

SEC secretary

TREAS Department of the Treasury

UN United Nations

US United States

LEGEND

Secretary of 

Defense

Secretary of 

Defense

Deputy 

Secretary or 

Under 

Secretary for 

Policy

Representatives from the executive departments, offices, and agencies 

represented in the National Security Council/Deputies Committee.

Secretary of 

State

Secretary of 

State

Deputy 

Secretary for 

International 

Affairs

Chairman of 

the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff

Chairman of 

the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff

Vice Chairman 

of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff

President, Vice 

President, Dir 

National Intelligence, 

National Security 

Advisor, US Rep to 

UN, Sec of TREAS, 

Asst for Economic 

Policy, Chief of Staff 

to the President, 

Attorney General, 

Other

National Security 

Advisor, DNI, US Rep 

to UN, Asst for 

Economic Policy, 

Other

National Security 

Advisor to the Vice 

President, Other 

Deputies

NATIONAL 

SECURITY 

COUNCIL

PRINCIPALS 

COMMITTEE

DEPUTIES 

COMMITTEE

INTERAGENCY 

POLICY 

COMMITTEES

OFFICE OF THE 

SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT 

OF

STATE

JOINT STAFF OTHER EXECUTIVE 

BRANCH

PARTICIPANTS

Figure A-K-2. Participation in National Security Council System Activities
National Security Council

A-K-5 

on a regular basis to review and coordinate the implementation of Presidential decisions 

in their policy areas. Strict guidelines shall be established governing the operation of the 

IPCs, including participants, decision-making paths, and time frame.

(a) During a rapidly developing crisis, the President may request the 

National Security Advisor to convene the NSC. The NSC reviews the situation and takes 

appropriate action. 

(b) Under more routine conditions, concerns focus on broader aspects 

of national policy and long-term strategy perspectives. Policy and strategy documents

outline specific national interests, overall national policy objectives, and tasks for the 

appropriate components of the executive branch. 
Annex K to Appendix A

A-K-6 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
A-L-1 

ANNEX L TO APPENDIX A

PEACE CORPS

1. Overview

The Peace Corps’ (http://www.peacecorps.gov) mission has three simple goals.

a. Helping the people of interested countries in meeting their need for trained men 

and women. 

b. Helping promote a better understanding of Americans on the part of the peoples 

served. 

c. Helping promote a better understanding of other peoples on the part of 

Americans. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities

The Peace Corps is an independent federal agency committed to meeting the basic 

needs of those living in the countries in which it operates. President John F. Kennedy 

created the Peace Corps by executive order in 1961. 

3. Organizational Structure

The Peace Corps is headquartered in Washington, DC. Approximately 7,800 Peace 

Corps volunteers and trainees serve in over 76 countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, 

Central and South America, the Caribbean, and Europe. 

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

Peace Corps volunteers work in a wide variety of areas. 

a. Agriculture. Work with small farmers to increase food production while 

promoting environmental conservation practices. 

b. Education, Youth Outreach, and Community Development. Introduce 

innovative teaching methodologies, encourage critical thinking in the classroom, and 

integrate issues like health education and environmental awareness into English, math, 

science, and other subjects. 

c. Environment. Work on a wide variety of activities, from teaching environmental 

awareness to planting trees within a community. 

d. Health. Educate and promote awareness issues such as malnutrition and safe 

drinking water. 
Annex L to Appendix A

A-L-2 JP 3-08 

e. Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/acquired immunodeficiency 

syndrome (AIDS). Provide hope and meaningful assistance to people affected by 

HIV/AIDS.

f. Business Development. Work in education, private businesses, public 

organizations, government offices, cooperatives, women’s and youth groups, and more. 

g. Information and Communications Technology. Help communities capitalize 

on technologies by teaching computer and multimedia skills, developing regional 

databases, and implementing networks for NGOs, businesses, and government offices. 

5. Interagency Relationships

a. Peace Corps volunteers, by nature of their commitment and responsibilities, 

traditionally work as members of a team. Through its collaborative agreements with 

USG agencies and ongoing cooperation and coordination with NGOs and with self-help 

grants to indigenous groups, the Peace Corps strengthens and increases its impact. 

b. Although working in a broad sense to further USG foreign policy and 

development goals, the Peace Corps is an independent federal agency. As such, although 

its projects are coordinated with the relevant HN organizations and the appropriate 

elements of the embassy, it works independently with little day-to-day contact with the 

US mission or other USG organizations. In many countries, Peace Corps coordinates its 

efforts with local NGOs.

c. To fulfill its responsibilities successfully and to retain its unique people-to-people 

character, the Peace Corps must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day 

conduct and concerns of foreign policy. The Peace Corps’ role and its need for 

separation from the day-to-day activities of the US mission are not comparable to those 

of other USG agencies. Peace Corps activities must be completely and absolutely 

separated from intelligence activities. There should be no contact whatsoever between 

anyone in the IC and any Peace Corps volunteer or trainee. Peace Corps staff should not 

be included in meetings where defense or intelligence issues are discussed, unless 

volunteer safety is at issue.
A-M-1 

ANNEX M TO APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

1. Overview 

a. USAID (http://www.usaid.gov) is an independent federal agency that receives 

overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. It is the principal US agency 

to extend assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and 

engaging in democratic reforms. USAID supports long-term and equitable economic 

growth and advances US foreign policy objectives by supporting economic growth, 

agriculture, and trade; global health; and democracy, conflict prevention, and 

humanitarian assistance. USAID works in agriculture, democracy and governance, 

economic growth, the environment, education, health, global partnerships, and 

humanitarian assistance in more than 100 countries to provide a better future for all. 

b. USAID provides assistance in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Near East, Latin 

America and the Caribbean, and Europe and Eurasia. USAID’s strength is its field 

offices in many regions of the world. USAID works in close partnership with NGOs, 

IGOs, IPI, universities, American businesses, other governments, trade and professional 

associations, faith-based organizations, and USG agencies. USAID has working 

relationships, through cooperative agreements, contracts, and grant agreements, with 

more than 3,500 companies and over 300 US-based NGOs. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities 

a. USAID works largely in support of DOS and manages a worldwide network of 

country programs for economic and policy reforms that generates sound economic 

growth, encourages political freedom and good governance, and invests in human 

resource development. 

b. USAID plays a vital role in promoting US national security, foreign policy, and 

the war on terrorism. It does so by addressing poverty fueled by lack of economic 

opportunity, one of the root causes of violence today. As stated in the NSS, USAID’s 

work in development joins diplomacy and defense as one of three key pieces of the 

Nation’s foreign policy apparatus. USAID efforts to improve the lives of millions of 

people worldwide represent US values and advance US interests for peace and prosperity. 

c. USAID is also the principal agency charged with coordinating the USG response 

to declared disasters and emergencies worldwide. Through its OFDA, USAID 

administers the President’s authority to provide emergency relief and long-term 

humanitarian assistance in response to disasters as declared by the ambassador within the 

affected country or higher DOS authority. USAID/OFDA may also expedite 

interventions at the operational and tactical levels through NGOs, IGOs, and other 

sources of relief capacity. 

d. When a disaster declaration has been made by the Ambassador, USAID 

coordinates the USG response. The Director of OFDA has primary responsibility for 
Annex M to Appendix A

A-M-2 JP 3-08 

initiating this response. The Administrator of USAID, as the Special Coordinator for 

International Disaster Assistance, has delegated the authority to coordinate response to 

international disasters to OFDA, which is organized under USAID’s Bureau for 

Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA). USAID/OFDA 

responsibilities include:

(1) Organize and coordinate the total USG disaster relief response. 

(2) Respond to embassy and/or mission requests for disaster assistance.

(3) Initiate necessary procurement of supplies, services, and transportation. 

(4) Coordinate assistance efforts with operational-level NGOs.

3. Organizational Structure

a. At its Washington, DC HQ, USAID’s mission is carried out through four regional 

bureaus: Africa, Asia and the Near East, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe 

and Eurasia. These are supported by three technical (or pillar) bureaus that provide 

expertise in democracy promotion, accountable governance, disaster relief, conflict 

prevention, economic growth, agricultural productivity, environmental protection, 

education reform, and global health challenges such as maternal/child health and AIDS. 

(1) USAID operating units located overseas are known as field missions. Full 

field missions usually consist of 9–15 US direct-hire employees, along with a varying 

number of other personnel. They conduct USAID’s major programs worldwide, 

managing a program of four or more strategic objectives. Medium-sized missions (5–8 

US direct-hire) manage a program targeting two to three strategic objectives, and small 

missions (3–4 US direct-hire) manage one or two strategic objectives. These missions 

assist their HN based on an integrated strategy that includes clearly defined program 

goals and performance targets. USAID missions operate under decentralized program 

authorities (legal powers) allowing missions to design and implement programs and 

negotiate and execute agreements. These authorities are assigned to senior field officers 

in accordance with each officer’s functions. In countries with a US embassy, the USAID 

mission director reports directly to the ambassador, who serves as the COM for all USG 

agencies in a given country. As a key member of the country team, the USAID mission 

director is often called upon to stand in for the ambassador or the DCM during their 

absences.

(2) Regional support missions (typically 12–16 US direct-hire), also known as 

regional hubs, provide a variety of services. The hubs house a team of legal advisors, 

contracting and project design officers, and financial services managers to support small 

and medium-sized missions. In countries without integrated strategies, but where aid is 

necessary, regional missions work with NGOs to implement programs that help to 

facilitate the emergence of civil society, alleviate repression, head off conflict, combat 

epidemics, or improve food security. Regional missions can also have their own program 

of strategic objectives to manage. 
United States Agency for International Development

A-M-3 

b. The Bureau for Global Health is USAID’s center of excellence and focal point in 

providing worldwide leadership and technical expertise in the areas of child and maternal 

health and nutrition, HIV/AIDS, infectious disease, population, family planning and 

related reproductive health, and health systems. As such, the Bureau aligns resources 

with identified public health and development needs, and influences the global health 

priorities of the US private sector, US-based foundations, other donor organizations, HN

governments, and HN civil society organizations. It also serves as the primary source of 

technical expertise and intellectual capital to USAID and other US foreign affairs 

agencies. The Bureau for Global Health is USAID’s repository for state of the art 

thinking in biomedical, social science, and operations research and works to produce 

technical advances and innovations that can be disseminated and replicated at USAID 

Missions throughout the world. 

c. The Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade provides a central 

USAID focus for the design, implementation, review, coordination, and evaluation of 

worldwide activities in the areas of economic growth, poverty reduction, education, 

economic infrastructure, agriculture, environment, natural resources management, and 

women in development and for supporting nationally or regionally implemented activities 

in these areas.

d. DCHA provides technical leadership and expertise in coordinating USAID’s 

democracy programs; international disaster assistance; emergency and developmental 

food aid; aid to manage and mitigate conflict; and volunteer programs. DCHA provides 

technical leadership, support, and advice in developing policy and programs to assist 

countries transitioning out of crisis and administers disaster assistance, preparedness, and 

mitigation. DCHA also provides capacity building for US NGOs and aid to American 

schools and hospitals abroad. DCHA provides technical advice and support to the 

USAID Administrator, regional bureaus, field missions, and other offices with regard to 

these programs.

(1) The OMA addresses areas of common interests between defense and

development, with a focus on improving civilian-military field readiness programs and

coordination. Program areas of common interest include, but may not be limited to, 

FHA, CT, SC, conflict prevention and mitigation, counterinsurgency, post-conflict R&S, 

and transformational development. OMA serves as the USAID-wide unit for managing 

the day-to-day aspects of the USAID-military relationship and consists of two divisions. 

(a) The Planning Division serves as the overall coordination unit for

managing the day-to-day aspects of the USAID-military relationship, and for planning

and developing effective operations. This includes developing a joint information

network; prioritizing requests for participation in events, exchanges, and exercises; and

overseeing program planning and development for priority regions and countries. It

coordinates USAID civilian-military planning and analysis with DOD, S/CRS, and USG 

agencies. It manages training programs for selected military and civilian audiences;

develops guidance on USAID and NGOs for use in the civilian-military context; and

develops and manages staff, budgets, contracts, grants, and other mechanisms required to

perform division duties, including program development, planning, training, and
Annex M to Appendix A

A-M-4 JP 3-08 

exercises. Finally, the Planning Division serves as the base for USAID personnel trained

in the war colleges or other DOD institutes.

(b) The Operations Division serves as the lead unit to develop operational

readiness, leadership, and coordinated response capacity for field operations requiring

joint USAID-military action. Its functions include developing a network of contacts in

the military as needed for operational readiness; supporting combatant commands during

major operations; and conducting liaison with the Planning Division to develop a joint

planning capacity within the combatant commands. It develops and leads the

implementation of annual work plans with geographic and functional combatant

commands; develops and maintains at least two rapid deployment teams that manage

emergency responses; and develops a common logistics platform with OFDA, field

missions, and DOD for R&S initiatives. It keeps USAID bureaus informed of pending 

and ongoing field operations involving the US military; works with NGO and military 

personnel and organizations to strengthen field coordination; and develops a leadership 

training program, including long-term and short-term modules. 

(2) Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) supports local partners to advance

peace and democracy in priority conflict-prone countries. At the request of and in

coordination with the Congress, DOS, and the appropriate in-country US ambassadors

and USAID field missions, OTI seizes critical windows of opportunity to provide on-the 

ground, fast, flexible, catalytic short-term assistance that promotes movement toward

political and social stability and democracy. OTI programs in such countries should

continue until reasonable stability is established and an effective hand-off is completed to

longer-term institutional development efforts.

(a) The management and program operations team enhances and facilitates 

OTI activities worldwide by contributing to OTI’s strategic plan and managing OTI’s 

policy formulation; monitoring and evaluation of activities; internal communications and 

public outreach; budget formulation; tracking and reconciliation; procurement planning 

and processing; and general operations support and administrative services.

(b) The field operations team develops and oversees OTI country

programs, including country strategies, program design, implementation, and donor

coordination; and conducts liaison with USAID bureaus, field missions, and USG 

agencies to ensure policy compliance and coordination. 

(3) Office of Food for Peace provides leadership, coordination, and operational 

support for international food activities. It develops USG policy, formal positions, and 

funding levels for grants and cooperative agreements to the World Food Programme 

(WFP), NGOs, and in selected instances governments, implementing food programs. It 

provides assistance for emergency operations and support for USAID food security and

developmental objectives. The office implements legislation and policies governing the

donation of US agricultural commodities. It manages a budget of over a billion dollars

annually, and also oversees the procurement and shipping of over two million metric tons

of food annually. The Famine Early Warning System is also part of the office. 
United States Agency for International Development

A-M-5 

(4) OFDA coordinates and ensures that the needs of disaster victims are met by

providing all forms of relief and rehabilitation. OFDA provides technical support to the

Administrator, who serves as the President’s Special Coordinator for International

Disaster Assistance. OFDA formulates US foreign disaster assistance policy in

coordination with USG agencies. OFDA works with national and international foreign 

affairs agencies, DOD, DOS, UN agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector in 

disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and rehabilitation. OFDA funds 

and procures relief supplies and administrative support for short- and long-term disaster

situations and provides humanitarian relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance

to foreign disaster victims.

(a) The Disaster Response and Mitigation Division coordinates with 

USAID offices and others to provide relief supplies and humanitarian assistance. It plans 

for the level of response needed for an emergency and implements and manages USG 

disaster relief and rehabilitation programs worldwide. It devises, coordinates, and 

implements program strategies for the application of the most current science and 

technology to prevention, mitigation, and national and international preparedness for a 

variety of natural and man-made disaster situations. It evaluates the impact of previous 

disaster response initiatives/programs and ensures the integration of this information into 

future planning and response activities. It coordinates with other USAID geographic 

bureaus’ donor organizations, UN agencies, and NGOs. 

(b) The Operations Division develops and manages logistical, operational, 

and technical support for disaster responses. It identifies sources for procurement of 

relief supplies and manages the stockpiling and transportation of those supplies. It 

maintains readiness to respond to emergencies through several mechanisms, including 

managing SAR teams, maintaining the operational status of the ground operations team, 

and developing and maintaining the capability to field DARTs and response management

teams in Washington. It develops and maintains OFDA’s relationship with DOD, 

FEMA, DOS, and DOE. 

(c) The DART was developed by USAID’s OFDA to provide rapid 

response to foreign disasters. A DART provides a variety of trained specialists to assist 

US embassies and USAID missions with managing the USG response to foreign 

disasters. DART activities vary according to the nature, magnitude, and complexity of 

each disaster and are staffed accordingly.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. Agriculture. USAID works with all participants in agricultural development to 

support efforts to increase productivity. 

b. Democracy and Governance. Expanding the global community of democracies 

is a key objective of US foreign policy. USAID provides technical leadership and 

strategic support in promoting sustainable democracies. 
Annex M to Appendix A

A-M-6 JP 3-08 

c. Economic Growth and Trade. USAID economic growth and trade programs 

provide support both to government and private sector partners in lower-income countries 

to improve the levels of income their citizens enjoy. 

d. Environment. USAID takes an integrated approach to natural resources 

management. Land and water must be managed skillfully so that they are able to 

maintain our basic ability to produce food for the nine billion people that the world is 

expected to have by 2050. 

e. Education and Training. USAID emphasizes programs of support for basic 

education and places a special emphasis on improving opportunities for girls, women,

and other underserved and disadvantaged populations. 

f. Global Health. USAID’s programs in global health represent the commitment 

and determination of the USG to prevent suffering, save lives, and create a brighter future 

for families in the developing world. 

g. Global Partnerships. USAID works in cooperation with US and international 

partners to improve conditions for people around the world. USAID is committed to an 

approach that recognizes and incorporates the efforts of partnership and private giving, 

focusing on grassroots support, local ownership, sustainability, accountability, and—not 

least—passion and commitment. 

h. Humanitarian Assistance. The United States gives more to those in crisis than 

any other country in the world. USAID is the USG agency that is responsible for 

directing these contributions to thousands of nonprofit partners and international 

organizations. USAID ensures that all of this assistance is spent in the way that most 

effectively helps those who are in need. 

i. Cross-Cutting Programs. Some parts of USAID’s work are best implemented 

by working through USAID’s key sectors to implement their goals in a coordinated 

fashion and to call attention to these issues in each programmatic area. These are called 

cross-cutting programs, and include: 

(1) Transition Initiatives. Provides fast, flexible, short-term assistance to take 

advantage of windows of opportunity to build democracy and peace. This program lays 

the foundations for long-term development by promoting reconciliation, jumpstarting 

economies, and helping stable democracy take hold. 

(2) Private and Voluntary Cooperation. USAID has forged critical ties with 

US NGOs committed to participating in development. It has used competitive grants and 

programs to help deliver essential services in underserved communities. 

(3) Conflict Management. Violence, or the imminent threat of violence, can 

destabilize a society in ways that traditional USAID programs are often ill-prepared to 

identify and address. USAID takes a lead role in designing development assistance 

programs that better address the causes and consequences of violent conflict. 
United States Agency for International Development

A-M-7 

(4) Urban Programs. USAID’s urban programs improve the living conditions 

of the urban poor, while protecting the well-being of future generations. 

(5) Water. USAID has made the preservation and environmentally sound 

development of the world’s water resources a top priority.

(6) Women in Development. The contributions that women make to the 

economic, social, and political lives of their nations, communities, families, and the next 

generation make them key actors in effective development. USAID’s approach to gender 

is to design programs that take both women’s and men’s participation into account.

5. Interagency Relationships

USAID/OFDA has established relationships with several USG agencies and dozens 

of NGOs and IGOs. In carrying out its responsibilities, USAID/OFDA draws on these 

agencies and organizations, as required, to coordinate the USG’s response to foreign 

disasters. Similarly, these agencies and organizations look to USAID/OFDA for advice 

and assistance, as appropriate, in handling their assigned responsibilities. USAID/OFDA 

currently has agreements with the following: 

a. USDA’s US Forest Service and the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land 

Management, for emergency managers, logisticians, communicators, and firefighting 

experts.

b. Commissioned Corps of the US Public Health Service (USPHS) and the Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), for health assessment and to provide medical 

personnel, equipment, and supplies. 

c. US Geological Survey, for notification and assessment of earthquakes and 

volcanic eruptions. 

d. NOAA, for typhoon, hurricane, and cyclone reporting and assessment. 

e. FEMA, for training in disaster management, emergency preparedness, and relief 

for HN disaster specialists.

f. DOD, for matters concerning defense equipment and personnel provided to the 

affected country and for arranging DOD transportation. 

(1) DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, establishes the relationship 

between DOD and USAID/OFDA. OUSD(P) is DOD’s primary POC. JS POC is the 

Chief, JLOC (J-4). 

For more information on FHA, see JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 

(2) Although USAID is concerned primarily with development and civic 

assistance, many programs it administers, particularly in weak or fragile states, are 

security related. The USAID representative in the HN coordinates USAID managed 
Annex M to Appendix A

A-M-8 JP 3-08 

assistance programs with other members of the country team, including the DOD 

representative. Coordination is also with all other assistance programs managed by USG 

departments or agencies active in the HN. The USAID representatives in a HN help 

coordinate US foreign assistance with other multilateral, bilateral, and US private

assistance programs to that country. 

For more information on USAID, see USAID Primer.

6. District Stability Framework

a. The District Stability Framework (DSF) is a methodology designed for use by 

both military and civilian personnel to identify the underlying causes of instability and 

conflict in a region, devise programs to diminish the root causes of instability and 

conflict, and measure the effectiveness of programming. It is employed to gather 

information using the following lenses: operational environment, cultural environment, 

local perceptions, and stability/instability dynamics. This information then helps 

identify, prioritize, monitor, evaluate, and adjust programming targeted at diminishing the 

causes of instability or conflict. 

b. The DSF has four major components: gaining situational awareness (from the 

four lenses of data mentioned above); analyzing that data; designing effective 

programming based on that analysis; and monitoring and evaluating programming. 

c. USAID conducts training for deploying personnel on DSF. Wherever possible, 

USAID seeks to raise awareness of development and conflict mitigation and to help 

preempt these issues before military and civilian personnel are sent into hostile areas in 

reaction to them. 

Refer to http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/ma/dsf.html, for more 

information. 
A-N-1 

ANNEX N TO APPENDIX A

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

EPA’s mission is to protect human health and the environment. EPA leads the 

Nation’s environmental science, research, education, and assessment efforts. EPA works 

closely with other federal agencies, state and local governments, and Indian tribes to 

develop and enforce regulations under existing environmental laws. EPA is responsible 

for researching and setting national standards for a variety of environmental programs 

and delegates to states and tribes responsibility for issuing permits, and monitoring and 

enforcing compliance. Where national standards are not met, EPA can issue sanctions 

and take other steps to assist the states and tribes in reaching the desired levels of 

environmental quality. EPA also works with businesses, nonprofit organizations, and 

state and local governments through dozens of partnerships in a wide variety of voluntary 

pollution prevention programs and energy conservation efforts. EPA, along with the 

USCG, also has significant responsibilities under the NRF for ESF #10 (Oil and 

Hazardous Materials Response) and under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances 

Pollution Contingency Plan, Title 40, CFR, Part 300. EPA, depending upon the location 

of the incident, is generally the lead for directing the USG’s response to assessing and 

cleaning up CBRN, industrial material, and numerous other source contaminate 

responses. EPA leads interagency and intergovernmental planning and response teams to 

that end. DOD has membership on those teams to varying degrees. During significant 

disaster and routine responses, EPA often activates the regional response team, an 

interagency support team, to support the federal on-scene coordinator. The national 

response team may also be activated. Information on the teams can be found in Title 40, 

CFR, Part 300 and at http://www.nrt.org. The federal on-scene coordinator will utilize 

the ICS to manage the response. Often, the federal on-scene coordinator will establish a 

unified command structure under ICS to bring in other parties that have a significant 

interest in the response. Other agencies may be in the command post in planning 

positions, as liaisons, or in other capacities. In addition, the federal on-scene coordinator 

may establish a command post where tactical planning takes place. The command post is 

most often located much closer to the incident than the JFO. 

For additional information, refer to the DODIs in the 4715 series concerning 

environmental programs, compliance, and coordination. 
Annex N to Appendix A 

A-N-2 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
A-O-1 

ANNEX O TO APPENDIX A

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

1. US General Services Administration

The GSA (http://www.usa.gov) leverages the buying power of the USG to acquire 

best value for taxpayers and federal customers. GSA exercises responsible asset 

management; delivers superior workplaces, quality acquisition services, and expert 

business solutions; and develops innovative and effective management policies. GSA 

oversees the business of the USG. GSA’s acquisition solutions supply federal purchasers 

with cost-effective, high-quality products and services from commercial vendors. GSA 

provides workplaces for federal employees, and oversees the preservation of historic 

federal properties. Its policies covering travel, property, and management practices 

promote efficient government operations. GSA helps keep the Nation safe by providing 

tools, equipment, and non-tactical vehicles to the US military, and providing state and 

local governments with law enforcement equipment, firefighting and rescue equipment, 

and disaster recovery products and services. GSA provides direct access to a wide range 

of government services, as well as consumer protection information through the official 

Web portal of the USG. 

2. Office of Emergency Response and Recovery

The Office of Emergency Response and Recovery helps to ensure that GSA 

maintains a constant state of readiness to perform its essential functions in response to 

natural or man-made disasters or catastrophic emergencies in support of national 

continuity responsibilities, and to quickly resume normal operations. It is composed of 

four divisions and one team, and reports directly to GSA’s Chief of Staff through its 

Training and Exercise Division. It coordinates GSA participation in international as well 

as state and local disaster exercise programs.
Annex O to Appendix A 

A-O-2 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
A-P-1 

ANNEX P TO APPENDIX A

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

1. Overview

The mission of the ODNI is to create decision advantage. It integrates foreign, 

military, and domestic intelligence capabilities through policy, personnel, and technology 

actions to provide decision advantage to policy makers, warfighters, HS officials, and law 

enforcement personnel. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. DNI serves as the head of the IC, overseeing and directing the implementation of 

the National Intelligence Program and acting as the principal advisor to the President, the 

NSC, and the HSC for intelligence matters related to national security. ODNI’s goal is to 

effectively integrate foreign, military, and domestic intelligence in defense of the 

homeland and of United States interests abroad. 

b. With this goal in mind, Congress provided the DNI with a number of authorities 

and duties, as outlined in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004. 

These charge the DNI to:

(1) Ensure that timely and objective national intelligence is provided to the 

President, the heads of departments and agencies of the executive branch; CJCS and 

senior military commanders; and Congress. 

(2) Establish objectives and priorities for collection, analysis, production, and 

dissemination of national intelligence. 

(3) Ensure maximum availability of and access to intelligence information 

within the IC. 

(4) Develop and ensure the execution of an annual budget for the National 

Intelligence Program based on budget proposals provided by IC component 

organizations. 

(5) Oversee coordination of relationships with the intelligence or security 

services of foreign governments and international organizations. 

(6) Ensure the most accurate analysis of intelligence is derived from all sources 

to support national security needs. 

(7) Develop personnel policies and programs to enhance the capacity for joint 

operations and to facilitate staffing of community management functions. 

(8) Oversee the development and implementation of a program management 

plan for acquisition of major systems, doing so jointly with SecDef for DOD programs, 

that includes cost, schedule, and performance goals and program milestone criteria.
Annex P to Appendix A

A-P-2 JP 3-08 

3. Organizational Structure

Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the DNI 

reports directly to the President. The DNI through the efforts of the Principal Deputy 

Director, the Director of the Intelligence Staff, four deputy directors, (i.e., Analysis; 

Collection; Policy, Plans, and Requirements; and Acquisitions and Technology), and 

assisted by several country specific mission management teams and a number of support 

activities and centers, coordinates the activities of the 16 US intelligence agencies to 

achieve critical national objectives.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. The National Intelligence Emergency Management Activity’s mission is to plan 

and manage the ODNI’s Emergency Management and Continuity programs and build an 

enduring, collaborative strategic system to ensure the ODNI can perform its primary 

mission essential functions and the DNI can: 

(1) Head and lead the IC. 

(2) Serve as the President’s principal intelligence advisor. 

(3) Direct the National Intelligence Program. 

(4) Reduce the loss of ODNI lives and resources. 

(5) Maintain situational awareness of ODNI and IC personnel, resources, and 

capabilities.

b. The NIC is the IC’s center for midterm and long-term strategic thinking. Its 

primary functions are to: 

(1) Support the DNI in his role as head of the IC. 

(2) Provide a focal point for policymakers to task the IC to answer their 

questions. 

(3) Reach out to nongovernment experts in academia and the private sector to 

broaden the IC’s perspective.

(4) Contribute to the IC’s effort to allocate its resources in response to 

policymakers’ changing needs.

(5) Lead the IC’s effort to produce national intelligence estimates and other 

NIC products. 

c. The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive is part of the ODNI and 

is staffed by senior CI and other specialists from across the national intelligence and 

security communities. The office develops, coordinates, and produces: 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

A-P-3 

(1) Annual foreign intelligence threat assessments and other analytic CI 

products. 

(2) An annual national CI strategy for the USG. 

(3) Priorities for CI collection, investigations, and operations. 

(4) CI program budgets and evaluations that reflect strategic priorities. 

(5) In-depth espionage damage assessments. 

(6) CI awareness, outreach, and training standards policies. 

d. The NCTC leads our Nation’s effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by 

analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all 

instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort. 

For more information, see Appendix E, “Joint Interagency Task Force.”

e. The ISE is an approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism information. It is a 

trusted partnership among all levels of government in the United States, the private 

sector, and our foreign partners, in order to detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate 

the effects of terrorism against the territory, people, and interests of the United States by 

the effective and efficient sharing of terrorism and HS information. The ISE aligns and 

leverages existing information sharing policies, business processes, technologies, 

systems, and promotes a culture of information sharing through increased collaboration. 

f. Special Security Center (SSC). The SSC exists to assist the DNI, in his dual role 

as head of the IC, and as the Security Executive Agent for USG security clearance 

programs (pursuant to Executive Order 13467). The SSC assists in the execution of DNI 

responsibility to share and protect national intelligence information throughout the IC, the 

USG, US contractors, state and local officials, and our foreign partners. 

(1) The SSC’s objectives include: 

(a) Fostering IC security uniformity and reciprocity. 

(b) Performing policy review, coordination, and formulation. 

(c) Promoting uniform application of security policy. 

(d) Assessing, advising, and reporting to the DNI on the implementation of 

security policies. 

(e) Enabling IC-wide exchange of critical security data. 

(f) Providing services of common concern in the areas of security research, 

training and database management. 
Annex P to Appendix A

A-P-4 JP 3-08 

(2) The SSC also executes DNI’s responsibilities as Security Executive Agent 

to drive efforts to achieve government-wide improvements to clearance process 

timeliness and effectiveness, reciprocal recognition of security clearances and access

approvals, and to modernize security business practices in the USG. The SSC hosts a 

joint program management activity (“Joint Team”) to develop and implement reforms 

across the Executive Branch, to include the IC. Joint Team reform efforts are responsive 

to the direction of the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability 

Council. 

g. The National Counterprolification Center (NCPC) was founded to help counter 

the threats caused by proliferation of CBRN weapons. NCPC works with the IC to

identify critical holes in our WMD knowledge—resulting from shortfalls in collection, 

analysis, or exploitation—and then develop solutions to reduce or close these gaps. In 

conjunction with the policy community, NCPC also helps to identify long-term 

proliferation threats and requirements and develops strategies to ensure that the IC is 

positioned to address these over-the-horizon threats. 

h. The National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C). The NIC-C was 

established to foster efficient strategic management of the national collection enterprise. 

The NIC-C provides the DNI a mechanism to optimize collection to satisfy the country’s 

most important intelligence priorities. It accomplishes this by managing collection and 

analysis activities as an integrated enterprise focused on the highest priorities. Products 

and services include assessments, strategic collection postures, and support to senior 

policy makers.

5. Oversight of the Intelligence Community

a. The IC is subject to external oversight from the Executive and Legislative 

branches. Within the Executive, the IC works closely with the NSC. Other Executive 

organizations involved in oversight include the following organization. 

b. The President’s Intelligence Advisory Board. The board is an entity within the 

Executive Office of the President formed “to assess the quality, quantity, and adequacy” 

of intelligence collection, analysis, CI, and other activities of the IC. It reports directly to 

the President, and provides recommendations for actions to improve and enhance the 

performance of intelligence efforts. It also examines issues raised by the President or the 

DNI and can make recommendations directly to the DNI. 
A-Q-1 

ANNEX Q TO APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

1. The DOL fosters and promotes the welfare of the job seekers, wage earners, and 

retirees of the United States by improving their working conditions, advancing their 

opportunities for profitable employment, protecting their retirement and health care 

benefits, helping employers find workers, strengthening free collective bargaining, and 

tracking changes in employment, prices, and other national economic measurements. In 

carrying out this mission, the DOL administers a variety of Federal labor laws including 

those that guarantee workers’ rights to safe and healthful working conditions; a minimum 

hourly wage and overtime pay; freedom from employment discrimination; 

unemployment insurance; and other income support. DOL can provide valuable insight 

through labor statistics, occupational safety and health, office of the inspector general, 

and other agencies that will promote recovery from war or other disasters. DOD 

contractors at overseas locations are required to comply with DOL regulations. Bringing 

DOL into the interagency process better ensures quality performance of DOD 

contractors.

2. For purposes of interorganizational coordination, DOD may likely coordinate with 

the Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) who leads the DOL’s efforts to ensure 

that workers around the world are treated fairly and are able to share in the benefits of the 

global economy. ILAB’s mission is to use all available international channels to improve 

working conditions, raise living standards, protect workers’ ability to exercise their 

rights, and address the workplace exploitation of children and other vulnerable 

populations. The ILAB is consists of: 

a. Office of Trade and Labor Affairs implements trade-related labor policy and

coordinates international technical cooperation in support of the labor provisions in free 

trade agreements; develops and coordinates DOL positions regarding international 

economic policy issues and to participate in the formulation and implementation of US 

policy on such issues; and provides services, information, expertise, and technical 

cooperation programs that effectively support the international responsibilities of the 

DOL and US foreign labor policy objectives. 

 b. Office of International Relations represents or facilitates representation of the 

USG in the International Labor Organization and the labor components of international 

organizations; provides expertise, research and advice on labor and employment trends 

and issues in foreign countries; and helps facilitate the sharing of information between 

specialized DOL agencies and other countries. 

c. Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking supports USG labor 

and foreign policy objectives and congressional mandates, performs public outreach by 

promoting the elimination of the worst forms of child labor, and increases knowledge and 

information on child labor, forced labor, and human trafficking. 
Annex Q to Appendix A 

A-Q-2 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
A-R-1 

ANNEX R TO APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

1. Overview

DHHS (http://www.hhs.gov) is the USG’s principal agency for protecting the health 

of all Americans and providing essential human services, especially for those who are 

least able to help themselves.

2. Organizational Structure

a. DHHS comprises staff divisions and operating divisions. Staff divisions are 

subdivisions of Office of the Secretary that provide direct support to the Secretary’s 

initiatives. Operating divisions are agencies that perform a wide variety of tasks and 

services, including research, public health, food and drug safety, grants and other 

funding, health insurance, and many others. 

b. The Office of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR)

(http://www.hhs.gov/aspr) coordinates with the DOS and other federal and international 

public health and medical response agencies on emergency response issues. The ASPR is 

also responsible for ensuring that DHHS response personnel from its multiple agencies 

are enrolled in programs to be registered, credentialed, organized, trained, equipped, and 

able to deploy as federal public health and medical responders. ASPR establishes policy, 

assigns responsibilities, and as needed, directs and coordinates DHHS’s efforts to 

prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the public health and medical 

consequences of disaster or emergency. Under the direction of the Secretary, the ASPR 

may designate and deploy DHHS personnel into a variety of response, support, and 

liaison roles to other response cells. DHHS international response activities are 

conducted in support of, and as requested by, the DOS, USAID, or DOD. 

(1) The Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response is the primary 

contact for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of DHHS for international preparedness 

and emergency operations. ASPR will use the most updated information to make key 

decisions, direct and deploy DHHS resources to support the DOS, USAID, DOD, or the 

UN, and to assist any response to international and public health and medical 

emergencies.

(2) The ASPR Office of Medicine, Science, and Public Health (OMSPH)

serves as the focal point in ASPR for international activities related to public health 

emergency preparedness and response. The OMSPH International Response 

Coordination and Policy Team partnered closely with the ASPR Office of Preparedness 

and Emergency Operations (OPEO) to develop the DHHS International Emergency 

Response Framework and international pandemic influenza assessment and containment 

plans and exercises. OMSPH coordinates ASPR’s overall international influenza 

pandemic efforts and works closely with other DHHS components, the DOS, the USDA, 

and the World Health Organization (WHO). Additionally, OMSPH is the principal 

liaison to the DOS and USG departments and agencies that may seek DHHS assistance in 
Annex R to Appendix A 

A-R-2 JP 3-08 

responding to public health and medical emergencies internationally. The International 

Health Regulations Program within OMSPH coordinates USG implementation of 

International Health Regulations and monitors USG compliance to the regulations. 

OMSPH is also the lead for R&S initiatives within DHHS. 

(a) DHHS leads all federal public health and medical response to public 

health and medical emergencies and incidents covered by the NRF. Under the NRF, 

DHHS leads ESF #8, the mechanism for coordinated federal assistance to supplement 

state, tribal, and local resources in response to a public health and medical disaster, 

potential or actual incidents requiring a coordinated federal response, and/or during a 

developing potential health and medical emergency. 

(b) Under the same authority, ASPR is the principal advisor to the DHHS 

Secretary on all matters related to federal public health and medical preparedness and 

response for public health emergencies or biological incidents (whether natural or 

deliberate) and has strategic, tactical, and operational responsibilities which include (but 

are not limited to) serving as the Incident Manager for ESF #8 during activation; 

responsibility for coordination of preparedness and response planning with DHHS 

operating divisions, with ESF #8-supporting agencies and also with state, local, and 

private sector; managing the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and directing 

the deployment, employment, and release of any needed Strategic National Stockpile 

personnel and materiel; mobilization of public health and medical assets at the direction 

of the DHHS Secretary; in response to a directive from DHS/FEMA in accordance with 

the NRF or under a mission assignment issued by FEMA under the Stafford Act; in 

response to designated national security special events; and at ASPR’s own discretion 

when an incident requires coordinated action by two or more DHHS response assets in 

the absence of an emergency declaration. 

(3) The ASPR OPEO leads and supports domestic and international 

preparedness and emergency operations efforts at the DHHS HQ level. OPEO ensures 

that ASPR has the plans, procedures, logistical support, systems, and training to support 

domestic and international emergency operations and response needs. The ASPR/OPEO 

Emergency Management Group is the primary HQ-level element involved in incident 

management, directly supports DHHS’ emergency response activities as part of a 

comprehensive multiagency incident management system. Domestically ASPR leads 

public health and medical responses under ESF #8 of the NRF. OPEO also manages the 

NDMS. 

(a) The NDMS is a federally coordinated system that augments the Nation’s 

medical response capability. The overall purpose of the NDMS is to supplement an 

integrated national medical response capability for assisting state and local authorities in 

dealing with the medical impacts of major peacetime disasters and to provide support to 

the military and the Department of Veterans Affairs medical systems in caring for 

casualties evacuated back to the US from overseas armed conventional conflicts. 

(b) NDMS temporarily supplements federal, state, local, and tribal 

capabilities by funding, organizing, training, equipping, deploying, and sustaining a 
Department of Health and Human Services

A-R-3 

specialized and focused range of public health and medical capabilities. NDMS 

comprises medical response to a disaster area in the form of personnel, teams and 

individuals, supplies, and equipment; patient movement from a disaster site to unaffected 

areas of the Nation; and definitive medical care at participating hospitals in unaffected 

areas.

(c) The NRF utilizes the NDMS, as part of the DHHS ASPR, under ESF 

#8, Health and Medical Services, to support federal agencies in the management and 

coordination of the federal medical response to major emergencies and federally declared 

disasters including: natural disasters, major transportation accidents, technological 

disasters, and acts of terrorism including WMD events. NDMS teams include medical 

assistance, veterinary, mortuary, and international surgical teams. 

(4) DHHS has the lead responsibility within the USG to protect the civilian 

population against the adverse health effects of CBRN, pandemic influenza, and 

emerging infectious disease threats by providing leadership in research, development, 

acquisition, and deployment of effective medical countermeasures. The ASPR 

Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority provides an integrated, 

systematic approach to the development and purchase of the necessary vaccines, drugs, 

therapies, and diagnostic tools for public health medical emergencies. It manages Project 

BioShield, which includes the procurement and advanced development of medical 

countermeasures for CBRN agents, as well as the advanced development and 

procurement of medical countermeasures for pandemic influenza and other emerging 

infectious diseases that fall outside the auspices of Project BioShield. In addition, the 

authority manages the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise. 

The enterprise is responsible for defining and prioritizing requirements for public health 

emergency medical countermeasures; focusing research, development, and procurement 

activities on identified requirements; and establishing deployment and use strategies for 

medical countermeasures in the Strategic National Stockpile.

c. The Office of Global Health Affairs is the staff division responsible for overall 

policy leadership, development and coordination for DHHS’s engagement with 

multilateral organizations, at which domestic priorities for health, public health and 

science are increasingly central to the global policy dialogue. It is also responsible for 

the DHHS Secretary’s interaction bilaterally with foreign governments, including 

Ministries of Health and Social Development. The office represents and protects 

domestic interests within multilateral organizations of which the United States is a 

member state and in areas in which a global component, multilaterally or bilaterally, 

could enhance or contribute to DHHS domestic programs and benefit the people of the 

United States, including at-risk populations. It engages with foreign governments and 

multilateral organizations on a wide range of policy and programmatic objectives of 

relevance and importance to DHHS domestically.

d. The Office of Public Health and Science directed by the Assistant Secretary for 

Health (ASH), is comprised of 12 core public health offices. The ASH serves as the 

primary advisor to the Secretary of DHHS on matters involving the Nation’s public 

health. The ASH also provides the executive leadership and policy guidance for the 
Annex R to Appendix A 

A-R-4 JP 3-08 

Commissioned Corps of the US Public Health Service (Corps) and is assisted by the 

Office of the Surgeon General and the Office of Commissioned Corps Force 

Management in this activity.

(1) The Office of the Surgeon General, under the direction of the Surgeon 

General, oversees the operations of the Corps and provides support for the 

accomplishment of the Surgeon General’s other duties. The Surgeon General serves as 

America’s chief health educator by providing Americans the best scientific information 

available on how to improve their health and reduce the risk of illness and injury. The 

Surgeon General provides leadership and management oversight of the Corps’ 

involvement during DHHS emergency preparedness and response activities.

(2) The Corps, comprising more than 6,000 health professionals, is one of the 

seven uniformed services. Corps officers are well-trained, highly qualified public health 

professionals dedicated to delivering the Nation’s public health promotion and disease 

prevention programs and advancing public health science. Corps officers fill essential 

public health leadership and service roles within USG agencies and programs. 

(a) Corps officers are assigned to DHHS and other USG agencies to 

include the DOD. The Corps has engaged with the USN on humanitarian and health 

diplomacy missions and during international emergencies such as the response to the 

tsunami in Indonesia in 2005. During emergencies, Corps officers may be deployed 

domestically to provide applied public health, mental health, and direct medical support 

to affected regions, states, and localities. Internationally, Corps officers have worked 

side by side with DOD, for example, as health attachés, consultants on PRTs, and LNOs 

within a geographic combatant command. 

(b) At the direction of the Surgeon General, the Office of Force Readiness 

and Deployment exercises oversight and management related to training, rostering, and 

response activities of the entire Corps. It is responsible for facilitating and overseeing all 

Corps deployments to domestic public health emergencies and international humanitarian 

assistance missions. To do this, the office ensures that Corps officers, and the teams into 

which they are rostered, are appropriately trained, suitably equipped, professionally 

competent, and physically prepared to effectively deploy to provide public health and 

medical care during disasters, terrorist attacks, urgent public health threats, and special 

security events. In addition, the Office director serves as the Senior Advisor to the 

Surgeon General and the Assistant Secretary for Health on Commissioned Corps 

preparedness and response activities.

e. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (http://www.cdc.gov) is 

responsible for conducting disease surveillance activities, detecting and investigating 

disease outbreaks and other health conditions, and developing strategies for dealing with 

the public health aspects of domestic and international emergencies. When requested in 

response to international disease outbreaks, CDC staff, either through relationships 

established at the national level and/or through established relationships in the Global 

Outbreak Alert and Response Network, provide technical assistance to help characterize 

the outbreak, investigate risk and protective factors, and assist in efforts to control the 
Department of Health and Human Services 

A-R-5 

disease. The CDC’s role in natural disaster response operations has grown in recent 

years. CDC personnel and supplies, including materiel from the Strategic National 

Stockpile, may be called upon to assist in a public health emergency. US based units 

must coordinate with state and local public health offices to request CDC Strategic 

National Stockpile support. Overseas units must have established plans to coordinate 

CDC Strategic National Stockpile support through the GCC to the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. 

(1) In order to mitigate the risk of importation and spread of communicable 

diseases to or within the United States, CDC quarantine stations are located at 20 US 

ports of entry, covering approximately 85% of all entering and exiting air travel and a 

substantial portion of the southern border land crossings in San Diego and El Paso. 

Central to the quarantine stations’ mission to protect the US from communicable disease 

introduction and spread at ports of entry is the development of strong partnerships with 

state and local health departments and law enforcement to create a public health safety 

network addressing border health issues. The quarantine program works closely with 

DHS, particularly CBP, Transportation Security Administration, ICE, and USCG, and 

partners with travel industry to plan, prepare, and respond to illnesses in travelers. The 

quarantine program is responsible for border pandemic planning as the technical lead, in 

collaboration with DHS as the lead agency. 

(2) DHHS/CDC has more than 300 CDC permanent staff members assigned to 

long-term assignments in 50 countries around the world. CDC also employs 

approximately 1,400 local staff members (citizens of the HN) to support global programs. 

The staff is a mix of epidemiologists, clinicians, health scientists of many types, 

including laboratory, behavioral, and informatics scientists, operations managers, 

administrative staff, and others. Approximately 80 percent of these staff work primarily 

on major endemic (nonemergency) diseases such as HIV/AIDS, TB [tuberculosis], and 

malaria. A smaller number work in areas such as emerging infectious diseases, influenza, 

and training programs in surveillance and outbreak response that are intrinsically focused 

on epidemics and emergency response. DHHS/CDC offices with long-term staff 

members usually become trusted advisors to local public health officials. This familiarity 

and resulting long-term trusting relationships are critical assets that help to establish 

access to provide assistance in the context of emergencies. 

(3) CDC also manages the Laboratory Response Network (LRN). The LRN is 

a network of more than 160 laboratories affiliated with federal agencies, military 

installations, international partners, and state/local public health departments that provide 

the laboratory infrastructure and capacity to respond to biological and chemical terrorism, 

and other public health emergencies by providing clinical and environmental sample 

testing as well as limited supporting analysis of food samples that may be implicated as 

part of epidemiological investigations associated with incident response to cases of 

human illness. 

f. The Food and Drug Administration is responsible for protecting the public 

health by assuring the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, 

biological products, medical devices, the Nation’s food supply, cosmetics, and products 
Annex R to Appendix A 

A-R-6 JP 3-08 

that emit radiation. In response operations, it may be called upon to assist with 

assessments and inspections, and provide subject matter expertise. It conducts 

inspections of medical products produced overseas. It has expertise in many areas, and 

experts occasionally assist foreign governments in developing regulatory oversight 

systems.

g. The Health Resources and Services Administration supports DHHS’s

emergency response through its National Health Service Corps Ready Responder 

Program. The Ready Responders, also Commissioned Corps officers, are primary care 

clinicians delivering quality health care to populations in under-served domestic areas. 

They are trained to respond quickly and effectively in the event of a large-scale regional 

or national emergency and may be potentially deployed internationally.

h. The Indian Health Service provides a comprehensive health service delivery 

system to tribal communities, to include personal and public health care, mental health 

issues, environmental health, engineering, dental, pharmaceutical, nursing, laboratory, 

and community health and varied surveillance activities that involve disease outbreaks 

and other health problems during national and international disasters and emergencies. 

They serve as a source of skilled health care professionals who can augment DHHS

response teams, and can serve as a resource to DOD as advisors for how to support tribal 

communities and cultures, while honoring and protecting the inherent sovereign rights of 

tribes.

i. The Administration for Children and Families (http://www.acf.hhs.gov). In the 

event of a massive evacuation from overseas, DHHS is the LFA responsible for arranging 

through state agencies for the reception, temporary care, and onward transportation to the 

final destination of noncombatant evacuees returned to the US from a foreign country. 

The Repatriation Program within the Office of Refugee Resettlement is responsible for 

the National Emergency Repatriation planning and implementation of the emergency 

plan. 

j. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration provides 

consultation, technical assistance, and grants to state and local entities as part of 

emergency response through NRF ESF #8. It liaises with state and community 

behavioral health public and private officials and service providers, as well as voluntary 

organizations. Personnel consult on a variety of behavior health issues including, but not 

limited to, chronic mental and substance abuse disorders, normal reactions to “abnormal” 

situations, grief reactions and treatment, traumatic stress, suicide prevention, public 

anxiety and stress reduction, assistance to emergency responders, psychological factors in 

medical surge, public education, risk communication, grief reactions, and traumatic 

stress. It also offers technical assistance and consultation to international communities 

when requested and approved by DOS. 

k. The National Institutes of Health, which consists of 27 institutes and centers, 

plays a key role in public health emergencies through their research and development of 

countermeasures against potential CBRN agents of terrorism. While many of the 

Institutes conduct and support research that helps provide the evidence base for medical 
Department of Health and Human Services

A-R-7 

and public health interventions related to bio-defense, the lead institute engaged in such 

research is the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. It plays a key role in 

the research and development of CBRN medical countermeasures. It works closely with 

DOD biomedical research components that focus on infectious disease and immunology 

research. In response to public health emergencies, it may be called upon to provide 

subject matter experts and/or to redirect its research efforts to address important scientific 

issues related to the emergency. Such response is accomplished in coordination with 

DHHS and sister agencies. The Fogarty International Center provides research grants for 

collaborative research and capacity building projects relevant to low- and middle- income 

nations, as well as Institutional training grants designed to enhance research capacity in 

the developing world, with an emphasis on institutional partnerships and networking. 

The Disease Control Priorities Project develops recommendations on effective health care 

interventions for resource-poor settings. The Fogarty International Center also conducts 

regional activities and programs in biomedical and behavioral sciences throughout the 

world. 

l. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality is responsible for supporting 

research, preparing models and practices that enhance the preparedness efforts of 

national, state, and local jurisdictions through the development and assessment of 

alternative approaches that ensure health surge capacity for mass casualty events, 

protocols, and technologies to enhance interoperability among health care systems, the 

public health systems, and other organizational participants in the emergency response 

network and training and information needs of health care providers for enhanced 

emergency response.

m. The Federal Occupational Health Service provides comprehensive, highquality, customer-focused occupational health services in strategic partnership with 

federal agencies nationwide to improve the health, safety, and productivity of the federal 

workforce. Services include the following: Employee Assistance Services, which 

provides Specialized Behavioral Health Services, and Work/Life Services; the Program 

Support Center Joint Health Services to USAID’s OFDA which includes hazardous 

material and safety training courses, maintaining and deploying hazardous material/safety 

stockpile, conducting safety assessments of disaster zones for federal response teams, and 

designing personal protective clothing kits. 

3. Interagency Relationships

a. DHHS can provide consultation on public health and medical issues that span the 

breadth of expertise within DHHS. DHHS can provide technical advice and perspective 

on relevant health sector issues.

b. Global Disease Detection. To make early disease detection and containment a 

reality around the world, DHHS/CDC is developing a network of global disease detection 

centers in partnership with ministries of health. Additional partners include WHO, DOS, 

DOD, USAID, and academic institutions. Centers currently in place are located in China, 

Egypt, Guatemala, Kenya, Thailand, and Kazakhstan. 
Annex R to Appendix A 

A-R-8 JP 3-08 

c. Stability Operations

(1) DHHS is an active participant in the interagency working groups supporting 

R&S operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations, and other 

civil-military coordinative operations, planning, and exercises.

(2) DHHS supports whole-of-government R&S efforts by contributing 

members to the Civilian Reserve Corps. DHHS is standing up a 5-member active 

component, and 10-member standby component, with expertise in health care service 

delivery and system administration, information management and health education, 

medicine, pharmacy, disease prevention and epidemiology, environmental health and 

safety, immunizations, infection control, reproductive health services, occupational health 

and injury prevention, nursing, veterinary health, noncommunicable diseases, and 

communicable diseases.

(3) DHHS can provide regional and country-specific perspective on existing 

health systems’ capabilities and infrastructure. Health sector issues are of increasing 

importance worldwide and a DHHS civilian or USPHS representative can add valuable 

perspective in collaboration with the command surgeon and USAID representatives.

d. Domestic Response. USPHS officers are assigned to DHHS and other federal 

agencies to include DOD. During emergencies, USPHS officers are deployed 

domestically to provide applied public health, mental health, and direct medical support 

to affected regions, states, and localities. DHHS works alongside DOD during domestic 

civil-military response operations. USPHS officers are involved when there is a Stafford 

Act declaration with domestic public health CS operations. 

e. International Response

(1) DOD and DHHS work alongside each other in support of several programs. 

DHHS supports the following USG interagency partners during international 

emergencies:

(a) DHHS is the technical lead for international pandemic influenza 

assessment and containment response supporting DOS in international pandemic 

influenza planning and prevention activities. 

(b) DHHS appoints representatives to the USG foreign emergency support 

team that is led by the DOS Foreign Consequence Management Program.

(c) DHHS supports USAID/OFDA by providing technical assistance and 

support on public health issues such as large disease outbreaks. 

(d) DHHS provides technical assistance on refugee health and mental 

health issues to the DOS Office of Population, Migration, and Refugees. 

(e) DOD may request support of DHHS to assist in FHA, as well as 

stability operations. The ASPR is the primary contact for international preparedness and 
Department of Health and Human Services

A-R-9 

emergency operations within DHHS. The ASPR can direct and deploy DHHS resources 

to support the DOS, USAID, DOD, or the UN to assist response to international and 

public health and medical emergencies.

(2) USPHS officers work side by side with DOD, for example as health 

attachés, consultants on PRTs, or as LNOs within a geographic combatant command. 

DHHS currently has two full-time LNOs assigned to USNORTHCOM, and is currently 

working towards assigning LNOs to each of the GCCs. Collectively DHHS has 

personnel either permanently assigned, or deployed, to each of the GCCs’ AORs from its 

component staff and operating divisions. 

f. Repatriation. The US Repatriation Program is committed to helping eligible 

repatriates referred from the DOS by providing them with effective and efficient 

temporary assistance necessary for their transition and reestablishment in the United 

States (http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/repatriation.htm). While DHHS

is responsible for the National Emergency Repatriation planning and implementation of 

the emergency plan, provision relies on state and local governments to carry out 

operational responsibility for the reception, temporary care, and onward transportation for 

the noncombatant evacuee. 

g. Training and Exercises

(1) Operating divisions and staff divisions throughout DHHS may support and 

interrelate with DOD by providing subject matter expertise in training and exercise 

events. DHHS routinely participates in DOD-led disaster preparedness and response 

training and exercises.

(2) The DHHS Office of Force Readiness and Deployment engages with DOD 

and its service components, including but not limited to: USSOUTHCOM, USPACOM, 

USAFRICOM, US Army South, and USAF South, USN 4th and 7th Fleets as 

participants in Continuing Promise, Pacific Partnership, Medical Readiness and Training 

exercises, and other operations and planning missions. 

(3) The US Army Office of the Surgeon General assigns an LNO to ASPR to 

help facilitate DHHS-DOD coordination and joint planning. The CDC also has DOD 

liaisons for this same purpose. 

For further information, see National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) Federal Partners 

MOA, NDMS MOA Among the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human 

Services, Veterans Affairs, and Defense at http://fhpr.osd.mil/cmm/pdf/NDMS_Partners_ 

MOA_with_sig.pdf, and Interagency Agreement Between the Department of Health and 

Human Services and the Department of Defense for Support of Contingency Medical 

Materiel Requirements at http://usachppm.apgea.army.mil/news/influenzaWebsite/ 

documents/DOD-DHHS_IA_on_SNS_20050505.pdf.
Annex R to Appendix A 

A-R-10 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
B-1 

APPENDIX B

INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

 This appendix includes the descriptions of key IGOs. 

 Annex A North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

 B United Nations 

 C United Nations Children’s Fund 

 D United Nations Office for the Coordination of 

 Humanitarian Affairs 

 E United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 

 F United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

 G United Nations World Food Programme 

 H United Nations World Health Organization 

 I United Nations Development Programme

 J United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 

 K European Union 

 L Organization of American States
Appendix B

B-2 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
B-A-1 

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX B

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

1. Background and Objectives

a. NATO is an alliance of 28 countries from North America and Europe committed 

to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty. The fundamental role of NATO is to

safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military 

means. NATO is playing an increasingly important role in crisis management and 

peacekeeping. NATO is currently undergoing a comprehensive reorganization and 

current information can be obtained at: http://www.nato.int. 

b. The Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks.

(1) Provide one of the indispensable foundations for stable security in Europe 

based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution 

of disputes. 

(2) Seek to create an environment in which no country would be able to 

intimidate or coerce any member nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use 

of force.

(3) Serve as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues 

affecting the vital interests of its members, in accordance with Article 4 of the North 

Atlantic Treaty, including developments, which might pose risks to their security.

(4) Facilitate appropriate coordination of members’ efforts in fields of common 

concern. 

(5) Provide deterrence and defense against any form of aggression against the 

territory of any NATO member state.

(6) Contribute to effective conflict prevention and engage actively in crisis 

management, including crisis response operations. 

(7) Promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other 

countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. 

c. To fulfill these tasks, member nations:

(1) Provide continuous consultation and cooperation in political, economic, and 

other nonmilitary fields.

(2) Formulate joint plans for the common defense. 

(3) Establish the infrastructure needed to enable military forces to operate.

(4) Arrange joint training programs and exercises.
Annex A to Appendix B

B-A-2 JP 3-08 

(5) Coordinate communications needed to facilitate political consultation, C2 of 

military forces, and their logistic support.

2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Organizational Structure

a. NATO HQ. NATO’s HQ in Brussels is the home of the NAC. It houses 

permanent representatives (PERMREPs) and national delegations, the Secretary General 

and the International Staff, national military representatives, the Chairman of the Military 

Committee and the International Military Staff, and a number of NATO agencies. 

NATO’s civil and military organizational structure is shown in Figure B-A-1. 

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION’S CIVIL

AND MILITARY STRUCTURE

command coordination

LEGEND

Defence Planning 

Committee (DPC)

Committees 

Subordinated to the 

Council, DPC, and 

NPG

Secretary 

General

Nuclear Planning 

Group (NPG)

Military 

Representatives 

to North Atlantic

Treaty 

Organization

International 

Military Staff

International Staff Strategic Commands

National Authorities

Allied 

Command 

Operations

Allied Command 

Transformation

Military 

Committee 

(MC)

North Atlantic 

Council (NAC)

Figure B-A-1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Civil and Military Structure
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

B-A-3 

b. NAC. The supreme authority of the Atlantic Alliance is the NAC, which has 

effective political authority and powers of decision and consists of PERMREPs of the 28 

member countries who meet together at least once a week. The NAC also meets at 

higher levels involving foreign ministers or heads of government, but it has the same 

authority and powers of decision making and its decisions have the same status and 

validity at whatever level it meets. The Chairman of the NAC, at both the ministerial and 

PERMREP levels, is the Secretary General. The presidency, held by the foreign 

ministers of each member country in turn, rotates annually. The NAC has an important 

public profile and issues declarations and communiques explaining its policies and 

decision to the general public and to governments of countries which are not members of 

the Alliance.

c. PERMREPs. Each member nation is represented on the NAC by an ambassador 

or PERMREP with ambassadorial rank. Each PERMREP is supported by a national 

delegation composed of advisers and officials who represent their country on different 

NATO committees. The delegations are similar in many respects to small embassies. 

Their collocation within the same HQ building enables them to maintain formal and 

informal contacts with each other, as well as with NATO’s international staffs, easily and 

without delay. 

d. Defense Planning Committee (DPC). The DPC is normally composed of 

PERMREPs, but meets at the level of defense ministers at least twice a year and deals 

with most defense matters and subjects related to collective defense planning. All 

member countries are represented in this forum. The DPC provides guidance to NATO’s 

military authorities and, within the area of its responsibilities, has the same function and 

attributes and the same authority as the NAC. An Executive Working Group is 

responsible to the DPC for the principal aspects of defense and the overall conduct of the 

long-term defense program.

e. Nuclear Planning Group. The Nuclear Planning Group meets at the same level 

and with the same status as the DPC. It is the principal forum for consultation on all 

matters relating to the role of nuclear forces in NATO’s security policy. The Nuclear 

Planning Group follows a similar pattern of meeting at the ambassadorial level and at the 

level of ministers of defense and has the same functions and authority for decisions on 

nuclear matters as the NAC and DPC have in their own spheres. All member countries 

except France participate. Iceland participates only as an observer.

f. Secretary General

(1) The Secretary General is a senior international statesman nominated by the 

member nations both as Chairman of the NAC, DPC, Nuclear Planning Group, and of 

other senior committees and as Secretary General of NATO. The Secretary General also 

acts as principal spokesman of the Organization, both in its external relations and in 

communications and contacts between member governments. As such, the Secretary 

General is responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation and 

decision making through the Alliance. 
Annex A to Appendix B

B-A-4 JP 3-08 

(2) The Secretary General has under his direct control a Private Office and the 

Office of the Secretary General. The Private Office supports the Secretary General and 

Deputy Secretary General in all aspects of their work. Its staff includes a legal advisor 

and a special advisor for Central and Eastern European Affairs. 

g. International Staff. The work of the NAC and its many committees and 

working groups is supported by an International Staff. This staff comprises the Office of 

the secretary general, five operational divisions, the Office of Management and the Office 

of the Financial Controller. Each of the divisions is headed by an Assistant Secretary 

General, who is normally the chairman of the main committee dealing with subjects in 

his field of responsibility. 

h. National Military Representatives. The members of the Military Committee 

(Chiefs of Staff) are represented at NATO HQ by senior officers acting as military 

representatives, each supported by a national staff varying in size. The military 

representatives constitute the Military Committee in Permanent Session. France is 

represented by a Military Mission to the Military Committee.

i. Military Committee

(1) The Military Committee is the highest military authority in the Alliance and 

is responsible to the NAC, DPC, and the Nuclear Planning Group for the overall conduct 

of the military affairs of the Alliance. It provides for the maximum consultation and 

cooperation between member nations on military matters relating to the Treaty and is the 

primary source of military advice to the Secretary General and to the NAC, DPC, and 

Nuclear Planning Group. 

(2) The Military Committee is composed of the Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of JS, 

or Chiefs of Defense Staff of each member country. Iceland has no military forces, but 

may be represented by a civilian. The Chiefs of Staff meet at least twice a year. At other 

times, member countries are represented by national military representatives appointed 

by the Chiefs of Staff.

(3) The Presidency of the Military Committee rotates annually among the 

nations in the order of the English alphabet. 

(4) The Chairman of the Military Committee chairs both the Chiefs of Staff and 

permanent sessions and is elected by the Chiefs of Staff, normally for a 3-year term. The 

Chairman is the spokesperson and representative of the Committee, directs its day-to-day 

activities, and represents the Military Committee at meetings of the NAC, DPC, and the 

Nuclear Planning Group, providing advice on military matters. The Chairman is assisted 

by the Deputy Chairman and by the Director of the International Military Staff. 

j. International Military Staff 

(1) The Military Committee is supported by an integrated International Military 

Staff made up of military personnel seconded from national military establishments and 

of supporting civilian personnel. Members of the International Military Staff have a 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

B-A-5 

similar status within the Organization as the International Staff, but come under the 

administrative authority of the Director of the International Military Staff or the head of 

the independent NATO agency within which they are employed. The national military 

status of personnel transferred from national armed forces is not affected by their 

temporary assignment to NATO. 

(2) The International Military Staff is headed by a Director of three-star rank 

who is nominated by the member nations and is selected by the Military Committee. The 

Director must be of a different nationality than the Chairman of the Military Committee.

(3) As the executive agent of the Military Committee, the International Military 

Staff is tasked with ensuring that the policies and decisions of the Military Committee are 

implemented as directed. In addition, the International Military Staff prepares plans, 

initiates studies, and recommends policy on matters of a military nature referred to 

NATO or to the Military Committee by national or NATO authorities, commanders, or 

agencies.

k. Integrated Military Structure

(1) The integrated military structure remains under political control and 

guidance at the highest level. It includes a network of major and subordinate military 

commands covering the whole of the North Atlantic area.

(2) The strategic area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty is currently divided 

among two Major NATO Commands (European and Transformation) and a Regional 

Planning Group for Canada and the United States. Two regional commands are within 

Allied Command Europe, and are responsible for the Southern and Northern regions. 

(3) The Major NATO commanders are responsible for the development of 

defense plans for their respective areas, for the determination of force requirements and 

for the deployment and exercise of the forces under their command. Their reports and 

recommendations regarding the forces assigned to them and their logistic support are 

referred to the NATO Military Committee. The Major NATO commanders are also 

responsible for the development and conduct of their military contacts with cooperation 

partners.

3. NATO Command Structure

a. Strategic Level

(1) At the strategic level, there is one command with operational 

responsibilities, Allied Command Operations commanded by Supreme Allied 

Commander, Europe (SACEUR). SACEUR is dual-hatted as Commander USEUCOM. 

Allied Command Transformation, commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander 

Transformation is responsible for promoting and overseeing the continuing 

transformation of Alliance forces and capabilities.
Annex A to Appendix B

B-A-6 JP 3-08 

(2) Allied Command Operations, with its HQ, Supreme Headquarters Allied 

Powers Europe, near Mons, Belgium, is responsible for all Alliance operations. The 

operational level consists of two standing joint force commands—one in Brunssum, the 

Netherlands, and one in Naples, Italy—which can conduct operations from their static 

locations or provide a land-based combined JTF HQ and a robust but more limited 

standing joint HQ in Lisbon, Portugal, from which a deployable sea-based combined JTF 

HQ capability can be drawn. The organizational structure of Allied Command 

Operations is depicted in Figure B-A-2. 

ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS

CAOC combined air operations center

CC component command

DCAOC deployable combined air operations 

center

HQ headquarters

SHAPE Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

(1) Appropriate links from Joint HQ Lisbon to CCs are detailed in sub-paragraph 10b.

(2) See sub-paragraph 3b. for the DCAOCs Forward Operating Base at Torrejon, SP.

LEGEND

STRATEGIC:

OPERATIONAL:

COMPONENT:

SHAPE

Mons, Belgium

Joint Force Command

HQ Brunssum

The Netherlands

CC-Air

HQ

Ramstein

Germany

CAOC Uedem

Germany

CAOC P. Renatico

Italy

DCAOC Uedem(2)

Germany

DCAOC P. Renatico (2)

Germany

CAOC Finderup

Denmark

CAOC Larissa

Greece

CC-Maritime

HQ 

Northwood

United Kingdom

CC-Land

HQ 

Heidelberg

Germany

CC-Air

HQ

Izmir

Turkey

CC-Land

HQ 

Madrid

Spain

CC-Maritime

HQ

Naples

Italy

Joint HQ Lisbon (1)

Portugal

Joint Force Command 

HQ Naples

Italy

Figure B-A-2. Allied Command Operations
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

B-A-7 

b. Component/Tactical Level

(1) The component or tactical level consists of six joint force component 

commands, which provide Service-specific—land, maritime, or air—expertise to the 

operational level. Although these component commands will be available for use in any 

operation, they will be subordinated to one of the joint force commands. For the joint 

force command in Brunssum, there is an air component command at Ramstein, Germany; 

a maritime component command at Northwood in the United Kingdom; and a land 

component command at Heidelberg, Germany. For the joint force command in Naples, 

there is an air component command at Izmir, Turkey; a maritime component command in 

Naples; and a land component command at Madrid, Spain. 

(2) In addition to these component commands, there are four static combined air 

operations centers (CAOCs)—in Uedem, Germany; Finderup, Denmark; Poggio 

Renatico, Italy; and Larissa, Greece; and two deployable CAOCs—in Uedem and Poggio 

Renatico. The deployable CAOCs exercise their capability to mobilize and deploy at the 

current facilities at Torrejon Air Base in Spain. A small NATO air facility support staff 

is stationed at Torrejon to support this capability. 

c. Transformation Command

(1) Allied Command Transformation, with its HQ in Norfolk, Virginia, 

oversees the transformation of NATO’s military capabilities. In doing so, it enhances 

training, improves capabilities, tests and develops doctrine, and conducts experiments to 

assess new concepts. It also facilitates the dissemination and introduction of new 

concepts and promotes interoperability. 

(2) An Allied Command Transformation Staff Element in Belgium is primarily 

responsible for resource and defense planning issues. 

(3) Allied Command Transformation includes the Joint Warfare Centre in 

Norway, the Joint Force Training Centre in Poland, and the Joint Analysis and Lessons 

Learned Centre in Portugal. Allied Command Transformation HQ also supervises the 

Undersea Research Centre in La Spezia, Italy. There are direct linkages between Allied 

Command Transformation, Alliance schools, and NATO agencies, as well as USJFCOM. 

In addition, a number of nationally- or multinationally-sponsored centers of excellence 

focused on transformation in specific military fields support the command. 

4. Combined Joint Task Force Concept

a. Should a crisis occur, the NAC might consider the formation of a combined JTF 

composed of forces drawn from member states. A combined JTF is a multinational JTF, 

task organized and formed for the full range of the Alliance’s military missions, which 

the commander, combined JTF, commands from a multinational and joint HQ. The JTF 

may include elements from non-NATO troop contributing nations. 
Annex A to Appendix B

B-A-8 JP 3-08 

b. The purpose of creating an Alliance combined JTF capability is to:

(1) Provide the Alliance with flexible and efficient means to generate, at short 

notice, rapidly deployable combined JTFs, with dedicated C2 capability.

(2) Facilitate operations in concert with partners and other non-NATO nations 

in situations not related to collective defense.

(3) Enable the Alliance, based on the principle of ‘separable but not separate 

capabilities’, to support the development of European Security and Defense Identity 

within the Alliance by the provision of a combined JTF HQ and associated capabilities or 

elements thereof for operations under the political control and strategic direction of the 

EU or as otherwise agreed.

For additional information on NATO’s combined JTF concept, see AJP-01(C), Allied 

Joint Doctrine.

5. Non-Article 5 Operations

a. NATO activities falling outside the scope of Article 5 are referred to collectively 

as non-Article 5 crisis response operations (NA5CROs). One principal difference 

between Article 5 operations and NA5CROs is that there is no formal obligation for 

NATO nations to take part in a NA5CRO while in case of an Article 5 operation, NATO 

nations are formally committed to take the actions they deem necessary to restore and 

maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

b. NA5CROs range from support operations primarily associated with civil agencies 

through operations in support of peace, to Alliance combat operations. In the framework 

of a NATO-led operation, Alliance forces could additionally conduct extraction 

operations, and tasks in support of disaster relief and humanitarian operations, SAR, or 

support to noncombatant evacuation operations. Operations that involve the use of 

military force or the threat of force include military action ranging from freedom of 

navigation and overflight enforcement, sanction and embargo enforcement, support to 

stabilization and reconstruction activities, and counter irregular threat operations—to 

military combat operations. Military Committee 327/2, NATO Military Policy for NonArticle 5 Crisis Response Operations, establishes the guidance for conducting NA5CROs 

within the Alliance. 

6. NATO Response Force

a. The NATO response force is a joint, trained, and certified force package, held at 

high readiness, that is tailored for an assigned mission. The NATO response force is 

capable of performing certain missions on its own, as well as participating in an operation 

as part of a larger force, or serving as an initial-entry force that prepares the JOA for 

follow-on forces. However, the NATO response force is limited in size, composition, 

and capabilities, thus it is not always the solution to emerging crises.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

B-A-9 

b. To be responsive to rapidly developing crises, the NATO response force relies on 

NATO and national procedures for the political decision-making process and for the 

preparations for employment. The NATO response force, when alerted by the NAC, can 

start deploying on five days notice and operate as a stand-alone force for up to 30 days 

using embedded logistic capabilities, or longer if resupplied. 
Annex A to Appendix B

B-A-10 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
B-B-1 

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX B

UNITED NATIONS

1. Introduction

The UN (http://www.un.org/en) is a unique international organization of 192 

sovereign states, representing virtually every country in the world. It was founded

towards the end of the Second World War. The member states are bound together by the 

principles of the UN Charter, an international treaty that spells out their rights and duties 

as members of the world community. 

2. Purpose

The purposes of the UN, as set forth in the Charter, are to maintain international 

peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 

principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; to cooperate in solving 

international economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems and in promoting 

respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and to be a center for harmonizing 

the actions of nations in attaining these ends. The UN is not a world government and it 

does not make laws. It does; however, provide the means to help resolve international 

conflicts and formulate policies on matters affecting all of us. At the UN, all the member 

states—large and small, rich and poor, with differing political views and social systems—

have a voice and a vote in this process. 

3. United Nations Charter

The Charter is the constituting instrument of the organization, setting out the rights 

and obligations of member states, and establishing the UN organs and procedures. There 

are 19 chapters in the UN Charter containing 111 articles, as shown in Figure B-B-1. 

Amendments to the Charter enter into effect when they have been adopted by a twothirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and ratified by two-thirds of the 

members of the UN, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. The 

amendments introduced so far have related to the expansion of two main organs, the 

Security Council and the ECOSOC. 

4. Organization 

a. There are six principal organs of the UN: the General Assembly, the Security 

Council, the ECOSOC, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and 

the Secretariat. The UN family, however, is much larger, encompassing 15 agencies and 

several programs and bodies. The UN family of organizations (the “UN system”) 

consists of the UN Secretariat, the UN funds and programs (e.g., UN Children’s Fund 

[UNICEF] and UNDP), the specialized agencies (e.g., WHO), and related organizations. 

The funds and programs are subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly. The specialized 

agencies are linked to the UN through special agreements and report to the ECOSOC 

and/or the General Assembly. The related organizations—including IAEA and the World 

Trade Organization—address specialized areas and have their own legislative bodies and 
Annex B to Appendix B

B-B-2 JP 3-08 

budgets. Together, the organizations of the UN system address all areas of economic and 

social endeavor. The organization of the UN System showing the other organs, 

operations, specialized agencies, and autonomous organizations that are either part of, or 

affiliated with, the UN can be found at http://www.un.org/aboutun/chart.html. 

b. General Assembly. The General Assembly is the chief deliberative, 

policymaking, and representative organ and consists of all the members of the UN, each 

country having one vote and being entitled to be represented at meetings by five 

delegates and five alternates. It provides a unique forum for multilateral discussion of the 

full spectrum of international issues covered by the Charter. Decisions on such key 

issues as international peace and security, admitting new members, and the UN budget 

are decided by two-thirds majority. Other matters are decided by simple majority. In 

Chapter I Purposes and Principles

Chapter II Membership

Chapter III Organs

Chapter IV The General Assembly

Chapter V The Security Council

Chapter VI Pacific Settlement of Disputes

Chapter VII Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches 

of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression

Chapter VIII Regional Arrangements

Chapter IX International Economic and Social Cooperation

Chapter X The Economic and Social Council

Chapter XI Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories

Chapter XII International Trusteeship System

Chapter XIII The Trusteeship System

Chapter XIV The International Court of Justice

Chapter XV The Secretariat

Chapter XVI Miscellaneous Provisions

Chapter XVII Transitional Security Arrangements

Chapter XVIII Amendments

Chapter XIX Ratification and Signature

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

CHAPTER TITLE

Figure B-B-1. United Nations Charter
United Nations

B-B-3 

recent years, a special effort has been made to reach decisions through consensus, rather 

than by taking a formal vote. The Assembly cannot force action by any state, but its 

recommendations are an important indication of world opinion and represent the moral 

authority of the community of nations. It also plays a significant role in the process of 

standard-setting and the codification of international law. According to the Charter of the 

UN, the General Assembly may:

(1) Consider and make recommendations on the general principles of 

cooperation for maintaining international peace and security, including disarmament. 

(2) Discuss any question relating to international peace and security and, except 

where a dispute or situation is currently being discussed by the Security Council, make 

recommendations on it. 

(3) Discuss, with the same exception, and make recommendations on any 

questions within the scope of the Charter or affecting the powers and functions of any 

organ of the UN. 

(4) Initiate studies and make recommendations to promote international 

political cooperation, the development and codification of international law, the 

realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and international collaboration in 

the economic, social, humanitarian, cultural, educational and health fields. 

(5) Make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of any situation that 

might impair friendly relations among nations. 

(6) Receive and consider reports from the Security Council and other UN 

organs. 

(7) Consider and approve the UN budget and establish the financial assessments 

of member states.

(8) Elect the nonpermanent members of the Security Council and the members 

of other UN councils and organs and, on the recommendation of the Security Council,

appoint the SYG. 

(9) The Assembly may also take action if the Security Council fails to act, 

owing to the negative vote of a permanent member, in a case where there appears to be a 

threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. The Assembly can consider 

the matter immediately with a view to making recommendations to members for 

collective measures to maintain or restore international peace and security.

c. Security Council. The UN Charter gives the Security Council primary 

responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The Security Council 

may convene at any time, whenever peace is threatened. Under the Charter, all member 

states are obligated to carry out the Security Council’s decisions. 
Annex B to Appendix B

B-B-4 JP 3-08 

(1) There are 15 Security Council members. Five of these—China, France, the 

Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are permanent 

members. The other 10 are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. It is 

organized to function continuously, and a representative of each of its members must be 

present at all times at UN HQ. Decisions of the Security Council require nine yes votes. 

Except in votes on procedural questions, a decision cannot be taken if there is a no vote, 

or veto, by a permanent member. The Presidency of the Security Council rotates 

monthly, according to the English alphabetical listing of its member states.

(2) Under the Charter, the functions and powers of the Security Council are: 

(a) To maintain international peace and security in accordance with the 

principles and purposes of the UN; 

(b) To investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international 

friction; 

(c) To recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of 

settlement; 

(d) To formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate 

armaments; 

(e) To determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression 

and to recommend what action should be taken; 

(f) To call on members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not 

involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression; 

(g) To take military action against an aggressor; 

(h) To recommend the admission of new members; 

(i) To exercise the trusteeship functions of the UN in “strategic areas;” and

(j) To recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the SYG

and, together with the Assembly, elect judges of the International Court of Justice. 

(3) When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the 

Security Council’s first action is usually to recommend to the parties to try to reach 

agreement by peaceful means. In some cases, the Security Council itself undertakes 

investigation and mediation. It may appoint special representatives or request the SYG to 

do so or to use his good offices. It may set forth principles for a peaceful settlement. 

(4) When a dispute leads to fighting, the Security Council’s first concern is to 

bring it to an end as soon as possible. On many occasions, the Security Council has 

issued cease-fire directives which have been instrumental in preventing wider hostilities. 

It also sends UN peacekeeping forces to help reduce tensions in troubled areas, keep 
United Nations

B-B-5 

opposing forces apart, and create conditions of calm in which peaceful settlements may 

be sought. The Security Council may decide on enforcement measures, economic 

sanctions (such as trade embargoes), or collective military action. 

(5) A member state against which preventive or enforcement action has been 

taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and 

privileges of membership by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the 

Security Council. A member state which has persistently violated the principles of the 

Charter may be expelled from the UN by the Assembly on the Security Council’s 

recommendation. 

(6) A state which is a member of the UN but not of the Security Council may 

participate, without a vote, in its discussions when the Security Council considers that 

that country’s interests are affected. Both members of the UN and nonmembers, if they 

are parties to a dispute being considered by the Security Council, are invited to take part, 

without a vote, in the Security Council’s discussions; the Council sets the conditions for 

participation by a nonmember state. 

d. Economic and Social Council. The ECOSOC, under the overall authority of the 

General Assembly, coordinates the economic and social work of the UN and the UN 

family of organizations. As the central forum for discussing international economic and 

social issues and for formulating policy recommendations, the ECOSOC plays a key role 

in fostering international cooperation for development. It also consults with academics, 

business sector representatives, and more than 3,000 registered NGOs, thereby 

maintaining a vital link between the UN and civil society.

(1) It is responsible for: 

(a) Promoting higher standards of living, full employment, and economic 

and social progress; 

(b) Identifying solutions to international economic, social, and health 

problems; 

(c) Facilitating international cultural and educational cooperation; and 

(d) Encouraging universal respect for human rights and fundamental 

freedoms.

(2) The ECOSOC’s subsidiary bodies meet regularly and report back to it. 

These bodies focus on such issues as social development, the status of women, crime 

prevention, narcotic drugs, and sustainable development. Five regional commissions 

promote economic development and cooperation in their respective regions. 

e. The Trusteeship Council was established to provide international supervision for 

Trust Territories administered by member states. By 1994, all Trust Territories had 

attained self-government or independence. Its work completed, the Trusteeship Council 
Annex B to Appendix B

B-B-6 JP 3-08 

now consists of the five permanent members of the Security Council and meets when the 

occasion may require.

f. The International Court of Justice, also known as the World Court, is the main

judicial organ of the UN. Its 15 judges are elected by the General Assembly and the 

Security Council, voting independently and concurrently. The World Court was 

established by the UN Charter, which provides that all member states of the UN are ipso 

facto parties to the World Court’s Statute. The composition and functioning of the World

Court are organized by this Statute, and by the Rules of the Court, which are drawn up by 

the World Court itself. The World Court’s role is to settle, in accordance with

international law, legal disputes submitted to it by states and to give advisory opinions on 

legal questions referred to it by authorized UN organs and specialized agencies. The 

World Court may entertain two types of cases: legal disputes between states submitted to 

it by them (contentious cases) and requests for advisory opinions on legal questions 

referred to it by UN organs and specialized agencies (advisory proceedings).

g. The Secretariat carries out the substantive and administrative work of the UN as 

directed by the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the other organs. At its 

head is the SYG, who provides overall administrative guidance. The Secretariat consists 

of departments and offices with a total staff of about 8,100 under the regular budget, 

drawn from some 170 countries. Duty stations include UN HQ in New York, as well as 

UN offices in Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi, and other locations. 

h. The UN System. The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and 13 

other independent organizations known as “specialized agencies” are linked to the UN 

through cooperative agreements. These agencies are autonomous bodies created by 

intergovernmental agreement. They have wide-ranging international responsibilities in 

the economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields. Some of them, like 

the International Labour Organization and the Universal Postal Union, are older than the 

UN itself.

(1) In addition, a number of UN offices, programs and funds—such as the 

Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UNDP, and the 

UNICEF—work to improve the economic and social condition of people around the 

world. They report to the General Assembly or the ECOSOC. 

(2) All these organizations have their own governing bodies, budgets, and 

secretariats. Together with the UN, they are known as the UN family, or the UN system. 

Together, they provide technical assistance and other forms of practical help in virtually 

all economic and social areas. 
B-C-1 

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX B

UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND

1. Overview

UNICEF (http://www.unicef.org) is the driving force that helps build a world where 

the rights of every child are realized. Nurturing and caring for children are the 

cornerstones of human progress. UNICEF was created with this purpose in mind – to 

work with others to overcome the obstacles that poverty, violence, disease, and 

discrimination place in a child’s path. UNICEF advocates for measures to give children 

the best start in life, because proper care at the youngest age forms the strongest 

foundation for a person’s future. UNICEF promotes girls’ education—ensuring that they 

complete primary education as a minimum—because it benefits all children, both girls 

and boys. UNICEF acts so that all children are immunized against common childhood 

diseases, and are well nourished, because it is wrong for a child to suffer or die from a 

preventable illness. UNICEF works to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS among young 

people because it is right to keep them from harm and enable them to protect others. 

UNICEF helps children and families affected by HIV/AIDS to live their lives with 

dignity. UNICEF involves everyone in creating protective environments for children. 

UNICEF is present to relieve suffering during emergencies, and wherever children are 

threatened, because no child should be exposed to violence, abuse, or exploitation. 

UNICEF upholds the Convention on the Rights of the Child. UNICEF works to assure 

equality for those who are discriminated against, girls and women in particular. UNICEF 

works for the Millennium Development Goals and for the progress promised in the UN 

Charter. UNICEF strives for peace and security. UNICEF works to hold everyone 

accountable to the promises made for children. UNICEF is part of the Global Movement 

for Children – a broad coalition dedicated to improving the life of every child. UNICEF 

works in 190 countries through country programs and national committees. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. UNICEF is mandated by the UN General Assembly to advocate for the protection 

of children’s rights, to help meet their basic needs, and to expand their opportunities to 

reach their full potential. 

b. UNICEF is guided by the Convention on the Rights of the Child and strives to 

establish children’s rights as enduring ethical principles and international standards of 

behavior towards children. 

c. UNICEF insists that the survival, protection, and development of children are 

universal imperatives that are integral to human progress. 

d. UNICEF mobilizes political will and material resources to help countries, 

particularly developing countries, ensure a “first call” for children, build their capacity to 

form appropriate policies, and deliver services for children and their families.
Annex C to Appendix B

B-C-2 JP 3-08 

e. UNICEF is committed to ensuring special protection for the most disadvantaged 

children—victims of war, disasters, extreme poverty, all forms of violence and 

exploitation, and those with disabilities.

f. UNICEF responds in emergencies to protect the rights of children. In 

coordination with UN partners and humanitarian agencies, UNICEF makes its unique 

facilities for rapid response available to its partners to relieve the suffering of children 

and those who provide their care. 

g. UNICEF is nonpartisan and its cooperation is free of discrimination. In 

everything it does, the most disadvantaged children and the countries in greatest need 

have priority. 

h. UNICEF aims, through its country programs, to promote the equal rights of 

women and girls and to support their full participation in the political, social, and 

economic development of their communities. 

i. UNICEF works with all its partners towards the attainment of the sustainable 

human development goals adopted by the world community and the realization of the 

vision of peace and social progress enshrined in the UN Charter.

3. Organizational Structure

a. The heart of UNICEF’s work is in the field. Each country office carries out 

UNICEF’s mission through a unique program of cooperation developed with the host 

government. This five-year program focuses on practical ways to realize the rights of 

children and women. Their needs are analyzed in a situation report produced at the 

beginning of the program cycle. Regional offices guide this work and provide technical 

assistance to country offices as needed. UNICEF’s work is fully integrated with other 

UN activities in a country. 

b. Overall management and administration of the organization takes place at the 

UNICEF HQ in New York, where global policy on children is shaped. Specialized 

offices include the Supply Division, based in Copenhagen, which provides such essential 

items as the majority of life-saving vaccine doses for children in developing countries. 

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. Increasing numbers of children and women are being affected by natural disasters, 

conflict, or other forms of crisis. In 2003, UNICEF clarified what it would do to protect 

and assist such children and women by revising its Core Commitments for Children in 

Emergencies. In so doing, it distinguished between those vital, life-saving interventions 

that should be done in the first six to eight weeks of any crisis and the broader spectrum 

of activities that may be added following that initial response.

b. Guiding the response of UNICEF in humanitarian situations is the principle that 

children in the midst of armed conflict and natural disasters have the same needs and 

rights as children in stable situations.
United Nations Children’s Fund

B-C-3 

c. In the first six to eight weeks following the outbreak of a crisis, and in 

coordination with its national, UN, and NGO partner organizations, UNICEF will 

work to: 

(1) Assess, monitor, report, and communicate on the situation of children and 

women. Conduct a rapid assessment, including on severe or systematic abuse, violence, 

or exploitation, and report through the appropriate mechanisms. 

(2) Provide measles vaccinations, vitamin A, essential drugs, and nutritional 

supplements. Vaccinate children between 6 months and 14 years of age against measles. 

Provide vitamin A supplementation as required. Provide essential drugs, basic and 

emergency health kits, oral rehydration, fortified nutritional products, and micronutrient 

supplements. Provide post-rape-care kits, including post-exposure prophylaxis for HIV, 

where appropriate. Provide other emergency supplies (e.g., blankets, tarpaulins). 

(3) Provide child and maternal feeding and nutritional monitoring: with the 

WFP and NGO partners, support infant and young child feeding, therapeutic and 

supplementary feeding. Introduce nutritional monitoring and surveillance. 

(4) Provide safe drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene including emergency 

water supply and purification, provision of basic family water kits, safe disposal of feces, 

and hygiene education. 

(5) Assist in preventing the separation and facilitate the identification, 

registration, and medical screening of children separated from their families. Ensure 

family tracing systems are put in place and provide care and protection. Prevent sexual 

abuse and exploitation of children and women. 

(6) Initiate the resumption of schooling and other child learning opportunities: 

set-up temporary learning spaces and reopen schools; start reintegrating teachers and 

children (with a focus on girls); and organize recreational activities.

d. Once this initial emergency response is well established, other activities may be 

introduced to address other elements of the Core Commitments for Children in 

Emergencies, as the situation evolves: 

(1) Monitoring and advocating on the situation of children: 

(a) Ensure that information on the situation of children and violations of 

their rights is collected and updated. 

(b) Make this information available to relevant partners, child rights 

advocates, the public, and the media, as appropriate. 

(c) Use UNICEF’s voice on behalf of children. 
Annex C to Appendix B

B-C-4 JP 3-08 

(2) Survival: 

(a) Expand support to vaccination and preventive health services. 

(b) Support infant and young child feeding, including breastfeeding and 

complementary feeding and, when necessary, support therapeutic and supplementary 

feeding programs. 

(c) Establish, improve, and expand safe water and sanitation facilities and 

promote safe hygiene behavior. 

(3) Organizing Child Protection: 

(a) Continue to identify and register unaccompanied and orphaned children. 

Support communities to provide for their protection and care. 

(b) Establish child friendly spaces and provide psychosocial support. 

(c) Monitor, report on, and advocate against abuse and exploitation of 

children including recruitment of child soldiers and other exploitative forms of child 

labor. 

(d) Initiate work on the release and reintegration of child combatants. 

(e) Promote activities that prevent and respond to sexual violence against 

children and women. 

(f) Lead in the organization of mine risk education. 

(4) Resuming primary education services: reestablish and/or sustain primary 

education as well as establishing community services within schools (such as water 

supply and sanitation). 

(5) Preventing HIV/AIDS: 

(a) Provide access to relevant information on HIV/AIDS using three 

primary prevention methods. 

(b) In collaboration with relevant partners, facilitate young people’s access 

to comprehensive HIV prevention services including treatment for sexually transmitted 

infections. 

For more information, refer to UNICEF’s Core Commitments for Children in 

Emergencies. 
United Nations Children’s Fund

B-C-5 

5. Interagency Relationships

UNICEF works in collaboration with local and international partners, including 

governments, UN agencies, and civil society. These partnerships are crucial to ensuring 

comprehensive and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. They also permit the 

diverse array of programs necessary to address the full spectrum of children’s rights, a 

fact that is especially important in emergencies, when these rights are most under threat.
Annex C to Appendix B

B-C-6 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
B-D-1 

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX B

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF

HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

1. Overview

UNOCHA’s (http://ochaonline.un.org) mission is to mobilize and coordinate 

effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international 

entities in order to: alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies; advocate for 

the rights of people in need; promote preparedness and prevention; and facilitate 

sustainable solutions. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. UNOCHA facilitates the work of operational agencies that deliver humanitarian 

assistance to populations and communities in need. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator 

has overall responsibility for ensuring coherence of relief efforts in the field. UNOCHA

supports the Humanitarian Coordinator in needs assessments, contingency planning, and 

the formulation of humanitarian programs. UNOCHA also provides response tools, and 

advocacy and information services. The head of UNOCHA, as the Under Secretary 

General for Humanitarian Affairs/Emergency Relief Coordinator, chairs the Inter-Agency 

Standing Committee (IASC), which comprises all major humanitarian entities, including 

the Red Cross Movement and three NGO consortia. By developing common policies, 

guidelines and standards, the IASC assures a coherent interagency response to complex 

emergencies and natural and environmental disasters. UNOCHA also chairs the 

Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), which develops common UN 

positions on humanitarian issues. 

b. IASC (http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc) is a unique interagency forum for 

coordination, policy development, and decision making involving the key UN and nonUN humanitarian partners. IASC serves as the primary mechanism for interagency 

coordination of humanitarian assistance. Under the leadership of the Emergency Relief 

Coordinator, the IASC develops humanitarian policies, agrees on a clear division of 

responsibility for the various aspects of humanitarian assistance, identifies and addresses 

gaps in response, and advocates for effective application of humanitarian principles. 

Together with ECHA, the IASC forms the key strategic coordination mechanism among 

major humanitarian entities.

3. Organizational Structure

UNOCHA, a department of the UN Secretariat, is headquartered in New York, with 

a small policy staff and an Emergency Liaison Branch divided into geographical sections. 

UNOCHA HQ in New York is concerned with policy decisions about humanitarian 

responses and the coordination of agencies. UNOCHA’s Geneva office is the operational 

section. All funding requests and donations are handled by Geneva as are issues of the 

deployment of personnel to humanitarian emergency sites. UNOCHA’s Disaster 

Mitigation Branch, also in Geneva, is the office that handles natural disaster responses. 
Annex D to Appendix B

B-D-2 JP 3-08 

UNOCHA operates through a network of field offices, which support UN humanitarian 

coordinators and UN country teams. It also maintains regional support offices and 

regional disaster response advisors in Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America, the 

Middle East, and Asia Pacific.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. UNOCHA plays a key role in raising funds for emergencies and disasters. 

(1) UNOCHA solicits donor support mainly through the Consolidated Appeals 

Process and issues emergency appeals on behalf of countries affected by disasters. The 

Consolidated Appeals Process, through the consolidated humanitarian action plan, is the 

UN’s foremost tool for coordination and strategic planning during complex emergencies. 

It also provides an opportunity for advocacy. The UN Resident/Humanitarian 

Coordinator and UN country team are responsible for preparing, implementing, and 

reviewing the Consolidated Appeals Process. On average, some 15 appeals are launched 

annually to meet the requirements of nearly 40 million people. In sudden-onset disasters,

UNOCHA may issue flash appeals for a three to six-month period. 

(2) In addition, UNOCHA manages the Central Emergency Response Fund 

(CERF), established by the UN to enable agencies to jump-start relief activities and 

ensure more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters 

and armed conflicts. The CERF is funded by voluntary contributions from around the 

globe from member states of the UN, private businesses, foundations, and individuals. 

The CERF is intended to complement not substitute, existing humanitarian funding 

mechanisms such as the UN Consolidated Appeals. 

b. In today’s complex emergencies, civilians are often the direct targets of violence. 

UNOCHA works with key stakeholders to develop policies and advocacy strategies 

designed to ensure the protection of civilians in armed conflict and respect for 

international human rights. It also seeks to draw attention to “neglected crises” that are 

not in the media spotlight. Finally, UNOCHA works with operational agencies to aid an 

estimated 26 million internally displaced people in the world (almost one percent of the 

world’s 6.7 billion people). 

c. UNOCHA maintains an in-house emergency response capacity, supported by a 

24-hour monitoring and alert system, to deploy staff at short notice to disaster areas. In 

addition, UNOCHA supports several “surge capacity” mechanisms and networks that 

enable the humanitarian community, as a whole, to respond quickly to emergencies and 

disasters. These include:

(1) The UNDAC can dispatch teams within 12 to 24 hours of a natural disaster 

or sudden-onset emergency to gather information, assess needs, and coordinate 

international assistance. 

(2) The OSOCC, run by the UNDAC team, assists local authorities with 

coordinating international response teams during disasters. In addition, an internet-based 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

B-D-3 

virtual OSOCC facilitates information exchange between responding governments and 

organizations throughout the relief operation.

(3) The Environment Standby Experts, a joint venture with the UN 

Environment Program, functions in environmental disasters the same way UNDAC does 

in natural disasters. 

(4) The Civil-Military Coordination Section ensures military resources, when 

available and appropriate, are effectively used to respond to humanitarian emergencies. 

(5) The International Search and Rescue Advisory Group is a global platform 

for developing standards for urban SAR teams and coordinating international rescue 

operations. 

d. An important part of UNOCHA’s work is to gather, analyze, and disseminate 

information from the field to key stakeholders. UNOCHA monitors and issues situation 

reports on natural disasters on a 24-hour basis. The tools used to collect and share 

information include: 

(1) http://www.ReliefWeb.int – provides comprehensive information on 

emergencies on natural disasters to the global humanitarian community on a 24-hour 

basis. 

(2) http://www.IRINnews.org – offers accurate and impartial reporting of 

humanitarian crises in sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia. 

(3) http://www.humanitarianinfo.org – the gateway to humanitarian information 

centers and other field-based sources which provide accurate information and data to 

relief workers and decision-makers. 

(4) http://ochaonline.un.org – a corporate platform for advocacy, information 

sharing, a repository of humanitarian and UNOCHA-related information and a donor 

solicitation platform. The site includes an online guide to help businesses identify ways 

to support UN emergency relief efforts. 

5. Interagency Relationships

a. UNOCHA has close interagency relationships through a variety of forums, but 

especially through the IASC, the Consolidated Appeals Process, and the ECHA. 

Through the ECHA, UNOCHA maintains close contact with the Department of Political 

Affairs and UNDPKO with regard to security, political and humanitarian dimensions of 

complex emergencies to promote joint policy planning, and coordination. UNOCHA 

coordinates operational organizations of the UN system (like UNICEF and WFP) and 

other humanitarian agencies. In the event of a complex emergency, the UN Emergency 

Relief Coordinator, UNOCHA under the SYG, consults with IASC members before 

either confirming the RC as humanitarian coordinator or designating another official to 

perform that function. 
Annex D to Appendix B

B-D-4 JP 3-08 

b. UNOCHA works closely with NGOs as indispensable implementers of 

emergency programs. UNOCHA operates under the assumption that NGOs often have 

more detailed knowledge of, and are closer to, affected populations, and should therefore 

be part of the overall coordination effort. 

c. UNOCHA realizes that the use of military and civil defense assets should be 

employed by humanitarian agencies as a last resort, (i.e., only in the absence of any other 

available civilian alternative to support urgent humanitarian needs in the time required). 

For more information, refer to Guidelines on The Use of Military and Civil Defence 

Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies and 

Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief— 

“Oslo Guidelines.” 
B-E-1 

ANNEX E TO APPENDIX B

UNITED NATIONS FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION

1. Overview

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN 

(http://www.fao.org/index_en.htm) leads international efforts to defeat hunger. 

Achieving food security for all is at the heart of FAO’s efforts—to make sure people 

have regular access to enough high-quality food to lead active, healthy lives. FAO’s 

mandate is to raise the levels of nutrition, improve agricultural productivity, better the 

lives of rural populations, and contribute to the growth of the world economy. Serving 

both developed and developing countries, FAO acts as a neutral forum where all nations 

meet as equals to negotiate agreements and debate policy. FAO is also a source of 

knowledge and information. FAO helps developing countries and countries in transition 

modernize and improve agriculture, forestry, and fisheries practices and ensure good 

nutrition for all. Since its founding in 1945, it has focused special attention on 

developing rural areas, home to 70 percent of the world’s poor and hungry people. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. FAO is governed by the Conference of Member Nations, which meets every two 

years to review the work carried out by the FAO and approve a program of work and 

budget for the next biennium. The Conference of Member Nations elects a council of 49 

member nations to act as an interim governing body. 

b. FAO provides the kind of behind-the-scenes assistance that helps people and 

nations help themselves. If a community wants to increase crop yields but lacks the 

technical skills, FAO introduces simple, sustainable tools and techniques. When a 

country shifts from state to private land ownership, FAO provides the legal advice to 

smooth the way. When a drought pushes already vulnerable groups to the point of 

famine, FAO mobilizes action. In a complex world of competing needs, FAO provides a 

neutral meeting place and the background knowledge needed to reach consensus. 

3. Organizational Structure

FAO is composed of eight departments: Agriculture and Consumer Protection; 

Economic and Social Development; Fisheries and Aquaculture; Forestry; Human, 

Financial, and Physical Resources; Knowledge and Communication; Natural Resources 

Management, and Environment; and Technical Cooperation. 

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. Putting information within reach. FAO serves as a knowledge network. FAO 

uses the expertise of its staff—agronomists, foresters, fisheries and livestock specialists, 

nutritionists, social scientists, economists, statisticians, and other professionals—to 

collect, analyze, and disseminate data that aid development. A million times a month, 

someone visits the FAO internet site to consult a technical document or read about FAO’s
Annex E to Appendix B

B-E-2 JP 3-08 

work with farmers. FAO also publishes hundreds of newsletters, reports, and books; 

distributes several magazines; creates numerous compact disks; and hosts dozens of 

electronic fora. 

b. Sharing policy expertise. FAO lends its years of experience to member 

countries in devising agricultural policy, supporting planning, drafting effective 

legislation, and creating national strategies to achieve rural development and hunger 

alleviation goals. 

c. Providing a meeting place for nations. On any given day, dozens of policymakers and experts from around the globe convene at HQ or in FAO field offices to forge 

agreements on major food and agriculture issues. As a neutral forum, FAO provides the 

setting where rich and poor nations can come together to build common understanding. 

d. Bringing knowledge to the field. FAO’s breadth of knowledge is put to the test 

in thousands of field projects throughout the world. FAO mobilizes and manages 

millions of dollars provided by industrialized countries, development banks, and other 

sources to make sure the projects achieve their goals. FAO provides the technical know 

how and in a few cases is a limited source of funds. In crisis situations, FAO works sideby-side with the WFP and other humanitarian agencies to protect rural livelihoods and 

help people rebuild their lives. 

5. Interagency Relationships

The FAO helps national governments cooperate through regional and subregional 

groupings, such as the Economic Community of West African States, South African 

Development Coordination Conference, Center for Integrated Rural Development in Asia 

and the Pacific, and Organization of Andean Pact Countries. The FAO cooperates with 

practically all the major multilateral funding institutions, including the World Bank, 

International Fund for Agriculture Development, African Development Bank and Fund, 

Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, the UN Capital 

Development Fund, most of the major Arab banks, and subregional institutions. The 

World Bank is the single most important source of financing for investment projects 

prepared by the FAO.
B-F-1 

ANNEX F TO APPENDIX B

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

1. Overview

The Office of the UNHCR (http://www.unhcr.org) is the UN Refugee Agency. 

UNHCR is mandated by the UN to lead and coordinate international action for the 

worldwide protection of refugees and the resolution of refugee problems. UNHCR’s 

primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees. In its efforts to 

achieve this objective, UNHCR strives to ensure that everyone can exercise the right to 

seek asylum and find safe refuge in another state, and to return home voluntarily. By 

assisting refugees to return to their own country or to settle permanently in another 

country, UNHCR also seeks lasting solutions to their plight. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities

UNHCR’s efforts are mandated by the organization’s statute, and guided by the 1951 

United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. 

International refugee law provides an essential framework of principles for UNHCR’s 

humanitarian activities. In support of its core activities on behalf of refugees, UNHCR’s 

Executive Committee and the UN General Assembly have authorized the organization’s 

involvement with other groups. These include former refugees who have returned to 

their homeland; internally displaced people; and people who are stateless or whose 

nationality is disputed. 

3. Organizational Structure

UNHCR is headquartered in Geneva. The UNHCR Branch Office for the United 

States is located in Washington, DC. UNHCR employs over 6,600 people, including 

short-term staff. UNHCR, funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions from donor 

governments, has offices in over 111 countries. UNHCR helps 34.4 million people 

worldwide 

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. UNHCR seeks to reduce situations of forced displacement by encouraging states 

and other institutions to create conditions which are conducive to the protection of human 

rights and the peaceful resolution of disputes. In pursuit of the same objective, UNHCR 

actively seeks to consolidate the reintegration of returning refugees in their country of 

origin, thereby averting the recurrence of refugee-producing situations. 

b. UNHCR is an impartial organization, offering protection and assistance to 

refugees and others on the basis of their needs and irrespective of their race, religion, 

political opinion, or gender. In all of its activities, UNHCR pays particular attention to 

the needs of children and seeks to promote the equal rights of women and girls. 

c. In its efforts to protect refugees and to promote solutions to their problems, 

UNHCR works in partnership with governments, regional organizations, IGOs, and 
Annex F to Appendix B

B-F-2 JP 3-08 

NGOs. UNHCR is committed to the principle of participation, believing that refugees 

and others who benefit from the organization’s activities should be consulted over 

decisions, which affect their lives. 

d. By virtue of its activities on behalf of refugees and displaced people, UNHCR 

also endeavors to promote the purposes and principles of the UN Charter: maintaining 

international peace and security; developing friendly relations among nations; and 

encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 

5. Interagency Relationships

a. From the outset, UNHCR’s work was intended to be undertaken jointly with other 

members of the international community. As its activities have increased and diversified, 

UNHCR’s relations with other organs and agencies of the UN system, IGOs, and NGOs 

have become increasingly important. As humanitarian crises have become more 

complex, UNHCR has expanded both the number and type of organizations with which it 

works. UN sister agencies and offices include the WFP, UNICEF, WHO, UNDP, 

UNOCHA, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. 

b. When the security situation allows UNHCR to perform its Core Competencies, a 

symbiotic relation can arise between UNHCR and the joint force. Security in postconflict regions often requires joint or coalition military force, but emergency 

humanitarian response and long-term resolution of underlying grievances of refugees and 

displaced persons is often best addressed by the UNHCR and other independent agencies. 

Strategic objectives which cannot be accomplished through military force alone or 

current USG interagency processes may be addressed by UNHCR functions. Enabling 

the UNHCR to do its job can help accomplish political and national strategic objectives. 
B-G-1 

ANNEX G TO APPENDIX B

UNITED NATIONS WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

1. Overview

The WFP (http://www.wfp.org) is the UN frontline agency in the fight against global 

hunger. It is the world’s largest humanitarian organization. In emergencies, WFP gets 

food to where it is needed, saving the lives of victims of war, civil conflict, and natural 

disasters. After the cause of an emergency has passed, WFP uses food to help 

communities rebuild their shattered lives. WFP’s five objectives are: save lives and 

protect livelihoods in emergencies; prepare for emergencies; restore and rebuild lives 

after emergencies; reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition everywhere; and strengthen 

the capacity of countries to reduce hunger. WFP food assistance reaches an average of 

100 million people in 80 countries every year. Almost 12,000 people work for the 

organization, most of them in remote areas, directly serving the hungry poor. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. WFP is the food aid arm of the UN system. Food aid is one of the many 

instruments that can help to promote food security, which is defined as access of all 

people at all times to the food needed for an active and healthy life. The policies 

governing the use of WFP food aid must be oriented towards the objective of eradicating 

hunger and poverty. The ultimate objective of food aid should be the elimination of the 

need for food aid. 

b. Targeted interventions are needed to help to improve the lives of the poorest 

people—people who, either permanently or during crisis periods, are unable to produce 

enough food or do not have the resources to otherwise obtain the food that they and their 

households require for active and healthy lives. 

c. Consistent with its mandate, which also reflects the principle of universality, WFP 

will continue to:

(1) Use food aid to support economic and social development; 

(2) Meet refugee and other emergency food needs, and the associated logistics 

support; and 

(3) Promote world food security in accordance with the recommendations of the 

UN and FAO.

d. The core policies and strategies that govern WFP activities are to provide food 

aid:

(1) To save lives in refugee and other emergency situations; 

(2) To improve the nutrition and quality of life of the most vulnerable people at 

critical times in their lives; and 
Annex G to Appendix B

B-G-2 JP 3-08 

(3) To help build assets and promote the self-reliance of poor people and 

communities, particularly through labor-intensive works programs. 

e. In the first case, food aid is essential for social and humanitarian protection. It 

will be used in a way that is as developmental as possible, consistent with saving lives. 

To the extent possible, the provision of relief food aid will be coordinated with the relief 

assistance provided by other humanitarian organizations. In the second case, food aid is a 

pre-investment in human resources. In the third, it uses poor people’s most abundant 

resource, their own labor, to create employment and income and to build the 

infrastructure necessary for sustained development. 

f. WFP is well placed to play a major role in the continuum from emergency relief 

to development. WFP will give priority to supporting disaster prevention, preparedness, 

and mitigation and post-disaster rehabilitation activities as part of development programs. 

Conversely, emergency assistance will be used to the extent possible to serve both relief 

and development purposes. In both cases, the overall aim is to build self reliance. 

g. In carrying out its mandate, WFP will concentrate on what it is best suited to do 

with the resources available as cost-effectively as possible. WFP will focus on those 

aspects of development where food-based interventions are most useful. It will make all 

necessary efforts to avoid negative effects on local food production, consumption 

patterns, and dependency on food aid. WFP will continue to play a major and significant 

role in providing transport and logistics expertise and assistance to ensure rapid and 

efficient delivery of humanitarian aid.

h. WFP’s multilateral character is one of its greatest strengths. WFP will exploit its 

capability to operate virtually everywhere in the developing world, without regard to the 

political orientations of governments, and to provide a neutral conduit for assistance in 

situations where many donor countries could not directly provide assistance. WFP will 

provide services: advice, good offices, logistic support and information, and support to 

countries in establishing and managing their own food assistance programs. 

i. WFP, on request, will provide bilateral services to donors, UN agencies, and 

NGOs on the basis of full cost recovery. These will be administered and accounted for 

separately. Such services will complement WFP’s regular operations to the extent 

possible. 

j. WFP will concentrate its efforts and resources on the neediest people and 

countries to provide at least 90 percent of WFP’s development assistance to low-income, 

food-deficit countries and at least 50 percent of its development assistance to the least 

developed countries. 

k. WFP will ensure that its assistance programs are designed and implemented on 

the basis of broad-based participation. Women in particular are key to change; providing 

food to women puts it in the hands of those who use it for the benefit of the entire 

household, especially the children. WFP assistance will aim to strengthen their coping 

ability and resilience.
United Nations World Food Programme

B-G-3 

l. To be truly effective, food aid should be fully integrated into the development 

plans and priorities of recipient countries and coordinated with other forms of assistance. 

WFP’s starting point is the national policies, plans, and programs of developing 

countries, including their food security plans. WFP will pull together its activities in an 

integrated way at the country level so that it can respond to urgent needs as they occur 

while retaining core development objectives. The country strategy note, where this 

exists, should provide the framework for an integrated response by the UN system. In 

some special cases, WFP will adopt a multi-country or regional approach, particularly for 

the provision of humanitarian assistance. 

m. No single agency has either the resources or the capacity to deal with all the 

problems of hunger and underdevelopment. Hence, the importance WFP attaches to 

collaboration with other agencies, particularly with its parent bodies, the UN, and FAO. 

WFP will continue to work closely with the UNOCHA, UNHCR, other relevant agencies, 

and NGOs in the response to emergencies and humanitarian crises. WFP will also 

collaborate closely with the Rome-based UN food and agriculture agencies, FAO and 

International Fund for Agricultural Development, especially in using food aid for 

achieving household food security. WFP will continue to forge effective partnerships of 

action with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, regional bodies and 

institutions, bilateral donors, and NGOs in support of economic and social development. 

n. WFP will play its part as an active member of the UN system to bring the issue of 

hunger to the centre of the international agenda. In its dialogue with recipient 

governments and the aid community, WFP will advocate policies, strategies, and 

operations that directly benefit the poor and hungry. 

3. Organizational Structure

WFP is headquartered in Rome, Italy. At WFP HQ, the Operations Department has 

six regional bureaus coordinated by three divisions for development, emergencies, and 

transport and logistics. Operational responsibilities for emergency operations are 

integrated into the regional bureaus, which receive technical support from the Emergency 

Division. The Transport and Logistics Division has line responsibility for transport, 

logistics, and insurance operations. Country offices fall under the six regional bureaus. 

WFP is governed by the WFP Executive Board, which consists of 36 member states. The 

organization has an Executive Director, who is appointed jointly by the UN SYG and the 

Director-General of FAO. 

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. As the UN frontline agency in the fight against hunger, WFP is continually 

responding to emergencies. It saves lives by getting food to the hungry fast. In an 

emergency, the hungry look to WFP for an immediate response. After the local 

government has requested WFP help, this is what happens: 

(1) First, emergency assessment teams are sent in to ask how much food 

assistance is needed for how many beneficiaries and for how long. They must also work 
Annex G to Appendix B

B-G-4 JP 3-08 

out how food can best be delivered to the hungry. Equipped with the answers, WFP 

draws up an Emergency Operation, including a plan of action and a budget. This lists 

who will receive food assistance, what rations are required, the type of transport WFP 

will use, and which humanitarian corridors lead to the crisis zone. 

(2) Next, WFP launches an appeal to the international community for funds and 

food aid. The agency relies entirely on voluntary contributions to finance its operations, 

with donations made in cash, food, or services. Governments are the biggest single 

source of funding. As funds and food start to flow, WFP’s logistics team works to bridge 

the gap between the donors and the hungry. 

(3) Ships carry the largest WFP cargo, their holds filled with tons of grain, cans 

of cooking oil, and tinned food; every day, the agency has 30 ships on the high seas, 

frequently rerouting vessels to get food fast to crisis zones. In extreme environments, 

WFP also uses the skies to reach the hungry, airlifting, or airdropping food directly into 

disaster zones. 

(4) Before the aid can reach its country of destination, logistics experts often 

need to upgrade ports and secure warehouses. Trucks usually make the final link in 

WFP’s food chain—transporting food aid along the rough roads that lead to the hungry. 

Where roads are impassable or simply nonexistent, WFP relies on less conventional 

forms of transport: donkeys in the Andes, speedboats in the Mozambique floods, camels 

in Sudan, and elephants in Nepal. 

(5) When the food reaches designated distribution sites—refugee camps, 

therapeutic feeding centers, and other emergency shelters—WFP teams up with 

governments and NGOs to deliver food into the hands and mouths of the hungry. WFP 

works with about 3,000 international and local NGOs to distribute food aid. At this 

stage, local community leaders work closely with WFP to ensure rations reach the people 

who need it most: women, pregnant mothers, children, and the elderly.

b. WFP also works to help the hungry gain food security for the future. WFP does 

this through programs that use food as a means to build assets, spread knowledge, and 

nurture stronger, more dynamic communities. Before intervening in a country, the first 

priority for WFP is to analyze the food security situation of the population. WFP’s food 

security analysis work is commonly known as vulnerability analysis and mapping and is 

carried out by 120 analysts around the world. Be it an emergency or otherwise, WFP 

needs to answer some critical questions. Who is hungry or vulnerable? How many of 

them are there? Where do they live? Why are they hungry? Only when they have these 

answers can WFP experts decide on the scale of intervention, the type of intervention, 

and the most appropriate responses required to save people’s lives and livelihoods. 

c. To achieve its objectives, WFP has developed expertise in a range of areas 

including food security analysis, nutrition, food procurement, and logistics. The WFP 

works in the following areas: 

(1) Have precise information on where the hungry are and how many there are.
United Nations World Food Programme

B-G-5 

(2) Ensure the right sort of food and nutrition is provided for each situation. 

(3) Buy the right sort of food as near as possible to where it is needed.

(4) Organize food transport to the most inaccessible places on earth. 

d. Thanks to its expertise in all these areas, WFP reaches an average of 100 million 

people a year with food assistance. WFP currently has operations in 77 countries. WFP 

has four major types of operations: 

(1) Emergency operations provide immediate assistance. 

(2) Relief and rehabilitation operations rebuild after an emergency. 

(3) Development operations improve food security for communities. 

(4) Special operations create the specific infrastructure needed for emergency 

operations. 

e. In places where hunger strikes most often, communication is essential to saving 

lives. Local communications are at best primitive or at worst unpredictable. Only when 

communication systems are in place can WFP’s aid workers effectively manage the 

movement, delivery, and monitoring of critical food assistance while ensuring their own 

safety at the same time. WFP information and communication technology allows staff to 

communicate with field offices and HQ wherever they are—be it the jungles of 

Cambodia, the Angolan bush, or the deserts of Yemen. WFP information and

communication technology rapid response teams can be dispatched to emergencies with 

the equipment necessary to get communications up and running within 48 hours. In 

between crises, the crews travel to WFP’s operations, providing the necessary technical 

support and continuous upgrading of the information and communication technology 

network. 

f. WFP transports more food than any other international organization. In 2007 

alone, it distributed 3.3 million metric tons of food by sea, air, river, road, and rail. 

Moving food assistance, a bulk commodity, thousands of miles at a moment’s notice, 

often into some of the world’s most inhospitable places, is a skill, which WFP has turned 

into a fine art. Ocean transport forms the backbone of WFP’s transportation system, with 

some 90 percent of its food moved by ship. But as complex as shipping arrangements 

can be, that’s just the easy part. The hard bit lies in getting the food from the ships to the 

people who need it. To achieve this, WFP’s transport officers stretch a logistical lifeline 

across deserts, mountains, and rivers deep into the heart of the world’s poorest countries. 

If there are no roads or bridges, WFP builds them. Where there is no landing space for 

aircraft, it arranges an airdrop. WFP even rehabilitates entire ports and railways. Once 

the supply line is secure, WFP brings in its emergency food supplies via wing, wheel, and 

wagon. It uses whatever means are available: ships, barges, dug-out canoes; trucks and 

trains; planes, helicopters and air drops; even the backs of donkeys, yaks, and elephants. 
Annex G to Appendix B

B-G-6 JP 3-08 

5. Interagency Relationships

a. WFP cooperates with other UN agencies, NGOs, and regional and international 

organizations. WFP also works with the international financial institutions (especially 

the World Bank) and bilateral agencies.

b. WFP collaborates with about 3,000 NGOs in emergencies to get food through to 

the needy. NGOs are often contracted to transport and distribute food. Special measures 

have been emphasized to form stronger partnerships with NGOs. These include more 

formal arrangements in countries where collaboration with NGOs has taken place on an 

ad hoc basis. The grassroots and technical knowledge of these NGOs is invaluable when 

it comes to assessing how to deliver food to the right people. Among other things, these 

arrangements cover monitoring, reporting, and financial accountability in the 

implementation of actual food distribution, while also maintaining some flexibility to 

allow freedom of action of partners. For example, WFP has signed country-specific 

agreements with the Mozambican Red Cross, Cooperative for Assistance and Relief 

Everywhere, World Vision, Oxfam, and Save the Children Federation. 

c. Particularly close interagency coordination has been established with the 

UNOCHA and with the UNHCR in responding to emergency situations. WFP actively 

participates in UNOCHA-led meetings, particularly the IASC and the IASC Working 

Group. WFP also strongly supports UNOCHA through the temporary assignment of 

senior emergency management staff to UNOCHA’s New York and Geneva offices, 

participation in UNOCHA’s Consolidated Appeals Process and in UNOCHA-led 

interagency assessment missions, and the use of UNOCHA’s CERF. 

d. WFP and UNHCR have working arrangements, which make the former

responsible for the mobilization of all basic food commodities and the funds for meeting 

transport costs for all UNHCR-managed refugee relief operations. 

e. The program’s involvement in conflict zones results in greater interaction with 

UN peacekeeping forces around the world. Such interaction is instrumental in ensuring 

the demining of access routes, a key requirement for the delivery of large amounts of 

relief supplies. Peacekeeping forces also assist in the delivery of relief aid in 

humanitarian convoys across military lines.

f. The WFP is the UN logistics cluster lead (http://www.logcluster.org).
B-H-1 

ANNEX H TO APPENDIX B

UNITED NATIONS WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

1. Overview

WHO (http://www.who.int/en) is the directing and coordinating authority for health 

within the UN system. It is responsible for providing leadership on global health matters, 

shaping the health research agenda, setting norms and standards, articulating evidencebased policy options, providing technical support to countries, and monitoring and 

assessing health trends. In the 21st century, health is a shared responsibility, involving

equitable access to essential care and collective defense against transnational threats.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. WHO’s objective, as set out in its Constitution, is the attainment by all peoples of 

the highest possible level of health. The Constitution defines health as a state of 

complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or 

infirmity.

b. WHO fulfils its objectives through its core functions: 

(1) Providing leadership on matters critical to health and engaging in 

partnerships where joint action is needed. 

(2) Shaping the research agenda and stimulating the generation, translation, and 

dissemination of valuable knowledge. 

(3) Setting norms and standards and promoting and monitoring their 

implementation. 

(4) Articulating ethical and evidence-based policy options. 

(5) Providing technical support, catalyzing change, and building sustainable 

institutional capacity. 

(6) Monitoring the health situation and assessing health trends. 

3. Organizational Structure

a. WHO is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. It performs its functions through 

three principal bodies: the World Health Assembly, the Executive Board, and the 

Secretariat. The WHO Liaison Office to the UN is located in New York City. 

b. WHO operates in six regions, each consisting of a regional committee and a 

regional office headed by a regional director. The regional offices are responsible for 

formulating regional policies and for monitoring regional activities. In 147 countries 

there is a resident WHO representative, who is responsible for WHO’s activities in the 
Annex H to Appendix B

B-H-2 JP 3-08 RFC 

country and who supports the government in the planning and management of national 

health programs.

c. The six regional offices are:

(1) Africa (Regional Office for Africa; Brazzaville, Congo). 

(2) Americas (Regional Office for the Americas/Pan American Health 

Organization; Washington, DC). 

(3) South-East Asia (Regional Office for South-East Asia; New Delhi, India).

(4) Europe (Regional Office for Europe; Copenhagen, Denmark).

(5) Eastern Mediterranean (Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean; Nasr 

City, Cairo, Egypt).

(6) Western Pacific (Regional Office for the Western Pacific; Manila, 

Philippines). 

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. WHO operates in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing landscape. The 

boundaries of public health action have become blurred, extending into other sectors that 

influence health opportunities and outcomes. WHO responds to these challenges using a 

six-point agenda. The six points address two health objectives, two strategic needs, and 

two operational approaches. The overall performance of WHO will be measured by the 

impact of its work on women’s health and health in Africa. 

b. Promoting Development. During the past decade, health has achieved 

unprecedented prominence as a key driver of socioeconomic progress, and more 

resources than ever are being invested in health. Yet poverty continues to contribute to 

poor health, and poor health anchors large populations in poverty. Health development is 

directed by the ethical principle of equity: Access to life-saving or health-promoting 

interventions should not be denied for unfair reasons, including those with economic or 

social roots. Commitment to this principle ensures that WHO activities aimed at health 

development give priority to health outcomes in poor, disadvantaged, or vulnerable 

groups. Attainment of the health-related Millennium Development Goals, preventing and 

treating chronic diseases and addressing the neglected tropical diseases is the cornerstone 

of the health and development agenda. 

c. Fostering Health Security. Shared vulnerability to health security threats 

demands collective action. One of the greatest threats to international health security 

arises from outbreaks of emerging and epidemic-prone diseases. Such outbreaks are 

occurring in increasing numbers, fuelled by such factors as rapid urbanization, 

environmental mismanagement, the way food is produced and traded, and the way 

antibiotics are used and misused. The world’s ability to defend itself collectively against 
United Nations World Health Organization

B-H-3 

outbreaks has been strengthened since June 2007, when the revised International Health 

Regulations came into force. 

d. Strengthening Health Systems. For health improvement to operate as a povertyreduction strategy, health services must reach poor and underserved populations. Health 

systems in many parts of the world are unable to do so, making the strengthening of 

health systems a high priority for WHO. Areas being addressed include the provision of 

adequate numbers of appropriately trained staff, sufficient financing, suitable systems for 

collecting vital statistics, and access to appropriate technology including essential drugs. 

e. Harnessing Research, Information, and Evidence. Evidence provides the 

foundation for setting priorities, defining strategies, and measuring results. WHO 

generates authoritative health information, in consultation with leading experts, to set 

norms and standards, articulate evidence-based policy options, and monitor the evolving 

global heath situation. 

f. Enhancing Partnerships. WHO carries out its work with the support and 

collaboration of many partners, including UN agencies, other international organizations, 

donors, civil society, and the private sector. WHO uses the strategic power of evidence 

to encourage partners implementing programs within countries to align their activities 

with the best technical guidelines and practices, as well as with the priorities established 

by countries. 

g. Improving Performance. WHO participates in ongoing reforms aimed at 

improving its efficiency and effectiveness, both at the international level and within 

countries. WHO aims to ensure that its strongest asset—its staff—works in an 

environment that is motivating and rewarding. WHO plans its budget and activities 

through results-based management, with clear expected results to measure performance at 

country, regional, and international levels. 

5. Multilateral Relationships

a. As a cooperative organization, WHO is the collective expression of the health 

aspirations and actions of the UN membership. Besides providing technical cooperation 

for individual UN member states, WHO facilitates technical cooperation between 

countries, both developed and developing. For example, WHO’s Global Programme on 

AIDS works with more than 150 countries to provide financial and technical support. 

WHO’s Action Programme on Essential Drugs collaborates with all countries to ensure 

the regular supply of drugs at the lowest possible cost and the rational use of a select 

number of safe and effective drugs and vaccines of acceptable quality.

b. Since WHO has a constitutional requirement to “establish and maintain effective 

collaboration with the UN,” it coordinates its international activities with the UN system 

in the field of health and socio-economic development, working closely with other UN 

organizations, including: 

(1) UNICEF. 
Annex H to Appendix B

B-H-4 JP 3-08 RFC 

(2) UN Environment Program. 

(3) IAEA.

(4) International Labor Organization. 

(5) International Programme on Chemical Safety.

(6) FAO of the UN and the Joint FAO/WHO Meeting on Pesticide Residues. 

(7) The Joint WHO/FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission that ensures the 

safety of food moving in trade and provides guidelines for national food control. 

c. WHO maintains close working relationships with NGOs. Some 160 NGOs have 

official relations with WHO. In addition, more than 1,000 leading health-related 

institutions around the world are officially designated as WHO collaborating centers. 
B-I-1 

ANNEX I TO APPENDIX B

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

1. Overview

The UNDP (http://www.undp.org) is the UN’s global development network, an 

organization advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience,

and resources to help people build a better life. UNDP is on the ground in 166 countries, 

working with them on their own solutions to global and national development challenges. 

As they develop local capacity, they draw on the people of UNDP and a wide range of 

partners.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

The UNDP is an executive board within the UN General Assembly. The UNDP 

Administrator is the third highest ranking member of the UN after the SYG and Deputy 

Secretary General. 

3. Organizational Structure

In each country office, the UNDP resident representative normally also serves as the 

RC of development activities for the UN system as a whole. Through such coordination, 

UNDP seeks to ensure the most effective use of UN and international aid resources. 

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. Capacity development—the “how” of development—is the overarching 

contribution of UNDP. Within the framework of national ownership, UNDP efforts 

support program countries in developing national and local capacities for human 

development and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, characterized by 

effective aid management and South-South solutions. Capacity development cuts across

all of the UNDP focus areas.

b. Poverty Reduction and Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. 

While economic growth is essential to human progress, it is not the only important factor 

in achieving the goals. UNDP supports countries in formulating, implementing, and

monitoring national development strategies centered on inclusive growth and gender 

equality to ensure equitable, broad-based human development. UNDP works closely 

with the UN Conference on Trade and Development and other organizations to ensure 

that the globalization process—international trade, investment regime, and development 

finance—is inclusive and supportive of goal achievement. Reaching the target of halting 

and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS by 2015 is also critical to achieving the other 

goals, particularly targets related to poverty, education, gender equality, and child and 

maternal mortality. As a founding co-sponsor of the Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS, 

UNDP is responding to the multi-sectoral challenges of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and 

contributing to comprehensive UN system action, addressing dimensions of HIV/AIDS
Annex I to Appendix B

B-I-2 JP 3-08 

relating to development, governance, mainstreaming, legislation, human rights, and 

gender.

c. Democratic Governance. More countries than ever before are working to build 

democratic governance. Their challenge is to develop institutions and processes that are

more responsive to the needs of ordinary citizens, including the poor, and that promote 

development. UNDP helps countries strengthen electoral and legislative systems, 

improve access to justice and public administration, and develop a greater capacity to 

deliver basic services to those most in need. Through its programs, UNDP brings people 

together within nations and around the world, fostering partnerships and sharing ways to 

promote participation, accountability, and effectiveness at all levels.

d. Crisis Prevention and Recovery. Many countries are increasingly vulnerable to 

violent conflicts or natural disasters that can erase decades of development and further 

entrench poverty and inequality. Through its global network, UNDP seeks out and shares 

innovative approaches to crisis prevention, early warning, and conflict resolution. 

Because UNDP is on the ground in almost every developing country it can help bridge 

the gap between emergency relief and long-term development when a crisis occurs. 

e. Environment and Sustainable Development. The poor are disproportionately 

affected by environmental degradation and lack of access to clean, affordable energy

services. UNDP’s goal in this area is to strengthen national capacity to manage the 

environment in a sustainable manner while ensuring adequate protection of the poor. 

Energy and environmental issues are also global, as climate change, loss of biodiversity 

and ozone layer depletion cannot be addressed by countries acting alone. UNDP, through 

programs such as the Equator Initiative, and the Global Environment Facility—a 

partnership with the UN Environment Program and the World Bank—helps countries 

strengthen their capacity to address these challenges at the global, national, and 

community levels, seeking out and sharing best practices, providing innovative policy 

advice, and linking partners through pilot projects.

f. In each of these areas, UNDP advocates for the protection of human rights and 

especially the empowerment of women. UNDP, through its global network, seeks out 

and share ways to promote gender equality as an essential dimension of ensuring political 

participation and accountability; economic empowerment and effective development 

planning; crisis prevention and conflict resolution; access to clean water, sanitation, and 

energy services; and society-wide mobilization against HIV/AIDS. 

5. Interagency Relationships

One of UNDP’s most important roles is to support participatory and accountable 

management of the RC system through enhanced UN system coordination, efficiency, 

and effectiveness, and the strategic integration of development efforts within the context 

of national development priorities. UNDP, together with its UN and other development 

partners, helps to support the most effective use of UN and international aid resources. 
B-J-1 

ANNEX J TO APPENDIX B

UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

1. Overview

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) 

(http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping) is dedicated to assisting the member states and the 

SYG in their efforts to maintain international peace and security. The department’s 

mission is to plan, prepare, manage, and direct UN peacekeeping operations so that they 

can effectively fulfill their mandates under the overall authority of the Security Council 

and General Assembly, and under the command vested in the SYG. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. UNDPKO provides political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping 

operations, and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial 

contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council 

mandates. The department works to integrate the efforts of UN, governmental and nongovernmental entities in the context of peacekeeping operations. UNDPKO also provides 

guidance and support on military, police, mine action, and other relevant issues to other 

UN political and peace building missions.

b. Each UN peacekeeping operation has a specific set of mandated tasks, but all 

share certain common aims—to alleviate human suffering and create conditions and build 

institutions for self-sustaining peace. The substantial presence of a UN peacekeeping 

operation on the ground contributes to this aim by introducing the UN as a third party 

with a direct impact on the political process. In exercise of its tasks, UNDPKO aims to 

minimize the many risks to which peacekeepers may be exposed in the field. 

c. UN peacekeeping operations may consist of several components, including a 

military component, which may or may not be armed, and various civilian components 

encompassing a broad range of disciplines. Depending on their mandate, UN 

peacekeeping missions may be required to: 

(1) Deploy to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of conflict across 

borders; 

(2) Stabilize conflict situations after a cease fire, to create an environment for 

the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement;

(3) Assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements; and

(4) Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government, based on 

democratic principles, good governance, and economic development. 

For more information, refer to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and 

Guidelines and JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.
Annex J to Appendix B

B-J-2 JP 3-08 

3. Chapter VI and Chapter VII Operations

a. UN collective security operations span a broad operational spectrum from 

unarmed peace observation to full-fledged combat enforcement missions. However, most 

UN missions fall between these extremes and have acquired the rather elastic label of 

peacekeeping. The term “peacekeeping” is not defined anywhere in the Charter. 

b. Chapter VI—“Peacekeeping.” Chapter VI of the Charter, titled “Pacific 

Settlement of Disputes,” gives the UN the power to mediate international disputes 

between states and recommend terms of a settlement. It sets out a series of procedures 

that may be used by the Council in seeking to secure the peaceful settlement of disputes. 

Under Article 34, it may investigate a dispute or situation to see whether it is likely to 

endanger international peace and security. The Security Council did this, for example, in 

sending commissions to the Balkans in order to investigate disturbances on the Greek 

border, and more recently to investigate tension in the Israeli-occupied territories (1979 

and 1980). Under Article 35, it may consider any dispute or situation brought to its 

attention by any member. Under Article 36, the Security Council may recommend 

appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment on any dispute likely to endanger the 

maintenance of international peace and security. Under Article 37, it may consider a 

dispute which it thinks likely to endanger international peace and security and determine 

whether to “recommend . . . terms of a settlement.” And it may, under Article 38, make 

such a recommendation at the request of all the parties to a dispute, but no such request 

has ever been made to the Council under Article 38. 

c. Chapter VII—“Peace Enforcement.” Chapter VII of the Charter, titled “Action 

with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” is 

more powerful, and Article 42 of this chapter gives the UN authority to use the armed 

forces of member states to maintain or restore international peace and security. It sets out 

the procedures that may be used when a dispute has become a threat to the peace, a 

breach of the peace, or an act of aggression (terms that are never clearly defined in the 

Charter). Under Article 39, the Security Council is to determine the existence of such a 

state of affairs and decide what recommendations to make. Under Article 40, it can 

decide to call for certain provisional measures by the parties without prejudice to their 

rights, claims, or position. A ceasefire or mutual withdrawal from a border might be a 

measure of this kind, and the Council used this Article in ordering a ceasefire in Palestine 

in July 1948. If this has no effect, the Council can decide to use sanctions of various 

kinds, including the interruption of economic relations or communications (Article 41). 

Finally, if these are inadequate, it can decide to take action by air, sea, or land forces as 

may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. However, 

because the multilateral agreements for the provision of such forces have never been 

concluded (Article 43), UN peace enforcement operations have always been hastily 

improvised, much like peacekeeping missions. Although no Security Council force has 

ever been established, Article 42 speaks only of air, sea, or land forces, and does not 

specify that they must be a preexisting or a “standing” UN force. The reason that Article 

43 has never been used is because of the political difficulties and dangers of making such 

a call on member states that hold widely varying opinions on the merits of every dispute,

and who are not usually willing to commit themselves to armed action in conflicts in 
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

B-J-3 

which they may have no overriding national interest. This long-recognized difficulty 

facing any collective security system has not yet been overcome by the words of the 

Charter binding members to obey Security Council decisions. The UN operation in 

Korea (1950-1953) was conducted under purposefully vague Security Council and 

General Assembly resolutions, generally without specific reference to UN Charter 

provisions. Even the campaign to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait as part of Operation 

DESERT STORM was not conducted “strictly” under the provisions of Article 42; 

however, the Security Council did cite Chapter VII as the authority to permit the use of 

coercive force in carrying out its resolutions.

4. Types of United Nations Peace Operations

a. UN PO as they are emerging today are different from those that took place during 

the Cold War. 

b. Some of these new operations have been of the traditional, largely military type, 

deployed to control unresolved conflicts between states. Their principal task was to help 

the parties stop fighting and to prevent any resumption of hostilities, thus helping to 

create conditions in which the peacemakers could negotiate a lasting settlement. But 

most of the new operations have been set up to help implement negotiated settlements of 

long-standing conflicts, as in Namibia, Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, and 

Mozambique. Except for Namibia, each of these operations has involved an internal

conflict, albeit with significant external dimensions, within a sovereign member state of 

the UN. Another aspect to these new operations is the eruption of savage conflicts in, 

and sometimes between, newly emerging independent states. The former Yugoslavia has 

become the UN’s largest peacekeeping commitment to date. Ethnic conflict across 

political borders and the killing of civilians there are similar to the ordeals that UN 

peacekeeping forces faced in the 1960s in the former Congo. 

c. Although peacekeeping operations still invariably include military personnel, 

since 1988 the emphasis has changed, and these operations now frequently contain 

substantial civilian elements that are playing a more important role. This is mainly 

because the UN is more often involved in internal conflicts than in inter-state ones. As 

was proven in the Congo, internal conflicts are risky and complicated affairs in which 

success is hard to achieve and more than military skills are required. Helping to end a 

civil war is likely to involve a third party in a whole range of civilian activities, which are 

less often required in the inter-state context. In either case, though, experience has shown 

that there is a greater role for civilian peacekeepers than had been apparent in earlier 

years.
Annex J to Appendix B

B-J-4 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
B-K-1 

ANNEX K TO APPENDIX B

EUROPEAN UNION

1. Overview

a. The EU is a regional IGO comprised of 27 European countries (i.e., Austria, 

Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 

Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 

Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 

Sweden, and the United Kingdom). Current candidate countries are Croatia, Iceland, 

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey. Albania, Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia are officially recognized as potential candidates. 

Kosovo is also listed as a potential candidate but the European Commission does not list 

it as an independent country because not all member states recognize it as an independent 

country separate from Serbia.

b. Originally established as an economic union following World War II, it 

developed into the European Economic Community or “common market” in 1957. In 

1993, the Maastricht Treaty formed the foundation for a political and economic union 

that has become the EU. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. Among the many facets of the EU is a Common Foreign and Security Policy 

which was established by the Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty gives the 

Common Foreign and Security Policy the aims of promoting both the EU’s own interests 

and those of the international community as a whole. This includes promoting 

international cooperation, respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. 

b. The Amsterdam Treaty created the office of the High Representative for the 

Common Foreign and Security Policy to coordinate the EU’s foreign policy. The High 

Representative, in conjunction with the current Presidency, which rotates between 

member states every six months, speaks on behalf of the EU in foreign policy matters. 

The Common Foreign and Security Policy requires unanimity among the now 27 member 

states on the appropriate policy to follow on any particular issue. The unanimity and 

difficult issues treated under the Common Foreign and Security Policy makes 

disagreements, such as those which occurred over the war in Iraq, not uncommon. 

c. Member states are responsible for their own territorial defense. Many EU 

members are also members of NATO although some member states follow policies of 

neutrality. The Western European Union is a European security organization related to 

the EU. Elements of the Western European Union are currently being merged into the 

Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the President of the Western European Union 

is currently the EU's foreign policy chief. 
Annex K to Appendix B

B-K-2 JP 3-08 

d. In order to enable the EU to fully assume its responsibilities for crisis 

management, the European Council (Nice, December 2000) decided to establish 

permanent political and military structures:

(1) The Political and Security Committee meets at the ambassadorial level as a 

preparatory body for the Council of the EU. Its main functions are keeping track of the 

international situation and helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and 

Security Policy, including the European Security and Defense policy

(http://ue.eu.int/showPage.aspx?id=261&lang=EN). It prepares a coherent EU response 

to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic direction.

(2) The EU Military Committee is the highest military body set up within the 

Council of the EU. It is composed of the chiefs of defense of the member states, who are 

regularly represented by their permanent military representatives. The EU Military 

Committee provides the Political and Security Committee with advice and 

recommendations on all military matters within the EU.

(3) In parallel with the EU Military Committee, the Political and Security 

Committee is advised by a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. This 

committee provides information, drafts recommendations, and gives its opinion to the 

Political and Security Committee on civilian aspects of crisis management.

(4) The EU Military Staff composed of military and civilian experts seconded 

to the Council Secretariat by the member states. 

(5) The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, which is part of the Council 

Secretariat, is the permanent structure responsible for an autonomous operational conduct 

of civilian European Security and Defense Policy operations. Under the political control 

and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee and the overall authority 

of the High Representative, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability ensures the 

effective planning and conduct of civilian European Security and Defense Policy crisis 

management operations, as well as the proper implementation of all mission-related 

tasks.

e. Following the Kosovo War in 1999, the European Council agreed that “the Union 

must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the 

means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to 

international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.” To that end, a number of 

efforts were made to increase the EU’s military capability. The most concrete result was 

the EU Battlegroups initiative, each of which is planned to be able to deploy quickly 

about 1,500 men. EU forces have been deployed on peacekeeping missions from Africa 

to the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East. EU military operations are supported by a 

number of bodies, including the European Defense Agency, satellite center and the 

military staff.
European Union

B-K-3 

f. Members of the EU are increasingly involved in peacekeeping (Kosovo) and are 

playing an important role in the full range of development activities. In post-conflict or 

peacekeeping missions, the EU activities may be coordinated by an EU Special 

representative, whose office would include the various EU elements contributing to the 

mission. The various offices of the EU Special representative would be the primary 

participants in any intergovernmental coordination efforts. 

For more information, refer to Europa Online (http://europa.eu/index_en.htm). 
Annex K to Appendix B

B-K-4 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank 
B-L-1 

ANNEX L TO APPENDIX B

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

1. Overview

The OAS (http://www.oas.org/en/default.asp) brings together nations of the Western 

Hemisphere to strengthen cooperation on democratic values, defend common interests, 

and debate the major issues facing the region and the world. The OAS is the region’s 

principal multilateral forum for strengthening democracy, promoting human rights, and 

confronting shared problems such as poverty, terrorism, illegal drugs, and corruption. It 

plays a leading role in carrying out mandates established by the hemisphere’s leaders 

through the Summits of the Americas. All 35 independent countries of the Americas 

have ratified the OAS Charter and belong to OAS (i.e., Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; 

Barbados; Belize; Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; Bolivia; Brazil; Canada; Chile; 

Colombia; Commonwealth of the Bahamas; Costa Rica; Cuba; Dominica; Dominican 

Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Grenada; Guatemala; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; 

Jamaica; Mexico; Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and 

the Grenadines; St. Kitts & Nevis; Suriname; Trinidad and Tobago; United States of 

America; and Uruguay).

2. Authority and Responsibilities

The member countries set major policies and goals through the General Assembly, 

which gathers the hemisphere’s ministers of foreign affairs once a year in regular session. 

Ongoing actions are guided by the Permanent Council, made up of ambassadors 

appointed by the member states.

3. Organizational Structure

The OAS General Secretariat carries out the programs and policies set by the 

political bodies. Four specialized secretariats coordinate OAS efforts in several broad 

areas:

a. Secretariat for Multidimensional Security. Coordinates OAS actions against 

terrorism, illegal drugs, and other threats to public security.

b. Secretariat for Political Affairs. Directs efforts to promote democracy, 

strengthen democratic governance, and prevent democratic crises.

c. Executive Secretariat for Integral Development. Includes departments that 

promote social development, sustainable development, trade and tourism, and education, 

culture, science, and technology. Also handles follow-up actions from the region’s 

ministerial meetings.

d. Secretariat for Administration and Finance. Provides support services to the 

General Secretariat, in areas that include human resources, information and technology, 

and budgetary affairs. 
Annex L to Appendix B

B-L-2 JP 3-08 

e. Department of International Legal Affairs. Promotes legal cooperation among 

the member states by helping to develop and implement international treaties.

4. Inter-American Defense Board

a. The Inter-American Defense Board is an international committee of nationally 

appointed defense officials who develop collaborative approaches on common defense 

and security issues facing the Americas. 

b. The organization is an international forum consisting of civilian and military 

representatives appointed by the member states, that provides technical, consultative, and 

educational advisory services in military and hemispheric defense related matters 

consistent with the mandates of the OAS General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation 

of Ministers of Foreign Relations, and the OAS Permanent Council in their respective 

areas of jurisdiction.

c. The Inter-American Defense Board comprises the following entities: the Council 

of Delegates; the Secretariat, and the Inter-American Defense College. 

d. Current programs include humanitarian demining in Central America, reporting 

on confidence and security building measures, and developing educational programs on 

regional security. 
C-1 

APPENDIX C

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

 Annex A International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 

 B International Committee of the Red Cross 

 C International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 

 D American Red Cross

1. Overview

a. An NGO is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to 

alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic 

development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or 

encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. It may be 

local, national, or transnational; employ thousands of individuals or just a handful; and 

utilize a large management structure or no formal structure at all. Although listed in this

appendix, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is neither an IGO, nor 

NGO, but an organization with a hybrid nature. 

b. DOD uses the term NGO along with USG agencies and IGOs; however there is 

no consistent definition within the USG and among IGOs. As a point of reference, 

USAID uses the terms private voluntary organization and public international 

organizations along with NGOs. 

c. There are thousands of NGOs. The JFC, through his legal counsel, must verify 

that US persons are not prohibited from dealing with a particular organization by virtue 

of its inclusion on the list of individuals and entities subject to the various economic 

sanctions programs administered by the TREAS Office of Foreign Assets Control. A list 

is located at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement. 

2. Sources of Information 

a. JFCs should be aware of all NGOs within their operational area. NGOs operate 

both domestically inside the United States and in most foreign countries. Overseas, the 

country team should already have good situational awareness of all NGOs that are 

present. Country desk officers on JS, GCCs, and IC agencies can also be a good source 

of information. The USAID mission, if present, will have developed relationships with 

NGOs. The office of the UN mission/UN RC/UNDP Resident Representative will have 

good visibility of NGOs working in that country. 

b. InterAction (http://www.interaction.org) is the largest coalition of US based 

international NGOs focused on the world’s poor and most vulnerable people. 

Collectively, InterAction’s over 180 members work in every developing country. 

Members assist in expanding opportunities and supporting gender equality in education, 

health care, agriculture, small business, and other areas. 
Appendix C

C-2 JP 3-08 

c. The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (http://www.icva.ch) is a 

global network that brings together humanitarian and human rights NGOs as an advocacy 

alliance for humanitarian action. ICVA is a nonprofit global association of NGOs that 

works as a collective body, to promote, and advocate for, human rights and a 

humanitarian perspective in global debates and responses. The heart of the ICVA 

mission is to support NGOs to protect and assist people in need, to address the causes of 

their plight, and to act as a channel for translating patterns and trends into advocacy. 

Focusing on humanitarian and refugee policy issues, ICVA draws upon the work of its 

members at the field level and brings their experiences to international decision-making 

forums. ICVA provides a means for the collective body of its members to work together 

to effect change, and also assists members to improve their own work through access to 

initiatives and tools that help to increase quality and accountability. Through its 

cooperative and catalytic nature, it gathers and exchanges information and raises 

awareness on the most vital matters of humanitarian concern before policy-making 

bodies. 

d. The Union of International Associations (http://www.uia.be) is a research 

institute and documentation center, based in Brussels. Nonprofit, apolitical, independent, 

and nongovernmental in nature, the union has been a pioneer in the research, monitoring, 

and provision of information on international organizations, international associations, 

and their global challenges. Its Yearbook of International Organizations provides the 

most extensive coverage of nonprofit international organizations available today. 

Directly reflecting a dynamic international arena, it contains entries on 60,000 civil 

society organizations in 300 countries and territories, in every field of human endeavor. 

e. The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response

(http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-about-schr) is an 

alliance for voluntary action of eight major international humanitarian organizations and 

networks. The committee’s mission is to bring together the major international 

humanitarian networks with common values to make this vision reality. Its members 

pool experience and use their collective weight to carry out effective humanitarian action.

f. The World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (WANGO) 

(http://www.wango.org) is a global organization whose mission is to serve its member 

organizations, strengthen and encourage the nongovernmental sector as a whole, increase 

public understanding of the nongovernmental community, and provide the mechanism 

and support needed for NGOs to connect, partner, and multiply their contributions to 

solve humanity’s basic problems. WANGO unites NGOs worldwide in the cause of 

advancing peace and global well being. WANGO helps to provide the mechanism and 

support needed for NGOs to connect, partner, share, inspire, and multiply their 

contributions to solve humanity’s basic problems. WANGO publishes the NGO 

Handbook (http://www.ngohandbook.org) which is designed to provide leaders of NGOs 

an ever-expanding resource. Emphasis in particular is placed on practical information of 

relevance for the success of NGOs. 

g. The Alliance for Peacebuilding (http://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org) is a 

coalition of diverse organizations working together to build sustainable peace and 
Nongovernmental Organizations 

C-3 

security worldwide. Its members are directly engaged in applied conflict prevention and 

resolution. They provide negotiation and mediation services, train negotiators, facilitate 

communication to break down barriers, and help find solutions to the issues and pressures 

that otherwise drive groups and nations to achieve their objectives through violent force. 

Members also conduct research and provide evaluation and education. The role of the 

alliance is to bring these organizations together for collaborative peacebuilding. 

h. National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (http://www.nvoad.org)

members form a coalition of nonprofit organizations that respond to disasters as part of 

their overall mission. Together they foster more effective service through the four C’s—

communication, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration—by providing convening 

mechanisms and outreach for all people and organizations involved in disasters. It is an 

organization acknowledged as the leader in the Nation when it comes to integrating the 

efforts of nonprofit voluntary agencies for the purpose of enhancing their services to 

disaster survivors. This is accomplished through the national members as well as local 

and state affiliates. The mission is realized through the creation of trust, knowledge, 

shared information, standards, plans, and forums. Its vision has been one that seeks to 

maximize the effectiveness of the voluntary agencies as they work together toward their 

common goal of bringing help to disaster impacted communities across the country. 

3. Building Unity of Effort 

The following factors may assist in building unity of effort among NGOs and JFCs. 

a. Increase awareness and encourage contact between the military and NGOs 

through symposia, meetings, briefings, and joint planning sessions. 

b. Incorporate selected NGO training into Service and joint training and exercise 

programs; and conversely, incorporate interaction with military units and personnel into 

NGO training. 

c. Review lessons learned as recorded in both the joint and Services’ lessons 

learned databases. 

d. Clearly articulate the role of the military to the NGOs. It is imperative that 

these organizations understand the military mission, the level of support it can provide, 

and the process to receive support. Explain what NGOs may be able to receive from 

DOD forces (e.g., medical care, FP, transportation). Explain who determines what 

priority NGO personnel and equipment will be moved. NGOs desire transparency; which 

implies openness, communication, and accountability; when dealing with the military. 

Assets such as the crisis action team, HOC, HACC, CMOC, and LNOs can be used to 

provide such information. 

e. Ensure the joint force understands their support role. While UN and NGO 

guidelines provide that requesting assistance from the military is a last resort, some 

NGOs may assume the military has an inexhaustible resource reservoir and inundate 

the JFC with requests for various types of support. Members of the joint force must have 

a clear understanding of the nature and amount of support they will be authorized to 
Appendix C

C-4 JP 3-08 

provide. Normally, requests from NGOs should come to DOD through the DOS at the 

EXECSEC level. When the JFC has been delegated authority to fill certain types of 

requests from these organizations, the granting of that authority, and guidance on its use, 

should be included in the execute order (or a modification thereto). Keep in mind that 

equivocal responses, such as “we’ll try,” can be interpreted as an affirmative 

response, and establish unrealistic expectations. Failure to meet expectations (real or 

not) can adversely affect relationships in both current and future operations. 

f. Be aware that not all NGOs appreciate military assistance or intervention. 

Some NGO charters do not allow them to collaborate with armed forces based on 

political mandate, neutrality, religious, or impartiality concerns. JFCs need to honor this 

fact, while still striving for unity of effort.

(1) Most NGOs follow humanitarian principles when giving aid; all aid is based 

on need alone. Military aid does not follow the principles of humanitarian aid 

(impartiality, independence, humanitarianism, and neutrality), is politically motivated, 

and conditional. Therefore, NGOs do not see military aid—even aid in the form of 

humanitarian assistance—as “humanitarian aid.”

(2) The USG and NGOs may not share common objectives. 

(3) CDRs may find it beneficial to use a third party to establish liaison with 

NGOs reluctant to establish direct contact with military organizations. USAID is critical 

to this effort.

g. Be cognizant of legal requirements and regulations that apply to relationships

between the military and NGOs.

h. Ensure that agreements and MOUs fully address funding considerations, 

delineate authority, and define negotiation channels. Agreements may include air and 

surface transportation, petroleum products, telecommunications, labor, security, facilities, 

contracting, engineer support, supplies, services, and medical support. 

i. Exchange NGO and military unit operating procedures and capabilities.

j. Exercise due diligence in dealing with NGOs that do not adhere to accepted 

professional standards. Most NGOs follow the UN Principles of Humanitarian 

Assistance and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 

Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. Disaster-affected communities have a right to 

expect those who seek to assist them to measure up to these standards. In maintaining 

these standards, it is important that CMOC officers are not perceived as favoring a 

particular relief organization, particularly at the expense of other organizations. 

k. Seek the assistance of an individual from the NGO community to serve on the US 

force staff as an LNO to the NGO community. Such an LNO can perform duties such as 

initial collaboration activities with the humanitarian relief community prior to 

deployment, representation of the humanitarian relief perspective during planning, and 
Nongovernmental Organizations

C-5 

advice to the joint force through membership in the CMOC or other coordinating 

mechanisms during operations. 

l. Post information on the UN’s ReliefWeb Internet site. ReliefWeb is a global hub 

for time-critical humanitarian information on complex emergencies and natural disasters. 

ReliefWeb is widely used by NGOs and other participants in humanitarian assistance

operations to share and coordinate information. The humanitarian information center

(HIC), if established, is also a site for information, as are the NGO websites themselves, 

and bulletin boards at the OSOCC or HOCC location. 

m. Share information with NGOs to the greatest extent possible, especially 

regarding the security environment. Using information and communications technology 

will allow NGOs to plan their response with up to date and accurate information and to 

integrate into the overall response more efficiently.

n. When working with NGOs in an uncertain or hostile operational environment, 

guidelines found in the United States Institute of Peace Guidelines for Relations Between 

US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or 

Potentially Hostile Environments, will help mitigate friction between military and NGO 

personnel. 

See Appendix J, “Example Guidelines for Relations Between the Armed Forces of the 

United States and Other Organizations,” for more information. 

o. Identify and collaborate with the first responders to a disaster. While the US 

military may be the largest single organization on the ground in a disaster area, it is 

critical to understand that the US military will not be the first one on the ground. The 

NGOs that normally operate in the disaster region or those that can respond quickly to a 

disaster will be present prior to the US military arrival on the ground. 

4. Consultative Status with the United Nations

a. NGOs take a role in formal UN deliberations through the ECOSOC

(http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo). Nearly 3,200 NGOs today have consultative 

status. The consultative relationship includes: eligibility requirements for consultative 

status; rights and obligations of NGOs in consultative status; procedures for the 

withdrawal or suspension of consultative status; the role and functions of the ECOSOC 

Committee on NGOs; and the responsibilities of the UN Secretariat in supporting the 

consultative relationship. ECOSOC grants consultative status upon recommendation of 

the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs, which is comprised of 19 member states. 

b. Consultative relationships may be established with international, regional, sub 

regional and national nongovernmental, nonprofit public, or voluntary organizations. 

NGOs affiliated to an international organization already in status may be admitted 

provided that they can demonstrate that their program of work is of direct relevance to 

the aims and purposes of the UN. 
Appendix C

C-6 JP 3-08 

c. To be eligible for consultative status, an NGO must have been in existence 

(officially registered with the appropriate government authorities as an NGO/nonprofit) 

for at least two years, must have an established HQ, a democratically adopted 

constitution, authority to speak for its members, a representative structure, appropriate 

mechanisms of accountability, and democratic and transparent decision-making 

processes. The basic resources of the organization must be derived in the main part from 

contributions of the national affiliates or other components or from individual members. 

5. Faith-Based Nongovernmental Organizations

The USG supports faith-based organizations, but USG policy strictly states that USG 

assistance must be distributed based on need, not based on religious affiliation or for the 

purpose of influencing the religious beliefs of a population. Reports of USG assistance 

being distributed in violation of this policy should be reported to the embassy, DOS, 

and/or USAID. 

6. Terrorist and Insurgent Abuse of Charities

a. Protecting charities from terrorist abuse is a critical component of the global fight 

against terrorism. Charities provide essential services, comfort, and hope to those in need 

around the world. Unfortunately, terrorists have exploited the charitable sector to raise 

and move funds, provide logistical support, encourage terrorist recruitment, or otherwise 

support terrorist organizations and operations. This abuse threatens to undermine donor 

confidence and jeopardizes the integrity of the charitable sector, whose services are 

indispensable to the world community. The government and the charitable sector share 

fundamental interests in promoting and protecting charitable giving. Through active 

engagement, the government and private sector can identify terrorist financing risks, 

clarify obligations and best practices, facilitate compliance with US law, and help 

promote charitable giving while reducing the threats of terrorist abuse. Since the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001, the USG has conducted a comprehensive campaign 

against terrorists and their support networks, including the sources and conduits of 

terrorist financing. Investigations carried out during this campaign have revealed 

consistent terrorist abuse of the charitable sector through the diversion of charitable funds 

and services to terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and Hamas. The United States 

has designated several charities worldwide as supporting terrorist activity. A list of these 

charities can be found at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement. In addition, the 

United States has designated several organizations that have operated under various 

names that appear as potential fundraising front organizations for terrorist activity. 

b. Terrorist and insurgent abuse of the charitable sector can take many forms, 

including: 

(1) Establishing front organizations or using charities to raise funds in support 

of terrorist organizations. 

(2) Establishing or using charities to transfer funds, other resources, and 

operatives across geographical boundaries. 
Nongovernmental Organizations

C-7 

(3) Defrauding charities through branch offices or aid workers to divert funds to 

support terrorist organizations. 

(4) Leveraging charitable funds, resources, and services to recruit members and 

foster support for terrorist organizations and their ideology. 

c. A small number of NGOs have been co-opted in funding and facilitating the 

travel of terrorist elements. While this is not the norm, it is an issue that merits 

consideration in the interagency, IGO, and NGO operations environment. 
Appendix C

C-8 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
C-A-1 

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX C

INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT

1. Overview

a. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (http://www.redcross.int) 

is a term covering two international institutions with HQ in Geneva and national societies in 

186 countries. The two institutions are the ICRC and the International Federation of Red 

Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). The National Societies comprise most of the 

more than 97 million Red Cross workers—the world’s biggest volunteer force. The ICRC, 

the IFRC, and the National Societies are independent bodies. Each has its own individual 

status and exercises no authority over the others. 

b. With the advent of more and more complex humanitarian emergencies, the work of 

both institutions can require response to certain crises. When this is the case, the work of 

both is governed by an agreement signed in Spain in November of 1997, known as “the 

Seville Agreement”—it establishes one of the institutions, or a National Society, as the ‘lead 

agency’ responsible for spearheading the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 

Movement’s work overall. 

c. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is guided by the same 

seven fundamental principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary 

service, unity, and universality. Likewise, all Red Cross and Red Crescent activities have a 

central purpose—to help those who suffer without discrimination and thus contribute to 

peace in the world. 

2. The International Committee of the Red Cross 

The ICRC is an impartial, neutral, and independent organization with an exclusively 

humanitarian mission to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and 

internal violence or tensions and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates 

in situations of conflict the International Movement. It also endeavors to prevent suffering 

by promoting and strengthening humanitarian aspects of international law. Established in 

1863, the ICRC is at the origin of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. 

3. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

The IFRC works on the basis of the Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 

Movement to inspire, facilitate, and promote all humanitarian activities carried out by its 

member National Societies to improve the situation of the most vulnerable people. The 

IFRC directs and coordinates international assistance of the Movement to victims of natural 

and technological disasters, to refugees, and in health emergencies. It acts as the official 

representative of its member societies in the international field. It promotes cooperation 

between National Societies, and works to strengthen their capacity to carry out effective 

disaster preparedness, health, and social programs. 
Annex A to Appendix C 

C-A-2 JP 3-08 

4. The National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies embody the work and principles of the 

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in 186 countries. National Societies 

act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field and 

provide a range of services including disaster relief, health, and social programs. During 

wartime, National Societies assist the affected civilian population and support the army 

medical services where appropriate.

5. The Emblems 

a. The Red Cross, Red Crescent, and Red Crystal emblems (see Figure C-A-1) are 

symbols of protection in times of armed conflict and may be used as a protective device 

only by:

(1) Armed forces medical services;

(2) National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies duly recognized and authorized 

by their governments to lend assistance to the medical services of armed forces; the National 

Societies may use the emblem for protective purposes only for those of their personnel and 

equipment assisting official medical services in wartime, provided that those personnel and 

equipment perform the same functions and only those functions and are subject to military 

law and regulations; 

Figure C-A-1. The Emblems of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

THE EMBLEMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS 

AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 

C-A-3 

(3) Civilian hospitals and other medical facilities recognized as such by the 

government and authorized to display the emblem for protective purposes (e.g., first-aid 

posts, ambulances); and 

(4) Other voluntary relief agencies subject to the same conditions as National 

Societies: they must have government recognition and authorization, may use the emblem 

only for personnel and equipment allocated exclusively to medical services, and must be 

subject to military law and regulations.

b. Each state party to the Geneva Conventions is required to take steps to prevent and 

punish misuse of the emblem in wartime and peacetime alike, and to enact a law on the 

protection of the emblem. 

c. Use of the emblem

(1) Use of the emblem for protective purposes is a visible manifestation of the 

protection accorded by the Geneva Conventions to medical personnel, units, and transports.

(2) Use of the emblem for indicative purposes in wartime or in times of peace 

shows that a person or item of property has a link with the International Red Cross and Red 

Crescent Movement.

(3) The ICRC is entitled at all times to use the emblem for both protective and 

indicative purposes. 

d. Misuse of the emblem. Any use not expressly authorized constitutes a misuse of the 

emblem. There are three types of misuse.

(1) Imitation is the use of a sign, which, by its shape and/or color, may cause 

confusion with the emblem. 

(2) Usurpation is the use of the emblem by bodies or persons not entitled to do so 

(e.g., commercial enterprises, pharmacists, private doctors, NGOs, and ordinary individuals). 

If persons normally authorized to use the emblem fail to do so in accordance with the rules in 

the Conventions and Protocols, this also constitutes usurpation. 

(3) Perfidy is the making use of the emblem in time of conflict to protect 

combatants or military equipment. Perfidy is a violation of the law of war.

e. Misuse of the emblem for protective purposes in time of war jeopardizes the system 

of protection set up by the Geneva Conventions. Misuse of the emblem for indicative 

purposes undermines its image in the eyes of the public and consequently reduces its 

protective power in time of war. The states, party to the Geneva Conventions, have 

undertaken to introduce penal measures for preventing and repressing misuse of the emblem 

in wartime and peacetime alike.
Annex A to Appendix C 

C-A-4 JP 3-08 

6. The Seven Fundamental Principles

a. Proclaimed in Vienna in 1965, the seven fundamental principles bond together the 

National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the ICRC, and the IFRC. They guarantee 

the continuity of the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement and its humanitarian work. 

b. Humanity. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a 

desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, 

endeavors, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering 

wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for 

the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation, and lasting 

peace among all peoples.

c. Impartiality. It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, 

class, or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided 

solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress. 

d. Neutrality. In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the International Red 

Cross and Red Crescent Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in 

controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature. 

e. Independence. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is 

independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their 

governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their 

autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the 

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. 

f. Voluntary Service. It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by 

desire for gain. 

g. Unity. There can be only one Red Cross or one Red Crescent Society in any one 

country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its 

territory. 

h. Universality. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which 

all societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each 

other, is worldwide. 
C-B-1 

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX C

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

1. Overview

The ICRC (http://www.icrc.org/eng) is an impartial, neutral, and independent 

organization with an exclusively humanitarian mission to protect the lives and dignity of 

victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with 

assistance. It directs and coordinates in situations of conflict the International Movement. 

It also endeavors to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian 

aspects of international law and universal humanitarian principles. Established in 1863, 

the ICRC is at the origin of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. 

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. The ICRC has a legal mandate from the international community. That mandate 

has two sources: 

(1) The Geneva Conventions, which task the ICRC with visiting prisoners, 

organizing relief operations, reuniting separated families, and similar humanitarian 

activities during armed conflicts. 

(2) The ICRC statutes, which encourage it to undertake similar work in 

situations of internal violence, where the Geneva Conventions do not apply. 

b. The Geneva Conventions are binding instruments of international law, applicable 

worldwide. The ICRC statutes are adopted at the International Conference of the Red 

Cross and Red Crescent, which takes place every four years, and at which states that are 

party to the Geneva Conventions take part. 

c. The ICRC receives its funding from voluntary contributions from governments,

supranational organizations, national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and private 

sources.

d. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Protocols confer on the ICRC the 

right to take action (e.g., to visit prisoners of war) and to make proposals to states (e.g., to 

offer its services). Additionally, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 

Movement’s statutes recognize that the ICRC has a right of humanitarian initiative in 

situations not covered by the Geneva Conventions or their protocols. All of these 

“rights” constitute the permanent mandate conferred on the ICRC by much of the 

international community. This specific mandate distinguishes it from other humanitarian 

organizations. However, while the ICRC may argue that the 1977 Protocols to the 

Geneva Conventions of 1949 have gained universal application through the formative 

custom of international law, the United States does not agree. The United States has not 

ratified the 1977 Protocols and may not always agree with nor recognize as authoritative 

ICRC actions based on the Protocols. Other nations that have acceded to these Protocols 

are bound to them. This leads to a major problem for the legal counsel in the 
Annex B to Appendix C

C-B-2 JP 3-08 

international arena; not all participants accept that they are similarly bound to 

international law on very basic matters. There are numerous conventions of wide but not 

universal application. Adherence or non-adherence can make a mismatch of potential 

partners in humanitarian ventures. 

e. The ICRC is the guardian of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 

Movement’s seven fundamental principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, 

independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. 

3. Organizational Structure

a. The ICRC is the founding institution of the International Red Cross and Red 

Crescent Movement. Founded in 1863, the ICRC is headquartered in Geneva, 

Switzerland. This neutral Swiss association, with international influence, applies the 

provisions of humanitarian aspects of international law in armed conflicts. It undertakes 

its tasks and derives its mandate from the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two

additional Protocols of 1977. 

b. The ICRC is sometimes referred to as a NGO. In fact, it is not – but neither is it 

an IGO. The ICRC has a hybrid nature. As a private association formed under the Swiss 

Civil Code, its existence is not in itself mandated by governments. Yet its functions and 

activities—to provide protection and assistance to victims of conflict—are mandated by 

the international community of states and are founded on international law, specifically 

the Geneva Conventions, which are among the most widely ratified treaties in the world.

(1) Because of this the ICRC, like any IGO, is recognized as having an 

“international legal personality” or status of its own. It enjoys working facilities 

(privileges and immunities) comparable to those of the UN, its agencies, and other IGOs. 

Examples of these facilities include exemption from taxes and customs duties, 

inviolability of premises and documents, and immunity from judicial process. 

(2) The ICRC can only do its job of providing protection and assistance to 

conflict victims if its working principles of impartiality, independence, and neutrality are 

respected. It is through recognition of the ICRC’s privileges and immunities that states 

and international organizations acknowledge their respect for those principles. Thus, in 

line with its international legal mandate, the ICRC’s privileges and immunities are widely 

recognized by governments, by the UN and by other organizations. This means that the 

ICRC is not treated as a private entity or an NGO, but as an IGO for the work it does 

under its international mandate. 

NOTE: The US is signatory to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, but the 

US is not signatory to the two additional Protocols of 1977. The US 

recognizes the law of war.
International Committee of the Red Cross

C-B-3 

(3) In the nearly 80 countries in which the ICRC carries out significant 

operations, its international legal personality, judicial immunity, and testimonial privilege 

(right not to be called as a witness) is recognized either by treaty or by legislation.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

ICRC’s tasks include the following: 

a. Visits and interviews, without witness, to prisoners of war and detained or 

interned civilians; 

b. Search for missing persons; 

c. Transmit messages between family members separated by conflict, including 

from prisoners of war and detained civilians; 

d. Reunification of dispersed families; 

e. Provision of basic-health care services; 

f. Provision of urgently needed food, water, sanitation, and shelter to civilians 

without access to these basic necessities; 

g. Monitor compliance with and contribute to the development of humanitarian 

aspects of international law; and

h. Spreading knowledge of humanitarian aspects of international law. 

5. Interagency Relationships

a. The ICRC and the IFRC keep each other informed of their respective activities 

and consult with each other regularly on the coordination and distribution of their work 

and on all matters of interest to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. 

The ICRC has been granted permanent observer status at the UN General Assembly since 

1991 and enjoys similar status with IGOs. 

b. The terms neutrality and independence acquire a specific meaning when related to 

the activities of the ICRC. The ICRC applies almost exclusively to armed conflicts, 

disturbances, and tensions. It strictly avoids any involvement in hostilities or in 

controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature as an imperative for 

humanitarian action. This strict and specific neutrality that fosters and maintains 

universal trust also requires the ICRC to act openly and in good faith toward the nations 

and parties to the conflict. To discharge the mandate conferred by the Geneva 

Conventions and to take the humanitarian initiatives fundamental to its role as neutral 

intermediary, the ICRC must remain independent. Therefore, the ICRC adopts a special 

structure that allows it to resist political, economic, and other pressures and to maintain 

its credibility in the eyes of the governments and the public that support its activities.
Annex B to Appendix C

C-B-4 JP 3-08 

c. In terms of civil-military relations, ICRC’s humanitarian activities aim to protect 

human dignity and lives. ICRC humanitarian activities cannot be subordinated to 

political or military objectives. The ICRC must maintain a role independent of such 

influence or association. 
C-C-1 

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX C

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND

RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES

1. Overview

a. The IFRC (http://www.ifrc.org) is the world’s largest humanitarian organization, 

providing assistance without discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class, 

or political opinions. As part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 

Movement, its work is guided by seven fundamental principles: humanity, impartiality, 

neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality.

b. Founded in 1919, the IFRC comprises 186 member Red Cross and Red Crescent 

societies, a Secretariat in Geneva, and more than 60 delegations strategically located to 

support activities around the world. There are more societies in formation. The Red 

Crescent is used in place of the Red Cross in many Islamic countries.

c. The IFRC’s mission is to improve the lives of vulnerable people by mobilizing 

the power of humanity. Vulnerable people are those who are at greatest risk from 

situations that threaten their survival, or their capacity to live with an acceptable level of 

social and economic security and human dignity. Often, these are victims of natural 

disasters, poverty brought about by socio-economic crises, refugees, and victims of health 

emergencies.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. The IFRC carries out relief operations to assist victims of disasters and combines 

this with development work to strengthen the capacities of its member National Societies. 

The IFRC’s work focuses on four core areas: promoting humanitarian values, disaster 

response, disaster preparedness, and health and community care. 

b. The unique network of National Societies—which covers almost every country in 

the world—is the IFRC’s principal strength. Cooperation between National Societies 

gives the IFRC greater potential to develop capacities and assist those most in need. At a 

local level, the network enables the IFRC to reach individual communities. 

3. Organizational Structure

a. The role of the Secretariat in Geneva is to coordinate and mobilize relief 

assistance for international emergencies, promote cooperation between National 

Societies, and represent these National Societies in the international field.

b. The role of the field delegations is to assist and advise National Societies with 

relief operations and development programs, and encourage regional cooperation. 
Annex C to Appendix C

C-C-2 JP 3-08 

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. The IFRC’s programs are grouped into four main core areas: promoting 

humanitarian principles and values; disaster response; disaster preparedness; and health 

and care in the community. 

b. The IFRC promotes individual and community humanitarian values which 

encourage respect for other human beings and a willingness to work together to find 

solutions to problems. From the seven fundamental principles to the “power of 

humanity” slogan, the aim is to influence the behavior of the people the IFRC works 

with.

c. Disaster response continues to represent the largest portion of the IFRC’s work, 

with assistance to around 30 million people annually from refugees to victims of natural 

disasters. This includes emergency response units and issues relating to humanitarian 

policies as the IFRC strives to improve the quality of its immediate response and longterm rehabilitation work. 

d. The sharp increase in the number of natural disasters worldwide in recent years 

has prompted the IFRC to devote more attention to disaster preparedness activities. 

These aim to make National Societies and communities more aware of the risks they 

face, how to reduce their vulnerability, and how to cope when disaster strikes. 

e. Too many people die as a result of no access to even the most basic health 

services and elementary health education. Health and community care has become a 

cornerstone of humanitarian assistance, and accounts for a large part of Red Cross and 

Red Crescent spending. Through these programs, the IFRC aims to enable communities 

to reduce their vulnerability to disease, and prepare for and respond to public health 

crises. Guiding and supporting the development of its member National Societies is one 

of the IFRC’s fundamental tasks, and runs through these four core areas and other 

programs. Capacity building programs include management and volunteer training, 

branch structures, planning, fund-raising, and gender equality. Creating the opportunity 

for National Societies to network and work together is one of the IFRC’s key roles.

5. Interagency Relationships

The IFRC Secretariat in Geneva is at the heart of a global network that helps national 

societies to develop and to coordinate their work at the international level. Through its 

regional delegations and its many country delegations, the Secretariat is in regular contact 

with the national societies and keeps abreast of current field conditions. It enjoys 

consultative status (Category I) with the ECOSOC of the UN. In 1994, the UN General 

Assembly invited the IFRC to become a permanent observer and participate in the work 

of the Assembly. Through its many delegations, the IFRC maintains permanent contact, 

both in Geneva and in the field, with UN agencies, governments, the EU (especially the 

Humanitarian Office), and other NGOs. The IFRC has a delegation in New York City to 

maintain relations with UN agencies and diplomatic missions. In the field, IFRC

delegates maintain very close contact with other humanitarian agencies, particularly with 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

C-C-3 

the ICRC, that are engaged in operations complementary to those of the IFRC. The 

IFRC, funded by annual contributions from all member national societies, represents the 

Societies at the international level.

6. Code of Conduct

The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 

and NGOs in Disaster Relief is being used by the IFRC to monitor its own standards of 

relief delivery and to encourage other agencies to set similar standards. The Code of 

Conduct is voluntary and applicable to any NGO; and lays down 10 points of principle 

which all NGOs should adhere to in their disaster response work, and goes on to describe 

the relationships agencies, working in disasters, should seek with donor governments, 

host governments, and the UN system.

Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent 

Movement and nongovernmental organizations in disaster relief.

Principle Commitments:

1. The humanitarian imperative comes first.

2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and 

without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the 

basis of need alone.

3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.

4. We shall endeavor not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.

5. We shall respect culture and custom.

6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.

7. Ways shall be found to involve program beneficiaries in the management of 

relief aid.

8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as 

meeting basic needs.

9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those 

from whom we accept resources.

10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognize 

disaster victims as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects.
Annex C to Appendix C

C-C-4 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
C-D-1 

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX C

AMERICAN RED CROSS

1. Overview

a. The National Society in the United States is the ARC (http://www.redcross.org). 

Since its founding in 1881 by visionary leader Clara Barton, the ARC has been the Nation’s 

premier emergency response organization. As part of a worldwide movement that offers 

neutral humanitarian care to the victims of war, the ARC distinguishes itself by also aiding 

victims of devastating natural disasters. Over the years, the organization has expanded its 

services, always with the aim of preventing and relieving suffering. 

b. Today, in addition to domestic disaster relief, the ARC offers compassionate services 

in five other areas: community services that help the needy; support and comfort for military 

members and their families; the collection, processing, and distribution of lifesaving blood 

and blood products; educational programs that promote health and safety; and international 

relief and development programs. 

c. The ARC is where people mobilize to help their neighbors—across the street, across 

the country, and across the world—in emergencies. Each year, in communities large and 

small, victims of some 70,000 disasters turn to neighbors familiar and new—the more than 

half a million volunteers and 35,000 employees of the ARC. Through over 700 locally 

supported chapters, more than 15 million people gain the skills they need to prepare for and 

respond to emergencies in their homes, communities, and world. 

d. Some four million people give blood through the ARC, making it the largest supplier 

of blood and blood products in the United States. The ARC helps thousands of US Service 

members separated from their families by military duty stay connected. As part of the 

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, a global network of 186 national 

societies, the ARC helps restore hope and dignity to the world’s most vulnerable people. 

2. Mission Statement and Charter

a. The ARC, a humanitarian organization led by volunteers and guided by its 

Congressional Charter and the Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross 

Movement, will provide relief to victims of disaster and help people prevent, prepare for, and 

respond to emergencies. 

b. The purposes of the ARC, as stated in its Congressional Charter are: 

(1) To provide volunteer aid in time of war to the sick and wounded of the Armed 

Forces, in accordance with the spirit and conditions of the conference of Geneva of October 

1863; the treaties of the Red Cross, or the treaties of Geneva, August 22, 1864, July 27, 

1929, and August 12, 1949, to which the United States of America has given its adhesion; 

and any other treaty, convention, or protocol similar in purpose to which the United States of 

America has given or may give its adhesion; 
Annex D to Appendix C 

C-D-2 JP 3-08 

(2) To perform all the duties devolved on a national society by each nation that has 

acceded to any of those treaties, conventions, or protocols; 

(3) To act in matters of voluntary relief and in accordance with the military 

authorities as a medium of communication between the people of the United States and the 

Armed Forces of the United States and to act in those matters between similar national 

societies of governments of other countries through the ICRC and the USG, the people, and 

the Armed Forces of the United States; and

(4) To carry out a system of national and international relief in time of peace, and 

to apply that system in mitigating the suffering caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and 

other great national calamities, and to devise and carry out measures for preventing those 

calamities.

3. Responsibilities

The ARC’s role as the Nation’s largest mass care service provider is separate and 

distinct from its role in the NRF. As the United States’ largest mass care service provider, 

the ARC provides sheltering, feeding, bulk distribution of needed items, basic first aid, 

welfare information, and casework, among other services, at the local level as needed. In its 

role as a service provider, the ARC works closely with local, tribal, and state governments to 

provide mass care services to victims of every disaster, large and small, in an affected area. 

In providing these services, the ARC fulfills its humanitarian mission, acting on its own 

behalf and not on behalf of the USG or any other governmental entity. 
D-1 

APPENDIX D

JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP

1. Introduction and Overview

a. This appendix presents major aspects of enhancing interagency coordination at 

the strategic and operational levels through the JIACG (or equivalent organization) at the 

combatant commands. It is intended to provide sufficient detail to help CCDRs, 

subordinate JFCs, their staffs, and interagency partners understand the JIACG (or 

equivalent organization) as a capability to enable the coordination of all instruments of 

national power with joint operations. 

Refer to the Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group for 

more information. For JEL: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/jwfc_pam.htm. For 

JDEIS: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp. 

b. A JIACG is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and 

collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. 

Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR and tailored to 

meet the requirements of a supported combatant command, the JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational 

level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. One size does not fit all. Each 

combatant command has implemented and tailored their JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) based on their unique requirements, AORs, and missions to include titles 

and organizational schemes, to suit their needs (e.g., interagency partnering directorate, 

commander’s interagency engagement group, commander’s JIACG.)

c. Faced with challenges to national interests, the United States, along with its 

multinational partners, can respond by using the capabilities resident in one or more of 

the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). A 

strategic, top-down approach aligns and harmonizes a variety of ways and means with a 

set of desired strategic ends. These ends provide the fundamental purpose and context 

for committing the military and other instruments of national power. Figure D-1 

identifies those USG agencies with which CCDRs have frequent interaction or that a 

deployed joint force may encounter across the full range of military operations.

d. Joint and multinational operations against contemporary adversaries or supporting 

civil authorities during catastrophic disasters require unified action in planning and 

execution with interagency and multinational partners who are not under US military 

command authority. This effort depends on building and sharing a common 

understanding of the strategic purpose and end state; developing relevant objectives; a 

common understanding of the operational environment; and harmonization of the actions 

required to resolve the problem. 

e. Increased and efficient organizational cooperation between and among the myriad 

organizations performing their roles to achieve national strategic objectives is essential. 

Challenges to effective interagency coordination caused by partners having conflicting 
Appendix D

D-2 JP 3-08 

policies and procedures further complicates efforts at achieving unity of effort. 

Typically, each agency develops its own agency-specific plans at varying levels of detail 

in response to an issue or event. The challenge to the interagency community is to take 

INTEGRATING THE INTERAGENCY COMMUNITY

LEGEND

Interagency Planners

President

National Security Council

Strategic/Policy

Harmonizes

joint operation

planning and

execution

Combatant Commander

Joint Interagency Coordination 

Operation planning advisory element 

(colocated and virtual), security 

cooperation, contingency, crisis, 

transition, reconstitution and recovery, 

and operations

DOA

DOC

DOS

DOD

DOT

DOE

TREAS

DHS

CIA

DHHS

USAID

DOJ

EPA

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

DHHS Department of Health and Human

Services

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOA Department of Agriculture

DOC Department of Commerce

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DOJ Department of Justice

DOS Department of State

DOT Department of Transportation

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

TREAS Department of the Treasury

USAID US Agency for International Development

Joint Task 

Force

Ambassador 

Country 

Team

Figure D-1. Integrating the Interagency Community
Joint Interagency Coordination Group 

D-3 

single agency planning efforts and meld them into a collaborative, multiagency planning 

process that exploits the core competencies of all the interagency partners. Figure D-2 

shows the complexities of multiagency planning versus single agency planning.

f. The JIACG (or equivalent organization), with its tools, processes, and procedures, 

is an important organization supporting the overall DOD effort to strengthen its capability 

to conduct joint operations. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) supports the entire 

range of military operations. Representing USG agencies at the combatant command 

HQ, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) is a multifunctional, advisory element that 

facilitates information sharing across the interagency community. JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) members provide two-way links back to their parent organizations to help 

synchronize joint force operations with the efforts of USG agencies and departments. 

The JIACG (or equivalent organization) can significantly improve security cooperation, 

deliberate planning and CAP, and recovery and reconstitution. The JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) provides each CCDR with a standing capability to enhance situational 

awareness of interagency activities and keep the military and other USG agencies and 

departments informed of each other’s efforts to prevent undesired consequences and 

uncoordinated USG activities. 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OPERATIONAL

LEVEL PLANNING

Single Versus Multiagency Planning

LEGEND

Single-Agency Multiagency

l

l

l

l

Diplomatic Engagement (DOS)

Combat Operations (DOD)

Elections (USAID)

Humanitarian Relief (USAID)

l

l

l

Disarmament (DOS, DOD, 

USAID)

Counterterrorism (DOS, DOD, 

DOJ, TREAS, DHS)

Anticorruption (DOS, DOD, 

DOJ, TREAS)

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOJ Department of Justice

DOS Department of State

DOD Department of Defense

TREAS Department of the Treasury

USAID United States Agency for International 

Development

Figure D-2. United States Government Operational Level Planning
Appendix D

D-4 JP 3-08 

2. Purpose

a. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) is the CCDR’s lead organization for 

interagency coordination, providing guidance, facilitation, coordination, and 

synchronization of interagency activities. The JIACG (or equivalent organization)

interacts with DOS, which has primary responsibility for IGOs; USAID, which is the 

USG agency that maintains the most direct relationship with NGOs (many of which 

receive USAID funding to carry out programs); and other USG departments and 

agencies. For combatant commands who have US domestic missions, the JIACG (or 

equivalent organization) interacts with DHS and its NRF ESF coordinator agencies (e.g., 

DOT, EPA, DOJ) for the 15 different ESFs, as well as state, tribal, local government, 

private sector, and NGOs playing key parts in HS and HD. The JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) will help the CCDRs and staffs gain a common picture and shared 

understanding of the operational environment that promotes unified action with all 

interagency partners.

b. Unlike the military, most USG agencies are not equipped and organized to create 

separate staffs at all levels of war. The military coordinates at the strategic-national level 

(OSD and JS), strategic-theater level (combatant command), operational level (combatant 

command and JTF), and at the tactical level of war. Most USG agencies operate at the 

strategic-national level (Washington, DC home offices) and field level (country team). 

For example, although some regional coordination and projects occur within the bureaus 

of DOS and USAID, detailed regional operational level planning is less common as it 

relates to foreign missions. For domestic missions, most agencies (e.g., DHS, FEMA, 

EPA) have regional staffs involved in operations and planning. Consequently, combatant 

command and JTF staffs may find themselves interacting with USG agency 

representatives who are coordinating their organizations’ activities at multiple levels. 

The JIACG (or equivalent organization) at the operational level can potentially mitigate 

the effects of this problem. 

c. JIACGs (or equivalent organization) are maturing as collaboratively-enabled, 

multi-disciplined teams that coordinate support across the range of military operations. 

The JIACG (or equivalent organization) is an advisory element on the CCDR’s staff that 

facilitates information sharing and coordinated action across the interagency community. 

The JIACG (or equivalent organization) does not make policy or task interagency 

elements; nor is it designed to alter existing lines of authority or reporting. However, 

when properly staffed and collaboratively-enabled, it provides a powerful tool to improve 

awareness and better integrate planning and coordination between the CCDR and the 

larger interagency community.

d. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) effort is focused on acquiring, vetting, 

and managing the flow of information to enhance joint operation planning by offering a 

broader decision-making context that includes other USG agencies both in Washington, 

DC, and in the AOR. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) should interact with the 

command group and the combatant command staff directorates on a daily basis to stay 

abreast of changing issues. It draws on the command’s planning and operations expertise 

within the HQ to ensure relevant and timely connections are made with USG agencies 
Joint Interagency Coordination Group 

D-5 

and activities. It leverages the experience, expertise, and core competencies of members 

by having selective USG agency representatives permanently assigned to the JIACG (or 

equivalent organization). The result is a fusing of USG agency operational intentions and 

capabilities with military planning and operations to support unity of effort.

3. Organization 

a. Roles and Responsibilities. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) provides 

the CCDR with the primary and readily available integration venue for coordinating 

interagency efforts with joint force actions at theater strategic and operational levels. Its 

role is to enhance the interchange among USG agencies and military organizations. 

Accordingly, the JIACG (or equivalent organization): 

(1) Participates in combatant command theater campaign and joint operation

planning and assessment. 

(2) Advises the CCDR on USG policies, positions, and strategic planning

efforts, as appropriate. JIACG (or equivalent organization) members provide information 

to combatant command planners on their parent agencies’ current policies, positions on 

developing policies, and potential resources and assets that may be useful. 

(3) Provides interagency planning perspective during joint operations. 

(4) Informs the combatant command of interagency approaches, support

requirements, capabilities, and limitations.

(5) Establishes habitual relationships and collaborative links to planners within

USG agencies.

(6) Arranges interfaces for planning and rehearsal exercises and other joint

operation planning activities. 

(7) Facilitates communications with JTF staff and component planners

regarding interagency issues.

(8) For foreign missions, supports the deployment and employment of DOS, 

USAID, and other USG teams (e.g., integration planning cell, FACT, DART) within the 

AOR. For domestic HS/CS missions, an approved mission assignment is required in 

most cases (except for immediate response actions) to facilitate and support key domestic 

partners (e.g., DHS, DOJ). 

b. Combatant Command Staff and JIACG (or equivalent organization)

Relationships

(1) Within the staff, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) can provide the 

greatest value-added when authorized to operate across a CCDR’s staff and components. 

The greatest efficacy of the JIACG (or equivalent organization) is as a separate staff 
Appendix D

D-6 JP 3-08 

element reporting directly to the deputy commander or the chief of staff on behalf of the 

CCDR. 

(2) The JIACG (or equivalent organization) should be task-organized to support 

the entire combatant command staff and should be prepared to contribute staff members 

to participate in appropriate boards, centers, bureaus, cells, and working groups 

established and operating within the command’s battle rhythm. The closest possible 

working relationship between the JIACG (or equivalent organization) and staff 

directorates should be established and nurtured. As an operation progresses, planning 

generally occurs in three distinct but overlapping planning horizons: future plans, future 

operations, and current operations. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) must be 

engaged in all three planning horizons. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) should 

have functional relationships with multiple staff elements, to include:

(a) JIACG (or equivalent organization) planners should be fully engaged 

with joint operation planners to ensure, among other issues, that operational level plans 

under development are synchronized and fully supportive of broader interagency goals. 

JIACG (or equivalent organization) planners can assist in harmonizing military plans 

with US embassy mission strategic plans and USAID country strategic plans or with

DHS domestic response plans and operations. 

(b) Habitual interaction with home departments and agencies will enable 

JIACG (or equivalent organization) planners to facilitate the development of combatant 

command strategic plans and policies and enhance the timeliness of ongoing POLMIL or 

domestic response planning. Commands employing a systems perspective of the 

operational environment to support joint operation planning and JIPOE should coordinate 

with JIACG (or equivalent organization) planners for confirmation of underlying 

assumptions and analyses. A systems perspective can support the principle of achieving 

unity of effort in any operation by providing a common frame of reference for planning 

with USG agencies that represent other instruments of national power. This view can 

facilitate the combatant command staff collaboration with counterparts from USG 

agencies to determine and coordinate necessary actions that are beyond the CCDR’s 

command authority. 

(c) Senior Policy Advisors

1. The unique and highly individualized relationship between the 

CCDR and the POLAD can be enhanced by the JIACG (or equivalent organization)’s 

habitual interaction with Washington, DC-based agencies and field offices in the AOR. 

JIACG (or equivalent organization) support to this relationship should remain highly

flexible and responsive to combatant command requirements. Ultimately, the 

organizational relationship of the JIACG (or equivalent organization) with the POLAD is 

at the discretion of the CCDR. 

2. Senior DHS Representative. GCCs with HD and CS missions (i.e., 

USNORTHCOM, USPACOM) have a Senior Executive Service level senior DHS 
Joint Interagency Coordination Group 

D-7 

representative assigned to the command to help facilitate operational and planning 

coordination and collaboration in regards to domestic missions and issues. 

(d) The JIACG (or equivalent organization) provides a conduit for

interagency inputs to the standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ), assists in identifying 

and facilitating access to non-DOD centers of excellence for SJFHQ analysts, and 

contributes to joint operation planning. The POLMIL planner on the SJFHQ staff is the 

primary linkage between the SJFHQ and the JIACG (or equivalent organization). 

c. Management

(1) The JIACG (or equivalent organization) should be a permanent part of the 

command staff, including specification of roles, missions, and promulgation of 

appropriate guidance or regulations for the AOR.

(2) CCDRs should provide their intent and oversight for JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) operations. The staff should develop and refine the following for the 

JIACG (or equivalent organization): 

(a) Quality assurance/quality control procedures;

(b) Standard operating procedures;

(c) Assessment measures;

(d) Feedback systems;

(e) Selection process and qualifications for members; 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLITICAL ADVISOR AND THE

JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP

The political-advisor (POLAD) engaged the “full spectrum” Joint 

Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) continually throughout the 

exercise, facilitating the exchange of information and expert opinion on 

strategic and operational matters of concern to the combatant command.

The productive and collaborative relationship the JIACG established with 

the POLAD was extraordinary - a clear demonstration that a JIACG could 

work constructively and effectively with the POLAD. Two specific 

examples where the POLAD and the JIACG successfully worked together 

were:

Developed the mission statement for the combatant command; and

Developed the political-military plan for the combatant command that 

maps US strategic goals and objectives as well as provides guidance to 

civilian agencies for their planning of program activities. 

SOURCE: US Southern Command Exercise BLUE ADVANCE ‘04
Appendix D

D-8 JP 3-08 

(f) Continuing education requirements for members; and 

(g) Individual and collective training requirements. 

(3) The CCDR should engage relevant members of the interagency community, 

in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in support of JIACG (or 

equivalent organization) sustainment.

(4) The JIACG (or equivalent organization) should be included in the 

command’s joint training plan. 

(5) The JIACG (or equivalent organization) should be included in existing 

command readiness evaluations. 

4. Structure

a. Design. When joint strategic planning—and its subsets of security cooperation

planning, joint operation planning, and force planning—is required, the degree to which 

military and USG agencies are integrated and harmonized will bear directly on efficiency 

and success. Joint operation planning should include key participants from the outset. 

The CCDR, through the strategic concept, builds interagency activities into annex V 

(Interagency Coordination), of the joint OPLAN. Annex V is required for all CJCS 

approved OPLANs and provides a single source reference for the CCDR to request 

interagency activities and to lay the groundwork for interagency coordination. For 

domestic operations, military planners should coordinate and collaborate with their 

civilian counterparts at DHS and partner USG agencies regarding combatant command 

implications related to DHS OPLANs and CONPLANs. Plans developed under the IPS

may identify requirements for DOD support which also may impact on DOD’s missions 

and resources. These impacts must be resolved during the earliest steps in the planning 

process. Subordinate JFCs and components should also build interagency participation 

into their operations. Within the AOR, appropriate decision-making structures are 

established at combatant command, JTF HQ, and tactical levels to coordinate and resolve 

military, political, humanitarian, and other issues. The JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) provides the CCDR the means for organizing for successful interagency 

coordination focused at the operational level and below. 

(1) The JIACG (or equivalent organization) is fully integrated into the 

combatant command staff and is a primary participant in the planning process. It 

provides the CCDR with a standing capability to enhance situational awareness of USG 

agency activities and to keep all engaged USG agencies informed of each other’s efforts 

to prevent the undesired consequences of uncoordinated and redundant activity.

(2) A full-time, fully resourced operational JIACG (or equivalent organization)

broadens the CCDR’s understanding of the operational environment and the range and 

availability of response options. If the decision is made to employ joint forces, the 

CCDR may retain the JIACG (or equivalent organization) in-place at the combatant 

command HQ and integrate selected members of the JIACG (or equivalent organization)
Joint Interagency Coordination Group 

D-9 

into the JTF. Individual agency considerations must be taken into account before 

deploying non-DOD USG civilians.

b. Collaboration

(1) Effective C2 requires that commanders, their staffs, and the JIACG (or 

equivalent organization) collaborate in developing, understanding, and communicating 

the CCDR’s intent and determining the mission, operational objectives, desired effects, 

and tasks. In addition, the CCDR and staff must synchronize execution across all 

domains and the information environment by coordinating with USG agencies, IGOs, 

NGOs, multinational partners, and the private sector and continually assess the 

operational environment. Capabilities that improve long distance collaboration among 

dispersed agencies and organizations can enhance both planning and execution of joint 

operations. Information management can be more effective within a collaborative 

environment that integrates JIACG (or equivalent organization) participation with the 

combatant command staff.

(2) Collaboration enables military and JIACG (or equivalent organization)

planners to build interagency plans in discrete parts concurrently rather than sequentially, 

and integrate the results into OPLANs. Collaboration also provides planners with a view 

of the whole planning process as they work on various sections of the OPLAN, which 

helps them identify and resolve planning shortfalls and conflicts early. 

(3) The JIACG (or equivalent organization) develops and maintains 

relationships through collaboration with key USG agencies and departments that can 

provide specific expertise. The effective integration of the JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) into the collaborative environment will result in an improved understanding 

of the CCDR’s intent, objectives, effects, and required tasks, and, if properly managed, 

contribute to more effective interagency coordination and planning and increased 

execution efficiency.

c. Notional JIACG (or equivalent organization) Structure. To effectively bring all 

instruments of national power to bear on theater and regional strategies as well as 

campaign and OPLANs, CCDRs are augmented with representatives from USG agencies 

that may be assigned to the combatant command’s JIACG (or equivalent organization). 

(1) Each combatant command has assigned missions and, as such, each JIACG 

(or equivalent organization) is structured with the requisite capabilities to support them. 

Figure D-3 offers a baseline organizational structure for a JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) at the combatant command. This structure can be augmented as the 

combatant command transitions from planning to execution and to an even more robust 

capability when engaged in stability operations. However, regardless of structure, the 

JIACG (or equivalent organization) must provide regular, timely, and collaborative dayto-day support for planning, coordination, preparation, and implementation of 

interagency activities. Specific objectives of this organizational structure are to:
Appendix D

D-10 JP 3-08 

NOTIONAL JOINT INTERAGENCY

COORDINATION GROUP STRUCTURE

Combatant 

Commander

Staff Directorates

Joint Interagency 

Coordination Group 

Core Element

Mission Augmentation

(as needed)

International and 

Regional Planners

Washington Agency 

Planners

Commander, Joint

Task Force (JTF),

JTF Staff

US Ambassador 

Country Team

Integration 

Planning Cell

Virtual

Group Functions

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

Participate in combatant command engagement, deliberate, crisis, and transition planning.

Advise on civilian agency planning efforts.

Work military-civilian operational issues.

Present civilian agency perspectives, approaches, capabilities, and limitations.

Provide communication links to Washington and regional planners.

Arrange interface on interagency activities.

Coordinate with regional players.

Notional Core Staffing

Director Senior Civilian

Deputy Military

Department of State Regional Expert Civilian

Department of State Functional Expert Civilian

US Agency for International Development Officer Civilian

Department of Justice Civilian

Department of Transportation Civilian

Department of Homeland Security Civilian

Department of Defense Civilian

Department of Defense Civilian

Executive Officer Military

Administration Military

habitual links

Figure D-3. Notional Joint Interagency Coordination Group Structure
Joint Interagency Coordination Group 

D-11 

(a) Improve combatant command interagency joint operation planning and 

execution. 

(b) Exercise secure collaboration processes and procedures.

(c) Promote habitual relationships among the combatant command and 

interagency partners.

(2) USG agencies may assign liaison personnel to combatant command staffs to 

improve interagency coordination. For example, LNOs may be assigned to combatant 

command staffs to facilitate intelligence and antiterrorism support. These liaison 

personnel should be used to augment the core JIACG (or equivalent organization) staff.

d. Manning. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) is viewed as a relatively 

small, full-time core element consisting primarily of civilian personnel with extensive 

interagency coordination experience. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) is 

typically led by a full-time Senior Executive Service level civilian director. The core 

element is responsible for providing guidance, facilitation, coordination, and 

synchronization of interagency activities within the AOR. As a staff directorate of 

approximately 12 personnel within the HQ of the combatant command, it can be 

augmented with virtual or additional colocated members, as required.

5. Key Interagency Participants at the Combatant Command 

In addition to the JIACG (or equivalent organization), it is important to understand 

the roles and functions of other interagency participants in the AOR.

a. US Mission and Country Team. It is imperative that JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) members identify their counterparts within the mission and country team 

and establish the procedures necessary to conduct efficient and effective coordination. 

This should be in coordination with the combatant command’s country desk officers. 

b. Interagency Executive Steering Group

(1) JIACG (or equivalent organization) and interagency integration is 

emphasized within the combatant command staff by the establishment of an interagency 

ESG. The ESG is usually co-chaired by the deputy commander and the POLAD or 

Senior DHS representative and attended by the chief of staff, JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) director, special staff, and JTF or components, as required. In addition, 

there may be US embassy country team representatives, as required, and multinational 

representatives when appropriate. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) director may 

serve in a dual capacity as both a member and EXECSEC of the ESG. 

(2) The ESG provides JIACG (or equivalent organization) oversight and will 

meet periodically to review interagency posture, operations, and plans, and offers a forum 

to identify, discuss, and determine the way ahead and an office of primary responsibility. 

The ESG provides face-to-face interaction between senior interagency operational leaders 
Appendix D

D-12 JP 3-08 

that can overcome some bureaucratic obstacles to cooperation and further develop a 

reservoir of understanding before a crisis develops. 

c. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) must be prepared to facilitate and support 

the link between the combatant command staff and S/CRS teams and other civilian 

contingency teams. S/CRS teams may include: the CRSG, integration planning cell, and 

ACT. 

d. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) must be prepared to facilitate and support 

the link between the combatant command staff and DHS organizations under the NRF. 

e. JIACG (or equivalent organization) members may need to develop relationships 

with multiple agency counterparts. Members should know who their counterparts are 

that support the MOTR Plan, the maritime interdiction process, and have an 

understanding of their roles and responsibilities in support of maritime security.) JIACG 

(or equivalent organization) members who understand their agency’s roles in these 

important processes will enhance the CCDR’s understanding and situational awareness. 

6. Strategic Communication

a. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) can assist in the CCDR’s implementation 

of SC-directed effort by ensuring planning for IO, PA, DSPD, and military-to-military 

actions are consistent with overall USG SC objectives. CCDRs should consider 

including their JIACG (or equivalent organization) in processes to support SC-directed

planning and actions that are directly related to the CCDR’s intent. The JIACG (or 

equivalent organization) can facilitate coordination and synchronization among 

interagency partners to ensure consistent themes and messages facilitate unity of effort. 

Although IO is not its primary duty, JIACG (or equivalent organization) connectivity to 

the Washington, DC, interagency community is an important enabler during development 

of the SC annex (Y).

b. USG agencies and departments may have a role in planning and executing IO that 

supports SC. The expertise, programs, and activities of a wide variety of USG agencies 

should be considered as part of IO planning, when appropriate. CCDRs establish staff 

procedures specific to their AORs for requesting interagency support and coordination of 

various aspects of joint operations. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) is well 

positioned to help the CCDR and IO planners coordinate a “single voice.” 

7. Interagency Connectivity

a. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) develops and maintains habitual 

relationships with key civilian individuals, organizations, and agencies. These 

relationships are established through collaboration early in the planning process and 

become the basis for expanding the JIACG’s (or equivalent organization’s) core 

capabilities and situational awareness as a crisis develops. A robust, established two-way 

communication and reachback capability allows the JIACG (or equivalent organization)

to maintain these relationships during operations. JIACG (or equivalent organization)

connectivity should include, but not be limited to: 
Joint Interagency Coordination Group 

D-13 

(1) The operational and planning environment in the CCDR’s JOC, operations 

planning group, crisis action center, joint planning group, the joint intelligence operations 

center, and the SJFHQ. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) closely monitors these

organizations but does not duplicate their efforts. 

(2) USG agencies and departments and for domestic missions, select state, 

tribal, and local associations (e.g., National Emergency Managers Association, National 

Governor’s Association). 

(3) Combatant command Service components. 

(4) USG offices and missions located within the AOR. 

(5) Centers of excellence, which may include organizations or institutions such 

as NGOs, academia, and industry and private sector organizations that have particular 

expertise in areas such as governance. Examples include the National Defense 

University, FSI, the Institute for Defense Analysis, the various IASCs, and the Kennedy 

School of Government. However, the inclusion of centers of excellence may present 

challenges to the JIACG (or equivalent organization) relative to security classification 

and limitations related to the sharing of operational information.

b. The inclusion of USG civilian agency personnel into the JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) allows for the integration of expertise into command planning and enhances 

information sharing between USG agencies and the military. The responsibilities of USG 

agency representatives in the JIACG (or equivalent organization) do not alter current 

civilian agency relationships. Agency involvement in the JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) does not: 

(1) Replace any USG civilian agency staff officer currently assigned to the

CCDR’s staff or bypass any existing USG agency lines of authority and communications. 

(2) Provide USG agency concurrence with internal DOD staffing actions. 

(3) Interfere with existing MOU for requests for assistance and other formal 

interagency request process. 

(4) Challenge or replace the statutory and President-directed relationships for 

developing, implementing, or executing US national security and foreign policy. 

(5) Create policy. 

(6) Task personnel or USG agency elements. 

(7) Unilaterally commit USG agency resources.
Appendix D

D-14 JP 3-08 

8. Planning

a. Security Cooperation Planning. The JIACG (or equivalent organization)

maintains an understanding of the AOR, allowing it to make major contributions to the 

CCDR’s security cooperation portion of the global or theater campaign plan. Guided by 

the plan, the JIACG (or equivalent organization), in concert with the POLAD’s linkage to 

the DOS regional bureau and US ambassadors and COMs in the AOR, ensures the intent 

of other Washington, DC, agencies is identified and integrated into the work of the

combatant command staff. The goal is to establish an enhanced level of interagency

cooperation in the combatant command to prevent a crisis or mitigate its effect. 

Collaboration and close coordination with USG agencies that represent other instruments 

of national power, particularly with the ambassadors/COMs in the GCCs’ AOR is 

essential. 

b. Joint Operation Planning. Joint operation planning includes all activities that 

must be accomplished to plan for an anticipated operation—the mobilization, 

deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of forces. 

Planners recommend and commanders define criteria for the termination of joint 

operations and link these criteria to the transition to stabilization and achievement of the 

end state.

(1) Deliberate Planning. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) core element 

maintains a comprehensive understanding of potential crisis regions in the AOR. JIACG 

(or equivalent organization) planners will be key participants in developing and updating

contingency plans. Their expertise will be a crucial backstop against which combatant 

command planners can clarify and confirm strategic guidance, planning assumptions, and 

engaged USG agency roles and missions. Their expertise will be particularly useful

during transition operations, plan congruence and support to US embassy mission 

strategic plans, USAID mission strategic plans, and USG agency regional planning goals. 

For domestic missions, a similar tie-in to key NRF agencies (e.g., DHS, DOJ, EPA) as 

well as state, tribal, and local leadership is equally important.

(a) JIACG (or equivalent organization) planners should be closely involved 

with the combatant command planners’ efforts to update existing plans and interagency 

coordination annexes (annex V), as well as developing new plans for crisis response and 

deterrence. Typically the emphasis of the future plans effort is on planning the next 

phase of operations or sequels to the current operation. In a campaign, this could be 

planning the next major operation (the next phase of the campaign).

(b) Each instrument of national power has a finite capacity. Interagency

activities must be planned in a synchronized manner to maximize and focus the efforts of

multiple USG agencies toward the desired end state. The JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) role in advising the CCDR of interagency priorities and actions is important 

in setting the stage for handoff from the preponderant military phases of the operation to 

the USG civilian agency dominated phases.
Joint Interagency Coordination Group 

D-15 

(2) Crisis Action Planning

(a) Pre-Crisis

1. Designated members of the JIACG (or equivalent organization)

monitor events in the AOR as part of their daily activities. They are responsible for 

enhancing the CCDR and the combatant command staff’s understanding of USG agency 

activities, both in the AOR and in Washington, DC, that impact current and future 

operations. 

2. JIACG (or equivalent organization) members augment and are 

integrated into the combatant command prior to and during operations. The number and 

assignment of JIACG (or equivalent organization) members are mission and event 

dependent, particularly in planning and execution efforts that require interagency 

coordination. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) tracks and recommends

adjustments to the military tasks in collaboration and coordination with engaged USG

agencies and multinational partners to create and reinforce unified action across all

mission areas.

3. In a developing crisis, the JIACG’s (or equivalent organization’s) 

knowledge and understanding of the planning and policy objectives at the national level 

assist the combatant command staff in developing and recommending an OPLAN that 

harmonizes military and civilian operational response actions. The JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) is the one mechanism that collectively frames the plan with the CCDR’s 

staff for interagency coordination. The daily roles and responsibilities of the JIACG (or 

equivalent organization) shift to focus on the potential crisis and expand to become an 

integral part of the overall crisis resolution effort.

4.

(b) Crisis

 The JIACG (or equivalent organization), through its continuing 

coordination with external USG civilian agencies, refines its collaboration by aligning the 

right membership to support the developing OPLANs and OPORDs. JIACG (or 

equivalent organization) crisis response activities and actions facilitate the initial 

situational awareness of the crisis action team and operations planning group, support 

FDO and force enhancement execution, and make preparations to deploy designated 

member(s) to the crisis area or forward HQ, as required.

1. When a crisis occurs, the JIACG (or equivalent organization)

continues to monitor the evolving situation by maintaining a physical and/or virtual 

presence in the CCDR’s JOC, joint planning group, and joint intelligence operations 

center. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) augments these centers, as required. 

Once a situation is identified as a crisis, JIACG (or equivalent organization) members are 

integrated into the combatant command staff as prescribed in local instructions and 

directives. In the case where a R&S event necessitates the employment of the IMS, and 

an integration planning cell is deployed to a geographic combatant command, the JIACG 

(or equivalent organization) provides support necessary for the integration planning cell 
Appendix D

D-16 JP 3-08 

to integrate into the geographic combatant command to synchronize and coordinate 

national level planning with the military plan. The JIACG (or equivalent organization)

assists the SJFHQ and the JTF, when formed, to provide interagency connectivity by 

either deploying or providing reachback. Some combatant commands may stand up an 

interagency coordination cell or group as the 24/7 planning cell for the JIACG (or 

equivalent organization). This interagency coordination cell or group consists of resident 

and augmented agency representatives, command LNOs, and interagency subject matter 

experts positioned together to enhance two-way information flow, coordination, and 

collaboration between the CCDR, staff and components, interagency partners, IGOs, 

NGOs, and the private sector. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) becomes the 

responsible staff element for integrating information and understanding of USG agency 

activities. Its members respond to and assist in answering information requirements that 

fill critical gaps in the CAP effort.

2. JIACG (or equivalent organization) actions are generally most 

dynamic during the stabilize and transfer to civil authority phases. Its virtual network 

builds on the previous collaborative planning efforts and adjusts to changing mission 

tasks. This underscores the need to identify the right interagency participants, engage 

them in the military plan, surface issues and discontinuities, and get agreement on task

responsibility early in the process. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) continually 

reviews the specific objectives within the lines of operation/lines of effort and validates 

assessment measures so that interagency objectives are jointly achieved.

3. Planning also occurs for branches to current operations (future 

operations planning). 

4.

(c) Post-Crisis

 As the transition process continues, the roles of USG agencies will 

likely evolve as intermediate military objectives are achieved. These role adjustments 

will include the transfer of responsibilities and relationships among military and USG 

agencies. JIACG (or equivalent organization) collaboration and coordination with USG 

agencies assists the operations team in sorting accountability among the participants at 

the operational level for execution of multi-functional tasks. 

1. Post-crisis recovery and reconstitution implementation, like

transition, build on the OPLAN and/or OPORD and adjust to events on the ground. 

Moreover, the tasks and accountability among various agencies and donors will likely 

change over time. These adjustments may modify supported and supporting roles among 

military and civilian, IGOs, NGOs, and private sector organizations. JIACG (or 

equivalent organization) habitual relationships and collaboration with USG agencies can 

assist the CCDR in adapting to the changing roles and responsibilities among the 

participants.

2. When preplanned conditions are met, the recovery and

reconstitution authority will transfer to civilian leadership. This civilian authority should

have immediate access to the JFC and consultations on interagency planning and 
Joint Interagency Coordination Group 

D-17 

execution. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) role as an interlocutor is substantial. 

The expanding number of civilian organizations and agencies that will have actual or

perceived equities in post-crisis operations may need immediate access to military

planning and/or resources for coordinating support requirements. 

c. Force Planning. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) should be involved in 

the force planning process due to the potential for competition for scarce resources and 

footprint among USG agencies. The amount of personnel, spares, resources, and 

capabilities physically present and occupying space at a deployed location comprise the 

footprint of the force. The scale of any operation determines the footprint, but the proper 

balance of people and equipment and using reachback can minimize the impact of 

deployed forces. Increases in footprint size require more support for those forces. 

Diplomatic restrictions may affect the size of a footprint. A HN may limit the number of 

foreign personnel on its soil, making the need for reachback support even more crucial.

9. Employment

a. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) serves as the locus for facilitating the 

synchronization of interagency efforts in joint strategic planning. As a fully integrated 

element of the combatant command staff, it facilitates the implementation of DOD 

external POLMIL relationships in the AOR. The JIACG (or equivalent organization)

concentrates its efforts in five primary areas:

(1) Maintain continuous connectivity with USG agencies and departments,

IGOs, and NGOs, and the private sector; 

(2) Assist in security cooperation planning; 

(3) Collaborate in joint operation planning; 

(4) Support joint operations; and

(5) Participate in training and exercises.

b. In joint operations, interagency coordination will normally occur within the 

NSC/HSC. During lesser operations and operations not involving armed conflict, the 

GCC’s staff or JIACG (or equivalent organization) may deal directly with a COM or 

members of the country team regarding issues that do not transcend the boundaries of the 

HN. In some operations, a special envoy of the President or an SRSG may be involved. 

c. The JIACG (or equivalent organization) establishes regular, timely, and 

collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners in 

the AOR. Composed of USG civilian and military experts and tailored to meet the 

requirements of a supported GCC, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) provides the 

commander with the capability to collaborate with USG civilian agencies and 

departments. JIACGs (or equivalent organization) complement the interagency 

coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the NSC/HSC. Members 

participate in contingency, crisis, and transfer to civil authority planning and provide 
Appendix D

D-18 JP 3-08 

links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize operations with them. The 

JIACG (or equivalent organization) can aid military planners at all levels by focusing on 

the following: 

(1) Identify interagency partners that are or should be involved in the operation. 

In most cases, initial planning and coordination with other USG agencies will have 

occurred in the NSC/HSC, DOD, JS, and Services. 

(2) Understand and clarify, if required, the interagency relationships. Draft an 

authoritative interagency hierarchy diagram, including the lead USG agency having

primary responsibility, so that relational lines and decision pathways can be easily 

identified.

(3) Clarify the objectives of the response that should be outlined in the 

statement of conclusions from the relevant NSC/HSC, NSC/PC, or NSC/DC meetings 

that authorized the overall USG participation. 

(4) Review COAs for the assigned military tasks and determine the operational 

compatibility with USG agencies.

(5) Cooperate with each interagency participant and obtain a clear definition of 

the role that each plays. In some situations, they may not have representatives either in 

theater or be colocated with the combatant command’s staff. The JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) can advise and recommend that the GCC request temporary assignment of 

LNOs from the participating agencies and departments. Given limited staff in civilian 

agencies; however, placement of temporary liaisons may be difficult.

(6) Identify potential obstacles arising from conflicting priorities. Early 

identification of potential obstacles and concurrence to solutions by all participants is the 

first step toward resolution. Often these obstacles are assumed to have been addressed by 

another agency or department. If the obstacles cannot be resolved by the JIACG (or 

equivalent organization), they may be forwarded up to the appropriate level for 

resolution. 

(7) Identify resources relevant to the situation. Determine which interagency 

participants are committed to provide these resources to reduce duplication, increase 

coherence in the collective effort, and identify what additional resources are needed.

(8) Assist military planners in defining the appropriate military end state, plan 

for the transfer to civil authority, and recommend redeployment considerations. 

(9) Recommend the ways and means to optimize the varied and extensive 

resources available to complement and support the broader, long-term objectives during 

and after the response to a crisis.

(10) Coordinate the establishment of interagency assessment teams that can 

rapidly deploy to the area to evaluate the situation.
Joint Interagency Coordination Group 

D-19 

(11) Participate and contribute to CAP for incidents or situations involving a 

threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, and military forces or vital interests 

that may require interagency coordination to achieve US objectives. 

d. For domestic interagency coordination where DOD does not have the lead, the 

JIACG (or equivalent organization) acts as the focal point for collectively assisting in 

coordination and unification of the campaign plan between the primary agency and DOD 

so that senior national agency and military officials at the strategic level can possess a 

working architecture which achieves objectives. Architecture similar to that in the

DHS/FEMA Annual National Hurricane OPLANs/CONPLANs, with lines of operations 

for both military and governmental agencies must be developed. 

10. Training and Exercises

a. Integration of the JIACG (or equivalent organization) and linkage to interagency 

partners with the combatant command staff provides an opportunity to train together and 

develop working relationships essential to efficient staff work and successful joint 

operations. Training opportunities include: 

(1) Training JIACG (or equivalent organization) members on processes and 

procedures for joint operation planning, their responsibilities, staff relationships, 

collaborative tools, and interagency coordination and integration with military operations. 

JIACG (or equivalent organization) training is available on Joint Knowledge Online 

(http://jko.cmil.org).

(2) Training selected personnel external to the JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) on the use of communication and collaboration tools to optimize mutually 

supportive decision-support systems of participating USG agencies and departments.

(3) Training USG agency partners that would potentially augment JIACG (or 

equivalent organization) planning and operations. This augmentation may be on-site, 

virtual, or deployed. The training is aimed at developing a coherent team requiring 

minimum predeployment training with emphasis on the CCDR’s contingency planning 

and implementation processes. 

b. During the initial stages of a developing crisis, the CCDR may direct the staff to

coordinate and participate in crisis-specific training. The JIACG (or equivalent 

organization) is an integral element of this training. This training may range from a small 

internal staff training exercise to training with a potential JTF and components. The 

JIACG (or equivalent organization) is responsible for identifying the appropriate USG 

agency participants, surfacing the relevant issues, and coordinating the necessary 

training. Depending on the timeline and venue, this training may be onsite or virtual. 

Finally, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) continues to conduct internal training as 

required for individual replacements and augmentation personnel to maintain core skills 

proficiency. 
Appendix D

D-20 JP 3-08 

c. JIACG (or equivalent organization) planners should ensure that interagency 

concerns, priorities, and requirements are a part of any exercise or training plan. 

Consideration should be given to drafting a comprehensive listing of master scenario 

events that contains both routine events and, when possible, scenario-specific events to 

stress the interagency linkages with combatant command operations. 
E-1 

APPENDIX E

JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE

1. Introduction and Overview

a. The joint interagency task force (JIATF) is a force multiplier that uses a unique 

organizational structure to focus on a single mission. A JIATF is typically formed for a 

specific task and purpose as are most task forces. JIATFs are formal organizations 

usually chartered by the DOD and one or more civilian agencies and guided by a MOA or 

other founding legal documents that define the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of 

the JIATF’s members. The JIATF is staffed and led by personnel from multiple agencies 

under a single commander or director. 

b. Forming a national level JIATF takes a national charter that lays out authorities 

and mandates membership and resourcing. An executive order, national level directive, 

or mandate from the NSC/HSC that directs all agencies involved to support the JIATF 

with actual resources may be required. SecDef may, in cooperation with other Cabinet 

members, form a JIATF through the establishment of detailed memoranda of agreement. 

JFCs can form JIATFs with one or more USG agencies based on mutual cooperation and 

agreement. 

c. The establishment of functional and enduring JIATFs transcends the internal 

capabilities and authorities of combatant commands and JTFs. Based upon the analysis 

and the desire to establish JIATFs, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) or another 

designated staff entity should document the requirements for formal submission through 

command channels to JS and OSD for approval and pursuit through the NSC or HSC

system. Success would be manifest in interagency consensus, commitment, and MOAs 

or MOUs that infuse JIATFs with supporting policy, legitimacy, defined purpose, 

authorities, leadership parameters, functional protocols, and resources. 

d. Coordinating authorities, channels, and terms of reference must be carefully 

established and documented for JIATFs, with the aim of facilitating their missions and 

flexibility while not promoting duplication of effort and confusion. Such authorities 

constitute the rules of the road for JIATFs, and they must contribute to unity of effort and 

common situational awareness.

e. Increasingly, JIATFs are being formed to achieve unity of effort and bring all 

instruments of national power to bear on asymmetric threats. JIATFs are often created to 

address problems such as militias, “bad neighbors,” and foreign fighters, all of which 

complicate the security environment. JIATFs may be separate elements under the JFC, 

or they may be subordinate to a functional component command, a joint special 

operations task force, or a staff section such as the J-3. JIATF members can coordinate 

with the country team, their home agencies, JIACGs (or equivalent organization) in the 

area of interest, and other JIATFs in order to defeat complex hostile networks. Because 

they use more than the military instrument of national power, JIATFs are generally not a 

lethal asset, but rather develop and drive creative nonlethal solutions and policy actions to 

accomplish their mission. 
Appendix E

E-2 JP 3-08 

2. Joint Interagency Task Force South 

a. Located in Key West, Florida, JIATF South serves as the catalyst for integrated 

and synchronized interagency counterdrug operations and is responsible for the detection 

and monitoring of suspect air and maritime drug activity in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of 

Mexico, and the eastern Pacific. JIATF South also collects, processes, and disseminates 

counterdrug information for interagency and partner nation operations. JIATF South 

conducts counter illicit trafficking operations, intelligence fusion, and multi-sensor 

correlation to detect, monitor, and handoff suspected illicit trafficking targets; promotes 

security cooperation; and coordinates country team and partner nation initiatives in order 

to defeat the flow of illicit traffic. JIATF South is USSOUTHCOM’s executive agent for 

DOD support to counterdrug initiatives in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. 

b. The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy produces the National 

Drug Control Strategy which directs the Nation’s anti-drug efforts and establishes a 

program, a budget, and guidelines for cooperation among federal, state, and local entities. 

The office also evaluates, coordinates, and oversees both the international and domestic 

anti-drug efforts of executive branch agencies and ensures that such efforts sustain and 

complement state and local anti-drug activities.

c. While traditional joint operations focus on efforts among the Services, JIATF 

South has gone past these traditional boundaries, becoming a fully integrated interagency 

command. Whereas most organizations count on LNOs to represent them, JIATF South 

takes this concept much further. The top command structure demonstrates total 

integration, with the Director being a USCG rear admiral and the Vice Director coming 

from CBP. Integration also exists through the lower levels of the command: both the 

Directors for Intelligence and Operations are military officers, but their Deputies are from 

the DEA and CBP. Intelligence analysts from the DEA, CBP, and FBI are located in the 

Joint Intelligence Operations Center to ensure that LEAs are involved in daily operations 

and that information is not stovepiped. 

d. JIATF South incorporates a wide range of governmental and international 

organizations in addition to those previously mentioned. The NGA, DIA, CIA, and 

LNOs from the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and a host of Latin

American countries all play an important role in intelligence, operations, and planning. 

The United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands provide ships and aircraft to the task 

force; and the Flag officer of the Netherlands Forces Caribbean commands one task 

group in the task force. 

e. The focus of the command is a Joint Operations Command Center where 

intelligence and operations functions are fused in a state of the art command, control, 

communications, and intelligence facility. The JIATF coordinates the employment of 

USN and USCG ships and aircraft, USAF aircraft, and aircraft and ships from allied 

nations and LEAs—a complete integration of sophisticated multi-agency forces 

committed to the cause of interdicting the flow of illicit drugs.
Joint Interagency Task Force

E-3 

3. Joint Interagency Task Force West

JIATF West combats drug-related transnational organized crime to reduce threats in 

the Asia-Pacific region in order to protect national security interests and promote regional 

stability. To accomplish this mission, JIATF West provides US and foreign law 

enforcement with fused interagency information and intelligence analysis, and with 

counterdrug training and infrastructure development support. The JIATF West staff 

consists of uniformed and civilian members of all five military Services as well as 

representatives from the national IC and US federal LEAs. Law enforcement 

representatives include the DEA, FBI, and ICE. JIATF West is Commander 

USPACOM’s executive agent for DOD support to counterdrug initiatives in the 

USPACOM AOR. JIATF West is closely aligned with USPACOM’s Theater Security 

Cooperation, War on Terrorism, and Maritime Security priorities in planning, developing, 

and implementing counterdrug programs in Asia and the Pacific.

4. National Counterterrorism Center

a. The NCTC leads the USG efforts to combat terrorism at home and abroad by 

analyzing the threat, sharing that information with NCTC partners, and integrating all 

instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.

b. NCTC was established by Presidential Executive Order 13354 and codified by the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. NCTC implements a key 

recommendation of the 9/11 Commission: “Breaking the older mold of national 

government organizations, this NCTC should be a center for joint operational planning 

and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various agencies.”

c. The Director of NCTC is a Deputy Secretary-equivalent with a unique, dual line 

of reporting: to the President regarding Executive branch-wide CT planning, and to the 

DNI regarding intelligence matters. NCTC follows the policy direction of the President, 

and NSC/HSC. 

d. NCTC is staffed by more than 500 personnel from more than 16 departments and 

agencies (approximately 60 percent of whom are detailed to NCTC). NCTC is 

organizationally part of the ODNI. 

e. NCTC serves as the primary organization in the USG for integrating and 

analyzing all intelligence pertaining to CT (except for information pertaining exclusively 

to domestic terrorism).

f. NCTC serves as the USG’s central and shared knowledge bank on known and 

suspected terrorists and international terrorist groups. NCTC also provides USG agencies 

with the terrorism intelligence analysis and other information they need to fulfill their 

missions. NCTC houses more than 30 intelligence, military, law enforcement, and HS

networks under one roof to facilitate robust information sharing. NCTC is a model of 

interagency information sharing. 
Appendix E

E-4 JP 3-08 

g. NCTC conducts strategic operational planning for CT activities across the USG, 

integrating all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, financial, military, 

intelligence, HS, and law enforcement to ensure unity of effort. NCTC ensures effective 

integration of CT plans and synchronization of operations across more than 20 

government departments and agencies engaged in the war on terrorism, through a single 

and truly joint planning process. 

5. National Joint Terrorism Task Force 

a. The National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) acts as a liaison and conduit 

for information on threats and leads from FBI HQ to local joint terrorism task forces and 

to participating agencies. 

b. The NJTTF is located in the multi-agency NCTC, where it performs its mission 

while also working with NCTC personnel to exchange information, analyze data, and 

plan antiterrorism strategies.

c. A vital aspect of the NJTTF’s mission is sharing information among its 80 

members—officers, agents, and analysts—who then pass the information onto the 48 

different agencies they represent. Those agencies—from the law enforcement, 

intelligence, HS, defense, diplomatic, and public safety sectors—include the DHS, the 

US military, and federal, state, and local partners. Men and women from the US Secret 

Service, Federal Air Marshals, New York City Police Department, Naval Criminal 

Investigative Service, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Amtrak Police, and dozens of other 

organizations work together every day in the global war on terrorism. 

6. Joint Interagency Homeland Security Task Force 

The Secretary of Homeland Security, under Title 6, USC, Section 465, may establish 

and operate a permanent Joint Interagency Homeland Security Task Force composed of 

representatives from military and civilian agencies of the USG for the purposes of 

anticipating terrorist threats against the United States and taking appropriate actions to 

prevent harm to the United States. 

7. United States Special Operations Command Interagency Task Force

USSOCOM has established an interagency Task Force with liaison personnel from 

11 different DOD and non-DOD agencies. 

8. Considerations for Establishing a Joint Interagency Task Force 

a. Resolve the dual civilian and military chains of command to ensure both fall 

under the same directive authority, which ensures all departments and agencies work 

together. 

b. The JIATF must be empowered, within the missions specified, to be the USG 

national authority to direct departments and agencies to collaborate, coordinate, plan, 

prioritize, and integrate resources provided from the USG and willing multinational and 
Joint Interagency Task Force

E-5 

multilateral partners. Some operational level JIATFs utilize a more collaborative 

approach with less clearly defined C2 to great effect.

c. Establish operating procedures and protocols that are simple, general, and open to 

review and modification to accommodate the authorities that participating agencies bring 

with them. The authorities establishing the organization must also clearly define the role, 

responsibilities, and authorities of the HN on whose territory it operates. 

d. Although agency requirements can serve as the basis for JIATF procedures and 

formats, reporting procedures and doctrinal nomenclature must be developed and evolved 

to support the mission rather than individual agency requirements. 

e. Ideally, commanders of JIATF and agency representative equivalents must have 

control (OPCON, TACON, or another arrangement) to commit dedicated resources to 

operations and mission outcomes, likely requiring an Executive Branch mandate and 

relief from restrictions on application of resources, and cabinet level agreement and/or 

MOAs/MOUs among agencies. Operational level commanders of JIATFs often do not 

have the authority to commit resources but use reachback and networking to attain 

necessary assets and guidance when needed. 

f. The JIATF must establish operating procedures to “make space” for an 

empowered coordination node and direct that certain, specified coordination processes 

run through the organization. The authority must specify how internal processes will be 

structured to make them effective and adaptable to accommodate the participation of a 

wide variety of agencies and nations.

g. The JIATF should adapt existing authorities and process models, as appropriate to 

the mission, of other JIATFs. 

h. JIATF must have specified, appropriate staff analysis and decision-making 

processes (internal, higher authorities, or delegated) depending on the line of operation or 

mission assigned. 

i. The establishing authority should consider the types of missions and lines of 

operation that the JIATF will be assigned and ensure that staff analysis and decisionmaking processes are either in place or will be developed to ensure the success of the 

organization. 

j. Specify the least cumbersome and restrictive system for information sharing 

among USG and multinational partners. 

k. Consult with participating agencies and nations to establish a set of metrics which 

are appropriate to the mission or lines of operation assigned to the new organization. 

l. A JIATF should be a truly interagency staff and leadership body, with crosstrained interagency staff and senior representatives who have the authorities to commit 

resources. The leadership of the organization should be balanced, have the authority to 

direct actions within the staff and field elements operating for the organization, regardless 
Appendix E

E-6 JP 3-08 

of home agency (e.g., civilian deputies, watch officers can direct military units, and 

military officers can direct civilian organizations, in the name of the JIATF-like entity 

and its authorities).

m. A JIATF should have the internal organizational capability to administratively 

support LNOs to leverage their expertise. 

n. The JIATF should be an operational HQ, (not a staff element) with an interagency 

operations center that plans, prioritizes, synchronizes, integrates, executes, and assesses 

operations on a continuous basis. 

o. The JIATF must have access to national intelligence assets and products as a 

routine input to their own intelligence fusion requirements and capabilities. 

p. Whatever mission or line(s) of operation are assigned to a JIATF, dedicated 

resources to be provided from each participating agency and/or nation should be specified 

in advance, with the authority to employ those resources assigned to the JIATF. When 

this authority does not reside in a JIATF, reachback and networking can serve this 

purpose. 

q. Establishment and operation of a JIATF should be a separate, additional line item 

of funding for the establishing authorities. Costs should be allocated on an equitable 

basis. The JIATF should have its own resource management capability and 

administrative capability.
F-1 

APPENDIX F

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM

1. Introduction and Overview

a. The focus of the PRT is on the provincial government and local infrastructure in 

the area assigned. Normally, PRTs are assigned by province, but may be assigned to 

local governments within a province or to more than one province. Both the 

effectiveness and legitimacy of provincial governments will vary widely from country to 

country and even from province to province within a country. As such, the focus of the 

PRT’s effort will largely depend on the needs of the government in place. In an area 

where the government lacks legitimacy (possibly because it has not existed previously or 

is perceived as corrupt and ineffective), it may be necessary for the PRT to take on initial 

stabilization activities without the presence of the HN government until initial trust can 

be established and relationships built that will help enhance the legitimacy of the 

provincial government as progress continues. In another area where the government 

enjoys some measure of legitimacy but is largely ineffective (and therefore in danger of 

losing legitimacy as well), the PRT will focus on helping HN government institutions 

develop the capacity to govern. 

b. USG PRTs exemplify the nature of a true joint, interagency, intergovernmental, 

and multinational operational environment: Potential compositions of PRTs mandate 

interoperability and interdependence of the military and interagency components. Even 

though the mission sets of PRTs vary, their objectives are tactical with a strategic focus. 

Subject matter expert and critical skills provide the foundation for the PRT to function. 

Manning these skill sets requires contributions from the various Services, interagency 

partners, private sector/academia, and contractor capabilities. The most valued lesson 

learned within PRTs is the ability to train and work together as a team.

2. Organization 

a. The organization and size of the PRT will vary largely depending on the 

operational environment and required tasks. In addition to organization and size, PRTs 

differ in roles, interagency participation, contractor staffing, capabilities, capacities, 

funding, and chain of command. Military participation is often the driving factor in PRT 

size. 

b. The PRT leader is normally a DOS official with a DOD deputy; however, a 

military officer may lead the PRT with a DOS official as deputy. Personnel serving in a 

PRT continue to work for their parent agency and are subject to operating guidelines of 

their original chain of command for performance and discipline, but are expected to 

follow the PRT leadership team’s directions, rules, policies, and procedures. Although 

the agency providing the PRT leader may differ from one PRT to the next, the DOD, 

DOS, and USAID senior members generally form a command group/senior management 

team. Maintaining consensus within this command group is key to the integration of all

the organization’s elements. 
Appendix F

F-2 JP 3-08 

c. Functional groups within the PRT will also vary, but are generally similar to JTF 

directorates (e.g., operations, logistics, plans). The operations group (or groups) may be 

organized by lines of operations/lines of effort (e.g., rule of law, economic development), 

by capabilities (e.g., engineer, USAID office, security), or by a combination thereof. 

When multinational partners are included in a PRT, they may function as a distinct 

organization within the PRT. The PRT organization typically includes a CMOC to 

coordinate and share information with other CA teams, NGOs, and IGOs operating in the 

area.

d. Agencies participating in addition to DOD, DOS, and USAID may include, but 

are not limited to, USDA, DOJ, DHHS, and DOC as well as HN national government 

agencies (such as the Interior Ministry or multinational equivalent). Interagency (and 

possibly international) MOAs may be required in the establishment of PRTs to define 

roles, responsibilities, command relationships, and funding lines. When possible, PRT 

command team/senior leadership team and members should receive their training as a

unit prior to deployment to facilitate team building and unity of effort upon arrival in 

country. 

e. Military support to a PRT normally includes CA representation and other forces 

for CMO. Additionally, the military may provide a security element as well as a quick 

reaction force. Military support may also include, but is not limited to, mobility, 

sustainment, engineering, administrative, and communication. The PRT may contract for 

many of these functions, including security, rather than drawing on direct military 

support. This will be most prevalent as the security environment becomes more stable. 

Alternatively, when the security environment dictates the location of the PRT on a 

forward operating base, the local military commander may provide some of these support 

capabilities.

3. Command and Control

a. The nature of command and coordinating relationship is complex and should be 

addressed early and continuously. Direction and coordination of PRTs can be conducted 

by a national level interagency steering committee, under the supervision of the COM, a 

multinational executive committee, or JFC.

b. Funding is perhaps the most difficult issue for PRT management. Funding will 

come from several different sources (e.g., multinational, USG, and HN), even within a 

single executive department. PRT leaders should carefully track and understand sources 

of funding lines and legal restrictions on their use. The success of interagency 

coordination at the highest levels will be reflected in the ability of the PRT to coordinate 

interagency funding lines in the field. 

4. Employment

a. Participation in planning by the core PRT staff should begin as early as possible 

to build coordinating relationships. Although PRTs are employed primarily for the 

purpose of stability operations (which can occur in each phase), PRTs typically focus 
Provincial Reconstruction Team

F-3 

their efforts on achieving objectives in the stabilize phase of a joint operation, facilitating 

the transition to enable the civil authority phase. It should be noted that the stabilize 

phase may come at different times for different provinces or operational areas based on 

the design and/or progress of the operation. Normally, the PRT should enter the 

operational area before the joint force begins the transition from dominate to stabilize.

b. As HN civil authority is established and the environment is stabilized, military 

support generally decreases. Eventually the PRT will transition to a DOS ACT or FACT 

team, another international organization/entity, or HN; the other components of the PRT 

may transition to more traditional means of providing development assistance.

c. Governance. The primary focus of a PRT in any area of operations is to improve 

the provincial government’s ability to provide democratic governance and essential 

services, and linking central government with the population. 

(1) Assistance Specialists. The USAID typically contracts a three-person team 

of civilian specialists to provide training and technical assistance programs for PRTs. 

The program aims to improve the efficiency of provincial governments by providing 

policy analysis, training, and technical assistance to national ministries, their provincial 

representatives, provincial governors, and provincial councils. The team of civilian 

specialists works directly with provincial officials to increase competence and efficiency. 

For example, they assist provincial council and provincial development committee 

members with the conduct of meetings, budget development, and oversight of provincial 

government activities. The team also encourages transparency and popular participation 

by working with citizens and community organizations, hosting conferences, and 

promoting public forums. However, DOD must be prepared to execute this function, via 

CA functional specialty teams, in the absence of USAID and/or HN specialists. 

(2) Other Expertise. The USAID team contains members with expertise in 

local government, financial management, and municipal planning. Up to seventy percent 

of the contracted staff members come from regional countries and include local 

professionals. Additional contracted experts are on call from regional offices. The 

USAID requires contract advisors speak the HN language and possess extensive 

professional experience. USAID-trained instructors present training programs based on 

professionally developed modules in the HN language. The training and technical 

assistance programs emphasize practical application with focus areas in computers, 

planning, public administration, and provision of public services.

d. Security. The absence of security impacts the effectiveness of PRT operations 

and efforts to develop effective local governments.

(1) Security Impacts. Provincial governors and other senior officials may be 

intimidated, threatened, and assassinated in limited or unsecure areas. Provincial 

councils may potentially reduce or eliminate regular meetings if security deteriorates. 

Additionally, provincial-level ministry representatives could become reluctant to attend 

work because of security concerns. PRT personnel and local officials may lose the 

ability to meet openly or visit provincial government centers and US military installations 
Appendix F

F-4 JP 3-08 

in limited security environments. During security alerts, PRT civilian personnel may be 

restricted to base, preventing interaction with HN counterparts. Unstable security 

situations limit PRT personnel from promoting economic development by counseling 

local officials, encouraging local leaders and business owners, and motivating outside 

investors. 

(2) Secure Movement and Presence. The movement of PRT personnel with 

heavily armed military escorts contributes to the overall security presence and reassures 

citizens in the areas where they operate. However, the PRT does not normally conduct 

military operations, nor do they assist HN military forces. However, PRTs must be 

prepared to conduct defensive military operations when under attack. The only security 

role assigned to a PRT is FP by providing armored vehicles and an advisor to escort PRT 

personnel to meetings with local officials. US military assigned to escort civilian PRT 

members receive training in providing PRT civilian personnel protection under an 

agreement with the DOS. The training is designed to reinforce understanding of escort 

responsibilities and to prevent endangerment to PRT civilian personnel. US military 

escorting PRT personnel should not combine this responsibility with other missions. The 

problem of providing PRT civilian personnel with security is compounded by competing 

protection priorities preventing dedicated security teams in most situations limiting 

security teams to available personnel.

e. Reconstruction. The USAID representative of the PRT has the primary 

responsibility for developing the PRT economic development work plan including its 

assistance projects. The PRT partners with the HN to develop their capacity which 

results in the development of infrastructure including schools, clinics, community 

centers, and government buildings. The PRT also focuses on developing human capacity 

through training and advisory programs. 

5. Fundamental Guidelines

a. Objective. The mission of a PRT is to stabilize the operational environment, 

creating conditions for development, laying the foundations for long-term stability, and 

enabling the civil authorities. PRT planners for a particular area must define decisive and 

achievable goals for that province that meet the objective of stability, giving direction to 

all PRT operations. These goals will define the lifespan of the PRT, facilitating its 

transition to more traditional development mechanisms. 

b. Unity of Effort. The success of the PRT depends on its ability to operate as a 

composite unit. Unity of effort is the goal and members must lay aside interagency 

differences to focus on the common objective. Additionally, members of the PRT must 

ensure higher agency organizations understand and support the unified effort required. 

PRT development and capacity building activities should be coordinated with the military 

commander responsible for security in the area the PRTs is operating. Beyond 

interagency integration, the PRT must also work with IGOs and NGOs in the area to 

share information, reduce duplication of work (or counterproductive efforts), and 

communicate about civil-military sensitivities.
Provincial Reconstruction Team

F-5 

c. Promotion of Legitimacy and Effectiveness. The key to achieving long-term 

stability and development is the establishment of the local government as the legitimate 

and effective governing authority. To achieve this, the PRT will often need to “lead from 

behind and underneath,” building capacity and working behind the scenes to ensure HN 

ownership and promoting HN primacy and legitimacy. This will often mean accepting 

local government solutions rather than imposing expertise. Legitimacy may be partly 

achieved by facilitating the visibility of HN presence in the province by assisting official 

visits to remote districts and villages (e.g., transportation, communications). Another key 

element will be the engagement of HN officials, the local communities, and the 

population through established and traditional bodies. 

d. Restraint. PRTs establish realistic objectives and balance the tempo of 

operations to maintain the primacy of HN legitimacy and effectiveness. SC efforts must 

be aimed at managing expectations—promising only what can be delivered. Planning for 

all programs and projects must include long-term sustainability. Additionally, efforts at 

the local level must be coordinated with national level processes to ensure the legitimacy 

and effectiveness of the entire HN government.
Appendix F

F-6 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
G-1 

APPENDIX G

THE INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR 

RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

1. Introduction and Overview

a. The Secretary of State may direct the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 

Stabilization to coordinate integrated USG efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct R&S 

activities, including ensuring harmonization with any planned or ongoing military 

operations, and by convoking an IMS response to a crisis. 

b. The IMS for R&S is designed to assist Washington, DC, policymakers, COMs, 

and military commanders manage complex R&S engagements by ensuring coordination 

among all USG stakeholders at the strategic, operational, and tactical/field levels. The 

lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo demonstrate that the US 

must employ an approach in these types of engagements that draws upon the full range of 

diplomatic, development, defense, intelligence, and economic resources available to the 

USG.

c. The IMS is designed for highly complex crises and operations, which are national 

or security priorities, involve widespread instability, may require military operations, and 

where multiple US agencies will be engaged in the policy and programmatic response. It 

is not intended to respond to the political and humanitarian crises that are regularly and 

effectively handled through the current Washington, DC, and embassy systems.

d. The system is designed to provide policymakers in Washington, DC, COMs, and 

military commanders with flexible tools to ensure unity of effort as laid out through 

whole-of-government strategic and implementation planning for R&S. The system is 

intended to facilitate and support: 

(1) Integrated planning processes for unified USG strategic and implementation 

plans, including funding requests; 

(2) Joint interagency deployments; and

(3) A joint civilian operations capability including shared communications and 

information management. 

e. This system is a crisis response mechanism. It does not preclude interagency 

scenario-based prevention or contingency planning, which may occur independently. 

The system will draw upon such plans when they exist. 

f. When a significant crisis occurs or begins to emerge, the Secretary of State may 

decide to convoke an IMS response, with input from regional bureaus, ambassadors, and 

other relevant USG leadership and possibly at the request of NSC/PC and NSC/DC. 

g. The IMS consists of the following: 
Appendix G

G-2 JP 3-08 

(1) Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group. A Washington, DCbased secretariat to support an IPC or another interagency decision-making body 

established to manage a crisis; 

(2) Integration Planning Cell. A civilian planning cell integrated with 

relevant GCC(s) or with equivalent multinational HQ; and

(3) Advance Civilian Team. One or more interagency field management and 

coordination teams to support COMs in the field. 

h. These structures are flexible in size and composition to meet the particular 

requirements of the situation and integrate personnel from all relevant agencies. 

Recruitment of personnel may require additional flexible hiring authorities, training, and 

resources not presently available. International partners may also be represented. Each 

team is designed to support and augment, not replace, existing structures in Washington, 

DC, at the GCC, and in the field. The DOS’s Executive Secretariat will continue to 

establish and manage interagency task forces, monitor crises worldwide, promote 

contingency planning and emergency preparedness, and support overseas evacuations. 

2. Components

a. The IMS consists of the following components: 

(1) Washington, DC

(a) The CRSG serves as a secretariat to the central interagency coordinating 

body for the USG effort, such as a crisis-specific NSC/IPC co-chaired by the regional 

assistant secretary, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and the relevant 

NSC director. This NSC/IPC would cover any country-specific concerns related to the 

R&S operation. It would augment any existing regional or country-specific NSC/IPC for 

the purposes of the crisis response. 

(b) The group prepares the whole-of-government strategic plan. The plan 

will include a common USG strategic goal, a CONOPS, the major essential tasks the 

USG must undertake, including with international partners, and resource requirements to 

achieve stability. This can build off of earlier interagency scenario-based planning. The 

CRSG manages the interagency process that prepares and forwards strategic guidance 

recommendations for decision by the crisis-specific NSC/IPC, NSC/DC, and, as 

appropriate, the NSC/PC to ensure USG guidance. This plan can be coordinated and 

synchronized with the development of military planning with the GCC’s HQ and JTF HQ 

through an IPC and ACT, respectively. 

(c) Once the USG integrated strategic plan is approved, the CRSG may

facilitate preparation and integration of interagency implementation planning. It also 

facilitates operations support, information management, international/coalition 

partnership development, and resource mobilization. 
The Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

G-3 

(2) GCC’s HQ (or equivalent multinational HQ). An integration planning cell

can be deployed to a GCC’s HQ. The CRSG may establish and deploy an integration 

planning cell at the request of the GCC through DOD. The integration planning cell

assists in harmonizing the civilian and military planning processes and operations. If 

DOD issues a warning/planning order to the GCC, the CRSG sends to the command an

integration planning cell made up of relevant interagency planners, and regional and 

sectoral experts. The integration planning cell supports the commander in harmonizing 

military plans with USG civilian strategic and implementation plans. In the case of a 

multinational led mission, an integration planning cell could also be deployed to its HQ 

to advise and support as appropriate. 

(3) Embassy/US Field Presence

(a) To support existing field operations and/or establish new operations, the 

CRSG may deploy an ACT at the request of the COM and approval of the interagency 

crisis decision-making body (e.g., NSC/IPC). The ACT forms the R&S interagency 

general staff under COM authority to coordinate and support execution of US R&S plans. 

The team can operate with or without US military involvement. Under any 

circumstances, all US civilian field operations are conducted under the COM’s authority, 

and the COM bears ultimate responsibility for implementation of the USG R&S strategic 

plan. 

(b) The ACT and its operations will be integrated with existing embassy

and USAID mission structures and personnel as appropriate to support the COM’s 

implementation of the USG R&S strategic plan. In the absence of an existing USG 

civilian presence, the senior member of an ACT will act as COM, which will have the 

additional task of standing up a more permanent, formal USG presence. 

(c) If the COM determines field units are necessary, the ACT can deploy a 

number of FACTs, which provide the COM with maximum capacity to implement R&S 

programs at the provincial or local level. When required, FACTs will integrate with US 

or other military forces to achieve optimal USG/coalition unity of effort. 

b. This system participants at all levels have similar visibility in the provinces, 

providing a foundation for a COP, that the COM has a coherent framework for R&S 

decision making, and that all agency activities are synchronized in time, space, and 

purpose, limiting duplication of effort. The current roles and responsibilities of each of 

these components are outlined below. Guides are under development that will further 

clarify the roles and structures of the IMS. 

3. Washington, DC: Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group

a. The CRSG is an interagency planning, operations, and coordination staff that acts 

as a secretariat to the lead interagency crisis response body (NSC/IPC). The CRSG is 

drawn from interagency participants as necessary to provide expertise in strategic 

assessment and planning, operations support, knowledge sharing, resource mobilization, 

and strategic monitoring, as well as field team support and partner coordination. 
Appendix G

G-4 JP 3-08 

b. The CRSG assists interagency leadership (e.g., NSC/IPC) with the following 

tasks: 

(1) Informs and Presents Options. Channels interagency input and provides 

recommendations to NSC/PC and NSC/DC in the form of a country-specific R&S 

strategic plan; ensures that NSC/PC and NSC/DC understand the full range of 

interagency consensus, interests or divergence of opinion; 

(2) Unifies Effort. Integrates all relevant regional and functional capabilities 

across the USG into one focused process for planning and implementation; 

(3) Identifies and Mobilizes Resources. Uses integrated planning to identify, 

mobilize, and coordinate human resources and funding as well as additional resource 

requirements to meet the needs of the evolving mission. Works closely with the Director 

of Foreign Assistance country core team, which currently serves as the focal point for all 

foreign assistance prioritizing and programming for a given country as well as other 

agencies which do not fall under Director of Foreign Assistance. Works also with agency 

budget, legal, Congressional, and human resources offices to facilitate any necessary 

flexible personnel authorities, supplemental requests, or legislation;

(4) Manages Strategy. Ensures that the range of diplomatic, development, 

defense, economic and trade strategies, Congressional consultations, resources decisions, 

and PA strategies are integrated and managed as part of overall engagement efforts; 

(5) Drives Implementation. Drives implementation of policy decisions by 

NSC/PC and NSC/DC through appropriate interagency entities in close coordination with 

the COM and military commanders; 

(6) Resolves Disputes. As needed, resolves disputes among interagency 

partners or raises disputes to higher decision-making authority, (i.e., NSC/PC, NSC/DC); 

and

(7) Monitors Security. Working closely with the COM, assesses evolving 

security environment, assists the DOS’s Diplomatic Security to alter security 

requirements/support and review safety of civilians on the ground in coordination with 

Diplomatic Security, and the regional security officer, taking into account any military 

assessments.

c. A CRSG does not direct field operations. The COM retains control of all USG 

activities in country not under the GCC. 

d. The CRSG Secretariat

(1) Plans. Develops with the interagency community, for senior decision, an 

overall US R&S strategic plan. This plan lays out policy goals, program requirements, 

institutional responsibilities, base funding requirements, and supporting plans for 

diplomatic engagement (including public diplomacy) and intelligence support. From the 
The Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

G-5 

strategic plan, the CRSG secretariat staff may work with agency planners and the COM 

to develop and update a US interagency R&S implementation plans. 

(2) Informs. Ensures widespread situational awareness within USG of all 

agencies’ activities and of the field perspective, coordinating assessments, and 

disseminating information (including situation and progress reports) through the 

Washington, DC, community, Congress, and the field. 

(3) Supports the NSC/IPC. Supports decision making and activities of the 

CRSG through organizational support (e.g., agendas, papers, records, paper preparation, 

clearance), NSC/PC or NSC/DC meeting preparation, management of sub-NSC/IPCs and 

teams charged with developing the strategic plan’s major mission elements (i.e., strategic 

objectives), and dissemination of information. 

(4) Supports Operations. Supports mobilization, activities, and policy 

requirements of integration planning cells and USG field elements. Provides support for 

these teams in information management, incorporating best practices, policy review and 

guidance, and logistical support. 

(5) Facilitates Partnerships. Facilitates international relationships and partner 

coordination. 

(6) Monitors and Evaluates. Establishes and tracks strategic-level metrics, 

assumptions, and other trend indicators to assess progress. 

e. Structure of the CRSG Secretariat. In order to perform these tasks, the 

Secretariat may form the following groups, drawing on personnel from across 

interagency participants. 

(1) Strategic Planning. An interagency team which develops the integrated 

strategic plan, as well as any required budget proposals outside the regular Director of 

Foreign Assistance/Resource Management and Office of Management and Budget cycles 

for the NSC/IPC, NSC/DC, and Congress. 

(2) Planning Integration. While most specific implementation planning will 

occur within individual agencies, this group will coordinate with the strategic planners 

and work closely with the COM to integrate these programs and operations into a single 

US R&S implementation plan, which will include the scope and requirements for 

deploying integration planning cells and ACTs. 

(3) Operations Support/Information Management. This group is responsible 

for coordinating with agency operations centers to ensure the CRSG has a single COP 

and civilians in the field receive the required operations support. It also monitors and 

reports strategic-level metrics. 

(4) Resource Mobilization. A resource management team that coordinates 

resource planning; expedites recruitment, flexible hiring waivers and authorities, 

mobilization, and deployment; facilitates interagency logistics; and informs budget and 
Appendix G

G-6 JP 3-08 

legislation development. A supply chain management team that identifies key 

reconstruction material requirements, facilitates relationships with global suppliers, and 

promotes efficient logistic networks. 

(5) Partner Development. A team, which works to establish or leverage 

partnerships for R&S with multinational, multilateral, bilateral partners, international 

financial institutions, and the UN. 

f. The DOS Executive Secretariat and Operations Center, as well as agency watch 

centers, will continue to function as necessary by their guidelines and to stand up shortterm task forces and/or monitoring groups as needed. The CRSG Secretariat coordinates 

closely with and draws upon the DOS’s Operations Center staff and expertise; the two 

could be located in close proximity in some instances. 

g. Staffing of the crisis-specific NSC/IPC. Co-chairs will include the appropriate 

DOS Regional Assistant Secretary and/or Special Envoy, S/CRS Coordinator, and NSC 

Director. All agencies with involvement in programs or policy relating to the crisis 

should be represented on the CRSG at the Assistant Secretary-level including DOD, 

USAID, DOS, DOJ, and other agencies as appropriate. Agency representatives to the 

CRSG must be able to speak authoritatively on behalf of their agencies or bring issues for 

decision to their leadership. 

h. CRSG Secretariat. The secretariat may be managed by a policy director (DOS 

regional bureau) or a chief operations officer (S/CRS) or jointly by both. The NSC/IPC 

will ultimately approve CRSG leadership proposed by itself or by S/CRS. Interagency 

staff for the Secretariat should include:

(1) Regional experts (ideally the desk officer or agency equivalent) from all 

participating agencies. The DOS country desk officer is considered the COM’s 

representative on the CRSG Secretariat, except when other officers are designated;

(2) S/CRS planning and operations staff; 

(3) Agency planners, sectoral and resource experts including DOS’s Director of 

Foreign Assistance and Diplomatic Security staff, DOD, USAID, DOJ, and others; 

(4) Additional full-time and part-time staff, including interagency technical 

experts provided as the situation requires; and 

(5) Interagency team members to be deployed in the integration planning cell or 

ACT, as necessary, prior to deployment. 

i. The CRSG will seek members with recent experience in the affected country, 

taking advantage of USG personnel who may have been evacuated from the country. In 

some cases staff working part- or full-time on a CRSG may continue to reside in their 

regular offices and contribute to the interagency process and products as agreed with each 

agency. 
The Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

G-7 

j. The Secretariat can be located in an expanded country desk or elsewhere within 

DOS. It will be operational as required during low-intensity periods, ramping up to 24 

hours a day and 7 days a week if required. The staffing schedules and procedures for 

after-hours coverage will be worked out and communicated in advance. 

k. Activation of the CRSG. Interagency planning is necessary for effective conflict 

or crisis response. Therefore, in the case of an emerging crisis, even if a CRSG is not yet 

established, the core Secretariat planning staff must be immediately identified with clear 

lines of communications and guidance. With the concurrence of the relevant DOS 

regional assistant secretary or more senior DOS leadership, S/CRS may decide in 

advance of and in expectation of a formal decision, to establish the core secretariat 

planning staff. A CRSG should be established as soon as possible while follow-on 

staffing arrangements are made. 

l. Establishing a CRSG must take into account any international or political 

sensitivity surrounding prospective interventions and steps must be taken to minimize 

any potential negative implications of public knowledge of the effort. 

m. A CRSG does not necessarily need to remain in place throughout the entire US 

engagement; rather, it should be in place for coordination during the intensive phases of 

planning and early implementation, allowing for downsizing or transition to a traditional 

NSC/IPC. 

n. Generally, a CRSG Secretariat could be disbanded by the NSC when US 

involvement has ‘normalized’ such that: agencies are focusing on longer term program 

and policy implementation; standing US institutions have sufficient management or 

resources capacity for the effort; and program resources are integrated into regular 

budgeting processes. A NSC/IPC-level body should oversee completion of the plan and 

any follow-on activities. Regular budget planning will continue so that essential 

programs will be resourced as the strategic R&S plan phases out.

4. Integration Planning Cell in Support of a Geographic Combatant Command 

a. The integration planning cell is an interagency team of R&S specialists; 

empowered by the Washington, DC-based strategic planning process and the CRSG, it 

can deploy to support integration of civilian and military planning at a GCC, or at an 

equivalent multinational HQ. The size and composition can be adjusted to the 

circumstances. The purpose of the integration planning cell is to harmonize civilian and 

military R&S efforts. 

b. An integration planning cell may be established in response to an emerging crisis 

potentially requiring military intervention or support, a DOD RFA with R&S planning, or 

a request from an equivalent multinational HQ. 

c. The integration planning cell should also ensure planning integration and ongoing 

communication between civilian and military R&S implementation planning teams. This 

mechanism is not designed to create a USG civilian R&S operations/tactical plan. R&S 
Appendix G

G-8 JP 3-08 

operations that do not involve significant military engagement may not require the 

establishment of an integration planning cell. 

d. The integration planning cell provides: 

(1) Country-specific expertise and analysis; 

(2) R&S functional expertise; 

(3) Insight on policy guidance and assumptions; 

(4) Liaison with Washington, DC, agencies and civilian field elements; and

(5) Assistance drafting relevant aspects of the military plan. 

e. If the crisis does not involve the US military, but does involve a multinational 

military or peacekeeping force, the integration planning cell can help coordinate 

planning. 

f. The team assigned to the integration planning cell should have appropriate 

sectoral and regional experts empowered to represent their agencies. If agencies are not 

able to provide requested personnel to the integration planning cell, they should designate 

a member of the integration planning cell to represent their interests and act as liaison. 

g. Organization of the Integration Planning Cell. The size and composition of 

the integration planning cell can be determined and adjusted with the approval of the 

CRSG and participating agencies as requirements dictate. IPCs can consist of a single 

official or as many as 50 officials. A robust team will focus on the following functions: 

(1) Leadership. Senior level officer responsible for setting priorities and 

communicating with the CRSG and COM. This officer normally should have direct 

access to the CCDR; 

(2) Operations and Information Management. Management of the

integration planning cell, information flow, and coordination with the host HQ’s staff; 

ensure integration planning cell’s integration with host networks; 

(3) Plans. Coordinates interaction with all relevant planning teams, boards, 

working groups, or cells; 

(4) Support. Management of administrative functions for the team to include 

coordination of travel, billeting, meals, transportation, office space, supplies, and 

communications; and 

(5) Provision of Sectoral and Regional Expertise.

h. The integration planning cell leadership should be of an appropriate civilian rank 

that allows peer interaction with the commander or leader of the organization with which 
The Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

G-9 

the integration planning cell intends to integrate and plan. The experts may include 

specialists in the country/foreign policy, transitional security/policing, rule of law, 

governance, economic stabilization, administration and logistics, communications, 

education, health, SC, migration and internally displaced persons, infrastructure, urban 

planning, finance and banking, diplomatic security, and legal issues.

i. S/CRS maintains rosters of potential team members and develops supporting 

MOUs with appropriate DOS bureaus and other federal agencies. When possible, US 

personnel with recent experience in the country in question (such as those 

evacuated/drawn down from a US embassy) will be attached to the integration planning 

cell to provide country-specific expertise. The integration planning cell team members’ 

agencies may be responsible for providing funds for appropriate housing, transportation, 

and per diem when the integration planning cell is deployed. 

j. Authorities of the Integration Planning Cell. The integration planning cell

reports to the CRSG. It has neither oversight of nor control over USG field operations. 

The integration planning cell will have a coordinating relationship with the relevant ACT 

and embassy. 

k. If deployed to a foreign country with the GCC’s HQ or equivalent multinational 

HQ, the integration planning cell will fall under COM authority in the country of 

deployment. 

l. Establishment of an Integration Planning Cell. The CRSG, or in the absence of 

it, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization identifies the necessary 

capabilities for the integration planning cell in consultation with the GCC’s HQ, 

embassy, and other relevant agencies and bureaus with required knowledge and expertise 

appropriate for the developing crisis. 

m. The integration planning cell will work closely with the GCC’s HQ, JIACG (or 

equivalent organization), and the POLAD to ensure coordination and unity of purpose. 

The JIACG (or equivalent organization) and POLAD facilitate the coordination of 

integration planning cell efforts with the GCC’s HQ. The IPC maintains a distinct

identity, independent chain of command (to the IPC leader and CRSG), and purpose from 

its interlocutors at the GCC’s HQ. 

n. Deployment of an Integration Planning Cell. Integration planning cell

members should prepare to deploy to the GCC’s HQ as long as necessary to complete 

initial planning integration. Estimates range from one to six months, depending on the 

scale and complexity of the crisis and associated planning.

o. The integration planning cell leadership should continuously evaluate the size and 

composition of the team in the context of the host HQ’s requirements and integration 

planning cell needs. The integration planning cell will maintain the intensity of its efforts 

until the locus of planning shifts to field-level management (subordinate HQ) and the 

normal (steady state) functions can be fully supported by existing structures. 
Appendix G

G-10 JP 3-08 

p. As necessary, DOS will develop an MOU with each GCC’s HQ or multinational 

HQ to ensure effective and timely attachment of the integration planning cell to the HQ

as well as MOUs between DOS and supporting departments and agencies to identify 

security requirements expected by each agency. In the case of an international 

deployment, specific security arrangements will be identified. While deployed, members 

will fall under the security rules of the appropriate host HQ based on the signed MOUs, 

but will otherwise fall under the authority of the COM in country of deployment. 

q. When major planning is accomplished, individual team members may either: 

(1) Return to Washington, DC; 

(2) Deploy to join the ACT staff, with COM approval; or 

(3) Remain at the host HQ to continue advising planning cells and boards on 

ACT activities, inform HQ elements of other agency plans, modify planning, and 

otherwise assist the host HQ mission.

r. The integration planning cell will deploy with as complete an understanding of the 

approved USG strategic plan and resources available to implement it as possible. It will 

maintain a situational awareness of changes in USG strategic planning as plans evolve 

and share new developments with military counterparts. Ideally, this will include a 

national policy goal and major mission elements (i.e., strategic objectives), and 

performance indicators, based on an assessment of conflict drivers. 

s. In the absence of an approved plan or plan in progress, the integration planning 

cell will identify potential policy issues and make recommendations for major mission 

elements (i.e., strategic objectives) of the strategic plan to the CRSG, in consultation with 

the host HQ leadership. These recommendations will take into account military and 

agency objectives, and resource capabilities. Key to achieving success in this process is 

working from a common interagency planning framework. 

t. To fulfill these functions effectively, integration planning cell members ideally 

should participate in Washington, DC-based strategic planning processes prior to 

deploying to the military command or multinational agency HQ. 

u. Coordination of the Integration Planning Cell. The integration planning cell

leadership will have frequent communications with and seek guidance from the ACT and 

CRSG regarding: 

(1) The strategic plan and its integration with the military operational plan; 

(2) Identifying and addressing gaps and deficiencies between the civilian and 

military plans; 

(3) Identifying impacts of planned military operations on future R&S efforts; 

and
The Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

G-11 

(4) Recommending processes and criteria to ensure a smooth transfer of 

military to civilian lead, if appropriate, by function and region as the environment is 

stabilized. 

v. The integration planning cell leadership will keep the host HQ leadership 

apprised of communications with the CRSG. The integration planning cell and DOD 

representatives on the CRSG keep the CRSG informed of military planning and 

operations so that the planning process can take into account the military operations and 

their potential effects. The integration planning cell will also coordinate with the ACT. 

Coordination between the integration planning cell and CRSG does not obviate the 

defense policy guidance and plan approval process as established by DOD procedures. 

w. The integration planning cell may require frequent coordination with and 

guidance from key implementing agencies. Ideally, such communication should be 

channeled through the CRSG to implementing agencies in order to facilitate the 

development of timely, field-informed recommendations for program development, and 

supplemental budget requests. Recommendations should be based on an understanding 

of the host HQ plans, field-identified R&S conditions and requirements. If necessary, 

disputes among interagency partners within the integration planning cell or between the

integration planning cell and the host HQ can be referred to the CRSG.

x. Integration planning cell leadership will determine which information and policy 

guidance requests from the host HQ have sufficient importance or interagency 

implications that they should be channeled through the CRSG. The integration planning 

cell will maintain regular communication with the ACT to ensure the host HQ leadership 

is informed of field assessments, program status, new requirements, and other related 

R&S issues. 

y. Training the Integration Planning Cell. It is essential that core integration 

planning cell staff develop planning expertise through professional training and regular 

exercise participation with military commands, and multinational equivalents as 

appropriate. S/CRS offers a basic and intermediate R&S curriculum and provide 

opportunities for potential integration planning cell members to participate in planning 

seminars/workshops, iterative planning exchanges, and selected military exercises to 

refine integration planning cell procedures, hone civilian-military planning processes, 

become familiar with military planning templates, and develop habitual relationships 

with the GCCs. Integration planning cell members must also be familiar with the 

capabilities of their own agency as well as other USG capacity in their field of expertise 

in relation to R&S operations. 

5. Advance Civilian Teams 

a. ACTs are rapidly deployable, cross-functional interagency teams that are flexible 

in size and composition. ACTs are formed to quickly set up, coordinate, and conduct 

field R&S operations, in conjunction with country teams where extant. This can include 

performing assessments, and coordinating and conducting USG operations in uncertain 

and hostile environments. They serve under COM authority and can operate with or 
Appendix G

G-12 JP 3-08 

without US military deployment. An ACT may deploy alone or with one or more 

FACTs, which can assess, coordinate, and conduct USG operations from provincial and 

local levels (field/tactical).

b. For unity of effort, ACTs integrate and coordinate the execution of the US R&S 

Implementation Plan with existing USG civilian and military operations. ACTs fill gaps 

in existing civilian operations. ACTs provide core R&S implementation planning and 

operations expertise to COMs and military commanders. They also may extend the 

USG’s civilian presence via FACTs reporting to the ACT HQ. ACTs will work to ensure 

that US efforts focus on supporting joint USG and HN’s goals and interests. 

c. FACTs are usually deployed to establish a US presence, provide direct 

information about conditions on the ground, and support those R&S operations conducted 

at a provincial and local level. In this regard, FACTs build upon the lessons learned from 

PRTs and provide assessments, first-response, and management of the full range of R&S

operations. They are equipped and trained to perform their tasks in hostile environments, 

including combat environments. While remaining under COM authority, FACTs may 

integrate with US or foreign military forces when appropriate to maintain maximum 

US/coalition unity of effort. As required, they may coordinate the field execution of 

projects that involve USG resources. They will also coordinate with UN, other IGOs, 

NGOs, or HN entities to execute projects as appropriate.

d. Tasks of the ACT. The ACT, located at the embassy, JTF HQ, or alternate site, 

serves as the COM’s general R&S staff, supporting the COM, as he or she deems 

appropriate, in executing the USG interagency R&S implementation plan. The ACT is 

strategic and operational in nature, assisting the COM to direct R&S planning and 

operations. As directed by the COM, primary tasks may include: 

(1) Coordinate and Conduct R&S Operations. Working with embassy staff 

and as directed by the COM, coordinates and conducts nation-wide US R&S operations 

with all US elements, HN, and international officials based in country (e.g., NGOs, other 

donors, the UN); 

(2) Field-HQ Direction. In support of the COM, directs and synchronizes the 

activities of the FACTs and/or other national and local level USG civilian and military 

R&S units in time, space, and purpose; 

(3) Knowledge Sharing. Consolidates and transmits regular ACT/FACT 

reporting, including planning and programming recommendations, to the embassy, 

military JTF, integration planning cell, and CRSG; and

(4) Progress Monitoring. Performs monitoring and evaluation and 

recommends program adjustments as necessary to support implementation of the US 

interagency strategic plans.

e. In the absence of a functioning HN government, the ACT supports the 

management of transitional administration and governance with the objective of rapidly 

developing legitimate local capacity. Additionally, ACTs may be provided to support 
The Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

G-13 

multinational operations. In this instance, the COM will provide guidance regarding the 

ACT’s relationship with the COM in that country. 

f. In the absence of an existing COM, the individual designated as COM is dualhatted as ACT leader, and establishes a platform for diplomatic and R&S operations as 

directed by the Secretary of State.

g. Tasks of the Field ACTs. Acting under the authority of the COM, FACTs’ 

primary tasks may include, but are not limited to:

(1) Direction of R&S activities. Based on the plan, synchronizing, integrating, 

conducting, and advising on US civilian and military R&S operations in its operational 

area, in coordination with HN authorities, IGOs, NGOs, other donors; 

(2) Assessments. Assessing conditions for implementing the US R&S country 

strategy and monitoring existing plans and programs to ensure that they are consistent 

with US strategy and reflect ground realities;

(3) Negotiations and Support to Local Governance. Based on COM 

guidance, leading negotiations or political discussions with local leaders to advance R&S 

operations and support/develop local governance capacities; and

(4) Information. Providing situation reports directly to the ACT, and 

responding to ACT guidance and requests for information. 

h. ACTs may also be deployed in support of an international mission or in regional 

operations covering more than one country. These missions have additional requirements 

for authorities, logistics, security, and guidance beyond the scope of operations described 

above. These requirements will be developed as needed following further consultation. 

i. ACT/FACT Staffing. The ACT/FACT structure and composition should be 

adapted to conditions on the ground in order to meet objectives of USG R&S plans. 

ACT/FACT personnel may be drawn from DOS, USAID, other USG agencies as 

required, military personnel, members of a civilian reserve (if formed), and contractors, 

as well as international and HN personnel when appropriate. ACT/FACT deployment 

may require additional flexible hiring authorities, training, and resources not presently 

available.

j. Although an ACT or FACT may be composed of a single individual, larger 

deployments will organize themselves in similar structures. Both should have a staff 

covering the following functions: 

(1) Leadership. Providing a leader and a deputy; 

(2) Sectoral Expertise. Providing expertise to manage the implementation of 

major mission elements (strategic objectives) of the US R&S plan;

(3) Operations. Conducting and coordinating current ACT/FACT operations; 
Appendix G

G-14 JP 3-08 

(4) Plans/Evaluation. Maintaining and revising the R&S implementation plan 

as appropriate, and monitoring and reporting on implementation; 

(5) Support. Managing logistics, information technology, contracting, and 

administration;

(6) Knowledge Sharing. Maintaining and disseminating a COP throughout the 

ACT/FACT;

(7) SC. Supporting PA, DSPD, and IO associated with R&S operations; and

(8) Security. Managing safety and security of ACT/FACT personnel and 

resources.

k. Staff functions should be performed by trained and qualified personnel from 

appropriate US agencies (including the US military) to augment existing embassy staff. 

Depending on the magnitude of the operation and resources available, these tasks could 

be divided among a few officers in a small organization, or each could be a separate staff 

office with multiple personnel in a very large organization. 

l. ACT/FACT Structure. With COM guidance, ACTs/FACTs may augment 

existing embassy structures and working groups or create new structures based on major

mission elements (strategic objectives), rather than by individual separate agencies. Each 

objective should have a single team coordinator selected from any one of the 

participating agencies. This integrated structure supports unity of effort in operations, 

while simplifying integration of operations with military, international, and HN

organizations working to achieve similar objectives.

m. As an example, the hypothetical strategic objective “Increased internal security 

and consolidated territorial control,” might assign various US implementation tasks to the 

DOS regional bureau, DOS’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, 

USAID, DOD, DHS, and DOJ. All of these agencies and bureaus may assign personnel 

to the ACT and its FACTs to execute or oversee their particular tasks as defined in the 

R&S strategic plan. The Plan will identify one lead agency for each strategic objective. 

The lead agency will select a representative to ensure program coordination and unity of 

effort for achieving the strategic objective within the appropriate ACT or FACT.

n. ACT/FACT Authorities. The COM is responsible for the execution of all 

elements of the US R&S implementation plan tasked to agencies operating under COM 

authority. The ACT works under COM authority to support and enhance the COM’s 

effort. The ACT both conducts R&S operations and synchronizes and integrates 

operations conducted by its members, the participating agencies. 

o. COM Authority and the ACT. Because of the centrality of the COM’s role in 

the execution of US policy, in countries without an existing US presence the ACT will 

take direction from an individual designated by DOS. In such conditions, the individual 

designated as COM will also hold the position of ACT leader until a more normal 
The Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

G-15 

mission structure is established. Under any circumstances, the COM is responsible for 

the safety and security of all ACT/FACT personnel. 

p. The ACT deployment derives its authority by being the COM’s R&S general 

staff. It assists him/her in implementing R&S plans by organizing interagency operations 

around the strategic objectives, and synchronizes and integrates the field implementation 

of interagency programs through the FACTs. The ACT also serves as the mechanism by 

which the COM, integration planning cell, and CRSG can be informed of the progress of 

plan implementation, or of any changes required to the plans. 

q. The COM determines the ACT command structure. Notionally, an ACT leader 

could report through the DCM to the COM. FACT leaders, regardless of agency 

affiliation, report to the ACT and through it to embassy leadership. ACT and FACT

members are under the OPCON of the ACT/FACT leader, though they may remain in 

contact with their parent agencies and may still be rated/evaluated by their parent 

agencies, with input from the ACT/FACT leader. Alternately, if agreed in advance, 

ACT/FACT members may be rated directly by the ACT/FACT leadership and reviewed 

by their parent agency.

r. Operational Control. As an interagency body, the ACT leader, as directed by 

the COM, exercises authority over interagency personnel assigned or attached to it. The 

COM’s authority in no way denies or alters any military team member’s right and duty to 

remain in communication with his/her parent agency, to exchange information and 

recommendations with that agency, and to appeal to more senior parent agency 

representatives when necessary. While formal R&S guidance, decision making, and 

reporting will move through the CRSG-embassy/ACT FACT chain, informal 

communications are essential for rapid implementation and reporting on R&S operations. 

s. A COM may delegate, in writing, specific authorities as appropriate to FACT 

leaders within their geographic areas of operation. FACT leaders are most effective 

when viewed as field directors for R&S operations within their operational area, 

reporting to the COM through the ACT leader and DCM. 

t. Optimally, a COM may designate a well-resourced ACT to coordinate all US 

R&S operations in country, including FACTs, to maintain unity of effort. In this manner, 

challenges requiring interagency resolution can be identified and resolved. Every agency 

involved in the R&S operation should have the capability to keep informed of and control 

field-level operations within their sectoral responsibility, while keeping those operations 

coordinated within the overall US effort. 

u. In supporting the COM in the execution of the R&S plan, all agencies and 

programs retain their existing legal authorities and responsibilities for the commitment of 

the funds controlled by that agency and the implementation of that agency’s programs. 

Existing US funds and programs, as well as those created under the aegis of a particular 

agency to execute the implementation plan, will be managed by officers of the 

responsible agencies assigned/attached to the ACT or FACTs, in accordance with 

appropriate agency procedures and regulations. 
Appendix G

G-16 JP 3-08 

v. Within the operational area of an ACT and its FACTs, control of resources and 

programs is the responsibility of the implementing agencies. Depending on R&S 

program requirements, agencies may conduct activities centrally from the ACT (with 

FACT personnel handling monitoring and evaluation), or may delegate implementation 

authority to their representatives on the FACTs. 

w. It is an agency’s responsibility to ensure it has sufficient personnel to implement, 

monitor, and/or oversee agency projects. Failing this, agencies need to consider what 

other FACT personnel may have the most appropriate qualifications to implement, 

monitor, and/or oversee an agency’s operations on its behalf. For example, when a 

FACT officer from Agency A has an additional task of monitoring a project 

funded/implemented by Agency B, that officer receives his/her guidance regarding that 

project’s implementation from an officer designated by Agency B at the ACT /embassy. 

Within the approved R&S plan, responsibility for implementing individual programs lies 

with the agency funding the program. 

x. Formation of ACTs. Although interagency teams may deploy under a variety of 

circumstances with ACT-like roles and responsibilities, an ACT requires that a CRSG 

has been formed in Washington, DC, to develop interagency strategic and 

implementation plans, and that the CRSG has concluded that an ACT will be required for 

the implementation of R&S plans. Establishment of an integration planning cell is not a 

prerequisite to the formation of an ACT and may not be required if the ACT is deployed 

without a military presence. The strategic planning process will task agencies with 

personnel requirements and establish mission-specific roles, responsibilities, and 

relationships. 

y. Considerations for ACT formation may include: 

(1) Mandate. The USG has determined that an enhanced R&S effort is in the 

national interest;

(2) Plans. The CRSG has developed a comprehensive R&S strategic plan and 

R&S implementation plan (or is in the process of developing one), which assesses that 

field platforms for R&S activities will increase the effectiveness of US efforts to achieve 

stability and begin reconstruction; 

(3) Deployment Mechanism. The plans have determined that field platforms 

for R&S activities will facilitate coordination with multinational operations; and

(4) HN Support. The host government (when appropriate) supports the plan. 

z. ACTs and FACTs deploying into a country to work with military units should 

join those units at their home base whenever possible prior to deployment for orientation, 

integration, and mission planning. Given differing tours of duty and the desirability of 

maintaining strong, consistent relationships with HN governments, deploying with a 

military unit does not necessarily imply redeploying with that unit.
The Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

G-17 

aa. Operations In-Country. The COM has ultimate responsibility for the effective 

allocation of personnel for the accomplishment of those elements of the R&S plans under 

COM authority. In consultation with the COM, the ACT leader reviews the R&S plans 

and recommends what, if any, allocation or exchange of personnel may be necessary 

between the ACT and other sections/agencies of the embassy. Ideally, many of these 

issues may be decided during predeployment planning. While this will be very missionspecific, and the COM ultimately decides upon whatever ACT roles, responsibilities, and 

structures the COM deems desirable, the following notional guidelines may be useful:

(1) Reporting. An ACT leader may report through the DCM to the COM. The 

ACT should be represented on the country team. 

(a) Where a country team lacks a representative from an agency now 

participating in the R&S operation, the ACT’s representative from that agency may, in 

addition to their responsibilities to achieve their specific strategic objective, be dualhatted as their agency’s senior representative in-country, reporting directly to the COM in 

this capacity; 

(b) Conversely, where an embassy already has an agency representative, 

that agency’s officer/s on the ACT (if required) may focus their efforts on 

implementation;

(c) When appropriate, previously evacuated, or drawn-down embassy 

personnel may be attached to the ACT as it deploys into country; 

(d) Existing embassy personnel with appropriate skills may be designated 

the lead for specific strategic objectives; and

(e) Where an ACT requires more area expertise, an embassy may attach 

officers or local hires to support the ACT or FACTs, as needed. 

(2) Other Deployed Elements. Where there are other US civilian and military 

field teams in operation, the COM may authorize the ACT or FACTs to synchronize the 

operations of those teams in time, space, and purpose in support of the R&S plans. This 

requires careful consideration as to whether these other teams are conducting operations 

related to implementation of the R&S plans.

bb. Military/ACT Integration. When operating with military forces, ACT 

/embassy and FACT delineated operational areas should mirror those of the military 

forces deployed, so that each operational area has a dual US civilian and military 

leadership structure, starting at the COM-JFC level and working to the lowest tactical 

level feasible/necessary. 

cc. When appropriate, US civilian and military HQ at each level should be colocated for maximum coordination and effectiveness. ACT personnel will remain under 

COM authority throughout their deployment. 
Appendix G

G-18 JP 3-08 

dd. Specific leadership relationships between civilian and military organizations will 

be established initially in the planning process based on the requirements of the particular 

mission. Regardless of the particular relationship, it is essential that civilian leaders and 

military commanders at the ACT, FACTs, and their corresponding military units 

exchange LNOs. The function of LNOs is to maintain the intercommunication between 

elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of 

purpose and action. Additionally, they should come equipped with the full range of 

communications capabilities required to maintain contact with their parent organization. 

When colocated with military operations, agreements should be made to share basic 

communications infrastructure. 

ee. When necessary to support implementation of the R&S plan, ACT personnel 

may be attached directly to military units, and military units or personnel may be attached 

to the ACT, at the discretion of the appropriate level of civilian-military leadership.

ff. Coordination with Host Nation. The primary objective in any R&S operation 

is to identify and work to reduce drivers of conflict and instability and build HN

government capacity sufficient to put the country on a path towards sustainable peace. 

Although specific ACT and FACT operations could range from direct governance to 

advisory missions to reporting and program-implementation functions, all ACT and 

FACT operations should be conducted with a view towards creating local host 

government capabilities to sustain stable and functional governance. 

gg. Operational Tempo. The pace of R&S operations, particularly in the initial 

weeks and months and when operating with military forces, far exceeds that of 

conventional US overseas operations. It is incumbent on ACT and FACT leaders to 

balance activities to meet planning and reporting requirements, while also providing for 

adequate rest.

hh. Interagency “Contingency Fund” Programming. When available and 

authorized, program funds may be directly managed by an ACT/FACT, or by an agency 

participating in an ACT/FACT for small-scale local programs to enhance R&S efforts. 

For the purpose of this appendix, these funds will be termed “contingency funds.” These 

funds would be distinct from operating funds the ACT/FACT may have for internal 

operations and management. They would also be distinct from program funds for 

centrally managed programs, which FACTs may evaluate or monitor, but not directly 

control. 

ii. Any ACT/FACT allotted contingency funds for use within its operational area

allocates such funds through a consultative process involving representation from all 

agencies involved in the ACT/FACT. 

jj. The ACT/FACT regularly reviews the progress of ongoing projects, and review 

project proposals for use of contingency funds under their direct control. By doing so, 

ACTs/FACTs can synchronize the activities of disparate funding streams, draw upon the 

knowledge of team personnel who have relevant expertise but not direct funding of their 
The Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

G-19 

own, and ensure that all projects are synchronized in time, space, and purpose to execute 

the implementation plan. 

kk. Decisions to use contingency funds should be consensus-based, relying on a 

shared understanding of the COP, the R&S plans, and the military operational plan. All 

decisions and disputes should be put in writing and can be raised to higher levels for 

resolution as required. To ensure rapid program implementation, ACTs/FACTs, in 

coordination with appropriate military units, may agree to set parameters or thresholds on 

programming contingency funds, such as:

(1) Dollar Thresholds. Only programs exceeding a certain agreed amount 

should be consulted on; 

(2) Timing. Projects need not be referred to the ACT in the first 30 days (for 

example); or

(3) Key Priority. A certain issue is so time-sensitive that projects directed to 

addressing it need not be referred to the ACT for approval (this does not imply the 

projects should not be reported or scrutinized to ACT/embassy). 

ll. The ACT/FACT reviews projects and resources to determine which type of 

available contingency funds would best fill the gap. The ACT/FACT may identify which 

agency may be the most appropriate to fund and perform a particular project. In any 

case, agencies retain their own program and financial authorities.

mm. Phase-out. ACTs are organized to assist the COM in implementing the US 

R&S plans. Planning should anticipate some level of ACT/FACT involvement in the 

country over this time period, or until the crisis subsides or efforts are effectively manned

through regular USG staff assignments. This presence may, if appropriate, transition into 

a more traditional US presence. Factors to influence the phase-out of ACTs/FACTs may 

include: 

(1) Achieving benchmarks set in the R&S plan which justify phasing out 

relevant elements of the ACTs/FACTs; and

(2) An improved security or transportation environment allows the embassy or 

other capital-based US presence to visit and/or influence a local area on a sufficiently 

regular basis as to render a field presence there unnecessary.

nn. In addition, the COM or appropriate DOS Regional Assistant Secretary may 

recommend that the ACT/FACTs should be phased out and responsibility for 

implementing the R&S plans transferred to regular embassy staff.

oo. It is essential that steady state country planning continue in order to ensure the 

conventional budget process be ready to support normal operations. 

pp. Additional work is required to determine how ACTs will operate in conjunction 

with multinational operations and for regional deployments.
Appendix G

G-20 JP 3-08 

6. Civilian Response Corps 

a. The CRC provides the USG with a pool of qualified, trained, and ready to deploy 

civilian professionals to support overseas R&S operations. Additionally, the CRC

reinforces regular standing staff in Washington, DC, and overseas in support of R&S

operations in countries or regions that are at risk of, in, or are in transition from conflict 

or civil strife. The CRC consists of three complementary components: 

(1) Active Component officers are full-time USG employees whose specific job 

is to train for, prepare, and staff reconstruction, stabilization, and conflict prevention 

efforts. They are able to deploy within 48 hours and focus on critical initial interagency 

functions such as assessment, planning, management, administrative, logistical, and 

resource mobilization. 

(2) Standby Component officers are full-time employees of their departments 

who have specialized expertise useful in R&S operations and are available to deploy 

within 30 days in the event of a reconstruction and/or stabilization operation. 

(3) Reserve Component officers are US citizens who have committed to be 

available within 45-60 days of call-up to serve as USG temporary employees in support 

of overseas R&S operations. Reserve officers are critical to efforts to bring “normalcy” 

to countries by filling capabilities career USG employees simply cannot match in 

expertise or in number. 

b. Because no single USG entity has all of the relevant expertise to deal with these 

threats, the CRS is a partnership of seven departments and agencies: DOS, USAID, 

USDA, DOC, DHHS, DHS, and DOJ.
H-1 

APPENDIX H

THE INTERAGENCY CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

1. Overview

a. Addressing the causes and consequences of weak and failed states has become an 

urgent priority for the USG. Conflict both contributes to and results from state fragility. 

To effectively prevent or resolve violent conflict, the USG needs tools and approaches 

that enable coordination of US diplomatic, development, and military efforts in support 

of local institutions and organizations/individuals seeking to resolve their disputes 

peacefully.

b. A first step toward a more effective and coordinated response to help states 

prevent, mitigate, and recover from violent conflict is the development of shared 

understanding among USG agencies about the sources of violent conflict or civil strife. 

Achieving this shared understanding of the dynamics of a particular crisis requires both a 

joint interagency process for conducting the assessment and a common conceptual 

framework to guide the collection and analysis of information. The ICAF is a tool that 

enables an interagency team to assess conflict situations systematically and 

collaboratively. It supports USG interagency planning for conflict prevention, 

mitigation, and stabilization.

2. Purpose

a. Using the ICAF can facilitate a shared understanding across relevant USG 

departments and agencies of the dynamics driving and mitigating violent conflict within a 

country that informs US policy and planning decisions. (Note: agencies will be used in 

this appendix in place of departments and agencies.) It may also include steps to 

establish a strategic baseline against which USG engagement can be evaluated. It is 

available for use by any USG agency to supplement interagency planning. 

b. The ICAF draws on existing methodologies for assessing conflict currently in use 

by various USG agencies as well as IGOs and NGOs. It is not intended to duplicate 

existing independent analytical processes, such as those conducted within the IC. Rather, 

it builds upon those and other analytical efforts to provide a common framework through 

which USG agencies can leverage and share the knowledge from their own assessments 

to establish a common interagency perspective. 

c. The ICAF is distinct from early warning and other forecasting tools that identify 

countries at risk of instability or collapse and describe conditions that lead to outbreaks of 

instability or violent conflict. The ICAF builds upon their results by assisting an 

interagency team to understand why such conditions may exist and how to best engage to 

transform them. The ICAF draws on social science expertise to lay out a process by 

which an interagency team will identify societal and situational dynamics known to 

increase or decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. In addition, the ICAF provides a 

shared, strategic snapshot of the conflict against which future progress can be measured. 
Appendix H

H-2 JP 3-08 

3. When to Use the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

a. An ICAF should be part of the first step in any interagency planning process. It 

can help to inform the establishment of USG goals, design or reshape activities, 

implement or revise programs, or reallocate resources. The interagency planning process 

within which an ICAF is performed determines who initiates and participates in an ICAF, 

the time and place for conducting an ICAF, the type of product needed and how the 

product will be used, and the level of classification required.

b. Whenever the ICAF is used, all of its analytical steps should be completed. 

However, the nature and scope of the information collected and assessed may be 

constrained by time, security classification, or access to the field.

c. The ICAF is a flexible, scalable interagency tool suitable for use in: 

(1) Engagement and conflict prevention planning. 

(2) USG R&S contingency planning. 

(3) USG R&S crisis response planning. 

d. Engagement/conflict prevention planning may include, but is not limited to: 

embassy preparation for National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 1207 

funding; request by an embassy or combatant command for interagency assistance in 

understanding and planning to leverage US interests in fragile or at-risk countries; 

development of the CCDRs’ TCP; development of country assistance strategies or 

mission strategic plans; designing interagency prevention efforts for countries listed on 

State Failure Watchlists and Early Warning Systems. In an engagement or conflict 

prevention effort, there normally will be sufficient time and a sufficiently permissive 

environment to allow a full-scale assessment such as a several day Washington, DCbased tabletop and several weeks of an in-country verification assessment.

e. Reconstruction and Stabilization Contingency Planning. The ICAF provides 

relevant background concerning existing dynamics that could trigger, exacerbate, or 

mitigate violent conflict. The ICAF should be a robust element of contingency planning 

by providing critical information for the situation analysis. A several-day-long 

Washington, DC-based tabletop and/or an in-country verification assessment might prove 

useful when conducting an ICAF as part of this planning process. Additional information 

on R&S contingency planning can be found in the following S/CRS documents:

Triggering Mechanisms for ‘Whole-of-Government’ Planning for Reconstruction, 

Stabilization and Conflict Transformation and Principles of the USG Planning 

Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation.

f. Reconstruction and Stabilization Crisis Response Planning. The ICAF 

provides critical information for the initial step of whole-of-government planning, the 

situation analysis. The ICAF may be updated as more information and better access 

become available to inform the policy formulation, strategy development, and 

interagency implementation planning steps of the ICAF. When used for crisis response, 
The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

H-3 

the ICAF might be a Washington, DC-based tabletop assessment that could be 

accomplished in as little as one and one-half days or, with longer lead-times to the crisis, 

could take place over several weeks with conversations back and forth between 

Washington and any USG field presence. For additional information on R&S crisis 

response planning, see Triggering Mechanisms for ‘Whole-of-Government’ Planning for 

Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation and Principles of the USG 

Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation.

4. Roles and Responsibilities

a. The process within which an ICAF is used determines which agencies and 

individuals should serve on the team and in what capacities they should serve. For 

example, an established country team may use the ICAF to inform country assistance 

strategy development, or USAID and S/CRS may co-lead an interagency team to assist in 

developing a NDAA Section 1207 request. In whole-of-government crisis response 

under the IMS for R&S, an ICAF normally will be part of the strategic planning process 

led by the CRSG Secretariat. The ICAF might also be used with a key bilateral partner as 

part of collaborative planning. The agency/individual responsible for managing the 

overall planning process is responsible for proposing the ICAF and requesting necessary 

agency participation.

b. Participants in an ICAF assessment should include the broadest possible 

representation of USG agencies with expertise and/or interest in a given situation. An 

ideal interagency field team would represent diverse skill sets and bring together the 

collective knowledge of USG agencies. Participants would at a minimum include 

relevant: regional bureaus, sectoral experts, intelligence analysts, and social science or 

conflict specialists. When used as part of the planning processes outlined in Principles of 

the USG Planning Framework, the team will normally include members of the strategic 

planning team. This team could be expanded as needed to include local stakeholders and 

international partner representatives.

c. Members of the interagency team are responsible for providing all relevant 

information held by their respective agencies to the team for inclusion in the analysis, 

including past assessments and related analyses. These representatives should also be 

able to reach back to their agencies to seek further information to fill critical information 

gaps identified by the ICAF. 

5. The Elements of the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

a. The ICAF can be used by the full range of USG agencies at any planning level. 

Conducting an ICAF might be an iterative process with initial results built upon as the 

USG engagement expands. For example, an ICAF done in Washington at the start of a 

crisis might be enhanced later by a more in-depth examination in-country. The level of 

detail into which the ICAF goes will depend upon the conflict and type of USG 

engagement.
Appendix H

H-4 JP 3-08 

b. The two major components of the ICAF are the conflict diagnosis and the segue 

into planning. 

6. Conflict Diagnosis 

a. Using the conceptual framework for diagnosing a conflict (see Figure H-1), the 

interagency team will deliver a product that describes the context; core grievances and 

social/institutional resilience; drivers/mitigators of conflict; and opportunities for 

increasing or decreasing conflict.

(1) Context. The team should evaluate and outline key contextual issues of the 

conflict environment. Context does not cause conflict but describes often long-standing 

conditions resistant to change. Context may create preconditions for conflict by 

reinforcing fault lines between communities or contribute to pressures making violence 

appear as a more attractive means for advancing one’s interests. Context can shape 

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR 

DIAGNOSING A CONFLICT

Windows of 

Vulnerability

Windows of 

Opportunity

Key Actors' 

Motivations and 

Means

Identity 

Groups

Core Grievances

Social and Institutional 

Resilience

Drivers of Conflict

Mitigating Factors

Opportunity for 

Increasing Conflict

Opportunity for 

Decreasing Conflict

Societal Patterns

Institutional 

Performance

Context

Figure H-1. Conceptual Framework for Diagnosing a Conflict
The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

H-5 

perceptions of identity groups and be used to manipulate and mobilize constituencies. 

Context may include environmental conditions, poverty, recent history of conflict, youth 

bulge, or conflict-ridden region.

(2) Core Grievances and Sources of Social/Institutional Resilience. The 

team should understand, agree upon, and communicate the concepts of core grievance 

and sources of social/institutional resilience and describe them within the specific 

situation being assessed. 

(a) Core Grievance. The perception, by various groups in a society, that 

their needs for physical security, livelihood, interests, or values are threatened by one or 

more other groups and/or social institutions. 

(b) Sources of Social/Institutional Resilience. The perception, by various 

groups in a society, that social relationships, structures, or processes are in place and able 

to provide dispute resolution and meet basic needs through nonviolent means. 

(3) Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors. The team should understand 

and outline drivers of conflict and mitigating factors, and enumerate those identified 

within the specific situation being assessed. 

(a) Drivers of conflict refers to the dynamic situation resulting from the 

mobilization of social groups around core grievances. Core grievances can be understood 

as the potential energy of conflict. Key individuals translate that potential energy into 

active drivers of conflict.

(b) Mitigating factors describe the dynamic situation resulting from the 

mobilization of social groups around sources of social/institutional resilience. Mitigating 

factors can be understood as the actions produced when key individuals mobilize the 

potential energy of social and institutional resilience.

(4) Windows of Vulnerability and Windows of Opportunity. The team 

should specify opportunities for increasing and decreasing conflict as defined here and 

describe those expected in the near-term, and where possible, in the longer-term.

(a) Windows of vulnerability are moments when events threaten to rapidly 

and fundamentally change the balance of political or economic power. Elections, 

devolution of power, and legislative changes are examples of possible windows of 

vulnerability. Key individuals/organizations may seize on these moments to magnify the

drivers of conflict. 

(b) Windows of opportunity are moments when over-arching identities 

become more important than sub-group identities, for example, when a natural disaster 

impacts multiple groups and requires a unified response. These occasions may present 

openings for USG efforts to provide additional support for a conflict’s mitigating factors.
Appendix H

H-6 JP 3-08 

b. Conflict Diagnosis Steps. To determine the preceding elements of the conflict 

dynamic, the designated interagency conflict assessment team (ICAT) should follow a 

series of analytical steps.

(1) Step 1: Establish Context. All ICAF steps begin with acknowledging the 

context within which the conflict arises. This is depicted (see Figure H-1) by placing 

each analytical task within a larger circle labeled “Context.” The arrows going in and out 

of the concentric circles, the rectangle, and the triangle remind the analyst that context 

affects and is affected by each of the other components. 

(2) Step 2: Understand Core Grievances and Sources of Social and 

Institutional Resilience. Interacting with Context in Step 1 are the concentric circles 

labeled “Identity Groups,” “Societal Patterns” and “Institutional Performance” (see 

Figure H-1). In Step 2, the ICAT: 

(a) Describes identity groups that believe others threaten their identity, 

security, or livelihood. Identity groups are groups of people that identify with each other, 

often on the basis of characteristics used by outsiders to describe them (e.g., ethnicity, 

race, nationality, religion, political affiliation, age, gender, economic activity, or socioeconomic status). Identity groups are inclined to conflict when they perceive that other 

groups’ interests, needs, and aspirations compete with and jeopardize their identity,

security, or other fundamental interests. 

(b) Articulates how societal patterns reinforce perceived deprivation, 

blame, and intergroup cleavages and/or how they promote comity and peaceful resolution 

of intergroup disputes. Societal patterns associated with conflict reinforce group 

cleavages, for example: elitism, exclusion, corruption/rent-seeking, chronic state capacity 

deficits (e.g., systematic economic stagnation, scarcity of necessary resources, 

ungoverned space), and unmet expectations (e.g., lack of a peace dividend, land tenure 

issues, disillusionment, and alienation). Impacts of societal patterns often include 

negative economic consequences for disadvantaged groups. 

(c) Explains how poor or good institutional performance aggravates or 

contributes to the resolution of conflict. Institutional performance considers formal (e.g., 

governments, legal systems, religious organizations, public schools, security forces, 

banks and economic institutions) and informal (e.g., traditional mechanisms for resolving 

disputes, family, clan/tribe, armed groups, and patrimonialism) social structures to see 

whether they are performing poorly or well and whether they contribute to conflict and 

instability or manage or mitigate it. In assessing institutional performance, it is important 

to distinguish between outcomes and perceptions. Institutional outcomes are results that 

can be measured objectively; perceptions are the evaluative judgments of those outcomes. 

Understanding how outcomes are perceived by various groups within a society, 

especially in terms of their perceived effectiveness and legitimacy, is an important 

component of conflict diagnosis. 

(d) The ICAT completes Step 2 by listing Core Grievances and Sources 

of Social and Institutional Resilience.
The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

H-7 

(3) Step 3: Identify Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors. In Step 3 of 

the analysis, the ICAT identifies key individuals/groups that are central to producing, 

perpetuating, or profoundly changing the societal patterns or institutional performance 

identified in Step 2. The ICAT should identify whether they are motivated to mobilize 

constituencies toward inflaming or mitigating violent conflict and what means are at their 

disposal. To perform the analysis in Step 3, the ICAT: 

(a) Identifies: 

1. WHO. People, organizations, or groups who, because of their 

leadership abilities and/or power (e.g., political position, moral authority, charisma, 

money, weapons): 

a. Have an impact on societal patterns/institutional performance. 

b. Are able to shape perceptions and actions and mobilize people 

around core grievances or social and institutional resilience. 

c. Are able to provide the means (money, weapons, information) 

to support others who are mobilizing people around core grievances or social and 

institutional resilience. 

2. WHERE. Look for key individuals in leadership positions in 

governing, social or professional organizations or networks (either within or external to a 

state or territory), including private business, religious organizations, government 

positions (including police forces, judicial system, and military), informal and illicit 

power structures, media, and academic institutions. 

3. WHAT and HOW. Understand key individuals’ motivations and 

means by describing: 

a. What motivates them to exert influence on each of the political, 

economic, social and security systems in a country or area. 

b.

(b) Determines key individuals’:

 How they exert influence (e.g., leadership capacity, moral 

authority, personal charisma, money, access to resources or weapons, networks or 

connections).

1. Objectives that promote violence or promote peaceful alternatives. 

2. Means and resources available to accomplish those objectives, 

including: 

a. Capacity for violence/intimidation. 
Appendix H

H-8 JP 3-08 

b. Financial resources (including taxes, “protection” fees, support 

from external individuals/groups). 

c. Valuable primary commodities (e.g., labor, information, forest 

products, minerals, high value crops). 

d. Control of media outlets. 

e.

(c) Using the information generated on key individuals/groups, the ICAT 

draft brief narrative statements describing “why” and “how” they mobilize constituencies 

around core grievances and, separately, around sources of social and institutional 

resilience. Each statement relating to core grievances becomes an entry in the list of 

drivers of conflict, and each relating to sources of social and institutional resilience 

becomes an entry in the list of mitigating factors.

 Mass support. 

(d) The ICAT completes Step 3 of the analysis by listing the drivers of 

conflict and, separately, the mitigating factors by the strength of their impact on the 

conflict. 

(4) Step 4: Describe Windows of Vulnerability and Windows of 

Opportunity. “Windows” are moments in time when events or occasions provoke 

negative or positive changes in the status quo. In Step 4, the ICAT:

(a) Identifies potential situations that could contribute to an increase in 

violent conflict. Windows of vulnerability are potential situations that could trigger 

escalation of conflict (e.g., by contributing to confirmation of the perceptions underlying 

core grievances) and often result from large-scale responses to an increase of uncertainty 

during elections or following an assassination, an exclusion of parties from important 

events such as negotiations or elections, or attempts to marginalize disgruntled followers.

(b) Identifies potential situations that might offer opportunities for 

mitigating violent conflict and promoting stability. Windows of opportunity describe 

the potential situations that could enable significant progress toward stable peace (e.g., 

through conditions where core grievances can be reconciled and sources of social and 

institutional resilience can be bolstered) such as those where overarching identities 

become important to disputing groups, where natural disasters impact multiple identity 

groups and externalities require a unified response or a key leader driving the conflict is 

killed.

(c) The ICAT completes Step 4 by considering windows of vulnerability

and windows of opportunity and prioritizing drivers and mitigating factors identified 

in Step 3. The ICAT uses the list of prioritized drivers and mitigating factors as the basis 

for its findings whether those findings are: priorities for the whole-of-government 

assistance working group setting parameters for a DOS Office of Foreign Assistance 

country assistance strategy; recommendations to a country team preparing an application 
The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

H-9 

for NDAA Section 1207 funding; or recommendations to a whole-of-government R&S 

crisis response planning or R&S contingency planning team.

7. Segue into Planning

a. When an ICAF is undertaken to support R&S crisis response planning or R&S 

contingency planning, the findings of the conflict diagnosis feed into situation analysis 

and policy formulation steps of the planning process in Principles of the USG Planning 

Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation.

b. When an ICAF is undertaken to support interagency engagement or conflict 

prevention planning, after completing the diagnosis, the ICAT begins preplanning 

activities. During the segue into these types of planning, the ICAT maps existing 

diplomatic and programmatic activities against the prioritized lists of drivers of conflict 

and mitigating factors to identify gaps in current efforts as they relate to conflict 

dynamics, it is not intended as an evaluation of the overall impact or value of any 

program or initiative. The ICAT uses these findings as a basis for making 

recommendations to planners on potential entry points for USG activities. 

c. Steps for Engagement and Conflict Prevention Planning

(1) Specify current USG activities (listing USG agencies present in the country 

and the nature and scope of their efforts). 

(a) Identify the impact of these efforts on drivers of conflict and mitigating 

factors. 

(b) Identify efforts that target similar outcomes and coordination 

mechanisms in place. 

(2) Specify current efforts of non-USG participants, including bilateral 

agencies, multi-lateral agencies, NGOs, the private sector, and local entities. 

(a) Identify the impact of the efforts on the drivers of conflict and 

mitigating factors. 

(b) Identify efforts that target similar outcomes (including USG efforts) and 

coordinating mechanisms in place. 

(3) Identify drivers of conflict and mitigating factors not sufficiently addressed 

by existing efforts (i.e., gaps). 

(4) Specify challenges to addressing the gaps. 

(5) Referring to windows of vulnerability, describe risks associated with failure 

to address the gaps. 
Appendix H

H-10 JP 3-08 

(6) Referring to windows of opportunity, describe opportunities to address the 

gaps. 

d. The ICAT draws on the information generated in segue into planning to 

determine potential entry points for USG efforts. The description of these entry points 

should explain how the dynamics outlined in the ICAF diagnosis may be susceptible to 

outside influence. 
J-1 

APPENDIX J

EXAMPLE GUIDELINES FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN THE 

ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 

The US Institute of Peace facilitated the development of the following guidelines 

with the participation of the Armed Forces of the United States, DOS, USAID, and the 

NGO community. 

GUIDELINES FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN US ARMED FORCES AND 

NON-GOVERNMENTAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS 

On March 8, 2005, the heads of major US humanitarian organizations and 

US civilian and military leaders met at the US Institute of Peace (USIP) to 

launch a discussion on the challenges posed by operations in combat 

and other nonpermissive environments. The Working Group on CivilMilitary Relations in Nonpermissive Environments, facilitated by USIP, 

was created as a result of this meeting. 

InterAction, the umbrella organization for many US nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs), has coordinated the non-governmental delegation. 

Representatives from the Department of Defense (DOD), the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, the State Department, and the US Agency for International 

Development have participated on behalf of the US Government. 

1 Recommended Guidelines 

The following guidelines should facilitate interaction between US Armed 

Forces and Non-Governmental Organizations (see Key Terms) belonging 

to InterAction that are engaged in humanitarian relief efforts in hostile or 

potentially hostile environments. (For the purposes of these guidelines, 

such organizations will henceforth be referred to as Non-Governmental 

Humanitarian Organizations, or NGHOs.) While the guidelines were 

developed between the DOD and InterAction, DOD intends to observe 

these guidelines in its dealings with the broader humanitarian assistance 

community. These guidelines are not intended to constitute advance 

endorsement or approval by either party of particular missions of the 

other but are premised on a de facto recognition that US Armed Forces 

and NGHOs have often occupied the same operational space in the past 

and will undoubtedly do so in the future. When this does occur, both 

sides will make best efforts to observe these guidelines, recognizing that 

operational necessity may require deviation from them. When breaks with 

the guidelines occur, every effort should be made to explain what 

prompted the deviation in order to promote transparency and avoid 

distraction from the critical task of providing essential relief to a 

population in need. 

 A. For the US Armed Forces, the following guidelines should be 

observed consistent with military force protection, mission 

accomplishment, and operational requirements: 
Appendix J

J-2 JP 3-08 

 1. When conducting relief activities, military personnel should 

wear uniforms or other distinctive clothing to avoid being mistaken for 

NGHO representatives. US Armed Forces personnel and units should not 

display NGHO logos on any military clothing, vehicles, or equipment. 

This does not preclude the appropriate use of symbols recognized under 

the law of war, such as a red cross, when appropriate. US Armed Forces 

may use such symbols on military clothing, vehicles, and equipment in 

appropriate situations. 

 2. Visits by US Armed Forces personnel to NGHO sites should be 

by prior arrangement. 

 3. US Armed Forces should respect NGHO views on the bearing 

of arms within NGHO sites. 

 4. US Armed Forces should give NGHOs the option of meeting 

with US Armed Forces personnel outside military installations for 

information exchanges. 

 5. US Armed Forces should not describe NGHOs as “force 

multipliers” or “partners” of the military, or in any other fashion that could 

compromise their independence and their goal to be perceived by the 

population as independent. 

 6. US Armed Forces personnel and units should avoid interfering 

with NGHO relief efforts directed toward segments of the civilian 

population that the military may regard as unfriendly. 

 7. US Armed Forces personnel and units should respect the 

desire of NGHOs not to serve as implementing partners for the military in 

conducting relief activities. However, individual NGOs may seek to 

cooperate with the military, in which case such cooperation will be carried 

out with due regard to avoiding compromise of the security, safety, and 

independence of the NGHO community at large, NGHO representatives, or 

public perceptions of their independence. 

 B. For NGHOs, the following guidelines should be observed: 

 1. NGHO personnel should not wear military-style clothing. This 

is not meant to preclude NGHO personnel from wearing protective gear, 

such as helmets and protective vests, provided that such items are 

distinguishable in color/appearance from US Armed Forces issue items. 

 2. NGHO travel in US Armed Forces vehicles should be limited to 

liaison personnel to the extent practical. 

 3. NGHOs should not have facilities co-located with facilities 

inhabited by US Armed Forces personnel. 

 4. NGHOs should use their own logos on clothing, vehicles, and 

buildings when security conditions permit. 
Example Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Other Organizations 

J-3 

 5. NGHO personnel’s visits to military facilities/sites should be 

by prior arrangement. 

 6. Except for liaison arrangements detailed in the sections that 

follow, NGHOs should minimize their activities at military bases and with 

US Armed Forces personnel of a nature that might compromise their 

independence. 

 7. NGHOs may, as a last resort, request military protection for 

convoys delivering humanitarian assistance, take advantage of essential 

logistics support available only from the military, or accept evacuation 

assistance for medical treatment or to evacuate from a hostile 

environment. Provision of such military support to NGHOs rests solely 

within the discretion of the military forces and will not be undertaken if it 

interferes with higher priority military activities. Support generally will be 

provided on a reimbursable basis in accordance with applicable US law. 

 C. Recommendations on forms of coordination, to the extent 

feasible, that will minimize the risk of confusion between military and 

NGHO roles in hostile or potentially hostile environments, subject to 

military force protection, mission accomplishment, and operational 

requirements are: 

 1. NGHO liaison officer participation in unclassified security 

briefings conducted by the US Armed Forces. 

 2. Unclassified information sharing with the NGHO liaison officer 

on security conditions, operational sites, location of mines and 

unexploded ordnance, humanitarian activities, and population 

movements, insofar as such unclassified information sharing is for the 

purpose of facilitating humanitarian operations and the security of staff 

and local personnel engaged in these operations. 

 3. Liaison arrangements with military commands prior to and 

during military operations to deconflict military and relief activities, 

including for the purpose of protection of humanitarian installations and 

personnel and to inform military personnel of humanitarian relief 

objectives, modalities of operation, and the extent of prospective or 

ongoing civilian humanitarian relief efforts. 

 4. Military provision of assistance to NGHOs for humanitarian 

relief activities in extremis when civilian providers are unavailable or 

unable to do so. Such assistance will not be provided if it interferes with 

higher priority military activities. 

2 Recommended Processes 

 A. Procedures for NGHO/military dialogue during contingency 

planning for DOD relief operations in a hostile or potentially hostile 

environment: 
Appendix J

J-4 JP 3-08 

 1. NGHOs engaged in humanitarian relief send a small number of 

liaison officers to the relevant combatant command for discussions with 

the contingency planners responsible for designing relief operations. 

 2. NGHOs engaged in humanitarian relief assign a small number 

of liaison officers to the relevant combatant command (e.g., one liaison 

was stationed at United States Central Command for 6 of the first 12 

months of the war in Afghanistan, and one was in Kuwait City before US 

forces entered Iraq in 2003). 

 3. The relevant military planners, including but not limited to the 

Civil Affairs representatives of the relevant commander, meet with 

humanitarian relief NGHO liaison officers at a mutually agreed location. 

 B. Procedures for NGHOs and the military to access assessments of 

humanitarian needs. US military and NGHO representatives should 

explore the following: 

 1. Access to NGHO and military assessments directly from a 

DOD or other US Government Web site. 

 2. Access to NGHO and military assessments through an NGO 

serving in a coordination role and identifying a common Web site. 

 3. Access to NGHO and military assessments through a US 

Government or United Nations (UN) Web site. 

 C. Procedures for NGHO liaison relationships with combatant 

commands that are engaged in planning for military operations in hostile 

or potentially hostile environments. (NGHO liaison personnel are 

provided by the NGHO community): 

 1. The NGHO liaison officer should not be physically located 

within the military headquarters, but if feasible should be close to it in 

order to allow for daily contact. 

 2. The NGHO liaison officer should have appropriate access to 

senior-level officers within the combatant commands and be permitted to 

meet with them as necessary and feasible. 

 3. There should be a two-way information flow. The NGHO 

liaison officer should provide details on NGHO capabilities, infrastructure 

if any, plans, concerns, etc. The military should provide appropriate 

details regarding minefields, unexploded ordnance, other hazards to 

NGHOs, access to medical facilities, evacuation plans, etc. 

 4. The NGHO liaison officer should have the opportunity to brief 

military commanders on NGHO objectives, the Code of Conduct of the 

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) 

and NGOs Engaged in Disaster Relief, the United Nations Inter-Agency 

Standing Committee (IASC) Guidelines, country-specific guidelines based 
Example Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Other Organizations 

J-5 

on the IASC Guidelines, and, if desired, The Sphere Project Humanitarian 

Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. US Armed Forces 

personnel should have the opportunity to brief NGHOs, to the extent 

appropriate, on US Government and coalition goals and policies, 

monitoring principles, applicable laws, and rules of engagement, etc. 

 5. The NGHO liaison officer could continue as a liaison at higher 

headquarters even after a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) or 

similar mechanism is established in-country. Once this occurs, liaison 

officers of individual NGHOs could begin coordination in-country through 

the CMOC for civil–military liaison. 

 D. Possible organizations that could serve as a bridge between 

NGHOs and US Armed Forces in the field2

, e.g., US Agency for 

International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of Military Affairs, State 

Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 

Stabilization (S/CRS), and the UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator: 

 1. If the US Agency for International Development or the State 

Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 

Stabilization agree to serve a liaison function, they should be prepared to 

work with the broader NGHO community in addition to US Government 

implementing partners. 

 2. The UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator or his/her representative 

could be a strong candidate to serve as liaison because he/she normally 

would be responsible for working with all NGHOs and maintaining contact 

with the host government or a successor regime. 

Key Terms 

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs): In wider usage, the term NGO 

can be applied to any nonprofit organization that is independent from 

government. However, for the purposes of these guidelines, the term 

NGO refers to a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization 

dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, 

health care, economic development, environmental protection, human 

rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of 

democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 3-08/JP 1-02) 

Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations (NGHOs): For the 

purposes of these guidelines, NGHOs are organizations belonging to 

InterAction that are engaged in humanitarian relief efforts in hostile or 

potentially hostile environments. NGHOs are a subset of the broader 

NGO community. 

Independence for NGHOs: Independence is defined in the same way as it 

is in the Code of Conduct of the International Federation of Red Cross and 

Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and NGOs Engaged in Disaster Relief; 

independence is defined as not acting as an instrument of government 

foreign policy. NGHOs are agencies that act independently from 
Appendix J

J-6 JP 3-08 

governments. NGHOs, therefore, formulate their own policies and 

implementation strategies and do not seek to implement the policy of any 

government, except insofar as it coincides with their own independent 

policies. To maintain independence, NGHOs will never knowingly—or 

through negligence—allow themselves, or their employees, to be used to 

gather information of a political, military, or economically sensitive nature 

for governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than 

those that are strictly humanitarian, nor will they act as instruments of 

foreign policy of donor governments. 

InterAction: InterAction is the largest coalition of US-based international 

development and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations. With 

over 165 members operating in every developing country, InterAction 

works to overcome poverty, exclusion, and suffering by advancing basic 

dignity for all. 

1 The InterAction delegation includes CARE, Catholic Relief Services, the 

International Medical Corps, the International Rescue Committee, Mercy 

Corps, Refugees International, Save the Children, and World Vision. 

2

 In situations in which there is no actor to serve as a bridge, a US military 

Civil Affairs cell could serve as a temporary point-of-contact between 

NGHOs and other elements of the US Armed Forces. 

SOURCE: US Institute of Peace
K-1 

APPENDIX K

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION POLICY

Interaction between the civilian and military sides of the USG has received renewed 

attention during recent operations. Those in the developing world who do not have 

access to suitable economic activities may turn to violent extremist organizations, which 

sometimes offer basic economic necessities and community infrastructure such as 

schools, medical clinics, and utilities. These groups can also offer a sense of belonging. 

Development is the traditional method of creating economic opportunity in these regions. 

However, as home to extremist organizations, these areas are often dangerous, making 

development work difficult, if not impossible. The military can secure these areas, but 

without proper development assistance, this security is unsustainable. Civilian-military 

cooperation resolves this dilemma by giving military and development activities equal 

standing in a single, coordinated effort. 

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION POLICY

1. PURPOSE

This policy establishes the foundation for the United States Agency for 

International Development (USAID) cooperation with the United States 

Department of Defense (DOD) in the areas of joint planning, assessment 

and evaluation, training, implementation, and strategic communication. 

This cooperation is designed to facilitate a whole-of-government 

approach in which US Government (USG) agencies work within their 

mandated areas of responsibility in a more coherent way to provide a 

coordinated, consistent response in pursuit of shared policy goals to 

include, inter alia, humanitarian relief efforts, counter-terrorism initiatives, 

civil affairs programs, and reconstruction and stabilization efforts. 

Such improved cooperation is a critical element of stabilization efforts in 

fragile states, particularly in pre- and post-conflict environments. This 

paper clarifies, formalizes, and defines the parameters of USAID’s 

interaction with DOD. It complements the efforts of the Department of 

State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

(S/CRS), to define a broader civilian interagency engagement with DOD. 

DOD representatives in the field and in Washington do not seek to 

supplant USAID’s role, but rather look to the Agency for guidance in 

identifying how the military can play a more supportive role in USAID’s 

development activities.

The companion internal document, Civilian-Military Cooperation 

Implementation Guidelines, further details functional areas for USAID 

DOD cooperation and provides legal guidance on operational issues and 

illustrative approaches for implementing this policy framework. 
Appendix K

K-2 JP 3-08 

The present policy is not intended to modify or supplant existing USAID 

policies regarding disaster response activities. Standard operating 

procedures of the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), 

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), 

will continue to be used in these situations.

KEY TERMS

SSTRO: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction 

Operations. A term employed, primarily by the military community, to 

refer to the complex non-lethal activities that may precede, 

accompany, or follow a conflict. The DOD defines Stability 

Operations as “military and civilian activities conducted across the 

spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in 

States and regions.”

Three-D Approach: A policy that recognizes the importance of 

Defense, Diplomacy, and Development as partners in the conduct of 

foreign operations, particularly in the developing world.

2. BACKGROUND

Development is a cornerstone of national security, along with diplomacy 

and defense. Development is also recognized as a key element of any 

successful whole-of-government counterterrorism and counterinsurgency effort. The Departments of State and Defense have issued 

policy guidance and directions to guide their organizations in support of 

the National Security Strategy. The policy defined herein is designed to 

complement those efforts and clarify the role of USAID as a key part of the 

interagency process. It places stabilization efforts as a key element of 

USAID’s development mission. The 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS)

acknowledges that weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas 

are not only a threat to their people and a burden on regional economies, 

but are also susceptible to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants, and 

international criminals. The relationship between poverty and insecurity 

is complex, and not reducible to a simple formula, but many of the 

indicators of instability and insecurity are associated with poverty and 

inadequate governance. Accordingly, the NSS pledges that the United 

States will work to bolster threatened states, provide relief in times of 

crisis, and build capacity in developing states to increase their ability to 

govern and provide basic services. Foreign policy institutions, including 

USAID, must therefore address the challenges and opportunities of the 

twenty-first century. The realities of the twenty-first century campaign 

against terrorism and the need to prevent violent extremism and its 

underlying causes have highlighted the need to adapt the DOD and 

civilian structures to work more effectively together.

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05 (November 2005) 

indicates that stability operations are a core US military mission that the 

DOD shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given 
US Agency For International Development Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy

K-3 

priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and 

integrated across all DOD activities. The Directive acknowledges that 

many of the tasks and responsibilities associated with reconstruction and 

stabilization operations are not ones for which the military is necessarily 

best suited. However, in the absence of civilian capacity to carry out 

these tasks, the capabilities will be developed within the military. 

Manifestations of this Directive are appearing in new DOD guidance and 

doctrine documents across the spectrum of DOD activity. 

National Security Presidential Directive 44, issued in December 2005, 

empowers the Secretary of State to improve coordination, planning, and 

implementation for reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) assistance for 

foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or 

civil strife. The Presidential Directive establishes that the Secretary of 

State, supported by a Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

(S/CRS), shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government 

efforts, involving all US Departments and Agencies with relevant 

capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and 

reconstruction activities. When the US military is involved, the Secretary 

of State is responsible for coordinating with the Secretary of Defense to 

ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing US military operations 

across the spectrum of conflict. 

Peace and Security is one of the five objectives outlined in the Framework 

for US Foreign Assistance (2006). International development increasingly 

benefits from—and requires—close cooperation between civilians and the 

military. In unstable areas in which USAID frequently works, development 

and security are intertwined and interdependent. The absence of a stable 

and secure environment constrains the provision of development 

assistance, and without development assistance, security will remain 

unsustainable. In humanitarian, stabilization, and reconstruction 

operations, US and international armed forces have long made invaluable 

contributions in logistics, planning, and implementation to save lives, 

build infrastructure, transport materials, and other efforts that benefit 

development. DOD acknowledges that USAID’s expertise in building the 

capacity of local institutions is key to stability and reconstruction. Close

cooperation will enhance the likelihood that Defense funded programs are 

consistent with development principles, while ensuring the achievement 

of overall national security objectives.

3. POLICY STATEMENT

It is USAID’s policy for all operating units to cooperate with DOD in joint 

planning, assessment and evaluation, training, implementation, and 

communication in all aspects of foreign assistance activities where both 

organizations are operating, and where civilian-military cooperation will 

advance USG foreign policy. Cooperation by all relevant operating units, 

whether in Washington or in the field, will strengthen coordination, 

planning, and implementation of assistance to states and regions at risk 

of, in, or in transition from violent conflict or civil strife. USAID is 
Appendix K

K-4 JP 3-08 

committed to a comprehensive, coherent whole-of-government approach 

and will partner with other USG entities to strengthen efforts to prepare, 

plan for, and conduct conflict mitigation, management, and stabilization 

assistance.

4. GUIDING PRINCIPLES

4.1(a) Cooperation with the DOD will not divert USAID resources away 

from its development mission or the principles of effective development 

assistance. USAID is the lead US government agency for US foreign 

assistance planning and programming. It works in fragile states and postconflict environments which often require program adjustments without 

compromise of its overarching mission to improve the capacity of local 

institutions, improve the host country’s ability to assure stability, and 

achieve sustainable development.

4.1(b) In order to maximize the chance for successful outcomes, USAID 

will strive to ensure that solutions for short term objectives are consistent 

with long-term goals. USAID recognizes that conflicts often produce a 

need for immediate stabilization and reconstruction programs. Shortterm stabilization activities, once completed, become the foundation upon 

which the longer-term development agenda can grow.

4.2 USAID will continue to maintain its long-standing relationships and 

work with a variety of partners. Since the USG’s primary expertise in 

international development resides at USAID, it will continue to lead and 

serve as principal advisor on development issues. Soliciting and 

maintaining the support of local populations and host governments, 

including the long-standing USAID practice of hiring and training Foreign 

Service Nationals (FSN), is critical to the success of joint USAID DOD

efforts.

5. USAID ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1 As the USG’s primary resource for expertise in international 

development, USAID seeks to influence the development dimensions of 

DOD strategic plans and implementation activities. Within the USG, 

USAID offers the comparative advantage of its field presence and its pool 

of skilled, experienced development and humanitarian assistance 

professionals. These assets must be better utilized in tandem with DOD

to help further the overall national security objectives of the US.

5.2 USAID will strengthen its planning, training, and implementation 

capacity to contribute to interagency security, stability, transition, and 

reconstruction operations. This recognizes the need to reduce the longstanding imbalance between the military and civilian components of the 

USG whole-of-government response to unstable, conflict-prone, and postconflict states.
US Agency For International Development Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy

K-5 

5.3 Opportunities for civil-military cooperation will take place at many 

levels and will depend upon the context and USG objectives. At the 

regional level, USAID will exchange officers with all appropriate 

Geographic Combatant Commands and place Senior Development 

Advisors within the Combatant Commands to improve coordination and 

communication and to promote program synchronization and 

effectiveness. In the field, USAID staff collaborate with US military 

officials at post to develop integrated approaches to country-specific 

security and development challenges. At headquarters, USAID will 

coordinate with DOD representatives through Principals’ Committees, 

Deputies’ Committees, or other regional and functional Policy 

Coordinating Committees, and among other fora.

5.4 USAID will seek to improve the preparedness of its personnel to 

operate in coordination with DOD, through improved pre-deployment 

training; recruiting and retaining personnel with military experience as 

appropriate; emphasizing the career enhancing nature of interagency and 

civilian-military assignments; training FSN personnel in effective civilianmilitary cooperation; developing exchange and fellowship programs with 

the DOD; and while maintaining USAID’s priorities, ensuring training and 

tour schedules can be adapted to synchronize with those of counterpart 

military units. 

5.5 DOD clearly recognizes the critical role of civilian involvement and 

expertise in addressing today’s challenges and opportunities, and seeks 

input on how it cooperates with and complements broader efforts led by 

USAID and other USG departments and agencies. USAID believes that the 

most significant contribution of DOD to the achievement of development 

goals is through long-term, strategic military-to-military engagement. 

USAID looks to DOD to lead, coordinate, and communicate the in-theater 

DOD response for security cooperation. This policy recognizes that 

coordination with the DOD is one aspect of our vital role in US national 

security, but it also reiterates that DOD should not substitute for civilian 

capabilities.

SOURCE: United States Agency for International Development, July 2008
Appendix K

K-6 JP 3-08 

Intentionally Blank
L-1 

APPENDIX L

JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS-STATE

1. General

a. The National Guard is “forward-based” in 3,200 communities throughout the United 

States; the territories of Guam, Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico; and the District of 

Columbia. The National Guard is readily available to conduct domestic operations, 

including HD and CS activities. The National Guard routinely interacts with local law 

enforcement, first responders, and Title 10, USC, forces and is experienced in supporting 

neighboring communities in times of crisis. The National Guard has both federal and state 

responsibilities (specified in the Constitution of the United States, Title 10, USC, and Title 

32, USC, and applicable state constitutional provisions and statutes). The National Guard 

operates not only as reserve components of the Army and the Air Force supporting the 

President in time of war and in national contingencies, but also as an organized militia 

supporting governors in domestic contingencies. Other Service/component commanders and 

staffs should bear in mind that the statutory roles and authorities of National Guard forces, 

when acting under state control, will vary from state to state.

b. The non-federalized National Guard is commanded and controlled by the governor 

and through TAG of each state or in the case of the District of Columbia, by SecDef through 

the commanding general of the District of Columbia National Guard. TAG exercises C2

through an NG JFHQ-State, which is comprised of ARNG and ANG members of that state. 

Additionally, some states maintain organized militias, generally referred to as state defense 

forces, which are generally integrated as additional forces under the command of the 

governor through TAG. Such forces may be integrated with Army and ANG forces during 

emergency response. Such forces remain under state control at all times and are not subject 

to DOD direction, regulations, or policy in any circumstances. The NG JFHQ-State is 

designed to correspond to the HQ staff of a combatant command in order to facilitate a joint 

approach to plans, operations, and military-to-military coordination (Figure L-1). The model 

depicted below may be tailored according to state resources and requirements. 

c. NG JFHQ-State gives DOD a focused communications channel through NGB 

between OSD, JS and CCDRs(e.g., CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSPACOM), and the nonfederalized National Guard; joint C2 for non-federalized National Guard operations; and a 

joint C2 capability in each state for Title 10, USC, (federal) HD, CS, and other related 

operations. In this respect, NG JFHQ-State is able to bridge the state and federal 

components of government and also bridge the active and reserve components of the US 

military in a way that complements the constitutional roles and authorities of the state and 

federal governments. In addition, NG JFHQ-State:

(1) Provides specific C2 and integration capabilities derived from the DOD strategy 

for HD and CS. The focus is shared situation awareness and unity/continuity of effort under 

frequently complex command relationships and overlapping authorities. 
Appendix L

L-2 JP 3-08 

(2) Facilitates integration of DOD joint capabilities with local, state, and federal 

agencies throughout the HD, CS, and emergency preparedness operational spectrums. 

(3) Improves unity of effort among military organizations of all services and 

components. 

(4) Creates synergy in many states where TAG is also the state HS and/or 

emergency operations director.

Figure L-1. Example of National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State 

Organization Model

EXAMPLE OF NATIONAL GUARD JOINT FORCE 

HEADQUARTERS – STATE ORGANIZATION MODEL

LEGEND

USPFO

Special

Staff

TAG

DJS/Chief,

Joint Staff

Personal

Staff

Land

Component

Air

Component G-Staff A-Staff

J-1 J-2

Air Force Army Joint

J-3 J-4 J-5 J-6 J-7

A-Staff Air component general staff

DJS director joint staff

G-Staff Army component general staff

J-1 manpower and personnel directorate 

of a joint staff

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff

J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff

J-6 communications system directorate 

of a joint staff

J-7 training and force development 

directorate of a joint staff

TAG The adjutant general

USPFO US Property and Fiscal Officer
Joint Force Headquarters-State

L-3 

(5) Enhances states’ ability to plan and operate in joint, interagency, and 

intergovernmental environments.

(6) Plans, monitors, assesses, and guides the execution of TAG/commander 

decisions while maintaining and promoting situational awareness by all partners.

(7) Maintains a deployable communications element. NG JFHQ-State may have

joint incident site communications capability available for HD and CS operations. 

2. National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State

The NG JFHQ-State maintains trained and equipped forces as reserve components of the 

Army and Air Force and performs missions as directed by the governor of that state or, when 

federalized, by the President or appropriate federal authorities. The NG JFHQ-State 

exercises C2 of all ARNG and ANG forces and any ARNG or ANG forces of other states 

that are operating in that state under EMACs. In accordance with policies and procedures 

established by SecDef, Secretary of the Army, and Secretary of the Air Force, the NG JFHQState is prepared to provide one or more JTF command elements; provides expertise and 

situational awareness to DOD authorities to facilitate integration of federal and state 

activities; participates in federal domestic preparedness planning, training, and exercises; and 

develops plans coordinated with local, state, and federal authorities and agencies. 

3. National Guard Bureau Joint Coordination Center 

The NGB Joint Coordination Center provides 24/7/365 support for data fusion between 

state JOCs, interstate collaboration, and situational awareness/information sharing between

USNORTHCOM, USPACOM and, through the DOD, to other federal agencies in support of 

domestic operations. It enables CNGB’s SecDef-directed responsibility as the channel of 

communication between DOD components and the National Guard. 

4. National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State Joint Operations Center

The NG JFHQ-State JOC is the fusion center for all state (territory) military operations. 

As the focal point for all domestic operational matters, its primary tasks are to initiate, 

monitor, alert, notify, and report on all activities ranging from natural or man-made disasters, 

terrorist attacks, or any civil-military related incidents in the state or territory. The NG 

JFHQ-State JOC monitors, plans, assesses, and assists the civil authorities; maintains and 

promotes situational awareness by all mission partners and agencies; and keeps the NGB 

aware of its actions and need for assistance.

5. Joint Task Force-State

a. Each state and territory is capable of fielding one or more JTF command element(s) 

to provide C2 for operations within the state. The JTF-State may be formed around an 

existing ARNG or ANG unit within the state, or may be formed as a sub-organization of an 

NG JFHQ-State. This JTF-State may function under the control of the governor (i.e., in state 

active duty or Title 32, USC, status) or when federalized under federal control (i.e., Title 10, 

USC, status). 
Appendix L

L-4 JP 3-08 

b. As depicted in Figure L-2, the JTF-State commander interacts with multiple outside 

elements in working to achieve unity of effort in support of domestic operations. C2 always 

remains vested in the governor and TAG of that state, unless the forces and HQ in question 

have been federalized under Title 10, USC. 

Figure L-2. National Guard Unified Action

NATIONAL GUARD UNIFIED ACTION

LEGEND

Joint

Operations

Multinational

Operations

Multi-Component

Operations

US Government

Agencies

Nongovernmental

Organizations

Private SectorCritical

Infrastructure

Local

Government

State

Agencies

Intergovernmental

Organizations

Military

NG JFHQ-State/

JTF- State

JFHQ joint force headquarters

JTF joint task force

NG National Guard

US United States
M-1 

APPENDIX M

REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-08 is based upon the following primary references. 

1. Statutes, National Policy, and Strategy 

a. Civil Disturbance Statutes (Title 10, USC, Sections 331-335).

b. The Foreign Assistance Act (Title 22, USC, Sections 2151- 2431k).

c. Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (Title 10, USC, 

Sections 371-382).

d. National Narcotics Leadership Act (Title 21, USC, Sections 1521-1524).

e. Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18, USC, Section 1385). 

f. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Title 42, USC, Sections 

5121-5207).

g. DOD’s Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Authorities (Title 10, USC, 

Sections 401-407, 2557, 2561). 

h. Presidential Policy Directive-1, Organization of the National Security Council 

System.

i. National Response Framework. 

j. National Military Strategy of the United States of America. 

k. National Strategy for Homeland Security. 

l. National Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key 

Assets. 

m. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. 

n. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

o. National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals. 

p. The Integrated Planning System. 

q. US National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication. 
Appendix M 

M-2 JP 3-08

2. Department of Defense Issuances

a. DOD Directive (DODD) 1100.20, Support and Services for Eligible

Organizations and Activities Outside the Department of Defense.

b. DODD 2000.13, Civil Affairs.

c. DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW). 

d. DODD 3020.40, DOD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure.

e. DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities.

f. DODD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances.

g. DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities.

h. DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major 

Components. 

i. DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief.

j. DODD 5105.75, Department of Defense Operations at US Embassies. 

k. DODD 5105.77, National Guard Bureau. 

l. DODD 5158.04, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). 

m. DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials. 

n. DOD Instruction (DODI) 1000.17, Detail of DOD Personnel to Duty Outside the 

Department of Defense. 

o. DODI 3000.05, Stability Operations. 

p. DODI 4000.19, Interservice and Intragovernmental Support.

q. DODI C-5105.81, Implementing Instructions for DOD Operations at US 

Embassies (U). 

r. DODI 8110.1, Multinational Information Sharing Networks Implementation. 

s. DODI 8220.02, Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Capabilities 

for Support of Stabilization and Reconstruction, Disaster Relief, and Humanitarian and 

Civic Assistance Operations.
References

M-3

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directives

a. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of 

Force for US Forces. 

b. CJCSI 3125.01B, Defense Support Of Civil Authorities (DSCA) for Domestic 

Consequence Management (CM) Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Incident. 

c. CJCSI 3214.01C, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management 

Operations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Incidents.

d. CJCSI 3710.01B, DOD Counterdrug Support. 

e. CJCSI 5130.01D, Relationships Between Commanders of Combatant Commands 

and International Commands and Organizations (U).

f. CJCSI 5205.01B, Implementing Instructions for Defense Attaché Offices and 

Security Assistance Organizations (U). 

g. CJCSI 5715.01B, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs. 

h. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), 

Volume II, Planning Formats.

4. Joint Publications 

a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

b. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

c. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 

d. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

e. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. 

f. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

g. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 

h. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

i. JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

j. JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations. 

k. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN)

Environments. 
Appendix M 

M-4 JP 3-08

l. JP 3-13, Information Operations.

m. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 

n. JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. 

o. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense. 

p. JP 3-28, Civil Support. 

q. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 

r. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

s. JP 3-61, Public Affairs. 

t. JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. 

u. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 

v. JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System.

w. JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

x. JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning. 

y. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

4. Other Documents

a. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. 

b. A Guide to NGOs: A primer about private, voluntary, non-governmental 

organizations that operate in humanitarian emergencies globally, Center for Disaster and 

Humanitarian Assistance Medicine.

c. Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook, UN Office for the 

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 

d. Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies, UN Office for 

the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 

e. Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group, Joint 

Warfighting Center.

f. Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication, Joint Warfighting Center.

g. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel. 
References

M-5

h. Department of Defense Information Sharing Strategy. 

i. General guidance for interaction between United Nations personnel and military

and other representatives of the belligerent parties in the context of the crisis in Iraq, UN

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 

j. Guidelines for Humanitarian Organisations on Interacting with Military and 

Other Security Actors in Iraq, UN Assistance Mission for Iraq. 

k. Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Humanitarian Actors and 

Military Actors in Afghanistan, UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan. 

l. Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief—

“Oslo Guidelines,” UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 

m. Interagency, Intergovernmental, Nongovernmental and Private Sector 

Coordination (A Joint Force Operational Perspective) Focus Paper #3 (2nd Edition), 

Joint Warfighting Center.

n. Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook, National 

Defense University. 

o. Joint Operations Insights and Best Practices, 2nd edition, Joint Warfighting 

Center. 

p. Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good 

Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies 

during Armed Conflict. 

q. NATO Handbook.

r. Principles of the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework.

s. Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual,

Joint Special Operations University. 

t. US Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual. 

u. United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Concept. 

v. USAID Primer: What We Do and How We Do It. 
Appendix M 

M-6 JP 3-08

Intentionally Blank
N-1 

APPENDIX N

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

CDR, USJFCOM, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Doctrine and Education Group, 116 

Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content 

(accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance. 

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is USJFCOM. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor 

for this publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-08, 17 March 2006, Interagency, 

Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination 

During Joint Operations, Volume I and Volume II. 

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted 

electronically to the Lead Agent, with information copies sent to the Joint Staff J-7 Joint 

Doctrine and Education Division and to the USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center, 

Doctrine and Education Group. 

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the USJFCOM Joint 

Warfighting Center, Doctrine and Education Group, and info the Lead Agent and the 

Joint Staff J-7 Joint Doctrine and Education Division. 

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this 

publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an 

enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to 

notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication 

are initiated. 

d. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix N

N-2 JP 3-08 

5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is 

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint 

publications must be in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET) and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside 

the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint 

publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the 

local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 

McDill Blvd., Bolling AFB, Washington, DC 20340-5100. 

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and 

deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications. 
GL-1 

GLOSSARY 

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

ACT advance civilian team 

AIDS acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 

AJP allied joint publication 

ANG Air National Guard 

AOR area of responsibility 

ARC American Red Cross 

ARNG Army National Guard 

ASD(HD&ASA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and 

 Americas’ Security Affairs) 

ASD(PA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) 

ASD(RA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) 

ASD(SO/LIC&IC) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and 

 Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities 

ASH Assistant Secretary for Health (DHHS) 

ASPR Office of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and 

 Response (DHHS) 

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (DOJ) 

BSRP bureau strategic resource plan 

C2 command and control 

CA civil affairs 

CAOC combined air operations center 

CAP crisis action planning 

CBP Customs and Border Protection (DHS) 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CCDR combatant commander 

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

CDRNORAD Commander, North American Aerospace Defense 

 Command 

CDRUSJFCOM Commander, United States Joint Forces Command 

CDRUSNORTHCOM Commander, Unites States Northern Command 

CDRUSPACOM Commander, United States Pacific Command 

CERF Central Emergency Revolving Fund (UN) 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

CI counterintelligence 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

CIE collaborative information environment 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

CJTF commander, joint task force 

CLDP Commercial Law Development Program 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-08 

CMO civil-military operations 

CMOC civil-military operations center 

CNGB Chief, National Guard Bureau 

COA course of action 

COM chief of mission 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CONPLAN concept plan 

COP common operational picture 

CRC Civilian Response Corps (DOS) 

CRSG country reconstruction and stabilization group 

CS civil support 

CT counterterrorism 

DART disaster assistance response team 

DATT defense attaché 

DCHA Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian 

 Assistance (USAID) 

D/CIA Director, Central Intelligence Agency 

DCM deputy chief of mission 

DCO defense coordinating officer 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

DHHS Department of Health and Human Services 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DNI Director of National Intelligence 

DOC Department of Commerce 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DODI Department of Defense instruction 

DOE Department of Energy 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DOL Department of Labor 

DOS Department of State 

DOT Department of Transportation 

DPC Defense Planning Committee (NATO) 

DSCA defense support of civil authorities 

DSF District Stability Framework (USAID) 

DSPD defense support to public diplomacy 

ECHA Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (UN) 

ECOSOC Economic and Social Council (UN) 

EDA Economic Development Administration (DOC) 

EMAC emergency management assistance compact 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

EPLO emergency preparedness liaison officer 

ESF emergency support function 
Glossary 

GL-3 

ESG executive steering group 

EU European Union 

EXECSEC executive secretary 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

FACT field advance civilian team 

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (UN) 

FAS Foreign Agricultural Service (USDA) 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FCO federal coordinating officer 

FDO flexible deterrent option 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance 

FP force protection 

FPS Federal Protective Service 

FRMAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and 

 Assessment Center (DOE) 

FSI Foreign Service Institute 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GEF Guidance for Employment of the Force 

GSA General Services Administration 

HACC humanitarian assistance coordination center 

HAST humanitarian assistance survey team 

HD homeland defense 

HIU humanitarian information unit (DOS) 

HIV human immunodeficiency virus 

HN host nation 

HOC humanitarian operations center 

HOCC humanitarian operations coordination center 

HOM head of mission 

HQ headquarters 

HS homeland security 

HSC Homeland Security Council 

HSI Office of Homeland Security Investigations (DHS) 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency (UN) 

IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee (UN) 

IC intelligence community 

ICAF Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework 

ICAT interagency conflict assessment team 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 

 Program (DOJ) 

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-08 

ICS incident command system 

ICVA International Council of Voluntary Agencies 

IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 

 Societies 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

ILAB Bureau of International Labor Affairs (DOL) 

IMPP Integrated Mission Planning Process 

IMS interagency management system 

INDRAC Interagency Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 Database of Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities 

INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization 

INTERPOL-USNCB International Criminal Police Organization, United States 

 National Central Bureau (DOJ) 

IO information operations 

IOSS Interagency Operations Security Support Staff 

IPC interagency policy committee 

IPI indigenous populations and institutions 

IPS Integrated Planning System (DHS) 

ISAC information sharing and analysis center 

ISE Information Sharing Environment 

ITA International Trade Administration (DOC) 

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff 

J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff 

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff 

J-7 Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development 

JCMOTF joint civil-military operations task force 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JDDOC joint deployment and distribution operations center 

JFC joint force commander 

JFO joint field office 

JIACG joint interagency coordination group 

JIATF joint interagency task force 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

JLOC joint logistics operations center 

JOA joint operations area 

JOC joint operations center 

JOPP joint operation planning process 

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

JP joint publication 

JS the Joint Staff 

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

JSF joint support force 

JTF joint task force 
Glossary 

GL-5 

LEA law enforcement agency 

LFA lead federal agency 

LNO liaison officer 

LRN Laboratory Response Network (DHHS) 

MARAD Maritime Administration 

MNC multinational corporation 

MNF multinational force 

MOA memorandum of agreement 

MOC media operations center 

MOTR maritime operational threat response 

MOU memorandum of understanding 

MPAT Multinational Planning Augmentation Team 

MSRP mission strategic resource plan 

NA5CRO non-Article 5 crisis response operation (NATO) 

NAC North Atlantic Council (NATO) 

NARAC National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NCPC National Counterprolification Center 

NCS National Clandestine Service 

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center 

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act 

NDMS National Disaster Medical System (DHHS) 

NDRF National Defense Reserve Fleet 

NEC National Economic Council 

NEST nuclear emergency support team 

NG JFHQ-State National Guard joint force headquarters-state 

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

NGB National Guard Bureau 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NIC National Intelligence Council 

NICC National Intelligence Coordination Center 

NIMS National Incident Management System 

NIST national intelligence support team 

NIT nuclear incident team 

NJTTF National Joint Terrorism Task Force 

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE) 

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command 

NRAT nuclear/radiological advisory team 

NRF National Response Framework 

NSA National Security Agency 

NSC National Security Council 

NSC/DC Deputies Committee of the National Security Council 

NSC/PC National Security Council/Principals Committee 

NSC/IPC National Security Council/interagency policy committee 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 3-08 

NSCS National Security Council System 

NSS National Security Strategy 

NTIA National Telecommunications and Information 

 Administration 

NWS National Weather Service 

OAS Organization of American States 

OASD(PA) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

 (Public Affairs) 

OCBD Office of Capacity Building and Development (USDA) 

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

OES office of emergency services 

OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control (TREAS) 

OFDA Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance 

OMA Office of Military Affairs (CIA and USAID) 

OMSPH Office of Medicine, Science, and Public Health (DHHS) 

OPC Ocean Prediction Center (DOC) 

OPCON operational control 

OPDAT Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, 

 and Training (DOJ) 

OPEO Office of Preparedness and Emergency Operations (DHHS) 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPSEC operations security 

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

OSOCC on-site operations coordination center 

OTI Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID) 

OUSD(P) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) 

PA public affairs 

PAO public affairs officer 

PBOS Planning Board for Ocean Shipping 

PERMREP permanent representative (NATO) 

PM Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (DOS) 

PO peace operations 

POC point of contact 

POLAD policy advisor 

POLMIL political-military 

PPD Presidential policy directive 

PRT provincial reconstruction team 

PSC private security contractor 

R&S reconstruction and stabilization 

RAP Radiological Assistance Program (DOE) 

RC resident coordinator (UN) 

REAC/TS radiation emergency assistance center/training site (DOE) 
Glossary 

GL-7 

RFA request for assistance 

RRF Ready Reserve Force 

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (NATO) 

SAR search and rescue 

SC strategic communication 

SCO security cooperation organization 

S/CRS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 

 and Stabilization (DOS) 

S/CT Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (DOS) 

SDO senior defense official 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network 

SJA staff judge advocate 

SJFHQ standing joint force headquarters 

SOST special operations support team 

SRSG special representative of the Secretary-General 

SSC special security center 

SYG Secretary-General (UN) 

TACON tactical control 

TAG the adjutant general 

TCP theater campaign plan 

TREAS Department of the Treasury

UN United Nations 

UNDAC United Nations disaster assessment and coordination 

UNDP United Nations development programme 

UNDPKO United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations 

UNHCR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner 

 for Refugees 

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 

UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of 

 Humanitarian Affairs 

USAF United States Air Force 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

USC United States Code 

USCENTCOM United States Central Command 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USCIS United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 

USDA United States Department of Agriculture 

USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

USEUCOM United States European Command 

USG United States Government 

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command 

USN United States Navy 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-08 

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command 

USPACOM United States Pacific Command 

USPHS United States Public Health Service 

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command 

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

VISA Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement 

WANGO World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations 

WFP World Food Programme (UN) 

WHO World Health Organization (UN) 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 
GL-9 

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

chancery. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

civil affairs activities. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

complex contingency operations. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

development assistance. Programs, projects, and activities carried out by the United States 

Agency for International Development that improve the lives of the citizens of developing 

countries while furthering United States foreign policy interests in expanding democracy 

and promoting free market economic growth. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

developmental assistance. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

disaster assistance response team. A team of specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief 

skills, rapidly deployed to assist US embassies and United States Agency for International 

Development missions with the management of US Government response to disasters. 

Also called DART. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

domestic intelligence. Intelligence relating to activities or conditions within the United States 

that threaten internal security and that might require the employment of troops; and 

intelligence relating to activities of individuals or agencies potentially or actually 

dangerous to the security of the Department of Defense. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02 with JP 3-08 as the source JP.) 

downgrade. To determine that classified information requires, in the interests of national 

security, a lower degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure than currently 

provided, coupled with a changing of the classification designation to reflect such a lower 

degree. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-08 as the source JP.) 

interagency. Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, 

including the Department of Defense. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02) 

intergovernmental organization. An organization created by a formal agreement between 

two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote 

national interests shared by member states. Also called IGO. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02.) 

internal security. The state of law and order prevailing within a nation. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-08 as the source JP.) 

interorganizational coordination. The interaction that occurs among elements of the 

Department of Defense; engaged United States Government agencies; state, territorial, 

local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; 

intergovernmental organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. 

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-10 JP 3-08 

joint interagency coordination group. A staff group that establishes regular, timely, and 

collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. 

Also called JIACG. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

lead agency. The US Government agency designated to coordinate the interagency oversight 

of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-

02.) 

liaison. That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or 

other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-08) 

nongovernmental organization. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization 

dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, 

economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; 

and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also 

called NGO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08) 

principal officer. The officer in charge of a diplomatic mission, consular office, or other 

Foreign Service post, such as a United States liaison office. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02.) 

resolution. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

subversive activity. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

US Defense Representative. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

LOGISTICS COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEM PLANS

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

JP 1-0

PERSONNEL

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

JP 3-0

OPERATIONS

JP 2-0

INTELLIGENCE

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the

development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-08 Operations













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts frontend analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

JS J-7 approves and releases PD to

lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant

command, JS directorate)













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/JS J-7 develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group