UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION

OF PATRICK ROGER LERET AND LUIS

ERNESTO GONZALES FOR AN ORDER Misc. Case No. 13-939 (RCL/JMF)

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1782, TO OBTAIN

DISCOVERY FROM ALVARO ROCHE 

CISNEROS FOR USE IN FOREIGN 

PROCEEDINGS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On September 3, 2013, Patrick Roger Leret and Luis Ernesto Gonzales (“the applicants”) 

filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 seeking an Order from this Court directing Alvaro Roche 

Cisneros (“Roche”) to submit to a deposition and to produce certain documents, both for the 

applicants’ use in foreign proceedings. Application for (1) An Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1782 to Conduct Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, and (2) an Order to Show Cause 

Why a Subpoena Should Not Immediately Issue [#1]. On September 9, 2013, the Court ordered 

Roche to show cause at a hearing. Show Cause Order [#6]. The hearing was held on September 

23, 2013, and, for the reasons stated below, the applicants’ motion will be denied.

BACKGROUND

The applicants contend that the discovery they seek is relevant to three actions currently 

pending in Caracas, Venezuela. [#1] at 1-2. These actions are 1) Patrick Roger Leret v. Alvaro 

Roche Cisneros and Marion Cisneros Rendiles; 2) Albaro Roche Cisneros v. Patrick Roger Leret 

and Luis Ernesto Gonzales; and 3) Arquitectura y Diseno Arquimeca C.A. v. Grupo Los 

Principitos, C.A. Id. at 2. These foreign actions arise out of a dispute between various 

shareholders of Los Principitos, a Venezuelan corporation. Response of Alvaro Roche Cisneros 
2

to the Court’s Order to Show Cause Why the Application of Patrick Roger Leret and Luis 

Ernesto Gonzalez Should Not Be Granted [#11] at 1. According to the applicants, because the 

respondent currently resides in Washington, D.C., they cannot obtain the discovery they seek 

through the Venezuelan courts. Id. at 4.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

Section 1782 of Title 28 of the United States Code, captioned “Assistance to foreign and 

international tribunals and to litigants before such tribunals” provides in pertinent part as 

follows:

The district court of the district in which a person resides or is 

found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to 

produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a 

foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations 

conducted before formal accusation. The order may be made 

pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign 

or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested 

person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or 

the document or other thing be produced, before a person 

appointed by the court . . . To the extent that the order does not 

prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and 

the document or other thing produced, in accordance with the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).1

To that end, the Court must determine “first, whether it is authorized to grant the request, 

and second, whether it should exercise its discretion to do so.” Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Chubb 

Insurance Co. of Canada, 384 F. Supp. 2d 45, 49 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Intel Corp. v. Advanced 

Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264 (2004)). Whether a Court is authorized depends on “(1) 

whether the person from whom discovery is sought resides or is found in the district where the 

 1 Error! Main Document Only.All references to the United States Code or the Code of Federal 

Regulations are to the electronic versions that appear in Westlaw or Lexis.
3

action has been filed; (2) whether the discovery sought is for use in a proceeding before a foreign 

or international proceeding; and (3) whether the application is made by a foreign or international 

tribunal or “any interested person.” Norex Petroleum Ltd., 384 F. Supp. 2d at 49 (citing Schmitz 

v. Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP, 376 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2004)). 

If the Court determines that it does have the authority to grant the request, it must then 

determine whether it should exercise that authority, which is discretionary. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. 

at 264 (“[A] district court is not required to grant a § 1782(a) discovery application simply 

because it has the authority to do so.”). That calculus is made in light of the statute’s “twin 

aims,” which are to provide “efficient assistance to participants in international litigation” and to 

encourage “foreign countries by example to provide similar assistance to our courts.” Norex 

Petroleum Ltd., 384 F. Supp. 2d at 49 (quoting Intel Corp., 524 U.S. at 252). 

Specifically, the Court must consider 1) whether the person from whom discovery is 

sought is a party to the foreign proceeding; 2) “the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of 

the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or 

agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance”; and 3) “whether the §1782(a) request 

conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a 

foreign country or the United States . . . [and] may reject . . . or trim . . . [any] unduly intrusive or 

burdensome requests.” Id. at 49 (quoting Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264).

II. Analysis

A. The Court has Authority to Grant the Application

First, the respondent does not dispute the applicants’ claim that he resides in the District 

of Columbia, the district where the application was made. See [#1] at 1; Memorandum of Law 

in Support of Leret’s and Gonzalez’s Application Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to Obtain 
4

Discovery from Alvaro Roche Cisneros For Use in Foreign Proceedings [#8] at 10 (“Roche lives 

[at] 3043 N Street NW, Washington D.C. 20007.”); Response of Alvaro Roche Cisneros to the 

Court’s Order to Show Cause Why the Application of Patrick Roger Leret and Luis Ernesto 

Gonzalez Should Not Be Granted [#11] at 10 (“Roche has strong connections to Venezuela. He 

used to live in Venezuela, he still has family that lives in Venezuela, and he maintains business 

and personal relationships in Venezuela.”). 

Second, it is undisputed that the discovery sought by the applicants is for use in three 

ongoing proceedings in Venezuela. [#1] at 2 (Leret v. Roche, et al., is pending in the 8th First 

Instance Court on Civil and Commercial Matter of the Caracas Judicial Circuit; Roche v. Leret,

et al., is pending in the 11th First Instance Court on Civil and Commercial Matter of the Caracas 

Judicial Circuit; and Arquimeca v. Leret, et al., is pending in the 11th Municipal Court of the 

Caracas Metropolitan Area.).

Third, the application was made by “interested persons” with respect to the foreign 

actions. See Lancaster Factoring Co. Ltd. V. Mangone, 90 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The 

legislative history to 1782 makes plain that ‘interested person’ includes ‘a party to the foreign . . . 

litigation.’”); [#8] at 10 (“Leret and Gonzalez . . . are each named defendants in Arquimeca’s 

claim of alleged mismanagement of Los Principitos . . . they each are named defendants in 

Roche’s damages claims . . . and Leret initiated proceedings against Roche, Gonzalez and 

Cisneros to dissolve the company, and Gonzalez has joined Leret’s claim.”). Therefore, the only 

issue before this Court is whether it should exercise its discretion in this instance and grant the 

application.

B. The Court Will Deny the Application
5

As noted above, Roche is a party to two of the foreign proceedings. [#8] at 11-12. The 

applicants argue that they need evidence, in the form of documents and testimony from Roche, to 

address claims made in all three suits. Id. at 11. The applicants further contend that they cannot 

obtain that evidence through the foreign courts because Roche no longer lives in Venezuela. Id.

at 2. [#1-1] at 5. According to Mario E. Trivella, the applicants’ Venezuelan counsel, the only 

way the applicants can obtain the evidence they need is through a § 1782 application:

18. Because Mr. Roche resides in Washington, D.C., Leret and 

Gonzalez have not been able to obtain oral testimony or documents 

from Mr. Roche. If Roche resided in Venezuela, the Court 

handling the Foreign Actions would call him as a witness, which 

would allow for a comprehensive examination. However, a 

witness has no obligation to appear if he or she does not reside in 

Venezuela.

* * *

20. The most that a Venezuelan Court could do is send a Letter 

Rogatory to the United States asking that Mr. Roche be notified of 

his role as a witness. But Mr. Roche cannot be compelled to travel 

to Venezuela and provide testimony, and the Court may draw no 

negative inference from his absence.

[#1-1] at 5-6. 

Trivella further notes that the Arquimeca case, to which Roche is not a party, is fasttracked:

16. Furthermore, under Venezuelan law, Arquimeca’s claim for 

irregulatories consists of only 10 working days after process is 

served on all interested parties. Leret and Gonzalez will have to 

produce evidence in support of their case during that period 

exclusively. The application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 is thus 

urgent.

Id. at 5.

In a later filing, the applicants again stress the urgency of their request, but note that, 

although service of process has not yet occurred, it “could occur at any time.” [#8] at 7. 
6

In Roche’s first response to the application, wherein Roche seeks an extension of time to 

respond to the Court’s show cause order, Roche argues that the applicants’ characterization of 

the application as “urgent” is misguided. According to Roche, the Arquimeca case was filed in 

December of 2012 and Trivella’s declaration, offered in support of the application, was dated 

August 12, 2013, even though the application itself was not filed until September 3, 2013. See

Alvaro Roche Cisneros’ Motion for Extension of Time [#9] at 3; [#1-1] at 7. Roche also notes 

that “the parties in [the Arquimeca] case would not be limited to a ten-day evidence gathering 

period, as the Venezuelan courts routinely grant extensions.” [#11] at 9. 

Even more remarkable, however, is Roche’s substantive response to the application. In 

his declaration, executed on September 20, 2013 in Caracas, Venezuela, Roche states the 

following: 

I agree to submit to the Venezuelan courts in the Venezuelan 

Actions for discovery consistent with Venezuelan procedures, and 

to be subject to the same discovery in the Venezuelan Actions as 

any party resident in Venezuela who appears before that country’s

courts. Should this Courft deny the Application, I will appear and 

will not raise any personal jurisdiction or process defenses in any 

Venezuelan [courts] of the [aforementioned] law suits.

[#11-3] at 2.

In addition, Roche adds the following in a footnote: “If there is any concern about 

Roche’s availability in Venezuela, the Court may make any order denying the Application 

contingent upon Roche’s appearing in Venezuela. Alternatively, [the applicants] may renew the 

Application if Roche does not appear in the Venezuelan proceedings.” [#11] at 14 n.1. 

Leaving aside the issue of urgency and whether or not the applicants are or are not trying 
7

to circumvent Venezuelan law,2 of greater significance to the Court’s reasoning is the applicants’ 

failure to provide any explanation whatsoever as to why they refuse to accept Roche’s offer to 

submit to their discovery requests in Venezuela.

3

 Therefore, in keeping with the statute’s twin 

goals of proving “efficient assistance to participants in international litigation” and encouraging 

“foreign countries by example to provide similar assistance to our courts,” this Court will deny 

the application. The greatest assistance this Court can provide to all the parties involved in the 

three foreign proceedings is to exercise its discretion in this matter, in a manner which does not 

prejudice either Roche or the applicants, by facilitating the resolution of the pending discovery 

requests by the very courts where the actions were filed, the Venezuelan courts. 

CONCLUSION

 2 According to Roche, the applicants are clearly trying to circumvent various limitations 

governing the Venezuelan proceedings. Specifically, Roche claims that 1) “[d]iscovery has 

expired in one Venezuelan action and is not currently open in the other two Venezuelan actions;” 

2) “[t]he requested discovery is not admissible in the Venezuelan actions;” 3) [t]he requested

discovery violates the Venezuelan Constitution and Venezuelan law;” and 4) [t]he discovery 

sought is not necessary or germane to any issues in dispute in the underlying Venezuelan 

actions.” [#11] at 3. The applicants dispute Roche’s claims, averring instead that 1) “nothing in 

Venezuelan law precludes the parties in domestic proceedings from submitting the type of 

evidence” the applicants seek; 2) the applicants’ request does not violate the Venezuelan 

constitution because, although only the Venezuelan court can rule on the merits of the parties’ 

disputes, the applicants are only asking this Court for assistance in conducting discovery; 3) 

there is nothing in Venezuelan law that precludes the admissibility, in the Venezuelan courts, of 

evidence obtained from a section 1782 application; 4) there is nothing in Venezuelan law that 

precludes the admission of further evidence in the three foreign actions. Motion for Leave to 

Submit Supplemental Citations and Supplemental Declaration in Reply to Alvaro Roche’s 

Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause [#12-1] at 2-4. Both the applicants and Roche 

also filed supplemental pleadings in support of their positions regarding the discoverability and 

relevance, under Venezuelan law, of the evidence sought. See [#12]; Alvaro Roche Cisneros’ 

Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Declaration [#13]. 3 “First, when the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign 

proceeding . . . the need for 1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent as it ordinarily is when 

evidence is sought from a nonparticipant in the matter arising abroad. A foreign tribunal has 

jurisdiction over those appearing before it, and can itself order them to produce evidence.” Intel 

Corp., 542 U.S. at 264. 
8

In light of the fact that Roche has agreed to the very discovery sought by the applicants in 

their 28 U.S.C. § 1782 motion, the Court will deny the application. An Order accompanies this 

Memorandum Opinion.

_______________________________________

JOHN M. FACCIOLA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE