FEDERAL PROTECTIVE 

SERVICE

Preliminary Results on 

Efforts to Assess Facility 

Risks and Oversee Contract 

Guards 

Statement of Mark L. Goldstein, Director

Physical Infrastructure Issues

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on 

Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, 

and Security Technologies of the House 

Committee on Homeland Security

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT

Tuesday, July 24, 2012

GAO-12-943T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office 

Highlights of GAO-12-943T, testimony before

the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, 

Infrastructure Protection, and Security 

Technologies of the House Committee on 

Homeland Security 

July 24, 2012 

FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE 

Preliminary Results on Efforts to Assess Facility 

Risks and Oversee Contract Guards

Why GAO Did This Study

FPS provides security and law 

enforcement services to over 9,000 

federal facilities managed by the 

General Services Administration 

(GSA). GAO has reported that FPS 

faces challenges providing security 

services, particularly completing FSAs 

and managing its contract guard 

program. To address these challenges, 

FPS spent about $35 million and 4 

years developing RAMP—essentially a 

risk assessment and guard oversight 

tool. However, RAMP ultimately could 

not be used to do either because of 

system problems.

This testimony is based on preliminary 

work for the Chairman and discusses 

the extent to which FPS is (1) 

completing risk assessments, (2) 

developing a tool to complete FSAs, 

and (3) managing its contract guard 

workforce. GAO reviewed FPS 

documents, conducted site visits at 3 

of FPS’s 11 regions and interviewed 

officials from FPS, Argonne National 

Laboratory, GSA, Department of 

Veterans Affairs, the Federal Highway 

Administration, Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, and guard 

companies; as well as 4 risk 

management experts. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making any 

recommendations in this testimony. 

GAO plans to finalize its analysis and 

report to the Chairman in August 2012, 

including recommendations. GAO 

discussed the information in this 

statement with FPS and incorporated 

technical comments as appropriate.

What GAO Found

GAO’s preliminary results indicate that the Department of Homeland Security’s

(DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS) is not assessing risks at federal facilities

in a manner consistent with standards such as the National Infrastructure 

Protection Plan’s (NIPP) risk management framework, as FPS originally planned. 

Instead of conducting risk assessments, since September 2011, FPS’s 

inspectors have collected information, such as the location, purpose, agency 

contacts, and current countermeasures (e.g., perimeter security, access controls, 

and closed-circuit television systems). This information notwithstanding, FPS has 

a backlog of federal facilities that have not been assessed for several years. 

According to FPS’s data, more than 5,000 facilities were to be assessed in fiscal 

years 2010 through 2012. However, GAO was not able to determine the extent of 

FPS’s facility security assessment (FSA) backlog because the data were

unreliable. Multiple agencies have expended resources to conduct risk 

assessments, even though they also already pay FPS for this service. 

FPS has an interim vulnerability assessment tool, referred to as the Modified 

Infrastructure Survey Tool (MIST), which it plans to use to assess federal 

facilities until it develops a longer-term solution. In developing MIST, FPS 

generally followed GAO’s project management best practices, such as 

conducting user acceptance testing. However, our preliminary analysis indicates 

that MIST has some limitations. Most notably, MIST does not estimate the 

consequences of an undesirable event occurring at a facility. Three of the four 

risk assessment experts GAO spoke with generally agreed that a tool that does 

not estimate consequences does not allow an agency to fully assess risks. FPS 

officials stated that they did not include consequence information in MIST

because it was not part of the original design and thus requires more time to 

validate. MIST also was not designed to compare risks across federal facilities. 

Thus, FPS has limited assurance that critical risks at federal facilities are being 

prioritized and mitigated. 

GAO’s preliminary work indicates that FPS continues to face challenges in 

overseeing its approximately 12,500 contract guards. FPS developed the Risk 

Assessment and Management Program (RAMP) to help it oversee its contract 

guard workforce by verifying that guards are trained and certified and for 

conducting guard post inspections. However, FPS faced challenges using RAMP

for guard oversight, such as verifying guard training and certification information,

and has recently determined that it would no longer use RAMP. Without a 

comprehensive system, it is more difficult for FPS to oversee its contract guard 

workforce. FPS is verifying guard certification and training information by 

conducting monthly audits of guard information maintained by guard contractors. 

However, FPS does not independently verify the contractor’s information. 

Additionally, according to FPS officials, FPS recently decided to deploy a new 

interim method to record post inspections that replaces RAMP. 

View GAO-12-943T. For more information, 

contact Mark L. Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 

or goldsteinm@gao.gov
 

Page 1 GAO-12-943T 

Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) Federal Protective Service’s (FPS) efforts to complete 

risk assessments of the over 9,000 federal facilities under the custody 

and control of the General Services Administration (GSA) and oversee its 

contract guards in the absence of its Risk Assessment and Management 

Program (RAMP), a Web-enabled facility security assessment (FSA) and 

guard management system. As we reported in July 2011, FPS had spent 

about $35 million and taken almost 4 years to develop RAMP—$14 

million and 2 years more than planned—but still could not use RAMP to 

complete FSAs because of several factors, including that FPS did not 

verify the accuracy of the federal facility data used.1 As a result, FPS’s 

Director decided to stop using RAMP to conduct FSAs and instead 

pursue an interim tool to replace it. FPS also experienced difficulty using 

RAMP to ensure that its guards met training and certification 

requirements, primarily because of challenges in verifying guards’ data.2

For fiscal year 2012, FPS has a budget of $1.3 billion, with over 1,200 

full-time employees and about 12,500 contract security guards, to achieve 

its mission to protect federal facilities. As part of the FSA process, FPS 

generally attempts to gather and review facility information; conduct and 

record interviews with tenant agencies; assess threats, vulnerabilities, 

and consequences to facilities, employees, and the public; and 

recommend countermeasures to federal tenant agencies. FPS’s contract 

guards are responsible for controlling access to federal facilities, 

screening access areas to prevent the introduction of weapons and 

explosives, enforcing property rules and regulations, detecting and 

reporting criminal acts, and responding to emergency situations involving 

In June 2012, FPS also decided to stop using RAMP to help oversee its 

contract guard program.

 

1

GAO, Federal Protective Service: Actions Needed to Resolve Delays and Inadequate 

Oversight Issues with FPS’s Risk Assessment and Management Program, GAO-11-705R 

(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2011).

2

GAO-11-705R. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-943T 

facility safety and security. FPS relies on the fees it charges federal 

tenant agencies in GSA–controlled facilities to fund its security services.3

This testimony is based on preliminary results of work we conducted for a 

report that we plan to issue to the Chairman in August 2012. That report 

will contain our final evaluation and recommendations. Consistent with 

the report’s objectives, this statement addresses the extent to which FPS 

is (1) completing risk assessments, (2) developing a tool to complete 

FSAs, and (3) managing its contract guard workforce. To examine the 

extent to which FPS is completing risk assessments and overseeing 

guards without RAMP, we reviewed, among other things, FPS’s current 

FSA procedures and data on completed and planned FSAs for fiscal 

years 2010 to 2012. Specifically, we reviewed FPS’s FSA data 

aggregated from its 11 regions to determine the extent of its FSA backlog. 

However, we could not determine the extent of the backlog because 

FPS’s data contained a number of missing and incorrect values which 

made the data unreliable. We also visited 3 of FPS’s 11 regions and 

interviewed internal and external stakeholders including, among others, 

FPS, GSA, Department of Veterans Affairs, the Federal Highway 

Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and guard 

companies. We selected these 3 regions based on the number of federal 

facilities in the region and their security levels, the number of contract 

guards in the region, and geographic dispersion. Our work is not 

generalizable to all FPS regions. To determine the status of FPS’s efforts 

to develop an FSA tool, we reviewed, among other things, relevant 

project documents and federal physical security standards, such as 

DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan’s (NIPP) risk management 

framework. We also interviewed FPS officials, representatives from 

Argonne National Laboratory, and four risk management experts. We 

selected our four risk assessment experts from a list of individuals who 

participated in the Comptroller General’s 2007 risk management forum.4

 

3

40 U.S.C. § 586; 41 C.F.R. § 102-85.35; Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142, 2156-57 

(2009).

This work is being conducted in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

4

GAO, Highlights of a Forum: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management Principles in 

Homeland Security, GAO-08-627SP (Washington, D.C.: April 2008).
 

Page 3 GAO-12-943T 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Our preliminary results indicate that, in the absence of RAMP, FPS 

currently is not assessing risk at the over 9,000 federal facilities under the 

custody and control of GSA in a manner consistent with federal standards 

such as NIPP’s risk management framework, as FPS originally planned.

According to this framework, to be considered credible a risk assessment 

must specifically address the three components of risk: threat, vulnerability, 

and consequence. As a result, FPS has accumulated a backlog of federal 

facilities that have not been assessed for several years. According to FPS 

data, more than 5,000 facilities were to be assessed in fiscal years 2010 

through 2012. However, we were not able to determine the extent of the 

FSA backlog because we found FPS’s FSA data to be unreliable.

Specifically, our analysis of FPS’s December 2011 assessment data 

showed nearly 800 (9 percent) of the approximately 9,000 federal facilities 

did not have a date for when the last FSA was completed. We have 

reported that timely and comprehensive risk assessments play a critical 

role in protecting federal facilities by helping decision makers identify and 

evaluate potential threats so that countermeasures can be implemented to 

help prevent or mitigate the facilities’ vulnerabilities.5

Although FPS is not currently assessing risk at federal facilities, FPS 

officials stated that the agency is taking steps to ensure federal facilities 

are safe. According to FPS officials, its inspectors (also referred to as law 

enforcement security officers) monitor the security posture of federal 

facilities by responding to incidents, testing countermeasures, and 

conducting guard post inspections. In addition, since September 2011, 

FPS’s inspectors have collected information—such as location, purpose, 

agency contacts, and current countermeasures (e.g., perimeter security, 

access controls, and closed-circuit television systems) at over 1,400 

facilities—which will be used as a starting point to complete FPS’s fiscal 

year 2012 assessments. However, FPS officials acknowledged that this 

approach is not consistent with NIPP’s risk management framework.

Moreover, several FPS inspectors told us that they received minimal 

training or guidance on how to collect this information, and expressed 

 

5

GAO, Homeland Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices Would Improve the Federal 

Protective Service’s Approach to Facility Protection, GAO-10-142 (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 23, 2009).

FPS Does Not 

Currently Assess 

Risks at Federal 

Facilities but Multiple 

Agencies Are 

Conducting Their 

Own Assessments
 

Page 4 GAO-12-943T 

concern that the facility information collected could become outdated by 

the time it is used to complete an FSA.

We reported in February 2012 that multiple federal agencies have been 

expending additional resources to conduct their own risk assessments, in 

part because they have not been satisfied with FPS’s past assessments.6

These assessments are taking place even though, according to FPS’s 

Chief Financial Officer, FPS received $236 million in basic security fees 

from federal agencies to conduct FSAs and other security services in 

fiscal year 2011.7 For example, officials we spoke with at the Internal 

Revenue Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

stated that they conduct their own risk assessments. GSA is also 

expending additional resources to assess risk. We reported in October 

2010 that GSA officials did not always receive timely FPS risk 

assessments for facilities GSA considered leasing.8 GSA seeks to have 

these assessments completed before it takes possession of a property 

and leases it to tenant agencies. However, our preliminary work indicates 

that as of June 2012, FPS has not coordinated with GSA and other 

federal agencies to reduce or prevent duplication of its assessments.

In September 2011, FPS signed an interagency agreement with Argonne 

National Laboratory for about $875,000 to develop an interim tool for 

conducting vulnerability assessments by June 30, 2012.9

 

6

GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 

Fragmentation, Achieve Savings and Enhance Revenue, 

According to 

FPS officials, on March 30, 2012, Argonne National Laboratory delivered 

this tool, called the Modified Infrastructure Survey Tool (MIST), to FPS on 

time and within budget. MIST is an interim vulnerability assessment tool 

that FPS plans to use until it can develop a permanent solution to replace 

GAO-12-342SP (Washington, 

D.C.: February 2012).

7

FPS currently charges tenant agencies in properties under GSA control a basic security 

fee of $0.74 per square foot per year for its security services including physical security 

and law enforcement activities as per 41 C.F.R. § 102-85.35. 

8

GAO-10-142. 

9

As of March 2012, FPS’s total life cycle cost for MIST was estimated at $5 million.

Multiple Federal Agencies 

Are Conducting Their Own 

Risk Assessments

FPS Efforts to 

Develop a Risk 

Assessment Tool Are 

Evolving, but 

Challenges Remain
 

Page 5 GAO-12-943T 

RAMP. According to MIST project documents and FPS officials, among 

other things, MIST will:

• allow FPS’s inspectors to review and document a facility’s security 

posture, current level of protection, and recommend 

countermeasures;

• provide FPS’s inspectors with a standardized way for gathering and 

recording facility data; and

• allow FPS to compare a facility’s existing countermeasures against 

the Interagency Security Committee’s (ISC) countermeasure 

standards based on the ISC’s predefined threats to federal facilities 

(e.g., blast-resistant windows for a facility designed to counter the 

threat of an explosive device) to create the facility’s vulnerability 

report.10

According to FPS officials, MIST will provide several potential 

improvements over FPS’s prior assessment tools, such as using a 

standard way of collecting facility information and allowing edits to GSA’s 

facility data when FPS inspectors find it is inaccurate. In addition, 

according to FPS officials, after completing a MIST vulnerability 

assessment, inspectors will use additional threat information gathered 

outside of MIST by FPS’s Threat Management Division as well as local 

crime statistics to identify any additional threats and generate a threat 

assessment report. FPS plans to provide the facility’s threat and 

vulnerability reports along with any countermeasure recommendations to 

the federal tenant agencies.

In May 2012, FPS began training inspectors on MIST and how to use the 

threat information obtained outside MIST and expects to complete the 

training by the end of September 2012. According to FPS officials, 

 

10The ISC is comprised of representatives from more than 50 federal agencies and 

departments, establishes standards and best practices for federal security professionals 

responsible for protecting non-military federal facilities in the U.S. FPS is a member 

agency of the Interagency Security Committee in the Department of Homeland Security, 

along with other federal agencies such as the General Services Administration, the 

Federal Aviation Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other 

components within the Department of Homeland Security. The ISC has defined 31 

different threats to federal facilities including vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, 

workplace violence, and theft.
 

Page 6 GAO-12-943T 

inspectors will be able to use MIST once they have completed training 

and a supervisor has determined, based on professional judgment, that 

the inspector is capable of using MIST. At that time, an inspector will be 

able to use MIST to assess level I or II facilities.11 According to FPS 

officials, once these assessments are approved, FPS will subsequently 

determine which level III and IV facilities the inspector may assess with 

MIST.

Our preliminary analysis indicates that in developing MIST, FPS 

increased its use of GAO’s project management best practices, including 

alternatives analysis, managing requirements, and conducting user 

acceptance testing.12 For example, FPS completed, although it did not 

document, an alternatives analysis prior to selecting MIST as an interim 

tool to replace RAMP. It appears that FPS also better managed MIST’s 

requirements. Specifically, FPS’s Director required that MIST be an FSAexclusive tool and thus helped avoid changes in requirements that could 

have resulted in cost or schedule increases during development. In March 

2012, FPS completed user acceptance testing of MIST with some 

inspectors and supervisors, as we recommended in 2011.13 According to 

FPS officials, user feedback on MIST was positive from the user 

acceptance test, and MIST produced the necessary output for FPS’s FSA 

process. However, FPS did not obtain GSA or federal tenant agencies’ 

input in developing MIST’s requirements. Without this input, FPS’s 

customers may not receive the information they need to make wellinformed countermeasure decisions.

 

11FPS uses the ISC’s Facility Security Level Determination for Federal Facilities to 

determine the facility security level (FSL). The ISC recommends that level I and II facilities 

be assessed every 5 years and level III and IV facilities every 3 years. According to the 

ISC’s criteria, a level I facility may be 10,000 or fewer square feet, have fewer than 100 

employees, provide administrative or direct service activities, and have little to no public 

contact; a level II facility may be 100,000 or fewer square feet, have 250 or fewer 

employees, be readily identifiable as a federal facility, and provide district or state-wide 

services; a level III facility may be 250,000 or fewer square feet, have 750 or fewer 

employees, be an agency’s headquarters, and be located in an area of moderate crime; 

and a level IV facility may exceed 250,000 square feet, have more than 750 employees, 

house national leadership, and be located in or near a popular tourist destination. 

12GAO-11-705R. 

13GAO-11-705R. 

FPS Increased Its Use of 

Project Management Best

Practices in Developing 

MIST
 

Page 7 GAO-12-943T 

FPS has yet to decide what tool, if any, will replace MIST, which is 

intended to be an interim vulnerability assessment tool. According to FPS 

officials, the agency plans to use MIST for at least the next 18 months. 

Consequently, until FPS decides what tool, if any, will replace MIST and 

RAMP, it will still not be able to assess risk at federal facilities in a 

manner consistent with NIPP, as we previously mentioned. Our 

preliminary work suggests that MIST has several limitations:

• Assessing Consequence. FPS did not design MIST to estimate 

consequence, a critical component of a risk assessment. Assessing 

consequence is important because it combines vulnerability and 

threat information to evaluate the potential effects of an adverse event 

on a federal facility. Three of the four risk assessment experts we 

spoke with generally agreed that a tool that does not estimate 

consequences does not allow an agency to fully assess the risks to a 

federal facility. However, FPS officials stated that incorporating 

consequence information into an assessment tool is a complex task.

FPS officials stated that they did not include consequence 

assessment in MIST’s design because it would have required 

additional time to develop, validate, and test MIST. As a result, while 

FPS may be able to identify a facility’s vulnerabilities to different 

threats using MIST, without consequence information, federal tenant 

agencies may not be able to make fully informed decisions about how 

to allocate resources to best protect federal facilities. FPS officials do 

not know if this capability can be developed in the future, but they said 

that they are working with the ISC and DHS’s Science and 

Technology Directorate to explore the possibility.

• Comparing Risk across Federal Facilities. FPS did not design MIST to 

present comparisons of risk assessment results across federal 

facilities. Consequently, FPS cannot take a comprehensive approach 

to managing risk across its portfolio of 9,000 facilities to prioritize 

recommended countermeasures to federal tenant agencies. Instead, 

FPS takes a facility by facility approach to risk management where all 

facilities with the same security level are assumed to have the same 

security risk, regardless of their location.14

 

14

We reported in 2010 that 

FPS’s approach to risk management provides limited assurance that 

the most critical risks at federal facilities across the country are being 

GAO-10-142. 

MIST Has Limitations as 

an Assessment Tool
 

Page 8 GAO-12-943T 

prioritized and mitigated.15

• Measuring Performance. FPS has not developed metrics to measure 

MIST’s performance, such as feedback surveys from tenant agencies. 

Measuring performance allows organizations to track progress toward 

their goals and, gives managers critical information on which to base 

decisions for improving their programs. This is a necessary 

component of effective management, and should provide agency 

managers with timely, action-oriented information.

FPS recognized the importance of having 

such a comprehensive approach to its FSA program when it 

developed RAMP and FPS officials stated that they may develop this 

capability for the next version of MIST.

16 Without such 

metrics, FPS’s ability to improve MIST will be hampered. FPS officials 

stated that they are planning to develop performance measures for 

MIST, but did not give a time frame for when they will do so.

Our work to date indicates that FPS does not have a comprehensive and 

reliable system to oversee its approximately 12,500 contract guards. In 

addition to conducting FSAs, FPS developed RAMP as a comprehensive 

system to help oversee two aspects of its contract guard program: (1) 

verifying that guards are trained and certified to be on post in federal 

facilities; and (2) conducting and documenting guard post inspections.17

However, FPS experienced difficulty with RAMP because the contract 

guard training and certification information in RAMP was not reliable. 

Additionally, FPS faced challenges using RAMP to conduct and 

document post inspections.18

 

15GAO, Homeland Security: Addressing Weaknesses with Facility Security Committees 

Would Enhance Protection of Federal Facilities, 

For example, FPS inspectors we 

interviewed reported they had difficulty connecting to RAMP’s servers in 

remote areas and that recorded post inspections disappeared from 

RAMP’s database without explanation. Although we reported some of 

GAO-10-901 (Washington, D.C.: August 

5, 2010).

16GAO, Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges 

That Hamper its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities, GAO-08-683 (Washington, D.C.: June 

11, 2008).

17A post is a guard’s area of responsibility in a federal facility. 

18FPS’s inspection requirement for level I and II facilities is two annual inspections of all 

posts, all shifts. The inspection requirement for level III facilities is biweekly inspections of 

two posts, any shift, and for level IV, weekly inspections of two posts, any shift.

FPS Faces Challenges 

in Overseeing Its 

Contract Guards
 

Page 9 GAO-12-943T 

these challenges in 2011, FPS did not stop using RAMP for guard 

oversight until June 2012 when the RAMP operations and maintenance 

contract was due to expire.

In the absence of RAMP, in June 2012, FPS decided to deploy an interim 

method to enable inspectors to record post inspections. FPS officials said 

this capability is separate from MIST, will not allow FPS to generate post 

inspection reports, and does not include a way for FPS inspectors to 

check guard training and certification data during a post inspection. FPS 

officials acknowledged that this method is not a comprehensive system 

for guard oversight. Consequently, it is now more difficult for FPS to verify 

that guards on post are trained and certified and that inspectors are 

conducting guard post inspections as required.

Although FPS collects guard training and certification information from the 

companies that provide contract guards, it appears that FPS does not 

independently verify that information. FPS currently requires its guard 

contractors to maintain their own files containing guard training and 

certification information and began requiring them to submit a monthly 

report with this information to FPS’s regions in July 2011.19

FPS’s monthly audits of contractor data provide limited assurance that 

qualified guards are standing post, as FPS is verifying that the contractorprovided information matches the information in the contractor’s files. We 

To verify the 

guard companies’ reports, FPS conducts monthly audits. As part of its 

monthly audit process, FPS’s regional staff visits the contractor’s office to 

select 10 percent of the contractor’s guard files and check them against 

the reports guard companies send FPS each month. In addition, in 

October 2011, FPS undertook a month-long audit of every guard file to 

verify that guards had up-to-date training and certification information for 

its 110 contracts across its 11 regions. FPS provided preliminary October 

2011 data showing that 1,152 (9 percent) of the 12,274 guard files FPS 

reviewed at that time were deficient, meaning that they were missing one 

or more of the required certification document(s). However, FPS does not 

have a final report on the results of the nation-wide audit that includes an 

explanation of why the files were deficient and whether deficiencies were 

resolved.

 

19For example, guard training and certifications include firearms qualification, 

cardiopulmonary resuscitation, first aid, baton certification, and x-ray and magnetometer 

training.
 

Page 10 GAO-12-943T 

reported in 2010 that FPS’s reliance on contractors to self-report guard 

training and certification information without a reliable tracking system of 

its own may have contributed to a situation in which a contractor allegedly 

falsified training information for its guards.20

We plan to finalize our analysis and report to the Chairman in August 

2012, including recommendations. We discussed the information in this 

statement with FPS and incorporated technical comments as appropriate.

Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and members of the 

Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy 

to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

In addition, officials at one 

FPS region told us they maintain a list of the files that have been audited 

previously to avoid reviewing the same files, but FPS has no way of 

ensuring that the same guard files are not repeatedly reviewed during the 

monthly audits, while others are never reviewed. In the place of RAMP, 

FPS plans to continue using its administrative audit process and the 

monthly contractor-provided information to verify that qualified contract 

guards are standing post in federal facilities.

For further information on this testimony, please contact me at 

(202) 512-2834, or by e-mail at goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to 

this testimony include Tammy Conquest, Assistant Director; Geoffrey 

Hamilton; Greg Hanna; Justin Reed; and Amy Rosewarne.

 

20GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service’s Contract Guard Program 

Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of Contract Guards, GAO-10-341 

(Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2010).

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments

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