United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted June 30, 2020*

Decided July 1, 2020 

Before 

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge 

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

No. 19-3221 

MARLON L. WATFORD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

RANDY PFISTER, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 19 C 3868 

 

Virginia M. Kendall, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Marlon Watford, an Illinois inmate, believes that the prison where he formerly 

was housed overcharges inmates for legal photocopying services. He brought this civil 

rights suit against prison officials, and the district court dismissed the complaint with 

prejudice for failure to state a claim. We affirm the judgment. 

*

 The defendants were not served with process in the district court and are not 

participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument 

because the brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral 

argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 19-3221 Page 2 

During Watford’s confinement at Stateville’s Northern Reception and 

Classification Center in 2017, the prison began charging ten cents per copy to photocopy 

legal documents. (The prior cost of a copy is not clear from the record.) The state 

administrative code states that “[t]he cost for reproduction [of photocopied materials] 

will be determined by the facility based on actual cost per copy.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE 

§ 430.40(a). Watford says that the prison’s cost is only one cent per photocopy. 

Watford sued the warden and four other prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000cc-1. He alleged that the ten-cent fee violates his religion because, as a devout 

Muslim, he must “keep himself free from all forms of oppression,” including “financial 

oppression.” He also alleged that the fee increase amounts to cruel and unusual 

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and that he has a due-process 

property interest in being charged only one cent per copy. Finally, he asserted that 

because the fee contravenes the state administrative code, it also violates federal law. 

At screening, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court dismissed the complaint 

with prejudice on several grounds. The court first stated that Watford’s 65-page 

complaint “runs afoul” of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) because it contains 

“many pages of immaterial information, argument, and legal conclusions.” The court 

then concluded that Watford failed to state a claim for relief because the complaint 

primarily alleged that the ten-cent fee violates the state administrative code, and 

noncompliance with state law does not by itself violate the Constitution. It also called 

the suit “duplicative and malicious,” stating that Watford “has tried, unsuccessfully, 

twice now to litigate the same/similar issues” in federal court, citing Watford v. Ellis., 

15-CV-567 (S.D. Ill.), and Watford v. Doe, 15-CV-9540 (N.D. Ill.). The court assessed 

Watford a strike, his third, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Watford moved to alter or amend 

the judgment, see FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e), to no avail. 

On appeal, Watford first contends that his complaint does not violate Rule 8(a), 

as the district court stated, because, setting aside the 45 pages of attached exhibits, it is 

only 20 pages long. He has a point: where, as here, the complaint is not “too confusing 

to determine the facts that constitute the alleged wrongful conduct,” dismissal based on 

“undue length” or “the inclusion of superfluous material” generally is inappropriate. 

Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 797–98 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 

F.3d 843, 844 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that 28–page complaint “is not excessively long” 

given number of claims and that district court could have “stricken without bothering 

to read” 71-page appendix). Even so, any error in this regard would be harmless 
No. 19-3221 Page 3 

because the district court did not rely on Rule 8(a) alone in dismissing the complaint. 

Rather, as the court twice stated, it dismissed the complaint because it failed to state a 

claim and because it was duplicative and malicious. 

Watford next suggests that, in concluding that he failed to state a claim for relief, 

the district court focused on his state-law allegations only and ignored his invocations 

of RLUIPA and the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Regardless of how 

Watford frames his claims, however, they all turn on an alleged violation of the state 

administrative code. And as the district court correctly recognized, the violation of a 

state law is “completely immaterial ... of whether a violation of the federal constitution 

has been established.” Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 454 (7th Cir. 2006). 

In any event, Watford cannot state a claim for relief under any of the federal 

provisions that he cites. The prison’s ten-cent photocopy fee does not implicate the 

Eighth Amendment, which prohibits prison conditions that “deprive inmates of the 

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 

(1981). Watford also cannot state a claim under RLUIPA or the First Amendment. 

See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 356–58 (2015) (noting that RLUIPA provides greater 

protection than First Amendment). Even if we assume that Watford’s request for a 

lower fee is “sincerely based on a religious belief and not some other motivation,” id. at

360–61, he cannot show that the ten-cent fee substantially burdens his religious exercise. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. The prison’s fee increase on an optional service has not coerced 

Watford to modify his behavior in a way “undeniably at odds” with his religious beliefs 

nor has it rendered his religious exercise “effectively impracticable.” Korte v. Sebelius, 

735 F.3d 654, 683 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Finally, Watford cannot state a claim under the Due Process Clause because the state 

administrative code section that he cites does not create a benefit to which he has a 

“legitimate claim of entitlement.” Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 

(1972); Bell v. City of Country Club Hills, 841 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 2016). 

We have considered Watford’s other arguments, and none has merit. 

AFFIRMED