## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS

N O . A P - 74, 391

PE R R Y EU G EN E W I LL I A M S , A ppe l l ant

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS ON DI RE CT AP P EA L FROM HA RRI S CO UNTY J OHNS ON , J. , f

i l e d a c onc ur r i ng a nd di s s e nt i ng o pi ni on. C O N C U R R I N G AND D I S S E N T I N G O P I N I O N

Th e art ic le s o f t

he Te xas C od e of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure that de a l w ithtr ia ls a re ve ry sp e c if ic as to the duties of the participants and the rig hts of the par ties. Many

article s contains mandator y langua g e , f

oll ow e d b y

a c on dit ion . A rt ic le 33 .0 3 c omm and s th at a de fe nd ant m us t be pe rs on a lly prese nt at trial, but allows the def endant to choose to be abse nt after the commenc ement of tria l. See als o G ar c ia v . S

tate , 919 S.W .2d 3 7 0 (T ex . C ri m . App. 1996). L ikewise, the de fenda nt must be prese nt at sentenc ing on a felony offe nse, unless t h e d efendant voluntarily absents himself. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 37.06. Ar ticle 36.15 requires t he trial court to allow counse l for the state and2

the def endant a rea sonable ti me t o prese nt written i nstructions to be included within the jury char g e. The statute mandates opportunit y , but does not require a re quest from e ither counse l or requir e the tr ia l c ourt to g ra nt a ny su c h r e qu e st. Ar

tic le 20 .0 3 s ay s th a t an a tto rn e y re pr e se nti ngthe state is entitled to appea

r bef ore the g rand jury

and pre sent evidenc e, but does not mandate the prese nce of state’s c ounsel and ba

rs it during g rand-

jury deliberations. Article 26.052(g ) say s that the trial court sh a ll g ra nt a re qu e st f or a dv anc e pa

y me nt of c e rt a in e xpe ns e s, if the tr ia l c ourt

de e ms the re qu e st i s

rea sonable. The United States Constit ution gua ran tees the r ight to counse l, but even that constitutional right may

be wa ived by the defendant if cer tain prer equisites are met. See F aretta v. Cal ifo rn ia , 4 22 U. S. 8 06 (1 97 5) . T he de fe nd ant m ay int ro du c e e vid e nc e in his de fe ns e or may sit sil e nt, jus t a s a

c a pit a l de fe nd ant may int

ro du c e mit ig a tin g e vid e nc e or re ma in sil e nt. Ea c h o f t he se conditional duties or rig hts is parce led out to the court, the state , or t he def endant. Ea ch condition that ne g a te s a du ty and

e a c h d e c isi on

to w a ive a

ri g ht c an b e inv ok e d o nly by the pe rs on

wh os e du ty

or ri g ht i t is . T he tr ia l c ourt c ann ot f or c e a de fe nd ant to wa ive his ri g ht to co un se l or d ism iss a c a se befor e trial without the state’s consent. The prose cutor c annot deny a re quest from de fense counsel for advanc e pay

ment, a def

endant c annot forbid a

prosec utor to prese nt evidence to a g rand jury , and neither c an dictate to the trial court the c ontents of the cour t’s char g e. Whil e some rig hts and duties are condit i o n al an d others wa ivable, some statutes c reate an unavoidable duty

. The state must produc e evide nce of g uilt. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ar t. 1.1 5. Wri t

“ c ouns e l sh a ll i nv e sti g a te
. . . the fa c tua l and le g a l g ro un ds fo r the fi lin g of an a pp lic a tio n f

or a wr it of habe as cor

pus.” T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 11.071, § 3 (a ). The state shall answe r the defe ndant’s applica

tion for wr i t o f h ab ea s corpus. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 11.071, § 7. A de fe nd ant in a ca

pit a l ca se may no t w a ive ind ic tme nt i n f a vo r o f a n in fo rm a tio n, e ve n if

the state is3

A rt i cl e 3 6

. 1 4 m and at es t hat t he d ef end ant or d ef

ense counsel s hal l have reas o nab l e t i m e t o exam i ne t he 1 c o u rt’s c h a rg e a n d su b m it w ritten o b je c tio n s to it . C u rio u sly, t h e p ro se c u tio n is no t ac c o rd e d the sa m e o p p o rtu n ity. not seeking the death penalty . T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 1.141. In a ca pital trial, the defe ndant cannot wa ive a jury trial if the s tate is seekingdeath. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . a rt . 1 .1 3( a ). Our c a se l aw p e r m i t s a c a p i t a l d e f e n d an t t o w a i v e t h e g u i l tp h a s e an d p l e a d g u i l t y t o t h e j u r

y, b u ti ti s a l w ays and only for the jur

y to decide what punishment will be assessed. W ill iam s v . S

tate , 674 S.W .2d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Many of the provisions that gover n the t rial of capital murder place upon the t rial cour t an unconditional duty ; the trial court sha ll conduct a jury trial (T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . a rt . 1 .1 3) , s ha ll h o l d a sepa

rate punishment hearingwith the trial jury if death is sought (T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art
. 37 .0 71 , § (3 )( a )( 1) ), and sh a ll s e nte nc e the de fe nd ant t o e ith e r l if e wi tho ut p aro le or

to d e a th (T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . a rt 37 .0 71 , § (2 )( g ). A g e ne ra l pr ov isi on state s t hat th e tr ia l c ourt sh a ll deliver to the jury

the cour t’s char g e. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . a rt . 3 6. 14

. Th e art ic le sp e c if ic to 1 the cour t’s char g e in ca

pital-murder trials, article 37.071, expli citly mandates two issues that the jur y must alway s answer

and a third instruc tion that, if the jury answe rs “Ye s” to ea ch of the first two

m an d a t o r y i s s u e s , m u s ta l s o b e an s w e r e d b y t h e j u r

y. Ar tic le 37 .0 71 Pr oc e dure in C a pit a l Ca se * * * Sc e . 2 (b ) O n c on c lus ion

of th e prese ntatio n o f t

he e vid e nc e , th e c ourt

sh a ll s ub mit the fo llo wi ngiss ue s to the jur y : (1) whe ther ther e is a proba bility that the def

endant would c ommit criminal acts of violenc e that would constitute a c ontinuing thre at to society ; and (2) in ca ses in which the jury char g e at the guilt or innocence stag e per mitted the jury to find the defe ndant g uilty as a pa rty under Sec tions 7.01 and 7.02, Penal Code, whe ther the de fenda nt actually

cause d the death of the dec ease d or did not actua lly

cause t h e d ea t h o f the dec ease d but intended to kill the4 dece ased or

another or anticipated that a human life would be take n.

* * * Sec. 2(e )(1) The c ourt shall instruct the jury th at if the jury

returns a n aff irmative finding to eac h issue submitt ed under Subsection (b), it shall answe r the following issue: Whether, taking i nto consideration all of the evidenc e, including the circ umstances of

the offe nse, the de fenda

nt’s char acte r and bac kg round, and the per sonal mor a l c ulpability of the de fenda

nt, there is a suf

ficient mitigating circ umstance or

circ umstances to wa

rra nt that a sentenc e of

li f e im p r is o nme nt without parole rather than a death se ntence be imposed. To my knowledg e, no one ha s ever sug g ested that e ither or both of the fi rs t t wo i s sues may be waived. T hey

are clea rly nece ssary

to the decision on t he sentence to be assessed. Why is it, t hen, that the third mandate d issue, also nec essar y to the decision on the s entenc e to be assessed, can be

w a i v e d ? Th e ans we r f

re qu e ntl y g ive n is that th e fi rs t tw o is su e “ be lon g to t he state ,” wh ic h h a s a burden of proof, while the mitigation issue is “ the def endant’ s issue.” B y

waiving the g iving of

the mitigation instruction, the re asoning say s, a defenda nt may fore stall presentation of victim-impact and victim-cha

rac ter e vidence by

the state; a de fenda

nt give s up the instruction a nd the mitigating evidenc e, and the state may not then “re but” that evidenc e w i t h victim-impact and -c hara cter evidenc e. We have said so ourselves. Se e, e .g ., Ri pk ows k i v . S tate , 6 1 S. W.3 d 3 78 , 3 90 (T e x. Cr im. App. 2001). I might be persua ded of the validi ty of that position if that were the way things wor

ked in the rea l world, but it is not

. I n the real world, capital defe ndants waive the mitigation instruction only to f in d th a t, b y a s s e rti n g th a t t

h e v ic ti m- im

p a c t a n d - c h ar a c te r

e v id e n c e is a dmi s s ib le u n d er some other leg al theory , the state introduce s the very evidenc e that th e d ef

endant waived the instruction to keep out. The state benef its f ro m t h e waiver, but the defe ndant loses two way s–no5

instruction, no evidence

. Isee two possibl e resolutions. The first is for this Court to rule that the m ere g iving of the leg islatively

mandated instruc tion does not “open the door ” to pre s en t at i o n of victim-impact and vic tim -c ha

ra c te r e vid e nc e by

the state ; a dmi ssi bil ity of that evi de nc e , like a ll o the r e vid e nc e , w ou ld be g overne d by

Rules of Evidence 403 and 404. The second is that, if the instruction is waived, victi m -i mpact and vic tim-chara cter evidenc e may

not be admitted. The f

irst applies limit s to the nature and exte n t o f v i cti m-impact and vic tim-chara cter evidenc e. The second e nsures that the defe ndant g ets some bene fit from his barg ain. Idis se nt a s to po int

of e rr or on e and oth e rw ise c on c ur

in t he jud g me nt o f t

he Court
.

Filed: June 11, 2008 Pub lis h