05 October 2009

Counterinsurgency Operations

Joint Publication 3-24
PREFACE 

1. Scope 

 This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment 

of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations across the range of military operations. This 

will include the description of relationships between COIN, irregular warfare, 

counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense. 

2. Purpose 

 This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and 

other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, 

education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in 

preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the 

authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the 

JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the 

overall objective. 

3. Application 

 a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders 

of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate 

components of these commands, and the Services. 

 b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances 

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the 

contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. 

Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military 

command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United 

States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should 

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Preface 

ii JP 3-24 

evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where 

applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

 For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

 LLOYD J. AUSTIN III 

 Lieutenant General, USA 

 Director, Joint Staff 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................... ix 

CHAPTER I 

 FOUNDATION FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

 Introduction .................................................................................................... I-1 

 Fragile States Framework and Governance .................................................... I-2 

 Warfare and Counterinsurgency ..................................................................... I-6 

 Related Operations and Activities................................................................... I-8 

 Balance and Simultaneity of Offense, Defense, and Stability Operations.... I-14 

CHAPTER II 

 INSURGENCY 

 Introduction .................................................................................................. II-1 

 Ends, Scope, Core Grievances, and Prerequisites ........................................ II-4 

 Dynamics of Insurgency ............................................................................... II-8 

 Organization..... ........................................................................................... II-16 

 Approaches ................................................................................................. II-20 

 Recruitment, Causes, Resources, and Information ..................................... II-22 

 Vulnerabilities ............................................................................................. II-26 

 Devolution and Decline............................................................................... II-28 

CHAPTER III 

 COUNTERINSURGENCY 

 Introduction ................................................................................................... III-1 

 Context of Counterinsurgency....................................................................... III-3 

 Strategic and Operational Approaches.......................................................... III-5 

 Principles of Counterinsurgency ................................................................. III-10 

CHAPTER IV 

 UNITY OF EFFORT IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 

 Unity of Effort and Unified Action ............................................................. IV-1 

 The Internal Defense and Development Strategy ........................................ IV-5 

 United States Civil-Military Integration .................................................... IV-10 

 United States Civil-Military Integration Mechanisms ............................... IV-13 

 Military Unity of Command in Multinational Operations ........................ IV-19 

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CHAPTER V 

 INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY 

 Purposes of Joint Intelligence in a Counterinsurgency ................................ V-1 

 Intelligence-Operations Dynamic and Intelligence Architecture.................. V-2 

 Principles of Intelligence Operations in Counterinsurgency......................... V-3 

 Intelligence Disciplines ................................................................................. V-5 

 All-Source Intelligence................................................................................. V-12 

 Factors Effecting Intelligence Collaboration ............................................... V-14 

CHAPTER VI 

 SUPPORTING OPERATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY 

 SECTION A. INFORMATION OPERATIONS.............................................VI-1 

 General ..........................................................................................................VI-1 

 Employing Information Operations Capabilities ..........................................VI-2 

 Planning Information Operations in Counterinsurgency...............................VI-5 

 Influencing the Population’s Perspective Through Psychological 

 Operations .....................................................................................................VI-7 

 Planning Psychological Operations in Counterinsurgency ...........................VI-8 

SECTION B. PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND MEDIA SUPPORT TO 

COUNTERINSURGENCY....................................................................................VI-11

 General .........................................................................................................VI-11 

 Public Affairs Focus.....................................................................................VI-11 

 Public Affairs Relationships with Related Functions...................................VI-12 

 Media Engagement.......................................................................................VI-13 

 SECTION C. DETAINEE OPERATIONS IN 

 COUNTERINSURGENCY .........................................................................VI-14 

 General .........................................................................................................VI-14 

 Voluntary Detainee Programs ......................................................................VI-14 

 Release Authority.........................................................................................VI-15 

 SECTION D. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM OPERATIONS IN 

COUNTERINSURGENCY....................................................................................VI-15 

 General .........................................................................................................VI-15 

 Security Sector Reform Operations..............................................................VI-15 

 SECTION E. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND 

REINTEGRATION IN COUNTERINSURGENCY ............................................VI-19 

 General ........................................................................................................VI-19 

 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Elements ......................VI-19 

 Planning a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program .....VI-22 

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CHAPTER VII 

 COMPONENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO COUNTERINSURGENCY 

 Joint Counterinsurgency is Team Counterinsurgency ................................ VII-1 

 Host-Nation Land Contribution to Counterinsurgency............................... VII-1 

 Air Contribution to Counterinsurgency....................................................... VII-4 

 Maritime Contribution to Counterinsurgency ............................................. VII-7 

 Special Operations Forces Contribution to Counterinsurgency ................ VII-10 

CHAPTER VIII 

 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 

 Holistic Counterinsurgency Operational Environment .............................. VIII-1 

 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Overview VIII-3 

SECTION A. STEP ONE ..................................................................................... VIII-3 

 Define the Operational Environment ......................................................... VIII-3 

SECTION B. STEP TWO..................................................................................... VIII-8 

 Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment................................ VIII-8 

 Sociocultural Factors.................................................................................. VIII-8 

 Civil Factors ............................................................................................. VIII-12 

 Core Grievances, Prerequisites, and Drivers of Conflict ......................... VIII-13 

 Develop a Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment............ VIII-13 

SECTION C. STEP THREE............................................................................... VIII-15 

 Evaluate the Adversary ............................................................................ VIII-15 

 Evaluating Insurgent Activities................................................................ VIII-18 

 Identify Adversary Centers of Gravity..................................................... VIII-20 

SECTION D. STEP FOUR................................................................................. VIII-22 

 Determine Adversary Courses of Action ................................................. VIII-22 

CHAPTER IX 

 PLANNING IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 

 Counterinsurgency Planning ........................................................................ IX-1 

 Levels of War and Counterinsurgency......................................................... IX-2 

 Joint Operation Planning and Operational Design ...................................... IX-2 

CHAPTER X 

 EXECUTION IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 

 Introduction ................................................................................................... X-1 

 Clear-Hold-Build........................................................................................... X-2 

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 Clear .............................................................................................................. X-4 

 Hold............................................................................................................... X-5 

 Build .............................................................................................................. X-7 

 Combined Action ...................................................................................... X-11 

 Limited Support........................................................................................... X-13 

 Targeting in Counterinsurgency.................................................................. X-14 

 Joint Assessment and Counterinsurgency ................................................... X-15 

APPENDIX 

 A Insurgency and Crime ................................................................................. A-1 

 B Provincial Reconstruction Teams ............................................................... B-1 

 C Insurgent Approaches Indicators ................................................................. C-1 

 D References................................................................................................... D-1 

 E Administrative Instructions.......................................................................... E-1 

GLOSSARY 

 Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ........................................................... GL-1 

 Part II Terms and Definitions ...................................................................... GL-5 

FIGURE 

 I-1 Fragile States Framework ........................................................................ I-3 

 I-2 Source of Governance.............................................................................. I-5 

 I-3 Counterinsurgency and Foreign Internal Defense ................................. I-10 

 I-4 Example Related Operations: Counterinsurgency, Counterterrorism, 

 and Peace Enforcement.......................................................................... I-15 

 II-1 Characteristics of Insurgencies .............................................................. II-3 

 II-2 Eight Dynamics of Insurgency............................................................... II-9 

 II-3 Range of Popular Support.................................................................... II-13 

 II-4 Insurgent Actions, Underground and Military..................................... II-15 

 II-5 Example Elements of an Insurgency.................................................... II-19 

 II-6 Notional Insurgent Decline.................................................................. II-29 

 III-1 Range of Popular Support..................................................................... III-2 

 III-2 Counterinsurgency Range of Responses............................................... III-9 

 III-3 Example Progression of the Operational Approach............................ III-10 

 IV-1 Unified Action ...................................................................................... IV-2 

 IV-2 Internal Defense and Development Strategy Model............................. IV-6 

 IV-3 Internal Defense and Development Coordination................................. IV-9 

 IV-4 US Strategic and Theater Strategic Civil-Military Coordination ....... IV-15 

 IV-5 Example Joint Task Force Civil-Military Integrating Mechanisms ... IV-20 

 V-1 Notional Example of Human Intelligence and Geospatial 

 Intelligence Product ................................................................................ V-9 

 VIII-1 Counterinsurgency Operational Environment Framework................. VIII-5 

 VIII-2 Two Examples of Insurgent Plans ................................................... VIII-23 

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 IX-1 Example Friendly Logical Lines of Operations.................................... IX-7 

 X-1 Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Conflict ......................................... X-2 

 X-2 Clear, Hold, and Build ........................................................................... X-3 

 X-3 Joint Targeting Cycle........................................................................... X-15 

 X-4 Execution, Assessment, and Reframing............................................... X-16 

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Intentionally Blank 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

ix 

• Provides the foundation for defining insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN)

• Describes the relationships between COIN, irregular warfare, counterterrorism, 

and foreign internal defense

• Gives a doctrinal baseline to understanding insurgencies

• Describes strategic and operational approaches to COIN

• Introduces the principles of COIN

• Emphasizes the need for “unity of effort” in COIN operations and how to achieve 

it through “unified action”

• Explains the dynamic relationship between intelligence and COIN operations

• Provides principles of intelligence operations in COIN

• Describes supporting operations for COIN

• Addresses component contributions to COIN

• Describes the COIN operation environment and use of the joint intelligence 

preparation of the operational environment process in analyzing it 

• Discusses COIN planning, execution, and assessment

Foundation for Counterinsurgency 

Insurgencies are complex, 

dynamic, and adaptive; 

they can rapidly shift, 

split, combine, or 

reorganize. 

The twenty-first century is typified by a volatile international 

environment, persistent conflict, and increasing state 

fragility. Long-standing external and internal tensions tend 

to exacerbate or create core grievances within some states, 

resulting in political strife, instability, or even insurgency. 

Moreover, some transnational terrorists/extremists with 

radical political and religious ideologies may intrude in weak 

or poorly governed states to form a wider, more networked 

threat. 

Insurgents seek to gain 

power to overthrow or 

force change of a 

governing authority. 

Insurgency is an internal threat that uses subversion and 

violence to reach political ends. Conversely, 

counterinsurgents seek to defeat insurgents and address core 

grievances to prevent insurgency’s expansion or 
Executive Summary 

regeneration. Typically the insurgents will solicit or be 

offered some type of support from state or non-state actors, 

which can include transnational terrorists who take 

advantage of the situation for their own benefit. Affected 

nations may request United States support in countering an 

insurgency, which is typically the circumstances under which 

US forces become involved in counterinsurgency (COIN) 

operations. 

Counterinsurgency 

(COIN) is comprehensive 

civilian and military 

efforts taken to 

simultaneously defeat and 

contain insurgency and 

address its core 

grievances. 

COIN is primarily political and incorporates a wide range of 

activities, of which security is only one. Unified action is 

required to successfully conduct COIN operations and should 

include all host nation (HN), US, and multinational agencies 

or actors. Civilian agencies should lead COIN efforts. 

When operational conditions do not permit a civilian agency 

to lead COIN within a specific area, the joint force 

commander (JFC) must be cognizant of the unified action 

required for effective COIN. 

The fragile states 

framework, used in 

interagency fora, can help 

the joint force commander 

(JFC) develop a 

foundational 

understanding of the 

operational environment 

(OE). 

The term “fragile states” describes a broad range of failing, 

failed, and recovering states. The framework has three 

categories of states: failed, failing, and recovering, although 

the distinction or exact transition between categories is rarely 

clear. 

Failed State. A failed state is unable to effectively protect 

and govern the population. 

Failing State. The failing state is still viable, but it has a 

reduced capability and capacity to protect and govern the 

population. 

Recovering State. The recovering state is moving towards 

normalcy but may have an imperfect level of viability. This 

state is able to protect and govern its population to some 

degree. 

There are several 

operations, programs, and 

activities that may be 

interdependent with 

COIN, including nation 

assistance, foreign 

internal defense (FID), 

security force assistance, 

security cooperation, 

In traditional warfare the conflict focuses on defeating the 

opposing military through force-on-force engagements, and 

influencing the government by taking control of their 

territory, and influencing the people generally through 

intimidation, fear, and deception; whereas in irregular 

warfare (IW), the conflict focuses more on the control or 

influence over, and the support of, a relevant population and 

not on the control of an adversary’s forces or territory. Some 

military operations, such as foreign internal defense (FID), 

x JP 3-24 
Executive Summary 

unconventional warfare, 

combating terrorism, 

peace operations, and 

psychological operations. 

COIN, combating terrorism, and unconventional warfare 

(UW) are primarily conducted during IW. COIN requires 

joint forces to both fight and build sequentially or 

simultaneously, depending on the security situation and a 

variety of other factors. 

There are several operations, programs, and activities that 

may be interdependent with COIN, including nation 

assistance, FID, security force assistance, security 

cooperation, UW, combating terrorism, peace operations, and 

psychological operations (PSYOP). 

Balance and Simultaneity 

of Offense, Defense, and 

Stability Operations. 

COIN requires joint forces to both fight and build 

sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the security 

situation and a variety of other factors. The balance of 

these operations must be appropriate to accomplish the 

current phase’s objectives. Offensive and defensive 

operations in COIN that are predominantly aimed at 

insurgent combatants are counterguerrilla operations. 

Stability operations are consequently fundamental to 

COIN—stability operations address the core grievances of 

insurgency as well as drivers of conflict and are therefore 

essential to long-term success. 

Insurgency 

Insurgency is the 

organized use of 

subversion and violence by 

a group or movement that 

seeks to overthrow or force 

change of a governing 

authority. Insurgency can 

also refer to the group 

itself. 

Successful COIN operations require comprehensive 

knowledge of the operational environment (OE) including an 

understanding of the insurgents, the scope of the insurgency, 

any external supporting elements, and the other players (e.g., 

terrorists and criminals) that may benefit from a protracted 

conflict and especially the relevant population. An 

insurgency typically succeeds or fails based on the support of 

the population. This understanding acts as a foundation on 

which the joint force can plan, prepare, execute, and assess 

COIN operations. 

Understanding an 

insurgency’s motivations, 

breadth of activity and 

support, and core 

grievances is essential to 

successful COIN. 

Ends, scope, and core grievances are three of the most 

important aspects of an insurgency. 

Ends. Insurgencies generally share some combination of 

four common objectives: political change, overthrow of the 

government, resistance against an outside actor, or nullifying 

political control in an area. 

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Executive Summary 

Scope. There are four general categories for the scope of 

insurgencies; however, there is no clear-cut delineation 

between categories: local, local-external support, local-global 

support, and global. 

Core Grievances. The core grievances are issues, real or 

perceived, in the view of some of the population. 

Additionally, insurgents can be adept at manipulating or 

creating core grievances to serve their purpose. 

The dynamics of 

insurgency are a 

framework to assess an 

insurgency’s strengths and 

weaknesses. 

The dynamics of insurgency are a framework to assess an 

insurgency’s strengths and weaknesses. The dynamics can 

be examined separately, but studying their interaction is an 

indispensable part of COIN mission analysis. The dynamics 

include leadership, objectives, ideology, OE, external 

support, internal support, phasing and timing, and 

organizational and operational approaches, though they 

should be examined with the underlying understanding that 

insurgents are a product of their culture, society, and history. 

There are three 

prerequisites for an 

insurgency to be 

successful in an area—a 

vulnerable population, 

leadership available for 

direction, and lack of 

government control. 

When all three prerequisites exist in an area, insurgency can 

operate with some freedom of movement, gain the support of 

the people, and become entrenched over time. A population 

is vulnerable if the people have real or perceived grievances 

that insurgents can exploit. If insurgents can recruit, co-opt, 

or coerce local leaders or the local leaders are part of the 

insurgency, these leaders can direct the frustrations of the 

populace. Real or perceived lack of governmental control 

can allow insurgents to operate with little or no interference 

from security forces or other agencies. 

There are shared general 

organizational 

characteristics that 

provide a general 

framework for analysis of 

insurgencies. 

Components. Insurgent structure may be generally broken 

down into two wings [components]: political and military. 

The political wing is primarily concerned with undermining 

the legitimacy of the HN government and its allies while 

building up support for the insurgency. The military wing of 

the insurgency conducts combat operations. 

Elements. The elements are the basic organizational 

“building blocks” of insurgencies. Leaders provide overall 

direction in more organized insurgencies. The underground 

is that element of the insurgent organization that conducts 

operations in areas normally denied to the auxiliary and the 

guerrilla force. Guerrillas conduct the actual fighting and 

provide security. Cadre element forms the political or 

xii JP 3-24 
Executive Summary 

ideological core of the insurgency. The auxiliary is the 

support element of the insurgent organization. 

Some key approaches or 

strategies used by 

insurgencies include: 

conspiratorial, militaryfocused, terrorism, 

identity-focused, 

subversive, and composite 

and coalitions. 

A conspiratorial approach involves a few leaders and a 

militant cadre or activist party seizing control of government 

structures or exploiting a revolutionary situation. 

Users of military-focused approaches aim to create 

revolutionary possibilities or seize power primarily by 

applying military force. 

A terrorism-focused approach is waged by small, 

independent cells that require little or no popular support. 

This approach uses terrorist tactics to accomplish the 

following: sow disorder, incite sectarian violence, weaken 

the government, intimidate the population, kill government 

and opposition leaders, fix and intimidate police and military 

forces, attempt to create government repression, and, in cases 

where foreign forces may occupy the country, force their 

withdrawal. 

The identity-focused approach mobilizes support based on 

the common identity of religious affiliation, clan, tribe, or 

ethnic group. 

A subversive approach either attempts to transform an 

illegal political entity into a legitimate political party or to 

use an existing legitimate political party. This party will 

attempt to subvert the government from within. 

A composite approach includes tactics drawn from any or 

all of the other approaches. Also, different insurgent forces 

using different approaches may form loose coalitions when 

it serves their interests. 

Counterinsurgents should 

seek to create or exploit 

potential vulnerabilities. 

Insurgencies have aspects that can be strengths or 

vulnerabilities. Some insurgency vulnerabilities are: secrecy, 

recruitment and message, base of operations, external 

support, finances, internal divisions, maintaining momentum, 

defectors and informants, attrition of human resources, and 

leadership. 

Devolution and Decline Many insurgencies can devolve into organizations merely 

focused on terrorism or criminality. Devolution may occur 

due to one or a combination of counterinsurgent pressure, 

lack of popular support, loss of leadership, organizational 

xiii 
Executive Summary 

fragmentation, or atrophy during long periods of stalemate. 

The counterinsurgents must ameliorate the core grievances of 

the insurgency to bring the insurgents to their breaking point. 

If core grievances remain, the insurgency will remain at least 

latent and incipient. 

Counterinsurgency 

The support of the people 

is the most vital factor in 

the long-term success of 

any COIN effort.

Mindset. Conducting successful COIN operations requires 

an adaptive and flexible mindset. Counterinsurgents must 

make every effort to reinforce the legitimacy of the HN 

government in the eyes of the people. Counterinsurgents 

must understand that the military instrument is only one 

part of a comprehensive approach for successful COIN 

Counterinsurgents must also understand the core grievances, 

drivers of conflict, and friction points between different 

groups. Cultural awareness facilitates accurate anticipation 

of the population’s perception of COIN operations. These 

perceptions can determine the success or failure of COIN 

operations. 

Strategic Direction. The military contribution to countering insurgency, while 

vital, is not as important as political efforts for long-term 

success. Military efforts are especially important initially to 

gain security. The national strategy, military strategy, and 

theater strategy play key roles in determining COIN strategic 

context. There are three possible general strategic settings 

for US involvement in COIN: assisting a functioning 

government as part of FID, as an adjunct to US major 

combat operations, or US operations in an ungoverned area. 

Strategic Approach. The potential global and regional scope of contemporary 

insurgency has added to the complexity and therefore the 

challenge of conducting COIN. This challenge requires a 

global or regional COIN strategic approach for success. A 

strategy of disaggregation includes the following activities: 

containment, isolation, disruption, and resolution of core 

grievances, and neutralization in detail. 

Operational Approaches. There are a range of possible operational approaches to 

COIN. COIN should strive to move from direct to balanced 

and balanced to indirect. The direct approach focuses on 

protecting US and HN interests while attacking the 

insurgents. The indirect approach focuses on the actions to 

establish conditions (a stable and more secure environment) 

for others to achieve success with the help of the US. 

xiv JP 3-24 
Executive Summary 

Principles of COIN. The principles of COIN are derived from the historical 

record and recent experience. These principles do not 

replace the principles of joint operations, but rather provide 

focus on how to successfully conduct COIN. 

Counterinsurgents Must 

Understand the OE. 

This understanding includes the political, military, economic, 

social, information, infrastructure, and other aspects of the 

OE. Counterinsurgents must pay special attention to society, 

culture, and insurgent advantages within the OE. 

Legitimacy Is the Main 

Objective. 

The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster 

development of effective governance by a legitimate 

government. Counterinsurgents achieve this objective by 

undertaking appropriate actions and striving for a balanced 

application of both military and nonmilitary means as 

dictated by the situation. 

Unity of Effort is 

Essential. 

Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of a 

COIN operation. Otherwise, well-intentioned but 

uncoordinated actions can cancel each other or provide 

vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit. 

Political Factors are 

Primary. 

At the beginning of a COIN operation, military actions may 

appear predominant as security forces conduct operations to 

secure the populace and kill or capture insurgents. However, 

political objectives must guide the military’s approach. 

Commanders must consider how operations contribute to 

strengthening the HN government’s legitimacy and 

achieving US goals—the latter is especially important if 

there is no HN. 

Intelligence Drives 

Operations. 

Effective COIN is shaped by timely, specific, and reliable 

intelligence, gathered and analyzed at all levels and 

disseminated throughout the force. Reporting by units, 

members of the country team, and information derived from 

interactions with civilian agencies is often of equal or greater 

importance than reporting by specialized intelligence assets. 

Insurgents Must be 

Isolated from Their Cause 

and Support. 

While it may be required to kill or capture insurgents, it is 

more effective in the long run to separate an insurgency 

from the population and its resources, thus letting it die. 

Confrontational military action, in exclusion is 

counterproductive in most cases; it risks generating popular 

resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and 

producing cycles of revenge. 

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Executive Summary 

Security Under the Rule of 

Law is Essential. 

To establish legitimacy, commanders transition security 

activities from military operations to law enforcement as 

quickly as feasible. When insurgents are seen as 

criminals, they often lose public support.

Counterinsurgents Should 

Prepare for a Long-Term 

Commitment. 

Insurgencies are protracted by nature, and history 

demonstrates that they often last for years or even decades. 

Thus, COIN normally demands considerable expenditures of 

time and resources, especially if they must be conducted 

simultaneously with conventional operations in a protracted 

war combining traditional and IW. 

Manage Information and 

Expectations. 

To limit discontent and build support, the HN government 

and any counterinsurgents assisting it create and maintain a 

realistic set of expectations among the populace, friendly 

military forces, and the international community. 

Information operations (IO), particularly PSYOP and the 

related activities of public affairs (PA) and civil-military 

operations (CMO), are key tools to accomplish this. 

Use the Appropriate Level 

of Force. 

Even precise and tailored force must be executed 

legitimately and with consideration for consequent 

effects. An operation that kills five insurgents is 

counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the 

recruitment of fifty more insurgents. 

Learn and Adapt. An effective counterinsurgent force is a learning 

organization. Insurgents constantly shift between military 

and political phases and tactics. Every unit needs to be 

able to make observations, draw and apply lessons, and 

assess results.

Empower the Lowest 

Levels. 

Successful COIN is normally conducted with 

decentralized execution based upon centralized vision 

and orders that include clear and concise rules for the use of 

force and rules of engagement. 

Support the Host Nation 

(HN). 

US forces committed to supporting COIN are there to assist a 

HN government. The long-term goal is to leave a 

government able to stand by itself, which is also normally 

the goal even if the US begins COIN in an area that does not 

have a HN government. US forces and agencies can help, 

but HN elements must accept responsibilities to achieve real 

victory. 

xvi JP 3-24 
Executive Summary 

Unity of Effort in Counterinsurgency 

Unified action refers to the 

synchronization, 

coordination, and/or 

integration of military 

operations with the 

activities of governmental 

and nongovernmental 

entities to achieve unity of 

effort. 

Unified action includes a “whole-of-government” or 

“comprehensive approach” that employs all instruments of 

national power. Achieving unity of effort is challenging in 

COIN due to the normally complex OE and its many 

potential actors—friendly, neutral, and adversarial. The 

military contribution to COIN must be coordinated with the 

activities of US Government (USG) interagency partners, 

intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs), regional organizations, the operations 

of multinational forces, and activities of various HN agencies 

to be successful. The joint military contribution is essential 

to provide security that enables other COIN efforts. Joint 

forces contribute to unified action through unity of command 

and a solid command and control architecture that integrates 

strategic, operational, and tactical COIN. 

The internal defense and 

development strategy is the 

overarching strategy in a 

FID mission. 

When a HN is dealing with an insurgency and the US 

supports the HN, COIN is one aspect of a larger FID 

mission. Internal defense and development (IDAD) is the 

HN’s plan that US FID supports; the HN does not 

support the US FID plan. The purpose of the IDAD 

strategy is to promote HN growth and its ability to protect 

itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. 

There are several United 

States (US) civil-military 

integration mechanisms 

that facilitate unified 

action for COIN. 

Civil-military integration mechanisms fall into two general 

areas: those that are located outside of the theater and those 

that are located in theater. 

Civil-military mechanisms in the US include the National 

Security Council and policy operations groups. 

Civil-military integration mechanisms in theater may 

include: joint interagency coordination group, US country 

team, advance civilian team, executive steering group, 

regional authority, civil-military coordination board, joint 

civil-military operations task force, national-level 

governmental assistance teams, provincial reconstruction 

teams, civil-military operations centers, and joint interagency 

task force. 

Military unity of command 

is achieved by establishing 

Unity of command should extend to all military forces 

engaged in COIN—US, HN, and other multinational 

xvii 
Executive Summary 

and maintaining formal 

command or support 

relationships. 

forces. No single command structure meets the needs of 

every multinational command but one absolute remains 

constant; political considerations will heavily influence the 

ultimate shape of the command structure. Regardless of the 

command structure, coalitions and alliances require a 

significant liaison structure, and liaisons are even more 

important in COIN in order to coordinate many disparate and 

highly politically sensitive efforts.

Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency 

Purposes of Joint 

Intelligence in a 

Counterinsurgency 

The purpose of joint intelligence in counterinsurgency is to 

inform the commander; identify, define, and nominate 

objectives; support the planning and execution of operations; 

counter adversary deception and surprise; support friendly 

deception efforts; and assess the effectiveness of operations. 

As in any joint operation, intelligence and operations have a 

cyclical relationship. This dynamic relationship is 

particularly important in COIN—intelligence drives 

operations and successful operations generate additional 

intelligence. COIN efforts conducted without accurate 

intelligence may alienate the population, which results in 

their offering less information 

Principles of Intelligence 

Operations in COIN. 

Bottom-Up Intelligence Flow. The fact that all units collect 

and report information, combined with the mosaic nature of 

insurgencies, means that the intelligence flow in COIN is 

more bottom up than top down. 

Feedback. Feedback from analysts and intelligence 

consumers to collectors is important to synchronizing the 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) effort in 

COIN. 

Intelligence Collection Considerations. Because all 

counterinsurgents are potential collectors, the collection plan 

addresses all day-to-day tactical operations. 

Nontraditional ISR Assets. Commanders should consider 

use of assets not traditionally used for ISR to fill gaps in ISR 

coverage. Commanders should ensure intelligence from 

nontraditional assets is fused with other analytical efforts in 

order to maintain the appropriate situational awareness. 

xviii JP 3-24 
Executive Summary 

Intelligence disciplines are 

core competencies of the 

intelligence community 

involved in intelligence 

planning, collection, 

processing, exploitation, 

analysis, production, and 

dissemination using a 

specific category of 

technical or human 

resources. 

Some Intelligence disciplines specifics for COIN are: 

Geospatial intelligence, the combination of imagery, the 

intelligence derived from imagery, and geospatial 

information, provide the ability to visualize the OE and 

establish a shared situational awareness picture. 

Human intelligence is a category of intelligence derived 

from information collected and provided by human sources; 

and, during COIN operations, actionable intelligence is 

often based on information gathered from people. 

Signal intelligence collection is a good source for 

determining adversary locations, intentions, capabilities, and 

morale. 

Measurement and signature intelligence sensors can 

provide remote monitoring of avenues of approach or border 

regions for smugglers or insurgents. They can also be used 

to locate insurgent safe havens and cache sites and 

determining insurgent activities and capabilities. 

Civil information is information developed from data about 

civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and 

events (ASCOPE) that can be fused or processed to increase 

interagency, IGO, and NGO situational awareness. 

Technical intellegence on insurgent equipment can help 

understand insurgent capabilities. These may include how 

insurgents are using improvised explosive devices, 

homemade mortars, and other pieces of customized military 

equipment. 

All-Source Intelligence. The multidisciplinary fusion of information by intelligence 

organizations at all echelons results in the production of allsource intelligence products. Analysis for COIN operations 

is very challenging, due in part to the need to understand 

perceptions and culture, the need to track hundreds or 

thousands of personalities, the local nature of insurgencies, 

and the tendency of insurgencies to change over time. 

Factors effecting 

intelligence collaboration

include: complexity, 

intelligence cells and 

working groups, 

Effective intelligence collaboration organizes the 

collection and analysis actions of counterinsurgent 

organizations into a coherent, mutually supportive 

intelligence effort. The intelligence portion of 

understanding the OE and other supporting intelligence for 

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Executive Summary 

intelligence sharing, hostnation integration, and 

infiltration of HN 

intelligence.

COIN operations is complex. It is important not to 

oversimplify an insurgency. 

Supporting Operations for Counterinsurgency 

Information operations 

employ capabilities that 

will significantly 

contribute to the 

achievement of the end 

state. 

A strong IO plan when integrated effectively in military 

operations will assist the HN government in acquiring 

control of legitimate social, political, economic and security 

institution; marginalize or separate, both physically and 

psychologically, insurgency and its leaders from the 

population; and help demobilize and reintegrate armed 

insurgents forces into the political, economic and social 

structures of the population. 

Public affairs activities are 

critical for informing and 

influencing the populace’s 

understanding and 

perceptions of events. 

Through professional 

relationships, military 

leaders should strive to 

ensure that the media’s 

audiences understand the 

counterinsurgents’ efforts 

from the 

counterinsurgents’ 

perspective.

Public opinion, perceptions, media, public information, 

and rumors influence how the populace perceives the HN 

legitimacy. PA shapes the information environment through 

public information activities and facilitates media access to 

preempt, neutralize, or counter adversary disinformation 

efforts. 

Embedded media representatives experience the joint force 

perspective of operations in the COIN environment. 

Commanders may hold periodic press conferences to explain 

operations and provide transparency to the people most 

affected by COIN efforts. However, counterinsurgents 

must strive to avoid the perception of attempting to 

manipulate the population or media. Even the slightest 

appearance of impropriety can undermine the credibility 

of the COIN force and HN legitimacy.

Counterinsurgents must 

carefully consider who will 

be detained, and the 

manner and methods that 

will be used to detain 

them. 

While detainees can be vital sources of information, how 

counterinsurgents treat captured insurgents has immense 

potential impact on insurgent morale, retention, and 

recruitment. Humane and just treatment may afford 

counterinsurgents many short-term opportunities as well as 

potentially damaging insurgent recruitment. Abuse may 

foster resentment and hatred; offering the enemy an 

opportunity for propaganda and assist potential insurgent 

recruitment and support. 

Security sector reform is 

the set of policies, plans, 

programs, and activities 

National defense and internal security are the traditional 

cornerstones of state sovereignty. Security is essential to 

legitimate governance and participation, effective rule of 

xx JP 3-24 
Executive Summary 

that a government 

undertakes to improve the 

way it provides safety, 

security, and justice. 

law, and sustained economic development. Security sector 

reform (SSR) aims to provide an effective and legitimate 

public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian 

authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. SSR 

must be part of any COIN plan, including the IDAD 

strategy, from the outset.

Disarmament, 

demobilization, and 

reintegration attempts to 

stabilize the OE by 

disarming and 

demobilizing insurgents 

and by helping return 

former insurgents to 

civilian life. 

The objective of the disarmament, demobilization, and 

reintegration process is to contribute to security and stability 

in post-conflict environments so that recovery and 

development can begin. Disarmament is the collection, 

documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, 

ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of 

former insurgents and the population. Demobilization is the 

process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military 

establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a 

peacetime configuration while maintaining national security 

and economic vitality. Demobilization for COIN normally 

involves the controlled discharge of active combatants 

from paramilitary groups, militias, and insurgent forces 

that have stopped fighting. Reintegration is the process 

through which former combatants, belligerents, and 

dislocated civilians receive amnesty, reenter civil society, 

gain sustainable employment, and become contributing 

members of the local population. 

Component Contributions to Counterinsurgency 

All components of the 

joint force are essential for 

the overall military 

contribution to COIN. 

Joint warfare is a team effort and air, land, maritime, and 

special operations components of the joint force make vital 

contributions in support of all instruments of national power 

in achieving national security objectives. 

HN Land Contribution to 

COIN. 

Much of securing or protecting the population is done by 

deploying land forces within the population and with an 

enduring presence. Normally, US land forces will operate 

in designated contiguous operational areas that coincide with 

HN national political boundaries. 

Air Contribution to COIN. Air forces and capabilities play a vital role in the military 

contribution to COIN. These forces and capabilities are 

especially critical for successful counterguerrilla, 

intelligence, combating weapons of mass destruction, 

humanitarian, and informational efforts. Air 

contributions include close air support, precision strikes, 

armed overwatch, personnel recovery, air interdiction, ISR, 

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Executive Summary 

communications, electronic warfare, combat support, and air 

mobility. 

Maritime Contribution to 

COIN. 

For COIN, the maritime component plays a critical role in 

controlling the seas, which may be vital to isolating an 

insurgency physically and psychologically. The 

expeditionary character and versatility of maritime 

forces provide an advantage in areas where access is 

denied or limited. Maritime forces may provide direct 

support to the joint task force that does not include combat 

operations, to include CMO, logistic support, 

intelligence/communication sharing, humanitarian relief, 

maritime civil affairs, and expeditionary medical aid and 

training. 

Special Operations Forces 

Contribution to COIN. 

Special operation forces are vitally important to successful 

COIN operations. Their capacity to conduct a wide array 

of missions, working by, with, and through HN security 

forces or integrated with US conventional forces make 

them particularly suitable for COIN campaigns. They are 

particularly important when the joint force is using an 

indirect approach to COIN. In a more balanced or direct 

approach to COIN, however, they should be used to 

complement rather than replace conventional forces in 

traditional warfare roles. 

Operational Environment 

Understanding of the 

COIN environment begins 

with understanding the 

population, then the 

insurgents, and finally the 

counterinsurgents. 

The OE for all joint operations is the sum of the conditions, 

circumstances, and influences that affect how the 

commander uses the available capabilities and makes 

decisions. The OE encompasses physical domains, 

nonspatial environments and other factors. The OE 

includes the information environment, sociocultural 

considerations, and civil considerations. A holistic 

understanding of the OE includes all of these aspects and 

helps the commander to understand how the OE constrains 

or shapes options, how the OE affects capabilities, and how 

friendly, adversary, and neutral actors’ actions affect or 

shape the OE. 

Initial Joint Intelligence 

Preparation of the 

Operational Environment 

(JIPOE) must focus on 

having enough detail to 

Joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

environment (JIPOE) in COIN follows the process 

described in Joint Publication 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence 

Preparation of the Operational Environment, with an 

emphasis of sociocultural and civil factors. The joint 

xxii JP 3-24 
Executive Summary 

complete mission analysis 

of the joint operation 

planning process. 

force should include HN representatives if possible in the 

JIPOE process. 

Step one of the JIPOE 

process is to “Define the 

OE”. 

The first step of the JIPOE process is defining the OE by 

identifying those aspects and significant characteristics that 

may be relevant to the joint force’s mission. Defining the 

OE must include the many military and nonmilitary 

organizations involved in the COIN effort. When working to 

determine the significant characteristics of the OE, for COIN 

this step should pay special attention to the sociocultural 

factors, civil factors, root causes of the insurgency, insurgent 

desired end state, and insurgent narratives 

Step two of the JIPOE 

process is to “Describe the 

Impact of the OE”. 

This JIPOE step continues to develop a holistic view of the 

OE by analyzing the nonphysical and physical aspects of the 

OE, developing a systems perspective of relevant political, 

military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure 

links and nodes. COIN operations require a detailed 

understanding of sociocultural factors and civil factors from 

three perspectives: the population, the insurgent, and the 

counterinsurgent. To understand the population the 

following five sociocultural factors should be analyzed: 

society, social structure, culture, power and authority, and 

interests. Civil factors include areas, structures, capabilities, 

organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE). ASCOPE 

analysis will help determine COIN impact on neutral, 

adversarial, and friendly systems. 

JIPOE must determine the sources of frustration or anger 

within the population, from their perspective. JIPOE also 

must determine if the three prerequisites for insurgency are 

present: a vulnerable population, leadership available for 

direction, and lack of government control. When all three 

exist in an area, insurgency can operate with some freedom 

of movement, gain the support of the people, and become 

entrenched over time. 

Step three of the JIPOE 

process is to “Evaluate the 

Adversary”. 

JIPOE uses the eight dynamics as a framework to analyze 

insurgencies. While each dynamic is important, analyzing 

their overarching interaction is essential to understand the 

insurgency holistically. Not only are insurgent activities 

indicators of what approach or approaches an insurgency is 

using, they will help determine what counters can be used. A 

thorough and detailed center of gravity analysis helps 

commanders and staffs to understand the systemic nature of 

xxiii 
Executive Summary 

the OE and the actions necessary to shape the conditions that 

define the desired end state. 

Step four of the JIPOE 

process is to “Determine 

Adversary Courses of 

Action”

The fourth step of the JIPOE process builds upon this holistic 

view to develop a detailed understanding of the adversary’s 

plan and probable courses of action. The insurgency’s 

overall approach, or combination of approaches, the 

insurgent senior leaders have selected to achieve their goals 

and their recent tactics are key indicators of their plan. From 

these indicators a model of the insurgent plan can be 

constructed. 

Planning in Counterinsurgency 

Planning involves 

thinking about ways to 

influence the future rather 

than responding to events. 

Because COIN operations require comprehensive 

solutions, planning horizons in COIN are normally 

longer than other operations, despite increased 

uncertainties associated with these longer planning 

horizons. The unified action required to achieve the 

comprehensive solutions that will bring success during COIN 

operations, in turn requires interorganizational planning 

efforts among all interagency, intergovernmental, and 

nongovernmental partners involved. 

Through early and 

continuous assessment 

during COIN execution, 

the staff and JFC monitor 

the OE and progress 

toward accomplishing 

tasks and achieving 

objectives. 

Joint operation planning blends two complementary 

processes. The first is the joint operational planning 

process. The second process is operational design, the use 

of various design elements in the conception and 

construction of the framework that underpins a joint 

operation plan and its subsequent execution. The initial 

observable symptoms of an insurgency often do not reflect 

the true nature and core grievances of the insurgency, so the 

JFC and staff must devote sufficient time and effort early in 

planning to correctly frame the problem and design a broad 

approach to a solution. Because there is only one IDAD 

strategy or campaign, there should only be one operational 

design. 

Logical lines of operations (LOOs) describe the linkage of 

various actions on nodes and decisive points with an 

operational or strategic objective and the conditions of the 

end state. COIN requires the synchronization of activities 

along multiple and complementary logical LOOs in order 

to work through a series of tactical and operational 

objectives to attain the military end state. 

xxiv JP 3-24 
Executive Summary 

Execution in Counterinsurgency 

COIN is fundamentally a 

counterstrategy for 

insurgency. While a 

counter effort, COIN does 

not concede the initiative. 

There are many ways to achieving success in COIN. The 

components of each form of execution are not mutually 

exclusive. These forms are not the only choices available 

and are neither discrete nor exclusive. They may be 

combined, depending on the environment and available 

resources, and they have proven effective. The approaches 

must be adapted to the demands of the local 

environment. Three examples are: Clear-hold-build, 

combined action, and limited support. 

A clear-hold-build 

operation is executed in a 

specific, high-priority area 

experiencing overt 

insurgent operations. 

A clear-hold-build operation has the following objectives: 

create a secure physical and psychological environment, 

establish firm government control of the populace and area, 

and gain the populace’s support. 

Clear operation’s purpose 

is to disrupt insurgent 

forces and force a reaction 

by major insurgent 

elements in the area. 

For COIN, clear is a task that requires the commander to 

remove all guerrilla forces and eliminate organized 

resistance in an assigned area. The force does this by 

destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of guerrilla 

combatants. 

Ideally HN forces or 

combined HN and 

coalition forces execute 

the hold portion of clearhold-build approach 

Hold operations are designed to continuously secure the 

people and separate them from the insurgents; establish a 

firm government presence and control over the area and 

populace; recruit, organize, equip, and train local security 

forces; and establish a government political apparatus to 

replace the insurgent apparatus. The success or failure of the 

effort depends, first, on effectively and continuously securing 

the populace and, second, on effectively reestablishing a HN 

government presence at the local level. 

Progress in building 

support for the HN 

government requires 

protecting the local 

populace. 

The most important activities during the build stage are 

conducted by nonmilitary agencies. HN government 

representatives reestablish political offices and normal 

administrative procedures. National and international 

development agencies rebuild infrastructure and key 

facilities. Local leaders are developed and given authority. 

Combined action is a 

technique that involves 

joining US and HN 

ground troops in a single 

Commanders use the combined action approach to hold and 

build while providing a persistent counterinsurgent presence 

among the populace. This approach attempts to first achieve 

security and stability in a local area, followed by offensive 

xxv 
Executive Summary 

xxvi JP 3-24 

organization, usually a 

platoon or company, to 

conduct COIN operations. 

operations against insurgent forces now denied access or 

support. 

The limited support 

approach focuses on 

building HN capability 

and capacity. 

In many cases US support is limited or focused on missions 

like advising security forces and providing fire support or 

sustainment. Under this approach, HN security forces are 

expected to conduct combat operations, including any 

clearing and holding missions. 

Targeting is conducted for 

all COIN efforts, not just 

attacks against the 

insurgent military wing 

(counterguerrilla 

operations). 

Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets 

and matching the appropriate response to them, considering 

operational requirements and capabilities. The targeting 

process facilitates achieving effects that support the logical 

LOOs in a COIN campaign plan. The targeting process can 

support IO, CMO, and even meetings between commanders 

and HN leaders. 

Assessment is a process 

that measures progress of 

the counterinsurgent team 

toward mission 

accomplishment. 

Effective assessment in COIN operations is necessary for 

counterinsurgents to recognize changing conditions and 

determine their meaning. Assessment requires determining 

why and when progress is being achieved along each logical 

LOO. It is important for the commander to understand the 

larger context of the assessment as it relates to the OE and 

the principles guiding the USG response. A USG framework 

for assessment whose principles have been approved is the 

Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF). The 

purpose of the ICAF is to develop a commonly held 

understanding across relevant USG departments and 

agencies of the dynamics driving and mitigating violent 

conflict within a country that informs US policy and 

planning decisions. 

CONCLUSION 

This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, 

execution, and assessment of COIN operations across the 

range of military operations. This will include the 

description of relationships between COIN, IW, 

counterterrorism, and FID. 
CHAPTER I 

FOUNDATION FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY 

I-1 

1. Introduction 

 a. The twenty-first century is typified by a volatile international environment, 

persistent conflict, and increasing state fragility. Long-standing external and internal 

tensions tend to exacerbate or create core grievances within some states, resulting in 

political strife, instability, or even insurgency. Moreover, some transnational 

terrorists/extremists with radical political and religious ideologies may intrude in weak or 

poorly governed states to form a wider, more networked threat. 

 b. Insurgency is an internal threat that uses subversion and violence to reach 

political ends. Typically the insurgents will solicit or be offered some type of support 

from state or non-state actors, which can include transnational terrorists who take 

advantage of the situation for their own benefit. Affected nations may request US 

support in countering an insurgency, which is typically the circumstances under which 

US forces become involved in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Whatever the mix 

of actors and level of conflict, and despite the broadly applied label of insurgency, the 

motivation and objectives of the various belligerents must be understood to be effectively 

countered. 

 c. Insurgency. Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence by a 

group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. 

Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. An insurgent is a member of that group. 

When compared to their adversaries, insurgents generally have strong will but limited 

means. Although some insurgents have no interest in working within any political 

system, it is this relative disparity of means that normally drives groups to use insurgency 

to alleviate core grievances. Additionally, this relative disparity of means also drives the 

insurgents to use subversion, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism, in the face of capable 

counterinsurgent forces. Insurgency requires few resources to initiate, yet it ties up 

significant resources to counter as the insurgents seek to exhaust the government in an 

effort to be effective in the long term. Insurgency allows a group time to potentially gain 

public support, expand, and secure external moral and material support; it seeks to erode 

the opposition’s will, influence, and power. In its early phases, insurgency may only be 

loosely organized with competing interests amongst its subgroups. For example, 

subgroups may differ on their views of foreign support to the host nation (HN). 

Additionally, some subgroups may focus more on fighting other groups in the region than 

they focus on the overall insurgent efforts. Typical insurgencies only become a military 

“In counterinsurgency, military forces are a delivery system for civilian 

activity: their role is to afford sufficient protection and stability to allow the 

government to work safely with its population and for economic revival and 

political reconciliation to occur.” 

Counterinsurgency: A Guide for Policy-Makers 

United States Government, Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative 

May 2008 
Chapter I 

concern when normal political process and law enforcement methods are insufficient. 

Insurgencies are complex, dynamic, and adaptive; they can rapidly shift, split, combine, 

or reorganize. 

For more detail on insurgency, see Chapter II, “Insurgency.” 

 d. Counterinsurgency. COIN is comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken 

to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. COIN is primarily political 

and incorporates a wide range of activities, of which security is only one. Unified action 

is required to successfully conduct COIN operations and should include all HN, US, and 

multinational agencies or actors. Civilian agencies should lead US efforts. When 

operational conditions do not permit a civilian agency to lead COIN within a specific 

area, the joint force commander (JFC) must be cognizant of the unified action required 

for effective COIN. Ideally, all COIN efforts protect the population, defeat the 

insurgents, reinforce the HN’s legitimacy, and build HN capabilities. COIN efforts 

include, but are not limited to, political, diplomatic, economic, health, financial, 

intelligence, law enforcement, legal, informational, military, paramilitary, psychological, 

and civic actions. As capable insurgents evolve and adapt, counterinsurgents must evolve 

and adapt. 

 e. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. Insurgency and COIN are two sides of one 

conflict. Insurgents seek to gain power to overthrow or force change of a governing 

authority. Conversely, counterinsurgents seek to defeat insurgents and address core 

grievances to prevent insurgency’s expansion or regeneration. Local and global popular 

perception and support are vital considerations for both insurgents and counterinsurgents. 

Insurgency and COIN tend to be nested in larger, complex, and irregular conflicts; 

therefore, understanding and appreciating the strategic context and operational 

environment (OE) of an insurgency are essential to success of the COIN operations. 

2. Fragile States Framework and Governance 

a. Fragile States Framework. The fragile states framework, used in interagency 

fora, can help the JFC develop a foundational understanding of the OE. A fragile state is 

a country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the 

stability of its central government. This is normally a function of the government’s 

legitimacy and effectiveness. The term “fragile states” describes a broad range of failing, 

failed, and recovering states (see Figure I-1). However, the distinction among them is not 

always clear in practice, as fragile states rarely travel a predictable path of failure and 

recovery, and the labels may mask other important factors (e.g., insurgencies, factions). 

It is more important to understand in which direction a state is moving along the 

framework and how quickly than it is to categorize a state as failed or not. Therefore, the 

JFC must distinguish between fragile states that are vulnerable to failure and those that 

are already in crisis. 

 b. Insurgency in a Fragile State. Insurgency can be a significant contributor to a 

state’s weakness, though other factors usually contribute as well. When joint forces 

I-2 JP 3-24 
Foundation for Counterinsurgency 

FRAGILE STATES FRAMEWORK

Failed 

State

Violent 

Conflict

Crisis Vulnerable

Failing 

State

Recovering 

State

Normalization

Figure I-1. Fragile States Framework

become involved in COIN, the state may be at any point along the fragile states 

framework; thus, the starting conditions may range from a failed state to a recovering 

state. From that point, the joint and coalition forces will attempt to move towards 

normalization, while insurgents will attempt to move toward increased violent conflict. 

Movement along the framework does not have to be linear; the conditions can decline 

and improve in separate iterations. Conditions on the left end of the framework require 

more military effort to eliminate threats and reduce violence. As conditions improve, 

military forces and civilian agencies focus on building capacity and encouraging 

sustained development. COIN can be conducted at any point within the framework. 

 c. Failed, Failing, and Recovering States. The framework has three categories of 

states: failed, failing, and recovering, although the distinction or exact transition between 

categories is rarely clear. 

 (1) Failed State. A failed state may only have remnants of a government due 

to collapse or regime change or it may have a government that exerts weak governance in 

all or large portions of its territory. A failed state is unable to effectively protect and 

govern the population. A failed state may not have a national government with which to 

work and, consequently, conducting COIN is difficult, especially with respect to 

legitimacy at the national level. Under these extreme circumstances, the intervening 

authority has a legal and moral responsibility to install a transitional military authority. 

 (2) Failing State. The failing state is still viable, but it has a reduced capability 

and capacity to protect and govern the population. When a state is fighting an insurgency 

and its ability to protect and govern the population starts to decline, the pace of that 

state’s decline tends to accelerate towards collapse. Outside support for a failing state’s 

COIN efforts may halt and reverse this trend; however, assistance becomes more difficult 

based on the level of decline at the time of intervention. 

I-3 
Chapter I 

 (3) Recovering State. The recovering state is moving towards normalcy but 

may have an imperfect level of viability. This state is able to protect and govern its 

population to some degree. A key consideration is whether the population considers the 

level of protection and governance acceptable and normal. A recovering state may still 

suffer from insurgency, although any insurgency in a recovering state will be relatively 

weak. When dealing with a recovering state, US efforts focus on building HN capability 

and capacity and preventing a latent insurgency from emerging. 

 d. When considering the OE, the JFC considers whether the HN is vulnerable to 

failure or already in crisis. This may be different in different parts of the country. 

 (1) Vulnerable States. Vulnerable states are those states unable or unwilling to 

adequately assure the provision of security and basic services to significant portions of 

their populations and where the legitimacy of the government is in question. This 

includes states that are failing or recovering from crisis. 

 (2) Crisis States. Crisis states are those states where the central government 

does not exert effective control over its own territory or is unable or unwilling to assure 

the provision of vital services to significant parts of its territory, where legitimacy of the 

government is weak or nonexistent, and where violent conflict is a reality or a great risk. 

For further details on the fragile states framework, refer to United States Agency for 

International Development’s (USAID’s) Fragile States Strategy (2005). 

e. Governance. Governance is the state’s ability to serve the citizens through the 

rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, 

and power is exercised in a society. A state’s ability to provide effective governance 

rests on its capability and capacity to establish rules and procedures for political decision 

making, strengthen public sector management and administrative institutions and 

practices, provide public services in an effective and transparent manner, and provide 

civil administration that supports lawful private activity and enterprise. An ungoverned 

area (UGA) is a place where the state or the central government is unable or unwilling to 

extend control, effectively govern, or influence the local population, and where a 

provincial, local, tribal, or autonomous government does not fully or effectively govern, 

due to inadequate governance capacity, insufficient political will, gaps in legitimacy, the 

presence or recent presence of conflict, or restrictive norms of behavior. UGA is a broad 

term that encompasses under-governed, misgoverned, contested, and exploitable areas as 

well as UGAs. 

 f. Source of Governance. A fundamental issue is who provides governance to the 

population during a COIN operation. Figure I-2 depicts three potential sources of 

governance: the HN government, transitional civilian authority, and transitional military 

authority. For an UGA, the establishment of a transitional civilian authority or 

transitional military authority may be required until the HN indigenous populations and 

institutions (IPI) can resume their functions and responsibilities. For a failed state, a 

I-4 JP 3-24 
Foundation for Counterinsurgency 

SOURCE OF GOVERNANCE

Violent 

Conflict Normalization

Transitional Military 

Authority

Transitional Civilian 

Authority

Host Nation Government

Failed 

State

Failing 

State

Recovering 

State

Figure I-2. Source of Governance

transition to a new HN government or former government-in-exile should begin as soon 

as feasible. 

 g. Vulnerabilities of Governance and Authority. A state’s authority is dependent 

upon the successful amalgamation and interplay of four factors: mandate, manner, 

support and consent, and expectations. When the relationship between the governing and 

the governed breaks down, challenges to authority are likely. If the population, or a 

significant section of it, cannot achieve a remedy through established political discourse, 

they are likely to resort to insurgency. 

 (1) Mandate. The perceived legitimacy of the mandate that establishes a state 

authority, whether through the principles of universal suffrage, a recognised or accepted 

caste/tribal model, or an authoritarian rule. 

 (2) Manner. The perceived legitimacy of the way in which those exercising 

that mandate conduct themselves, both individually and collectively. 

 (3) Support and Consent. The extent to which factions, local populations and 

others consent to, comply with, or resist the authority of those exercising the mandate. 

Consent may range from active resistance, through unwilling compliance, to freely given 

support. 

I-5 
Chapter I 

 (4) Expectations. The extent to which the expectations and aspirations of 

factions, local populations, and others are managed or are met by those exercising the 

mandate. 

 h. Transitional Military Authority. Joint or multinational military forces may 

initially have to govern an area through a transitional military authority, which provides 

civil administration. This may occur because forces have occupied foreign territory or 

because the security situation may not permit civilian agencies to function effectively. 

Use of a transitional military authority should be of as short duration as practicable and 

should continue only until a civil authority can assume or resume its functions and 

responsibilities. 

 i. Transitional Civilian Authority. If deemed necessary by US and multinational 

leaders, a transitional civilian authority may be formed. A transitional civilian authority 

may be formed to immediately provide governance in some cases. Alternatively, as the 

level of security improves, transitional civilian authority may replace a transitional 

military authority. The exact nature and tempo of the transition period will be 

determined by US and multinational decision makers based on the security conditions in 

the OE. Like a transitional military authority, transitional civilian authority should be of 

as short duration as practicable and should continue only until the HN can assume or 

resume its functions and responsibilities. 

j. Support to Civil Administration (SCA). SCA helps continue or stabilize 

management by an existing governing body of a HN’s civil structure. The joint force 

may provide SCA when a HN requests support for their COIN efforts or as a continuation 

of a transitional military authority and/or transitional civilian authority. Civil 

administration in friendly territory may include advising friendly authorities and 

performing specific functions within the limits of authority and liability established by 

international treaties and agreements. 

For more information on SCA, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil-Military 

Operations. 

3. Warfare and Counterinsurgency 

War is a violent contest of wills between sociopolitical groups. Carl von 

Clausewitz proposed that the nature of war is unchanging in that there are three key 

forces—passion and enmity, chance and creativity, and policy and reason. These forces 

often are expressed as the population, the military, and the government, respectively. 

While the nature of war is unchanging, there are differences in the way wars are waged, 

and we refer to the way war is waged as “warfare.” While the way any war is fought is 

unique, JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, discusses traditional 

warfare and irregular warfare (IW). The important distinction between these is focus. In 

traditional warfare the conflict focuses on defeating the opposing military through forceon-force engagements, and influencing the government by taking control of their 

territory, and influencing the people generally through intimidation, fear, and deception; 

I-6 JP 3-24 
Foundation for Counterinsurgency 

whereas in IW, the conflict focuses more on the control or influence over, and the support 

of, a relevant population and not on the control of an adversary’s forces or territory. 

Even while understanding the differing contexts for military operations, it is important to 

understand that and all wars involve the full range of capabilities available to an actor’s 

strategy. Nations have historically used subversion, unconventional warfare, guerrilla 

warfare and other means focused on influence over relevant populations during 

traditional war; likewise, states and other actors use missiles, aircraft, troop formations 

and other conventional means to strike at enemy military forces during IW. 

 a. Irregular Warfare. IW is a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for 

legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and 

asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other 

capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Enemies of the 

United States may be loosely organized networks or entities with no discernible 

hierarchical structure. Nevertheless, they have critical vulnerabilities to be exploited 

within their interconnected political, military, economic, social, information, and 

infrastructure systems. These actors often wage protracted conflicts in an attempt to 

break the will of the state. Military operations alone rarely resolve such conflicts. This 

publication will address all the instruments of national power. States have sovereign 

rights and a social contract with their inhabitants; therefore, they have sovereign 

responsibilities to combat these irregular threats. What makes IW "irregular" is the focus 

of its operations—the population—and its strategic purpose—to gain or maintain control 

or influence over, and the support of that population through various efforts. 

 (1) Credibility and Legitimacy. An adversary waging IW often attempts to 

protract the conflict to break the will of its opponent and control the relevant population. 

The belligerents, whether states or other armed groups, seek to undermine their 

adversaries’ legitimacy and credibility and to isolate their adversaries from the relevant 

population, physically as well as psychologically. At the same time, they also seek to 

bolster their own legitimacy and credibility to exercise authority over that same 

population. 

 (2) Means. IW, as practiced by our adversaries, typically manifests itself as 

one or a combination of several possible means, including guerrilla warfare, terrorism, 

subversion, information operations (IO), strikes, and raids. The specific form or 

combination will vary according to the adversary's capabilities and objectives. 

 (3) Selection. The context of warfare in which forces operate, whether 

insurgent or counterinsurgent is driven by many different factors including the 

protagonist’s culture, capabilities, and means; adversary capabilities, vulnerabilities, and 

actions; and the strategic objectives and end state. Failure of one side or the other to 

recognize the context in which they and their adversary operate will normally result in 

strategic failure, even in the wake of tactical success. The relative disparity of means 

between insurgents and governments often drives insurgents to nontraditional devices, 

particularly during the early and middle stages of an insurgency. If a parity of means 

I-7 
Chapter I 

becomes more attainable and domination of influence with the relevant population is 

achieved, the insurgents may turn to more traditional means of conducting warfare. 

 (4) Range of Military Operations. The joint force operates across the range of 

military operations to counter the enemy during IW with military operations and other 

capabilities. Some military operations, such as foreign internal defense (FID), COIN, 

combating terrorism, and unconventional warfare (UW) are primarily conducted during 

IW. 

For additional information on IW, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Force of the United 

States, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, JP 3-05, Joint Special Operations, JP 3-22, Foreign 

Internal Defense, and JP 3-26, Counterterrorism. 

 b. Traditional Warfare. Traditional warfare is characterized as a confrontation 

between states or coalitions/alliances of states. This confrontation is predominately 

between belligerents pitting one side’s government and military against the opposition’s 

government and military. The objective is to defeat an adversary's armed forces, destroy 

an adversary's war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change 

in an adversary's government or policies. Military operations in traditional warfare 

normally focus on an adversary's armed forces and critical infrastructure to ultimately 

influence the adversary's government. 

For additional information on traditional warfare, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed 

Force of the United States, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

4. Related Operations and Activities 

 There are several operations, programs, and activities that may be interdependent 

with COIN, including nation assistance, FID, security force assistance (SFA), security 

cooperation, UW, combating terrorism, peace operations (PO), and psychological 

operations (PSYOP). 

 a. Nation Assistance. Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than 

foreign humanitarian assistance) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s 

territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually 

concluded between the United States and that nation. Nation assistance operations 

support the HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive 

institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. Nation assistance 

programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, FID, and humanitarian and 

civic assistance. 

 b. Foreign Internal Defense. FID refers to the participation by civilian and 

military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another 

government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from 

subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. The 

focus of all US FID efforts is to support the HN’s program of internal defense and 

I-8 JP 3-24 
Foundation for Counterinsurgency 

development (IDAD). FID can only occur when there is a HN that has asked for 

assistance. The US will generally employ a mix of diplomatic, economic, informational, 

and military instruments of national power in support of these objectives. Military 

assistance is often necessary in order to provide the secure environment for the above 

efforts to become effective. For example, a FID program may help a HN to improve the 

capability or capacity of one of its programs such as counterdrug activities or quell the 

nascent stages of an insurgency. 

 (1) Relation to COIN. FID may or may not include countering an insurgency. 

When FID includes countering an insurgency, COIN is part of FID. COIN only 

refers to actions aimed at countering an insurgency whereas FID can aim at dealing 

with any one or a combination of subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. In most 

cases, the joint force conducts COIN as part of a larger FID program supporting the HN 

government. COIN that is not part of FID is an uncommon situation, and it should 

be a transitory situation where the US and any multinational partners should work 

to establish or reestablish HN sovereignty. Figure I-3 depicts where COIN is distinct, 

where COIN supports FID, and where FID is distinct. There are three Department of 

Defense (DOD) categories of FID programs. 

 (2) Indirect Support. DOD FID indirect support consists of security 

assistance, exchange programs, and joint/multinational exercises. These programs can 

have either a small or no US footprint in the HN, and they can support issues not related 

to insurgency, issues related to a latent insurgency, or programs related to an entrenched 

insurgency. 

 (3) Direct Support Not Involving Combat Operations. DOD FID military 

direct support that does not involve combat operations includes civil-military operations 

(CMO), PSYOP, SFA, military training support, logistics support, mobility support, and 

intelligence and communications sharing. These programs have varying US footprints in 

the HN. They can be in support of a HN of any kind, but large efforts in this area tend to 

assist a HN with an extant insurgency. 

 

 (4) US Combat Operations. The introduction of US combat forces into FID 

operations requires a Presidential decision and serves only as a temporary solution until 

HN forces can stabilize the situation and provide security for their populace. If this 

involves COIN, US efforts can vary from providing advisors that fight alongside HN 

forces to the US conducting COIN in support of the larger HN IDAD. Consequently, the 

US footprint could vary from a few advisors to a large joint force. Control must 

transition to the HN as soon as practical to ensure the population perceives its 

government as legitimate. 

For further details on FID, see JP 3-05, Joint Special Operations, and JP 3-22, Foreign 

Internal Defense. 

I-9 
Chapter I 

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND 

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Violent 

Conflict Normalization

Military Governance

Coalition Civilian 

Governance

Host Nation Governance

Counterinsurgency

(No Host Nation)

Counterinsurgency in 

Support of Foreign 

Internal Defense Foreign Internal 

Defense

(Not Countering an 

Insurgency)

Failed 

State

Failing 

State

Recovering 

State

Figure I-3. Counterinsurgency and Foreign Internal Defense 

 c. Security Force Assistance. Security forces comprise both civilian and military 

participants, to include law enforcement, border security, intelligence, special operations 

forces (SOF), and conventional military forces. Security forces can be at the regional 

level, such as United Nations (UN) forces, and all levels of the HN from local to national. 

Many actors can participate in SFA, including joint, intergovernmental, interagency, 

multinational, nongovernmental, and others. These efforts focus on the HN’s efforts to 

increase its security forces’ capability and capacity. 

For further information, see JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. 

I-10 JP 3-24 
Foundation for Counterinsurgency 

 (1) Relationship to COIN. SFA and security forces are integral to successful 

FID, COIN, and stability operations. SFA includes organizing, training, equipping, 

rebuilding, and advising various components of security forces in support of a legitimate 

authority; however, actors performing SFA have to initially assess the security forces 

they will assist and then establish a shared, continual way of assessing the security forces. 

 (2) Organizing. SFA includes organizing institutions and units, which can 

range from standing up a ministry to improving the organization of the smallest 

maneuver unit. Building capability and capacity in this area includes personnel, logistics, 

and intelligence and their support infrastructure. Developing HN tactical capabilities 

alone is inadequate; strategic and operational capabilities must be developed as well. HN 

organizations and units should reflect their own unique requirements, interests, and 

capabilities—they should not simply mirror existing external institutions. 

 d. Security Cooperation. Security cooperation interactions build defense 

relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly 

military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces 

with peacetime and contingency access to a HN. These activities help the US and HN 

gain credibility and help the HN build legitimacy. These efforts can help minimize the 

effects of or prevent insurgencies and thwart their regeneration. 

 e. Unconventional Warfare. UW is a special operations mission. UW is a broad 

spectrum of military and paramilitary operations normally of long duration and 

conducted by, with, and through indigenous or surrogate forces. These surrogate forces 

are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an 

external source. UW activities include, but are not limited to, insurgency, guerrilla 

warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence, PSYOP, and unconventional assisted 

recovery. UW most frequently refers to the military and paramilitary aspects of an 

insurgency designed to resist, overthrow, or gain political autonomy from an established 

government or used to resist or expel a foreign occupying power. However, UW can also 

refer to military and paramilitary support to an armed group seeking increased power and 

influence relative to its political rivals without overthrowing the central government and 

in the absence of a foreign occupying power. 

For further details on UW, see JP 3-05, Joint Special Operations. 

 f. Counterterrorism (CT). Terrorism is the calculated use of unlawful violence or 

threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; which is intended to coerce or to intimidate 

governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or 

ideological. Terrorism can be a standalone activity when the terrorists have no intent to 

control territory but instead focus on political impact to further their agenda. Terrorism is 

often used in conjunction with insurgency. CT can be applied directly against terrorist 

networks and indirectly to influence and render global environments inhospitable to 

terrorist networks. 

I-11 
Chapter I 

For further details on CT, see JP 3-05, Joint Special Operations, and JP 3-26, 

Counterterrorism. 

 g. Peace Operations. For the Armed Forces of the United States, PO are crisis 

response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national 

power and also include international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, 

restore the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and 

to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. PO include peacekeeping operations 

(PKO), peace enforcement operations (PEO), peace building (PB) post-conflict actions, 

peacemaking (PM) processes, and conflict prevention. PO may be conducted under the 

sponsorship of the UN, another intergovernmental organization (IGO), within a coalition 

of agreeing nations, or unilaterally. 

 (1) Peacekeeping Operations. PKO consist of military operations 

undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute. PKO may be part of a 

larger COIN framework when some parties come to a diplomatic agreement. When all 

parties have agreed to a diplomatic agreement, PKO can replace COIN over time. 

 (2) Peace Enforcement Operations. PEO are generally coercive in nature and 

rely on the threat of or use of force; however, PEO also rely on the development of 

working relationships with the local population. The impartiality with which the PO 

force treats all parties and the nature of its objectives separate PEO from COIN and 

major combat operations.

 

 (3) Peacemaking. PM is a diplomatic process that may include mediation, 

negotiation, or conciliation. PM efforts may take advantage of seams in insurgent 

organizations by establishing separate agreements with individual organizations or 

groups that make up an insurgency movement. Commanders should constantly seek 

opportunities for PM throughout COIN. 

 (4) Peace Building. PB is an important aspect of a larger COIN effort. PB 

covers several post conflict actions including diplomatic, economic, and security related 

activities aimed at strengthening political settlements and legitimate governance, and 

rebuilding governmental infrastructure and institutions, in order to establish sustainable 

peace and security, foster a sense of confidence and well-being, and support the 

conditions for economic reconstruction. 

 (5) Conflict Prevention. Conflict prevention consists of diplomatic initiatives 

and other actions taken in advance of a crisis to prevent or limit violence, deter parties, 

and reach an agreement short of conflict. Conflict prevention also occurs in the postconflict phase in order to prevent a return to conflict. Military deployments designed to 

deter and coerce parties will need to be credible, and this may require a combat posture 

and an enforcement mandate under the principles of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 

Conflict prevention activities range from diplomatic initiatives to deployments designed 

to resolve disputes. Early efforts to prevent insurgency are covered in Chapter III, 

“Counterinsurgency.” 

I-12 JP 3-24 
Foundation for Counterinsurgency 

For further details on PO, see JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations. 

 h. Psychological Operations. By lowering insurgent morale and reducing their 

operational or combat effectiveness, PSYOP can discourage aggressive actions and create 

dissension and disaffection within insurgent ranks. When properly employed, PSYOP 

can save lives of friendly, noncombatant, and insurgent forces by reducing insurgent will 

to fight. 

 (1) Purpose. The purpose of PSYOP in COIN is to induce or reinforce 

attitudes and behavior that support HN legitimacy and are favorable to the end state, 

including addressing perceived core grievances, drivers of conflict, and the illegitimacy 

of the insurgents. PSYOP efforts in COIN are most effective when personnel with a 

thorough understanding of the language and culture of the target audience (TA) are 

included in the review of PSYOP materials and messages. The dissemination of PSYOP 

includes print, broadcast, Internet, facsimile messaging, text messaging, and other 

emerging media. However, face-to-face communications are the most effective and 

preferred method of communicating with local audiences, especially in COIN. 

 (2) Employment. PSYOP employed at the strategic, operational, and tactical 

levels, are used to establish and reinforce foreign perceptions of counterinsurgent 

credibility and HN legitimacy. PSYOP conducted at the strategic level are international 

information activities conducted by United States Government (USG) agencies to 

influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in favor of US goals and objectives 

during peacetime and in times of conflict. These programs are conducted predominantly 

outside the military arena but typically utilize DOD assets. PSYOP conducted at the 

operational level are in a defined operational area to promote the effectiveness of COIN, 

and PSYOP conducted at the tactical level are employed in the area assigned a maneuver 

commander to COIN tactical efforts. PSYOP forces are vital at the tactical level in 

COIN. They build rapport for US/coalition forces, enhance legitimacy and populace 

support for the HN, and support on-going CMO, as well as reduce combat effectiveness 

of the insurgents. 

 (3) The PSYOP program. The PSYOP program forms the legal authority to 

integrate PSYOP in Secretary of Defense (SecDef) approved missions in a theater of 

operation. The program establishes the parameters for the execution of PSYOP. The 

components of a PSYOP program provide the necessary guidelines from which to 

develop and approve PSYOP series to target foreign audiences. The program is staffed 

and coordinated through the Joint Staff and interagency process and approved by the 

SecDef to ensure PSYOP products reflect national and theater policy, strategy and also 

receive the broadest range of policy considerations. 

 (4) PSYOP Product Approval. Under US policy and the PSYOP Supplement 

to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, PSYOP product approval authority may be subdelegated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to the geographic combatant 

commander (GCC) and further to the commander, joint task force through official 

I-13 
Chapter I 

message traffic. When required or requested, the SecDef can authorize PSYOP product 

approval authority to be delegated down to the brigade combat team in order to facilitate 

responsive PSYOP support. Current policy facilitates decentralized PSYOP execution 

and allows for commanders with product approval authority to develop a streamlined 

time sensitive product approval process. A JFC must have an approved PSYOP 

program, execution authority, and delegation of product approval authority before 

PSYOP execution can begin. 

For more discussion on PSYOP see JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations. 

 i. Counterguerrilla Operations. Counterguerrilla operations are operations and 

activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies against 

guerrillas. Counterguerrilla operations essential supporting efforts, or a subset, of COIN 

operations focused on the insurgents’ military forces. 

 j. Example of Related Operations. The complex nature of COIN often requires 

many types of operations to effectively shape the OE and set the conditions to reach the 

desired end state. For example, all or part of unsuccessful PEO can transition to COIN as 

the situation devolves and becomes more unstable. COIN and PEO can also occur 

simultaneously if some parties have agreed to peace while one or more use insurgency to 

reach their goals. More importantly, successful COIN can become long-term PEO as part 

of a larger FID framework. Figure I-4 depicts an example nexus of COIN, CT, and PEO. 

5. Balance and Simultaneity of Offense, Defense, and Stability Operations 

Simultaneity and Balance. COIN requires joint forces to both fight and build 

sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the security situation and a variety of 

other factors. Although offense, defense, or stability levels of effort will change over 

time, there will be some offensive, defensive, and stability operations occurring 

simultaneously. The balance of these operations must be appropriate to accomplish the 

current phase’s objectives. 

 a. Offensive and Defensive Operations. Offensive and defensive operations in 

COIN that are predominantly aimed at insurgent combatants are counterguerrilla 

operations. Counterguerrilla operations are focused on countering the military aspect of 

insurgencies. The joint force, however, must never lose sight of the broader COIN effort 

and not merely focus on lethal efforts. Although the political dimension of COIN is 

paramount for the long-term, counterguerrilla operations are essential to protect the 

population. A balance of counterguerrilla, CT, collection, counterintelligence (CI), 

information, and other operations are necessary to secure the population. 

I-14 JP 3-24 
Foundation for Counterinsurgency 

EXAMPLE RELATED OPERATIONS: COUNTERINSURGENCY, 

COUNTERTERRORISM, AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT

Terrorism

Counterterrorism

Insurgency

Counterinsurgency

Communal 

Conflict

Peace Enforcement

Figure I-4. Example Related Operations: Counterinsurgency, Counterterrorism, and Peace 

Enforcement

 b. Stability Operations. Stability operations refer to various military missions, 

tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of 

national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide 

essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and 

humanitarian relief. Stability operations are consequently fundamental to COIN—

stability operations address the core grievances of insurgency as well as drivers of 

conflict and are therefore essential to long-term success. US military forces should be 

prepared to lead the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil, 

USG, multinational, or international capacity does not exist or is not yet capable of 

assuming responsibility. Once a legitimate civil authority is prepared to conduct such 

tasks, US military forces may support such activities as required. Integrated civilian and 

military efforts are essential to success and military forces need to work competently in 

this environment while properly supporting the agency in charge. Effectively planning 

and executing stability operations require a variety of perspectives and expertise. The 

Department of State (DOS) is charged with responsibility for a whole-of-government 

approach to stability operations that includes USG departments and agencies (including 

DOD), the HN, alliance or coalition partners, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 

I-15 
Chapter I 

I-16 JP 3-24 

IGOs, and other actors. Military forces should be prepared to work in informal or formal 

integrated civilian-military teams that could include, and in some cases be led by, 

representatives from other US departments and agencies, foreign governments and 

security forces, IGOs, NGOs, and members of the private sector with relevant skills and 

expertise. 

For further details on stability operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, JP 3-07.3, 

Peace Operations, and Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05, Military 

Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. 
CHAPTER II

INSURGENCY 

II-1 

1. Introduction 

 Successful COIN operations require comprehensive knowledge of the OE including 

an understanding of the insurgents, the scope of the insurgency, any external supporting 

elements, and the other players (e.g., terrorists and criminals) that may benefit from a 

protracted conflict and especially the relevant population. An insurgency typically 

succeeds or fails based on the support of the population. This understanding acts as a 

foundation on which the joint force can plan, prepare, execute, and assess COIN 

operations. This chapter provides COIN practitioners a doctrinal baseline to understand 

their adversaries. 

 a. Nature. Insurgencies are primarily internal conflicts that focus on the population. 

An insurgency aims to gain power and influence, win a contest of competing ideologies, 

or both. The insurgent goal of gaining power, influence, and freedom of action may not 

extend to overthrowing the HN government, but only to gaining power and influence at a 

greater rate or extent than other means would peacefully or legally allow. Some 

insurgent leaders may use ideology to gain power but not actually subscribe to the 

ideology—the ideology can be a means to another end. To survive, insurgencies must 

adapt to environmental and operational changes and new threats. This need to adapt also 

applies to any significant subgroups in an insurgency. Insurgents strive to adapt to 

change more quickly and effectively than the counterinsurgents. The use of subversion 

and violence is what makes insurgency distinct from the culturally accepted political 

process or culturally accepted nonviolent means of political protest. 

 b. An Approach. The use of insurgency is normally necessary because of the 

inherent weakness of insurgent forces relative to the state or external forces. This relative 

weakness forces insurgents to avoid an initial direct confrontation and instead look for 

ways to attack asymmetrically. While combatants generally prefer a quick, cheap, 

overwhelming victory over a protracted struggle, insurgents often must prolong their 

effort to gain in relative strength and erode the will of opponents over time. 

 c. Focus. Insurgencies may focus at the local, state, or regional level. The focus 

depends on the insurgents’ endstate and phase. They may focus current operations on a 

small area and later expand their efforts geographically. 

 d. Subversion and Violence 

 (1) Subversion. Subversion describes actions designed to undermine the 

military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing 

“The beginning of wisdom is to grasp and hold on tightly to the idea that 

insurgency is a profoundly political problem.” 

Anthony James Joes 

Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency 
Chapter II 

authority. Insurgents may stage violent acts for their subversive impact, such as 

fomenting violent civil unrest, such as violent riots or strikes. Insurgents may also use 

nonviolent subversive efforts, such as political fronts, infiltration of government 

agencies, or nonviolent civil unrest (nonviolent strikes or peaceful public 

demonstrations). Subversion is most effective when consistently conducted over a long 

period of time. Insurgent use of propaganda, sabotage, and other means to influence 

audiences often seeks to undermine the legitimacy of the HN government and other 

counterinsurgent forces and increase support for the insurgency. These efforts are often 

focused on the HN population, but they may be focused on counterinsurgent forces or 

foreign audiences. Despite the lack of formal doctrine for these efforts, insurgents will 

often have honed propaganda skills and will quickly master skills in the manipulation of 

international media. Successful insurgents will plan activities and supporting influence 

efforts; they will have propaganda and media messages ready for immediate 

implementation. Furthermore, the eagerness of international media to obtain inside, 

exclusive stories may allow insurgents to control messages and present images and 

stories that support their narrative, their core grievances, and representation of themselves 

as victims. 

 (2) Violence. Insurgents use violence, which may include guerrilla warfare, 

terrorism, and even conventional operations to erode the strength and numbers of 

counterinsurgent forces, weaken the HN government, undermine the HN government’s 

legitimacy, and promote their influence. The insurgents may only seek the population’s 

acquiescence through violence. To gain popular support, the insurgents may use violence 

to make the government look incompetent or provoke an inappropriate HN government 

response. An inappropriate response could be HN government repression of the 

population that does no actual harm to the insurgents. 

 

 e. Organization. There may be many insurgent groups or other destabilizing actors 

involved in one area. Insurgency may be conducted by a highly organized single 

movement or by a loose coalition of poorly organized groups. Individual insurgencies 

may have several factions or subgroups that have varying degrees of unity, ideological or 

otherwise. Insurgent organization may also change. This can take varying forms, from 

splitting into smaller groups to separate insurgencies forming a loose coalition or 

permanent larger insurgency. Loose coalitions may cooperate only to achieve a certain 

goal, so the groups that make up the loose coalition may be unable to cooperate on 

fundamental ideological issues or be unwilling to share power if the insurgency succeeds. 

Some insurgencies have members that work towards a common goal with little or no 

central direction. The potential involvement or support of international terrorists, 

criminals, and other actors may further impact insurgent organization. 

 f. Characteristics. While each insurgency is unique and often adaptive, there are 

basic similarities among insurgencies. In all cases, insurgent military action is secondary 

and subordinate to a larger end, which differentiates insurgency from lawlessness. 

However, counterinsurgent commanders may face a confusing and shifting coalition of 

many kinds of opponents, some of whom may be at odds with one another. Additionally, 

II-2 JP 3-24 
Insurgency 

some of these adversaries are insurgents and some are not. Characteristics of 

insurgencies can be found in Figure II-1. 

CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURGENCIES

1. Ends, Scope, Core Grievances, and Prerequisites

2. Dynamics

3. Organization

4. Approaches

5. Recruitment, Causes, Resources, and Information

6. Vulnerabilities

7. Devolution and Decline

Figure II-1. Characteristics of Insurgencies 

 g. Inherent Advantages. The counterinsurgents normally have initial advantage 

over insurgents in means and resources; however, that edge is counterbalanced by the 

counterinsurgents’ requirement to maintain a degree of order throughout the operational 

area. On the other hand, insurgents only need to sow chaos and disorder. A small 

number of highly motivated insurgents with simple weapons, good operations security 

(OPSEC), and limited mobility can undermine security over a large area. A coordinated 

COIN effort requires political and military leaders to recognize that an insurgency exists 

and determine its makeup and characteristics. While the government prepares to respond, 

the insurgents gain strength and foster increasing disruption throughout the state or 

region. Some insurgents are successful at disguising their intentions, so potential 

counterinsurgents are at a disadvantage; however, the exposure of disingenuous insurgent 

goals often proves advantageous to the HN’s COIN efforts. 

 h. Protraction and Success. It is not necessary for the insurgency to “win” in a 

traditional Western sense—an insurgency wins by not losing. As long as the insurgency 

survives to regenerate and fight another day, it continues to erode the counterinsurgents’ 

capabilities and will. If the counterinsurgents are not effective in dealing with the 

insurgency, they are usually losing relative strength, credibility, and legitimacy. 

Counterinsurgents must first contain and then defeat an insurgency as well as address the 

II-3 
Chapter II 

insurgency’s core grievances. If core grievances are not addressed sufficiently, the 

insurgency will regenerate and prolong the conflict. 

 i. Will, Time, and Space. Insurgent strategies seek to achieve their political aims 

by using time, space, and will. They normally accept temporary setbacks with respect to 

time and space to reach their long-term goals. 

 (1) Will. The ideological nature and core grievances of insurgency often result 

in insurgencies having a strong collective will. This sense of collective will is often 

relatively much greater than that of fragile states’ governments. The insurgent thus seeks 

to make the struggle a protracted “contest of wills.” 

 (2) Time. Due to their relative strong will, insurgents can afford to be patient. 

When their relative weakness requires, insurgents can erode their opponents’ will through 

various means, such as guerrilla warfare, subversion, terrorism, and propaganda. Thus, 

capable insurgents use time as a resource that effective insurgents manage at all levels, 

especially the strategic. 

 (3) Space. Like their use of time, insurgents can use space to wear down their 

opponents’ will. Like conventional operations, they may seek to attack relatively weak 

areas. However, capable insurgents will be fluid. They will fight on ground of their 

choosing, wear down their opponent, yet avoid becoming decisively engaged or 

destroyed. In this fashion, they will seek to wear down their opponents’ actual strength 

and force their opponent to react to insurgent efforts. Sanctuaries and porous border 

regions also offer insurgent’s transnational lines of communication, escape routes, and 

havens to recuperate, train, and plan future operations. 

2. Ends, Scope, Core Grievances, and Prerequisites 

 Ends, scope, and core grievances are three of the most important aspects of an 

insurgency. Understanding an insurgency’s motivations, breadth of activity and support, 

and core grievances is essential to successful COIN. 

 a. Ends. Insurgencies generally share some combination of four common 

objectives: political change, overthrow of the government, resistance against an outside 

actor, or nullifying political control in an area. Insurgencies may have more than one 

end, and the ends can change with circumstances; however, ends tend to be ideologically 

driven. In some cases, insurgents may only seek to goad the international community to 

intervene, which may force political change, or the presence of foreigners may help fuel 

support for the insurgency. 

 (1) Change. Many insurgencies center on forcing the HN into significant 

political or economic change. This change can have multiple forms. Moreover, the level 

of violence and subversion may be beyond the HN’s capability to address with 

nonmilitary means. Change can include issues such as political processes, religious 

practices, or secession of a region. 

II-4 JP 3-24 
Insurgency 

 (2) Overthrow. Insurgents may seek to overthrow governments. The actual 

efforts to overthrow a regime can range from an unplanned, spontaneous explosion of 

popular will to a coup d’état with little support from the population. Most insurgencies 

fall between these two extremes and are characterized more by a strategy of protracted 

attrition than broad-based populist revolutions or coup d’état. They normally seek to 

achieve at least one of two goals: to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate 

power. 

 (3) Resistance. In some cases indigenous elements seek to expel or overthrow 

perceived “occupiers” or “outsiders,” particularly when local groups initially resist the 

joint force during or in the aftermath of major operations. These resistance groups may 

initially have little or no central direction, or they may have been part of a preplaned 

resistance effort. Either way, the actions of these small groups can have a cumulative 

impact. Counterinsurgents must address these nascent insurgencies as quickly as 

possible, before resistance efforts gain momentum and organization. Resistance is 

usually more easily addressed if action is taken early. Some resistance groups could 

come under the control of a government in exile or by factions competing for that role. It 

is important to note that the joint force may be unwelcome or seen as “occupiers” or 

“outsiders” in an UGA just as they might in a state. As in many situations, the objective 

of general resistance is often to protract the war until the “outsiders” tire of the struggle 

and withdraw. 

 (4) Nullification. Some non-state actors seek to create or maintain a region 

where there is no governmental control or governmental control that they can co-opt. For 

example, powerful criminal organizations desire a space where they can conduct their 

activities unrestrained by a government. If these criminal organizations can challenge a 

HN’s control beyond the local level of government, they have become an insurgency. 

Additionally, some insurgencies may have the goal of nullifying one state’s control of a 

region with the intent to form a sanctuary in support of action elsewhere. Such a 

sanctuary may be safely over an international border from the real (or current) focus of 

the insurgency or may be far from the seat of the insurgency, serving as a safe haven for 

training and other preparation. 

 b. Scope. There are four general categories for the scope of insurgencies; however, 

there is no clear-cut delineation between categories. The first two categories are more 

common forms of insurgency. The latter two categories refer to more broadly-based 

insurgencies made more potent and prevalent by globalization. 

 (1) Local. These insurgencies are local-national in scope and end state; 

however, these insurgencies do not enjoy any substantive external support. 

 (2) Local-External Support. Like the previous category, these insurgencies 

are local-national in scope and end state. What makes these insurgencies different from 

the previous category is that they enjoy external support from other actors. External 

support may come from diverse sources and may be either overt or covert. Support may 

II-5 
Chapter II 

come from states in any combination of diplomatic, informational, military, or economic 

efforts, although an important form of support is another nation’s allowing the insurgents 

to use its territory as a safe haven. Support from non-state actors is generally smaller in 

size and scope than a state’s support. 

 (3) Local-Global Support. These insurgencies focus on a particular area, but 

supporters and elements can be found globally. For example, some insurgencies use 

subversion and violence in a localized area while using IO for a more regional or global 

impact; these IO often originate from a site geographically separate from the area where 

the insurgency is physically operating. Thus, the support network of these insurgencies 

may be global in scope, especially when there is a sympathetic diaspora or émigré 

population. By definition the operations of insurgencies of this kind can be found in 

multiple states, which adds to the difficultly of effectively dealing with them in a 

coherent fashion. A good example of this type of insurgency is the Liberation Tamil 

Tigers Elam—their efforts are focused on one island while their support has taken on a 

global scale. 

 (4) Global. These insurgencies are committed to a radical end state—they wish 

to force major change in the world. The theater for these insurgencies is politically, 

logistically, and operationally global. Global insurgencies often seek to first transform 

regions and then eventually the world. Global insurgencies often are willing to use any 

means to achieve their end state, including forming coalitions with or amalgamating other 

smaller-scoped insurgencies. Portions of these insurgencies can be found globally, 

although they may concentrate in ungoverned spaces or within sympathetic states. 

Global insurgencies can exploit local grievances and may transform these grievances 

from mundane to more religious or philosophical ones. They are often willing to support 

causes they view as compatible with their own goals through the provision of funds, 

volunteers, and propaganda. Some of these insurgents also attempt to leverage religious 

or ideological identity to create and support a transnational array of insurgencies. The 

world-wide communist efforts during the Cold War and Al Qaeda are examples of such 

groups. As the scope of these groups increases, the scope and therefore the complexity of 

COIN also increases. Traditional COIN methods still apply—isolation and 

disaggregation of the insurgencies to deal with them in detail coupled with addressing the 

core grievances. Defeating such enemies requires a global, strategic response; such a 

response addresses the array of linked resources and conflicts that sustain these 

movements while tactically addressing the local grievances that feed them. While 

globalization makes these insurgencies very difficult to destroy, their extreme beliefs and 

dispersion make it difficult for them to hold any territory for any duration. 

 c. Core Grievances. The core grievances are issues, real or perceived, in the view 

of some of the population. Some or all may fuel insurgency to varying degrees. The 

importance of the core grievances, or even their existence, can change over time. 

Additionally, insurgents can be adept at manipulating or creating core grievances to serve 

their purpose. The following represent common core grievances: 

II-6 JP 3-24 
Insurgency 

 (1) Identity. There are many factors that shape a person’s sense of identity, 

but identity is sociocultural in character. Strong feelings based on identity can be in 

conflict with the HN government, potentially leading to insurgencies with secession, 

border changes, or political overthrow as goals. External actors with similar identity as 

the insurgents may assist. 

 (2) Religion. Religious fundamentalism or extremism can become a core 

grievance of insurgency in and of itself. External groups with similar extremist religious 

views as the insurgents often provide support. 

 (3) Economy. Pervasive and desperate poverty often fosters and fuels 

widespread public dissatisfaction. Young people without jobs or hope are ripe for 

insurgent recruitment. Additionally, a perceived disparity of means can be an economic 

core grievance, for example a gap between a large poor majority and a small wealthy 

minority. 

 (4) Corruption. Corruption of national politics, HN government, or key 

institutions or organizations can be a core grievance. Institutional corruption is systemic 

and ongoing, unfair or illegal actions or policies. Political corruption is the dysfunction 

of a political system. For example, corruption in government development programs can 

cause resentment by the aggrieved group. Corruption leads to loss of HN legitimacy and 

is often a key core grievance. 

 (5) Repression. Repression can take many forms, such as discriminatory 

policies, rights violations, police brutality, or imprisonment. Like corruption, repression 

can lead to popular dissatisfaction with the current government and leads to the reduction 

of HN legitimacy. 

 (6) Foreign Exploitation or Presence. The perception that outsiders exploit 

the HN or the HN government excessively panders to foreigners can be a core grievance. 

For example, if foreign businesses dominate critical portions of the local economy, some 

of the population may feel that they or their country are being exploited by outsiders. A 

foreign military presence or military treaty may offend national sentiment as well. 

Finally, the mere presence or specific actions of foreigners may offend local religious or 

cultural sensibilities. 

 (7) Occupation. Foreign military forces’ occupation of another state is often a 

core grievance. If groups within the population have the will to fight on after a regime 

change or occupation, they may form a resistance movement. 

 (8) Essential Services. Essential services provide those things needed to 

sustain life. Examples of these essential needs are availability of food, law enforcement, 

emergency services, water, electricity, shelter, health care, schools, transportation, and 

sanitation (trash and sewage). Stabilizing a population requires meeting these basic 

needs. People pursue essential needs until they feel they are met, at any cost and from 

any source. People support the source that meets their needs. 

II-7 
Chapter II 

 d. Prerequisites. There are three prerequisites for an insurgency to be successful in 

an area—a vulnerable population, leadership available for direction, and lack of 

government control. When all three exist in an area, insurgency can operate with some 

freedom of movement, gain the support of the people, and become entrenched over time. 

 (1) Vulnerable Population. A population is vulnerable if the people have real 

or perceived grievances that insurgents can exploit. The insurgents can exploit the 

population by offering hope for change as well as exploiting political, economic, or social 

dissatisfaction with the current government. A gap between population’s expectations 

and the capability to meet these expectations may cause unrest within the population, 

including turning to insurgency. The larger the gap, the greater the population’s 

perceived or relative, deprivation between what they have and what they perceive they 

should have. Similarly, the larger the gap, the more susceptible the population is to 

insurgent influence through promises to close the gap. 

 (2) Leadership Available for Direction. A vulnerable population alone will 

not support an insurgency. There must be a leadership element that can direct the 

frustrations of a vulnerable population. If insurgents can recruit, co-opt, or coerce local 

leaders or the local leaders are part of the insurgency, these leaders can direct the 

frustrations of the populace. If the HN government alienates the intelligentsia, religious 

leaders, middle class, or other influential people in their society, these influential people 

may start or become part of an insurgency. This may be very important as these people 

often bring special skills and leadership to an insurgency. 

 (3) Lack of Government Control. Real or perceived lack of governmental 

control can allow insurgents to operate with little or no interference from security forces 

or other agencies. Greater government control decreases the likelihood of insurgent 

success. The opposite is also true. If the people feel the government is inadequate in 

meeting their needs, insurgents may provide an alternative, or “shadow,” government, or 

they may merely nullify governance to allow freedom of action and movement. HN 

failure to see or admit that there is an issue, or outright refusal to change, can further 

strengthen this prerequisite. 

3. Dynamics of Insurgency 

The dynamics of insurgency are a framework to assess an insurgency’s strengths and 

weaknesses. The dynamics can be examined separately, but studying their interaction is 

an indispensable part of COIN mission analysis. The interplay of these dynamics 

influences an insurgency’s approach. A change in location or the amount of external 

support might lead insurgents to adjust their approach and organization. Effective 

counterinsurgents identify the organizational pattern these dynamics form and closely 

monitor its evolution. The dynamics include leadership, objectives, ideology, OE, 

external support, internal support, phasing and timing, and organizational and operational 

approaches, though they should be examined with the underlying understanding that 

insurgents are a product of their culture, society, and history (see Figure II-2). 

II-8 JP 3-24 
Insurgency 

EIGHT DYNAMICS OF INSURGENCY

Underlying Culture, Society, and History of Insurgents

1. Leadership

2. Objectives

3. Ideology

4. Operational Environment

5. External Support

6. Internal Support

7. Phasing and Timing

8. Organizational and Operational Approaches

Figure II-2. Eight Dynamics of Insurgency 

 a. Leadership. Like any organization, leadership is critical to any insurgency. 

Leaders must provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, and organizational 

coherence. This may come at the strategic level in an organized insurgency, or direction 

may initially come locally in a disparate resistance movement. Successful insurgent 

leaders’ key tasks are to break the ties between the people and the government, build 

physical and psychological ties between the insurgency and the people, and to establish 

credibility for insurgent efforts. Leader education, background, family and social 

connections, and experiences contribute to their ability to organize and inspire the people 

who form the insurgency. Insurgent leaders ultimately advance alternatives to existing 

conditions. 

 (1) Distributed Leadership. In some cases, insurgencies have multiple 

important leaders. They are often from the elite, middle class, or intellectual segments of 

society. These leaders may separately recruit, indoctrinate, and use other members of the 

insurgency to carry out tasks. Consequently, these kinds of insurgent leadership 

structures are difficult to penetrate and can continue to operate efficiently despite the loss 

of any single leader, and sometimes even multiple leaders. 

 (2) Collective Leadership. Some insurgencies operate from a collective power 

base that does not depend on specific leaders or personalities. This kind of collective 

leadership arrangement may require physical meetings, which often require a sanctuary 

II-9 
Chapter II 

for security. Insurgencies with this style of leadership are easier to penetrate but recover 

rapidly when they lose key personnel. 

 (3) Charismatic Leadership. Some insurgencies depend on a charismatic 

personality to provide cohesion, motivation, and a focal point for the movement. Some 

charismatic leaders are traditional authority figures such as tribal leaders, local warlords, 

or religious leaders. These traditional authority figures often wield enough power to 

single-handedly drive an insurgency. Identity-focused insurgencies can be defeated in 

some cases by co-opting the responsible traditional authority figure; in others, the 

authority figures have to be discredited or eliminated. Organizations led in this way 

make decisions and initiate new actions rapidly, but they are vulnerable to disruption or 

collapse if the charismatic leader is removed. 

 b. Objectives. Effective analysis of an insurgency requires identifying its 

strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. This analysis must be from the 

insurgent perspective, rather than that of the counterinsurgent. Insurgents do not 

normally plan specifically in terms of strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. 

Insurgents use physical or psychological effects to connect strategic and operational 

objectives to tactical actions. Insurgent objectives may be achieved through lethal or 

nonlethal actions. For instance, to achieve a strategic objective of discouraging support 

for the government, insurgents may conduct operations to assassinate government 

officials or may delegitimize the HN in the eyes of the population by damaging or seizing 

a key facility. Identifying direct and indirect effects of insurgent actions within the OE 

and understanding the insurgent's strategic, operational, and tactical objectives are key to 

countering insurgent operations. 

 (1) Strategic. The insurgents’ strategic end state is related to the ends and 

scope of the insurgency. The end state is a set of conditions that describe victory. 

During insurgency, these conditions usually describe a government that is either unable 

or unwilling to control regions of the state, or the conditions may include the fall of the 

existing government. Strategic objectives are developed by insurgents that will bring 

about the end state conditions. A common strategic objective among insurgencies is a 

population that perceives the government as illegitimate and ineffective. Other strategic 

objectives may include popular support for the insurgency and negation of COIN forces. 

 (2) Operational. Insurgents pursue operational objectives that support their 

strategic objectives. Operational objectives will substantially increase insurgent control 

and influence and erode government legitimacy and counterinsurgent credibility. 

Operational objectives exploit the three prerequisites of an insurgency. Continued 

successful achievement of operational objectives will progressively establish the 

insurgents’ desired end state. For example, successful derailment of a national election 

may be an operational objective that will produce reduced confidence in government 

legitimacy - an effect that will lead to the achievement of a strategic objective. 

 (3) Tactical. Insurgents conduct missions, tasks, and actions to produce effects 

that achieve tactical objectives. The insurgent operational objectives often require 

II-10 JP 3-24 
Insurgency 

cumulative tactical efforts over a protracted period. Tactical objectives vary substantially 

in size and scope. For example, a large tactical objective could be successfully derailing 

a national election in one province and a small tactical objective may be successfully 

terrorizing a single family to not vote. 

 c. Ideology. Insurgents promise reforms or improvements and can present 

membership as an alternative to what otherwise may be a dull, impoverished existence. 

Thus, some join an insurgency due to poverty or lack of other opportunities. In other 

cases, insurgencies can recruit and gain popular support by appealing to the cause and the 

narrative. Finally, recruits may join an insurgency simply because they are seeking to 

belong to a community or because insurgents exploit recruits’ religious beliefs or 

ideological views. 

 

 (1) Narrative. The narrative is the central mechanism through which 

ideologies are expressed and absorbed. A narrative is an organizational scheme 

expressed in story form, and a good narrative is rooted in the local culture. Narratives are 

central to representing identity, particularly the collective identity of religious sects, 

ethnic groupings, and tribal elements. Stories about a community’s history provide 

models of how actions and consequences are linked. Stories are often the basis for 

strategies and actions, as well as for interpreting others’ intentions. 

 (2) Ideological Dogma. Many insurgents hold all-encompassing worldviews; 

they are ideologically rigid and uncompromising, seeking to control their members’ 

private thought, expression, and behavior. Seeking power and believing themselves to be 

ideologically pure, these insurgents often brand those they consider insufficiently 

orthodox as enemies. Extremist beliefs can also fortify the will of insurgents. For 

instance, their dogmas often confirm the idea, common among hard-core transnational 

terrorists, that unlimited means are appropriate to achieve their often unlimited goals—

the means are justified by the ends and mitigated by the vilification and dehumanization 

of the target. Some insurgent groups employ religious concepts to portray their efforts 

favorably and mobilize followers in pursuit of their political goals. However, these 

insurgents often pursue their ends in highly pragmatic ways based on realistic 

assumptions. Even the most rigid insurgents may seek cease fires and participate in 

elections when such actions support their short-term interests. 

 d. Operational Environment. The OE—including sociocultural factors and civil 

factors—affects all participants in a conflict, including insurgents. The effects of these 

factors are immediately visible at the tactical level, where they are perhaps the 

predominant influence on decisions. For example, insurgencies in urban environments 

present different planning considerations from insurgencies in rural environments. 

Similarly, border areas contiguous to states that may actively or passively provide 

external support and sanctuary to insurgents create a distinct vulnerability for 

counterinsurgents. 

 e. External Support. External support to insurgency can provide political, 

psychological, and material resources that might otherwise be limited or unavailable. 

II-11 
Chapter II 

External support for an insurgency can be provided by a state, organization, or non-state 

actor. Assistance can come from outside state governments or political entities that may 

provide support by recognizing an insurgency or political party sympathetic to the 

insurgency. Political support is the most dangerous form of support and can result in the 

insurgency’s gaining legitimacy, which may force limitations on the counterinsurgent 

operations. Psychological support to insurgency is sympathy for, or acknowledgement 

of, the insurgent cause. Support in the form of resources may include fighters, money, 

weapons, equipment, food, intelligence, advisors, and training. Insurgencies may turn to 

transnational criminal elements for funding or use the Internet to create a support 

network. Ethnic or religious communities in other states may also provide external 

support. 

 (1) Sanctuaries. Sanctuaries provide insurgents with safe havens from which 

to prepare or conduct further operations. This may include physical sanctuaries where 

insurgents may plan, train, or otherwise prepare for ongoing operations. These 

sanctuaries may be located areas external to a HN from which operations are launched 

and to which insurgents may retire. Physical safe havens may be in areas with 

sympathetic governments or, more often, UGAs. In either case, sanctuaries challenge or 

prevent COIN efforts to enter these areas that protects insurgents. Similarly, insurgents 

may be able to use safe havens created by cultural sanctuaries, such religious or other 

culturally significant areas (e.g., churches, mosques, museums), or in locations among 

historically protected populations, such as women and children. Insurgents also draw on 

virtual sanctuaries such as websites, chatrooms, and blogs. These virtual sanctuaries are 

used to transmit propaganda, recruit, issue directives or orders, and conduct various other 

activities. For these virtual sanctuaries, the complexity of cyberspace can impede 

counterinsurgent efforts. 

 (2) Urban Sanctuaries. Modern target acquisition and intelligence collection 

technology make insurgents in isolation, even in neighboring states, more vulnerable than 

those hidden among the population. Thus, contemporary insurgencies often develop in 

urban environments, using formal and informal networks. Human intelligence 

(HUMINT) and other forms of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) are 

vital to understanding and defeating these underground networks. 

 

 (3) Non-state Actors. Non-state actors often team with insurgents and profit 

from the conflict. Non-state actors, such as transnational terrorist organizations, often 

represent a security threat beyond the areas they inhabit. 

 f. Internal Support. Internal support is vital for insurgencies, especially when 

insurgencies are latent or incipient. Insurgents must recruit or mobilize elements of the 

population to provide practical internal support and maintain momentum if an insurgency 

is to survive. In many cases neutrals are neither recognized nor tolerated by insurgents; 

they need to be persuaded or coerced. Therefore, the insurgents may have to eliminate 

some to persuade the remainder. 

II-12 JP 3-24 
Insurgency 

 (1) Level of Internal Support. The reality is that neither side will ever enjoy 

the support of the entire population. The support of the population will fluctuate due to 

many factors. Assessing why groups within the population favor the HN or an insurgent 

group(s) is difficult. Measuring the population’s support is important and asking the 

population directly or using surveys can produce valuable insight into popular support 

and attitudes. Figure II-3 depicts an insurgency’s range of popular support. 

 (2) Types of Internal Support. Popular support can be either active or 

passive. It may come from only a small segment of the population or from a broad base 

of the population. Support for an insurgency may also be open or hidden, depending on 

the overall situation. Local insurgents normally exploit local core grievances when 

conducting recruiting. Normally insurgents link their messages with tangible solutions 

and actions. 

RANGE OF POPULAR SUPPORT

Insurgency

Government

For

Against

Against

For

Indifferent Population Indifferent Passive

Support

Active

Support

Passive

Support

Active

Support

Figure II-3. Range of Popular Support 

 g. Phasing and Timing. Most insurgencies pass through three common phases of 

development. Within those phases, insurgencies may evolve through radicalization, 

popular unrest, civil disobedience, subversion, localized guerrilla activity, widespread 

guerrilla warfare, and conventional warfare. Alternatively, they may wither away to 

dormancy if effectively countered or if they fail to capture sufficient popular support. Not 

all insurgencies experience a phased or neatly evolving development, and linear 

progression is not required for insurgent success. Moreover, a single insurgency may be 

in different phases in different parts of a country simultaneously, and they often continue 

activities they began in earlier phases with new activities. Insurgencies under pressure 

can also revert to an earlier phase, as needed. They then resume development when 

favorable conditions return. This flexibility is the key strength of a phased approach, 

which provides fallback positions for insurgents when threatened. Movement from one 

phase to another does not end the operational and tactical activities typical of earlier 

II-13 
Chapter II 

phases; it incorporates them. The phases of the protracted model below may not provide 

a complete template for understanding contemporary insurgencies; however, they do 

explain the shifting mosaic of activities usually present in some form. 

 (1) Phase I—Strategic Defensive (Latent and Incipient). The first phase of 

an insurgency normally begins with the HN government’s having stronger forces than the 

insurgents, when the insurgency is on the strategic defensive. In this situation insurgents 

must concentrate on survival and building support. There are two distinct, common 

stages within the first phase: latent and incipient. 

 (a) Latent. A latent insurgency is not yet ready to begin significant 

subversive or violent activities—it has not manifested or openly conducted operations. A 

latent insurgency usually begins with a group of like-minded individuals discussing core 

grievances. This exchange of ideas may occur through many mediums, including the 

Internet or recorded video. The involved individuals may discuss challenging authority 

or correcting perceived core grievances, which may lead to a conspiracy and plan for 

action. During this period the insurgency establishes an identity, cause, narrative, and a 

firm ideological or political base. This period tends to be a vulnerable and crucial time 

for the insurgents, and it can be a period of frequent fracturing or splintering due to 

ideological or other internal disputes. Insurgents often try to keep their activities hidden 

from the HN government and the majority of the population due to their potential 

vulnerability in this period. There are two key tasks insurgents perform during the latent 

stage: recruitment and infiltration (see Figure II-4). Counterinsurgents must take great 

care to differentiate between the activities of a latent insurgency and the activities of likeminded individuals of a political group lawfully exercising their rights to challenge the 

viewpoints of a sovereign government. Ignoring this, counterinsurgents may unwittingly 

drive these groups to support insurgency. 

 (b) Incipient. There is usually a period of time for any latent insurgency to 

transform to an incipient insurgency. When the insurgents have a sufficient foundation to 

begin more activities, they move into the incipient stage. During this stage an insurgency 

is becoming more active. In addition to expanding the tasks from the latent stage, 

insurgents will begin efforts to subvert and influence. They will also expand their efforts 

into using armed force. The insurgents often declare their existence through IO in the 

incipient stage (see Figure II-4). 

 (2) Phase II—Strategic Stalemate (Guerrilla Warfare). When the insurgents 

have reached rough strategic parity with counterinsurgent forces, they often begin to 

emphasize guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is military and paramilitary operations 

conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous 

forces. This emphasis on guerrilla warfare characterizes the second phase. Guerrilla 

warfare is characterized by guerrillas’ striking at the time and place of their choosing and 

disappearing back into the population. The size and intensity of such attacks will depend 

on the situation and objectives of the insurgency. Insurgents will normally continue other 

efforts used in the latent and incipient phase; however, these efforts often change to 

support guerrilla warfare (see Figure II-4). 

II-14 JP 3-24 
Insurgency 

INSURGENT ACTIONS, UNDERGROUND AND MILITARY OPEN CHALLENGE CLANDESTINE

Large-scale 

Guerrilla Actions

Increased Political Violence 

and Sabotage

Increased Underground Activities to 

Demonstrate Strength of Resistance 

Organization and Weakness of Government

Intensification of Propaganda; Psychological 

Preparation of Population for Rebellion

Establishment of National Front Organizations and 

Liberation Movements; Appeal to Foreign Sympathizers

Penetration into Labor Unions, Student and National 

Organizations, and all Parts of Society

Infiltration of Foreign Organizers and Advisors and Foreign 

Propaganda, Material, Money, Weapons, and Equipment

Agitation; Creation of Favorable Public Opinion (Advocating 

National Cause). Creation of Distrust of Established Institutions.

Minor Guerrilla Actions

Intense Sapping of Morale

(Government, Administration, 

Police, and Military)

Overt and Covert Pressures Against 

Government (Strikes, Riots, and Disorder)

Expansion of Front Organizations

Spreading of Subversive Organizations into all 

Sectors of a Country

Recruitment and Training of Resistance Cadres

Increased Agitation, Unrest, and Disaffection. Infiltration of 

Administration, Police, Military, and National Organizations. 

Boycotts, Slowdowns, and Strikes.

Creation of Atmosphere of Wider Discontent through Propaganda 

and Political and Psychological Efforts to Discredit Government, 

Police, and Military Authorities.

PREPARATION

OF

PARALLEL

HIERARCHIES

FOR

TAKING

OVER

GOVERNMENT

POSITIONS

PREPARATION

OF

RESISTANCE

CADRES

AND INFLUENCE

OF

MASS

BASE

Figure II-4. Insurgent Actions, Underground and Military 

 (3) Phase III—Strategic Counteroffensive (War of Movement). The third 

phase begins if insurgents feel they have superior strength and they choose to employ a 

II-15 
Chapter II 

portion of their forces to fight in a conventional manner. These conventional insurgent 

forces often attempt to hold terrain and expand insurgent-controlled areas. To prepare for 

these conventional insurgent efforts, guerrilla forces normally combine and train to fight 

as conventional forces, which often takes place in cross-border sanctuaries. These forces 

may form multiple echelons. They often acquire sophisticated, modern weapons and the 

skill to employ them. Insurgents may also obtain support from external combat forces, 

such as advisors or even conventional forces from a friendly border nation. 

 h. Organizational and Operational Approaches. Insurgencies develop 

operational approaches from the interaction of various factors. Insurgencies will adapt 

their approaches and organizational structure to the current conditions of the OE. More 

specifically, insurgent organizational and operational approaches are directly related to 

the strength of the HN government. If the HN is strong, the insurgency will have to be 

more secretive and selective. Conversely, the insurgency can be bolder if the HN is 

weak. 

 

4. Organization 

 While each insurgency will have its own unique organization that may change over 

time, there are shared general organizational characteristics that provide a general 

framework for analysis of insurgencies. There are two basic organizational structures 

that comprise most insurgent organizations: components and elements. 

 a. Components. Insurgent structure may be generally broken down into two wings: 

political and military. Insurgent sociocultural factors, approaches, and resources tend to 

drive its organization, and most insurgencies. Figure II-4 depicts the many activities that 

these two wings may perform, from exploiting root causes to overt guerrilla warfare. 

Progression up the diagram does not have to be linear; insurgencies can perform any of 

these activities at any time, in any order or combination. 

 (1) Political Wing. Insurgencies will have some form of political wing, 

although some ends or approaches may only require a nascent political wing. The 

political wing is primarily concerned with undermining the legitimacy of the HN 

government and its allies while building up support for the insurgency. This may be 

accomplished by participation of members of the political wing in legitimate elections 

and political processes in order to infiltrate the government and undermine it from within. 

The political wing of the insurgency builds credibility and legitimacy for the insurgency 

within the population and potentially with the international community. The political 

wing may downplay insurgent violence and subversion, some to the point of outright 

deception. 

 (a) Shadow Government. An insurgency and its political wing may 

become strong enough to not only challenge the HN government, but it may act as an 

alternative government. It may provide some or all of the functions or services of a 

government, for example food distribution, health care, and security. Normally the 

shadow government will attempt to satisfy grievances in local areas first. They may 

II-16 JP 3-24 
Insurgency 

attempt to transfer blame for any residual issues to foreign presence or the HN 

government in order to facilitate popular support. This approach is used in Lebanon and 

has become widely known as the “Hezbollah model.” This model is being explicitly 

replicated by other insurgents in the region, including in Iraq. 

 (b) Supportive Parties. While not part of the insurgency, an existing legal 

political party may come to support the insurgency or may form a legal political party 

that supports the insurgency. These legal political parties may become the insurgents’ 

conduit for diplomacy and political reconciliation. In some cases, the political party may 

consist of former insurgent strategic leaders and cadre. Efforts should be made to open 

and maintain these avenues for reconciliation. 

 (2) Military Wing. The military wing of the insurgency conducts combat 

operations. Most insurgencies will initially have few combatants; however, militaryfocused insurgencies will focus on this wing. Most insurgencies build the military wing’s 

capability and capacity over time. The military wing may have to execute its overt 

operations and go back into hiding to survive. As the insurgency grows in relative 

strength, however, its military wing may be able to continuously operate in an overt 

fashion. Insurgent military forces usually start with paramilitary forces, but advanced 

insurgencies may transition some paramilitary forces to more traditionally-organized 

military forces. Thus, if security is ineffective or the insurgency has grown powerful 

relative to the HN, the insurgent elements may exist openly. If the state maintains a 

continuous and effective security presence, some part of the insurgent organization will 

likely maintain a secret existence. 

 b. Elements. The elements are the basic organizational “building blocks” of 

insurgencies. The proportion or presence of each element relative to the larger 

organization depends on the strategic approach the insurgency uses. Figure II-5 depicts 

an example of the insurgency’s elements. 

 (1) Strategic Leaders. Leaders provide overall direction in more organized 

insurgencies. These leaders are the “key idea people” or strategic planners. They usually 

exercise leadership through force of personality, the power of revolutionary ideas, and 

personal charisma. In some insurgencies, they may hold their position through religious, 

clan, or tribal authority. A loosely organized insurgency may not have strategic leaders, 

but they will have leaders of smaller groups that happen to act towards the same goals, 

such as expelling an “occupier.” 

 (2) Underground. The underground is that element of the insurgent 

organization that conducts operations in areas normally denied to the auxiliary and the 

guerrilla force. The underground is a cellular organization within the insurgency that 

conducts covert or clandestine activities that are compartmentalized. This secrecy may 

be by necessity, by design, or both depending on the situation. Most underground 

operations are required to take place in and around population centers that are held by 

counterinsurgent forces. Underground members often fill leadership positions, 

overseeing specific functions that are carried out by the auxiliary. The underground and 

II-17 
Chapter II 

auxiliary—although technically separate elements—are, in reality, loosely connected 

elements that provide coordinated capabilities for the insurgent movement. The key 

distinction between them is that the underground is the element of the insurgent 

organization that operates in areas denied to the guerrilla force. Members of the 

underground often control cells used to neutralize informants and collaborators from 

within the insurgency and the population. 

 (3) Guerrillas. Guerrillas conduct the actual fighting and provide security. 

They support the insurgency’s broader agenda and maintain local control. Guerrillas 

protect and expand the counterstate, if the insurgency establishes such an institution. 

They also protect training camps and networks that facilitate the flow of money, 

instructions, and foreign and local fighters. Guerrillas include any individual member of 

the insurgency who commits or attempts an act of overt violence or terrorism in support 

of insurgent goals. Guerrilla leaders are considered part of the combatant element for 

analyzing insurgencies. 

 (4) Cadre. Although few contemporary insurgencies would use the term 

“cadre,” this element forms the political or ideological core of the insurgency. If present, 

the cadre is part of the underground. Some cadre activities are violent deeds, but their 

fundamental role is enforcement of political and ideological discipline, subversion of 

opponents, and co-optation of social power to support the insurgent strategy. Cadre 

leaders maintain organizational discipline and may perform key “shadow government” or 

government-in-exile functions. Cadres wage the battle of ideas and lead other insurgents 

in this respect. Cadre activities may include: control of intelligence and CI networks; 

focus and integration of IO capabilities against the government, the population, and the 

international community; direction and coordination of acts of sabotage; and operation of 

the command structure or shadow government, if present. Parts of the cadre may act as a 

formal political party. Movements based on religious extremism usually include 

religious and spiritual advisors among their cadre. 

 (5) Auxiliary. The auxiliary is the support element of the insurgent 

organization. The auxiliary’s organization and operations are secretive in nature, and 

members do not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement with the insurgent 

movement. This support enables the combatant force to survive and function. This 

support can take the form of logistics, labor, or intelligence. Auxiliary members are 

active sympathizers who provide important support services but do not generally 

participate in combat operations. Typical auxiliary activities include: running safe 

houses; storing weapons and supplies; acting as couriers; providing intelligence 

collection; giving early warning of counterinsurgent movements; providing funding from 

lawful and unlawful sources; and providing forged or stolen documents and access or 

introductions to potential supporters. 

 

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Insurgency 

EXAMPLE ELEMENTS OF AN INSURGENCY

Insurgency

Auxiliary

Guerrillas

Strategic 

Leaders

Underground

Figure II-5. Example Elements of an Insurgency 

 c. Networks. Insurgents are often organized as a network. A network is a series of 

direct and indirect ties from one actor to a collection of others. Networking extends the 

range and variety of both their military and political actions. Networked organizations 

are difficult to destroy; they tend to heal, adapt, and learn rapidly. However, such 

organizations have a limited ability to attain strategic success because they cannot easily 

muster and focus power. The best outcome they can expect is to create a security 

vacuum leading to a collapse of the targeted regime’s will and then to gain in the 

competition for the spoils, thus moving to the strategic offensive without building combat 

superiority. Their enhanced capabilities to sow disorder, survive, and protract the 

struggle, however, present particularly difficult problems for counterinsurgents. 

 d. Mass Base. The mass base consists of the population indigenous to an area that 

insurgent forces are from and from whom support for an insurgent effort can be wittingly 

or unwittingly drawn. Organization of the larger indigenous population from which the 

insurgent forces are drawn is conducted primarily by the political cadre; often through, or 

II-19 
Chapter II 

with the assistance of, the underground and auxiliary. The primary value of the mass 

base to the insurgency is less a matter of formal organization than it is a marshalling of 

population groups to act in specific ways that support the insurgency. Elements of the 

mass base are divided into three distinct groups in relation to the insurgent cause or 

movement: pro-insurgent; anti-insurgent; and uncommitted, undecided, or ambivalent. 

The political cadres then conduct activities to influence or leverage these groups. These 

groups may or may not be knowledgeable of the insurgent nature of the operations or 

activities in which they are utilized. 

5. Approaches 

 This section examines some of the key approaches or strategies used by insurgencies. 

The first four approaches often make winning the peace difficult for former insurgents. 

This may begin a cycle of collapsing or changing governments or, in the worst case, lead 

to poorly governed areas. 

 a. Conspiratorial. A conspiratorial approach involves a few leaders and a militant 

cadre or activist party seizing control of government structures or exploiting a 

revolutionary situation. Such insurgents remain secretive as long as possible. They 

emerge only when success can be achieved quickly. This approach usually involves 

creating a small, secretive, “vanguard” party or force. Insurgents who use this approach 

successfully may have to create or co-opt security forces and generate mass support to 

maintain power. Outside state complicity or support may be necessary to promulgate a 

successful coup de main at the onset of the conspiracy. 

 b. Military-Focused. Users of military-focused approaches aim to create 

revolutionary possibilities or seize power primarily by applying military force. Leaders 

of this form of insurgency assert that an insurrection itself can create the conditions 

needed to overthrow a government. They often believe that a small group of guerrillas 

operating in a rural environment can eventually gather enough support to achieve their 

aims. In contrast, some secessionist insurgencies have relied on major conventional 

forces to try to secure their independence. Military-focused insurgencies may have little 

or no political structure; they may spread their control through movement of combat 

forces rather than political subversion. Other military-focused insurgencies may attempt 

to politicize controlled areas. The insurgents will use varying levels of coercion, 

indoctrination, direct military control of civil institutions, and martial law to solidify their 

position. Political subversion in areas outside of those under insurgent military control 

remains infrequent. 

 c. Terrorism-Focused. Protracted terrorism is waged by small, independent cells 

that require little or no popular support. As societies have become more interconnected 

and insurgent networks more sophisticated, this approach has become more effective. 

When facing adequately run internal security forces, insurgencies typically assume a 

conspiratorial, underground cellular structure recruited along lines of close association—

family, religious affiliation, political party, or social group. This approach uses terrorist 

tactics to accomplish the following: sow disorder, incite sectarian violence, weaken the 

II-20 JP 3-24 
Insurgency 

government, intimidate the population, kill government and opposition leaders, fix and 

intimidate police and military forces, attempt to create government repression, and, in 

cases where foreign forces may occupy the country, force their withdrawal. 

 d. Identity-Focused. The identity-focused approach mobilizes support based on the 

common identity of religious affiliation, clan, tribe, or ethnic group. Some movements 

may be based on an appeal to a religious identity, either separately from or as part of 

other identities. This approach is common among contemporary insurgencies and is 

sometimes combined with the military-focused approach. The insurgent organization 

may not have the dual military/political hierarchy evident in a protracted popular war 

approach. Rather, communities often join the insurgent movement as a whole, bringing 

with them their existing social/military hierarchy. Additionally, insurgent leaders often 

try to mobilize the leadership of other clans and tribes to increase the movement’s 

strength. 

 e. Protracted Popular War. Protracted conflicts favor insurgents, and no approach 

makes better use of strength and patience asymmetries than the protracted popular war. 

There are three strategic phases: defensive, stalemate, and counteroffensive. These 

phases are not necessarily linear and can overlap depending on the situation. The aim is 

to erode the strength and will of the HN. A key objective for a protracted insurgency is 

to preserve insurgent forces and attrite the enemy. Thus, an insurgency must constantly 

attack yet avoid being decisively engaged and potentially destroyed. That is why many 

insurgencies never progress past guerrilla warfare. 

 f. Subversive. Although subversive activities may take place in other strategies, 

particularly in the protracted popular war approach, a subversive approach either attempts 

to transform an illegal political entity into a legitimate political party or to use an existing 

legitimate political party. This party will attempt to subvert the government from within. 

The insurgency will use this political party in conjunction with violent and subversive 

activities to delegitimize the HN and its allies; however, there may be a reduction in overt 

violent actions. This approach is marked by sophisticated IO, aimed at specific TAs with 

appropriate messages. Overall, the insurgent purpose is not to integrate into the national 

government, but to undermine and even overthrow the government. 

 g. Composite and Coalitions. Contemporary insurgents may use different 

approaches at different times, applying approaches that take best advantage of 

circumstances. Insurgents may also apply a composite approach that includes tactics 

drawn from any or all of the other approaches. In addition, different insurgent forces 

using different approaches may form loose coalitions when it serves their interests. This 

is often the case with a local insurgency’s aligning with an insurgency of regional or 

global scale. However, these same insurgents may fight among themselves, even while 

engaging counterinsurgents. Within a single operational area there may be multiple 

competing entities, each seeking to maximize its survivability and influence—and this 

situation may be duplicated several times across a joint operations area. This reality 

further complicates both the mosaic that counterinsurgents must understand and the 

operations necessary for victory. 

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Chapter II 

6. Recruitment, Causes, Resources, and Information 

 Competent insurgents and counterinsurgents seek to establish control of the 

population and to rally cooperation and popular support for their cause. 

Counterinsurgents who do not gain the control and support of the population will 

normally fail. Counterinsurgents gain control and popular support through providing 

security and governance, and through overt and lawful mobilization. The insurgents, 

however, use recruitment and causes. When both insurgents and counterinsurgents vie 

for support of the population, both try to sustain their efforts while discouraging support 

for their adversaries. 

 a. Recruitment. A mixture of recruitment means may motivate an individual. 

There are normally six means to recruit: persuasion, coercion, reaction to abuses, foreign 

support, apolitical motivations, and deception. 

 (1) Persuasion. Political, social, security, religious, and economic benefits can 

often entice people to support one side or the other in times of turmoil. Ideology and 

religion are means of persuasion, especially for the elites and leadership. In this case, 

legitimacy derives from the consent of the governed, though leaders and followers can 

have very different motivations. 

 (2) Coercion. In the eyes of some, a government that cannot protect its people 

forfeits the right to rule. Legitimacy is accorded to the element that can provide security. 

Insurgents may use coercive force to provide security for people or to intimidate them 

and the legitimate security forces into active or passive support. Kidnapping or killing 

local leaders or their families is a common insurgent tactic to discourage working with 

the government, as is killing or intimidating local government officials such as 

schoolteachers or police. Insurgents sometimes use security, or the threat to remove it, to 

maintain control of cities and towns. Some members and supporters may simply be more 

afraid of the insurgents than they are of counterinsurgents. 

 (3) Reaction to Abuses. Though firmness by security forces is often necessary 

to establish a secure environment, a government that exceeds accepted local norms and 

abuses its people or is tyrannical generates resistance to its rule. People who have been 

maltreated or have had close friends or relatives killed by the government may strike 

back at their attackers. Security force abuses and the social upheaval caused by collateral 

damage from combat can be major escalating factors for insurgencies. 

 (4) Foreign Support. Foreign governments can provide the expertise, 

international legitimacy, and money needed to start or intensify a conflict. Also of note, 

NGOs, even those whose stated aims are impartial and humanitarian, may wittingly or 

unwittingly support insurgents. For example, funds raised overseas for professed 

charitable purposes can be redirected to insurgent groups, or funds and aid can permit 

both the HN and insurgents to concentrate scarce resources elsewhere. 

II-22 JP 3-24 
Insurgency 

 (5) Apolitical Motivations. Deteriorating conditions may prompt otherwise 

law-abiding citizens to see an insurgency as the only viable means of support. In effect, 

the insurgency may enjoy a “poverty draft.” Insurgencies often attract criminals and 

mercenaries seeking illicit rewards. Some individuals inspired by the romanticized image 

of the revolutionary or holy warrior and others who imagine themselves as fighters for a 

cause might also join. It is important to note that a political solution will probably not 

satisfy many of the people enough to end their participation. 

 (6) Deception. Deception is rarely a stand-alone means of recruitment, but 

rather a means of supporting other motivators. Persuasive and coercive approaches may 

contain deceptive elements. Insurgents may be deliberately deceptive of their goals, 

support levels, and strength. They may manufacture abuses by counterinsurgents and 

mask their own. Stated insurgent policies and platforms may be deceptive as well. 

Insurgents may target recruits who do not understand the larger implications of joining. 

In illiterate population’s deception by insurgents is usually more successful. 

 (7) Acquiescene. In some cases, the local populace is unable or unwilling to 

resist those wielding de facto control of the local area. 

 b. Causes. A cause is a principle that the insurgents are willing to militantly defend 

or support. 

 (1) Potential Causes. Insurgents can capitalize on a number of potential 

causes. Any country ruled by a small group without broad, popular participation 

provides a political cause for insurgents. Exploited or repressed social groups—be they 

entire classes, ethnic or religious groups, or small elites—may support larger causes in 

reaction to their own narrower grievances. Economic inequities can nurture 

revolutionary unrest. So can real or perceived persecution. Insurgents may create 

artificial or deceptive grievances using propaganda and misinformation. Typically these 

will be extrapolations of previously held grievances and will play on stereotypes, 

xenophobia, racism, classism or other arguments conducive to shallow emotional appeal 

and jingoism. 

 (2) Exploiting Causes. Insurgents employ deep-seated, strategic causes as well 

as temporary, local ones, adding or deleting them as circumstances demand. Insurgents 

can gain more support by not limiting themselves to a single cause. By selecting an 

assortment of causes and tailoring them for various groups within the society, insurgents 

increase their base of sympathetic and complicit support. Insurgent leaders often use a 

bait-and-switch approach. They attract supporters by appealing to local grievances; then 

they lure followers into the broader movement. Without an attractive cause, an 

insurgency might not be able to sustain itself. But a carefully chosen cause is a 

formidable asset; it can provide a fledgling movement with a long-term, concrete base of 

support. The ideal cause attracts the most people while alienating the fewest and is one 

that is the most difficult for counterinsurgents to defeat or co-opt. It must be remembered 

that due to the austere nature of an insurgency, especially in its infancy, most of an 

insurgency’s resources may be obtained through or from the local population. 

II-23 
Chapter II 

 

 c. Resources. Insurgents resort to such tactics as guerrilla warfare and terrorism for 

any number of reasons. These may include disadvantages in manpower or organization, 

relatively limited resources compared to the government, and, in some cases, a cultural 

predisposition to an indirect approach to conflict. To strengthen and sustain their effort 

once manpower is recruited, insurgents require weapons, supplies, and funding. 

Insurgents often use crime as a source of sustainment. 

 (1) Weapons. Acquiring weapons is a critical task to an insurgency movement. 

In some parts of the world, lack of access to weapons may forestall insurgencies. In 

some cases there is widespread availability of weapons in many areas, with especially 

large surpluses in the most violent regions of the world. Availability and sales of small 

arms can lend legitimacy to insurgent forces, especially if insurgents reach combat parity 

with HN security forces. Explosive hazards, such as mines and improvised explosive 

devices (IEDs), are likely to be common weapons in insurgencies. Insurgents can obtain 

weapons through legal or illegal purchases or from foreign sources. A common tactic is 

to capture them from government forces. Homemade weapons and parts may be used as 

well. As insurgents gain secure locations, this may progress to cottage industry. 

 (2) Supplies. Insurgencies require a wide variety of supplies to support their 

efforts. As with any major undertaking, supplies can come in many forms, from 

ammunition to foodstuffs. Circumstances will dictate how difficult it is for an insurgency 

to acquire supplies and which supplies are more challenging to acquire. For example, 

acquiring sufficient small arms ammunition may be more difficult than acquiring the 

weapons themselves. The current phase and level of operations also impacts insurgent 

supply needs and difficulties. For example, foodstuffs may also be difficult to acquire in 

sufficient quantities to support large-scale guerrilla warfare. 

 (3) Funding. Income is essential for insurgents to purchase weapons, pay 

recruits, provide patronage to subordinates and the population, and bribe corrupt officials. 

Money and supplies can be obtained through many sources. Foreign support has already 

been mentioned. Local supporters or international front organizations may provide 

donations. Sometimes legitimate businesses are established to furnish funding. In areas 

controlled by insurgents, confiscation or taxation may be utilized. Another common 

source of funding is criminal activity. Devoting exceptional amounts of time and effort 

to fund-raising can require an insurgent movement to shortchange ideological or armed 

action. Indeed, the method of raising funds is often at the heart of internal debates among 

insurgents. Funding greatly influences an insurgency’s character and vulnerabilities; the 

insurgents’ approach determines its requirements. 

 (4) Insurgent Criminal Sustainment. Insurgent funding requirements often 

drive insurgents into relationships with organized crime or into criminal activity 

themselves, usually due to the ease of reaping windfall profits compared to securing 

external support or taxing a mass base. Kidnapping, extortion, bank robbery, slavery, 

piracy, intellectual property piracy, smuggling, and drug trafficking are common 

lucrative criminal activities that insurgents use. However, the insurgents’ descent into 

II-24 JP 3-24 
Insurgency 

crime risks alienating the population. On the other hand, some powerful criminal 

organizations take on aspects of or evolve into insurgencies. 

For more details on insurgent criminal activity, see Appendix A, “Insurgency and 

Crime.”

 d. Information Environment. The information environment is a critical dimension 

for insurgents. Insurgents can have an advantage in shaping the information environment 

in that counterinsurgents must stick to the truth and make sure that words are backed up 

by deeds. On the other hand, insurgents can make exorbitant promises and point out 

government shortcomings, many caused or aggravated by the insurgency. As insurgents 

achieve more success and begin to control larger portions of the populace, many of these 

asymmetries diminish, which may provide new vulnerabilities that adaptive 

counterinsurgents can exploit. Counterinsurgents can overcome this insurgent advantage 

with a comprehensive IO plan. 

 (1) Propaganda of the Deed. These efforts, which include such acts as 

homicides, have little military value but are a key tool of insurgents as it creates fear and 

uncertainty within the IPI. These actions are executed to attract high-profile media 

coverage or local publicity and inflate perceptions of insurgent capabilities. Resulting 

stories often include insurgent fabrications designed to undermine the government’s 

legitimacy. The actual danger to the population posed by insurgent operations, notably 

terrorist tactics, is often far lower than the perceived danger. The insurgents often only 

need to foster the perception in the general populace of counterinsurgent helplessness and 

the inevitability of insurgent victory. 

 (2) Technology. Globalization, interconnectedness, and information 

technology are key aspects for twenty-first century insurgencies. Insurgents virtually link 

with allied groups throughout the world. This is especially difficult to counter as 

insurgents do not recognize established international laws or the same moral restraints. 

Counterinsurgents must strive to build the capability to rapidly and credibly counter the 

insurgents’ efforts and send their own message. 

 e. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). If they become available, insurgents 

may attempt to integrate WMD into their arsenal for physical destruction and, more 

importantly, psychological and political impact. Insurgents will try to use WMD as part 

of terrorism and will attempt to integrate their use with their IO. The type of WMD and 

available means of delivery will constrain insurgent targets. Insurgents may attack 

conventional forces with WMD out of necessity or by choice. Insurgent concepts for 

employment of WMD may include conventional and clandestine delivery of chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons for the purposes of disruption, 

destabilization, coercion, or revenge. Broad objectives for acquisition and employment 

of CBRN weapons may include the capabilities to: 

 (1) Defeat, influence, intimidate, and deter an opponent. 

II-25 
Chapter II 

 (2) Disrupt HN, US, and multinational forces and operations. 

 (3) Forestall defeat or prolong the struggle. 

 (4) Punish opponents for countering insurgent efforts. 

7. Vulnerabilities 

 Most insurgencies have aspects that can be strengths or vulnerabilities. 

Counterinsurgents should seek to create or exploit potential vulnerabilities. 

 a. Secrecy. An insurgency that starts from a position of weakness that intends to 

use violence to pursue its political aims must initially adopt a secret approach for its 

planning and activities. This practice can become counterproductive once an active 

insurgency begins. Excessive secrecy can limit insurgent freedom of action, reduce or 

distort information about insurgent goals and ideals, and restrict communication within 

the insurgency. Some insurgent groups try to avoid the effects of too much secrecy by 

using the political wing. 

 b. Recruitment and Message. In the early stages of an insurgency, a movement 

may be tempted to go to almost any extreme to attract followers. To mobilize their base 

of support, insurgent groups use a combination of propaganda and intimidation, and they 

may overreach in both. Effective counterinsurgents use IO to exploit inconsistencies in 

the insurgents’ message as well as their excessive use of force or intimidation. The 

insurgent cause itself may also be an exploitable vulnerability. 

 c. Base of Operations. Insurgents can experience serious difficulties finding a 

viable base of operations. A base too far from the major centers of activity may be secure 

but risks being out of touch with the populace. It may also be vulnerable to isolation. A 

base too near centers of government activity risks opening the insurgency to observation 

and perhaps infiltration. Bases close to national borders can be attractive when they are 

beyond the reach of counterinsurgents yet safe enough to avoid suspicions of the 

neighboring authority or population. In the information environment, bases of operation 

may be easy for insurgents to establish, especially if these bases are physically distant 

from the actual conflict. 

 d. External Support. Insurgencies often rely heavily on freedom of movement 

across porous borders, and insurgencies often cannot sustain themselves without 

substantial external support. An important feature of many transnational terrorist groups 

is the international nature of their basing. Terrorists may train in one country and fight or 

conduct other types of operations in another country. The movements of fighters and 

their support are vulnerable to intervention or attack. 

 e. Finances. All insurgencies require funding to some extent. Criminal 

organizations are possible funding sources; however, these groups may be unreliable. 

Such cooperation may attract undue attention from HN authorities and create 

II-26 JP 3-24 
Insurgency 

vulnerabilities to counterinsurgent intelligence operations. In addition, cooperating with 

criminals may not be ideologically consistent with the movement’s core beliefs, although 

it often does not prevent such cooperation. Funding from outside donors may come with 

a political price that can affect the overall aim of an insurgency and weaken its popular 

appeal. 

 f. Internal Divisions. Counterinsurgents must remain alert for signs of divisions 

within an insurgent movement. A series of successes by counterinsurgents or errors by 

insurgent leaders can induce some insurgents to question their cause or challenge their 

leaders. In addition, relations within an insurgency do not remain harmonious when 

factions form to vie for power. 

 g. Maintaining Momentum. Controlling the pace and timing of operations is vital 

to the success of any insurgency. Insurgents seek to control when the conflict begins and 

have some measure of control over subsequent activity. However, many insurgencies fail 

to capitalize on their initial opportunities. Others allow counterinsurgents to dictate the 

pace of events and scope of activities. Initiative is paramount in terms of the 

psychological struggle for the population’s support. 

 h. Defectors and Informants. Nothing is more demoralizing to insurgents than 

realizing that people inside their organization or trusted supporters among the public are 

deserting or providing information to government authorities. Counterinsurgents may 

attract deserters or informants by arousing fear of prosecution or by offering rewards. 

However, informers must be confident that the government can protect them and their 

families against retribution. 

 i. Attrition of Human Resources. Regardless of how an insurgency loses 

combatants, leaders, auxiliaries, and supporters, it cannot maintain its momentum if 

attrition outpaces recruiting. An insurgency that sustains heavy attrition of human 

resources will have to adjust its current activities or assume risk. Reduction of 

observable and verifiable insurgent effectiveness and actions will usually translate into 

loss of political support. However, attrition or reduction of insurgent activity does not 

eliminate the possibility of regeneration and reinvigoration if the core grievances of the 

insurgency are not addressed. Moreover, a strategy of attrition can provide additional 

motivation to insurgents when attrition is accompanied by substantial collateral 

casualties. Attrition is ultimately only valuable when exploited politically and 

informationally. An insurgency need not have many combatants to cause a tremendously 

disproportional amount of disruption in a nation. 

 j. Leadership. Leadership is essential to all organizations, including insurgencies. 

Disrupting leadership, however, is not always equal to direct attack on leaders. It is more 

important to first disrupt the leadership function than to kill or capture individual leaders. 

Actions that disrupt an organization’s leadership—including attacking the will and 

capability of the leaders to communicate with their followers as well as exacerbating 

distrust between leaders and followers—may diminish an insurgency’s effectiveness. An 

insurgency with centralized leadership is vulnerable to effective decapitation, be it 

II-27 
Chapter II 

physical or psychological. Even if the insurgency’s leadership is distributed, 

commanders can find ways to disrupt communications and sow discord within the 

insurgent network. These actions are unlikely to produce decisive effects on their own, 

but when incorporated into a multifaceted plan designed to expose insurgents to broad, 

simultaneous pressure, they can produce critical effects such as denying sanctuary and 

inducing fog and friction. 

8. Devolution and Decline 

 a. Many insurgencies can devolve into organizations merely focused on terrorism or 

criminality. Devolution may occur due to one or a combination of counterinsurgent 

pressure, lack of popular support, loss of leadership, organizational fragmentation, or 

atrophy during long periods of stalemate. Long periods of equilibrium or decline may 

cause an insurgency to reach a spoiling point where it fails, changes radically, or devolves. 

Insurgencies devolve with changes in the three prerequisites as vulnerable population 

grievances are mitigated, insurgent leadership is eliminated or discredited, or government 

control and legitimacy increases. 

 (1) Terrorists. Insurgencies that lose strength and momentum over time may 

regress to the point of only having terrorism as a means. When this occurs, the focus of the 

organization often becomes solely deed rather than the end; thus, the organization is 

essentially no longer an insurgency. Moreover, most insurgencies have a narrative that 

includes an alternative to the status quo, which terrorist groups may not have or be 

interested in. 

 (2) Criminals. Some insurgencies can compartmentalize criminal activity, 

keeping it ancillary to the main effort and preventing it from affecting the organization and 

its unity. However, some insurgencies can become focused on criminal activity that once 

only served as a funding mechanism. This can occur as the primary organization 

disintegrates and the remaining elements are cast adrift. Such disintegration is exploitable. 

Because the desire for a particular end state is the organizing force behind insurgency, 

when it devolves to crime, that desired end state no longer serves to organize insurgent 

efforts nor provides an avenue to political support. Hierarchical control may disappear and 

what remains may be incapable of or unwilling to conduct any coordinated action. Cellular 

leaders may become crime bosses and a security threat requiring military action may be 

transformed into a law-and-order concern. The HN can vilify the criminals by PSYOP. 

Successful counterinsurgents foment and address this devolution. 

 b. Insurgent Decline. Historically, when an insurgency starts to decline, the pace of 

its decline tends to decelerate over time (see Figure II-6). In many ways this deceleration is 

because a declining insurgency tends to grow smaller and can therefore better blend into 

the population. COIN efforts, lack of popular support, and failed insurgent efforts can 

contribute to the decline of the insurgency; however, these factors have diminishing impact 

on reducing the insurgency. The counterinsurgents must ameliorate the core grievances of 

the insurgency to bring the insurgents to their breaking point. If core grievances remain, 

the insurgency will remain at least latent and incipient. 

II-28 JP 3-24 
Insurgency 

II-29 

NOTIONAL INSURGENT DECLINE

Counterinsurgency Efforts

Decelerating 

Decline

Insurgent Breakpoint

TIME

Insurgent Decline

INSURGENT STRENGTH

Figure II-6. Notional Insurgent Decline 
Chapter II 

II-30 JP 3-24 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER III

COUNTERINSURGENCY 

III-1 

1. Introduction 

 a. Mindset. Conducting successful COIN operations requires an adaptive and 

flexible mindset. First and foremost, the population is the critical dimension of 

successful COIN. Understanding the population is to successful COIN as understanding 

physical terrain is to successful conventional land operations. Understanding the 

population requires an intimate knowledge of the causes and ongoing grievances of the 

insurgency. A second aspect of the counterinsurgent mindset is being able to think like 

an insurgent to stay ahead of the actual insurgents’ decisions and actions. Third, 

successful counterinsurgents must understand it is essential to establish an enduring 

presence within the population to provide continuous security and development efforts 

vital to assuring the population’s sense of security and long-term outlook. Finally, 

counterinsurgents must understand that the military instrument is only one part of a 

comprehensive approach for successful COIN, although the security situation may 

require the joint force to execute tasks that other organizations are better suited to 

conduct. 

 b. Popular Support. The support of the people is the most vital factor in the longterm success of any COIN effort. Gaining and maintaining the population’s support can 

be a formidable challenge. It is imperative that the population have trust and confidence 

in their government and its institutions. Counterinsurgents must make every effort to 

reinforce the legitimacy of the HN government in the eyes of the people (see Figure III1). 

 c. Cultural Understanding. Forces or agencies supporting or conducting COIN 

must understand and be aware of the local and national culture. More specifically, 

counterinsurgents must understand the core grievances, drivers of conflict, and friction 

points between different groups. Only when counterinsurgents understand the 

relationships of these factors can their COIN efforts be effective. Cultural awareness 

facilitates accurate anticipation of the population’s perception of COIN operations. 

These perceptions can determine the success or failure of COIN operations. By 

simultaneously addressing the core grievances and drivers of conflict and taking 

measures against the insurgencies themselves, COIN attacks the problem indirectly and 

directly, thus providing the best chance for success. Insurgency and COIN also tend to be 

“In small wars, caution must be exercised, and instead of striving to 

generate the maximum power with the forces available, the goal is to gain 

decisive results with the least application of force. In small wars, tolerance, 

sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the 

mass of the population. Small wars involve a wide range of activities 

including diplomacy, contacts with the civil population and warfare of the 

most difficult kind.” 

Small Wars Manual 

United States Marine Corps, 1940 
Chapter III 

RANGE OF POPULAR SUPPORT

Insurgency

Government

Population

Indifferent

Active 

Support

Passive 

Support Indifferent

Against

For

For

Against

Uncommitted 

or Neutral 

Populations

Persuade

Government 

Sympathizers

Protect

Active 

Government 

Supporters

Consolidate 

and 

Strengthen

Insurgent 

Sympathizers

Dissuade

Active 

Insurgent 

Supporters

Deter

Insurgents

Marginalize 

and Deter

Passive 

Support

Active 

Support

Figure III-1. Range of Popular Support 

nested in larger, complex, and irregular conflicts; therefore, understanding and 

appreciating the strategic context and OE are essential to success. 

 d. Military and Nonmilitary Contributions. Although COIN may emphasize 

military actions in some phases, nonmilitary contributions are essential for COIN to be 

successful in the long term. COIN military efforts focused on destroying the military 

wing of insurgencies are counterguerrilla operations. In addition to its military 

contribution, the joint force may initially be responsible for and heavily involved in 

diplomatic, informational, and economic aspects until civil agencies construct, install, or 

build HN capability and capacity to provide governance. These military efforts will be 

coordinated and incorporated with other civil agencies at the first opportunity. 

 e. Civilian agencies should lead COIN efforts. Unified action that includes all 

HN, US, and multinational agencies is essential for COIN. This can be challenging due 

to the wide array of potential actors in COIN, regardless of who leads the overall effort. 

Whenever possible, civilian agencies should lead COIN efforts. Military participation in 

COIN is focused on establishing security, assistance in security sector reform, and 

supporting other stability operations as required. Although JFCs should be prepared to 

lead COIN efforts if required, the JFC must normally focus military operations as part of 

a comprehensive solution under civilian agency leadership. 

III-2 JP 3-24 
Counterinsurgency 

For more information on core grievances, see Chapter II, “Insurgency.” For more 

information on IDAD and civil-military integration see Chapter IV, “Unity of Effort in 

Counterinsurgency.” For more information on the population and drivers of conflict see 

Chapter VIII, “Operational Environment.” 

2. Context of Counterinsurgency 

 The military contribution to countering insurgency, while vital, is not as important as 

political efforts for long-term success. Military efforts are especially important initially 

to gain security. 

 a. Counterinsurgency Situations. There are two fundamental ways in which joint 

forces may be involved with COIN: support to COIN or conduct of COIN. 

 (1) Support to Counterinsurgency. Joint forces normally conduct COIN to 

support a HN. Ideally, political and military COIN efforts gain credibility with the 

relevant population, reinforce the HN’s legitimacy and capabilities, and reduce insurgent 

influence over the population. Joint forces’ support to a HN’s COIN is normally an 

aspect of FID and normally supports a HN’s IDAD plan. 

 (2) Counterinsurgency. In some rare cases, joint forces may conduct COIN 

without a HN. The US can conduct COIN in a UGA should our national interest require. 

Second, joint forces may have to conduct COIN against general resistance when 

occupying foreign territory as part of a larger operation. This occurs when joint forces 

are required by US and international law to provide military governance to the local 

population when there is no HN governance. 

For additional detail on the COIN environment, please see Chapter VIII, “Operational 

Environment,” and JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational 

Environment. 

 b. Force Levels. No force level guarantees victory for either side, insurgent or 

counterinsurgent. No predetermined, fixed ratio of friendly forces to enemy forces 

ensures success in COIN. The OE and insurgents’ approaches vary too widely. Such 

calculations remain very dependent upon the assets available and the situation. A better 

force requirement gauge is counterinsurgent force density, which is the ratio of land 

security forces (including both indigenous and foreign contributions) and supporting 

elements (which must account for technological sophistication and applicability) to 

inhabitants. Force density will depend on the overall context, especially the size and 

density of the population, and can change over time. In some situations, the necessary 

force ratio may be unattainable. In these situations, the commander will have to 

determine if there are ways to leverage other advantages through innovative operational 

design and interdependent joint operations. If not, this may lead the commander to adopt 

limited objectives or plan for a prolonged, multiphased campaign as alternatives. 

III-3 
Chapter III 

 c. Manpower and Support. As in any operation, the size of the force needed to 

execute the concept of operations and attain the commander’s vision depends on the 

situation and support. Although advanced technology can make counterinsurgents more 

effective, COIN is manpower- and resource-intensive because counterinsurgents 

(indigenous or foreign) must maintain widespread order and security—capable insurgents 

will occupy any vacuum. The ratio of US and coalition forces to HN forces will evolve. 

Moreover, counterinsurgents typically have to adopt different approaches to address each 

element of the insurgency. For example, some members of the organization or supporters 

among the population might be co-opted by economic or political reforms, while more 

fanatic insurgents will most likely have to be killed or captured. 

 d. Preventing Insurgency. When a potential insurgency is identified, HN leaders 

may request US or multinational assistance to prevent insurgency through the use of 

diplomatic, informational, military, and economic efforts. The chief of mission (COM) 

can request assistance, help mobilize international support through multilateral 

diplomacy, and engage NGOs to help address the causes of unrest before the crisis 

escalates and limits political alternatives to the use of force. The COM, along with the 

country team, must take an active role in helping the HN develop or revise an effective 

IDAD strategy to address core grievances which may result in an insurgency. It is vital 

for the US to recommend action and, if necessary, assist a HN as early as possible. The 

nature of the HN government and its potential willingness to make necessary reforms 

must be taken into account. Even the best support to COIN cannot overcome unresolved 

core grievances. Preventative strategy should develop mechanisms to integrate and coopt talented and ambitious people from the disaffected segment of the population, as well 

as prevent those who cannot be integrated and co-opted from joining or supporting 

insurgency. 

 e. Early Intervention. An insurgency is generally more easily dealt with in its 

early stages, although it may be difficult to detect. Successfully identifying an 

insurgency requires accurate intelligence, recognition of an insurgency’s potential or 

existence, a decision to act, and actual COIN efforts. The earlier that COIN begins the 

better. Normally efforts to deal with latent or incipient insurgencies are less extensive 

and less expensive in lives and materiel than dealing with an insurgency that is already 

using guerrilla warfare and has some popular support. This is true for COIN or for 

support to COIN. However, members of the counterinsurgent force must take great care 

to differentiate between the activities of a latent insurgency and the activities of a 

political group lawfully exercising their right to challenge the viewpoints of a sovereign 

HN government. If they ignore this, counterinsurgents may unwittingly drive these 

groups to support insurgents. 

 f. Defining Success. The meaning of success in COIN operations may be different 

from that in other operations. Long-term strategic success in COIN normally depends on 

the HN institutions effectively governing and the population’s consenting to the 

government’s rule. In generic terms, the strategic objective normally is isolation of the 

insurgents from the population, and this isolation is maintained by, with, and through the 

population—not forced upon the population. From the US perspective, policymakers 

III-4 JP 3-24 
Counterinsurgency 

determine the precise meaning of strategic success; however, the first military objective 

is to protect the population. Subsequent security and development efforts are interrelated 

and interdependent—a secure environment is necessary for successful development, and 

successful development is necessary to facilitate a secure environment. 

 (1) Setting Conditions. Achieving the conditions necessary for strategic 

success normally requires the HN government to eliminate the key grievances that are 

fueling the insurgency. However, reform often directly conflicts with long-seeded 

political and financial interest of families, tribes, clans, and even entire ethnic groups in 

the HN. Encouraging necessary reform requires careful diplomacy. As long as there are 

significant grievances, there may be a latent insurgency. COIN can include killing, 

capturing, or neutralizing extremists whose beliefs prevent them from ever reconciling 

with the government. Over time, counterinsurgents aim to enable a country or regime to 

provide the security and rule of law that allow establishment of social services and 

growth of economic activity. COIN involves the comprehensive and integrated 

application of the instruments of national power. Political and military leaders and 

planners should not underestimate its scale and complexity; moreover, they should 

recognize military operations alone cannot force success. 

 (2) General Conditions of Success. COIN is successful when three general 

conditions are met. First, the HN government effectively controls legitimate social, 

political, economic, and security institutions that meet the population’s general 

expectations, including adequate mechanisms to address the grievances that may have 

fueled support of the insurgency. Second, the insurgency and its leaders are effectively 

co-opted, marginalized, or separated physically and psychologically from the population, 

with the voluntary assistance and consent of the population. Third, armed insurgent 

forces have been destroyed or demobilized and reintegrated into the political, economic, 

and social structures of the population. 

3. Strategic and Operational Approaches 

 a. Strategic Direction. The national strategy, military strategy, and theater strategy 

play key roles in determining COIN strategic context. 

 (1) National Strategy. Interagency unity, or a whole-of-government approach, 

is required to create and support national strategy; moreover, this unity must extend from 

the national strategic to the tactical level for COIN to be effective. 

 (2) Military Strategy. Military strategy, derived from national strategy and 

policy and shaped by the appropriate ambassador’s guidance and joint doctrine, provides 

a framework for conducting COIN operations. 

 (3) Theater Strategy. Ideally, campaign planning should be done in 

conjunction with the country team and those responsible for the production of the US 

ambassador’s mission strategic plan so the campaign plan is coordinated and does not 

contradict the long-term USG plan for the country. The combatant commander’s 

III-5 
Chapter III 

(CCDR’s) operation plan establishes the military strategic objectives, operational 

concepts, and resources that contribute to attainment of the national strategic end state. 

These plans must be flexible enough to take advantage of insurgents who lose momentum 

so counterinsurgents can regain the initiative. Theater strategy formulation normally 

involves key leaders and their staffs: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 

GCCs, and, if established, joint task force (JTF) commanders. Every effort must be made 

to include all USG agencies and NGOs involved in COIN operations, as security 

requirements and organizational cultures allow. There are three possible general strategic 

settings for US involvement in COIN: assisting a functioning government as part of FID, 

as an adjunct to US major combat operations, or US operations in an UGA. These three 

settings could occur in any combination at the same time in the same theater.

 b. Strategic Approach. The potential global and regional scope of contemporary 

insurgency has added to the complexity and therefore the challenge of conducting COIN. 

This challenge requires a global or regional COIN strategic approach for success. While 

each situation will be unique, there are some general guidelines for strategies to deal 

with a global or regional insurgency.

 c. Disaggregation. Some insurgencies aspire to regional and even global ends; 

however, these groups are not one monolithic entity—they consist of smaller groups. 

These smaller groups can be subordinate parts of one insurgency or willing partners who 

share similar goals. The progress behind the association can range from a temporary 

coalition to achieve a shared objective to actually beginning the process of becoming one 

group of subordinate parts. The first step in disaggregation is cognitive: identify fissures 

in the supposed monolith. To do this counterinsurgents must have a deep understanding 

of the OE and, more specifically, an understanding of the adversaries. Subsequently, a 

strategy of disaggregation includes the following activities: containment, isolation, 

disruption, and resolution of core grievances, and neutralization in detail. Containment, 

isolation, and disruption should be implemented as soon as possible and simultaneously. 

While the previous three aspects require political consensus, the choice of what 

insurgency to neutralize in detail is a shared strategic policy decision amongst all nations 

involved. 

 (1) Containment. Diplomatic, informational, intelligence, economic, financial, 

law enforcement, and military efforts should focus on containing the spread of the 

insurgency. Diplomatic efforts should attempt to gain international support to politically 

contain the insurgency, and subsequently bring other instruments in line with political 

containment efforts. Public affairs (PA) and IO capabilities play a key role in combating 

the insurgent’s narrative. Successful containment depends heavily on FID and CT 

efforts. These efforts should focus on denying the insurgency the ability to link with and 

amalgamate or exploit new local actors or local insurgencies. 

 (2) Isolation. Efforts to isolate the insurgency must be made concurrently with 

efforts to contain the insurgency. Superficially these two efforts may seem to be the 

same; however, efforts to contain an insurgency prevent its spread, where efforts to 

isolate focus on separating the insurgency physically and psychologically from other 

III-6 JP 3-24 
Counterinsurgency 

parts of the insurgency and the population. In addition to physical and psychological 

isolation, efforts to isolate the insurgency economically are necessary, but must be 

narrowly focused on the activities of insurgents. These efforts seek to isolate the 

insurgency as much as possible, as complete isolation of the insurgency is not realistic. If 

implemented too broadly, efforts to isolate may have a negative effect on the population 

and strengthen the insurgency. 

 (a) Physical Isolation. One of the initial steps of isolation is to physically 

isolate insurgents. This means that all efforts strive to physically isolate the insurgency 

in all physical domains—air, land, maritime, and space—as well as the information 

environment (which includes cyberspace). Ultimately this means controlling the physical 

domains as well as controlling borders; however, completely controlling the physical 

domains or border at all times is not realistic. It also means impeding the insurgents’ 

physical means of transmitting information. 

 

 (b) Psychological Isolation. Psychologically isolating insurgencies is 

arguably the most important part of isolating an insurgency; however, it is difficult, 

resource intensive, and time consuming. This isolation has two aspects: first to break the 

psychological links between the insurgent and the population and, second, to degrade the 

psychological links between the insurgent and the remainder of the insurgent 

organization or support base. Psychological isolation requires success in the overall 

information environment, which includes the physical dimension, informational 

dimension, and the cognitive dimension. 

 (c) Economic Isolation. Successfully isolating the insurgents from 

funding can severely undermine their operations. Economic isolation requires both 

physical and informational interruption of financial, business, and criminal enterprises. 

Attempting to economically isolate insurgents from the population must be narrowly 

focused on the insurgents and minimize the effect on the population, by offering viable 

replacement sources of employment and revenue. This needs to be communicated to the 

affected population. Applying economic isolation of insurgents must be planned and 

implemented in coordination with civilian agency specialists who are skilled in the 

aspects of the local economy and culture and individuals representing significant 

knowledge of the local business and financial sectors. Improperly implementing 

economic isolation will have the opposite of the intended effect and may further 

strengthen an insurgency. 

 (3) Disruption. Disruption focuses on degrading the overall coherence and 

operations of an insurgency. Disruption can come in many forms—diplomatic, 

informational, military, economic, financial, and legal. An insurgency that is left 

unhindered will continue to grow and strengthen, so disruption is essential to degrade an 

insurgency and to keep it off balance. Disruption efforts are secondary to the main effort 

of neutralizing in detail. 

 (4) Addressing Core Grievances. To defeat insurgency, counterinsurgents 

must address the core grievances fuelling the insurgency. The joint force should 

III-7 
Chapter III 

contribute to the comprehensive approach to address the core grievances of the conflict, 

focusing on the causes which have generated the insurgency, and minimize its effects. 

Effectively addressing core grievances will facilitate isolating the insurgent from the 

population. It is vital to note that addressing core grievances is not the same as solving all 

of the core grievances. 

 (5) Neutralizing in Detail. Defeating a global or regional insurgency is an 

immense task. The previous aspects of a strategy of disaggregation all occur 

simultaneously to deal with these insurgencies. However, countering these insurgencies 

across a wide geographic area may preclude being able to bring enough assets to bear 

simultaneously. Thus, political and military decision makers must choose where to focus 

or, in other words, where to counter the insurgency. When more assets are available or 

the first area is secured, a subsequent area on which to focus can be identified. Thus, 

where to neutralize the insurgency in detail is fundamentally an issue of how to allocate 

scarce means and where to accept risk. The COIN efforts in an area chosen to defeat the 

insurgency in detail resemble “classic” COIN efforts of the past. 

 d. Operational Approaches. There are a range of possible operational approaches 

to COIN (see Figure III-2). Careful consideration and coordination determines what 

initial approach is appropriate given the starting conditions; however, the earlier efforts 

can begin, the more likely an indirect approach is appropriate. Commanders adjust their 

approach as circumstances change, especially the security situation. COIN should strive 

to move to the right on the scale—to move from direct to balanced and balanced to 

indirect. The direct approach focuses on protecting US and HN interests while attacking 

the insurgents. The indirect approach focuses on the actions to establish conditions (a 

stable and more secure environment) for others to achieve success with the help of the 

United States. 

 (1) Direct. A direct approach may be required where a HN government is 

losing ground in its struggle with an insurgency or there is no viable HN government. 

The first task in this situation is to establish security and control in as wide an area and 

extent as possible. Once security and control are established, the counterinsurgent 

approach should strive to become more balanced. If COIN efforts start without a viable 

HN governing body, the JFC will most likely have to use a direct approach until security 

and control allow transitioning authority to the HN or other specified organization. The 

direct approach may also be appropriate when facing an insurgency that is not concerned 

with the support of the population and the population supports the HN government. In 

this situation, the COM leads all US efforts in support of the IDAD. 

 (2) Balanced. This approach is a more even blend of US diplomatic, 

development and military efforts. The balanced approach is led by the COM and 

supported by the JFC, but all efforts support the HN’s IDAD. While the overall level of 

effort is balanced, military efforts are secondary and subordinate to diplomacy and 

development activities when using this approach. Removing the fuel that keeps the 

insurgency going—the core grievances and narrative—is more effective in the long-term 

than attacking or destroying the military wing of the insurgency. 

III-8 JP 3-24 
Counterinsurgency 

COUNTERINSURGENCY RANGE OF RESPONSES

Range of Responses

Defense

Development

Diplomacy

Direct Approach Balanced Approach Indirect Approach

Proportion of Effort

Figure III-2. Counterinsurgency Range of Responses 

 (3) Indirect. An indirect approach utilizes more development and political 

efforts than military efforts to address the insurgency. The ability to use the indirect 

approach is based on the security situation. If the insurgency is at least in military 

stalemate, counterinsurgents can avoid direct military confrontation and instead focus on 

addressing the core grievances and combating the insurgency’s narrative. The indirect 

approach also requires that the HN be viable. If the HN is viable, US and other coalition 

partners can support the HN’s COIN efforts. A US indirect approach will assist the HN 

as part of a larger FID effort. This FID mission is led by the COM, supported by the JFC, 

and planned to support the HN’s IDAD plan. SFA and other advisory efforts are 

normally an essential part of the indirect approach. Finally, the indirect approach is best 

suited to early intervention and must be a holistic effort. 

 e. Progression. Figure III-3 is an example of how a COIN operation might move 

from a direct approach to a balanced approach and is currently using an indirect 

approach, yet the COIN operation has not reached its end state and is consequently 

III-9 
Chapter III 

EXAMPLE PROGRESSION OF THE 

OPERATIONAL APPROACH

Proportion of Effort

DEV DIP

DEV DEF

DIP

DEF

Start Improving Security End State

Defense (DEF)

Development (DEV)

Diplomacy (DIP)

Figure III-3. Example Progression of the Operational Approach 

ongoing. This reinforces that US long-term efforts should aim to be more developmental 

and political than military until the presence of US forces is no longer required. 

4. Principles of Counterinsurgency 

 The principles of COIN are derived from the historical record and recent experience. 

They are detailed below to provide guideposts for the joint force in COIN. These 

principles do not replace the principles of joint operations, but rather provide focus on 

how to successfully conduct COIN. 

 a. Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Operational Environment. This 

understanding includes the political, military, economic, social, information, 

infrastructure, and other aspects of the OE. Counterinsurgents must pay special attention 

to society, culture, and insurgent advantages within the OE. Counterinsurgents also must 

understand the broader context within which they are operating. A mission to assist a 

III-10 JP 3-24 
Counterinsurgency 

functioning government offers different options from situations where no such viable 

entity exists or where a regime has been changed by conflict. The joint force may 

support a HN that has been heavy-handed or excessive in the past; thus, the HN’s security 

apparatus may have inadvertently assisted the insurgency in its incipient stages. 

Counterinsurgents must also be prepared to identify their opponents and their opponents’ 

approach to insurgency. Effective counterinsurgents understand the insurgents’ approach 

and act accordingly. 

 (1) Cultural Knowledge. Cultural knowledge is essential to successful COIN. 

American ideas of what is “normal” or “rational” are not universal. To the contrary, 

members of other societies often have different notions of rationality, appropriate 

behavior, level of religious devotion, and norms concerning gender. Thus, what may 

appear abnormal or strange to an external observer may appear as self-evidently normal 

to a group member. For this reason, US counterinsurgents—especially commanders, 

planners, and small-unit leaders—should strive to avoid imposing their ideal of normalcy 

on a foreign cultural problem. Joint forces should receive appropriate cultural awareness 

training before joining specific COIN operations. 

 (2) Leaders. Accurately determining whether a leader can be dissuaded from 

insurgency and won over to counterinsurgency is crucial. However, counterinsurgent 

attempts to win over traditional leaders can backfire if those leaders choose to oppose the 

COIN. Leaders who refuse to accept counterinsurgent overtures can strengthen their 

standing as they gain power and influence among insurgents, especially if this refusal is 

well exploited through subsequent propaganda. Insurgent authority figures need to be 

neutralized; preferably through co-option or by bringing discredit to the leader or his 

position. While eliminating the insurgent leader may greatly harm or defeat the 

insurgency, it may have unwanted results such as creating a martyr for the insurgents or 

causing popular backlash. 

 (3) Insurgent Advantages. In most COIN operations in which joint forces 

participate, insurgents hold a distinct advantage in their level of local knowledge. They 

speak the language, move easily within the society, and are more likely to understand the 

population’s interests. Thus, effective COIN operations require a greater emphasis on 

certain skills, such as language and cultural awareness, than do operations in traditional 

warfare. Successful COIN operations require joint forces at every echelon to possess a 

clear appreciation of the essential nature and nuances of the conflict, an understanding of 

the motivation, strengths, and weaknesses of the insurgents, and knowledge of the roles 

of other actors in the area. 

 b. Legitimacy Is The Main Objective. The primary objective of any COIN 

operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate 

government. Counterinsurgents achieve this objective by undertaking appropriate 

actions and striving for a balanced application of both military and nonmilitary means as 

dictated by the situation. All governments rule through a combination of consent and 

coercion. Governments described as “legitimate” rule primarily with the consent of the 

governed; those described as “illegitimate” tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion. 

III-11 
Chapter III 

Citizens of the latter obey the state for fear of the consequences of doing otherwise, rather 

than because they voluntarily accept its rule. A government that derives its powers from 

the governed tends to be accepted by its citizens as legitimate. It still uses coercion—for 

example, against criminals—but most of its citizens voluntarily accept its governance. 

 (1) Legitimacy and Governances. Legitimacy makes it easier for a state to 

carry out its key functions. These functions include the authority to regulate social 

relationships, extract resources, and take actions in the public’s name. Legitimate 

governments can develop these capabilities more easily, which usually allows them to 

competently manage, coordinate, and sustain collective security as well as political, 

economic, and social development. Illegitimate states (sometimes called “police states”) 

typically regulate society by applying overwhelming coercion. Legitimate governance is 

inherently more stable. The societal support it engenders allows it to adequately manage 

the internal problems, change, and conflict. 

 (2) Indicators of Legitimacy. There are six possible indicators of legitimacy 

that can be used to analyze threats to stability. First, the ability to provide security for the 

populace, including protection from internal and external threats, is a key indicator of 

legitimacy. Second, the selection of leaders at a frequency and in a manner considered 

just and fair by a substantial majority of the populace strengthens the legitimacy of the 

HN. Other indicators of legitimacy include: a high level of popular participation in or 

support for political processes; a culturally acceptable level of corruption; a culturally 

acceptable level and rate of political, economic, and social development; the existence 

and acceptance of laws; and a high level of regime acceptance by major social 

institutions. 

 (3) Cultural Lens. Governments that have many of the indicators of 

legitimacy probably have the support of a sufficient portion of the population. Different 

cultures, however, may see acceptable levels of development, corruption, and 

participation differently. For some societies providing security and some basic services 

may be enough for citizens to see a government as legitimate. Additionally, the 

importance of security in situations where violence has escalated cannot be 

overemphasized. In such cases, establishing security can win the people’s confidence, 

gain credibility, and enable the government to develop legitimacy in other areas. 

 (4) Population Perception of Credibility and Legitimacy. In working to 

understand the problem, joint forces must determine what the HN population defines as 

effective, credible, and legitimate governance. This understanding continues to evolve as 

information is developed. Joint forces must continually evaluate what legitimacy means 

to the HN population. The population’s expectations will influence all ensuing 

operations. Additionally, planners may also consider perceptions of credibility and 

legitimacy held by outside supporters of both the HN government and the insurgents. 

Joint force efforts may have to strive to win the hearts and minds of the local population 

to change their views on legitimacy if the local population considers genocide or the 

exclusion of some ethnic groups as legitimate. The often-used phrase “winning hearts 

and minds” should not be taken to mean that the goal is for the population to like 

III-12 JP 3-24 
Counterinsurgency 

counterinsurgent forces, but rather is a more subtle and indirect influence aimed at 

establishing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government in the eyes of the people 

through the provision of basic services in a secure environment and having a voice and 

stake in the system. Ultimately people must be convinced that supporting the COIN 

effort is in their best interest. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over 

time, successful trusted networks grow in the populace. They displace enemy networks, 

which forces enemies into the open, letting military forces seize the initiative and destroy 

the insurgents. 

 (5) Rule of Law. The presence of the rule of law is a major factor in assuring 

voluntary acceptance of a government’s authority, and therefore its legitimacy. A 

government’s respect for a preexisting and impersonal legal system as well as the 

population’s perception of the rule of law, can provide the key to gaining widespread, 

enduring societal support. Such government respect for rules is the essence of the rule of 

law. As such, it is a powerful potential tool for counterinsurgents. 

 c. Unity of Effort is Essential. Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of 

a COIN operation. Otherwise, well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel 

each other or provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit. Ideally, a single 

counterinsurgent leader has authority over all government agencies involved in COIN. 

Usually, JFCs work to achieve unified action through liaison with the leaders of a wide 

variety of government, nongovernmental, and international agencies, including the HN 

and the US. The ambassador, when present, is the central figure to be supported as the 

representative of the President. The ambassador and country team, along with senior HN 

representatives, are key players in higher level planning; similar connections are needed 

throughout the chain of command. 

 d. Political Factors are Primary. At the beginning of a COIN operation, military 

actions may appear predominant as security forces conduct operations to secure the 

populace and kill or capture insurgents. However, political objectives must guide the 

military’s approach. Commanders must consider how operations contribute to 

strengthening the HN government’s legitimacy and achieving US goals—the latter is 

especially important if there is no HN. This means that political and diplomatic leaders 

must actively participate throughout the conduct (planning, preparation, execution, and 

assessment) of COIN. The political and military aspects of insurgencies are so bound 

together as to be inseparable. Military actions executed without properly assessing their 

diplomatic and political effects at best result in reduced effectiveness and at worst are 

counterproductive. Resolving most insurgencies requires a political solution. It is 

imperative that counterinsurgent actions do not hinder achieving that solution. Moreover, 

most solutions involve some sort of political compromise and are rarely a “winner take 

all” situation. 

 e. Intelligence Drives Operations. Effective COIN is shaped by timely, specific, 

and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at all levels and disseminated throughout 

the force. A cycle develops where operations produce intelligence that drives subsequent 

operations. Reporting by units, members of the country team, and information derived 

III-13 
Chapter III 

from interactions with civilian agencies is often of equal or greater importance than 

reporting by specialized intelligence assets. This reporting may be both solicited and 

unsolicited information from the relevant population or defectors. In all cases 

corroboration of the information retains significant importance to prevent acting upon 

false, misleading, or circular reporting. These factors, along with the need to generate a 

favorable operational tempo, drive the requirement to produce and disseminate 

intelligence at the lowest practical level. 

 f. Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support. While it may be 

required to kill or capture insurgents, it is more effective in the long run to separate an 

insurgency from the population and its resources, thus letting it die. Confrontational 

military action, in exclusion is counterproductive in most cases; it risks generating 

popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of 

revenge. 

 (1) Expropriating the Insurgent Cause. Skillful counterinsurgents can deal a 

significant blow to an insurgency by expropriating its cause. Insurgents often exploit 

multiple causes, however, making counterinsurgents’ challenges more difficult. In the 

end, any successful COIN operation must address the legitimate grievances insurgents 

exploit to generate popular support. These may be different in each local area, in which 

case a complex set of solutions will be needed. A mix of usurpation and direct refutation 

may also be used. Counterinsurgents may champion portions of the insurgents’ cause 

while directly refuting others. This approach may be especially useful when stated 

insurgent goals are clearly disproportionally beneficial to one group. Counterinsurgents 

may be able to also “capture” an insurgency’s cause and exploit it. For example, an 

insurgent ideology based on an extremist interpretation of a holy text can be countered by 

appealing to a moderate interpretation of the same text. When a credible religious or 

other respected leader passes this kind of message, the counteraction is even more 

effective. 

 (2) Cutting Logistics. Counterinsurgents must cut off the flow of arms and 

ammunition into the area and eliminate their sources. An effective weapon in denying 

logistics to an insurgency is populace and resource control. These two controls are 

distinct, yet linked, normally a responsibility of indigenous civil governments. They are 

defined and enforced during times of civil or military emergency. 

 (a) Populace control provides security for the populace, mobilizes human 

resources, denies personnel to the enemy, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of 

enemy agents. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel 

permits, registration cards, and relocation of the population. 

 (b) Resource control regulates the movement or consumption of materiel 

resources, mobilizes materiel resources, and denies materiel to the enemy. Resources 

control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (for example, 

roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities. 

III-14 JP 3-24 
Counterinsurgency 

 (3) Reducing Finances. Counterinsurgents can exploit insurgent financial 

weaknesses. Controls and regulations that limit the movement and exchange of materiel 

and funds may compound insurgent financial vulnerabilities. These counters are 

especially effective when an insurgency receives funding from outside the state. 

Additionally, effective law enforcement can be detrimental to an insurgency that uses 

criminal means for funding. Department of the Treasury designations and other 

diplomatic tools outside the scope of DOD are key to countering threat finance. The JFC 

must work closely with the COM to identify and target threat finance sources, and may 

even consider the creation of interagency and threat finance cell to enhance the 

collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence to support and strengthen US, 

coalition, and HN efforts to disrupt and eliminate key insurgent financial network nodes. 

 (4) Momentum. As the HN government increases its legitimacy, the 

populace begins to assist it more actively. Eventually, the people marginalize and 

stigmatize insurgents to the point that the insurgency’s claim to legitimacy is destroyed. 

However, victory is gained not when this isolation is achieved, but when legitimate 

government functions are maintained by and with the people’s active support and when 

insurgent forces lose legitimacy. 

 g. Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential. To establish legitimacy, 

commanders transition security activities from military operations to law enforcement as 

quickly as feasible. When insurgents are seen as criminals, they often lose public 

support. Using a legal system established in line with local culture and practices to deal 

with such criminals enhances the HN government’s legitimacy. Joint forces help 

establish HN institutions that sustain that legal regime, including police forces, court 

systems, and penal facilities. In support of this process, a reduced level of violence must 

be established to permit police forces to maintain order. It is a paradox of COIN that the 

increased use of force required to maintain order decreases the perceived legitimacy of 

counterinsurgent actions. The key to establishing legitimate and effective HN security 

institutions is to limit the use of force to the minimum necessary, while taking care to 

ensure that legitimacy is established when the use of force is required.

 (1) Illegitimate Actions. Illegitimate actions are those involving the use of 

power without authority—whether committed by government officials, security forces, or 

counterinsurgents. Such actions include unjustified or excessive use of force, unlawful 

detention, torture, and punishment without trial. Illegitimate actions to build a legitimate 

government are self-defeating, even against insurgents who conceal themselves amid 

civilians and flout the law. Moreover, US forces participation in COIN operations must 

follow US laws, applicable HN and international laws, as well as certain international 

treaties or pacts. Any abuses or legal violations committed by US forces quickly become 

known throughout the local populace and eventually around the world. Illegitimate 

actions undermine both long- and short-term COIN efforts. 

 (2) Evidence Gathering. Every action by insurgents and counterinsurgents 

leaves a “forensic trace” that may be required sometime later in a court of law. Joint 

forces working with or in support of appropriate police agencies should support to the 

III-15 
Chapter III 

maximum extent possible actions to preserve a chain of evidence. Accurate 

documentation can be an important means to counter insurgent propaganda. Although 

evidence gathering resembles intelligence efforts, appropriate evidentiary standards are 

more stringent. 

 h. Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment. 

Insurgencies are protracted by nature, and history demonstrates that they often last for 

years or even decades. Thus, COIN normally demands considerable expenditures of time 

and resources, especially if they must be conducted simultaneously with conventional 

operations in a protracted war combining traditional and IW. The relevant population 

may prefer the HN government to the insurgents; however, people do not actively support 

a government unless they are convinced that the counterinsurgents have the means, 

ability, stamina, and will to win—credibility. The insurgents’ primary battle is against 

the HN government, not the US; however, US support can be crucial to building public 

faith in that government’s viability. The population must have confidence in the staying 

power of both the counterinsurgents and the HN government. Insurgents and relevant 

population often believe that a few casualties or a few years will cause the US to abandon 

a COIN effort. Constant reaffirmations of commitment, backed by deeds, can overcome 

that perception and bolster US credibility. Even the strongest US commitment, however, 

will not succeed if the population does not perceive the HN government as having similar 

credibility. US forces must help create crucial HN capabilities and capacities to sustain 

the HN’s credibility and legitimacy. It is also important to note that US support to a 

HN’s COIN efforts can decrease or even cease while the HN’s COIN efforts are still 

fighting an insurgency. This normally is because the HN can successfully deal with the 

insurgency. 

 (1) Preparation. Preparing for a protracted COIN effort requires establishing 

headquarters and support structures designed for long-term operations. Planning and 

commitments should be based on sustainable operating tempo and personnel tempo limits 

for the various components of the force. Even in situations where the US goal is 

reducing its military force levels as quickly as possible, some support for HN institutions 

usually remains for a long time. US preparatory actions for long-term support must come 

at the public request of the HN and be focused on supporting the IDAD strategy. 

 (2) US Public Support. At the national strategic level, gaining and 

maintaining US public support for a protracted deployment is critical. Demonstrating 

incremental success is essential to maintaining support. 

 i. Manage Information and Expectations. Information and expectations are 

related; capable counterinsurgents manage both. To limit discontent and build support, 

the HN government and any counterinsurgents assisting it create and maintain a realistic 

set of expectations among the populace, friendly military forces, and the international 

community. IO (particularly PSYOP and the related activities of PA and CMO) are key 

tools to accomplish this. Achieving steady progress toward a set of reasonable 

expectations can increase the populace’s tolerance for the inevitable inconveniences 

entailed by ongoing COIN. Where a large US force is present to help establish a 

III-16 JP 3-24 
Counterinsurgency 

legitimate government, due care must be taken to avoid the negative repercussions that 

are often involved when a country is legally occupied by US or allied forces. 

 (1) Expectations. US agencies trying to build enthusiasm for their efforts 

should avoid making unrealistic promises. In some cultures, failure to deliver promised 

results is automatically interpreted as deliberate deception, rather than good intentions 

gone awry. Effective counterinsurgents understand local norms; they use locally tailored 

approaches to control expectations. Managing expectations also involves demonstrating 

economic and political progress to show the populace how life is improving. Expectation 

management is a process that enforces reasonable expectations, and is intended to prevent 

unrealistic expectations. Increasing the number of people who feel they have a stake in 

the success of the state and its government is a key to successful COIN. In the end, 

victory comes, in large measure, by convincing the populace that their life will be better 

under the HN government than under an insurgent regime. However, sometimes 

societies are most prone to unrest not when conditions are the worst, but when the 

situation begins to improve and people’s expectations rise. For example, the indigenous 

population may have unrealistic expectations of the ability of the United States to 

improve their lives. The resulting discontent can fuel unrest and insurgency. At such 

times, the influences of globalization and the international media may create a sense of 

relative deprivation, contributing to increased discontent. 

 (2) Actions. Both counterinsurgents and the HN government must ensure that 

their deeds match their words. Any action also has a consequent information reaction. 

Counterinsurgents and the HN government must carefully consider that impact on the 

many audiences involved in the conflict and on the sidelines and work actively to shape 

responses that further their ends. In particular, messages to different audiences must be 

consistent and crafted with their views in mind. In the global information environment, 

people in the area can access the Internet and satellite television to determine the 

messages counterinsurgents are sending to the international community and the US 

public. Any perceived inconsistency reduces credibility and undermines COIN efforts. 

 j. Use the Appropriate Level of Force. Even precise and tailored force must be 

executed legitimately and with consideration for consequent effects. Overwhelming 

effort may prove necessary to destroy an opponent, especially extremist insurgent 

combatants. However, counterinsurgents should carefully calculate the type and amount 

of force and who applies it, regardless of the means of applying force. An operation that 

kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of 

fifty more insurgents. Thus, careful targeting is required to weigh the potential effects 

and perceptions of the relevant population, the US population, the multinational partner 

populations, and international opinion. 

 (1) Security. Counterinsurgents undertake offensive and defensive operations 

to regain the initiative and create a secure environment. However, killing insurgents—

while often necessary, especially with respect to extremists—by itself cannot defeat an 

insurgency. Gaining and retaining the initiative requires counterinsurgents to address the 

population’s core grievances through stability operations as well as providing security 

III-17 
Chapter III 

from insurgent activities. To achieve this goal, counterinsurgents must initially establish 

a trusted presence within the population. As security improves, joint resources contribute 

to supporting government reforms and reconstruction projects. 

 (2) Restraint. Normally, counterinsurgents can use rules of engagement (ROE) 

to minimize potential loss of life. ROE should address lesser means of force when such 

use is likely to create the desired effects and joint forces can do so without endangering 

themselves, others, or mission accomplishment. Escalation of force procedures do not 

limit the right to use deadly force when such force is necessary to defend against a hostile 

act or demonstrated hostile intent. Commanders ensure that their forces are properly 

trained in such procedures and, more importantly, in methods of shaping situations so 

that small unit leaders have to make fewer split-second, life-or-death decisions. 

 (3) Law Enforcement Use of Force. The perception of legitimacy with respect 

to the use of force is also important. If the HN police have a reasonable reputation for 

competence and impartiality, it is better for them to execute urban raids, as the population 

is likely to view that application of force as more legitimate than military action. This is 

true even if the police are not as well armed or as capable as military units. However, 

local circumstances affect this decision. If the police are seen as part of an ethnic or 

sectarian group oppressing the general population, their use may be counterproductive. 

Effective counterinsurgents thus understand the character of the local police and popular 

perceptions of both police and military units. This understanding helps ensure that the 

application of force is appropriate and reinforces the rule of law. 

 k. Learn and Adapt. An effective counterinsurgent force is a learning 

organization. Insurgents constantly shift between military and political phases and 

tactics. In addition, networked insurgents constantly exchange information about their 

enemy’s vulnerabilities—even with insurgents in distant theaters. However, skillful 

counterinsurgents can adapt at least as fast as insurgents. Every unit needs to be able to 

make observations, draw and apply lessons, and assess results. Commanders must 

develop an effective system to circulate best practices throughout their command. 

Commanders might also need to seek policies that authorize or resource necessary 

changes. Insurgents shift where they operate to look for weak links, so widespread 

competence is required throughout the counterinsurgent force. 

 l. Empower the Lowest Levels. Successful COIN is normally conducted with 

decentralized execution based upon centralized vision and orders that include clear and 

concise rules for the use of force and ROE. 

 (1) Initiative. Successful decentralized execution results from exercise, by 

subordinate leaders at all echelons, of disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent 

to accomplish missions. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding 

and is the preferred method for commanding and controlling COIN forces. Commanders 

must provide subordinates with a mission, commander’s intent, a concept of operations, 

and resources adequate to accomplish the mission. Higher commanders empower 

subordinates to make decisions within the commander’s intent. They leave details of 

III-18 JP 3-24 
Counterinsurgency 

execution to their subordinates and expect them to use initiative and judgment to 

accomplish the mission. 

 (2) Mosaic Nature. The mosaic nature of COIN is ideally suited to 

decentralized execution. On-scene commanders often have the best grasp of their tactical 

situations. Counterinsurgents that win this kind of mosaic war are those able to respond 

to all forms of insurgent operations, often simultaneously; thus, commanders must allow 

them access or control of the resources needed to produce timely intelligence, conduct 

effective tactical operations, and manage IO. 

 m. Support the Host Nation. US forces committed to supporting COIN are there 

to assist a HN government. The long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by 

itself, which is also normally the goal even if the US begins COIN in an area that does 

not have a HN government. Regardless of the starting conditions, the HN ultimately has 

to win on its own. Achieving this requires development of viable local leaders and 

institutions. US forces and agencies can help, but HN elements must accept 

responsibilities to achieve real victory. While it may be easier for joint forces to conduct 

operations themselves, it is better to work to strengthen local forces and institutions and 

then assist them. HN governments have the final responsibility to solve their own 

problems. Eventually all foreign armies are seen as interlopers or occupiers; the sooner 

the main effort can transition to HN institutions, without unacceptable degradation, the 

better. 

III-19 
Chapter III 

III-20 JP 3-24 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER IV

UNITY OF EFFORT IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 

IV-1 

1. Unity of Effort and Unified Action 

Unity of effort and unified action are essential for successful COIN operations.

Unified action refers to the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of military 

operations with the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities to achieve 

unity of effort. Figure IV-1 depicts the joint military perspective of unified action. 

Unified action includes a “whole-of-government” or “comprehensive approach” that 

employs all instruments of national power. Achieving unity of effort is challenging in 

COIN due to the normally complex OE and its many potential actors—friendly, neutral, 

and adversarial. The military contribution to COIN must be coordinated with the 

activities of USG interagency partners, IGOs, NGOs, regional organizations, the 

operations of multinational forces, and activities of various HN agencies to be successful. 

Coordinating and integrating efforts between the joint force and USG interagency 

partners, IGOs, and NGOs should not be equated to the command and control (C2) of a 

military operation. Successful interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination helps enable the 

USG to build international support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations 

that efficiently achieve shared goals. All friendly and neutral actors should seek to 

coordinate, or at least deconflict, their activities with the activities of other organizations. 

 a. Military. While nonmilitary considerations are paramount for long-term success 

in COIN, the joint military contribution is essential to provide security that enables other 

COIN efforts. Joint forces contribute to unified action through unity of command and a 

solid C2 architecture that integrates strategic, operational, and tactical COIN. Services 

play a key role in both stability and countering insurgency and their efforts are most 

effective when synchronized. The JFC should coordinate with and draw on the 

capabilities of separate agencies as well as provide support, especially security, to other 

actors. 

 b. Interagency. Interagency coordination is conducted among agencies of the USG, 

including the DOD, for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. In COIN, interagency 

coordination between the joint force and USG interagency partners is fundamental. For 

US support to a HN’s COIN efforts, the COM is the senior USG representative. 

 “You cannot command what you do not control. Therefore ‘unity of 

command’ (between agencies or among government and non-government 

actors) means little in this environment. Instead, we need to create ‘unity of 

effort’ at best, and collaboration or deconfliction at least. This depends less 

on a shared command and control hierarchy, and more on a shared 

diagnosis of the problem, platforms for collaboration, information sharing 

and deconfliction.” 

Dr. David J. Kilcullen 

Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency 
Chapter IV 

UNIFIED ACTION

Operations with 

US Government 

Agencies

Operations with 

Nongovernmental 

Agencies

Multinational 

Operations

Operations with 

Other 

Organizations

Operations with 

Intergovernmental 

Agencies

Joint 

Operations

Unified

Action

Figure IV-1. Unified Action 

 c. Intergovernmental. Intergovernmental coordination involves the USG, led by 

the DOS and implemented through the relevant COM and country team, working with 

one or more IGOs. When working with IGOs, the JFC should use existing mechanisms 

of the COM and country team, DOS, USAID, and other appropriate agencies. An IGO is 

created by a formal agreement between two or more governments. It may be established 

on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. 

IGOs provide leadership, capabilities, and mandate; furthermore, they may lend 

legitimacy and credibility to governance, especially the HN. 

 d. Multinational. Multinational coordination involves the USG, led by the DOS 

and implemented through the relevant COM and country team, working with agencies 

and forces from other nations, and this coordination normally occurs within the 

framework of an alliance or coalition. When working with multinational organizations, 

the JFC should use existing mechanisms of the COM and country team, DOS, USAID, 

IV-2 JP 3-24 
Unity of Effort in Counterinsurgency 

and other appropriate agencies. The HN is the most important entity for multinational 

coordination in COIN. As with any multinational efforts, trust and agreement bind the 

entities conducting COIN on common goals and objectives, which is especially important 

between the HN and the remainder of the multinational forces. Language and cultural 

differences often present the most immediate challenge, and all actors must strive to 

overcome these challenges through communication and improving cultural awareness. 

Liaisons and advisors can play a vital role in these areas. Multinational forces who 

support a HN’s COIN effort must remember that they are present by the HN’s request 

and that COIN is ultimately the HN’s responsibility. Leaders of US contingents must 

work closely with their multinational counterparts to become familiar with agencies that 

may operate in their operational area. To the degree possible, military leaders should use 

military liaison personnel to establish appropriate relationships and awareness of their 

HN counterparts. 

 e. Nongovernmental. Nongovernmental coordination is between elements of the 

USG, led by the USAID and implemented through the relevant COM and country team, 

and NGOs, multinational corporations, private contractors, and private organizations of 

any kind to achieve an objective. When working with NGOs, the JFC should use existing 

mechanisms of the COM and country team, DOS, USAID, and other appropriate 

agencies. Absent a COM, a JFC may have to directly coordinate with NGOs, 

multinational corporations, private contractors, and private organizations until a US 

diplomatic mission is established. This can be facilitated by reachback through the GCC 

to relevant departments or agencies and through the use of civil-military operations 

centers (CMOCs). The preponderance of effort put forth by the JTF will continue to 

focus on creating the security conditions necessary to support the civilian administration 

of the host country government and establish the US diplomatic mission. 

For official guidance on dealing specifically with humanitarian NGOs, see Guidelines for 

Relations Between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian 

Organizations. 

 (1) Nongovernmental Organizations. An NGO is a private, self-governing, 

not-for-profit organization. Many NGOs will not wish to openly associate with the joint 

force, at all. Some NGOs are concerned with preserving the “humanitarian space” as 

open association with the military can give the perception that they are part of the COIN, 

thus potentially making them less effective or subject to insurgent attack. Collaborating 

and coordinating operations with these NGOs can be difficult. Establishing basic 

awareness of these groups and their activities may be the most commanders can achieve. 

NGOs, however, play important roles in resolving insurgencies. Many NGOs arrive 

before military forces and remain afterwards. They can support lasting stability. To the 

greatest extent possible, commanders try to complement and not override their 

capabilities. Building a complementary, trust-based relationship is vital. Regardless of 

the NGOs level of cooperation, the JFC and joint force have a moral obligation to do 

everything possible to ensure the security of NGOs to the extent that the NGO will allow. 

Commanders also must be aware that some illegal and potentially adversarial 

organizations will attempt to claim status as an NGO. 

IV-3 
Chapter IV 

 (2) Multinational Corporations. When working with multinational 

corporations, the JFC should use existing mechanisms of the COM and country team, 

DOS, USAID, and other appropriate agencies. Multinational corporations often engage 

in reconstruction, economic development, and governance activities. The joint force 

should provide support as required to the DOS economic counselor and the Foreign 

Commercial Service representative of the US Department of Commerce in the US 

mission to support the IDAD strategy. Even in the absence of USG civilian departments 

and agencies on the ground, the JFC should use reachback through the GCC to consult 

with the appropriate agencies in Washington prior to engagement with multinational 

corporations. At a minimum, commanders should seek to know which companies are 

present in their area and where those companies are conducting business. Such 

information can prevent fratricide and destruction of private property. 

 (3) Government Contractors. When contractors or other businesses are being 

paid to support military or USG interagency partners involved in COIN, the principle of 

unity of command applies. 

 (4) Private Security Contractors. Armed contractors may provide different 

security services to the USG, HN, NGOs, and private businesses. Many businesses 

market expertise in areas related to supporting governance, economics, education, and 

other aspects of civil society as well. Providing capabilities similar to some NGOs, these 

firms often obtain contracts through government agencies. When under a USG contract, 

private security contractors behave as an extension of the organizations or agencies for 

which they work. Commanders should identify private security contractors operating in 

their area and determine the nature of their contract, existing accountability mechanisms, 

and appropriate coordination relationships. Depending on the terms of their contract, the 

environment in which they operate and certain agreements the USG is a party to, private 

security contractors may be subject to the laws of the HN, US law, and international law. 

Any failure on the part of these actors will reflect negatively on counterinsurgent 

credibility and HN legitimacy. 

 f. Other. Some organizations that the joint force must coordinate with do not fit 

neatly into the previous five categories. Some organizations have the characteristics of 

more than one type of the previously mentioned five categories. Additionally, many 

other groups can play critical roles in influencing the outcome of a COIN effort yet are 

beyond the control of military forces or civilian governing institutions. These groups can 

include local leaders, informal associations, religious groups, families, and the media. 

Commanders must remain aware of the influence of such groups and be prepared to work 

with, through, or around them. 

For more information, see JP 3-08, Intergovernmental Coordination During Joint 

Operations, and JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 

IV-4 JP 3-24 
Unity of Effort in Counterinsurgency 

2. The Internal Defense and Development Strategy 

 When a HN is dealing with an insurgency and the US supports the HN, COIN is one 

aspect of a larger FID mission. The IDAD strategy is the overarching strategy in a FID 

mission; however, this is a joint military term and it is important to note that the HN and 

others may not use this term. IDAD is the HN’s plan that US FID supports; the HN 

does not support the US FID plan. The purpose of the IDAD strategy is to promote HN 

growth and its ability to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. 

IDAD programs focus on building viable political, economic, military, and social 

institutions that respond to the needs of society. The HN government mobilizes the 

population to participate in IDAD efforts. The ultimate goal is to prevent an insurgency 

or other forms of lawlessness or subversion by forestalling and defeating the threat; thus, 

IDAD is ideally a preemptive strategy. If an insurgency or other threat develops, IDAD 

becomes an active strategy to combat that threat. When dealing with an insurgency, 

IDAD programs focus on addressing the core grievances and dealing with the actual 

extant insurgency. JFCs and joint planners must understand the HN’s IDAD strategy if 

they are to plan effectively to support it. In some cases, the joint force may need to assist 

the HN to formulate an appropriate IDAD strategy, especially if the joint force began 

operations in an area of weak or no HN governance. While IDAD is the overarching 

strategy; the HN’s government below the national level needs to build the capability and 

capacity to support IDAD, which may necessitate civil-military support. Civil-military 

support may come in the form of organizations like national-level governmental 

assistance teams (GATs) or provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). 

 a. Concept. The IDAD strategy integrates all security force and development 

programs into a coherent, holistic effort. Security actions provide a level of internal 

security that permits and supports growth through balanced development. This 

development often requires change to address core grievances. These changes may in 

turn promote temporary unrest; however, they are necessary for long-term success. The 

IDAD strategy must include measures to maintain conditions under which orderly 

development can take place. Similarly, addressing the core grievances of the insurgency 

often includes overcoming the HN government’s inertia and shortcomings. It may be 

difficult for US leaders to convince the HN government to reform, but these reforms are 

often the best way to diffuse the core grievances of and support for the insurgency. An 

underlying assumption for the IDAD strategy is that the threat to the HN lies in insurgent 

political strength rather than military power. Although the counterinsurgents must 

contain violent insurgent actions, concentration on the military aspect of the threat does 

not address the real long-term danger. IDAD efforts must pay continuing, serious 

attention to the political claims and demands of the population and insurgents. Military 

and paramilitary programs are necessary for success, but are not sufficient alone. 

 b. IDAD Functions. The IDAD strategy blends four interdependent functions to 

prevent or counter internal threats. Figure IV-2 depicts the IDAD Strategy Model. 

IV-5 
Chapter IV 

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT 

STRATEGY MODEL

RESULTS

FEEDBACK

NATIONAL OBJECTIVE

Prevent and/or Eliminate Lawlessness, Subversion, and Insurgency

GRAND STRATEGY

MILITARY STRATEGY

CMO civil-military operations PSYOP psychological operations

LEGEND

Internal Defense and 

Development 





Unity of Effort

Maximum Intelligence

Minimal Violence







Responsive 

Government

Maximum Use of 

PSYOP/CMO

 Strategic 

Communications

Balanced 

Development

Neuralization

Develop, deploy, and employ 

resources to assist security, 

neutralization, balanced 

development, and mobilization

Security

Mobilization

Diplomatic Informational Military Economic

OPERATIONAL STRATEGY

SECURITY FORCE OPERATIONS

Figure IV-2. Internal Defense and Development Strategy Model 

IV-6 JP 3-24 
Unity of Effort in Counterinsurgency 

 (1) Balanced Development. Balanced development attempts to achieve HN 

goals through political, social, economic, and other developmental programs. Balanced 

development should allow all individuals and groups in the society to share in the 

rewards of development, thus alleviating frustration due to inequities. Balanced 

development should satisfy legitimate grievances that the opposition attempts to exploit. 

The government must recognize conditions that contribute to the internal threat and 

instability and take preventive measures. COIN must strive for balanced development as 

insurgents will take advantage of real or perceived development inequalities, especially 

with IO. All civil-military development should account for the IDAD balanced 

development function, including the integration of entities such as GATs and PRTs. 

 (2) Security. Security includes all activities implemented in order to protect the 

populace from the threat and to provide a safe environment for development. Security of 

the populace and government resources is essential to countering the threat. Protection 

and control of the populace permit development and deny the adversary access to popular 

support. The security effort should establish an environment in which the local 

government can provide for its own security with limited national government support; 

however, this security must adhere to the current legal framework. This function also 

includes any SFA functions that multinational forces, including the US, provide to the 

HN. 

 (3) Neutralization. Neutralization is a political concept that makes an organized 

force irrelevant to the political process. It is the physical and psychological separation of 

the threatening elements from the population, and includes all lawful activities to disrupt, 

preempt, disorganize, and defeat the insurgent organization. It may involve public 

exposure and the discrediting of centers of gravity (COGs) during a period of low-level 

unrest with little political violence, may involve arrest and prosecution when laws have 

been broken, or can involve combat action when the adversary’s violent activities 

escalate. All neutralization efforts must be legal. They must scrupulously observe 

constitutional provisions regarding rights and responsibilities. The need for security 

forces to act lawfully is essential not only for humanitarian reasons but also because this 

reinforces government legitimacy while denying the adversary an exploitable issue. 

Special emergency powers may exist by legislation or decree. Government agents must 

not abuse these powers because they might well lose the popular support they need. 

Denying the adversary an opportunity to seize on and exploit legitimate issues against the 

government discredits their leaders and neutralizes their propaganda. 

 (4) Mobilization. Mobilization provides organized manpower and materiel 

resources and includes all activities to motivate and organize popular support of the HN 

government. This support is essential for a successful IDAD program. If successful, 

mobilization maximizes manpower and other resources available to the HN government 

while it minimizes those available to the insurgent. Mobilization allows the government 

to strengthen existing institutions, to develop new ones to respond to demands, and 

promotes the government’s legitimacy. All mobilization efforts must have a plan for 

eventual demobilization or reintegration into the HN government and security apparatus. 

IV-7 
Chapter IV 

 c. Assessment. The HN and any coalition partners must continually analyze the 

results of the IDAD strategy. Part of the assessment process is to establish measures of 

effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance, as well as having a methodology to 

provide feedback for future planning, refinement of strategy, and continued formulation 

of strategic national policy. While the HN should have input into all aspects of 

assessment, it should take the lead in determining MOEs. MOEs measure changes in 

system behavior, capability, or OE. MOEs in COIN predominately focus on the 

population. Although the HN has the best understanding of its own culture, its views 

have to be balanced with the views of other coalition partners to assist in providing other 

perspectives. Coalition perspectives are especially important if the HN government is 

slow to reform or has had a previous record of harsh treatment. 

 d. Campaign Plan to IDAD Transition. Some situations may require the joint 

force to occupy territory and to provide governance through a transitional military 

authority. However, this authority should transition to civilian authority as quickly as the 

situation allows. This civilian authority could be a provisional governing authority or an 

IGO such as the UN. Authority could also transfer from a provisional civilian authority 

to an IGO as an intermediate transition. Ultimately, authority will be transferred to a HN 

when either a government in exile or new government is ready, although this transition 

may be a lengthy process to ensure continued effective governance. As with transitions 

in governance, there may be several military transitions. When ready, the HN will first 

assume the lead and then eventually take over military operations. This transition may be 

phased over time. 

 e. Internal Defense and Development Coordination. Military assistance is often 

required to provide a secure environment enabling the activities of the COM and the 

country team in support of the HN’s goals as expressed through the IDAD strategy. The 

US country team, led by the COM, is the cornerstone of US coordination with the HN. 

The COM, the US country team, the GCC, and other JFCs are responsible for ensuring 

that US plans and efforts are nested within the IDAD strategy. It is important to note that 

there are multiple supporting actors or echelons in both the JTF commanders’ and 

coalition partners’ FID programs. Figure IV-3 depicts the IDAD coordination. 

 (1) Sovereignty. The sovereignty of a HN must be respected. This means that 

the HN has the authority over the manner and pace of operations conducted within its 

borders. Sovereignty issues are among the most difficult for commanders conducting 

COIN. Multinational commanders—whether US, other nation, or specifically HN—are 

required to lead through coordination, communication, and consensus, in addition to 

traditional command practices. Political sensitivities must be acknowledged. 

Commanders and subordinates often act as diplomats as well as warriors. Within military 

units, legal officers and their staffs are particularly valuable for clarifying legal 

arrangements with the HN. To avoid adverse effects on operations, commanders should 

address all sovereignty issues through the chain of command to the US COM. As much 

as possible, sovereignty issues should be addressed before executing operations. 

Examples of sovereignty issues include: aerial ports of debarkation; basing; border 

crossings; collecting and sharing information; protection (tasks related to preserving the 

IV-8 JP 3-24 
Unity of Effort in Counterinsurgency 

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT 

COORDINATION

LEGEND

FID program and support 

to COIN administration

lines of coordination

PRESIDENT

JFC’s FID 

Programs and 

Support to COIN

Department of

State

Country Team

Host-nation 

IDAD Program

Department of 

Defense

Allied Nation/ 

Coalition Partner 

Government

Coalition 

Partners’ FID 

Programs and 

Support to COIN

COIN counterinsurgency

FID foreign internal defense

IDAD internal defense and development

JFC joint force commander

Figure IV-3. Internal Defense and Development Coordination 

force); jurisdiction over members of the US and multinational forces; location and access; 

operations in the territorial waters, both sea and internal; overflight rights; police 

operations, including arrest, detention, penal, and justice authority and procedures; 

railheads; and seaports of debarkation. Counterinsurgents must be particularly respectful 

of HN sovereignty issues that cut to the heart of governance, rule of law, and the 

economy. Counterinsurgents must support the HN to find their own way, exercising 

extreme patience, rather than directing HN actions. This can be a point of friction 

IV-9 
Chapter IV 

between military commanders who tend to focus on short to midterm objectives and 

military end states, and country team personnel who tend to focus on long term issues. 

 (2) Coordinating Mechanisms. Commanders create coordinating mechanisms, 

such as committees or liaison elements, to facilitate cooperation and build trust with HN 

authorities. HN military or nonmilitary representatives should have leading roles in such 

mechanisms. These organizations facilitate operations by reducing sensitivities and 

misunderstandings while removing impediments. Sovereignty issues can be formally 

resolved with the HN by developing appropriate technical agreements to augment 

existing or UN Security Council resolution or status-of-forces agreement. In many cases, 

embassy security cooperation organizations, NGOs, and IGOs have detailed local 

knowledge and reservoirs of good will that can help establish a positive, constructive 

relationship with the HN. 

 (3) Coordination and Support. Coordinate and support down to the village and 

neighborhood level. All members of the joint force should be aware of the political and 

societal structures in their areas. Political structures usually have designated leaders 

responsible to the government and people. However, the societal structure may include 

informal leaders who operate outside the political structure. These leaders may be 

associated with economic, religious, informational, and family based institutions. Other 

societal leaders may emerge due to charisma or other intangible influences. Commanders 

should identify the key leaders and the manner in which they are likely to influence 

COIN efforts and attempt to build relationships and coordination mechanisms with them. 

For more information see JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. 

3. United States Civil-Military Integration 

COIN is normally only effective with a holistic approach that employs all HN 

and supporting nation instruments of national power. Joint military efforts to secure 

the population may initially dominate COIN, but the other instruments of national power 

are essential to achieve national strategic objectives. Interagency participants in COIN 

must know each others’ roles, capabilities, cultures, and terminology. COIN planning at 

all levels should include indigenous representatives and other participants. Military 

participants should support civilian efforts, including those of NGOs, IGOs, USG 

interagency partners, IPI, and other friendly actors. Military participants, as required by 

the situation, conduct or participate in political, social, informational, and economic 

programs. Societal insecurity can trigger violence that discourages or precludes 

nonmilitary organizations, particularly external agencies, from helping the local 

populace. A more benign environment allows civilian agencies greater opportunity to 

provide their resources and expertise, thereby relieving joint forces of some of these 

responsibilities. Long-term development and therefore successful COIN depends on the 

joint force providing an environment in which civilian agencies can effectively operate, 

especially with respect to economic efforts. Many civilian humanitarian assistance (HA) 

providers view security differently than does the joint force. In fact, the HA community 

has an entirely different security paradigm than the joint force. For HA providers, 

IV-10 JP 3-24 
Unity of Effort in Counterinsurgency 

security is based on belligerent perception of the neutrality of HA providers rather than 

on the lack of violence in an area or perceived strength of military forces. This security 

paradigm difference may impact military planning, execution, and assessment. 

 a. Responsibilities and Leadership. Counterinsurgents are responsible for the 

population’s well-being. This includes security from insurgent intimidation and 

coercion, sectarian violence, and nonpolitical violence and crime. To succeed, 

counterinsurgents must ensure basic economic needs, essential services (such as sewage, 

water, electricity, sanitation, and health care), sustainment of key social and cultural 

institutions, and other aspects that contribute to a society’s basic quality of life are 

provided. Informed, strong leaders must focus on the central problems affecting the local 

populace. Given the primacy of political considerations, military forces should support 

civilian efforts. The changing nature of COIN means that lead responsibility shifts 

among military, civilian, and HN authorities, and these transitions must be planned and 

managed at the highest levels. However, the joint force must prepare to assume local 

leadership for COIN efforts, as the situation and need dictate. The overall imperative is 

to focus on what needs to be done, not on who does it. While this imperative can be 

emphasized by senior civilian and military leaders, its practice must be based on positive 

interpersonal relationships and the IDAD strategy. 

 b. Shared Understanding of the Operational Environment. Countering an 

insurgency begins with understanding the complex environment and the numerous 

competing forces within it. Gaining an understanding of the environment—including the 

insurgents, affected population, and different counterinsurgent organizations—is essential 

to an integrated COIN operation. Various agencies acting to reestablish stability may 

differ in goals and approaches, based on their experience and institutional culture. When 

their actions are allowed to adversely affect each other, the populace suffers and 

insurgents identify grievances to exploit. Integrated actions are essential to defeat the 

ideologies professed by insurgents. A shared understanding of the operation’s purpose 

provides a unifying theme for COIN efforts. Through a common understanding of that 

purpose, the COIN leaders can design an operation that promotes effective collaboration 

and coordination among all agencies and the affected populace. 

 c. Preferred Division of Labor. It is always preferable for civilians to lead the 

overall COIN effort, in addition to performing traditionally civilian tasks. Even where 

civilians’ capability and capacity do not match their expertise, they should lead in the 

areas of governance, economics, rule of law, etc. as policy guides and decision makers 

who define the role the military should and will play to support the effort. Military 

leaders should avoid the temptation to take over the role of decision maker in these areas 

despite a lack of civilian capability and capacity. Their forces may play a significant role 

in executing actions in these areas, but should never proceed without the guidance of 

civilian agency personnel as to the course of action (COA) and the military role. It is 

important to note that civilian agencies often have the greatest capability and the joint 

force may have the greatest capacity; in this case the civilian agency should lead the 

overall effort with the joint force in a supporting role. Legitimate local authorities should 

receive special preference to lead or perform civilian tasks. There are many US agencies 

IV-11 
Chapter IV 

and civilian IGOs with more expertise in meeting the fundamental needs of a population 

than military forces have; however, the ability of such agencies to deploy to foreign 

countries in sustainable numbers and with ready access to necessary resources is often 

limited. The violence level in the area also can affect civilian agencies’ ability to operate. 

The more violent the environment, the more difficult it is for civilians to operate 

effectively. Hence, the preferred or ideal division of labor is frequently unattainable. 

The more violent the insurgency, the more unrealistic is this preferred division of labor. 

 d. Realistic Division of Labor. Participants best qualified and able to accomplish 

nonmilitary tasks are not always available. The realistic division of labor does not 

always match the preferred division of labor. In those cases, military forces perform 

those tasks. Sometimes joint forces have the skills required; other times they learn them 

during execution. 

 (1) Nonmilitary Contribution. USG interagency partners and IGOs rarely have 

the resources and capabilities needed to address all COIN tasks. Success requires 

adaptable leaders who prepare to perform required tasks with available resources. These 

leaders understand that long-term security cannot be imposed by military force alone; it 

requires an integrated, balanced application of effort by all participants with the goal of 

supporting the local populace and achieving legitimacy for the HN government. Military 

forces can perform civilian tasks but often not as well as the civilian agencies with people 

trained in those skills. Further, military forces performing civilian tasks are not 

performing military tasks. Diversion from those tasks should be temporary and only 

taken to address urgent circumstances. Military forces should be aware that putting a 

military face on economics, politics, rule of law, etc., may do more harm than good in 

certain situations. The implications of the military role in these areas should be discussed 

at length with the country team. 

 (2) Military Capability and Capacity. In nonpermissive security situations, US 

and multinational military forces often possess the only readily available capability to 

meet many of the local populace’s fundamental needs. Human decency, and even the law 

of war, may require joint forces to assist the populace in their operational areas. Leaders 

at all levels prepare to address civilian needs, including identifying people in their units 

with regional and interagency expertise, civil-military competence, and other critical 

skills needed to support a local populace and HN government. Even if lack of civilian 

capacity requires military forces to take on this mission, military leaders should consult 

with the country team on the proper COA to follow. Commanders should also seek 

awareness of NGOs that may be operating in the region and providing for the basic needs 

of the population. The joint force must strive to support the population and other partners 

that are supporting the population. 

 e. Transitions. Regardless of the division of labor, an important recurring feature 

of COIN is transitioning responsibility and participation. As consistently and 

conscientiously as possible, military leaders ensure continuity in meeting the needs of the 

HN government and local populace, which is best accomplished by all efforts supporting 

the IDAD strategy. The same general guidelines governing battle handovers apply to 

IV-12 JP 3-24 
Unity of Effort in Counterinsurgency 

COIN transitions. Whether the transition is between military units or from a military unit 

to a civilian agency, all involved must clearly understand the tasks and responsibilities 

being passed. Maintaining unity of effort is particularly important during transitions, 

especially between organizations of different capabilities and capacities. Relationships 

tend to break down during transitions. A transition is not a single event where all activity 

happens at once. It is a rolling process of little handoffs between different actors along 

several streams of activities. There are usually multiple transitions for any one stream of 

activity over time. Using the coordination mechanisms discussed below can help create 

and sustain the links that support effective transitions without compromising unity of 

effort. 

 

 f. Coordination and Liaison. COIN partners and other organizations have many 

interests and agendas that military forces cannot and should not try to control. Their local 

legitimacy is frequently affected by the degree to which local institutions are perceived as 

independent and capable without external support. Nevertheless, military leaders should 

make every effort to ensure that COIN actions are as well integrated as possible. Active 

leadership by civilian and military leaders is imperative to effect coordination, establish 

formal and informal liaison, and share information. Influencing and persuading groups 

outside a commander’s authority requires skill and often subtlety. Commanders should 

also recognize that they will often be in a supporting role, and must realize that they may 

be on the receiving end of being influenced and persuaded by civilian agencies in charge. 

As actively as commanders pursue unity of effort, they should also be mindful of their 

prominence and recognize the wisdom of acting indirectly and in ways that allow credit 

for success to go to others—particularly local individuals and organizations. The joint 

force should remain in a supporting role to appropriate civilian agencies or groups, follow 

US policy and the COM’s direction, and focus on supporting the IDAD strategy. 

For more information see US Government Counterinsurgency Guide, JP 3-16, 

Multinational Operations, and the American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New 

Zealand Armies Program, Coalition Operations Handbook, edition 4. 

4. United States Civil-Military Integration Mechanisms 

 There are several US civil-military integration mechanisms that facilitate unified 

action for COIN. Many of these structures exist and are often employed in other types of 

missions, such as peacekeeping or humanitarian relief, but they are fundamental for 

successful COIN. These mechanisms fall into two general areas: those that are located 

outside of the theater and those that are located in theater. It is important to note that 

these are options and may not always be present and their relationships can vary. 

 a. Civil-Military Mechanisms in the United States. Key civil-military integration 

mechanisms located outside of the GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR) include the 

National Security Council (NSC), special missions established in Washington to provide 

policy guidance for a theater (e.g., Iraq Policy and Operations Group, and Afghanistan 

Interagency Operations Group), and appointed leaders focused on a particular COIN 

effort. 

IV-13 
Chapter IV 

 (1) National Security Council. At the strategic level, the NSC directs the 

creation of the interagency civil-military plan for COIN. When COIN substantially 

overlaps with and triggers the responsibilities given to the State Department’s 

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to direct interagency planning for 

countries at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict, the Interagency Management System 

(IMS) and accompanying USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, 

and Conflict Transformation will be used to craft and implement the strategic whole-ofgovernment plans. This will inform military and civilian planning in Washington, DC, at 

the GCC, at the embassy, and at the JTF level. Not all COIN operations will reach the 

threshold to activate the IMS, but commanders must be aware of the system and actively 

seek to find out if it has been stood up for the operation. The utilization of the USG 

Planning Framework does not require the establishment of the IMS. The NSC staff, 

guided by the deputies and principals, assists in integrating interagency processes to 

develop the plan for NSC approval. The country team, GCC, and department/agency 

country offices interact with the appropriate NSC policy coordinating 

committees/country groups (see Figure IV-4). 

For more information on the IMS, see JP 3-08, Intergovernmental Coordination During 

Joint Operations, Volumes I and II. 

 (2) Policy Operations Groups. A policy operations group may be established to 

focus on a geographic region, state, or insurgency. For example, both Iraq and 

Afghanistan have a separate DOS mission to steer policy for the operations – The Iraq 

Policy and Operations Group and the Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group. 

 b. Civil-Military Integration Mechanisms in Theater. GCCs are charged with 

coordinating US military policy and operations within an assigned AOR. Subordinate 

JTFs are assigned to conduct joint military operations within a designated operational 

area which may be one or more countries suffering from an insurgency. The US country 

team, advance civilian team (ACT), JFC, executive steering committee, provincial 

authority, civil-military coordination board (CMCB), joint CMO task forces, joint 

interagency task forces (JIATFs), GATs PRTs, and CMOCs are key civil-military 

integration mechanisms that are normally located inside the designated operational area. 

The more extensive the US participation is in a COIN operation and the more dispersed 

US forces are throughout a country, the greater the need for additional mechanisms to 

extend civilian oversight and assistance. Operating with a clear understanding of the 

guiding political aims, members of the military at all levels must be prepared to exercise 

judgment and act without the benefit of immediate civilian oversight and control and 

ultimately to reinforce HN credibility and legitimacy. At each subordinate political level 

of the HN government, military and civilian leaders should establish the necessary 

integration mechanisms. These mechanisms should include military and civilian 

representatives of the HN and other coalition members. Commanders should be aware of 

the activities of IGOs and NGOs in the theater. However, JFCs should be aware that the 

IGO/NGO independent, impartial, and sometimes neutral status does not bind them to 

working as part of a USG or coalition team, or to support the IDAD strategy. 

IV-14 JP 3-24 
Unity of Effort in Counterinsurgency 

US STRATEGIC AND THEATER STRATEGIC

CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION

Representative of 

US agencies with 

personnel stationed, 

or on temporary 

duty, within country

Daily coordinating 

US policy and 

assistance efforts

Chief of Mission

Operations-level 

personnel within 

department/agency 

involved

Developing policy 

options on, among 

other things, 

sectors to target, 

allocation of 

assistance funds, 

strategies for 

increasing 

international donor 

support, and the 

role of the PRTs

US military within 

geographic region

Coordinating US military 

policy and assistance efforts

Commander

US military within country

Daily coordinating US 

military policy and 

assistance efforts

Commander

Composition:

Roles:

Chair:

Composition:

Roles:

Composition:

Roles:

Chair:

Composition:

Roles:

Chair:

US Embassy 

Country Team

Geographic Command

Joint Task Force

Department's/Agency's 

Country Office

Deputy Secretaries from the US departments/agencies involved

Making decisions on proposals developed by the Policy Committee, resolving interagency disputes

National Security Council

Weekly

Secretary-level officials from the US departments/agencies involved

Making decisions on proposals developed by Deputies' Committee, resolving interagency disputes, providing 

information on policy, reporting to the President

National Security Council

Monthly as needed

Operations-level personnel from executive branch US departments/agencies involved

Developing policy options on, among other things, assistance sectors to target, allocation of assistance funds, 

strategies for increasing international support and the role of the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs)

Department of State Coordinator for US Assistance/National Security Council

Daily

Composition:

Roles:

Chair:

Meeting Frequency:

Composition:

Roles:

Chair:

Meeting Frequency:

Composition:

Roles:

Chair:

Meeting Frequency:

Principals' Committee

Deputies' Committe

Policy Coordinating Committee/Country Group

Figure IV-4. US Strategic and Theater Strategic Civil-Military Coordination 

 (1) Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). JIACGs help CCDRs 

support COIN by facilitating unified action in support of plans, operations, contingencies, 

and initiatives. The primary role of the JIACG is to enhance interagency coordination. 

IV-15 
Chapter IV 

The JIACG is a fully integrated participant on the CCDR’s staff with a daily focus on 

joint strategic planning. It provides a capability specifically organized to enhance 

situational awareness of interagency activities to prevent undesired consequences and 

uncoordinated activity. When activated, the JIACG will assist with the reception of the 

integration planning cell (IPC) of the IMS into the staff. The IPC is an interagency team 

that brings operation-specific capabilities to a regional military command, either a GCC 

or an equivalent multinational headquarters. The purpose of the IPC is to support 

civilian-military communication and integration of the civilian and military planning in 

order to achieve unity of effort. JIACGs include representatives from other federal 

departments and agencies and state and local authorities, as well as liaison officers from 

other commands and DOD components. The JIACG provides the CCDR with the 

capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies 

and departments. Representatives and liaison officers are the subject matter experts for 

their respective agencies and commands. They provide the critical bridge between the 

CCDR and USG interagency partners; however, JIACGs can be called by different names 

in different combatant commands. 

For additional information on JIACGs see JP 3-08, Intergovernmental Coordination 

During Joint Operations, Volumes I and II and the Commander’s Handbook for the Joint 

Interagency Coordination Group.

 (2) US Country Team. All USG COIN strategies, plans, programs, and 

activities that are undertaken to support a HN government are managed through the 

elements of the US country team, led by the COM. The US country team is the primary 

interagency coordinating structure that is the focal point for unified action in COIN. 

Figure IV-5 depicts a generic US country team’s organization. The country team is the 

senior in-country coordinating and supervising body, headed by the US COM, who is 

normally the ambassador. Title 10, US Code, Section 3927, assigns the COM to a 

foreign country responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all 

government executive branch employees in that country except for Service members and 

employees under the command of a US JFC. Where a confirmed ambassador is not 

present, the charge d’affaires represents the Secretary of State as the senior diplomat 

accredited to the foreign government. The country team is composed of the senior 

member of each represented department or agency. In a foreign country, the COM is the 

highest US civil authority. As the senior USG official permanently assigned in the HN, 

the COM is responsible to the President for policy oversight of all USG programs. The 

COM leads the country team and is responsible for integrating US efforts in support of 

the HN. As permanently established interagency organizations, country teams represent 

a priceless COIN resource. They often provide deep reservoirs of local knowledge and 

interaction with the HN government and population. 

For more information see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination during Joint 

Operations, Volumes I and II. 

 (3) Advance Civilian Team. An ACT may be formed to implement the USG 

strategic plan for reconstruction and stabilization through development and management 

IV-16 JP 3-24 
Unity of Effort in Counterinsurgency 

of the interagency implementation plan (IIP), under the leadership of the COM. The 

ACT stands-up at the USG field headquarters, typically the embassy. When established, 

it is the integrating civilian counterpart of the JTF at the country level. The ACT is 

comprised of a combination of USG personnel already in-country and other agency 

personnel deployed to the country from agency headquarters or elsewhere.

 (4) Executive Steering Group (ESG). The COM and a JTF commander can 

jointly form an ESG. The ESG may be composed of the principals from the JTF, the US 

embassy, NGOs/IGOs present in the operational area, and other organizations as 

appropriate. Lacking another similar forum, the ESG can provide high-level outlet for 

the exchange of information about operational policies as well as for resolution of 

difficulties arising among the various organizations. The ESG plays a policy role and is 

charged with interpreting and coordinating operational area aspects of strategic policy. A 

commander at any echelon may establish an ESG to serve as a conduit through which to 

provide information and policy guidance to participating agencies. The ESG may be 

charged with formulating, coordinating, and promulgating local and theater policies 

required for the explanation, clarification, and implementation of US policies. The ESG 

should either be co-chaired by the JFC and COM or assigned outright to either individual, 

depending on the nature of the US mission and possibly based on the security situation. 

 (5) Regional Authority. Direction and coordination of PRTs is conducted by a 

national-level interagency steering committee, under the supervision of the COM and 

JFC (for US-led PRTs) or a multinational executive committee (for coalition-led PRTs). 

This body will also conduct liaison with the HN national government to support PRT 

operations. Both embassy and JTF personnel staff the steering committee. Regional 

authorities may be established with regional commanders overseeing a number of PRTs 

to ensure coordination between provinces and with national level objectives. The 

regional authority coordinates the deployment and operations of all US PRTs in the 

operational area, including ensuring that PRTs have a long-term vision nested with either 

the campaign plan or the IDAD strategy, whichever is appropriate at the time. If an ACT 

has been established at the country level, a decision to deploy field advance civilian 

teams (FACTs) to sub-national regions or provinces may follow. FACTs, which are an 

element of the ACT and are managed by its headquarters, are responsible for 

implementing plans pertaining to their particular geographic AOR and for informing 

revisions of the overall USG strategic plan and IIP. They are also responsible for 

coordinating planning with any US military entities operating in their AOR, in order to 

achieve the objectives in the IIP. FACTs are primarily local, on-the-ground operational 

entities, but their role in assessments, plan revisions, and sub-national field level planning 

is also important. 

For further detail on PRTs, see Appendix B, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams.” 

 (6) Civil-Military Coordination Board. If established, a CMCB is the JTF 

commander’s vehicle for coordinating CMO support. Membership is typically restricted 

to key representatives from the JTF staff sections. A senior member of the JTF staff, 

such as the JTF deputy commander or chief of staff, serves as chairperson of this board. 

IV-17 
Chapter IV 

If a CMOC has been established at the JTF level, the CMOC director would be a key 

member of the board and also may serve as its chairperson. During COIN multinational 

operations, the JTF commander should normally include multinational partners on the 

board unless there are compelling reasons not to. The type of C2 structure and the level 

of staff integration in the JTF should drive the decision to establish a coordination board 

and determine its membership. Depending on the situation, the JTF commander should 

include selected members from the US country team on the board. 

 (7) Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF). The JTF 

commander may establish a JCMOTF to improve CMO in support of COIN operations. 

The JCMOTF can provide the JFC a subordinate command to exercise necessary control 

and coordinating support when the size and scope of the COIN mission is beyond organic 

CMO capabilities. The JCMOTF should be functionally organized around an existing 

command structure with augmentation. The JFC designates the JCMOTF commander. A 

JCMOTF is composed of units from more than one military department and is formed to 

carry out CMO. Although the JCMOTF is not a civil affairs (CA) organization, there 

may be a requirement for strong representation of CA. Because of their expertise in 

dealing with NGOs, IGOs, and USG interagency partners, they will greatly enhance the 

opportunity for success in COIN. By design, the US Army CA brigade, the maritime CA 

group, or the Marine Corps CA group can provide the structure to form a JCMOTF in 

support of the JTF commander. In rare instances, and depending on resources 

availability, a JCMOTF could be formed as a standing organization. 

For more information see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

 (8) National-level Governmental Assistance Teams. A national-level GAT 

supports governance and development at the national level in a semipermissive 

environment. GATs operate by combining civilian and military personnel for 

development and governance into one cohesive team. A DOS representative is the team 

leader and a military officer is normally the deputy commander. Personnel from 

appropriate USG agencies make up the elements focused on governance and 

development where DOD personnel comprise the civil security focused staffs. However, 

when civilian agencies lack the capacity, DOD personnel, especially reservists with 

civilian skills, may be used to mitigate a shortfall. GATs vary in structure, size, and 

mission to suit their situation; however, all GATs facilitate the campaign plan in a 

collapsed state setting or the IDAD strategy in COIN that directly supports a HN. GATs 

extend the reach, capability, and capacity of governance and facilitate reconstruction. 

While the GATs are primarily concerned with addressing national-level conditions, they 

also work on building and improving communication and linkages between the central 

government and regional/local agencies. 

 (9) Provincial Reconstruction Teams. A PRT is an interim interagency 

organization designed to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy 

and effectiveness of a HN local or provincial government in providing security to its 

citizens and delivering essential government services. PRTs vary in structure, size, and 

mission. PRTs extend the reach, capability, and capacity of governance and facilitate 

IV-18 JP 3-24 
Unity of Effort in Counterinsurgency 

reconstruction. While the PRTs are primarily concerned with addressing local 

conditions, they also work on building and improving communication and linkages 

among the central government, regional, and local agencies. 

 (10) Civil-Military Operations Centers. The CMOC is a mechanism for 

bringing a wide variety of civil, HN, and military elements together for coordination, and 

it serves as a meeting place for these elements. CMOCs coordinate the interaction of US 

and multinational military forces with a wide variety of civilian agencies. A CMOC is 

not a C2 element; it is useful for exchanging information and facilitating complementary 

efforts. Commanders build a CMOC around a nucleus of organic assets that typically 

includes CA, logistic, legal, and communications personnel. Commanders invite 

representatives from nonmilitary organizations. The size, structure, and location of the 

CMOC are situation dependent. 

 (11) Joint Interagency Task Force. Increasingly, JIATFs are being formed to 

achieve unity of effort and bring all instruments of national power to bear on COIN 

mission sets. JIATFs are often created to address problems such as militias, “bad 

neighbors,” and foreign fighters, all of which complicate the COIN environment. JIATFs 

may be separate elements under the JFC, or they may be subordinate to a component 

command, a joint special operations task force, or a staff section such as the operations 

directorate of a joint staff. JIATFs are formal organizations usually chartered by the 

DOD and one or more civilian agencies and guided by a memorandum of agreement or 

other founding legal documents that define the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of 

the JIATF’s members. JIATF members can coordinate with the country team, their home 

agencies, JIACGs in the area of interest (AOI), and other JIATFs in order to defeat 

complex networks. Because they utilize all instruments of national power, JIATFs are 

generally not a lethal COIN asset, but rather develop and drive creative nonlethal 

solutions and policy actions to defeat the insurgency. 

 (12) Theater Example. Figure IV-5 depicts a situation that uses a wide array of 

US civil-military integrating mechanisms in one theater. This example would be for a 

complex and difficult COIN situation. Some COIN efforts may not require all of these 

integrating mechanisms and other COIN efforts may require additional integrating 

mechanisms. 

5. Military Unity of Command in Multinational Operations 

 Military unity of command is the preferred method for achieving unity of effort in 

any military operation. Military unity of command is achieved by establishing and 

maintaining formal command or support relationships. Unity of command should extend 

to all military forces engaged in COIN—US, HN, and other multinational forces. The 

purpose of these C2 arrangements is for military forces, police, and other security forces 

to establish effective control while attaining a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence 

within the society. 

IV-19 
Chapter IV 

EXAMPLE JOINT TASK FORCE CIVIL-MILITARY 

INTEGRATING MECHANISMS

BCT brigade combat team

CMCB

ESG executive steering group

JCMTOF j

civil-military coordination 

board

oint civil-military 

operations task force

lines of authority lines of coordination

JFLCC joint force land component 

commander

JTF

PRT provincial reconstruction 

team

RCT

joint task force

regimental combat team

LEGEND

Country 

Team ESG JTF

JCMOTF

Subordinate

Units

PRT

(Embedded)

PRT

(Paired)

PRT

(Noncollocated)

CMCB

Provincial 

Authority

BCT/RCT

JFLCC

BCT/RCT

As Appropriate Security & 

Movement Security & 

Movement

Security & 

Movement

Figure IV-5. Example Joint Task Force Civil-Military Integrating Mechanisms 

IV-20 JP 3-24 
Unity of Effort in Counterinsurgency 

 a. Political Considerations. As important as unity of command is to military 

operations, it is one of the most sensitive and difficult-to-resolve issues in COIN. 

Nations join coalitions for various reasons. Although the missions of multinational 

partners may appear similar to those of the United States, ROE, home-country policies, 

and sensitivities may differ among partners. Military leaders must have a strong cultural 

and political awareness of US, HN, and other multinational military partners. The 

participation of US and multinational military forces in COIN missions is inherently 

problematic, as it influences perceptions of the capacity, credibility, and legitimacy of 

local security forces. Although unity of command of military forces may be desirable, it 

may be impractical due to political considerations. Political sensitivities about the 

perceived subordination of national forces to those of other states or IGOs often preclude 

strong command relationships; however, the agreements that establish a multinational 

force provide a source for determining possible authorities and command, or other 

relationships. When operating under the control of a foreign commander, US 

commanders maintain the capability and responsibility to report separately to higher US 

authorities in addition to foreign commanders. 

 b. National Mandates and Commitment. Nations determine if and where they 

will expend their national resources. Nations also choose the manner and extent of their 

foreign involvement for reasons both known and unknown to other nations. The only 

constant is that a decision to join in a COIN effort is, in every case, a calculated political 

decision by each potential member of a coalition. The nature of their national decisions, 

in turn, influences the overall command structure. In most multinational operations, the 

differing degrees of national interest result in varying levels of commitment by alliance 

and coalition members. While some countries might authorize the full range of 

employment, other countries may limit their country’s forces to strictly defensive or 

combat service support roles. 

 c. Military Capabilities. Numerous factors influence the military capabilities of 

nations. The operational level commander must be aware of the differences in the 

political constraints and capabilities of the forces of various nations, and consider these 

differences when assigning missions and conducting operations. Commanders at all 

levels may be required to spend considerable time working political issues related to the 

utilization of coalition troops; the requirement for diplomatic skills should not be 

underestimated. Commanders may routinely work directly with political authorities in 

the region, but should coordinate with the COM to ensure alignment with US foreign 

policy, to speak with one voice, and to avoid redundancy in engagements with key 

leaders. In the absence of a US diplomatic mission to the country, the commander should 

coordinate through the GCC to obtain guidance for any diplomatic engagements. The 

basic challenge in multinational operations is the effective integration and 

synchronization of available assets toward the achievement of common objectives. This 

goal may be achieved through unity of effort despite disparate and occasionally 

incompatible capabilities, ROE, equipment, and procedures. To reduce disparities among 

participating forces, minimum capability standards should be established and a 

certification process developed. 

IV-21 
Chapter IV 

IV-22 JP 3-24 

 d. Command Structure. No single command structure meets the needs of every 

multinational command but one absolute remains constant; political considerations will 

heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure. This is especially 

important in COIN as the command structure may change depending on the overall 

political situation. 

 (1) Lead Nation. The best command structure in COIN is a lead nation structure 

wherein all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation. The lead 

nation command can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff 

arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity. Regardless of 

the starting command structure, this is the goal—the HN must ultimately take the lead for 

COIN to be successful. 

 (2) Integrated. Multinational commands organized under an integrated 

command structure provide unity of effort in a multinational setting. This command 

structure often has a strategic commander designated from a member nation, but the 

strategic command staff and the commanders and staffs of subordinate commands are of 

multinational makeup. This is the second-best command structure in COIN. The 

structure is most effective when the HN is viable and has effective political and military 

establishments. 

 (3) Parallel. Under a parallel command structure, no single force commander is 

designated. The coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination among the 

participants to attain unity of effort. This can be accomplished through the use of 

coordination centers. Nonetheless, because of the absence of a single commander, the 

use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if at all possible. This may often 

be the initial conditions for supporting a HN’s COIN efforts, although the least favored. 

 e. Liaison Officers. Regardless of the command structure, coalitions and alliances 

require a significant liaison structure, and liaisons are even more important in COIN in 

order to coordinate many disparate and highly politically sensitive efforts. For example, 

the success of COIN hinges upon timely and accurate information and intelligence 

sharing. 

 f. Training. Training of forces within the coalition for specific mission standards 

enhances unified action. The coalition should consider establishing common training 

modules or certification training to ensure assigned forces are trained for the missions 

assigned. Such training and certification of forces can occur prior to deployment to the 

theater or after deployment to the theater, although predeployment training is preferred. 

For additional detail, see JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 
CHAPTER V 

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY 

V-1 

1. Purposes of Joint Intelligence in a Counterinsurgency 

 a. Inform the Commander. In a COIN operation, the dynamic relationship 

between operations and intelligence is particularly important—intelligence drives COIN 

operations and successful COIN operations generate additional intelligence. The 

intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) must gather and fuse intelligence and 

information from a multitude of sources (e.g., HN, multinational, interagency, 

intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and other sources) and keep all participants 

informed, often to an even greater degree than in other operations. Intelligence supports 

the JFC in COIN planning, operations, and assessment. In conjunction with the HN and 

coalition partners, the J-2 analyzes relevant aspects of the OE and assists the JFC in 

building a holistic view of the OE. The JFC and J-2 must focus on maintaining the 

initiative with respect to the insurgents, other adversaries, and the local population. 

 b. Identify, Define, and Nominate Objectives. Military planning is dependent on 

clearly defined, achievable, and measurable objectives. To do this, the JFC must 

understand IDAD strategy, the command’s responsibilities, the overarching mission, and 

the means available. Intelligence should provide an understanding of the adversary’s 

probable intention, objectives, strengths, weaknesses, critical vulnerabilities, and human 

factors. Objectives should be based on adversary critical factors (capabilities, 

requirements, and vulnerabilities), COGs, strategic approaches, campaign plans, and 

COAs. Objectives must be agreed upon by the HN, US, and coalition partners. Once the 

objectives are agreed upon, the J-2 must continuously review them with respect to 

the population, the adversary, and the changing situation to determine whether they 

remain relevant. 

 c. Support the Planning and Execution of Operations. After the objectives, 

nature, and scope of COIN operations are determined, intelligence is essential to plan, 

direct, conduct, and assess operations. Intelligence is crucial to identify and select 

specific objectives and targets. Intelligence will further enable analysis of desired and 

undesired effects, and determine means, operations, and tactics to most efficiently 

achieve overall mission objectives. 

 d. Counter Adversary Deception and Surprise. Despite the apparent weight of 

indicators and decision maker predisposition, intelligence analysts must remain sensitive 

to the possibility that they are being deceived. Intelligence analysts should therefore 

consider all possible adversary capabilities and intentions. For example, an absence of 

insurgent attacks or suicide bombings does not necessarily mean that the insurgency has 

been defeated. In fact, it may be that the insurgents have moved to another area, 

transitioned to an earlier phase of operations, or are preparing to change their focus of 

activity. 

“Everything good that happens seems to come from good intelligence.” 

General Creighton W. Abrams Jr., US Army 

1970 
Chapter V 

 e. Support Friendly Deception Efforts. Misleading, deluding, or creating 

uncertainty in the mind of the adversary—including insurgents—helps achieve security 

and surprise; however, deception is difficult in COIN due to the need for transparency 

with the population. Intelligence also supports effective friendly IO, through human 

factors analysis of the adversary leadership. This analysis can assess insurgent leaders’ 

beliefs, information environment, and decision-making processes. Intelligence personnel 

also conduct assessments to determine how the adversary is reacting to the friendly 

deception effort. The process of identifying deception objectives to complement 

operational objectives should be an interactive process, with the HN, US, and 

coalition commanders in a central role orchestrating the efforts of operations and 

intelligence resources.

 f. Assess the Effectiveness of Operations. Intelligence assesses operations’ impact 

on the population, insurgents, and other relevant aspects of the OE. Intelligence should 

assess whether operations are creating desired or undesired effects, when objectives have 

been attained, and when unforeseen opportunities can be exploited. It is fundamental 

for HN representatives to participate in this process. There must be a balance of 

indigenous and outside participants to conduct a COIN assessment.

2. Intelligence-Operations Dynamic and Intelligence Architecture 

 a. Intelligence-Operations Dynamic. As in any joint operation, intelligence and 

operations have a cyclical relationship. This dynamic relationship is particularly 

important in COIN—intelligence drives operations and successful operations 

generate additional intelligence. The reverse is also true. COIN efforts conducted 

without accurate intelligence may alienate the population, which results in their offering 

less information. Because intelligence and operations are so closely related, it is 

important for collectors to be linked directly to the analysts and operators they support. 

Similarly, analysts must remain responsive to their supported units’ intelligence 

requirements. Collectors should not passively wait for operators to submit requirements; 

rather, they should closely monitor the OE and recommend requirements based on their 

understanding of operators’ needs. 

 b. Architecture. An inclusive intelligence infrastructure must be created to provide 

the best possible intelligence. The joint force intelligence architecture required to support 

the COIN must be designed during the intelligence planning process and subsequently 

refined. The intelligence architecture must meet the demanding intelligence and 

operational requirements of COIN, especially the intelligence-operations dynamic. The 

same level of emphasis should be used on designing the intelligence architecture as 

traditionally has been done for other functions, such as task organization and C2. Due to 

the imperative for operations-intelligence fusion in COIN, JTF commanders may 

consider fusion cells and other solutions that enable operations and intelligence to 

work more closely together in a dynamic relationship.

V-2 JP 3-24 
Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency 

 (1) Considerations. There are many considerations for the intelligence 

architecture. Intelligence tasks and purposes must be defined, collection systems and 

sensors identified, an informational architecture established, and asset tasking authority 

determined. JFCs should address how to support their subordinate commanders with 

intelligence assets. All echelons must have the intelligence assets to properly analyze and 

understand their environment, including diagnosing key local system elements and how 

to best affect them. Subordinate commanders must have the capability to push their 

intelligence throughout the joint force, especially to higher echelons from those directly 

interacting with the population. All units in COIN are generating their own intelligence, 

and they must strive to effectively share it. Every participant in COIN should be viewed 

as a collector, and collectors and analysts must be tailored to meet the adversary. The 

hierarchy and reporting responsibilities of each intelligence organization should be 

clearly defined, and direction given to nontraditional collectors. 

 (2) Interagency Considerations. The compression of the strategic, 

operational, and tactical levels of war in COIN requires that control of strategic 

intelligence assets be pushed down or made easily accessible to the operational and 

tactical levels. Joint force intelligence and operations staffs should include 

representatives from the intelligence community. Tactical units in COIN benefit from 

direct connection to strategic intelligence community assets. Physical teaming of civilian 

and military intelligence assets in the field is preferable to traditional hierarchical 

reachback coordination, which is not responsive enough in a COIN environment. 

 (3) Responsiveness. Given the dynamic nature of COIN, the intelligence 

architecture must be responsive to the changing OE and resultant changes to intelligence 

requirements. The intelligence architecture should remain flexible as operations 

progress, especially to realign with any changes to the commander’s intent and main 

effort. Regular liaison between all intelligence organizations should be conducted, and 

the frequency should reflect the tempo of operations. 

 (4) Multinational Considerations. Foreign disclosure guidelines could be a 

significant constraint to intelligence sharing with allies. Intelligence staffs should 

sanitize collected intelligence and downgrade material so that it is releasable to coalition 

partners in accordance with the foreign disclosure policy. This is important in 

maintaining the integrity of a common holistic understanding of the OE. Other nations 

are also likely to have access to their own national intelligence and should be encouraged 

to share across coalition elements. 

3. Principles of Intelligence Operations in Counterinsurgency 

 Intelligence efforts in COIN must assist with fighting insurgency as well as 

developing the intelligence needed to address the root causes and grievances fueling the 

insurgency. Intelligence must be “fought” actively. Intelligence gaps and information 

requirements determined during joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

environment (JIPOE) may range from insurgent leaders’ locations, to the populace’s 

perceptions of insurgents, to HN political parties’ status. In general, collection focuses 

 V-3 
Chapter V 

on the populace, insurgents, and HN. Several factors are particularly important for ISR 

operations in COIN environments, including: a focus on the local population, collection 

occurring at all echelons, localized nature of insurgencies, all counterinsurgents prepared 

to function as potential collectors, and insurgent use of complex terrain. Given the 

potential challenges faced by intelligence assets in collecting information against 

insurgent networks, counterinsurgents must effectively employ all available intelligence 

collection capabilities. 

 a. Bottom-Up Intelligence Flow. The fact that all units collect and report 

information, combined with the mosaic nature of insurgencies, means that the 

intelligence flow in COIN is more bottom up than top down. Conducting aggressive ISR 

operations and pushing intelligence collection assets and analysts to the lowest tactical 

level possible benefits all echelons. It strengthens local intelligence, enhances regional 

and national reporting, and bolsters operations at all levels. 

 b. Collection. Collection may occur in any unit and collectors may be pushed to the 

lowest levels, which is essential in COIN. Nonetheless, the overall intelligence plan must 

remain synchronized so that all echelons receive the intelligence they require. There are 

several means of ensuring this happens. One is to ensure that priority intelligence 

requirements (PIRs) are nested at all echelons. PIRs must be articulated clearly by the 

commander to ensure limited assets are employed against the right efforts and focused on 

the insurgent dynamics. Headquarters monitor requests for information from lower 

echelons and taskings from higher echelons to get information to requestors when they 

need it. 

 c. Feedback. Feedback from analysts and intelligence consumers to collectors is 

important to synchronizing the ISR effort in COIN. Responses tell collectors that a 

report is of interest and that they should follow it up. Such feedback may come from any 

unit at any echelon but often comes from the bottom up in COIN. Also affecting 

intelligence synchronization is the requirement to work closely with USG agencies, HN 

security and intelligence organizations, and multinational intelligence organizations. 

 d. Intelligence Collection Considerations. Because all counterinsurgents are 

potential collectors, the collection plan addresses all day-to-day tactical operations. This 

means every patrol or mission should be given intelligence collection requirements as 

well as operations requirements. There are two types of reconnaissance and surveillance: 

overt and covert. Overt and covert reconnaissance and surveillance are excellent means 

to learn more about the OE; however, covert these types of reconnaissance and 

surveillance operations are often ineffective in places where the populace is alert and 

suspicious of outsiders. Therefore, using a HUMINT network or aerial imagery 

platforms is often preferable to ground reconnaissance and surveillance. Persistent aerial 

surveillance can often identify people, vehicles, and buildings—even when they are 

hidden under heavy growth. Manned and unmanned aircraft can patrol roads to locate 

the emplacement activities of insurgent ambushes and IEDs. 

V-4 JP 3-24 
Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency 

 e. Nontraditional ISR Assets. Commanders should consider use of assets not 

traditionally used for ISR to fill gaps in ISR coverage; however, using assets for missions 

they were not intended must be weighed against any negative impact on their primary 

mission. Assets not traditionally used for ISR can fulfill intelligence requirements in 

denied areas or provide real-time imaging allowing platforms to directly communicate 

with ground forces in order to engage targets based on this real-time intelligence. 

Commanders should ensure intelligence from nontraditional assets is fused with other 

analytical efforts in order to maintain the appropriate situational awareness. Open-source 

intelligence (OSINT) is often more useful than any other discipline for understanding 

public attitudes and public support for insurgents and counterinsurgents. OSINT is also 

an important means of determining the effectiveness of IO. Monitoring all available 

media, e.g., radio, television (TV), Internet, in multiple languages benefits the COIN 

effort. Each echelon should submit collection requirements to monitor open source 

material that satisfies their requirements. Reporting by major news networks often 

provides information pertinent to the combatant command level; in contrast, local 

newspapers or radio stations may be more relevant to tactical units. OSINT must be 

evaluated for bias, including who owns and/or controls a specific media (government, 

pro-insurgent, foreign-owned). 

For more information on OSINT, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, Appendix B, Intelligence 

Disciplines.

4. Intelligence Disciplines 

 Intelligence disciplines are core competencies of the intelligence community 

involved in intelligence planning, collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, 

production, and dissemination using a specific category of technical or human resources. 

While the JP 2-0 series provides a comprehensive discussion of intelligence doctrinal 

fundamentals and principles this paragraph will highlight some issues specific to COIN. 

 a. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT). GEOINT can be crucial to successful 

COIN operations. GEOINT is the combination of imagery, the intelligence derived from 

imagery, and geospatial information. Together, they provide the ability to visualize the 

OE and establish a shared situational awareness picture. It aids in identifying facilities 

and structures, finding and fixing potential adversaries, and warning of possible hostile 

action. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is a national asset in this 

area, and is a civil-military agency. NGA analysts frequently deploy in support of 

military operations with support teams or individuals embedded in both intelligence and 

operations staff sections at JTFs. 

 (1) Imagery. Imagery is a likeness or presentation of any natural or man-made 

feature or related object or activity and the positional data acquired at the same time the 

likeness or representation was acquired. Imagery platforms are vital for surveillance and 

detection of insurgent activities and locales. Static imagery, such as aerial photos of 

facilities, is useful for detecting long-term changes in structures or activities. Similarly, 

full motion video, in concert with other sensors, are critical to assessing whether 

 V-5 
Chapter V 

particular locations are likely sites of insurgent activity. This capability may also be used 

to track insurgents during operations. If flown high enough that insurgents cannot hear 

the platform, real-time video provides surveillance in areas where it is difficult or 

impossible to use observation posts. 

 (2) Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). IMINT is the technical, geographic, and 

intelligence information derived through the interpretation or analysis of imagery and 

collateral materials. IMINT provides the who, what, and why of facilities, buildings, or 

equipment identified on imagery.

 (3) Geospatial Information. Geospatial information identifies the geographic 

location and characteristics of natural or constructed features and boundaries on the 

Earth. Geospatial information is the basic data used to produce maps and charts, which 

facilitate spatial visualization of the OE. It also includes social and cultural data for 

characterization of the population occupying the OE. 

GEOINT is addressed in detail in JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint 

Operations. 

 b. Human Intelligence. HUMINT is a category of intelligence derived from 

information collected and provided by human sources. HUMINT operations often collect 

information that is difficult or sometimes impossible to obtain by other, more technical, 

means. During COIN operations, actionable intelligence is often based on 

information gathered from people. Analysts and HUMINT collectors should work 

closely with operations staffs and other personnel to ensure sources are properly 

exploited and that potential new sources are identified. Although any 

counterinsurgent can provide intelligence information from observations, only 

trained and certified HUMINT collectors can conduct HUMINT collection 

operations. 

 (1) Source Operations. Designated and fully trained DOD HUMINT 

collection personnel may develop information through the elicitation of sources. 

Establishing a reliable source network is an effective collection method. Source 

operations provide the COIN equivalent of the reconnaissance and surveillance 

conducted by scouts in conventional operations. People are a significant source of 

intelligence information during COIN operations. The urban populace, in particular, 

should be a focus of HUMINT operations. HUMINT sources serve as “eyes and ears” on 

the street and provide an early warning system for tracking insurgent activity. All 

counterinsurgents should report information given to them by walk-up contacts (one time 

voluntary sources), including liaison relationships, but they may not develop recurring 

HUMINT sources or networks. Biometric data and intelligence from technical 

intelligence (TECHINT) sources such as signals intelligence (SIGINT) may be used to 

verify HUMINT source identification. Sources include: 

 (a) “Walk-in” sources, who without solicitation make the first contact 

with HUMINT personnel. 

V-6 JP 3-24 
Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency 

 (b) Developed sources that are met over a period of time and provide 

information based on operational requirements. 

 (c) Unwitting persons, with access to sensitive information. 

 (d) Protecting Sources. The lives of people offering information on 

insurgents are often in danger as insurgents try to defeat collection operations. Careless 

handling of human sources can result in murder or intimidation of sources. Not only will 

this result in the loss of a source, but a perception among the population that 

counterinsurgent forces are careless or callous about protecting sources, whether or not 

based in truth, will lead to a dramatic reduction in HUMINT. HUMINT collectors are 

trained in procedures that limit the risk to sources and handlers. HUMINT reporting may 

increase if counterinsurgents protect the populace from insurgents. Analysts and leaders 

must remain aware of the fragile state of HUMINT sources; especially when involving 

media, interagency organizations, and NGOs during COIN operations. 

 (e) Inaccuracies. People may provide inaccurate and conflicting 

information to counterinsurgents. They may be spreading rumors or providing inaccurate 

information purposefully for their own reasons. Sources from the general population 

should be vetted to determine how trustworthy they may be; then the accuracy of 

information should be verified before being used to support operations. This means that 

reported information should be verified with information gained from other intelligence 

disciplines and fused into all-source intelligence products. Examples of reasons for 

giving false information include: using counterinsurgents to settle tribal, ethnic, or 

business disputes; leading counterinsurgents into ambushes; enticing counterinsurgents 

into executing operations that upset the populace; learning about US planning time and 

tactics; and stretching COIN forces thin by causing them to react to false reports. 

 (2) Interrogation. Interrogation is the systematic direct and indirect 

questioning of a person in the custody of joint or HN COIN forces to procure information 

to answer specific collection requirements. Proper questioning of guerrillas, insurgents, 

or other detainees by trained and certified DOD interrogators may obtain information, 

provided voluntarily or inadvertently. 

There are important legal restrictions on interrogation and source operations. 

Federal law and Department of Defense policy require that these operations be 

carried out only by specifically trained and certified personnel. Violators may 

be punished under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 

 (3) Debriefing. Debriefing is the process of interviewing cooperating human 

sources to satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with applicable law. Through 

debriefing, face-to-face meetings, conversations, and elicitation, information may be 

obtained from a variety of human sources, including the general populace, friendly 

forces, dislocated civilians (DCs), detainees, defectors, and repatriated forces. 

 V-7 
Chapter V 

 (4) Interrogation of Detainees and Debriefing of Defectors. Both detainees 

and defectors should be thoroughly questioned on all aspects of an insurgency discussed 

in Chapter II, “Insurgency.” Their answers should be considered along with information 

obtained from captured equipment, pocket litter, and documents to build a better 

understanding of the insurgency. Properly trained personnel can conduct immediate 

tactical questioning of detainees or defectors. However, only trained HUMINT personnel 

are legally authorized to conduct interrogations. A trained debriefer should be used for 

questioning a defector. All questioning of detainees is conducted to comply with US law 

and regulation, international law, execute orders, and other operationally specific 

guidelines. 

 (5) Collection of Evidence. Procedures that ensure captured equipment and 

documents are tracked accurately and attached to the correct insurgents are necessary. 

Evidence needs to be enough to justify using operational resources to apprehend the 

individuals in question; however, it does not necessarily need be enough to convict in a 

court of law. Assigning HUMINT or law enforcement personnel to the lowest possible 

echelons can improve target, document, and media exploitation by tactical units. Tactical 

units must receive intelligence collected and exploited from the documents, equipment, 

and personnel they capture in a timely manner. 

 (6) Document and Media Exploitation. Captured documents and media, 

when properly processed and exploited, may provide valuable information for COIN. 

These sources may provide insight into insurgent plans and intentions, force locations, 

equipment capabilities, and logistical status. This category includes all media capable of 

storing fixed information to include computer storage material. This operation can 

provide critical information that analysts need to evaluate insurgent organizations, 

capabilities, and intentions, as well as provide a great benefit to HUMINT collectors in 

substantiating what detainees know and whether they are telling the truth. 

 (7) Human Intelligence Teams. Dedicated HUMINT teams with appropriate 

cultural and linguistic skills and/or interpreters are vital to successful COIN. This is 

especially true if COIN efforts involve large multinational forces operating amongst the 

population in support of a HN’s COIN efforts. These teams are normally low density and 

have a large impact, so their use must be carefully planned and managed. HUMINT 

teams and other similar groups often have force protection and sustainment requirements 

that must be addressed. 

 (8) Interpreters. In many environments, HUMINT collectors without the 

proper language skills and/or cultural knowledge are severely constrained and require the 

support of interpreters. Properly trained and cleared interpreters can identify language 

and culturally based clues that can help confirm the validity of information from sources 

as well as assist the collector with cultural issues. 

 (9) Human Intelligence and Geospatial Intelligence. HUMINT and GEOINT 

information may be combined to produce accurate population information. Local law 

V-8 JP 3-24 
Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency 

enforcement officials are crucial sources of information regarding criminal organizations, 

individuals, activities, areas, and methods. Combining HUMINT and GEOINT 

intelligence from multiple sources can produce network analysis diagrams and 

corresponding geospatial products that are particularly important for successful COIN 

operations. Figure V-1 depicts a notional example of one of these products. 

HUMINT is addressed in detail in JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human 

Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

c. Signals Intelligence. SIGINT is intelligence produced by exploiting foreign 

communications systems and noncommunications emitters. SIGINT collection is a good 

NOTIONAL EXAMPLE OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AND 

GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT

REPORTED DATA

NETWORK 

PERSPECTIVE

GEOSPATIAL PERSPECTIVE

1. Hazad Tribe

a. Abu Hazad is the sheik.

b. Rashid Hakim owns Abu Trucking

c. Ai Hazad (son of sheik) injured in 

improvised explosive device (IED) attack

d. Samar Hakim married Mumar Wahad

2. Aziri Tribe

a. Mumar Wahad (sheik’s son)

manufactures IEDs

b. Mokmud Aziz (uncle) leads smuggling ring

c. Sheik Wahad recently returned from exile

d. Akmar Wahad (eldest son) manages

 Abu Trucking

Figure V-1. Notional Example of Human Intelligence and Geospatial Intelligence Product 

 V-9 
Chapter V 

source for determining adversary locations, intentions, capabilities, and morale. This is 

especially important if an area is under insurgent control. SIGINT is often helpful for 

confirming or denying HUMINT reporting and may be the primary source of intelligence 

in areas under insurgent control. SIGINT provides unique intelligence information, 

complements intelligence derived from other sources, and is often used for cueing other 

sensors to potential targets of interest. The conduct of SIGINT operations against US 

persons or in the US raises substantial policy and legal concerns and should be vetted by 

legal personnel.

 (1) Communications Intelligence (COMINT). COMINT is intelligence and 

technical information derived from collecting and processing intercepted foreign 

communications passed by radio, wire, or other electromagnetic means. COMINT can 

also include computer network exploitation, which is gathering data from target or 

adversary automated information systems or networks. COMINT also may include 

imagery, when pictures or diagrams are encoded by a computer network/radio frequency 

method for storage and/or transmission. The imagery can be static or streaming, to 

include transmission of messages embedded in pictures sent across computer networks 

via electronic mail (i.e., steganography). 

 (2) Electronic Intelligence (ELINT). ELINT is intelligence derived from the 

interception and analysis of noncommunications emitters such as radar. ELINT provides 

locational data by emitter type and can be useful in conducting nodal analysis. 

 (3) Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT). FISINT 

involves the technical analysis of data intercepted from foreign equipment and control 

systems such as telemetry, electronic interrogators, tracking/fusing/arming/firing 

command systems, and video data links. 

d. Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT). MASINT is scientific 

and TECHINT obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, 

spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived 

from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features 

associated with the target, source, emitter, or sender. MASINT is also derived from 

imagery to detect spatial change over time or movement using infrared or other forms of 

technical means. MASINT sensors can provide remote monitoring of avenues of 

approach or border regions for smugglers or insurgents. They can also be used to locate 

insurgent safe havens and cache sites and determining insurgent activities and 

capabilities. MASINT can also contribute to targeting. 

For more information on MASINT, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, Appendix B, 

Intelligence Disciplines.

e. Civil Information Management (CIM). Civil information is information 

developed from data about civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and 

events (ASCOPE) that can be fused or processed to increase interagency, IGO, and NGO 

situational awareness. It is a CA planning consideration. CIM is the process whereby 

V-10 JP 3-24 
Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency 

civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and fused with the 

supported JFC, higher headquarters, DOD and joint intelligence organizations, other 

USG and DOD agencies, NGOs, and the private sector to ensure the timely availability of 

information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed 

civil information to military and nonmilitary partners. With the rise of the importance of 

CMO to HUMINT and the concept of “cultural intelligence,” the role of CMO in the 

JIPOE process has likewise accelerated. Through civil-military liaison activities such as 

key leader engagement and its CMOC and CIM functions, CA can contribute 

significantly as an information source for JIPOE. 

For more discussion on CIM, see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

 f. Technical Intelligence. TECHINT assesses the capabilities and vulnerabilities of 

captured military materiel and provides detailed assessments of foreign technological 

threat capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities. Insurgents often adapt their tactics, 

techniques, and procedures (TTP) rapidly. TECHINT on insurgent equipment can help 

understand insurgent capabilities. These may include how insurgents are using IEDs, 

homemade mortars, and other pieces of customized military equipment. 

For more information on TECHINT, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, Appendix B, 

Intelligence Disciplines. 

 g. Counterintelligence. CI counters or neutralizes intelligence collection efforts 

through collection, CI investigations, operations, analysis and production, and functional 

and technical services. CI is especially important in COIN to prevent insurgent 

infiltration into HN and other areas. CI includes all actions taken to detect, identify, 

exploit, and neutralize the multidiscipline intelligence activities of competitors, 

opponents, adversaries, and enemies. 

 (1) Vetting. Background screenings should include collection of personal and 

biometric data and a search through available reporting databases to determine whether 

the person is an insurgent. Biometric concerns the measurement and analysis of unique 

physical or behavioral characteristics such as fingerprints or voice patterns. Identification 

badges may be useful for providing security and personnel accountability for local people 

working on US and HN government facilities. Biometric data is preferable, when 

available, because identification badges may be forged or stolen and insurgents can use 

them to identify people working with the HN government. 

 (2) Insurgent Intelligence. Insurgents place heavy emphasis on gathering 

intelligence. They use informants, double agents, reconnaissance, surveillance, opensource media, and open-source imagery. Insurgents can potentially use any person 

interacting with HN, US, or multinational personnel as informants. These include the 

same people that US forces use as potential HUMINT sources. OPSEC is thus very 

important; US personnel must carefully screen personnel working with them. Failure to 

do so can result in infiltration of US facilities and deaths of US personnel and their 

partners. 

 V-11 
Chapter V 

 (a) Insurgent Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Insurgents have their 

own reconnaissance and surveillance networks. Because they usually blend well with the 

populace, insurgents can execute reconnaissance without easily being identified. They 

also have an early warning system composed of citizens who inform them of 

counterinsurgent movements. Identifying the techniques and weaknesses of enemy 

reconnaissance and surveillance enables commanders to detect signs of insurgent 

preparations and to surprise insurgents by neutralizing their early warning systems. Thus, 

sophisticated counter ISR efforts may be required. 

 (b) Insurgent Signals Intelligence. Insurgents may also have a SIGINT 

capability based on commercially available scanners and radios, wiretaps, or captured 

counterinsurgent equipment. Counterinsurgents should not use commercial radios or 

phones because insurgents can collect information from them. If counterinsurgents must 

use commercial equipment or unencrypted communications, they should employ 

authorized brevity codes to reduce insurgents’ ability to collect on them. However, joint 

forces conducting CMO will likely require commercial equipment as their primary means 

of communicating with representatives of the HN or NGOs in the conduct of their day to 

day activities. Severely limiting this capability will result in a degraded CMO effort. 

Counterinsurgents must be careful to exercise OPSEC protocols when utilizing 

commercial equipment to communicate. 

CI is addressed in detail in JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence 

Support to Joint Operations. 

5. All-Source Intelligence 

 The multidisciplinary (HUMINT, IMINT, GEOINT, SIGINT, FISINT, MASINT, 

OSINT) fusion of information by intelligence organizations at all echelons results in the 

production of all-source intelligence products. Analysis for COIN operations is very 

challenging, due in part to the need to understand perceptions and culture, the need to 

track hundreds or thousands of personalities, the local nature of insurgencies, and the 

tendency of insurgencies to change over time. 

 a. Analysts at the Tactical Level. Intelligence requirements supporting COIN 

require staffing tactical units with intelligence analysts. This is necessary due to the 

requirement to collect and analyze large amounts of information on the local population 

and insurgents. Pushing analysts to the lowest tactical level places analysts closer to 

collectors and improves holistic understanding of the OE. Intelligence analysis at the 

tactical level supports operational-level intelligence. This is due to the bottom-up flow of 

intelligence. Tactical units develop intelligence for their operational areas and higher 

echelons fuse this information into theater-wide intelligence analysis of the insurgency. 

Operational-level intelligence also fuses relevant strategic intelligence from nationallevel intelligence organizations. 

V-12 JP 3-24 
Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency 

 b. Current Operations Analysis. Current operations intelligence supports a 

commander’s understanding of what insurgents are currently doing. The basic tasks of 

analysts working in current operations are to analyze past and current enemy actions to 

look for changes in the insurgents’ approach, operation or campaign plan, or tactics; track 

the impact of friendly operations on the populace and insurgents; provide intelligence 

support to ongoing operations; and disseminate immediate threat warnings to appropriate 

consumers. Intelligence for current operations comes from a variety of sources, but 

operations reports are particularly important. This is because current enemy activities are 

more often reported by patrols, units conducting raids, or observation posts than they are 

by dedicated intelligence collectors. Current operations analysis depends on the 

insurgent actions database for determining changes in insurgent tactics and techniques. 

 c. Comprehensive Insurgency Analysis. Accurate and thorough intelligence on 

insurgent organizations, leadership, financial support networks, and the OE contribute to 

more effective friendly operations. Comprehensive insurgency analysis integrates a 

range of analytic tools to develop this intelligence. These tools include automated 

software which can aid in link, time, and pattern analysis. Comprehensive insurgency 

analysis provides information for the commanders and staffs. Effective development and 

the integration of information from a range of intelligence and operations sources 

provides the detailed knowledge and insights required to exploit insurgents’ 

vulnerabilities, as well as mitigate their strengths. 

 (1) Time and Level of Detail. Developing knowledge and using network 

analytic tools requires an unusually large investment of time compared to conventional 

analytic problem-solving methods. Comprehensive insurgency analysis may not provide 

immediately usable intelligence. Analysts may have to spend weeks or months analyzing 

numerous all-source intelligence reports before providing an accurate picture of insurgent 

groups, leaders, and activities. 

 (2) Comprehensive Insurgency Analysis Teams. It is essential that 

commanders designate a group of analysts to perform comprehensive insurgency 

analysis. This team must be insulated from the short-term demands of current operations 

and day-to-day intelligence demands. These analysts focus on long-term intelligence 

development. It is ultimately the commander’s responsibility to ensure that 

comprehensive and basic insurgent network analysis still occurs despite high-profile 

demands and time-sensitive requirements. 

 d. Reachback. Reachback refers to the process of obtaining products, services, 

applications, forces, equipment, or material from organizations that are not forwarddeployed. This is vital for COIN as it leads to an improved understanding of the OE, 

especially the population, its core grievances, and insurgents. Deployed or deploying 

units should use reachback capabilities to “outsource” time-intensive aspects of analysis. 

e. Analytic Continuity. The complexity and difficulty of analyzing the COIN OE, 

especially insurgents, means it often requires months to understand the nuances of the OE 

holistically. The most productive analysts and action officers generally have more than a 

 V-13 
Chapter V 

year focused on an aspect of the insurgency problem. Commanders should therefore try 

to maintain continuity among their analysts. 

6. Factors Effecting Intelligence Collaboration 

 Effective intelligence collaboration organizes the collection and analysis actions of 

counterinsurgent organizations into a coherent, mutually supportive intelligence effort. 

The intelligence portion of understanding the OE and other supporting intelligence for 

COIN operations is complex. It is important not to oversimplify an insurgency. 

 a. Complexity. Insurgencies are often localized; however, most have national or 

international aspects to them. This characteristic complicates intelligence collaboration 

between adjacent units and among various echelons. A common database based on 

intelligence reporting is a prerequisite for effective intelligence fusion. Also 

complicating collaboration is that COIN involves many government agencies and foreign 

security forces. Analysts must establish good working relationships with various 

agencies and elements to ensure they can fuse intelligence. 

 b. Intelligence Cells and Working Groups. Intelligence officers form working 

groups or boards to synchronize COIN collection, analysis, and targeting efforts. Cells 

and working groups conduct regular meetings to establish and maintain a shared 

understanding of the OE and situational awareness, share collection priorities, deconflict 

activities and operations, discuss target development, and share results of operations. 

 c. Intelligence Sharing. The effective use and sharing of intelligence information 

in a COIN environment is key to successful operations. The commander must establish 

and maintain reliable networks with which to share critical operational intelligence 

among all echelons and partners. However, information about sources and methods for 

obtaining that intelligence is extremely sensitive and should not be shared with allies and 

coalition partners unless cleared to do so by the appropriate national level agency. In 

many cases, the commander uses a tiered approach to information sharing; involving two 

or more levels of intelligence cleared for release to coalition allies and partners, 

according to the level of trust involved. 

 d. Host-Nation Integration. COIN operations require US personnel to work 

closely with the HN. Sharing intelligence with HN security forces and government 

personnel is an important and effective means of supporting their COIN efforts. HN 

intelligence should be considered useful but definitely not the only intelligence available. 

It is essential for US intelligence personnel to evaluate HN intelligence capabilities and 

offer training as required. 

 e. Infiltration of Host-Nation Intelligence. Infiltration of HN security forces by 

insurgents or foreign intelligence services can create drawbacks to intelligence sharing. 

Insurgents may learn what is known about them, gain insight into COIN intelligence 

sources and capabilities, and get early warning of targeting efforts. When sharing 

intelligence with the HN, it is important to understand the level of infiltration by 

V-14 JP 3-24 
Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency 

insurgents or foreign intelligence services. Insofar as possible, intelligence should be 

tailored so required intelligence still gets to HN consumers but does not give away 

information about sources and capabilities. In addition, care is needed when providing 

targeting information; it should be done such that insurgents do not receive early warning 

of an upcoming operation. As trust develops between HN and US personnel, the amount 

of intelligence shared should grow. This will make the COIN effort more effective. 

 V-15 
Chapter V 

V-16 JP 3-24 

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER VI 

SUPPORTING OPERATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY 

VI-1 

SECTION A. INFORMATION OPERATIONS 

1. General 

 a. Overview. IO employ capabilities that will significantly contribute to the 

achievement of the end state. A strong IO plan when integrated effectively in military 

operations will (1) assist the HN government in acquiring control of legitimate social, 

political, economic and security institution; (2) marginalize or separate both physically 

and psychologically insurgency and its leaders from the population; and help demobilize 

and reintegrate armed insurgents forces into the political, economic and social structures 

of the population. Specifically, IO focuses on influencing the population’s perception of 

events and the HN’s legitimacy, as well as insurgent decisions and decision-making 

processes.

 b. Information Environment. The information environment is made up of three 

interrelated dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive. All of the dimensions are 

important for COIN, but the cognitive dimension is vital for COIN. The cognitive

dimension is normally where COIN success is determined—in the HN population’s

perception of legitimacy. It is also vital to understand that the information environment 

in COIN is dynamic. The free flow of information present in all theaters via television, 

telephone, and Internet, can present conflicting messages that quickly defeat the intended 

effects. To preclude unintended effects, continuous synchronization and coordination 

between IO, PA, public diplomacy (PD), and our allies are imperative. This effort will 

allow information themes employed during operations involving neutral or friendly 

populations to remain consistent. 

For more information on the information environment and its dimensions, see JP 2-01.3, 

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, and JP 3-13, Information 

Operations. 

For more discussion on IO, see JP 3-13, Information Operations.

 c. Information Superiority and Its Advantages 

“It’s not necessarily the insurgent, the individual, that you focus on, but 

what the insurgents are doing – their means to accomplish their ends. 

That’s what you are really going after. Some insurgents cloak themselves 

in a noble cause, but their objective is more about power and control. As 

information warriors, we have to expose the façade. We need to 

understand what is sensitive to our adversary, and work that to discredit 

their means.” 

Deirdre Collings and Rafal Rohozinski 

Shifting Fire, Conference Report, 2006 
Chapter VI 

 (1) The forces possessing better information and using that information to more 

effectively gain understanding have a major advantage over their adversaries. 

Counterinsurgents who gain this advantage can use it to accomplish missions by affecting 

perceptions, attitudes, decisions, and actions. However, information superiority is not 

static; during COIN, all sides continually attempt to secure their own advantages and 

deny useful information to adversaries. IO have a direct impact on the population’s 

perceptions of COIN credibility and legitimacy; consequently, the struggle between 

counterinsurgents and insurgents will be centered on the population’s perception of 

information. 

 (2) Information superiority can be difficult to attain during an insurgency. 

When it exists, the information available to counterinsurgents allows them to accurately 

visualize the situation, anticipate events, and make appropriate, timely decisions more 

effectively than adversary decision makers. In essence, information superiority enhances 

counterinsurgents’ freedom of action and facilitates maintaining the initiative. However, 

counterinsurgents must recognize that without continuous IO designed to achieve 

and maintain information superiority, adversaries may counter those advantages 

and possibly attain information superiority themselves. Counterinsurgents can 

achieve information superiority by maintaining accurate situational understanding while 

controlling or affecting the adversaries’ or TA’s perceptions. The more 

counterinsurgents shape this disparity, the greater the friendly advantage. 

 d. Dominant Narrative. Counterinsurgent leaders must compose a unified message 

that exploits the negative aspects of the insurgent efforts and reinforces the credibility 

and legitimacy of the counterinsurgent efforts, which can be referred to as the dominant 

narrative. The dominant narrative counters insurgent narrative and propaganda. It is 

vital for counterinsurgents to analyze, advertise, and exploit the differences between 

accepted cultural norms and the insurgent narrative and propaganda. The dominant 

narrative must be the result of a painstaking and detailed effort using a comprehensive 

approach. While the dominant narrative should appeal to a wider audience, it must be 

shaped and adaptable to appeal to the cultural perspective of the population. The 

dominant narrative must strike a balance between simplicity for ease of understanding 

and explain an often complex situation. The dominant narrative also must be adaptive, or 

it will fail or even be counterproductive. Finally, it assists in managing both expectations 

and information. 

2. Employing Information Operations Capabilities 

 a. Insurgencies typically succeed or fail based on the support of the population. IO 

provide COIN with capabilities to influence the population’s perceptions of the 

insurgents’ activities and leadership. 

 b. Core Capabilities. IO core capabilities are PSYOP, military deception 

(MILDEC), OPSEC, and electronic warfare (EW), and computer network operations 

(CNO). These capabilities are integrated into the planning and execution of operations in 

VI-2 JP 3-24 
Supporting Operations for Counterinsurgency 

the information environment. All capabilities must be synchronized and coordinated to 

create the effects needed to establish successful conditions of COIN. 

 (1) Psychological Operations. PSYOP has a central role in the achievement of 

IO objectives in support of COIN. PSYOP must be coordinated with CI, MILDEC, and 

OPSEC to ensure deconfliction and synchronization. There also must be close 

cooperation and coordination between PSYOP and PA efforts to maintain credibility with 

their respective audiences. 

For more discussion on PSYOP, JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations and JP 3-13,

Information Operations. 

 (2) Military Deception. MILDEC is fundamental to successful IO, but can be 

difficult in a COIN environment, as COIN efforts need to be transparent to the 

population. Successful deception of the insurgents that causes resentment amongst the 

population is counterproductive for long-term success. MILDEC relies upon 

understanding how insurgent leaders support and plan and how both use information 

management to support their efforts. This requires a high degree of coordination with all 

elements of friendly forces’ activities in the information environment as well as with 

physical activities. Each of the core, supporting, and related capabilities has a part to 

play in the development of successful MILDEC and in maintaining its credibility over 

time. While PA should not be involved in the provision of false information, it must be 

aware of the intent and purpose of MILDEC in order not to inadvertently compromise it. 

For more discussion on MILDEC, see JP 3-13.4, Military Deception. 

 (3) Operations Security. OPSEC is critical for COIN as insurgent intelligence 

efforts can be pervasive, substantial, and effective. Good OPSEC denies the insurgent 

the information needed to correctly assess counterinsurgent capabilities and intentions. 

To be effective, other types of security must complement OPSEC. 

For more discussion on OPSEC, see JP 3-13.3, Operations Security, and JP 3-13,

Information Operations. 

 (4) Electronic Warfare. EW and other countermeasures are very important in 

countering IEDs and disrupting insurgent communication networks. EW and related 

electronic countermeasures alone do not necessarily mean IEDs will be successfully 

countered. 

For more discussion on EW, see JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, and JP 3-13, Information 

Operations. 

 (5) Computer Network Operations. The network infrastructure supporting 

insurgents and their reliance to disseminate information determine the importance of 

CNO in IO plans and activities. Insurgents’ use of computers and supporting networks 

offers both opportunities to attack and exploit information and vulnerabilities. To 

VI-3 
Chapter VI 

prevent a similar attack to friendly computer networks, requirements for protection are 

identified and resolved through computer network defense actions.

For more discussion on CNO or any of the core IO capabilities, see JP 3-13, Information 

Operations. 

 c. Supporting Capabilities. Capabilities supporting IO include information 

assurance (IA), physical security, physical attack, CI, and combat camera (COMCAM). 

These are either directly or indirectly involved in the information environment and 

contribute to effective IO for COIN. They must be integrated and coordinated with

the core capabilities, but can also serve other wider COIN purposes. 

 (1) Information Assurance. IA and IO have an operational relationship in 

which IO are concerned with the coordination of COIN activities in the information 

environment, while IA protects the electronic and automated portions of the information 

environment. 

 (2) Physical Security. The physical security process includes determining 

vulnerabilities to known threats (including insurgent threats), applying appropriate 

deterrent, control, and denial safeguarding techniques and measures, and responding to 

changing conditions. 

 (3) Physical Attacks. Physical attacks disrupt, damage, or destroy insurgent 

targets. Physical attacks can also be used to create or alter insurgent perceptions or drive 

an adversary to use certain exploitable information systems. Physical attacks can be 

employed in support of IO as a means of attacking insurgent leaders or other C2 nodes to 

affect enemy ability to exercise C2. IO capabilities, for example PSYOP, can be 

employed in support of physical attacks to maximize the effect of the attack on the 

morale of an insurgency. The integration and synchronization of other COIN efforts with 

IO through the targeting process is fundamental to long-term success. 

 (4) Counterintelligence. CI analysis offers a view of the insurgent’s 

information-gathering methodology. From this, CI can develop the initial intelligence 

target opportunities that provide access to the adversary for MILDEC information, 

PSYOP products, and computer network attack or computer network exploitation efforts. 

For more discussion on CI, see Chapter V, “Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency,” 

JP 3-13, Information Operations, and classified JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and 

Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. 

 (5) Combat Camera. COMCAM is responsible for rapid development and 

dissemination of products that support strategic and operational IO and COIN objectives. 

For more discussion on IO supporting capabilities see JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

VI-4 JP 3-24 
Supporting Operations for Counterinsurgency 

 d. Related Functions. There are three related functions, PA, CMO, and defense 

support to public diplomacy (DSPD), specified as related capabilities for IO in COIN. 

These capabilities make significant contributions to IO and COIN and must always 

be coordinated and integrated with the core and supporting IO capabilities.

 (1) PA’s principal focus during COIN operations is to inform domestic and 

international audiences of COIN to support public information needs. PA and IO must be 

coordinated and synchronized to ensure consistent themes and messages are 

communicated to avoid credibility losses. While intents differ, PA and IO ultimately 

support the dissemination of information, themes, and messages adapted to their 

audiences. PA contributes to the achievement of objectives, for instance, by countering 

insurgent misinformation and disinformation through the publication of accurate 

information. PA also assists OPSEC by ensuring that the media are aware of the 

implications of a premature release of information. 

 (2) Civil-Military Operations. CMO may include performance by joint forces 

of activities and functions that are normally the responsibility of local, regional, or 

national government. The CMO staff has an important role to play in the development of 

broader IO plans and objectives. Given the accessibility of information to the widest 

public audiences and the conduct of COIN in open environments, the linkage between 

CMO and IO objectives is vital. 

For more discussion on CMO, see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, and JP 3-13,

Information Operations. 

 (3) Defense Support to Public Diplomacy. DOD contributes to PD, which 

includes those overt international information activities of the USG designed to promote 

US foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign 

audiences and opinion makers and by broadening the dialogue between American 

citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. This is a vital USG function for 

COIN that DOD supports. When approved, PSYOP assets may be employed in support 

of DSPD as part of security cooperation initiatives or in support of US embassy PD 

programs. Much of the operational level IO activity conducted in any theater will be 

directly linked to PD objectives. DSPD requires coordination with both the interagency 

and among DOD components. 

For more discussion on DSPD, see DODD 3600.1, Information Operations (IO), and JP

3-13, Information Operations.

3. Planning Information Operations in Counterinsurgency 

 a. COIN planning should specify a visualization of the IO tasks to be executed in 

order to create effects necessary to achieve objectives. This includes effects that other 

planned tasks have in order to support IO and how to sustain unity of the messages. 

Planners must also understand the insurgents’ IO capabilities and objectives. 

VI-5 
Chapter VI 

Insurgents will attempt to seize or hold information superiority while striving to 

undermine COIN IO. 

 b. Release and Execution Authority. IO may involve complex legal and policy 

issues requiring careful review and national-level coordination and approval; however, it 

is vital that IO planning in COIN be as rapid and flexible as the insurgent IO, and the 

population’s perception of events is vital. 

 c. Vision. The vision of IO’s role in an operation should begin before the specific 

planning is initiated; it is a vital component of operational art and design for COIN. 

COIN relies on IO capabilities and must ensure that IO related PIRs and requests for 

information are given priority for the intelligence products to be ready in time to support 

the COIN planning, execution, and assessment. 

 d. Logical Lines of Operations and Information Operations. IO must be 

considered in any COIN plan, and IO are often depicted as a logical lines of operations 

(LOOs). If IO is a separate logical LOO, the plan must emphasize that the other logical 

LOOs and the IO LOO are interdependent. Any objective of one of the other LOOs 

(such as a security logical LOO) must be considered in conjunction with the IO LOO. 

Some of these other LOOs’ objectives will support the IO LOO, IO LOO will support the 

other LOOs’ objectives, and in some cases it will be both. Planners must integrate IO 

and other efforts to change the conditions necessary to reach the objective. Commanders 

should ensure that the IO function is not placed within the staff in such a way as to be 

inaccessible to the intelligence, operations, plans, and CMO staff elements in particular. 

IO staff officers must work closely with intelligence, plans, operations, and CMO staff to 

integrate IO into every aspect of the campaign plan and its execution. 

 e. Effective Information Operations in COIN. There are three key considerations 

when planning IO in COIN. 

 (1) Factually Based. Effective IO and related activities are tailored to the TA’s 

frame of reference utilizing consistent themes, which are based on policy and program 

guidance. PSYOP manage the local populace’s expectations regarding what 

counterinsurgents can achieve. Themes must be reinforced by actions along all logical 

LOOs. Making unsubstantiated claims can undermine the long-term credibility and 

legitimacy of the HN government. Counterinsurgents should never knowingly commit 

themselves to an action that cannot be completed. However, to reduce the negative 

effects of a broken promise, counterinsurgents should publicly address the reasons 

expectations cannot be met before insurgents can take advantage of them. It should be 

noted that the need to be factually based is a consideration when considering MILDEC 

operations in COIN. 

 (2) Countering Insurgent Propaganda. Insurgents are not constrained by 

truth; they create propaganda that furthers their aims. Insurgent propaganda may include 

lying, deception, and creating false causes. Historically, as the environment changes, 

insurgents change their message to address the issues that gain them support. IO should 

VI-6 JP 3-24 
Supporting Operations for Counterinsurgency 

point out the insurgency’s propaganda and lies to the local populace. Doing so creates 

doubt regarding the viability of the insurgents’ short- and long-term intentions among the 

uncommitted public and the insurgency’s supporters. In countering insurgent 

propaganda, the counterinsurgent risks could give validity to insurgent claims or 

inadvertently provide information to insurgents. 

 (3) Impartiality. Impartiality is a common theme for information activities 

when there are political, social, and sectarian divisions in the HN. Counterinsurgents 

should avoid taking sides, when possible. Perceived favoritism can exacerbate civil strife 

and make counterinsurgents more desirable targets for sectarian violence. 

For more discussion on IO, see JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

4. Influencing the Population’s Perspective Through Psychological Operations

 a. By lowering insurgent morale and reducing their efficiency, PSYOP can also 

discourage aggressive actions and create dissidence and disaffection within insurgent 

ranks. When properly employed, PSYOP can reduce the insurgent’s will to fight; 

consequently saving the lives of civilians, friendly forces, and the insurgents 

themselves. 

 b. Purpose. The purpose of PSYOP in COIN is to influence foreign audiences in 

order to induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior that support HN legitimacy and are 

favorable to the end state, including addressing perceived core grievances, drivers of 

conflict, and the illegitimacy of the insurgents. PSYOP efforts in COIN are most 

effective when personnel with a thorough understanding of the language and culture of 

the TA are included in the review of PSYOP materials and messages. The dissemination 

of PSYOP includes print, broadcast, Internet, facsimile messaging, text messaging, and 

other emerging media. However, face-to-face communications are the most effective and 

preferred method of communicating with local audiences, especially in COIN. 

 c. Categories. There are three categories of military PSYOP: strategic, operational, 

and tactical, which are used to establish and reinforce foreign perceptions of 

counterinsurgent credibility and HN legitimacy. Strategic PSYOP are international 

information activities conducted by USG agencies to influence foreign attitudes, 

perceptions, and behavior in favor of US goals and objectives during peacetime and in 

times of conflict. These programs are conducted predominantly outside the military 

arena but can utilize DOD assets. Operational PSYOP are in a defined operational 

area to promote the effectiveness of COIN, and tactical PSYOP are conducted in the 

area assigned to a tactical commander for COIN tactical efforts. Tactical PSYOP 

forces are vital in COIN. They build rapport for US/coalition forces, enhance legitimacy 

and populace support for the HN, and support ongoing CMO, as well as reduce combat 

effectiveness of the insurgents. 

 d. The Psychological Operations Program. The PSYOP program forms the legal 

authority to integrate PSYOP in SecDef approved missions in a theater of operation. The 

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Chapter VI 

program establishes the parameters for the execution of PSYOP. The components of a 

PSYOP program provide the necessary guidelines from which to develop and approve 

PSYOP series to target foreign audiences. The program is staffed and coordinated 

through the Joint Staff and interagency process and approved by the SecDef to ensure 

PSYOP products reflect national and theater policy, strategy, and also receive the 

broadest range of policy considerations. 

 e. PSYOP Product Approval. Under US policy and the PSYOP Supplement to the 

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, PSYOP product approval authority may be subdelegated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to the GCC and further to the JFC 

through official message traffic. When required or requested, the SecDef can authorize 

PSYOP product approval authority to be delegated down to the brigade combat team in 

order to facilitate responsive PSYOP support. Current policy facilitates decentralized 

PSYOP execution and allows for continuous data recordings with product approval 

authority to develop a streamlined time sensitive product approval process. A JFC must 

have an approved PSYOP program, execution authority, and delegation of product 

approval authority before PSYOP execution can begin. 

For more discussion on PSYOP see JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations, and JP 3-13,

Information Operations. 

 f. Key Leader Engagement. Commanders often interact directly with local 

populations and stakeholders through face-to-face meetings, town meetings, and 

community events highlighting counterinsurgent community improvements. These 

interactions give commanders additional opportunities to assess their efforts’ 

effectiveness, address community issues and concerns, and personally dispel 

misinformation. These events often occur in the CMOC. Leader engagement must be 

included in the overall plan. Dissemination of information by leaders can be vital and 

help build credibility and HN legitimacy. These meetings should include the media and 

key leaders within the population. This interaction should be an ongoing process, it 

may increase to support certain COIN efforts or to counter insurgent efforts. 

5. Planning Psychological Operations in Counterinsurgency 

 a. PSYOP Responsibilities 

 (1) Preparing key audiences for USG activities can directly assist the HN in 

establishing a friendly environment that promotes internal stability and security. PSYOP 

increase HN support for programs that provide positive populace control and protection 

from adversary activities. PSYOP forces advise, train, and assist HN counterparts and 

government agencies to develop and implement effective information activities. In 

COIN, a PSYOP goal is the development of a HN ability to conduct information 

activities in support of achieving and maintaining internal security. 

 (2) Providing the cultural, linguistic, and social expertise required to analyze 

populations influenced by adversary information. As part of strategic communication 

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Supporting Operations for Counterinsurgency 

(SC), PSYOP mitigate the effects of adversary information, thus reducing their credibility 

and access to resources and safe havens. 

 (3) Integrating with civil affairs operations (CAO) activities to increase support 

for the HN government and reduce support to destabilizing forces. PSYOP can publicize 

the existence and successes of CAO to enhance the positive perception of US and HN 

actions. PSYOP inform and direct civilians concerning safety and welfare to reduce 

civilian casualties, suffering, and interference with military operations. 

 (4) Providing personnel to conduct IO staff functions to coordinate, 

synchronize, and deconflict core, supporting, and related capabilities. PSYOP and IO 

capabilities are mutually supporting, however, both can be conducted independently. 

SOF and conventional forces working within the same AOR must synchronize IO 

activities to prevent duplication of effort and information inconsistencies. 

 (5) PSYOP can be employed as an economy of force or main effort with a 

capacity to create effects not possible by physical force alone. In this capacity, PSYOP 

can increase friendly relative combat power and decrease enemy relative combat power. 

 b. PSYOP Officer. The senior PSYOP officer in the operational area, normally the 

joint PSYOP task force commander, may also serve as the de facto joint force PSYOP 

officer. Working through the various component operations staffs, the joint force PSYOP 

officer ensures continuity of psychological objectives and identifies themes to stress and 

avoid. 

 c. Planning Concepts. There are four general planning concepts for PSYOP. 

 (1) Persuasive Communications. All communications that systemically 

convey information with the intent of affecting the perceptions and behaviors of the 

foreign TA are persuasive communications. These communications are conducted to 

influence individual beliefs that will change or reinforce attitudes and behaviors. 

Persuasive communications are important in COIN as they reinforce 

counterinsurgent credibility and HN legitimacy. 

 (2) Command Disruption. Disruption of C2 systems not only directly 

interferes with the capabilities of an insurgency to succeed in combat but also can have 

serious impact upon the morale, cohesion, discipline, and public support essential to 

efficient operations. The effectiveness of these efforts against insurgencies depends upon 

the accurate analysis of core grievances of the insurgency and the motivation of 

insurgents. An ideological insurgency will often be a more difficult target for command 

disruption. 

 (3) Counterinformation. Competing parties systematically can deny 

opponents information they require to formulate decisions. The DOD Information 

Security Program establishes procedures to protect classified information, and the 

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OPSEC program establishes measures to deny unclassified but sensitive indicators of 

friendly activities, capabilities, and intentions. 

 (4) Intelligence Shaping. It is possible to systematically convey or deny data 

to opposing intelligence systems with the objective of causing opposing analysts to derive 

desired judgments. These judgments interact with the perceptions of opposing planners 

and decision makers to influence estimates upon which capabilities, intentions, and 

actions are based. 

 d. Key Support Roles. PSYOP can be vital for COIN in support of detainee, 

civilian internee, and DC operations. In many cases in COIN, joint forces come into 

close contact with and, in some cases, control people who are demoralized, desperate, 

apprehensive, and distrustful. These emotions can create a volatile atmosphere that is 

dangerous to counterinsurgents and those civilians and detainees being managed, 

handled, or interned. PSYOP can be used to dispel rumors, create dialogue, and 

pacify or inform detainees, civilian internees, or DCs to minimize violence, facilitate 

efficient camp operations, and ensure safe and humane conditions persist. PSYOP 

forces also may use this function to facilitate other PSYOP tasks. These tasks include 

testing informational PSYOP materials, assessing the culture of potential audiences, 

collecting intelligence, and recruiting key communicators, informants, and collaborators. 

 e. Target Groups. PSYOP TAs are approved by the SecDef. Messages are tailored 

to specific TAs each addressing a specific behavior. 

 (1) Insurgents. PSYOP should aim to create dissension or exploit existing 

divisions, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within insurgent forces, 

as well as help discredit them internally and externally. These efforts must be closely 

planned and coordinated with amnesty and defector programs. Insurgent defection or 

desertion can be devastating to the morale and effectiveness of the insurgents who 

remain. 

 (2) Host-nation Civilian Population. PSYOP can gain, preserve, and 

strengthen civilian support for the HN government and its COIN programs. This may 

include projecting a favorable image of the HN government and the United States. These 

PSYOP efforts may also include supporting HN programs that protect the population 

from insurgent activities and strengthening HN support of programs that provide positive 

population control and protection from insurgent activities. These efforts can be vital to 

help gain and maintain a perception of HN legitimacy. 

 (3) Military Forces. PSYOP can strengthen military support, with emphasis on 

building and maintaining the morale of the HN forces. This can be vital to SFA efforts, 

including retention and recruitment. It can include providing close and continuous 

support to CMO. 

 (4) Neutral Elements. PSYOP can gain the support of uncommitted groups 

inside and outside the HN. This includes discrediting the insurgent forces with neutral 

VI-10 JP 3-24 
Supporting Operations for Counterinsurgency 

groups and informing the international community of HN and US intent and goodwill. 

These PSYOP efforts also undermine external support for the insurgency. 

 (5) External Hostile Powers. PSYOP can convince hostile foreign TAs that 

the insurgency will fail. This often includes bordering powers that are actively 

supporting the insurgency. Diminishing this support can have a significant impact on the 

insurgency. This is especially true when PSYOP are combined with strategic

physical isolation of the insurgency.

SECTION B. PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND MEDIA SUPPORT TO 

COUNTERINSURGENCY 

6. General 

 a. Public opinion, perceptions, media, public information, and rumors influence how 

the populace perceives the HN legitimacy. PA shapes the information environment 

through public information activities and facilitates media access to preempt, neutralize, 

or counter adversary disinformation efforts.

 b. To effectively communicate with the intended audience, it is necessary to 

understand the cognitive dimension of the insurgency and how it pervades the OE’s 

social, political, informational, and other systems that support its success. 

7. Public Affairs Focus 

 a. PA activities are critical for informing and influencing the populace’s 

understanding and perceptions of events. Insurgents and counterinsurgents know that 

popular perception and support, both locally and globally are important considerations for 

success. Consequently, open and honest communication with the population is desirable 

during COIN operations. 

 b. In their planning, the public affairs officer (PAO) supports the commander’s 

COIN objectives through the communication of truthful, timely, and factual unclassified 

information about joint military activities within the operational area to foreign, 

domestic, and internal audiences. 

 c. PA provides public information targeting audiences to influence their perceptions. 

The timely and accurate release of factual information helps to deter propaganda, 

misinformation and disinformation. 

 d. The primary emphasis of the PA assessment is identifying, measuring, and 

evaluating the implications of the information environment that the commander does not 

control, but can influence through a coherent, comprehensive strategy and early 

integration in the planning and decision-making process. Analyzing the relevant 

information (media coverage, Internet content, polls, intelligence products, etc.) will also 

determine the success of PA activities. 

VI-11 
Chapter VI 

 (1) The PA staff collaborates with pertinent members of the joint force staff 

(SC, CA, PSYOP, intelligence, etc.) on assessment development. 

 (2) The PAO must provide the JFC with an assessment of public support within 

the operational area and provide timely feedback on trends in public opinion based on 

media analysis, published polling data, and professional assessments. 

 (3) Based on assessments, the PAO advises the commander on the implications 

of command decisions on public perception and operations, media events and activities, 

and the development and dissemination of the command information message. 

8. Public Affairs Relationships with Related Functions 

 a. Actions, Images, and Words. The information environment is influenced by a 

combination of actions, images and words. PA must coordinate with other stakeholders 

that influence the information environment to ensure consistency in actions, images and 

words. Coordination and synchronization of themes and messages for both strategic and 

operational approaches to COIN is essential. 

 b. Coordination and Synchronization. Consistency, accuracy and dissemination 

of information, themes, and messages adapted to various audiences require close 

planning, coordination and deconfliction with other related functions such as IO, CMO 

and DSPD. 

 (1) Information Operations. As a related function, IO themes and messages 

should be synchronized with PA activities. In that both IO and PA shape the information 

environment, through their own capabilities, close coordination must occur during COIN 

planning to preclude unintended effects. 

 (2) Civil Military Operation and Community Engagement. PA provides 

specialized skills in planning and developing relationships and interaction within local 

communities while conducting operations. PA should be involved in the planning, 

preparation and execution of engagements within the local/HN communities to support 

the CMO plan. 

 (3) Defense Support to Public Diplomacy. PA activities should be planned 

and coordinated with any other DSPD activities to ensure unity of effort and maximum 

effect. DSPD can entail the use of a military information support team (MIST), to 

support a US embassy within a HN. The MIST prepares information products, based on 

the guidance of the country team to communicate country-specific themes and messages. 

It could also involve the deployment of a joint public affairs support element (JPASE) 

team to a contingency location where JPASE representatives work out of the US embassy 

and coordinate military PA activities with embassy goals and objectives.

VI-12 JP 3-24 
Supporting Operations for Counterinsurgency 

9. Media Engagement 

 a. The embedding of media in combat units offers new opportunities, as well as 

risks, for the media and the military; the PA staff has a key role in recommending ground 

rules for embedding media. Many adversaries rely on limiting their population’s 

knowledge to remain in power; PA and IO provide ways to get the joint forces’ messages 

to the populations. 

 b. Media Relations. Well-planned, properly coordinated, and clearly expressed 

themes and messages can significantly clarify confusing situations often associated with 

countering an insurgency. Clear, accurate portrayals can improve the effectiveness and 

morale of counterinsurgents, reinforce the will of the US public, and increase popular 

support for the HN government. The right messages can reduce misinformation, 

distractions, confusion, uncertainty, and other factors that cause public distress and 

undermine COIN efforts. Constructive and transparent information enhances 

understanding and support for continuing operations against the insurgency. 

 c. Embedded Media. Embedded media representatives experience the joint force 

perspective of operations in the COIN environment. Media representatives should be 

embedded for as long as practicable. Representatives embedded for weeks become better 

prepared to present informed reports. Short-term media embedding risks media 

representatives not gaining a full understanding of the context of operations. Such short 

exposure may actually lead to unintended misinformation.

 d. Press Conferences. Commanders may hold periodic press conferences to 

explain operations and provide transparency to the people most affected by COIN efforts. 

Ideally, these sessions should include the HN media and HN officials. Such events 

provide opportunities to highlight the accomplishments of the HN government and 

counterinsurgent efforts. 

 e. Media Outlets and Communications. Commanders should apply resources to 

establish the proper combination of media outlets and communications to transmit the 

repetitive themes of HN government accomplishments and insurgent violence against the 

population. This may require counterinsurgents to be proactive, alerting the media to 

news opportunities and perhaps providing transportation or other services to ensure 

proper coverage. Helping establish effective HN media is another important COIN 

requirement. However, counterinsurgents must strive to avoid the perception of 

attempting to manipulate the population or media. Even the slightest appearance of 

impropriety can undermine the credibility of the COIN force and HN legitimacy. 

 f. Working Relationships. Good working relationships between counterinsurgent 

leaders and members of the media are vital. When they do not understand COIN efforts, 

media representatives portray the situation to their audience based on what they know. 

Such reports can be incomplete, if not incorrect. Through professional relationships, 

military leaders should strive to ensure that the media’s audiences understand the 

counterinsurgents’ efforts from the counterinsurgents’ perspective. 

VI-13 
Chapter VI 

For more discussion on PA, see JP 3-61, Public Affairs, and JP 3-13, Information 

Operations. 

SECTION C. DETAINEE OPERATIONS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 

10. General 

 a. How counterinsurgents treat captured insurgents has immense potential impact on 

insurgent morale, retention, and recruitment. Humane and just treatment may afford 

counterinsurgents many short-term opportunities as well as potentially damaging 

insurgent recruitment. Abuse may foster resentment and hatred; offering the enemy an 

opportunity for propaganda and assist potential insurgent recruitment and support. It is 

important that all detainees or other persons captured in any conflict, regardless of how it 

is characterized, shall be treated, at a minimum, in accordance with Common Article 3 of 

the Geneva Conventions of 1949, unless they are entitled to another standard based on 

status. 

 b. Detainees. Counterinsurgents must carefully consider who will be detained, and 

the manner and methods that will be used to detain them. Detainees can be vital sources 

of information. Counterinsurgents detaining people who are not part of the insurgency or 

do not support insurgency damages the counterinsurgents’ credibility and legitimacy; 

thus, poor detainee operations can prolong the war, increase resentment, and undermine 

any efforts to ameliorate grievances or discredit the insurgents’ narrative. 

 c. Detention. The methods and infrastructure for detention of insurgents is complex 

and important. The exact chain of custody and responsibility is vitally important and 

must be carefully planned, prepared, and conducted. The infrastructure and sustainment 

effort must be able to cope with the volume of people in detention. The methods and 

perception of credibility and legitimacy for the release of personnel in detention is also 

important. Fairness may help the counterinsurgent cause while any negative

perceptions will hurt efforts in the long term. For those in custody, reintegration 

efforts should begin as soon as possible. Detention should protect and empower 

moderate detainees. 

11. Voluntary Detainee Programs 

 It is vital that detainees have voluntary access to a wide array of programs. These 

programs help protect and empower moderate detainees from extremist influence, 

prepare detainees for release, and encourage them to not rejoin the insurgency when 

released. While the programs must be tailored for each area and insurgency, they can 

include vocational, educational (especially reading and writing), and religious programs. 

VI-14 JP 3-24 
Supporting Operations for Counterinsurgency 

12. Release Authority 

 For transfer or release authority of US-captured detainees during COIN, the SecDef 

or designee shall establish criteria for transfer or release and communicate those criteria 

to all commanders operating within the operational area. How to reintegrate released 

detainees is of vital importance and requires careful planning. Coordination is required 

with respect to the local governmental and security forces of the area that the detainee 

will be released to, especially if this was the same area where the individual was 

detained. Release procedures and policy must be closely coordinated with disarmament, 

demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). 

For more information on detainee operations, see JP 3-63, Detainee Operations. 

SECTION D. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM OPERATIONS IN 

COUNTERINSURGENCY 

13. General 

 National defense and internal security are the traditional cornerstones of state 

sovereignty. Security is essential to legitimate governance and participation, effective 

rule of law, and sustained economic development. The security sector comprises the 

individuals and institutions responsible for the safety and security of the HN and the 

population. This often includes the military and any state-sponsored paramilitary forces; 

national and local police; the justice and corrections systems; coastal and border security 

forces; oversight bodies; and militia and private military and security companies 

employed by the state. The security sector represents the foundation of effective, 

legitimate governance and the potential of the state for enduring viability. An effective 

security sector is essential to deal with an ongoing insurgency and other 

destabilizing elements or external support and is vital in accomplishing US 

objectives for HN stability and self-sufficiency. 

14. Security Sector Reform Operations 

 a. Security Sector Reform. Security sector reform (SSR) is the set of policies, 

plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it 

provides safety, security, and justice. SSR aims to provide an effective and legitimate 

public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the 

needs of the public. It may include integrated activities in support of defense and armed 

forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice, police, corrections, and 

intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; 

DDR; and concurrent reduction of armed violence. SSR must be part of any COIN 

plan, including the IDAD strategy, from the outset. 

 (1) Institutions. SSR involves the reestablishment or reform of the institutions 

and key ministerial positions that maintain and provide oversight for the safety and 

security of the HN and its people. Through unified action, individuals and institutions 

VI-15 
Chapter VI 

assume an effective, legitimate, and accountable role that provides external and internal 

security for their citizens under the civilian control of a legitimate state authority. 

Effective SSR enables a state to build its capacity to provide security and justice. SSR 

promotes stability, fosters democratic reform processes, and enables economic 

development. The desired outcome of SSR programs is an effective and legitimate 

security sector firmly rooted within the rule of law. 

 (2) Reform. SSR includes reform efforts targeting the individuals and 

institutions that provide a nation’s security and promote and strengthen the rule of law. 

By recognizing the inherently interdependent aspects of the security sector and by 

integrating operational support with institutional reform and governance, SSR promotes 

effective, legitimate, transparent, and accountable security and justice. SSR captures the 

full range of security activities under the broad umbrella of a single, coherent 

framework—from military and police training to weapons destruction; from community 

security to DDR of former combatants; and to security sector oversight and budgeting. 

Cultural sensitivities, political concerns, or apprehensions within neighboring states can 

become obstacles to reform. 

 (3) Unified Action. In SSR, the USG and its agencies, including the DOD, 

pursue an integrated approach to SSR based on unified action. With the support of the 

HN, military forces collaborate with interagency representatives and other civilian 

organizations to design and implement SSR strategies, plans, programs, and activities. 

DOS leads and provides oversight for these efforts through its bureaus, offices, and 

overseas missions. The DOD provides coercive and constructive capability to support 

the establishment; to restructure or reform the armed forces and defense sector; and to 

assist and support activities of other USG agencies involved in SSR. Joint forces 

participate in and support SSR activities as directed by the JFC. 

 b. Program Implementation. Effective SSR requires coordinated assessment, 

planning, training, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. The following 

guidelines are designed to assist with the execution of this statement, which is resourceneutral. 

 (1) Assessment. Ideally, interagency analysis should be the basis for USGwide programming decisions. Interagency SSR assessments may be initiated by the 

COM in country or by any of the contributing USG agencies. Where possible and 

appropriate, an interagency team comprised of relevant USG agencies and offices should 

conduct the assessment. A thorough assessment will combine desktop study with field 

work and will map institutions and actors, identify capacity strengths and gaps, and 

prioritize entry points for SSR programs and activities. Assessment teams should 

consider US foreign policy objectives; partner government capabilities, requirements, and 

resources; the possible contribution of other members of the international community; 

and community and individual security needs. Wherever possible, assessment teams 

should consider vulnerable groups and the security and justice issues that affect them. 

 (2) Planning. Coordinated interagency planning is required to ensure balanced 

VI-16 JP 3-24 
Supporting Operations for Counterinsurgency 

development of the entire security sector. Imbalanced development can actually 

undermine the long-term success of SSR efforts. Coordination of US strategic and 

operational objectives through integrated planning that synchronizes USG program and 

budget execution will help to prioritize and sequence the activities of each contributing 

agency into a coherent SSR strategy. Interagency planning should be conducted both in 

the field and at the appropriate Washington and regional headquarters level to ensure 

adequate resources are made available to support the effort. All departments and 

agencies of the USG engaged in security or justice activities in a given country and 

should be included in planning efforts. Equally important, other donors are likely to be 

engaged in security and justice programs, and should be consulted early in the planning 

process to avoid duplication of effort. Through unified action, the various actors consider 

the unique capabilities and contributions of each participant. The ensuing plan aims for a 

practical pace of reform and accounts for the political and cultural context of the 

situation. The plan accounts for available resources and capabilities while balancing the 

human capacity to deliver change against a realistic timeline. The SSR plan reflects HN 

culture, sensitivities, and historical conceptions of security. As with the broader 

campaign plan, the SSR plan seeks to resolve the underlying sources of conflict while 

preventing new or escalating future security crises. The level of HN development—

especially as it pertains to poverty and economic opportunity—is an important 

consideration in SSR planning. Planning for SSR includes building or rebuilding 

culturally appropriate security forces, judicial systems, law enforcement, and corrections. 

SFA builds or improves security forces. 

 (3) Implementation. SSR strategies, plans, and programs should incorporate 

the guiding principles of: 

 (a) Support HN ownership. 

 (b) Incorporate principles of good governance. 

 (c) Respect for human rights. 

 (d) Balance operational support with institutional reform. 

 (e) Link security and justice. 

 (f) Foster transparency. 

 (g) Do no harm. 

 (4) Monitoring and Evaluation. SSR programs should be monitored 

throughout implementation to ensure they deliver sustainable results while minimizing 

unintended negative consequences. Program evaluation at key decision points, and at the 

close of specific projects, will provide important measures of effectiveness to adjust 

ongoing programs and to provide lessons for future SSR programs. 

VI-17 
Chapter VI 

 c. Security Sector Elements. The security sector consists of both uniformed 

forces—police and military—and civilian agencies and organizations operating at various 

levels within the OE. Elements of the security sector are interdependent; the activities of 

one element significantly affect other elements. The four core elements of the security 

sector consist of state security providers, government security management and oversight 

bodies, civil society and other nonstate actors, and nonstate security sector providers. 

State security providers are those bodies authorized by the state to use or support the use 

of force. Government security management and oversight bodies are those bodies, both 

formal and informal, authorized by the state to manage and oversee the activities and 

governance of armed and public security forces and agencies. The third core element of 

the security sector consists of the civil society and other nonstate actors. Nonstate 

security sector providers are nonstate providers of justice and security. 

 d. Host Nation Ownership. Successful SSR is a HN effort supported by USG and 

other donors. Nonmilitary SSR partners, focus on all SSR activities, including the 

transition from external to HN responsibility for security and public safety should be 

planned based on the initial assessment. SSR activities may also transition to new HN 

institutions, groups, and governance frameworks as part of the peace process. As the 

transition proceeds, US military primacy recedes and other civilian agencies and 

organizations come to the forefront. 

 e. Agency Guidance and Policy. Participants in SSR help develop the program 

using their own policy guidance and policy implementation mechanisms. For example, 

UN Security Council resolutions define the mandates of UN peacekeepers and UNintegrated missions. National policy guidance; national justice systems; and relevant 

national legislation, treaties, and agreements—both bilateral and multilateral— provide a 

framework for HN and military forces. US security assistance, in particular, must 

proceed within the framework of legislated provisions governing the delivery of foreign 

assistance by US agencies, both military and civilian. While SSR integrates these 

influences, ultimately, it reflects the HN institutions, laws, and processes. 

 f. Planning. Sustainable SSR depends on thorough planning and assessment. 

Through unified action, the various actors consider the unique capabilities and 

contributions of each participant. The ensuing plan aims for a practical pace of reform 

and accounts for the political and cultural context of the situation. The plan accounts for 

available resources and capabilities while balancing the human capacity to deliver change 

against a realistic timeline. The SSR plan reflects HN culture, sensitivities, and historical 

conceptions of security. It does not seek to implement a Western paradigm for the 

security sector, understanding that a Western model may not be appropriate. As with the 

broader campaign plan, the SSR plan seeks to resolve the underlying sources of conflict 

while preventing new or escalating future security crises. The level of HN 

development—especially as it pertains to poverty and economic opportunity—is an 

important consideration in SSR planning. Planning for SSR includes building or 

rebuilding culturally appropriate security forces, judicial systems, law enforcement, and 

corrections. SFA builds or improves security forces. 

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Supporting Operations for Counterinsurgency 

For more discussion on security sector reform and SFA, see JP 3-22, Foreign Internal 

Defense, and Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations. 

SECTION E. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, 

AND REINTEGRATION IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 

15. General

 DDR attempts to stabilize the OE by disarming and demobilizing insurgents and by 

helping return former insurgents to civilian life. DDR has cultural, political, security, 

humanitarian, and socioeconomic dimensions. DDR can potentially provide incentives 

for insurgent leaders and combatants to facilitate political reconciliation, dissolve 

belligerent force structures, and present opportunities for former insurgents and other 

DDR beneficiaries to return to their communities. A successful DDR program helps 

establish sustainable peace. A failed DDR effort can stall COIN or reinforce drivers of 

conflict. 

16. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Elements 

a. Purpose. The objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security and 

stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. The 

DDR of former combatants is a complex process, with political, military, security, 

humanitarian and socioeconomic dimensions. It aims to deal with the post-conflict 

security problem that arises when former combatants are left without livelihoods or 

support networks, other than their former comrades, during the vital transition period 

from conflict to peace and development. Disarmament and demobilization refers to the 

act of releasing or disbanding an armed unit and the collection and control of weapons 

and weapons systems. Reintegration helps former combatants return to civilian life 

through benefit packages and strategies that help them become socially and economically 

embedded in their communities. 

 b. Disarmament. Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control, and 

disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of former 

insurgents and the population. Disarmament also includes the development of 

responsible arms management programs. Ideally, disarmament is a voluntary process 

carried out as part of a broader peace process to which all parties accede. Disarmament 

functions best with high levels of trust between those being disarmed and the forces 

overseeing disarmament. Some groups may hesitate to offer trust and cooperation or 

even refuse to participate in disarmament efforts. In these circumstances, disarmament 

may occur in two stages: a voluntary disarmament process followed by more coercive 

measures. The latter will address individuals or small groups refusing to participate 

voluntarily. In this second stage, disarmament of combatant factions can become a 

contentious and potentially very destabilizing step of DDR. The HN and coalition

partners manage DDR carefully to avoid disarmament becoming a catalyst for

renewed violence. Disarmament may be a slow process in an ongoing COIN and

realistic goals must be set. 

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Chapter VI 

 c. Demobilization. Demobilization is the process of transitioning a conflict or 

wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime 

configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. Demobilization

for COIN normally involves the controlled discharge of active combatants from

paramilitary groups, militias, and insurgent forces that have stopped fighting. 

Demobilization under these circumstances may include identifying and gathering excombatants for demobilization efforts. Demobilization involves deliberately dismantling 

insurgent organizations and belligerent group loyalties, replacing those with more 

appropriate group affiliations, and restoring the identity of former fighters as part of the 

national population. The demobilization of insurgents enables the eventual 

development of value systems, attitudes, and social practices that help them 

reintegrate into civil society. 

 d. Reintegration. Reintegration is the process through which former combatants, 

belligerents, and DCs receive amnesty, reenter civil society, gain sustainable 

employment, and become contributing members of the local population. It encompasses 

the reinsertion of individual former insurgents into HN communities, villages, and 

social groups. Reintegration is a social and economic recovery process focused on the 

local community; it complements other community-based programs that spur economic 

recovery, training, and employment services. It includes programs to support their 

resettlement in civilian communities, basic and vocational education, and assistance in 

finding employment in local economies. It accounts for the specific needs of women and 

children associated with insurgent and other armed groups. 

 (1) Insurgent Reintegration. Former insurgents, when properly protected, 

reintegrated, and well treated, can become positive members of their community. 

Conversely, unprotected, poorly prepared, or poorly treated former insurgents will 

become powerful IO opportunities for the insurgents. The reintegration process and 

programs, such as HN led moderate ideological or religious education and job training, 

should be started early in the reintegration process. 

 (2) Amnesty and Reconciliation. Reintegration also addresses the willingness 

of civilian communities to accept former fighters into their midst; amnesty and 

reconciliation are key components to successful reintegration. In this context, 

reintegration cannot be divorced from justice and reconciliation programs that are part of 

the broader transition process. Successful reintegration programs tend to be long term 

and costly, requiring the participation of multiple external and HN participants. The 

Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu wrote that a commander must: “Build your opponent a 

golden bridge to retreat across.” While Sun Tzu intended this remark to illustrate how a 

cornered enemy will often fight more intensely than one with an escape route, this 

admonition can apply in a COIN context as well. Counterinsurgents must leave a way

out for insurgents who have lost the desire to continue the struggle. Effective 

amnesty and reintegration programs provide the insurgents this avenue; amnesty provides 

the means to quit the insurgency and reintegration allows former insurgents to become 

part of greater society. Rifts between insurgent leaders, if identified, can be exploited in 

VI-20 JP 3-24 
Supporting Operations for Counterinsurgency 

this fashion. Offering amnesty or a seemingly generous compromise can also cause 

divisions within an insurgency and present opportunities to split or weaken it. COIN can 

also act to magnify existing rifts. 

 (3) Amnesty Programs. Amnesty programs provide a means for members of 

the insurgency to stop fighting. The essential part of an amnesty program is that 

insurgents believe they will be treated well and protected from their erstwhile 

comrades’ potential reprisal. Thus, the counterinsurgents must have detailed IO plans 

to get insurgents to know about the program, to turn themselves in, and to support 

subsequent amnesty efforts. Pragmatism must be the first consideration of amnesty 

programs, not ideology or vendetta. Counterinsurgents also must have methods to protect 

the former insurgents. Incentives for disaffected insurgents or their supporters are 

important, especially modest monetary rewards. 

 (4) Defector Programs. Turning former insurgents against their erstwhile 

comrades can prove invaluable to COIN efforts. Defectors can provide vital 

intelligence and even become valuable allies and combatants. Incentives and a sense of 

fair treatment by counterinsurgents are vital to effective defector programs, which are 

also dependent on effective IO so insurgents are aware of their options. Insurgents may 

be prone to defect when conflict has been prolonged, the broad population is weary of 

conflict, or if the insurgents have an uneven sense of purpose or drive. Defector 

knowledge of how the insurgents are led, organized, and operate can prove invaluable. 

This can include personality profiles of insurgent leaders, current communication 

procedures, plans, and TTP. This detailed intelligence is difficult to gain without 

defector operations. 

 (5) Reinsertion. Reinsertion is the assistance offered to former insurgents and 

belligerents prior to the long-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of 

transitional assistance intended to provide for the basic needs of reintegrating individuals 

and their families; this assistance includes transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, 

shelter, health services, short-term education, training, employment, and tools. While 

reintegration represents enduring social and economic development, reinsertion is a short 

term material and financial assistance program intended to meet immediate needs. 

 (6) Repatriation. The repatriation of foreign nationals to their country of 

citizenship is governed by complex US and international legal standards, legal standards 

that likely apply differently in each case of proposed repatriation. Any program of 

repatriation is likely to raise important legal issues that must be reviewed by US legal 

personnel. 

 (7) Resettlement. Resettlement is the relocation of refugees to a third country, 

which is neither the country of citizenship nor the country into which the refugee has 

fled. Resettlement to a third country is granted by accord of the country of resettlement. 

It is based on a number of criteria, including legal and physical protection needs, lack of 

local integration opportunities, health needs, family reunification needs, and threat of 

VI-21 
Chapter VI 

violence and torture. Resettlement can also mean the relocation of internally displaced 

persons to another location within the country. 

 (8) Return. The return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their 

homes is one of the most difficult aspects of COIN. If their dislocation was originally 

caused by ethnic or sectarian cleansing, their return risks a return to ethno-sectarian 

violence. Often abandoned homes are occupied by squatters, who must be removed in 

order to return the home to the rightful owner. Poor real estate records and immature 

judicial systems and laws exacerbate the return process, as ownership must be legally 

established prior to return. Counterinsurgents can play a key role in transporting and 

providing security for returnees, and often play a role in establishing temporary legal 

mechanisms to resolve property disputes.

17. Planning a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program 

 a. Importance to COIN. The promise and nature of DDR to insurgents often plays 

a crucial role in undermining insurgent recruitment, increasing insurgent desertion or 

defection, and even achieving a peace agreement. The success of DDR depends on 

integrating strategies and planning across all the sectors. 

 (1) For example, the employment opportunities extended to former insurgents 

depend on an effectively governed, viable economy with an active market sector. If the 

DDR program ends without providing alternative economic opportunities to the former 

combatants, the likelihood of a return to violence substantially increases. 

 (2) DDR closely coordinates with reform efforts in all sectors to ensure an 

integrated approach that synchronizes activities toward a common end state. DDR 

planning directly ties to SSR, determining the potential size and scope of military, police, 

and other security structures. 

 b. DDR Planning. Planning for a successful DDR program requires an 

understanding of both the situation on the ground and the goals, political will, and 

resources in which actors and other donor organizations are willing to support. Effective 

DDR planning relies on analysis of possible DDR beneficiaries, power dynamics, and 

local society as well as the nature of the conflict and ongoing peace processes. 

Assessments are conducted in close consultation with the local populace and with 

personnel from participating agencies who understand and know about the HN. Joint 

forces and other actors may enter the DDR process at many different stages; therefore, 

assessment is a continuous process used to guide decision-making throughout the DDR 

program. 

 c. Unified Action. Governmental and NGOs from the international community and 

the HN cooperate to plan and execute DDR programs. External and HN military forces 

and police working together in a peace support role may facilitate DDR. Former 

insurgents must develop confidence in DDR and the organizations charged with 

implementing it. To build this confidence, the DDR program focuses on restoring the 

VI-22 JP 3-24 
Supporting Operations for Counterinsurgency 

society, the government, and the economy at all levels. This leads to the HN taking 

responsibility for DDR processes. 

 d. Joint Contribution. Generally, the joint force does not lead the planning and 

execution of the DDR program. However, joint forces must be integrated in the planning 

of DDR from its inception and may be involved more directly in the disarmament and 

demobilization stages. Security forces and police, whether from external sources or the 

HN, are fundamental to the broad success of the program, providing security for DDR 

processes. Successful DDR programs use many approaches designed for specific 

security environments. Each program reflects the unique aspects of the situation, culture, 

and character of the state. 

VI-23 
Chapter VI 

VI-24 JP 3-24 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER VII 

COMPONENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO COUNTERINSURGENCY 

VII-1 

1. Joint Counterinsurgency is Team Counterinsurgency 

All components of the joint force are essential for the overall military 

contribution to COIN. Joint warfare is a team effort and air, land, maritime, and special 

operations components of the joint force make vital contributions in support of all 

instruments of national power in achieving national security objectives. Military 

operations must address counterguerrilla operations, which include securing the 

populations and neutralizing the insurgent military wing. Neutralizing the insurgent 

military wing includes killing or capturing irreconcilable insurgents and securing the 

population from insurgent terrorism. While the land component is normally the 

supported component during COIN, this can change due to external threats or if an 

insurgency has developed a conventional military threat, such as in the Chinese 

Communist Revolution in 1948-9. In this case, all components of the joint force are 

involved in both COIN and combat operations. This is also true if an external power has 

sent conventional military forces to assist the insurgents. 

2. Host-Nation Land Contribution to Counterinsurgency 

Much of securing or protecting the population is done by deploying land forces 

within the population and with an enduring presence. Normally, US land forces will 

operate in designated contiguous operational areas that coincide with HN national 

political boundaries. However, HN forces should provide most of this enduring presence. 

The current COIN operational approach—direct, balanced, or indirect—will determine 

the size, footprint, roles, and relationship of HN, US, and coalition partner land forces. 

See JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations.

 a. Host-Nation Military Forces. HN military forces will be unique to their 

particular culture and location. This includes their quantity, quality, and effectiveness. 

There may or may not be a professional standing army, navy, air force, marine corps, 

coast guard, police, or other security force. Regardless of their situation at the outset of 

COIN, indigenous forces will be indispensable in terms of execution of COIN and, more 

importantly, creating enduring solutions. When the US is supporting a HN COIN, 

professional HN military forces will be invaluable for ISR collection, assessment, and/or 

collaboration and understanding the OE, particularly when the joint force is new to the 

OE. 

“As long as the insurgent has failed to build a powerful regular army, the 

counterinsurgent...needs infantry and more infantry, highly mobile and 

lightly armed.” 

David Galula 

Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory, and Practice 
Chapter VII 

 (1) Host-Nation Military Forces and Legitimacy. If US or external coalition 

elements are working with or training HN security forces, care must be taken to ensure 

that the population perceives their nation’s security forces as capable, competent, and 

professional—failure to do so will generally undermine the HN government’s legitimacy. 

 (2) Security Sector Reform. The training and development of HN security 

forces is a key part of SSR, which is covered in Chapter VI, “Supporting Operations for 

Counterinsurgency.” SSR requires unified action to develop not only military forces, but 

other aspects of security and governance, such as border police, prison services, and the 

judiciary. 

 b. Host-Nation Law Enforcement. HN law enforcement plays an indispensable 

role in COIN, if they are competent and trustworthy. If they are legitimate in the eyes of 

the population, they are likely to have access to detailed intelligence on insurgent leaders, 

networks, and links to criminal elements. The presence of indigenous law enforcement 

elements, particularly if they are perceived to be leading operations, will have a 

stabilizing and normalizing impact on the population. 

 (1) Coordination between Law Enforcement and the Military. Military 

COIN forces coordinate closely with law enforcement. Military forces will support law 

enforcement to provide security and protection for police in their routine duties when the 

security situation requires. Law enforcement may support the military as well. For 

example, police may arrest insurgents captured and detained by military forces and 

cooperate in site exploitation to gather evidence to prosecute the insurgents. Law 

enforcement and military forces may be collocated to conduct joint operations and to 

afford the police additional protection, based on the security situation. This coordination 

will often provide valuable intelligence sources, and law enforcement and military 

intelligence should be shared within prudent classification restrictions. As security 

improves, law enforcement should assume a greater role and profile amongst the 

population, thus allowing military forces to focus on subsequent operations. Increasing 

HN law enforcement presence while simultaneously decreasing military presence 

enhances HN legitimacy, which is essential to successful COIN. 

 (2) Proficiency. The role of law enforcement in the HN and the level of 

employment of those law enforcement forces are often dependent on the proficiency of 

the police force and judiciary and the population’s perception of them. For example, if a 

police force or judiciary is regarded as corrupt, the population will have little trust that 

the police will have the best interests of the people in mind or that the force can provide 

real security. 

For more details on HN security forces, see FM3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting 

Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-07, Stability Operations, and FM 

3-07.1, Security Force Assistance. 

 (3) Training Police Forces. Military forces may have to be used in some 

instances to train HN law enforcement, especially civilian police. Ideally, this 

VII-2 JP 3-24 
Component Contributions to Counterinsurgency 

responsibility will be assumed by supporting police forces so that they receive proper 

mentoring and training in all aspects of police duties. However, the military will 

continue to work closely with police forces and mentor them when necessary. 

 (4) Corruption. Some law enforcement forces are not organized or controlled 

in a manner common to responsible governance. Law enforcement may be corrupt or 

have been poorly organized, trained, and equipped. In fact, corrupt law enforcement or 

other security forces may have been a root cause of the insurgency or may be a driver of 

continuing conflict. One must also understand the potential ramification of using former 

combatants as police. Efforts must be made to rectify any issues with corruption, 

especially as it is unlikely that a nation will be stable without a competent, professional 

law enforcement apparatus. Commanders and their staffs must ensure they fully 

understand the cultural differences in what constitutes corruption in the affected 

population. Western value systems do not carry equal implications in many non-Western 

cultures. 

 c. Host-Nation Auxiliary Forces. When the security situation requires, 

counterinsurgents should organize and mobilize the local population to protect 

themselves by forming auxiliary forces. This is a key, but potentially dangerous policy 

decision that the HN must make. These auxiliary forces will need to be demobilized and 

disarmed when hostilities cease. Resentments between local groups may make disarming 

them difficult. These forces may augment military and/or law enforcement efforts. 

 (1) Training and Roles. Well organized, equipped, trained, and led auxiliary 

forces can play a decisive role in COIN. They can augment and assist professional 

military and law enforcement forces, especially with providing a permanent presence 

within the population. A permanent presence within the population is vital to security, 

but is manpower intensive. Auxiliary forces are best used to augment or execute 

defensive or stability operations. 

 (2) Advantages. Auxiliary forces are often based on local family, tribal, clan, 

ethnic, or religious affiliations, so they have inherent cultural and linguistic advantages. 

In this capacity, they can be invaluable intelligence assets; their understanding of the 

local OE is far superior to that of any outsider. Auxiliary forces may also have 

specialized skills developed as part of their culture that may complement other more 

professional forces. These skills can include tracking, patrolling, understanding of the 

terrain and wildlife, and local communications methods. 

 (3) Disadvantages. Auxiliary forces can have disadvantages, but these can 

generally be overcome with oversight. Auxiliary forces may be more prone to insurgent 

infiltration, and they may provide informational, operational, and security challenges. 

Counterinsurgents should realize that some nominally counterinsurgent auxiliaries may 

be simultaneously working for insurgents offering services for immediate monetary or 

material advantage. It is also common for auxiliaries to shift sides when they perceive an 

opportunity or which side may have gained the advantage. Members of auxiliaries or 

their friends and family may be subject to insurgent coercion and violence. The overall 

VII-3 
Chapter VII 

context will determine how vulnerable and therefore how useful the auxiliary forces may 

be. 

3. Air Contribution to Counterinsurgency 

Air forces and capabilities play a vital role in the military contribution to 

COIN. These forces and capabilities are especially critical for successful 

counterguerrilla, intelligence, combating weapons of mass destruction (CWMD), 

humanitarian, and informational efforts. Air contributions include close air support, 

precision strikes, armed overwatch, personnel recovery, air interdiction, ISR, 

communications, EW, combat support, and air mobility. Air forces and capabilities 

provide considerable asymmetric advantages to counterinsurgents, especially by denying 

insurgents secrecy and unfettered access to bases of operation. If insurgents assemble a 

conventional force or their operating locations are identified and isolated, air assets can 

respond quickly with joint precision fires or to airlift ground forces to locations to 

accomplish a mission. Airpower enables counterinsurgents to operate in rough and 

remote terrain, areas that insurgents traditionally have used as safe havens. The air 

component may be the supported component in COIN when attacking approved insurgent 

sanctuaries that are outside land or maritime forces operational areas. 

 a. Air Command and Control. The C2 relationships established for engagement 

operations should consider both the need for flexibility and the training level of forces to 

be employed. For example, the training and competency required for precision strikes in 

COIN are more demanding than for traditional warfare. Consequently, JFCs and 

component commanders must consider the C2 architecture that best suits the situation. 

 (1) Command and Control Architecture. The joint structure applies to more 

than just US forces; it involves coordinating air assets of multinational partners and the 

HN. COIN planners must establish a joint and multinational airpower C2 system and 

policies, with HN and interagency, on the rules and conditions for employing airpower in 

the theater. In the same manner, COIN planning must account for and incorporate 

interagency capabilities and functions. 

 (2) Planning. During COIN operations, most planning occurs at lower 

echelons. Air planners require visibility of actions planned at all echelons to provide the 

most effective air support so coordination should occur at all levels. Furthermore, COIN 

planning is often fluid and develops along short planning and execution timelines, 

necessitating some degree of informal coordination and integration for safety and 

efficiency. 

 b. Air Mobility. Cargo mobility aircraft provide the important support with 

intertheater and intratheater transport. This transport can include deployment to remote 

regions to deliver resources and personnel and can be used to rapidly deploy, sustain, and 

reinforce ground forces as part of security and counterguerrilla operations. Air mobility 

can be used to support political goals by extending effective governance to remote areas 

and delivering highly visible humanitarian aid. Sustainment tasks are enabled through 

VII-4 JP 3-24 
Component Contributions to Counterinsurgency 

airland, airdrop, and aerial extraction of equipment, supplies, and personnel. Fixed-wing 

and vertical-lift airlift provide a crucial capability in COIN. In the military realm, fixedwing transports are best suited for carrying ground forces into forward staging areas. 

Vertical-lift platforms are ideal for carrying ground forces to remote sites that are unable 

to support fixed-wing operations. Lift capable of moving small units around the 

battlefield have proven very valuable in assisting COIN forces. The ability to maneuver 

while engaged with an adversary is extremely powerful in managing the battle and 

insuring that the adversary is unable to disengage at a time and place of their choosing. 

Casualty evacuation is integral to any operation involving the employment of personnel 

in hostile-fire situations, with vertical-lift assets best suited for this task. While land 

forces can execute these basic missions alone, airlift bypass weaknesses insurgents have 

traditionally exploited. However, airlift is more costly than surface or maritime 

transportation and in some circumstances may be inhibited by terrain, weather, and 

threats such as man portable surface-to-air missiles and rocket-propelled grenades. Also, 

requesting airlift may be subject to limitations due to availability and other priority 

requirements. It is usually a small percentage of the overall transportation network 

during major combat operations; however, in particularly challenging situations, airlift 

may become the primary transportation mode for sustainment and repositioning. 

 c. Precision Engagement. The joint force air component can provide close air 

support, armed overwatch, air interdiction, and strategic attack that in COIN often 

includes the use of precision-guided munitions with a full spectrum of capabilities (lethal 

and nonlethal). These precision strikes are often based on corroborated HUMINT and are 

an effective means of destroying the insurgent military wing, leaders, or assets with 

minimal collateral damage or risk to land forces. The use of lethal fires, regardless of 

source, against insurgents must be carefully considered and targets confirmed in terms of 

their authenticity and value. Additionally, insurgents may have signature reduction 

methods, deception methods, and man-portable air defense systems that must be 

considered and addressed. 

 (1) Airpower. The impact on the population from using strike operations 

against insurgents must be carefully considered. In determining the appropriate 

capability to create the desired effects, planners should look at the desired objectives and 

end state, duration, and consequences to ensure that not only the direct but the longerterm indirect effects that may result are anticipated. Collateral damage and civilian 

casualties can do much to undermine indigenous, domestic, and international support. 

Additionally, insurgents will exploit such incidents especially through IO and 

propaganda, using international media coverage when possible. 

 (2) Intelligence. Just as in traditional warfare, attacks on key nodes usually 

reap greater benefits than attacks on dispersed individual targets. For this reason, 

effective strike operations are inextricably tied to the availability of actionable 

intelligence, effective ISR, and detailed systems analysis that identifies and fully 

characterizes the potential targets of interest (networks, nodes, and links). Persistence is 

critical as it is often not known in advance how long a particular node will remain 

stationary. 

VII-5 
Chapter VII 

 (3) Host-nation Precision Engagement. If US or coalition forces conduct the 

strike, there may be the perception that the HN government is dependent for its survival 

on foreign forces. This may have the indirect effect of delegitimizing the HN 

government in the public’s perception. Precision engagement should be designed to 

employ HN airpower resources to the greatest extent possible. Properly trained and 

structured teams of airpower advisors, ranging from planning liaison to tactical 

operations personnel, offer potential for HN unilateral and combined actions against 

high-value targets. Use of these options serves to enhance the legitimacy of the HN 

government while achieving important coalition security objectives. Use of assets 

controlled by US agencies outside the DOD, but not directly affiliated with it, may also 

prove useful in providing precision strike capability. 

 d. Interoperability Between Ground and Air. Video downlink and datalink 

technology have revolutionized real-time air to ground employment allowing air assets to 

seamlessly integrate into and support the ground commander’s scheme of maneuver. 

Armed overwatch missions provide ground forces with the critical situational awareness, 

flexibility, and immediate fire support necessary to succeed in the dynamic COIN 

environment. Airpower’s ability to quickly support ground forces can lower the need for 

mutual support between ground units and therefore decrease overall manpower density. 

This allows counterinsurgents to further disperse ground forces in areas and in numbers 

that would not be feasible without air power—mutual support can come from the air 

rather than from other ground forces or indirect ground fire. Dispersion of ground forces 

facilitates the actual and perceived level of security. However, joint planners must 

carefully balance the risk of catastrophic tactical surprise of dispersed ground forces with 

the benefits gained from dispersion. 

 e. Personnel Recovery (PR) Operations. The part of PR that plays the largest role 

in COIN and combating terrorism is combat search and rescue (CSAR). The availability 

of dependable CSAR and casualty evacuation, especially at night, has dramatically 

improved the willingness and ability of HN ground combatant forces to engage in 

operations they may otherwise be less motivated to perform. 

 f. Basing. US and multinational air units, along with HN forces, will likely use 

expeditionary airfields. COIN planners must consider where to locate airfields, including 

those intended for use as aerial ports of debarkation and other air operations. US air 

forces frequently build and provide infrastructure to HN air services as part of performing 

COIN operations. Airpower operating from remote or dispersed airfields may present a 

smaller signature than large numbers of land forces, possibly lessening HN sensitivities 

to foreign military presence. Employment of long-range bombers for COIN operations 

has increased due to advances in Global Positioning System-guided weapons and carriage 

of advanced targeting pods. Often these platforms are free from the basing limitations of 

shorter range tactical platforms. Commanders must properly protect their bases and 

coordinate their defense among all counterinsurgents. 

VII-6 JP 3-24 
Component Contributions to Counterinsurgency 

 g. Building Host-Nation Airpower Capability. US and multinational aviation 

SFA operations strive to enable the HN to provide its own internal and external defense. 

Developing an air force is a foundational initiative for unifying, advancing, or developing 

a nation. Airpower capability is a catalyst for government legitimacy, projecting national 

sovereignty, and accelerating the nation’s overall internal stability as well as regional 

security. Rebuilding HN air capability will require long lead times. Planners, therefore, 

need to establish a long-term program to develop a HN airpower capability. The HN air 

force should be appropriate for that nation’s requirements and sustainment base. For 

conducting effective COIN operations, a HN air force may be able to provide aerial 

reconnaissance and surveillance, air transport, close air support and interdiction for land 

forces, helicopter troop lift, medical evacuation, and counterair. Likewise, airlift supports 

essential services, governance, and economic development by providing movement of 

personnel and supplies, particularly in a COIN operation with IEDs and other dangers on 

the roads. HN security forces thus should include airlift development as the HN’s first 

component of airpower. Frequently, the majority effort of air forces centers on providing 

combat support and combat service support, such as train and equip services, to HN air 

forces. Infrastructure to include airfields and a viable air traffic control system 

construction and development are also frequently required. Development of supporting 

services (maintenance, logistics and planning) often requires the most extensive timelines 

when working with HN air services. HN air services often include a mixture of civil and 

military aviation assets that provides unique challenges to air force efforts at engagement. 

For additional information, see JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations, Air Force Doctrine 

Document (AFDD) 2-3, Irregular Warfare, AFDD 2-6, Air Mobility Operations; AFDD 

2-7, Special Operations; AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense, and FM 3-24/MCWP 3-

33.5, Counterinsurgency. 

4. Maritime Contribution to Counterinsurgency 

 For COIN, the maritime component plays a critical role in controlling the seas, 

which may be vital to isolating an insurgency physically and psychologically. The 

expeditionary character and versatility of maritime forces provide an advantage in areas 

where access is denied or limited. The maritime contribution to COIN will continue to be 

vital because much of the world’s population lives in littoral areas, including large coastal 

cities. Demographic projections also indicate that the population of these areas will 

continue to grow in overall numbers and in relative terms to inland populations. Much of 

this burgeoning population may live in poverty, which may be a key root cause leading to 

insurgency. Due to the rise in population and potential unrest, the likelihood of COIN’s 

being conducted in the littoral areas also increases. COIN in littoral areas has important 

maritime considerations. Maritime forces may provide direct support to the JTF that does 

not include combat operations, to include CMO, logistic support, 

intelligence/communication sharing, humanitarian relief, maritime civil affairs (MCAG), 

and expeditionary medical aid and training. 

 a. Maritime Security Operations (MSO). As discussed in Chapter II, 

“Insurgency” the OE may affect the insurgent’s planning considerations and objectives, 

VII-7 
Chapter VII 

whether they are lethal or nonlethal. If the insurgency is dependent on external support 

for material resources, in the form of funding, weapons, equipment, fighters, or 

intelligence, COIN planning should include MSO as part of its efforts. MSO counters 

terrorism, insurgency and crime, while complimenting the effort to protect the HN, its 

sovereignty, the people, and critical infrastructure from insurgent efforts of subversion or 

violence. It also assures access to HN ports, and free-flow of commerce and sustained 

logistic support through the waterways. MSO is vital as a force multiplier to isolating 

insurgent dependent upon external support along inland waterways especially with 

respect to the littorals. Riverine units provide security along inland waterways, which 

helps to isolate insurgents within the affected area or, if the river is an international 

border, from external support. Since insurgent funding requirements may require 

reliance on criminal activities, piracy and smuggling are common sources to secure 

funds. Piracy threatens freedom and safety of maritime navigation, undermines 

economic security, and contributes to the destabilization of governance and the security 

situation. Because maritime forces conduct MSO in open ocean and the littorals, MSO 

can be applied towards negating piracy which may guarantee the HN’s access to sea lines 

of communications, while eliminating a source of funding used for sustaining insurgent 

operations. 

 b. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Naval forces provide the joint 

force with expeditionary ISR capabilities with global reach and persistence. These 

capabilities can support any of the intelligence disciplines discussed in Chapter V, 

“Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency.” 

 c. Deterrence and Patrols. Naval support to COIN may consist of deterrence, 

escort operations, presence, patrols, and defending critical infrastructure. Maritime 

intercept operations are used to enforce sanctions or blockades, support law enforcement 

operations, and provide a means to extend situational awareness in the maritime domain. 

The presence of maritime forces can be adjusted as conditions dictate to enable flexible 

approaches to escalation, de-escalation, and deterrence. A visible presence just offshore 

demonstrates support for an ally or coalition partner, which may send a strong message to 

insurgents and their sympathizers. Naval forces’ ability to loiter over the horizon reduces 

the appearance of a large US footprint while still maintaining the ability to influence 

events ashore. 

 d. Sustainment and Transport. Maritime forces can provide land-based forces 

with key sustainment capabilities. This includes commercial vessels’ provision of the 

majority of bulk supplies. The expeditionary nature of naval forces, however, may 

transport forces within the theater as well. Naval forces can also provide a forced entry 

capability for insurgent-controlled areas or bases bordering waterways or in the littorals. 

 e. Naval Aircraft. Like ground-based aircraft, as part of a carrier airwing, are 

multi-mission platforms which provide rapid response capabilities, and are capable of 

conducting precision strikes, C2, EW, and CSAR. Naval aircraft have the added 

flexibility in that aircraft carriers are self-sustaining, secure bases that can be quickly 

repositioned within theater. Theater based maritime patrol aircraft further complement 

VII-8 JP 3-24 
Component Contributions to Counterinsurgency 

the flexibility with their endurance and multi mission capability. Naval aviation can thus 

provide the JFC with a source of airpower without increasing the coalition footprint 

ashore. 

 f. Precision Strikes and Naval Fires. Naval aircraft execute maritime interdiction 

and precision strikes, complementing land based aircraft close air support and precision 

strike missions. However, naval forces also are capable of launching precision-guided 

munitions from surface or subsurface platforms, while surface combatants can conduct 

naval surface fire support for expeditionary forces ashore. Like the air-launched 

precision-guided munitions, precise targeting, and quality, continuous and actionable ISR 

is required for these munitions to be effective. As with any use of force in COIN, all of 

the potential desired and undesired effects – fratricide and collateral damage, must be 

considered. 

 g. Building Host-Nation Maritime Capability. SFA also applies to assisting the 

HN with building or improving its maritime capability and capacity. The maritime 

component of security forces includes HN navy, marine, coast guard elements, and 

interagency organizations which may be loosely affiliated with the HN maritime 

organization. These may include fishery patrols, interior security, port authority, customs, 

and immigration. Further considerations to enhance the HN maritime capability is to 

introduce or expand existing maritime domain awareness efforts. Development of a 

robust automated identification system, tied into an interagency maritime operations 

center, will increase the HN’s ability to track and identify vessels of interest, potentially 

involved in illegal or illicit activities. SFA planners must develop a long-term plan to 

assist the HN in these areas. As with the land and air, assistance to the maritime elements 

of a HN must be appropriate for that nation’s requirements and sustainment base. 

 h. Maritime Civil Affairs. The maritime component may also contribute to the HN 

rebuilding effort with a dedicated MCAG. MCAG skill sets are uniquely tailored to those 

areas most likely to influence HNs rebuilding efforts in maritime and naval affairs. 

These are: 

 (1) Maritime law. 

 (2) Marine fisheries and resource management. 

 (3) Port administration and port operations. 

 (4) Maritime interagency coordination. 

 (5) Port/waterborne security. 

 (6) Customs and logistics. 

 (7) Port/intercoastal surveys. 

VII-9 
Chapter VII 

 (8) Control of maritime immigration. 

5. Special Operations Forces Contribution to Counterinsurgency 

 a. Special Operations Forces and Counterinsurgency Approaches. SOF are 

vitally important to successful COIN operations. Their capacity to conduct a wide array 

of missions, working by, with, and through HN security forces or integrated with US 

conventional forces make them particularly suitable for COIN campaigns. They are 

particularly important when the joint force is using an indirect approach to COIN. In a 

more balanced or direct approach to COIN, however, they should be used to complement 

rather than replace conventional forces in traditional warfare roles. 

 b. Special Operations Forces’ Core Tasks and COIN. SOF are specifically 

organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish the following nine core tasks: direct 

action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), UW, FID, CT, CAO, PSYOP, IO, and 

CWMD, which embraces many tenets of the aforementioned core tasks, as well as 

discrete CWMD tasks. Any of these SOF core tasks may be involved in COIN. SOF 

must adhere to the same principles of COIN as conventional joint forces. Even if focused 

on DA missions, SOF must be cognizant of the need to win and maintain popular 

support. 

 (1) Direct Action. DA missions may be required in COIN to capture or kill 

key insurgent leaders or other vital insurgent targets. The specific types of DA are raids, 

ambushes, and direct assaults; standoff attacks; terminal attack control and terminal 

guidance operations; personnel recovery operations; precision destruction operations; and 

anti-surface operations. 

 (2) Special Reconnaissance. SOF may conduct SR into insurgent strongholds 

or sanctuaries. Activities within SR include environmental reconnaissance, armed 

reconnaissance, target and threat assessment, and poststrike reconnaissance. 

 (3) Foreign Internal Defense. Both conventional and SOF units have a role 

and capability to conduct FID missions. SOF’s primary role in this interagency activity is 

to assess, train, advise, and assist HN military and paramilitary forces with the tasks that 

require their unique capabilities. The goal is to enable these forces to maintain the HN’s 

internal stability, to counter subversion, lawlessness and insurgency in their country, and 

to address the causes of instability. Internal stability forms the shield behind which a 

nation assistance campaign can succeed. 

For more information on FID, see JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. 

 (4) Unconventional Warfare. These are operations that involve a broad 

spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, 

predominantly conducted by, with, or through indigenous or surrogate forces who are 

organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external 

source. 

VII-10 JP 3-24 
Component Contributions to Counterinsurgency 

 (5) Counterterrorism. CT consists of actions taken through approaches 

applied directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global 

environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. Indirect and direct approaches to CT are 

mutually supporting and integrate the capabilities to concurrently disrupt violent 

extremist organizations operating today and to influence the environment in which they 

operate to erode their capability and influence in the future. Both approaches are 

integrated globally from the strategic national to tactical levels. Either or both 

approaches may be conducted within the scope of a broader campaign or in conjunction 

with COIN as directed by a JFC. 

For additional information, see JP 3-26, Counterterrorism, JP 3-05, Joint Special 

Operations, JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, and AFDD, 2-3.1, Foreign Internal 

Defense. For detailed discussion of integrating conventional forces and SOF, see US 

Special Operations Command Publication 3-33, Conventional Forces and Special 

Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability Handbook and Checklist. 

 c. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Capabilities. ARSOF elements 

(special forces, rangers, and aviation) can support COIN operations by HN forces and 

conducting combat or other operations as required. ARSOF also has CAO and PSYOP 

elements that can support COIN. 

 d. Marine Corps Special Operations Forces (MARSOF) Capabilities. MARSOF 

can support COIN operations by providing a foreign military training unit that provides 

tailored military combat skills training and advisor support for identified foreign forces. 

It can also execute DA and other operations in support of COIN as required. 

 e. Navy Special Operations Forces (NAVSOF) Capabilities. NAVSOF can 

support COIN operations by providing sea-air-land and special boat teams to train HN 

forces or conduct combat or other operations as required. They generally operate in 

maritime, littoral, and riverine areas. 

 f. Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) Capabilities. AFSOF support 

COIN operations by working by, with, and through HN aviation forces from the 

ministerial level to the tactical unit. When required, AFSOF provide persistent manned 

and unmanned ISR, mobility, and precision engagement to support COIN operations. 

AFSOF maintain specially trained combat aviation advisors to assess, train, advise, and 

assist HN aviation capability thereby facilitating the availability, reliability, safety, and 

interoperability of these forces into COIN operations. Additionally, AFSOF special 

tactics teams enhance the air-to-ground interface, synchronizing conventional and special 

operations during COIN operations. 

For additional information on SOF capabilities, see JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations 

Task Force Operations. 

VII-11 
Chapter VII 

VII-12 JP 3-24 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER VIII 

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 

“Counter-insurgency intelligence must cover a wide field and deal not only 

with the operational organization and capabilities of the insurgents, but 

must try also to expose and to understand their minds, their mentality and 

their motives. The influence that they are likely to exert over the populace 

must also be anticipated so that their efforts at subversion and intimidation 

can be thwarted.” 

Julian Paget 

Counter-Insurgency Campaigning 

1. Holistic Counterinsurgency Operational Environment 

 The OE for all joint operations is the sum of the conditions, circumstances, and 

influences that affect how the commander uses the available capabilities and makes 

decisions. The OE encompasses physical domains, nonspatial environments and other 

factors. The OE includes the information environment, sociocultural considerations, and 

civil considerations. A holistic understanding of the OE includes all of these aspects and 

helps the commander to understand how the OE constrains or shapes options, how the 

OE affects capabilities, and how friendly, adversary, and neutral actors’ actions affect or 

shape the OE. While all aspects of the OE are important, COIN is a battle of will and 

ideas that is often determined by the population. Consequently, JIPOE must conduct a 

thorough analysis of population for COIN. Because individuals and groups are the 

foundation of the COIN OE and because human behavior is multifaceted, shifting, and 

difficult to predict, the COIN OE as a whole is shifting, dynamic, and complex. 

Understanding of the COIN environment begins with understanding the population, 

then the insurgents, and finally the counterinsurgents.

 a. Physical Domains. Physical domains are composed of physical geography, both 

natural and man-made, and include the air, land, maritime, and space domains. While 

insurgents tend to operate primarily on land and inland waterways, some advanced 

insurgencies have used aircraft and operated offshore. As the insurgents primarily 

operate in the land domain and operate weakly in the other domains, the joint force has 

advantages it can exploit given its capabilities in air, maritime, and space domains. The 

physical domains are also important aspects to consider for isolating and restricting 

the insurgent. 

 b. Information Environment. The information environment both transcends and 

resides within the four physical domains and is the aggregate of individuals, 

organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The 

information environment is made up of three interrelated dimensions: physical, 

informational, and cognitive. Cyberspace is a global domain within the information 

environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology 

infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, 

and embedded processors and controllers. All actors in the OE affect the information 

environment. In fact, any attempt to interact with the information environment, including 

attempts to merely measure it, change or affect it. Increasingly, disproportionally small 

actors in this environment can gain asymmetric advantage in the information 

VIII-1 
Chapter VIII 

environment. The information environment is paramount in COIN, as it is a 

medium that greatly influences the population.

 (1) Physical Dimension. The physical dimension consists of the physical 

infrastructure and means of transmission of command, control, and communication 

systems. The physical dimension makes up a significant portion of cyberspace as well. 

 (2) Informational Dimension. The informational dimension is where 

information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected. It 

consists of the content and flow of information. The informational dimension also makes 

up a significant portion of cyberspace. 

 (3) The Cognitive Dimension. The cognitive dimension encompasses how 

people think, perceive, visualize, and decide. How people think is affected by a myriad 

of factors such as propaganda, education, training, experience, personal motivations, 

religion, leadership, morale, cohesion, emotion, state of mind, public opinion, 

perceptions, media, and rumors. For COIN the cognitive dimension extends to US and 

international public opinion. Because COIN battles and campaigns are struggles of 

will and ideas, they are ultimately won and lost in the cognitive dimension. When 

trying to contemplate the cognitive dimension, it is imperative that counterinsurgents 

understand that it is not only how the populace views the counterinsurgents, but how 

counterinsurgents view the populace. 

 c. Systems Perspective. A systems perspective of the OE provides an 

understanding of relationships within interrelated political, military, economic, social, 

information, and infrastructure (PMESII) and other systems relevant to a specific joint 

operation without regard to geographic boundaries. This perspective helps facilitate 

understanding of the complex COIN OE, including the continuous and complex 

interaction of friendly, adversary, and neutral systems. 

 d. Other Factors. Other factors that help comprise a holistic view of the OE 

include intangible aspects such as the electromagnetic spectrum, weather and climate, 

time, and cultural and country characteristics. While in traditional warfare 

sociocultural and civil factors were secondary considerations, these factors are 

critically important for COIN.

 (1) Civil Factors. An analysis of civil factors determines who, what, when, 

where, why, and how with respect to civilians, what activities those civilians are engaged 

in that might affect the military operation, what operations the military are engaged in 

that might affect the civilians’ activities, and what the commander must do to support and 

interact with those civil actions. There are six key civil considerations: ASCOPE. 

Complex adaptive systems remain coherent under pressure and during change. 

Adversarial systems such as insurgencies will not acknowledge defeat without first 

attempting to adapt and change. Insurgencies tend to be less regimented and hierarchical, 

often allowing them to adapt quickly. The insurgent ability to adapt requires 

counterinsurgents to learn as well. The COIN environment is itself a complex adaptive 

VIII-2 JP 3-24 
Operational Environment 

system as it potentially includes multiple unique insurgencies, a larger combination of 

adversaries, and a diverse population with varied sociocultural and civil factors. The 

population also consists of multiple complex adaptive systems that have inherent internal 

and external tensions and divisions. As a result, COIN is a complex adaptive problem. 

Because adversaries and other elements in the OE have adapted to earlier COIN efforts, 

those leading COIN may discover that the original understanding of a problem is no 

longer valid. 

 (2) Sociocultural Factors. While outsiders can gain an understanding of the 

OE, this understanding is still second-hand. Only someone from the indigenous 

population can truly understand the OE and all of its nuances. Thus, the HN 

representatives must be involved in every facet of COIN operations—from JIPOE to 

assessment. There are five sociocultural factors for the COIN environment: society, 

social structure, culture, power and authority, and interests.

 e. Holistic View. The holistic view of the OE provides a detailed and 

comprehensive perspective on the OE. The OE constrains and shapes the options that 

counterinsurgents can perform. Planning COIN operations is based first on the 

perspective of the people, accounts for the insurgency second, and then attempts to 

plan COIN operations or, in other words, shape the OE. 

For more detail on the holistic view of the OE see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence 

Preparation of the Operational Environment.

2. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Overview 

 Initial JIPOE must focus on having enough detail to complete mission analysis of the 

joint operation planning process (JOPP). JIPOE in COIN follows the process described 

in JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, with an 

emphasis of sociocultural and civil factors. The joint force should include HN 

representatives if possible in the JIPOE process. 

For more detail on JIPOE, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 

Operational Environment.

SECTION A. STEP ONE 

3. Define the Operational Environment 

 The first step of the JIPOE process is defining the OE by identifying those aspects 

and significant characteristics that may be relevant to the joint force’s mission. Defining 

the OE must include the many military and nonmilitary organizations involved in the 

COIN effort. Knowledge of nonmilitary organizations is needed to establish working 

relationships and procedures for sharing information. These relationships are critical to 

developing a holistic, common operational picture. 

VIII-3 
Chapter VIII 

 a. Identify the Joint Force’s Operational Area. HN and coalition partner policy 

determine theater level operational area considerations. Below the theater level, 

additional considerations are conducted like any joint operation: there are several choices 

to define the operational area, these areas may be contiguous or noncontiguous, and 

higher headquarters are responsible for the area between noncontiguous areas. 

 b. Analyzing the Mission and Joint Force Commander’s Intent. The JFC’s 

stated intent and all characteristics of the mission are of special significance to the JIPOE 

process for any mission, including COIN. The sociocultural and civil factors that are 

involved in COIN will expand the OE far beyond the designated limits of the operational 

area. Similarly, the HN, other multinational coalition partners, and the international 

community impact a COIN OE. 

 c. Determine the Significant Characteristics of the Operational Environment. 

This JIPOE step consists of a cursory examination of each aspect of the OE in order to 

identify those characteristics of possible significance or relevance to the joint force and 

its mission. A more in-depth evaluation of the impact of each relevant characteristic of 

the OE takes place during step two of the JIPOE process. Specific adversary capabilities 

and possible COAs are evaluated in detail during the third step of the JIPOE process. 

Other significant characteristics of the OE include: geographical features and 

meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) characteristics, complex relationships 

between PMESII systems, civil considerations, sociocultural considerations, 

infrastructure, ROE or legal restrictions, all friendly and adversary conventional, 

unconventional, and paramilitary forces and their general capabilities and strategic 

objectives, environmental conditions, psychological characteristics of adversary decision 

making, all locations of foreign embassies, and NGOs. For COIN this step should pay 

special attention to the sociocultural factors, civil factors, root causes of the 

insurgency, insurgent desired end state, and insurgent narratives.

 d. Counterinsurgency Operational Environment Framework. Four important 

groups comprise the COIN OE: the population, adversaries, friendly elements, and 

neutral actors. Subsequent steps of JIPOE—especially development of a PMESII 

systems perspective—add depth and clarity to understanding the COIN 

environment. 

 (1) Groups. Effective analysis requires a framework with which to look at and 

examine the behaviour and motivation of actors within the population that may be 

involved, as the population is not a homogeneous, single group (see Figure VIII-1). There 

are four main categories based on their attitude towards the government. In addition to 

the four main groups it is inevitable that there will be ‘spoilers’, who have an interest in 

maintaining that level of local instability that enables them to achieve their own, often 

criminal ends. They may be disinterested in involvement in the political settlement, but 

will seek to maintain freedom of action through corruption, coercion, and undermining 

the rule of law. They will attempt to frustrate progress or to prevent any change that 

could adversely affect their activities. The four main categories are:

VIII-4 JP 3-24 
Operational Environment 

COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONAL 

ENVIRONMENT FRAMEWORK

MEDIA MEDIA

Military Political 

Party

Drug 

Traffickers

Neutral

Actors

Other 

External 

Supporters

Supportive 

Diaspora/ 

Emigres

Supporting 

External 

State Population

Underground

Underground

Host Nation 

Government

Supporting 

Multinational 

Coalition

Military

Host Nation 

Military

MilitaryFocused 

Insurgency

Criminal 

Gangs

International

Terrorists

Neutral 

Actors

Supporting 

External 

State

MEDIA MEDIA

Third

Insurgency

First Insurgency

Second

Insurgency

Figure VIII-1. Counterinsurgency Operational Environment Framework

 (a) Positive. Those in this category will generally see the HN government 

as both legitimate and beneficial and will be supportive of their actions. They would be 

expected to include members of the HN government and its institutions including the 

judiciary, police, army and other internal security forces. These institutions are liable to 

infiltration by groups opposed to either the HN government or US intervention. 

 (b) Neutral. Some groups will ally themselves neither with hostile nor 

positive groups. The conflict produces uncertainty as to where their best interests. 

Nevertheless, neutral groups may play a critical role in any campaign especially if they 

constitute a large proportion of the population. They may offer potential and unseen 

support. When analyzing neutral groups, to develop means of engagement, it will be 

crucial to understand their aims, objectives and needs in order that at a minimum the 

VIII-5 
Chapter VIII 

status quo of their involvement in the conflict remains consistent with the wider political 

end state. The support of formerly neutral groups has historically proven to be vital to 

the success of either the HN or hostile groups. 

 (c) Negative. Those in this category oppose the HN authority but their 

day-to-day behaviour stops short of violence against that authority. Those who adopt a 

negative stance will do so for a variety of reasons, often based on core grievances and 

cycles of violence. Guarding against these individuals becoming the next generation of 

insurgents will be as much to do with our behaviour as that of the hostile groups. 

 (d) Hostile. Those in this category are actively and violently opposed to 

the HN government and joint forces. They will view violence as a legitimate means to 

their ends. However, even amongst those who are in this category there will be 

reconcilable and irreconcilable elements. 

 (2) Population. The population is the most important group in the COIN 

environment. Portions of the population will be pro-insurgent, pro-government, and 

neutral; however, the majority will most likely be neutral. COIN efforts seek to decrease 

the support for insurgents while increasing the neutral and the pro-government support. 

Physical and psychological links between the insurgents and counterinsurgents are 

important to determine who succeeds in the overall struggle. 

 (3) Adversaries. Some adversaries in a COIN environment directly challenge 

the HN, while others merely cause instability. Competent insurgencies seek to 

strengthen their physical and psychological links with the population while breaking 

the HN’s links with the population. The adversaries in the example COIN OE in 

Figure VIII-1 consist of three distinct insurgencies, the external support for insurgencies, 

and other destabilizing actors. 

 (a) Insurgencies. The most advanced of the three insurgencies depicted in 

Figure VIII-1 has an associated political party to legitimize the insurgents, delegitimize 

the HN, and propagate the narrative. The political party and the underground are 

attempting to provide the population with a political alternative by building a shadow 

government. The military wing conducts sabotage, assassinations, and attacks in support 

of these efforts. Overall, this insurgency has strong physical and psychological links with 

the population. The second example insurgency does not have an associated political 

party but has an underground and military component. This insurgency is not as 

advanced as the previous one, but it enjoys much external support and has strong links 

with the population. The third insurgency is employing a military-focused strategy and is 

not providing a strong alternative to the HN. Due to its focus, it has weak linkages to the 

population. 

 (b) Other Major Adversaries. There are two other major adversaries 

depicted in Figure VIII-1: drug traffickers and international terrorists. Drug traffickers 

are members of powerful organization that present destabilizing influences but are 

typically contained by the HN law enforcement apparatus. The drug trafficking 

VIII-6 JP 3-24 
Operational Environment 

organization could begin efforts to nullify the HN’s control in two HN provinces to 

counter successful law enforcement efforts; therefore, transforming the organization’s 

criminal ends into an insurgency. International terrorists could exploit destabilizing 

situations in the HN to undermine the credibility of select HN leaders and/or coalition 

members. However, international terrorists do not function as irregular units in the open, 

nor are they interested in the population, holding terrain, or forming a shadow 

government. 

 (4) Friendly Actors. US and multinational efforts should focus on working by, 

with, and through the HN elements whenever possible and to the maximum extent 

possible. The more the HN does, the more likely it is to gain legitimacy. Figure VIII-1 

depicts a coalition, including the US, supporting the HN’s COIN efforts. Some of these 

multinational efforts are directly aimed at the population and the insurgents, although in 

consonance with the IDAD. As the HN capabilities and capacities increase, coalition 

efforts take on a more supporting role instead of a lead role. HN elements are linked 

physically and psychologically to the population, and COIN efforts should strive to 

protect and strengthen these links with the population while breaking the links 

between the insurgents and the population.

 (5) Neutral Actors. Neutral actors in the COIN environment may be 

completely neutral or they may be friendly or adversarial by degree. For example, the 

media are neutral actors that may have elements that are biased towards either the 

friendly or the adversarial side. Overall, neutral actors play an important role in COIN. 

 e. Establish the Limits of the Joint Force’s AOI. The AOI is the area of concern 

for the JFC. People and information flow through the operational area continuously, so 

the AOI may be quite large due to their impact. The AOI must include the impacts of 

media influence on the local population, the US population, and multinational partners. 

External financial, moral, and logistic support for the insurgents must be considered in 

determining the AOI as well. 

 f. Determine the Level of Detail Required. The time available for JIPOE may not 

permit each step to be detailed. Overcoming time limitations requires focusing JIPOE on 

what is most important. COIN is normally protracted, so large databases can and should 

be built. 

 g. Determine Intelligence Gaps and Priorities. There will be gaps in existing 

databases and these gaps must be identified in order to initiate appropriate intelligence 

collection efforts. The IDAD strategy, stated intent, and PIRs establish priorities for 

intelligence collection, processing, production, and dissemination.

 h. Collect Material and Submit Requests for Information. Collecting data and 

incorporating it into JIPOE is a continuous effort. The intelligence staff initiates 

collection operations and issues requests for information to fill intelligence gaps to the 

level of detail required. When new intelligence confirms or repudiates previously made 

assumptions, the intelligence staff must inform the HN, COM, JFC, and other appropriate 

VIII-7 
Chapter VIII 

actors. When this occurs, all COIN participants should reexamine any evaluations and 

decisions that were based on those assumptions. 

For more detail on defining the OE see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 

Operational Environment.

SECTION B. STEP TWO 

4. Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment 

 This JIPOE step continues to develop a holistic view of the OE by analyzing the nonphysical and physical aspects of the OE, developing a systems perspective of relevant 

PMESII links and nodes. The JIPOE process for evaluating the physical aspects of the 

OE is generally the same as in any other operation, but must pay attention to how the 

physical aspects relate to the population and the insurgency. COIN operations require 

a detailed understanding of sociocultural factors and civil factors from three 

perspectives: the population, the insurgent, and the counterinsurgent.

5. Sociocultural Factors 

 To understand the population the following five sociocultural factors should be 

analyzed: society, social structure, culture, power and authority, and interests. 

 a. Society. JIPOE must consider societies or societal links to groups outside the 

operational area and the impact of society on the overall OE. 

 b. Social Structure. Understanding social structure provides insight into how a 

society functions and how to attempt to build HN legitimacy, address core grievances, 

conduct successful IO, and undermine insurgent popular support. Social structures are 

often described by racial and ethnic groups, tribes, institutions and organizations, and 

other groups and networks. 

 (1) Groups. Tensions or hostilities between groups may destabilize a society, 

be a root cause of an insurgency, or provide opportunities for insurgents. It is vital to 

identify major groups inside and outside the operational area, to include their formal 

relationships, informal relationships, divisions and cleavages between groups, and crosscutting ties. 

 (2) Races and Ethnic Groups. Of special note, racial or ethnic groups are 

often key sources of friction within societies and may be a root cause of insurgency or be 

a destabilizing influence. 

 (3) Tribes. Social roles, status, and norms form the foundation of the social 

structure affecting the populace and its perceptions. Tribes, clans, and kinship groups 

form another layer of identity for the population in COIN. In some cultures, loyalty to 

this layer of identity is the most powerful explanation for behavior. 

VIII-8 JP 3-24 
Operational Environment 

 c. Culture. Once the social structure has been thoroughly assessed, the JIPOE 

effort should identify and analyze the culture of the society as a whole and of each major 

group within the society. Culture is a system of shared beliefs, values, customs, 

behaviors, and artifacts that members of a society use to cope with their world and with 

one another. Where social structure comprises the relationships within a society, culture 

provides meaning within the society. 

 (1) Identity. Primary identities can be national, racial, and religious (specific 

examples could be tribe and clan affiliation). Secondary identities include past times or 

personal preferences. Individuals belong to multiple social groups which determine their 

cultural identities. Furthermore, people tend to rank order these identities depending on 

the importance they place on different groups. As a result, an individual’s cultural 

identities may conflict with one another, such as when tribe loyalty may conflict with 

political affiliation. 

 (2) Values and Attitudes. A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of 

conduct or end state of existence is preferable. Values may be in conflict within a 

society. Attitudes are affinities for, or aversions to, groups, persons, and objects. 

Attitudes affect perception, which is the process by which an individual selects, 

evaluates, and organizes information from the external environment. Counterinsurgents 

must understand how values and attitudes impact core grievances, public opinion, HN 

legitimacy, and support for insurgents. 

 (3) Belief Systems. Not only must counterinsurgents understand relevant belief 

systems, but they must avoid making arbitrary assumptions regarding what a society 

considers right and wrong, good and bad. 

 (4) Cultural Forms. Cultural forms are the outward expressions of the relevant 

culture. While not strictly dogmatic, cultural forms help define a culture, both for 

members and observers. Cultural forms include language, rituals, symbols, ceremonies, 

myths, and the cultural narrative. Understanding cultural forms of the relevant 

population (which may include several different cultures or combinations of cultures, 

each with their own forms) can be key to understanding the OE in COIN. The most 

important cultural form for counterinsurgents to understand is the narrative. 

 (a) Language. Communication requires more than just grammatical 

knowledge; it requires understanding the social setting, appropriate behaviors towards 

people of different statuses, and nonverbal cues. 

 (b) Rituals. It is vital for counterinsurgents to understand not only rituals, 

but the context in which they take place and the associated meaning or message. 

 (c) Symbols. Counterinsurgents should pay careful attention to the 

meaning of common symbols and how various groups use them. 

VIII-9 
Chapter VIII 

(d) Ceremonies. These are a formal act or set of formal acts established by 

customs, or authority, or just over time and can be associated with religious or state 

occasion. The behavior can follow rigid etiquette or a prescribed formality. Just as for 

rituals, it is vital to understand not only the ceremonies, but also their context and its 

meaning. 

(e) Myths. Myths are traditional stories of unknown origin passed on from 

generation to generation which serve to explain some phenomenon. They often greatly 

influence a given population’s perception of truth. The counterinsurgent must understand 

that some myths are as resilient as the truth, and can influence the TA either negatively or 

positively. 

(f) Narratives. A cultural narrative is a story recounted in the form of a 

linked set of events that explains an event in a group’s history and expresses the values, 

character, or identity of the group. Narratives are the means through which ideologies are 

expressed and absorbed by members of a society. 

 d. Power and Authority. There are four major forms of power in a society: 

coercive force, social capital, economic resources, and authority. There are formal and 

informal power holders in a society and neither can be neglected during COIN 

operations. JIPOE should analyze each group to identify its type of power, what it 

uses power for, and how it acquires and maintains power.

 (1) Coercive Force. Insurgents and other nongovernmental groups may 

possess considerable means of coercive force and often use it to gain power over the 

population. 

 (2) Social Capital. In a system based on patron-client relationships, an 

individual in a powerful position provides goods, services, security, or other resources to 

followers in exchange for political support or loyalty, thereby amassing power. 

Counterinsurgents must take these relationships into account when dealing with the 

population and their centers of influence. 

 (3) Economic Power. In weak or failed states, the formal economy may not 

function well. The informal economy refers to such activities as smuggling, black market 

activities, barter, and exchange. JIPOE must analyze how groups use economic power 

with the OE and how that power can be exploited during COIN operations. 

 (4) Authority. Understanding authority is vital to working with leaders to 

address core grievances, build HN legitimacy, and undermine insurgency. 

 e. Interests. Interests refer to the core motivations that drive behavior, which is a 

key issue during COIN operations. These include physical security, essential services, 

economic well-being, political participation, and core grievances. During times when the 

government does not function, groups and organizations to which people belong satisfy 

some or all of their interests that the government does not. Reducing support for 

VIII-10 JP 3-24 
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insurgents and gaining support for the HN government requires that the joint force 

understand the population’s interests.

 (1) Physical Security. During periods of instability people’s primary interest is 

physical security for themselves and their families. When HN forces fail to provide 

security or threaten the security of civilians, the population is likely to seek alternative 

security measures, which may include guarantees from insurgents, militias, or other 

armed groups. JIPOE should therefore determine whether the population is safe from 

harm, whether there is a law enforcement system which is fair and nondiscriminatory and 

which provides security for each group when no effective government security apparatus 

exists. 

 (2) Essential Services. Essential services provide those things needed to 

sustain life. Examples of these essential needs are food, water, clothing, shelter, and 

healthcare. Stabilizing a population requires meeting these needs. If the HN government 

provides reliable essential services, the population is more likely to support it. 

 (3) Economic Well-Being. A society’s individuals and groups satisfy their 

economic interests by producing, distributing, and consuming goods and services. 

Economic root causes of an insurgency may include the following: disenfranchisement, 

exploitative arrangements, and significant income disparity that creates or allows for 

intractable class distinctions. Operations or insurgent actions can adversely affect the 

economy, which can generate resentment against the HN government. Conversely, 

economic efforts can energize the economy and positively influence local perceptions. 

 (4) Political Participation. Many insurgencies begin because groups within a 

society believe that they have been denied political rights. JIPOE determines whether all 

members of the civilian population enjoy political participation; if ethnic, religious, or 

other forms of discrimination exist; and if legal, social, or other policies are creating 

grievances that contribute to the insurgency. 

 (5) Grievances. Resentment or frustration—real or perceived—may grow to 

become grievances. These grievances may become vulnerable to the insurgent narrative 

and exploitation. If the other two prerequisites for insurgency—leadership available for 

direction and lack of governmental control—are present, conditions exist for insurgency. 

A key point for COIN is consensus amongst all counterinsurgents on grievances and how 

to address them. JIPOE must determine the grievances of the population and the 

insurgents, and accurately distinguish between the two. The next step is to determine if 

these grievances are reasonable using subjective and objective criteria. 

For more detail on sociocultural factors see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of 

the Operational Environment, and FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency.

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Chapter VIII 

6. Civil Factors 

 Civil factors include ASCOPE. ASCOPE analysis will help determine COIN 

impact on neutral, adversarial, and friendly systems. 

 a. Areas. Areas are localities or physical terrains that have direct impact on the 

population and its activities. Examples include tribal regions, police districts, political 

boundaries, religious boundaries, territorial boundaries, military boundaries, polling 

stations, and government centers. Areas are where the population congregates.

 b. Structures. Structures are existing important infrastructure. Examples include 

hospitals, bridges, communications towers, power plants, dams, jails, warehouses, 

schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plants. For COIN, some cultural 

structures may be even more vital, such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and 

museums. Analysis of these structures includes determining why they are important 

with respect to their location, functions, capabilities, and application.

 c. Capabilities. Capabilities are key functions and services. They include, but are 

not limited to, administration, safety, emergency services, food distribution, agricultural 

systems, public works and utilities, health, public transportation, electricity, economics, 

and commerce. Sewage, water, electricity, academic, trash, medical, and security 

(SWEAT-MS) are the essential services local authorities must provide. Failure to 

provide essential services may give credibility to insurgents’ grievances, reduce HN 

credibility, and ultimately undermine COIN. This analysis must include who is 

officially and unofficially responsible for these functions and services. 

 d. Organizations. Organizations can be religious, fraternal, criminal, media, 

patriotic or service, and community watch groups. They include media, IGOs, NGOs, 

merchants, squatters, and other groups. Counterinsurgents must understand what 

organizations are important. 

 e. People. People include all nonmilitary personnel in the AOI. Analysts must 

consider historical, cultural, ethnic, political, economic, and humanitarian factors when 

examining a given population. Any affiliations may have tremendous effect on the local 

population’s support to an insurgency, including areas where people and insurgents may 

transit, retreat, evade, or hide. Populations such as squatters, the homeless, refugees, 

displaced persons, and outcast groups can also have an immense impact on the OE, and 

can be exploited by insurgents. In addition to sociocultural factors, JIPOE must 

determine how people communicate, who are key communicators, and other formal 

and informal processes used to influence the population. 

 f. Events. Events are routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that 

significantly affect the OE. Some examples are planting and harvest seasons, elections, 

changes in government, key leader succession, economic reforms, political reforms, 

holidays, observances, anniversaries of key historical events, riots, and trials. Events 

may spur an increase or decrease in insurgent attacks. For example, insurgents may 

VIII-12 JP 3-24 
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escalate violence to prevent an election, or insurgent activity may decrease during a 

harvest season as they assist the population. Combat operations, including indirect fires, 

deployments and redeployments, also affect the OE. JIPOE must determine when 

events are occurring and analyze the events for their political, economic, 

psychological, environmental, and legal implications.

7. Core Grievances, Prerequisites, and Drivers of Conflict 

 a. Core Grievances. JIPOE must determine the sources of frustration or anger 

within the population, from their perspective. These are the core grievances of the 

insurgency. Chapter II, “Insurgency,” discussed the five general categories of core 

grievances for insurgencies, although there often are multiple core grievances. These 

core grievances can be the basis of grievances among the population, and these 

grievances are key contributors to what makes a population vulnerable (one of the three 

prerequisites for insurgency). Additional core grievances may appear or the original core 

grievances may change over time, especially if the HN government’s actions further 

alienate the population. The general categories of core grievances are: identity, religion, 

economy, corruption, repression, foreign exploitation or presence, occupation, and 

essential services. Insurgents use grievances to communicate their cause through their 

narrative. 

 b. Prerequisites. JIPOE also must determine if the three prerequisites for 

insurgency are present: a vulnerable population, leadership available for direction, and 

lack of government control. When all three exist in an area, insurgency can operate with 

some freedom of movement, gain the support of the people, and become entrenched over 

time. 

For more detail on core grievances and prerequisites, please see Chapter II, 

“Insurgency.”

 c. Drivers of Conflict. Although core grievances, or prerequisites, all play a role in 

insurgency and conflict overall, other factors can perpetuate, exacerbate, and escalate 

conflict. These dynamic factors are drivers of conflict and may or may not be directly 

associated with insurgency. Drivers of conflict fall into several categories, including but 

not limited to: sectarian, political, religious, external pressure, criminal, terrorist, revenge, 

and extremist ideology. 

8. Develop a Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment 

 a. The development of a systems perspective of the COIN OE will require crossfunctional participation by other joint force staff elements and collaboration with all other 

participants in COIN efforts. 

For detail on a systems perspective, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 

Operational Environment. 

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Chapter VIII 

 b. Identifying relevant nodes. While most of individual nodes (people) and their 

links are not relevant at the strategic and operational levels, some individual nodes have 

tactical importance during COIN operations. Thus, the level of the systems analysis will 

affect what is a node and what is a system. 

 (1) Political Nodes. Due to the primacy of politics in COIN, these nodes are 

often the most important nodes. Competent insurgents will strive to gain influence and 

control of these nodes. Counterinsurgents strive to work with these nodes to address the 

core grievances of insurgency and build the legitimacy of the HN while simultaneously 

degrading or breaking links between insurgency and political nodes. 

 (2) Military Nodes. Insurgents purposely distribute and network these military 

nodes to protect them, especially from infiltration. The exception to dispersing its 

military nodes occurs when an insurgency becomes powerful enough relative to the 

COIN security forces that it can openly conduct operations with irregular, traditional 

forces, or a fusion of the two. Counterguerrilla efforts must focus on destroying or 

neutralizing insurgent military nodes as well as breaking or degrading links between 

insurgent military nodes. 

 (3) Economic Nodes. Economic nodes may be targeted by the insurgency to 

gain power, secure funding, and delegitimize the HN. Insurgents normally have covert 

control of economic assets, as open control of any economic nodes requires holding 

terrain. COIN focuses on protecting and developing economic systems and degrading or 

destroying insurgent economic systems, although the effect on the population must be 

considered when attacking insurgent economic systems. 

 (4) Social Nodes. Social nodes, like political nodes, are vitally important to 

successful COIN. Competent insurgents will strive to gain influence and control of these 

nodes. Counterinsurgents must always strive to work with these nodes to address the 

core grievances of insurgency and build the legitimacy of the HN. 

 (5) Infrastructure Nodes. Like economic nodes, infrastructure nodes may be 

targeted by the insurgency to gain power and delegitimize the HN, although covertly. 

COIN focuses on protecting and developing infrastructure systems and degrading or 

destroying insurgent infrastructure systems, although the effect on the population must be 

considered when attacking insurgent infrastructure systems. 

 (6) Information Nodes. The control or use of information nodes is another key 

struggle in COIN. Insurgents will attempt to use these nodes for subversion. They will 

also attempt to destroy or degrade information nodes that support the HN. 

Counterinsurgents must strive to support and maintain freedom of the information 

network (press, radio, TV, etc.) while building and protecting HN legitimacy. 

 

For more information on determining and analyzing node-link relationships, see JP 2-

01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

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SECTION C. STEP THREE 

9. Evaluate the Adversary 

 JIPOE uses the eight dynamics as a framework to analyze insurgencies. While each 

dynamic is important, analyzing their overarching interaction is essential to understand 

the insurgency holistically. The following paragraphs focus on JIPOE considerations for 

the eight dynamics: 

 a. Leadership. Insurgent leaders exploit the grievances of a vulnerable population 

to their end state. Leaders of insurgencies provide vision, direction, guidance, 

coordination, and organization. As discussed in Chapter II, “Insurgency,” insurgent 

leadership may be distributed, collective, or charismatic. Because the leaders’ 

personalities and decisions often determine whether the insurgency succeeds, JIPOE must 

identify them and analyze their individual beliefs, intentions, capabilities, and 

vulnerabilities. Important leader characteristics include the role in the organization; 

known activities; known associates; background and personal history; beliefs, 

motivations, and ideology; education and training; temperament; importance of the 

organization; and popularity outside the organization. It is also important to know if the 

insurgency has few leaders or if there is redundant leadership. 

 (1) Senior Leaders. Effective insurgent senior leaders provide cohesion and 

direction for the insurgency as a whole. Senior leaders in some insurgencies must 

communicate directly with insurgents for significant action, which leaves the insurgency 

vulnerable to penetration. Effective use of covert or clandestine communications, on the 

other hand, is the mark of effective insurgent senior leadership, as are decentralized but 

coordinated operations. Similarly, leaders who instill cohesion and discipline are also 

indicators of a capable insurgency. 

 (2) Subordinate Leaders. Subordinate leaders may include senior staff 

members, spokesmen, political leaders, guerrilla leaders, auxiliary leaders, underground 

leaders, and leaders of individual cells. Subordinate leaders in advanced insurgencies are 

organized and indoctrinated to act without constant guidance from the key insurgent 

leaders. If these individuals possess a high level of discipline and indoctrination, it is an 

indicator of an advanced insurgency. 

 b. Objectives. Insurgents have political objectives and are motivated by ideology, 

grievances, or power. Identifying insurgent objectives and motivations assists 

counterinsurgents in addressing both the conflict’s core grievances as well as the 

insurgency itself. There may be multiple insurgent groups with differing goals and 

motivations, which require separate monitoring of each insurgency’s objectives. 

Additionally, insurgent leaders may have different motivations from their followers, and 

insurgent leaders may change as well as the insurgency’s goals. Insurgents may also hide 

their true motivations to portray their efforts in a way that the population will be more 

supportive. JIPOE must identify insurgent strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. 

VIII-15 
Chapter VIII 

 c. Ideology. Ideology drives many facets of the insurgency. Most importantly, 

ideology drives the insurgent end state. The insurgency normally uses an ideological 

alternative to which the government cannot or does not provide. Insurgent ideology often 

explains the population’s grievances and how the insurgency will provide a resolution to 

those grievances. Ideology also provides justification for the insurgents’ actions. 

 (1) Addressing Core Grievances. What the insurgency says about its ability to 

address root causes is a key indicator of its end state, methods, and level of 

sophistication. This can help the counterinsurgent understand the core grievances in the 

area and people’s perception of their problems. Counterinsurgents should work with 

local leaders and the HN to address core grievances, increase HN legitimacy, and to preempt insurgent efforts to address the core grievances. 

 (2) Insurgent Perception. Ideology influences the insurgent’s perception of 

the OE and shapes its organization and methods. It acts as a prism or lens for the 

insurgency’s view of actors and activities. Insurgents may also work to reinforce or 

create false perceptions. An example is the perception that the government does not 

support a specific ethnic group. Counterinsurgents should use IO to address these 

insurgent efforts and ensure COIN actions do not reinforce false perceptions. Coalition 

partners should arrange for local leaders and the HN government to work together and 

allow legitimate leaders a voice in the government. Every action the counterinsurgent 

takes should be accompanied with an IO message with special emphasis on publicizing 

HN efforts and neutralizing the insurgent IO. 

 (3) Internal Ideological Conflict. Conflicting ideologies among the insurgents 

can create exploitable fracture points between different insurgent factions. Similarly, 

“external” ideologies can be exploited by working with the HN government using 

nationalist sentiments to expose the insurgents as “puppets of foreigners.” 

 d. Physical Environment. This dynamic is the holistic view of the OE from an 

insurgent perspective. Considerations of METOC and terrain should include how the 

current weather and aspects of the terrain affects operations as well as how climate, 

weather, seasons, and terrain affect the local inhabitants and the insurgent. Additionally, 

JIPOE must account for the different aspects of rural and urban areas. The OE in these 

areas will greatly influence the insurgent organization and tactics due to terrain, density 

of people, and location of government forces. An urban environment is a dynamic 

mosaic where insurgent objectives and tactics may vary by neighborhood and the 

insurgents can easily blend in to the population. Proximity to international borders may 

provide an insurgency with sanctuary or support. Rugged, inaccessible terrain with 

populations hostile to outsiders may provide sanctuary or support for insurgents as well. 

 e. External Support. External support to insurgency can provide political, 

psychological, and material resources that might otherwise be limited or unavailable. 

External support for an insurgency can be provided by a state, organization, or non-state 

actor. JIPOE must consider what type of support is being provided, how much support is 

being provided, and who is providing the support and why. Two key indicators of 

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external support are the presence of advisors with insurgents and supporters actively 

promoting the insurgent cause or strategic goals in international forums. 

 f. Internal Support. Internal support is essential for insurgencies. Insurgents 

recruit from and exploit vulnerable populations, and they often co-opt, coerce, deter, or 

marginalize other segments of the population. Internal support can be active or passive, 

open or hidden. This support may come from a small or large segment of the population. 

Internal support is especially important when insurgencies are latent or incipient, as they 

are attempting to grow and consequently are vulnerable. 

 g. Phasing and Timing. There are three basic phases to insurgencies: strategic 

defense, strategic equilibrium, and strategic offensive. There are several considerations 

with respect to phasing and timing. The insurgent leaders’ ability to shift the insurgent 

organization from one phase to another to support political-military goals is a key 

consideration. More capable leaders will be able to rapidly shift to adjust to the current 

situation in the concerned area. Another consideration is the insurgent ability to shift 

personnel geographically, often in response to counterinsurgent pressure. Advanced 

insurgencies will be able to shift rapidly and effectively. Finally, the insurgent ability to 

consolidate and reorganize is an indicator of how capable the insurgency is; however, the 

lack of guerrilla activity does not necessarily mean there are no insurgents. Leaders and 

other elements may temporarily remain underground but will reappear when conditions 

are favorable. During periods like this, counterinsurgents must continue to address core 

grievances. 

 h. Organizational and Operational Patterns. Every insurgency’s organization is 

unique; however, the type and level of organization are indicators of which approach it 

employs. Analyzing the organizational and operational patterns help the 

counterinsurgent to model and predict insurgent TTP. Understanding their organization 

also helps us to understand their capabilities and their potential targets. As discussed in 

Chapter II, “Insurgency,” insurgents have a military wing and a political wing as well as 

several elements. These elements include leaders, the underground, combatants, cadre, 

auxiliary, and a mass base. 

 (1) Insurgent Structure. Insurgencies can be structured in several ways, and 

each structure has its own strengths and limitations. The structure used balances the 

following: security, efficiency and speed of action, unity of effort, survivability, 

geography, and social structures and cultures of the society. An insurgency’s structure 

often determines whether it is more effective to target enemy forces or enemy leaders. 

Understanding an insurgent organization’s structure requires knowing if the insurgency is 

hierarchical or nonhierarchical, structured or unsystematic, centralized or decentralized, 

independent or part of a larger organization, and emphasizes political or violent action. 

Additionally, it is important to ascertain if the insurgency’s members are specialists or 

generalists. Organizations also vary greatly by region and time. Insurgent organizations 

are often based on existing social networks—familial, tribal, ethnic, religious, 

professional, or others. 

VIII-17 
Chapter VIII 

 (2) Insurgent Error. It should be noted that insurgents may be inept at the use 

of a given strategic approach. Alternatively, they may misread the OE and use an 

inappropriate approach. Knowledge of misapplication of approach or the use of different 

approaches by different insurgent groups may provide opportunities for counterinsurgents 

to exploit. It is imperative not only to identify insurgent approaches but also to 

understand their strengths and weaknesses in the context of the OE. 

10. Evaluating Insurgent Activities 

 JIPOE must carefully examine insurgent activities. Not only are insurgent activities 

indicators of what approach or approaches an insurgency is using, they will help 

determine what counters can be used. 

 a. Popular Support. Developing support early in an insurgency is often critical to 

an insurgent organization’s long-term survival and growth. As an insurgent group gains 

support, its capabilities grow. New capabilities enable the group to gain more support. 

Insurgencies that strive for acquiescence from the population desire freedom of 

movement and, consequently, the ability to expand their operations. Insurgents generally 

view popular support or acquiescence as a zero-sum commodity; that is, a gain for the 

insurgency is a loss for the government, and a loss for the government is a gain for the 

insurgency. 

 (1) Forms of Popular Support. Popular support can originate internally or 

externally and this support can be active or passive in nature. External support can take 

the form of finances, logistics, training, fighters, and safe havens. A state can provide 

passive external support as well. A foreign state passively supports an insurgency 

through inaction. Active internal support is usually the most important to an insurgent 

group. Passive internal support allows insurgents to operate and includes not providing 

information to counterinsurgents. 

 (2) Methods of Generating Popular Support. Insurgents generate popular 

support through persuasion, coercion, and encouraging overreaction. 

 (a) Persuasion. Insurgents can use persuasion to obtain either internal or 

external support. Forms of persuasion include charismatic attraction to a leader or group, 

appeal to an ideology, promises to address core grievances, and demonstrations of 

potency. Demonstrations of potency could be large-scale attacks or social programs for 

the poor. 

 (b) Coercion. Insurgents use coercion to either force people to support 

them or to acquiesce to insurgent activities. Insurgents can use violence or the threat of 

violence. Coercion is often very effective in the short term; however, coercion can 

undermine long-term insurgent efforts by alienating the population. 

 (c) Encouraging Overreaction. Encouraging overreaction refers to 

insurgents’ enticing counterinsurgents to use brutal and repressive tactics. This is 

VIII-18 JP 3-24 
Operational Environment 

especially harmful to COIN if the counterinsurgents focus the reaction on the population 

rather than the elusive insurgents, thus alienating the population. 

 

 (3) Critical Information. Unbiased analysis of the relative levels of popular 

support of the insurgency and the HN are critical to understanding the OE and planning 

COIN. This analysis must extend to specific segments of the population. The relative 

levels of support of other states, non-state actors, and criminal organizations are also 

important. 

 b. Support Activities. Support activities often make up the majority of insurgent 

efforts. These activities are often tied to an insurgency’s ability to generate popular 

support or external support. Safe havens, logistical areas, and training areas are key 

facilities for insurgent support activities. Logistics, finances, communications, recruiting, 

training, intelligence, and CI are key functions for insurgencies. 

 c. Information and Media Activities. Information and media activities are often 

an insurgency’s main effort, with violence used in support of IO. This is one effective 

asymmetric tactic in that it minimizes the insurgency’s materiel weakness and 

accentuates its potential sociocultural strengths, including the core grievances. Insurgents 

use information activities for several purposes—undermining HN legitimacy, 

undermining COIN forces’ credibility, excusing insurgent transgressions, generating 

popular support, and garnering external support. Insurgents try to broadcast their 

successes, counterinsurgent failures, HN failures, and illegal or immoral actions by 

counterinsurgents or the HN. Insurgent efforts need not be factual; they need only appeal 

to the intended audience. Additionally, insurgents often seek to influence the global 

audience by directly attacking international and US public support for the COIN effort. 

Overall, insurgent media efforts can use forms or mediums such as: word of mouth, 

speeches, handouts, newspapers, periodicals, books, audio recordings, video recordings, 

radio, TV, web sites, e-mail, blogs, mobile telephones, and text messaging. 

 d. Political Activities. Insurgents use political activities to achieve their goals and 

enhance their cause’s legitimacy. Competent insurgents link their political activities, IO, 

and acts of violence to achieve their goals. Political parties affiliated with an insurgent 

organization may negotiate or communicate on behalf of the insurgency, thereby serving 

as its public face. However, links between insurgents and political parties may be weak 

or easily broken by disputes between insurgents and politicians. In such cases, political 

parties may not be able to keep promises to end violent conflict. Some political parties 

may have much stronger ties to insurgencies. These ties can be hidden or overt. It is 

important to understand not only the links between insurgent groups and political 

organizations but also the amount of control each exerts over the other. 

 e. Violent Activities. Violent actions by insurgents include guerrilla warfare, 

terrorism, and conventional warfare, all of which may occur simultaneously. Terrorism 

and guerrilla warfare are usually planned to achieve the greatest political and 

informational impact with the lowest amount of risk to insurgents. JIPOE must analyze 

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insurgent tactics, insurgent targeting, how the insurgent organization uses violence to 

achieve its goals, and how violent actions are linked to political and informational efforts. 

 (1) Guerrilla Warfare. Guerrilla tactics feature hit-and-run attacks by lightly 

armed irregular forces. The primary targets are HN government activities, security 

forces, and other COIN elements. Guerrillas usually avoid decisive confrontations unless 

they know they can win. Instead, they focus on harassing counterinsurgents. Guerrilla 

tactics are neither mindless nor random, but focused on attrition of enemy capabilities 

and erosion of enemy will. 

 (2) Terrorism. Terrorism is a tool the insurgents often use to strike fear into 

the civilian and military populace. Terrorism is sometimes not a tactic unto itself but 

supports the insurgent’s strategic goals. Terror attacks generally require fewer personnel 

than guerrilla warfare or conventional warfare. They allow insurgents greater security 

and have relatively low support requirements. Insurgencies often rely on terrorist tactics 

early in their formation due to these factors. Terrorist tactics do not involve mindless 

destruction nor are they employed randomly. Insurgents choose targets that produce the 

maximum informational and political effects. 

 (3) Conventional Warfare. While insurgents may use conventional warfare, it 

is rare and not always necessary for success. These operations normally follow after the 

insurgency develops extensive popular support and sustainment capabilities. Only then 

can insurgents generate a traditional military force that can engage HN government 

forces. Building up a force capable of conducting conventional warfare usually requires 

significant external support as well. 

 f. Exploiting Insurgent Vulnerabilities. JIPOE should focus on insurgent 

vulnerabilities to exploit and strengths to mitigate. It is important to identify divisions 

between the insurgents and the populace as well as between the HN government and the 

people. Determining such divisions identifies opportunities to conduct operations that 

expand splits between the insurgents and the populace or lessen divides between the HN 

government and the people. 

For more information on insurgent vulnerabilities, see Chapter II, “Insurgency.”

11. Identify Adversary Centers of Gravity 

 Thorough and detailed COG analysis helps commanders and staffs to understand the 

systemic nature of the OE and the actions necessary to shape the conditions that define 

the desired end state. A thorough understanding of the insurgent ends, scopes, dynamics, 

approach, and activities are required to begin an insurgent COG analysis. The nature of 

the insurgent strategic ends is predominantly political and often more intangible than in 

traditional warfare. As a source of power or strength, COGs are inherently complex 

and dynamic; they can change over time. COGs consist of certain critical factors that 

may include intrinsic weaknesses. These critical factors help commanders identify and 

analyze COGs, formulate methods to neutralize or isolate them, and prevent them from 

VIII-20 JP 3-24 
Operational Environment 

influencing events. Insurgent COGs and critical factors also tend to be conceptual and 

moral, although an advanced insurgency that is able to engage in a war of movement and 

has a shadow government will have more tangible COG and critical factors. 

 a. Insurgent Centers of Gravity. The insurgent strategic COG is likely to be 

conceptual or moral, although the core grievances of the insurgency may well be 

physical. A strategic COG analysis will therefore highlight the insurgent’s ideology, 

motivations, and cause. Critical strengths and weaknesses are predominantly tactical and 

intangible in their nature. This also makes it difficult to determine which of the enemy’s 

critical strengths represent the true COG. The insurgent leaders or the underground 

might comprise a COG. In some cases, ideology should be considered an important part 

of the COG. The individual insurgent commanders and their forces in the countryside 

may in exceptional cases constitute an operational COG. At the operational level, 

insurgents rarely mass large forces to constitute a tangible operational COG. 

 b. Operational Level Example. A notional insurgency’s propaganda apparatus 

could represent an operational-level COG. The critical capabilities (CCs) necessary for 

the COG to function might include information collection, internal communications, key 

leaders of the apparatus, and dissemination methods. Without those capabilities, the 

propaganda apparatus has no potential for action and would not represent a COG. For 

those CCs to function, they in turn require certain conditions, resources, and means 

(critical requirements [CRs]) to be fully operational, such as internet access, radio 

stations, television stations, printing facilities, and collectors. Critical factors analysis 

identifies systemic vulnerabilities that, if attacked, influence the COG through the loss of 

CCs. The critical vulnerabilities (CVs), which the counterinsurgents could locate and 

gain control, could be the radio stations, television stations, and printing facilities. While 

efforts can be made against insurgent internet access and collectors, these would be much 

more difficult, if not impossible, to consistently deny the insurgent. 

 c. Using Critical Requirements and Vulnerabilities. CRs and CVs are 

interrelated. The loss of one CR may expose vulnerabilities in other CRs; the loss of a 

CR may initiate a cascading effect that accelerates the eventual collapse of a COG. The 

analysis of a COG and its critical factors will reveal these systemic relationships and their 

inherent vulnerabilities. In situations where a COG possesses multiple CVs, critical 

factors analysis helps commanders and staffs prioritize the vulnerabilities. Due to the 

complex nature of the insurgency and OE, CRs and CVs are often more difficult to 

identify and target. 

 d. Tactical Critical Requirements. The CRs that sustain a strategic or operational 

COG function are independent of the respective level of war. This exposes CVs to 

actions generated at any echelon. For example, an operational COG may rely upon 

certain CRs that are vulnerable at the tactical level of war. 

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Chapter VIII 

SECTION D. STEP FOUR 

12. Determine Adversary Courses of Action 

 The first three steps of the JIPOE process help to provide JFCs, subordinate 

commanders, and their staffs with a holistic view of the OE by analyzing the impact of 

the OE, assessing adversary approaches and tactics, and identifying adversary COGs. 

The fourth step of the JIPOE process builds upon this holistic view to develop a detailed 

understanding of the adversary’s plan and probable COAs. The insurgency’s overall 

approach, or combination of approaches, the insurgent senior leaders have selected to 

achieve their goals and their recent tactics are key indicators of their plan. From these 

indicators a model of the insurgent plan can be constructed. The final step is determining 

the COAs the insurgency may use. 

 a. Insurgent Plan. The insurgent plan is the way that the strategic approach is 

applied to create the conditions necessary to achieve the desired end state. Insurgents can 

accomplish this goal by maintaining preexisting adverse conditions or by creating those 

conditions. While the insurgents normally do not have a campaign plan in the same sense 

that US and multinational forces do, constructing a model of their actions in this form 

adds to understanding the insurgency, predicting insurgent COAs, planning a COIN 

operation, seizing the initiative in COIN, executing the overall COIN, and assessing a 

COIN operation. 

 (1) Collaborative Effort. Constructing a model of the insurgents’ plan 

requires participation and input from the HN, JFC, outside agencies, and the entire staff. 

Cultural understanding as well as judgment, experience, education, intelligence, boldness, 

perception, and character are required to effectively cooperate. It is imperative that the 

entire process be based on open discussion and intellectual honesty. Mirror imaging or 

biasing this process will result in not only a skewed enemy campaign plan, but it will 

skew all friendly efforts based on it. 

 (2) Model-Making. The process of constructing a model of the insurgents’ 

plan is an inductive and intuitive one. Constructing a model of the insurgents’ plan 

requires intelligence products and the previous steps of the JIPOE to build and 

subsequently update the model. The intelligence products and JIPOE are based on the 

insurgents’ actions, and building the model requires analyzing these products holistically 

and then inductively determining the insurgents’ logical LOOs. For example, insurgents 

that rely heavily on terrorism to gain the population’s acquiescence will have a terrorism 

logical LOO, or another insurgency may focus on propaganda and therefore may merit 

having a propaganda logical LOO that is separate from just subversion. 

 (3) Graphic Example. Figure VIII-2 graphically depicts two examples of an 

insurgent’s plans. The population can include the HN, coalition partners, and even the 

international community. Guerrilla warfare normally focuses on the military and law 

enforcement elements of the opposition. The insurgent end state is the sum of several 

conditions that the insurgents must change from current conditions. The insurgency does 

VIII-22 JP 3-24 
Operational Environment 

this though activities that successfully cause effects. The logical LOOs are the 

insurgency’s operational ways to cause effects to change the current conditions. 

Insurgents execute tactical actions simultaneously or sequentially along these logical 

LOOs. These tactical actions hope to cause effects in the overall OE. The effects or an 

accumulation of effects may occur simultaneously or sequentially, depending on the 

situation and the effectiveness of insurgent and counterinsurgent efforts. When tactical 

actions and their cumulative effects have successfully translated to the operational level 

to change all of the conditions, the insurgency will have reached its end state. The COIN 

OE is extremely dynamic, requiring flexible planning and execution and continuous 

analysis of desired conditions. 

 (4) Multiple Threats. If there are multiple insurgencies, this process of model 

making must be done for each insurgency or adversary. Once the models have been 

made for each adversary, they must be accounted for holistically or cumulatively. Thus, 

the intelligence community will incorporate this comprehensive view of adversarial end 

states, conditions, and logical LOOs into the intelligence estimate. The comprehensive 

view must be accounted for in the IDAD strategy and other subordinate COIN plans. 

TWO EXAMPLES OF INSURGENT PLANS

Recruitment & 

Finances

Recruitment & 

Finances

Terrorism Shadow 

Government

Subversion Subversion

Criminal Activity Assassination

Guerrilla Warfare Guerrilla Warfare

Information 

Operations

Information 

Operations

Objective Objective

Objective Objective

Objective Objective

Objective Objective

Objective Objective

Population Population

Figure VIII-2. Two Examples of Insurgent Plans 

VIII-23 
Chapter VIII 

VIII-24 JP 3-24 

 

 (5) Assessment and Adjustment. Once an initial model is constructed, it must 

be evaluated during the continuous assessment of operations. If necessary, the model 

should be updated, which could potentially cause the IDAD strategy and subordinate 

friendly plans to be modified accordingly. The dynamic nature of the COIN environment 

will often require tactical adjustments. Similarly, the operational level may require 

changes, although major changes in this area will normally be less frequent or sweeping. 

The strategic level, specifically the strategic approach, will normally change even less 

frequently than the operational level. 

 b. Insurgent Courses of Action. The insurgency plan model provides a disciplined 

methodology for analyzing the set of potential adversary COAs in order to identify the 

COA the adversary is most likely to adopt. However, insurgents may pursue many 

different tactical COAs within an operational area at any time, although these efforts will 

support the broader plan, and their tactical COAs change with both time and location. 

Insurgent tactics are the means to achieve tactical objectives in support of the plan. 

Insurgents base their tactical COA on their capabilities and intentions. Evaluating the 

support, information, political, and violent capabilities of insurgent organizations was 

discussed previously. The intentions come from goals, motivations, approach, culture, 

perceptions, and leadership personalities. However, insurgent tactical actions can have 

operational and strategic effects. This is because insurgent propaganda and media 

reporting can reach a wide and even global audience, multiplying the effects of insurgent 

tactical actions. 
CHAPTER IX 

PLANNING IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 

We need to stop planning operationally and strategically as if we were 

going to be waging two separate wars, one with tanks and guns on a 

conventional battlefield, the other with security and stabilization of the 

population... we should do extensive planning on how we will establish [or 

support] an indigenous host government, to include military and police 

forces, and how we will provide protection and essential services to the 

conflict population. The most critical initial problem in such a campaign will 

not be how to form [or support] a central indigenous government, but how 

to ‘clear, hold, and build.’ 

John J. McCuen, Colonel (Ret), US Army 

Hybrid Wars, March-April Military Review 2008

1. Counterinsurgency Planning 

 a. Influencing the Future. Planning involves thinking about ways to influence the 

future rather than responding to events. This involves evaluating potential decisions, 

actions, and shaping conditions in advance. Planning involves integrating these 

individual decisions and tasks together into creating potential effects, as well as 

examining the implications of these decisions, tasks, and effects. Planning involves 

thinking through the conditions and, through operational art and design, understanding 

how achieving the objectives will cumulatively reach the end state. 

 b. Planning Horizons. In general, a planning horizon refers to a future time or 

event associated with a specific planning effort. The farther into the future that plans 

reach, the wider the range of possibilities and the more uncertain the forecast of the future 

conditions. Because COIN operations require comprehensive solutions, planning 

horizons in COIN are normally longer than other operations, despite increased 

uncertainties associated with these longer planning horizons. During COIN, JFCs 

may plan in months and years, and subordinate units’ time horizons are similarly 

expanded in duration. Careful oversight of planning efforts must be maintained to avoid 

planning in too detailed a fashion too far into the future, which wastes time and effort. 

 c. Planning for Unified Action. Although there are many specific ways to counter 

insurgency, comprehensive planning efforts are essential for successful long-term COIN. 

While the joint force primarily contributes to the military instrument of national or 

coalition power, the joint force supports the other instruments. More specifically, the 

joint force supports the HN’s military COIN efforts, which is primarily the 

counterguerrilla effort (destruction or neutralization of the insurgent’s military wing), and 

this support to the overall counterguerrilla effort is vital to short- and long-term success 

of COIN. The unified action required to achieve the comprehensive solutions that will 

bring success during COIN operations, in turn requires interorganizational planning 

efforts among all interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental partners 

involved. The level of unity of effort in planning will vary from close coordination of 

IX-1 
Chapter IX 

operational plans to informal collaboration to sharing of information through third 

parties. Additionally, planning horizons for the partners that the JFC is supporting tend 

to be significantly longer than military planning horizons. The JFC must ensure that 

military planning complements planning conducted by interagency and other partners. 

This will require liaison and the nesting of operational plans to accommodate supported 

interagency objectives and longer planning horizons 

For more information on joint planning, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint 

Operation Planning. 

2. Levels of War and Counterinsurgency 

 a. The levels of war remain the same for any form of warfare, regardless of whether 

it is traditional, irregular, or a combination. The levels of war in COIN may be 

compressed and difficult to define. The tactical and operational levels in COIN may be 

compressed due to the protracted nature of the conflict and the complexity of the OE. 

The levels of war are not closely associated with echelons in COIN as they have tended 

to be in traditional warfare. For example, a Marine expeditionary force may be the basis 

of the operational-level headquarters in one theater while an Army corps may be the basis 

of the operational-level headquarters in another. Time horizons for COIN are extended at 

every level of war; it takes longer to achieve the objectives in COIN. 

 b. A COIN operation or campaign normally consists of a series of major tactical 

actions and operations of long duration. Tactical action in COIN is the direct link with 

the relevant population and gaining counterinsurgent credibility and HN legitimacy. The 

cumulative effect of tactical action translates to changing conditions. The operational 

and strategic levels in COIN are extremely sensitive to tactical actions. Tactical 

commanders should be empowered with the authority and capabilities they need. They 

must also understand their role in supporting the non-security LOOs led by civilian 

agencies, and the effects their security actions may have on those LOOs. Tactical COIN 

efforts are normally decentralized with a centralized vision and message. However, JFCs 

must avoid having a “strategy of tactics.” In other words, JFCs must have a plan within 

which tactical efforts nest. Additionally, JFCs must ensure that tactics are not used that 

win in combat but prevent operational or strategic success. 

 c. The COIN environment presents complex problems that have incomplete, 

contradictory, and changing requirements. The solutions to these problems are often 

difficult to recognize because of complex interdependencies. While attempting to solve a 

complex problem, the solution of one of its aspects may reveal or create another complex 

problem. 

3. Joint Operation Planning and Operational Design 

 a. Joint operation planning blends two complementary processes. The first is 

the JOPP. JOPP is an orderly, analytical planning process, which consists of a set of 

logical steps to analyze a mission, develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs, 

IX-2 JP 3-24
Planning in Counterinsurgency 

select the best COA, and produce a plan or order. JOPP underpins planning at all levels 

and for missions across the full range of military operations. Although the JFC can 

compress or extend JOPP steps in response to the urgency of the situation and complexity 

of assigned tasks, each planning step is relevant to any mission. The steps of JOPP 

facilitate interaction between the JFC, staff, and subordinate and supporting 

organizations, regardless of strategic objectives, the nature of the OE, and the type of 

operation (such as COIN). 

 b. The second process is operational design, the use of various design elements in 

the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a joint operation plan 

and its subsequent execution. Operational design helps expand and synthesize the 

intuition and creativity of the commander with the methodical and logical planning 

process. 

 c. While operational design is continuous throughout planning and execution, the 

process plays a particularly important early role in helping commanders and staffs 

visualize a broad approach to a solution rather than jumping prematurely to consideration 

of detailed, alternative COAs. A COIN operation can be more complex and its 

operational and strategic objectives more difficult to achieve than those of traditional, 

force-on-force military operations. The initial observable symptoms of an insurgency 

often do not reflect the true nature and core grievances of the insurgency, so the JFC and 

staff must devote sufficient time and effort early in planning to correctly frame the 

problem and design a broad approach to a solution. Line of operations, objective, center 

of gravity, and end state are design elements that are particularly important in the early 

design effort to help commanders and staffs visualize a joint operation’s framework. 

 d. Through early and continuous assessment during COIN execution, the staff and 

JFC monitor the OE and progress toward accomplishing tasks and achieving objectives. 

Assessment helps the JFC ensure that the design concept, concept of operations, and 

tasks to subordinate and supporting commands remain feasible and acceptable in the 

context of higher policy, guidance, or orders. If the current approach is failing to meet 

these criteria, or if aspects of the OE change significantly, the JFC may decide to revisit 

earlier design conclusions and decisions that led to the current design concept. This 

could result in small adjustments to current operations or in a significant reorientation 

involving new objectives and organizational realignments. The challenge in COIN, more 

than in traditional combat operations, is that changes in the OE are often more subtle and 

difficult to assess. Likewise, when the JFC revisits and changes the design decisions that 

drove the original plan’s concept of operations, execution of a new design and CONOPS 

typically will evolve slowly. See Chapter X, “Execution in Counterinsurgency,” for 

more information on assessment during COIN. 

 e. Elements of Operational Design. Operational design for COIN should reflect a 

comprehensive approach applicable to the phase or stage of the campaign. Because there 

is only one IDAD strategy or campaign, there should only be one operational design. 

This single design should incorporate all actors, with particular attention placed on 

interagency partners and HN participants, if there is a legitimate HN present. The 

IX-3
Chapter IX 

elements of operational design for COIN are superficially the same as for any joint 

planning effort, but the context and therefore their application are different. During 

execution, commanders and planners continue to consider design elements. Reframing 

may become necessary due to friendly, adversary, or other effects changing the OE 

significantly. This may be to adjust both current operations and future plans to capitalize 

on tactical and operational successes as the joint operation unfolds. 

 (1) Termination. If the joint force is supporting a HN’s COIN efforts, 

termination will depend on political discourse between the HN, the US, and other 

coalition members. This discourse is normally based on the projected security 

environment. The ends, core grievances, drivers of conflict, and leadership of an 

insurgency are also important factors. Insurgencies based on interest-based root causes, 

such as economic disparity or political corruption, may be persuaded or coerced back into 

a political process. Insurgencies based on ideology, ethnicity, or religious or cultural 

identities are value-based and their demands are more difficult to negotiate. Some 

insurgencies or groups of insurgencies will be both value- and interest-based. The drivers 

of conflict also impact the conditions necessary for termination. 

 (2) End State and Objectives. The end state normally will represent a point in 

time or circumstance beyond which the President does not require the military instrument 

of national power to achieve remaining objectives of the national strategic end state. The 

combined political and military nature of COIN, however, make the overall military 

end state very close or even the same as the national end state. Aside from its 

obvious role in accomplishing strategic objectives, clearly defining the conditions of the 

end states promotes unified action, facilitates synchronization, and helps clarify (and may 

reduce) the risk associated with the joint campaign or operation. In COIN, commanders 

should include both the national end state and the military end state in their planning 

guidance and commander’s intent statement. 

 (3) Effects. Identifying desired and undesired effects within the OE connects 

military strategic and operational objectives to tactical tasks. Combined with a systems 

perspective of the COIN environment, the identification of desired and undesired effects 

informs a holistic view of the OE. Counterinsurgents plan joint COIN operations by 

developing strategic and operational objectives supported by measurable strategic and 

operational effects and assessment indicators. Effects are useful in planning COIN; 

however, effects can be difficult to accurately predict given their highly 

sociocultural and political nature. The difficulty in predicting these effects 

reinforces the need for wide participation and lengthy discourse when planning 

COIN. 

 (a) Direct and Indirect. A direct effect is the first-order consequence of 

an action, and an indirect effect is a delayed consequence associated with an action. 

Indirect effects are often more important in COIN, which is one of the factors that 

tend to make COIN both protracted and difficult. These effects establish conditions, 

and counterinsurgents should determine the best sequence of actions to create these 

IX-4 JP 3-24
Planning in Counterinsurgency 

effects. Discourse should develop and refine the necessary conditions for success in 

COIN. 

 (b) Intelligence, Discourse, and Effects. Determining required effects 

requires a clear understanding of the desired end state and the current conditions, both of 

which require appropriate discourse to develop. JIPOE informs discourse and helps 

provide a holistic view of the current OE or, in other words, the current conditions. 

 (4) Centers of Gravity. COGs are inherently complex and dynamic in that 

they change depending on each belligerent’s objectives and the OE. Changes to COGs 

must be carefully planned for and analyzed. Changes to COGs often indicate a change in 

the nature of operations. JFCs consider not only the insurgents’ COGs, but also identify 

and protect their own COGs. Counterinsurgents must similarly determine the friendly 

strategic and friendly operational COGs. Critical factors analysis provides commanders 

with a detailed, systemic understanding of friendly and adversary COGs, and the 

knowledge to balance resources accordingly to protect them as the situation requires. 

See Chapter VIII, “Operational Environment,” for more information on COG and 

critical factors analysis. 

 (5) Decisive Points. Decisive points are a logical extension of COGs critical 

factors. Counterinsurgents should identify decisive points to leverage friendly 

capabilities to exploit insurgent vulnerabilities. A decisive point is a node, system, or 

key event that allows a marked advantage over an insurgent and greatly influences 

the outcome of COIN. Decisive points are not COGs; they are keys to attacking or 

protecting COG CRs. In COIN, this can be influential individuals in the population, 

and leader engagement and providing them security may provide the 

counterinsurgents an advantage over the insurgents. When it is not feasible to attack 

a COG directly, commanders focus operations to weaken or neutralize the CRs—

therefore critical vulnerabilities—upon which it depends. These critical vulnerabilities 

are decisive points, providing the indirect means to weaken or collapse the COG. 

Decisive points at the operational level provide the greatest leverage on COGs, where 

tactical decisive points are directly tied to task and mission accomplishment. 

 (a) Prioritization. COIN typically presents more decisive points than the 

joint force can control, destroy, or neutralize with available resources. Through critical 

factors analysis, commanders identify the decisive points that offer the greatest leverage 

on COGs. They designate the most important decisive points as objectives and allocate 

enough resources to create the desired results on them. Decisive points that enable 

commanders to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative are crucial. Controlling these 

decisive points during operations helps commanders gain freedom of action, maintain 

momentum, and dictate tempo. If the adversary maintains control of a decisive point, it 

may exhaust friendly momentum, force early culmination, or facilitate an adversarial 

counterattack. 

IX-5
Chapter IX 

 (b) Stability Decisive Points. Decisive points assume a different character 

during stability operations, which are a key part of COIN. These decisive points may be 

less tangible and more closely associated with critical events and conditions. For 

example, they may include repairing a vital water treatment facility, establishing a 

training academy for HN security forces, securing a major election site, or quantifiably 

reducing crime. While most of these decisive points are physical, all are vital to 

establishing the conditions for defeating an insurgency, addressing core grievances, and 

building HN capabilities, capacity, and ultimately legitimacy. 

 (6) Direct Versus Indirect. In theory, direct attacks against enemy COGs 

resulting in their neutralization or destruction is the most direct path to victory. It is 

often difficult or impossible to attack an insurgency’s strategic COG or operational 

COG; thus, COIN often requires an indirect approach. As a result, the insurgent’s 

CVs can offer indirect pathways to gain leverage over the insurgent’s COGs. In this way, 

JFCs employ a synchronized combination of operations to weaken insurgent COGs 

indirectly and over time by attacking CRs that are sufficiently vulnerable. 

 (7) Lines of Operations. Logical LOOs are a key tool for counterinsurgents to 

visualize the operational design as positional reference to insurgent forces may have little 

operational relevance. Each logical LOO represents a conceptual category along 

which the HN government and COIN force commander intend to “attack” the 

insurgent strategy and build HN government legitimacy. Logical LOOs describe the 

linkage of various actions on nodes and decisive points with an operational or strategic 

objective and the conditions of the end state. They also connect tasks and effects to 

nodes and decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective. COIN requires 

the synchronization of activities along multiple and complementary logical LOOs in 

order to work through a series of tactical and operational objectives to attain the 

military end state. The JFC should not organize the staff around LOOs. Figure IX-1 

depicts a set of example logical LOOs, some working through the population and others 

focused on the insurgents. 

 (a) Main Effort. Commanders may specify a logical LOO as the main 

effort. In this case the other LOOs shape the OE for the main effort. This prioritization 

may change as COIN creates or exploits insurgent vulnerabilities, insurgents react 

or adjust their activities, or the environment changes. In this sense, commanders 

adapt their operations not only to the state of the insurgency, but also to the OE. 

 (b) Interdependence. Success in one logical LOO reinforces successes in 

the others. Progress along each LOO contributes to attaining a stable and secure 

environment for the HN. Stability is reinforced by popular recognition of the HN 

government’s legitimacy, improved governance, and progressive, substantive reduction 

of the core grievances of the insurgency. There is no list of logical LOOs that applies 

in all COIN or all phases of COIN. Logical LOOs should be based on the holistic 

understanding of the OE and what must be done to achieve the end state. 

IX-6 JP 3-24
Planning in Counterinsurgency 

IX-7

 (8) Operational Reach. Operational reach is the distance and duration over 

which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities. Operational reach may 

be a factor in COIN if there are limitations set on the number, type, or general footprint 

of forces that can support a HN’s COIN efforts. Operational reach can also be a factor if 

the joint force faces insurgency when there is no HN. 

 (9) Simultaneity and Depth. Simultaneity refers to the simultaneous 

application of military and nonmilitary power against the adversary’s key capabilities and 

sources of strength. Simultaneity in COIN contributes directly to an insurgency’s 

erosion and ultimate collapse by addressing core grievances and placing more 

demands on insurgent military forces and functions than can be handled. 

Simultaneity also refers to the concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, 

operational, and strategic levels. For COIN, depth applies to time as well as to space. 

This reflects that most insurgencies protract the conflict by design. Because of the 

inherent tight interrelationships between the levels of war in COIN, commanders 

cannot be concerned only with events at their respective echelon, but must 

understand how their actions contribute to the military end state and the overall 

end state. 

EXAMPLE FRIENDLY LOGICAL LINES OF OPERATION

END STATE

Governance

HN Security Forces

Essential Services

Economic Development

Counterguerrilla Ops

Information Operations

Objective

Objective

Objective

Objective

Objective

Population

Figure IX-1. Example Friendly Logical Lines of Operations 
Chapter IX 

 (10) Timing and Tempo. The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo 

and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy. 

However, the COIN intelligence-operations dynamic ultimately determines the 

tempo that the counterinsurgents can maintain. Good intelligence will allow for 

successful operations that may in turn result in more usable intelligence. Given 

actionable, reliable intelligence and proper timing, counterinsurgents can dominate the 

action, remain unpredictable, and operate ahead of the insurgency’s ability to react. 

 (11) Forces and Functions. COIN should focus on addressing the core 

grievances and drivers of conflict in addition to defeating the insurgency as a military 

force (counterguerrilla operations). Defeating the insurgency as a military force consists 

largely of the counterguerrilla aspect of neutralizing or destroying the insurgent military 

wing. 

 (12) Leverage. Leverage is gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages 

across all domains and the information environment. Leverage can be achieved through 

asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against insurgent vulnerabilities and the 

concentration and integration of joint force capabilities. Leverage allows 

counterinsurgents to impose their will on the insurgency, increase the enemy’s dilemma, 

and maintain the initiative. 

 (13) Balance. Balance is the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and its 

operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. 

Balance refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the overall 

counterinsurgent force as well as the nature and timing of operations conducted. 

Balance is particularly challenging to achieve in an interagency campaign, where the mix 

of capabilities includes civilian agencies, and time horizons differ widely between the 

shorter-term focus of the JTF and the longer-term focus of the US embassy. Balance also 

refers to a proper balance of offense, defense, and stability operations. 

 (14) Anticipation. Anticipation is essential to effective planning and execution 

for COIN. Counterinsurgents must use intelligence to ascertain the insurgents’ approach 

and campaign plan, which will assist in anticipating insurgent activities. A shared, 

common holistic view of the OE aids counterinsurgents in anticipating opportunities and 

challenges. Knowledge of the population, friendly capabilities, insurgent and other 

adversarial capabilities, intentions, and likely COAs allows COIN to focus efforts on 

where they can best impact the situation. However, anticipation is not without risk, 

especially if insurgent deception is effective. 

 (15) Synergy. Counterinsurgents integrate and synchronize operations, forces, 

and capabilities in a manner that addresses the core grievances of insurgency, deals with 

the drivers of conflict, and neutralizes and defeats insurgents. This includes combining 

forces and actions to achieve concentration throughout the OE, culminating in achieving 

the objectives. Synergy in COIN consists of physical and psychological aspects. In the 

complex COIN environment, it is impossible to accurately view the contributions of any 

IX-8 JP 3-24
Planning in Counterinsurgency 

individual organization, capability, or the area in which they operate in isolation from all 

others. Each may be critical to success, and each has certain capabilities that cannot be 

duplicated. Commanders and JTF staff must work with the COM and embassy staff to 

develop mechanisms to synchronize the campaign plan and achieve civil-military synergy 

in operations. 

 (16) Culmination. Culmination has both an offensive and a defensive 

application and can occur at any level of war. Culmination may, during COIN or 

stability operations, form the erosion of national will, or the decline of popular support, 

pose questions concerning legitimacy or restraint, or create lapses in protection leading to 

excessive casualties. A well-developed assessment methodology is crucial to supporting 

the commander’s determination of culmination, both for insurgent and friendly actions. 

 (17) Arranging Operations. Counterinsurgents must determine the best 

arrangement of COIN operations to accomplish the assigned tasks and joint force 

mission. This arrangement often will be a combination of simultaneous and sequential 

operations to achieve the end state conditions. A variety of factors must be considered 

when determining this arrangement for COIN operations, including the 

population’s current view of counterinsurgent credibility, HN legitimacy, and the 

insurgents in general. The arrangement of COIN operations impacts the tempo of 

activities in time, space, and purpose. 

 (a) Phases. Reaching the end state for COIN requires the conduct of a 

wide array of operations over a protracted period. Consequently, the design of COIN 

operations normally provides for related phases implemented over time. Phasing helps 

visualize and think through the entire COIN effort and to define requirements in 

terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. The primary benefit of phasing 

is that it assists in systematically achieving objectives that cannot be attained all at once 

by arranging smaller, related operations in a logical sequence. Each phase should 

represent a natural subdivision of the campaign or operation’s intermediate objectives. 

Transitions between phases are designed to be distinct shifts in focus by the 

counterinsurgent force, often accompanied by changes in command relationships. 

The need to move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that a set of 

objectives are achieved or that the insurgent has acted in a manner that requires a major 

change in focus for the joint force and is therefore usually event driven, not time driven. 

Changing the focus of the operation takes time and may require changing priorities, 

command relationships, force allocation, or even the design of the operational area. 

While the phasing construct is a helpful planning tool, phases are not linear nor represent 

a clear-cut distinction in reality. Conditions in the operating environment may force 

returning or regressing to earlier phases, and various geographic areas within the theater 

may be in different phases at any given time, even within a single city. JFCs and joint 

forces must be agile in recognizing how conditions affect phasing. Similarly, they must 

be prepared to shift from military to civilian control based on the operating environment. 

 (b) Branches and Sequels. Many COIN operation plans require 

adjustment beyond the initial stages of the operation. Consequently, plans should be 

IX-9
Chapter IX 

IX-10 JP 3-24

flexible by having branches and sequels. Both branches and sequels are plans associated 

with the base plan, all of which are created using the initial problem frame. When 

transitioning to a branch or a sequel, counterinsurgents should examine if 

reframing the problem is required by the current conditions. 

 1. Branches. Branches are options built into the basic plan. Branches 

may include shifting priorities, changing unit organization and command relationships, or 

changing the very nature of COIN itself. Branches add flexibility to plans by anticipating 

situations that could alter the basic plan. Such situations could be a result of insurgent 

action, availability of friendly capabilities or resources, or many other potential 

situations. It is vital to prioritize COIN branch planning efforts with respect to the most 

likely and most dangerous branch plans. 

 2. Sequels. Sequels are subsequent operations based on the possible 

outcomes of the current operation — victory, defeat, or stalemate. In COIN, sequels can 

focus on different phases or shifting the overall approach. For example, unanticipated 

success might allow for a more indirect US approach, or defeat might require a more 

direct US approach to shore up HN security forces. 

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, for more detail on the 

elements of operational design.
CHAPTER X 

EXECUTION IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 

X-1 

1. Introduction 

 a. The Nature of Counterinsurgency Operations. COIN operations require 

synchronized application of military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, 

and civic actions. Successful counterinsurgents support or develop local institutions with 

legitimacy and the ability to provide basic services, economic opportunity, public order, 

and security. The political issues at stake are often rooted in culture, ideology, societal 

tensions, and injustice. As such, they defy nonviolent solutions from the parties 

involved. Joint forces can compel obedience and secure areas; however, they cannot by 

themselves achieve the political settlement needed to resolve the situation. Successful 

COIN efforts include civilian agencies, US military forces, and multinational forces. 

These efforts purposefully attack the basis for the insurgency rather than just its fighters, 

and comprehensively address the HN’s core problems. HN leaders must be purposefully 

engaged in this effort and ultimately must take lead responsibility for it. 

 b. Executing Counterinsurgency. There are many ways to achieving success in 

COIN. The components of each form of execution are not mutually exclusive. In fact, 

several are shared by multiple forms. These forms are not the only choices available and 

are neither discrete nor exclusive. They may be combined, depending on the 

environment and available resources, and they have proven effective. However, the 

approaches must be adapted to the demands of the local environment. Three examples 

are: clear-hold-build, combined action, and limited support. 

 c. General Patterns. COIN efforts normally require the joint force to create the 

initial secure environment for the population. Ideally, HN forces hold cleared areas. As 

the HN security forces’ capabilities are further strengthened, the joint force may shift 

toward combined action and limited support. As HN forces assume internal and external 

security requirements, US forces can redeploy to support bases, reduce force strength, 

and eventually withdraw. SOF and conventional forces continue to provide support as 

needed to achieve IDAD objectives. 

 d. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Conflict. COIN is fundamentally a 

counterstrategy for insurgency. While a counter effort, COIN does not concede the 

initiative. In fact, insurgency (which may include multiple individual insurgent groups) 

and COIN are in a constant struggle. Figure X-1 depicts with logical LOOs how the two 

sides conflict. The insurgents on the right attempt to work towards their end state from 

right to left. The counterinsurgents work towards their end state from left to right. Much 

“Learn and adapt. Continually assess the situation and adjust tactics, 

policies, and programs as required. Share good ideas (none of us is 

smarter than all of us together). Avoid mental or physical complacency. 

Never forget that what works in an area today may not work in that same 

area tomorrow.” 

David Petraeus, General, US Army 

Multinational Force-Iraq Commander’s Guidance 
Chapter X 

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY CONFLICT

LEGEND

END STATE END STATE

insurgency counterinsurgency

Objective

Objective

Objective

Objective

Objective

Objective

Objective

Objective

Objective

Objective

Population

Governance

Host Nation 

Security Forces

Essential 

Services

Economic 

Development

Counterguerrilla 

Operations

Information 

Operations

Recruitment & 

Finances

Terrorism

Subversion

Criminal Activity

Guerrilla Warfare

Information 

Operations

Figure X-1. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Conflict

of these efforts are focused on winning popular support or, in the insurgents’ case, 

forcing the population’s acquiescence. The population is depicted in the middle, 

although the size of the diagram does not indicate its importance. 

2. Clear-Hold-Build 

 A clear-hold-build operation is executed in a specific, high-priority area experiencing 

overt insurgent operations (see Figure X-2). It has the following objectives: create a 

secure physical and psychological environment, establish firm government control of the 

populace and area, and gain the populace’s support. Popular support can be measured in 

terms of local participation in HN programs and political systems to counter the 

insurgency and whether people give counterinsurgents usable information about 

insurgent locations and activities. 

X-2 JP 3-24 
Execution in Counterinsurgency 

CLEAR, HOLD, AND BUILD

Security

Forces Military

Police

Paramilitary

Core Grievances

Cycles of Violence

Underground

Auxiliary

Development 

and Security 

Sector 

Rule of Law Reform

Essential Services

Insurgent 

Elements

Guerrillas

Clear Hold Build

People

Development 

and Reform

Figure X-2. Clear, Hold, and Build 

 a. Key Areas. COIN efforts should begin by controlling key areas. Security and 

influence then spread out from secured areas. The pattern of this approach is to clear, 

hold, and build one village, area, or city—and then reinforce success by expanding to 

other areas. This approach aims to develop a long-term, effective HN government 

framework and presence that secures the people and facilitates meeting their basic needs. 

Success reinforces the HN government’s legitimacy. The primary tasks to accomplish 

during clear-hold-build are: 

 (1) Provide continuous security for the local populace. 

 

 (2) Eliminate insurgent presence. 

 

 (3) Reinforce political primacy. 

 (4) Enforce the rule of law. 

 

 (5) Rebuild local HN institutions. 

X-3 
Chapter X 

 b. Initial Focus. To create success that can spread, a clear-hold-build operation 

should not begin by assaulting the main insurgent stronghold. However, some cases may 

require attacks to disrupt such strongholds, even if counterinsurgents cannot clear and 

hold the area. “Disrupt and leave” may be needed to degrade the insurgents’ ability to 

mount attacks against cleared areas. Clear-hold-build objectives require considerable 

resources and time. US and HN commanders should prepare for a long-term effort. All 

operations require unity of effort by civil authorities, intelligence agencies, and security 

forces. Coherent IO are also needed. 

 c. Expansion. Clear-hold-build operations should expand outward from a secure 

base where the population supports the government effort and where security forces are 

in firm control. No population subjected to the intense organizational efforts of an 

insurgent organization can be won back until certain conditions are created: 

 (1) The counterinsurgent forces are clearly superior to forces available to the 

insurgents. 

 (2) Enough nonmilitary resources are available to effectively carry out all 

essential improvements needed to provide basic services and control the population. 

 (3) The insurgents are cleared from the area. 

 (4) The insurgent organizational infrastructure and its support have been 

neutralized or eliminated. 

 (5) A HN government presence is established to replace the insurgents’ 

presence, and the local populace willingly supports this HN presence. 

3. Clear 

 The following discussion describes some examples of activities involved in the clearhold-build approach (see Figure X-2). Its execution involves activities across all logical 

LOOs. There can be overlap between steps—especially between hold and build, where 

relevant activities are often conducted simultaneously. For COIN, clear is a task that 

requires the commander to remove all guerrilla forces and eliminate organized resistance 

in an assigned area. The force does this by destroying, capturing, or forcing the 

withdrawal of guerrilla combatants. This task is most effectively initiated by a clear-inzone or cordon-and-search operation. This operation’s purpose is to disrupt insurgent 

forces and force a reaction by major insurgent elements in the area. Commanders employ 

a combination of offensive small-unit operations. These may include area saturation 

patrolling that enables the force to defeat insurgents in the area, interdiction ambushes, 

and targeted raids. Counterinsurgents must take great care in the clear stage to avoid 

destruction or disruption of civilian homes and businesses. Collateral damage, 

indiscriminate targeting, or driving people out of their homes and business in order to 

establish military headquarters in preparation for the hold stage, even when accompanied 

X-4 JP 3-24 
Execution in Counterinsurgency 

by compensation, can have negative second and third order effects, particularly when not 

accompanied by an effective SC strategy. 

 a. Initial Effort. Clear is an offensive operation that is only the beginning, not the 

end state. Eliminating insurgent forces does not remove the entrenched insurgent 

infrastructure. While their infrastructure exists, insurgents continue to recruit among the 

population, attempt to undermine the HN government, and try to coerce the populace 

through intimidation and violence. After insurgent forces have been eliminated, 

removing the insurgent infrastructure begins. This should be done so as to minimize the 

impact on the local populace. Rooting out such infrastructure is essentially a police 

action that relies heavily on military and intelligence forces until HN police, courts, and 

legal processes can assume responsibility for law enforcement within the cleared area. 

 b. Isolation and Pursuit. If insurgent forces are not eliminated but instead are 

expelled or have broken into smaller groups, they must be prevented from reentering the 

area or reestablishing an organizational structure inside the area. Once counterinsurgents 

have established their support bases, security elements cannot remain static. They should 

be mobile and establish a constant presence throughout the area. Offensive and stability 

operations are continued to maintain gains and set the conditions for future activities. 

These include isolating the area to cut off external support and to kill or capture escaping 

insurgents; conducting periodic patrols to identify, disrupt, eliminate, or expel insurgents; 

and employing security forces and government representatives throughout the area to 

secure the populace and facilitate follow-on stages of development. 

 c. Information Operations. Operations to clear an area are supplemented by IO 

focused on two key audiences: the local populace and the insurgents. The message to the 

populace focuses on gaining and maintaining their overt support for the COIN effort. 

This command theme is that the continuous security provided by US and HN forces is 

enough to protect the people from insurgent reprisals for their cooperation. Conversely, 

the populace should understand that actively supporting the insurgency will prolong 

combat operations, creating a risk to themselves and their neighbors. The command 

message to the insurgents focuses on convincing them that they cannot win and that the 

most constructive alternatives are to surrender or cease their activities. 

4. Hold 

 Ideally HN forces or combined HN and coalition forces execute the hold portion of 

clear-hold-build approach (see Figure X-2). Establishment of security forces in bases 

among the population furthers the continued disruption, identification, and elimination of 

the local insurgent leadership and infrastructure. The success or failure of the effort 

depends, first, on effectively and continuously securing the populace and, second, on 

effectively reestablishing a HN government presence at the local level. Measured 

offensive operations continue against insurgents as opportunities arise, but the main effort 

is focused on the population. 

X-5 
Chapter X 

 a. Protecting Key Infrastructure. Key infrastructure must be secured. Since 

resources are always limited, parts of the infrastructure vital for stability and vulnerable 

to attack receive priority for protection. These critical assets should be identified during 

planning. For instance, a glassmaking factory may be important for economic recovery, 

but it may not be at risk of insurgent attack and therefore may not require security. 

 b. Target Audiences. There are four key TAs during the hold stage: 

 (1) Population. 

 (2) Insurgents. 

 (3) COIN force. 

 (4) Regional and international audiences. 

 (a) Population-Focused Themes and Messages. IO should also 

emphasize that security forces will remain until the current situation is resolved or stated 

objectives are attained. This message of a persistent presence can be reinforced by 

structuring contracts with local people for supply or construction requirements. Themes 

and messages to the population should affirm that security forces supporting the HN 

government are in the area to accomplish the following: 

 1. Protect the population from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and 

reprisals. 

 2. Eliminate insurgent leaders and infrastructure. 

 3. Improve essential services where possible. 

 4. Reinstate HN government presence. 

 (b) Insurgent-Focused Themes and Messages. The IO message to the 

insurgents is to surrender or leave the area. IO emphasizes the permanent nature of the 

government victory and presence. The HN government might try to exploit success by 

offering a local amnesty. Insurgent forces will probably not surrender in great numbers, 

but they may temporarily cease hostile actions against the HN government agencies in 

the area. The insurgents will fade into the population when not actively operating, thus 

making them difficult to detect. 

 (c) Counterinsurgent-Focused Themes and Messages. The 

commander’s message to the COIN force should explain changes in missions and 

responsibilities associated with creating or reinforcing the HN government’s legitimacy. 

The importance of protecting the populace, gaining people’s support by assisting them, 

and using measured force when fighting insurgents should be reinforced and understood. 

X-6 JP 3-24 
Execution in Counterinsurgency 

 c. Purpose of Hold Operations. Operations during this stage are designed to: 

 (1) Continuously secure the people and separate them from the insurgents. 

 (2) Establish a firm government presence and control over the area and 

populace. 

 

 (3) Recruit, organize, equip, and train local security forces. 

 (4) Establish a government political apparatus to replace the insurgent 

apparatus. 

 (5) Develop a dependable network of sources by authorized intelligence agents. 

 d. Execution. Major actions occurring during this stage include: 

 (1) Designating and allocating area-oriented counterinsurgent forces to continue 

offensive operations. Other forces that participated in clearing actions are released or 

assigned to other tasks. 

 (2) A thorough population screening to identify and eliminate remaining 

insurgents and to identify any lingering insurgent support structures. 

 (3) In coordination with USAID or other USG civilian agencies, conducting 

area assessment to determine available resources and the populace’s needs. Local leaders 

should be involved. 

 (4) Environmental improvements designed to convince the populace to support 

the HN government, participate in securing their area, and contribute to the 

reconstruction effort. 

 (5) Engaging local paramilitary security forces to seek their cooperation and 

inclusion in the HN security structure. From the outset, counterinsurgents must consider 

implications for DDR to avoid arming a group that may return to the insurgency if 

counterinsurgent support ends without a viable alternative for the group. 

 (6) Establishing a communications system that integrates the area into the HN 

communications grid and system. 

5. Build 

 Progress in building support for the HN government requires protecting the local 

populace (see Figure X-2). People who do not believe they are secure from insurgent 

intimidation, coercion, and reprisals will not risk overtly supporting COIN efforts. The 

populace decides when it feels secure enough to support COIN efforts. 

X-7 
Chapter X 

 a. Protecting the Population. To protect the populace, HN security forces 

continuously conduct patrols and use measured force against insurgent targets of 

opportunity. Contact with the people is critical to the local COIN effort’s success. 

Actions to eliminate the remaining covert insurgent political infrastructure must be 

continued; an insurgent presence will continue to threaten and influence people. 

 b. Tasks. Tasks that provide an overt and direct benefit for the community are key, 

initial priorities. Special funds (or other available resources) should be available to pay 

wages to local people to do such beneficial work. Accomplishing these tasks can begin 

the process of establishing HN government legitimacy. Sample tasks include: 

 (1) Collecting and clearing trash from the streets. 

 (2) Removing or painting over insurgent symbols or colors. 

 (3) Building and improving roads. 

 (4) Digging wells. 

 (5) Preparing and building an indigenous local security force. 

 (6) Securing, moving, and distributing supplies. 

 (7) Providing guides, sentries, and translators. 

 (8) Building and improving schools and similar facilities in coordination with 

the local population, HN, and other actors. 

 (9) Providing essential health services. 

 (10) Developing of local and regional markets. 

 c. Population Control Measures. Population control includes determining who 

lives in an area and what they do. This task requires determining societal relationships—

family, clan, tribe, interpersonal, and professional. Establishing control normally begins 

with conducting a census and issuing identification cards and family records. A census is 

an extremely complex evolution. Conducting a census can be complicated by the fear of 

the population of being identified with a certain group and/or a history of ethnic or 

religious oppression from a previous government. Census records can provide 

information regarding real property ownership, relationships, and business associations. 

The COM/country team can be requested to assist with appropriate tasks such as 

advertising and a detailed plan for execution. 

 (1) Other population control measures include: 

 (a) Curfews. 

X-8 JP 3-24 
Execution in Counterinsurgency 

 (b) A pass system (for example, one using travel permits or registration 

cards) administered by security forces or civil authorities. 

 (c) Limits on the length of time people can travel. 

 (d) Limits on the number of visitors from outside the area combined with a 

requirement to register them with local security forces or civil authorities. 

 (e) Checkpoints along major routes to monitor and enforce compliance 

with population control measures. 

 (2) Explanation. The HN government should explain and justify new control 

measures to the affected population. People need to understand what is necessary to 

protect them from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals. Once control measures 

are in place, the HN government should have an established system of punishments for 

offenses related to them. These should be announced and enforced. The HN should 

establish this system to ensure uniform enforcement and conformity with the rule of law 

throughout its territory. The HN government must be able to impose fines and other 

punishments for such civil infractions. 

 (3) Insurgent Counterefforts. Insurgents may try to force people to destroy 

their identification cards. The benefits of retaining identification cards must be enough to 

motivate people to resist losing them. Insurgents may participate in the census to obtain 

valid identification cards. Requiring applicants to bring two men from outside their 

family to swear to their identity, for instance, can reduce this probability. 

Counterinsurgents must use all assets at their disposal – sociocultural experts, 

intelligence, etc. – to ensure that the witnesses are not members of the insurgency 

swearing to the identity of a fellow insurgent. Those who affirm the status of an 

applicant are accountable for their official statements made on behalf of the applicant. 

Identification cards should have a code that indicates where the holders live. 

 d. Increasing Popular Support. Counterinsurgents should use every opportunity to 

help the populace and meet its needs and expectations. Projects to improve economic, 

social, cultural, and health needs can begin immediately. Actions speak louder than 

words. Once the insurgent political infrastructure is destroyed and local leaders begin to 

establish themselves, necessary political reforms can be implemented. These aspects of 

COIN should ideally be led by civilian agencies, IGOs, or NGOs, with the military in a 

supporting role. The JFC should coordinate actions in these areas with the COM and the 

country team. Other important tasks include the following: 

 (1) Establishing HN government agencies to perform routine administrative 

functions and begin improvement programs. 

X-9 
Chapter X 

 (2) Providing HN government support to those willing to participate in 

reconstruction. Selection for participation should be based on need and ability to help. 

People should also be willing to secure what they create. 

 (3) Beginning efforts to develop regional and national consciousness and 

rapport between the population and its government. Efforts may include participating in 

local elections, making community improvements, forming youth clubs, and executing 

other projects. 

 (4) Providing systems for safely reporting adversary or friendly acts of 

intimidation, violence, crime, and corruption. 

 e. Information Operations. Commanders can use IO to increase popular support. 

Command messages are addressed to the populace, insurgents, and counterinsurgents. 

 (1) Population-Focused Messages. The IO message to the population has 

three facets: 

 (a) Obtaining the understanding or approval of security force actions that 

affect the populace, such as control measures or a census. Tell the people what forces are 

doing and why they are doing it. 

 (b) Establishing HUMINT sources that lead to identification and 

destruction of any remaining insurgent infrastructure in the area. 

 (c) Winning over passive or neutral people by demonstrating how the HN 

government is going to make their life better. 

 (2) Insurgent-Focused Messages and Themes. The IO message to insurgents 

should aim to create divisions between the movement leaders and the mass base by 

emphasizing failures of the insurgency and successes of the government. Success is 

indicated when insurgents abandon the movement and return to work with the HN 

government. 

 (3) Counterinsurgent-Focused Messages and Themes. Commanders should 

emphasize that counterinsurgents must remain friendly towards the populace while 

staying vigilant against insurgent actions. Commanders must ensure all forces 

understand the ROE, which become more restrictive as peace and stability return. 

 (4) Timeliness of Messages and Themes. Commanders should afford 

sufficient latitude to subordinates to enable them to generate IO messages in a timely 

manner that is ahead of insurgent propaganda. 

 f. Key Tasks. The most important activities during the build stage are conducted by 

nonmilitary agencies. HN government representatives reestablish political offices and 

normal administrative procedures. National and international development agencies 

X-10 JP 3-24 
Execution in Counterinsurgency 

rebuild infrastructure and key facilities. Local leaders are developed and given authority. 

Life for the area’s inhabitants begins to return to normal. Activities along the combat 

operations/civil security operations logical LOO and HN security force LOO become 

secondary to those involved in essential services and good governance LOOs. 

6. Combined Action 

 Combined action is a technique that involves joining US and HN ground troops in a 

single organization, usually a platoon or company, to conduct COIN operations. This 

technique is appropriate in environments where large insurgent forces do not exist or 

where insurgents lack resources and freedom of maneuver. Combined action normally 

involves joining a US rifle squad or platoon with a HN platoon or company, respectively. 

Commanders use this approach to hold and build while providing a persistent 

counterinsurgent presence among the populace. This approach attempts to first achieve 

security and stability in a local area, followed by offensive operations against insurgent 

forces now denied access or support. Combined action units are not designed for 

offensive operations themselves and rely on more robust combat units to perform this 

task. Combined action units can also establish mutual support among villages to secure a 

wider area. 

 a. Security Situation. A combined action program can work only in areas with 

limited insurgent activity. The technique should not be used to isolate or expel a wellestablished and supported insurgent force. Combined action is most effective after an 

area has been cleared of armed insurgents. 

 b. Influencing Factors. The following geographic and demographic factors can 

also influence the likelihood of success: 

 (1) Towns relatively isolated from other population centers are simpler to 

secure continuously. 

 (2) Towns and villages with a limited number of roads passing through them are 

easier to secure than those with many routes in and out. All approaches must be guarded. 

 (3) Existing avenues of approach into a town should be observable from the 

town. Keeping these areas under observation facilitates interdiction of insurgents and 

control of population movements. 

 (4) The local populace should be small and constant. People should know one 

another and be able to easily identify outsiders. In towns or small cities where this is not 

the case, a census is the most effective tool to establish initial accountability for 

everyone. 

 (5) Combined action or local defense forces must establish mutual support with 

forces operating in nearby towns. Quick reaction forces (ground maneuver or air 

X-11 
Chapter X 

assault), fires, close air support, and medical evacuation should be quickly available. 

Engineer and explosive ordnance disposal assets should also be available. 

 c. Relationships. Combined action unit members must develop and build positive 

relationships with their associated HN security forces and with the town leadership. By 

living among the people, combined action units serve an important purpose. They 

demonstrate the commitment and competence of counterinsurgents while sharing 

experiences and relationships with local people. These working relationships build trust 

and enhance the HN government’s legitimacy. To build trust further, US members 

should ask HN security forces for training on local customs, key terrain, possible 

insurgent hideouts, and relevant cultural dynamics. HN forces should also be asked to 

describe recent local events. 

 d. Command and Control Architecture. Combined action units are integrated 

into a regional scheme of mutually supporting security and influence; however, they 

should remain organic to their parent unit. Positioning reinforced squad-sized units 

among HN citizens creates a dispersal risk. Parent units can mitigate this risk with oncall reserve and reaction forces along with mutual support from adjacent villages and 

towns. 

 e. Integration. Thoroughly integrating US and HN combined action personnel 

supports the effective teamwork critical to the success of each team and the overall 

program. US members should be drawn from some of the parent unit’s best personnel. 

Designating potential members before deployment facilitates the training and team 

building needed for combined action unit success in theater. Preferably, team members 

should have had prior experience in the HN. Other desirable characteristics include: 

 (1) The ability to operate effectively as part of a team. 

 (2) Strong leadership qualities, among them: 

 

 (a) Communicating clearly. 

 (b) Maturity. 

 (c) Leading by example. 

 (d) Making good decisions. 

 (3) Ability to apply the commander’s intent in the absence of orders. 

 (4) Possession of cultural awareness and understanding of the HN environment. 

 (5) The absence of obvious prejudices. 

 (6) Mutual respect when operating with HN personnel. 

X-12 JP 3-24 
Execution in Counterinsurgency 

 (7) Experience with the HN language, the ability to learn languages, or support 

of reliable translators. 

 (8) Patience and tolerance when dealing with language and translation barriers. 

 f. Tasks. Appropriate tasks for combined action units include, but are not limited 

to, the following: 

 (1) Helping HN security forces maintain entry control points. 

 (2) Providing reaction force capabilities through the parent unit. 

 (3) Conducting multinational, coordinated day and night patrols to secure the 

town and area. 

 (4) Facilitating local contacts to gather information in conjunction with local 

HN security force representatives. (Ensure information gathered is made available 

promptly and on a regular basis to the parent unit for timely fusion and action.) 

 (5) Training HN security forces in leadership and general military subjects so 

they can secure the town or area on their own. 

 (6) Conducting operations with other multinational forces and HN units, if 

required. 

 (7) Operating as a team with HN security forces to instill pride, leadership, and 

patriotism. 

 

 (8) Assisting HN government representatives with civic action programs to 

establish an environment where the people have a stake in the future of their town and 

nation. 

 (9) Protecting HN judicial and government representatives and helping them 

establish the rule of law. 

7. Limited Support 

 Not all COIN efforts require large combat formations. In many cases, US support is 

limited, focused on missions like advising security forces and providing fire support or 

sustainment. The longstanding US support to the Philippines is an example of such 

limited support. The limited support approach focuses on building HN capability and 

capacity. Under this approach, HN security forces are expected to conduct combat 

operations, including any clearing and holding missions. This is an indirect approach to 

COIN and is COIN in support of FID. 

X-13 
Chapter X 

See JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, for more information. 

8. Targeting in Counterinsurgency 

 Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the 

appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. The 

targeting process facilitates achieving effects that support the logical LOOs in a COIN 

campaign plan. Targeting is conducted for all COIN efforts, not just attacks against 

the insurgent military wing (counterguerrilla operations). The targeting process can 

support IO, CMO, and even meetings between commanders and HN leaders. Targeting 

also links intelligence, plans, and operations across all levels of command. Targeting 

encompasses many processes, all linked and logically guided by the joint targeting cycle, 

that continuously seek to analyze, identify, develop, validate, assess, and prioritize targets 

for engagement in order to achieve the commander’s objectives and end state. 

 a. Purpose. The purpose of targeting is to integrate and synchronize efforts. 

Targeting provides an iterative methodology for the development, planning, execution, 

and assessment in supporting objectives. Targeting in COIN is a unified action that 

involves participation from all appropriate elements. 

 b. Focus. The focus for COIN targeting is on people, both insurgents and civilians. 

There are several different potential targets that can link objectives with effects in COIN. 

These can include, but are not limited to, insurgents, insurgent internal support structure, 

insurgent external support systems, and, when directly supporting insurgent operations, 

HN governance, HN security forces, and other HN functions. Effective targeting 

identifies the targeting options, both lethal and nonlethal, to create effects that support the 

commander’s objectives. Some targets are best addressed with lethal means, while other 

targets are best engaged with nonlethal means. Having nonlethal weapons available 

during CMO, FID, and humanitarian operations when dealing with crowd control and 

individuals with unknown intent, can be beneficial. Other nonlethal options include IO, 

negotiation, political programs, economic programs, social programs, and other 

noncombat methods. Creating effects with nonlethal weapons and other means in COIN 

will discourage, delay, and prevent hostile actions; limit escalation of violence; provide 

force options when lethal force in not preferred or authorized; enhance long term force 

protection; and reduce collateral damage that will help decrease post-conflict costs of 

reconstruction. 

 c. Targeting Cycle. The joint targeting cycle is an iterative process that is not timeconstrained, and steps may occur concurrently, but it provides a helpful framework to 

describe the steps that must be satisfied to successfully conduct joint targeting (see Figure 

X-3). An effective, disciplined joint targeting cycle helps minimize undesired effects and 

reduces inefficient actions during COIN. 

For more information on targeting, see JP 3-60 Joint Targeting.

X-14 JP 3-24 
Execution in Counterinsurgency 

JOINT TARGETING CYCLE

1. End State and 

Commander's 

Objectives

2. Target 

Development and 

Prioritization

3. Capabilities 

Analysis

4. Commander's 

Decision and Force 

Assignment

5. Mission 

Planning and 

Force Execution

6. Assessment

Figure X-3. Joint Targeting Cycle 

9. Joint Assessment and Counterinsurgency 

 Effective assessment in COIN operations is necessary for counterinsurgents to 

recognize changing conditions and determine their meaning. It is crucial to successfully 

adapt to the changing situation. A continuous discourse among counterinsurgents at all 

echelons provides the feedback the senior leadership needs to refine the design (see 

Figure X-4). 

 a. Reframing. In an ideal world, the commander of military forces engaged in 

COIN operations would enjoy clear and well-defined goals for the operation or campaign 

from the very beginning. However, the reality is that many goals emerge only as the 

operation or campaign develops. For this reason, counterinsurgents usually have a 

combination of defined and emerging goals toward which to work. Likewise, the 

complex problems encountered during COIN operations can be so difficult to understand 

that a clear design cannot be developed initially. Often, the best choice is to create 

iterative solutions to better understand the problem. In this case, these iterative solutions 

allow the initiation of intelligent interaction with the environment. 

X-15 
Chapter X 

EXECUTION, ASSESSMENT, AND REFRAMING

“Are we doing the 

right things?”

“Are changes needed?”

“Are we doing 

things right?”

“How have the 

conditions 

changed?”

“Have we achieved 

our objective?”

Task Task Task Task Task Task

MOE

Logical LOO

DESIGN

Inform

 Indicators

 Reframe

EFFECT

MOP

LEGEND

LOO line of operations

MOE measure of effectiveness

MOP measure of performance

Objective

Current 

Conditions

End State 

Conditions

Figure X-4. Execution, Assessment, and Reframing 

 b. Assessing Insurgencies. The following measures can be useful in assessing 

insurgencies: 

 (1) Changes in local attitudes (friendliness towards US and HN personnel). 

 (2) Changes in public perceptions. 

 (3) Changes in the quality or quantity of information provided by individuals or 

groups. 

 (4) Changes in the economic or political situation of an area. 

X-16 JP 3-24 
Execution in Counterinsurgency 

 (5) Changes in insurgent patterns. 

 (6) Captured and killed insurgents. 

 (7) Captured equipment and documents. 

 c. Detainees, Defectors, and Captured Documents and Equipment. Critical and 

vital information may be obtained from detainees, captured documents and other forms of 

media, and captured equipment. Its exploitation and processing into intelligence often 

adds to the overall understanding of the enemy. This understanding can lead to more 

targeting decisions. In addition, the assessment of the operation should be fed back to 

collectors. This allows them to see if their sources are credible. In addition, effective 

operations often cause the local populace to provide more information, which drives 

future operations. 

 d. Learning and Adapting. When an operation is executed, counterinsurgents may 

develop the situation to gain a more thorough situational understanding. This increased 

environmental understanding represents a form of operational learning and applies across 

all logical LOOs. counterinsurgents and staffs adjust the operation’s design and plan 

based on what they learn. 

 (1) Cycles of Adaptation. COIN operations involve complex, changing 

relations among all the direct and peripheral participants. These participants adapt and 

respond to each other throughout an operation. A cycle of adaptation usually develops 

between insurgents and counterinsurgents; both sides continually adapt to neutralize 

existing adversary advantages and develop new (usually short-lived) advantages of their 

own. Success is gained through a tempo or rhythm of adaptation that is beyond the other 

side’s ability to achieve or sustain. Therefore, counterinsurgents should seek to gain and 

sustain advantages over insurgents by emphasizing the learning and adaptation that this 

publication stresses throughout. 

 (2) Complexity. Learning and adapting in COIN is very difficult due to the 

complexity of the problems counterinsurgents must solve. Generally, there is not a single 

adversary that can be singularly classified as the enemy. Many insurgencies include 

multiple competing groups. Success requires the HN government and counterinsurgents 

to adapt based on understanding this very intricate environment. But the key to effective 

COIN design and execution remains the ability to adjust better and faster than the 

insurgents. 

 e. Developing Measurement Criteria. Assessment requires determining why and 

when progress is being achieved along each logical LOO. Traditionally, 

counterinsurgents use discrete quantitative and qualitative measurements to evaluate 

progress. However, the complex nature of COIN operations makes progress difficult to 

measure. Subjective assessment at all levels is essential to understand the diverse and 

complex nature of COIN problems. It is also needed to measure local success or failure 

against the overall operation’s end state. Additionally, counterinsurgents need to know 

X-17 
Chapter X 

X-18 JP 3-24 

how actions along different logical LOOs complement each other; therefore, planners 

evaluate not only progress along each logical LOO but also interactions among logical 

LOOs. 

 f. Assessment Tools for COIN. Assessment tools help counterinsurgents and staffs 

determine: 

 (1) Completion of tasks and their impact. 

 (2) Level of achievement of objectives. 

 (3) Whether a condition of success has been established. 

 (4) Whether the operation’s end state has been attained. 

 (5) Whether the leader’s intent was achieved. 

 g. For example, planning for transition of responsibility to the HN is an integral part 

of COIN operational design and planning. Assessment tools may be used to assess the 

geographic and administrative transfer of control and responsibility to the HN 

government as it develops its capabilities. Assessments differ for every mission, task, 

and logical LOO, and for different phases of an operation. Leaders adjust assessment 

methods as insurgents adapt to counterinsurgent tactics and the environment changes. 

 h. Assessment is a process that measures progress of the counterinsurgent team 

toward mission accomplishment. It is important for the commander to understand the 

larger context of the assessment as it relates to the OE and the principles guiding the USG 

response. A USG framework for assessment whose principles have been approved is the 

Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF). It is a tool that enables an 

interagency team to assess conflict situations systematically and collaboratively and 

supports interagency planning for conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization. The 

purpose of the ICAF is to develop a commonly held understanding across relevant USG 

departments and agencies of the dynamics driving and mitigating violent conflict within a 

country that informs US policy and planning decisions. It may also include steps to 

establish a strategic baseline against which USG engagement can be evaluated. It is a 

process and a tool available for use by any USG agency to supplement interagency 

planning. 

 i. Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments. A metrics framework for 

assessing conflict transformation and stabilization is being field tested in Afghanistan, 

Haiti, Kosovo, and Sudan. It is focused on developing an overarching framework of 

indicators that measure outcomes over time and across five sectors (governance, 

economics, security, rule of law and social well-being). It also provides sample metrics 

and a methodology for collecting data involving statistical, polling, expert opinion. 
APPENDIX A 

INSURGENCY AND CRIME 

A-1 

1. General 

 There often is a nexus between insurgency and crime, and this problem continues to 

grow in the twenty-first century. Crime is often necessary for insurgents to fund their 

operations, control the population, and erode counterinsurgent efforts. Some insurgents 

and criminals can form temporary coalitions when it is in their collective interests. 

Paradoxically, some criminals may oppose insurgencies that threaten criminal goals. The 

most powerful criminal organizations can also grow into insurgencies in their own right. 

2. Criminal Evolution

Left unchecked, criminal violence often grows worse over time. Criminal activity 

can develop from low-level “protection,” “gangsterism”, and brigandage; to drug 

trafficking, piracy, smuggling people, body parts, armament, and other lucrative “items” 

associated with the global criminal activity; to taking political control of ungoverned 

space or areas governed by corrupt politicians and functionaries. Most criminal 

organizations, however, never move beyond protectionism and “gangsterism.” As small 

criminal organizations expand their activities to compete with or support long-established 

criminal organizations, they expand their geographical and commercial parameters. 

Criminals may seek areas of political nullification that allow them sufficient latitude to 

operate and that discourage rival criminal enterprises. They can generate more and more 

violence and instability over wider sections of the political map. Some criminal 

organizations can generate substate, state, and suprastate instability and insecurity; they 

can become partners of a kind with insurgents in order to further their criminal ends. 

Some criminal organizations may seek to co-opt political power through corruption and 

intimidation. The more they seek freedom of action, the more they inhibit state 

sovereignty. However, the criminal organizations may not want to take direct control of 

the government, yet they may take indirect control. Thus, some criminal organizations 

can become an insurgency unto themselves. As criminal organizations evolve through 

these developmental and functional shifts, three generations emerge. 

3. First-Generation 

The first-generation, or traditional, street gangs are primarily turf-oriented. They 

have loose and unsophisticated leadership that focuses on turf protection to gain petty 

cash. They often focus on gang loyalty within their immediate environs such as 

designated city blocks or neighborhoods. When first-generation criminal organizations 

engage in criminal enterprise, it is largely opportunistic and individual in scope, tends to 

be localized, and operates at the lower end of extreme societal violence. Most gangs stay 

firmly within this first generation of development, but some evolve into and beyond the 

second generation of criminal organizations. First-generation gangs are not insurgents; 

however, they certainly can be a local destabilizing factor and can work, either actively or 

accidentally, to assist insurgents. They can also further degrade conditions in a generic 

and unaffiliated manner or even actively oppose insurgencies that degrade their criminal 

enterprises. Increasing the law enforcement capabilities of a HN as a part of FID can 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-24 

help a HN deal with this form of criminal activity (see JP 3-22, Foreign Internal 

Defense). 

4. Second-Generation 

 This generation is organized for illicit business and commercial gain. The leaders of 

these organizations are more centralized and tend to focus on trafficking and market 

protection. These criminal organizations operate in a broader area than first-generation 

criminal organizations, which may include neighboring cities and countries. Secondgeneration criminal organizations are known to expand their activities to smuggling 

people, body parts, weapons, and cars; associated intimidation, murder, kidnapping and 

robbery; money laundering; home and community invasion; intellectual property theft to 

include the production of pirated goods; and other lucrative activities. These criminal 

organizations use the level of violence necessary to protect their markets and control their 

competition. They seek to control or incapacitate state security institutions, and they 

often begin to dominate vulnerable community life within large areas of the nation-state. 

As second-generation criminal organizations develop broader, market-focused, and 

sometimes overtly political agendas to improve their market share and revenues, they 

often more overtly challenge state security and sovereignty. When these criminal 

organizations use subversion and violence as political interference to negate law 

enforcement efforts directed against them, they become insurgents. Al Capone’s 

organization during Prohibition is a good example of a second-generation criminal 

organization. 

5. Third-Generation 

 Some criminal organizations develop into sophisticated transnational criminal 

organizations with ambitious economic and political agendas. These third-generation 

criminal organizations often begin to control ungoverned territory within a nation-state, 

acquire political power in poorly-governed space, and eventually vie for HN controlled 

space. This political action is intended to provide security and freedom of movement for 

the criminal organization’s activities. As a result, the third-generation criminal 

organization and its leadership challenge the legitimate state monopoly on the exercise of 

political control and the use of violence within a given geographical area. In this case, a 

third-generation criminal organization is an insurgency, although its ends are materially 

focused and not ideological. In some cases, these criminal organizations may have the 

objectives to neutralize, control, depose, or replace an incumbent government. In other 

cases, they may wish to control parts of a targeted country or sub-regions within a 

country and create autonomous enclaves that are sometimes called “criminal free-states” 

or “parastates.” 
APPENDIX B 

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 

B-1 

1. General 

 The focus of the PRT is on the provincial government and local infrastructure in the 

area assigned. Normally, PRTs are assigned by province, but may be assigned to local 

governments within a province or to more than one province. Both the effectiveness and 

legitimacy of provincial governments will vary widely from country to country and even 

from province to province within a country; as such, the focus of the PRT’s effort will 

largely depend on the needs of the government in place. In an area where the 

government lacks legitimacy (possibly because it has not existed previously or is 

perceived as corrupt and ineffective), it may be necessary for the PRT to take on initial 

stabilization activities without the presence of the HN government until initial trust can 

be established and relationships built that will help enhance the legitimacy of the 

provincial government as progress continues. In another area where the government 

enjoys some measure of legitimacy, but is largely ineffective (and therefore in danger of 

losing legitimacy as well), the PRT will focus on helping HN government institutions 

develop the capacity to govern. 

2. Organization 

 a. The organization and size of the PRT will vary largely depending on the OE and 

required tasks. In addition to size, PRTs differ in roles, contractor participation, 

interagency participation, staff organization, and even the chain of command. Military 

participation, which will be driven by the operational requirements among other 

considerations, is often the driving factor in PRT size. 

 b. The PRT leader is normally a DOS official but may be a DOD official. Personnel 

serving in a PRT continue to work for their parent agency and are subject to operating 

guidelines of their original chain of command for performance, discipline, etc., but are 

expected to follow the PRT leader’s directions, rules, policies, and procedures. Although 

the agency providing the PRT leader may differ from one PRT to the next, the DOS, 

DOD, and USAID senior members generally form a command group. Maintaining 

consensus within this command group is key to the integration of all the organization’s 

elements. 

 c. Functional groups within the PRT will also vary, but are generally similar to JTF 

directorates (administration, operations, service support, etc.). The operations group (or 

groups) may be organized by LOOs (rule of law, economic development, etc.), by 

"Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than 

that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. 

Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be 

as good as, perhaps, you think it is.” 

- T.E. Lawrence 
Appendix B 

capabilities (engineer, USAID office, security, etc.), or by a combination thereof. When 

multinational partners are included in a PRT, they may function as a distinct organization 

within the PRT. The PRT organization may include a CMOC to coordinate and share 

information with NGOs and IGOs operating in the area. 

 d. Agencies participating in addition to DOD, DOS, and USAID may include, but 

are not limited to, Department of Agriculture, Department of Justice, Department of 

Health and Human Services, and Department of Commerce as well as HN national 

government agencies (such as the interior ministry). Interagency (and possibly 

international) memoranda of agreement may be required in the establishment of PRTs to 

define roles, responsibilities, command relationships, and funding lines. When possible, 

PRT members should receive their training as a unit prior to deployment to facilitate 

unity of effort upon arrival in country. 

 e. Military support to a PRT normally includes CA representation and other forces 

for CMO. Additionally, the military may provide a security element as well as a quick 

reaction force. Military support may also include, but is not limited to, mobility, 

sustainment, administration and communication. The PRT may contract for many of 

these functions, including security, rather than drawing on direct military support; this 

will be most prevalent as the security environment becomes more stable. Alternatively, 

when the security environment dictates the location of the PRT on a forward operating 

base, the local military commander may provide some of these support capabilities. 

3. Command and Control 

 a. The nature of command and coordinating relationship is complex and should be 

addressed early and continuously. Direction and coordination of PRTs can be conducted 

by a national level interagency steering committee, under the supervision of the COM, a 

multinational executive committee, or JFC. 

 b. Funding is perhaps the most difficult issue for PRT management. Funding will 

come from several different sources, even within a single executive department. PRT 

leaders carefully track and should understand sources of funding lines and legal 

restrictions on their use. The success of interagency coordination at the highest levels 

will be reflected in the ability of the PRT to coordinate interagency funding lines in the 

field. 

4. Employment 

 a. Participation in planning by the core PRT staff should begin as early in this 

process as possible to build coordinating relationships. Although PRTs are employed 

primarily for the purpose of stability operations (which can occur in each phase), PRTs 

typically focus their efforts on achieving objectives in the stabilize phase of a joint 

operation, facilitating the transition to enable civil authority phase. It should be noted 

that the stabilize phase may come at different times for different provinces or operational 

B-2 JP 3-24 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

areas based on the design of the operation. The PRT should enter the operational area not 

later than when the joint force begins the transition from dominate to stabilize. 

 b. As HN civil authority is established and the environment is stabilized, military 

support decreases, and eventually the PRT will dissolve; the other components of the 

PRT may transition to more traditional means of providing development assistance. 

 c. Governance. The primary focus of a PRT in any area of operations is to improve 

the provincial government’s ability to provide democratic governance and essential 

services. Improving the provincial government is important given the decentralization of 

authority often associated with COIN. 

 (1) Assistance Specialists. USAID typically contracts a three-person team of 

civilian specialists to provide training and technical assistance programs for PRTs. The 

program aims to improve the efficiency of provincial governments by providing policy 

analysis, training, and technical assistance to national ministries, their provincial 

representatives, provincial governors, and provincial councils. The team of civilian 

specialists works directly with provincial officials to increase competence and efficiency. 

For example, they assist provincial council members with the conduct of meetings, 

budget development, and oversight of provincial government activities. The team also 

encourages transparency and popular participation by working with citizens and 

community organizations, hosting conferences, and promoting public forums. 

 

 (2) Other Expertise. The USAID team contains members with expertise in 

local government, financial management, and municipal planning. Up to seventy percent 

of the contracted staff members come from regional countries and include local 

professionals. Additional contracted experts are on call from regional offices. The 

USAID requires that contract advisors speak the HN language and possess extensive 

professional experience. USAID-trained instructors present training programs based on 

professionally developed modules in the HN language. The training and technical 

assistance programs emphasize practical application with focus areas in computers, 

planning, public administration, and provision of public services. 

 d. Security. The absence of security impacts the effectiveness of PRT operations 

and efforts to develop effective local governments. 

 (1) Security Impacts. Provincial governors and other senior officials may be 

intimidated, threatened, and assassinated in limited or unsecure areas. Provincial 

councils may potentially reduce or eliminate regular meetings if security deteriorates. 

Additionally, provincial-level ministry representatives could become reluctant to attend 

work because of security concerns. PRT personnel and local officials may lose the 

ability to meet openly or visit provincial government centers and US military installations 

in limited security environments. During security alerts, PRT civilian personnel may be 

restricted to base, preventing interaction with HN counterparts. Unstable security 

situations limit PRT personnel from promoting economic development by counseling 

B-3 
Appendix B 

local officials, encouraging local leaders and business owners, and motivating outside 

investors. 

 (2) Secure Movement and Presence. Heavily armed and armored personnel 

have more difficulty connecting with the population than those who can move more 

naturally amongst the population. A dismounted soldier not wearing full body armor is 

more approachable than a mounted soldier or one in full body armor. Military 

commanders must balance force protection and approachability. In nonpermissive 

environments PRT personnel move with armed military escorts, which contributes to the 

overall security presence. However, the PRT does not conduct military operations, nor 

do they assist HN military forces. The only security role assigned to a PRT is force 

protection by providing armored vehicles and an advisor to escort PRT personnel to 

meetings with local officials. US military assigned to escort civilian PRT members 

receive training in providing PRT civilian personnel protection under an agreement with 

DOS. The training is designed to reinforce understanding of escort responsibilities and to 

prevent endangerment to PRT civilian personnel. US military escorting PRT personnel 

should not combine this responsibility with other missions. The problem of providing 

PRT civilian personnel with security is compounded by competing protection priorities, 

precluding dedicated security teams in most situations and limiting security teams to 

available personnel. 

 e. Reconstruction. The USAID representative of the PRT has the primary 

responsibility for developing the PRT economic development work plan including its 

assistance projects. The PRT emphasizes the construction of infrastructure including 

schools, clinics, community centers, and government buildings. The PRT also focuses on 

developing human capacity through training and advisory programs. 

5. Fundamental Guidelines 

a. Objective. The mission of a PRT is to stabilize the OE, creating conditions for 

development, laying the foundations for long-term stability, and enabling the civil 

authorities. PRT planners for a particular area must define decisive and achievable goals 

for that province that meet the objective of stability, giving direction to all PRT 

operations. These goals will define the lifespan of the PRT, facilitating its transition to 

more traditional development mechanisms. 

b. Unity of Effort. The success of the PRT depends on its ability to operate as a 

composite unit. When unity of command is not possible, members nonetheless must lay 

aside interagency differences to focus on the common objective. Additionally, members 

of the PRT must ensure higher agency organizations understand and support the unified 

effort required. Beyond interagency integration, the PRT must also work with IGOs and 

NGOs in the area to share information, reduce duplication of work (or counterproductive 

efforts), and communicate about civil-military sensitivities. 

c. Promotion of Legitimacy and Effectiveness. The key to achieving long-term 

stability and development is the establishment of the local government as the legitimate 

B-4 JP 3-24 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

and effective governing authority. To achieve this, the PRT will often need to “lead from 

behind and underneath,” building capacity and working behind the scenes to ensure HN 

ownership and promoting HN primacy and legitimacy. This will often mean accepting 

local government solutions rather than imposing expertise. Legitimacy may be partly 

achieved by facilitating the visibility of HN presence in the province by assisting official 

visits to remote districts and villages (e.g., by providing transportation or 

communications). Another key element will be the engagement of HN officials, the local 

communities, and the population through established and traditional bodies. 

d. Restraint. PRTs establish realistic objectives and balance the tempo of 

operations to maintain the primacy of HN legitimacy and effectiveness. SC efforts must 

be aimed at managing expectations – promising only what can be delivered. Planning for 

all programs and projects must include long-term sustainability. Additionally, efforts at 

the local level must be coordinated with national level processes to ensure the legitimacy 

and effectiveness of the entire HN government. 

B-5 
Appendix B 

B-6 JP 3-24 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX C 

INSURGENT APPROACHES INDICATORS 

C-1 

1. Analyzing Insurgent Approaches 

 It is important to analyze what approach an insurgency is using. Understanding an 

insurgency’s approach provides insight into their campaign plan and potential COAs. 

There are indicators for each insurgent approach. 

 

2. Indicators of Urban Terrorist Approach 

 In this strategy the insurgents attack government targets with the intention of causing 

government forces to over-react against the population. This strategy can be initiated 

without popular support and its success relies almost exclusively on spontaneous uprising 

sparked by rage at government oppression. The urban terrorist approach actions are often 

predictable. Some indicators that the insurgents are using this approach are: 

 a. Insurgent actions calculated to provoke harsh government or counterinsurgent 

response. 

 b. Terrorist attacks which are high-visibility and produce high casualties. 

 c. Propaganda focuses on government brutality, calling attention to specific harsh 

government actions such as massacres, torture of political prisoners, “disappearances,” 

brutal responses to peaceful demonstrations. 

 d. In this strategy there normally is little political organization or sustained effort to 

indoctrinate political cadre or the masses. 

 e. Little or no effort to subvert the government from within. 

 f. Insurgency may have popular sympathy if government is particularly brutal or 

corrupt, but very limited committed support. 

3. Indicators of a Military-Focused Approach 

 Insurgents using a military-focused approach are focused on causing the government 

to lose legitimacy, and inspiring a vulnerable population to join the insurgents against the 

government. This approach is vulnerable to effective counterguerrilla operations. Its 

success depends upon successful military action and popular uprising. Like the urban 

terrorist approach, a military-focused strategy can be predictable. Some indicators of this 

approach are: 

 a. Attacks on government targets, accompanied by propaganda inciting people to 

join the insurgency and rise up against the government. 

 b. IO focused on HN government weakness and illegitimacy. 
Appendix C 

 c. Little evidence of long-term efforts at building a political base. 

 d. Few efforts along other lines of operations such as creating a political wing or 

infiltrating legitimate organizations. 

4. Indicators of a Protracted Popular War Approach 

 Although other insurgent strategies have phases as discussed in the phasing and 

timing dynamic, the protracted popular war approach is based upon the three distinct 

phases: latent and incipient, guerrilla warfare, and war of movement. Each phase’s 

activities build upon those of the previous; the insurgents generally continue activities 

from previous phases. There are a number of variations to this strategy, with different 

emphasis along different lines of operations. This approach has a political wing and a 

military wing. This approach is characterized by its high level of organization and 

indoctrination, actions along multiple lines of operations, and ability of leadership to 

direct shifting of phases according to circumstances. Due to its flexibility, the protracted 

popular war approach is difficult and time consuming to effectively counter. Some 

indicators of this approach are: 

 a. Continuous, long-term efforts to build popular support, infiltrate legitimate 

government organizations, and establish and maintain a clandestine organization. 

 b. Highly-indoctrinated leadership, political cadre, and guerrillas. 

 c. Extensive, well-organized auxiliary and underground. 

 d. Leadership that is able to exert control over the insurgency. 

 e. Able to shift phases at the direction of its leadership; including return to previous 

phase when necessary. 

 f. Repeated attacks on infrastructure and attacks designed to wear down the 

government and allies. 

 g. Continuous operations along multiple lines of operations, although some will be 

emphasized more than others in different phases. 

5. Indicators of a Subversive Approach 

 An insurgency using a subversive approach uses part of its illegal political wing to 

become a legitimate political party and enter the government. It then attempts to subvert 

and destroy the government from within. The insurgents’ purpose is not to integrate into 

the national government, but to overthrow the government. This is a difficult approach to 

counter due to its highly political nature. Indicators of this approach are: 

C-2 JP 3-24 
Insurgent Approaches Indicators 

 a. Insurgents’ seeking meetings with government or coalition forces to discuss 

ceasefires. 

 b. Repeated attacks on infrastructure; designed to wear down and reduce credibility 

of government. 

 c. Public statements denouncing violence, distancing itself from the insurgency 

while still operating under control of insurgent leadership. 

 d. An apparent breach between militant and political elements of the insurgency. 

 e. Formation of new alliances, sometimes with groups that seem to have little in 

common with the insurgency or its ideology. 

 f. End or reduction in guerrilla activity; increase in political activity. 

 g. Intensive efforts to gain international moral and political support. 

 h. Sophisticated IO aimed at specific TAs with appropriate messages. 

 i. Emergence of insurgent political wing that seeks recognition and entry into 

national politics or election to local, district, department, regional, or national offices. 

6. Shifting Approaches 

 Insurgents will change approaches, using different approaches in different phases or 

in different geographical areas. These decisions are based on the current state of the OE, 

insurgent objectives, and counterinsurgent pressure. Significant changes in approach may 

indicate a shift from one approach to another. Insurgencies move to some form of the 

protracted popular war approach or the subversive approach after other approaches have 

proved to be unsuccessful. Insurgencies are most vulnerable while they shift between 

approaches or phases. These shifts may be due to fractures among the leadership or key 

losses. Other reasons for a shift include changes in external support, changes in 

leadership, or counterinsurgent action. These shifts will often occur quickly, so 

counterinsurgents must be prepared to exploit them. Indicators of a shift in approach are: 

 a. Changes in IO content or methods. 

 b. Sudden increase in internal communications. 

 c. Unexplained and sudden pauses in guerrilla attacks or increases in attacks. 

 d. Shift of insurgent effort from urban to rural or vice versa. 

 e. Apparent disappearance of insurgents in specific areas to reappear elsewhere. 

C-3 
Appendix C 

C-4 JP 3-24 

 f. Statements of support for insurgency from external actors. 

 g. Evidence of increasing organization, indoctrination of followers, and more secure 

means of communications. 

 h. Evidence of new efforts to infiltrate legitimate organizations. 

 i. New insurgent advocacy for rights of peasants, farmers, or other groups. 

 j. Change in focus of attacks, such as targeting a different, specific sector. 

For more detail on insurgent approaches, see Chapter II, “Insurgency.” 
APPENDIX D 

REFERENCES 

D-1 

The development of JP 3-24 is based upon the following primary references: 

1. Strategic Guidance and Policy 

 a. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 

 b. National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. 

 c. National Military Strategy. 

 d. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, Management of Interagency 

Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. 

 e. DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and 

Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. 

 f. DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare. 

2. Joint Publications 

 a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

 b. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

 c. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

 d. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

 e. JP 3-05, Joint Special Operations. 

 f. JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations. 

 g. JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations. 

 h. JP 3-08, Intergovernmental Coordination During Joint Operations, Volumes I 

and II. 

 i. JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

 j. JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations. 

 k. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security. 

 l. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 
Appendix D 

 m. JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. 

 n. JP 3-26, Counterterrorism. 

 o. JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

 p. JP 3.57, Civil-Military Operations.

 q. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 

 r. JP 4-02, Health Service Support. 

 s. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

3. Allied Joint Publications 

 a. Allied Joint Pub – 3.4.4, Allied Joint Publication for Counterinsurgency. 

 b. Allied Joint Pub – 5, Allied Joint Doctrine Operational Planning. 

 c. Allied Joint Pub – 9, NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine. 

4. Service Publications 

 a. AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare. 

 b. AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense. 

 c. FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations. 

 d. FM 3-05.201, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations. 

 e. FM 3-05.202, Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations. 

 f. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency. 

 g. FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict. 

 h. FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Warfare. 

 i. Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1-2, Campaigning. 

 j. MCDP 5, Planning.

D-2 JP 3-24 
References 

5. Department of State Publications 

 a. United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency initiative, US 

Government Counterinsurgency Guide, January 2009. 

 b. DOS publication, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks, April 2005. 

6. General 

 a. Byman, Daniel, Understanding Proto-Insurgencies. Santa Monica: RAND 

Corporation, 2007. 

 b. Cassidy, Robert M. Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military 

Culture and Irregular Warfare. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, INC., 2006. 

 c. Celeski, Joseph D. JSOU Report 05-2: Operationalizing COIN. Hurlburt Field: 

Joint Special Operations University, 2005. 

 d. Fishel, John T. and Max G. Manwaring. Uncomfortable Wars Revisited. Norman: 

University of Oklahoma Press, 2006. 

 e. Gray, Colin S. Another Bloody Century. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2005. 

 f. Hoffman, Frank G. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. 

Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007. 

 g. Kilcullen, David J. The Accidental Guerrilla. 

 h. Mackinlay, John and Alison Al-Baddawy. Rethinking Counterinsurgency. Santa 

Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008. 

 i. Manwaring, Max G. A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and 

Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations In Central America, El Salvador, 

Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007. 

 j. McCormick, Gordon H., Steven B. Horton, and Laruen A. Harrison. Things Fall 

Apart: the endgame dynamics of internal wars. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2, 

2007, pp 321-367. 

 k. Metz, Steven. Rethinking Insurgency. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007. 

 l. Mockaitis, Thomas R. The Iraq War: Learning from the Past, Adapting to the 

Present, and Planning for the Future. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007. 

 m. McCuen, John J. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War. Mechanicsburg, 

Stackpole Books, 1966. 

D-3 
Appendix D 

D-4 JP 3-24 

 n. Rosenau, William. Subversion and Insurgency. Santa Monica: RAND 

Corporation, 2007. 
APPENDIX E 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

E-1 

1. User Comments 

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: –

Doctrine and Education Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. 

These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and 

organization), writing, and appearance. 

2. Authorship 

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor 

for this publication is the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5). 

3. Change Recommendations 

 a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

 TO: DA WASHINGTON DC// G35-SSP// 

 INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-7-JEDD// 

 CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JT10// 

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting 

Center, Doctrine and Education Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for 

Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS joint electronic 

library (JEL) at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. 

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change 

source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a 

proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services 

and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source 

documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 

c. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

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Appendix E 

E-2 JP 3-24 

4. Distribution of Publications 

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. 

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be 

in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 

5. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET) and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET) and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the 

combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication 

to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy 

(Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 

Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400. 

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and 

deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications. 
GLOSSARY 

PART I – ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

GL-1 

ACT advance civilian team 

AFDD Air Force doctrine document 

AFSOF Air Force special operations forces 

AOI area of interest 

AOR area of responsibility 

ARSOF Army special operations forces 

ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events 

C2 command and control 

CA civil affairs 

CAO civil affairs operations 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CC critical capability 

CCDR combatant commander 

CI counterintelligence 

CIM civil information management 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CMCB civil-military coordination board 

CMO civil-military operations 

CMOC civil-military operations center 

CNO computer network operations 

COA course of action 

COG center of gravity 

COIN counterinsurgency 

COM chief of mission 

COMCAM combat camera 

COMINT communications intelligence 

CR critical requirement 

CSAR combat search and rescue 

CT counterterrorism 

CV critical vulnerability 

CWMD combating weapons of mass destruction 

DA direct action 

DC dislocated civilian 

DDR disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DOS Department of State 

DSPD defense support to public diplomacy 

ELINT electronic intelligence 

ESG executive steering group 

EW electronic warfare 
Glossary 

FACT field advance civilian team 

FID foreign internal defense 

FISINT foreign instrumentation signals intelligence 

FM field manual (Army) 

GAT governmental assistance team 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GEOINT geospatial intelligence 

HA humanitarian assistance 

HN host nation 

HUMINT human intelligence 

IA information assurance 

ICAF Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework 

IDAD internal defense and development 

IED improvised explosive device 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

IIP interagency implementation plan 

IMINT imagery intelligence 

IMS Interagency Management System 

IO information operations 

IPC integration planning cell 

IPI indigenous populations and institutions 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

IW irregular warfare 

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

JCMOTF joint civil-military operations task force 

JFC joint force commander 

JIACG joint interagency coordination group 

JIATF joint interagency task force 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

JOPP joint operation planning process 

JP joint publication 

JPASE Joint Public Affairs Support Element 

JTF joint task force 

LOO line of operations 

MARSOF Marine Corps special operations forces 

MASINT measurement and signature intelligence 

MCDP Marine Corps doctrine publication 

MCAG maritime civil affairs group 

MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication 

METOC meteorological and oceanographic 

GL-2 JP 3-24 
Glossary 

MILDEC military deception 

MIST military information support team 

MOE measure of effectiveness 

MSO maritime security operations 

NAVSOF Navy special operations forces 

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NSC National Security Council 

OE operational environment 

OPSEC operations security 

OSINT open-source intelligence 

PA public affairs 

PAO public affairs officer 

PB peace building 

PD public diplomacy 

PEO peace enforcement operations 

PIR priority intelligence requirement 

PKO peacekeeping operations 

PM peacemaking 

PMESII political, military, economic, social, information, and 

 infrastructure

PO peace operations 

PR personnel recovery 

PRT provincial reconstruction team 

PSYOP psychological operations 

ROE rules of engagement 

SC strategic communication 

SCA support to civil administration 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SFA security force assistance 

SIGINT signals intelligence 

SOF special operations forces 

SR special reconnaissance 

SSR security sector reform 

TA target audience 

TECHINT technical intelligence 

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 

TV television 

GL-3 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-24 

UGA ungoverned area 

UN United Nations 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

USG United States Government 

UW unconventional warfare 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 
PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions 

found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, will reflect this publication as the source document for 

these terms and definitions.

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, 

influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and 

nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a 

friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, 

to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may 

include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the 

responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may 

occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, 

if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may 

be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination 

of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

civil-military operations center. An organization normally comprised of civil affairs, 

established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the 

United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, 

intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational 

forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. 

Also called CMOC. See also civil-military operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

counterguerrilla operations. Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, 

paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies against guerrillas. (Approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

counterguerrilla warfare. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

counterinsurgency. Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an 

insurgency and to address any core grievances. Also called COIN. (This term and its 

definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion 

in JP 1-02.) 

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against 

espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on 

behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign 

persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

2-0) 

country team. The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by 

the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each 

GL-5 
Glossary 

represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic 

mission. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.4) 

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a 

government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other 

designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, 

and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-22) 

governance. The state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and 

behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is 

exercised in a society, including the representative participatory decision-making 

processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority. (Approved 

for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or 

NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. 

Also called HN. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57)

indicator. In intelligence usage, an item of information which reflects the intention or 

capability of an adversary to adopt or reject a course of action. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 2-0)

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of 

electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military 

deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related 

capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated 

decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. See also psychological 

operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13) 

instruments of national power. All of the means available to the government in its 

pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, 

informational and military. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 

insurgency. The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that 

seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also 

refer to the group itself. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its 

definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

insurgent. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

intelligence operations. The variety of intelligence and counterintelligence tasks that are 

carried out by various intelligence organizations and activities within the intelligence 

process. Intelligence operations include planning and direction, collection, 

processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, 

and evaluation and feedback. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-01) 

GL-6 JP 3-24 
Glossary 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. An activity that synchronizes and 

integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, 

and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is 

an integrated intelligence and operations function. Also called ISR. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 2-01) 

internal defense and development. The full range of measures taken by a nation to 

promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. 

It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) 

that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD. See also foreign internal 

defense. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-22) 

irregular forces. Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed 

forces, police, or other internal security forces. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-24)

irregular warfare. A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy 

and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and 

asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other 

capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Also called 

IW. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 

measure of effectiveness. A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, 

capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an 

end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

measure of performance. A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to 

measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by 

forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition 

or alliance. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-16) 

operational art. The application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — 

supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, 

campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. 

Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

operational design. The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a 

campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-0) 

operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences 

that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the 

commander. Also called OE. (This term and its definition modify the existing term 

and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02and sourced to JP 3-0.) 

GL-7 
Glossary 

paramilitary forces. Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any 

country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-

02. SOURCE: JP 3-24) 

peace building. Stability actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that 

strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a 

relapse into conflict. Also called PB. See also peace enforcement; peacekeeping; 

peacemaking; peace operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.3) 

peace enforcement. Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally 

pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or 

sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. See also peace building; 

peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.3) 

peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a 

dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease 

fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a longterm political settlement. See also peace building; peace enforcement; peacemaking; 

peace operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.3) 

peacemaking. The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of 

peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it. 

See also peace building; peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peace operations. (JP 1-

02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.3) 

peace operations. A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis 

response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national 

power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the 

environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to 

legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, 

peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts. Also called PO. See 

also peace building; peace enforcement; peacekeeping; and peacemaking. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-07.3) 

propaganda. Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to 

influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to 

benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.2) 

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and 

indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective 

reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, 

and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce 

foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called 

PSYOP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.2) 

GL-8 JP 3-24 
Glossary 

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community 

relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest 

in the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-61) 

reachback. The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or 

equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-30) 

security sector reform. The set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a 

government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. 

Also called SSR. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

strategic communication. Focused United States Government efforts to understand and 

engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the 

advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through 

the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized 

with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

strategy. A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power 

in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or 

multinational objectives. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

subversion. Actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or 

political strength or morale of a governing authority. (This term and its definition 

modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02).

support to counterinsurgency. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

support to insurgency. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to 

inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the 

pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. See also terrorist; 

terrorist group. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.2) 

terrorist. An individual who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in 

pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives. See also terrorism. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-07.2) 

terrorist group. Any number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying 

relationship, or are organized for the purpose of committing an act or acts of violence 

or threatens violence in pursuit of their political, religious, or ideological objectives. 

See also terrorism. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.2) 

theater of operations. An operational area defined by the geographic combatant 

commander for the conduct or support of specific military operations. Multiple 

GL-9 
Glossary 

GL-10 JP 3-24 

theaters of operations normally will be geographically separate and focused on 

different missions. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for 

operations in depth and over extended periods of time. Also called TO. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

theater strategy. Concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives 

of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and 

integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power. 

See also strategy. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, 

normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous 

or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in 

varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla 

warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted 

recovery. Also called UW. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

unified action. The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of 

governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity 

of effort. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATION

PLANS SYSTEMS

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to

fill extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of

the development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-24 Operations