NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.N.H.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0228 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD37277, JS21371

The Honorable Michael J. Herrod, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa

By Suzanne W. Sanchez

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Jennifer R. Blum

Counsel for Appellee

FILED 05-23-2024
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.N.H.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Precilla H. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental 

rights to N.N.H. (“Child”).1 For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother is the biological parent of Child, born in February 

2023. She also has two other biological children—J.E., born in 2006, and 

N.S., born in 2021.

¶3 Mother’s history with the Department of Child Safety 

(“DCS”) dates back several years. In 2019, DCS took temporary custody of 

J.E. because she was neglecting him, abusing drugs, and suffering from 

untreated mental health problems. The superior court adjudicated J.E. 

dependent and ordered a family-reunification case plan. Then, in 2021, she

tested positive for methamphetamine after she gave birth to N.S. After DCS 

filed a supplemental dependency petition, the court also adjudicated N.S. 

dependent and affirmed the reunification case plan.

¶4 In that consolidated dependency, DCS offered Mother 

services, including supervised visitation, drug testing through Physician 

Services, Inc. (“PSI”), substance abuse treatment and mental health services 

at Terros, case management, transportation, a family support partner, and 

parenting education through the Nurturing Parenting Program. Her

participation in these services was minimal, and in December 2022, the 

superior court terminated her parental rights to N.S. She appealed that

termination order, arguing DCS failed to provide her with appropriate 

reunification services, but we affirmed. See In Re N.S., 1 CA-JV 22-0282, 

2023 WL 3589655, at *2–3, ¶¶ 8, 14 (Ariz. App. May 23, 2023) (mem. 

decision). His foster family adopted N.S., while J.E. has remained in DCS 

custody.

1 The superior court also terminated the parental rights of the alleged

biological fathers, J.S. and John Doe. They are not parties to this appeal.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.N.H.

Decision of the Court

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¶5 In February 2023—just two months after the superior court 

terminated Mother’s parental rights to N.S.—Child was born substanceexposed, and Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana. 

DCS took temporary custody of Child and placed him with N.S.’s adoptive

family.

¶6 In April 2023, the superior court adjudicated Child dependent 

as to Mother and ordered a severance-and-adoption case plan. DCS 

petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Child, alleging as 

grounds that she had a history of chronic substance abuse and a prior 

termination within the last two years. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 8-

533(B)(3), (10). DCS later amended its petition to include a six-month outof-home placement ground. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b).

¶7 Even though the case plan was severance and adoption, DCS 

continued to provide Mother with reunification services. These services 

included visitation, taxis, bus passes, drug testing, and three new referrals 

to Terros.

¶8 Mother, however, often missed her visits, and when she did 

attend, she was unprepared to care for Child. She did not drug test at PSI

after Child’s birth. In fact, across all of the dependencies, she has only drug 

tested three times, and those tests were positive for methamphetamine.

Additionally, her new referrals to Terros were closed because she never 

attended her intake appointments despite rescheduling them multiple

times.

¶9 In November 2023, the superior court held a trial on DCS’s 

petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. After the case manager 

testified, the court took a short recess for Mother, who had appeared 

telephonically, to speak to her attorney. When the trial reconvened, 

Mother’s attorney said Mother planned to testify, but she had not returned 

the attorney’s call. The court took another recess to give her additional time 

to call in. When she failed to appear after the second recess, the court 

proceeded in her absence and over her attorney’s objection.

¶10 The superior court terminated Mother’s parental rights. The 

court found DCS made reasonable and diligent efforts to provide her with 

appropriate reunification services. The court also found DCS proved by 

clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds it alleged and proved

by a preponderance of the evidence that termination was in Child’s best 

interests.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.N.H.

Decision of the Court

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¶11 Mother timely appeals the termination order. We have 

jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), 12-2101(A)(1); Ariz. R.P. 

Juv. Ct. 601.

DISCUSSION

¶12 The superior court may terminate a parent-child relationship 

if DCS proves at least one statutory ground set forth in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by 

clear and convincing evidence. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 

246, 249, ¶ 12 (2000). The court must also find that termination is in the 

child’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Kent K. v. Bobby

M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). The court’s factual findings are accepted 

if supported by reasonable evidence and inferences; its legal conclusions 

regarding a statutory ground for termination “will be affirmed unless they 

are clearly erroneous.” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478–

79, ¶¶ 30–31 (2023). We do not reweigh the evidence on appeal but look 

“to determine if there is evidence to sustain the [superior] court’s ruling.” 

Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004)

(citation omitted).

I. DCS made a diligent effort to provide Mother with appropriate 

reunification services.

¶13 Focusing on the six-month out-of-home placement ground,

DCS had to prove that it “made a diligent effort to provide appropriate 

reunification services.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b). This obligation requires 

DCS to provide a parent with services and “the time and opportunity to 

participate in programs designed to help her become an effective parent.” 

Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). 

DCS “is not required to provide every conceivable service or to ensure that 

a parent participates in each service it offers.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶14 On appeal, Mother challenges the superior court’s finding 

that DCS made a diligent effort to provide her with appropriate 

reunification services. Specifically, she contends DCS services were 

inadequate because it never provided her with taxis to and from Terros for 

her intake appointments. At trial, however, the case manager testified that 

he had arranged taxis to take Mother to visitation and offered to provide 

taxis for drug testing. He explained that when Mother wanted a taxi, she 

would ask him for one. He further explained that she never asked him for 

transportation to Terros, so he never put it in place. Because DCS made 

taxis available to her, the superior court did not err in finding DCS provided

Mother with adequate services.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.N.H.

Decision of the Court

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¶15 Mother also contends DCS never helped her communicate 

with Terros or provided her with a daily planner to keep track of her 

appointments. But the record shows she knew how to communicate with 

Terros and had participated in some services there during her prior 

dependency. The record also shows Terros employees actively sought to 

engage her in services by calling and emailing her several times before each 

of her intake appointments. Moreover, Mother rescheduled multiple 

appointments, demonstrating she was aware of those appointments and 

did not need a daily planner to keep track of them.

¶16 Mother next contends DCS knew she had multiple mental 

illnesses but never provided her with a psychological evaluation. The case 

manager testified DCS had been willing to refer her to a psychological 

evaluation but did not do so because DCS’s consulting psychologist 

required Mother demonstrate thirty-days of sobriety first, which she never 

did. Mother argues that DCS obtained this advice during her prior

dependency, but she cites nothing in the record to support the need for a 

new psychological consultation. The case manager also testified that had 

Mother gone to Terros, she would have had access to mental health 

services, including a psychiatric evaluation, medication management, and 

individual and group counseling. Mother knew that these services were 

available to her at Terros, and had previously participated in them, but did 

not do so in this case. Reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s 

finding that DCS made a diligent effort to provide Mother with appropriate 

reunification services.

II. The termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best 

interests.

¶17 When determining the child’s best interests, the superior 

court must focus on the child’s needs and consider the totality of the current 

circumstances. See Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150–51, ¶¶ 

13, 15 (2018). The court may find a child would benefit from termination if 

there is an adoption plan or if the child is adoptable. See id. at 150, ¶ 13. 

The court may also find that a child will benefit from the permanency and 

stability an adoption would provide. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 

209 Ariz. 332, 337, ¶ 16 (App. 2004); JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 352. Conversely, 

the court may find termination of the parent-child relationship is in the 

child’s best interests if continuing the relationship would harm the child. 

Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 16 (2016).

¶18 Mother argues she was denied due process because the 

superior court improperly drew an adverse inference regarding Child’s 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.N.H.

Decision of the Court

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best interests because she failed to testify at her termination trial. She 

argues we should remand for the superior court to reweigh best interests 

without making the improper inference.

¶19 We review constitutional issues de novo. Brenda D. v. Dep’t of 

Child Safety, 243 Ariz. 437, 442, ¶ 15 (2018). Parental rights may be 

terminated only through “’fundamentally fair procedures’ that satisfy due 

process requirements.” Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 24 (citation omitted). 

“Due process requires ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action 

and to afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” JS-501904, 

180 Ariz. at 355 (citation omitted). “Due process errors require reversal only 

if a party is thereby prejudiced.” Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462, 470, ¶ 26 

(App. 2014) (citation omitted).

¶20 Mother has not shown how any alleged error prejudiced her 

because, even without the adverse inference, reasonable evidence supports 

the superior court’s best interests finding. The superior court found that 

Child was adoptable and in an adoptive placement with the foster family 

who had previously adopted his brother, N.S. The court observed that 

there was little bond between Mother and Child because she “never 

actually parented th[e] child[.]” It also found “[t]he child has been placed 

with the same placement since birth and is bonded with that placement and 

his brother.” The court concluded that Child would benefit from 

termination because “placement is providing the child with a loving and 

nurturing home environment and the child has thrived in their care.” The 

court also concluded the Child would be harmed by continuing the parentchild relationship because Mother is still homeless and using drugs. 

Mother does not challenge any of these findings, which the record supports.

CONCLUSION

¶21 We affirm.