13 November 2009

Counterterrorism

Joint Publication 3-26
PREFACE 

1. Scope 

 This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning and execution of 

counterterrorism across the range of military operations. 

2. Purpose 

 This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other 

joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and 

training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their 

appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC 

from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most 

appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of 

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of 

these commands, and the Services. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate 

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of 

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of 

a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational 

doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not 

ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational 

command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, 

regulations, and doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

 LLOYD J. AUSTIN III 

 Lieutenant General, USA 

 Director, Joint Staff 

i 
Preface 

ii JP 3-26 

Intentionally Blank 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

iii 

 PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... v 

CHAPTER I 

 OVERVIEW 

• General ..................................................................................................................... I-1 

• United States Government Policy and Strategy ...................................................... I-3 

• Department of Defense Policy and Strategy ............................................................ I-6 

• The Military Strategic Approach and Objectives for the War on Terrorism ........... I-7 

• Prioritized Strategic End States for the Global War on Terrorism ........................ I-10 

• Irregular Warfare ................................................................................................... I-11 

• Doctrinal Foundation for Counterterrorism ........................................................... I-12 

CHAPTER II 

 TERRORIST THREATS 

• Overview ................................................................................................................ II-1

• Terrorist Behaviors, Motivations, and Characteristics .......................................... II-4 

• Terrorist Organization ........................................................................................... II-8 

• Terrorist Approaches ........................................................................................... II-17 

CHAPTER III 

 OPERATONAL APPROACHES 

• Nature of the Problem ........................................................................................... III-1 

• Strategic Campaign Framework ........................................................................... III-2 

• Direct and Indirect Approaches ............................................................................ III-4 

• Terrorism Threat and Counterterrorism Models .................................................. III-7 

• Roles of Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces ............................. III-9 

• Strategic and Operational Planning Considerations ........................................... III-13 

CHAPTER IV 

 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

• General .................................................................................................................. IV-1 

• National Level ...................................................................................................... IV-1 

• United States Special Operations Command ........................................................ IV-3 

• Other Combatant Commands ............................................................................... IV-4 

• Joint Task Force Considerations ........................................................................... IV-5 

• Multinational Considerations ............................................................................... IV-6 

• Interagency Coordination ..................................................................................... IV-8 
Table of Contents 

iv JP 3-26 

CHAPTER V 

 SIGNIFICANT ENABLING FUNCTIONS FOR COUNTERTERRORISM 

• General ................................................................................................................... V-1 

• Intelligence ............................................................................................................ V-1 

• Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance .................................................... V-7 

• Logistics ................................................................................................................. V-8 

• Legal .................................................................................................................... V-11 

• Strategic Communication .................................................................................... V-14 

• Information Operations ........................................................................................ V-15 

APPENDIX 

 A References ....................................................................................................... A-1 

 B Administrative Instructions .............................................................................. B-1 

GLOSSARY 

 Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................. GL-1 

 Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-4 

FIGURE 

 I-1 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism ................................................. I-5 

 I-2 Military Strategic Approach ......................................................................... I-8 

 II-1 Structure Pyramid of a Typical Terrorist Organization .............................. II-9 

 II-2 Typical Terrorist Organizational Structures ............................................. II-11 

 II-3 Terrorist Planning Cycle ........................................................................... II-18 

 II-4 Forms of Terrorist Tactics ........................................................................ II-23 

 III-1 Strategic Campaign Framework ................................................................ III-2 

 III-2 Terrorism Threat Model ............................................................................. III-8 

 III-3 Counterterrorism Model .......................................................................... III-10 

 III-4 Effects and Command Echelons .............................................................. III-16 

 V-1 Counterterrorism Analytical Framework .................................................... V-4 

 V-2 Strategic Communication for Counterterrorism ....................................... V-16 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

v 

• Provides joint doctrine for the planning and execution of counterterrorism (CT) 

across the range of military operations. 

• Describes the strategic campaign framework for CT. 

• Provides insight into terrorist behaviors, examines terrorist motivations, and 

provides observations of general terrorist characteristics. 

• Presents prevalent models of terrorist organizations and terrorist approaches to 

planning and execution. 

• Summarizes the relationship of CT to irregular warfare. 

• Describes the direct and indirect operational approaches to CT. 

• Outlines CT roles, responsibilities, and authorities – command and control. 

• Discusses significant enabling functions for CT - intelligence; intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance; logistics; legal; strategic communication; and 

information operations. 

Overview 

Terrorism had been treated 

primarily as a law 

enforcement issue by most 

countries and international 

organizations because it 

represents extreme 

lawlessness. 

Terrorism has evolved as a preferred tactic for ideological 

extremists around the world, directly or indirectly 

affecting millions of people. In addition to increasing law 

enforcement capabilities for counterterrorism (CT), the 

United States (US), like many nations, developed 

specialized, but limited, military CT capabilities. In joint 

doctrine, CT was simply defined as operations that include 

the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, 

and respond to terrorism. 

The broader construct of 

combating terrorism is 

defined as “actions, 

including antiterrorism and 

counterterrorism (CT), 

taken to oppose terrorism 

throughout the entire threat 

spectrum.” 

In addition to any diplomatic and law enforcement actions, 

the US Government (USG) typically viewed CT missions 

as special operations by covert, clandestine, or low 

visibility means. CT is one of the core tasks of the US 

special operations forces (SOF), and their role and additive 

capability is to conduct offensive measures within 

Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) overall combating 

terrorism (CbT) efforts. Some significant policy and 

strategy adjustments were required because terrorism has 

evolved from a tactic of inducing fear in select 

populations/areas to a transnational threat of strategic 

proportion. 
Executive Summary 

CT: “Actions taken directly 

against terrorist networks 

and indirectly to influence 

and render global and 

regional environments 

inhospitable to terrorist 

networks.” 

The United States 

Government (USG) policy 

on countering terrorism has 

been summarized as 

follows: Defeat violent 

extremism, and create a 

global environment that is 

inhospitable to violent 

extremists. 

After September 11, 2001, the US, along with 

multinational partners, embarked on what was 

characterized as a “global war on terrorism (GWOT).” 

That war has proven the need for expanded CT capabilities 

and a broader role for the US military in unified action 

against terrorism. That increasing role for conventional 

forces (CF), the need for truly unified action, and an 

increased emphasis on an indirect approach has led to 

developing this doctrine with a new definition for CT. 

The Department of State (DOS) was given the lead in 

developing policy action plans that employ both incentives 

and disincentives to end state sponsorship of terrorism. 

Unity of effort requires coordination not only at the apex 

of the federal government but also at the 

operational/tactical level, where response and intervention 

actions may be taken by diverse authorities acting 

independently or in coordination with each other. This 

policy requires what is doctrinally known as unified 

action, also called the “whole of government approach” by 

many interagency partners. 

National Strategy. The broad USG strategy is to continue to lead an 

international effort to deny violent extremist networks 

the resources and functions they need to operate and 

survive. This strategy of three key elements and three 

enabling elements represents the critical efforts (the ways) 

for achieving success. The key strategy elements are: 

protect and defend the homeland; attack terrorists and their 

capacity to operate effectively at home and abroad; and 

support mainstream efforts to reject violent extremism. 

The three key elements of the strategy are enabled by three 

crosscutting elements: expanding foreign partnerships and 

partnership capacity; enhancing capacity to prevent 

terrorist acquisition and use of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD); and institutionalizing, domestically 

and internationally, the strategy against violent extremists. 

Department of Defense 

Strategy for Combating 

Terrorism. 

The DOD strategy for CbT is derived from the National 

Security Strategy and implements the National Strategy 

for Combating Terrorism. Objectives are summarized as 

follows: thwart or defeat terrorist attacks against the US, 

our partner nations (PNs), and interests; attack and disrupt 

terrorist networks abroad so as to cause adversaries to be 

incapable or unwilling to attack the US homeland, allies, 

vi JP 3-26 
Executive Summary 

or interests; deny terrorist networks WMD; establish 

conditions that allow PNs to govern their territory 

effectively and defeat terrorists; and deny a hospitable 

environment to violent extremists. 

Military Strategic 

Approach. 

The military strategic approach is to focus military 

operations in such a way as to assist the other instruments 

of national power to undermine the terrorists’ center of 

gravity: extremist ideology. The Armed Forces of the 

United States will pursue direct and indirect approaches to 

counter the terrorists’ ideology, support moderate 

alternatives, build rapport with and capacities of partners, 

and attack the terrorist and their infrastructure. 

Military Strategic 

Objectives. 

The military strategic objectives provide a way to 

achieve the national strategic aims (end state). They are: 

Deny terrorists the resources they need to operate and 

survive. 

Enable partner nations to counter terrorism. Prevent 

WMD proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled 

materials, and maintain capacity for consequence 

management. 

Defeat terrorists and their organizations. 

Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in 

coordination with other government agencies (OGAs) and 

PNs. 

Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter 

ideological support for terrorism. 

Prioritized Strategic End 

States for the Global War 

on Terrorism.

Planning starts with the overarching National Defense 

Strategy from which the Guidance for Employment of the 

Force (GEF) derives prioritized regional and functional 

strategic end states. The functional end states for the 

GWOT in the GEF are: 

End State 1. Organizations committed to violent 

extremism no longer have the capability or intent to strike 

globally and catastrophically and their capacity to strike is 

outweighed by the capacity of local governments to 

counter and defeat them. 

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Executive Summary 

End State 2. Key states deny the enemy the resources 

needed to operate and survive. In particular, key states 

have reduced ungoverned or under governed areas that 

violent extremists seek to exploit. 

End State 3. Terrorists, violent extremists, and their 

supporters are prevented from obtaining, developing, 

distributing, or using WMD. 

End State 4. The global environment is inhospitable to 

terrorism and violent extremism. 

Irregular Warfare (IW). Irregular warfare (IW) is a violent struggle among 

state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence 

over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect 

approaches and asymmetric means, though it may involve 

the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to 

erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. 

IW involves a variety of 

operations and activities 

that occur in isolation or 

combined with conventional 

force operations. 

CT is an activity of IW. An adversary using irregular 

methods typically will endeavor to wage protracted 

operations in an attempt to break the will of their opponent 

and influence relevant populations. Activities applicable 

to IW include, but are not limited to: foreign internal 

defense, security force assistance, counterinsurgency 

(COIN), CT, unconventional warfare, stability operations, 

strategic communication (SC), psychological operations, 

information operations (IO), civil-military operations, 

intelligence and counterintelligence, and law enforcement. 

The key to success in IW 

comes from the ability of a 

group or organization to 

influence populations to 

gain or enhance political 

authority. 

The focus of IW is on the relevant population and not 

military platforms or armed forces, as it is in traditional 

war. IW is a struggle for legitimacy and influence over a 

population from which its authority to act originates, and 

is conferred upon either its government or leadership. IW 

depends not just on military prowess, but also an 

understanding of such social dynamics as tribal politics, 

social networks, religious influences, and cultural mores. 

CT efforts should include all instruments of national 

power to undermine an adversary's power and will, and its 

credibility and legitimacy to influence the relevant 

population. 

Terrorist Threats 

America is at war with Violent extremists find it useful to mischaracterize the war 

viii JP 3-26 
Executive Summary 

extremists who advocate 

and use violence to gain 

control over others and 

threaten our way of life. 

as a religious or cultural clash. These violent extremists 

see the US and other Western societies as primary 

obstacles to achieving their political ends. The greatest 

strength of our society is its freedom and openness. The 

extremist networks will continue to exploit the seams in 

open societies around the globe, and consequently, the US 

and PNs remain vulnerable to terrorist violence designed 

to undermine those relationships and cause some members 

to abandon the struggle. 

Terrorist networks, such as 

al-Qaeda, may employ 

irregular, catastrophic, or 

disruptive methods to 

challenge United States 

(US) security interests. 

Irregular threats involve the employment of 

“unconventional” methods and tactics to counter the 

traditional advantages of stronger opponents.

Catastrophic threats involve the acquisition, possession, 

and potential use of WMD or methods and material 

producing WMD-like effects. Disruptive threats may 

come from terrorist organizations that develop and use 

breakthrough technologies to negate current US 

advantages. 

Nature of the Enemy. Terrorist groups, regardless of ideology, origin, location, 

or organizational structure have some common basic needs 

to survive and remain credible to their followers: funding, 

security, an ability to produce and distribute propaganda, a 

support infrastructure, an ability to recruit, and the means 

to conduct violent acts against selected targets. The 

principal enemy is a transnational movement, 

consisting of extremist organizations, networks, and 

individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – 

which uses terrorism for ideological ends. Our 

secondary enemy is the other collective violent extremist 

organizations (VEOs) that interfere with our CT efforts 

and which may transition to overt sponsorship of or active 

participation in direct action against the US, our PNs, and 

our interests. 

There are a variety of state 

and non-state actors 

identified with terrorism 

that have been generally 

categorized as opportunists, 

extremists, and terrorists. 

Opportunists are members of criminal organizations 

(e.g., narcoterrorists), weapon proliferators, or state 

sponsors, who undercut the rule of law and governmental 

legitimacy, contributing to an environment of corruption 

and violence. 

Extremists are those who seek to force their ideological 

beliefs on others. They oppose - in principle and practice - 

the right of people to choose how to live and how to 

organize their societies; and support the murder of 

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Executive Summary 

ordinary people to advance their extremist ideological 

objectives. 

Terrorist refers to those who commit acts of terrorism. 

Terrorist Behavior. 

Terrorism is a tactic 

selected after rational 

consideration of the costs 

and benefits in order to 

achieve an objective.

Terrorism is a rationally selected tactic usually employed 

in the pursuit of ideological aims. However, some 

individuals or small violent organizations that employ 

terrorist means may not always be concerned with 

particular causes or an avowed ideology. These terrorists 

may be motivated purely by a desire to commit violent 

acts. 

Some terrorists have utopian goals regardless of their 

aims. This utopianism expresses itself forcefully as an 

extreme degree of impatience with the “status quo” of the 

rest of the world that validates the terrorists’ extreme 

methods. Change, and the destructive method by which 

change is brought about, may be much more important 

than the end result. 

Terrorists within groups usually have different behaviors 

collectively than individually. Groups are collectively 

more daring and ruthless than the individual members. 

The individual terrorist does not want to appear less 

committed than the others, and will not object to proposals 

within the group that they would not consider as an 

individual. 

Understanding and 

knowledge of a violent 

extremist organization’s 

preferences and capabilities 

provides a baseline to 

conduct successful CT 

operations and promotes 

the use of active 

approaches, both direct and 

indirect, to counter the 

threat. 

Strategies against terrorists require understanding their 

point of view. 

Terrorist groups require recruitment, preparation, and 

integration into the operational structure of the group. A 

group’s leadership will not employ assets without 

weighing the value of the asset, the probability of success, 

and the potential benefits to the group. 

Terrorist strategies are aimed at publicly causing damage 

to symbols or inspiring fear. Timing, location, and 

method of attacks accommodate media dissemination and 

ensure wide-spread reporting to maximize impact. In its 

purest form, a terrorist operation often will have the goal 

of manipulating popular perceptions, and strives to 

achieve this by controlling or dictating media coverage. 

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Executive Summary 

Ideology and motivation are the primary characteristics 

that influence the objectives of terrorist operations. Groups 

with secular ideologies and nonreligious goals often will 

attempt highly selective and discriminate acts of violence 

to achieve a specific political aim. 

Terrorist Characteristics. In general, terrorists often feel alienated from society, 

have a perceived grievance, or regard themselves as 

victims of an injustice. Terrorists most commonly 

originate from middle class backgrounds, with some 

coming from extreme wealth and privilege. In general, 

terrorists, especially their leaders, are usually of average or 

better intelligence and have been exposed to advanced 

education. Terrorist groups increasingly are recruiting 

members with expertise in areas such as communications, 

computer programming, engineering, finance, and the 

sciences. Terrorists are often unremarkable in individual 

characteristics and attempts to “profile” likely terrorist 

groups’ members may not be productive. 

A terrorist organization is 

characterized by its levels of 

commitment, the tactical 

level cellular organization, 

group organizational 

structure, and its primary 

motivation.

Typically, there are four different levels of commitment

within a terrorist organization: passive supporters, active 

supporters, cadre, and leadership. Leaders provide 

direction and policy; approve goals and objectives; and 

provide overarching guidance for operations. Cadre is the 

nucleus of “active” members, the zealots, who comprise 

the core of a terrorist organization. This echelon plans and 

conducts not only operations, but also manages areas of 

intelligence, finance, logistics, IO, and communications. 

Active supporters participate in the political, fundraising, and information activities of the group. Usually, 

they are fully aware of their relationship to the terrorist 

group but do not commit violent acts. Passive supporters

are typically individuals or groups that are sympathetic to 

the announced goals and intentions of the terrorist 

organization or its ideology, but are not committed enough 

to take action. 

Tactical-level Cellular 

Organization. 

One of the primary reasons 

for a cellular or 

compartmental structure is 

security. 

The smallest elements of terrorist organizations are the 

cells at the tactical level — the building blocks for the 

terrorist organization. A cellular structure makes it 

difficult for an adversary to penetrate the entire 

organization, and the compromise or loss of one cell does 

not compromise the identity, location, or actions of other 

cells. Personnel within one cell may not be aware of the 

existence of other cells or their personnel and, therefore, 

xi 
Executive Summary 

cannot divulge sensitive information to infiltrators or 

captors. 

Group Organizational 

Structure. 

Hierarchical Structure.

There are two typical organizational structures used by 

terrorist groups: networked and hierarchical 

Hierarchical structure organizations have a welldefined vertical chain of command and responsibility. 

Information flows up and down organizational channels 

that correspond to these vertical chains, but may not move 

horizontally. This is more traditional, and is common of 

groups that are well established with a command and 

support structure. Normally, only the cell leader has 

knowledge of other cells or contacts, and only senior 

leadership has visibility of the entire organization. 

Networked Structure. 

A terrorist group may also 

employ a hybrid structure 

that combines elements of 

more than one network 

type. 

A network structure may be a variation of several basic 

nodal concepts, a node being an individual, a cell, another 

networked organization, or even a hierarchical 

organization. A terrorist network may consist of parts of 

other organizations (even governments), which are acting 

in ways that can be exploited to achieve the network’s 

organizational goals. There are three basic types of 

network structures, depending on the ways in which 

elements (nodes) are linked to other elements of the 

structure: the chain, hub (or star and wheel), and allchannel. In a chain type structure each node links to the 

node next in sequence and communication between the 

nodes is by passing information along the line. In the hub 

(or star and wheel) type structure outer nodes 

communicate with one central node, which may not be the 

leader or decision maker for the network. In the allchannel type structure all nodes are connected to each 

other. The network is organizationally “flat,” meaning 

there is no hierarchical command structure above it. 

Command and control is distributed within the network. 

Categories of Terrorist 

Organizations. 

There are many different categories of terrorism and 

terrorist groups. These categories serve to differentiate 

terrorist organizations according to specific criteria, which 

are usually related to the field or specialty of whoever is 

selecting the categories. 

Government Affiliation 

Categories. 

Categorizing terrorist groups by their affiliation with 

governments provides indications of their means for 

intelligence, operations, and access to types of weapons. 

xii JP 3-26 
Executive Summary 

Motivation Categories. Motivation categories describe terrorist groups in terms of 

their ultimate goals or objectives. While political or 

religious ideologies will determine the “how” of the 

conflict, and the sort of society that will arise from a 

successful conclusion, motivation is the “what” in terms of 

end state or measure of success. 

Ideological Categories. Ideological categories describe the political, religious, or 

social orientation of the group. While some groups will be 

seriously committed to their avowed ideologies, for others, 

ideology is poorly understood, and primarily a justification 

for their actions to outsiders or sympathizers 

Proliferation of Knowledge 

Between Organizations. 

Terrorist groups increase their capabilities through the 

exchange of knowledge. Military professionals must 

evaluate potential terrorist threats according to what 

capabilities they may acquire through known or suspected 

associations with other groups, or those capabilities that 

can be acquired through the study and employment of 

techniques and approaches that have proven successful for 

other terrorist organizations. 

Terrorist Approaches. Terrorist operations typically are planned in great 

detail with the objectives of minimizing risk, achieving 

the highest probability of success, and attaining the 

widest publicity of their actions. Terrorists seek to avoid 

adversary strengths and concentrate on their weaknesses. 

Terrorist tactics are aligned with their overall plans which 

attempt to use the successful achievement of their 

operational objectives to realize the accomplishment of 

their strategic goals. 

Terrorist Approach to 

Planning and Execution. 

Exploitation is the primary 

objective of all terrorist 

operations. 

Terrorist operational planning can be analyzed according 

to requirements common to all operations. The planning 

and operation cycle of broad target selection, intelligence 

gathering and surveillance, specific target selection, preattack surveillance and planning, rehearsals, actions on the 

objective, and escape and exploitation is valid for 

traditional hierarchically organized groups, as well as 

decentralized “network” type organizations. 

Terrorist Approach to 

Operations and Tactics.

The combination of methods and approaches is virtually 

unlimited. Common themes in terrorist operations are 

surprise, secrecy, innovation, and indirect methods of 

attack. Terrorist operations are unique, in that each is 

planned for a specific target and effect. 

xiii 
Executive Summary 

Forms of Terrorist Tactics. Terrorist tactics take many forms. Some are accomplished 

as independent actions. Others may be undertaken as part 

of other coordinated activities. The more common types 

of terrorist tactics are: threat or hoax; arson; sabotage; 

bombing; kidnapping; hostage taking; hijacking; raid or 

ambush; seizure; assassination; and weapons of mass 

destruction. 

Terrorist Information 

Operations and Public 

Relations Activities.

The Internet provides terrorists and extremists the 

means to spread their radical ideology, an ad hoc means of 

operational connectivity, and a link to the full-media 

spectrum for public relations. The Internet facilitates their 

recruiting, training, logistic support, planning, fundraising, etc. The internet is also a powerful tool to conduct 

the equivalent of media facilitated IO against the US and 

PNs. 

Operational Approaches 

IW, and especially the 

employment of terrorist 

tactics, has become the 

“warfare of choice” for 

some state and non-state 

adversaries. 

US superiority in conventional warfighting drives many of 

our adversaries to avoid direct military confrontation with 

the US. They employ a strategy of physical, economic, 

and psychological subversion and attrition to undermine, 

erode, and ultimately exhaust the national power, 

influence, and will of the US and its strategic partners. 

The strategic campaign 

framework for CT is 

composed of three 

elements: friendly, enemy, 

and the global environment. 

The structure of the campaign uses five logical lines of 

operations (LOOs) further divided into two categories 

consisting of efforts applied directly against the enemy 

and actions applied indirectly to influence the global 

environment. These are referred to as direct and indirect 

approaches. The aims of the strategic campaign are to 

create a stabilized global environment which is 

inhospitable to terrorists and their organizations, and to 

isolate, defeat, and prevent the reemergence of a terrorist 

threat. 

Integrated Approaches. The campaign plan for the war on terrorism makes use 

of both direct and indirect approaches. Either or both 

approaches may be conducted within the scope of a 

broader campaign as directed by a joint force commander 

(JFC). The ability to manage both approaches to harness 

their synergistic effects is vital to the success of both nearand long-term CT objectives. 

xiv JP 3-26 
Executive Summary 

Direct Approach. The direct approach describes actions taken against 

terrorists and terrorist organizations. The goals of the 

direct approach against terrorists and their organizations 

are to defeat a specific threat through 

neutralization/dismantlement of the network (including 

actors, resources, and support structures) and to prevent 

the reemergence of a threat once neutralized. 

Indirect Approach. The indirect approach describes the means by which the 

global combating terrorism network (GCTN) can 

influence the operational environments within which CT 

campaigns/operations are conducted. This approach 

usually includes actions taken within LOOs to enable 

partners to conduct operations against terrorists and their 

organizations as well as actions taken to shape and 

stabilize those environments as a means to erode the 

capabilities of terrorist organizations and degrade their 

ability to acquire support and sanctuary. 

Terrorist Model. To understand the nature of the development of VEOs, the 

war on terrorism campaign plan uses a circular model that 

represents the four critical enabling components in the 

cycle of terrorist operations that facilitates development of 

a global terrorism network. The components are: a 

populace from which extremists have the potential to draw 

support; the tacit and/or active support given to the 

extremist by some of the sympathetic populace; 

local/regional terrorism as a result of states unwilling or 

incapable of countering violent extremists; and global 

terrorism that results from global networks built upon 

popular support and the inability of states to control local 

and regional extremist networks. 

Counterterrorism Model. The CT model is a model based on the application of the 

indirect and direct approach LOOs from the strategic 

campaign framework against the circular model of the 

terrorism threats. This model addresses each of the critical 

components of the threat circle with five lines of operation 

from the direct and indirect approaches - erode support for 

extremist ideology; enable partners to combat VEOs; deter 

tacit and active support for VEOs; disrupt VEOs; and deny 

access and/or use of WMD by VEOs. The desired 

objectives of these LOOs are to: defeat the 

VEOs; isolate the VEOs: prevent reconstitution/emergence 

of VEOs, defend the homeland against VEOs. 

xv 
Executive Summary 

Conventional forces and 

special operations forces 

each possess unique 

capabilities that can 

produce even greater 

warfighting potential for 

the joint force commanders 

(JFCs) when integrated into 

a holistic global CT 

campaign with numerous 

theater CT operations. 

CT is a core task of SOF, but global demand for CT 

activities and the varied conditions under which the broad 

range of CT activities occur dictates that SOF cannot be 

the sole force engaged in CT operations. Executing 

protracted CT operations will increasingly require CF 

to perform missions that traditionally have been viewed 

primarily as SOF activities. Circumstances may dictate 

that SOF support CF; and conversely, that CF support 

SOF. 

Command and Control 

Effectively countering 

terrorism may require more 

complex command and 

control and interagency 

coordination. 

Rarely in history have the effects of tactical level actions 

been so pronounced at the national strategic level as 

during the large scale CT and COIN operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. This realization has been fully recognized by 

the national level authorities and down the chain of 

command to the warfighters. 

President and Secretary of 

Defense. 

When the President directs that CT operations be 

conducted, the Armed Forces of the United States provide 

the military instrument of national power. Secretary of 

Defense (SecDef) is responsible to the President for 

creating, supporting, and employing military capabilities, 

to include CT military capabilities. 

National Security Council. The National Security Council is the principal forum for 

consideration of national security policy requiring 

Presidential determination. Of high importance among 

these policy determinations are the national security 

implications of terrorism and CT. 

National Counterterrorism 

Center. 

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is the 

primary organization in the USG for integrating and 

analyzing all intelligence possessed or acquired 

pertaining to terrorism (except purely domestic 

terrorism). It provides all-source intelligence support to 

government-wide CT activities; establishes its own 

information technology systems and architectures, and 

those between the NCTC and other agencies. The NCTC 

serves as the principal advisor to the Director of National 

Intelligence (DNI) on intelligence operations and analysis 

relating to CT. Unique among US agencies, the NCTC 

also serves as the primary organization for strategic 

operation planning for CT. It is responsible for the 

xvi JP 3-26 
Executive Summary 

integration of all instruments of national power to the CT 

mission. 

Commander, US Special 

Operations Command. 

Commander, US Special Operations Command

(CDRUSSOCOM) is responsible for synchronizing 

planning for global operations against terrorist networks, 

and will do so in coordination with other combatant 

commands, the Services, and, as directed, appropriate 

USG agencies. 

Geographic Combatant 

Commanders (GCCs). 

The GCCs have the best 

regional focus and 

knowledge of the 

operational environment in 

their areas of responsibility. 

For global operations against terrorist networks, typically 

a geographic combatant commander (GCC) is the 

supported combatant commander (CCDR) with the 

CDRUSSOCOM supporting. However, for specific 

missions as may be directed by the President or SecDef, 

CDRUSSOCOM may be the supported CCDR with the 

GCC(s) supporting in their area(s) of responsibility 

(AOR)(s). To provide the necessary unity of command, 

GCCs are normally authorized a theater special 

operations command (TSOC) — a subunified command 

which serves as the primary organization by which the 

GCC exercises command and control (C2) over SOF. The 

TSOC also serves as a joint force special operations 

component command equivalent to a Service component 

command under the GCC. 

Joint Task Force. The C2 requirements for a joint task force (JTF) for CT 

operations are largely dependent upon its size, 

composition, organization, mission, the situation, and the 

size of the joint operations area. CT operations may be 

part of a larger IW-type situation (e.g., insurgency) for 

which the JFC is responsible. The GCC will designate a 

subordinate JFC and establish the JTF on a functional or 

geographic basis. When integrating CF and SOF for joint 

operations, the JFC will typically establish support 

relationships, often with mission-type orders, or 

alternatively, some operations may require tactical control 

as the command relationship. 

Multinational CT command 

structures follow the same 

premise as for other 

multinational operations. 

In working with multinational partners, the success of CT 

operations hinges on the US ability to work within each 

partner’s political restraints, traditional structures, policies, 

and procedures. This requirement includes a multinational 

partner’s willingness to not only coordinate and operate 

with the US military but with OGAs as well. 

Interagency Coordination. Success in the war against terrorism requires interagency 

xvii 
Executive Summary 

coordination to maximize the effectiveness of all 

instruments of national power. US Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM), as the integrating command for 

global CT planning efforts, supports a growing network of 

relationships through continuous liaison partnerships, a 

supporting technical infrastructure, and using information 

sharing policies. 

Joint Interagency 

Coordination Groups. 

To enhance interagency coordination at the strategic and 

operational levels, joint interagency coordination 

groups (JIACGs) have been established at the GCCs. A 

CT planning effort and subsequent operations may require 

a combatant command to request additional CT expertise 

from various agencies and organizations to staff its JIACG 

and optimize interagency effectiveness and efficiency. 

US Special Operations 

Command Interagency 

Task Force. 

USSOCOM Interagency Task Force is a dedicated 

operations and intelligence planning team comprised of 

interagency intelligence and operations planning 

specialists and a robust information collection capability. 

The interagency task force searches for and identifies new, 

developing, and emerging CT opportunities to attack 

terrorist organizations and networks worldwide. It further 

develops actionable intelligence into operational courses 

of action and plans against the emerging targets. 

Combatant commands’ JIACGs should coordinate their 

CT planning with the USSOCOM interagency task force 

as appropriate. 

Significant Enabling Functions for Counterterrorism 

Enabling functions 

requiring special emphasis 

for CT. 

There are enabling functions that are essential to all joint 

operations, but require special emphasis for CT operations. 

These significant enabling functions for CT are: 

intelligence; intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR); logistics; legal; SC; and IO.

In the aftermath of the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist 

attacks, the USG enhanced 

CT intelligence architecture 

and interagency 

collaboration by setting 

clear national priorities and 

transforming the 

organizational structure of 

The intelligence community (IC) has been reorganized and 

the DNI now oversees the IC to better integrate its efforts 

into a more unified, coordinated, and effective body. The 

President established a mission manager organization, the 

NCTC, dedicated solely to planning and conducting 

intelligence operations against terrorist networks. 

The USSOCOM Center for Special Operations is the 

fusion point for DOD synchronization of CT plans and 

xviii JP 3-26 
Executive Summary 

the intelligence agencies to 

achieve those priorities. 

Combatant commands 

require actionable 

intelligence, and that 

requirement is very relevant 

for CT operations from the 

strategic to the lowest 

tactical levels. 

establishing intelligence priorities against terrorist 

networks. Accurate and timely intelligence is absolutely 

critical to CbT. All disciplines of intelligence are required 

for CT. 

Intelligence requirements for global and regional 

operations against the primary enemy, the transnational 

terrorists (i.e., al-Qaeda), must also be synchronized with 

the intelligence requirements for regional operations (i.e., 

within AORs) against the secondary enemy, VEOs. GCCs 

have responsibility for intelligence analysis and 

production on all terrorist groups whose primary operating 

bases reside within their theater. 

The responsible JFC must 

properly prioritize 

intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance for CT 

among other operational 

needs. 

USSOCOM, the GCCs, Defense Intelligence Operations 

Coordination Center, DNI, and Joint Functional 

Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance coordinate and synchronize the ISR 

requirements and assets available to support the long war 

on terrorism. At the strategic and operational levels, the 

JFC employs ISR forces assigned or attached to the joint 

force and requests support of national/interagency assets 

through a validation by the supported CCDR, normally a 

GCC. 

Logistic Planning. The war against terrorism requires robust logistic planning 

with global distribution requirements for the Services. CT 

operations may receive priority over existing operations, 

and the transnational terrorist threat can require multiple 

CT operations within and across AORs. The numerous 

CT operations around the globe, utilizing various elements 

of US and PN instruments of national power, require 

continuing assessment, and prioritization of 

actions/support. 

Commanders at all levels 

ensure their forces operate 

in accordance with the “law 

of war,” often called the 

“law of armed conflict.” 

With CT operations in numerous locations across the 

globe, JFCs must be particularly aware of the status of 

their conflict, the legal basis for their use of force, the 

characterization of enemy combatants, civilians taking a 

direct part in the hostilities, and potential detainees. The 

JFC responsible for CT should determine early in the 

planning stage what the required standing rules of 

engagement/standing rules for the use of force 

(ROE/RUF) should be. When conducting multinational 

CT operations, the use of military force may be influenced

xix 
Executive Summary 

xx JP 3-26 

Domestic CT operations are 

considered part of 

homeland security under 

the lead of Department of 

Homeland Security. 

by the differences between US and a host nation’s and/or a 

PN’s ROE/RUF. 

Department of Homeland Security is considered primary 

for coordinating Executive Branch efforts to detect, 

prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and 

recover from terrorist attacks within the US. In domestic 

situations, the Constitution, law, and DOD policy limit 

the scope and nature of military actions. The President 

has the authority to direct the use of the military against 

terrorist groups and individuals in the US for other than 

law enforcement actions (i.e., national defense, emergency 

protection of life and property, and to restore order). 

Effective use of strategic 

communication (SC) also 

can be used to counter 

violent extremist 

organizations’ use of their 

own form of SC: ideological 

propaganda and 

disinformation. 

The DOD SC objectives in the war on terrorism are to 

strengthen the GCTN by supporting PNs, converting 

moderates to become PNs, weaken sympathy and support 

for VEOs, provide support for moderate voices, dissuade 

enablers and supporters of extremists, counter ideological 

support for terrorism, and deter and disrupt terrorist acts. 

Subordinate JFCs must coordinate their SC activities with 

the CCDR to ensure they are consistent with USG 

objectives. GCCs must collaborate with the DOS 

diplomatic missions within their AORs. 

CT is a mission area that 

focuses on effects of 

operations on people, and 

in some operational areas 

the “information war” can 

determine which side will 

gain the upper hand in 

public opinion. 

IO are used to create and/or sustain desired and 

measurable effects on adversary leaders, forces (regular or 

irregular), information, information systems, and other 

audiences; while protecting and defending the JFC’s own 

forces actions, information, and information systems. It is 

obvious that IO can and should be applied across the 

breadth and depth of CT operations as a primary means of 

influencing not only extremists and their supporters, but 

just as important, the moderates (mainstream populace). 

In CT operations, a goal is to identify the target audiences 

(TAs) and use IO to influence the TAs’ behavior. 

CONCLUSION 

This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning 

and execution of counterterrorism across the range of 

military operations.
CHAPTER I 

OVERVIEW 

I-1 

“. . . We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense, and 

for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering 

innocents, we say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken; you 

cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you. . . .” 

President Barack Obama 

Inauguration Address, 20 January 2009 

1. General 

 Over several decades, terrorism has evolved as a preferred tactic for ideological 

extremists around the world, directly or indirectly affecting millions of people. Terrorism 

had been treated primarily as a law enforcement issue by most countries and international 

organizations because it represents extreme lawlessness. As the terrorist threat grew, in 

addition to increasing law enforcement capabilities for counterterrorism (CT), the United 

States, like many nations, developed specialized, but limited, military CT capabilities to 

rescue hostages, take preemptive action or retaliate against some terrorists because they 

were geographically or politically beyond the reach of law enforcement. In joint doctrine, 

CT was simply defined as operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, 

deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. In addition to any diplomatic and law 

enforcement actions, the US Government (USG) typically viewed CT missions as special 

operations by covert, clandestine, or low visibility means. CT became one of the core tasks 

of the US special operations forces (SOF), and their role and additive capability is to 

conduct offensive measures within Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) overall combating 

terrorism (CbT) efforts. 

a. The broader construct of CbT is defined as “actions, including antiterrorism and 

counterterrorism, taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.” The 

early terrorist threat was generally from secular and nationalist terrorist groups, many of 

which depended upon active state sponsors. The collapse of the Soviet Union—which 

provided critical backing to terrorist groups and certain state sponsors—accelerated the 

decline in state sponsorship, and many terrorist organizations were effectively destroyed or 

neutralized, but that decline was short lived. Today, whether the extremists are local 

insurgents, participants in organized criminal activities, or members of an international 

terrorist network, if they use terrorist tactics, they are generally viewed as terrorists. Also, 

with the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the opportunity 

for terrorists to acquire and use them becomes more likely. Therefore, some significant 

policy and strategy adjustments were required because terrorism has evolved from a 

tactic of inducing fear in select populations/areas to a transnational threat of strategic 

proportion, particularly against the United States and Western societies. For example, AlQaeda and associated terrorist networks form a multinational enterprise with activities in 

more than 60 countries. 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-26 

b. After September 11, 2001, the United States, along with multinational partners, 

embarked on what was characterized as a “global war on terrorism (GWOT).” That war 

has proven the need for expanded CT capabilities and a broader role for the US military in 

unified action against terrorism. DOD realized the size and scope of this global CT effort 

were beyond the capabilities of the CT dedicated SOF. While conventional forces (CF) 

continue to directly support some SOF CT operations, the pervasiveness of the threat has 

required that conventional forces also conduct CT operations. The 2006 Quadrennial 

Defense Review Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap states, “the Military Departments 

and Services must continue to rebalance the capabilities and capacity to increase 

substantially their ability to conduct long-duration COIN [counterinsurgency] and CT 

operations, including operations with host nation security forces.” That increasing role 

for CF, the need for truly unified action, and an increased emphasis on an indirect 

approach has led to developing this doctrine with a new definition for CT: “Actions 

taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and 

regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.” 

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE WAR ON TERRORISM 

(1 FEBRUARY 2006) 

The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSPWOT) was developed to address the specific need for focusing US 

military planning efforts to countering terrorism. The NMSP-WOT 

fulfilled the need for strategy and planning guidance and articulated the 

military contribution to achieving the objectives for the global war on 

terrorism identified in the National Security Strategy, the National 

Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the National 

Strategy for Combating Terrorism.

The NMSP-WOT was “operationalized” by the US Special Operations 

Command Concept Plan 7500, Department of Defense Global War on 

Terrorism Campaign Plan. 

As a planning and source document, the NMSP-WOT was superseded by 

the 2008 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), but much of the 

content of the NMSP-WOT remains relevant. The strategy and planning 

guidance that was consolidated in the superseded NMSP-WOT is now 

maintained within the functional planning guidance of the Guidance for 

Employment of the Force (GEF) while the more specific planning tasks 

are in the JSCP. The GEF moved the Department of Defense from a 

“contingency-centric” approach to planning to a “strategy-centric” 

approach. The GEF and JSCP are the “principal sources of guidance for 

combatant command steady-state campaign, contingency, and posture 

planning efforts. 

Various Sources 
Overview 

I-3 

c. This chapter outlines the policies and strategies that influenced the development 

of the strategic campaign framework for CT doctrine. The following paragraphs briefly 

introduce the national and DOD policies and strategies that led to and became part of the 

National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (1 February 2006) (NMSPWOT), which led to the development of the US Special Operations Command Concept Plan 

7500, Department of Defense Global War on Terrorism Campaign Plan. While the 2008 

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) superseded the NMSP-WOT, some of its content 

was adopted into the JSCP and the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), and now 

those documents are the principal sources for military strategy and planning guidance 

(including that for the GWOT). The military strategic approach and the military 

strategic objectives, are briefly discussed because of their historical relevance to the 

current framework for CT discussed in Chapter III, “Operational Approaches.” That brief 

summary is followed by the prioritized strategic end states for the GWOT listed in the GEF. 

Then, the relationship of CT to irregular warfare (IW) is summarized, and the depth of the 

doctrinal foundation already associated with CT is explained. 

2. United States Government Policy and Strategy 

a. Policy. The National Security Strategy states, “It is the policy of the United States 

to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with 

the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. In the world today, the fundamental 

character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them. The goal of 

our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the 

needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This 

is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.” In conjunction with 

that broad policy, the USG policy on countering terrorism has been summarized as follows: 

Defeat violent extremism, and create a global environment that is inhospitable to 

violent extremists. 

(1) In 2003, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism listed a number of 

policy goals intended to establish and maintain an international standard of accountability 

with regard to CbT. They include: 

(a) A “zero tolerance” policy for terrorist activity. 

(b) Strong support for new, strict standards for all states to meet in the global 

war against terrorism. 

(c) States that have sovereign rights also have sovereign responsibilities.

(d) The clear articulation of policy goals through appropriate public and 

diplomatic channels. 

(2) To ensure the United States has a well orchestrated and synchronized policy, 

the Department of State (DOS) was given the lead in developing policy action plans 

that employ both incentives and disincentives to end state sponsorship of terrorism. 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-26 

All appropriate USG departments and agencies were tasked to engage key allies to develop 

common or complementary strategies to support the policy action plans. 

(3) Because each case is unique, with different interests and legacy issues 

involved the USG does not have a single, inflexible approach to handling the 

recognized state sponsors of terrorism. Each case is unique, with different interests and 

legacy issues involved. Each situation demands specifically tailored policies. The USG is 

open to overtures from states that want to put their sponsorship of terrorism behind them, 

but remains resolute on the essential principle that there are no “good” or “just” 

terrorists. The United States will be relentless in discrediting terrorism as a means of 

expressing discontent. 

(4) An example of diplomacy supported by the USG policy is United Nations 

Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373, which clearly established states’ obligations 

for CbT. This resolution called upon all member states to cooperate to prevent terrorist 

attacks through a range of activities, including suppressing and freezing terrorist financing, 

prohibiting their nationals from financially supporting terrorists; denying safe havens to 

those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts; and taking steps to prevent the 

movement of terrorists. Additionally, the international CT conventions and protocols, 

together with UNSCR 1373, set forth a compelling body of international obligations 

relating to CT. The USG will continue to press all states to become parties to and fully 

implement these conventions and protocols. 

(5) Unity of effort requires coordination not only at the apex of the federal 

government but also at the operational/tactical level, where response and intervention 

actions may be taken by diverse authorities acting independently or in coordination with 

each other. This policy requires what is doctrinally known as unified action, also called the 

“whole of government approach” by many interagency partners. 

“An analysis of the history of combating terrorism confirms that the best way to 

defeat terrorism is to isolate and localize its activities and then destroy it through 

intensive, sustained action. This effort requires us to identify terrorists, locate their 

sanctuaries and destroy their ability to plan and operate.” 

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 

February 2003 

b. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Guidance for the war against 

extremism was derived from appropriate national security Presidential directives, the 

National Defense Strategy, contingency planning guidance, and the National Military 

Strategy. The consolidated guidance is summarized in the following national strategic 

aims, strategy, and means for the war on terrorism, and is depicted in Figure I-1. NOTE: 

Now, the GEF and the JSCP provide the principal planning guidance. 
Overview 

I-5 

(1) National Strategic Aims. Defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of 

life as a free and open society; and create a global environment inhospitable to violent 

extremists and all who support them (the ends). 

(2) National Strategy. The broad USG strategy is to continue to lead an 

international effort to deny violent extremist networks the resources and functions they need 

to operate and survive. This strategy of three key elements and three enabling elements 

represents the critical efforts (the ways) for achieving success. 

(a) Key Strategy Elements

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM

Continue to lead a broad international effort to

deny terrorist networks the resources they need

to operate and survive.

Protect

the

Homeland

Attack

Terrorists

Support

Mainstream

Efforts

MEANS

ENDS

National Strategic Aims:

-- Defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life

as a free and open society, and

-- Create a global environment inhospitable to violent

extremists and all who support them.

Expand foreign partnership and partnership capacity.

Instruments of National Power

Enhance capacity to prevent terrorist use of weapons of

mass destruction.

Institutionalize the war on terrorism domestically and internationally.

WAYS

Figure I-1. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-26 

1. Protect and Defend the Homeland. These efforts protect and 

defend the economy, society, and systems of the USG from the effects of terrorist attacks. 

This element includes efforts both internal and external to the homeland because protecting 

and defending the homeland requires what can be characterized as a multilayered defense in 

depth beginning in the forward regions of the world. 

2. Attack Terrorists and their Capacity to Operate Effectively at 

Home and Abroad. These direct offensive efforts are designed to disrupt terrorists’ 

operations and can affect terrorists’ ability to effectively execute their attacks or sustain 

their ideology. They include killing and capturing key terrorist leaders and tactical 

elements, destroying training centers, and denying the enemy access to resources and 

functions critical to their operations. Ultimately, continuous and successive network-wide 

attacks against the terrorists are intended to cause their networks to fail. USG efforts will 

typically need a transregional approach to counter terrorist networks. 

3. Support Mainstream Efforts to Reject Violent Extremism. These 

efforts aim to counter extremist ideology and encourage democracy, freedom, and 

economic prosperity in societies. A decisive point in countering ideological support for 

terrorism occurs when a moderate group of the population, religious affiliation, sect, etc., of 

which the terrorists are a part, becomes active in the fight against the terrorists. Key to this 

is the moderates’ belief that terrorism is not a legitimate means to pursue political goals. 

The strategy is to encourage and enable moderates to promote the view that violent 

extremist efforts undermine the wellbeing of the collective community on a local, regional, 

and global basis. A goal is for the mainstream moderates to become more active and 

successful in stopping support for the violent extremists. The US role in this effort is to 

support, where appropriate, and encourage and amplify the interests and voices of 

moderates who oppose extremists and continue to encourage democracy, freedom, and 

economic prosperity. This is a key element of the national strategy that is focused on 

the terrorist’s center of gravity (COG): extremist ideology. 

(b) Enabling Elements. The three key elements of the strategy are enabled 

by three crosscutting elements: expanding foreign partnerships and partnership capacity; 

enhancing capacity to prevent terrorist acquisition and use of WMD; and institutionalizing, 

domestically and internationally, the strategy against violent extremists. 

(3) Instruments of National Power. Success in this war relies heavily on the 

close cooperation among USG and partner nations (PNs) to integrate all instruments of 

their national power — diplomatic, informational, military, and economic, and particularly 

the financial, intelligence, and law enforcement elements of those instruments (the means). 

3. Department of Defense Policy and Strategy 

a. Policy. DOD policy provides military commanders and their staffs with military 

objectives and relative priorities in the allocation of resources for CT. It also provides 

guidance for DOD cooperation with other USG departments and agencies and with PNs for 

planning and conducting CT operations. The resulting Department of Defense Global War 
Overview 

I-7 

on Terrorism Campaign Plan, and geographic combatant commanders’ (GCCs’) concept 

plans for the war on terrorism fulfill the DOD policy guidance. 

b. Department of Defense Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The DOD strategy 

for CbT is derived from the National Security Strategy and implements the National 

Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Its objectives are summarized as follows: 

(1) Defeat Terrorist Attacks. Thwart or defeat terrorist attacks against the 

United States, our PNs, and interests. 

(2) Attack Terrorist Networks Abroad. Attack and disrupt terrorist networks 

abroad so as to cause adversaries to be incapable or unwilling to attack the US homeland, 

allies, or interests. 

(3) Deny Terrorist Networks WMD. This includes possession or use of WMD. 

(4) Establish Favorable Conditions. Establish conditions that allow PNs to 

govern their territory effectively and defeat terrorists. 

(5) Deny Hospitable Environment to Violent Extremists. Contribute to the 

establishment and maintenance of a global environment inhospitable to violent extremist 

organizations (VEOs) and all who support them. 

4. The Military Strategic Approach and Objectives for the War on Terrorism 

 The military strategic approach and military strategic objectives are summarized below 

because they are the basis for development of the strategic campaign framework for the 

Department of Defense Global War on Terrorism Campaign Plan and for the development 

of joint doctrine for CT. The principal military strategy and planning guidance are 

contained in the GEF and the JSCP. 

a. Military Strategic Approach. The military strategic approach is to focus military 

operations in such a way as to assist the other instruments of national power to undermine 

the terrorists’ COG: extremist ideology. The Armed Forces of the United States will pursue 

direct and indirect approaches to counter the terrorists’ ideology, support moderate 

alternatives, build rapport with and capacities of partners, and attack the terrorist and their 

infrastructure. The direct approach focuses on protecting US interests while attacking the 

terrorists. The indirect approach focuses on the actions to establish conditions (a stable and 

more secure environment) for others to achieve success, and if necessary, with the help of 

the United States. Figure I-2 depicts the military strategic approach and provides the 

foundation for the operational approaches depicted in Figure III-1. 

b. Military Strategic Objectives. The military strategic objectives provide a way to 

achieve the national strategic aims (end state). The military strategic objectives are: 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-26 

(1) Deny Terrorists the Resources They Need to Operate and Survive. 

Understanding the critical nodes and linkages of the terrorists’ networks is critical. At the 

national military level, efforts are focused on identifying global linkages among terrorist 

networks, and then to arranging regional actions that will create detrimental effects 

network-wide. Because the terrorists are located in many countries around the world, much 

of the effort against them will have to be made by those countries with the necessary 

encouragement and assistance of the United States. 

MILITARY STRATEGIC APPROACH

ENEMY

Leadership

Safe Havens

Finance

Communications Movement

Intelligence

Personnel

Weapons

Ideology

Protect

the

Homeland

Attack

Terrorists

Support

Mainstream

Efforts

MEANS

ENDS

National Strategic Aims:

-- Defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open

society, and

-- Create a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all

who support them.

Combatant Commands, Services, and Combat

Support Agencies

WAYS

Military Strategic Objectives

Defeat terrorists and their organizations.

Deny terrorists the resources they need to operate and survive.

Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination

with other government agencies and partner nations.

Enable partner nations to counter terrorism.

Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter

ideological support for terrorism.

Prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation, recover

and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and maintain capacity for

consequence management.

Figure I-2. Military Strategic Approach 
Overview 

I-9 

(2) Enable Partner Nations to Counter Terrorism. Terrorist groups based in a 

remote, relatively inaccessible country can still pose a major threat to the United States and 

its interests. Countering terrorism requires a worldwide, continuous, and comprehensive 

effort to create a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support 

them. The United States must also continue to encourage and assist bilateral and 

multilateral regional partnerships among states that can work together in CbT. 

(3) Prevent WMD Proliferation, Recover and Eliminate Uncontrolled 

Materials, and Maintain Capacity for Consequence Management (CM). Important to 

the terrorist’s success is recognition as a credible opponent. The terrorists gain credibility if 

they are able to obtain and use WMD or successfully employ technology to achieve their 

goals. Military activities include efforts to detect and monitor WMD acquisition and 

development (nonproliferation); conduct WMD interdiction or WMD offensive operations 

against terrorists armed with WMD capabilities (WMD, delivery systems, associated 

technology, expertise and material) (counterproliferation); conduct security cooperation 

activities; and coordinate CM operations (e.g., logistics, health service support, and 

decontamination activities). All of these efforts also serve to protect the homeland. 

(4) Defeat Terrorists and Their Organizations. This military strategic 

objective directly addresses the terrorist’s ability to continue global terrorist operations. 

This requires continuous military operations to develop the situation and generate the 

intelligence that allows the United States to attack global terrorist organizations. This 

intelligence supports the first objective of military operations against the terrorists: find the 

terrorist. Once the situation is effectively developed, military operations may be authorized 

to capture or kill senior leadership and senior operatives, eliminate safe havens, destroy 

training camps and resources, capture or kill cell members (foot soldiers), and disrupt 

recruiting and indoctrination efforts. Emphasis is placed on operating with and training 

PNs to achieve this objective, however the United States must also be prepared to operate 

unilaterally, if necessary. 

(5) Counter State and Non-State Support for Terrorism in Coordination 

with Other Government Agencies (OGAs) and PNs. State sponsorship provides violent 

extremists access to key resources, including fronts for illegal activities. Non-state 

supporters may be financial supporters, such as charities and criminal organizations that 

directly or indirectly support or benefit from terrorist organizations. To counter these 

threats, US and PN activities include, among others: intelligence operations to identify state 

sponsors and non-state supporters; operations to eliminate terrorists and their direct 

supporters; and to interdict their resources (including WMD and their components); CT, 

counterinsurgency (COIN), counternarcotics efforts, and participation in exercises and 

capability demonstrations to dissuade and coerce states and non-state entities. In certain 

circumstances, the military can lead efforts to oust regimes that support terrorists. 

(6) Contribute to the Establishment of Conditions that Counter Ideological 

Support for Terrorism. Countering ideological support for terrorism attacks the enemy’s 

strategic COG - extremist ideology. Although DOD is not the lead federal agency for this 
Chapter I 

I-10 JP 3-26 

effort, the US military can contribute significantly. As examples, the military may be 

directed to take actions to bolster the security, confidence, and other institutional 

capabilities of those who oppose violent extremists. Military actions can shake the 

confidence of violent extremists, expose their false statements and corruption (e.g., through 

an active public affairs [PA] program), and otherwise diminish their ability to effectively 

convey their messages of antagonism, violence, and intimidation (e.g., information 

operations [IO]). 

5. Prioritized Strategic End States for the Global War on Terrorism 

 The strategy and planning guidance is maintained within the functional planning 

guidance of the GEF while the more specific planning tasks are in the JSCP. Planning starts 

with the overarching National Defense Strategy from which the GEF derives prioritized 

regional and functional strategic end states. The strategic campaign framework for CT (see 

Chapter III, “Operational Approaches”) and the following current functional end states for 

the global war on terrorism are contained in the GEF: 

a. End State 1. Organizations committed to violent extremism no longer have the 

capability or intent to strike globally and catastrophically and their capacity to strike is 

outweighed by the capacity of local governments to counter and defeat them. 

b. End State 2. Key states deny the enemy the resources needed to operate and 

survive. In particular, key states have reduced ungoverned or under governed areas that 

violent extremists seek to exploit. 

c. End State 3. Terrorists, violent extremists, and their supporters are prevented from 

obtaining, developing, distributing, or using WMD. 

d. End State 4. The global environment is inhospitable to terrorism and violent 

extremism. 

(1) Violent extremism is denounced, terrorism activity is criminalized, and 

sanctions or use of force are supported to thwart or respond to a terrorist attack. 

(2) Muslims reject violent extremism and there is popular support for peaceful 

political and non-extremist political models within the Muslim world. 

(3) Based on a shared understanding of terrorist challenges, allies and partners 

work actively with the United States in pursuing complementary strategies to address them. 

(4) States and non-state entities either do not support terrorism or are deterred 

from supporting terrorism. 
Overview 

I-11 

6. Irregular Warfare 

a. IW is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 

influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect approaches and asymmetric 

means, though it may involve the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to 

erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. 

b. CT is an activity of IW. IW involves a variety of operations and activities that 

occur in isolation or combined with conventional force operations. An adversary using 

irregular methods typically will endeavor to wage protracted operations in an attempt to 

break the will of their opponent and influence relevant populations. Activities applicable to 

IW include, but are not limited to: foreign internal defense (FID), security force assistance 

(SFA), COIN, CT, unconventional warfare (UW), stability operations, strategic 

communication (SC), psychological operations (PSYOP), IO, civil-military operations 

(CMO), intelligence and counterintelligence, and law enforcement. 

c. The focus of IW is on the relevant population and not military platforms or armed 

forces, as it is in traditional war. IW is a struggle for legitimacy and influence over a 

population from which its authority to act originates, and is conferred upon either its 

government or leadership. IW depends not just on military prowess, but also an 

understanding of such social dynamics as tribal politics, social networks, religious 

influences, and cultural mores. Therefore, the key to success in IW comes from the ability 

of a group or organization to influence populations to gain or enhance political authority. 

Governance is the mechanism through which those political authorities serve the needs of 

the population. Terrorist and insurgent organizations may seek to attack and disrupt 

governments and their supporting ideology as a means to erode legitimacy. Hence, all 

parties seek to undermine their adversaries’ legitimacy in order to isolate them physically 

and psychologically from the relevant populations. At the same time, terrorist and 

insurgents also seek to bolster their own legitimacy and credibility with those same 

populations. However, defeating terrorist organizations usually requires maintaining the 

legitimacy and enhancing the credibility of a political authority to support and govern the 

relevant population. These actions serve as a means to eliminate terrorist safe havens and 

set favorable conditions in which direct action can more effectively dismantle or neutralize 

the terrorist organizations. 

d. Successful CT requires stable, long-term engagement to develop comprehensive 

knowledge of the global and regional environments and provide security and stability for 

key populations. However, security and stability cannot be provided by military operations 

alone. As a major IW activity, CT efforts should include all instruments of national power 

to undermine an adversary's power and will, and its credibility and legitimacy to influence 

the relevant population. Terrorists use physical or psychological violence to disrupt the 

capabilities of political authorities to govern. Terrorists seek safe haven within un-governed 

or under-governed areas. These areas can be decisive points in the CT effort — especially 

if the terrorist organization migrates towards insurgency tactics and seeks to fulfill 

governance functions as a means of gaining legitimacy from the population. Security, then, 

becomes a critical element of any plan to defeat a terrorist network; because without it, a 
Chapter I 

I-12 JP 3-26 

terrorist can gain significant influence by inducing and/or exploiting a population's 

grievances. 

e. IW activities such as CT often will be led by a USG agency other than the DOD. 

The complex nature of terrorist organizations and their focus on population coercion require 

joint force commanders (JFCs) to synchronize operations with the activities of the 

interagency and PN teams to achieve a unity of effort beyond that traditionally associated 

with direct action CT missions. CT operations require JFCs and their staffs to work closely 

with interagency and multinational counterparts during all stages of planning and execution 

to achieve unified action and ensure that actions taken by one organization complement the 

actions of others. 

f. For long-term CT campaigns/operations, an indirect approach for continual shaping 

and stabilizing should be synchronized with direct approach actions. All US efforts should 

be integrated with those of the PN in a global and regional context. These efforts require 

patience, coupled with consistent and persistent messages describing the USG focus on and 

support of the relevant populations and their legitimate government. Paramount to 

success in planning CT is an appreciation for the basic human physiological, safety, 

and security needs as motivating factors common to all populations. The extent to 

which the USG and other regional and global partners can provide the basis for the relevant 

population to meet these human needs will affect the degree of popular support of and/or 

noninterference with joint force CT operations. 

HUMAN NEEDS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

People desire a strong degree of security. 

People want control over their social and political order, according to the 

norms and expectations of their culture. 

People want meaningful economic activity that enables them to provide a 

living for their families. 

People want a society that reinforces their cultural preferences and 

allows them to feel pride and a sense of belonging to their group. 

Various Sources 

7. Doctrinal Foundation for Counterterrorism 

 Joint doctrine is inexorably linked to the development of national military strategy. 

Accordingly, the development of this publication is tied to the National Strategy for 

Combating Terrorism. Additionally, the scope of CT has broadened from the more 

narrowly defined “offensive measures” typically conducted by SOF to one that incorporates 

both SOF and conventional forces in a wide range of actions through “direct and indirect 

approaches” in unified action against violent extremism. Within these approaches, certain 
Overview 

I-13 

joint doctrine already exists. Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 

United States, addresses terrorism within the strategic security environment, terrorism as 

related to IW, and the US military effort in the context of the long war, among other 

aspects. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, discusses the security environment, strategic guidance, 

and conduct of joint operations of which CT is a part. Other JPs have related discussions, 

that when refocused on a CT application, provide methodology that facilitates both direct 

and indirect approaches to countering terrorism. Examples, while not all inclusive, include 

the following: 

a. JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Specific CT efforts can be conducted as 

part of the FID program for a host nation (HN). FID has long been recognized as a means 

of supporting the CT and COIN efforts of a number of HNs. The same is true when 

conducting SFA in support of foreign security forces (FSF). 

b. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism. Provides the joint doctrine for planning, executing, and 

assessing joint antiterrorism operations. It also established the CbT framework of which 

antiterrorism and CT are a part.. 

c. JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations. Narcoterrorism is a form of terrorism 

linked to illicit drug trafficking. Whether terrorism is used to support drug trafficking or 

funding from drug trafficking is used to support terrorist activities, there is frequently a 

correlation between joint counterdrug and CT operations. 

d. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. The long 

war cannot be won without effective integration of the CT efforts of OGAs, 

intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as 

part of unified action with joint forces. JP 3-08 outlines the methodology to accomplish 

such coordination. 

e. JP 3-13, Information Operations. IO, with its core and supporting activities, 

provides the flexibility of action through what are now identified as direct and indirect 

approaches to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the terrorists’ human and automated 

decision-making processes while protecting our own. 

f. JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations. PSYOP, as a core IO capability, have proven 

to be an essential part of the capabilities required for CT, especially in application of the 

indirect approach to shape, stabilize, and influence the environment in which VEOs operate. 

g. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. Many aspects of integrating multinational 

efforts are described, whether through coalitions, alliances, or partnerships, that will be 

required to fight the long war on terrorism. 

h. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. CMO can support both the direct and indirect 

approaches to CT. CMO, with its range of activities, can build a nation’s capacity to 

combat terrorism by mitigating the actions of VEOs, helping gain the support of moderate 

elements, and otherwise create a secure and stable environment. 
Chapter I 

I-14 JP 3-26 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER II 

TERRORIST THREATS 

II-1 

The Nature of the Terrorist Threat Today 

“We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous 

ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical 

visions—by abandoning every value except the will to power—they follow in the 

path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all 

the way, to where it ends: in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies.” 

President George W. Bush 

Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People 

September 20, 2001 

1. Overview 

 America is at war with extremists who advocate and use violence to gain control over 

others and threaten our way of life. Violent extremists find it useful to mischaracterize the 

war as a religious or cultural clash (e.g., between Islam and the West). These violent 

extremists see the United States and other western societies as primary obstacles to 

achieving their political ends. The greatest strength of our society is its freedom and 

openness. The extremist networks will continue to exploit the seams in open societies 

around the globe, and consequently, the United States and PNs remain vulnerable to 

terrorist violence designed to undermine those relationships and cause some members to 

abandon the struggle. 

terrorism — The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful 

violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or 

societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or 

ideological. 

Joint Publication 3-07.2, Antiterrorism

a. Nature of the War. In the years preceding the 9/11 attacks, the United States 

countered terrorism primarily through diplomacy and law enforcement. The President of 

the United States declared those attacks acts of war by an enemy that threatens to destroy 

our freedoms and way of life. Since that time, the DOD’s understanding of the nature 

of the war and the nature of the enemy continues to mature and evolve. 

(1) Our future efforts will often be executed in the urban areas of various nation 

states. As a result, the nature of military operations will be limited by issues of 

national sovereignty and political risk, all significantly influenced by public opinion at 

home and abroad. 

(2) The employment of military and other instruments of national power against 

terrorist organizations is complicated by their secretive nature, widely dispersed resources, 

support by some populations and governments, often decentralized control, and an almost 
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-26 

seamless integration into diverse communities worldwide. The easy availability, speed, and 

simplicity of global communications, financial transfers, and inter-continental movement of 

people enable the terrorists’ global reach and their capacity to rapidly adapt their tactics and 

techniques to breach security measures and elude capture. 

(3) The conditions that extremist networks exploit to operate and survive have 

developed over the years, and those conditions must be altered through long-term, sustained 

operations using both direct and indirect approaches. Success against transnational 

terrorism will not occur in a single, defining moment but through a sustained effort to 

compress the scope and capabilities of terrorist organizations/VEOs, isolating them 

regionally and individually, and then destroying them within state borders. 

(4) Terrorist networks, such as al-Qaeda, may employ irregular, catastrophic, or 

disruptive methods to challenge US security interests. Irregular threats involve the 

employment of “unconventional” methods and tactics to counter the traditional advantages 

of stronger opponents. Catastrophic threats involve the acquisition, possession, and 

potential use of WMD or methods and material producing WMD-like effects. Disruptive

threats may come from terrorist organizations that develop and use breakthrough 

technologies to negate current US advantages. 

b. Nature of the Enemy. Terrorist groups, regardless of ideology, origin, location, or 

organizational structure have some common basic needs to survive and remain credible to 

their followers: funding, security, an ability to produce and distribute propaganda, a support 

infrastructure, an ability to recruit, and the means to conduct violent acts against selected 

targets.

transnational threat. Any activity, individual, or group not tied to a particular 

country or region that operates across international boundaries and threatens 

United States national security or interests.

(1) The principal enemy is a transnational movement, consisting of extremist 

organizations, networks, and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – 

which uses terrorism for ideological ends. For example, the brand of terrorism used by 

Islamic terrorist groups has included the use of children and the mentally challenged as 

unknowing participants in suicide-bombing attacks against both fellow civilians and 

government personnel alike. Unlike traditional military adversaries, these transnational 

terrorists have shown no tendency to be deterred, adding significantly to the 

complexity of countering them. This enemy is often educated, absolutely dedicated, 

highly motivated, and shows little restraint. Terrorists find freedom of action within 

physical and virtual safe havens by exploiting modern technology, the population, the civil 

liberties of the societies they attack, and their extreme ideology. A common extremist 

ideology is what links some often disparate organizations into terrorist networks. 

Although they may have differing local goals or objectives, ideological extremism is the 

foundation of this movement’s overall success. It is the key to motivation, recruitment, 

and direct and indirect support, and serves as the basis for justifying terrorist actions no 

matter how abhorrent. 
Terrorist Threats 

II-3 

(2) Our secondary enemy is the other collective VEOs that interfere with our 

CT efforts and which may transition to overt sponsorship of or active participation in direct 

action against the United States, our PNs, and our interests. 

(3) Opportunists, Extremists, and Terrorists. There are a variety of state and 

non-state actors identified with terrorism that have been generally categorized as 

opportunists, extremists, and terrorists. Often, the three may be indistinguishable. 

(a) Opportunists are members of criminal organizations (e.g., narcoterrorists), weapon proliferators, or state sponsors, who undercut the rule of law and 

governmental legitimacy, contributing to an environment of corruption and violence. 

Opportunists take advantage of opportunities as they arise. They often allow the existence 

of terrorist safe havens and sanctuaries in various regions of the world or provide mutual 

support to satisfy other interests. The United States is just beginning to understand the 

collusive nature of this criminal-extremist nexus—a convergence of opportunists’ and 

extremists’ interests. A key danger of the association are terrorists/extremists seeking 

to obtain and use, or threaten to use, WMD, may find their efforts assisted by those 

opportunists who might not endorse the extremists’ views or methods but who are merely 

seeking financial gain.

“In addition to known state proliferators, there is a dangerous new breed of nonstate sponsored actors who provide technology and materials for profit such as 

Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, who developed a matured transnational 

nuclear proliferation network selling sensitive technology and weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD)-related materials to any rogue nation or organization willing to 

pay.” 

US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 

Country Reports on Terrorism, The Global Challenge of WMD Terrorism

(b) Extremists are those who seek to force their ideological beliefs on others. 

They oppose—in principle and practice — the right of people to choose how to live and 

how to organize their societies; and support the murder of ordinary people to advance their 

extremist ideological objectives. Many violent extremists, because of the degree to 

which they carry their violence, are best described as terrorists. VEO is a 

characterization of organized extremists who may not be part of a transnational terrorist 

network, the primary enemy, but are organized and dangerous enough to be the secondary 

enemy in the long war on terrorism. 

(c) The term terrorist refers to those who commit acts of terrorism. 

c. Enemy COGs and Critical Vulnerabilities. The analysis of the critical 

capabilities inherent in the adversary’s COGs should identify their critical requirements, 

and in turn, the critical vulnerabilities. Critical vulnerabilities are those aspects or 

components of the adversary’s critical requirements which are deficient or vulnerable 

to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects. The 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-26 

networked and cellular structure of global extremist threats requires careful and continuous 

COG analysis, because a COG can change during the course of an operation. The danger is 

relying on those “critical factors”—capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities—that are 

not accurate for a given CT operation. COG and critical vulnerability analysis enable 

the USG to focus efforts more effectively on the enemy.

(1) COGs exist at the strategic and operational levels, and may differ for each 

extremist network or organization. Normally, at the strategic-level, the COG is an 

extremist ideology. This ideology motivates anger and resentment and justifies the use of 

violence to achieve strategic goals and objectives. 

(2) Enemy networks rely on key resources to be able to operate and survive, and 

some of those may be critical capabilities for the COG. If attacked, these resources may 

become critical vulnerabilities for further exploitation. Attacked individually or in 

combination, the loss of key resources serves to disrupt the enemy’s ability to operate. 

Attacked systematically over time, enemy critical vulnerabilities can be exploited and the 

operational effectiveness of the network neutralized or degraded. Some of the key 

resources to all terrorist networks include: leadership, safe havens, funds, communications, 

weapons, foot soldiers, and ideological support. Additionally, the processes/functions of 

movement, intelligence, targeting (especially access to targets), and media relations are 

essential to a terrorist’s purpose. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 

Operational Environment, provides fundamental principles, guidance, and examples on 

how to determine enemy COGs and critical vulnerabilities. 

2. Terrorist Behaviors, Motivations, and Characteristics 

 The following discussion provides an insight into terrorist behaviors at both the 

individual and group levels, examines the impact of group goals and motivations on 

terrorist planning and operations, and provides observations of general terrorist 

characteristics. 

a. Terrorist Behavior. Terrorism is a rationally selected tactic usually employed in 

the pursuit of ideological aims. However, some individuals or small violent organizations 

that employ terrorist means may not always be concerned with particular causes or an 

avowed ideology. These terrorists may be motivated purely by a desire to commit violent 

acts. From a psychological behavioral perspective, terrorism may fulfill a compelling need 

and this form of terrorism treats avowed ideology and political causes as after the fact 

justification. Another behavioral perspective is one based on rational choice. Terrorism is 

a tactic selected after rational consideration of the costs and benefits in order to 

achieve an objective.

(1) Individual Terrorist Behaviors

(a) Utopian View. Some terrorists have utopian goals regardless of their 

aims. This utopianism expresses itself forcefully as an extreme degree of impatience with 

the “status quo” of the rest of the world that validates the terrorists’ extreme methods. This 
Terrorist Threats 

II-5 

view commonly perceives a crisis too urgent to be solved other than by the most extreme 

methods. Alternately, the perception is of a system too corrupt or ineffective to see or adopt 

the “solution” the terrorist espouses. This sense of desperate impatience with opposition is 

central to the terrorist worldview. This is true of both the secular and religiously motivated 

terrorist, although with slightly different perspectives as to how to impose their solutions. 

There is also a significant impractical element associated with this utopian mindset. 

Although their goals often involve the transformation of society or a significant reordering 

of the status quo, individual terrorists, even philosophical or intellectual leaders, are often 

vague or uncaring as to what the future order of things will look like or how their ideas will 

be implemented. Change, and the destructive method by which change is brought about, 

may be much more important than the end result. 

(b) Interaction with Others. Terrorists interact within their groups at both 

the member and leadership levels. Individuals forming or joining groups normally adopt 

the “leader principle” which amounts to unquestioning submission to the group’s authority 

figure. This explains the prevalence of individual leaders with great charisma in many 

terrorist organizations. Such leaders can demand tremendous sacrifices from subordinates. 

This type of obedience can cause internal dissension when a leader is at odds with the group 

or factions arise in the organization. Another adaptation of the individual is accepting an 

“in-group” (us against the world) mentality. This results in a presumption of automatic 

morality on the part of the other members of the group, and purity of their cause and goals. 

Thus, violence is necessary and morally justified and the use of violence becomes a 

defining characteristic. 

(c) Dehumanization of Nonmembers. There is a dehumanization of all 

“out-group” individuals. This dehumanization permits violence to be directed 

indiscriminately at any target outside the group. Dehumanization also removes some of the 

stigma regarding the killing of innocents. Another aspect is that by making the oppressed 

people an abstract concept, it permits the individual terrorist to claim to act on their behalf. 

(d) Lifestyle Attractions. A terrorist may choose violence as a lifestyle. It 

can provide emotional, physical, perceived religious, and sometimes social rewards. 

Emotionally, the intense sense of belonging generated by membership in an illegal group 

can be satisfying. Physical rewards can include such things as money, authority, and 

adventure. This lure often can subvert other motives. Social rewards may be a perceived 

increase in social status or power. 

(2) Behaviors Within Groups. Terrorists within groups usually have different 

behaviors collectively than individually. Groups are collectively more daring and ruthless 

than the individual members. The individual terrorist does not want to appear less 

committed than the others, and will not object to proposals within the group that they would 

not consider as an individual. Peer pressure is the norm. Group commitment stresses 

secrecy and loyalty to the group and ideological intensity abounds. However, this same 

peer pressure and intensity can sometimes result in the forming of splinter groups or 

dissenting individual members, and run the risk of compromising the original group’s 

purpose. New causes may evolve as a result. Organizations that experience behavioral 
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-26 

difficulties may tend to increase their level of violence as frustration and low morale 

develop because of a lack of perceived progress or successful CT operations. 

b. Impact of Terrorist Goals and Motivations on Planning. Strategies against 

terrorists require understanding their point of view. Understanding and knowledge of 

VEO’s preferences and capabilities provides a baseline to conduct successful CT operations 

and promotes the use of active approaches, both direct and indirect, to counter the threat. 

(1) Terrorist Asset Cost Versus Target Value. Terrorist groups require 

recruitment, preparation, and integration into the operational structure of the group. 

Recruits also require extensive vetting to ensure that they are not infiltrators. A group’s 

leadership will not employ assets without weighing the value of the asset, the probability of 

success, and the potential benefits to the group. For example, suicide bombings are on the 

increase. This type of terrorist attack provides effective target results for relatively low 

cost. Normally in a terrorist operation, extensive preoperational surveillance and 

reconnaissance, exhaustive planning, and sufficient resources will be committed to the 

operation. The potential risk of exposure of these resources, and the demands on their time, 

are factored into the equation when deciding to commit to an attack. 

(2) Operational Intent of Terrorism. At the fundamental level, terrorism is a 

psychological act that communicates through the medium of violence or the threat of 

violence. Terrorist strategies are aimed at publicly causing damage to symbols or inspiring 

fear. Timing, location, and method of attacks accommodate media dissemination and 

ensure wide-spread reporting to maximize impact. In its purest form, a terrorist operation 

often will have the goal of manipulating popular perceptions, and strives to achieve this by 

controlling or dictating media coverage. This control need not be overt, as terrorists 

analyze and exploit the dynamics of major media outlets and the pressure of the “news 

cycle.” In considering possible terrorist targets, a massive destructive attack launched 

against a target that does not attract media coverage may not be a suitable target for the 

intended effect and targeted population. When the attack is meant to influence a population 

outside of the area of interest to the terrorists (i.e., the US) in order to influence decision 

making, a small attack against a “media accessible” target may be a more lucrative target 

than a larger one of less publicity. However, the spread of information technology and its 

accessibility, the growth of global and regional media outlets, and the sense of a global 

community make many targets more attractive than they were in the past. 

(3) Ideological and Motivational Influences on Operations. Ideology and 

motivation are the primary characteristics that influence the objectives of terrorist 

operations. Groups with secular ideologies and nonreligious goals often will attempt highly 

selective and discriminate acts of violence to achieve a specific political aim. This often 

requires the terrorist group to keep casualties to the minimum amount necessary to attain 

the objective. This is both to avoid a backlash that might severely damage the organization 

and to also maintain the appearance of a rational group that has legitimate grievances. By 

limiting their attacks, the group reduces the risk of undermining external political and 

economic support. Groups that comprise a “wing” of an insurgency, or are affiliated with 

sometimes legitimate political organizations often operate under these constraints. The 
Terrorist Threats 

II-7 

tensions caused by balancing these considerations are often a prime factor in the 

development of splinter groups and internal factions within these organizations. In contrast, 

religiously oriented groups typically attempt to inflict as many casualties as possible. An 

apocalyptic frame of reference may deem loss of life as irrelevant and encourage mass 

casualty producing incidents. Losses among this group are of little account because such 

casualties will reap the benefits of the afterlife. Likewise, nonbelievers, whether they are 

the intended target or collateral damage, deserve death, because their killing may be 

considered a moral duty. The type of target selected will often reflect motivations and 

ideologies. For groups professing secular, political, or social motivations, their targets are 

highly symbolic of authority. They may also conduct attacks on individuals whom they 

associate with economic exploitation, social injustice, or political repression. While 

religious groups also use much of this symbolism, there is a trend to connect it to greater 

physical devastation. There also is a tendency to add religiously affiliated individuals to the 

targeting equation. Another common form of symbolism in terrorist targeting is striking on 

particular anniversaries or commemorative dates. 

c. Terrorist Characteristics. Singular personality profiles of terrorists do not exist. 

In general, terrorists often feel alienated from society, have a perceived grievance, or regard 

themselves as victims of an injustice. The following provides some general characteristics 

that are fairly common among terrorists. 

(1) Status. Contrary to a belief that terrorism is a product of poverty and despair, 

terrorists most commonly originate from middle class backgrounds, with some coming from 

extreme wealth and privilege. While guerilla fighters and gang members often come from 

poor and disadvantaged backgrounds, and may adopt terrorism as a tactic, terrorist groups 

that specifically organize as such generally come from middle and upper social and 

economic strata. The leadership may use less educated and socially dispossessed people to 

conduct acts of terrorism. Even within terrorist groups that espouse the virtues of “the 

people” or “the proletariat,” leadership consists of those of middle class backgrounds. This 

characteristic, however, must be considered within the society from which the terrorist 

originates. 

(2) Education and Intellect. In general, terrorists, especially their leaders, are 

usually of average or better intelligence and have been exposed to advanced education. 

Very few terrorists are uneducated or illiterate. Some leaders of larger terrorist 

organizations may have minimal education, but that is not the norm. Terrorist groups 

increasingly are recruiting members with expertise in areas such as communications, 

computer programming, engineering, finance, and the sciences. Among terrorists that 

have had exposure to higher learning, many are not highly intellectual and are frequently 

dropouts or possess poor academic records. However, this is subject to the norms of the 

society from which they originate. Societies where religious fundamentalism is prevalent, 

the focus of advanced studies may have been in religion or theology. 

(3) Age. Terrorists tend to be young. Leadership, support, and training cadres 

can range into the 40- to 50-year-old age groups, but most operational members of terrorist 

organizations are in the 20- to 35-year-old age group. The amount of practical experience 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-26 

and training that contributes to making an effective operative is not usually present in 

individuals younger than the early 20s. Individuals in their teens have been employed as 

soldiers in guerilla groups, but terrorist organizations tend to not accept extremely young 

members, although they will use them as nonoperational supporters. Groups that utilize 

suicide operations often employ very young individuals as suicide assets, but they 

likely are not actual members of the organization and are simply coerced or exploited 

into an operational role. 

(4) Gender. The terrorists’ gender is predominately male, but not exclusively 

male, even in groups that are rigorously Islamic. Females in these groups are used to 

support operations or assist in intelligence gathering. Some fundamentalist Islamic groups, 

however, may use females in the actual conduct of terrorist operations. In groups where 

religious constraints do not affect women’s roles, female membership may be high and 

leadership roles within the group are not uncommon. Female suicide bombers have been 

employed with a growing frequency. 

(5) Appearance. Terrorists are often unremarkable in individual characteristics 

and attempts to “profile” likely terrorist groups’ members may not be productive. They 

may not appear out of the ordinary and are capable of normal social behavior and 

appearance. Over the long term, elements of fanatical behavior or ruthlessness may become 

evident, but they are typically not immediately obvious to casual observation. 

3. Terrorist Organization 

 A terrorist organization’s structure, membership, resources, and security determine its 

capabilities, influence, and reach. A general knowledge of the prevalent models of terrorist 

organizations helps to understand their overall capabilities. A terrorist organization is 

characterized by its levels of commitment, the tactical level cellular organization, 

group organizational structure, and its primary motivation.

a. Terrorist Levels of Commitment. Typically, there are four different levels of 

commitment within a terrorist organization: passive supporters, active supporters, cadre, 

and leadership. Figure II-1 graphically depicts the ratio of people characterizing each 

successive level of commitment within terrorist organizations. 

(1) Leaders provide direction and policy; approve goals and objectives; and 

provide overarching guidance for operations. Usually leaders rise from within the ranks of 

any given organization, or create their own organization, and are ruthless, driven, and very 

operationally oriented in order to accomplish their objectives. 

(2) Cadre is the nucleus of “active” members, the zealots, who comprise the core 

of a terrorist organization. This echelon plans and conducts not only operations, but also 

manages areas of intelligence, finance, logistics, IO, and communications. Mid-level cadres 

tend to be trainers and technicians such as bomb makers, financiers, and surveillance 

experts. Low-level cadres are the bombers and foot soldiers for other types of attacks.
Terrorist Threats 

II-9 

(3) Active supporters participate in the political, fund-raising, and information 

activities of the group. Acting as an ally or tacit partner, they may also conduct initial 

intelligence and surveillance activities, and provide safe houses, financial contributions, 

medical assistance, and transportation assistance for cadre members. Usually, they are 

fully aware of their relationship to the terrorist group but do not commit violent acts.

(4) Passive supporters are typically individuals or groups that are 

sympathetic to the announced goals and intentions of the terrorist organization or its 

ideology, but are not committed enough to take action. Passive supporters may interact 

with a front group that hides the overt connection to the terrorist group, or passive 

supporters may intermingle with active supporters without being aware of what their actual 

relationship is to the organization. Sometimes fear of reprisal from terrorists compels 

passive support. Sympathizers can be useful for political activities, fund-raising, and 

unwitting or coerced assistance in intelligence gathering or other nonviolent activities. 

b. Terrorist groups recruit from populations that are sympathetic to their goals or 

ideology, and often legitimate organizations can serve as recruiting grounds for terrorists. 

STRUCTURE PYRAMID OF A TYPICAL TERRORIST

ORGANIZATION

Leadership

Cadre

Passive Support

Active Support

Figure II-1. Structure Pyramid of a Typical Terrorist Organization 
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-26 

For example, militant Islamic recruiting has been linked to the schools (Madrassas) 

established by radical Wahhabi clerics. 

(1) Some recruiting may be conducted to acquire personnel with particular skills 

and qualifications, rather than ideological characteristics. Of particular concern are 

attempts to recruit personnel with knowledge of WMD production or maintenance and/or 

current or former members of the US and partner armed forces, both as trained operatives, 

and as agents-in-place. Recruiting may also occur among groups that feel disenfranchised 

such as prisoners. 

(2) Recruiting can gain operatives from many diverse social backgrounds. Radical 

behavior or direct actions with terrorism may develop over years or decades. Some groups 

will also use coercion and leverage to gain limited or one-time cooperation from useful 

individuals. This cooperation can range anywhere from gaining information to conducting 

a suicide bombing operation. Blackmail and intimidation (e.g., threats to family members) 

are the most common forms of coercion. Coercion is often directed at personnel in 

government security and intelligence organizations. 

c. Tactical-level Cellular Organization. The smallest elements of terrorist 

organizations are the cells at the tactical level — the building blocks for the terrorist 

organization. One of the primary reasons for a cellular or compartmental structure is 

security. A cellular structure makes it difficult for an adversary to penetrate the entire 

organization, and the compromise or loss of one cell does not compromise the identity, 

location, or actions of other cells. Personnel within one cell may not be aware of the 

existence of other cells or their personnel and, therefore, cannot divulge sensitive 

information to infiltrators or captors. Terrorists may organize cells based on tribal, family, 

or employment relationships, on a geographic basis, or by specific functions such as direct 

action or intelligence. Some cells may be multifunctional. The terrorist group uses the cells 

to control its members. Cell members remain in close contact with each other in order to 

provide emotional support and to prevent desertion or breach of security procedures. The 

cell leader is normally the only person who communicates and coordinates with higher 

levels and other cells. Thus, a local terrorist group could, unwittingly, be part of a larger 

transnational or international network. 

d. Group Organizational Structure. There are two typical organizational structures 

used by terrorist groups: networked and hierarchical (see Figure II-2). Newer groups 

tend to organize or adapt to the network model. Terrorist groups associated with political 

organizations and activities prefer the more structured and centralized control of the 

hierarchical structure to coordinate their violent action with political action (e.g., traditional 

Leninist or Maoist groups) because strict control of activities can be difficult to enforce in a 

networked organization. Within either of those two larger organizational structures, 

however, virtually all terrorist groups use variants of “cellular organizations” (i.e., 

compartmentalization) at the tactical level to enhance security and to organize for 

operations.
Terrorist Threats 

II-11 

(1) Hierarchical Structure. These organizations have a well-defined vertical 

chain of command and responsibility. Information flows up and down organizational 

channels that correspond to these vertical chains, but may not move horizontally through 

the organization. This is more traditional, and is common of groups that are well 

established with a command and support structure. Hierarchical organizations feature 

greater specialization of functions in their subordinate cells (support, operations, 

intelligence). Normally, only the cell leader has knowledge of other cells or contacts, and 

only senior leadership has visibility of the entire organization. In the past, some significant 

“traditional” terrorist organizations influenced by revolutionary theory or ideology used this 

structure: Japanese Red Army, the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Red Brigades in 

Italy, as well as ethno-nationalist terrorist movements such as the Palestine Liberation 

Organization, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA). These organizations had a 

clearly defined set of political, social or economic objectives, and tailored aspects of their 

organizations (such as a “political” wing or “social welfare” group) to facilitate their 

success. The necessity to coordinate actions between various “fronts,” some political and 

allegedly nonviolent, and the use of violence by terrorists and some insurgents, favored a 

strong hierarchical structure. 

Hierarchical Networked

TYPICAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

Figure II-2. Typical Terrorist Organizational Structures 
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 3-26 

(2) Networked Structure. Terrorists are now increasingly part of a far broader 

but indistinct system of networks than previously experienced. Groups based on religious 

or single-issue motives lack a specific political or nationalistic agenda and therefore have 

less need for a hierarchical structure to coordinate their actions. Instead, they can depend 

on loose affiliation with like-minded groups or individuals from a variety of locations. 

General goals and targets are announced, and individuals or cells are expected to use 

flexibility and initiative to conduct the necessary actions. 

(a) Basic Network Concepts. A network structure may be a variation of 

several basic nodal concepts, a node being an individual, a cell, another networked 

organization, or even a hierarchical organization. A terrorist network may consist of parts 

of other organizations (even governments), which are acting in ways that can be exploited 

to achieve the network’s organizational goals. The effectiveness of a networked 

organization is dependent on several things. 

1. Network effectiveness requires a unifying idea, concern, goal, or 

ideology. Without that unifier, networks can take actions or pursue objectives that are 

counterproductive, and independent nodes may not develop the necessary synergism for 

success of the network. 

2. Networks can distribute the responsibility for operations while 

providing redundancies for key functions. The various cells need not contact or coordinate 

with other cells except for those essential to a particular operation or function. The 

avoidance of unnecessary coordination or command approval for action provides 

deniability to the leadership and enhances operations security. 

3. Networks need not be dependent on the latest information technology 

to be effective. The organizational structure and the flow of information inside the 

organization (i.e., their information management plan) are the defining aspects of networks. 

While information technology can make networks more effective, low-technology means 

such as couriers and landline telephones can enable networks to operate effectively. 

4. Changes in terrorist leadership, whether through generational 

transition or as a response to enhanced security operations, may signal significant 

adjustments to terrorist group organizational priorities and its means of conducting 

terrorism. 

(b) Basic Types of Networks. There are three basic types of network 

structures, depending on the ways in which elements (nodes) are linked to other elements of 

the structure: the chain, hub (or star and wheel), and all-channel. A terrorist group may also 

employ a hybrid structure that combines elements of more than one network type. For 

example, a transnational terrorist organization might use chain networks for its moneylaundering activities, tied to a hub network handling financial matters, tied, in turn, to an allchannel leadership network to direct the use of the funds into the operational activities of a 

hub network conducting pre-targeting surveillance and reconnaissance. Organizational 

structure that may appear very complex during initial assessments of terrorist groups may 
Terrorist Threats 

II-13 

be more understandable when viewed in the context of chain, hub variants, or all channel 

networks. 

1. Chain. Each node links to the 

node next in sequence and communication between the 

nodes is by passing information along the line. This 

organization is typical among networks that have a 

common function such as smuggling goods and people 

or laundering money. 

2. Hub or Star and Wheel. Outer 

nodes communicate with one central node, which may 

not be the leader or decision maker for the network. 

A variation of the hub is a wheel design where the 

outer nodes communicate with one or two other outer 

nodes in addition to the hub. A wheel configuration is 

common for a financial or economic network. 

3. All-Channel. All nodes 

are connected to each other. The network is 

organizationally “flat,” meaning there is no 

hierarchical command structure above it. 

Command and control is distributed within the 

network. This is communication intensive and 

can be a security problem if the linkages can 

be identified or reconstructed. However, the 

lack of an identifiable “head” confounds the 

targeting and disrupting efforts normally 

effective against hierarchies. 

e. Categories of Terrorist Organizations. There are many different categories of 

terrorism and terrorist groups. These categories serve to differentiate terrorist 

organizations according to specific criteria, which are usually related to the field or 

specialty of whoever is selecting the categories. Also, some categories are simply labels 

appended arbitrarily, often by the media. For example, every terrorist organization is by 

definition “radical,” as terrorist tactics are not the norm for the mainstream of any group. 

Much of current terrorism can be described as being based on a universal political ideology 

or religious dogma, which is in contrast to traditional nationalist-ethnic terrorism that was 

more prominent in the past. 

(1) Government Affiliation Categories. Categorizing terrorist groups by their 

affiliation with governments provides indications of their means for intelligence, operations, 

and access to types of weapons. Joint doctrine identifies three affiliations: non-state 

supported, state-supported, and state-directed terrorist groups.

Chain Network

Hub or Star and Wheel Network

All-Channel Network
Chapter II 

II-14 JP 3-26 

(a) Non-state supported. These are terrorist groups that operate 

autonomously, receiving no significant support from any government. 

(b) State-supported. These are groups that generally operate independently 

but receive support from one or more governments. Sometimes the support is passive or 

submissive as the government allows the terrorist group a safe haven within the country. 

(c) State-directed. These groups operate as an agent of a government and 

receive substantial intelligence, logistic, and operational support from the sponsoring 

government. 

(2) Motivation Categories. Motivation categories describe terrorist groups in 

terms of their ultimate goals or objectives. While political or religious ideologies will 

determine the “how” of the conflict, and the sort of society that will arise from a successful 

conclusion, motivation is the “what” in terms of end state or measure of success. Some of 

the common motivation categories are: 

(a) Separatist. Separatist groups desire separation from existing entities 

through independence, political autonomy, or religious freedom or domination. The 

ideologies separatists subscribe to include social justice or equity, anti-imperialism, as well 

as the resistance to conquest or occupation by a foreign power. 

(b) Ethnocentric. Groups of this persuasion view race as the defining 

characteristic of a society and a select group is often perceived superior because of its 

inherent racial characteristics. Ethnicity, therefore, becomes a basis of cohesion. 

(c) Nationalistic. The loyalty and devotion to a nation, and the national 

consciousness derived from placing one nation’s culture and interests above those of other 

nations or groups is the motivating factor behind these groups. This can find expression in 

the creation of a new nation, or in splitting away part of an existing state to join with 

another that shares the perceived “national” identity. 

(d) Revolutionary. These groups are dedicated to the overthrow of an 

established order and replacing it with a new political or social structure. Although often 

associated with communist political ideologies, this is not always the case, and other 

political movements can advocate revolutionary methods to achieve their goals. 

(3) Ideological Categories. Ideological categories describe the political, 

religious, or social orientation of the group. While some groups will be seriously 

committed to their avowed ideologies, for others, ideology is poorly understood, and 

primarily a justification for their actions to outsiders or sympathizers. It is a common 

misperception to believe that ideological considerations will prevent terrorists from 

accepting assistance or coordinating activities with terrorists or states on the opposite side 

of the religious or political spectrum. Quite often terrorists with differing ideologies have 
Terrorist Threats 

II-15 

more in common with each other than with the mainstream society they oppose. Common 

ideological categories include: 

(a) Political. Political ideologies are concerned with the structure and 

organization of the forms of government and communities. While observers outside 

terrorist organizations may stress differences in political ideology, the activities of groups 

that are diametrically opposed on the political spectrum are similar to each other in practice. 

1. Right-wing. These groups are associated with the reactionary or 

conservative side of the political spectrum, and often, but not exclusively, are associated 

with fascism or neo-Nazism. Despite this, right-wing extremists can be every bit as 

revolutionary in intent as other groups, the difference being that their intent is to replace 

existing forms of government with a particular brand of authoritarian rule. 

2. Left-wing. These groups are usually associated with revolutionary 

socialism or variants of communism (e.g., Maoist, Marxist-Leninist). With the demise of 

many communist regimes, and the gradual liberalization of the remainder towards 

capitalism, left-wing rhetoric can often move towards and merge with anarchistic thought. 

3. Anarchist. Anarchist groups are antiauthority or antigovernment, and 

strongly support individual liberty and voluntary association of cooperative groups. Often 

blending anticapitalism and populist or communist-like messages, modern anarchists tend 

to neglect the issue of what will replace the current form of government. They generally 

promote small communities as the highest form of political organization necessary or 

desirable. Currently, anarchism is the ideology of choice for many individuals and small 

groups that have no particular dedication to any ideology, and are looking for a convenient 

philosophy to justify their actions. 

(b) Religious. Religiously inspired terrorism is on the rise, with over a forty 

percent increase of total international terrorist groups espousing religious motivation since 

1980. While Islamic terrorists and organizations have been the most active, and the greatest 

recent threat to the United States, all of the major world religions have extremists that have 

taken up violence to further their perceived religious goals. Religiously motivated terrorists 

seek justification of their objectives from religious authorities to promote their cause as 

infallible and nonnegotiable. 

1. Religious motivations can also be tied to ethnic and nationalist 

identities, such as Kashmiri separatists who combine their desire to break away from India 

with the religious conflict between Islam and Hinduism. The conflict in Northern Ireland 

also provides an example of the mingling of religious identity with nationalist motivations. 

There are frequently instances where groups with the same general goal, such as Kashmiri 

independence, will engage in conflict over the nature of that goal (religious or secular 

government). 

2. Numerous religious denominations have either seen activists commit 

terrorism in their name, or spawned cults professing adherence to the larger religion while 
Chapter II 

II-16 JP 3-26 

following unique interpretations of that particular religion’s dogma. Cults that adopt 

terrorism are often apocalyptic in their worldview, and are extremely dangerous and 

unpredictable. Of note, religiously inspired cults executed the first confirmed uses of 

biological and chemical nerve agents by terrorists. 

(c) Social. Often particular social policies or issues will be so contentious 

that they will incite extremist behavior and terrorism. Frequently this is referred to as 

“single issue” or “special interest” terrorism. 

(d) Location or Geographic Categories. Geographic designations have 

been used in the past, and although they are often confusing, and even irrelevant when 

referring to international and transnational terrorism, they still appear. Often, a 

geographical association to the area with which the group is primarily concerned will be 

made. “Mid-Eastern” is an example of this category and came into use as a popular 

shorthand label for Palestinian and Arab groups in the 1970s and early 1980s. Frequently, 

these designations are only relevant to the government or state that uses them. However, 

when tied to particular regions or states, the concepts of domestic and international 

terrorism can be useful. 

1. Domestic or Indigenous. These terrorists are “home-grown” and 

operate within and against their home country. They are frequently tied to extreme social or 

political factions within a particular society, and focus their efforts specifically on their 

nation’s sociopolitical arena. 

2. International. Often describing the support and operational reach of 

a group, “international” and “transnational” are often loosely defined. International groups 

typically operate in multiple countries, but retain a geographic focus for their activities. For 

example, Hezbollah has cells worldwide, and has conducted operations in multiple 

countries, but is primarily focused on influencing the outcome of events in Lebanon and 

Israel. NOTE: An insurgency-linked terrorist group that routinely crosses an international 

border to conduct attacks, and then flees to safe haven in a neighboring country, is 

“international” in the strict sense of the word, but does not compare to groups that 

habitually operate across regions and continents. 

3. Transnational. Transnational groups operate internationally, but are 

not tied to a particular country, or even region. Al-Qaeda is transnational; being made up of 

many nationalities, having been based out of multiple countries simultaneously, and 

conducting operations throughout the world. Their objectives affect dozens of countries 

with differing political systems, religions, ethnic compositions, and national interests. 

(4) Proliferation of Knowledge Between Organizations. Terrorist groups 

increase their capabilities through the exchange of knowledge. Military professionals must 

evaluate potential terrorist threats according to what capabilities they may acquire through 

known or suspected associations with other groups, or those capabilities that can be 

acquired through the study and employment of techniques and approaches that have proven 
Terrorist Threats 

II-17 

successful for other terrorist organizations. These exchanges occur both directly and 

indirectly. 

(a) Direct exchange occurs when one group provides the other with training 

or experienced personnel not readily available otherwise. An example of direct exchange is 

the provision of sophisticated bomb construction expertise by the IRA to less experienced 

groups. In 2001, three members associated with the IRA were arrested in Colombia for 

“inter-group terrorist support.” Terrorist techniques not previously observed in FARC 

[Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] operations, such as use of secondary explosive 

devices, indicated a transfer of IRA tactics and techniques. 

(b) To disseminate much of this knowledge, terrorist organizations often 

develop extensive training initiatives. Al-Qaeda, for instance, has assembled in excess of 

10,000 pages of written training material, more than 100 hours of training videos, a global 

network of training camps, and considerable amounts of training material that can be 

distributed either via hard copy or the Internet. 

(c) Indirect transfer of knowledge occurs when one group carries out a 

successful operation and is studied and emulated by others. The explosion of hijacking 

operations in the 1970s, and the similar proliferation of hostage taking in the 1980s were the 

result of terrorist groups observing and emulating successful techniques. The widespread 

use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), vehicle-borne IEDs, and suicide bombers are 

further examples of emulated successes. 

(d) A development related to this is the proliferation of specialized 

knowledge useful to terrorists over the last decade. The reductions in military and 

intelligence establishments after the Cold War have made expertise in sabotage, espionage, 

small unit tactics, and other useful skills readily available. Similar reductions in research 

and development institutions make technical and scientific expertise in WMD, information 

technology, and electronic countermeasures more accessible, either through direct contacts 

or intermediaries such as rogue or dysfunctional states. 

4. Terrorist Approaches 

 Terrorist operations typically are planned in great detail with the objectives of 

minimizing risk, achieving the highest probability of success, and attaining the widest 

publicity of their actions. Terrorists seek to avoid adversary strengths and concentrate on 

their weaknesses. Terrorist tactics are aligned with their overall plans which attempt to use 

the successful achievement of their operational objectives to realize the accomplishment of 

their strategic goals. Their approaches to planning and execution follow. 

a. Terrorist Approach to Planning and Execution. Terrorist operational planning 

can be analyzed according to requirements common to all operations. The planning and 

operation cycle shown in Figure II-3 is valid for traditional hierarchically organized groups, 

as well as decentralized “network” type organizations. The differences between the two 
Chapter II 

II-18 JP 3-26 

organizations are the location of the decision maker at the various steps of the cycle, and the 

method of task organizing and providing support for the operations. 

(1) Broad Target Selection. This phase of planning is the collection of 

information on a large number of potential targets, some of which may never be attacked, or 

seriously considered for attack. Personnel who are not members of a terrorist 

organization’s cadre, but lower-level active or even passive supporters may be used for data 

collection and target surveillance. 

(a) This phase also includes open source and general information collection. 

Potential targets are identified through the media, Internet research, and elicitation of 

unwitting sources. 

(b) Potential targets are screened based on symbolic value and their potential 

to generate high profile media attention. Objectives of the terrorist group influence the 

selection of a person or facility as a worthy target. This includes the risk and likely casualty 

figures achieved by the attack. The number of preliminary targets that can be screened is 

limited only by the capabilities of the group to collect information from sympathizers and 

open sources. Targets that are considered vulnerable and which would further the terrorist 

organization’s goals are selected for the next phase of intelligence collection. 

TERRORIST PLANNING CYCLE

Broad Target Selection

Intelligence Gathering and Surveillance

Specific Target Selection

Pre-attack Surveillance and Planning

Rehearsals

Actions on the Objective

Escape and Exploitation

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

Figure II-3. Terrorist Planning Cycle 
Terrorist Threats 

II-19 

(2) Intelligence Gathering and Surveillance. Targets showing potential 

vulnerabilities are given a higher priority of effort. The type of surveillance employed 

depends on the priority and type of target. Elements of information typically gathered 

include: 

(a) Practices, Procedures, and Routines. For facilities, this includes 

scheduled deliveries, work shift changes, identification procedures and other observable 

routines. For individuals, it can include regularly scheduled errands, appointments, and 

activities. 

(b) Residence and Workplace. This category applies primarily to the 

physical layout and individual activities at the two places the target typically spends the 

most time. 

(c) Transportation and Routes of Travel. For individuals, this is the mode 

of transport and common routes to any regular destination. For facilities and conveyances, 

it addresses ingress and egress points, types of vehicles allowed on the grounds, or 

availability of transportation into the target site. 

(d) Security Measures. Intelligence gathering and surveillance of security 

measures include a myriad of potential collection areas, depending on the complexity of the 

security around the target. Presence of a guard force; the reaction time of response units; 

any hardening of structures, barriers, or sensors; personnel, package, and vehicle screening 

procedures; and the type and frequency of emergency reaction drills are examples of key 

collection objectives. This is one of the most important areas of information for attack site 

selection, since the intent is to bypass and avoid security measures, and be able to strike the 

target during any period. 

(3) Specific Target Selection. Target selection for actual planning considers 

several factors prior to a decision to proceed or not proceed. A decision to proceed requires 

continued intelligence collection against the chosen target. Targets not receiving immediate 

consideration will still be collected against for future opportunities. Selection factors 

include: 

(a) Does success affect a larger audience than the immediate victim(s)? 

(b) Will the target attract high profile media attention? 

(c) Does success make the desired statement to the correct target 

audience(s)? 

(d) Is the effect consistent with objectives of the group? 

(e) Does the target provide an advantage to the group by providing the group 

an opportunity to demonstrate its capabilities? 
Chapter II 

II-20 JP 3-26 

(f) What are costs versus benefits of conducting the operation? 

(4) Pre-attack Surveillance and Planning. Members of the actual operational 

cells begin to appear during this phase. Either trained intelligence and surveillance 

personnel, or members of the cell organized to conduct the operation conduct this phase of 

planning. Consequently, the level of intelligence expertise and operational competency 

increases correspondingly. During this phase, information is gathered on the target’s 

patterns over time, usually days to weeks, sometimes longer depending on the complexity 

of the target. It allows the attack team to confirm the information gathered from previous 

surveillance and reconnaissance activities, but with greater focus based upon the planning 

conducted thus far. The type of surveillance employed depends on the target’s activities. 

The information gained is then used to: 

(a) Conduct security studies. 

(b) Conduct detailed preparatory operations. 

(c) Recruit specialized operatives as needed. 

(d) Establish a base of operations in the target area (e.g., safe houses, caches). 

(e) Design and test escape routes. 

(f) Decide on type of weapon or attack. 

(5) Rehearsals. As with conventional military operations, rehearsals are 

conducted to improve the odds of success, confirm planning assumptions, and develop 

contingencies. Terrorists also rehearse to test security reactions to particular attack profiles. 

Terrorists use both their own operatives and unwitting people to test target reactions. 

(a) Typical rehearsals include: 

1. Deployment into target area. 

2. Actions on the objective. 

3. Escape routes. 

4. Equipment and weapon performance. 

(b) Tests in the target area are conducted to confirm: 

1. Target information gathered to date. 

2. Target pattern of activities. 
Terrorist Threats 

II-21 

3. Physical layout of target or operation area. 

4. Security force reactions (state of alert, timing, size of response, 

equipment, routes). 

(6) Actions on the Objective. Once terrorists reach the execution phase of the 

operation, the odds of success favor the terrorist and are clearly against the target. 

Terrorists attempt to minimize time spent conducting the actual operation to reduce their 

vulnerability to discovery or countermeasures. With the exception of barricade-style 

hostage taking operations, terrorists normally plan to complete their actions before 

immediate security forces can react. Terrorists conducting planned operations possess 

important tactical advantages. As the attacker, they possess the initiative, giving them the 

advantage of surprise; choice of time, place, and conditions of attack; employment of 

diversions and secondary or follow-on attacks; and employment of security and support 

positions to neutralize target reaction forces and security measures. 

(7) Escape and Exploitation

(a) Escape plans are usually well rehearsed and executed. Successful escape 

further enhances the effect of fear and terror from a successful operation. The exception is a 

suicide operation, where the impact is enhanced by the willingness to die in achieving the 

attack. Even in suicide attacks, however, there are usually support personnel and 

“handlers” who must deliver the suicide asset to the target, and subsequently make their 

escape. 

(b) Exploitation is the primary objective of all terrorist operations. Terrorist 

operations must be exploited properly and publicized to create their intended effect. Media 

control measures, prepared statements, and a host of other preparations are made to 

effectively exploit a successful operation. These are timed to take advantage of media 

cycles for the selected target audiences (TAs). By quickly capturing and exploiting images 

themselves, the adversary can rapidly leverage events to influence the public via selfproduced media (Internet, radio, television, text messaging, podcast, Weblogs (blogs), etc.) 

and gain an advantage within the information environment. 

(c) Unsuccessful operations are disavowed when possible. The perception 

that a group has failed severely damages the organization’s prestige and makes it appear 

vulnerable, or worse, ineffective. Once a terrorist organization is perceived as ineffective, it 

becomes more difficult to impact target audiences or recruit members. 

(d) In addition to the impact on the target, successful attacks bring perceived 

favorable attention, notoriety and support (such as money and recruits) to the terrorist group 

conducting the operation. If the group conducting the operation subscribes to a 

revolutionary ideology, they will see each success as gradually inspiring more revolutionary 

fervor in the population they are attempting to influence. Any success encourages the 

terrorists to conduct further operations, and improves their ability to do so through 

increased support and experience. 
Chapter II 

II-22 JP 3-26 

b. Terrorist Approach to Operations and Tactics. The ensuing discussion presents 

the most common types of terrorist operations and tactics. It is not intended to be an 

exhaustive discussion of the subject since the combination of methods and approaches is 

virtually unlimited. However, common themes in terrorist operations are surprise, secrecy, 

innovation, and indirect methods of attack. Terrorist tactics are broad and diverse. 

Additionally, with the use of the Internet and common training bases, terrorist groups 

exchange information on tactics that can yield success. 

(1) Terrorist Operational Considerations

(a) The terrorist utilizes tactics, forces, and weapons specifically tailored to 

the particular mission. Terrorist operations are unique, in that each is planned for a specific 

target and effect. Terrorists normally expose only as much of their resources and personnel 

as are absolutely necessary to accomplish a mission in order to avoid capture or destruction. 

A conventional military force would approach an operation with plans to concentrate forces 

and keep excess combat power on hand to meet contingencies, ensure mission success, and 

prepare for follow-on missions. A terrorist takes a minimal force and relies upon prior 

planning and reconnaissance to match the force, weapons, and methods to the target. If 

changes to the target, or unexpected conditions render success unlikely, the terrorist group 

will most often cancel or postpone the operation, regroup, update its plan, and adapt to 

whatever conditions are required to ensure a successful operation. For major terrorist 

operations, mission accomplishment is often followed by a disbanding of the force, a return 

of terrorists to their cells and covers, and formation of new task groups for future 

operations. 

(b) In addition to adaptive and flexible organizations, terrorists also employ 

specific equipment built or procured for a particular operation. Because of the lag time 

between development of a new technology and military acquisition and fielding, terrorists 

can sometimes procure equipment superior to standardized military models. As an 

example, instead of purchasing hundreds of identical radios constructed to meet all likely 

uses, a terrorist group may only procure the quantity it needs of the newest, most capable 

radio appropriate for the operation. The only real limitation is funding and availability of 

the equipment when it is needed. As with equipment, terrorist organizations choose 

weapons that are tailored to the particular operation. If a particular weapon is not available, 

the terrorist is adept at creating a weapon from available sources to suit the mission. 

(c) Although several types of operations may satisfy a particular objective, 

terrorist groups often develop expertise in one or more types of operations, and less 

specialization in others. 

(2) Forms of Terrorist Tactics. Terrorist tactics take many forms. Some are 

accomplished as independent actions. Others may be undertaken as part of other 

coordinated activities. The more common types of terrorist tactics are described below and 

are shown in Figure II-4. 
Terrorist Threats 

II-23 

(a) Threat or Hoax. Terrorist groups use threats and hoaxes to coerce or 

preclude actions by a targeted individual or population. Threats and hoaxes can dull the 

effectiveness of counter or preventive measures when a targeted individual or population 

loses situational awareness, or disperses finite assets against many possible threats. This 

tactic also can be used to gain information concerning the target’s response to a potential 

attack. It also can be combined with an actual attack to circumvent fixed security measures 

as a diversion tactic. While there is limited evidence that terrorists use hoaxes to achieve 

their aims, the potential exists for them to use them, so JFCs should consider this possibility 

when conducting CT operations. 

(b) Arson. Arson is a destructive technique usually used in sabotage 

operations against property. It is most often used for symbolic attacks and to create 

economic effects. 

(c) Sabotage. Sabotage is the planned destruction of the target’s equipment 

or infrastructure. Its purpose is to inflict both psychological and physical damage. 

Sabotage demonstrates how vulnerable the target is to the terrorist group’s actions. 

Sabotage can have significant economic impacts, as well as the additional effects of 

creating mass casualties. 

(d) Bombing. Bombs, to include IEDs, vehicle-borne IEDs, and suicide 

bombers (wearing explosives or in vehicles with IEDs), are the favored weapon of 

terrorists. They are highly destructive, are flexible enough to be tailored to the mission, do 

not require the operator to be present, and have a significant psychological impact. They 

FORMS OF TERRORIST TACTICS

Threat or Hoax

Arson

Sabotage

Bombing

Kidnapping

Hostage Taking

Hijacking

Raid or Ambush

Seizure

Assassination

Weapons of Mass

Destruction

Figure II-4. Forms of Terrorist Tactics 
Chapter II 

II-24 JP 3-26 

may be used as a technique to conduct other operations, such as sabotage or assassination, 

or can simply be a tactic to create terror through destruction and casualties. 

(e) Kidnapping. Kidnapping is usually conducted against a prominent 

individual(s) for a specific reason. The most common reasons are ransom, some demanded 

action such as release of a fellow terrorist; or the desire to publicize a demand or an issue. 

The risk to terrorist groups is generally lower in kidnapping as compared to hostage taking 

because the kidnapped victim is typically moved to a location controlled by the group. A 

kidnap victim may be killed once a terrorist group achieves its objective or perceives its 

demands will not be met. The success of kidnapping relies upon balancing the value of the 

victim to the government, organization, or social group with the costs of meeting the 

kidnappers’ demands. Kidnapping (and hostage taking) can also be used as a means of 

financing the terrorist organization. 

(f) Hostage Taking. Hostage taking is typically an overt seizure of people to 

gain publicity for a cause, political concessions, political asylum, release of prisoners, or 

ransom. Killing of hostages may occur once the terrorist group believes that it has fully 

exploited the media coverage from the situation. Unlike kidnapping victims, hostages 

usually are not prominent figures. Because of high risk from retaliation or CT operations, 

terrorists usually attempt to hold hostages in a neutral or friendly area. 

(g) Hijacking. Hijacking involves the forceful commandeering of a 

conveyance. Normally associated with aircraft, it may also include ships, trains, vehicles or 

other forms of conveyance. The type of hijacking depends on the purpose of the terrorists. 

Purposes range from hostage taking activities, procuring a means of escape, or as a means 

of destruction. 

(h) Raid or Ambush. A terrorist raid is similar in concept to a conventional 

military operation, but usually is conducted with smaller forces against targets marked for 

destruction, hijacking, or hostage/barricade operations. In some cases, the raid is designed 

to allow control of the target for the execution of another operation. An ambush is a 

surprise attack characterized by violent execution and speed of action. Its objective may be 

to cause mass casualties, assassinate an individual, or disrupt security operations. 

(i) Seizure. Seizure of a critical element of infrastructure typically is a 

physical site of notoriety or importance to a target population, or a media or 

communications node that could gain widespread attention in one way or another (e.g., 

pirated broadcasts or disruption of service). 

(j) Assassination. An assassination is a deliberate action to kill specific, 

usually prominent, individuals such as political leaders, notable citizens, collaborators, or 

particularly effective government officials, among others. A terrorist group will assassinate 

people it cannot intimidate, those who have left the group, people who support the 

“enemy,” or people who have some symbolic significance to the enemy or world 

community. Terrorist groups may refer to these killings as “punishment” or “justice” as a 
Terrorist Threats 

II-25 

way of legitimizing them. Assassinations are an effective psychological tool of terrorist 

tactics. 

(k) WMD. This category acknowledges a broad range of chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. A WMD capability would allow 

for catastrophic results and could be delivered through numerous means. 

(3) Terrorist IO and Public Relations Activities. The Internet provides 

terrorists and extremists the means to spread their radical ideology, an ad hoc means of 

operational connectivity, and a link to the full-media spectrum for public relations. The 

Internet facilitates their recruiting, training, logistic support, planning, fund-raising, etc. 

The internet is also a powerful tool to conduct the equivalent of media facilitated IO against 

the United States and PNs. Although not yet typical, terrorists may employ electronic 

attacks to disrupt communications, or banking, or to project disinformation and propaganda 

in support of their cause. From the terrorist perspective, media coverage is an important 

measure of the success of a terrorist act and a means of countering US and PN IO and SC 

activities. News reports, streaming videos on websites, blogs, and editorials can amplify 

(some unwittingly) the psychological effects of a terrorist incident and aid terrorists in 

publicizing the event globally to a much wider audience, and potentially gain further 

recognition of their radical ideology. 
Chapter II 

II-26 JP 3-26 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER III 

OPERATIONAL APPROACHES 

III-1 

“In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect 

methods will be needed in order to secure victory. In battle, there are not more 

than two methods of attack - the direct and the indirect; yet these two in 

combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. The direct and the 

indirect lead on to each other, in turn. It is like moving in a circle - you never 

come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?” 

Sun Tzu, The Art of War

1. Nature of the Problem 

a. US superiority in conventional warfighting drives many of our adversaries to avoid 

direct military confrontation with the United States. IW, and especially the employment 

of terrorist tactics, has become the “warfare of choice” for some state and non-state 

adversaries. They employ a strategy of physical, economic, and psychological subversion 

and attrition to undermine, erode, and ultimately exhaust the national power, influence, and 

will of the United States and its strategic partners. They fight us from amongst the people 

in protracted struggles for popular support and legitimacy, and limit the utility of our 

conventional military power. 

b. Defeating VEOs and their state and non-state supporters in a protracted struggle will 

require long-term CT operations concurrently in scores of countries, many of which are not 

at war with the United States; using all our instruments of national power, and the 

cooperation and support of foreign security partners. 

c. A low-visibility USG presence in countries where US forces have not 

traditionally operated, but where they are needed to train, equip, advise, and support the 

indigenous security forces (i.e., build PN capacity), supports our national CT strategy and 

the defeat of designated VEOs. Current efforts being conducted on five continents 

demonstrates the importance of PNs, having indigenous and surrogate security force 

capabilities, and operating clandestinely or in a low-visibility manner, to bring security and 

social, economic, and political stability to unstable areas to influence the global 

environment. Security is the foundation for economic and social development and 

underpins improvements in governance and the rule of law. These are key pillars for 

stable, peaceful and prosperous environments that will be less hospitable to terrorists and 

their sponsors. A strategic goal is to render terrorist organizations incapable of threatening 

US and PN vital interests and to reduce their threat to a level that can be controlled by local 

law enforcement actions. 

d. DOD should perform CT operations in unified action. However, this may not 

always be possible in some remote, unstable, or hostile environments. The joint force 

problem is twofold: being able to operate both as a supporting element to another USG 

agency lead; and the supported element performing military CT operations, as well as 

CMO in environments where indigenous agencies, IGOs, or OGAs are unable to do so. 
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-26 

2. Strategic Campaign Framework 

 The strategic campaign framework for CT is composed of three elements: friendly, 

enemy, and the global environment. The structure of the campaign uses five logical lines 

of operations (LOOs) further divided into two categories consisting of efforts applied 

directly against the enemy and actions applied indirectly to influence the global 

environment. These are referred to as direct and indirect approaches. The aims of the 

strategic campaign are to create a stabilized global environment which is inhospitable to 

terrorists and their organizations, and to isolate, defeat, and prevent the reemergence of a 

terrorist threat. The strategic campaign framework is depicted in Figure III-1. 

a. Strategic Aims. The strategic aims help define the intermediate conditions to 

measure progress on a global basis, linking the military strategic objectives with the 

termination objectives and the end states. These aims include: 

(1) Discredit the ideas and beliefs of terrorist organizations and isolate them 

psychologically from populations. 

ENEMY

Defeat the 

Isolated 

Threat

Isolate the 

Threat

Prevent

Emergence

ReConstitution

Increase Friendly Freedom of Action /

Reduce Enemy Freedom of Action

Enable Partners to Combat VEOs

Enable Partners to Combat VEOs

Deter Tacit and Active Support for VEOs

Deter Tacit and Active Support for VEOs

Erode Support for Extremist Ideologies

Erode Support for Extremist Ideologies

Critical 

Isolate the Threat

Capability

Lines of Operations

Strategic Aims

FRIENDLY

Global Combating

Terrorism Network

Inhospitable to Violent 

Extremism

Stabilize

Shape

GLOBAL 

ENVIRONMENT

Disrupt Disrupt VEOs

D

EOs

eny access and use of WMD by VEOs

Deny access and use of WMD by VEOs

Dire

ct Approach

Indirect Ap

pro

a

c

h

STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN FRAMEWORK

VEO violent extremist organization

WMD weapons of mass destruction

Figure III-1. Strategic Campaign Framework 
Operational Approaches 

III-3 

(2) Build and leverage the capabilities and capacity of USG civilian agencies and 

foreign security partners to protect populations; gain and/or maintain legitimacy and 

influence over those populations; and physically isolate terrorist organizations from 

populations. 

(3) Prevent threatened friendly countries from failing by helping them establish 

and/or maintain effective governance in their ungoverned or under-governed areas. 

(4) Encourage and support friendly armed groups opposing or resisting the hostile 

regimes of countries that support or sponsor terrorism. 

(5) Disrupt and defeat terrorist organizations. 

(6) Prevent the reconstitution of disrupted or defeated terrorist organizations. 

(7) Prevent new terrorist threats from emerging. 

b. Lines of Operations. Achieving these strategic aims requires integration of the five 

LOOs within the direct and indirect approaches. The direct approach focuses on actions 

taken to isolate terrorist organizations in order to disrupt or defeat their operations, reduce 

their capability to threaten US national security, and prevent their reemergence. The 

indirect approach focuses on shaping and stabilizing the global environment as a means to 

erode the support for terrorist organizations and deny them access to the resources they 

need to survive. The LOOs applied to the indirect approach take more time to have an 

effect, but will be the decisive actions in the long term. The direct LOOs are: disrupt 

VEOs; deny access to and the use of WMD by VEOs; the indirect LOOs are: enable 

partners to combat VEOs; deter tacit and active support for VEOs; and erode support for 

extremist ideologies. 

c. Global Combating Terrorism Network (GCTN). Success in CT campaigns is 

fundamentally driven by the creation of a global environment that is inhospitable to 

terrorists and their organizations. This end state will be achieved through a coordinated 

effort integrating US and foreign militaries and agencies, NGOs, and IGOs working 

together to create a critical mass of capabilities that enable both the direct and indirect 

approaches necessary to isolate, defeat and prevent the reemergence of terrorist 

organizations. This coordinated effort creates a critical capability. 

d. A Global Campaign. The global campaign for CT requires the accomplishment of 

the strategic aims through joint operations/campaigns by the GCCs in their areas of 

responsibility (AORs). It allows coordination for strategic unity of effort and purpose, 

synchronization of the planning, integration of assets, and coordination of the joint 

operations that may cross AOR boundaries. Global campaigns mitigate cross-AOR 

operational risks. The strategic campaign framework provides for the development of 

theater and subordinate campaigns and operations and will facilitate integration of many 

interdependent, cross-AOR missions supporting CT such as security cooperation, 

intelligence collection, SC, sustainment, and multinational support. 
Chapter III 

THEATER CAMPAIGN GUIDANCE 

Disrupt the timing and tempo of enemy operations

Contain the enemy’s actions to their current operational areas

Isolate the enemy from their resources

Neutralize selected capabilities and functions of the enemy

Block the movement of enemy fighters, leaders, and supporters

Interdict the enemy efforts to establish new bases of support and safe havens

SOURCE: Department of Defense Global 

Campaign Plan for the War on Terrorism 

3. Direct and Indirect Approaches 

a. Integrated Approaches. The campaign plan for the war on terrorism makes use of 

both direct and indirect approaches. These approaches are mutually supporting and 

integrate the capabilities to concurrently disrupt VEOs operating today and to influence the 

environment in which they operate to erode their capability and influence in the future. 

Both approaches are integrated globally from the strategic to tactical levels. Either or both 

approaches may be conducted within the scope of a broader campaign as directed by 

a JFC. The ability to manage both approaches to harness their synergistic effects is vital to 

the success of both near- and long-term CT objectives. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTEGRATED APPROACH 

In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, special operations forces (SOF) integrates 

the direct and indirect approaches on a daily basis. SOF are conducting 

continual direct action missions to disrupt insurgents and al-Qaida 

network terrorists, killing or capturing those responsible for committing 

violence against Iraqis and the multinational force. At the same time, 

SOF conduct foreign internal defense missions to train and advise the 

Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade and other Iraqi security forces. 

In fact, the majority of US Army Special Forces (Green Berets) and US 

Navy SEALs [Sea, Air, and Land forces] in Iraq are partnered with Iraqi 

units, fighting side-by-side with them, increasingly with Iraqis in the lead, 

to better enable them to take over all aspects of their country’s security 

in the future. Simultaneously, civil affairs and psychological operations 

units are engaged in construction, infrastructure rebuilding, and 

information dissemination operations that positively influence the Iraqi 

populace and address the underlying conditions of terrorism and the 

insurgency. 

SOURCE: United States Special Operations 

Command Posture Statement 2007 

III-4 JP 3-26 
Operational Approaches 

III-5 

b. Direct Approach. The direct approach describes actions taken against terrorists 

and terrorist organizations. In many situations, the USG will be required to take action 

against terrorists and their organizations in order to neutralize an imminent threat and 

degrade the operational capability of a terrorist organization. The goals of the direct 

approach against terrorists and their organizations are to defeat a specific threat through 

neutralization/dismantlement of the network (including actors, resources, and support 

structures) and to prevent the reemergence of a threat once neutralized. However, the 

resiliency of terrorist organizations and networks to reconstitute their forces and 

reorganize their efforts limits the long-term effectiveness of the direct approach as a 

sole means of countering terrorism. Specific to the direct approach are operations and 

activities designed to: 

(1) Disrupt terrorists and their organizations. These actions focus on VEO 

infrastructure and leadership which provide the enemy global access, connectivity, and the 

resources needed to operate and survive over the long-term. 

(2) Deny access to and use of WMD by terrorist organizations. These actions 

seek to deny acquisition, development, or the use of WMD against the United States or its 

partners. 

(3) An example of a military capability applicable to the direct approach is direct 

action. This action requires a high degree of discrimination and precise use of force to 

achieve specific objectives. These actions are normally of short duration and conducted in a 

hostile, denied, or politically sensitive area where a terrorist enclave may exist. 

c. Indirect Approach. The indirect approach describes the means by which the 

GCTN can influence the operational environments within which CT campaigns/operations 

are conducted. This approach usually includes actions taken within LOOs to enable 

partners to conduct operations against terrorists and their organizations as well as actions 

taken to shape and stabilize those environments as a means to erode the capabilities of 

terrorist organizations and degrade their ability to acquire support and sanctuary. The 

indirect approach combines various operations and activities (e.g., FID, UW, stability 

operations, CMO, counterintelligence, IO, PSYOP, and SC) that produce synergies 

designed to: 

(1) Enable PNs to combat terrorist organizations. These actions are taken by 

DOD in support of a larger USG effort to ensure our partners have both the capability and 

will to effectively conduct long-term operations to defeat terrorist organizations. Our 

partners have the cultural and historical understanding which when coupled with advanced 

technology; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and training, can help 

develop the necessary capability to execute operations within their borders and regionally to 

defeat terrorism. The realization of this capability for partners to secure their own territory 

is decisive in a CT campaign. 

(2) Deter tacit and active support for terrorism. Actions taken by DOD are part of 

a larger USG effort to deter state and non-state actors from providing tacit and active 
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-26 

support of terrorist organizations. The goal of the indirect approach is to influence the 

global environment by shaping and stabilizing it to deny terrorists safe havens and access to 

population bases that are ripe for terrorist recruiting operations. The indirect approach 

seeks to change the conditions, ideologies, and motivations which spawn terrorists and to 

isolate terrorists and their organizations (psychologically and physically) from populations. 

This will facilitate their subsequent neutralization/dismantlement through the direct 

approach and prevent their ability to reconstitute. Applications of the indirect approach are 

long-term efforts that require consistency and persistence in order to have a full effect. 

(3) Erode support for terrorist ideologies. Actions within this LOO are part of 

larger USG efforts to erode legitimacy of terrorist ideologies and neutralize their 

propaganda and misinformation campaigns which often serve as justification for acts of 

terrorism. Additionally, these actions seek to reduce support for terrorists over time by 

alleviating the underlying conditions (e.g., government corruption, poverty, chronic 

unemployment, and illiteracy), which can be exploited by terrorists. 

(4) Examples of military capabilities applicable to the indirect approach are: 

(a) UW. UW covers a broad range of military and paramilitary operations, 

normally of long duration conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces 

supported by an external source. Use of these types of forces within the UW umbrella can 

result in firsthand knowledge and information of terrorist groups and organizations located 

within the operational area and provide a means for locating and defeating the terrorists in 

their backyard. 

(b) FID. Subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency can contribute to the rise 

of terrorism. While FID is a core task of SOF, CF have established capabilities for FID. 

FID conducted by CF and SOF can help the HN reduce these contributing factors to 

terrorism. The FID strategy focuses on building viable political, economic, military, 

security infrastructure, and social institutions for the needs of the local population. FID 

operations involve military training and building infrastructure (e.g., schools, roads, and 

wells) in conjunction with foreign aid programs administered by DOS. Specific CT efforts 

also can be conducted as part of the FID program for a HN. 

1. Bolstering the will of other states to fight terrorism is primarily the 

responsibility of DOS. Effective FID programs, however, can improve public perceptions 

of the HN and USG and facilitate more active HN policies to combat terrorism. More 

directly, military-to-military contacts can help make HN officials advocates of potential 

operations against terrorist capabilities. 

2. In many cases, measures increasing the capacity of a state to fight 

terrorism also will strengthen its overall internal defense and development program. These 

measures, not all inclusive, include the following: developing the ability of the HN to break 

funding streams for criminal and insurgent groups, and prosecute their members; ensuring 

that HN security personnel have access to appropriate equipment and training to conduct all 

phases of CT operations; training HN personnel at entry and exit points (including airports, 
Operational Approaches 

III-7 

seaports, and border crossings) to identify and apprehend individuals and materials being 

used by international/transnational terrorist groups; assist HN security and intelligence 

agencies in gaining access to international networks that can share information on terrorist 

activities; and help HNs develop effective judicial systems and minimize corruption and 

intimidation of officials. 

(c) SFA. SFA encompasses joint force activities conducted within unified 

action to train, advise, assist, and equip FSF is support of a partner nation’s efforts to 

generate, employ, and sustain local, HN, or regional security forces and their supporting 

institutions. This includes activities from ministry level to tactical level units of action, and 

the national security support base. 

(d) Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). These operations facilitate CMO 

which in turn support the overall operation/campaign by enhancing the relationship among 

military forces, civil authorities, and the private sector in functional specialty areas (i.e., 

governance, economic stability, infrastructure). Civil affairs (CA) personnel also 

coordinate with other OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and the indigenous populations and institutions, 

all of which are susceptible to terrorist influences. While CAO are conducted during all 

phases of a campaign, CA can facilitate specific phases by performing in a “first-responder” 

role by applying these functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil 

government until the HN, in coordination with the USG and its partners, can reestablish the 

authority of legitimate civil entities. 

(e) PSYOP. PSYOP actions and activities are planned and conducted to 

influence foreign audiences in support of USG objectives. This capability is integrated in 

USG CT efforts to increase the likelihood of success. All PSYOP are governed by explicit 

authorities that provide for Joint Chiefs of Staff advocacy, interagency coordination and 

support, and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) approval. During CT operations, PSYOP are 

used to discredit the terrorist activities and to show the benefits of rejecting terrorism and its 

associated activities in an effort to gain popular support for the CT operations. 

4. Terrorism Threat and Counterterrorism Models 

 The following models show how extremists can operationally become VEOs and 

further establish and maintain a network for global terrorism, and how the US-led GCTN 

uses the strategic LOOs within the direct and indirect approaches to influence/counter the 

critical enabling components of the terrorism threat. 

a. Terrorism Threat Model

(1) To understand the nature of the development of VEOs, the war on terrorism 

campaign plan uses a circular model (Figure III-2) that represents the four critical enabling 

components in the cycle of terrorist operations that facilitates development of a global 

terrorism network. 
Chapter III 

III-8 JP 3-26 

TERRORISM THREAT MODEL

The Terrorism Threat Model

populace

tacit and/or active support

Local/regional terrorism

Global terrorism

This model shows how violent extremist organizations can use terrorism as a circle that operates

around four critical components:

(1) A from which extremists have the potential to draw support

(2) The given to the extremist by some of the sympathetic populace

(3) as a result of states unwilling or incapable of countering violent extremists

(4) that results from global networks built upon popular support and the inability of

states to control local and regional extremist networks

The cycle is completed when successful terrorist operations (at the global or local/regional level)

reinforce their ideological justification, and influence that portion of the populace that is susceptible to

the extremist ideology

Transnational Terrorist Networks

That Know No Borders,

No Boundaries

Social

Acceptance

Global

Effect

Ideological

Support

Safe

Haven

LOCAL/

REGIONAL

TERRORISM

TACIT/ACTIVE

SUPPORT

POPULACE

Weapons of Mass

Destruction







Acquisition

Transportation

Utilization

Global Network

Links

















Leadership

Weapons

Personnel

Movement

Finance

Communication

Intelligence

Ideology

Incapable States

CAPABILITY SHORTFALLS:

Counterterrorism

Internal security

Intelligence







Unwilling States

WILLINGNESS:

State sponsors

Tacit/active support

Failed states

Internal political risk









Underlying

Conditions











Lack of political voice

Perceived social injustices

Religious persecution

Economic disparity

Perceived deprivation

Core

Motivation











Religious

Political

Financial

Territorial

Criminal

Successful Terrorist

Operations







Increase recruiting

Influence the fringe

Ideological

justification

GLOBAL

TERRORISM

Figure III-2. Terrorism Threat Model 
Operational Approaches 

III-9 

(2) It is the combination of the global network links and the VEOs’ ability to 

generate global effects through terrorism (including the threat of their acquiring WMD) that 

pose the greatest strategic threat to the United States and PNs. Each component of the 

circle is enabled by the interdependent support mechanisms as shown. Extremists develop 

active support for a given cause by espousing a message or ideology which resonates 

within a targeted populace. Tacit/active support for their cause results from some 

combination of fear, sympathy, or apathy among those not inclined to fully believe the 

extremist message. As a popular support base develops, extremists gain and expand their 

freedom of action within those states willing but incapable of enforcing the rule of law 

within their own territory, or within nation states that support terrorism, or are unwilling to 

act to deny terrorists freedom of action. Establishing global network links through a 

combination of safe havens and freedom of action permits VEOs to create global 

effects through terrorism. Finally, the circle is completed when successful operations by 

the terrorists serve to reinforce their ideology, and influence their target populace. 

Typically, this brings even more new recruits and resources to their cause. The circle is 

repeated over time as the VEOs strengthen their global networks. Too often, the VEOs gain 

such popularity in their safe haven areas through disinformation and their public relations 

that they even sway a percentage of the moderate public opinion in some free societies. 

b. Counterterrorism Model

(1) Figure III-3 is a model based on the application of the indirect and direct 

approach LOOs from the strategic campaign framework (discussed in paragraph 2, above) 

against the circular model of the terrorism threats. 

(2) The CT threat model depicts specific LOOs from both the direct and indirect 

approaches linked to each component of the threat circle in integrated action to create the 

desired CT effects. A successful threat circle develops, evolves, and strengthens over a 

period of years and it will take time to prevent further growth, weaken its components, 

isolate its parts by further elimination of terrorist support, and reduce terrorist freedom of 

action. These actions will ultimately reduce the terrorism threat to a level where the 

extremists can be eliminated. 

5. Roles of Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces 

a. CF and SOF each bring certain competencies to CT efforts. CF and SOF skills 

and capabilities complement each other. The scope, intensity, and duration of each specific 

operation will dictate the missions to be accomplished and the JFCs must determine the 

right joint force mix to employ. CF and SOF each possess unique capabilities that can 

produce even greater warfighting potential for the JFCs when integrated into a holistic 

global CT campaign with numerous theater CT operations. Flexible command and control 

(C2), specific mission generation processes, clear mission approval levels, integration of all 

appropriate partners at the operational level, and tactical interdependence improves the CT 

effectiveness of both CF and SOF . 
Chapter III 

III-10 JP 3-26 

COUNTERTERRORISM MODEL

Counterterrorism Model

This model addresses each of the critical components of the Threat Circle with 5 lines of operation from

the direct and indirect approaches:

The desired objectives of these LOOs are to:

Transnational Terrorist Networks Know

No Borders Nor Boundaries

LOCAL/

REGIONAL

TERRORISM

GLOBAL

TERRORISM TACIT/ACTIVE

SUPPORT

Defend

the

Homeland

POPULACE

Erode Support for

Extremist Ideology







Erode Support for Extremist Ideology

Enable Partners to Combat VEOs

Deter Tacit and Active Support for VEOs





Defeat the VEOs

Isolate the VEOs





Disrupt VEOs

Deny Access and/or Use of WMD by VEOs





Prevent reconstitution/emergence of VEOs

Defend the Homeland against VEOs

3 Indirect Approach LOOs LOO line of operations

VEO violent extremist organization

WMD weapons of mass destruction 2 Direct Approach LOOs

Disrupt VEOs

Deny VEOs access

and use of WMD

Cumulative

Effect

Defeat

Isolated

Threat

Prevent

Emergence/

Reconstitution

Isolate the

Threat

Enable partners to

combat VEOs

Deter tacit and active

support for VEOs

Figure III-3. Counterterrorism Model 
Operational Approaches 

III-11 

INTEGRATION OF CONVENTIONAL AND 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, operations such as those resulting in 

deaths of the Hussein brothers and Abu Masab al-Zarqawi demonstrated 

the synergies that can be produced by integrating conventional forces 

and special operations forces. 

From Multiple Sources 

b. CT is a core task of SOF, but global demand for CT activities and the varied 

conditions under which the broad range of CT activities occur dictates that SOF 

cannot be the sole force engaged in CT operations. SOF generally perform two types of 

activities. First, they perform tasks that CF do not, and second, they perform tasks that can 

be done by the CF, but do so to a unique set of conditions and standards, normally using 

tactics, techniques, and procedures not used by CF. SOF perform nine specific core tasks as 

depicted below. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CORE TASKS 

-- Counterterrorism -- Unconventional Warfare 

-- Direct Action -- Foreign Internal Defense 

-- Special Reconnaissance -- Information Operations 

-- Counterproliferation of Weapons -- Psychological Operations 

 of Mass Destruction -- Civil Affairs Operations 

Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

NOTE: Commander, US Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM) is responsible 

for synchronizing planning for global operations against terrorist networks and will do so in 

coordination with other combatant commands, the Services, and, as directed, appropriate 

USG agencies. As such, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) considers its role 

in the synchronization of DOD efforts to be a core task of its headquarters. 

c. Executing protracted CT operations will increasingly require CF to perform 

missions that traditionally have been viewed primarily as SOF activities. CF personnel 

should receive cultural and language training for the operational areas to which they deploy. 

They should be capable of operating in smaller, more cross-functional units, under 

independent authorities and for prolonged periods. They should be able to plan, gather and 

disseminate intelligence/information and operate in coordination with interagency and 

multinational partners. Increased CF interaction abroad is an opportunity to gain area 

familiarization and gather useful information about potential operational areas. 

Employment of CF in efforts to build the capacity of PNs serves both to improve the 

capability of the CF in CT operations as well as develop those capabilities in our partners. 
Chapter III 

III-12 JP 3-26 

(1) CF role in CT operations. The focus on the population leads to the need for 

a number of small units operating throughout a potentially large operational area. These 

units may be operating in conjunction with the forces of other PNs, as trainers or advisors, 

or they may be operating independently. In any case, the CF may be required to provide 

combat support; combat service support (CSS), and sustainment. Specific examples of CF 

support to CT include, but are not limited to: 

(a) Delivering precision fires and providing ISR to forces conducting CT 

operations throughout an operational area. 

(b) Conducting preemptive attacks on terrorist targets, as directed by the JFC. 

(c) Providing combat support and sustainment to multiple small, dispersed 

teams in permissive or hostile operational areas. 

(d) Providing emergency extraction and personnel recovery for all joint 

forces in an operational area. 

(e) Establishing security for OGAs or PNs that support CT operations. 

(f) Operating in a support relationship to the dedicated US or PN CT forces 

and conducting strikes, raids, and other combat operations against terrorist training camps, 

safe havens, and other targets when the precision-strike capabilities of dedicated CT forces 

are not required to perform the mission. 

(g) Support WMD elimination operations. 

(2) Building PN security force capacity in operational areas on a global scale. 

The CF possess the basic skills necessary to train and advise indigenous forces in basic 

military skills in order to enhance the internal security of PNs vulnerable to terrorism. CF 

units normally will require specific assets be made available to equip indigenous forces. To 

do this effectively, the CF require language and cultural instruction, equipment, and other 

support necessary to train and advise indigenous forces in CT operations. CF may be 

required to provide a safe-haven for friendly armed groups that will allow them to establish 

either literal or virtual centers to publicize their cause, conduct recruitment, solicit funding, 

and/or serve as a venue for SC efforts. 

(3) Providing CMO activities such as interim military government or 

performing civil administration functions. Like SOF, CF may be required to establish an 

interim military government or perform civil administration functions for stability 

operations in occupied or liberated territory when indigenous institutions, IGOs, or OGAs 

cannot do so. Failure to rapidly establish or reestablish order and basic services will 

encourage terrorist recruitment and support for their causes. This may require additional 

capabilities for intelligence, counterintelligence, security, and law enforcement functions in 

support of population security and the development of good governance. 
Operational Approaches 

III-13 

d. Integrating CF and SOF – C2 requirements. In general, support relationships 

provide the best framework for integrated CF/SOF operations. This relationship allows the 

supported commander to set requirements and allows the supporting commander the 

flexibility to determine methods and tactics. To fully integrate CF and SOF, effective 

liaison must be maintained with all components of a joint force that may impact the conduct 

of their activities. The use of a number of CF and SOF liaison and control elements will 

help ensure the proper coordination of missions, minimize potential for friction between the 

forces, and sustain unity of effort. Circumstances may dictate that SOF support CF; and 

conversely, that CF support SOF. Integration enables the JFC to take full advantage of CF 

and SOF core competencies. SOF are most effective when special operations are fully 

integrated into the overall plan and the execution of special operations is through proper 

SOF C2 elements responsive to the needs of the supported commander. SOF C2 elements 

are provided to the supported or the supporting CF commanders and include joint special 

operations task forces (JSOTFs) or combined JSOTFs when organized with multinational 

SOF to conduct specific special operations or special operations in support of a larger joint 

operation or theater campaign; special operations C2 elements to synchronize integrated 

SOF/CF operations; and special operations liaison elements to coordinate, deconflict, and 

integrate special operations air, surface, and subsurface operations with conventional air 

operations. The exchange of SOF and CF liaison officers is essential to enhance situational 

awareness and facilitate staff planning and training for integrated operations. 

e. Integrating CF and SOF - operational planning requirements. When properly 

integrated during planning, CF and SOF can capitalize on their collective strengths to 

achieve the JFC’s intent. Ignoring CF and SOF integration issues during planning may 

either increase risk or miss opportunities to integrate with other partners involved in the CT 

activities. Effective crisis response depends on gaining early warning of potential 

problems. CF and SOF missions with foreign military forces can provide early recognition 

of these areas. SOF are especially adept in providing cultural awareness and can help 

facilitate the introduction of CF into an area or region. Likewise, CF can enable the 

introduction and support of SOF into denied areas, providing them logistical bases of 

operations, fire support, and reinforcements. 

For detailed discussion of integrating CF and SOF, see USSOCOM Publication 3-33, 

Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability 

Handbook and Checklist. 

6. Strategic and Operational Planning Considerations 

a. Strategic Assumptions

(1) A long war. The war on terrorism is a long-term war of varying intensity that 

can be expected to take decades of effort. 

(2) Violent extremists will use any means of attack. The United States and 

other free and open societies will remain principal targets of the extremists. They may seek 

to use all means of attack, including WMD against targets at home and abroad. 
Chapter III 

III-14 JP 3-26 

(3) Internal struggle within societies. Extremists are waging a global war to 

gain control over their communities and freedom is seen as a primary obstacle to their 

success. Violent extremists are hostile to the United States and the other societies for 

philosophical, political, and other ideological reasons, but portray the religious aspect as the 

primary reason. The world, in general, has a large stake in the defeat of violent extremists. 

The al-Qaeda network is the best example of an immediate strategic threat to the United 

States, and our partners, and mainstream Muslims. 

(4) Ideology matters. Violent extremist movements can make new terrorists 

faster than the GCTN partnership can directly eliminate them. Ideological support and 

propaganda operations are a foundation for extremist success and a key to their recruitment 

and indoctrination. 

(5) Enemies within friends. The networks of terrorist groups and others who 

support their violent extremist ideologies will influence, and in some cases penetrate, the 

governmental, civil, and religious institutions of PNs. 

(6) Together and alone. The United States prefers to operate in a partnership 

with other countries to combat violent extremism, but will act alone, as necessary. 

(7) All instruments of national power required. The United States is at war, 

and success will require the coordinated efforts of all instruments of US and PN power. In 

fact, the principal thrust must come from instruments of national power and influence 

outside DOD. The United States will also promote freedom, democracy, and economic 

prosperity around the world to mitigate those conditions that terrorists seek to exploit. 

(8) Divided responsibilities. Responsibilities for protecting the United States are 

divided among Federal, state, and local governments and the private sector. DOD will need 

to coordinate closely with OGAs to achieve integrated plans for unified action. A detailed 

understanding of this division of responsibility is necessary for developing 

operation/campaign plans. This division of responsibility is continuously evolving and 

should be reviewed throughout the planning process as well as during execution. 

b. Key Considerations 

(1) Close neighbors. To protect the homeland, cooperation with neighbors in this 

hemisphere is especially important. 

(2) Enemies are transnational. Our enemies in the war on terrorism do not 

respect national boundaries. VEOs cooperate with opportunists — other extremists, 

criminal elements, proliferators, and drug cartels — based on self-interest. The USG will 

need to use its country teams abroad in new ways to execute a global strategy. 

(3) Common assessment of threat. USG agencies will not automatically adopt a 

common assessment of the threat or a common understanding of the nature of the war; nor 
Operational Approaches 

III-15 

will CT PNs. The challenge is pursuing the right efforts to gain greater commonality of 

view. 

(4) Networked enemy. A “networked enemy” has certain vulnerabilities that can 

be exploited. Although some nodes of the network are difficult to see, others may be 

identified and acted upon. Perturbations of nodes in the network may present opportunities 

for intelligence collection and/or allow more effective exploitation. Networked enemies 

have different vulnerabilities than hierarchical enemies. There may be vulnerabilities 

especially in network links consisting of non-ideological opportunists. 

c. Operational Art. Operational art is the application of creative imagination by 

commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design 

strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. 

Operational art also promotes unified action by helping JFCs and their staffs understand 

how to facilitate the integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward 

achieving the national strategic end state. This should be part of the JFC’s joint operation 

planning process, and it lends itself to CT operations, especially when CT is combined with 

other IW-type operations within an operational area. 

d. Operational Design. Operational design is the conception and construction of the 

framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution. 

Joint operation planning — particularly for extensive operations that require a campaign 

(e.g., global campaign against terrorism) — uses various elements of operational design to 

help commanders and staffs visualize the arrangement of joint capabilities in time, space, 

and purpose to accomplish the mission. For integrating CF and SOF in CT operations, 

operational design, incorporating operational art, provides the necessary planning 

tool for bringing clarity of purpose and structure to that complex operational level 

planning.

Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, for a detailed discussion of the elements of 

operational design as well as the applications of operational art and design in planning 

joint operations. 

e. Effects in Joint CT Operations. Like all operations, CT operations create effects 

which must be considered in the context of long-term efforts. These operations contribute 

most to the global campaign when higher order effects are considered, and actions are 

oriented toward creating the effects necessary to degrade terrorist networks. See Figure 

III-4 for a depiction of the relationships of missions, objectives, effects, and tasks for the 

various command echelons. 

(1) Influencing the relevant population. Because CT operations can be as much 

about “influencing relevant populations” as finding the terrorists themselves, successful CT 

operational planning analyzes both desired and potential undesired effects. This is so 

because when the focus is on the population, a tactical miscue can create one, or a set of, 

undesired effects and result in a significant strategic setback. 
Chapter III 

III-16 JP 3-26 

Echelon

National

Strategic

Theater

Strategic

Operational

Tactical

Guidance

President's End State

(Objectives)

End State & Mission

Objectives

Effects

Tasks

Mission

Objectives

Effects

Tasks

Mission

Tasks

EFFECTS AND COMMAND ECHELONS

Figure III-4. Effects and Command Echelons 

(2) Direct and indirect effects. At the tactical level, a direct effect is the 

proximate, first-order consequence of an action — for example, the elimination of a 

“wanted” terrorist by a precision attack, or restoration of electrical power to a relevant area 

by military engineers after a terrorist attack. Direct effects are most evident against 

structural systems. Indirect effects often are less observable or recognizable than direct 

effects, particularly when they involve changes in an adversary’s behavior. However, an 

indirect effect often is the one more desired, such as the aforementioned change in the 

adversary’s behavior — which may lead to adversary operational vulnerabilities that can 

then be exploited, such as the exposure and capture of a high-value individual (HVI). 

Objectives prescribe friendly goals. 

Effects describe system behavior in the operational environment — 

desired effects are the conditions related to achieving objectives. 

Tasks direct friendly action. 

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning 

Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, for further details about the use of effects as an 

element of operational design. 
CHAPTER IV 

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

IV-1 

“Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise 

you with their ingenuity.” 

General George S. Patton

1. General 

 Rarely in history have the effects of tactical level actions been so pronounced at the 

national strategic level as during the large scale CT and COIN operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. This realization has been fully recognized by the national level authorities and 

down the chain of command to the warfighters. Effectively countering terrorism may 

require more complex C2 and interagency coordination. This chapter outlines the roles, 

responsibilities, and authorities of some of the individuals and organizations at the national 

strategic and operational levels that exercise C2, interagency coordination, or otherwise 

influence unified action against terrorism worldwide. Additionally, multinational planning 

considerations are briefly addressed.

2. National Level 

a. President and Secretary of Defense. The President is responsible for national 

strategic direction. When the President directs that CT operations be conducted, the Armed 

Forces of the United States provide the military instrument of national power. Ideally, the 

military instrument is used as a last resort, but should always be used in concert with the 

other instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, and economic. SecDef is 

responsible to the President for creating, supporting, and employing military capabilities, to 

include CT military capabilities. Presidential directives guide participation by all USG 

departments and agencies for unified action for such operations. 

b. National Security Council (NSC). The NSC is the principal forum for 

consideration of national security policy requiring Presidential determination. Of high 

importance among these policy determinations are the national security implications of 

terrorism and CT. The NSC advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of 

national security policy. Along with its subordinate committees, the NSC is the principal 

means for coordinating, developing, and implementing national security policy. 

c. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 

(1) The NCTC is the primary organization in the USG for integrating and 

analyzing all intelligence possessed or acquired pertaining to terrorism (except purely 

domestic terrorism). It provides all-source intelligence support to government-wide CT 

activities; establishes its own information technology systems and architectures, and those 

between the NCTC and other agencies. 
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-26 

(2) The NCTC serves as the principal advisor to the Director of National 

Intelligence (DNI) on intelligence operations and analysis relating to CT. 

(3) Unique among US agencies, the NCTC also serves as the primary 

organization for strategic operation planning for CT. Operating under the policy 

direction of the President, the NSC, and the Homeland Security Council (HSC), the NCTC 

provides a full-time interagency forum and process to plan, integrate, assign lead 

operational roles and responsibilities, and measure the effectiveness of strategic-level CT 

activities of the USG. It is responsible for the integration of all instruments of national 

power to the CT mission. 

d. USG Participation in Domestic CT

(1) Homeland Security Council. The HSC provides a parallel forum to the NSC 

for considering unique homeland security matters, especially those concerning terrorism 

within the homeland. The HSC is responsible for advising and assisting the President with 

respect to all aspects of homeland security and serves as the mechanism for ensuring 

coordination of homeland security related activities of executive departments and agencies, 

as well as the effective development and implementation of homeland security policies. 

(2) Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS leads the unified national 

effort to secure the US. Key among its strategic goals is to prevent, protect, respond, and 

recover from acts of terrorism. 

(3) United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). For threats or acts 

of terrorism within the USNORTHCOM AOR, the Department of Justice (DOJ) is the 

primary agency within US territory, and DOS is the primary agency on foreign territory. At 

the direction of the President or SecDef, Commander, USNORTHCOM 

(CDRUSNORTHCOM) may be directed to support the primary agency for CT operations 

in accordance with appropriate laws and regulations. To enable CT activities, timely 

intelligence and data exchange is conducted between the North American Aerospace 

Defense Command (NORAD), USNORTHCOM and other partners, to include 

multinational, local, state, tribal and federal entities. Partnering with the NCTC and the 

Defense Intelligence Agency’s Joint Intelligence Task Force — Combating Terrorism 

(JITF-CT) and participating in the Bilateral Consultative Group on Counterterrorism (a 

mechanism used by the US and Canada to work on important bilateral issues and includes 

representatives of DOS, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), NSC, DOJ, DHS and 

Canadian counterparts), NORAD and USNORTHCOM have access to many sources of 

intelligence, information and data to support the NORAD and USNORTHCOM missions 

and provide mutual support to other agencies engaged in combating terrorism. Military CT 

operations within the AOR would typically be the responsibility of CDRUSNORTHCOM. 

For more information on USG departments and interagency coordination in the homeland 

see JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, and JP 3-28, Civil Support. 
Command and Control 

IV-3 

3. United States Special Operations Command 

 CDRUSSOCOM is a global synchronizer for the war on terrorism and responsible for 

synchronizing planning, and as directed, executing operations against terrorist networks on 

a global basis in coordination with other combatant commands, the Services, and as 

directed, appropriate USG agencies. 

a. Authority to Synchronize Efforts. CDRUSSOCOM has the authority to 

synchronize and lead a collaborative planning process leveraging other combatant 

command capabilities and expertise that results in decentralized execution by both 

USSOCOM and other combatant commands against terrorist networks designated by the 

SecDef. The USSOCOM Center for Special Operations (CSO) is the fusion point for DOD 

synchronization efforts, combining operations, intelligence, and long-range planning and 

strategy. 

b. CDRUSSOCOM Responsibilities:

(1) Integrating DOD CT strategy into plans, establishing intelligence priorities, 

and leading the development and synchronization of plans for operations against designated 

terrorist networks as part of a DOD global campaign plan. 

(2) Prioritizing and synchronizing those parts of security cooperation activities, 

deployments, and capabilities that support campaigns against terrorist networks in 

coordination with GCCs. 

(3) Executing C2 of CT operations, as directed. 

(4) Providing representation, in addition to other military commands, to US 

national and international agencies for matters related to US and multinational operations 

against terrorist networks. 

(5) Planning operational preparation of the environment (OPE), and as directed, 

executing OPE or synchronizing the execution of OPE in coordination with GCCs. 

(6) Supporting other combatant commanders (CCDRs) for operational planning 

as required against terrorist network targets. 

(7) Developing and leading a time sensitive planning process to rapidly propose 

courses of action (COAs) and to provide operational recommendations to SecDef or the 

President considering the full range of military options. 

(8) Interfacing with national, Service, and commercial laboratories to maintain 

awareness of promising state of the art technology for the warfighter. 

(9) Leading the development of a war on terrorism intelligence campaign plan for 

DOD. 
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-26 

4. Other Combatant Commands 

 Commanders of combatant commands exercise combatant command (command 

authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces and are responsible to the President and SecDef 

for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to 

perform assigned missions. For the war on terrorism, typically a GCC is the supported 

CCDR with the CDRUSSOCOM supporting. However, for specific missions as may be 

directed by the President or SecDef, CDRUSSOCOM may be the supported CCDR with 

the GCC(s) supporting in their AOR(s). 

a. Retain Control of AOR for CT Operations. GCCs retain control of their AORs 

and COCOM of their assigned forces and operational control (OPCON) of attached forces. 

The primary role of CDRUSSOCOM is to synchronize CT operations and activities at the 

strategic level and arrange military actions to ensure the optimum employment of forces for 

CT. This synchronization facilitates unified action and allows USSOCOM to look 

“between the seams” as terrorists move, communicate, finance their activities, and operate 

around the world. 

b. Supported Command within Theater. The GCCs have the best regional focus 

and knowledge of the operational environment in their AORs. They continue to execute 

operations, including CT missions, as the supported commanders in their respective 

theaters, with CDRUSSOCOM in a supporting role unless directed otherwise by the 

President or SecDef. 

(1) To provide the necessary unity of command, GCCs are normally authorized a 

theater special operations command (TSOC) — a subunified command which serves as the 

primary organization by which the GCC exercises C2 over SOF. The TSOC also serves as 

a joint force special operations (SO) component command equivalent to a Service 

component command under the GCC. TSOCs ensure SOF are fully integrated into a 

GCC’s collective security plans, contingency operations, and are focused on planning and 

conducting joint SO, to include CT operations, ensuring that SOF capabilities are properly 

matched to mission requirements, and advising their GCC on the proper employment of 

SOF. Typically, the GCC has COCOM over assigned SOF and exercises it through the 

commander of the TSOC. For attached SOF, the GCC has OPCON, which is normally 

exercised by the commander of the TSOC or another JFC subordinate to the GCC (e.g., 

commander, JSOTF [CDRJSOTF]); commander, joint PSYOP task force; or commander, 

joint CMO task force). The TSOC commander normally coordinates any operational links 

and command relationships between SOF and CF for approval by the appropriate JFC. 

(2) The GCC has COCOM of assigned conventional forces and OPCON of 

attached forces, and exercises these authorities through the respective Service component 

commanders or functional component commanders. The appropriate component 

commanders normally discuss and then recommend for the JFC approval, the preferred 

command relationships, between conventional units and SOF. 
Command and Control 

IV-5 

(3) Integrated SOF and CF operations are typically conducted under the OPCON 

of a subordinate JFC with SOF and conventional units in support or tactical control 

(TACON) relationships. 

c. Prepare Supporting Campaign Plans. The GCCs prepare theater campaign/ 

operation plans that support the DOD global campaign plan against terrorism. These plans 

provide broad strategic concept of operations (CONOPS) and sustainment for achieving 

multinational, national, and theater strategic objectives. These plans enable USSOCOM to 

synchronize the interdependent, cross-AOR, missions for CT. 

Refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for detailed discussion of 

responsibilities of CCDRs or command relationships. 

5. Joint Task Force Considerations 

a. The C2 requirements for a joint task force (JTF) for CT operations are largely 

dependent upon its size, composition, organization, mission, the situation, and the size of 

the joint operations area (JOA). CT operations may be part of a larger IW-type situation 

(e.g., insurgency) for which the JFC is responsible. The GCC will designate a subordinate 

JFC and establish the JTF on a functional or geographic basis. The JFC normally will have 

OPCON of the JTF and exercise it through Service or functional component commanders. 

When integrating CF and SOF for joint operations, the JFC will typically establish support 

relationships, often with mission-type orders, or alternatively, some operations may require 

TACON as the command relationship. For some CT operations/tasks it may be 

advantageous for the JFC to use Service force components or SOF because their command 

lines are clear and uncomplicated. CT operations may be led by another interagency 

partner (e.g., US ambassador/DOS), and the JFC will be in support. The GCC normally 

will maintain coordination with an established US ambassador, or the appropriate DOS 

representative, and the JFC will have the appropriate interagency representatives/liaisons 

required for the tasked unified action. 

b. For a given JOA within a GCC’s AOR, the JFC responsible for CT operations will 

typically be a commander, joint task force (CJTF) (subordinate to the GCC) or a 

CDRJSOTF if predominately a SOF organization. CF/SOF Service force components 

normally are part of the JTF/JSOTF, respectively. Dependent upon the mission, the 

CJTF/CDRJSOTF could have a joint CMO task force and/or a joint PSYOP task force, or 

their equivalent task groups/elements, attached as components (or staff elements). If 

operations are conducted with HN, OGA, or multinational components, for unity of effort, 

their coordination relationships must be determined when the JFC organizes the force, and 

exchanging experienced liaison officers/personnel among the components is essential. 

c. The JFC must establish operational areas within the JOA for the joint force and 

other components when continuing operations are expected. Procedures must be 

established for coordinating operations along/across operational boundaries within the JOA. 

The JFC should designate areas of operations (AOs) for the surface components and joint 

special operations area(s) (JSOAs) for the SOF, as required. CT operations are typically 
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-26 

land-oriented, and within a land force commander’s AO or a JSOA. The land force 

commander may subdivide the AO into smaller contiguous operational areas, and may 

assign units of the land forces (including multinational and HN components) 

responsibilities within those smaller operational areas as a matter of decentralized execution 

for operations. This decentralization of execution requires an efficient C2 system 

(organizational structure and communications architecture) at the component and tactical 

levels. Without robust C2 and combat identification capabilities, situational awareness of 

friendly and enemy force dispositions are difficult, because CT operations are normally 

nonlinear. 

d. C2 for Joint Air Support of CT Operations. Some CJTFs may not have their own 

Air Force component commander. In such situations, the CJTF may have to establish 

support relationships with the GCC’s Air Force component commander. The C2 

arrangements must be fully coordinated to allow for the decentralized execution of air 

support typically required for CT operations. A CDRJSOTF may have a joint special 

operations air component commander, but will likely need a support relationship with an 

Air Force component commander. 

e. The JFC establishes control and coordination measures (including a geospatial 

reference system for the JOA) for maneuver and movement control, airspace coordination, 

fire support, restrictive areas, etc. 

f. C2 is essential for targeting. Targeting supports the process of linking the JFC’s 

desired effects of fires to actions and tasks at the component level. The JFC should 

anticipate that CT operations will result in numerous time-sensitive targets in the form of 

HVIs and other fleeting targets of opportunity. The JFC may find the bulk of CT targeting 

with the land component or SOF. 

For detailed discussion of organizing a joint force, and establishing operational areas, 

command authorities, and command relationships refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations. For a 

discussion of joint security areas, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater. 

6. Multinational Considerations 

 In working with multinational partners, the success of CT operations hinges on the US 

ability to work within each partner’s political restraints, traditional structures, policies, and 

procedures. This requirement includes a multinational partner’s willingness to not only 

coordinate and operate with the US military but with OGAs as well. Once an accord is 

reached between the US military and its multinational partners, a more rapid sharing of CT 

intelligence, coordination, and synchronization of operation plans and orders, missions, and 

other related documents and information can occur. 

a. C2 of US Forces in Multinational CT Operations. Multinational CT command 

structures follow the same premise as for other multinational operations. 
Command and Control 

IV-7 

(1) Overview. Nations will rarely relinquish national command of their forces. 

As Commander in Chief, the President always retains and cannot relinquish national 

command authority over US forces. 

(a) Command authority for a multinational force commander normally is 

negotiated between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. Command 

authority could range from OPCON, to TACON, to designated support relationships, to 

coordinating authority. 

(b) While the President cannot relinquish national command authority, in 

some multinational environments it might be prudent or advantageous to place appropriate 

US forces under the OPCON of a foreign commander to achieve specified military 

objectives. 

(c) In many cases, coordinating authority may be the only acceptable means 

of accomplishing a multinational mission. Coordinating authority is a consultation 

relationship between commanders, not an authority by which C2 may be exercised. 

(2) Multinational CT Task Force. Within a larger military organizational 

structure, a multinational CT task force may be established to conduct operations that can 

better coordinate and synchronize the multifaceted CT capabilities of multinational partners, 

the interagency, regional and multilateral organizations, and various other countries’ 

organizations (e.g., intelligence organizations, law enforcement organizations). There 

should be sufficient flexibility within the task force whereas one nation may be identified as 

the lead nation for a particular CT operation. This may occur because of sensitive political 

concerns with the method of sharing information, the relationship between countries, or a 

country’s expertise. 

b. Operational Considerations

(1) Strategic implications of all actions must be considered because of the nature 

of CT operations and competing multinational interests (e.g., political interests). 

(2) Multinational partners must have a common goal and willingness to conduct 

CT operations. 

(3) In CT operations, multinational partners must be willing to share information 

and synchronize other operational capabilities to ensure all available and required support is 

accessible. This equates to developing resilient, lasting, and collaborative relationships to 

use shared resources and expertise to counter terrorism. 

(4) Multinational forces participation in CT exercises and operations builds vital 

relationships that influence cooperation, coordination, trust, and confidence in the fight 

against terrorism. 
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-26 

(5) Multinational forces must be treated as legitimate partners with appropriate 

trust and confidence. 

(6) Under bilateral relationships, sensitivity is required to ensure third party 

countries are not offended, especially while working in combined facilities, such as in 

operations and intelligence planning, coordination, and execution. 

For a detailed discussion regarding multinational force operations, refer to JP 3-16, 

Multinational Operations. 

7. Interagency Coordination 

“Many Global War on Terrorism [GWOT] activities are not limited to the 

Department of Defense. In fact, most GWOT tasks require actions by other 

government agencies and international partners.” 

United State Special Operations Command Posture Statement 2007 

 Within the context of DOD involvement, interagency coordination is the coordination 

that occurs between elements of DOD, and engaged USG agencies for the purpose of 

achieving an objective. The strategic security environment that is characterized by regional 

instability, failed states, increased weapons proliferation, transnational terrorism, and 

unconventional threats to US citizens, interests, and territories, requires even greater 

cooperation among interagency partners. In addition to military power, national CT 

strategic objectives require the coordinated use of the diplomatic, informational, and 

economic instruments of national power and other national capabilities that can only be 

accomplished through interagency coordination. The war on terrorism, and particularly the 

significant ongoing CT operations in various countries, has solidified the importance and 

necessity for effective and detailed interagency coordination not only at the national level, 

but down to the operational and tactical levels. Continued success in CT operations 

demands an end to unilateral “stove piping” of action within departments, agencies, 

and staff directorates. In a parallel context, IGO and NGO coordination refers to 

coordination among DOD elements and IGOs (including regional security organizations) 

and NGOs to achieve a mutual objective. 

a. Interagency Unity of Effort. Success in the war against terrorism requires 

interagency coordination to maximize the effectiveness of all instruments of national power. 

USSOCOM, as the integrating command for global CT planning efforts, supports a growing 

network of relationships through continuous liaison partnerships, a supporting technical 

infrastructure, and using information sharing policies. Along with the interagency partners, 

this network draws upon an increasing number of countries, regional organizations, IGOs, 

NGOs, and the private sector to achieve unified action. 

(1) Typically, each agency develops its own agency-specific plans at varying 

levels of detail in response to an issue, incident, or event. The challenge to the 

interagency community with respect to CT operations is to meld the individual agency 
Command and Control 

IV-9 

planning efforts into a collaborative, multi-agency planning process that exploits the 

core competencies of all the interagency partners. 

(2) To enhance interagency coordination at the strategic and operational levels, 

joint interagency coordination groups (JIACGs) have been established at the GCCs. 

Additionally, USSOCOM has established an interagency task force to enhance operational 

effectiveness in the long war against terrorism and synchronize the interagency efforts of 

other combatant commands and designated joint forces commands. 

b. Joint Interagency Coordination Group. Representing USG agencies at the 

combatant command headquarters, the JIACG is the CCDR’s lead organization for 

interagency coordination providing guidance, facilitation, coordination, and synchronization 

of interagency activities within the AOR. The JIACG is an interagency staff group that 

establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between the USG 

civilian and military operational planners. In particular, the JIACG participates in security 

cooperation, contingency, crisis, and transition planning and facilitates information sharing 

across the interagency community. 

(1) Combatant Command Staff and the JIACG

(a) Within the staff, the JIACG can provide the greatest value-added when 

authorized to coordinate across a CCDR’s staff and with the components. Normally, the 

JIACG operates most effectively as a separate staff element reporting directly to the deputy 

CCDR or the chief of staff. 

(b) A CT planning effort and subsequent operations may require a combatant 

command to request additional CT expertise from various agencies and organizations (e.g., 

Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, FBI, and National Security 

Agency) to staff its JIACG and optimize interagency effectiveness and efficiency. This 

arrangement also facilitates the use of reachback and collaboration between subordinate 

JFCs and the CCDR. 

(2) JIACG Participation in CT Exercises and Training Events. Combatant 

commands, their subordinate JTFs, and interagency representatives (versus role players) 

should participate in CT related exercises and training events to build more viable working 

relationships, improve interoperability, and make use of lessons learned from real-world 

operations. 

For more details concerning the JIACG, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 

United States, JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, and the 

US Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, Commander’s Handbook for the Joint 

Interagency Coordination Group. 

c. USSOCOM Interagency Task Force. This task force is a dedicated operations 

and intelligence planning team comprised of interagency intelligence and operations 

planning specialists and a robust information collection capability. All of the major 
Chapter IV 

IV-10 JP 3-26 

interagency partners are represented in the task force to include the DOD combat support 

agencies (CSAs). 

(1) The interagency task force searches for and identifies new, developing, and 

emerging CT opportunities to attack terrorist organizations and networks worldwide. It 

further develops actionable intelligence into operational COAs and plans against the 

emerging targets. 

(2) Throughout this process, the interagency and CSA liaison partners provide the 

direct conduit for the flow of operational information and intelligence between their parent 

organizations and USSOCOM as the global CT synchronizer. 

d. Interagency Coordination Planning Considerations

(1) CT operations require participation of all essential military and interagency 

planners. 

(2) During the planning process it is crucial to understand who has the lead for a 

particular CT task. 

(3) The prudent sharing of information is paramount to success. “Read in” other 

interagency partners that may not have direct participation in initial CT operations but may 

be required for subsequent operations. 

(4) Consider the involvement of other stakeholders (e.g., IGOs, NGOs, and the 

private sector) in CT operations planning. 

(5) At the subordinate joint force level (e.g., JTF), effective use of reachback to 

the combatant command JIACG and USSOCOM interagency task force is an invaluable 

resource. The ability of the various JIACG and interagency task force agencies to react 

quickly to requests for information can enhance branch and sequel development. 

(6) Combatant commands’ JIACGs should coordinate their CT planning with the 

USSOCOM interagency task force as appropriate. 
CHAPTER V 

SIGNIFICANT ENABLING FUNCTIONS FOR COUNTERTERRORISM 

V-1 

“...the terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United States. And war 

is what they got.” 

President George W. Bush 

1 May 2003 

1. General 

 This chapter discusses specific enabling functions that are essential to all joint 

operations, but require special emphasis for CT operations. 

2. Intelligence 

 In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the USG enhanced CT 

intelligence architecture and interagency collaboration by setting clear national priorities 

and transforming the organizational structure of the intelligence agencies to achieve those 

priorities. The intelligence community (IC) has been reorganized and the DNI now 

oversees the IC to better integrate its efforts into a more unified, coordinated, and 

effective body. The President established a mission manager organization, the NCTC, 

dedicated solely to planning and conducting intelligence operations against terrorist 

networks. The DNI launched an Open Source Center to coordinate open source intelligence 

and ensure this information is integrated into IC products. The FBI is fully integrated with 

the IC and has refocused its efforts on preventing terrorism. The Central Intelligence 

Agency has transformed to fulfill its role to provide overall direction and coordination for 

overseas human intelligence operations of IC elements. To undercut the financial 

underpinnings of terrorism worldwide, the Department of the Treasury created the Office of 

Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. The Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination 

Center (DIOCC) is the lead DOD intelligence organization responsible for integrating and 

synchronizing military intelligence and national intelligence capabilities in support of the 

combatant commands. The USSOCOM CSO is the fusion point for DOD 

synchronization of CT plans and establishing intelligence priorities against terrorist 

networks. The CSO provides a venue for regular meetings, briefings, and conferences with 

interagency members (including the GCCs) and PNs and provides a forum for consistent 

dialogue for ongoing planning and situational understanding that simply had not existed 

earlier. The continuous collaboration is augmented with a USSOCOM sponsored 

semiannual Global Synchronization Conference. The following discussion provides insight 

as to the complexities and rigorous analyses involved in establishing requirements and 

obtaining the intelligence products required for CT. 

a. Intelligence for Counterterrorism. Accurate and timely intelligence is absolutely 

critical to CbT. All disciplines of intelligence are required for CT: human, imagery, signals, 

measurement and signature, technical, open source, and counterintelligence. Because of its 

global application, intelligence for CT is discussed in detail in the USSOCOM Concept 
Chapter V 

V-2 JP 3-26 

Plan 7500, DOD Global War on Terrorism Campaign Plan, Annex B - Intelligence 

(hereafter referred to as Annex B). It provides the combatant commands and the IC with a 

detailed common intelligence framework to support prosecution of the DOD Global War on 

Terrorism Campaign Plan. 

b. Concept of Counterterrorism Intelligence Operations. The concept of 

intelligence operations for CT developed in Annex B closely parallels the CONOPS for that 

campaign plan. It recognizes that intelligence requirements for global and regional 

operations against the primary enemy, the transnational terrorists (i.e., al-Qaeda), must also 

be synchronized with the intelligence requirements for regional operations (i.e., within 

AORs) against the secondary enemy, VEOs. 

(1) Intelligence processes and procedures for integration and synchronization 

include: 

(a) Assigning intelligence missions, roles, and responsibilities for the 

supporting, integrating, and synchronizing of the campaign plan. 

(b) Integrating national, theater, and PN intelligence plans. 

(c) Describing the integrated intelligence architecture to facilitate a common 

intelligence picture. 

(d) Developing priority intelligence requirements and intelligence tasks (for 

inclusion in the appropriate appendix to annex B (Intelligence), and a common 

counterterrorism analytical framework (CTAF) to understand the global CT threat and the 

operational environment. 

(e) Identifying collection and analysis and production (A&P) requirements, 

intelligence gaps, and the mitigation responsibilities for addressing the gaps. 

(f) Assessing and developing multinational intelligence capabilities to partner 

with the United States to defeat, disrupt and defend against terrorism. 

(g) Identifying doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and 

education, personnel, and facilities shortfalls and mitigation responsibilities. 

(2) Assignment of Intelligence Task Lists. Specific intelligence task lists (ITLs) 

are developed for the specific intelligence requirements for each of the campaign LOOs. 

The ITL items drive the development of the national intelligence support plan (NISP) and 

the functional intelligence support plans which delineate capabilities required of the CSAs 

and Service intelligence centers to support the CT intelligence processes. 

(3) Collection. Annex B establishes processes and procedures to collaborate with 

US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Joint Functional Component Command for 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR), Defense Intelligence Agency, 
Significant Enabling Functions for Counterterrorism 

V-3 

the combatant commands, and the other CSAs, to synchronize/deconflict CT collection 

requirements. USSOCOM reviews, evaluates and scores the GCC requirements for the 

JFCC-ISR allocation process, and uses the ITL matrices to assess collection capacity and 

identify shortfalls. 

(4) A&P. Annex B identifies intelligence requirements which are the basis for 

intelligence production. Production will focus on identifying the functions and 

resources terrorist groups need to operate. The CTAF will be the model used as a guide 

to develop dynamic threat assessments (DTAs) for various terrorist groups (see Figure 

V-1). These DTAs will include designation of critical nodes, critical capabilities, critical 

requirements, and critical vulnerabilities. 

(5) Intelligence Support for Regional (i.e., AOR) Operations Objectives. There 

are four types of intelligence analysis normally used in concert to ensure all aspects of the 

requirements are covered for regional operations and the global campaign. 

(a) Geographic Analysis. This is traditional analysis with one exception: it is 

divided into transnational and regional analysis. The JITF-CT is the primary A&P 

organization for transnational CT analysis, and the GCCs are the primary A&P 

organizations for regional CT analysis (within their AORs). 

(b) Relational Analysis. This analysis examines organizations, social 

networks, and transactions to identify the HVIs, critical requirements, and the relationships 

between people, functions, and the physical terrain/human environment. 

(c) Geospatial and Cultural Analysis. This analysis combines geography 

with social science to predict where terrorists are operating or will operate. A multilayer 

analysis is the primary analytical output. Additionally, analyses of environmental and 

cultural data support this type of analysis. 

c. Global Campaign and Regional/Theater Operations Interface. The GCCs 

develop plans for CT within their AORs and in support of the global campaign. The annex 

B (Intelligence) of their plans must be synchronized with Annex B. The GCCs ITLs also 

must support the global campaign LOOs. While USSOCOM ensures global campaign 

seams are covered, the GCCs also must identify known regional seams (e.g., between 

operational areas and AORs) and work with the other combatant commands to ensure 

coverage. Synchronization requires information sharing among the GCCs and USSOCOM. 

GCCs have responsibility for intelligence A&P on all terrorist groups whose primary 

operating bases reside within their theater (specific terrorist groups are designated 

during the federation process of intelligence planning). 

d. Actionable Intelligence. Combatant commands require actionable intelligence, 

and that requirement is very relevant for CT operations from the strategic to the lowest 

tactical levels. Key elements of actionable intelligence are: 
Chapter V 

V-4 JP 3-26 COUNTERTERRORISM ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK Unifying Vision Legitimacy Propaganda Key Personnel Indoctrination Procurement Production Distribution/ Storage Employment Key Personnel Research and Development Weaponization Weapons Recruitment/ Selection Use/ Assignment Sustainment Members/ Supporters Training Key Personnel Plan/ Direct Process/ Analyze Production/ Dissemination Security/ Counter- Intelligence Collect Key Personnel Mode/ Method Routes Purpose Key Facilitation Personnel Physical Location Demographics Cultural Conditions Political/ Governance Access to Resources Key Personnel Virtual Location Terrain Sponsorship Charitable Activity Legal Enterprises Criminal Activity Financial Systems Key Personnel Audience Procedures/ Tradecraft Medium/ Tools Key Function/ Personnel Intent Personal Qualities Sources of Authority Span/Level of Control Vision/Goals Objectives Key Structure/ Personnel Organization/ Role Decision- making Process Movement Intelligence Weapons Personnel Ideology Safe Havens Finance Communication Leadership Figure V-1. Counterterrorism Analytical Framework 
Significant Enabling Functions for Counterterrorism 

V-5 

(1) Location. Providing an ellipse radius or “vicinity of” location, if possible. 

Even a probable location is worthwhile. 

(2) Facilities. Providing useful data that can help identify the place when an HVI 

is involved, or where terrorist assets are located. 

(3) Time. Providing the time of a sighting or an event. Time, as with location, 

helps to establish patterns that are exploitable. Time is also useful in establishing potential 

evidence that may link an HVI to actual or planned terrorist events. 

(4) Travel. Providing information regarding movement and means of travel and 

other available details when they relate to HVIs. 

(5) Relationships/connections. Providing known or suspected family/tribal 

relationships that exhibit or have potential for greater trust. CTAF functional connections

show possible linkages from COG/critical capabilities to critical vulnerabilities. 

e. CTAF and COG-to-Critical Vulnerability Analysis. The CTAF is used for 

DTAs that should include the COG-to-critical vulnerability analysis for a given VEO or 

terrorist group. It is important to understand that each terrorist group is different and what 

is deemed a COG for one may not apply to another and, on a case-by-case basis, use of the 

CTAF is key to the functional and resource analysis for determining their critical 

vulnerabilities. Actionable intelligence on a terrorist group’s critical vulnerabilities 

will provide a significant advantage in seizing the initiative. 

(1) The CTAF and its nine categories include the potential COGs or critical 

capabilities and can provide a useful step towards a systems perspective of a terrorist 

group. It is not intended as a static, linear, exclusive construct and should be modified as 

deemed necessary. It was designed as a guideline and developed as part of the common 

intelligence framework supporting all aspects of the DOD Global War on Terrorism 

Campaign Plan. While CTAF component functions and systems can appear interdependent 

or mutually exclusive of each other, they are interrelated through a series of simple or 

complex nodal relationships. The exact nature of those relationships are identified and 

defined during the target system or network analysis and the process requires timely, 

focused data on enemy functions and processes. 

(2) The Annex B federation process establishes responsibilities for A&P of the 

CTAF for designated terrorist groups to drive intelligence operations and identify critical 

vulnerabilities using the critical factors methodology. Briefly stated, collection and analysis 

in support of the CTAF identifies the terrorist groups’ COG/critical capabilities (normally 

CTAF subgroups) and then GCC and JITF-CT analysts determine the critical requirements 

needed to meet those critical capabilities, and which of those requirements are vulnerable to 

friendly action (making them critical vulnerabilities). A critical vulnerability level of 

understanding (i.e., actionable intelligence about Group X) is the level of detail needed to 
Chapter V 

V-6 JP 3-26 

act (disrupt, contain, isolate, neutralize, block, and interdict) against a designated terrorist 

group. 

(3) The results of this analysis will appear in the DTAs and, as appropriate, in 

time critical reporting and planning. This process will drive the collection and production 

of the intelligence, and for time critical operations, may include dynamic re-tasking of 

collection assets and planning/targeting analysis. 

(4) CTAF categories/components (Figure V-1) are as follows: 

(a) Leadership. The direction of terrorist activities by individuals, 

organizations, and processes. 

(b) Safe havens. The exploitation of an environment by terrorists to pursue 

their activities relatively free from detection and disruption. 

(c) Finance. The generation, storage, movement, and use of assets to fund 

terrorist activities. 

(d) Communications. The transferring of information in support of terrorist 

activities. 

(e) Movement. The transferring of people and materials in support of 

terrorist activities. 

(f) Intelligence. The collection, protection, and use of information to support 

terrorist activities. 

(g) Weapons. The acquisition and employment of materials; to include 

WMD, and expertise to conduct terrorist attacks. 

(h) Personnel. The acquisition and use of human assets in support of 

terrorist activities. 

(i) Ideology. The interpretation and propagation of a shared belief system 

that motivates individuals to support terrorist activities. 

Refer to USSOCOM Concept Plan 7500, DOD Global War on Terrorism Campaign Plan, 

Annex B – Intelligence, for specific details regarding intelligence planning for the war on 

terrorism. Refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 

for further doctrinal guidance regarding intelligence. 
Significant Enabling Functions for Counterterrorism 

V-7 

3. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance — An activity that synchronizes 

and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, 

exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future 

operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. 

Joint Publication 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations

a. The Unified Command Plan assigns USSTRATCOM responsibility for global ISR. 

At the strategic level, JFCC-ISR collaborates with joint force providers and CCDRs to 

formulate and recommend allocation solutions to meet combatant command requirements 

for ISR resources, and ensures an integrated response for crisis-related and time-sensitive 

ISR requirements that cannot be satisfied by the supported CCDR’s assigned or attached 

assets. DIOCC develops the ISR support plan located in the NISP that describes the 

processes used to prioritize, coordinate, and synchronize ISR for operations/campaigns like 

the DOD Global War on Terrorism Campaign Plan. USSOCOM, the GCCs, DIOCC, 

DNI, and JFCC-ISR coordinate and synchronize the ISR requirements and assets available 

to support the long war on terrorism. 

b. At the strategic and operational levels, the JFC employs ISR forces assigned or 

attached to the joint force and requests support of national/interagency assets through a 

validation by the supported CCDR, normally a GCC. Some SOF unique requirements may 

be validated by CDRUSSOCOM in coordination with the appropriate GCCs. 

c. Because ISR is an integrated intelligence and operations function, the joint force 

staff develops an overall collection strategy and posture for the execution of the ISR 

missions controlled by the JFC. The intelligence directorate of a joint staff, in coordination 

with the operations directorate of a joint staff, reviews, validates, and prioritizes all 

outstanding intelligence requirements for the JFC. The joint force air component 

commander (JFACC), if designated, provides integrated airborne ISR for the JFC. The 

responsible JFC must properly prioritize ISR for CT among other operational needs. 

The JFC may designate a joint collection management board to perform the ISR collection 

operations management, prioritization, and tasking functions. 

d. The JFACC normally is responsible for planning, coordinating, allocating, and 

tasking assigned airborne ISR assets to accomplish and fulfill JFC tasks and 

requirements. ISR assets normally include manned and unmanned aircraft systems 

(UASs), some under the control of the JFACC, or made available by Service components to 

the JFACC for tasking. Many UASs and some aircraft are organic to, and remain under the 

control of their Service and SOF components. If assigned assets cannot fulfill specific 

airborne ISR requirements, the joint air operations center (JAOC) will request additional 

ISR support from the JFC or another joint force component, or the JFC requests support 

from the supported CCDR. It is imperative that the JFACC remains aware of all available 

airborne joint force ISR capabilities that can be used to support the JFC. SOF and the 

Service components may have organic assets that are not airborne nor dedicated to ISR, but 

capable of fulfilling an ISR requirement for the JFC. Those components should ensure the 
Chapter V 

V-8 JP 3-26 

JFC’s ISR collection manager is also aware of the availability of their non-flying ISR 

capabilities. 

e. National and non-DOD ISR resources normally are not placed under the OPCON of 

the JFC. Those resources may provide direct support to the JFC or one of the components, 

either full-time or on-call, but are normally shared with other commands, components or 

OGAs. The supported commander will be provided ISR liaison teams upon request. These 

teams will normally be the points of contact for coordinating their specific ISR resources 

and associated capabilities with the supported commander’s ISR operators. 

f. Normally, ISR personnel are integrated into the JAOC. The complexity of 

integrating airborne ISR will normally determine whether the function is handled by a 

specialty team, cell, or division within the JAOC. The ISR collection managers and 

operations planners will work with the joint force staff and other components to 

effectively coordinate national and theater ISR objectives. 

g. As a land-centric mission, CT may require more priority and a greater share of 

direct ISR support for tactical level land force commanders than for operational level 

decision makers because of the nature of the threat and the enemy. For CT, time-sensitive 

targets are typically HVIs in urban environments, and tactical events frequently have 

strategic level effects, so the JFC must be able to properly balance where ISR support is 

aimed within the operational environment to be operationally effective. 

4. Logistics 

a. General. The war against terrorism requires robust logistic planning with global 

distribution requirements for the Services. The GCCs (and their Service component 

commands), can have significant distribution challenges as the components may have 

tactical units widespread across an operational area or an AOR. The designation of the 

support relationship for a CT plan/order is significant for logistic purposes. For long-term 

CT operations in specific operational areas, a GCC normally will be the supported CCDR 

and CDRUSSOCOM the supporting CCDR. If directed by SecDef, CDRUSSOCOM may 

be the supported CCDR and a GCC with the operational area in the AOR may be the 

supporting CCDR. Generally, for the purpose of this section the former is assumed, so the 

GCC will be the “supported CCDR” for CT operations. For CF in CT operations, it is 

unlikely CDRUSSOCOM would be logistically supporting those forces. The directive 

authority for logistics (DAFL) of both supported and supporting CCDRs necessitates a 

coordinated effort between them and among their Service component commands. 

CDRUSSOCOM has DAFL for SOF unique items. 

b. Assumptions and Planning Factors. The following are significant and generally 

apply to CT operations, but may not for all. 

(1) CT operations may receive priority over existing operations, and the 

transnational terrorist threat can require multiple CT operations within and across AORs. 
Significant Enabling Functions for Counterterrorism 

V-9 

Specific intertheater lift and material prioritization decisions will occur that ensure 

execution of priority CT operations. 

(2) CDRUSSOCOM is generally responsible for the synchronization and 

coordination of logistics for SOF when executing across multiple AORs. 

(3) Supporting GCCs will establish initial theater staging bases at designated 

locations, as required for deploying CT forces. 

(4) Supporting GCCs will provide early access to aerial ports of embarkation 

(APOEs), seaports of embarkation, aerial ports of debarkation (APODs), seaports of 

debarkation (SPODs), and intermediate staging bases (ISBs). Alternate APODs and 

SPODs should be identified in anticipation of an area denial event such as a WMD attack 

and contamination or some other major force protection issues at the primary port. 

(5) Supporting GCCs will coordinate host-nation support (HNS) and ensure HNS 

agreements established by the United States and PNs are in effect. 

(6) Supporting GCCs will coordinate contract support. 

(7) Supporting GCCs will ensure their Service component commanders provide 

common item and service unique support, and designate the lead Service for common user 

support within their AORs. Common support to other US services, interagency elements, 

and/or OGAs, PN, and multinational forces may be necessary. 

(8) Lines of communications (LOCs) will remain open throughout operations. 

(9) Supporting GCCs will focus on strategic and operational CSS, to include 

introducing C2 into the theater early, early entry CSS, and theater level distribution 

management. Deploying forces will include planning for combat support and CSS for barebase locations. 

(10) Supporting GCCs will phase operational logistics to coincide with 

operations, with initial logistic support inserted with operational forces. 

(11) Supporting Service components will identify logistic shortfalls and limiting 

factors with their proposed resolutions to their GCC and the supported CCDR. 

(12) Supporting GCCs may provide a joint deployment and distribution 

operations center (JDDOC) that will provide movement control, including trace, track, and 

expediting on proposed theater supply routes. The logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4) 

at the combatant command will coordinate distribution requirements with the supporting 

JDDOC, which will in turn, coordinate with the US Transportation Command Deployment 

and Distribution Operations Center. 
Chapter V 

V-10 JP 3-26 

(13) Regional governments will provide base access (to include overflight rights), 

transit authority, and other PN support. 

(14) CT plans/orders will set the number of days the deploying forces must be self 

sustaining. 

(15) Supporting GCCs will coordinate additional logistic requirements with 

Service component commands, theater support activities, and national providers. 

(16) Supporting GCCs will be prepared to provide operational logistics beyond 

combat operations; to include support to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 

operations, and additional PSYOP and CA operations, as required by the operation 

plan/order. 

(17) The supporting GCCs and CDRUSSOCOM will establish appropriate 

logistic coordination and reporting procedures between their staffs and among their Service 

component commands. 

(18) The legal considerations of globally distributive logistic efforts for the war 

on terrorism requires that CCDRs involve a Judge Advocate or legal counsel in logistic 

planning, including their review of all supporting plans to ensure compliance with various 

international, US and HN laws, and applicable treaties, status-of-forces agreements, status 

of mission agreements, acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs), memoranda 

of understanding, and memoranda of agreements. 

(19) Logistic support agreements / contracts will provide the authority to obtain 

necessary logistic support from HN/PN. Established logistic support will be based on 

existing authorities and agreements (such as ACSAs), or newly obtained authorities and 

international agreements. All contracting support efforts will be conducted in accordance 

with all established regulatory guidance and directives. 

c. Concept of Logistic Support

(1) Each supported CCDR should produce a logistic supportability analysis based 

on assigned/attached force structure, operational areas, and specific mission requirements 

for their CT operations. This analysis should consider the potential for a terrorist attack 

using WMD and operations in CBRN environments. 

(2) Logistic support for US forces is fundamentally a Service responsibility 

(except USSOCOM for SOF unique items). Services will arrange for logistic support in 

accordance with current Service directives and the CCDR’s plans/orders. The TSOC has 

responsibility for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of all SOF in 

support of the GCC. USSOCOM coordinates through the GCC for SOF common 

sustainment and supply. Due to the short duration and high operating tempo of SO, 

deploying SOF provide a statement of requirements to the TSOC for coordination with the 

GCC’s subordinate commands. 
Significant Enabling Functions for Counterterrorism 

V-11 

(3) CCDRs exercising their DAFL will plan for and establish administrative and 

logistic systems, including sustainment and distribution that most effectively support the 

globally distributed CT mission requirements. 

(4) The United States and PNs are responsible for providing sufficient logistic and 

contracting capability necessary to provide any logistic support, supplies and/or services 

that are beyond the CCDRs capabilities. Whenever possible, ACSAs with eligible PNs, and 

cooperative security locations will be negotiated in advance so as to increase the flexibility 

and timeliness of mutual logistic support. 

(5) Logistic distribution and allocation issues that cannot be resolved 

among/between Services and CCDRs should be forwarded to Joint Staff J-4 for 

consideration by the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board. 

(6) If a warning order or execute order is issued pertaining to a concept or 

operation plan, a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) project code normally will 

be issued to expedite supply actions. However, this may increase visibility of an operation, 

so operations security must be considered prior to assigning any project code. 

d. Priorities. The numerous CT operations around the globe, utilizing various 

elements of US and PN instruments of national power, require continuing assessment, and 

prioritization of actions/support. Some general statements of priorities affecting logistics 

include: 

(1) Priority of Support: ISBs, APOE/APOD, build-up of sustainment, and LOCs. 

(2) Priority of Sustainment: ammunition, fuel, food/water, and base support. 

(3) Priority of Movement: deploying forces and sustainment. 

(4) Priority of Engineer Effort: force protection, LOC, APOD, and SPOD 

maintenance. 

Basic logistics policy and guidance are provided in JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.03, Logistics Supplement To The Joint 

Strategies Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Other specific logistic subject matter is contained in 

the other JP-series publications. 

5. Legal 

a. Application of the Law of War. Commanders at all levels ensure their forces 

operate in accordance with the “law of war,” often called the “law of armed conflict.” The 

law of war encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the 

United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international law agreements 

to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary international law. It 
Chapter V 

V-12 JP 3-26 

specifically applies to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict between the 

United States and other nations; and by policy, the principles and spirit of the law of war 

applies to all military operations. With CT operations in numerous locations across the 

globe, JFCs must be particularly aware of the status of their conflict, the legal basis 

for their use of force, the characterization of enemy combatants, civilians taking a 

direct part in the hostilities, and potential detainees. 

For further guidance on the law of war, refer to CJCSI 5810.01C, Implementation of the 

DOD Law of War Program. For detailed information and guidance on legal support, refer 

to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations. 

b. Legal Basis for Use of Force. Nearly every military decision and action has 

potential legal considerations and implications. A legal basis must exist for every decision 

to use military force. In a general sense, under customary international law, as reflected in 

the United Nations Charter and elsewhere, the United States has the inherent right of selfdefense against hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile intent toward the United States or 

its citizens, including the use of force in anticipatory self-defense. Additionally, US forces 

may be acting under a UNSCR to take action to restore international peace and security in a 

particular area. Actions within the sovereign territory of another state should be based on 

either the consent of that state, a UNSCR, or a Presidential determination that such is 

necessary either in response to an armed attack or in anticipation of an imminent armed 

attack. Normally, for a given operation, the JFC has approved rules of engagement 

(ROE)/rules for the use of force (RUF) that govern the use of military force and that were 

developed based on the legal and operational considerations for the situation. 

c. ROE and RUF. For operations, the responsibility and authority for using military 

force is generally delegated from the President/SecDef to the supported CCDR/JFC in the 

form of approved plans/orders with either ROE for operations overseas, or RUF for civil 

support (CS) within the homeland or while conducting official DOD security functions 

outside US territory. For a given operation, the ROE/RUF begin at a standard (level) set by 

the CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules Of Engagement/Standing Rules For The Use Of Force 

For US Forces, or as approved through the chain-of-command in the appropriate plan/order 

to the supported CCDR. NOTE: ROE/RUF must always be consistent with the inherent 

right of self defense, but the specifics that determine when and how that right may be 

exercised may be different for various missions and weapons systems as determined by the 

responsible commander. Also, when compared to major combat operations, ROE for some 

smaller-scale operations/actions (i.e., some CT operations) may be more restrictive and 

detailed, especially in an urban environment, due to national policy concerns for the impact 

on civilians, their culture, values, and infrastructure. A JFC may begin operations with 

different ROE/RUF for each type of mission, and especially for CT operations. The JFC 

responsible for CT should determine early in the planning stage what the required 

ROE/RUF should be, including anticipating the need for serial changes based on the need 

for escalation of force, changing phases of an operation, branches/sequels to a plan, etc. 

Dependent upon the required level of approval for any changes, that JFC must take 

anticipatory action if the serial changes are to be timely enough for effective operations. 

When conducting multinational CT operations, the use of military force may be influenced 
Significant Enabling Functions for Counterterrorism 

V-13 

by the differences between US and a HN’s and/or a PN’s ROE/RUF. Commanders at all 

levels must take proactive steps to ensure an understanding of ROE by the individual 

Service member, because a single errant act could cause significant adverse political 

consequences. 

For more detailed discussion on restraint (a joint operations principle) and ROE/RUF, see 

JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

d. Detainee Operations. CT operations may result in detainees. Proper handling of 

detainees is essential not only for possible exploitation purposes, but to prevent 

violations of the law (civil or military) and/or national political embarrassment. Of the 

three categories of detainees, an “enemy combatant” includes a terrorist (properly 

designated as an “unlawful” enemy combatant). More specifically, for the war on 

terrorism, the term unlawful enemy combatant includes, but is not limited to, an individual 

who is, or was part of, or supporting Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are 

engaged in hostilities against the United States or its multinational partners. However, 

regardless of the detainees’ legal status, US forces must treat all detainees humanely and be 

prepared to properly control, maintain, protect, and account for detainees in accordance 

with applicable US law, the law of war, and applicable US policy. Inhumane treatment of 

detainees is prohibited by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, domestic and 

international law, and DOD policy. Accordingly, the stress of combat operations, the need 

for intelligence, or provocations by captured and/or detained personnel does not justify 

deviation from this obligation. The challenges of today’s security environment and the 

nature of the enemy require clear operational and strategic guidance for detainee 

operations during CT operations. 

For detailed information regarding detainee operations, see JP 3-63, Detainee Operations. 

e. Domestic Military CT Operations. Domestic CT operations are considered part 

of homeland security under the lead of DHS. DHS is considered primary for coordinating 

Executive Branch efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and 

recover from terrorist attacks within the United States. DOJ supports DHS for CT, but also 

could be the primary Federal agency for some situations. If tasked to support the primary 

agency for domestic CT operations, DOD would be in a CS role, which would include any 

support for law enforcement purposes. If a CT situation should formally transcend into a 

matter of homeland defense (HD), then DOD is the lead for action and interagency 

coordination for HD. 

(1) SecDef retains the authority to approve use of DOD resources for CS. For CS 

within the United States, the Joint Staff Joint Director of Military Support must validate 

requests for assistance, determine what DOD capabilities are available to fulfill the requests, 

coordinate for the SecDef approval to use DOD assets, and then allocate forces to the 

combatant command with responsibility for that area of the United States. 

(2) In domestic situations, the Constitution, law, and DOD policy limit the scope 

and nature of military actions. The President has the authority to direct the use of the 
Chapter V 

V-14 JP 3-26 

military against terrorist groups and individuals in the United States for other than law 

enforcement actions (i.e., national defense, emergency protection of life and property, and 

to restore order). The National Guard has a unique role in domestic military operations. 

Under control of the respective states, National Guard units in Title 32, United States Code 

(USC) and state active duty status can support a variety of tasks for HD and CS. In its 

maritime law enforcement role under DHS, the US Coast Guard (USCG), as a Service 

under DHS, has jurisdiction in both US waters and on the high seas as prescribed in law. 

Memoranda of agreements between DOD and DHS/USCG exists to facilitate the rapid 

transfer of forces between DOD and the USCG for support of homeland security, HD, and 

other defense operations. Therefore, the military response to extraordinary events that 

requires DOD CS will likely be a coordinated effort between the National Guard (in state 

active duty or Title 32, USC status), and the Armed Services (Title 10, and Title 14, USC). 

(3) Domestic CT activities may involve other civil participants including state, 

local, and/or tribal governments. 

For more information on homeland security, HD, CS, and the coordination of associated 

interagency activities supporting of those missions, see the National Strategy for Homeland 

Security, the National Response Framework, the DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and 

Civil Support, JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, and JP 3-28, Civil Support. 

6. Strategic Communication 

SC is the focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, 

strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, 

and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and 

products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. For CT, SC 

should focus on understanding the key audiences, building rapport with them, and 

providing them with timely, user-friendly information that provides a clear understanding of 

how USG interests, actions, policies, and objectives may be of value to them. 

a. SC Capability. SC aims to ensure certain audiences have access to information that 

is easy for them to consume and relevant to decisions they may have to make in regards to 

the war on terrorism. Information must be accurate and consistent with all actions. 

Information needs to be developed and presented with the end user in mind. For example, 

we must understand what is important to the audience in order to share USG interests in 

context. SC planning and execution should focus capabilities that apply information to 

create, strengthen, or preserve an information environment favorable to US national 

interests. Effective use of SC also can be used to counter VEOs’ use of their own form 

of SC: ideological propaganda and disinformation. SC planning establishes unity of US 

themes and messages, emphasizes success, accurately confirms or refutes external reporting 

on US CT operations, and reinforces the legitimacy of US objectives. Effective use of SC 

requires extensive interagency coordination. 
Significant Enabling Functions for Counterterrorism 

V-15 

b. VEOs Form of SC. VEOs use the Internet and some mass media for 

organizational support, intelligence gathering, and offensive actions. Uses of the Internet 

include command and control, training, dissemination of information and ideology, 

perception management, and propaganda, as well as open source intelligence gathering. 

Mass media and other influence networks are used to deliver disinformation and 

propaganda to further extremist objectives. Extremists are resourceful and adaptive in using 

IO in support of their own SC strategy to gain and maintain ideological support, fundraise 

and recruit, and influence key audiences. Because VEOs are not constrained by truth or 

accuracy, they can exploit the information environment with considerable effect. 

c. CT Objectives for DOD SC. The DOD SC objectives in the war on terrorism are 

to strengthen the GCTN by supporting PNs, converting moderates to become PNs, weaken 

sympathy and support for VEOs, provide support for moderate voices, dissuade enablers 

and supporters of extremists, counter ideological support for terrorism, and deter and 

disrupt terrorist acts. 

d. CCDR Responsibilities. CCDRs support the DOD effort as part of the USG effort 

to develop a more robust SC capability. DOD SC uses the functions of PA, defense support 

to public diplomacy (DSPD), military diplomacy, and IO and normally within an 

interagency framework to add synergy to the overall SC effort. CCDRs receive their SC 

guidance from and coordinate their SC activities with the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense. Subordinate JFCs must coordinate their SC activities with the CCDR to ensure 

they are consistent with USG objectives. GCCs must collaborate with the DOS diplomatic 

missions within their AORs. CCDRs should integrate an SC strategy and incorporate 

themes, messages, and other relevant factors in their security cooperation plans. During 

contingency and crisis action planning, CCDRs review SC guidance during mission 

analysis, and their staffs address SC issues in their staff estimates. 

e. Interaction among SC Elements and Functions. DOD PA, DSPD, military 

diplomacy, and IO are synchronized to support SC. However, certain PA, IO, and DSPD 

activities may be constrained by USG policy or legal considerations. Also, while those 

capabilities have common interfaces within the information environment, their primary 

purposes and rules make them separate and distinct. Figure V-2 depicts the general 

relationships among the elements and functions of SC for CT. While some actions may 

occur in isolation of others, none should be considered subordinate to another, and it is vital 

to synchronize the four functions. 

7. Information Operations 

 JP 3-13, Information Operations, states, “A key goal of IO is to achieve and maintain 

information superiority for the US and its allies. Information superiority provides the joint 

force a competitive advantage only when it is effectively translated into superior decisions.” 

IO are used to create and/or sustain desired and measurable effects on adversary leaders, 

forces (regular or irregular), information, information systems, and other audiences; while 

protecting and defending the JFC’s own forces actions, information, and information 

systems. IO are described as the integrated employment of the core capabilities of 
Chapter V 

V-16 JP 3-26 

electronic warfare, computer network operations, PSYOP, military deception, and 

operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to 

influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making 

while protecting our own. It is obvious that IO can and should be applied across the 

breadth and depth of CT operations as a primary means of influencing not only 

extremists and their supporters, but just as important, the moderates (mainstream 

populace). 

a. To achieve and maintain information superiority requires a collective effort between 

the interagency, PNs, and IGOs to include a concerted effort in coordinating and seeking 

cooperation with NGOs and the private sector in operational areas. Typically, for CT, in 

addition to intelligence (often limited), it takes effective and efficient use of IO capabilities 

to gain an operational advantage and exploit or neutralize a terrorist group. CT is a mission 

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION FOR

COUNTERTERRORISM

LEGEND

DSPD defense support to public diplomacy

IO information operations

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff

PA public affairs

PA Diplomacy IO

Function

Element

Military PA DSPD Military

Diplomacy Military IO

Audience

US and

Foreign

Audiences

Foreign

Audiences

Foreign

Defense

Officials

Adversaries

and

Moderate

Foreign

Audiences

Example Media

Affairs

PA PA J-5 J-3

Web

Initiatives

Coalition

Building

Internet

Broadcasts

Lead

Coordination Across the Functions

Figure V-2. Strategic Communication for Counterterrorism
Significant Enabling Functions for Counterterrorism 

V-17 

area that focuses on effects of operations on people, and in some operational areas the 

“information war” can determine which side will gain the upper hand in public opinion. A 

number of terrorist groups have gained sympathy if not support among moderate audiences 

through disinformation partly based on their IO playing off miscues of the friendly CT 

forces. An example goal for IO, as it relates to CT, is to help shape public opinion to inhibit 

recruitment of potential terrorists and their sympathizers, and ultimately create an 

inhospitable environment for terrorism. 

b. In CT operations, a goal is to identify the TAs and use IO to influence the TAs’ 

behavior. Within an operational area there may be a number of TAs and there will likely be 

multiple synchronized themes, messages, and means of delivery required for each. 

(1) CT operations must disrupt terrorists’ decision-making capabilities (e.g., 

information, information processes, C2) that will, in turn, hinder their operating tempo, 

limit movements across borders, and require increased protective measures to attempt to 

reduce their vulnerability to attack by United States and PNs forces. 

(2) CT operations must disrupt terrorists’ IO processes to reduce fear and 

uncertainty within the United States, its partner and other friendly nations, and other 

interested parties. 

(3) The intent of CT operations as they relate to IO is to shape and influence the 

terrorists’ informational environment. CT operations must use all available tools to compel 

the TA to do or not do a certain action. 

c. A JFC’s IO program will be linked through the CCDR to USG SC. 

For more detailed discussion of IO, refer to JP 3-13, Information Operations. 
Chapter V 

V-18 JP 3-26 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX A 

REFERENCES 

A-1 

The development of JP 3-26 is based upon the following primary references: 

1. General 

a. Unified Command Plan. 

b. Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept. 

c. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 

d. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. 

e. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense. 

f. National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism. 

g. USSOCOM Concept Plan 7500, Department of Defense Global War on Terrorism 

Campaign Plan (classified). 

h. USSOCOM Publication 3-33, Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces 

Integration and Interoperability Handbook and Checklist (Version 2). 

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

a. CJCSI 3110.03, Logistics Supplement To The Joint Strategies Capabilities Plan 

(JSCP). 

b. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of 

Force for US Forces. 

c. CJCSI 5120.02A, Joint Doctrine Development System. 

d. CJCSI 5810.01C, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program. 

e. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

f. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 

g. JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations. 

h. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-26 

i. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 

j. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

k. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 

l. JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations. 

m. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism. 

n. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I & II. 

o. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater. 

p. JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

q. JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations. 

r. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 

s. JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (FID). 

t. JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations. 

u. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense. 

v. JP 3-28, Civil Support. 

w. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 

x. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

y. JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

z. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

aa. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

bb. JP 3-63, Detainee Operations. 

cc. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 

dd. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

ee. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 
References 

A-3 

3. Service Documents 

 US Army Training and Doctrine Command, A Military Guide to Terrorism in the 

Twenty-First Century, 15 August 2005 (Version 3.0). 

4. Acknowledgements 

 The following are acknowledged for their specific contributions to the content of the 

US Army Training and Doctrine Command, A Military Guide to Terrorism in the TwentyFirst Century, 15 August 2005 (Version 3.0), which was used extensively for portions of 

Chapter II, “Terrorist Threats.” 

a. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ed., Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica: 

RAND, 2001), 9. 

b. Peter Chalk, “Threats to the Maritime Environment: Piracy and Terrorism,” (RAND 

Stakeholder Consultation, Ispra, Italy 28-30 October 2002): 9. 

c. Martha Crenshaw, “Suicide Terrorism in Comparative Perspective,” in Countering 

Suicide Terrorism (Herzilya, Israel: The International Policy Institute for Counter 

Terrorism, The Interdisciplinary Center, 2002), 21. 

d. Lou Dolinar, “Cell Phones Jury-rigged to Detonate Bombs,” Newsday.com, 15 

March 2004; available from http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/nywocell153708827mar15,0,1644248.story?coll=ny-nationworldheadlines; Internet; accessed 

15 March 2004. 

e. Rachael Ehrenfeld, IRA + PLO + Terror [journal on-line] American Center for 

Democracy (ACD), 21 August 2002; available from http://publicintegrity.org/publications21.htm; Internet; accessed 13 February 2004. 

f. Christopher C. Harmon, Terrorism Today (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000; 

reprint, Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 198. 

g. Seth Hettena, “Earth Liberation Front Claims Responsibility for San Diego Arson,” 

The Mercury News, 18 August 2003; available from http://www.mercurynews.com/ 

mld/mercurynews/news/local/6562462.htm; Internet; accessed 17 March 2004. 

http://www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/ggosep03.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 April 2004. 

h. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 

i. David E. Long, The Anatomy of Terrorism (New York: THE FREE PRESS, A 

Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1990). 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-26 

j. John McWethy et al., no title, ABCNews.Com,18 October 2000; available from 

http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/ DailyNews/cole001018b.html; Internet; 

accessed 9 January 2003. 

k. Bob Newman, “Terrorists Feared to Be Planning Sub-Surface Naval Attacks,” CNS 

News.com, 3 December 2002; available from http://www.cnsnews.com/Foreign Bureaus/ 

archive/200212/FOR20021203a.html; Internet; accessed 19 March 2004. 

l. Graham Gerard Ong, “Next Stop, Maritime Terrorism,” Viewpoints (12 September 

2003): 1; available from R Michael Richardson, “A Time Bomb for Global Trade: 

Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Viewpoints (25 

February 2004): 8; available from http://www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/mricsumfeb04.pdf; 

Internet; accessed 5 April 2004. 

m. Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, 

States of Mind, rev. ed. (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998). 

n. Jan Schuurman, Tourists or Terrorists? [press review on-line] Radio Netherlands, 

25 April 2002; available from http://www.rnw.nl/hotspots/html/irel020425.html; Internet; 

accessed 13 February 2004. 

o. Yoram Schweitzer, “Suicide Terrorism: Development and Main Characteristics,” in 

Countering Suicide. 

p. Don Thompson, “British Ecoterror Tactics Spread to US Activists,” The Mercury 

News, 10 May 2003, 1-2; available from http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/ 

mercurynews/news/local/5832723.htm?1c; Internet; accessed 21 April 2004. 

q. Ben N. Venzke, al Qaeda Targeting Guidance - Version 1.0 (Alexandria, VA: 

IntelCenter/Tempest Publishing, LLC, 2004). 

r. Ben Venzke and Aimee Ibrahim, The al-Qaeda Threat, An Analytical Guide to alQaeda’s Tactics & Targets (Alexandria: Tempest Publishing, 2003). 

s. “Saboteurs Disable Critical Iraqi Oil Pipeline,” HoustonChronicle.com, 8 September 

2003; available from http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/ special/iraq/2087438; 

Internet; accessed 16 January 2004. 

t. “Terrorists Demand Extortion Cash in Euros,” TCM Breaking News (4 September 

2001): 1; available from http://archives.tcm.ie/breakingnews/2001/09/04/story22584.asp; 

Internet; accessed 31 March 2004. 

u. Encyclopedia of World Terror, 1997 ed., s.v. “Bombing.” 277 Department of 

Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Division, Terrorism 2000/2001, 

Report 0308, (Washington, D.C., 2004). 
References 

A-5 

v. Terrorism (Herzilya, Israel: The International Policy Institute for Counter 

Terrorism, The Interdisciplinary Center, 2002), 85. 306 Ehud Sprinzak, “Rational Fanatics,” 

Foreign Policy, no. 120 (September/October 2000). 
Appendix A 

A-6 JP 3-26 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX B 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

B-1 

1. User Comments 

 Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: 

Doctrine and Education Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These 

comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), 

writing, and appearance. 

2. Authorship 

 The lead agent for this publication is the United States Special Operations Command 

(SOKF-J7). The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Directorate for 

Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5). 

3. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: CDRUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//SOKF-J7-DD// 

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3/J7-JEDD// 

 CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JT10// 

 Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting 

Center, Doctrine and Education Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for 

Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. 

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that 

directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. 

The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when 

changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 

c. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

___________________________________________________________________ 

___________________________________________________________________ 

___________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-26 

4. Distribution of Publications 

 Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. 

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be 

in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 

5. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET) and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the 

combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication 

to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy 

(Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 

Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400. 

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and 

deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications. 
GLOSSARY 

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

GL-1 

A&P analysis and production 

ACSA acquisition and cross-servicing agreement 

AO area of operations 

AOR area of responsibility 

APOD aerial port of debarkation 

APOE aerial port of embarkation 

C2 command and control 

CA civil affairs 

CAO civil affairs operations 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CbT combating terrorism 

CCDR combatant commander 

CDRJSOTF commander, joint special operations task force 

CDRUSNORTHCOM Commander, United States Northern Command 

CDRUSSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations Command 

CF conventional forces 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJTF commander, joint task force 

CM consequence management 

CMO civil-military operations 

COA course of action 

COCOM combatant command (command authority) 

COG center of gravity 

COIN counterinsurgency 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CS civil support 

CSA combat support agency 

CSO Center for Special Operations (USSOCOM) 

CSS combat service support 

CT counterterrorism 

CTAF counterterrorism analytical framework 

DAFL directive authority for logistics 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DIOCC Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center 

DNI Director of National Intelligence 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DOS Department of State 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-26 

DSPD defense support to public diplomacy 

DTA dynamic threat assessment 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FID foreign internal defense 

FSF foreign security forces 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GCTN global combating terrorism network 

GEF Guidance for Employment of the Force 

GWOT global war on terrorism 

HD homeland defense 

HN host nation 

HNS host-nation support 

HSC Homeland Security Council 

HVI high-value individual 

IC intelligence community 

IED improvised explosive device 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

IO information operations 

IRA Provisional Irish Republican Army 

ISB intermediate staging base 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

ITL intelligence task list 

IW irregular warfare 

J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff 

JAOC joint air operations center 

JDDOC joint deployment and distribution operations center 

JFACC joint force air component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFCC-ISR Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, 

 Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

JIACG joint interagency coordination group 

JITF-CT Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism 

JOA joint operations area 

JP joint publication 

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

JSOA joint special operations area 

JSOTF joint special operations task force 

JTF joint task force 

LOC line of communications 

LOO line of operations 
Glossary 

GL-3 

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NISP national intelligence support plan 

NMSP-WOT National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism 

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command 

NSC National Security Council 

OGA other government agency 

OPCON operational control 

OPE operational preparation of the environment 

PA public affairs 

PN partner nation 

PSYOP psychological operations 

ROE rules of engagement 

RUF rules for the use of force 

SC strategic communication 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SFA security force assistance 

SO special operations 

SOF special operations forces 

SPOD seaport of debarkation 

TA target audience 

TACON tactical control 

TSOC theater special operations command 

UAS unmanned aircraft system 

UNSCR United Nations Security Council resolution 

USC United States Code 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USG United States Government 

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command 

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

UW unconventional warfare 

VEO violent extremist organization 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-26 

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions 

found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, will reflect this publication as the source document for 

these terms and definitions. 

acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. Agreements negotiated on a bilateral basis 

with US allies or coalition partners that allow US forces to exchange most common 

types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment. 

Authority to negotiate these agreements is usually delegated to the combatant 

commander by the Secretary of Defense. Authority to execute these agreements lies 

with the Secretary of Defense, and may or may not be delegated. Governed by legal 

guidelines, these agreements are used for contingencies, peacekeeping operations, 

unforeseen emergencies, or exercises to correct logistic deficiencies that cannot be 

adequately corrected by national means. The support received or given is reimbursed 

under the conditions of the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. Also called 

ACSA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-08) 

alliance. The relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or 

more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the 

members. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and 

property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military 

and civilian forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.2) 

campaign. A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and 

operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

campaign plan. A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at 

achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

center of gravity. The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom 

of action, or will to act. Also called COG. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, 

trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support 

civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

civil affairs operations. Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) 

enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities 

where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency 
Glossary 

GL-5 

organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, 

indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve 

application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil 

government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. Also called CAO. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, 

influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and 

nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a 

friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to 

consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may 

include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the 

responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may 

occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if 

directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be 

performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of 

civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

combating terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism and counterterrorism, taken to 

oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CbT. (This term 

and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

consequence management. Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and 

manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including 

natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. Also called CM. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-28) 

conventional forces. 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear 

weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for 

coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military 

Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same 

Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation 

between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. 

In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to 

the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an 

authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more 

applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 1) 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 3-26 

counterinsurgency. Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously 

defeat and contain an insurgency and to address any core grievances. Also called 

COIN. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-24) 

counterterrorism. Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to 

influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist 

networks. Also called CT. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and 

its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

critical capability. A means that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to 

function as such and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed 

objective(s). (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

critical requirement. An essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability 

to be fully operational. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

critical vulnerability. An aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable 

to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

defense support to public diplomacy. Those activities and measures taken by the 

Department of Defense components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts 

of the United States Government. Also called DSPD. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13) 

direct action. Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a 

special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which 

employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or 

damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional offensive actions in 

the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of 

discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives. Also called DA. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government 

in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated 

organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and 

insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-22) 

homeland. The physical region that includes the continental United States, Alaska, 

Hawaii, United States possessions and territories, and surrounding territorial waters 

and airspace. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-28) 

homeland defense. The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic 

population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or 

other threats as directed by the President. Also called HD. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-27) 
Glossary 

GL-7 

homeland security. A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the 

United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other 

emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and 

other emergencies that occur. Also called HS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-28) 

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic 

warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, 

and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to 

influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making 

while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13) 

insurgency. The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that 

seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer 

to the group itself. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-24) 

irregular warfare. A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 

influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and 

asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other 

capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Also called IW. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 

joint interagency coordination group. An interagency staff group that establishes regular, 

timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military 

operational planners. Composed of US Government civilian and military experts 

accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a 

supported joint force commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides 

the joint force commander with the capability to coordinate with other US Government 

civilian agencies and departments. Also called JIACG. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08) 

joint special operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force 

commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special 

operations activities. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action 

mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of 

unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations 

units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or 

prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The 

joint special operations task force may have conventional non-special operations units 

assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of 

Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task 

force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-26 

line of operations. 1. A logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points 

related in time and purpose with an objective(s). 2. A physical line that defines the 

interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects 

actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). 

Also called LOO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

multinational. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition 

partners. See also coalition. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed 

an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 1) 

nongovernmental organization. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization 

dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, 

economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict 

resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil 

society. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 3-08) 

operational art. The application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — 

supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, 

and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art 

integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-0) 

operational design. The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a 

campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-0) 

operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences 

that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. 

Also called OE. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and 

indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective 

reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, 

and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce 

foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called 

PSYOP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.2) 

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relations 

activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the 

Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-61) 

raid. An operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an 

adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability. It ends with a 
Glossary 

GL-9 

planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-0) 

rules for the use of force. Directives issued to guide United States forces on the use of 

force during various operations. These directives may take the form of execute orders, 

deployment orders, memoranda of agreement, or plans. Also called RUF. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-28) 

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the 

circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or 

continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 1-04) 

security cooperation. All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense 

establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security 

interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and 

multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency 

access to a host nation. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.1) 

special operations. Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 

environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic 

objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional 

force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility 

capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. 

They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of 

conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, 

with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional 

operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of 

employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed 

operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-05) 

special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military 

Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, 

and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-05.1) 

stability operations. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, 

and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other 

instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, 

provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and 

humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

strategic communication. Focused United States Government efforts to understand and 

engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the 

advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through 
Glossary 

GL-10 JP 3-26 

the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized 

with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate 

response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to 

inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the 

pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-07.2) 

terrorist. An individual who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in 

pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-07.2) 

terrorist group. Any number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying 

relationship, or are organized for the purpose of committing an act or acts of violence 

or threatens violence in pursuit of their political, religious, or ideological objectives. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.2) 

theater special operations command. A subordinate unified or other joint command 

established by a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint 

special operations within the joint force commander’s assigned operational area. Also 

called TSOC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05.1) 

time-sensitive target. A joint force commander designated target requiring immediate 

response because it is a highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity or it poses (or 

will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces. Also called TST. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-60) 

transnational threat. Any activity, individual, or group not tied to a particular country or 

region that operates across international boundaries and threatens United States 

national security or interests. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

unified action. The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of 

governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity 

of effort. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 

weapons of mass destruction. Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons 

capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude the 

means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and 

divisible part from the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-40) 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATIONS

PLANS SYSTEM

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the

development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-26 Operations