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ASSESSMENT OF THE TRANSITION FROM A 

MILITARY TO A CIVILIAN-LED MISSION IN IRAQ 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, 

HOMELAND DEFENSE AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 28, 2012 

Serial No. 112–162 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

RAU ́ L R. LABRADOR, Idaho 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida 

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director 

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director 

ROBERT BORDEN, General Counsel 

LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, HOMELAND DEFENSE AND FOREIGN

OPERATIONS

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

RAU ́ L R. LABRADOR, Idaho, Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Ranking 

Minority Member 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on June 28, 2012 ............................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management, U.S. 

Department of State 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 4 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 6 

Mr. Peter F. Verga, Chief of Staff for The Under Secretary for Policy, U.S. 

Department of Defense 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 16 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 17 

The Honorable Mara Rudman, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for The Middle East, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 21 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 23 

Mr. Michael J. Courts, Acting Director, International Affairs and Trade, 

U.S. Department Accountability Office 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 33 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 35 

The Honorable Harold W., Geisel, Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department of State 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 42 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 44 

Mr. Joseph T. McDermott, Special Deputy Inspector General for Southwest 

Asia, U.S. Department of Defense 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 53 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 55 

Mr. Michael G. Carroll, Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 64 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 66 

Mr. Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 80 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 82 

(1) 

ASSESSMENT OF THE TRANSITION FROM A 

MILITARY TO A CIVILIAN–LED MISSION IN 

IRAQ 

Thursday, June 28, 2012, 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, HOMELAND

DEFENSE, AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:29 a.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz [chairman of the subcommittee] Presiding. 

Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Farenthold, Tierney, and 

Lynch. 

Staff Present: Ali Ahmad, Majority Communications Advisor; 

Thomas A. Alexander, Majority Senior Counsel; Sharon Casey, Majority Senior Assistant Clerk; Mitchell S. Kominsky, Majority 

Counsel; Scott Schmidt, Majority Deputy; Jaron Bourke, Minority 

Director of Administration; Devon Hill, Minority Staff Assistant; 

Carla Hultberg, Minority Chief Clerk; Carlos Uriarte, Minority 

Counsel; and Ellen Zeng, Minority Counsel. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The Committee will come to order. I would like 

to begin this hearing by stating the Oversight Committee mission 

statement. 

We exist to secure two fundamental principles: First, Americans 

have the right to know that the money Washington takes from 

them is well spent and, second, Americans deserve an efficient, effective government that works for them. Our duty on the Oversight 

and Government Reform Committee is to protect these rights. Our 

solemn responsibility is to hold government accountable to taxpayers, because taxpayers have a right to know what they get from 

their government. We will work tirelessly in partnership with citizen watchdogs to deliver the facts to the American people and 

bring genuine reform to the federal bureaucracy. This is the mission of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee. 

Let me start at the outset here. I appreciate you all being here. 

The Country has invested a lot of time, money, blood, and resources to the mission in Iraq. This is an interesting day on Capitol 

Hill given everything that has happened at the Supreme Court and 

their decisions, what is happening on the Floor with the contempt 

vote that directly involves this Committee. 

You will see a limited number of members participating today. 

We do believe it is vital, though, to get all of the testimony that 

2 

will be shared here today. The questions today will be probably 

somewhat limited, with the understanding of everything that is 

happening on Capitol Hill. We were faced with the decision as to 

whether or not to delay this hearing. We were concerned that that 

would push us back to the latter part of July, perhaps even August. 

We would like to be fairly close to a quarterly type of update and 

hearing given this, so we do appreciate all your testimony and hope 

you have an understanding of the complexity that is this day. 

Today’s hearing is entitled Assessment of the Transition from the 

Military to a Civilian-Led Mission in Iraq, and I want to again 

thank you all for participating. 

We are going to focus today on our efforts in Iraq since the military withdrew on December 31st, 2011. We assess the Administration’s progress, its prospects for success, and whether this strategy 

should be used as a model for Afghanistan in 2014. And I cannot 

emphasize this enough: We need to learn from the experiences that 

we have so that, as we go through this in another situation, we can 

make the most of it. 

On November 17, 2008, the Bush Administration and the Government of Iraq agreed that the United States would withdraw its 

troops by December 31, 2011. Keeping with that agreement, the 

Defense Department has removed all but approximately 275 uniformed personnel. The remaining troops work under the Chief of 

Mission authority of the Office of Security Cooperation. 

The State Department has greatly expanded its footprint in Iraq. 

There are approximately 2,000 direct-hire personnel and 14,000 

support contractors, roughly a 7 to 1 ratio. This includes 7,000 private security contractors to guard our facilities and move personnel 

throughout Iraq. 

Leading up to the withdrawal, the State Department’s mission 

seemed clear. Ambassador Patrick Kennedy testified the diplomatic 

mission was ‘‘designed to maximize influence in key locations’’ and 

later said ‘‘State will continue the Police Development Programs, 

moving beyond basic policing skills to provide police forces with the 

capabilities to uphold the rule of law. The Office of Security Cooperation will help close gaps in Iraq Security Force’s capabilities 

through security assistance and cooperation.’’ 

This is an unprecedented mission for the State Department. 

Nonetheless, our diplomatic corps has functioned without the protections of a typical host nation. It has also carried on without 

troop support that many believed that it would have. As a result, 

the embassy spends roughly 93 percent of its budget on security 

alone. 

Without a doubt, this is an enormously complex and difficult mission. Six months into the transition, the Congress must assess 

whether the Administration is accomplishing its mission. While the 

State Department has made progress, it appears to be facing difficult challenges in a number of areas. The Oversight Committee 

has offered some criticism based on their testimony today, including the Government Accountability Office noting that the State and 

Defense Departments’ security capabilities are not finalized. The 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction states that ‘‘thousands of projects completed by the United States and transferred 

3 

to the Government of Iraq will not be sustained and, thus, will fail 

to meet their intended purposes.’’ 

The Defense Department Inspector General’s Office explains that 

the lack of status of forces agreement has impacted land use agreements, force protection, passport visa requirements, air and ground 

movement, and our foreign military sales program. And the USAID 

Inspector General’s Office testifies that ‘‘According to the USAID 

mission, the security situation has hampered its ability to monitor 

programs. Mission personnel are only occasionally able to travel to 

the field for site visits.’’ 

Embassy personnel have also told Committee staff that the 

United States Government has difficulty registering its vehicles 

with the Iraqi government and Iraqis have stood up checkpoints 

along supply lines. According to one official, the embassy must dispatch a liaison ‘‘to have tea and figure out how we are going to get 

our trucks through.’’ 

These are just some of the challenges the State Department is 

facing in Iraq today. Perhaps as a result of these conditions Mission Iraq appears to be evolving. In an effort to be more efficient, 

the State Department is evaluating its footprint, reducing personnel, and identifying possible reductions. This rapid change in 

strategy, however, raises a number of questions. Are we on the 

right track? Are we redefining the mission? What should we expect 

in the coming months? And, in hindsight, was this a well managed 

withdrawal? 

The purpose of this hearing, therefore, is to gain some clarity 

about our efforts in Iraq. Moreover, we need to examine whether 

such transition is possible in how we execute in Afghanistan. Our 

Nation’s down-draw is only two years away and will likely present 

a greater challenge than Iraq. We need to have answers before we 

commit billions in taxpayers dollars. 

We continue to look at these issues over the coming months and 

we look forward to hearing the testimony from the panel, as I said 

before. 

I would like to now recognize the distinguished Ranking Member, the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney, for his opening statement. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You were talking about 

whether or not this is a well managed withdrawal. It basically was 

an ill-conceived venture in the beginning and flawed implementation for much of the time that we were there, so I think the withdrawal concept is particularly difficult to do, and we have to keep 

that in mind. 

I am going to ask unanimous consent that my prepared remarks 

be placed on the record so that we can sort of expedite the hearing 

and move forward and hear from the witnesses. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So ordered. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Tierney follows:] 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I really do appreciate it. 

Members may have seven days to submit opening statements for 

the record. 

We will now recognize our first panel. 

Ambassador Patrick Kennedy is the Under Secretary for Management at the United States Department of State; Mr. Peter 

4 

Verga is the Chief of Staff of the Under Secretary for Policy at the 

United States Department of Defense; and the Honorable Mara 

Rudman is the Assistant Administrator for the Middle East Bureau 

at the U.S. Agency for International Development. 

Pursuant to Committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn before 

they testify. Please rise and raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth? 

[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.] 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. You may be seated. 

Let the record reflect that the witnesses all answered in the affirmative. 

In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your verbal testimony to five minutes. Your entire written statement will be part 

of the record. 

We would now like to recognize Ambassador Kennedy for five 

minutes. 

WITNESSES STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PATRICK F. KENNEDY 

Mr. KENNEDY. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney, 

distinguished members, thank you for inviting me to discuss the 

State Department’s operations in Iraq after the military to civilianled transition. 

U.S. Forces completed their withdrawal from Iraq in December 

2011, marking a significant milestone in our bilateral relationship. 

Our strategic goal continues to be a united, unified, democratic, 

and stable Iraq. 

While security has improved overall, the situation on the ground 

remains challenging. Nonetheless, our diplomatic engagements are 

robust. Our embassy meets regularly with President Talabani, 

Prime Minister Maliki, cabinet members, parliamentarians, and 

civil society leaders. 

The State Department has always planned to align our presence 

in Iraq with other comparable U.S. Missions, but transition planning called for a robust structure that could handle multiple situations. Now that we have successfully transitioned, we are methodically streamlining our operations in a phased approach which we 

call the glide path. This recognizes that security did not deteriorate 

when U.S. Forces departed and that the Government of Iraq also 

recognizes the value of a streamlined U.S. Mission. 

We have been evaluating our presence and reducing personnel, 

sites, and agency programs under Chief of Mission authority. We 

expect to reduce direct hire staffing 25 to 30 percent by the end of 

2013. This is not arbitrary. Rather, we examined our operations 

and determined how they could be made more efficient. We have 

hired more Iraqis, with 240 of the 400 planned direct hires now on 

board. We have also emphasized to our contractors the need to hire 

Iraqis as well. 

Over the next 18 months we will consolidate onto the embassy 

compound and relinquish three facilities in Baghdad: The Baghdad 

Police College Annex, OSC–I Headquarters, and the Prosperity 

5 

Support Annex. We will continue to make adjustments to support 

a robust and secure, yet appropriately sized platform. 

I would like to provide an update touching on a few key elements 

of our support platform. 

Our Iraqi planning began in late 2009 and involved an interdisciplinary team from within the Department working closely with 

our DOD and AID colleagues. Since the follow-on negotiations to 

the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement were not completed, our 

predicate was that we had to be self-sufficient. 

On October 1st of 2011, the embassy and our consulates were 

fully operational and mission capable, as we had long planned. 

While the term mission capable comes from DOD lexicon and has 

not been previously applied to State operations, we were fully engaged in all diplomatic, consulate, and support activities, even 

though some of our facilities were not fully complete. We have continued to complete our facilities and, despite the challenging environment, we have been and will continue to carry out our diplomatic mission. 

Task orders for static and movement security were awarded 

under the Worldwide Protective Services contract for all State Department sites. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security is performing 

its increased oversight to ensure the professionalism of security 

contractor personnel. 

State Department requested that DOD continue to provide life 

support services through 2013 under the competitively awarded 

LOGCAP and via the Defense Logistics Agency. Our partnership 

with the Department of Defense remains highly effective. A posttransition working group meets twice a month to discuss life support. We are working on local sourcing of more food and fuel. Looking forward, State plans to award a life support contract to replace 

LOGCAP by the end of 2013. 

Under an existing competitively awarded contract, our aviation 

operations support all U.S. Government elements in Iraq, using 

five dedicated fixed-wing and 31 helicopters. Missions include medical evacuation, movement of security support, personnel, transportation of personnel within Iraq, and movement of personnel into 

and out of Iraq. We plan to downsize that program under the glide 

path. 

In conclusion, the scope of the Department’s diplomatic activities 

in Iraq remains larger than any of our past efforts. As Secretary 

Clinton said during remarks at the Virginia Military Academy in 

April, in Iraq, we have completed the largest transition from military to civilian leadership since the Marshall Plan. Civilians are 

leading our lasting partnership with a free and democratic Iraq. 

Mr. Chairman, we are committed to assisting Iraq in securing 

the gains it made with U.S. Assistance towards becoming a secure, 

stable, and self-reliant country as efficiently and effectively as possible. Thank you again for inviting me here today and for your ongoing support of the Department of State. I welcome any questions 

you might have. Thank you, sir. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:] 

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Mr. FARENTHOLD. [Presiding.] Thank you very much, Ambassador Kennedy. 

We will now recognize Mr. Peter Verga, the Chief of Staff for the 

Under Secretary for Policy for the U.S. Department of Defense. You 

are recognized for five minutes, sir. 

STATEMENT OF PETER F. VERGA 

Mr. VERGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. Member Tierney, distinguished Committee members, I do appreciate the 

opportunity to appear before you today, along with my Department 

of State colleagues, to provide you an update on the United States’ 

transition from a military to civilian-led presence in Iraq. 

Given Iraq’s importance, situated strategically in the Middle 

East, it remains profoundly in the United States’ national interest 

that Iraq emerge as a strategic partner with the United States, a 

sovereign, stable, self-reliant nation, and a positive force for moderation and stability in the region. In the time since we last appeared before this Committee, the United States has upheld its 

commitments in the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement by withdrawing all U.S. Forces by the end of December 2011. 

The Department of Defense has worked closely with Department 

of State to help ensure a successful transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq. Before, during, and after the transition, DOD provided all possible support to posture State for success as U.S. 

Forces withdrew from Iraq. Today, the Department of Defense continues to work with Department of State to help meet its needs 

through assignment of DOD personnel, extensions of equipment 

loans, and contracting assistance. 

The focus is now on cementing a normalized presence in Iraq 

with Department of State in the lead. That means building on 

years of working with the Iraqis to create a lasting, long-term security relationship, including a robust foreign military sales program. 

Currently, our FMS program with Iraq is the fourth largest in the 

region and the ninth largest in the world, with a total value of approximately $11.6 billion. 

Of all the FMS cases with Iraq, the F–16 case stands out as the 

cornerstone of the long-term U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship. Iraq 

has requested the sale of 36 F–16s and associated training, at a 

value of approximately $6 billion. To date, Iraq has deposited approximately $2.5 billion towards that sale and deliveries of the first 

aircraft are scheduled in September of 2014. 

We are now at a point where the strategic dividends of our efforts are within reach. DOD has worked closely with Department 

of State to help ensure a successful transition to the civilian-led 

presence in Iraq. That successful transition enables us to concentrate on building that long-term strategic partnership based on 

mutual interests and mutual respect. 

Finally, Iraq, through its substantial FMS program, is demonstrating its desire for long-term strategic partnership and its 

commitment to this program is a testimony to the future of the 

U.S.-Iraq partnership. 

I thank you for your attention and look forward to your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Verga follows:] 

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Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. 

We will now recognize the Honorable Mara Rudman, the Assistant Administrator for the Middle East Bureau at the U.S. Agency 

for International Development. Ms. Rudman, you are recognized for 

five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARA RUDMAN 

Ms. RUDMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Tierney. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss USAID’s work in 

the context of the transition from a military-led to a civilian-led 

mission in Iraq. 

Our goal is a stable, self-reliant, unified Iraq. This is critical to 

U.S. Interests in the Middle East. It is a goal made possible 

through enormous sacrifice by Americans and Iraqis alike. 

USAID is adjusting its footprint in Iraq in align with its development strategy and programmatic needs. We are focused on Iraq’s 

sustainable development under the terms of the U.S.-Iraq Strategic 

Framework Agreement. 

Over the past 10 years, USAID’s role in Iraq progressed through 

three distinct stages: 

Immediately after the invasion, USAID’s emphasis was on restoring essential infrastructure and services, and supporting transitional democratic processes. 

Then, as part of the military and civilian counterinsurgency campaign, we concentrated on stabilizing Iraqi communities and 

strengthening governmental institutions. 

Now, with the completion of the transition to civilian leadership 

of the U.S.’s effort in Iraq, USAID’s focus is on helping Iraqis improve how they manage their own resources for development. 

Our ability to adapt and work closely with the Iraqi government 

and people has provided critical continuity to our work. Our current efforts reflect lessons learned over these years, particularly in 

the need for greater oversight and prioritization of sustainability. 

Today, USAID provides technical assistance to Iraqis to improve 

their abilities to finance and implement their own development 

projects. We are also working with Iraqis to strengthen civil society 

and increase civic participation, implement reforms that will encourage private sector-led economic growth, support development of 

good governments and democratic institutions, support ethnic and 

religious minorities, and provide durable solutions for the reintegration of internally displaced persons. 

All of our efforts are designed with sustainability in mind so 

that, as an end goal, Iraqis will manage every one of these projects 

without U.S. Assistance. 

In addition to the considerable human capital of the Iraqi people 

themselves, Iraq has great oil wealth. Revenues from the oil industry, which has yet to reach its full potential, supply nearly all of 

the Iraqi government’s budget. Sadly, the country’s institutions and 

ability to deliver services has been degraded by decades of war, 

misrule, and other factors. Rebuilding the structure, resiliency, and 

effectiveness of the state, the private sector, and civil society is 

where Iraq still needs help. Thus, our current programs are focused 

primarily on improving the capacity of Iraqi government institutions and consist largely of technical assistance that requires the 

22 

Iraqis to match USAID contributions on a dollar-for-dollar basis. 

These efforts stand in stark contrast to the much larger relief, infrastructure, or stabilization projects in which we were earlier engaged. 

We work with the Government of Iraq to first establish common 

objectives for new activities. We then come to an agreement with 

the GOI on its required matching contributions and plans for 

transitioning ultimate responsibility for projects to the government. 

Throughout implementation, we monitor and measure the GOI’s 

progress and require cost-sharing contributions. These steps help 

ensure long-term Iraqi investment and commitment to the sustainability of USAID activities that specifically benefit their governing 

institutions. 

This focus on sustainability is not simply good development practice; it also reflects congressional guidance. In early 2009, the State 

Department and USAID, in consultation with Congress, adapted a 

set of policy guidelines on Iraqi Government matching for U.S. Assistance funds which require financial or in-kind Iraqi Government 

counterpart contributions for most U.S.-funded foreign assistance 

programs and projects that directly benefit or involve the Iraqi central government. 

Ensuring that the resource provided for American taxpayers are 

used effectively and that our contributions to Iraq’s progress yields 

sustainable results requires both careful and consistent monitoring 

on our part and engagement of the Iraqi Government and our other 

partners. Thus, in addition to standard USAID protections against 

waste, fraud, and abuse, including checks on terrorist financing, we 

have designed an extensive and effective oversight system that is 

tailored for the unique operating environment in Iraq. 

USAID also contracts with a third-party monitoring and evaluation implementer that conducts independent evaluations of all of 

our projects. 

There are multiple independent oversight bodies that also review 

our programs and, collectively, these entities have conducted more 

than 300 financial and performance audits since 2003. 

Finally, our focus on sustainability extends to the very staffing 

of our effort in Iraq. In fiscal year 2012 and beyond, we will reduce 

the number of foreign service offices at our mission and we will 

hire and train more locally employed Iraqis to perform the functions that have previously been handled by third-country nationals. 

In summary, our programs in Iraq are designed to help Iraqis 

use their own resources to foster self-reliance, maintain stability, 

and increase their well-being. Our continued commitment to Iraq 

demonstrates the importance we place on the mutual interests and 

benefits of this long-term partnership. 

I too appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and 

I am happy to answer your questions. Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Ms. Rudman follows:] 

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Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much, Ms. Rudman. 

I now recognize myself for five minutes. 

Ambassador Kennedy, how many personnel, contractors, and 

U.S. Government employees does Mission Iraq currently have at its 

various sites? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, we have approximately 16,000 personnel at this time, representing the State Department and all associated agencies, including the Department of Defense and the 

USAID. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Do you know how those are broken out versus 

government employees versus contractors? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, sir. It is approximately 1900 employees, 

American and Iraqis who are government employees, and approximately 14,000 contractors. So relatively 2,000 to 14,000. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. And how does that break down? Do you have 

the breakdown of U.S. Personnel versus Iraqi nationals? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, sir. There are 1640, plus or minus, American 

U.S. Government employees; 240 Iraqi employees; and 14,000 contractors. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. And you don’t have the breakdown of how the 

contractors are broken down as far as U.S. Versus Iraqi. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Most of the contractors are either Americans or 

third-country nationals. We are increasing every day the number 

of Iraqi contract employees as part of our program. We have informed our contractors that in certain categories we believe, and 

they are engaging and they are acting on our instructions, they are 

replacing the third-country national contractors with Iraqi contractors. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. And how safe are our operations in Iraq now? 

At one point you were seeing a reluctance of certainly U.S. Personnel to operate outside of the Green Zone. What is happening 

now? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, our personnel have been operating 

outside the Green Zone since I was in Iraq in 2003 and 2004. We 

go outside the Green Zone every day. In the last quarter of 2011, 

calendar 2011, there were 3,000 missions, security missions that 

our personnel executed outside the Green Zone, and I believe in the 

first quarter of this calendar year the number is almost up to 

4,000. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Ms. Rudman, it is my understanding that 

USAID has hired 25 Iraqis to oversee projects because USAID employees are reluctant to leave the embassy because of security concerns. Is that accurate? 

Ms. RUDMAN. The 25 field monitors that were hired, who are 

Iraqi field monitors, are not overseeing the projects, they are monitoring the work, so it is an added staff for monitoring and evaluation work, so it was augmenting our staff to be able to be out on 

the field on a regular basis to help with our monitoring and evaluation work. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. So why can’t our personnel be out there? Is it 

accurate that they have security concerns? 

Ms. RUDMAN. It is accurate that there are security concerns. The 

way that we would describe it would be that the security environment in Iraq is improving. It is still not a normal security environVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:13 Aug 14, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75464.TXT APRIL
29 

ment in the sense of what we would have at embassies elsewhere. 

So in terms of having the best possible monitoring and evaluation 

work for our projects, it is seen as a good thing for our monitoring 

and evaluation work to have Iraqis doing that work. As well, it is 

also part of, frankly, the sustainable development effort to have 

Iraqis have that capacity to do that work so that these projects 

could eventually be handed over. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I would like to ask, just to ponder, is what 

needs to be done to create a level of security and confidence for our 

personnel to get out there, but I am running out of time. What I 

did also want to ask you, ma’am, was the GAO has reported that 

Iraq has accumulated a budget surplus of over $50 billion, of which 

$10 billion was available for future spending. Why are we pouring 

a lot of money into Iraq when their budget is certainly in better 

shape than ours? 

Ms. RUDMAN. Sir, we have been on a glide-path, in fact, to reducing the amount of program money that we are putting into Iraq on 

a fairly consistent basis. That is something that we are reviewing 

year to year, how much money we are putting into Iraq for program assistance. 

In addition to that, as I described in my testimony, we have, 

working out with Congress, been working on that cost-sharing arrangements with Iraq so that since 2009 Iraq has contributed directly on a dollar-for-dollar basis. They match funds, essentially. 

For everything that we do with them for any capacity building, any 

assistance to the Iraqi Government, they match those funds. So we 

provide purely technical assistance to them and they match everything that we do, with the idea that any development assistance 

they are learning how to do and will eventually take over and do 

on their own. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. America has certainly invested a lot in blood 

and treasure in Iraq. 

I see my time has expired. I will recognize the Ranking Member 

for five minutes. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. 

Ambassador Kennedy, how are you? 

Mr. KENNEDY. [Remarks made off microphone.] 

Mr. TIERNEY. Good, thanks. I was beginning to think from time 

to time you are on this Committee. 

Mr. KENNEDY. [Remarks made off microphone.] 

Mr. TIERNEY. I am sure. Would you put your microphone on for 

us, or pull it closer, one or the other? Thanks. 

So you have 14,000 United States personnel in Iraq. What was 

what you said, right. 

Mr. KENNEDY. No, sir. There are 16,000. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Sixteen thousand. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Sixteen thousand total, of which 1600 are U.S. 

Government employees, plus another about 240, 250 Iraqi nationals who are directly employed by the U.S. Government, and about 

14,000 contractors, both American, Iraqi, and third-country national. 

Mr. TIERNEY. So what are the 14,000 contractors doing? 

Mr. KENNEDY. They do movement security; they do static security; they do operations and maintenance of our properties all over 

30 

Iraq; they do life support such as feeding our personnel; medical; 

aviation; and a small number that are involved in other activities. 

Mr. TIERNEY. So about 14,000 people to take care of 2,000 people. 

Mr. KENNEDY. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. TIERNEY. What does the embassy in Egypt look like in terms 

of those same types of considerations. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Certainly, the embassy in Egypt does not have the 

security concerns that we face in Iraq. Of that number, approximately 6500 of that 14,000 are security personnel. That is a presence that we have in Iraq, it is a presence we have in Afghanistan. 

We have nowhere else in the world and it is directly related to the 

security conditions, which are improving, but are certainly not at 

the point where we can not rely on our own inherent security personnel. 

Mr. TIERNEY. How many sites in Iraq are those security personnel responsible for? 

Mr. KENNEDY. They are responsible for about 13 or 14, depending upon how you count one site, whether it is one or two. 

Mr. TIERNEY. And what is the nature of those sites? 

Mr. KENNEDY. There is the embassy compound itself; there is a 

logistics annex across the street; there is the Office of Security Cooperation Annex, which is also across the street from the embassy; 

there is the police training site; there is a support operation we 

have adjacent to the Baghdad Airport; there is our consulate in 

Erbil and a support site at the Erbil Airport in the north; there is 

our consulate in Basrah; there is a joint OSC–I State Department 

site in Kirkuk; and then there are four exclusively DOD Office of 

Security Cooperation sites in Taji, Tikrit, Umm Qasr, and 

Besmaya, where they carry out the foreign military sales development that my colleague referred to in his testimony, sir. 

Mr. TIERNEY. This is for all of you. What lessons are we learning 

in Iraq that we should take heed to learn from when we go into 

the Afghan withdrawal situation? What are the major principles? 

I will start with you, Ms. Rudman. What have we learned that 

we ought to make sure that we are well prepared for as we start 

withdrawing in Afghanistan? 

Ms. RUDMAN. Well, I would say that the way that we have approached our work with the Government of Iraq since 2009 has 

been quite informative. When we look at our switch to the sustainable development approach with the Government of Iraq so that 

the working in partnership with them and the scope of our programs being ones that we ensure that we have their buy-in for at 

the front-end. 

The cost-sharing aspect of it has been a very smart aspect, frankly, that you required of us and we worked with you on, so that 

when you literally have their buy-in, it is not just theoretical, they 

have to pay for stuff; they have to make it work. There is much 

less waste involved at the front end so the scoping of the programs 

and the design of the programs makes sense for us, makes sense 

for them. And I think we have seen a real shift in our programming and the workability of our programming from their end and 

from ours since that time. I would say that is the single most important lesson for us. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Verga? 

31 

Mr. VERGA. From our perspective, the most important lessons 

that we are learning is the requirement for both advanced planning 

and essentially a continuous cooperation and monitoring process as 

we move through a transitional period. We can’t drop any of the 

balls that are going on, and I think it was a good lessons in interagency cooperation and information sharing that made this transition successful. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Ambassador, you had more of a broad view. It 

would be tougher for you to pick one. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I think my colleagues have touched on it. I would 

say there are three points: Plan, plan, plan. Second, a change management vision that, like in football, you go to the line of scrimmage and you have a plan, and sometimes you have to call an audible, but you have to be prepared to call that audible. So I think 

that we have done that. 

And, third, just as in Iraq we have a glide-path. We anticipate 

that there will be problems; we scope to make sure that we are safe 

and secure and can carry out our mission, but depending, as we 

hope, on the situation beginning to continually be more and more 

stable, we have a glide-path in place so that we can reduce our 

staffing, just as we are now doing in Iraq. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Are you done? 

I just have one more question, so we will just do a quick second 

round of questions. 

Ambassador Kennedy, you mentioned the Baghdad Police College 

Annex facility as one of the facilities. It is my understanding that 

the United States taxpayers have invested more than $100 million 

in improvements on that site. It was intended to house the police 

department program, a multibillion dollar effort that is currently 

being downsized. As a result of the State Department’s failure to 

secure land use rights, the entire facility is being turned over to 

the Iraqis at no cost. 

The GAO reports Mission Iraq has land use agreements or leases 

for only five out of all of the sites that it operates. Can you say 

with confidence that those sites now operating without leases or 

agreements will not be turned over to Iraq for free, as was the case 

with the Police Development Program? And what would the cost to 

the U.S. Taxpayers be if they were to lose without compensation 

all of those facilities? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, the statement that you were reading from about we are closing the Baghdad 

Police development site because of a failure to have land use rights 

is simply factually incorrect. We have a land use agreement for 

that site. As part of the program of the Police Development Program, there are periodic reviews that are underway and my colleagues who do that—it is not part of my general responsibility— 

on the operating side of the house engage in reviews on a sixmonth basis, both internally and with the Government of Iraq. 

It was always our plan to make adjustments to the Police Development Program over time, but the statement that somehow we 

have wasted or had everything pulled out from under us because 

of a lack of a land use agreement, sir, is simply false. 

For our other properties in Iraq we have agreements, for every 

single property we have in Iraq except for one, which is our interim 

32 

facility in Basrah, which is simply a reincarnation of a former U.S. 

Military facility there. But even in that regard we have a long-term 

agreement that was signed with the Government of Iraq by Ambassador Negroponte in 2005 in which we swapped properties with the 

Government of Iraq and they are committed to provide us with a 

10-acre facility in Basrah of our mutual choosing. So we are covered, sir. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. We will be hearing from the GAO in the next 

panel. I am basing my information on their report, and I think it 

is an important responsibility of this Committee to be watchdogs 

over the taxpayers’ dollars. Again, as I questioned Ms. Rudman 

about and mentioned in that questioning, we spent a lot of money 

and a lot of blood in Iraq, and we just need to be careful that we 

are not wasting any more money, or spending any more money I 

guess would be a more polite way to put it, than is necessary and 

that we are carefully guarding the assets of the United States Government. 

One of the chief roles, I think, of this Committee is to be the 

watchdog over the purse strings. Please be aware that this is something we are going to continue to keep an eye on in all of your purviews. 

I realize, as Chairman Chaffetz said earlier, this is a very busy 

legislative day. It is important that we get your testimony and 

other information in, so I will yield back the remainder of my time 

and offer Mr. Tierney five minutes if he has any additional questions. 

Mr. TIERNEY. No, I will go to the next panel. 

I do want to thank the witnesses for their written testimony, 

their comments today, and their accessibility. I know that we can 

follow up on all of this directly with them, so in order to expedite 

it and move forward, I will take care and yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I too would like to thank the panel for their 

appearance and cooperation with this Committee and Congress. It 

is admirable that you are here, took the time, and are committed 

to being open and transparent with this Committee and the American taxpayers. 

At this point we will take a short recess to seat the other panel 

and we will resume as soon as they are seated, probably less than 

10 minutes. So we stand in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. The Committee is called back to order as we 

end our recess and prepare to recognize our second panel. 

First we have Dr. Michael Courts, the Acting Director of International Affairs and Trade at the U.S. Government Accountability 

Office. Next we have Ambassador Harold W. Geisel. He is the Acting Inspector General at the U.S. Department of State. Mr. Micky 

McDermott is a Special Deputy Inspector General for Southwest 

Asia at the U.S. Department of Defense; Mr. Michael G. Carroll is 

Deputy Inspector General at the U.S. Agency for International Development; and the Honorable Stuart W. Bowen is a Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 

Pursuant to the Committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn before they testify, so, gentlemen, would you please rise and raise 

your right hands? 

33 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth? 

[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.] 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

Please be seated. 

As you know, we have a busy day on Capitol Hill today, and in 

order to allow time for questioning and discussion, we would ask 

that you limit your testimony to five minutes. Your entire written 

statement will be made part of the record. We invite you to summarize and hit the high points of your remarks. 

So we will start off with Mr. Courts. You are recognized for five 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. COURTS 

Mr. COURTS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Tierney. I am pleased to be here this morning to discuss the transition from a predominantly U.S. Military presence in Iraq to a civilian presence led by the Department of State. This work is a continuation of GAO’s efforts to review the planning and execution of 

the drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq and the buildup of the U.S. 

Civilian-led presence there. 

GAO was asked to testify this morning on U.S. Plans for the diplomatic presence and Iraqi commitment to that presence, the support capabilities for our sites and personnel in Iraq, and our capabilities to provide security for those sites and personnel. 

The primary message of my testimony this morning is that the 

State Department and DOD planned for a very large civilian-led 

presence in Iraq, but Iraqi commitment to that presence remains 

unclear. Further, the support and security capabilities for the presence have not yet been finalized and, most importantly, efforts to 

identify security vulnerabilities and progress toward mitigating 

them are not being fully tracked. 

My first point is that State and DOD planned for a robust presence in Iraq. For fiscal year 2012, they allocated an estimated $4 

billion for the presence and planned to have over 16,000 personnel 

at 14 different sites across the country. Most of these personnel 

were to be contractors primarily responsible for security and 

logistical support. As of last month, State and DOD were reassessing the presence and developing a plan to reduce the number 

of sites and personnel in Iraq. However, the Mission would still 

comprise, by far, the largest overseas U.S. Diplomatic presence in 

the world. 

My second point is that Mission Iraq has encountered delays in 

establishing basic infrastructure and life support capabilities such 

as housing and water supply. Construction projects are behind 

schedule; Mission Iraq is still revising emergency evacuation plans 

to reflect the absence of an in-country combat force; and the Mission and its contractors have encountered delays and challenges in 

dealing with the Iraqi bureaucracy. 

My final point is that State and DOD have not yet finalized security capabilities in Iraq. As you know, Mission Iraq personnel and 

facilities face numerous threats, including routine rocket and morVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:13 Aug 14, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75464.TXT APRIL
34 

tar attacks, roadside bombs, small arms firing, and kidnapping. As 

of last month, the State Department had conducted security assessments of the sites that it manages and had taken a number of mitigating steps to address vulnerabilities. However, while DOD has 

reported some efforts to address vulnerabilities of the sites that 

they manage, they have not fully tracked those efforts. 

In summary, State and DOD planned for the largest diplomatic 

presence in the world, but Iraqi commitment to that presence remains unclear. Mission Iraq support functions are still very much 

a work in progress and, most importantly, while operational, its security capabilities are not yet fully mission capable. Further, 

DOD’s efforts to mitigate security vulnerabilities at its sites are not 

being fully tracked and, therefore, it is unclear if and to what extent U.S. Personnel and facilities at these locations may be at risk. 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Tierney, this concludes my 

prepared remarks. I would be happy to address any questions that 

you may have. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Courts follows:] 

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Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. We will get to the questions after we have heard testimony from the entire panel. 

Mr. Geisel, you are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HAROLD W. GEISEL 

Mr. GEISEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Tierney, and members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to 

discuss our assessment of the transition to a civilian-led mission in 

Iraq. 

Since 2008, the Department of State Office of Inspector General 

has conducted 35 investigations and 27 audits, inspections, and 

evaluations in Iraq. The Department has been responsive to OIG 

recommendations. In May 2011, OIG reported that the U.S. Military was managing more than 370 civilian police and advisers. The 

Department has now assumed responsibility for the Police Development Program and is consulting with Iraqi officials to evaluate security needs and downsize efforts accordingly. 

Pending audit reports from the Special Inspector General for 

Iraq Reconstruction and final funding decisions, OIG will audit the 

Department’s oversight of related civilian assistance programs in 

March 2013. In response to State OIG recommendations to create 

an Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq sufficient to support Iraqi 

security forces and manage U.S.-Iraqi defense relations, DOD IG 

found that OSC–I met full operating capability in October 2011. 

We will coordinate to monitor OSC–I progress in coordination with 

DOD IG. 

In May 2011, OIG reported that the Department continued to 

face challenges in establishing provincial posts due to questions regarding land use agreements, staffing, construction, and life support operations. While security threats prevented construction in 

Mosul, consulates in Basrah, Erbil, and Kirkuk opened in 2011 and 

continuing presence posts in Tikrit, Taji, Besmaya, and Umm Qasr 

currently serve as OSC–I operation sites. 

OIG remains concerned about the safety of U.S. Government personnel and contractors in Iraq. In May 2011, OIG reported that security risks could be mitigated through closer working relationships with the Government of Iraq and its security forces. During 

field work for an ongoing audit of private security contractors in 

Baghdad, OIG found that Iraqi security forces are routinely detaining private security contractors at checkpoints and the Government 

of Iraq is restricting airspace, jeopardizing potential evacuation 

routes. In April 2013, OIG will audit the effectiveness of private security contractors in Kirkuk and Mosul. 

The Department procured aircraft and obtained flight approval 

from the Government of Iraq and other foreign authorities to establish Embassy Air Iraq, currently operating routes between Amman 

and Baghdad with fares of $2400 and between Kuwait City and 

Baghdad for $1600 round-trip. In comparison, as of May 31, 2012, 

commercial round-trip fares between Amman and Baghdad were 

available for approximately $600 to $800. OIG will audit the Department’s Air Wing Program in August 2012 and consider the cost 

efficiency versus security concerns of commercial air travel. 

In May 2011, OIG reported that the cost to provide medical care 

for U.S. Personnel and contractors in Iraq would be considerable. 

43 

A Department contractor now operates nine health units. OIG will 

audit the Department’s management of medical operations in October 2012. 

In May 2011, OIG reported that Embassy Baghdad lacked adequate response plans for a mass casualty event. In January 2012, 

OIG reported that Embassy Baghdad and Consulates General 

Basrah and Erbil had created emergency action plans in compliance with Department guidelines and had conducted regular emergency response briefings and mandated drills. 

Also, in May 2011, OIG reported that embassy facilities were 

near capacity due to addition and relocation of civilian staff and 

contractors. OIG will audit the Department’s implementation of the 

Baghdad master plan in July 2012 and consider the effects of a 

proposed 20 to 25 percent presence downsizing. We have scheduled 

a full inspection of the mission early in 2013 to include further 

evaluation of staffing and security needs. State OIG is uniquely 

qualified to provide mission-specific oversight in a volatile posttransition environment. 

We currently have 19 open investigations related to programs 

and to operations in Iraq, and intend to assign 6 additional personnel to monitor progress in Iraq. We remain committed to providing the Department and Congress a comprehensive spectrum of 

audits, inspections, and investigations on the enduring U.S. Presence in Iraq. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Tierney, and members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you once again for this opportunity, and I am pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Geisel follows:] 

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Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you for your testimony, sir. 

We will now recognize Mr. McDermott for five minutes. You are 

recognized. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH T. MCDERMOTT 

Mr. MCDERMOTT. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, 

Ranking Member Tierney, distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you 

today to discuss our assessment of the transition from a military 

to a civilian-led mission in Iraq. 

The Office of Security Cooperation - Iraq, referred to as the 

OSC–I, operates under the Chief of Mission authority. OSC–I is 

charged with managing the bilateral security cooperation and security systems functions, and maintaining a long-term strategic partnership between the U.S. Government and the Government of Iraq. 

In recognizing the importance of the challenges concerning OSC– 

I and the fact that the scope of the Security Systems Program is 

one of the largest in the world, we started a series of oversight efforts focused on the planning and the establishment of OSC–I. 

In 2010, we assessed the planning effort for transitioning the security assistance mission. We determined that the OSC–I planning 

was progressing with a significant contribution made by an ad hoc 

cadre of strategic planners operating from within U.S. Forces-Iraq. 

We also identified several planning shortcomings and recommended that the U.S. Central Command issue Iraq-specific 

country planning details, assess the procedures and resources applied to development of the Iraq-specific security cooperation related planning guidance, and capture lessons learned regarding the 

experiences of organizing the OSC–I. 

In 2011, we assessed the establishment of OSC–I and the DOD 

efforts to provide for its sustained, effective operation in post-2011 

in Iraq. We found that the establishment of OSC–I was on track, 

but identified some shortfalls in the planning efforts. We again determined the shortfalls were due to incomplete Iraq-specific plans. 

We also reported the need for planning capability within the Office 

of Security Cooperation. In addition, we observed the need to improve communications between both the OSC–I and, externally, to 

the key officials at the Iraq Ministries of Defense and Interior 

about the OSC–I’s enduring role regarding U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance Programs. 

In response to our assessment, OSC–I made improvements in the 

flow of information to its personnel and with key senior Iraqi officials. The Central Command also responded by issuing a completed 

Iraq Country Plan with necessary security cooperation and assistant details. 

On April 16, 2012, we issued a third report, which is classified, 

related to the transition on the management of private security 

contractors in Iraq, including private security contractors guarding 

the OSC–I locations. While the OSC–I was generally successful in 

its transition from DOD to the Department of State, the U.S. And 

Iraq Governments did not finalize certain agreements that were envisioned as necessary to enable OSC–I’s ability to become fully 

functional within Iraq’s dynamic post-2011 operating environment. 

54 

Responding to our report in March 2012, senior OSC–I officials 

indicated that the absence of a post-2011 Security Agreement or 

Status of Forces Agreement was affecting aspects of its operations. 

Some of the challenges cited by these officials included obtaining 

or extending land use agreements, force protection, passport and 

visa requirements, and air and ground movement. 

The precise impact of these command concerns with respect to 

achieving short- and long-term OSC–I goals is unclear. However, 

having a formal, follow-on Security and Status of Forces Agreements was perceived to have value in clarifying and stabilizing 

Iraqi government support for the day-to-day operations of OSC–I, 

and would benefit longer-term relationship building. 

In closing, let me emphasize that the DOD IG remains committed to providing oversight concerning OSC–I and reporting on 

the progress and challenges of maintaining a long-term strategic 

partnership with the Government of Iraq. We plan to return to 

Iraq early next fiscal year to continue our assessment on the operations of the OSC–I. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to discuss the work of DOD 

IG and I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. McDermott follows:] 

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Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. McDermott. 

We will now recognize Mr. Carroll for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL G. CARROLL 

Mr. CARROLL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Tierney, distinguished members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate 

the invitation and the opportunity that you have given me to brief 

the Committee on the USAID IG’s activities in Iraq currently and 

what we see for the challenges for the future. 

AID was not part of the massive transition planning process, so 

I will just restrict my remarks to AID’s programs. 

As the Committee might know, we started our oversight in Iraq 

in 2003 with long-term TDYs and opened the office of seven auditors and two investigators in 2004, so we have a substantial body 

of work over that period of time, and if I could just give you some 

stats quickly. 

We have done over 60 performance audits during that time, con- ducted 153 cost-incurred financial audits covering $5 billion of 

USAID expenditures over that period of time, opened 105 investigations, 45 referrals for prosecution, 13 indictments, 10 convictions, 40 administrative actions, and 10 suspension and 

debarments. So we have done a substantial amount of work over 

time. 

But in the post-transition environment, clearly AID’s funding has 

been coming down, as Mara Rudman mentioned, and in 2013 it is 

only going to be—well, I shouldn’t say only—it is going to be $231 

million, which is a substantial amount of money, but relative to 

previous years it is on a downward trajectory. 

So with State being in a complete cost recovery mode now that 

the State Department is gone and we are not getting supplemental 

funding or essential funding for ICAS and that sort of thing, it has 

become, for us, prohibitively expensive to be there. 

So what we are going to do is maintain an office of two auditors, 

one investigator, transfer the other staff to Egypt, because when 

you consider the amount of money being spent by AID in Iraq, it 

ranks third in the region, behind Jordan and West Bank-Gaza. So 

we will continue to provide a robust oversight package in Iraq; it 

just won’t be to the extent that it has been in the past. 

And our plan for 2013 would be to do three performance audits; 

two major program reviews, one of those being a retrospective look 

back using some of the work that Mr. Bowen has done or will do 

on sustainability, because we see two primary challenges for the 

agency going forward, and Mara Rudman discussed them. One is 

monitoring and evaluation. Historically, it has been problematic for 

AID in Iraq. They have relied to a degree on the implementers to 

provide performance data. 

We found the performance data to be suspect at times, and the 

ability to get out and monitor and evaluate the programs, get legitimate, accurate performance data has been problematic. So without the military, with State Department providing security, we will 

have to see how that goes. So we are going to be on that pretty 

substantially. 

The other challenge that I see, and, again, Mara talked about it, 

was sustainability. Now, AID has transitioned from—there has 

65 

been a natural progression from infrastructure and reconstruction 

that AID was doing there for a while to more of a traditional development assistance in, like she said, technical assistance, democracy 

and governance, civil society, those sorts of things. 

So retrospectively, one of our audits we just issued on the IT sustainability, IT systems, it was a pretty bleak story as far as the effectiveness of some of the programs that were implemented, or not 

implemented but paid for. So I think the lesson learned from that, 

and I think the agency has gotten it, is Iraqi buy-in and, to the extent that they can based on guidance from Congress, get a costsharing kind of agreement, because if they have money in it and 

it is in their best interest, then it will be sustainable; if not, then 

it is not going to be, based on our previous experience. 

So, for us, the one challenge I see as we move forward, and it 

has been a disappointment over time, has been our ability to work 

with the Iraq law enforcement to get local prosecutions. We have 

had some success in Pakistan, we have had success in Afghanistan, 

but, for whatever reason, we have not had success in Iraq. We are 

working with our IG counterparts; we are working with the LDAT 

at the embassy to try and identify law enforcement entity in the 

Iraqi Government. Because as AID moves forward and implements 

more locally with local entities and more Iraqis involved, as Ambassador Kennedy said, the fraud that is going to take place, if it 

takes place, is going to be perpetrated primarily by Iraqis, and our 

ability to investigate is not a problem, but our ability to take that 

probable cause, find a willing partner in the Iraqi Government so 

we can do local prosecutions, that is what we would like to do, but 

so far problematic. So that is our one major challenge going forward. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to taking any questions you might have. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Carroll follows:] 

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Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you, Mr. Carroll. 

Mr. Bowen, you are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF STUART W. BOWEN, JR. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Tierney, members of the Committee, for the opportunity to appear 

before you and present SIGIR’s assessment of the transition from 

a military to civilian-led mission in Iraq. My statement examines 

this question in light of five issues: The Police Development Program, the security situation, the Office of Security Cooperation, 

Iraq, the transfer and sustainment of reconstruction assets, and 

the increase in criminal investigative activity that we have seen 

this year. I will briefly summarize each of my points in my oral 

statement. 

The Police Development Program is the single largest program to 

transition from DOD management to State management over the 

last eight months. Interestingly, it transitioned from State management to DOD management eight years ago. The initial contract 

was led to the State department, but eventually challenges in Iraq 

and the size and security mission required the formation of something called the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq, 

which operated the police training program for in excess of six 

years and expended significant amount of money. 

The Police Development Program, however, was not well planned 

or well agreed to, or a sufficient agreement wasn’t secured from the 

Iraqis, as our audit of last October revealed. We have another review coming out this July that will follow up on that audit and look 

at progress made with regard to those recommendations, but the 

most significant events that have occurred since then has been the 

reduction in the size of the program; I think a wise reduction, a 

recognition that the Iraqis haven’t fully bought into it and that the 

security challenges that continue in Iraq have limited the capacity 

to execute the initial ambitious range of the program. 

Second point, security situation. We saw today again bombs 

across Baghdad killing 15, punctuating what has been a very violent June. The year began violently in January. March saw the 

least violent month since 2003. So it is a very volatile situation, 

that is what these stats tell you, in Iraq. Notwithstanding whatever those numbers are, the requirements for personnel to move 

about the country are the same as they were, essentially, in 2006, 

2007. So it is expensive, and that is why the largest single expense 

in Iraq right now for the embassy is security. As Ambassador Kennedy pointed out, in excess of 6,000 contractors are security contractors, and most of the money is going to pay their salaries. 

The Office of Security Cooperation, Iraq is spending about $1.5 

billion and Iraq security forces fund the money that Congress appropriated for training and equipping the Iraqi army and the Iraqi 

police. We issued an audit in April about the progress they are 

making in using that money in the FMS program, raised some concerns about the obligation rate, but my meetings with General 

Caslen, who runs the program, assuaged our concerns. We will 

have a follow-up report in July that gives concrete points on the 

progress made regarding the use of that money. 

81 

A continuing issue that SIGIR has addressed over the years is 

the transfer and sustainment of projects that we spent $51 billion 

producing, and it is not a good story. The audits reveal that there 

was no consensus upon how to transfer these projects. Our audit 

program did stimulate the development of a sustainment program 

and sustainment requirements in contracts, but it was, for the 

most part, too little, too late. Frankly, Iraqis have not bought into 

investing significant sums into what we have provided, in part because they are not sure what we have provided. That is what I 

hear over and over again from Iraqis, and that is understandable 

given the weaknesses in the database that we developed. Indeed, 

our audits of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System found 

that it captures maybe 70 percent of what we provided. That is certainly unacceptable. 

Lastly, we have seen an uptick in criminal investigative activity 

simply because as the program has drawn down, for whatever reason, people have been more willing to come forward and provide us 

with leads and, second, some of our technical examinations of what 

happened to that money have produced more cases. So we have in 

excess of 100 investigations going on. We just convicted our 71st 

person this week and our SIGIR prosecution initiative continues to 

produce good fruit. 

So, with that, I will conclude my statement and look forward to 

your questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Bowen follows:] 

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89 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. 

I will now recognize myself for five minutes. 

Mr. Courts, Ambassador Kennedy and I got into a discussion 

about the absence or presence of land use agreements for the facilities we have in Iraq. Do you have the current status of that, or at 

least the information from your latest report as to what facilities 

we do and do not have land use agreements for? 

Mr. COURTS. Yes. What Ambassador Kennedy may have been referring to is that for 13 of the 14 facilities the Iraqis have acknowledged a presence through diplomatic notes, but there is still only 

five of the 14 for which we actually have explicit title land use 

agreements or leases. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right, so I am not a diplomat, so what does 

that mean? They say, all right, you can use it until we change our 

minds? Is that basically what those are, or is there some force of 

law to those notes? 

Mr. COURTS. Well, the notes are definitely not the same thing as 

having an explicit agreement. As a matter of fact, there has already been one case where the Iraqis required us to reconfigure, 

downsize one of our sites, and that was one of the sites where we 

did not have a land use agreement. So, obviously, we are in a much 

more vulnerable position when there is not an explicit agreement. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right, Mr. Carroll, I would also like to follow up with a question I had on the last panel about the use of 

Iraqi nationals in overseeing some of our investigations. What is 

your opinion on that? Does that strike you as a good idea, a bad 

idea, or something we are stuck with because there is no alternative? It seems like Americans would be a little bit more concerned about how their tax dollars were spent than the Iraqi nationals who are the recipients of those tax dollars. It is kind of a 

fox guarding the hen house, it looks like. 

Mr. CARROLL. Well, personally, I think it is, like Ms. Rudman 

said, it is an additive sort of step. We would do the same thing. 

For example, in some of the places where it is absolutely prohibited 

because of security, what we will do is contract with a local CPA 

firm, primarily out of Egypt, and do a very comprehensive agreed 

upon procedures document that they will go out and they will take 

pictures, they will ask questions. They would do what we would do 

if we could get there. So I think that is what Mara was talking 

about as well. 

I don’t see it as a problem. In fact, I see it as an adjunct to, and 

it is not a replacement for, USAID contracting representatives and 

technical representatives actually getting out and ensuring that the 

work is being done. That is not what these people are doing. What 

these people are doing is going out, just doing some monitoring and 

evaluation, but it does not replace what the responsibilities are for 

the Americans. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right, thank you very much. 

I am not sure if I want to address this to Mr. Courts or Mr. 

Bowen. Whichever one of you seems the most eager to answer can 

take this. I haven’t been to Iraq; my information in the field of 

what it is like on the ground there is based on things that I have 

read and reports that I have seen on television. But a good many 

of our facilities are in metropolitan areas, including the capital, 

90 

Baghdad, and I am concerned that we are struggling getting food 

and water to these folks in a safe manner. I mean, what is the procedure? Is the food delivered? How is that handled and why is it 

a problem in a metropolitan area? There are hundreds of thousands of people in these cities, Iraqi nationals that need to be fed. 

Obviously, it is more complicated than just going down to the 

Safeway, but how is that handled and why is it such a problem? 

Mr. BOWEN. The State Department, as Ambassador Kennedy indicated, continued the LOGCAP contract after the military withdrew in December and, thus, the process for bringing food into the 

country continued as well, and that is via convoys that come up 

from Kuwait. There have been challenges: That checkpoint has occasionally been closed, there have been security challenges with regard to those convoys, and other reasons that the shipments have 

been intermittent and has led to an occasional shortage of certain 

foodstuffs at the embassies. 

Ambassador Jeffrey emphasized repeatedly this spring his desire 

to move towards local purchase, but that has been slow. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. There is also a lot of concern about 

the amount of security that is necessary and how much we are 

spending on it. Could you take a moment, just a typical day in the 

life of an embassy employee? Do they sleep on the compound? Do 

we have security where they are living? Do we escort them home. 

It looks like the ratio of contractors to employees is almost 7 to 

1. I don’t know how many of those are security personnel. I mean, 

is it like the President, where everybody has a security detail that 

travels with them everywhere they go? 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. How much do they get out and how does that 

work? 

Mr. BOWEN. It is, as I said in my statement, very much the process that existed in 2007. So the drop in the number of attacks has 

not led to a relaxation in the security requirements, and those security requirements are dictated by the regional security officer at 

the embassy. 

In Baghdad, the situation, as a general matter, has improved 

greatly, but still to make a movement outside the embassy grounds 

requires 48 hours of notice, three hardened vehicles and a couple 

of shooters in each vehicle, and limited time onsite to carry out 

your mission. So it is a restrictive environment from a security perspective. 

By the way, it is still quite dangerous up at Kirkuk. While there 

haven’t been very many duck-and-covers, as we say at the embassy 

this year, that is not the case up at the Kirkuk facility. Basrah 

similarly has a much more difficult security situation than those 

who operate in Baghdad. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. And do our personnel live near or onsite? 

Mr. BOWEN. They live at the embassy in Baghdad, yes. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Okay. So we are not sending dozens of people 

home with somebody. 

Mr. BOWEN. No. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Okay. 

I see my time is way expired. I would recognize the gentleman 

from Massachusetts and we will give him six minutes as well. 

91 

Mr. LYNCH. You are very kind. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Like it or not, I have been to Iraq, I think, 13 or 14 times now. 

A couple of things in the testimony raised some concerns for me. 

Mr. Carroll, on USAID, I understand the security situation there 

is very, very difficult, but it seems to me that it is probably the 

worst situation we could have where our inspectors can’t get out 

to the sites to review the projects that the American taxpayer is 

paying for. That is just a very tough situation. I am very uncomfortable with that. I know I have been out many times with Mr. 

Bowen and his inspectors onsite in Iraq. 

There is a certain value in having U.S. Personnel go out there, 

engineers, if possible, to review some of these projects. We have 

had widespread corruption at various levels in Iraq, so there has 

been an experience there that should cause us to be very, very cautious about where our money is going and whether these projects 

are being built to proper standards, number one, and whether they 

are being built at all and whether some of our money is being diverted. 

Is there any hope here? Is there any way that we could enhance 

the cooperation that we are getting from the Iraqi Government by 

withholding funds for these projects unless we get access to those 

sites and have the ability to do proper oversight. 

Mr. CARROLL. Well, it is not the Iraqi Government that is I don’t 

want to say creating the problem, but it is not the Iraqi Government; it is the RSO, as Mr. Bowen said. During the transition period, which was a very difficult period, I think we would all agree 

with that, we were turned down on three of our seven movement 

requests. 

But, again, that was a very difficult time. Since then we have 

been able to make site visits and, like Mr. Bowen said and you 

have been there too, it takes a lot of planning. So you can’t just 

drop in, which sometimes we would like to do, particularly on the 

investigative side. The way it is going now, everybody knows we 

are coming, so that creates some problems for us. But so far we 

have been able to do our work. 

Now, as AID has moved from what is not their traditional kind 

of work, and that is reconstruction—they were doing that quite a 

bit in the early days—and now it is a lot of technical assistance 

and it is a lot of the meat and potatoes of, like I said, democracy 

and governance and civil society and education and health, and 

those sorts of things, most of that is located in and around Baghdad, so it is not like we have to go to Basrah, Kirkuk, or something 

like that. So we are confident that if we are smart about it, and 

we work with the RSO, that we can do our job. Like I said earlier, 

it is extraordinarily expensive for us to be there, so we are going 

to change our sort of footprint a little bit, but I want to assure you 

that we are still going to provide substantial oversight of the AID 

programs. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay, thank you. 

Stuart, if I ask you, in terms of the deployment of our—we have 

6,000 private contractors there. Are these all DynCorp? Are they 

U.S. Nationals? What is the makeup of that security force? 

Mr. BOWEN. They are not all DynCorp; it is under the Worldwide 

Protective Services contract that the State Department manages. 

92 

Triple Canopy is there and others. The guards themselves are 

third-country nationals as I have observed. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. 

Mr. BOWEN. And then there are a variety of other companies that 

are working there. I should say the static guards are third-country 

nationals; those that are running the convoys themselves, that are 

doing the driving of the shooters in the Suburbans, are Americans, 

contractors. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. 

What is the security—I know we have several sites there and you 

mentioned the difficulty in Kirkuk. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Give me the worst situations that we have there 

right now for our facilities that Mr. Courts was talking about, as 

well. What is the worst situation we have, is it Basrah? 

Mr. BOWEN. It is a close call between Basrah and Kirkuk, but 

Kirkuk is subject to indirect fire quite regularly, and that is—— 

Mr. LYNCH. Are we still getting rocket attacks out of Sadr City 

into Baghdad? 

Mr. BOWEN. Very, very infrequently. And the duck-and-covers 

have been minimal at the embassy in Baghdad. Contrarywise, in 

Kirkuk, it is a weekly, if not daily, experience. 

Mr. LYNCH. What about Umm Qasr, down at the port there, are 

we having a bad situation down there as well. 

Mr. BOWEN. In Basrah, the size of the consulate down there is 

limited and their capacity to move about is limited, and because of 

that the Police Development Program office that was going to operate there has been withdrawn. 

Mr. LYNCH. Now, is that our decision or was that the Iraqi decision? 

Mr. BOWEN. Our decision. But the Iraqis, when I was in Iraq at 

the end of April and met with active Minister Asaby, he said that 

he needed maybe 15 or 20 advisors, in his view, from the program. 

The program, as you know, started out at about 200, dropped down 

to 115, now down to about 70 to 80. The plans are to bring it down 

to 30 to 40, and then it will continue to evolve and devolve, as it 

were. 

Mr. LYNCH. Mr. Courts, can I address you for a second? Where 

do you see the flashpoints in terms of our facilities. You had a 

whole list of sites that you had identified in your testimony. What 

are the bottom three? What do you worry about at night in terms 

of your facilities there. 

Mr. COURTS. Congressman, the State Department and the DOD 

agreed together that they would meet three overarching criteria in 

the area of security to be considered fully mission capable. 

The three criteria that they identified were that they would have 

secure and protected facilities, that they would have the ability to 

achieve the secure movement of their people, and that they would 

have emergency response capability in place. They didn’t meet 

those criteria in October and in many cases they still don’t meet 

them today. I can’t go into the details of what the exact 

vulnerabilities are because that is sensitive information; however, 

I can say that they intended to have certain security features in 

place at sites in October. Some of those features are still not in 

93 

place today. Some of them are not slated to be in place until sometime in 2013. 

In addition to that, the State Department intended to have the 

use of MRAPs to help achieve the secure movement of their people, 

the mine resistant ambush protected vehicles. The DOD provided, 

I think, something close to 60 of those vehicles, but our understanding is that the Iraqi Government will not allow their use, so 

they are essentially sitting unused right now. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. Well, that is important for the Committee to 

know. And, again, I am trying to get you to tell me about site-specific concerns that you have. Are there some areas that you think 

desperately need security attention right now? 

Mr. COURTS. Again, I can’t get specific about the sites; however—— 

Mr. LYNCH. Oh, okay. All right. I will let you go on that. Okay, 

we can talk later. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you, sir. 

We will now recognize the other gentleman from Massachusetts 

for five minutes. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Does Texas get the sense we are ganging up on you. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. No. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Which, if any, of you gentleman has been looking 

into the planned work being done on the embassy that was reported by Walter Pincus in the Post this morning? Mr. Geisel, what 

kind of work are you doing in terms of evaluating the expense 

there and the purpose? 

Mr. GEISEL. Well, we started actually, oh, I guess it was about 

more than three years ago, with an audit of the building of the embassy itself and, as you know, we recommended to the Department 

that they recover I believe it was over $200 million from the contractor for what was really slipshod, and worse than slipshod, construction. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Did they recover it? 

Mr. GEISEL. Not to my knowledge. It would probably take court 

action, and we, in all candor, we understand that asking for the 

money is one thing, and finally getting it after battles is another, 

but we really believe the Department should be trying to get it 

back. 

We, on a continuing basis, audit the Department and construc- tion. Now, for instance, let’s take the $100 million that was mentioned in the article. I don’t know if that is an absolutely accurate 

figure, but what I do know is the Department does have plans. 

First of all, you have to remember the Department doesn’t have 

that money yet, it is asking the Congress for the money. But where 

we come in is we want to know what is the Department going to 

get for that money. Do they have provable savings of $200 million 

or is it a matter of security? Or is it a matter of something nice 

to have? And we will be looking at that. But we can’t look too far 

until and unless the Congress decides to give them that money that 

he spoke about. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I would hope Congress would find the answers to those questions before it gave him the money, frankly. I 

94 

mean, it is a $700 million facility before we have even started; $700 

million, slipshod work, incredible expenditure. We went all through 

those hearings under Henry Waxman and others on that, and now 

they want to be spend $60 million to $80 million supposedly over 

the next two years for a central utility power plant, underground 

fuel storage facility, wide-fire water distribution, domestic water 

system, sanitary sewer system, stormwater system, and telecommunication system. So can you tell us whether or not $700 million just didn’t address any of those issues in a compound of that 

size? 

Mr. GEISEL. I think the answer is that obviously the way the 

$700 million was spent didn’t, and that was in our report. And the 

question now is are you throwing in good money after bad or is this 

something that is going to save us money? 

Mr. TIERNEY. Has anybody looked at evaluating their proposed 

purpose for using this facility, the number of people who are ostensibly going to occupy it and how that may be different than at 

other embassies of similar size and purpose? 

Mr. GEISEL. That is really going to be done under our Baghdad 

master plan audit, which begins literally in a matter of days. And 

what we are going to do is review whether the infrastructure that 

is already in place and the proposed new construction align with 

the short-term and long-term diplomatic presence. So the answer 

is we are looking and we will let you know. 

Mr. TIERNEY. I mean, obviously, that should be conditioned on 

that. We also look at part of what they are proposing is a classified 

embassy annex extension, some considerable work, maybe $20 million to $35 million on that. It looks to me like they are talking 

about a sniff and some other things in that base, some classified 

stuff. Are you going to be able to see what you need to see to make 

an evaluation of that, or should this Committee and others in Congress be looking to make sure it is evaluated by some other appropriate entity? 

Mr. GEISEL. We have all the clearances we need to look at that 

work, and we certainly will. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Okay. I mean, having sat through the hearings on 

the original embassy construction and failures or whatever, it is 

something that we definitely have to do. And I also question $700 

million, none of the seventh of that hundred million plus for things 

that look like they would be intricate to any building of that nature 

out there. How they could have left them out is sort of surprising 

on that. 

I am also very interested that we take a look at how many people 

they plan to have in that facility, what their purposes are and how 

that purpose aligns to what the diplomatic mission is. Are we doing 

diplomacy on that building? Are we doing something else? Do we 

need those people for that particular mission? Where does it line 

up. One mention in this article is it going to consolidate other 

things so we will be taking a presence out of other parts of the 

country and putting them in there, only to find out that later mobility and security improves and you are going to be kicking them 

back out. All those questions are yours hopefully to give us some 

advice and direction on. 

95 

Mr. GEISEL. I would love to have you lead the team. I think you 

are asking the very questions we will be asking. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I am comforted to know that you are going 

to ask them because I think all of us up here just sit here with our 

mouths gaping open when we look at the amount of money for such 

basic things on that and we look at the staggering number of people that they are going to put in an embassy that I have not seen 

in any of the embassies anywhere else in comparably sized countries. 

I understand the security issue, but if a country doesn’t want our 

people to be moving around, we have to take a look at how we limit 

our presence there and just work with that. This idea of having private security people running around getting paid what they are 

getting paid, to then tell us that they just can’t move and their security advice is to stay put is kind of crazy on that. So thank you 

for your help with that. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

I would like to thank our witnesses for taking time to be with 

us. As I think the testimony today has made clear, this is an ongoing issue, so I suspect we will be seeing many, if not all, of you in 

front of this Committee again, and again I thank you for your participation. 

The Committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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