United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted January 20, 2015*

Decided January 23, 2015 

Before 

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge 

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 13-3153 

JOHN DEUELL BROWN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 12 CV 00957 

Joan B. Gottschall, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

John Brown, an Illinois prisoner, sued Cook County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

claiming that he was denied essential medical care while in the county sheriff’s custody 

as a pretrial detainee. The district court eventually dismissed the suit after finding that 

Brown had tried to renege on a settlement, which the court enforced. Brown appeals 

from the order enforcing the settlement, which we uphold. 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is 

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 13-3153 Page 2 

 Brown concedes that, after the district court had recruited a lawyer to assist him, 

he authorized counsel to engage in settlement negotiations. The defendant offered 

$6,000, and, according to Brown’s lawyer, the plaintiff privately said he would accept 

that figure if the attorney couldn’t wrangle a better deal. Brown’s lawyer resumed 

negotiating, and when the defendant increased its offer to $6,300, the lawyer orally 

accepted on Brown’s behalf. Counsel orally communicated this agreement to Brown, 

who, according to the lawyer, replied that he was satisfied with the deal. That same day 

Brown’s lawyer notified opposing counsel that Brown was on board, and Brown 

himself wrote his lawyer acknowledging the “agreed settlement” but noting that he had 

forgotten to tell counsel that he wanted the settlement check issued in the name of his 

mother. Brown’s lawyer then notified the district court that a settlement had been 

reached, but a week later, after the terms were reduced to writing, Brown refused to 

sign. 

 Brown’s lawyer then filed a motion to withdraw, disclosing the course of the 

negotiations and her communications with Brown. Counsel also attached a copy of 

Brown’s letter acknowledging his acceptance of the $6,300 deal. At the same time the 

defendant moved to compel Brown to sign the settlement. In pro se responses to both of 

these motions, Brown expressed skepticism that his attorney had done much to assist 

him but said he still would accept $6,300 if the defendant could prove that his lawyer 

had participated in drafting or revising the settlement document. The defendant then 

submitted e-mail correspondence and redlined drafts of the settlement language 

evidencing changes made at the insistence of Brown’s lawyer. 

 The district court reviewed the written submissions from Brown and the lawyers 

and concluded that appointed counsel’s authority to accept the $6,300 offer on Brown’s 

behalf appeared to be in dispute. Nevertheless, the court continued, Brown had said in 

his pro se responses that he would accept the settlement embodied by the opposing 

lawyers’ final, written agreement if given proof that his lawyer participated in drafting 

that language. That condition was met, the court said. After then giving Brown several 

months to execute the settlement document, the court ordered it enforced when Brown 

still refused to sign. The court dismissed Brown’s lawsuit, making that dismissal with 

prejudice after giving the defendant 90 days to make payment. Brown received the 

settlement check. 

 On appeal Brown principally challenges the district court’s determination that he 

accepted a $6,300 settlement offer. Brown also insists that the court was required to 
No. 13-3153 Page 3 

conduct an evidentiary hearing before concluding that his lawyer was authorized to 

agree to the offer on his behalf. 

 Whether the parties to a federal lawsuit have reached an enforceable settlement 

is a question governed by contract principles in the state where the court sits. Dillard v. 

Starcon Int’l Inc., 483 F.3d 502, 506 (7th Cir. 2007); Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc., 279 

F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2002). In Illinois an oral settlement negotiated between counsel is 

binding on the litigants if the lawyers were expressly authorized to settle and there was 

an offer, acceptance, and meeting of the minds. Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 710 (7th 

Cir. 2010); Dillard, 483 F.3d at 507; Magallanes v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 535 F.3d 582, 584–85 (7th 

Cir. 2008); Brewer v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1333-34 (Ill. 1995). The 

need for an evidentiary hearing to decide if these conditions were satisfied is within the 

district court’s discretion, see Elustra, 595 F.3d at 710; Hakim v. Payco-Gen. Am. 

Credits, Inc., 272 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2001). 

 We agree with the district court that a binding settlement was reached. Brown 

insists that he didn’t accept the $6,300 deal and regardless, he says, there wasn’t a 

meeting of the minds. But plainly he had authorized his attorney to settle the suit for 

this amount. For purposes here we accept Brown’s assertion that his lawyer jumped the 

gun by agreeing to the $6,300 figure without authorization (though counsel says that 

she had express authorization to accept even $6,000 if she couldn’t get a better offer). 

But even if the lawyer acted hastily, the letter that Brown wrote after learning what 

counsel had done shows unequivocally that Brown—whether or not he gave prior 

authorization—surely ratified counsel’s action immediately after being told. See Horwitz 

v. Holabird & Root, 816 N.E.2d 272, 280 (Ill. 2004) (recognizing there can be ratification of 

lawyer’s unauthorized act); People v. Bowman, 561 N.E.2d 633, 639 (Ill. 1990) (collecting 

civil and criminal cases where client ratifies lawyer’s actions). See also Carr v. Runyan, 89 

F.3d 327, 332 (recognizing same rule under Indiana law). An evidentiary hearing would 

have added nothing to this obvious conclusion, especially since Brown has never 

explained what else he possibly could have meant by his reference to an “agreed 

settlement” for $6,300. Moreover, as the district court observed, even after Brown had 

tried to back out of the deal, he told the court and opposing counsel that he would 

stand by the agreement if the defendant supplied proof that his appointed lawyer had 

actively participated in the settlement process. The defendant did exactly that, though, 

in our view, the parties’ agreement would have been equally binding had the defendant 

ignored this demand. Further, counsel for the parties had agreed to all material terms, 

so there was a meeting of the minds. See Dillard, 483 F.3d at 507. 
No. 13-3153 Page 4 

 Accordingly, Brown was bound by his settlement, and the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in enforcing his agreement. We have reviewed Brown’s remaining 

arguments, and none has merit. 

 AFFIRMED.