U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,

http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,

U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202–512–1800, or 866–512–1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

i 

75–635 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–151] 

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: 

AFGHAN CORRUPTION AND THE 

DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE 

FIGHTING FORCE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

AUGUST 2, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CHRISTOPHER J. BRIGHT, Professional Staff Member 

PAUL LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

ARTHUR MILIKH, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, August 2, 2012, Afghan National Security Forces: Afghan Corruption and the Development of an Effective Fighting Force ................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, August 2, 2012 ....................................................................................... 25 

THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 2012 

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: AFGHAN CORRUPTION AND 

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Wittman, Hon. Rob, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Oversight and Investigations ......................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Dubik, LTG James M., USA (Ret.), Senior Fellow, Institute for the Study 

of War .................................................................................................................... 2 

Felbab–Brown, Vanda, Ph.D., Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution ..................................................................................................................... 4 

Katzman, Kenneth, Ph.D., Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional 

Research Service .................................................................................................. 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Dubik, LTG James M. ...................................................................................... 30 

Felbab–Brown, Vanda ...................................................................................... 43 

Katzman, Kenneth ........................................................................................... 61 

Wittman, Hon. Rob ........................................................................................... 29 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES: AFGHAN CORRUPTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE 

FIGHTING FORCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

Washington, DC, Thursday, August 2, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:05 p.m. in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Rob Wittman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Mr. WITTMAN. Ladies and gentleman, thank you all so much. 

We will call to order the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations for a hearing on Afghan National Security Forces, specifically looking at Afghan corruption and the development of an effective fighting force. I want to welcome folks today as our subcommittee convenes the fifth and final hearing in our series related 

to the Afghan National Security Forces. 

This afternoon we have before us a panel of experts to provide 

testimony about how corruption in Afghanistan might impede the 

development of that nation’s security forces. 

Corruption could prevent army and police units from successfully 

assuming the responsibility for securing Afghanistan from internal 

and external threats after 2014. Corruption also potentially reduces 

the operational effectiveness of security forces and jeopardizes their 

legitimacy with their population. 

In order for the United States to achieve its strategic goal of denying terrorists safe haven in Afghanistan, it is essential that Afghan forces be capable of maintaining security and stability after 

transition is complete in 2014. 

Our purpose today is not to undertake a comprehensive assessment of corruption in the region, but instead to narrowly focus on 

how corruption affects the development of an effective Afghan army 

and police. 

Our panel today includes retired Lieutenant General James M. 

Dubik, Senior Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War; Dr. 

Vanda Felbab-Brown, a Foreign Policy Study Fellow at the Brookings Institution; and Dr. Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle 

Eastern Affairs at the Congressional Research Service. 

Thank you for your participation today. We appreciate you taking your time and we look forward to your testimony. 
2 

I note that all members have received your full written testimony. It will also be entered into the record as submitted. Therefore, this afternoon I ask that in the interest of time that you summarize your comments and highlight the significant points to allow 

members greater time to pose questions and ask for additional information. I will make sure that I sound the gavel at 5 minutes to 

try to keep you all as closely as we can to 5 minutes so that panel 

members have a chance to ask questions. 

This hearing marks the conclusion of a 7-week effort overseeing 

the development of the Afghan National Security Forces and the 

timetable to withdraw U.S. combat troops and cede security responsibility to Afghan units. 

The subcommittee has also held five hearings and received one 

classified briefing on the topic. In addition to our three panelists 

today, we have heard from sixteen other witnesses. Among other 

topics, these specialists have assessed the President’s declared 

strategy and drawdown schedule and the method by which the 

United States and its allies train Afghan forces and measure the 

results. 

The subcommittee has also taken testimony from historians who 

reflected upon applicable lessons from earlier cases in which indigenous forces assumed security responsibility from withdrawing allies. 

Like the remarks we will hear today, the briefing statements and 

testimony have informed subcommittee members about the situation in Afghanistan, and they equip us to consider how the U.S. 

should proceed. 

With that, Mr. Cooper, I will turn it to you for any opening statement you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no opening statement. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. 

We will go to our witnesses. We will go first to Lieutenant General Dubik. 

STATEMENT OF LTG JAMES M. DUBIK, USA (RET.), SENIOR 

FELLOW, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR 

General DUBIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to 

address the committee. 

Developing security forces, military and police, during an active 

insurgency where the outcome remains unclear and government 

proficiency and legitimacy are still emerging is no simple task and 

is harder still in the face of a strategic deadline. Yet the task is 

not impossible. 

During my tenure as the Commanding General of Multinational 

Security and Transition Command in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization] Training Mission Iraq, we did accelerate the growth 

of the Iraqi Security Forces in size, capability, and confidence and 

improve the Ministries of Defense and Interior as well as the Iraqi 

joint headquarters well enough that when the counteroffensive of 

2007 and 2008 ended, the Iraqi forces were large enough, capable 
3 

enough, and confident enough for coalition forces first to withdraw 

from the cities and then altogether. 

So using that experience in my several trips to Afghanistan prior 

to on active duty and active duty, I present four major points for 

the committee’s consideration. 

First, our goal with respect to the Afghan National Security 

Forces must be to create a large enough, capable enough, and confident enough set of security forces. Numbers matter. The U.S. offsets size with the highest quality leadership, recruiting, training, 

and equipment, but nations like Iraq and Afghanistan use size to 

offset their lack in those categories. Capability, combat power, is a 

function of fighting skill and supporting systems, and fighting skill 

is the easiest to develop. The systems that support a soldier or a 

policeman, intelligence, fire support, logistics, command and control, are as important as fighting skill, but are much harder to develop. 

And confidence comes in three categories. First, the Security 

Force is confident in itself; second, the people’s confidence in their 

own security forces—and this confidence is a function of the ability 

to impose security; and then fairness in enforcing security, once imposed; and last, the government’s confidence to use their security 

forces. 

My second major point. Three types of partnerships will be required to meet this ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] development goal: Partners in training and institutions, embedded partners, and unit partners. The numbers and types of partners will 

change and diminish over time, but all three will be required, in 

my view, in some form well after 2014. In a post-2014 Afghanistan, 

the Office of Security Cooperation approach used in Iraq will not 

work. 

My third major point. Neither the ANSF nor their associated 

ministries will be self-sustaining by 2014. This is the main reason 

why an Office of Security Cooperation approach will not work. They 

will need assistance in developing their human capital, acquiring 

and maintaining their equipment, funding, and most importantly, 

in improving the systems and procedures associated with good tactical through institutional performance. 

My last main point. Illiteracy and corruption are conditions that 

cannot be ignored, but need not impede progress toward the ANSF 

development goal. In Afghanistan, insufficient literacy is a national 

condition and growing the literacy rate will be a multigenerational 

activity. In the last 2 or 3 years, the ANSF has played a huge part 

in improving this national problem. Illiteracy rates do affect the 

growth rates of both leadership and technical skills and therefore 

aggressive literacy training will have to continue for some time. 

But the literacy programs are a positive influence in a retention 

within the ANSF. 

Corruption is also a national condition. It is not going away anytime soon. For the Ministry of Defense and the ANSF themselves, 

this means a robust inspector general and a sufficiently independent criminal investigation division is important. In the Ministry of Interior it means sufficient independent internal affairs organizations, from ministerial to a district level. While we can’t expect these kinds of anticorruption measures to be immediately ef-
4 

fective, we can expect that they exist, that their caseloads expand, 

and that cases are closed with some sort of satisfactory action. 

So in closing, I have addressed the development of the Afghan 

National Security Forces as if such development is an independent 

activity. Of course, it is not. Rather, it is very much a dependent 

activity. First, depending on the sense that the government of Afghanistan has credibility with its people and will prevail over the 

insurgency. Second, and related to the first, the capability of any 

security force is always relative to the enemy it is fighting. Thus, 

the ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] requirement is 

to drive down the capacity of the Taliban, the Haqqani network, 

and others, to a level that the Afghans can in fact handle with the 

size force they have. And finally, success depends upon continued 

U.S. and NATO commitment. 

Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity and I look 

forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you very much, Lieutenant General Dubik. 

[The prepared statement of General Dubik can be found in the 

Appendix on page 30.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Now we will go to Dr. Felbab-Brown. 

STATEMENT OF VANDA FELBAB–BROWN, PH.D., FELLOW, 

FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I am honored to able to address you today. 

The linchpin of the transition strategy in Afghanistan and its 

most developed element is the gradual transfer of responsibility 

from ISAF to Afghan National Security Forces. However, in handing responsibility over to the Afghans, we are handing over a stalemated war and the territory clearly that is being handed over is 

much smaller than projected. 

Few Afghans believe that a better future lies on the horizon after 

2014. The result is pervasive hedging on the part of key power brokers as well as ordinary Afghans. Worse yet, Afghans have become 

disconnected and alienated from the national government and the 

country’s other power arrangements. Governance in Afghanistan 

has been characterized by weakly functioning state institutions 

that are unwilling and unable to uniformly enforce laws and policies. 

Standing up the ANSF has been one of the brightest spots of the 

transition. But it is also a big unknown. Its size and quality has 

been growing, but for many years beyond 2014 it will be dependent 

on ISAF for critical enablers such as in command and control, intelligence, air support, medical evacuations, and others. Moreover, 

much of the transfer of responsibility to ANSF remains undefined, 

including what does it mean that the ANSF will be in lead as of 

mid-2013, how many U.S. forces will stay, how narrow the U.S. 

mission will be defined, is it simply counterterrorism after 2014 or 

on-base narrow training. 

One thing is clear, however; the faster we go out, the smaller the 

U.S. military presence, the greater the chance that whatever 

achievements have been accomplished will be undermined. A disturbing big unknown is whether the ANSF itself, including the Afghan National Army, will in fact be able to withstand the ethnic 
5 

and patronage fractionalization that is already fracturing the institution today. 

Even the Afghan National Army is being increasingly threatened 

and weakened by corruption. The Afghan National Police is notorious for being both ethnically fractionalized and deeply corrupt, 

being seen by many Afghans as the true perpetrator of many 

crimes. It lacks any anticrime capacity. 

Among the most controversial aspects of the transition strategy 

is the standing up of various militias, including the Afghan Local 

Police. In highly contested communities rift by ethnic and tribal divisions there is a substantial risk that the ALP [Afghan Local Police] itself will become the source of conflict as well as a source of 

corruption and it will start preying on both local and neighboring 

communities. 

Let me offer a few policy recommendations. The political and 

governance system in Afghanistan is so pervasively corrupt that 

there is a need to prioritize some anticorruption efforts. Among the 

most critical one is to limit ethnic and tribal discrimination that 

drives entire communities into the hands of the Taliban, particularly such discrimination in the standing up of the ANA [Afghan 

National Army] and ANP [Afghan National Police]. Expanding access to markets and contracts and expanding such access so it is 

not ethnically and tribally driven is also critically important. Whatever effective local officials there are—and often there are very 

few—they should be supported and efforts to undermine them 

should not be tolerated. 

The United States and the international community should seek 

to diminish and ideally neutralize the influence of problematic 

power brokers. There are very many and it is a difficult task, but 

we should get away from the policy of cobbling them for the sake 

of shortened battlefield exigencies. But whatever redlines we set for 

the power brokers, we need to be willing to uphold and punish 

those who transgress those redlines. 

ISAF needs to resist the siren song of speeding up the formation 

of the ALP and expanding the program. In fact, I would argue it 

is important now to develop a credible and robust mechanism to 

roll back those units that have gone rogue and to start thinking 

about how to demobilize the ALP after 2014. 

Persevering with whatever capacities and resolve can still be 

gathered in the United States and in the West and emphasizing 

good governance does not guarantee success. Many of the large and 

deeper trends may not be completely outside the control and beyond the diminishing leverage of the international community. But 

we still have leverage and we still can pull some levers. Going out 

fast, defining success and the mission in 2014, after 2014 in very 

narrow counterterrorism terms, and the writing off of governance 

only spells failure of the entire effort. 

Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Dr. Felbab-Brown. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Felbab-Brown can be found in 

the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. We will go to Dr. Katzman. 
6 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH KATZMAN, PH.D., SPECIALIST IN 

MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 

SERVICE 

Dr. KATZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the committee, for 

asking CRS to invite me today. I will summarize my testimony and 

look forward to your questions afterwards. 

Having followed Afghanistan since 1985 as a U.S. Government 

analyst during Soviet occupation, one conceptual problem I think 

we have with the term ‘‘corruption’’ is that it is used to describe 

a lot of different behaviors in Afghanistan, some of which are illegal and illicit, some of which are simply cultural and traditional 

and do not involve the use of power and position for personal gain. 

The ANSF, as I totally agree, is influenced by many related factors, ethnic, political and regional factionalism, that I would like to 

discuss today, because they have the potential for the ANSF to 

fracture after 2014. 

Fundamentally, the ANSF is not a long-established institution. 

There was no military in 2001 when the United States led the effort to kick out the Taliban. The military had been completely disbanded during the fighting of 1992 to 1996 and the Taliban regime 

of 1996 to 2001. So there is no tradition of professionalism in the 

Afghan National Forces. We have built them from scratch. 

After the Taliban fell in 2001, a lot of the factional fighters from 

the north, the Tajiks particularly, Uzbeks, Hazaras, who had 

fought the Taliban, they were simply put on the rolls of the Defense Ministry. They were declared Defense Ministry employees for 

all practical purposes, but they were basically militia fighters. The 

international community then decided to disband these militia 

fighters and build a new national army from scratch. And so this 

is the reason there is no professional tradition. 

Even though there was a decision to disband these militias, 

many of them simply stashed weapons, many of them simply keep 

caches, and many of them continue to report to the informal power 

brokers that we have been discussing. In addition, because there 

is no tradition of professionalism, the force is subject to all the corruption factors that we see generally in Afghanistan. Demanding 

bribes; particularly the ANP demand bribes from citizens at checkpoints. Selective justice; putting people in jail or taking them out 

of jail, in many cases based on who they are or appeals from the 

family. Embezzlement. Numerous examples exist where the United 

States has given the ANA and ANP weaponry and then they have 

sold it and put the money in their pockets. They have sold fuel. 

And then they are claiming they are unable to move around to perform missions because they sold the fuel we gave them. 

Ghost employees: putting people on the payroll that do not show 

up for duty in the ANP and ANA. Diverting of salaries. This has 

been a great problem. Initially, the salaries were given to the commanders to give out to their people. So the commanders were putting a portion in their pocket and then giving the rest to the people 

under their command. 

As I said, selling of donor-provided vehicles. Illicit activity: we 

have had numerous reports of ANP headquarters with poppy fields 

growing poppy right there at the police headquarters. We had a recent example of U.S. investigators looking into half the Afghan Air 
7 

Force flying narcotics around the country. Absences without leave. 

Afghanistan has very little banking system, even today. So a lot it 

is dealt with in cash. And the tradition in Afghanistan is a soldier 

will go bring his mother his payroll in cash. It is very difficult to 

just wire money around. So a lot of them go home for a month, give 

their mother the money, and then they disappear for a month. And 

usually they do make their way back. 

But the issue I want to in my remaining time get to is this issue 

of factionalism, because I think that really has the potential to destroy the force outright if it is put under pressure. Now if the 

United States is there in significant numbers after 2014, the U.S. 

can keep these pressures under control. If, however, the Taliban 

begin making gains after 2014 or if Karzai or his successor makes 

a deal with the Taliban that the Northern factions view as consolidating the Pashtun faction—Karzai is a Pashtun; Pashtuns are 

about 42 percent—the force could break up. A lot of them have loyalty to warlords, these factional leaders. The Vice President, Muhammad Fahim, a lot of Tajiks are loyal to him. Uzbek leader 

Abdul Rashid Dostam, from the north, many in the ANSF are loyal 

to him. He has a very unsavory record of human rights abuses. 

Atta Mohammad Noor, the Governor of Balkh Province, has a large 

following in the ANSF. Mohammad Mohaquiq, a leader of the 

Hazaras, which are Shiites, many Hazaras in the force follow him. 

Isma’il Khan, a Tajik from the West, he is now Energy Minister. 

Still, many people loyal to him. And the Karzai family that basically runs Kandahar, many in the force, Pashtuns, are loyal to 

them. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Dr. Katzman, thank you. We will make sure your 

testimony gets entered in its entirety into the record. We appreciate that. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Katzman can be found in the Appendix on page 61.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. We will go to questions. 

Mr. Cooper, I will go to you first. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Felbab-Brown, you have studied corruption and problems in 

many tough areas of the world. Are the Afghan problems particularly bad or are they pretty much par for the course from Mexico, 

Colombia, countries you have studied? 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. In my view, they are particularly bad. Although, of course, the region, Afghan and more broadly the part of 

South Asia and Central Asia, is very corrupt, what is striking 

about Afghanistan is the extent to which corruption undermines 

any basic legitimacy the population feels toward the existing political system. 

What is also very disturbing about the nature of corruption in 

Afghanistan is the patronage networks have been shrinking and 

becoming increasingly exclusionary. In my view, it is very difficult 

to imagine how the regime could continue operating beyond 2014, 

even if President Karzai does not remain in power and in fact does 

not run for reelection and does not seek to change the constitution, 

without some effort to make the system more legitimate. 

What is also disturbing about corruption in Afghanistan is, of 

course, it is overlapped with the ethnic and tribal rifts, and the 
8 

ability of the Taliban insurgency to emphasize corruption as a key 

motivating mechanism for the population to tolerate if not outright 

support the Taliban. 

Mr. COOPER. Would it make sense to just go ahead and de facto 

allow the warlord system to continue? Because as Dr. Katzman 

mentioned, these ethnic differences seem to be so great that Tajiks 

support Tajiks, Hazaras support Hazaras, Pashtuns support 

Pashtuns. 

Woodrow Wilson had a policy of ethnic self-determination. 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. However, what is, of course, difficult in the 

case of Afghanistan, is the way in which these different allegiances 

overlap. There are many rifts even within the ethnic communities. 

There are different power brokers within the same ethnic communities. And increasingly the population really does not see the 

power brokers or the warlords as legitimate. In fact, from my interactions with ordinary Afghans during repeated trips to Afghanistan, I am struck by the craving for a state that could be legitimate, that could deliver justice, and that would allow people to 

break out of the clasp in which the warlords have them. But to the 

extent that the security situation is difficult and there is more and 

more identification of the basis of narrow patronage as the only 

mechanism of access to security, the more difficult, of course, it is 

to break out from these warlords. But I hear repeatedly how much 

people really dislike the mafia rule or the patronage, the nepotism. 

So I don’t feel it is a viable path for a stable Afghanistan. 

Mr. COOPER. Your recommendation to go ahead and disband the 

ALP is startling. It is very much counter to the U.S. military point 

of view. 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. I am aware. I also do not believe that it is 

likely that we are going to move quickly to disbanding the ALP. 

But I think one of the biggest burdens we can saddle, whatever Afghan government there is, it is an open-ended bag in which these 

militias, ALP being one of them, exist. But there is no clear path 

to dismantle them because they have the huge potential of triggering insecurity in local areas and fundamentally in the short 

term as well as in the long term they are one of the most difficult 

aspects of governance, to the point that they even prevent or complicate the rule of the warlords, should it ever come to that. 

Mr. COOPER. I thank the chairman. In view of the shortness of 

time, I will yield the balance of my time. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. 

We will go now to Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Felbab-Brown, so you are referring to the ALP as part of that 

village stabilization program, am I correct in that? 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. Yes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. So it is your concern that that merely feeds the 

sort of factionalism and militia content? 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. Often that is the case. I would emphasize 

there is a need to look at the ALP in local context and that in fact 

Afghanistan is an extremely diverse and varied place. But of communities are not homogenous; if they are rift by ethnic and tribal 

divisions, militias, including the ALP, is yet another trigger of con-
9 

flict, competition over land, resources, and a trigger of security dilemma. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Let me just refer to the whole panel in terms of 

if you were to make one recommendation as to how we can counter 

corruption and better account for U.S. taxpayer dollars as well as 

those from our coalition allies in the international community, 

what recommendation would that be? General. 

General DUBIK. Well, sir, it would be the recommendation that 

I made in my opening remarks. On the military side, a robust, 

independent inspector general criminal investigation, and on the 

Ministry of Interior and police side and internal affairs. To get 

those systems going, however weak they might be at the beginning, 

but to keep moving them forward and expanding their strength 

and their semi-independence as internal mechanism to look at the 

defense and interior forces. 

Mr. COFFMAN. That is incredibly challenging. 

General DUBIK. It is incredibly challenging. 

Mr. COFFMAN. I think this committee had looked at the situation 

with Dawood Hospital and the corruption that occurred there and 

with military medical supplies that were sold and the fact that soldiers and police, their families, had to pay the requisite bribes to 

the hospital personnel before they were treated or fed. And so the 

commanding general that was in charge of the hospital was merely 

laterally moved, was never disciplined, to our knowledge, for that. 

General DUBIK. I can just say that with my experience in Iraq, 

the Minister of Interior’s Internal Affairs had 12 assassination attempts in the 15 months that I was there. This was a gruesome 

but very telling metric that his system was at least having some 

effect. 

Given the political situation, sometimes lateral moves are a satisfactory solution. It may not always be the case that a person is 

fired or tried or jailed. Merely eliminating might be good enough 

for now. And until the system gets more robust and stronger and 

better outcomes can occur, you might have to just say lateral moves 

are okay. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Dr. Katzman. 

Dr. KATZMAN. Thank you. I think there is really no magic bullet 

for corruption in Afghanistan. I think we have repeatedly thought 

that by creating anticorruption institutions and getting Karzai to 

make statements—and he just issued a huge administrative decree 

last week with all sorts of anticorruption provisions—we feel we 

are going to make progress. And we never do. 

Not to paraphrase former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, but we 

have to deal with the Afghanistan we have. It is very difficult. 

Every Afghan feels the regime may collapse and he is going to have 

to run quickly and he wants as much money as possible. So it is 

very difficult to grapple with. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Let me put this question forward and if you all 

could answer briefly because my time is very limited, and that is: 

Is it that the Afghans don’t have confidence that the regime is 

going to hold and so they are looking out for themselves in terms 

of their own economic security or financial security and lining their 

pockets as much as they can, while they can? Or, is it something 

so such a part of their culture that even if they felt the regime was 
10 

going to last forever and the United States was going to be physically there forever, that there would still be the same level of corruption as there is today? 

Who would like to answer that? 

General DUBIK. Well, I will take a shot, sir; a very short shot. 

I think it is a combination. People are people. And some cases of 

corruption are just that, unsurety of the future. I have no retirement. I have no future. I have to protect myself. That is one face 

of corruption. Power and intimidation is another face of corruption. 

And mere greed and nefarious character is another face of corruption. It is not a single-source activity. 

Mr. WITTMAN. We are going to at this point recess. We have a 

series of votes that we have to get to the floor to. I will ask the 

indulgence of the witnesses to return. We should be returning here 

by about 5 o’clock. We would like to pick up questioning from there. 

From there, we will also have an opportunity to go through a second round of questioning for the members that are here now. 

So we will recess and we will reconvene when we come back from 

votes approximately 5 o’clock. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Panelists, thank you so much. We appreciate your 

patience. It was an interesting time across the street. 

We are back here to get back to our line of questioning. I will 

go ahead and begin. And we have several other members that are 

in line to ask questions. We will make sure that they get to ask 

theirs when they come back. 

I wanted to ask Lieutenant General Dubik a question. Some Afghans believe that the U.S. and its allies aren’t really serious about 

fighting corruption, and the reason being is because we have had 

alliances with different power brokers there and leaders that have 

been associated with corruption and trying to achieve certain 

things. So I think the Afghans look at us and say, If you are going 

to deal with leaders that are corrupt, how then are we supposed 

to battle corruption if you are going to essentially try to secure 

gains through those particular efforts? 

How do you feel, first of all, that the Afghans view that? Is it 

something that creates credibility on our behalf when we try to advise them about how to avoid corruption and when we have been 

dealing with leaders that have been associated with corruption? I 

just wanted to get your thoughts on that and really to what extent 

should we tolerate corruption as we try to navigate our way 

through the current position that we are in, in the transfer of 

power and making sure that there is some level of stability there 

in the country? 

General DUBIK. Going back to my Iraq experience, I guess if I 

was only allowed to deal with people who I knew were absolutely 

clean, it would be talking to myself in the mirror. So as a matter 

of working with people that you have to work with to move something forward and trying at the same time to reduce their involvement in corrupt activities, that is, unfortunately, the situation in 

which many of the senior leaders find themselves in. 

But there is a line beyond which we shouldn’t cross; that there 

are some kinds of levels of corruption that are so nefarious that 

they erode our own credibility and therefore erode our risk to the 
11 

mission itself. And in those kind of situations, when they come up, 

it is hard to say that person has to go, we can’t deal with that person anymore, because who is going to be the replacement. It really 

is a physical conundrum if there ever was one. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Dr. Felbab-Brown, I wanted to maybe elaborate a 

little bit on that. Mr. Cooper spoke about the system of working 

with warlords that the U.S. pursued initially and then said, No, we 

actually need to go to a different system. But is there a utility or 

a need to deal with those different factions here? And we talked 

about how the country ethnically is broken up. Is there a need to 

actually do that? And we know that there is some corruption within that warlord system. Is there a need or an association with our 

success and being able to deal with those folks? Even though we 

know that there is corruption there, we know the problems that we 

deal with from an ethical standpoint in doing that and what that 

means in the long term for the country. 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. Mr. Chairman, it would be unrealistic and 

perhaps naive to believe that we can completely do away with the 

power brokers or completely not deal with them. It would be equally naive that we can combat all of corruption. I think where we 

have run into real difficulties is that we have systematically been 

unable to bypass even the most pernicious power brokers that undermine institutions that we have been trying to build. So today, 

really, we have very few institutions. We have structures that 

revolve around personalities, often personalities that are profoundly illegitimate from the perspective of Afghans that have participated in land theft, murder, systematic tribal discriminations, 

all of which are fodders for the Taliban insurgency and for mobilization against the government. 

So the question is really not do we deal with power brokers. The 

question is: What are the redlines that we draw for power brokers, 

how visibly we embrace them. I am very concerned when I see us 

embracing Afghan commanders that perhaps are effective on the 

battlefield but have a record of mass murder. If we embrace them 

publicly and if you allow them to perpetuate behaviors, that drives 

entire communities into the hands of the Taliban. 

I am equally, however, concerned when I see us setting redlines 

that we then do not have the wherewithal to uphold. I think that 

extremely hurts the mission. So we need to be very careful to assess what behavior absolutely undermines the very fundamentals 

of what we are trying to achieve—any chance of a stable government—but then really be prepared to impose some punishment for 

those who violate the redlines. 

Unfortunately, I see us being stuck in situations where we publicly say we are determined to combat corruption, and corruption 

defined very broadly, including things like land theft, systematic 

discrimination, and say no, that is intolerable. You cannot steal the 

votes, you cannot beat up this village, and then when it happens 

say, Oh well, next time we really mean it; you cannot do it. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you. 

Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to believe that 

the average Afghan that you have described wants a better system 

and wants to be clean, but so often it seems like they just want 
12 

to take the place of the dictator or the kleptocrat. Can you identify 

a completely clean noncorrupt Afghan leader? 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. I think I can identify individuals, many of 

whom are not in positions of power, where one would say they are 

completely not corrupt. And we need to, I think, understand the 

systems of corruptions is indeed system, not simply individual 

vices. The reality is that to become a leader in Afghanistan, one 

needs to conduct a lot of compromises and a lot of engaging in very 

brutal politics, power politics. 

I would, again, go back to what kind of corruption can be lived 

with and what kind of corruption is tolerable to the Afghans. So 

the issue is not so much that you have to pay an extra fee, a bribe 

to get a license for something. The issue becomes where you systematically cannot get a contract or cannot bid for a contract because you are member of a different tribe. That is the level of corruption that is intolerable to Afghans and that is the kind of corruption, that is the kind of power abuse we should be focusing on, 

even if we cannot say absolutely no one is corrupt. And, unfortunately, what has often happened is we have embraced local leaders, 

we exalted them, and later on we discover how extremely problematic they were and how much they were involved in criminal activities or even siding with the Taliban. So that is not the base that 

we should say. That is not the baseline that we should set. It 

should be about what levels of corruption and abuse systematically 

undermines the effort. 

What I fear increasingly is that the very impressive, very committed young Afghans—often young Afghans—that I think have a 

great commitment to their country are increasingly finding themselves squeezed out of the political system and having less opportunity to participate. The more insecure the country will feel after 

2014 and heading up to 2014, the less space for them will be to 

push for any changes. 

Mr. COOPER. My able military aide, Major Ray Windmiller, had 

these questions he wanted to ask. How is the transition going in 

the Tranche 3 areas? Anybody has a response to that? 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. If I may start on that, I think Tranche 3 is 

very important. It is the first time that the Afghan National Security Forces are encountering difficult environments. The difficulty 

will be Tranche 4 and Tranche 5, but it is the first time that 

Tranche 3 includes some districts where there is deep military concentration and very problematic governance. 

I think the verdict is still out. I think there are concerns. But the 

good thing about Tranche 3 is that it is still opportunity for 

backup, which there might not be in the same extent in Tranche 

4 and Tranche 5, which will be even more difficult environments. 

What concerns me about transition and the tranche concept is 

that more and more it is simply a one-way street. There is really 

very little opportunity for ISAF forces to come back to aid us that 

have gone problematically. And that is worrisome. And it is given 

by the drawdown schedule, by the timeline schedule. 

Mr. COOPER. When you talk about anticorruption efforts, could 

you give us a specific example of what might work? You talk about 

how they don’t like land theft or murder and then that forces them 

into the arms of the Taliban. And the Taliban is known for murder. 
13 

They have prompt justice, but is it fair justice? It is—your choice 

is between evils, isn’t it? 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. Yes, you are absolutely right the Taliban is, 

of course, brutal, and in many ways it is a choice between evils. 

What I find in many settings, including Afghanistan, is that what 

is most difficult for people to adjust to and develop coping mechanisms is unpredictable abuse, unpredictable delivery of power or 

delivery of rules. And, unfortunately, the Taliban is capable of delivering a brutal order but nonetheless a predictable order. Indeed, 

very many of my Afghan interlocutors constantly draw on the comparisons to the Taliban era and they will say it was very brutal, 

we disliked the Taliban, we hated the Taliban, but there was predictability. We could adjust. There was no crime. You could travel 

between Tarin Kot and Kandahar and no one would draw a buzz 

and we could have a million rupees. At the time, it was rupees. 

Now we will have to pay to the Taliban, we will have to pay the 

police, we will have to pay to the ANA, whoever has a checkpoint. 

You will have to pay to the power broker. 

So the most difficult thing for them is just the cause of the situation and the unpredictability. One of the major weaknesses of our 

campaign is the lack of focus that we devote to crime. The Afghan 

National Police is all focused as either counterterrorism force or 

light counterinsurgency force. It has close to no capacity for dealing 

with any form of crime. And of course the Taliban is not bound by 

the same burdens of proof. It can simply designate this is the victim or this is the perpetrator of the crime, here is the victim, here 

is the punishment. And people gravitate to it. I see the Taliban all 

the time outcompeting us in the delivery of ‘‘justice.’’ And it is, of 

course, tragic, given how abusive and terrible they are. But I all 

the time hear from my Afghan interlocutors that the Taliban fares 

far better than the Afghan government in delivering justice. 

Mr. COOPER. I see that my time has expired. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Go ahead, Dr. Katzman. 

Dr. KATZMAN. If I can just add to that. In my talks there is not 

public popular support for the Taliban. In some cases, they are 

winning through intimidation. People do go to the justice system 

that the Taliban run mainly because it is accessible. To get to formal justice system, you may have to drive far distances and you 

may not trust the outcome. But primarily the Taliban justice system may be right there in a community you know. It may be 

Duranni Pashtuns. There is a few types of Pashtuns. Duranni 

Pashtuns would rather use a Duranni Taliban informal justice 

than a Ghilzai Pashtun formal justice. So there are some affiliations there that we don’t really quite understand that well. But 

these are factors, too. But I would say that there is not popular 

support for the Taliban. When they came in in 1996, they were 

welcomed. People welcomed them into the communities. That is not 

happening now. They fight their way in, they intimidate their way 

in, but they are not welcomed. So I think the lion’s share of Afghans still want the government to succeed. The problem is we are 

not seeing the level of success that we would hope for. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you. I want to pose this question to all the panel members. A media outlet recently reported 

that an Afghan general felt like he had to halt missions because 
14 

his target had influence or was influential in the Taliban government. I wanted to ask your perception on that. Do you believe that 

that is happening? And if it is, how does it affect the operational 

success of the ANSF, obviously both in the short term, but in the 

long term also. 

General DUBIK. I don’t know specifically whether that was true 

or false. There are times in an insurgency where you go after targets without any political influence. But there are also times where 

you have a target, but for political reasons you don’t go after them 

right now, where the damage done by succeeding diminishes the 

overall positive effort. So I can conceive of cases. I did picture a few 

in my head where person X was eminently killable but we said, 

Let’s not kill him right now. Let’s not capture him right now. 

So I don’t see that as inconsistent with the way you might wage 

a counterinsurgency campaign, or a counterterrorist campaign, for 

that matter. 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. I also do not know the specific context of the 

statement, but certainly one of the manifestations of the ethnic tensions in the Afghan National Army, and more broadly ANSF, is a 

constant complaint from the Tajiks that the Durrani Pashtuns, 

Kandahari Pashtun factions are preventing them from going after 

targets they would like to go after. What one hears from the 

Pashtun side of the Afghan National Forces is that many of the 

targets that the NDS [National Directorate of Security] and Tajiks 

are designating as targets are perhaps personal targets and being 

unfairly labeled as the Taliban. 

I think it is critical that ISAF very much focuses on trying to understand the patterns of behavior and patterns of interest that are 

emerging for the different factions of the ANSF. What worries me 

about the future ahead is that increasingly the ISAF is going to be 

dependent on Afghan interlocutors for developing good local intelligence pictures, and particularly intelligence pictures with respect 

to targeting patterns and with respect to designation of who is the 

Taliban, who is the enemy, and that can in itself become a trigger 

of violence and further intensify pressures for the fracturing of the 

ANSF. 

Dr. KATZMAN. I would add that it is not only the Afghan side 

that we are seeing this, there have been some reports in the press 

that have come out that actually the U.S. military has been doing 

what is called selective releases of certain Taliban commanders 

from Bagram, where they have been imprisoned at Bagram Air 

Base, for the purpose of ingratiating with certain Taliban factions. 

And it is U.S. policy to try to promote a reconciliation between the 

Taliban and the Afghan government. 

So I think we are going to see more of this, pulling our punches, 

not going after certain targets, selective releases of certain Taliban 

who are perceived as perhaps having the ear of Mullah Omar, the 

Quetta Shura, maybe even the Haqqani Network. So I would say 

it is not a surprise that we are seeing these type of things. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Dr. Felbab-Brown, let me ask you this. In some 

previous testimony witnesses have stated that they believe the U.S. 

should pick a winner in the next Afghan election. What is your 

opinion? What do you think of that proposition? 
15 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. I do not believe this would be a good policy, 

for a variety of reasons. One, I don’t believe the U.S. record in picking winners is very good in either Afghanistan—of course, we 

haven’t picked, but we clearly supported the leader that turned out 

to be problematic as time went on, but more broadly in other contexts. 

I am also not persuaded that we have the capacity to really enforce the winner to either take place and win the elections or, if 

necessary, to support the leader beyond. And ultimately I do not 

believe it would enhance the legitimacy of that leader, and perhaps 

it could be a kiss of death for him—it will likely be him. There is 

very little chance it would be a woman. 

So I do not believe it is a good suggestion, a good policy. I, however, believe that in fact we should go in the opposite direction. We 

should try to enable whatever procedural legitimacy that can be 

built for the elections as well as help the Afghans very quickly 

draw up security plans for the election, should the elections take 

place. Clearly, the elections will be extremely problematic, extremely contested. Elite consensus has collapsed. I think the vitriolic level that we saw in 2009, 2010 after elections is nothing to 

what we are heading for with 2014. So it will be a political earthquake for Afghanistan. An extremely fragile period. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Dr. Katzman. 

Dr. KATZMAN. If I can add to that, an interesting example is actually in 2009 President Karzai believes the U.S. did try to pick a 

winner, which was against him, Ashraf Ghani, who reconciled subsequently with Karzai and is now working for him as the transition 

director. And what it led to was Karzai subsequently basically tried 

to freeze out Ambassador Holbrooke. And it caused a tremendous 

rift with the SRAP [Special Representative for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan] office. So it has proved problematic in the past. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Lieutenant General Dubik. 

General DUBIK. I didn’t want to—I don’t have the expertise to 

answer the political question, but I did want to talk about 2014. 

Because the conjunction of events in 2014—the election, our 

downsizing, and the potential beginning of the downsizing of the 

Afghan forces—is really an unholy mix of activities. And the timing 

of these activities is really important. We saw in Iraq, for example, 

the second Maliki government taking a year to form, and in that 

year not very many decisions, and led to a period where we 

couldn’t even make good decisions between the two governments. 

So the timing of such a transition is important. 

And with respect to the ANSF, the beginning of any thought of 

reducing them in size at a time that is going to be politically difficult and at a time when we are reducing ISAF forces and ISAF 

funding and U.S. forces and U.S. funding would be very problematic with respect to the confidence of the ANSF. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you. 

Does it make any sense to respect the Durand Line? 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. Respect for, or disrespect for what purpose? 

I think the—— 

Mr. COOPER. Well, we don’t want to anger the Pakistanis. 
16 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. I understand. And what I was—— 

Mr. COOPER. There is not much difference between the Federally 

Administered Tribal Area and that part of Afghanistan, and it is 

an arbitrary line on a map drawn by the Brits. And we spend, 

what, you know, enormous amounts of money enforcing British 

lines on a map, not just there but Iraq, the Middle East. 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. Understood. And I think we need to be very 

conscious of carefully calculating what benefits we would get out of 

more aggressive, more visible actions on the Pakistani side with respect to the Afghan environment, with what kind of precipitating 

triggers in Pakistan that could generate. 

And I am well aware of the game that Pakistan constantly plays 

with us. That is, if you push too aggressively, we are too fragile 

and we will collapse, and so we feel a great deal of restraint. I am 

well aware of the game. 

At the same time, Pakistan is extremely fragile. There are very 

few trends that are going right in the country. It is a country in 

a meltdown, or slow meltdown, if you would like, crumbling. And, 

of course, the consequences of a more fundamental crumbling in 

Pakistan beyond FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Area], but 

in Punjab, would be extraordinarily bad for the region and for the 

United States. So, unfortunately, we are stuck with treading very 

carefully across the Durand Line and more broadly in Pakistan. 

Mr. COOPER. It is so terribly frustrating when, you know, we 

won’t even change our textile policies to encourage more jobs or 

manufacturing in what is now the sixth-largest country in the 

world, or maybe the fifth. 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. I understand. 

Mr. COOPER. And, you know, we seem unable to coordinate our 

policy very well. And we always seem surprised when there is corruption. And it could well be that, you know, the natural state of 

human beings is corrupt, not innocent, you know, and I wonder if 

we have ever tried that as a foreign policy premise. Because there 

are some U.S. States that aren’t very clean, you know. If you look 

at a map of world corruption, most of the world is red, the United 

States is pink, Canada and Australia I think are pretty white. But 

that is not something to brag on. 

But, you know, certainly from a military standpoint, the first 

rule of war is to understand the nature of the enemy. And do we 

train our troops to expect massive wholesale corruption, you know, 

when they go into these places? 

General DUBIK. Well, I can say I have never participated in a 

training or education session of acceptance of corruption. But—— 

Mr. COOPER. But if that is the state of the world and that is the 

nature of the enemy—— 

General DUBIK. No, but—— 

Mr. COOPER [continuing]. Then deal with it. 

General DUBIK. And that was why I reacted to the chairman’s 

question as I did. If you go into any country—and I have invaded 

several—and you are only going to deal with noncorrupt individuals, you are not going to deal with very many people. So the issue 

is how to deal with it in such a way that it doesn’t undermine the 

accomplishment of the mission and how to deal with individuals 
17 

and attempt to limit the corruption to types that are going to go 

on anyway. 

Mr. COOPER. I had an unusual discussion with the Ambassador, 

U.S. Ambassador to Yemen, who told me that he was not allowed 

to attend any function at which Khat was chewed, which eliminated all functions in Yemen, so weddings, funerals, meetings. So 

he was, by U.S. law, unable to be an Ambassador, but yet he was— 

it is like, hello? You know, so we are not meshing Western views 

very well with these cultures. And we are not going to change the 

cultures, even after 10 years of intense U.S. involvement. So why 

are we there? 

And, you know, the U.S. taxpayer does not want us to be the 

world’s policeman. So when you fault us for not conducting more 

police activities inside Afghanistan, that is not what the U.S. taxpayer is for. 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. If I can answer, sir, I agree, the U.S. should 

not be the world’s policeman. Nonetheless, the United States made 

the decision to go to Afghanistan, and the U.S. has a vital interest 

to see a stable government, not democratic, not Valhalla, but a stable government in Afghanistan. And if crime undermines the very 

sustainability of the government, I think it is important that the 

international community focuses on developing local Afghan capacities to fight crime to the extent that it enables the sustainability 

of the government. 

I also agree that it is very difficult to change cultures. And there 

are many both cultural and institutional reasons for corruption. 

And I am not concerned with corruption that would be tolerable to 

Afghans. I am very concerned with corruption that is intolerable to 

Afghans, that they find is out of proportion, out of the context, that 

is corruption with abuse that makes their lives difficult to the extent that they do not want to exist under the current political dispensation. 

Dr. KATZMAN. I would just add that our—and I cover the Persian 

Gulf region for CRS [Congressional Research Service] also, and our 

entire Persian Gulf defense strategy hinges on dealing with governments, the Gulf Cooperation Council governments, that are perhaps not quite as corrupt as Afghanistan, but corruption is rampant in the Persian Gulf. I think we have to accept that in that region, where institutions are weak and personalities are strong, that 

this is just the cost of doing business. 

And certainly we could put standards on the Gulf countries, on 

human rights, corruption, democracy, and probably they would not 

meet those standards at any time in the foreseeable future. But if 

we had that standard, our Gulf defense strategy would collapse. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, just under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 

all these U.S. entities are liable unless they have some exemption 

that I am unaware of. But it is so routine, as you suggest, that 

they are all in legal jeopardy under our own laws, because we just 

don’t want to cope with the nature of the enemy or the culture. 

I see that my time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. 

Dr. Katzman, let me ask this: Do you believe that the U.S. has 

a clear policy as it relates to reducing corruption in Afghanistan, 

improving Afghan governance? Is there a structure or an organiza-
18 

tion to it that includes something like, you know, goals, methods, 

timetables, that sort of thing? 

And if there is, if there is a plain effort to do that, do you think 

that it is effective not only in how it might have been implemented 

to this point, but is it effective in what the structure projects to go 

forward? 

Dr. KATZMAN. Yes, I think so. And a lot of these metrics have 

been laid out. Generally, they get laid out at these big conferences 

we have had. We have had conferences in Kabul, we had the Bonn 

conference in December, we had the Tokyo donors’ conference just 

3 or 4 weeks ago. And that is when the Afghan Government usually recommits to pledges it has already made at the previous conference and did not accomplish. 

Now, as a consequence of the Tokyo conference, there were clear 

penalties. There will be reductions in donor assistance, presumably, if the Karzai government does not meet certain criteria. That 

prompted Karzai to issue the administrative reforms that I referred 

to earlier in my testimony. 

Now, again, Karzai’s administrative reforms are largely, if one 

goes through them—and I have gone through them—a recommitment to what has already been promised. Most of the laws that 

they promised to pass by now have not been passed. The institutions we have set up, like the High Office of Oversight, the 

Anticorruption Tribunal, the Office of the Attorney General, the 

Special Investigative Unit, all of these institutions Karzai has 

pledged to cooperate with, he has allowed us to set them up, but 

then when the rubber hits the road and it is time to really prosecute people close to Karzai or who he supports, who support him, 

it tends to fall apart. And we tend to see him go after people who 

do not support him, or he is trying to marginalize. 

So corruption becomes a political issue, in many ways. It is pure 

politics in Afghanistan. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Dr. Felbab-Brown. 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. If I can add to that, and, indeed, 

anticorruption efforts are politically manipulated not just by President Karzai but by many other people in the position of power. And 

I think we have to be careful not to embrace officials that claim to 

be doing anticorruption while they are really appointing to the 

cleared positions their friends and their clients. 

I am not as persuaded as Ken that we have a clear policy on corruption. I see U.S. policy over the decade oscillating between ignoring corruption because of its sheer size, because focus has been far 

more on the military side than on the political aspect of the effort, 

and then embracing goals that are unrealistic, ambitious goals, 

‘‘We are going to wipe out corruption.’’ 

That is why I think it is critical that we set goals that are realistic, the most egregious corruption that is clearly contributing to 

conflict dynamics. But then we need to have the wherewithal to exercise our leverage and punish those who violate these minimal 

standards. And I frequently see us not being able to deliver, folding 

at the last minute. And, of course, that just sends the signal that 

we truly don’t see the message. 

I also believe that we need to be realistic that the only, or the 

principal mechanism of power and influence that President Karzai 
19 

has is appointments. He has weak control with the military and is 

very much dependent on outside control. He has very weak control 

of the purse. So his principal way of assuring support for himself 

is political appointments. So we cannot tell him that anyone who 

is a bad governor or bad official will not be tolerable; we have to 

be concerned to his cause, to his political cause. But we need to be 

sure that the ones that are truly intolerable to us and are truly intolerable to Afghans, we will work with him to get rid of them. And 

I don’t see that we are taking this more nuanced approach. I see 

us oscillating between everything or nothing and being all the time 

frustrated. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I think that is a good point. In fact, that was 

going to lead to my next question. It seems like, to me, that there 

are many different levels of corruption. You know, there are very 

obtrusive forms of corruption, where somebody does something that 

is looked at as unethical in exchange for money or something that 

benefits them personally. But it seems like, too, that there is also 

a level of corruption there that obviously we define as corruption 

but maybe is more societal there, and that is influence-peddling; 

you know, I do something for you, you do something for me, you 

protect me, you insulate me, you provide that utility to me. Although it may not be a direct benefit, it is an indirect benefit in 

being able to preserve one’s power or being able to preserve oneself 

in that particular environment. 

Along that range, is there an acceptable area that the U.S. 

should say, officials that operate within this realm, while maybe 

not acceptable in the United States, should be acceptable there in 

Afghanistan as far as how that government develops and how we 

look at corruption? Because there are many, many different levels 

of that, and if we cast off this blanket definition of corruption, the 

question is, can we ever attain that? 

And Mr. Cooper brought up a great point, in that there are some 

limitations of U.S. law in how we deal with folks there. But is 

there an acceptable level of what we would define as corruption but 

what there is really a matter of maybe self-preservation or even 

being able to maintain power? Is there a level there that you think 

is acceptable? 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. Yes. Realistically, not just Afghanistan but 

the region very much operates on the basis of nepotism and patronage. It is something that Afghans are used to. What I would say 

is that the level that should not be acceptable to us is the level that 

is not acceptable to the Afghans. So, realistically, we will not be 

able to do without patronage network and have truly simply a process of promotions and job appointments based on merit. That is not 

going to happen anytime soon. 

However, we should be very concerned when patronage networks 

are becoming more and more exclusionary and less and less people 

have the ability to participate in these networks. So one of our objectives should be, well, how can you expand the networks of patronage? That is not ideal; it is problematic. I wish that was not 

the case, but it is probably the only mechanism that we might have 

available in some circumstances. 

What concerns me is that I do not see us exercise even these levels of leverage, that I do not see us even be concerned about pa-
20 

tronage, nepotism, exclusionary corruption, contract wars. There 

are literally contract wars of shooting up the opposition, where 

they are clearly alienating people and communities so profoundly 

from the government that they are easy prey, easy mobilization 

target for the Taliban. 

And so I think we really need to have far more consultations 

with ordinary Afghans, as well as power brokers in Afghanistan, 

about what level of political arrangement they believe can be sustainable. And from my conversations with Afghans over the many 

years, including recently, there are very few people in Afghanistan 

right now who believe that the current political dispensation is sustainable. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Dr. Katzman. 

Dr. KATZMAN. No, I mean, I think that is a very good point. 

When the Taliban fell, the international community set up a very 

high standard: that we are going to remake Afghanistan into a 

Western-style democracy with Western-style standards of human 

rights, anticorruption. And then that was doomed to fail. Had the 

standard been set more realistically from the beginning, we could 

have accomplished that and built these institutions. 

The problem we have had is, each time we have pushed on corruption, Karzai has pushed back. When Karzai has had his outbursts of, ‘‘I am going to join the Taliban,’’ or, ‘‘You are putting too 

much pressure,’’ it has been over this corruption issue. Every time 

we have pushed, that is when he has had his moments, let’s say. 

So it has been a very difficult issue. It is not going to be solved 

anytime soon. I think the issue is to stay engaged after 2014, let 

the society keep evolving, as it is. Civil society is much broader 

than it was in 2001. You have groups that are advocating for all 

types of things in Afghanistan that never existed before. Let the society mature, and that will help, I believe, reduce the problem over 

a long period of time. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me ask this: Do you agree with Dr. FelbabBrown’s assertion that what the Afghans define as acceptable or 

unacceptable in the corruption realm should become our metric in 

how we deal with corruption or don’t deal with corruption? 

Dr. KATZMAN. It is a way to approach the issue. I happen to 

think that most Afghans, what they complain about most are the 

shakedowns, where the police are demanding—their own interaction with first responders, with the Afghan Government, where 

that meets the road. 

I think the Afghans tend to be less concerned with the Kabul 

bank scandal and Karzai’s brothers. That tends to get interest here 

in the United States, but I think most Afghans probably accept 

that this is what happens in the region, and it is not as much. But 

when they themselves are forced to take from their paltry amount 

of money to pay a bribe, I think that is what has undermined the 

legitimacy the most. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Lieutenant General Dubik. 

General DUBIK. And could I say, Mr. Chairman, that is something that staying engaged can improve. Walking away after 2014 

or diminishing, sort of de facto walking away after 2014, won’t improve any of that. So staying engaged with the Afghan National Se-
21 

curity Forces and their ministries in the proper partnership way 

from ministerial to selected units has the greatest probability of 

improving that kind of corrupt predatory practices and I think 

raises the credibility of the government, would raise the credibility 

of the government, at least some degree. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Dr. Felbab-Brown, any additional comments? 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. Yes. I agree with Ken that it is particularly 

problematic when government officials are very abusive. So police 

ask for bribes, often bribes at the level that it makes no sense to 

bring legal products to market because nothing is left of profits, so 

exorbitant tolls, exorbitant bribes that really liquidate the productive capacity of the population. 

But I would also add that, apart from shakedowns, there is an 

increasing tendency on the part of power brokers, including government officials, to engage in land theft, murder, extortion at gunpoint, tactics that one associates with mafias. And Afghans are extraordinarily concerned and upset about the utter lack of prosecution and punishment, the utter impunity that government officials 

are capable of enjoying. 

I would also add to the comments that we promised something 

that we were not able to deliver that, of course, the problems with 

the early promises was that we really have not tried to deliver 

them. We frequently were speaking in very ambitious terms about 

democracy, equality, yet at the same time we were embracing some 

of the most bloody and most problematic power brokers. And so Afghans have lived with these contradictions about what we raised 

as their aspirations and, ultimately, the very little that we have 

been able to deliver. 

I have a book on Afghanistan coming out later in the fall, and 

the title of the book is ‘‘Afghan Aspirations and American Ambivalence.’’ And the choice is precisely because we raised their aspirations to perhaps levels they themselves would not aspire to, but 

nonetheless we raised them, but then we delivered so little. And, 

in fact, we kept constantly contradicting the promises and proclamations that we have made, that Afghans are profoundly disappointed with the political system and dispensation they are living with. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Uh-huh. 

Dr. KATZMAN. If I can just add, on this issue of what I call ‘‘faction leaders’’—and Karzai hates the term ‘‘warlords’’—the problem 

is, these faction leaders have constituencies. There are communities in Afghanistan who look to these leaders to protect their interests. This is why they stay afloat. Karzai has tried to 

marginalize Isma’il Khan, he has tried to marginalize Abdul 

Rashid Dostam, he has tried to marginalize Mohammad Mohaqiq. 

We have tried; Ambassador Khalilzad when he was there. It never 

works, because they have constituencies that are keeping them 

afloat. 

Until we solve that problem, which I would argue is probably not 

ever going to be solved, these guys are going to stay influential, 

they are going to keep committing the abuses and getting away 

with it. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me ask this, then, in closing. And I am assuming in what I have heard from your testimony that you all look at 
22 

the process of our efforts in Afghanistan along a continuum. And 

we know today we have people that say, let’s get out immediately, 

let’s cut our losses, let’s go. You have others that say, listen, still 

pretty challenging times here, we have done a lot, we have to continue past 2014 if we hope to preserve any hope of any kind of success there, regardless of the definition, or that we would preserve 

the efforts that have been put forth there, both in the money that 

we have spent, the lives that have been given there, and the future 

for Afghanistan. 

I just wanted to get you all in a closing comment to let me know, 

where do you think we ought to be on that continuum? Is the 2014, 

should that be shut the door and let’s get out? Should we continue 

past 2014? If we do, what do you think the nature of that should 

be past 2014? 

So I just want to get you all, your ideas about that as we close. 

General DUBIK. Well, I am not in the 2014-equals-index boat. My 

wife is, but I am not, so we have all kind of interesting conversations at home. 

But I do believe that if we maintain a sufficiently large and sufficiently aggressive military and nonmilitary presence up to 2014, 

we have the conditions to set so that our military presence beyond 

2014 can be much smaller than it is. 

It should be sufficient, though, to make sure that the Afghans’ 

force remains large enough, capable enough, and confident enough 

to take up the slack. The slack will be significant. The threat will 

not have gone away, even if we reduce it. And the elements that 

will give the Afghans the confidence and the capability are mostly 

the fact that we are still there. And we don’t have to be in large 

numbers to do this, but it has to be greater than zero, and it has 

to be significant from their perspective. 

On the diplomatic side, many of the problems that we see in the 

Government I think have been the result of vacillating policies, at 

least up to 2009. And the consistency of policies on the nonmilitary 

side will also help over time to mitigate some of these problems. 

None of the problems, security or nonsecurity, Government or 

economic, are going to be easily solved. They are all going to be 

developmentable over time, emerging, improving slowly. And our 

engagement and our assistance, NATO and U.S., is part of the solution. Withdrawal is not part of the solution. 

Dr. FELBAB-BROWN. I strongly believe that if 2014 is the end, 

what Afghans, most Afghans, fear, a civil war, a localized civil war, 

is the most likely outcome. Obviously, this would be terribly detrimental to U.S. national interests. 

I am not sure, and I don’t think anyone can be sure at this point, 

that staying beyond 2014 can reverse the trends, but it gives a 

chance. Nonetheless, how we stay beyond 2014, how we continue 

to be engaged is critical. In my view, it means to stay engaged militarily, with as much support, combat support for the Afghan National Security Forces as we can generate, certainly with respect to 

critical enablers but hopefully beyond critical enablers. 

The mission needs to be defined as more broadly stability and 

counterinsurgency than simply NATO counterterrorism. If it is defined simply as NATO counterterrorism, the value of our presence 

diminishes rapidly and our leverage diminishes rapidly. 
23 

And I also believe that we need to push on governance far more 

determinedly than we have had—selectively, critically. It cannot be 

we ask for everything, but, nonetheless, far more determinedly 

than we have done. I believe it is extremely difficult to imagine 

how stability can be achieved, even the improvements on the security situation, without some greater legitimacy of the government. 

So I think the excruciating dilemma for U.S. foreign policy is 

that continuing, even wisely continuing, doesn’t guarantee success, 

yet abruptly leaving and shutting the door spells failure. 

Dr. KATZMAN. I completely concur with my fellow panelists. The 

more we stay engaged after 2014, the better result we are going 

to achieve. I think a lot of it is, to be honest, probably up to the 

U.S. taxpayers and their elected representatives. We are probably 

going to be looking at, I would say, $25 billion a year after 2014, 

assuming there is 15,000 to 20,000 U.S. forces, plus the ANSF 

fund, which is $2 billion, plus economic aid, somewhere in that. 

Now, that is a lot less than $100 billion a year, but it is still $25 

billion or so. So those are considerations. 

But, clearly, the more we stay engaged, and not just with military training and special forces but with governance programs, 

State Department-led, AID [Agency for International Development]-led civil society programs, democracy and governance programs, economic development programs, we can preserve the 

progress and not witness a backsliding. 

If we leave entirely, all the guys I mentioned—Dostam, Mohaqiq, 

Isma’il—these guys are all going to become exponentially more 

powerful, because all the Afghans are going to look to them to protect them if we leave. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. 

Dr. KATZMAN. If we stay engaged, I think the government stays 

together and we continue to work on what we have worked on with 

them. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Panelists, thank you all so much for joining us. Thanks for your 

patience as we went back over to vote. And I appreciate you spending some time with us afterwards to make sure we could complete 

our line of questioning. 

So, again, thank you. 

And this hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 6:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

AUGUST 2, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

AUGUST 2, 2012 

(29) 

Statement of Hon. Rob Wittman 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations 

Hearing on 

Afghan National Security Forces: Afghan Corruption 

and the Development of an Effective Fighting Force 

August 2, 2012 

Today the Oversight and Investigations subcommittee convenes 

the fifth and final hearing in our series related to the Afghan National Security Forces. 

This afternoon we have before us a panel of experts to provide 

testimony about how corruption in Afghanistan might impede the 

development of that nation’s security forces. 

Corruption could prevent army and police units from successfully 

assuming responsibility for securing Afghanistan from internal and 

external threats after 2014. Corruption also potentially reduces the 

operational effectiveness of security forces and jeopardizes their legitimacy with the population. 

In order for the United States to achieve its strategic goal of denying terrorists safe haven in Afghanistan, it is essential that Afghan forces be capable of maintaining security and stability after 

transition is complete in 2014. Our purpose today is not to undertake a comprehensive assessment of corruption in the region, but 

instead to narrowly focus on how corruption affects the development of an effective Afghan army and police. 

Our panel today includes: 

 Retired Lieutenant General James M. Dubik, Senior Fellow 

at the Institute for the Study of War; 

 Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown, a Foreign Policy Studies Fellow at 

the Brookings Institution; and 

 Dr. Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs 

at the Congressional Research Service. 

Thank you for your participation. We look forward to your testimony. 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 

Æ