21 June 2012

Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, and Nuclear

Consequence Management

Joint Publication 3-41
Intentionally Blank
i 

PREFACE 

1. Scope 

This publication provides joint doctrine for the military response to mitigate the effects 

of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear event or incident. 

2. Purpose 

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other 

joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It 

provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. 

It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the 

force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity 

of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatant 

commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these 

commands, and the Services. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate 

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of 

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of 

a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine 

and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the 

United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s 

doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and 

doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

WILLIAM E. GORTNEY 

VADM, USN 

Director, Joint Staff 
Preface 

ii JP 3-41 

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iii 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-41, DATED 2 OCTOBER 2006 

• Incorporates a modified title and discussion of high-yield explosives. Does not 

provide doctrine for explosives incidents because of the lack of a residual hazard. 

• Characterizes chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) consequence 

management (CM) as an overall United States Government (USG) capability and 

responsibility. 

• Clarifies US military roles as a response to reduce the effects of a CBRN incident, 

regardless of who is designated the USG lead. 

• Highlights the importance of emergency preparedness in CBRN CM. 

• Adds a section on limitation and mitigation strategies (risk management). 

• Adds or revises 13 definitions and deletes 52 CBRN-related definitions in JP 1-02, 

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terminology. 

• Incorporates a new Appendix B, “Planning Considerations for Logistics and Other 

Services from Domestic Base Support Installations and Foreign Theater Assets.” 

• Incorporates a new Appendix C, “Department of Defense Domestic Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Enterprise Assets.” 

• Reduces redundancies and improves continuity between JP 3-11, Operations in 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments; JP 3-27, Homeland 

Defense; JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities; and JP 3-40, Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction.

 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-41 

Intentionally Blank 
v 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii 

CHAPTER I 

OVERVIEW 

 General ....................................................................................................................... I-1 

 Domestic, Foreign, and Military Situations ............................................................... I-4 

 Emergency Preparedness for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Consequence Management ........................................................................................ I-5 

 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response ..................................... I-5 

 General Planning Considerations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response .................................................................................................... I-10 

 Limitation and Mitigation Strategies ....................................................................... I-27 

CHAPTER II 

DOMESTIC CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR 

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT 

 General ......................................................................................................................II-1 

 Roles, Responsibilities, Authorities, and Assets ......................................................II-2 

 Command Relationships .........................................................................................II-12 

 Considerations ........................................................................................................II-17 

 Unique Planning Considerations in the Domestic Operational Environment ........II-28 

 Applicable Laws and Agreements in the Domestic Operational Environment ......II-31 

CHAPTER III 

FOREIGN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT 

 General .................................................................................................................... III-1 

 Roles, Responsibilities, Authorities, and Assets .................................................... III-6 

 Command Relationships ....................................................................................... III-11 

 Affected Nation Considerations ........................................................................... III-15 

 Joint and Multinational Force Considerations ...................................................... III-17 

 Unique Planning Considerations in a Foreign Operational Environment ............ III-18 

 Applicable International Laws and Agreements ................................................... III-19 

CHAPTER IV 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-LED CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, 

RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT 

 General .................................................................................................................... IV-1 

 Roles and Responsibilities ...................................................................................... IV-2 

 Command Relationships ......................................................................................... IV-3 

 Joint Force Considerations ..................................................................................... IV-4 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-41 

 Planning Considerations During Military Operations ............................................ IV-4 

 General Planning Considerations ........................................................................... IV-6 

APPENDIX 

A Key Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and 

International Protocols .............................................................................. A-1 

B Planning Considerations for Logistics and Other Services from 

Domestic Base Support Installations and Foreign Theater Assets .............B-1 

C Department of Defense Domestic Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear Response Enterprise Assets .............................C-1 

D References ................................................................................................. D-1 

E Administrative Instructions ........................................................................ E-1 

GLOSSARY 

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................. GL-1 

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-7 

FIGURE 

I-1 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Incident Responses ........................................................................ I-3 

II-1 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Consequence Management .........................................................................II-2 

II-2 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Command Relationships ............................................II-13 

II-3 Layered Response Spectrum ....................................................................II-18 

II-4 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

Activities by Operational Phase ...............................................................II-22 

II-5 Control Zones ...........................................................................................II-30 

III-1 Foreign Consequence Management ......................................................... III-2 

III-2 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Affected State Coordination Process ........................................................ III-4 

C-1 Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Enterprise .....................................................................C-2 

 
vii 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

• Provides an overview of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

consequence management 

• Covers domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence 

management 

• Describes foreign chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

consequence management 

• Explains Department of Defense-led chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear consequence management 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

Overview 

The United States Government 

(USG) approach to managing the 

consequences of a Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear (CBRN) incident is 

vested in chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear 

consequence management 

(CBRN CM). 

Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

consequence management (CBRN CM) can be 

described as the overarching United States 

Government (USG) capability and the strategic 

national direction, to prepare for, respond to, and 

recover from the effects of a chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incident at 

home or abroad, and whether or not it is attributed 

to an attack using weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD). When required, the USG will coordinate 

its response to a CBRN incident in one of three 

ways based on the geopolitical situation. The 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the 

USG lead agency for incident management that 

would include a domestic CBRN incident. 

Overseas, excluding homeland areas, the 

Department of State (DOS) is the USG lead for 

what is termed foreign consequence management 

(FCM). 

Domestic, Foreign, and Military 

Situations 

The geographic scope of the domestic CBRN 

response is associated with the US homeland. 

Generally, when tasked, Department of Defense 

(DOD) is a supporting agency, coordinating 

agency, or cooperating agency in support of DHS 

within the National Response Framework (NRF) 

and National Incident Management System 
Executive Summary 

viii JP 3-41 

Both the geographic location and 

the political or diplomatic context 

factor into the selection of USG 

lead for a CBRN incident 

response. 

(NIMS). A response could take place in a 

permissive or uncertain foreign operational 

environment. Requests for FCM originate from 

an affected nation through DOS. The military 

situation is when CBRN incidents occur requiring 

DOD to lead the USG response effort due to the 

lack of DOS and/or sufficient affected nation 

‘federal’ presence as a result of military 

operations or for a CBRN incident on a DOD 

installation. 

Emergency Preparedness for 

CBRN CM

CBRN CM provides the operational framework 

for those authorized measures DOD takes in 

preparation for anticipated CBRN incidents to 

mitigate the loss of life and property and to assist 

with the response and short-term recovery that 

may be required. This includes having plans, 

policies, procedures, training, and equipment 

necessary to effectively respond to CBRN 

incidents 

CBRN Response Domestic CBRN response (with DOD and/or 

National Guard [NG] in Title 10 or Title 32, 

United States Code (USC), status or state active 

duty) is a form of civil support (CS)/defense 

support of civil authorities (DSCA) (with DHS as 

the lead for coordinating the USG response). 

FCM encompasses the overall USG effort to 

prepare for and respond to a CBRN incident on 

foreign territory in which an impacted nation has 

primary responsibility, and DOS is the lead USG 

agency responsible for coordinating the USG 

response. DOD-led CBRN CM would typically 

occur during military operations (e.g., WMD 

offensive operations), or in other situations in 

which DOS lacks sufficient local authority or 

presence to lead the USG effort. 

General Planning Considerations 

for CBRN Response

Planning considerations for responding to CBRN 

incidents and requests for assistance are 

influenced by a variety of factors, including USG 

policy decisions, lessons learned from responses 

to previous incidents, capability limitations, time, 

current military operations, studies and analyses, 

modeling and simulation, live-agent tests and 

experiments, as well as analysis and exercise of 
Executive Summary

ix 

national planning scenarios. CBRN materials 

present hazards that can be both immediate and 

delayed. In some instances the delayed effects 

can cause significant problems for joint forces and 

may alter planned operations. Operational 

planning considerations for a CBRN response 

include: assessment, coordination planning, 

logistics planning, health services support 

planning, populace care planning, 

decontamination planning, site management 

support planning, religious affairs, and biometric 

and identity assurance. 

Limitation and Mitigation 

Strategies 

Any CBRN response must be 

rapid in order to save lives and 

minimize the overall impact of 

the incident. 

In conducting risk management, the joint force 

commander (JFC) should employ risk assessment 

procedures to help identify hazards and then 

assess those hazards to determine risk. Risk 

management entails developing controls and 

making risk decisions, implementing those 

controls, and then supervising and evaluating. 

JFCs providing CBRN incident response need to 

have viable plans and be prepared to make rapid 

decisions with minimal knowledge of the scope 

and magnitude of the incident. 

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence 

Management 

CBRN CM conducted by 

department of defense (DOD) in 

the homeland in support of civil 

authorities is conducted as a 

defense support of civil 

authorities operation. 

In conducting DSCA to include CBRN response, 

a distinction is made between the different chains 

of command for active DOD, Title 10, USC, 

federal forces providing support to civil 

authorities and for NG forces commanded by the 

state governor under Title 32, USC, and state 

active duty. State and local governments are 

closest to those affected by incidents, and have a 

lead role in response and recovery. For a federal 

response to a CBRN incident, DOD support is 

tailored to the scope and magnitude of the 

incident. 

Roles, Responsibilities, 

Authorities, and Assets 

When conducting CBRN response in accordance 

with (IAW) the NRF, DOD is in support of an 

NRF emergency support function (ESF) primary 

agency or NRF incident annex coordinating 

agency. Domestic CBRN CM is managed at the 
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lowest possible level, with DOD providing 

support as directed. Commanders and their staffs 

at all levels should be knowledgeable about the 

NRF and NIMS and how their commands fit in to 

the overall national response framework. The 

NRF is a guide to how the US conducts all-hazard 

responses. 

Commander, United States 

Northern Command and 

Commander, United States 

Pacific Command 

When Secretary of Defense (SecDef) approves a 

request for DSCA during a CBRN incident, 

Commander, United States Northern 

Command and Commander, United States 

Pacific Command are the supported geographic 

combatant commanders (GCCs) for CBRN 

responses within their respective areas of 

responsibility (AORs) as designated in the 

Unified Command Plan for a federal response. 

The operational chain of command for federal 

forces remains with the GCC; the operational 

chain of command for state controlled NG forces 

remains with the governor. 

Secretary of Defense SecDef retains approval authority for the use of 

forces, personnel, units, and equipment for 

DSCA, to include support to CBRN CM. 

Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Homeland Defense and 

Americas’ Security Affairs) 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland 

Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs) 

(ASD[HD&ASA]) serves as the DOD Domestic 

Crisis Manager and provides policy oversight for 

all domestic CBRN incident support. 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 

serves as the principal military advisor to SecDef 

and the President in preparing for and responding 

to CBRN incidents, and ensures that military 

planning is accomplished to support the lead or 

other primary agency for CBRN CM, and 

provides strategic guidance to the combatant 

commanders (CCDRs) for the conduct of 

operations. 

Joint Director of Military Support Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS), 

located within the operations directorate of a joint 

staff, works closely with ASD(HD&ASA) and the 

Services, CCDRs, and National Guard Bureau to 
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xi 

produce military orders pertaining to domestic 

emergencies for the CJCS. JDOMS forwards 

these orders to SecDef for approval, and then to 

the appropriate military commander for 

execution. 

Military Services Each Service has some capability (based on its 

available assets and doctrine) to conduct or 

support CBRN CM. These capabilities may be 

called upon, when approved by SecDef, to 

provide forces, facilities, and assets to the 

supported CCDR as part of the DOD response to 

a CBRN incident. 

National Guard (NG) 

Because forces in Title 32, United 

States Code, status remain under 

the command of the governor, 

NG units may conduct law 

enforcement missions and are not 

subject to the restriction of the 

Posse Comitatus Act 

NG forces, unless federalized, operate under the 

command and control (C2) of the governor and 

the adjutant general (TAG) in state active duty 

and Title 32, USC, status. National Guard 

coordination centers, NG joint force headquarters, 

joint task forces-state, weapons of mass 

destruction-civil support teams, chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 

explosives enhanced response force package, 

homeland response forces, Joint Continental 

United States Communications Support 

Environment, and Joint Interagency Training 

Capability form the keystone of NG CBRN 

response capabilities. 

United States Coast Guard 

(USCG) 

The USCG is a military Service, a 

branch of the Armed Forces, and 

a law enforcement agency at all 

times. 

The United States Coast Guard (USCG) provides 

unique authorities, surge capacities, and 

capabilities for CBRN CM. During CBRN CM 

operations, the USCG may be supported by DOD 

forces or may support DOD forces. The National 

Strike Force deploys specialized capabilities and 

incident command expertise to support lead 

agency, incident commander, and federal onscene coordinator preparation and response to 

CBRN incidents, hazardous substance releases, 

oil discharges, and other emergencies. 

Combat Support Agencies Combat support agencies provide direct support 

to CCDRs during emergency situations and are 

subject to evaluation by CJCS. Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency (DTRA) provides operational 

and technical advice and support to DOD 
Executive Summary 

xii JP 3-41 

components and other USG departments and 

agencies, as requested and approved, regarding 

CBRN CM operations. 

Command Relationships 

Domestic CBRN CM may engage 

the full spectrum of government, 

nongovernmental organizations, 

and the private sector. 

Unity of effort can be achieved 

without unity of command and is 

the predominant solution in 

domestic CBRN response 

operations. Success requires 

unity of effort, which respects the 

chain of command of each 

participating organization while 

harnessing seamless coordination 

across jurisdictions in support of 

common objectives. 

Military forces always remain under the control of 

the chain of command as established by Title 10, 

USC, Title 14, USC, Title 32, USC, or state active 

duty. NG Soldiers and Airmen may serve either 

in a federal status like other reserve soldiers, or in 

a state status (state active duty or Title 32, USC), 

under the command of the governor. The state 

governors, through TAGs, control NG forces 

when those forces are performing active duty in 

their state role and when performing active duty 

under Title 32, USC. Legislation allows for a 

dual-status commander to have command 

authority over both federal and state forces. A 

dual-status commander provides a means for 

providing unity of effort for military forces 

operating in Title 32, USC, and Title 10, USC. A 

dual-status commander must be duly appointed 

and can be an active duty officer who accepts an 

additional state commission or can be a 

federalized state NG officer. At the operational 

level, the joint field office ensures unity of effort 

by identifying agencies that have the requisite 

capabilities to reach the common objectives or the 

ability to adapt their wide-area operations in light 

of the response by bringing their core 

competencies to the interagency forum. The JFC 

can facilitate unity of effort with civil authorities 

at the tactical level by recognizing the incident 

commander’s need to integrate the JFC’s 

resources into his incident action plan, while 

remaining cognizant that US law prevents direct 

tasking by any entity outside the military chain of 

command. 

Considerations for Domestic 

CBRN CM 

Considerations for domestic CBRN CM include: 

The joint force in a CBRN environment. The 

joint force is also responsible for protecting each 

member of DOD in support of civil authorities. 

The CBRN environment causes joint forces to 

plan in a unique way and recognize the primary 

reason for employment of the joint force is to 
Executive Summary

xiii 

support civil authorities and mitigate the 

consequences of a CBRN incident. 

Layered CBRN response. The NRF describes a 

tiered response and emphasizes that response to 

incidents should be handled at the lowest 

jurisdictional level capable of handling the work. 

The response to a CBRN incident requires the 

integration and synchronization of capabilities 

from the local, state, tribal, and federal level.

Integrated CBRN CM framework. During a 

CBRN incident, DHS coordinates the federal 

government’s incident management efforts in 

support of the civil authorities. However, it is 

likely that the major elements of operational 

framework will have already been established 

IAW strategic decisions made by state and local 

responders in the initial hours of the response 

effort.

Organizing considerations. A joint task force 

(JTF) established in support of CBRN CM is 

organized in a manner similar to a conventional 

JTF.

CBRN response options. The Joint Publication 

(JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, phasing 

model is adapted for domestic CBRN response 

operations with the following phases: 

Phase 0—Shape - interagency coordination, 

planning, identification of gaps, exercises, and 

public affairs outreach; 

Phase I—Anticipate - alerting and preparing the 

joint force may be directed through a CJCS 

warning order, planning order, or alert order; 

Phase II—Respond - executes deployment of 

forces to key theater nodes and to the joint 

operations area (JOA) to save lives, minimize 

human suffering, and maintain public confidence; 

Phase III—Operate - planning and execution 

efforts are synchronized and integrated with the 
Executive Summary 

xiv JP 3-41 

efforts of the supported civil authorities, as well 

as other military operations that may be occurring 

simultaneously within the same operational area; 

Phase IV—Stabilize - scaling down of operations 

as DOD Title 10, USC, forces, Title 32, USC, 

NG, and/or state active duty utilization diminishes 

with the associated completion of a majority of 

incident site mission assignments; and 

Phase V—Transition - consequences of the 

CBRN incident have been mitigated and adequate 

support of civil authorities has been provided such 

that further support is no longer required. 

Unique Planning Considerations 

in the Domestic Operational 

Environment 

Unique planning considerations may include the 

following: 

Base Support Installation (BSI). A BSI is a 

military installation within the US or its territories 

controlled by any military Service or agency, in or 

near an actual or projected domestic emergency 

operational area, designated by DOD to provide 

military support for DOD and federal agency 

disaster response operation efforts. 

United States Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE) Services. USACE can provide water, 

ice, construction materials, and engineer services 

when activated under ESF#3 and ESF#6 (Mass 

Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and 

Human Services). 

Mortuary Affairs. The joint force may aid 

federal and state agencies by providing mortuary 

affairs assistance. 

Decontamination Planning. The Environmental 

Protection Agency is the ESF coordinator and 

primary agency responsible for hazardous waste. 

Control Zones. In CBRN response, control 

zones are established to ensure the safety of all 

responders and control access into and out of a 

contaminated area. The three zones established at 

a chemical, radiological, nuclear, and some 
Executive Summary

xv 

biological incident sites are often referred to as 

the hot zone, the warm zone, and the cold zone. 

Applicable Laws and Agreements 

in the Domestic Operational 

Environment 

Key executive and legislative guidance 

documents include: Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive-5, Management of 

Domestic Incidents; The Robert T. Stafford 

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act; 

The National Strategy for Homeland Security; the 

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 

Destruction; and the National Strategy for 

Countering Biological Threats. Some key DOD 

guidance documents include: The Strategy for 

Homeland Defense and Civil Support; the 

Department of Defense Directive 3025 series of 

directives that provide policy on and 

responsibilities for CS activities; and Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 

3125.01, Defense Support of Civil Authorities 

(DSCA) for Domestic Consequence Management 

Operations in Response to a Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield 

Explosive (CBRNE) Incident. The NRF is a guide 

to how the nation conducts all-hazards response. 

Foreign Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence 

Management 

Foreign consequence 

management is assistance 

provided by the USG to an 

impacted nation to mitigate the 

effects of a deliberate or 

inadvertent CBRN incident.

From the national level, FCM encompasses USG 

efforts to assist partner nations to respond to 

incidents involving CBRN contaminants and the 

coordination of the US interagency response to a 

request from a partner nation following an 

incident involving CBRN contaminants. DOD’s 

CBRN response includes efforts to protect its 

citizens and its Armed Forces abroad, as well as 

those of its friends and allies, in order to mitigate 

human casualties and to provide temporary 

associated essential services. When requested by 

DOS and directed by SecDef, DOD supports 

FCM operations by performing CBRN response 

activities to the extent allowed by law and subject 

to the availability of forces. 
Executive Summary 

xvi JP 3-41 

Roles and Responsibilities Impacted Nation. Primary responsibility for 

responding to, managing, and mitigating the 

consequences of a foreign CBRN incident resides 

with the affected nation’s government. When 

overwhelmed, the impacted nation is responsible 

for requesting foreign assistance and sharing all 

relevant information about the CBRN incident 

with international partners. 

The Department of State. Unless directed 

otherwise by the President, DOS coordinates all 

USG support to an affected nation. After such an 

FCM support request by DOS is approved by 

SecDef, DOD commences its support to the 

affected nation as part of the overall USG 

response. 

The US Embassy/Chief of Mission (COM). 

Normally, all USG support to the affected nation 

will be coordinated by the responsible COM and 

country team. 

Geographic Combatant Commanders. Each 

GCC has the inherent responsibility to provide 

support to DOS, the lead for FCM, unless 

otherwise directed by the President. Each GCC 

develops plans for FCM within their assigned 

AOR and is prepared to deploy a liaison element 

to the vicinity of the incident site to liaise with the 

US embassy and to provide situational awareness 

to the supported CCDR. 

Service Chiefs. When directed by SecDef, 

provide forces (to include forces from the Reserve 

Component) as part of the supported GCC’s 

response during a CBRN incident. 

Installation Commanders. As in the US, if a 

CBRN incident occurs, US commanders on 

foreign territory may, when requested by the 

impacted nation, exercise their immediate 

response authority; however, it is more restrictive 

(limited to saving lives) than within the 

homeland. 
Executive Summary

xvii 

Authorities and Assets In the event of a CBRN incident affecting foreign 

territory, various authorities exist to govern the 

response. The two major laws which govern US 

responses to foreign CBRN incidents are the 

International Disaster Assistance section of the 

Foreign Assistance Act (Title 22, USC), and the 

military humanitarian response authorities set 

forth in Title 10, USC. Organizations that could 

respond to an FCM incident include: foreign 

emergency support team; consequence 

management support team; DTRA consequence 

management advisory team; US Armed Forces 

Radiobiology Research Institute; United States 

Air Force Radiation Assessment Team; US 

Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident 

Response Force; and United States Army 20th 

Support Command (CBRNE).

Command Relationships SecDef designates the supported and supporting 

combatant command relationships, and the 

supported CCDR establishes the command 

relationships of assigned forces for each specific 

CBRN response. The DOD supports the lead 

federal agency during USG FCM operations 

unless otherwise directed by the President. DOD 

forces remain under the C2 of the supported 

CCDR. DOS retains responsibility for 

coordination among USG entities 

Affected Nation Considerations The affected nation has primary responsibility for 

responding to, managing, coordinating other 

nations’ augmenting support, and mitigating the 

consequences of a CBRN incident within its 

borders. A major part of any FCM operation is 

augmenting affected nation operations, not 

replacing them. In order to avoid duplication of 

effort, affected nation capabilities need to be 

determined. 

Joint and Multinational Force 

Considerations 

CJCSI 3121.01, Standing Rules of 

Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force 

for US Forces (U), outlines the DOD standing 

rules of engagement (SROE) and standing rules of 

force for US forces. In general, when conducting 

FCM, SROE should be applied. However, 

CCDRs may augment SROE with supplemental 
Executive Summary 

xviii JP 3-41 

measures or by submitting supplemental measures 

to SecDef for approval. The US has standing 

agreements with some foreign governments that 

allow for the sharing of high-level intelligence 

(e.g., special category), but in all cases, the 

release of classified information to multinational 

partners is made IAW the national disclosure 

policy. The ability of the JTF to work with all 

organizations and groups is essential to mission 

accomplishment. Conceptually, the civil-military 

operations center is the meeting place of these 

elements, represented by US Service liaisons, 

military liaisons from participating countries, 

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 

representatives, DOS personnel, affected nation 

representatives, and representatives from the 

United Nations, nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs), and intergovernmental organizations. 

Unique Planning Considerations 

in a Foreign Operational 

Environment 

As in the domestic operational environment, 

CBRN response is based on a six phase construct; 

however, phase names and associated activities 

differ from the JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 

model. The six phases are: 

Phase 0—Shape - ensure DOD is organized, 

trained, equipped, and prepared to support USG 

efforts to minimize the effects of CBRN incidents 

on foreign soil; 

Phase I—Situation Assessment and 

Preparation - actions required to conduct 

situation assessment and preparation, including 

the timely and accurate assessment of the CBRN 

situation, preparation for deployment, and 

deployment of selected advance elements;

Phase II—Deployment - SecDef-approved CJCS 

deployment and/or execute order designating the 

intermediate and/or forward staging bases and 

establishing formal command relationships (i.e., 

supported and supporting commanders). The 

order serves as the formal authority for the 

deployment of forces; 
Executive Summary

xix 

Phase III—Assistance to Affected Nation 

Authorities - begins with the arrival of required 

military assistance at the incident location and 

supporting locations and ends with the 

determination that DOD support is no longer 

required or appropriate;

Phase IV—Transition to Affected Nation 

and/or Other Agencies - begins with the formal 

implementation of the transition plan for those 

tasks and responsibilities being accomplished by 

DOD and ends when directed by SecDef or the 

affected nation has assumed full responsibility for 

response activities; and

Phase V—Redeployment - redeployment of US 

military forces involved in CBRN CM operations 

or the formal transition of those forces to a purely 

disaster relief or humanitarian assistance mission.

Applicable International Laws 

and Agreements 

The complexity of FCM policies, treaties, and 

agreements requires continuous involvement of 

the staff judge advocate or appropriate legal 

advisor with the planning, control, and assessment 

of operations. Because of the international nature 

of FCM efforts, this will also include continuous 

interorganizational coordination to establish the 

legal authorities, capabilities, and limitations 

associated with engaged organizations. 

International law, policies, treaties, and 

agreements to which the US is a signatory 

identify certain rights and obligations that may 

affect joint operations. These legal requirements 

may pose constraints and restraints. They shape 

the design of operations and campaigns that deal 

with support to an FCM mission. 

Department of Defense-Led Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Consequence Management 

DOD conducts CBRN CM to 

mitigate hazards in support of 

operations or to support others in 

response/recovery (when 

required/as directed). 

All DOD CBRN CM capabilities are designed to 

be used in support of military operations. Like 

any other DOD capability, these military assets 

may be used in support of civilian operations or 

joint or multinational forces, as directed. 

Mitigating the hazard reduces the threat to 
Executive Summary 

xx JP 3-41 

personnel, facilitates freedom of action, and 

supports mission completion. 

Roles and Responsibilities Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

coordinates JFC requests for support and forces 

with other USG departments and agencies and 

coordinates through DOS for support from partner 

nations and NGOs. OSD coordinates with the 

interagency for the transition or transfer of 

responsibility of CBRN CM operations to other 

USG departments and agencies, international 

agencies, or other countries, as appropriate. OSD 

coordinates with both DOS and the Joint Staff to 

obtain international legal authorities, protocols, 

standards, and agreements and multinational 

support for operations. 

CJCS through the Joint Staff coordinates with 

combatant commands and Services to make sure 

that DOD-led CBRN CM operations are executed 

in compliance with domestic, international, and 

foreign laws, policies, treaties, and agreements. 

They assist with interagency support for 

operations and assist in planning and exercising 

activities within the interagency process. They 

also coordinate and provide intelligence support 

to the CCDRs for threat identification and 

prioritization. 

GCCs plan and execute DOD-led CBRN CM 

operations within their AORs. They incorporate 

DOD-led CBRN CM operations into their 

operational plans. GCCs also provide for 

intratheater movement of specialized personnel 

and equipment and coordinate transportation of 

suspect or confirmed CBRN related material, to 

include weapons, agents, delivery systems, and 

infrastructure for short- to long-term storage, 

protection, dismantlement, destruction, or 

disposal. 

DTRA provides operational and technical advice 

and support to DOD components and other USG 

departments and agencies, as requested and 

approved regarding CBRN CM operations. 
Executive Summary

xxi 

Command Relationships The JFC coordinates the response to a CBRN 

incident in the assigned JOA. The JFC requests 

additional support through the appropriate GCC. 

The GCC coordinates with DOS for support from 

other USG departments and agencies or foreign 

countries. For DOD-led CBRN CM, the JFC is 

the supported commander. 

Joint Force Considerations In the context of DOD-led CBRN CM operations, 

the appropriate JFC assumes responsibility for the 

execution of operations within the JOA when a 

CBRN incident requiring a response occurs, 

mission permitting. The GCC approves end states 

for these operations by phase within the JOA. 

One major objective is to conduct DOD-led 

CBRN CM operations without jeopardizing 

critical military operations and objectives; 

however, commanders should plan for the 

diversion of combat forces and possible changes 

to overall end states and objectives due to the 

significance of a CBRN incident. 

Planning Considerations During 

Military Operations 

DOD-led CBRN CM operations may be required 

to facilitate combat operations, and depending on 

the nature and purpose of the activities, may 

require coordination with response operations of 

multiple countries, partners, and a wide variety of 

international organizations and other NGOs. 

DOD-led CBRN CM operations can occur at any 

point in a campaign; therefore, these operations 

should be considered as a branch to contingency 

operations. 

General Planning Considerations Many important DOD-led CBRN CM activities 

take place as shaping (phase 0) activities and are 

included in theater campaign plans, regional 

combating WMD plans, and contingency plans. 

International law, policies, treaties, and 

agreements to which the US is a signatory 

identify certain rights and obligations that may 

affect DOD-led CBRN CM operations. These 

legal requirements may pose constraints and 

restraints and shape the planning and execution of 

operations. To protect both DOD forces and 

civilian populations, DOD-led CBRN CM 

mission planning should address both immediate 
Executive Summary 

xxii JP 3-41 

and long-term effects of dispersed CBRN hazards. 

Planning should include the capability for CBRN 

hazard identification and assessment, protection, 

avoidance, and decontamination. 

CONCLUSION 

This publication provides joint doctrine for the 

military response to mitigate the effects of a 

chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 

event or incident.
I-1 

CHAPTER I 

OVERVIEW 

1. General 

a. This publication focuses on the US military response to reduce the effects of a 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incident, regardless of who is 

designated the Unite States Government (USG) lead. This includes the response to both 

deliberate and inadvertent releases of CBRN threats and hazards. As preparation is a 

requirement for effective response, emergency preparedness (EP) activities are discussed as 

well. A US military response is not automatically triggered by a CBRN incident. 

b. USG Approach to a CBRN Incident. The USG approach to managing the 

consequences of a CBRN incident is vested in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

consequence management (CBRN CM). CBRN CM can be described as the overarching 

USG capability and the strategic national direction, to prepare for, respond to, and recover 

from the effects of a CBRN incident at home or abroad, and whether or not it is attributed to 

an attack using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). When required, the USG will 

coordinate its response to a CBRN incident in one of three ways based on the geopolitical 

situation. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the USG lead agency for incident 

management that would include a domestic CBRN incident. Overseas, excluding homeland 

areas, the Department of State (DOS) is the USG lead for what is termed foreign 

consequence management (FCM). In either of those situations, and when directed, 

Department of Defense (DOD) typically supports the USG lead. A third scenario could 

require DOD to lead the USG effort during military operations when the host nation (HN) is 

unable to respond properly, or DOS is unable to lead the USG response. Also, a USG 

response is not necessarily triggered by recognition of a CBRN hazard or environment. 

(1) CBRN Hazards. CBRN hazards are CBRN materials that, if released, could 

create an adverse effect within the environment. If the size and scope of a CBRN hazard 

and/or environment exceeds established parameters, civil authorities may declare an 

emergency and the situation may be deemed a CBRN incident. However, only when local, 

tribal, or state authorities are overwhelmed by the situation would a USG response normally 

be required. Subsequently, if there are shortfalls in federal and state CBRN capabilities, the 

USG approach would likely require a request for DOD assistance in the form of CBRN CM. 

(2) CBRN Incidents. A CBRN incident is any occurrence resulting from the use 

of CBRN weapons or devices, or the release of CBRN hazards, to include toxic industrial 

materials (TIMs) from any source. This may include the emergence of CBRN hazards 

arising from counterforce targeting during military operations. Domestically, an incident 

“You can’t improvise consequence management.” 

Honorable Paul McHale 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

Visit to Joint Task Force Civil Support 

29 October 2004 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-41 

may result in the President declaring an emergency or a major disaster. For CBRN incidents 

occurring on foreign soil, either an HN or intergovernmental organization (IGO) could 

request a USG response, or if it is likely to create a deleterious domestic effect, such as the 

spread of infectious disease or radioactivity across borders into the US, that may require the 

President to declare an emergency under the National Emergencies Act. Outside of certain 

response requirements discussed in DOD issuances, an order from the President/Secretary of 

Defense (SecDef) is typically required for DOD CBRN response. 

(3) CBRN CM. CBRN CM considers the capabilities and limitations of the 

affected civil authorities, from the local first responders, up through the state response, to the 

federal (national) level. When the civil authorities up to and including the federal level lack 

necessary capabilities to mitigate the situation, or they anticipate being overwhelmed, 

military support typically is requested. For all domestic incidents (including a CBRN 

incident), the National Response Framework (NRF) and the National Disaster Recovery 

Framework provide national guidance for incident management and acknowledges the DOD 

as a full partner in the federal response when tasked. DOD and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff (CJCS) issuances frame US military support of a USG response for foreign and 

domestic CBRN incidents. 

(4) CBRN Response. DOD installation commanders develop CBRN responses for 

the installation as part of their installation emergency action plan in accordance with (IAW) 

Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2000.18, Department of Defense Installation 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency 

Response Guidelines, and DODI 6055.17, DOD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) 

Program. Note: “CBRN response” is captured in the NRF and in Presidential Policy 

Directive (PPD)-8, National Preparedness. Domestically, DOD conducts CBRN response in 

support of the broader USG activities to prepare for, respond to, and provide a foundation to 

recover from CBRN effects as a result of natural or man-made disasters. The term FCM still 

applies to foreign support through DOS to an HN and is a valid term when used accordingly. 

c. DOD Perspective of CBRN CM. The strategic national direction outlined above 

leads to the characterization of CBRN CM as DOD support of the overarching USG response 

to a CBRN incident at home or abroad. As such, a CBRN incident may be managed at the 

national level (USG or HN government), with DOD providing support as directed. During 

military operations, the USG would typically have DOD lead the response. Examples of 

CBRN incidents related to military operations include those that result from the execution of 

US military operations (e.g., offensive operations against WMD facilities); and a CBRN 

attack or inadvertent release affecting civilians in areas in which the US military is 

responsible for civilian security, safety, public health, etc., as determined by the President. 

(1) Ideally, each CBRN response may (see Figure I-1) include a whole-ofgovernment approach as required by the President or lawful directives. While NRF incident 

management includes operations to “prevent, protect, prepare, respond, and recover” from an 

incident, and FCM includes operations to “prepare US forces to provide requested 

assistance,” CBRN CM addresses only the common areas of “prepare” and “respond” within 

the USG overarching response to reduce the effects of a CBRN incident. 
 Overview 

I-3 

(2) CBRN CM operations typically include four activities: planning, preparation, 

execution, and assessment. Within the CBRN CM process, the execution activity is further 

expanded into two subordinate activities: response and short-term recovery. Assessment 

begins with planning and is continuous from before an incident through post-incident 

activities. 

(3) No single concept of operations exists that covers the entire range of DOD 

CBRN CM activities. The following guidelines or principles should be considered:

(a) DOD conducts CBRN CM to mitigate hazards in support of operations or 

to support others in response/recovery when directed/requested. 

(b) For DOD, the CBRN environment is hazard-focused and may involve 

deliberate, prolonged actions in and around the hazard area to support response and recovery 

efforts. 

Figure I-1. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incident Responses 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Response Environments

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Incident Responses

Ends: CBRN effects are neutralized, contained, and mitigated.

Means: Fully integrated US and partner nation capabilities linked across components and 

echelons of command. 

Ways: Simultaneous and synchronized operations focused on containing and then mitigating 

hazard effects through security operations, reconnaissance, decontamination, provision of 

essential services, and rapid transition to appropriate authority where necessary. Key 

elements include: coordination of response with partners; rapid response and mitigation; 

rapid remediation and restoration of services and facilities; and effective communications 

to sustain assurance and dissuasion.

Domestic

CBRN 

Consequence 

Management

Department of 

Defense-Led

CBRN 

Consequence 

Management

Foreign

Consequence 

Management

Lead Federal Agency:

Department of Homeland 

Security

Lead Federal Agency:

Department of Defense

Lead Federal Agency:

Department of State
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-41 

(c) When required/directed, DOD conducts CBRN CM as soon as possible to 

support mission completion. 

(d) DOD can conduct CBRN CM wherever the hazard may be: on the 

battlefield or in support of domestic CBRN CM or FCM. 

(e) DOD can access a variety of resources to conduct or contribute to CBRN 

CM. 

(f) DOD conducts CBRN CM using a tailored, scalable response based on 

inherent capabilities.

2. Domestic, Foreign, and Military Situations

a. Joint forces may respond to CBRN incidents under several different situations 

characterized as domestic, foreign, and military. Both the geographic location and the 

political or diplomatic context factor into the selection of USG lead for a CBRN incident 

response. 

(1) Domestic. The geographic scope of the domestic CBRN response is associated 

with the US homeland. The homeland is the physical region that includes the continental 

United States (CONUS), Alaska, Hawaii, US territories, and surrounding territorial waters 

and airspace. For most domestic CBRN incidents, when requested by the affected state, 

DHS coordinates the federal government’s incident management efforts to include the 

resources utilized in responding to or recovering from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or 

other emergencies. Generally, when tasked, DOD is a supporting agency, coordinating 

agency, or cooperating agency in support of DHS within the NRF and National Incident 

Management System (NIMS). The complex and unique aspects of domestic CBRN CM are 

detailed in Chapter II, “Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Consequence Management.” 

(2) Foreign. A response could take place in a permissive or uncertain foreign 

operational environment. Requests for FCM originate from an affected nation through DOS. 

Chapter III, “Foreign Consequence Management,” outlines the specific details of DOD 

CBRN response under FCM. 

(3) DOD-Led. The military situation is when CBRN incidents occur requiring 

DOD to lead the USG response effort due to the lack of DOS and/or sufficient affected 

nation ‘federal’ presence as a result of military operations or for a CBRN incident on a DOD 

installation. On-scene commanders may take appropriate action in responding to lifethreatening situations while awaiting DOD/DOS tasking (see information on immediate 

response in subsequent chapters). More information on CBRN CM and how the DOD CBRN 

response effort associates with the USG effort is provided in Chapter IV, “Department of 

Defense-Led Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management.” 

b. DOD has an associated preparation and CBRN response framework for specific 

employment of military forces in the USG effort in each of the three designated situations.
 Overview 

I-5 

3. Emergency Preparedness for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Consequence Management 

CBRN CM provides the operational framework for those authorized measures DOD 

takes in preparation for anticipated CBRN incidents to mitigate the loss of life and property 

and to assist with the response and short-term recovery that may be required. This includes 

having plans, policies, procedures, training, and equipment necessary to effectively respond 

to CBRN incidents. 

a. Planning and Policies. All geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) are 

responsible for planning effective coordinated responses to CBRN incidents in their areas of 

responsibility (AORs) IAW DOD policies and law. United States Northern Command 

(USNORTHCOM) and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) plan to respond to 

domestic and foreign incidents. Guidance documents are listed in Appendix A, “Key Legal, 

Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols.” 

b. Training and Equipment. Responding to a CBRN incident requires specialized 

training and equipment, especially in warm (decontamination) and hot (contamination) 

zones. However, CBRN response forces receive required training and equipment to mitigate 

CBRN effects under a variety of conditions. Procedures for employing forces to effectively 

respond to the CBRN incidents are detailed in subsequent chapters. 

4. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

a. Domestic CBRN CM is the USG effort to prepare for and respond to a CBRN 

incident within the US and its territories IAW the NRF. Domestic CBRN response (with 

DOD and/or National Guard [NG] in Title 10 or Title 32, United States Code (USC), status 

or state active duty) is a form of civil support (CS)/defense support of civil authorities 

(DSCA) (with DHS as the lead for coordinating the USG response). Domestic CBRN 

response leverages the total force capabilities of the Active Component (AC) and Reserve 

Component (RC) (NG, and reserves) in the homeland. The DOD CBRN Response 

Enterprise is an integrated AC and RC approach to CBRN response. As such, different 

elements of the DOD CBRN Response Enterprise may be in direct support of different 

entities at any given time. For example, NG forces may be under the command and control 

(C2) of a state governor while Title 10, USC, forces are under the C2 of Commander, United 

States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) in support of the lead federal agency 

(LFA). 

b. FCM encompasses the overall USG effort to prepare for and respond to a CBRN 

incident on foreign territory in which an impacted nation has primary responsibility, and 

DOS is the lead USG agency responsible for coordinating the USG response. DOD provides 

support as requested by the impacted nation, coordinated through DOS, and approved by 

SecDef. The USG may provide FCM to an affected nation either at the request of the 

affected nation or upon affected nation acceptance of a USG offer of assistance. 

c. Domestic and FCM responses formally begin when support is requested by either 

domestic or foreign civilian authorities, and continues until either those civilian authorities 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-41 

have determined that DOD support is no longer required or otherwise directed by SecDef. 

The final phase of USG operations will almost always be addressed and coordinated by 

civilian authorities in both the domestic and foreign situations. This final recovery phase 

may or may not require continued DOD assistance, depending upon the hazard and the 

circumstances. 

d. In DOD-led CBRN CM, DOD serves as the lead USG agency, although it may be 

supported by other organizations. DOD-led CBRN CM would typically occur during 

military operations (e.g., WMD offensive operations), or in other situations in which DOS 

lacks sufficient local authority or presence to lead the USG effort. 

e. The Joint Force in CBRN Response 

(1) Due to the potentially catastrophic nature of a CBRN incident, a DOD joint 

force may be called upon to assist with a civilian CBRN incident prior to civilian resources 

being overwhelmed or depleted. Even prior to being formally tasked to assist, the joint force 

commander (JFC) should strive to develop full situational awareness with respect to the 

incident’s cause to better understand the impact and to prevent further injury or harm to the 

civilian populace or the responding joint force. Situational awareness is especially important 

in suspected or known adversary attacks for force protection considerations. 

(2) SecDef designated supported JFC is ultimately responsible for the DOD CBRN 

response and its role in providing resources to mitigate the consequences of the CBRN 

incident. 

f. Many DOD strategies, activities, and programs support preparation for a CBRN 

response. Examples include unit training, local, regional, and national and international level 

planning, and national and command exercises in both the domestic and foreign 

environments. Security cooperation and partner activities (e.g., multinational exercises, 

exchanges, experimentation, and counterproliferation and nonproliferation activities), while 

not a part of FCM, still serve to foster positive working relationships and build partner 

capacity to prepare for and respond to CBRN incidents, which may reduce the need for US 

forces in FCM operations. 

g. Notional Joint Task Force-Consequence Management (JTF-CM) Structure. A 

joint task force (JTF) may be established, or an existing one tasked, to provide or facilitate 

the provision of a variety of response capabilities to mitigate the incident. These capabilities 

may be located within the current force or they may have to be requested from other DOD 

sources and attached temporarily to the JTF. The capabilities may be CBRN specific (e.g., 

CBRN reconnaissance, decontamination) or general (e.g., security, transportation) capable of 

functioning in CBRN environment. For example, some tasks, associated with CBRN CM 

technical rescue, require the rescuers to function in personal protective equipment (PPE), a 

specific capability that all rescue units may not possess. Possible capabilities the JTF might 

be tasked to provide or facilitate are included in Appendix C, “Department of Defense 

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Enterprise Assets.” 

The exact composition of each element will be based on incident type and severity. 
 Overview 

I-7 

(1) CBRN CM Command and Control Element. This element focuses on the 

overall management of the incident as well as the intra-team communications, interagency 

communications, and ability to provide situational awareness to adjacent agencies and 

supported higher headquarters. The CBRN CM C2 element should provide: 

(a) Secure encrypted digital voice and data communications via Nonsecure 

Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET)/ SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network 

(SIPRNET)/Global Command and Control System. 

(b) High-speed secure multimedia communications with reachback capability. 

(c) Warning reporting services. 

(d) Functionality to conduct incident simulation and projection exercises. 

(e) Assistance in dealing with displaced civilians (civil affairs). 

(f) Assistance in transitioning support to civilian authority. 

(2) CBRN Reconnaissance and Surveillance Element. This element provides 

capabilities to locate, detect, identify, quantify, collect samples, survey, observe, monitor, 

report, and mark contaminated areas.

(3) CBRN CM Decontamination Element. This element supports methods and 

technologies required to neutralize or remove hazardous materials (HAZMAT) including 

chemical warfare (CW) agents, TIMs, biological warfare agents, and radiological 

contamination. The capabilities needed for decontamination include: 

(a) Rapid assembly and dissemination of the decontamination capability at 

multiple sites. 

(b) Decontamination of personnel, ambulatory and non-ambulatory. 

(4) CBRN CM Medical Element. This element supports force health protection 

and all capabilities required for the transport, tracking, diagnosis, and treatment of casualties 

involved in a CBRN incident. 

(5) CBRN CM Force Protection Element. This element supports the protection 

of DOD personnel attending to a CBRN CM incident. Separate security elements may be 

required to provide convoy, airport, military aircraft, seaport, and ship security, as 

appropriate to the mission being performed. Additionally, coordination with USG crime 

scene investigators may be necessary. The force protection element may be called upon for: 

(a) Implementing appropriate antiterrorism (AT) measures. 

(b) Establishing early warning systems within the JTF operational area. 

(c) Providing convoy and patient transport security. 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-41 

(d) Incident site control, to include entry and exit management. 

(6) Search and Rescue Element. This element supports all capabilities necessary 

to search for and rescue casualties from a contaminated or hazardous environment. 

Casualties are usually decontaminated prior to transit from the incident site. This element 

requires specialized technical rescue training to support the rescue of personnel and 

equipment from a CBRN environment using unique equipment for structural collapse 

(urban) search and rescue. 

(7) General Support Element. This element supports all capabilities necessary to 

provide the general support to all the other mission areas and maintain force readiness. This 

includes providing the transportation, maintenance, engineering, and personnel support 

services to enable the effective employment of the other mission areas. 

Guidelines for establishing a JTF and standing JTF headquarters can be found in Joint 

Publication (JP) 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

h. Doctrinal Publication Relationships. Several joint doctrine publications relate to 

CBRN response and provide critical information on employment of forces in a CBRN 

environment. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence 

Management, shares a relationship with several publications within the joint doctrine 

hierarchy, specifically: JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear (CBRN) Environments; JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities; JP 3-29, 

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance; JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction; and 

JP 4-02, Health Service Support. However, each publication stands alone, as each has a 

particular focus and scope. The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 

identifies the three pillars of combating WMD as: nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and 

weapons of mass destruction consequence management (WMD CM). The National Military 

Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction also identifies WMD CM as one of the 

eight military mission areas to combat WMD. As such, it will include capabilities to 

perform CBRN CM. As a mission area for DOD, WMD CM is action authorized by SecDef 

to mitigate the effects of a WMD attack or incident and, if necessary, provide temporary 

essential operations and services at home and abroad (JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction). 

i. Global Considerations. Whether in WMD form or occurring due to natural events, 

disasters, or accidents, CBRN threats and any resulting incidents and accidents may require 

coordinated international action. The US partners with other nations to encourage 

nonproliferation and counterproliferation of WMD, promote increased security for storage of 

all hazardous CBRN materials, and also build capacity to respond to global CBRN related 

incidents. 

j. Pandemic Influenza (PI) and Other Infectious Diseases. A pandemic is an 

outbreak of an infectious disease that may be of natural, accidental, or deliberate origin, 

occurring over a wide geographic area. It is unique in that it is not a discrete event but a 

prolonged environment in which military operations, including any CBRN response, may 

continue. The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (NSPI) uses a three-pillar construct 
 Overview 

I-9 

 

Joint Publication (JP) 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments, focuses on maintaining the joint forces’ 

ability to continue military operations in a CBRN environment. This is done 

by describing the CBRN environment in a strategic context, providing a 

CBRN defense framework, discussing planning and operational 

considerations, and highlighting the complexities of sustainment. It 

expands the discussion of CBRN passive defense actions in JP 3-40, 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, to include those plans and 

activities intended to mitigate or neutralize adverse effects on operations 

and personnel resulting from the use or threatened use of CBRN weapons 

and devices, and the release, or risk of release, of toxic industrial materials 

into the environment. Furthermore, this publication carefully considers how 

logistics, personnel services, and health service support (HSS) are critical 

components of military operations in a CBRN environment. 

JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, shares a close relationship 

with JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence 

Management, as the Department of Defense (DOD) response activities to 

mitigate the effects of a CBRN incident within a domestic scenario are 

provided as defense support of civil authorities operations. Both 

publications address emergency preparedness and response, rely on the 

National Response Framework, and refer the user to the associated National 

Incident Management System for additional guidance on incident 

management. 

JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, provides joint doctrine for foreign 

humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations. It characterizes foreign 

consequence management (FCM) as a mission that is common with FHA 

operations. FCM operations may be conducted concurrently with foreign 

disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations. DOD supports United 

States Government (USG) FCM operations as part of the USG response to 

CBRN incidents abroad to relieve suffering and avoid further loss of life. 

JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, forms the foundation for 

all other joint and Service doctrine for combating weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) and provides overarching guidelines and principles to 

assist in planning and conducting operations to combat WMD. JP 3-40 

describes WMD consequence management which is one of the eight military 

mission areas of combating WMD. 

JP 4-02, Health Service Support, accepts that the joint force commander 

(JFC), at all levels, is faced with the possibility that any operation may have 

to be conducted in a CBRN environment. Therefore, the component 

command surgeons, working with the appointed joint force surgeon/joint 

task force surgeon, have a critical role in guiding and integrating all HSS 

capabilities available to the JFC toward mission accomplishment in that 

CBRN environment. 
Chapter I 

I-10 JP 3-41 

for preparation and response that can be extended to other pandemics as well. These three 

pillars are: EP, surveillance and detection, and response and containment. DOD plays a 

major role in the USG effort to contain, mitigate, and reduce the spread of PI or infectious 

diseases. Such actions also help preserve US combat capabilities and readiness, support 

USG efforts to save lives, reduce human suffering, and mitigate the spread of infection. 

(1) EP Within DOD for PI and Infectious Diseases. Throughout a PI or 

infectious disease outbreak, US military forces strive to preserve combat capabilities, 

accomplish assigned missions, and achieve strategic objectives. Implementation of force 

health protection measures is the primary focus throughout the entire spectrum of PI and 

infectious disease preparation, planning, and operations regardless of whether the virus was 

natural, accidental, or of deliberate origin. 

(2) Health Surveillance. Detecting and tracking the spread of an infectious 

disease is key to its containment. The same assets used to detect and track a biological threat 

or hazard are used to detect a PI or infectious disease outbreak. 

(3) Response and Containment. CBRN forces should be prepared to respond to 

CBRN incidents during a pandemic. 

For further doctrinal guidance on epidemics and medical procedures, refer to JP 4-02, 

Health Service Support.

5. General Planning Considerations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response 

a. Planning Considerations Regarding Hazard Effects. Planning considerations for 

responding to CBRN incidents and requests for assistance (RFAs) are influenced by a variety 

of factors, including USG policy decisions, lessons learned from responses to previous 

incidents, capability limitations, time, current military operations, studies and analyses, 

modeling and simulation, live-agent tests and experiments, as well as analysis and exercise 

of national planning scenarios. Military planners need to be able to translate military 

analysis capabilities for use in a CBRN CM response. For more information on possible 

scenarios, see the National Preparedness Guidelines. 

(1) The planning process begins with determining and assessing potential CBRN 

responses with respect to the end state the supported combatant commander (CCDR) plans to 

achieve. The developed response includes standing contingency plans and procedures to 

determine what forces and capabilities are required in support of RFAs. Accidents may 

occur at chemical plants, nuclear power plants, or other facilities (to include those on DOD 

installations) that have the potential for release of CBRN material, or they may occur during 

the transportation of TIMs. Intentional acts include use of CBRN materials by adversaries, 

sabotage, and acts of terrorism. CBRN materials present hazards that can be both immediate 

and delayed. In some instances the delayed effects can cause significant problems for joint 

forces and may alter planned operations. In all cases, the setting and managing of 

operational exposure guide (OEG) by the operational commander is a key requirement in 

protecting forces. 
 Overview 

I-11 

(2) Chemical Agents, Industrial Chemicals, and Their Effects

(a) The JFC may be required to manage the consequences of a deliberate or 

accidental release of chemical agents (chemical substances intended for use in military 

operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate mainly through their physiological effects) 

or toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) (chemicals developed or manufactured for use in 

industrial operations or research). 

(b) The risks associated with TIC release vary. Such risks include inhalation, 

absorption, or ingestion of a lethal or incapacitating dose as well as secondary complications 

such as asphyxiation, smoke inhalation, and fire. The use of appropriately certified PPE is 

critically important during responses to CBRN incidents involving TICs. 

(c) The scope of these environmental and industrial hazards may be quite 

extensive in an industrialized area. Any site that stores or uses TICs may pose a threat to 

personnel even if the site is operating under normal conditions. Industrial accidents or 

sabotage, such as destruction of a large industrial complex, may release these potentially 

toxic substances. For information on TIC hazards, see the current edition of the National 

Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, 

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg, and the US Department of Transportation’s Emergency 

Response Guidebook, http://phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/library/erg. 

For further doctrinal guidance on chemical agents and TICs, their effects, operational 

considerations, and force protection, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments, and Field Manual (FM) 4-02.283/Marine 

Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 4-11.1B/Navy Tactical Reference Publication (NTRP) 

4.02.21/Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 44-161(I), Treatment of Nuclear and Radiological 

Casualties.

(3) Biological Hazards and Their Effects

(a) Biological agents are microorganisms and/or biologically derived 

compounds or molecules that cause disease in personnel, plants, or animals; and/or cause the 

deterioration of material. Biological agents are divided into two broad categories: pathogens 

and toxins. Biological hazards from industrial, medical, or commercial toxic industrial 

biologicals can also cause a potential infectious or toxic threat. 

(b) Infectious diseases represent one of the greatest potential threats due to 

their reproductive ability and incubation period, the time delay from infection to the onset of 

symptom(s). An infectious biological incident anywhere in the world may remain 

undetected for several days to weeks after release due to the incubation periods. Diagnosis 

may be slow as many infectious agents have a slow onset and nonspecific symptoms that 

rapidly escalate in severity. Another compounding problem is that infectious casualties may 

be contagious without showing symptoms specific to the disease as they move from one 

geographic location to another, spreading the range of infection. Additionally, doctors often 

find difficulty in differentiating biological diagnoses as many initial symptoms often 

resemble those of the common cold. Depending on the pathogen, preventive measures and 
Chapter I 

I-12 JP 3-41 

treatment are difficult to implement due to factors such as large numbers of casualties, ease 

of travel, and challenges of quarantining. Finally, first responders may be among the first 

casualties, rapidly overwhelming local and government support systems. 

(c) When people are infected, medical facilities may be the first source to 

notice an increase in specific symptoms. Alternatively, the first signs of an attack may be 

unusually high and widespread purchase of over-the-counter medicines by civilians within a 

region. Domestically, hospitals report to their state departments of health and to the Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The CDC and National Institutes of Health can 

then recommend steps for containment and treatment. GCCs with foreign AORs encounter 

similar reporting processes that serve as warning and information sources. 

(d) Terrorists and other enemy elements may also attempt to use biological 

agents to infect agricultural plants and animals or to contaminate infrastructure, industry, and 

the environment. 

1. Agriculture can be attacked through animals or crops. This type of 

attack can affect a nation’s food supply, economics, and international trade. 

2. Bacteria, fungi, and viruses can be genetically engineered for specific 

functions. An example is an oil-eating bacterium. This technology could be used to 

deteriorate or contaminate industrial supplies or materials. A bacterial pathogen can be 

modified to be resistant to a variety of antibiotics and, thus, could be difficult to treat. 

For further guidance on biological agents, their effects, operational considerations, and 

force protection against biological hazards, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments.

(4) Sources of Radiation and Their Effects 

(a) Radiological Sources. Radioactive materials cause damage by ionizing 

effects of neutron, gamma, x-ray, beta, and/or alpha radiation. A population may be exposed 

to radiation intentionally through two primary methods (other than a nuclear detonation): 

radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) or radiological exposure devices (REDs). RDDs and 

REDs require limited technical knowledge to build and deploy as compared with a nuclear 

device. Also, the radioactive materials used in RDDs and REDs are widely used in 

medicine, agriculture, industry, and research, and thus are far easier to obtain than weaponsgrade uranium or plutonium. Alternatively, any population can be unintentionally exposed 

to radiation released during an industrial accident or natural disaster involving a nuclear 

facility such as a nuclear power plant. 

1. RDDs is an improvised assembly or process, other than a nuclear 

explosive device, designed to disseminate radioactive material in order to cause destruction, 

damage, or injury. Adversary use of an RDD—often called “dirty bomb”—is considered far 

more likely than employment of a nuclear explosive device. An RDD typically combines a 

conventional explosive device (such as a bomb) with radioactive material. RDDs are not 

designed to produce a nuclear detonation; rather, they produce a small area of acute 

immediate and residual hazard, and larger areas of delayed residual hazards. The immediate 
 Overview 

I-13 

dispersion incident produces radioactive aerosols that can be inhaled and particles that can be 

embedded in open cuts and sores or incorporated into food products growing in nearby 

agricultural areas. Inhaled materials can be dispersed throughout the body, captured by 

different organs and tissues, and remain internal hazards for a long time. Due to the 

unpredictability associated with radiation material dispersion over surfaces, the immediate 

surroundings may be littered with fragments of hazardous radiological source material. 

2. REDs are covertly placed radioactive sources intended to expose people 

to significant doses of ionizing radiation without their immediate knowledge. Constructed 

from partially or fully unshielded radioactive material, a RED could be hidden from sight in 

a public place, exposing those who pass by. A RED does not distribute physical 

contamination (however, if the seal around the source is broken, radiological contamination 

may occur). The ability of a RED to cause injuries depends on several factors: the size of the 

source, type of isotope, distance and shielding materials between the source and personnel, 

and the length and/or frequency of exposure. Unless an installation routinely employs 

radiation detection devices and/or dosimeters, patients presenting to a medical facility with 

acute radiation syndrome (ARS) or radiation sickness will likely be the first indication of a 

RED’s employment. 

(b) When responding to a radiological incident, the commander’s priorities are 

to keep critical missions operating while keeping exposure of all personnel as low as 

reasonably achievable (ALARA). ALARA guidance or parameters should be utilized to 

establish acceptable levels of contamination as prescribed by policy or the appropriate 

authority based on the CBRN incident. Unique post-radiological-incident challenges include 

determining personnel exposure (dose) rates; decontamination challenges; hazard duration 

that measures in months to years; and lifelong health concerns for personnel with even lowlevel radiological exposure. The setting and managing of OEG by the operational 

commander is a key requirement in protecting forces. 

For further guidance on the sources of radiation, their effects, and force protection against 

radiological hazards (to include setting and managing OEG), refer to JP 3-11, Operations in 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments, FM 3-11.3/Marine 

Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-37.2A/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

(NTTP) 3-11.25/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP[I]) 3-

2.56, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for CBRN Contamination 

Avoidance, and FM 4-02.283/MCRP 4.11.1B/NTRP 4-02.21/AFMAN 44-161(1), Treatment 

of Nuclear and Radiological Casualties. DOD forces conducting CBRN response operations 

in support of a primary federal agency (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] 

or DOS) should comply with OEG set by the primary agency.

For additional information on radiation injuries and ARS, see both Medical Management of 

Radiological Casualties Handbook, Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, 

http://www.afrri.usuhs.mil, and FM 4-02.283/MCRP 4-11.1B/NTRP 4-02.21/AFMAN 44-

161(I), Treatment of Nuclear and Radiological Casualties. The latter document is the 

Services’ consensus reference for medically qualified personnel on the recognition and 

treatment of nuclear and radiological casualties. 
Chapter I 

I-14 JP 3-41 

(5) Nuclear Environment, Nuclear Detonations, and Their Effects. Nuclear 

detonations cause three types of injuries: blast, thermal, and radiation; as well as 

electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects. The type and distribution of casualties depends on the 

weapon (e.g., yield, height of burst), environmental conditions (e.g., weather conditions), 

physical environment (e.g., structure types), and personnel conditions (e.g., age, health, skin 

tone, clothing). 

(a) Blast (pressure) injuries are caused by the overpressure wave traveling 

outwards from the center of the nuclear detonation. The types of injuries are much the same 

as occur with conventional explosives. The human body is remarkably resistant to 

overpressure, particularly when compared with rigid structures such as buildings. Although 

many would survive the blast overpressure itself, they will not easily survive the crushing 

injuries incurred during the collapse of buildings from the blast overpressure or the impact of 

shrapnel (e.g., flying debris and glass). The majority of casualties from blast effects will 

result from wind generated from the blast overpressure. For a 10 kiloton (KT) yield, the 

velocity of the wind within 1.0–1.6 kilometers of ground zero will lift and throw people, 

causing serious injuries. It will also turn lighter objects into flying shrapnel, resulting in 

impalement injuries (probability of injury increases with velocity). Heavier objects may 

present crushing hazards. 

(b) Thermal (heat) injuries present as flash burns (burns from direct exposure 

to the thermal radiation pulse, typically ultraviolet, visible, and infrared waves) or flame 

burns (burns from materials set afire by the infrared energy wave igniting flammable 

materials). Close to the fireball, the thermal energy is so intense that infrastructure and 

humans are incinerated. Immediate lethality would be 100 percent in close proximity. The 

distance of lethality will vary with nuclear yield, position of the burst relative to the Earth’s 

surface, weather, environment, and how soon casualties can receive medical care. People 

within line of sight of the burst may be subject to burn injuries up to two miles away for a 10 

KT device. The farther away from ground zero a person is, the less severe the burn injury 

will be. Early treatment can reduce mortality rates among the severely burned victims. 

(c) Radiation injuries from a nuclear blast occur from two sources: initial and 

residual. Initial radiation effects occur due to the neutrons and high-energy gamma rays 

emitted within the first minute after detonation of the weapon. Severity of exposure depends 

on the weapon’s yield, emissions, shielding, and distance from the explosion. Residual 

radiation effects result from either fallout or neutron-induced activity. The amount of 

residual radiation will depend on whether the detonation is an air or surface burst (air burst, 

the fireball does not touch the ground; surface burst, the fireball does). A surface burst will 

cause a tremendous amount of residual radiation. The hazards from surface bursts are more 

prevalent due to the presence of emissions (typically alphas, betas, and low-energy gammas) 

generated when unused-fissile material mixes with vaporized dirt, debris, and other 

materials, drawn back into the fireball and subsequently deposited downwind. In contrast, 

neutron-induced activity (when specific materials are bombarded by neutrons and become 

radioactive themselves) occurs more prevalently as a result of airbursts. Collectively, these 

sources are called fallout. The extent of fallout depends on the weapon’s yield, type, and 

height of burst, while the area affected depends heavily on the wind. The hazard to 

personnel depends on the level of radiation present and the duration of exposure. 
 Overview 

I-15 

(d) Electromagnetic Pulse. EMP is unlikely to have a direct health threat; 

however, personnel with pacemakers or other implanted devices may be affected. EMP can 

also be very damaging to electronic equipment. 

For further information on EMP effects with graphical representation, refer to 

the 2008, Critical National Infrastructures, Report of the Commission to Assess the 

Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, 

www.empcommission.org/docs/A2473-EMP_Commission-7MB.pdf. For further guidance 

on the nuclear weapon effects and hazard considerations, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments. 

(6) Explosives Effects and Role in CBRN Incidents. Even though this 

publication does not provide doctrine for explosives incidents because explosives do not 

leave a residual hazard, explosives are addressed here based on their role in CBRN incidents. 

(a) According to Technical Manual 9-1300-200, Ammunition, General

(Chapter 2-11 to 2-15), explosives are categorized as high explosives (HE) and low-order 

explosives (LE). HE detonate and produce a defining supersonic overpressurization shock 

wave. Examples of HE include TNT (trinitrotoluene), nitroglycerin, dynamite, and 

ammonium nitrate fuel oil. LE deflagrate (rapidly burn rather than detonate), create a 

subsonic explosion, and lack HE’s overpressurization wave. Examples of LE include 

gunpowder and most pure petroleum-based bombs such as Molotov cocktails or aircraft 

improvised as guided missiles. The differing injury patterns caused by HE and LE should 

also be factored in when mitigating the consequences of a chemical or radiological incident 

involving an explosive. 

(b) Explosives can generate casualties in several ways depending on the type 

of explosion, secondary effects of the explosion (e.g., building collapse, fire), and the 

surrounding environment of the explosion (e.g., confined spaces, availability of debris or 

materials to generate an expanding area of potential injuries). Some chemical compounds 

are unstable. When shocked or burned they react, possibly to the point of deflagration or 

even detonation, thereby adding to the potential hazards when dealing with a chemical 

incident. 

(c) An RDD may use explosives (e.g., bulk HE) or nonexplosive means (e.g., a 

crop duster spraying finely ground radioactive material) to disperse radioactive material. 

Explosives may be used to release chemical agents from ordnance or release a chemical 

agent from its container. The explosion itself and its effect on vehicles and structures will be 

a contributing factor in many of the injuries or add to the difficulty of getting to casualties 

trapped in rubble and collapsed structures, leaving them at further risk from the agent. 

Estimating CBRN response requirements only on the casualties with agent injuries will 

significantly underestimate the magnitude of the problem. Those injured who get radiation 

particles into their wounds will have significantly greater recovery problems and reduced life 

expectancy than those who have uncompromised skin surface that can be decontaminated. 

Conditions similar to this exist for chemical incidents. Secondary explosions, due to fires, 

can cause their own injuries and make the response more dangerous, particularly in a nuclear 

incident. Due to the negative effect of heat on most biological agents, explosives do not 
Chapter I 

I-16 JP 3-41 

generally play a role in biological incidents. Finally, a secondary attack using improvised 

explosive devices should always be considered during any CBRN CM response planning. 

(7) Consequences of CBRN Incidents on Infrastructure

(a) A CBRN incident can disrupt production and delivery of essential goods 

and services. Water supplies may be contaminated or unable to flow to incident area 

populace. Public health and emergency services will likely be affected by the CBRN 

incident either directly by their proximity to the incident or indirectly by the overwhelming 

need for the emergency response. EMP can destroy or cause transitory disruption of the 

power grid and damage or destroy portable/mobile electronic devices or equipment. EMP 

may further complicate immediate response operations by damaging/destroying the 

electronics in equipment first responders require. The transportation and communication 

infrastructure may be stressed through evacuations, providing relief supplies, or as a direct 

result of the CBRN incident. The response required by a joint force could potentially span 

the range of these effects. 

(b) Support to civilian authorities may also include specific public health 

support to government health departments, hospitals, health clinics, mortuaries, and 

pharmacies, to include distribution of pharmaceutical stockpiles. Joint forces supporting 

civilian authorities may assist in responding to the needs of affected communities. A 

primary concern to all response efforts is restoration of government functions to the affected 

area. Effects to public safety and security may result directly from CBRN attacks on 

government institutions or indirectly from cascading disruption of the institutions. Indirect 

effects include cascading disruption and financial consequences to government, society, and 

the economy through public and private sector reactions to an incident. Joint forces have the 

capability to assist in this area by supporting civilian authorities in restoration of essential 

goods and services. 

(c) Another consequence of CBRN incidents is contamination of infrastructure 

and terrain. Contamination can be concentrated or be spread over a significant area 

depending on the means of delivery and the agent used. These areas are of operational 

concern during the recovery phase of the incident. For larger areas of contamination, 

specialized forces may be requested to assist governmental authorities logistically by 

providing transportation for the affected population, assisting with decontamination efforts, 

assisting with infrastructure restoration, and monitoring operations. 

b. General Planning Strategy for Decontamination 

(1) Considering the scope of the emergency and determining proper 

decontamination procedures for different scenarios can help this process run more 

efficiently. Different forms of decontamination can be worked into response plans for 

different scenarios. 

(2) Decontamination operations should be set up in the warm zone, which is 

sometimes also referred to as the “contamination reduction corridor.” It should be far 

enough away from the hazard that decontamination workers are not in immediate danger. 
 Overview 

I-17 

(3) If the decontamination line or area is established outdoors, it should be in an 

area that is upwind of the hazard. 

(4) Locate decontamination lines in areas easily accessible to ambulances or other 

emergency transport vehicles if at all possible. 

(5) Determining the number of decontamination lines necessary is also a factor to 

consider. For a small incident, one line may be sufficient. If casualties are being taken from 

the area by one group of responders while another group of responders stops or cleans up a 

spill, it might be advantageous to have multiple lines: one for ambulatory casualties, a 

second for responders and equipment or non-ambulatory casualties. 

(6) Everyone and everything that comes out of the hot zone must be checked for 

contamination and decontaminated as necessary. Critical medical treatment should not be 

delayed for thorough radiological decontamination. However, contaminated clothing from 

the casualty should be removed, and initial skin decontamination should be completed if 

possible because a contaminated individual can easily pass contamination on to emergency 

medical personnel, ambulances or response vehicles, and hospital emergency rooms—

potentially putting these resources out of service until they can be properly decontaminated. 

In a large-scale emergency, this can be very problematic. 

See FM 3-11.5/MCWP 3-37.3/NTTP 3-11.26/AFTTP(I) 3-2.60, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Decontamination.

c. Operational Planning Considerations for a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

or Nuclear Response 

(1) Assessment. A thorough assessment of the employed CBRN material and/or 

its effects provides feedback such as protection requirements, hazard levels, areas of 

contamination, expected duration of hazards, etc. This information contributes to the 

commander’s situational awareness and technical assessment capability throughout any 

response. Objectives may include providing temporary critical life support; protecting 

critical infrastructure, preventing great property damage, protecting the environment; 

containing the incident and enabling community recovery. In addition, it is advantageous to 

respond in such a manner that the effects of the incident are minimal and serve as a deterrent 

for future domestic and international terrorist attacks. Every incident will be different, but 

the underlying concepts remain constant. 

(a) Immediately after a CBRN incident, initial assessments determine the 

scope and magnitude of the incident and ultimately determine the need for DOD and joint 

force participation. Assessments should be done as quickly as possible to avoid additional 

lives being lost. 

(b) The CCDR, at the request of federal and state/territory or supported nation 

authorities, sends a site assessment team to conduct assessments to gain early situational 

awareness in response to a CBRN incident. Common assessment requirements are provided 

below: 
Chapter I 

I-18 JP 3-41 

1. Damage and Injury Reports. Examine initial damage and injury 

reports for information on specific CBRN effects. Reports should be scanned for details 

including contamination control measures initiated and the number of contaminated 

casualties. Each CBRN incident has unique characteristics requiring appropriate follow-on 

response measures. 

2. Nature of the Incident. Examine the effect on the population and 

infrastructure to identify response capabilities required to address the incident. This includes 

assessing risk to responders in order to determine force protection requirements. 

3. Force Protection. Plan for and implement force protection measures. 

Force protection considerations are a top priority during any CBRN response operation and 

include providing proper protective equipment to personnel, planning for site safety, 

security, individual awareness of hazards and dangers, protection from contamination 

through proper marking and avoidance of contaminated areas, air monitoring, and health 

service support (HSS). Force protection efforts must include consideration of secondary 

incidents/devices that may target first responders or be designed to intentionally spread 

contamination. While these factors are primarily CBRN-oriented, the force may also be 

vulnerable to multiple types of opportunistic threats by adversaries, so the threat assessment 

must not be focused solely on CBRN. 

4. Duration and Geographical Extent of the Incident. Assess the 

number of jurisdictions affected by the incident and the likelihood of the scope expanding 

significantly due to population migration and weather/terrain. 

5. Weather and Terrain. Examine the effects weather and terrain may 

have on the CBRN material to include dispersion of chemical, biological, or radiological 

agents or toxic material by wind or water (e.g., stream/river flows). 

6. Public Reaction. Gauge public reaction to the incident as it can affect 

response requirements, particularly if the level of fear is high or likely to grow, or if massive 

population movement is under way or expected. 

7. Mission Duration. Assess mission duration, as it drives sustainment 

requirements. Extenuating circumstances may prolong CBRN response in the event civilian 

capability is lacking or inadequate. However, transition back to local responders should 

occur as soon as practical. 

8. CBRN Reconnaissance and Surveillance Tasks. Plan for the conduct 

of locating, detecting, identifying, quantifying, sample collecting, surveying, observing, 

monitoring, reporting, and marking contaminated areas. Military forces generally have only 

basic sampling and detection capabilities, so specialized military units may be required. 

9. Identification of Supporting DOD Forces. Local authorities may 

have some DOD forces assisting within their area under immediate response authority. The 

GCC should coordinate through the Services to identify Title 10, USC, units that are 

providing support either under immediate response or under local authority prior to the 

execute order (EXORD) and JTF establishment. Understanding the capabilities of forces 
 Overview 

I-19 

currently operating within the joint operations area (JOA), and leveraging their 

communications and logistics capabilities will accelerate JTF force arrival and employment. 

Locally available forces may be able to continue response operations or be committed to 

emerging requirements, thereby eliminating duplication of capabilities required for the 

CBRN response. 

(2) Coordination Planning

(a) Interorganizational Coordination. DOD will liaise and coordinate with 

other agencies and civilian authorities. Interorganizational coordination is a continuous 

process that should be established and emphasized prior to an incident, as well as during and 

after an incident. Coordination takes place at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 

Whether coordination is conducted through the CCDR’s joint interagency coordination 

group or other means such as an interagency planning cell or group at the combatant 

command or JTF levels, the importance of interorganizational coordination in the planning 

process cannot be overstated. Of particular concern is information management and public 

affairs (PA). These activities are done in concert with DHS or the chief of mission (COM) 

and impacted nation, depending upon the operational environment. The NRF provides 

additional guidance for domestic situations. JFCs should be prepared to coordinate 

operational activities with technical nuclear forensics sample collection task force (TF) in the 

event of a response to a radiological or nuclear incident. The CCDR and staff will 

coordinate with the collection TF through DHS to the Department of Justice/Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI) for national incidents and via DOS in response to a foreign RFA. 

Refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, for a detailed 

discussion on interagency, IGO, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) coordination 

during joint operations. 

(b) State and Local Coordination. Determine if specialized national, 

international, or local assets are responding to the incident. Chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) enhanced response force packages 

(CERFPs) and homeland response forces (HRFs) coordinate through NG joint force 

headquarters-state (NG JFHQ-State) with state and local civilian response planners and 

responders to verify that the DOD CBRN Response Enterprise is synchronized with civil 

authorities. The state NG weapons of mass destruction-civil support team (WMD-CST) and 

the state HAZMAT coordinator also synchronize with state organizations and advise on 

specialized response assets and private resources (such as industrial resources) available for 

use during a response. Attempt to determine response capability gaps and seams that will 

require filling by DOD resources or capabilities, i.e., equipment, material, or personnel. 

These processes should be practiced during training events and exercises. 

(c) Federal Coordination. The CCDR and staff coordinate through DHS for 

national incidents and DOS for incidents involving foreign nations. These contacts should 

be verified with every training event. 

(d) Communications. Determine if communications infrastructure is intact. 

If not, or if it is overwhelmed, joint forces may need to augment or replace the 
Chapter I 

I-20 JP 3-41 

communications infrastructure in the affected areas using organic equipment. This is 

particularly important in a nuclear incident with resulting EMP. It should be anticipated that 

normal civilian communications means (i.e., land-line, cell phone, Internet) will be greatly 

affected and should not be considered as primary means of communications during a 

catastrophic incident. 

(e) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Technical Support. EOD 

personnel should be part of any response to a possible CBRN incident. Consider the 

potential for secondary devices designed to explode or release a CBRN hazard after EOD or 

CBRN hazard response personnel have arrived. Ensure reachback is possible for CBRN 

hazard disposition or other technical expertise. 

(f) Occupational and Public Health. Identify a lead medical/health DOD 

point of contact/liaison to provide support and recommendations regarding personnel and 

public health and safety including cleanup levels and risk assessments. Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA), CDC, and Occupational Safety and Health Administration may 

provide recommendations to the DOD regarding health and safety. 

(g) Biometric and Forensic Requirements. Where exclusive federal 

jurisdiction applies, coordinate with the appropriate military legal advisor to determine 

evidence collection procedures in case the incident is a criminal or terrorist act. Ensure that 

biometric evidence is vetted with the Biometrics Identity Management Agency and queried 

against authoritative federal biometrics databases: DOD Automated Biometric Identification 

System, DHS Automated Biometric Identification System, and the FBI Integrated 

Automated Fingerprint Identification System. 

(h) Transition and Disengagement. Plan for the termination of military 

support. This is a politically sensitive phase requiring detailed planning. DOD typically 

disengages from operations when the local authorities are capable of assuming the 

responsibilities for the response operations. This is generally when the immediate danger 

from the CBRN incident is eliminated, the capabilities to save lives are in place, and critical 

services are restored. DOD generally does not remain to conduct site recovery operations. 

(i) Legal Requirements. In both domestic and FCM, unique legal 

requirements may exist. Legal review by the assigned judge advocate should occur as the 

incident unfolds to ensure compliance with any such requirements. 

(j) Strategic Communication. Accurate and timely communication with the 

public is crucial. Themes, messages, images, and actions should be synchronized across 

jurisdictions, agencies, and organizations. Planning must include anticipated outages of 

civilian mass media capabilities for communicating evacuation and quarantine information. 

For further guidance on applicable laws and agreements refer to the operational 

environment chapters and Appendix A, “Key Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and 

International Protocols.” 

(3) Logistics Planning
 Overview 

I-21 

(a) Conduct Logistic Support. Providing logistic support for a CBRN 

response produces numerous challenges. The force may need to deploy with unique assets 

and specialized equipment depending upon the mission, situation, and the designated 

response force. Examples of such equipment include decontamination systems, mobile 

laboratories, field hospitals, medical equipment, and facilities for temporary accommodation 

of persons. Forces may also be required to operate and/or maintain unfamiliar equipment 

that will impact maintenance requirements and repair parts management. It is also likely that 

much of the most critical equipment will require decontamination or hazard mitigation 

procedures during daily checks, refueling, and maintenance. These additional requirements 

illustrate that the nature of such deployments require unique planning and significant joint 

reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) support to receive, organize, 

and stage the forces for follow-on operations. Plans should allow forces to rapidly deploy, 

conduct JRSOI, and successfully execute their mission immediately after a CBRN incident. 

Contamination mitigation needs to be inherent in all CBRN logistics response planning in 

order to contain the spread of CBRN contamination and to prevent the unnecessary loss of 

valuable US assets. The responsiveness of support forces influences the success of the 

mission and the trust of the population affected by the CBRN incident. Logistical planning 

should address the integration of logistical support for Title 10 and Title 32, USC, and state 

active duty forces. Logistical planning should also address support United States Coast 

Guard (USCG) forces if they are to be a part of the support operations. While the DOD 

CBRN Response Enterprise contains significant tactical-level logistics/support forces, it 

requires a responsive theater opening and theater sustainment capability to support it. 

See Appendix B, “Planning Considerations for Logistics and Other Services from Domestic 

Base Support Installations and Foreign Theater Assets.” 

(b) Deployment and JRSOI. DOD response units, with direction from the 

parent unit and Service, are responsible for coordinating and executing predeployment 

activities, movement to and activities at ports of embarkation, and arrival at ports of 

debarkation (PODs). The designated JTF, in coordination with the designated base support 

installation (BSI) commander and joint field office (JFO), coordinates activities for JRSOI 

activities. Depending on the situation, JRSOI of incoming Title 10, USC, forces may not be 

tied to a designated installation. It may have to be conducted through an abbreviated method 

of capturing personnel and equipment status without requiring the traditional deliberate 

JRSOI model. 

For other deployment and redeployment operations, see JP 3-35, Deployment and 

Redeployment Operations. 

(c) Transportation. Planners must anticipate/plan that critical transportation 

routes and infrastructure may be disrupted by the incident itself or by secondary effects such 

as populace movement and emergency response efforts. Both primary and alternate 

transportation routes and staging areas need to be identified. The joint force headquarters 

staff coordinates movement restrictions and transportation safety and determines 

accessibility and status of the road network, aerial ports of debarkation (APODs), and 

seaports of debarkation (SPODs) within the operational area. The CJCS, by the authority of 
Chapter I 

I-22 JP 3-41 

and at the direction of the President or SecDef, issues a deployment order (DEPORD) to 

deploy US forces supporting CBRN CM. 

1. All transportation modes should be considered for providing support to 

the CBRN response including organic assets. The deployment of unit personnel, supplies, 

and equipment should be phased so as to not overwhelm throughput of PODs, road networks, 

and on-site reception and support capabilities. For those units that cannot deploy with 

organic assets, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) can provide 

deployment, employment, and redeployment common-user air, land, and sea transportation 

for forces engaged in domestic CBRN response operations. Due to the detrimental effects of 

aircraft contamination and the difficulties of decontaminating aircraft, operational 

commanders should consider all measures consistent with mission priorities and operational 

risks to debark uncontaminated or packaged decontaminated cargo, equipment, and 

personnel at uncontaminated or clean airfields. 

For more information on air mobility operations in a CBRN-contaminated environment, 

refer to Military Committee Memorandum (Memorandum in the Name of the Chairman) 

0026-02, Chemical Warfare (CW) Agent Exposure Planning Guidance, and JP 3-17, Air 

Mobility Operations. 

2. USTRANSCOM also provides aeromedical evacuation, air refueling, 

and aerial port services to support CBRN response. However, in a contaminated 

environment, USTRANSCOM will not transport contagious and contaminated casualties 

within the aeromedical patient movement system. In extreme circumstances, there may be a 

requirement to move contagious index cases (approximately two) for evaluation or critical 

medical care. If patient movement is required, the involved GCCs, Commander, United 

States Transportation Command, and SecDef in consultation with medical authorities 

provide necessary prior approval. Logistic planners need to be cognizant of the potential 

issues pertaining to requirements for the staging, reuse, transportation of, and/or disposition 

of decontaminated or residually contaminated equipment used during the CBRN response. 

These issues could significantly slow the normal redeployment process. Planners also need 

to consider the impact of cleanliness policy initiatives involving the transport of 

contaminated patients/cargo. 

For more information on current cleanliness policy, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service 

Support, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 41-307 (Attachment 12), Aeromedical Evacuation 

Patient Considerations and Standards of Care, and USTRANSCOM policy documents titled 

Policy on Patient Movement of Contaminated Contagious or Potentially Exposed Casualties. 

(d) Contracting Services. Critical contracting administration support is 

essential to expedite the procurement of services and material in support of any CBRN 

response. Logisticians should be familiar with the services provided by the Defense Contract 

Management Agency that support the CCDR. When contracting for supply, transportation, 

and services, logisticians should consider existing contracts already supporting military 

installations and other federal agencies in the operational area and contracts available 

through the state’s United States Property and Fiscal Office (the primary National Guard 
 Overview 

I-23 

Bureau [NGB] focal point in each state for federal funds and property allotted to the state)

when applicable. 

(e) Mortuary Affairs. When authorized by SecDef, DOD mortuary affairs 

assets can help mitigate the potential health risks posed by mass fatalities and assist in 

incident response and recovery operations. The primary mortuary affairs missions in a 

CBRN environment are mortuary affairs identification tasks and contamination mitigation. 

When responding to a domestic incident the mortuary affairs assets perform mission 

assignments in support of the lead agency. 

For more information on joint mortuary affairs operations, refer to JP 4-06, Mortuary 

Affairs, and Technical Guide 195, Safety and Health Guidance for Mortuary Affairs 

Operations: Infectious Materials and CBRN Handling. 

(f) Resupply. Ensure that critical resupply items are identified and addressed 

(e.g., self-contained breathing apparatus refills and other CBRN related consumables). 

(g) Response Times. Time sensitivity for DOD response may vary depending 

upon the severity and type of incident and may determine the need for a particular mode of 

transportation. Another factor that may influence response time is whether other high 

priority operational missions (e.g., technical nuclear forensics) are occurring simultaneously 

and compete for limited transportation. Some logistics assets may be pre-positioned forward 

into theater to facilitate a more effective response. 

For more information on general logistic planning and support, refer to JP 4-0, Joint 

Logistics. 

(4) Health Services Support Planning. Civil authorities consistently require 

assistance in Emergency Support Function (ESF) 8 (Framework Public Health and Medical) 

of the NRF. Providing initial essential stabilizing medical care and forward 

resuscitative/surgical care are the two essential capabilities that are required in the first hours 

following any CBRN incident. DOD may also be required to provide medical augmentation 

to local hospitals, community health (vaccinations, disease investigation, prophylaxis 

dispensing, preventive medicine, and veterinary support), patient movement. It may also be 

asked to assist with distribution/redistribution of patients, medical logistics distribution, and 

behavioral health, as well as direct medical treatment and patient decontamination. DOD 

coordinates HSS with the state health officer through the state’s office of EP. 

(a) Health Facilities. DOD health facilities have important roles in the 

National Disaster Medical System, local medical response organizations, and the Laboratory 

Response Network. Local health facilities should identify their capabilities to support and 

sustain patient movement, patient treatment, ancillary services, and medical sheltering. 

DOD health facilities should plan to work in concert with operational medical units in CBRN 

CM responses. 

(b) At-Risk Population. Identify the demographics of population at-risk 

(elderly, young, pregnant, etc.). 
Chapter I 

I-24 JP 3-41 

(c) Medical. Augment the analysis of available information on 

epidemiological and diagnostic patterns resulting from the incident to address preventive 

medicine requirements, laboratory services, and casualty evacuation and treatment conducted 

by local, state, and federal public health authorities. If foreign medical support is provided, 

ensure that operating procedures are provided. Recognize that there are unique issues 

relating to military medical support to include personnel and supplies. 

(5) Populace Care Planning. During a CBRN catastrophic incident, large 

numbers of people may be left temporarily or permanently homeless and may require 

prolonged temporary housing. The JFC may be requested to support short-term mass care in 

meeting basic human needs of food, water, shelter, hygiene, and medical care. DOD may 

also be requested to provide cots and tents or assist with construction of temporary shelters. 

Key to planning populace care is determining the transition of responsibilities from DOD to 

civilian authorities in the event that temporary shelters and camps become more permanent. 

DOD forces will ensure attention to property accountability so that transfers/disposals are 

properly documented for eventual reimbursement when it is authorized. 

(6) Decontamination Planning. Tasks may include decontamination of civilian 

and military personnel as well as civilian and military equipment and critical infrastructure. 

Additionally, contamination mitigation of remains is a viable mission. Local hospital 

decontamination tasks are also required. Contaminated waste disposal is a key requirement, 

and important in the context of interagency coordination. A DOD medical/health 

representative, with appropriate technical expertise, should be made available to civilian 

authorities to provide health-based recommendations concerning worker health and safety as 

well as environmental cleanup aspects related to military unique hazards (such as CW 

agents). If expertise is not available within the AOR, there are a number of technical 

reachback agencies/capabilities that can be contacted (such as the US Army Medical 

Research Institute of Chemical Defense) and US Army Public Health Command to assist the 

JFC. 

For the most current clearance criteria and policy guidance for materiel returning to the 

United States, refer to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (Policy) Revised 

Radiological Clearance Criteria Guidelines for Platforms and Materiel. For more guidance 

on decontamination operations, refer to FM 3-11.5/MCWP 3-37.3/NTTP 3-11.26/AFTTP(I) 

3-2.60, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear Decontamination.

(7) Site Management Support Planning 

(a) Containment. Joint force CBRN response forces can provide the 

capability to mitigate or reduce further risk or damage to persons, materiel, facilities, and the 

environment. Contamination-control measures include leaving equipment in a potentially 

contaminated area until it is tested for contamination by qualified personnel. Other measures 

include encapsulating contaminated items by covering the equipment with plastic bags or 

tarps. 
 Overview 

I-25 

(b) Detection/Identification. DOD forces may be tasked to detect and 

identify the specific hazard(s) and set hazard boundaries. Military CBRN surveillance and 

reconnaissance units may also be tasked to survey the contaminated area to determine extent 

and level/degree of contamination. Survey elements might need to consider the incident site 

as a crime scene by setting boundaries and cordoning the site to safeguard responders and 

onlookers and prevent further contamination or environmental damage. Hazard areas may 

need to be marked and isolated to warn and protect the response personnel working in the 

area. Setting boundaries facilitates strict control into and out of the incident site. 

(c) Security. The JFC may provide Title 10, USC, forces in support of 

nonmilitary law enforcement agencies. This support may include, but is not limited to, 

providing information concerning a violation of state or federal laws, loaning military 

equipment and facilities, providing personnel to operate and/or maintain the loaned 

equipment, and providing basic training or expert advice. 

(d) Evidence. Evidence collected for forensic analysis on-site or at a different 

location and time. 

(e) Zone Control. In a response role, joint forces may assist with verification 

and management of containment boundaries set by civilian (or affected nation) authorities. 

Control zones are operational areas established by civilian authorities at an incident site 

within which only specific types of operations are conducted. Personnel working in these 

areas must adhere to strict procedures to ensure the safety of those working in the zones. 

Control zones are established to ensure the safety of all responders and control access into 

and out of a contaminated area. See Chapter II, “Domestic Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management,” for domestic zone operations as a 

guide when local authorities have not established controls. 

(f) Movement. Consider requirements to decontaminate personnel, vehicles, 

and equipment in support of evacuation, redeployment, or any movement from a 

contaminated site. The intent to retrograde residually contaminated equipment/cargo will 

require special approval through CJCS due to potential risks and political and environmental 

sensitivities. 

(g) Disposal. Consider requirements to dispose of unsalvageable equipment 

and vehicles. Also plan for disposal/disposition of contaminated materials that cannot be 

feasibly decontaminated. 

(h) Monitoring. Consider requirements to monitor personnel, vehicles, and 

equipment entering or exiting a contaminated zone. 

(8) Safety Planning. Emphasis should be placed on safety during any CBRN 

response because response forces may be directed with little warning and preparation time. 

Forces may move immediately into employment with little rest and under extremely stressful 

conditions. Military issue protective equipment may not protect against all CBRN hazards. 

While Service safety programs are generally run by Service components, guidelines, 
Chapter I 

I-26 JP 3-41 

standards, and instructions should be set by the JFC. Tracking of exposure and force health 

protection compliance should be captured, analyzed, and acted upon as a joint safety issue. 

(9) Religious Affairs 

(a) Guidance in this section pertains to domestic, foreign, and DOD-led CBRN 

CM. The primary role for DOD chaplains during CBRN incidents will be to support 

authorized DOD personnel. Only during rare and exceptional emergencies may DOD 

chaplains provide religious support (RS) to non-DOD civilians or first responders, and then 

only strictly in compliance with command direction, legal guidance, and supervisory 

chaplain oversight. 

1. As part of the DOD CBRN response, military chaplains and their 

assistants deliver RS and advisement to the commander and authorized recipients according 

to applicable policies and standard operating procedures. They can work cooperatively and 

collaboratively to build partnerships with faith-based organizations and civilian clergy in 

order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian care to the affected population. Emergency 

spiritual care, traumatic incident management, respecting and honoring the dead, and other 

religious activities are critical to sustaining DOD personnel and supporting the restoration of 

a stable society. Additionally, military chaplains are trained in counseling and, as such, may 

be able to augment medical forces in the provision of some level of psychological care, when 

necessary. 

2. Many DOD CBRN units do not contain embedded religious support 

teams (RSTs). States will likely establish a NG JTF for C2 of NG forces. The NGB Office 

of the Chaplain will provide additional qualified RSTs as needed to support the NG JTF. 

(b) RST roles differ according to control zones. (See Chapter II, “Domestic 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management,” for full 

descriptions of each control zone.) Most RST activities including those pertaining to 

casualty care, counseling, worship opportunities, memorial services, and stress management 

occur in the cold zone. Selected RSTs with proper training and certification, equipment, and 

command direction may also be tasked to provide limited RS in the warm zone. RST warm 

zone activities could include hot zone casualty reception and support to medical triage, mass 

casualty decontamination, and mortuary affairs operations. It is not recommended that RSTs 

enter the hot zone, but be prepared to provide RS to those personnel operating within the hot 

zone. 

(c) The following specific key locations at the incident site normally require 

the presence of properly trained, equipped, and authorized RSTs: the decontamination line, 

casualty collection point, medical treatment facilities, mortuary affairs collection points, and 

evacuation centers/emergency family assistance centers. At these locations, RSTs normally 

focus on RS to casualties and care givers. They also ensure honor and respect for the 

deceased. 

For more information on legal guidance and supervisory chaplain oversight, see JP 1-05, 

Religious Affairs in Joint Operations, and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 
 Overview 

I-27 

(10) Biometric and Identity Assurance. When the US conducts foreign 

humanitarian and disaster relief (DR) operations in support of other nations, the employment 

of biometric capabilities is a mission enabler. Working by, with, and through the partner 

nations, employment of biometric capabilities can assist in the management of local 

populations, force protection, initial accountability, access to relief sites, and the 

management of aid (including food and medicine). 

6. Limitation and Mitigation Strategies

a. Risk Management 

(1) Risk Assessment. In conducting risk management, the JFC should employ risk 

assessment procedures to help identify hazards and then assess those hazards to determine 

risk. Assessment is usually a mechanical process of assessing the probability of the incident 

or occurrence, estimating the expected result or severity of an incident or occurrence, and 

then determining specified level of risk for a given probability and severity. Matrixes and 

tables are often used to assist in this process. The joint force may have an established 

standard operating procedure for risk assessment. 

For further doctrinal guidance on force employment risk management during a CBRN 

incident, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

(CBRN) Environments. For further guidance on the risk management process and useful 

examples of matrixes and tables, refer to FM 5-19, Composite Risk Management. 

For further guidance on force protection posture vulnerability analysis and risk reduction, 

refer to Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 3-11.36/MCRP 3-37B/NTTP 3-

11.34/AFTTP(I) 3-20.70, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for CBRN 

Aspects of Command and Control.

(2) Risk Control. Risk management entails developing controls and making risk 

decisions, implementing those controls, and then supervising and evaluating. Maintaining 

safety discipline is extremely important during CBRN response operations. The heightened 

sense of urgency in working to help parents, children, and the elderly who have been 

contaminated may impact on decisions and cause Service members to want to take more 

personal risk. Other examples of long-term hazards requiring leaders to establish controls 

that consider the reason for the hazard and not just the hazard itself include climatic 

extremes, CBRN and hazardous waste contamination, or disease threats within the particular 

operational area or indigenous population. 

b. Operational and Strategic Risk. Any CBRN response must be rapid in order to 

save lives and minimize the overall impact of the incident. JFCs providing CBRN incident 

response need to have viable plans and be prepared to make rapid decisions with minimal 

knowledge of the scope and magnitude of the incident. Self-confidence and high 

competency are necessary to execute effectively in a hazardous environment. Those forces 

committed by DOD to this mission as part of national preparedness need to be trained and 

ready when the nation calls. When these conditions are met, the risk of strategic and 

operational failure has been minimized. 
Chapter I 

I-28 JP 3-41 

Intentionally Blank 
II-1 

CHAPTER II 

DOMESTIC CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR 

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT 

1. General 

a. Overview. CBRN CM (Figure II-1) conducted by DOD in the homeland in support 

of civil authorities is conducted as a DSCA operation. See JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil 

Authorities, for a complete discussion of DSCA operations. The capability and capacity to 

effectively respond to domestic CBRN incidents and sustain operations in CBRN 

environments require properly trained and equipped forces that follow the parameters set 

forth in this chapter. A description of DOD’s participation in the whole-of-government 

response to a domestic CBRN incident is provided in the NRF. It further details the 

authorities that delineate the roles and limits for DOD in a domestic response. In conducting 

DSCA to include CBRN response, a distinction is made between the different chains of 

command for active DOD, Title 10, USC, federal forces providing support to civil authorities 

and for NG forces commanded by the state governor under Title 32, USC, and state active 

duty. State and local governments are closest to those affected by incidents, and have a lead 

role in response and recovery. For a federal response to a CBRN incident, DOD support is 

tailored to the scope and magnitude of the incident. DOD assets are employed with a focus 

on response requirements beyond the resources of state and federal civil authorities. The 

DOD CBRN response is typically conducted via a JTF that provides C2 of forces trained and 

equipped for this mission, as well as contingency sourced conventional forces. Using a sixphased approach, the JFC leads the response forces from steady state through CBRN 

response operations. During phase 0, the CCDR sustains subordinate response force 

readiness through exercises, training, and rehearsal activities. 

b. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. DSCA policy and procedures guide DOD 

support provided by federal military forces, NG forces performing duty IAW Title 10 and 

Title 32, USC, DOD civilian, military contract personnel, and DOD component assets in a 

domestic response. It includes immediate response and response to approved RFAs during 

domestic CBRN incidents. This DSCA response includes support to federal departments and 

agencies that assist local, state, and tribal authorities within the US territories for CBRN CM 

operations. Figure II-1 illustrates the basic relationships of CBRN CM. It includes support 

provided by NG forces performing duty conducted as state-directed actions when approved 

by SecDef IAW Title 10 and Title 32, USC, or when NG forces are in state active duty 

status. SecDef policy and Joint Staff instructions provide guidance for the operational 

framework that serves as the foundation for a joint force’s relationship with local, state, 

tribal, other federal, or nongovernmental entities.

“We are building our capability to prepare for disasters to reduce or eliminate longterm effects to people and their property from hazards and to respond to and 

recover from major incidents. To improve our preparedness, we are integrating 

domestic all hazards planning at all levels of government and building key 

capabilities to respond to emergencies.” 

National Security Strategy 2010 
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-41 

2. Roles, Responsibilities, Authorities, and Assets 

a. Department of Defense and the National Response Framework. DOD provides 

assistance upon request by an appropriate authority and after approval of SecDef. When 

conducting CBRN response IAW the NRF, DOD is in support of an NRF ESF primary 

agency or NRF incident annex coordinating agency. As a practical matter, DOD prefers a 

single source for mission assignments and generally identifies DHS FEMA as the primary 

agency in its EXORD, operation plan, or operation order (OPORD) authorizing federal 

military assistance. In any case, DOD may provide assistance that has been approved by the 

appropriate authorities. 

Figure II-1. Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Consequence Management 

CBRN

CBRN CM chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear consequence management

CONUS continental United States

DOD Department of Defense

OCONUS outside the continental United States

chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear

request for assistance/coordination

provision of assistance

response to incident

Legend

CBRN

Incident

Incident Area

DOD Installation

Nongovermental 

Organizations

DOD Support

(Incident Area 

Only)

Department of 

Homeland Security

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Consequence Management

Federal*

Local* Local First 

Responders*

State*

DOD First 

Responders and 

Additional 

Support





DOD support is 

organic

Assistance is 

requested through 

coordination with 

authorities at each 

echelon, CONUS 

and OCONUS

 DOD support 

is part of 

federal 

assistance

DOD Installation

Domestic 

CBRN CM

Base Support 

Installation

*Tribal response may require special consideration during coordination.
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

II-3 

For more information on ESFs, see the NRF and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil 

Authorities.

b. The domestic environment for DSCA presents many challenges to the JFC and more 

so when responding to a CBRN incident. It is imperative that commanders and staffs at all 

levels understand the statutory and operational relationships among all federal departments 

and agencies involved in the operation. NIMS provides a consistent nationwide template to 

enable federal, state, tribal, and local governments, the private sector, and NGOs to work 

together to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of 

incidents regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity. NIMS can be utilized for all 

incidents, ranging from daily occurrences to incidents requiring a coordinated federal 

response. 

c. Commanders and their staffs at all levels should be knowledgeable about the NRF 

and NIMS and how their commands fit in to the overall national response framework. The 

NRF is a guide to how the US conducts all-hazard responses. It is built upon scalable, 

flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities across 

the Nation. It describes specific authorities and best practices for managing domestic 

incidents that range from the serious but purely local, to large-scale terrorist attacks or 

catastrophic natural disasters. The NRF contains a number of incident annexes that apply to 

CBRN incidents. Each annex lists the coordinating agency or agencies and cooperating 

agencies involved in the response and provides information on applicable policies, 

authorities, planning assumptions, concept of operations, actions, and responsibilities of 

cooperating agencies for the particular incident described. 

For more information on the NRF and NIMS, refer to the NRF Resource Center: 

http://www.fema.gov/NRF and the NIMS Resource Center: www.fema.gov/NIMS. These 

online resources are routinely updated and evolving. 

d. DOD Roles and Responsibilities. Domestic CBRN CM is managed at the lowest 

possible level, with DOD providing support as directed. When SecDef approves a request 

for DSCA during a CBRN incident, CDRUSNORTHCOM and Commander, United States 

Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM) are the supported GCCs for CBRN responses within 

their respective AORs as designated in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) for a federal 

response. DOD supports the NRF primary and coordinating agencies during domestic 

CBRN CM operations. The operational chain of command for federal forces remains with 

the GCC; the operational chain of command for state controlled NG forces remains with the 

governor. A brief synopsis of specific DOD roles and responsibilities for CBRN response in 

the domestic operational environment is provided below: 

(1) Secretary of Defense. SecDef retains approval authority for the use of forces, 

personnel, units, and equipment for DSCA, to include support to CBRN CM. SecDef has the 

primary responsibility to provide the overall policy and oversight for DOD in the event of a 

domestic incident. 

(2) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security 

Affairs) (ASD[HD&ASA]). The Office of ASD(HD&ASA) is within the office of the 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-41 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]). ASD(HD&ASA) serves as the DOD 

Domestic Crisis Manager and provides policy oversight for all domestic CBRN incident 

support. ASD(HD&ASA) coordinates with the heads of the DOD components, the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on matters regarding the readiness posture of forces, 

to include critical infrastructure protection and CBRN nuclear response enterprise assets. 

See Appendix C, “Department of Defense Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Enterprise Assets,” for a description of these assets. 

(3) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) (ASD[HA]). ASD(HA) is 

within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. This 

office is responsible for interactions with the Department of Health and Human Services in 

the National Disaster Medical System. Each Service maintains federal coordinating centers, 

which are medical facilities responsible for locating all civilian beds in their geographic 

location, arranging the transport of patients from arriving aircraft, and all logistics in support 

of receiving mass casualties from a disaster area. 

(4) Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering 

Weapons of Mass Destruction supports the USD(P) and Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Global Strategic Affairs (ASD[GSA]), by developing strategies and policies and overseeing 

the execution of approved policies and programs regarding CBRN defense, WMD missile 

proliferation, and global threats. 

(5) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (ASD[RA]). ASD(RA) is 

responsible for monitoring RC readiness. ASD(RA) provides policy regarding the 

appropriate integration of RC forces into response efforts. 

(6) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CJCS serves as the principal military 

advisor to SecDef and the President in preparing for and responding to CBRN incidents, and 

ensures that military planning is accomplished to support the lead or other primary agency 

for CBRN CM, and provides strategic guidance to the CCDRs for the conduct of operations. 

(7) Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS). JDOMS, located within the 

operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3), works closely with ASD(HD&ASA) and the 

Services, CCDRs, and NGB to produce military orders pertaining to domestic emergencies 

for the CJCS. JDOMS forwards these orders to SecDef for approval, and then to the 

appropriate military commander for execution. The initial request enters through the DOD 

Executive Secretary and is forwarded to the Office of ASD(HD&ASA) and JDOMS, who 

evaluates the request against six criteria: legality (compliance with laws); lethality (potential 

use of lethal force by or against DOD forces); risk (safety of DOD forces); readiness (impact 

on the DOD ability to perform its primary mission); appropriateness (whether the requested 

mission is in the interest of DOD to conduct); and cost (who pays, impact on DOD budget). 

(8) Combatant Commands

(a) Commander, US Northern Command, and Commander, US Pacific 

Command. When directed by the President or SecDef, these GCCs provide Title 10, USC, 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

II-5 

CS/DSCA support to domestic CBRN CM and are the supported commanders in a CBRN 

response. CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible for providing CBRN CM assistance to US 

and Allied authorities, as directed, within the USNORTHCOM AOR, to include US 

territories and protectorates in that AOR. Other geographic and functional commands 

support CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSPACOM in their DSCA efforts. 

(b) Commander, United States Special Operations Command 

(CDRUSSOCOM). When directed by the President or SecDef, CDRUSSOCOM conducts 

special operations in support of national CBRN CM activities. CDRUSSOCOM may 

provide liaison officers (LNOs) and other assistance to the supported CCDR, as required. 

(c) Commander, United States Transportation Command, is a joint force 

provider and provides deployment, distribution, sustainment, and redeployment of commonuser air, land, and sea transportation for forces supporting CBRN CM and provides 

aeromedical evacuation as required, IAW current guidance. 

(d) Commander, United States Strategic Command 

(CDRUSSTRATCOM). CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for synchronizing planning 

for DOD combating weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) efforts in coordination with 

other combatant commands, the Services, and as directed, appropriate USG departments and 

agencies. 

(9) USNORTHCOM Subordinate Commands. In USNORTHCOM AOR, five 

JTFs or TFs are identified to provide C2 for DOD Title 10, USC, response efforts with 

AORs that coincide with the NRF for PI regional construct. 

(a) United States Army Forces North (USARNORTH). When approved by 

SecDef and directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, Commander, United States Army Forces 

North (CDRUSARNORTH) deploys a mission-specific TF or JTF, and conducts CBRN 

response operations to support federal, state, local, and tribal authorities. 

CDRUSARNORTH serves as the USNORTHCOM standing joint force land component 

commander (JFLCC) and has operational control (OPCON) of Joint Task Force-Civil 

Support (JTF-CS). It is also prepared to deploy additional JTF-level mission-specific 

headquarters for multiple CBRN incidents to provide appropriate C2 based on the magnitude 

of the response. USARNORTH can be augmented by other services to establish a JFC over 

subordinate JTFs and/or functional components when required by the scope and magnitude 

of the incident. It supports single or multiple incidents with communication zone 

coordination and logistics operations. 

(b) Joint Task Force-Civil Support. JTF-CS is a standing joint operational 

headquarters dedicated to DOD planning and response to domestic CBRN and other HE 

incidents in support of civil authorities. CDRUSNORTHCOM has combatant command 

(command authority) over JTF-CS, and the JFLCC has OPCON of the unit. JTF-CS forms 

the command headquarters of defense chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

response force (DCRF). Routine day-to-day functions include providing advice in doctrine 

development, requirements identification, training and exercise management, and the 

promotion of domestic interoperability for DOD CBRN CM capable assets in the AC and 
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-41 

RC. When approved by SecDef, and directed by the USNORTHCOM chain of command, 

JTF-CS deploys to take C2 of Title 10, USC, resources and forces, and conducts military 

support operations to assist civil authorities in responding to a CBRN or other HE incident 

within the homeland. When CBRN or bulk HE incidents occur in the USPACOM AOR, 

CDRUSPACOM is the supported commander, and JTF-CS may deploy in their support. 

(c) The DOD CBRN Response Enterprise includes: 

1. NG units from the NG of their respective states: 

a. WMD-CSTs. 

b. CERFPs. 

c. HRFs. 

2. Title 10, USC, units allocated to USNORTHCOM for this mission: 

a. DCRF. 

b. Command and control chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear response elements (C2CREs). 

3. In addition, a catastrophic incident may require significant contingencysourced follow-on forces. 

See Appendix C, “Department of Defense Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Enterprise Assets,” for additional information on CBRN response forces. 

(d) Joint Task Force-Alaska (JTF-AK). When established, JTF-AK is 

responsible to USNORTHCOM for the conduct of homeland defense (HD) and CS within its 

assigned JOA. JTF-AK is responsible for deterring, detecting, preventing, and defeating 

national security threats within the Alaska JOA to protect US territory, citizens, and interests, 

and as directed, conduct CS. 

(e) Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR). As a 

standing subordinate organization of USNORTHCOM, JFHQ-NCR plans, coordinates, and 

maintains situational awareness within its assigned JOA to accomplish assigned HD and CS 

missions. When approved by SecDef and directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, Joint Task 

Force National Capital Region is established and provides C2 of military support operations 

to help federal, state, and local authorities respond to a CBRN incident within the National 

Capital Region. 

(10) Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), USARNORTH. CDRUSARNORTH 

appoints a DCO to each of the 10 FEMA regions to serve as DOD’s single point of contact at 

a JFO. A DCO may be the first DOD representative on-site and acts as the single DOD point 

of contact. The DCO is the designated DOD on-scene member of the FEMA-led JFO, the 

multiagency coordination center established locally for federal response related prevention, 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

II-7 

preparedness, response, and recovery actions. The DCO, supported by a defense 

coordinating element (DCE), coordinates all RFAs and approved mission assignments with 

the principal federal official (PFO), federal coordinating officer (FCO), or designated 

representative from the NRF primary and coordinating agencies. If a JTF is established and 

colocated with the PFO at the JFO, this colocation does not replace the requirement for a 

DCO and DCE as part of the JFO coordination staff. The DCO continues to exercise the 

JFO staff function of mission assignment coordination and validation and acts as a liaison 

between the JFO staff and the JTF staff. 

(11) USPACOM Subordinate Units. Joint Task Force-Homeland Defense (JTFHD) is CDRUSPACOM’s HD and DSCA headquarters. The Commander, US Army Pacific, 

serves as the Commander, JTF-HD. JTF-HD, when directed, conducts CBRN response in 

support of civil authorities to mitigate the effects of deliberate and inadvertent CBRN and 

bulk HE incidents in Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, and US territories and insular areas 

within its JOA. The JTF-HD establishes C2 of designated DOD forces within the JOA and 

provides DSCA to save lives, prevent injury, and provide temporary critical life support. 

Although it may require augmentation, many of the JTF capabilities, subject matter experts, 

and resources are already within US Army Pacific. JTF-HD works with state, territorial, and 

military organizations to ensure response across a large AOR. Because of the vast 

geographical distances within the Pacific, each territory and base has plans to respond to a 

variety of threats with forces in place, since any external forces have to come by air or 

sealift. The USPACOM CBRN CM plan includes flexible task organizations of multiple 

services, components, and capabilities. 

(12) Military Services. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2060.02, 

Department of Defense (DOD) Combating WMD Policy, directs the Services to organize, 

train, and equip to support the CWMD mission areas. Each Service has some capability 

(based on its available assets and doctrine) to conduct or support CBRN CM. These 

capabilities may be called upon, when approved by SecDef, to provide forces, facilities, and 

assets to the supported CCDR as part of the DOD response to a CBRN incident. 

Specifically, the Service Chief responsibilities are as follows: 

(a) Provide the Joint Staff J-3 with information on assigned CBRN response 

capabilities, assets, units, and research or support facilities that are capable of providing 

reachback or on-scene support to CBRN CM operations. 

(b) Identify units available to the supported CCDR consistent with Title 10, 

USC. 

(c) Provide designated forces, to include RC forces, in order to prepare for and 

respond to a CBRN situation and assistance to the supported CCDR through the appropriate 

Service component commanders. 

(13) US Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF). 

CBIRF is a unit that was created to deploy on short notice in response to CBRN incidents. 

CBIRF consists of specially trained personnel and specialized equipment suited for 

operations in a wide range of contingencies. CBIRF is designed to minimize the effects of a 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-41 

CBRN incident through detection, identification, extraction, mass decontamination, medical 

triage, and emergency medical support. 

(14) RC Forces. NG and reserve forces are known collectively as RC forces. RC 

forces consist of the Army National Guard (ARNG), Air National Guard (ANG), United 

States Air Force Reserve (USAFR), United States Army Reserve (USAR), United States 

Navy Reserve (USNR), United States Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR), and United States 

Coast Guard Reserve (USCGR). Guidelines for utilization of RC forces can be found in 

Title 10, USC, and Title 32, USC. Guidelines for utilization of NG forces under state active 

duty will be found in their respective state codes. The Chief, National Guard Bureau 

(CNGB) facilitates and resources ANG and ARNG forces and assets through the states 

adjutants general to conduct CBRN response operations to assist federal, state, local, and 

tribal authorities in responding to a domestic CBRN incident. When directed by SecDef, the 

CNGB supports transition of state active duty or Title 32, USC, NG forces to federalized 

Title 10, USC, status for DSCA in coordination with individual states, and the ANG and 

ARNG. 

(a) National Guard. The NG primarily operates under two chains of 

command, state or federal. However, NG forces may be operationally employed under three 

different legal statuses: Title 10, USC (federalized and federally funded); Title 32, USC 

(non-federalized and federally funded); and state active duty (non-federalized and state 

funded). NG forces, unless federalized, operate under the C2 of the governor and the 

adjutant general (TAG) in state active duty and Title 32, USC, status. 

For more information, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

1. Under certain circumstances, a governor may request that the USG pay 

for the costs associated with a state call up of the NG for emergency response. When SecDef 

approves, NG forces change from state active duty status to Title 32, USC status. Even 

though the NG forces are on active duty and funded by the USG, in Title 32, USC status, the 

governor retains command of the NG. Although the distinction between funding lines is 

important to the respective state and federal treasuries, tactical employment of forces remains 

the same. For the JFC, the important distinction is that NG units in Title 32, USC, status 

remain under state control; and, as a result, have authority for some missions that Title 10, 

USC, units do not. Because forces in Title 32, USC, status remain under the command of the 

governor, NG units may conduct law enforcement missions and are not subject to the 

restriction of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). 

2. Additionally, the NG of one state can assist other states responding to a 

disaster through formal agreements, such as the emergency management assistance compact 

(EMAC). Typically, this occurs in state active duty (non-federalized and state funded). 

When requested by the supported state’s governor and authorized by the supporting state’s 

governor under a separate memorandum of agreement (MOA), NG elements deploy to the 

supported state. The supporting NG forces operate under operational command of the 

supported state’s TAG as granted by the supporting state’s governor. Typically, 

deployments under a state-to-state MOA are limited to a specific period, such as 30 days. 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

II-9 

(b) NG Capabilities and Contribution. National Guard coordination centers 

(NGCCs), NG JFHQs-State, joint task forces-state (JTFs-State), WMD-CSTs, CERFPs, 

HRFs, Joint Continental United States Communications Support Environment (JCCSE), and 

Joint Interagency Training Capability form the keystone of NG CBRN response capabilities. 

1. NG Coordination Center. The NGCC provides mutual, shared 

situational awareness among the NG JFHQs-State, NGB, and USNORTHCOM during a 

CBRN incident or other major or catastrophic incidents. The NGCC synchronizes alert 

notification and deployment of designated WMD-CSTs, CERFPs, and HRFs and 

synchronizes notification of deployment of other NG capabilities when requested by a state 

or agency. The JCCSE enables the NGCC to maintain situational awareness and share 

information with NG commanders at all levels throughout the 50 states and four territories. 

Additionally, it provides a deployable, interoperable communications capability to the JTFState commander. 

2. NG Joint Force Headquarters-State. The NG JFHQ-State provides 

the governor C2 capability for all NG forces in their state or territory, or in the case of the 

District of Columbia, the C2 of the District of Columbia NG has been delegated to the 

Secretary of the Army by SecDef and therefore the Joint Force Headquarters-District of 

Columbia currently operates on behalf of the Secretary of the Army. During a CBRN or 

bulk HE incident, the NG JFHQ-State assumes control of additional WMD-CSTs and 

CERFPs deployed into the supported state and provides JRSOI and logistical support. 

3. Joint Task Force-State. The JTF-State controls all subordinate state 

NG assets deployed in support of a CBRN or bulk HE incident. The JTF-State commander 

works closely with the incident commander to verify that NG resources are effectively, 

safely, and legally employed. 

4. Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams. WMD-CSTs 

are NG units designed to support civil authorities at a domestic CBRNE incident site by 

identifying CBRNE agents/substances, assessing current and projected consequences, 

advising on response measures, and assisting with requests for additional support. The 

WMD-CST mission is accomplished primarily in a Title 32, USC, operational status within 

the US and its territories, as established by Title 10, USC, Section 12310. 

For more information on WMD-CSTs, see FM 3-11.22, Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil 

Support Operations.

See Appendix C, “Department of Defense Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Enterprise Assets,” for additional information on CBRN response forces. 

5. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield 

Explosive Enhanced Response Force Package. CERFPs are designed and trained to 

provide search, extraction, medical triage, emergency medical treatment, decontamination of 

casualties, and recovery of remains during CBRN and non-CBRN incidents, as well as 

advice and assistance to the incident commander, state emergency management, the NG 

JFHQ-State, TAG, the governor, other key officials, and representatives of federal agencies. 
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-41 

For more information on CERFPs, see ATTP 3-11.47, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Enhanced Response Force Package Operations.

See Appendix C, “Department of Defense Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Enterprise Assets,” for additional information on CBRN response forces. 

6. NG Homeland Response Force. The HRF is part of the support to 

improve DOD’s CBRN response capability through reorganization of CBRN response 

forces. Designed to be employed primarily with forces in state active duty or Title 32, USC, 

status, the HRF leverages the current WMD-CSTs and CERFPs force structure and 

capabilities through augmentation by force packages that include a brigade level C2 element 

and a battalion sized CBRN response security element in each of the 10 FEMA regions. 

Designated NG JFHQs-State establish HRFs and maintain current NG HRFs with essential 

CBRN response capabilities. 

See Appendix C, “Department of Defense Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Enterprise Assets,” for additional information on CBRN response forces. 

7. Reserve Forces. The RC forces are structured and operated to mirror 

their respective AC counterparts. Unlike the ANG and ARNG, the USAR, USNR, USAFR, 

USMCR, and USCGR C2 relationships remain intact in both peacetime and wartime. These 

RC forces do not have state-specific relationships. When called to active duty, RC forces 

conduct CS missions under Title 10, USC, guidelines exactly as AC forces; USCGR is 

recalled pursuant to Title 14, USC. While on federal active duty, members of the ARNG of 

the United States, ANG of the United States, USAR, USNR, USAFR, USMCR, and USCGR 

are subject to the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. RC forces are called to 

active duty through the mobilization and demobilization processes. 

For more information on the RC mobilization and demobilization processes, see JP 4.05, 

Joint Mobilization Planning.

(15) Combat Support Agencies (CSAs). CSAs provide direct support to 

CCDRs during emergency situations and are subject to evaluation by CJCS. The seven 

CSAs are the Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense 

Logistics Agency (DLA), National Security Agency, Defense Contract Management 

Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

(DTRA). Each plays a critical role in supporting CBRN response operations by ensuring the 

supported commander has the technical CBRN information, situational awareness, technical 

support, 24/7 reachback capability, logistics, and contracting support necessary to carry out 

the mission. DTRA provides operational and technical advice and support to DOD 

components and other USG departments and agencies, as requested and approved, regarding 

CBRN CM operations. This is accomplished through training and exercises, the deployment 

of CBRN CM advisory teams, and operational planning assistance. DTRA also provides 

modeling, predictions, assessments, publications, training, lessons learned, analysis, and 

other support as required. DTRA provides technical reachback through the DTRA 

Operations Center, a 24/7 WMD and CBRN national reachback and situational awareness 

facility, for all technical support. During CBRN CM, DTRA liaises with other technical 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

II-11 

support providers and the intelligence community to meet support requests. DTRA provides 

operational and technical advice and support to DOD components and other USG 

departments and agencies, as requested and approved, regarding CBRN CM operations. 

This is accomplished through training and exercises, the deployment of CBRN CM advisory 

teams, and operational planning assistance. DTRA also provides modeling, predictions, 

assessments, publications, training, lessons learned, analysis, and other support as required. 

DTRA provides technical reachback through the DTRA Operations Center, a 24/7 WMD 

and CBRN national reachback and situational awareness facility, for all technical support. 

During CBRN CM, DTRA liaises with other technical support providers and the intelligence 

community to meet support requests. 

e. US Coast Guard 

(1) The USCG is a military Service, a branch of the Armed Forces, and a law 

enforcement agency at all times. When directed by the President, or by a congressional 

declaration of war, the USCG may be transferred from DHS to the Department of the Navy. 

The USCG is not constrained by the PCA and has jurisdiction on US waters, the high seas, 

and at selected land-based maritime transportation and industrial facilities. 

(a) USCG’s homeland security (HS) mission is to protect the US maritime 

domain and the US marine transportation system and deny their use and exploitation as a 

means for attacks on US territory, population, and critical infrastructure. Additionally, 

USCG prepares for and, in the event of attack, conducts hazard response operations. 

(b) The USCG is the LFA for maritime security. CCDRs may assign forces to 

USCG area commanders under tactical control (TACON) to support short notice HS 

operations without a formal request for forces (RFF) for up to 48 hours. Longer duration 

operations require an RFF. 

(c) USCG CBRN Capabilities. The USCG provides unique authorities, surge 

capacities, and capabilities for CBRN CM. During CBRN CM operations, the USCG may 

be supported by DOD forces or may support DOD forces. 

(2) USCG National Strike Force (NSF). The NSF deploys specialized 

capabilities and incident command expertise to support lead agency, incident commander, 

and federal on-scene coordinator preparation and response to CBRN incidents, hazardous 

substance releases, oil discharges, and other emergencies. NSF assets include the NSF 

Coordination Center in Elizabeth City, North Carolina, and three strike teams: the Atlantic 

Strike Team in Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey; the Gulf Strike Team in 

Mobile, Alabama; and the Pacific Strike Team in Novato, California. NSF equipment 

includes CBRN detection; air, water, and soil sampling; Level A, B, and C personnel 

protection; self-decontamination equipment; hazardous material packaging; mobile 

command posts; boats; pumps, generators, and weather stations. NSF equipment is palletized 

for immediate deployment by truck or aircraft. The NSF supports domestic response and 

may deploy detachments to support overseas military environmental response operations. 
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 3-41 

(3) Domestic USCG Search and Rescue and Security Forces. The USCG 

maintains widely distributed search and rescue and security forces. Selected units are trained 

to operate in a maritime CBRN environment and may support limited CBRN CM operations. 

These include the maritime security response force and maritime safety and security teams. 

(4) USCG expeditionary forces include USCG ships, aircraft, port security units, 

security teams, NSF detachments, and law enforcement detachments assigned to overseas 

GCCs. These forces are trained and equipped to DOD CBRN defense standards and may 

support limited FCM operations. 

3. Command Relationships 

a. Domestic CBRN Response Command and Control. Domestic CBRN CM may 

engage the full spectrum of government, NGOs, and the private sector. The efficient 

coordination of military and civil capabilities and activities within a stricken operating 

environment requires a unifying command structure to achieve unity of effort. Military 

forces always remain under the control of the chain of command as established by Title 10, 

USC, Title 14, USC, Title 32, USC, or state active duty. 

b. NG Soldiers and Airmen may serve either in a federal status like other reserve 

soldiers, or in a state status (state active duty or Title 32, USC), under the command of the 

governor. The state governors, through TAGs, control NG forces when those forces are 

performing active duty in their state role and when performing active duty under Title 32, 

USC. Figure II-2 depicts these command relationships. Two crucial principles clarify the 

duty status of NG personnel: 

(1) Unless ordered into federal service, NG Soldiers and Airmen serve in state 

active duty or Title 32, USC, status under a state chain of command under the governor. 

(2) The duty status of these NG Soldiers or Airmen is not determined by who funds 

an operation; rather, it depends upon their legal status and associated chain of authority. 

c. Dual-Status Command. Legislation allows for a dual-status commander to have 

command authority over both federal and state forces. A dual-status commander provides a 

means for providing unity of effort for military forces operating in Title 32, USC, and Title 

10, USC. A dual-status commander must be duly appointed and can be an active duty officer 

who accepts an additional state commission or can be a federalized state NG officer. Dualstatus command can leverage military leadership that has local situational awareness and 

existing relationships with local civil agencies; provide continuity as federal forces are 

integrated into the response effort; and provide for continuity in response (same JTF C2 prior 

to and after federal response). Dual-status authority is vested in an individual commander, 

not the organization. Therefore, a dual-status commander should have a Title 10, USC, 

deputy and a Title 32, USC, deputy, as well as a joint staff manned by Title 10, USC, and 

state active duty/Title 32, USC, personnel. This augmented staff is particularly important 

should a dual-status JTF-State have to control naval forces since few states have naval 

militias from which to draw maritime expertise. The primary shared DOD and state interests 

are unity of effort and effective execution. 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

II-13 

For more information on dual authority under Title 10, USC, and Title 32, USC, see 

JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 

d. Achieving Unity of Effort Without Unity of Command. When the US undertakes 

military operations, the Armed Forces of the United States are only one component of a 

national-level effort involving all instruments of national power. Unity of effort can be 

achieved without unity of command and is the predominant solution in domestic CBRN 

response operations. Unity of effort does not depend on “what” capabilities are employed; 

rather, it depends on “how” they are employed. 

Figure II-2. Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Command Relationships 

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Response Command Relationships

civilian authority

federal command

state command

coordination

advisory role

Legend

Coast Guard

Joint

Task Force

Functional

and/or

Service

Components

Joint Task 

Force – State

National

Guard

Bureau

Combatant

Commander

Secretary

of the

Army

Secretary

of the

Air Force

Joint Force

Commander

Joint Force

Headquarters – 

State

Federalized

National Guard 

Forces

Secretary of 

Homeland 

Security

President

Secretary of 

Defense

Chairman of 

the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff

Director, State 

Emergency 

Management 

Agency

Governor

State

Adjutant

General
Chapter II 

II-14 JP 3-41 

(1) Joint doctrine focuses on multinational and interagency coordination employing 

the broad term of “unified action” in referring to the synchronization, coordination, and/or 

integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military 

operations to achieve unity of effort. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is, of 

necessity, a cooperative endeavor involving a number of federal departments and agencies. 

A similar unity of effort will be necessary at the state and local levels. 

For more information on interagency coordination and unity of effort, see JP 3-08,

Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.

(2) National response doctrine in the NRF identifies unity of effort through unified 

command as one of its five key principles for the federal interagency/state/local/tribal 

response. Effective unified command is indispensable to response activities and requires a 

clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each participating organization. 

Success requires unity of effort, which respects the chain of command of each participating 

organization while harnessing seamless coordination across jurisdictions in support of 

common objectives. Use of the incident command system (ICS) is an important element 

across multi-jurisdictional or multiagency incident management activities. It provides a 

structure to enable agencies with different legal, jurisdictional, and functional responsibilities 

to coordinate, plan, and interact effectively on scene. The ICS “unified command” concept 

is distinct from the military chain of command construct of “unity of command” and, as 

such, military forces do not operate under the authority of the incident commander or under 

the ICS unified command structure. As a team effort, unified command allows all agencies 

with jurisdictional authority and/or functional responsibility for the incident to provide joint 

support through mutually developed incident objectives and strategies established at the 

command level. Each participating agency maintains its own authority, responsibility, and 

accountability. NIMS supports response through the following elements of unified 

command: developing a single set of objectives; using a collective, strategic approach; 

improving information flow and coordination; creating common understanding of joint 

priorities and restrictions; ensuring that no agency’s legal authorities are compromised or 

neglected; and optimizing the combined efforts of all agencies under a single plan. 

For more information on unified command and unity of effort in the NRF, NIMS, and ICS, 

refer to the NRF Resource Center, www.fema.gov/NRF, and the NIMS Resource Center, 

www.fema.gov/NIMS. These online resources are routinely updated and evolving. 

(3) At the operational level, the JFO ensures unity of effort by identifying agencies 

that have the requisite capabilities to reach the common objectives or the ability to adapt 

their wide-area operations in light of the response by bringing their core competencies to the 

interagency forum. When all participants in the interagency process understand what needs 

to be done, agree upon the means to accomplish it, and identify who will accomplish specific 

activities through coordination, a common sense of ownership and commitment toward 

resolution helps achieve unity of effort. 

(a) To facilitate unity of effort outside the interagency, the unified coordination 

group may include a limited number of principal state (represented by an appropriate state 

official or state coordinating officer, as under a Stafford Act declaration), local, and tribal 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

II-15 

officials, as well as NGO and private-sector representatives. The unified coordination group 

functions as a multiagency coordination entity (as defined by the NIMS) and works to 

establish coordinated priorities (single or multiple incidents) and allocate resources, resolve 

agency policy issues, and provide strategic guidance to support federal incident management 

activities. Because the principles of unified command apply to the unified coordination 

group, the objectives are a reflection of the agencies’ collective approach rather than 

“tasking” from a senior commander. JFO standard operating procedures ensure 

consideration to departmental/agency timelines and requirements to ensure a coordinated 

federal response. 

(b) Based on the magnitude, type of incident, and anticipated level of resource 

involvement, the supported CCDR may utilize a JTF to command federal (Title 10, USC) 

military activities in support of the incident. If a JTF is established, consistent with 

operational requirements, its C2 element is colocated at the JFO and included within the 

unified coordination group to ensure coordination and unity of effort. NIMS standardized 

structures and tools enable a unified approach to be effective both on scene and at the 

emergency operations centers (EOCs). 

For more information on unity of effort within the JFO, refer to the NRF Resource Center 

section on JFO job aides and the JFO Standard Operating Procedures and JFO Field 

Operations Guide, www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/jobaids.htm. These online resources are 

routinely updated and evolving. 

(4) Unity of effort is expected at the tactical level. This is because the designated 

incident commander develops the incident objectives on which subsequent incident action 

planning is based and integrates all capabilities into the response. The incident commander 

approves the incident action plan (IAP) pertaining to ordering and releasing of incident 

resources. 

(a) Almost all tasks given to DOD are tasks that someone in a civil position 

normally does, but the disaster conditions have overwhelmed their capacity. The technical 

knowledge and expertise is still resident with the activity or organization that needs the 

support (initial state requestor) but they are limited in their ability to cover the sheer 

magnitude of requirements on their own. Regardless of agency affiliation, newly reporting 

emergency management and response personnel check in at the designated staging area, 

base, camp, or location with the incident commander to receive their assignment IAW the 

established procedures. This direct control of resources at the local/tactical level is 

sometimes at odds with DOD procedures which require funded mission assignments in 

support of the federal response. The JFC can facilitate unity of effort with civil authorities at 

the tactical level by recognizing the incident commander’s need to integrate the JFC’s 

resources into his IAP, while remaining cognizant that US law prevents direct tasking by any 

entity outside the military chain of command. 

(b) The JFC shapes tactical unity of effort by having a common operating 

picture with all levels of the local, state, tribal, and federal response where DOD capabilities 

are being employed. Unity of effort in CBRN response is improved by interoperability with 

common methods of operation and common training using compatible or comparable 
Chapter II 

II-16 JP 3-41 

equipment. Finally, common control measures reflected in shared and common plans, 

concepts of execution, and IAPs can provide for civil authority oversight and direction in 

incident management, coordination of actions, and supervision of tactical effort without 

requiring a unity of command construct to get unity of effort. The JFC tasked with 

integrating DOD capabilities at the tactical level into domestic operations improves unity of 

effort when there is clarity at the tactical level in these four areas: 

1. Certainty as to Requirement(s). DSCA policy imposes strict controls 

for staying within the scope of the FEMA mission assignment process, leaving little latitude 

for tactical nimbleness in adjusting to quickly changing situations. The JFC should put 

controls into place to ensure that actual requirements are being met to the satisfaction of the 

entities closest to the situation. 

2. Clarification of Expectations. Ground truth at the work site can often 

change from the initial situation described in the federal response IAP and mission 

assignment. Thereafter, adjustments are made by first line leaders during execution to 

achieve the incident commander’s objectives. Direct coordination with the initial in-state 

requestor closest to the point of execution facilitates measured and reasonable adjustments 

while staying within the operational and fiscal constraints of the mission assignment. 

3. Efficient Resolution of Performance Issues. Even with the best 

intentions, support efforts sometimes don’t satisfy the expectations of the requestor who 

initially articulated the requirement. During a catastrophic incident, lost productivity or 

additional rework because of incomplete or improper performance can have a devastating 

impact on meeting goals and objectives. The JFC should encourage subordinate leaders to 

request routine checks and oversight by the initial state requestor to permit quick and 

efficient resolution of issues among requestors and responders closest to the point of 

performance. 

4. Risk Management. Just as in contracting, management of 

performance risk is allocated by the control measures agreed to by the parties within the 

contract, with the drafter (in this case the state requestor) initially setting the standards. The 

JFC should ensure that the initial requestor is part of the controls that are in place to identify 

and manage performance risk and not rely completely on the ESF coordinator in the JFO. 

Safety risks can be mitigated by the initial requestor, who routinely does the task, providing 

oversight over the DOD forces, perhaps even conducting on-site training for nontechnical 

forces. 

e. Achieving Unity of Effort Between Initial DOD Response Forces. Effective 

employment of federal and NG forces simultaneously is never easy, even with common 

doctrine and organizational design. Presidential directives and DOD regulatory guidance 

mandate that DOD civilian personnel and Service members meet minimum federal 

compliance standards for emergency responders and command and staff personnel. Law and 

circumstance often impede unity of command; leaders at every level depend on their 

experience, flexible initiative, and understanding of CS operations to ensure integrated and 

synchronized military CBRN response. Initial DOD response forces, consisting of both NG 

in Title 32, USC, status and federal forces in Title 10, USC, status, consult, coordinate with, 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

II-17 

and respond to state authorities or federal civil authorities in the tactical-level execution of 

assigned tasks, pursuant to an order by SecDef or the President to provide support to those 

authorities. The DOD CBRN Response Enterprise is structured to achieve an early unity of 

effort and integration of capabilities for responding to CBRN incidents. Key to achieving 

unity of effort is the integration of the enterprise through sourcing, training, exercising, 

readiness reporting, planning, and coordination in phase 0 prior to an incident. 

See Appendix C, “Department of Defense Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Enterprise Assets,” for additional information on response forces. 

4. Considerations 

a. The Joint Force in a CBRN CM Environment. Overarching requirements for a 

joint force in a CBRN environment are two-fold: the joint force shapes the composition of 

the response through proactive planning and interagency, intergovernmental, and 

nongovernmental coordination. The joint force is also responsible for protecting each 

member of DOD in support of civil authorities. The CBRN environment causes joint forces 

to plan in a unique way and recognize the primary reason for employment of the joint force 

is to support civil authorities and mitigate the consequences of a CBRN incident. Planning 

considerations are significantly different for the joint force conducting CBRN response as 

the primary mission than for the joint force conducting other missions. Requirements for

protecting joint forces remain a constant priority for the JFC, especially when operating in a 

contaminated environment. Supporting civil authorities also may entail unique legal 

implications that need to be considered through all phases of planning and operations. 

b. Layered CBRN Response. The NRF describes a tiered response and emphasizes 

that response to incidents should be handled at the lowest jurisdictional level capable of 

handling the work. The response to a CBRN incident requires the integration and 

synchronization of capabilities from the local, state, tribal, and federal level. Federal agency 

teams respond on their agency’s authority, if the problem exceeds the capabilities of lower 

tiers. From the DOD perspective, the layered response will likely begin within hours with 

employment of NG WMD-CSTs, HRFs, and CERFPs in Title 32, USC, or state active duty 

in addition to local Title 10, USC, commanders providing assistance under immediate 

response authority. When directed by SecDef, USNORTHCOM responds within hours with 

JTF-CS and the first DCRF and C2CRE echelons. These layered capabilities build quickly 

as depicted in Figure II-3. 

c. Integrated CBRN CM Framework

(1) Strategic. During a CBRN incident, DHS coordinates the federal 

government’s incident management efforts in support of the civil authorities. However, it is 

likely that the major elements of operational framework will have already been established 

IAW strategic decisions made by state and local responders in the initial hours of the 

response effort. A major decision is the determination of controls for the employment of 

first responders (police, fire, and emergency medical services) into the incident area to 

ensure that significant portions of the first responder community do not themselves become 

casualties. Another major decision concerns the ability of local civil government to control 
Chapter II 

II-18 JP 3-41 

the evacuation out of the incident area. If the local government can control the evacuation 

through public information and rapid establishment of traffic control points, then operational 

conditions are favorable for the deliberate application of local, state, and federal resources at 

designated evacuee processing centers and urban search and rescue, decontamination, and 

medical triage and emergency medical sites at points upwind or crosswind from the incident 

area. If the local civil government is unable to control the evacuation of the civil population, 

then evacuation centers are established at resulting choke points either on major roads or 

near hospitals and will result in a less deliberate approach to application of local, state, and 

federal resources. Both these decisions have significant impact on the operational 

environment that CBRN response forces will find when they are employed into the incident 

area. Therefore, the initial assessments conducted by NG WMD-CSTs or other federal 

Figure II-3. Layered Response Spectrum

Layered Response Spectrum

JOC joint operations center

JTF joint task force

LD/HD low density/high demand

NGCC National Guard coordination center

NGCE National Guard command element

NG JFHQ-State National Guard joint force 

headquarters-state

USC United States Code

WMD-CST weapons of mass destruction–civil 

support team

Legend

C2 command and control

C2CRE command and control 

 response element

CERFP chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 

high-yield explosives enhanced response force 

package

DCRF defense 

 response force

DOD Department of Defense

HRF homeland response force

chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear

chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear

DOD

(Title 10, USC)

Federal 

Civilian

Private Sector

National Guard

State Active Duty and

Title 32, USC

Local Emergency Services Mutual Aid

Agreements and Interstate Compacts

Specialized Regional Response Assets

Specialized Federal Assets (LD/HD)

High

NGCC

Situational Awareness and Joint C2

Throughout Layered Response

JOC

Low

PreIncidentFirst 12 Hours 12-24 

Hours

24-48 

Hours

48-96 

Hours

30 Days+

Required Capabilities and Resources

Incident

Title 10, USC

Reinforcing Response

NG JFHQ-State

Immediate 

Response

Title 32, USC

State 

Active 

Duty

JTF-State

NGCE

WMD CST

CERFP CERFP

HRF

HRF

DCRF and

C2CREs
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

II-19 

assessment teams are critical in providing DHS and other federal departments and agencies 

the necessary situational awareness to make quick decisions regarding resource sharing and 

coordination.

(2) Operational. The WMD-CST arrives in the vicinity of the incident site within 

the first 6 hours. The WMD-CST is able to provide the initial assessment to the NG JFHQState, JTF-State, and the incident commander, which forward the assessment to the NGCC 

and to USNORTHCOM. It is important the NGCC and USNORTHCOM joint operations 

center (JOC) forward the initial assessment and characterization of the threat to follow-on 

deploying NG WMD-CSTs, CERFPs, HRFs, and DCRF and C2CRE units, respectively, so 

these units can be better prepared for conditions they will face in the incident area. 

However, as discussed previously, much of the operational environment for CBRN response 

will be set based on early strategic decisions of the local authorities. If the evacuation of the 

population is controlled, CBRN response forces deploy to staging areas where they link up 

with local responders and are integrated into an existing network of evacuation processing 

centers. If the evacuation is uncontrolled, CBRN response forces may be required to 

establish evacuation centers at designated choke points or vicinity hospitals. For CBRN 

response forces, the most critical operational decision in the first 24 hours will be 

determination of how and where to employ life-saving (search and extraction, 

decontamination, and medical triage and emergency medical) capabilities. The most likely 

employment of forces is at the upwind or crosswind points either reinforcing local 

responders or establishing additional search and extraction, decontamination, and medical 

triage and emergency medical sites at upwind and crosswind points that local responders do 

not have the capability to cover. 

(3) Tactical. At the tactical level, the critical effort is rapid, and effective 

employment of reconnaissance capabilities is necessary to provide assessments on the effects 

in terms of casualties and medical treatment (detect and monitor). These assessments 

provide the necessary information to assist the incident commander in determining upwind 

and crosswind points and best locations for search and extraction, decontamination, medical 

triage and emergency medical services, and other sites. The next major effort is to increase 

the capability and capacity of local responders to perform search and extraction, 

decontamination, and medical triage and emergency medical care of casualties. DOD forces 

can reinforce evacuation centers to increase capacity and throughput or establish search and 

extraction, decontamination, medical triage and emergency medical—expanding the 

geographic distribution of response capability. An important force multiplier is DOD’s 

ability to assist with decontamination of local fire, police, and emergency medical services 

personnel and equipment, thus helping these immediate responders to stay safely engaged in 

the response. 

d. Organizing Considerations

(1) A JTF established in support of CBRN CM is organized in a manner similar to 

a conventional JTF. The CCDR normally establishes a JTF to plan and conduct CBRN 

response. However, a JTF may be established subordinate to a geographic combatant 

command or subunified command. For example, a GCC may elect to form a JTF to conduct 

CBRN response in a specific region of the theater. In establishing a JTF for CBRN response, 
Chapter II 

II-20 JP 3-41 

the CCDR experiencessignificant organizational, operational, and training challenges as he 

fuses a diverse group of key personnel, with varying degrees of understanding and 

experience in joint operations, CBRN response, and interagency cooperation, into a 

functioning JTF that can conduct a CBRN response. To be effective in such a response, key 

personnel need to fully understand both interagency and CBRN response techniques and 

procedures. JTF-CS can function as the core JTF headquarters element. Guidelines for 

establishing a JTF can be found in JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

(2) Augmentation. The JTF staff conducts crisis action planning (CAP) and 

determines whether mission requirements will exceed the JTF staff’s capabilities (e.g., 

qualified personnel, facilities, or equipment). The commander, joint task force (CJTF) 

requests assistance from the supported CCDR. The supported CCDR prepares in advance to 

identify or request possible resources from both AC and RC forces to meet critical needs. 

Additionally, these augmentees train regularly with the JTF if it is organized on a standing 

basis. 

(3) Joint Planning Augmentation Cell (JPAC). The JPAC is a tailored group of 

CBRN response joint planners. The cell is manned, equipped, and trained by JTF-CS to 

assist other JTF staffs or the DCE. JPAC members maintain currency in CBRN areas 

through professional education, participation in joint and multiagency exercises, and through 

planning for national special security event contingencies. The JPAC is able to focus an ad 

hoc JTF staff on how to employ joint forces in conducting CBRN response. The JPAC also 

assists the JTF with obtaining technical augmentation or dedicated reachback capability from 

DTRA, United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 

United States Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD), United 

States Army Forces Command’s (FORSCOM’s) 20th Support Command, and the CDC. 

These experts maintain liaison and reachback capability for the JTF and JPAC to nationallevel expertise, while providing on-staff subject matter expertise. The JTF medical officer, 

in particular, should consult with these technical experts, as they are able to provide 

information critical to medical planning considerations. 

(4) Technical Augmentation and Liaison. CBRN incidents entail operational and 

force health protection risks. The affected community and federal partners in the response 

may need technical advice and situational awareness in effects mitigation. 

(a) Defense Threat Reduction Agency. DTRA provides planning support 

through deployable teams and real-time technical reachback. This includes expertise in 

CBRN incident modeling and potential consequences of CBRN incidents, as well as 

consequence management advisory teams (CMATs) to assist in all phases of CBRN 

incidents. 

(b) US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. The 

USAMRIID representative provides expertise in epidemiology and biological warfare 

defense. 

(c) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The CDC expert serves as 

the on-staff augmentation for national level EP and response, the Laboratory Response 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

II-21 

Network, and Public Health emergency response, and has expertise on the Strategic National 

Stockpile. 

(d) 20th Support Command (CBRNE). The 20th Support Command is 

subordinate to US Army FORSCOM. Its representatives are CBRNE subject matter experts, 

can serve as liaison to the CJTF, and are knowledgeable of the command’s capabilities and 

units. 

(e) US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense. The 

USAMRICD representative provides an expert in the medical management of chemical 

casualties. 

(f) Air Force Technical Applications Center. This center operates and 

maintains a global network of sensors called the United States Atomic Energy Detection 

System (USAEDS). Once the USAEDS senses a disturbance underground, underwater, in 

the atmosphere, or in space, the incident is analyzed for nuclear identification, and findings 

are reported to SecDef and the President through Headquarters US Air Force.

(g) Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI). The AFRRI 

representative provides an expertise in radiological and nuclear warfare defense, response, 

and treatment for radiological/nuclear casualties. For more discussion on the AFRRI, see 

Chapter III, “Foreign Consequence Management,” paragraph 2c(4). 

(5) Boards, Centers, and Cells. The CJTF may elect to organize boards, centers, 

and cells to facilitate a number of functions required of the JTF. To assist in this decision, 

the staff should determine what organizational structures have been formed within the JTF, 

and what organizational structures have been delegated to the CJTF by the supported CCDR. 

The CJTF then decides what boards, centers, and cells would be best suited to support the 

JTF mission and functions. The DCO is closely associated with the JTF and resides within 

the JFO as the DOD single point of contact under the NRF. JTFs typically will require 

planning, logistics, movement, medical fusion, current operations, future operations, 

communication, mortuary affairs, effects assessment, and intelligence coordination centers 

and boards. Larger incidents may also require joint mortuary affairs, movement control, 

contracting, PA, visitors, and a standing personnel reception center. 

e. CBRN Response Operations. The JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, phasing model 

is adapted for domestic CBRN response operations as described below and depicted in 

Figure II-4. 

(1) Phase 0—Shape (Shape). Phase 0 is continuous situational awareness and 

preparedness. Actions in this phase include interagency coordination, planning, 

identification of gaps, exercises, and PA outreach. 

(a) This phase sets conditions for increased CBRN response interoperability 

and cooperation with interagency partners, through active engagement in planning, 

conferences, and exercises. These strategic- and theater-level objective activities continue 

through all phases. Preparedness of the designated units is the operational and tactical focus 

during this phase in order to ensure readiness conditions are sustained for execution of 
Chapter II 

II-22 JP 3-41 

CBRN response operations and building command relationships. Units with designated C2 

headquarters and the combatant command’s Army Service component prepare to assume 

their mission. TF commanders focus on training and rehearsals for CBRN response, based 

on the joint mission-essential task list (JMETL) provided through the Army Service 

component command (ASCC) and the CCDR directed JMETL. Individuals and detachments 

receive training from experts on operations in a contaminated environment. 

Figure II-4. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Activities by 

Operational Phase

Situational 

Awareness 

and 

Preparedness 

Phase 0 

includes 

planning, 

coordination, 

training, and 

exercises

CCDR identify 

CBRN response 

mission or 

directed by 

SecDef

Deploy CBRN response 

begins

Force units 

redeploy and 

OPCON reverts to 

Phase 0 

commander

DOD scales 

down response 

responsibilities

Forces receive 

DEPORD

Forces ready 

to conduct 

mission 

assignments 

in the JOA

DOD Title 10, 

United States 

Code, 

utilization 

diminishes

Force steady 

state Phase 0 

Redeployment preparedness

criteria met

BEGIN

BEGIN/

END

BEGIN BEGIN BEGIN BEGIN

END

END END

END

END

Phase 0

Shape

Phase 0

Shape

Phase I

Anticipate

Phase II

Respond

Phase III

Operate

Phase IV

Stabilize

Phase V

Transition

Phase 0

Shape

Phase I

Anticipate

Phase II

Respond

Phase III

Operate

Phase IV

Stabilize

Phase V

Transition

Phases are discrete but many activities overlap.

Operate Activities Transition Activities

Stabilize 

Activities

Respond 

Activities

Anticipate Activities

Shaping Activities Shaping Activities

Level of Military Effort

Incident

DOD Department of Defense

JOA joint operations area

OPCON operational control

SecDef Secretary of Defense

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear

CCDR combatant commander

DEPORD deployment order

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Response Activities by Operational Phase

Legend
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

II-23 

(b) Further, subordinate staffs, DCRF and C2CRE TF commanders, DCRF and 

C2CRE task forces, or others identify shortfalls and submit requests for additional 

capabilities through their parent headquarters. These staffs modify existing plans to fit their 

particular organization and capabilities and review the plans with the CJTF. This includes 

updating and submitting time-phased force and deployment data through the ASCC and their 

parent headquarters to USTRANSCOM. The TF commander pays particular attention to 

interoperability between elements from the other Services, and includes LNOs and other 

requirements. 

(c) CBRN response units should be immunized to prevent unnecessary delays 

in response posture. Unit inoculation may occur at home base, an intermediate staging base, 

or the BSI based on availability of vaccine(s), time required for the vaccine to be effective, 

and time-distance criteria. Units must meet force health protection standards established in 

the operation or DEPORD prior to deployment into an operational area. For units stationed 

in an operational area, force health protection standards are met prior to employment. The 

CJTF should consider all these factors and recommend a viable force health protection 

course of action (COA) to the supported CCDR at the earliest available opportunity. 

(d) Finally, the shaping phase includes a mission rehearsal exercise designed 

by USNORTHCOM/USPACOM and supported by USARNORTH/US Army Pacific, 

respectively. The phase ends with the identification of a potential CBRN response mission 

through indication and warning, SecDef direction, or the occurrence of a no-notice event. 

(2) Phase I—Deter (Anticipate). Continued situational awareness is vital to 

understanding the CBRN response operation parameters. The situation may warrant, due to 

indications and warnings, the CAP process to begin before a CBRN incident occurs. 

Determination of joint force command structure, the DOD anticipated response, and early 

and thorough collaboration with federal departments and agencies, state governments 

(including respective NG TAGs, commanders), and localities is paramount. Alerting and 

preparing the joint force may be directed through a CJCS warning order, planning order, or 

alert order; however, CBRN incidents may also occur without warning, resulting in 

accelerated procedures and the first notification being an EXORD. This EXORD guidance 

may possibly even be verbal. In this case, the operations would move directly into phase II, 

with relevant phase I tasks still requiring to be performed. During this phase, the DCOs and 

United States Northern Command situational awareness teams (NSATs) are employed post 

incident to provide assessments to USNORTHCOM and situational awareness to the JFLCC. 

(a) The assessment will determine the scope and magnitude of the incident; 

identify potential theater response forces; identify DCRF and C2CRE requirements to 

expedite response; and identify potential C2 node requirements. The senior individual of the 

assessment element serves as the CCDR’s LNO to gain on-scene situational awareness and 

provide recommendations on the appropriate level of C2 and initial resources required for the 

CBRN response. 

(b) The assessment element may include a staff judge advocate (SJA), CBRN, 

medical, PA, mortuary affairs, operations, plans, logistics, law enforcement, and 

communications officers and selected subject matter experts to assist in developing the 
Chapter II 

II-24 JP 3-41 

assessment and recommending an appropriate response. USNORTHCOM’s standing JTF in 

support of CBRN CM, JTF-CS, trains and prepares for this mission by maintaining a 24/7 

on-call command assessment element capability. Other CCDRs have standing site 

assessment teams or survey and assessment teams prepared for this mission. 

(c) Because the vast majority of Title 10, USC, capabilities for DSCA falls 

under USNORTHCOM, the JTF-CS NSAT procedures are included here as an example of 

assessment processes and actions. Following coordination with state civil and military 

officials (typically the state TAG or the NG JFHQ-State) and federal officials (to include the 

FCO, incident management assistance team, the DCO and other on-scene technical advisors), 

the NSAT makes an evaluation of potential shortfalls in federal and state capabilities, which 

may become requests for DOD assistance. The NSAT prepares its assessment shaped by its 

knowledge of CBRN effects, the harm or damage the effects may cause, and how to mitigate 

and manage the resulting consequences. The assessment identifies proposed methods of 

response, anticipated actions, and potentially required forces. Information gathered by the 

NSAT is developed, either independently or through the support of an appropriate joint 

planning group for CAP, into a commander’s assessment using the Adaptive Planning and 

Execution format for a commander’s estimate and forwarded to the CCDR. This document 

provides specific recommendations to the CCDR relative to the CBRN response effort, to 

include tailoring and supplementing the CBRN response force structure required to employ. 

(d) The NSAT assessment helps the CCDR conduct the mission analysis and 

prepare the commander’s estimate with a recommended DOD COA to be taken in support of 

the incident and recommended DOD resources and capabilities for anticipated mission 

assignments. The commander’s estimate identifies force to task capabilities required to 

accomplish anticipated DOD mission assignments. With SecDef approval and through CJCS 

direction, these capabilities are identified by the Services, CCDRs, and the DOD agencies. 

The CJCS EXORD identifies the designated forces allocated to the CCDR and specifies the 

type of command authority (normally OPCON) in steady state for exercises and mission 

execution. Additionally, it provides approval of purpose, desired effect, and COA to be 

taken in support of federal agencies for the CBRN response. 

(e) This phase ends when forces receive prepare-to-deploy orders and are 

staged and ready to deploy. Once a unit receives a DEPORD through its parent headquarters 

specifying OPCON by the receiving CCDR, the TF deploys LNOs to a location designated 

by the CJTF for establishing the JTF deployable headquarters. These LNOs provide C2 

connectivity for dissimilar systems and pass situational assessments back to their TF as the 

situation develops. Simultaneously, each TF deploys an advance party to the BSI identified 

by the JFLCC or JFC for JRSOI and base support. JRSOI is the essential process that 

transitions deploying forces, consisting of personnel, equipment, and materiel arriving in 

theater, into forces capable of meeting the CCDR’s operational requirements. The TF 

commanders should coordinate with the CJTF on rules for the use of force (RUF), arming 

status, law enforcement missions, intelligence support and restrictions, PA guidance, 

deployment priorities, and mission assignments (if known). Because of the nature of the 

most likely CBRN CM operations, forces will likely deploy into and remain in the JOA for 

the entire length of the CBRN response. Catastrophic incidents may require force rotation. 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

II-25 

(3) Phase II—Seize the Initiative (Respond). The key to success during the 

respond phase is echeloning the required JTF resources at the appropriate time and place. 

Phase II executes deployment of forces to key theater nodes and to the JOA to save lives, 

minimize human suffering, and maintain public confidence. Speed and decisiveness are 

essential. The JFC establishes C2 of designated DOD Title 10, USC, forces, establishes a 

common operational picture, continues JRSOI, and validates and establishes a BSI. (See 

Appendix B, “Planning Considerations for Logistics and Other Services from Domestic Base 

Support Installations and Foreign Theater Assets.”) Participation in the JRSOI is essential 

for mission accomplishment and protection of the joint force. 

(a) Forces are prioritized to deploy for mission tasks that are directly involved 

in life saving and preventing further injury. These forces have the highest movement priority 

for CBRN response force deployment. Next in movement priority are forces that assess and 

establish operations or provide temporary critical life support. These forces subsequently 

become the forces necessary to establish and sustain operations. Biological incidents may or 

may not provide a clear point of origin. In this case, TF-Medical may be the primary effort 

and have priority in movement. Elements of TF-Operations normally have priority for 

movement in the force flow because they contain those capabilities needed to relieve and/or 

augment the efforts of first responders (i.e., monitoring, marking, decontamination, hot-zone 

extraction, security). TF-Operations is normally employed closest to the actual incident site. 

(b) Forces for the JTF are transferred using a DEPORD to the CCDR, and 

command relationships are established as designated in the EXORD and/or OPORD. After 

coordinating with the BSI, the JTF commences JRSOI operations. Commanders should 

appoint a capable officer and staff to continue to manage unit arrival and JRSOI. As units 

complete JRSOI, they occupy their assigned operating bases and prepare for mission 

assignments. Leaders take every available opportunity to reinforce soldier skills they will 

need when operating in their operational areas, stressing protective measures, RUF, and 

situation awareness and reporting. TF commanders receive and integrate additional forces 

identified during phase II. They provide updates to the CJTF and keep the supporting 

installations informed. 

(c) Phase II completion is generally marked by having forces deployed with 

enough C2 and unit-capability to safely and effectively begin operations. Depending on the 

situation, the CJTF may decide to move into phase III operations before all phase II 

objectives are complete and continue to work on phase II objectives while in phase III. 

(4) Phase III—Dominate (Operate). In phase III, planning and execution efforts 

are synchronized and integrated with the efforts of the supported civil authorities, as well as 

other military operations that may be occurring simultaneously (e.g., technical nuclear 

forensics sample collection) within the same operational area. Phase III begins when DOD 

and/or NG forces begin executing mission assignments within the operational area. The 

coordinating agency typically assigns mission assignments to supporting or cooperating 

agencies for action. DOD accepts mission assignments as RFAs, which become mission 

assignments only after being received through the Office of the Executive Secretary of DOD, 

forwarded to the ASD(HD&ASA) and the JDOMS for validation and order processing, and 

then approved by SecDef. Once SecDef approves the request, an order is issued to 
Chapter II 

II-26 JP 3-41 

combatant commands, Services, and/or agencies to accomplish the mission. In the case of 

the DCRF and C2CRE, SecDef has authorized CDRUSNORTHCOM to approve the mission 

assignments as long as they are within the scope and capabilities of the DCRF and C2CRE. 

During this phase, the primary focus is on mission assignments that involve incident site 

lifesaving and injury prevention. Key tasks during this phase are hazard assessment, 

casualty search and extraction/rescue, ambulatory and non-ambulatory decontamination, 

emergency medical services, air and ground medical/casualty evacuation, and logistical 

support. 

(a) The CJTF exercises OPCON over all designated DOD forces as directed by 

the CCDR’s EXORD. The commander of a JTF-State exercises OPCON over all designated 

NG forces as directed by the approved EXORD or EMAC agreement. The JTF may task 

organize functionally, by Service components, or a combination of both, depending on the 

situation. The JTF is responsible for executing mission assignments using the allocated 

DOD forces within the designated operational area. The JTF-State is also responsible for 

executing mission assignments using NG forces within the designated operational area and 

requesting additional forces from the supported CCDR if those within the designated 

operational area are not adequate. The JTF receives mission assignments from the 

DCO/DCE after they have been validated. The JTF maintains force readiness and 

sustainment requirements for assigned forces in the designated operational area. 

(b) The CJTF begins to assign missions to the JTF component commanders, 

who in turn task their units as they become available within the JOA. In some cases, mission 

assignments will be awaiting specialized units as they arrive. Each TF can expect to receive 

multiple missions together with a priority of effort. Commanders should conduct 

information engagement actions with residents and responders working near their forces. 

(c) Certain units may work closely with highly specialized personnel from 

other agencies as part of their mission assignment. The TF commander may be required to 

support these agencies and should coordinate with them to assess the progress of operations. 

(d) Normally Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures and mission essential 

task list conditions and standards derived from the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) are 

adequate to meet the tactical expectation of civil authorities; however, in some 

circumstances, additional requirements may be established. Joint forces should expect some 

local authority coordination and periodic work oversight to confirm that projects are 

progressing on time and confirm that performance is to acceptable civil standards. Phase III 

ends when deployed Title 10, USC, Title 32, USC, and/or state active duty NG forces have 

completed the preponderance of incident site lifesaving mission assignments and the effort 

shifts to other state and/or federal mission assignments that have broader application to the 

JOA. 

(5) Phase IV—Stabilize (Stabilize). Stabilization is marked by a scaling down of 

operations as DOD Title 10, USC, forces, Title 32, USC, NG, and/or state active duty 

utilization diminishes with the associated completion of a majority of incident site mission 

assignments. 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

II-27 

(a) Great loss of property or life is no longer the state’s major concern; rather, 

the priority shifts to support life sustaining operations. Key tasks during this phase are 

patient redistribution, logistical support, and ESF activities to minimize human suffering and 

enable community recovery. During this operational phase, all requests for forces have been 

identified and filled such that a smaller DOD C2 or a state-based NG C2 headquarters may 

be warranted. The JTF may engage in repositioning capabilities to locations throughout the 

operations area that support the primary agency requests. Determining whether DOD has 

met transition criteria requires close coordination and day-to-day interaction with the lead 

agency. TF commanders continue to exercise battle command while reviewing subordinate 

operations for ability to transition. Redeployment of selected uncontaminated DOD force 

capabilities no longer required for operations may begin; however, selected contaminated 

assets such as aircraft require GCC and International Civil Aviation Organization approval 

before transition begins. Success equals civil authorities ready to respond effectively to 

continuing requirements and assuming full response without degradation of operations. 

(b) The phase ends when civil authorities are postured to transition to recovery 

operations and have the ability to accommodate surge requirements for treatment of 

casualties and critical life support. DCRF and C2CRE units redeploy and reconstitute. 

(6) Phase V—Enable Civil Authorities (Transition). Transition functions begin 

when consequences of the CBRN incident have been mitigated and adequate support of civil 

authorities has been provided such that further support is no longer required. 

(a) Civil authorities and the JTF, as well as the supported CCDR or supporting 

or supported JTF-State, agree to implement a seamless transition of operational 

responsibilities to a designated civil authority or a designated command. Civil authorities are 

postured for full responsibility for NRF recovery operations and have the ability to 

accommodate surge requirements. Well before this phase begins, TF and JTF planners 

develop transition criteria with specific measures of effectiveness for each mission 

assignment. As required, they modify reporting formats to indicate readiness for transition. 

Resource managers should pay particular attention to accountability for nonexpendable items 

that are to be turned over to a civilian agency as part of transition. Site clean-up is 

coordinated with federal, state, and local authorities, and HAZMAT is turned over for 

disposition. Lessons learned and after action reports are completed. Commanders review 

redeployment schedules and mode of transport details with their subordinates and ensure that 

leaders understand the schedule and requirements for a safe and efficient redeployment. 

Redeploying forces may require decontamination, and medical observation and evaluation 

based on the pathogen or hazard involved. Forces safely redeploy to home station to reset 

and reconstitute. 

(b) The phase ends when all response forces are moved out of the JOA and 

when DOD Title 10, USC, Title 32, USC, or state active duty NG forces have transitioned all 

operations back to civil authorities and redeployed to home stations.
Chapter II 

II-28 JP 3-41 

5. Unique Planning Considerations in the Domestic Operational Environment

a. Base Support Installation. A BSI is a military installation within the US or its 

territories controlled by any military Service or agency, in or near an actual or projected 

domestic emergency operational area, designated by DOD to provide military support for 

DOD and federal agency disaster response operation efforts. 

(1) Resources provided by a designated BSI may include, but are not limited to 

marshalling and lay down areas, security forces, personnel and equipment reception and 

staging areas and facilities, personnel support, billeting, transportation, material handling 

equipment, maintenance, general supply and subsistence support, contracting support, 

communications support, and medical services. 

(2) Logistic planners should consider appropriate Service and RC installations as 

potential BSIs that will facilitate JRSOI and sustainment of CBRN response units. Although 

the Services, when directed by SecDef, designate the appropriate BSI, locations for potential 

BSI should be based on previous site surveys, assessments, and mission analysis. 

For more information on BSI planning considerations, see Appendix B, “Planning 

Considerations for Logistics and Other Services from Domestic Base Support Installations 

and Foreign Theater Assets.” 

b. United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Services. USACE is the 

designated ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering) coordinator and a primary agency as 

directed by the NRF. USACE can provide water, ice, construction materials, and engineer 

services when activated under ESF#3 and ESF#6 (Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, 

Housing, and Human Services). If ESF#3 or ESF#6 have not been activated, the JTF or 

DCO may request engineering capabilities through the CCDR to the components. 

c. Mortuary Affairs. The joint force may aid federal and state agencies by providing 

mortuary affairs assistance. Any assistance provided will be IAW the NRF and existing 

civilian plans and local civilian direction. 

(1) The primary responsibility for responding to mortuary affairs issues rests with 

state and local authorities. A local or state medical examiner and/or coroner (ME/C) will 

have the responsibility for leading the response effort. DOD mortuary affairs assets are 

usually employed in support of the ME/C. Other important state and local stakeholders who 

may have significant operational involvement include Office of Emergency Management, 

Department of Public Health, NG, state law enforcement, EPA, and fire department and 

HAZMAT units. 

(2) Several conditions affect the ability of local and state officials to respond to 

mass fatality operations. Some of these factors include number of fatalities; quality and state 

of remains; the agent or agents (contaminated versus uncontaminated) present; location and 

size of the search and recovery area; conditions (weather, daylight, terrain); city and state 

resources available; and most important, public expectations. Within the construct of the 

civilian operation there are a number of different missions where joint forces may be asked 

to provide mortuary affairs assistance. 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

II-29 

(3) Expected DOD mortuary operations include advisory support, search and 

recovery, reception, remains storage, contamination mitigation of remains, photography, 

fingerprinting, forensic dentistry, forensic pathology, family assistance, disposition of 

remains and personal effects, administration and logistic support. Decedent identification is 

an ME/C responsibility; DOD mortuary affairs assets support the identification process 

through forensic recovery and preservation of decedent identification material.

(4) For remains that cannot be decontaminated to a specified transportation level, 

protecting the health of Service members and the public takes precedence over rapid 

disposition. Temporary storage of remains in a refrigerated storage facility or interment of 

those contaminated remains that pose a threat to public health is recommended until remains 

can be safely handled. 

(5) A phased mortuary affairs plan may be required to assist civil authorities in 

augmenting ME/C. Not all mortuary affairs assets are deployed for each mass fatality 

incident; the mortuary affairs response will be tailored to meet the needs of the local 

jurisdiction. 

For additional information on mortuary affairs, see JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs. 

d. Decontamination Planning. The EPA is the ESF coordinator and primary agency 

responsible for hazardous waste. The USCG may also play a significant role as a primary 

agency for HAZMAT as defined by the NRF and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances 

Pollution Contingency Plan. 

e. Control Zones. In CBRN response, control zones are established to ensure the 

safety of all responders and control access into and out of a contaminated area. The three 

zones established at a chemical, radiological, nuclear, and some biological incident sites 

(where there is a contaminated area such as may be the case with anthrax) are often referred 

to as the hot zone, the warm zone, and the cold zone. Figure II-5 depicts these control zones. 

In nearly all cases, the control zones will decrease in size with time as CBRN hazards 

naturally decrease. Once the characteristics of the hazard are understood, the control zones 

can be effectively altered to allow more mission flexibility. 

(1) Hot Zone. The hot zone is an area immediately surrounding a hazardous 

material incident which extends far enough to prevent adverse effects from released 

contamination to personnel outside the zone. The level of risk and thus the included area is 

determined by the incident commander, accounting for characteristics of the hazards. The 

hot zone can also be referred to as the exclusion zone, red zone, or restricted zone and is the 

primary area of contamination. The hot zone is the area that the incident commander judges 

to be the most affected by the incident. This includes any area to which the contaminant has 

spread or is likely to spread. Primary contamination can occur when individuals enter this 

zone. Usually, no decontamination or patient care except evacuation is carried out in this 

zone. Access is only permitted to personnel who are properly trained and protected. The 

incident commander sets the perimeters of this zone after giving consideration to the type of 

agent, the volume released, the means of dissemination, the prevailing meteorological 

conditions, and the potential of local topographic characteristics to channel agent dispersal. 
Chapter II 

II-30 JP 3-41 

Priorities within the hot zone may include conducting search and rescue, performing hazard 

mitigation, and identifying CBRN hazards or other physical obstacles to the entry point. 

(2) Warm Zone. The warm zone includes control points for the access corridor 

and thus assists in reducing the spread of contamination. The warm zone can also be referred 

to as the decontamination zone, contamination-reduction zone, contamination-reduction 

corridor, yellow zone, or limited access zone. The warm zone is the area between the hot 

and cold zones where personnel and equipment decontamination and hot zone support take 

place. Management of the warm zone includes decontamination corridors where casualties, 

emergency responders, and equipment are decontaminated and where there is a risk of 

secondary contamination from objects or individuals brought from the hot zone. 

Maintaining access control points connecting the warm zone to the hot and cold zones and 

for the decontamination corridor assists in reducing the spread of contamination. Warm zone 

operation should be established in an area that is safe from downwind exposure and should 

include the bulk of the decontamination assets where survey teams are positioned and 

equipment decontamination is accomplished. 

Figure II-5. Control Zones 

Control Zones

Wind

Staging 

Area

Staging 

Area

Decontamination

Corridor

Access 

Control 

Points

Command 

Post

Crowd Control Line

Hot 

Zone Warm

Zone

Cold

Zone
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

II-31 

(3) Cold Zone. The cold zone is the area where the command post and support 

functions that are necessary to control the incident are located. It should be clean, meaning it 

is free of all contamination by HAZMAT, including discarded protective clothing and 

respiratory equipment. Contaminated casualties and emergency response personnel must be 

decontaminated before entering this zone. The cold zone is the area where the incident 

command post, staging areas for equipment, and other support functions that are necessary to 

control the incident are located upwind and uphill of the warm zone. The same basic 

considerations that are used for the hot and warm zones influence the extent of the cold zone. 

The cold zone must be readily accessible and provide the means for safety and rest. It must 

also be large enough to accommodate local, state, and federal CBRN response forces (if 

required) and to serve as the staging area for personnel and equipment. The operational 

priorities of the cold zone include providing C2 for operations being conducted in the warm 

and hot zones and ensuring that there is an area of security for emergency personnel and 

response forces conducting operations. Access to the different zones should be tightly 

controlled and limited to as few people as possible. Communication between work areas 

should be face-to-face whenever possible, particularly if the use of radios or other electronic 

devices (e.g., megaphones) is restricted because of the hazards involved.

(4) Zone Control in Nuclear Detonations. DHS has worked with partner 

agencies and emergency response partners to establish standard guidance for emergency 

planners with nuclear detonation specific response recommendations to maximize the 

preservation of life in the event of an urban nuclear detonation. The planning guidance 

summarizes recommendations based on the effects of a 10 KT nuclear detonation in an urban 

environment. The nuclear explosion’s observable phenomena, in the area around ground 

zero, are linked to an accumulation of the hazards from pressure (blast), heat (thermal), and 

radiation as discussed in Chapter I, “Overview.” These cumulative hazards make it more 

dangerous for rescue workers and less likely to find survivors the closer one moves toward 

the point of detonation. The observable phenomenon of damage to infrastructure and other 

objects provides a way to describe zones with rough approximation delineations that can 

assist planners and the initial emergency responders in managing risk before radiation levels 

have been measured and hazard areas marked. There are no clear boundaries between 

damage zones resulting from a nuclear detonation, but generally, the light damage zone is 

characterized by broken windows and easily managed injuries; the moderate damage zone by 

significant building damage, rubble, downed utility poles, overturned automobiles, fires, and 

serious injuries; and the severe damage zone by destroyed infrastructure. 

For further guidance on the nuclear weapon effects, planning considerations, and zone 

control, refer to http://www.afrri.usuhs.mil/outreach/pdf/planning-guidance.pdf, for DHS 

Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation, and JP 3-11, Operations in 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments.

6. Applicable Laws and Agreements in the Domestic Operational Environment 

a. Key Executive and Legislative Guidance. PPDs, Presidential study directives, 

Presidential decision directives, national security Presidential directives (NSPDs), homeland 

security Presidential directives (HSPDs), and executive orders (EOs) are the primary means 

by which the President issues national security policy guidance. These Presidential 
Chapter II 

II-32 JP 3-41 

documents, national-level strategy documents, and laws provide the basis for the 

development of subordinate and implementing guidance by DOD agencies. A list of 

documents that provide guidance for CBRN response is contained in Appendix A, “Key 

Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols.” The following 

documents deserve special note due to their direct applicability to a domestic CBRN 

response: 

(1) HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents. HSPD-5 enhances the ability of 

the US to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national 

incident management system. The NRF was developed as a result of HSPD-5 to integrate 

the family of federal domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into a 

single, all-discipline, all-hazards plan to unify the domestic incident management process. 

When the NRF is used, national interagency plans such as the National Oil and Hazardous 

Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, Mass Migration Emergency Plan, National Search 

and Rescue Plan, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, and National Maritime 

Transportation Security Plan are incorporated as supporting and/or operational plans. In 

addition to consolidating federal plans, the NRF establishes a National Operations Center, 

and the creation of a PFO, who may be appointed to represent the Secretary of Homeland 

Security at the incident site and the JFO. HSPD-5 also created NIMS to provide a consistent 

nationwide approach for federal, state, and local governments to work effectively and 

efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. 

(2) PPD-8, National Preparedness. This directive establishes policies to develop a 

national preparedness goal that identifies the core capabilities necessary for preparedness and 

a national preparedness system to guide activities that will enable the nation to achieve the 

goal. The national preparedness system will allow the nation to track progress of our ability 

to build and improve the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the 

effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the 

security of the nation. 

(3) The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. The 

Stafford Act is the primary legal authority for federal participation in domestic DR. When 

incidents of national significance that are declared disasters or emergencies by the President 

occur, federal support to states is delivered IAW relevant provisions of the Stafford Act. A 

governor may request the President to declare a major disaster or emergency if the governor 

finds that effective response to the incident is beyond the combined response capabilities of 

the state and affected local governments. Based on the findings of a joint federal-state-local 

preliminary damage assessment indicating the damages are of sufficient severity and 

magnitude to warrant assistance under the act, the President may issue a major disaster or 

emergency declaration. The President may unilaterally provide federal emergency assistance 

under the Stafford Act when the President determines that an emergency exists for which the 

primary responsibility for response rests with the USG. Based upon the overwhelming 

nature of a no-notice catastrophic CBRN incident, the approval process will be expedited 

through federal levels. Federal assistance takes many forms—including the direct provision 

of goods and services, financial assistance (through insurance, grants, loans, and direct 

payments), and technical assistance—and can come from various sources. Under the NRF 

construct, DOD is designated a supporting agency for all ESFs and a cooperating agency for 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

II-33 

a number of NRF support and incident annexes. DOD approved support under the Stafford 

Act is generally provided on a reimbursable basis. The ESF coordinators, located in the JFO, 

serve as the primary operational-level functional mechanisms to provide assistance to state, 

local, and tribal governments or to federal departments and agencies conducting missions of 

primary federal responsibility. 

(4) The Economy Act (Title 31, USC, Section 1535). IAW the Economy Act or 

other applicable authorities, federal agencies participating in the NRF may provide federalto-federal support by executing interagency or intra-agency reimbursable agreements. 

Federal agencies providing mutual aid support may request reimbursement from the 

requesting agency for eligible expenditures. 

(5) The National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Strategy to 

Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the National Strategy for Countering 

Biological Threats. The National Strategy for Homeland Security complements the 

National Security Strategy (NSS) of the US by providing a road map for mobilizing and 

organizing the nation to secure the US homeland from terrorist attacks. This includes 

objectives around which society can mobilize, align, and focus on HS functions, align 

budgetary resources to the task of securing the homeland, and account for performance on 

HS efforts. The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction also 

complements the NSS by expanding on the actions necessary to use strengthened 

nonproliferation to combat WMD proliferation, counterproliferation to counter WMD use, 

and WMD CM to respond to WMD use. The National Strategy for Countering Biological 

Threats provides a framework for future USG planning efforts that supports the overall 

Biodefense for the 21st Century (HSPD-10/NSPD-33), and complements existing White 

House strategies related to biological threat preparedness and response. 

(6) Posse Comitatus Act, Title 18, USC, Section 1385. Under the PCA, federal 

military personnel in a Title 10, USC, duty status may not participate in law enforcement 

activities except as otherwise authorized by the Constitution or statute. For example, 

Congress specifically authorized military forces to engage in law enforcement activities as an 

exception to PCA when dealing with criminal investigations involving nuclear materials. 

See Title 18, USC, Section 831, and DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law 

Enforcement Officials. 

(7) The Emergency Management Assistance Compact. The EMAC is a 

congressionally approved interstate mutual aid compact that provides a legal structure by 

which states affected by an emergency may request assistance from other states. Signatories 

to the compact resolve potential legal and financial obstacles that states might otherwise 

encounter as they provide assistance to the stricken state or states. The compact sets out the 

responsibilities of the signatory states, provides authority to officials responding from other 

states (except that of arrest unless specifically authorized by the receiving state) equal to that 

held by residents of the affected state, ensures reciprocity in recognizing professional 

licenses or permits for professional skills, and provides liability protection (in certain areas) 

to responders from other states. The National Emergency Management Association, a 

professional association of state emergency managers, administers the compact. Since being 

ratified by Congress and signed into law in 1996 (Public Law 104-321), 50 states, the 
Chapter II 

II-34 JP 3-41 

District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands have enacted legislation to 

become members of EMAC. The compact establishes immunities, authorities, and liabilities 

for missions executed under its authority. It allows the states to rely upon each other in 

responding to, among other things, emergencies such as man-made or natural disasters, 

insurgencies, or enemy attack. 

b. Key DOD Guidance

(1) Implications. DOD guidelines are promulgated in a variety of documents that 

include strategy documents, planning guidance, DODDs, and the CJCS policy documents. 

These documents are consistent with and complementary to the federal statutes and national 

security policy discussed earlier. DODDs specifically address missions for HD and CS 

operations to include CBRN response. The following documents, further discussed in 

Appendix A, “Key Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols,” are 

of special note: 

(a) The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support that builds on the 

concept of an active, layered defense outlined in the National Defense Strategy (NDS). 

(b) The DODD 3025 series of directives that provide policy on and 

responsibilities for CS activities. 

(c) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3125.01, Defense 

Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) for Domestic Consequence Management Operations in 

Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive 

(CBRNE) Incident, provides operational and policy guidance for US military forces 

supporting domestic CBRN response operations to prepare for and respond to the effects of a 

threatened or actual CBRN situation. 

(2) Special Considerations. The following discussion provides general guidelines 

for functional areas that are associated with CBRN response. Commanders should be aware 

of the specific legal implications of special considerations. 

(a) Intelligence Oversight Information Collection, Sharing, and Handling 

1. In light of today’s changing environment, commanders and their staffs 

should carefully consider the different rules when planning domestic operations. 

2. The SJA role is especially important during domestic operations as the 

parameters under which DOD operates are different in the US than they are overseas. The 

military commander’s need for information and intelligence within the homeland is on the 

rise—force protection information and counterintelligence integrated into domestic 

operations are expected due to a heightened awareness of potential terrorist threats. These 

needs and expectations pose unique issues in the information and intelligence gathering 

arena. DOD intelligence components are restricted by a set of rules referred to as 

intelligence oversight, governed and regulated by DODD 5240.01, DOD Intelligence 

Activities, and DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence 

Components that Affect United States Persons. Everyone else in DOD, is subject to a 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

II-35 

different set of rules governed by DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning 

Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense. Therefore, the 

commander must direct his need for information or intelligence to the right component—the 

component with the capability and authority to achieve the commander’s intent. 

Determining the nature of the data and the right unit to gather it are areas that often require 

SJA input. 

(b) Military Information Support Operations. US law and DOD policy 

prohibit DOD from using military information support units to conduct operations against 

US persons. However, assets can be used to help disseminate critical information to the 

civilian population. DOD PA units may use military information support personnel and 

equipment to support activities such as information dissemination, printing, reproduction, 

distribution, and broadcasting. 

(c) Use of Weapons and RUF 

1. CJCSI 3125.01, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) for 

Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Incident, Enclosure F, 

establishes a presumption that units deployed to CBRN incident sites will not carry arms. 

Units may deploy to CBRN incident sites with their weapons in storage in the event that the 

unit is subsequently authorized to carry arms by SecDef or is deployed from the CBRN site 

to an assignment where weapons are authorized. Military commanders are responsible to 

ensure that weapons and ammunition are properly stored and physically secured. Military 

members providing security for stored weapons and ammunition at military facilities during 

CBRN response operations may carry their weapons while performing their normal security 

duties. 

2. JFCs should be thoroughly knowledgeable regarding the standing rules 

for the use of force (SRUF) IAW CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing 

Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (U). National and local decisions about force 

protection conditions (FPCONs) may affect decisions regarding the arming policy. The 

decision to implement a particular FPCON is a CJTF command decision. The CJTF may 

request a higher FPCON from the CCDR if warranted by threat level assessments for the 

JOA. FPCON is based on an assessment of the vulnerability of JTF personnel or facilities, 

criticality of personnel or facilities, availability of security resources, impact on operations 

and morale, damage control considerations, and other international or US actions. Deterrent 

measures may include requesting SecDef authorization to arm the response forces along with 

taking other additional security measures based on local FPCON. 

(d) Immediate Response. The DOD policy on immediate response addresses 

the authority delegated to DOD component or military commanders to provide immediate 

assistance to civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great 

property damage in the event of imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil 

emergency or attack. 
Chapter II 

II-36 JP 3-41 

1. Immediate response is situation-specific and may or may not be 

associated with a declared or undeclared disaster. The potentially catastrophic nature of 

CBRN incidents would most likely lead to DOD forces conducting some CBRN response 

activities under immediate response authority, but there are no policy exceptions or special 

authorities for CBRN response. A JFC, responding to a SecDef approved DSCA mission 

and/or EXORD, is like any other DOD military commander and may find the need to 

exercise his/her immediate response authority with available forces. This is particularly 

relevant in the event of a second terrorist attack or TIM release within the JOA, since trained 

medical and specialized CBRN assessment/response teams are on the scene and able to 

rapidly respond to time-sensitive requests from the civil sector. 

2. It is important for commanders to understand that the policy is limited, 

restrictive, and conditional. The situation must be a bona fide emergency that overwhelms 

the ability of civilians to respond and meets the restrictions criteria within DOD and Service 

directives. As soon as practical, the military commander, or responsible official of a DOD 

component or agency rendering such assistance, reports the request, the nature of the 

response, and any other pertinent information through the chain of command to the National 

Military Command Center (NMCC). The GCC should also be notified when the NMCC is 

notified. IAW state law and NGB policy, state officials may also direct immediate response 

assistance by Title 32, USC, NG personnel. Immediate response requests in the event of a 

CBRN incident may include, but are not limited to: 

a. Rescue, evacuation, and emergency medical treatment of casualties, 

maintenance or restoration of emergency medical capabilities, and safeguarding the public 

health. 

b. Emergency clearance of debris, rubble, and explosive ordnance 

from public facilities and other areas to permit rescue or movement of people and restoration 

of essential services. 

c. Detection, assessment, and containment (initial steps taken to 

facilitate emergency evacuation and public awareness warnings). 

d. Roadway movement control and planning. 

e. Emergency Response. An action that commanders or individuals 

may take in extraordinary emergency circumstances where prior authorization is impossible, 

and where the delay or absence of a quick response to save lives, prevent human suffering, 

protect property and the environment, or meet basic human needs may contribute to greater 

danger, tragedy, or misfortune. 

f. Emergency restoration of essential public services (including firefighting, water, communications, transportation, power, and fuel). 

For more information on immediate response authority,see JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, JP 

3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil 

Authorities. 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

II-37 

(e) Memoranda of understanding (MOUs) for mutual assistance are often 

established between military installations and local communities. If an installation 

commander receives a request for assistance directly from local civil authorities prior to the 

President declaring a major disaster or emergency, the requesting agency should be referred 

to the local/state emergency management channels, unless an immediate response condition 

exists or a mutual assistance agreement is in effect. Installations may have entered into 

earlier mutual assistance agreements with the local community in the areas of fire-fighting, 

HAZMAT, medical evacuation and/or other areas, as appropriate. Dependent upon 

circumstances, this type of support may not be considered immediate response. 

Accordingly, RFAs under mutual assistance MOUs must be considered IAW applicable 

DOD and Service directives. 

c. National Response Framework Guidance. The NRF is a guide to how the nation 

conducts all-hazards response. It is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable 

coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities across the nation. It 

describes specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents that range from the 

serious but purely local, to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. 

(1) The NRF explains the common discipline and structures that have been 

exercised and matured at the local, tribal, state, and national levels over time. It describes 

key lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, focusing particularly on how the USG 

is organized to support communities and states in catastrophic incidents. Most important, it 

builds upon NIMS, which provides a consistent template for managing incidents. 

(2) The term “response” as used in the NRF includes immediate actions to save 

lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs. Response also 

includes the execution of emergency plans and actions to support short-term recovery. The 

NRF is always in effect, and elements can be implemented as needed on a flexible, scalable 

basis to improve response. 

(3) The NRF is comprised of the core document, the ESF, Support, and Incident 

Annexes, and the partner guides. 

(a) Core Document. The core document describes the doctrine that guides the 

national response, roles and responsibilities, response actions, response organizations, and 

planning requirements to achieve an effective national response to any incident that occurs. 

(b) Emergency Support Function Annexes. Appendix B, Department of 

Defense Roles and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions, of the NRF, groups 

federal resources and capabilities into 15 functional areas that are most frequently needed in 

a national response. 

(c) Support Annexes. The support annexes describe essential supporting 

aspects that are common to all incidents (e.g., financial management, volunteer and 

donations management). 
Chapter II 

II-38 JP 3-41 

(d) Incident Annexes. The incident annexes address the unique aspects of 

how agencies respond to seven broad incident categories (e.g., biological, nuclear, 

radiological). 

(e) Partner guides provide ready references describing key roles and actions 

for local, tribal, state, federal, and private-sector response partners. 

d. Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP). The SPP is a US 

Presidential initiative with DOD equities. The SPP agreement, designed to reduce barriers 

on trade and facilitate economic growth while improving the security of the continent, was 

signed on 23 March 2005 by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of 

Canada, and the President of Mexico. DHS and the Homeland Security Council are the lead 

agencies for the agreement’s security components, with DOD as a supporting agency. The 

SPP Action Plan addresses goals and objectives associated with HS to include “protection, 

prevention, and response.” One of the goals of the agreement is to “develop and implement 

a common approach to critical infrastructure protection, response to cross-border terrorist 

incidents, and as applicable, natural disasters.” This includes a dual-binational (US/Canada 

and US/Mexico) objective on emergency management cooperation to develop and 

implement joint plans for cooperation in incident response, as well as conduct joint training 

and exercises in hazard response. This drives the development of plans to build and 

strengthen mechanisms, protocols, and agreements for communicating and coordinating 

hazard response for mutual assistance and cooperation in the event of natural and 

technological/industrial disasters or malicious acts involving CBRN devices and hazards. 
III-1 

CHAPTER III

FOREIGN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT 

1. General 

a. FCM is assistance provided by the USG to an impacted nation to mitigate the effects 

of a deliberate or inadvertent CBRN incident. From the national level, FCM encompasses 

USG efforts to assist partner nations to respond to incidents involving CBRN contaminants 

and the coordination of the US interagency response to a request from a partner nation 

following an incident involving CBRN contaminants. DOD’s CBRN response includes 

efforts to protect its citizens and its Armed Forces abroad, as well as those of its friends and 

allies, in order to mitigate human casualties and to provide temporary associated essential 

services. Primary responsibility for responding to a foreign CBRN incident resides with the 

impacted nation, unless otherwise stipulated under relevant international agreements. Unless 

otherwise directed by the President, DOS leads FCM operations and is responsible for 

coordinating the overall FCM response. When requested by DOS and directed by SecDef, 

DOD supports FCM operations by performing CBRN response activities to the extent 

allowed by law and subject to the availability of forces. 

b. Any FCM response typically includes a number of USG departments and agencies in 

addition to DOD. In the case of a CBRN incident, the ability of the USG to assist an 

impacted nation government and its affected population is determined by the nature of the 

CBRN incident, the resources available to provide assistance, and the time required to 

deploy to the vicinity of the incident. FCM operations may be conducted concurrently with 

foreign DR and humanitarian assistance (HA) operations. FCM operations generally occur 

in a permissive environment, but the relevant GCC is responsible for force protection 

requirements for US military personnel. Figure III-1 depicts the basic FCM relationships. 

c. A foreign nation that endures a significant CBRN incident requiring external 

assistance may first request assistance from neighboring states, regional allies, and regional 

or international organizations that have the capacity to deliver that assistance in a timely 

manner. The USG may be asked to provide assistance, or the USG may offer assistance, as 

part of a bilateral or international response to the CBRN incident. It is unlikely that the USG 

would be the only foreign entity providing assistance. 

For further guidance on foreign assistance, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian 

Assistance. 

“Abroad, when requested by a host nation, the President may authorize and the 

Secretary of Defense may direct DOD support to US Government (USG) foreign 

consequence management (FCM) operations. For all consequence management 

activities, the military must be prepared either to support or lead consequence 

management operations, as directed.”

National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 

13 February 2006 
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-41 

d. Limits on the Scope of Operations of FCM. FCM applies to foreign incidents 

involving the deliberate or inadvertent release of CBRN materials, including TICs and TIMs. 

It does not apply to the following activities: 

(1) Acts of nature or acts of man that do not involve CBRN materials. Response to 

such incidents is conducted as foreign DR or HA operations IAW DODD 5100.46, Foreign 

Disaster Relief. 

(2) CBRN incidents that are the direct result of US military operations in a foreign 

country where DOS does not have an established presence. See Chapter IV, “Department of 

Defense-Led Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management,” 

for additional information. 

(3) CBRN incidents that occur and are contained on DOD installations and 

facilities overseas for which DOD retains primary responsibility under relevant international 

Figure III-1. Foreign Consequence Management 

request for assistance/coordination

provision of assistance

response to incident

Legend

CBRN

Incident

Incident Area

Foreign Consequence Management

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear

DOD Department of Defense

Department of State

(Principal Agency)

Foreign 

Government

Nongovernmental

Organizations

Foreign First 

Responders

 DOD support is requested 

through the Department 

of State

Foreign Consequence 

Management

Base Support 

Installation

DOD Foreign 

Consequence 

Management 

Support
Foreign Consequence Management 

III-3 

agreements or arrangements IAW DODI 2000.18, Department of Defense Installation 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency 

Response Guidelines, and DODI 6055.17, Department of Defense Installation Emergency 

Management (IEM) Program. 

e. United States Government Offer of Assistance Process. The impacted nation’s 

response may or may not be sufficient to mitigate the hazards from a CBRN incident. 

Support requests for foreign assistance may begin immediately after an incident. During this 

period, the US embassy in the country, the applicable GCC, and other USG entities need to 

begin to obtain situational awareness related to the nature and magnitude of effects from the 

CBRN incident. The USG may also begin considering whether to proactively offer 

assistance to the impacted nation. 

f. Request for Assistance Process. Figure III-2 depicts both the FCM request for 

assistance and FCM processes. Once the impacted nation determines additional capabilities 

are required, the impacted nation notifies the US embassy with a request for assistance and 

provides known information about the incident. 

(1) The COM, frequently the ambassador, notifies DOS in Washington, DC. DOS 

makes internal DOS and National Security Staff notifications and dispatches a foreign 

emergency support team (FEST) and/or a consequence management support team (CMST) 

to the US embassy. Additionally, DOS begins logistics, transportation, and other support 

coordination with the country team. It is expected that the country team will inform the 

relevant GCC, who will dispatch a liaison element to work with the country team to assess 

the situation, identify potential support requirements, and begin the flow of information 

through the combatant command to the NMCC. 

(2) The National Security Staff coordinates interagency deliberations to assess the 

request and determine whether the US will honor it; identify what specific support will be 

provided and which agencies will provide that support; and develop initial guidance for 

responding organizations. During this period it is expected that response elements from 

other nations and international organizations will also start deployment to the country 

stricken by the CBRN incident. 

(3) Following interagency coordination, the National Security Staff provides 

guidance to executive departments and other organizations to initiate the formal USG 

response under FCM. The country team out of the US embassy increases coordination with 

the impacted nation regarding the specific support the US will provide and finalizes logistics, 

transportation, and legal negotiations. 

(4) Specific requests for DOD support are submitted to the OSD Executive 

Secretary or verbally through the NMCC with a follow-on formal request to the OSD 

Executive Secretary. Upon receipt of a request, DOD assesses it against specific request 

criteria, issues appropriate orders, and coordinates for the movement of tasked resources. 

DOD identifies command relationships, and the supporting commands coordinate the 

provision of identified resources. The supported combatant command identifies a TF 
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 3-41 

organization, develops C2 guidance, and coordinates resource deployment with the country 

team. 

g. Request for Assistance/Offer of Assistance Assessment Criteria. OSD and Joint 

Staff offices, in coordination with the supported GCC, will use the criteria outlined below to 

assess potential offers of, and requests for, assistance and provide a coordinated 

recommendation to SecDef. 

Figure III-2. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Affected State Coordination Process

notifications

requests

coordination

taskings

assistance provided

Legend

National Security 

Staff

Notification

Notification

Notification

Coordination

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Affected State Coordination Process

Request for 

assistance 

sent

Request for 

assistance 

sent

Liaison element dispatched by 

supported combatant commander

Foreign 

emergency 

support team and/or 

consequence 

management support 

team dispatched by 

Department of State

Supporting 

Department 

of Defense 

organizations 

tasked

Required 

resources 

provided

Assistance 

provided

Department of 

State

Department of 

Defense

International 

Support

Chief of 

Mission

Supporting 

Organizations

Department of 

Defense

Affected 

State

Supported 

Combatant 

Command
Foreign Consequence Management 

III-5 

(1) Legality—compliance with US and international laws and bilateral and 

multilateral agreements. 

(2) Lethality—potential use of force by or against DOD assets. 

FOREIGN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT DURING 

OPERATION TOMODACHI 

The disaster from a 9.0 magnitude earthquake, 46-foot tsunami, and 

catastrophic damage to the Fukushima Dai’ichi Nuclear Power Plant on 

Honshu Island, Japan, in March 2011 required the first foreign consequence 

management (FCM) support response by US forces. This incident ultimately 

resulted in the voluntary departure of American citizens from Japan, 

significant loss of life, and displacement of Japanese citizens, and a Level 7 

Major Accident—the highest level—on the International Nuclear Event Scale. 

United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) established Joint Support Force 

– Japan (JSF-J) to plan and execute several different missions concurrently 

including; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), FCM, 

departure of Department of Defense (DOD) dependents and force protection 

of US military bases. Adding to the complexity, HA/DR and FCM operations 

were conducted bilaterally with the government of Japan and the Japanese 

Ministry of Defense. 

In order to support FCM operations, JSF-J employed a combination of 

USPACOM forces and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear assets 

resourced from outside the joint operations area including staff 

augmentation from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Joint Task 

Force-Civil Support, the Air Force Radiological Assessment Team, the Army 

Area Medical Laboratory, and one Initial Response Force from the Marine 

Corps Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force. In addition, unilateral 

response operations were required of JSF-J forces in addition to FCM 

response. 

The radiological contamination from the nuclear power plant required unique 

and complex analysis of the potential radiation hazard areas and short- and 

long-term radiation hazard to US forces and citizens. Differing national and 

international standards of radiation exposure, hazard modeling, exclusion 

zones, response procedures, and units of radiation measurement were 

issues faced by the response community. Those issues coupled with the 

lack of reliable information of the state of the damaged reactors demonstrate 

that there can be uncertainty in situational awareness in FCM response 

operations. 

The concurrent execution of various mission areas (FCM, HA/DR, departure 

of DOD dependents, and force protection) demonstrates that joint force 

commanders should be prepared to adapt to any dynamic situations that 

arise during response. 

Various Sources 
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-41 

(3) Risk—to national security (if the USG does or does not provide the requested 

assistance), the potential to effect US interests across national instruments of power, and to 

the health and safety of forces supporting FCM operations. 

(4) Cost and Reimbursement—availability of funds, potential for reimbursement, 

and impact on DOD budget. 

(5) Readiness—impact on DOD’s ability to perform its primary mission and 

availability of appropriate forces. 

(6) Appropriateness—whether or not DOD can and should perform the mission. 

Factors to be considered include the contributions provided by other USG departments or 

agencies, other nations, and international and private organizations. 

(7) CCDR input—GCC issues regarding mission execution and impact of the 

mission on country-specific and regional policies, plans, and initiatives. 

(8) Timeliness—ability to get requested capabilities where they are needed in a 

timeframe that can make a positive difference. 

2. Roles, Responsibilities, Authorities, and Assets 

a. Roles and Responsibilities

(1) Impacted Nation. Primary responsibility for responding to, managing, and 

mitigating the consequences of a foreign CBRN incident resides with the affected nation’s 

government. When overwhelmed, the impacted nation is responsible for requesting foreign 

assistance and sharing all relevant information about the CBRN incident with international 

partners. 

(2) The Department of State. Unless directed otherwise by the President, DOS 

coordinates all USG support to an affected nation. DOS typically serves as the LFA for 

FCM; however, DOS frequently coordinates support through the US Agency for 

International Development. After such an FCM support request by DOS is approved by 

SecDef, DOD commences its support to the affected nation as part of the overall USG 

response. This support may include negotiation of landing and/or overflight diplomatic 

clearances for contaminated or formerly contaminated aircraft. 

(3) The US Embassy/Chief of Mission. The US COM (normally the ambassador) 

is the President’s top representative in the affected nation. Normally, all USG support to the 

affected nation will be coordinated by the responsible COM and country team. All matters 

requiring DOS review or approval should be submitted to the COM. 

(4) The National Security Council/Staff. The National Security Council through 

the National Security Staff coordinates interagency deliberations during any FCM response 

to determine whether the US will honor a potential affected nation request, identifies what 

specific support will be provided and which agencies will provide that support, and develops 

initial guidance for responding organizations. 
Foreign Consequence Management 

III-7 

(5) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs. The 

ASD(GSA) serves as the principal advisor to SecDef and the USD(P) on matters concerning 

any portion of the DOD response within a FCM operation. As such, the ASD(GSA) is 

responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing all aspects of associated policy. The 

ASD(GSA) also serves as the OSD office of primary responsibility for the review of all 

CJCS plans, instructions, and manuals related to CBRN response activities and exercises for 

the foreign operational environment. The ASD(GSA) represents SecDef on all FCM policy 

matters outside of DOD; provides policy oversight for the planning and pre-positioning of 

DOD FCM assets for foreign incidents, including but not limited to, international athletic 

events, summits, and conferences; and finally serves as the principal coordinator of DOD 

FCM exercises with the interagency. 

(6) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CJCS serves as the principal 

military advisor to SecDef and the President in preparing for and responding to a foreign 

CBRN incident. The CJCS assesses whether US force capabilities are able to support FCM 

operations and develops US military strategy, policy, and positions to support operational 

planning for a CBRN response. The CJCS reviews all requests and provides 

recommendations for DOD support to USG FCM operations, and ensures military planning 

is accomplished to support DOS in preparing for and responding to a foreign CBRN 

incident. 

(7) Geographic Combatant Commanders. Each GCC has the inherent 

responsibility to provide support to DOS, the lead for FCM, unless otherwise directed by the 

President. Each GCC develops plans for FCM within their assigned AOR and is prepared to 

deploy a liaison element to the vicinity of the incident site to liaise with the US embassy and 

to provide situational awareness to the supported CCDR. Each GCC identifies a 

headquarters element to provide the initial incident response and serve as the initial C2 

element of DOD for FCM operations within their respective AOR. When in a supporting 

role, CCDRs provide requested forces and assets to the supported GCCs. The GCCs develop 

interface procedures for exchanging CBRN response-related operational support requests 

between the COM, Joint Staff, their subordinate commanders, and higher headquarters. The 

interface procedures should include affected nation to DOS, DOS to DOD, DOD to 

supported CCDRs, and supported to supporting CCDRs’ protocols, and reside in theater 

plans or standard operating procedures. 

For more information, see CJCSI 3214.01, Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory.

(8) Commander, US Strategic Command. Consistent with USSTRATCOM’s 

role to integrate and synchronize DOD’s efforts in combating WMD, advises the CCDRs and 

Joint Staff on the capabilities available to assist in FCM operations. 

(9) Commander, US Transportation Command. When directed by SecDef, 

USTRANSCOM is prepared to move selected DOD forces and identified elements, 

equipment, supplies, and other commodities and those of other USG departments and 

agencies, the impacted nation, and international partners in support of a President-directed 

FCM and/or other military CBRN CM assistance operations. 
Chapter III 

III-8 JP 3-41 

(10) Commander, US Special Operations Command. Is prepared to deploy 

selected forces to support the GCC during Presidential-directed FCM and/or other military 

CBRN CM assistance operations. Provides special operations assets to the supported 

combatant command as requested and approved by SecDef. 

(11) Service Chiefs. When directed by SecDef, provide forces (to include forces 

from the RC) as part of the supported GCC’s response during a CBRN incident. These 

forces may consist of, but are not limited to, specialized personnel, teams, or units that have 

been trained and equipped to provide support in the warm and hot zone and conventional 

forces that will operate in the cold zone; and force protection elements, transportation units, 

logistics activities, air assets, and research and medical capabilities. 

(12) Defense Threat Reduction Agency. DTRA provides operational and 

technical advice and support to DOD components and other USG departments and agencies, 

as requested and approved regarding FCM operations. This is accomplished through training 

and exercises, the deployment of CBRN CMATs, and operational planning assistance. 

DTRA also provides modeling, predictions, assessments, publications, training, lessons 

learned, analysis, and other support as required. DTRA provides technical reachback 

through the DTRA Operations Center, a 24/7 WMD and CBRN national reachback and 

situational awareness facility, for all technical support. During FCM, DTRA liaises with 

other technical support providers and the intelligence community to meet support requests. 

(13) Installation Commanders. As in the US, if a CBRN incident occurs, US 

commanders on foreign territory may, when requested by the impacted nation, exercise their 

immediate response authority; however, it is more restrictive (limited to saving lives) than 

within the homeland (see CJCSI 3214.01, Military Support to Foreign Consequence 

Management Operations for Chemical, Biological Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents). 

DOD has independent statutory authority (Title 10, USC, Section 404) to respond to 

overseas man-made or natural disasters when necessary to prevent loss of life. Under EO 

12966, SecDef provides such assistance at the direction of the President, or in consultation 

with the Secretary of State; however, in emergency situations to save human lives, when 

there is not sufficient time to seek prior concurrence from the Secretary of State, DOD may 

provide assistance, and advise and seek the concurrence of the Secretary of State as soon as 

practicable thereafter (see also DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief). 

(14) NGOs and the Private Sector. NGOs are private, self-governing, not-forprofit organizations dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, 

health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict 

resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. 

Private sector is an umbrella term that may be applied in the US and in foreign countries to 

any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit 

organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected NGOs. While 

many of these organizations are very capable of performing HA tasks, there is a great 

diversity of capabilities between the various NGOs and private sector entities. For planning 

purposes, it should be assumed that these various agencies and entities will desire to 

participate in HA aspects of FCM operations. It should also be expected that various 

organizations will interact with the responsible combatant command military elements in 
Foreign Consequence Management 

III-9 

differing degrees and manners, from cooperative to indifferent. These organizations often 

need to work separate from the USG to maintain the ability to be neutral in the conflict. 

b. Authorities. In the event of a CBRN incident affecting foreign territory, various 

authorities exist to govern the response. The two major laws which govern US responses to 

foreign CBRN incidents are the International Disaster Assistance section of the Foreign 

Assistance Act (FAA) (Title 22, USC), and the military humanitarian response authorities set 

forth in Title 10, USC. In addition to a review of these authorizing laws, various restrictions 

on US foreign aid should be considered before any response or assistance is provided. 

(1) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provides authorization for USG foreign 

aid programs. Section 2292 of the FAA authorizes the President “to furnish assistance to any 

foreign country, international organization, or private voluntary organization, on such terms 

as he may determine, for international disaster relief and rehabilitation, including assistance 

relating to disaster preparedness, and to the prediction of, and contingency planning for, 

natural disasters abroad.” Additionally it states, “In carrying out the provisions of this 

section the President shall insure that the assistance provided by the United States shall, to 

the greatest extent possible, reach those most in need of relief and rehabilitation as a result of 

natural and man-made disasters.” The types of assistance that may be provided under this 

section are not enumerated; however, assistance relating to disaster preparedness is expressly 

approved. 

(2) EO 12966 authorizes the military to respond to a CBRN incident in a foreign 

operational environment either at the direction of the President, with the concurrence of the 

Secretary of State, or on its own initiative to save human lives in emergency situations where 

there is insufficient time to consult with the Secretary of State. EO 12966 is analogous to the 

military’s immediate response authority for domestic disasters. When conditions resulting 

from any emergency or attack in a foreign country require immediate action, local military 

commanders may take such actions as necessary to save lives. When such compelling 

conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters, 

commanders or officials acting under “immediate response authority” may take necessary 

action to respond to requests from local affected nation authorities or the US COM. 

Following their immediate response actions, commanders report to their higher headquarters 

of assistance being provided by the most expeditious means available, and seek approval or 

additional authorizations as needed. The GCC notifies the affected US COM at the time of 

higher headquarters notification. 

c. Assets. The following paragraphs identify organizations that could respond to an 

FCM incident: 

(1) Foreign Emergency Support Team. The FEST is a DOS-led interagency 

support team that can be deployed immediately in support of the US embassy in response to 

actual or suspected terrorist incidents. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 

exercises responsibility for the management of the FEST. The FEST is task-organized 

depending on the incident and may include DOD elements that provide support to the US 

embassy, consulate, or mission for foreign emergency operations. The appropriate GCC 

provides liaison, and as required technical support to the FEST. A small FCM advisory 
Chapter III 

III-10 JP 3-41 

component should be on the FEST whenever CBRN materials are involved. DOD provides 

additional support as required through the supported combatant command. 

(2) Consequence Management Support Team. The CMST is a DOS-led 

interagency support team that can be deployed pre- or post-incident. The CMST provides 

CBRN CM advice, assistance, and support to a US embassy, consulate, or mission in 

country. It can be deployed in lieu of or as a subordinate element to the FEST. It is 

comprised of subject matter experts from DOS and other USG departments and agencies as 

required. The CMST provides FCM situation assessments to the USG and affected nation, 

as appropriate, and with the COM, coordinates the USG response for DOS. Upon approval 

by SecDef, DOD provides support to the CMST through the appropriate GCC as requested 

by DOS. 

(3) DTRA Consequence Management Advisory Team. The CMAT deploys to 

provide joint technical support to the supported commander with expertise in CBRN 

response procedures, requirements, resources, C2, health physics, PA, legal affairs, and 

specialized technical information. The CMAT is able to task-organize and deploy to support 

commanders in the technical aspects of CBRN accidents or incidents. The incident tailored 

force has secure communications, trained technical experts, hazard prediction modeling 

capability, and rapid reachback capability. 

(4) The US Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute can provide DOD 

technical support capability for nuclear and radiological incidents or accidents. An AFRRI 

medical radiobiology advisory team (MRAT) responds as part of the DTRA CMAT and is 

available at all times. The MRAT can provide on-site training to health professionals on the 

management of nuclear or radiological casualties. The team provides state-of-the-art 

expertise and advice to commanders and primary care providers following a nuclear or 

radiological accident (nuclear weapons, reactor, or radiological material). The MRAT 

provides access to biodosimetry and bioassay support to incident responders and local health 

authorities. 

(5) The United States Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT) is a 

globally responsive, specialty asset team that provides health physics and radiological 

support in response to radiation incidents and accidents. AFRAT provides subject matter 

experts to support planning, surveillance, analysis, and assessment to mitigate radiation and 

operational risks resulting from radiation/nuclear incidents. The team provides field 

radioanalytical support. It measures, analyzes, and interprets environmental and 

occupational samples for its radioactivity content, providing expert guidance on the type and 

degree of radiological hazards that face deployed forces. The AFRAT performs 

radioanalytical analysis on environmental samples (such as swipes, soil, water, air, and 

foodstuffs) and occupational samples (such as urine and feces). Analysis results are 

interpreted for the effect on deployed forces and noncombatants. The information is 

compiled for use by command and medical authorities on dose avoidance, dose reduction, 

and dose assessment; risk of communication; and additional requirements for effective 

CBRN CM. 
Foreign Consequence Management 

III-11 

(6) US Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force. CBIRF is 

a unit that was created to deploy on short notice in response to CBRN incidents. CBIRF 

consists of specially trained personnel and specialized equipment suited for operations in a 

wide range of contingencies. CBIRF is designed to minimize the effects of a CBRN incident 

through detection, identification, search and extraction, technical rescue, mass casualty 

decontamination, medical triage, and emergency medical support. 

(7) The United States Army 20th Support Command (CBRNE) is the 

operational headquarters for Army CBRN specialized units. The 20th Support Command is 

the primary Army force provider of specialized CBRNE capabilities. It conducts CBRNE 

operations in support of the CCDR, JFC, Army, and provides support to federal agencies as 

required; provides C2 of assigned CBRN forces; provides CBRNE technical advice and 

assistance; and maintains a technical reachback assistance capability. 

A more comprehensive listing of military capabilities, assets, and units for support to CBRN 

CM operations can be found in FM 3-11.21/MCRP 3-37.2C/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP (I) 3-

2.37, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management Operations. 

Additionally, the Interagency Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Database of 

Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities (INDRAC) (http://indrac.dtra.mil) identifies 

responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities across the full spectrum mission for combating 

WMD, serving as a single focal point of information and references on combating WMD and 

CBRN CM assets. 

3. Command Relationships 

a. SecDef designates the supported and supporting combatant command relationships, 

and the supported CCDR establishes the command relationships of assigned forces for each 

specific CBRN response. The DOD supports the LFA during USG FCM operations unless 

otherwise directed by the President. DOD forces remain under the C2 of the supported 

CCDR. DOS retains responsibility for coordination among USG entities. 

b. Command and Control Element Considerations. Important considerations for 

commanders of C2 elements include: 

(1) Assessment and Response. JTF-CM assessment and response requirements 

may include: 

(a) Incident site surveillance and initial assessments. 

(b) Incident site control, to include entry and exit management. 

(c) Assistance with decontamination of personnel, equipment, facilities and/or 

terrain. The JTF-CM assessment and response element may provide initial assistance to the 

affected nation in decontamination services. The JTF-CM assessment and response element 

should scope planning for potential decontamination services providing protection for public 
Chapter III 

III-12 JP 3-41 

health and safety, keeping in mind that protracted clean-up efforts will be performed by the 

affected nation. 

(d) Analysis and recommendations to the COM, USG departments and 

agencies, and affected nation for near-term management of the incident. 

(e) Temporary provision of essential service support. This support may 

include providing assistance in critical infrastructure restoration or assistance in initial site 

clean-up and debris removal. Note, however, that long-term recovery efforts are the 

responsibility of the affected country. 

(f) In the event of a radiological incident, a radiological control team may be 

needed to provide health physicists and/or other technical assistance (radiation control and 

safety). 

(g) Risk communications coordination to include developing strategy, 

addressing operational issues, and ensuring consistent messaging across the JTF. Assistance 

with this task can be sought through the US Army Public Health Command or Service 

equivalents. 

(h) Coordination of information sharing protocols among data producers and 

data users in order to maintain a common operational picture among participating agencies. 

Provision of a share point or similar unique information clearinghouse that is access 

controlled and available to all participating agencies is recommended. 

(2) Transportation and Logistics. Transportation and logistics may include the 

following: 

(a) Pre-positioning materials and supplies for use by the JTF. 

(b) Providing transport support, to include aviation, ground, and, if necessary, 

waterborne assets. Assisting the affected nation in the coordination of transportation. 

1. Depending upon the condition of the remaining transportation 

infrastructure including roads and railroads, rotary-wing aviation and ground units may be 

able to assist in the movement of personnel, supplies, debris, and equipment in and around 

the incident area. The CCDR and CJTF should anticipate such assistance requests. 

2. The use of a maritime support detachment is dependent upon waterway 

and helicopter/aerial access of incident site and JTF transportation requirements. 

(c) Providing contract support to the JTF. 

(d) Coordinating logistic support for the other components of the JTF. 

(e) Providing medical evacuation transportation support. 
Foreign Consequence Management 

III-13 

1. USTRANSCOM will not transport contagious and contaminated 

casualties within the aeromedical patient movement system. In extreme circumstances, there 

may be a requirement to move contagious index cases (approximately two) for evaluation or 

critical medical care. If patient movement is required, prior approval must be given by the 

involved GCCs, Commander USTRANSCOM, and SecDef in consultation with medical 

authorities. 

2. Rotary-wing assets may be able to provide the most efficient means to 

move non-contaminated casualties within the vicinity of the incident site. 

3. Both fixed-wing and high speed waterborne assets can be used to 

quickly move casualties intertheater and intratheater depending upon the locations of the 

affected areas and the condition of surviving transportation infrastructure (e.g., airfields, 

ports, railroads). 

(f) Establish policy for the disposition of contaminated or formerly 

contaminated US materiel and equipment including aircraft, vehicles, and other major end 

items. Note that this may apply in the HN, a third party nation, or CONUS. 

(g) Establish policy for the maintenance of contaminated or formerly 

contaminated US materiel and equipment including aircraft, vehicles, and other major end 

items. Supporting elements should be notified that although the item may have been 

decontaminated to standard, there may be remaining contamination in internal areas and 

components not normally accessible during routine operations. Note that this may apply in 

the HN, a third party nation, or CONUS. 

(3) Health Service Support. Assess health risk of CBRN hazards and provide 

recommendations to mitigate risk. HSS tasks may include the following: 

(a) Triage of casualties. 

(b) Treatment for casualties and responders. 

(c) Augmentation to existing medical treatment facilities IAW status-of-forces 

agreements (SOFAs). 

(d) Assistance in medical administration and management during an incident. 

(e) Collection of medical specimens as required for laboratory analysis and 

identification. 

(f) Patient tracking/patient movement/evacuation teams for coordination 

purposes. 

(g) Distribution of medical supplies. 
Chapter III 

III-14 JP 3-41 

(h) Administration of medical countermeasures, to include immunizations and 

prophylaxes, as required. Medical countermeasure administration may require the 

establishment of a point of dispensing for mass prophylaxis operations. 

(i) Stress management. 

(j) Patient decontamination. 

(k) Detection. 

(l) For radiological incidents, a radiological advisory medical team specifically 

trained in radiological health matters may be needed to provide on-site assistance and 

guidance to the CJTF and local medical authorities. 

(m) For biological incidents, consider the following specific augmentation: 

1. The US Army chemical and biological advisory team provides onsite advice for chemical-biological casualty care. 

2. The aeromedical isolation team consists of physicians, nurses, 

medical assistants, and laboratory technicians specially trained to provide care to and 

transport for patients with diseases caused by infectious agents. 

3. The US Army Special Medical Augmentation Response Teams 

have transformed to US Army Specialized Medical Response Capabilities (SMRC) in order 

to meet DOD requirements for anticipated HD and DSCA missions. The US Army SMRCaeromedical isolation team composition has transformed to just a consultant role. The 

primary responsibility for contingency casualty movement has transitioned to the US Air 

Force. 

(n) Develop policy and guidance on health monitoring of exposed and/or 

contaminated Service members or other impacted US citizens. This may encompass short, 

intermediate, and/or long-term monitoring and follow-up. 

(o) Ensure coordination of force health protection measures with DOS and 

other USG and HN departments and agencies. Careful consideration should be given to 

higher order effects associated with force health protection measures. 

(4) Civil-Military Operations. Civil-military operations tasks may include the 

following: 

(a) Assistance in supporting the interface between the affected nation 

government and outside assets. 

(b) Assistance in dealing with displaced civilians. 

(c) Interorganizational coordination. 
Foreign Consequence Management 

III-15 

(5) Security. Security tasks may include the following: 

(a) Providing force protection and security for JTF, as required. 

(b) Protecting US citizens and casualties. 

(c) Implementing appropriate AT measures. 

(d) Establishing early warning systems within the JTF operational area. 

(e) Providing convoy and patient transport security. 

Guidelines for establishing a JTF and standing JTF headquarters can be found in JP 3-33, 

Joint Task Force Headquarters.

4. Affected Nation Considerations

a. An affected nation is one that has requested support to mitigate the effects of a CBRN 

incident. The affected nation has primary responsibility for responding to, managing, 

coordinating other nations’ augmenting support, and mitigating the consequences of a CBRN 

incident within its borders. A major part of any FCM operation is augmenting affected 

nation operations, not replacing them. In order to avoid duplication of effort, affected nation 

capabilities need to be determined. In the aftermath of a CBRN incident, it may be difficult 

to determine which government ministry is performing certain functions. The US embassy 

within the country should be able to assist in identifying such details. To assist in the 

clarification of duties, a list of typical government ministries is provided below, although 

exact names will vary in each country.

(1) Ministry of interior; in many countries this ministry performs the national crisis 

response mission.

(2) Ministry of agriculture typically has the responsibility for rural development 

and water conservation, as well as land resources. 

(3) Ministry of defense is typically responsible for ensuring the defense of the 

country by coordinating defense-related matters with the Services, as well as the applicable 

branches of government. 

(4) Ministry of finance is typically responsible for the administration of the 

finances of the affected nation government, regulation of expenditures of the government, 

and concerned with all economic and financial matters affecting the country as a whole.

(5) Ministry of foreign affairs typically prepares the affected nation foreign affairs 

policy and represents the interests of the affected nation government outside of its borders. 

(6) Ministry of health is typically the health authority in the affected nation 

responsible for the coordination of the affected nation health care policy (if applicable) and 

sanitation. 
Chapter III 

III-16 JP 3-41 

(7) Ministry of trade and industry is typically responsible for providing safe 

working conditions, administrating laws and regulations related to trade and industry, and 

dialogues with enterprises, organizations, and other authorities. 

(8) Ministry of justice is typically concerned with the creation and implementation 

of the affected nation laws, as well as advising the other ministries regarding these laws. 

(9) Ministry of labor is typically responsible for the affected nation employment 

policy, administration and personnel policy, competition and income policy, and matters 

concerning living standards. 

(10) Ministry of the environment typically handles issues such as pollution control, 

nature conservation, and waste management and minimization. 

(11) Ministry of public works and housing is typically responsible for affected 

nation programs that address housing needs; improves and develops communities; and 

enforcement of applicable housing and other public welfare laws. 

(12) Ministry of social development is typically entrusted with the welfare, social 

justice, and empowerment of the disadvantaged and marginalized section of the society. 

(13) Ministry of transportation typically ensures a fast, safe, efficient, accessible, 

and convenient transportation system that meets affected nation interests. 

(14) Ministry of education typically oversees the quality of education in the 

affected nation and prepares students for employment in the affected nation environment.

b. Negotiations Regarding Use of Specialized Equipment and Facilities. In the case 

of a foreign CBRN incident, highly specialized equipment such as decontamination systems, 

mobile laboratories, field hospitals, medical equipment, and facilities for temporary 

accommodation of persons may be necessary. However, the affected nation may have 

safety, interoperability, or other issues with the importation and use of such equipment in a 

CBRN response. For instance, US responders may have difficulty importing specialized 

chemical, biological, and radiological detection equipment into foreign countries. Unless 

prior agreements are in place, it may be necessary for the US to negotiate with the affected 

nation at the time of the incident based on the specific equipment required for that incident. 

Without adequate procedures in place in advance to manage such concerns, responders may 

have to rely on such ad hoc negotiations to import and/or use equipment necessary for an 

effective response. Ideally, relevant multinational CBRN CM training exercises can be used 

to identify any such special requirements and establish the necessary agreements prior to an 

actual incident occurring.

c. The affected nation will likely have its own guidelines for decontamination. For 

instance, within the US, the EPA provides guidance on cleanup levels for radioactive sites 

and trains other US departments and agencies to prepare for such emergencies. However, 

international standards may also apply to a foreign CBRN incident. 
Foreign Consequence Management 

III-17 

5. Joint and Multinational Force Considerations 

a. Rules on the Use of Force/Rules of Engagement (RUF/ROE). CJCSI 3121.01, 

Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (U), 

outlines the DOD standing rules of engagement (SROE) and SRUF for US forces. In 

general, when conducting FCM, SROE should be applied. However, CCDRs may augment 

SROE with supplemental measures or by submitting supplemental measures to SecDef for 

approval. Commanders also notify SecDef of restrictions placed on approved ROE/RUF. 

b. During FCM, commanders at all levels have the inherent right and obligation to 

defend their units and other US forces at all times against a “hostile act or demonstrated 

hostile intent.” 

c. US forces under the OPCON or TACON of a multinational force will follow the 

ROE of the multinational force for mission accomplishment if authorized by SecDef. Any 

inconsistencies between the multinational ROE and US ROE will be submitted through the 

chain of command for resolution. Prior to resolution, US forces will follow US ROE. 

Additionally, US forces will remain bound by international agreements to which the US is a 

party regardless of whether the other members of the multinational force are party to the 

agreements. However, international agreements, e.g., SOFAs, “may never be interpreted to 

limit US forces right of self-defense.” Self-defense, specifically unit self-defense, can be 

extended to, and includes persons, vessels, or aircraft receiving emergency assistance from 

US aircraft or vessels. 

Enclosure A of CJCSI 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of 

Force for US Forces (U), details SROE policy and provides implementation guidance for the 

application of force for mission accomplishment and the exercise of self-defense. It also 

addresses SROE for US forces operating with multinational forces. 

d. Multinational Operations. The US has standing agreements with some foreign 

governments that allow for the sharing of high-level intelligence (e.g., special category), but 

in all cases, the release of classified information to multinational partners is made IAW the 

national disclosure policy (NDP). Detailed guidance is provided to the senior US 

commander by the chain of command IAW National Security Decision Memorandum 119, 

Disclosure of Classified United States Military Information to Foreign Governments and 

International Organizations, and NDP-1, National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure 

of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations. 

During the integration of multinational partners into operations, commanders and planners 

should identify operational restrictions on those forces due to relevant US laws, policies, 

treaties, and agreements. 

JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, and JP 3-16, 

Multinational Operations, contain detailed discussions of sanitization and foreign disclosure 

procedures.

e. Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). The ability of the JTF to work with all 

organizations and groups is essential to mission accomplishment. A good working 
Chapter III 

III-18 JP 3-41 

relationship between military forces, USG departments and agencies, civilian authorities, 

involved international and regional organizations, and the population is therefore important. 

Conceptually, the CMOC is the meeting place of these elements, represented by US Service 

liaisons, military liaisons from participating countries, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 

representatives, DOS personnel, affected nation representatives, and representatives from the 

United Nations (UN), NGOs, and IGOs. More than one CMOC may be established in a 

JOA, and each is task organized based on the mission. The organization of the CMOC is 

theater and mission dependent—flexible in size and composition. During large-scale hazards 

assessment operations, if a headquarters operations center is formed by the affected nation or 

UN, the CMOC becomes the focal point for coordination between participating military and 

civilian agencies.

For further guidance on the interagency process, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations,

and JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. Additional guidance 

on multinational operations is found in JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

6. Unique Planning Considerations in a Foreign Operational Environment 

The phases of FCM are derived from CJCSI 3214.01, Military Support to Foreign 

Consequence Management Operations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Incidents. As in the domestic operational environment, CBRN response is based on a sixphase construct; however, phase names and associated activities differ from the JP 5-0, Joint 

Operation Planning, model. It is unlikely that all forces will shift from each of these phases 

to the next phase simultaneously. It is more likely that some forces will be still working the 

last issues associated with one phase as other components are commencing activities within 

the next phase. The six phases are listed below: 

a. Phase 0 (Shape). This is a continuous phase. The intent of this phase is to ensure 

DOD is organized, trained, equipped, and prepared to support USG efforts to minimize the 

effects of CBRN incidents on foreign soil. Key tasks of this phase include partner 

engagement, interagency coordination, plans development, training, exercise, and constant 

monitoring for a developing crisis. DOD will assist DOS in shaping the environment 

through theater security cooperation, information operations, partner capacity building and 

other engagement activities on both a country and regional basis in an effort to prevent or 

avert a CBRN incident and to enhance partner capabilities to effectively manage the effects 

of a CBRN incident if such an incident cannot be prevented. Additionally, combatant 

commands should coordinate response, support, and situational awareness processes, 

procedures, and requirements with US embassies within their AOR. 

b. Phase I Deter (Situation Assessment and Preparation). Transition to phase I 

occurs on reliable indications and warning of a CBRN incident or upon notification that an 

incident has occurred. Phase I includes those actions required to conduct situation 

assessment and preparation, including the timely and accurate assessment of the CBRN 

situation, preparation for deployment, and deployment of selected advance elements. This 

may include but is not limited to the GCC LNO or team. Phase I ends when the nature and 

scope of the CBRN situation and initial response force requirements are defined. 

Additionally, any limited initial response to a CBRN incident conducted by DOD 
Foreign Consequence Management 

III-19 

commanders operating under immediate response authority would likely occur during 

phase I. 

c. Phase II Seize the Initiative (Deployment). Phase II begins with SecDef-approved 

CJCS deployment and/or EXORD designating the intermediate and/or forward staging bases 

and establishing formal command relationships (i.e., supported and supporting commanders). 

The order serves as the formal authority for the deployment of forces. Phase II completion is 

generally marked by having forces deployed with enough C2 and unit capability to safely 

and effectively begin operations. Depending on the situation, the CJTF may decide to move 

into phase III operations before all phase II objectives are complete and continue to work on 

phase II objectives while in phase III. 

d. Phase III Dominate (Assistance to Affected Nation Authorities). Phase III begins 

with the arrival of required military assistance at the incident location and supporting 

locations and ends with the determination that DOD support is no longer required or 

appropriate. Commanders begin planning immediately for transition to affected nation and 

civilian agencies, including USG, other international governments, donors, and NGOs, and 

should identify the necessary or minimum conditions to initiate transition to other agencies. 

e. Phase IV Stabilize (Transition to Affected Nation and/or Other Agencies). 

Although planning for transition of CBRN CM activities begins as soon as practical 

following the initial response, phase IV begins with the formal implementation of the 

transition plan for those tasks and responsibilities being accomplished by DOD and ends 

when directed by SecDef or the affected nation has assumed full responsibility for response 

activities. 

f. Phase V Enable Civilian Authorities (Redeployment). Phase V begins with the 

redeployment of US military forces involved in CBRN CM operations or the formal 

transition of those forces to a purely DR or HA mission. Phase V is complete when all 

forces have returned to their previous military posture or completed transition to other 

missions. 

7. Applicable International Laws and Agreements 

a. Legal Guidance. The complexity of FCM policies, treaties, and agreements requires 

continuous involvement of the SJA or appropriate legal advisor with the planning, control, 

and assessment of operations. Because of the international nature of FCM efforts, this will 

also include continuous interorganizational coordination to establish the legal authorities, 

capabilities, and limitations associated with engaged organizations. 

(1) The SJA should be involved throughout the planning process, including mission 

analysis and COA development, to ensure that the relevant GCC is aware of potential FCM 

related legal issues. For instance, multinational partners, allies, and affected nations will 

have their own treaty obligations and laws that may significantly differ from our own and 

restrict or prohibit their participation in FCM operations. The SJA can advise of potential 

associated issues, such as consequences of execution and harmful environmental impacts, 
Chapter III 

III-20 JP 3-41 

collateral damage, or other FCM-related legal issues that should be considered during the 

response effort. 

(2) The SJA should address FCM-related legal issues associated with joint 

operations during both the mission analysis and the planning processes. FCM-related legal 

issues should be outlined in appendix 4 (Legal) to annex E (Personnel) and should reflect the 

description of legal support required to sustain the mission as developed during the planning 

process. Protecting enemy prisoners of war and third country nationals from CBRN hazards 

are examples of two such issues. 

b. International Law and Agreements. International law, policies, treaties, and 

agreements to which the US is a signatory identify certain rights and obligations that may 

affect joint operations. These legal requirements may pose constraints and restraints. They 

shape the design of operations and campaigns that deal with support to an FCM mission. 

For further guidance on legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military 

Operations. For additional background on legal issues unique to FCM operations, refer to 

the DTRA Foreign Consequence Management Legal Deskbook.
IV-1 

CHAPTER IV 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-LED CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, 

RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT 

1. General 

a. DOD conducts CBRN CM to mitigate hazards in support of operations or to support 

others in response/recovery (when required/as directed). All DOD CBRN CM capabilities 

are designed to be used in support of military operations. Like any other DOD capability, 

these military assets may be used in support of civilian operations or joint or multinational 

forces, as directed. Mitigating the hazard reduces the threat to personnel, facilitates freedom 

of action, and supports mission completion. In the majority of cases, DOD supports DOS in 

the conduct of FCM and DHS for domestic CBRN CM. However, during combat operations 

or in specific instances where DOS or DHS is unable or incapable of leading the USG effort, 

DOD could be given primary mission responsibility. DOD-led CBRN CM can occur in 

either domestic CBRN CM or FCM. DOD may be delegated or tasked with leading a USG 

CBRN CM effort. 

b. For DOD, the CBRN environment is hazard-focused and may involve deliberate, 

prolonged actions in and around the hazard area to support response and recovery efforts. 

While some hazard mitigation can be conducted by conventional forces, CBRN CM 

operations to address the source of the hazard often require specialized training and 

equipment. 

c. DOD-led CBRN CM operations are generally conducted in one of two situations. 

DOD may be directed to coordinate the USG CBRN CM response in a permissive or 

uncertain environment where the DOS has no established diplomatic presence in the JOA to 

facilitate LFA activities, or there is no functioning HN government, to meet FCM 

requirements. The US military will lead CBRN CM operations conducted concurrently with 

military operations in hostile environments consistent with strategic planning guidance. 

d. These unique conditions require the JFC to assume primary responsibility for 

planning, managing, and mitigating the incident until conditions permit transfer of 

responsibility as the lead USG agency for FCM to DOS or another authority. In these cases, 

the JFC becomes the de facto USG lead for the initial FCM response using available assets. 

The JFC requests additional support from the USG and other nations through DOS for 

follow-on operations. The conditions within the operational environment may range from 

DOD [Department of Defense] Led CM [Consequence Management] 

Operations. In both domestic and foreign environments, CM actions are initiated 

at the national level with DOD providing support as directed by the President or 

SecDef [Secretary of Defense]. DOD forces may, however, be directed to lead 

[these] operations as a direct result of US military operations in a foreign country 

where DOS [Department of State] does not have an established presence.

Joint Publication 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

10 June 2009 
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-41 

active combat operations to crisis response in limited contingency in responding to or in 

mitigating the effects of, such an incident. DOD transitions DOD-led CBRN CM activities 

as soon as feasible to an appropriate civilian governmental authority. 

e. Strategic and operational objectives drive the priority of DOD-led CBRN CM 

operations in relation to other ongoing military operations. JFC’s should plan DOD-led 

CBRN CM operations as a complex contingency or branch operation executed in any 

environment to: 

(1) Facilitate accomplishment of overall military objectives. 

(2) Reduce the effect of a CBRN incident on combat operations. 

(3) Provide assistance to civilian populace affected by a CBRN incident. 

(4) Facilitate transfer to stability operations. 

f. In general, DOD-led CBRN CM operations occur in one of the following two 

operational contexts: 

(1) In response to CBRN incidents on foreign territory where DOS does not have 

an established diplomatic presence or there is no functioning HN government DOD may be 

required to act as the LFA for FCM requests to coordinate the USG response including incountry activities and actions to minimize the effects of WMD use/CBRN hazards. 

Requested activities and actions will be assessed based on the following criteria: legality, 

lethality, risk, cost and reimbursement, readiness, appropriateness, GCC input, and 

timeliness to provide recommendations to SecDef and facilitate coordination of the USG 

response through DOS and interagency partners. 

(2) CBRN CM operations conducted concurrently with military operations include: 

(a) CBRN CM assistance to the local populace within the operational area. 

(b) CBRN CM operations at APODs/SPODs to maintain force projection 

capacity. 

(c) Activities to minimize potential collateral effects from targeting adversary 

WMD capabilities. 

(d) CBRN CM activities as a result of US, allied, or adversary military 

operations that result in the release of CBRN or TIMs. 

2. Roles and Responsibilities 

Roles, responsibilities, and relationships for DOD-led CBRN CM differ from those 

listed in Chapter II, “Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Consequence Management.” The following information applies only to DOD-led CBRN 

CM: 
 Department of Defense-Led Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

 Consequence Management 

IV-3 

a. Office of the Secretary of Defense. OSD coordinates JFC requests for support and 

forces with other USG departments and agencies and coordinates through DOS for support 

from partner nations and NGOs. OSD coordinates with the interagency for the transition or 

transfer of responsibility of CBRN CM operations to other USG departments and agencies, 

international agencies, or other countries, as appropriate. OSD coordinates with both DOS 

and the Joint Staff to obtain international legal authorities, protocols, standards, and 

agreements and multinational support for operations. Additionally, OSD coordinates with 

DOS to notify the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of discoveries or 

destruction of chemical weapons materials and former production facilities. 

b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CJCS through the Joint Staff coordinates 

with combatant commands and Services to make sure that DOD-led CBRN CM operations 

are executed in compliance with domestic, international, and foreign laws, policies, treaties, 

and agreements. They assist with interagency support for operations and assist in planning 

and exercising activities within the interagency process. They also coordinate and provide 

intelligence support to the CCDRs for threat identification and prioritization. When required 

after SecDef approval, CJCS publishes appropriate EXORDs for DOD-led CBRN CM 

operations. 

c. Geographic Combatant Commanders. GCCs plan and execute DOD-led CBRN 

CM operations within their AORs. They incorporate DOD-led CBRN CM operations into 

their operational plans. GCCs also provide for intratheater movement of specialized 

personnel and equipment and coordinate transportation of suspect or confirmed CBRNrelated material, to include weapons, agents, delivery systems, and infrastructure for short- to 

long-term storage, protection, dismantlement, destruction, or disposal. This includes 

tracking, documenting, accounting, and reporting WMD material, facilities, and personnel 

discovered, stored, or destroyed in the AOR. CCDRs coordinate with OSD and the Joint 

Staff to plan for transition or transfer of responsibility of DOD-led CBRN CM operations to 

other multinational forces or nation-states. Finally, they coordinate with OSD and the Joint 

Staff to ensure operations are in compliance with US obligations under international laws, 

policies, treaties, and agreements. 

d. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. DTRA provides operational and technical 

advice and support to DOD components and other USG departments and agencies, as 

requested and approved regarding CBRN CM operations. This is accomplished through 

training and exercises, the deployment of CBRN CM advisory teams, and operational 

planning assistance. DTRA also provides modeling, predictions, assessments, publications, 

training, lessons learned, analysis, and other support as required. DTRA provides technical 

reachback through the DTRA Operations Center, a 24/7 WMD and CBRN national 

reachback and situational awareness facility for all technical support. During CBRN CM, 

DTRA liaises with other technical support providers and the intelligence community to meet 

support requests. 

3. Command Relationships 

The JFC coordinates the response to a CBRN incident in the assigned JOA. The JFC 

requests additional support through the appropriate GCC. For large incidents, a JTF-CM as 
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-41 

described in Chapter III, “Foreign Consequence Management,” should be considered for the 

response. The GCC coordinates with DOS for support from other USG departments and 

agencies or foreign countries. For DOD-led CBRN CM, the JFC is the supported 

commander. JFCs should take into consideration that other USG departments and agencies 

may not be accustomed to working in a supporting capacity to DOD. 

4. Joint Force Considerations 

a. In the context of DOD-led CBRN CM operations, the appropriate JFC assumes 

responsibility for the execution of operations within the JOA when a CBRN incident 

requiring a response occurs. The GCC approves end states for these operations by phase 

within the JOA. One major objective is to conduct DOD-led CBRN CM operations without 

jeopardizing critical military operations and objectives; however, commanders should plan 

for the diversion of combat forces and possible changes to overall end states and objectives 

due to the significance of a CBRN incident. 

b. Providing assistance to civilian populace affected by a CBRN incident is an 

important aspect of these operations. Assistance may include, but is not limited to: 

(1) Saving lives and preventing human suffering. 

(2) Providing support to displaced personnel. 

(3) Preventing/reducing additional damage. 

(4) Providing mortuary affairs support. 

(5) Providing emergency mitigation of CBRN hazards. 

(6) Providing minimum emergency restoration of life supporting services. 

(7) Conducting a noncombatant evacuation operation. 

5. Planning Considerations During Military Operations 

a. GCC theater security cooperation activities (phase 0) support DOD-led CBRN CM 

operations by facilitating interaction with partner nation military forces to identify partner 

capabilities, build partner capacity, and increase interoperability. Planning for DOD-led 

CBRN CM should build on these activities and incorporate the experience gained in working 

with partner nations in operations. 

b. DOD-led CBRN CM operations may be required to facilitate combat operations, and 

depending on the nature and purpose of the activities, may require coordination with 

response operations of multiple countries, partners, and a wide variety of international 

organizations and other NGOs. JFCs should be aware of the following planning 

considerations: 
 Department of Defense-Led Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

 Consequence Management 

IV-5 

(1) Integration of specialized US military forces, USG departments and agencies, 

and contractors. 

(2) Integration of partner nation support and forces. 

(3) Support and integration of NGOs. 

(4) Development of a strategic communication plan. 

c. Coordination between DOD and other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, and 

IGOs will also be important aspects of any DOD-led CBRN CM operation. Regardless of 

the status of an impacted nation government or partner nations, IGOs and NGOs will have 

significant equities in the operation; therefore, JFCs should anticipate considerable 

interagency and intergovernmental coordination requirements. 

(1) Operations will likely be subject to monitoring by various government agencies 

or IGOs; therefore, planners should anticipate receiving specific US national level guidance. 

As DOD-led CBRN CM operations may involve significant interactions with foreign civilian 

authorities and IGOs that do not normally operate in a supporting role to DOD, the JFC 

should strongly consider forming a CMOC or supplementing an existing CMOC with 

appropriate FCM expertise. In addition to IGO participation, the CMOC often involves 

multinational partners that possess unique FCM capabilities. 

For further guidance on CMOCs, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. Additional 

guidance on multinational operations is found in JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

(2) As with USG departments and agencies, NGOs and IGOs may have significant 

equities and capabilities; planning for their participation in a hostile or uncertain 

environment is challenging. Some of these agencies may demand to participate regardless of 

the risk, and others may not be willing to participate until a permissive environment exists. 

d. DOD-led CBRN CM operations can occur at any point in a campaign; therefore, 

these operations should be considered as a branch to contingency operations. DOD-led 

CBRN CM-related activities are conducted in the following phases, which differ from 

traditional operational phases as found in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning: 

(1) Phase 0 (Shape). This is a continuous phase. The intent of this phase is to 

ensure DOD is organized, trained, equipped, and prepared to minimize the effects of CBRN 

incidents on foreign soil. Key tasks of this phase include planning response capabilities 

within the joint force, identifying possible partner nation FCM capabilities, incorporating 

DOD-led CBRN CM scenarios into training and exercises, and developing intelligence on 

friendly, neutral, and enemy CBRN threats in the operational area.

(2) Phase I Deter (Situation Assessment and Preparation). Transition to phase I 

occurs on reliable indications and warnings of a CBRN incident or upon notification that an 

incident has occurred. Phase I includes those actions required to conduct a timely and 

accurate assessment of the CBRN situation, preparation for deployment, and deployment of 

selected advance elements. Phase I ends when the nature and scope of the CBRN situation 
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-41 

and initial response requirements are defined. The response spectrum may include technical 

expertise, specialized teams, or entire units. Conventional forces will also be needed to carry 

out non-CBRN tasks (medical, transportation, security, etc.). Any limited initial response to 

a CBRN incident conducted by DOD commanders operating under immediate response 

authority would likely occur during phase I. Plans should also include HA/DR 

considerations for those affected by the CBRN incident or its cause.

(3) Phase II Seize the Initiative (Deployment). Phase II begins with the 

deployment of designated forces and the establishment of formal command relationships 

between supported and supporting commanders. Depending on the nature and scope of the 

hazard, forces may continue to flow for some time (days, weeks, or even months). 

Commanders begin planning immediately for redeployment and transition to civilian 

agencies, including USG, other international governments, donors, and NGOs, and should 

identify the necessary or minimum conditions needed to effect the transition. Phase II ends 

when the first capability arrives and is operational.

(4) Phase III Dominate (Mitigate Hazard Effects). Phase III begins with the 

initialization of efforts to mitigate hazard effects. These efforts may include lifesaving 

operations, personnel and equipment decontamination, actions to stop or reduce the source of 

contamination, and actions to support associated HA/DR efforts as a result of the CBRN 

incident. Remediation (return to a pre-contaminated state) is usually not possible by DOD 

forces. Rather, the control of the hazard site and reduction to the threat to forces and any 

nearby civilians is the goal. When (due to operations) transition is not possible, the area will 

be marked to protect forces and any civilians in the area. Phase III ends when the on-scene 

commander determines that the incident site is under positive control. 

(5) Phase IV Stabilize (Transition to Close the Incident Site). Phase IV begins 

initiation of the redeployment plan. The situation contained, the effort is now made to 

reduce the personnel needed to continue mitigation efforts. When possible, HN, NGO, or 

USG personnel may replace functions performed by DOD personnel. Otherwise, efforts will 

be made to mark the area to reduce any residual threat to personnel or civilians in the area. 

Phase IV ends when the mitigation of the incident is at such a point where it is determined 

that no or minimal personnel are needed to maintain security of the site. 

(6) Phase V Enable Civilian Authorities (Redeployment). Phase V begins with 

the redeployment of the bulk US military forces involved in CBRN CM operations or the 

formal transition of those forces to a purely DR or HA mission. Phase V is complete when 

all forces have returned to their previous military posture or completed transition to other 

missions. 

6. General Planning Considerations 

a. Overall Planning Considerations 

(1) Many important DOD-led CBRN CM activities take place as shaping (phase 0) 

activities and are included in theater campaign plans, regional combating WMD plans, and 

contingency plans. Many are executed as part of the theater security cooperation strategy, 
 Department of Defense-Led Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

 Consequence Management 

IV-7 

but provide direct support to DOD-led CBRN CM. These activities include joint, 

interagency, bilateral and multinational CBRN CM or FCM exercises and training; efforts to 

build partner CBRN CM capacity; and consultation with partner nations and local 

authorities. 

(2) International law, policies, treaties, and agreements to which the US is a 

signatory identify certain rights and obligations that may affect DOD-led CBRN CM 

operations. These legal requirements may pose constraints and restraints and shape the 

planning and execution of operations. 

(a) The complexity of international laws, US policies, treaties, and agreements 

requires the involvement of the SJA or appropriate legal advisor with planning and 

execution. 

(b) This will also include consultation with other USG departments and 

agencies, multinational partners, impacted nation governments (if applicable), and IGOs to 

establish the legal authorities, capabilities, and limitations associated with their 

organizations. 

(c) Policies for the disposition of contaminated human remains to meet healthbased clearance requirements for contamination mitigation, safety requirements for 

transportation, and environmental/diplomatic requirements for temporary interment in 

theater. 

(3) To protect both DOD forces and civilian populations, DOD-led CBRN CM 

mission planning should address both immediate and long-term effects of dispersed CBRN 

hazards. Planning should include the capability for CBRN hazard identification and 

assessment, protection, avoidance, and decontamination. Considerations include but are not 

limited to the following: 

(a) Procedures for the temporary or permanent disposition of human remains 

and equipment and materiel that cannot be decontaminated or that does not meet agreed upon 

cleanliness standards. 

(b) Medical obligations under international law. DOD should be prepared to 

lead activities necessary to accomplish medical obligations under international law when 

indigenous capacity does not exist or is incapable of assuming responsibility. Once 

legitimate civilian authority is prepared to conduct and sustain this medical support, US 

military forces transition to provide support, as required or necessary. Medical planning 

considerations include the following: 

1. Planning for medical assistance to be provided to indigenous 

populations, multinational forces, USG employees, contractors, and as appropriate, IGOs and 

NGOs. 

2. Policies for contaminated mass casualty decontamination. Policies and 

procedures should include provisions for casualty decontamination and evacuation both in 
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-41 

and out of the area of operations. Procedures and provisions for processing family pets are 

also an important consideration in catastrophic incidents. 

(c) Planning should include specific meteorological and oceanographic 

products and information support. These products are important components of modeling 

and simulation analysis used to predict hazard areas and estimate casualties during 

operations. 

(d) An effective communications strategy aids the commander in the conduct 

of DOD-led CBRN CM operations and responses. This plan should inform affected civilian 

and military populace, reduce panic and restore order, and provide information consistent 

with overall mission objectives. Communications planning should include common themes 

and messages to reassure local populations and promote effective communications between 

the JFC commander and partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs. 

b. Additional Planning Guidance 

(1) Flexibility. Geographic combatant commands and JTFs should be given 

maximum flexibility to both render assistance and continue conduct of their primary mission. 

Assistance that allows mission flexibility during conduct of DOD-led CBRN CM includes: 

(a) Assessment of the incident site (e.g., agent preliminary identification, 

initial damage assessment, perimeter of incident identified). 

(b) Timely cordoning off of the contamination site. 

(c) Emergency medical treatment on civilians (triage). 

(d) Providing incident information for subsequent public information 

broadcasts or warnings. 

(e) Decontamination of casualties. 

(f) Providing biological agent outbreak information to surveillance and disease 

reporting offices. 

(g) Facilitating transition to responding international health organizations or 

indigenous health care elements. 

(h) Conducting shipment and administration of vaccines to civilian populations 

in the event of a biological agent breakout (e.g., smallpox) while DOS or non-US health 

organizations have limited access due to a nonpermissive environment. 

(2) Use of Partner Nation Forces. Use of partner nation CBRN CM assets, with 

emphasis on those elements not fully engaged with combat operations, should be planned 

and coordinated, if possible, prior to the start of combat operations. Many partner nation 

forces have significant capabilities and trained forces to assist in reducing or mitigating the 

impact of CBRN hazards on affected indigenous civilian populations. These forces can be 
 Department of Defense-Led Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

 Consequence Management 

IV-9 

used to reinforce indigenous nation first response capabilities, conduct initial assessments of 

the incident, conduct incident scene C2, conduct limited medical treatment, and conduct 

limited decontamination. 

(3) Nonpermissive Environment Factors. Due to the nature of the environment 

in which DOD-led CBRN CM operations occur, the following specific details need to be 

covered during JFC planning: 

(a) Additional force protection is provided for elements in direct support of the 

CBRN CM operation. 

(b) Medevac resources, both air and land, are available for both the CBRN CM 

force and for possible civilian CBRN casualties. 

(c) Communications are adequate for CBRN CM operations during 

simultaneous combat operations and have as little priority competition as possible. 

(d) Intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities are focused on the CBRN 

incident to reduce its impact or eliminate future incidents. 

(e) PA and information operations that reduce the civilian population panic, 

support the early return of civilian authority to the management of the CBRN-related 

incident, and facilitate the release of US and partner nation forces to the conduct of the 

primary combat operation. 

c. Assessments. There are several assessments available to a commander to assist with 

overall planning. These include: 

(1) Operational Environment Assessment. An operational environment 

assessment provides the commander information on the threat, the physical environment, and 

the political environment. Decision support tools may be used in conjunction with this 

information to assist predictive modeling. 

(a) The threat assessment identifies what enemy or adversary the force may 

face during a DOD-led CBRN CM operation, if in a hostile environment. The threat 

assessment also addresses the types of agents and hazards and includes occupational and 

environmental health assessments. 

(b) The physical environment includes terrain, weather, and characteristics of 

the geographical area. Characteristics include critical infrastructure, hazard sites, and zone 

analysis considerations. Analysis of urban areas within the JOA can facilitate the complex 

transition from combat operations to CBRN CM when required. 

See JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations, for detailed discussions in urban areas.

(c) The political environment includes applicable impacted nation agreements, 

SOFAs, and other sovereignty issues that may apply. 
Chapter IV 

IV-10 JP 3-41 

(2) Capabilities Assessment. Capabilities assessment provides an assessment of 

the JFC’s ability to conduct DOD-led CBRN CM and includes plans, organization, 

manpower, equipment, logistics, medical, training, leadership, and readiness. 

(3) Vulnerability Assessment. A vulnerability assessment is an evaluation of the 

organization’s strengths and weaknesses compared with the operational environment and 

CBRN threat. Vulnerability analyses of key APOD, SPOD, and JRSOI sites, to include 

proximity of TIM storage facilities or sites, are used to develop measures to reduce the 

organization’s vulnerability to identified CBRN threats. The ultimate purpose of a 

vulnerability assessment is to help ensure that adequate defensive and CBRN CM assets are 

available. 

(4) Risk Assessment. These assessments attempt to quantify the level of risk that 

exists in the conduct of DOD-led CBRN CM operations. In certain incidents, such as high 

radiation hazards, the risk may preclude mission accomplishment. 

(5) Criticality Assessment. The criticality assessment evaluates a command’s 

missions and functions/capabilities and determines mission impact or consequence of loss of 

assets that support execution of the command’s missions. 

(6) Threat Assessment. The threat assessment provides an assessment on the 

adversary’s CBRN capability. This threat can come from nation states and non-state actors 

alike, sometimes simultaneously, and may occur in a variety of forms. These include 

deliberate attacks or accidental releases. 

See JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, CJCSI 3214.01, Military Support to 

Foreign Consequence Management Operations, and the DTRA Foreign Consequence 

Management Planning Guide for additional planning considerations for DOD-led CBRN CM 

missions. 

Response to US nuclear weapon incidents and other nuclear or radiological incidents 

involving materials in DOD custody is a special case and may or may not be led by DOD. 

These responses are conducted IAW NSPD 28, United States Nuclear Weapons Command 

and Control, Safety, and Security; the NRF, where applicable; NIMS, where applicable; and 

appropriate DOD instructions and plans. 

See DODD 3150.08, Response to Nuclear and Radiological Incidents, and DOD 3150.8-M, 

Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP), for further information. 

 
A-1 

APPENDIX A

KEY LEGAL, STRATEGY, AND POLICY DOCUMENTS AND 

INTERNATIONAL PROTOCOLS 

1. Legal, National Strategy, and National Policy Guidance

a. Key Executive and Legislative Guidance. The following documents are key 

references when addressing the CS mission area, to include CBRN CM: 

(1) The White House Notice, Continuation of Emergency with Respect to 

Weapons of Mass Destruction. Reissued every year since 1994, the notice concerns EO 

12938, and as amended, that a national emergency exists because of the worldwide threat 

posed by the proliferation and potential use of WMD. 

(2) PPD-1, Organization of the National Security Council System, establishes the 

process and structure for the national security council system. 

(3) HSPD-1, Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council,

established the Homeland Security Council to ensure coordination of all HS-related activities 

among the executive departments and agencies and promote the effective development and 

implementation of all HS policies. 

(4) HSPD-3, The Homeland Security Advisory System, provides the guidelines for 

a comprehensive and effective means to disseminate information regarding the risk of 

terrorist acts to federal, state, and local authorities and the American people. This document 

establishes the five threat conditions and their respective protective measures. 

(5) National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction states, “As part of 

our defense, the United States must be fully prepared to respond to the consequences of 

WMD use on our soil, whether by hostile states or by terrorists. We must also be prepared to 

respond to the effects of WMD use against our forces deployed abroad and to assist friends 

and allies.” Refer to the classified version of this strategy and its applicable annex for details 

concerning WMD CM. 

(6) HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, assigns the Secretary of the DHS 

as the PFO for domestic incident management to coordinate the USG’s resources utilized in 

response to, or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies. 

Additionally, HSPD-5 established the NIMS to provide a consistent nationwide approach for 

federal, state, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare 

for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. 

(7) PPD-8, National Preparedness, is aimed at strengthening the security and 

resilience of the US through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk 

to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyberspace attacks, pandemics, and 

catastrophic natural disasters. 

(8) Federal Strategic Guidance Statement for Chemical Attacks in the United 

States. The strategic guidance statement, issued pursuant to HSPD-8, Annex 1 (National 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-41 

Preparedness), guides USG efforts in addressing chemical attacks based on the applicable 

National Planning Scenarios along with threats of attacks using other possible chemical 

weapons. 

(9) HSPD-9, Defense of United States Agriculture and Food, establishes a national 

policy to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and 

other emergencies. 

(10) HSPD-10, Biodefense for the 21st Century, outlines the essential pillars of our 

biodefense program and provides specific directives to further strengthen the significant 

gains put in place during the past three years. These pillars include threat awareness, 

prevention and protection, surveillance and detection, and response and recovery, which 

include response planning, mass casualty care, risk communication, medical 

countermeasures, and decontamination. 

(11) HSPD-14, Domestic Nuclear Detection, seeks to protect against the 

unauthorized importation, possession, storage, transportation, development, or use of a 

nuclear explosive device, fissile material, or radiological material in the US, and to protect 

against attack using such devices or materials against the people, territory, or interests of the 

US. 

(12) HSPD-15, US Strategy and Policy on the War on Terror[ism] (U), discusses 

the coordination of all instruments of national power to meet six US goals for the war on 

terrorism: deny terrorists resources, enable partner nations to counter terrorism, combat 

WMD, defeat terrorists and their organizations, counter support for terrorism in coordination 

with partner nations, and establish conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism. 

(13) HSPD-18, Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, 

describes the principles from which national guidance is derived for addressing the 

challenges presented by the diverse CBRN threat spectrum, optimizing the investments 

necessary for medical countermeasures development, and ensuring that USG activities 

significantly enhance domestic and international response and recovery capabilities. 

Mitigating illness and preventing death from CBRN threats are the principal goals of the 

USG medical countermeasure efforts. 

(14) HSPD-19, Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States, 

establishes a national policy, and calls for the development of a national strategy and 

implementation plan, on the prevention and detection of, protection against, and response to 

terrorist use of explosives in the US. 

(15) HSPD-20, National Continuity Policy, establishes a comprehensive national 

policy on the continuity of USG structures and operations and a single national continuity 

coordinator responsible for coordinating the development and implementation of federal 

continuity policies. The policy establishes “national essential functions,” prescribes 

continuity requirements for all executive departments and agencies, and provides guidance 

for state, local, territorial, and tribal governments and private sector organizations in order to 

ensure a comprehensive and integrated national continuity program that will enhance the 
Key Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols 

A-3 

credibility of the USG national security posture and enable a more rapid and effective 

response to and recovery from a national emergency. 

(16) HSPD-21, Public Health and Medical Preparedness, establishes a national 

strategy for public health and a medical preparedness strategy which builds upon principles 

set forth in HSPD-10, Biodefense for the 21st Century. The directive sets forth policy 

enabling the provision of public health and medical needs of the American people in the case 

of a catastrophic health incident through continual and timely flow of information and rapid 

public health and medical response that marshals all available nation capabilities and 

capacities in a rapid and coordinated manner. 

(17) HSPD-22, Domestic Chemical Defense (U), establishes a national policy and 

directs actions to strengthen the ability of the US to prevent, protect from, and respond to, 

and recover from terrorist attacks employing toxic chemicals and other chemical incidents. 

(18) The NSS and the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NSS establishes 

broad strategic guidance for advancing US interests in the global environment through the 

instruments of national power. The NSS and the NMS continue to reflect the first and 

fundamental commitment to defend the Nation against its adversaries. 

(19) The National Strategy for Homeland Security. Prepared for the President 

by the Office of Homeland Security, this document lays out the strategic objectives, 

organization, and critical areas for HS. The strategy identifies critical areas that focus on 

preventing terrorist attacks, reducing the nation’s vulnerabilities, minimizing the damage and 

recovering from attacks that do occur. 

(20) National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. Issued by the 

National Security Council, this strategy guides efforts to prevent acts of bioterrorism or other 

significant outbreaks of infectious disease by reducing the risk of misuse of the life sciences 

or derivative materials, techniques, or expertise that will result in the use or intent to use 

biological agents to cause harm. It also complements existing policies, plans, and 

preparations to advance the USG’s ability to respond to public health crises of natural, 

accidental, or deliberate origin. 

(21) National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Expands on the National 

Strategy for Homeland Security and the NSS by expounding on the need to destroy terrorist 

organizations, win the war of ideas, and strengthen America’s security at home and abroad. 

While the national strategy focuses on preventing terrorist attacks within the US, this 

strategy is more proactive and focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they reach 

our borders. The direct and continuous action against terrorist groups can disrupt, degrade, 

and destroy their capability to attack the US. 

(22) National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. Issued by the Homeland 

Security Council, this strategy presents the USG approach to address the threat of PI. It 

outlines how the nation prepares, detects, and responds to a pandemic by documenting the 

responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments; private industry; international 

partners; and American citizens. 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-41 

(23) Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. Establishes strategic 

guidance for securing the US from direct attack with an active, layered defense. Expands on 

the NDS by establishing a lead, support, and enable construct in organizing DOD objectives. 

Provides specific objectives to support managing the consequences of CBRN and bulk HE 

use resulting in mass casualties. 

(24) Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Establishes DOS as LFA for USG assistance 

to a foreign country during a disaster and describes the procedures for conducting that relief 

as well as the congressionally authorized funding. 

(25) Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 

Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (US Patriot Act of 2001 [as 

amended]). This act enhances domestic security against terrorism. It eases some of the 

restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering within the US and affords the US intelligence 

community greater access to information discovered during a criminal investigation. 

(26) The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 

(Title 42, USC, Sections 5121–5207). The Stafford Act provides for assistance by the USG 

to the states in the event of natural and other disasters and emergencies. It is the primary 

legal authority for federal participation in domestic DR. Under the Stafford Act, the 

President may direct federal agencies, including DOD, to support DR. DOD may be directed 

to provide assistance in one of three different scenarios: a Presidential declaration of a major 

disaster, a Presidential order to perform emergency work for the preservation of life and 

property, or a Presidential declaration of emergency. 

(27) The Economy Act (Title 31, USC, Section 1535). The Economy Act 

authorizes federal agencies to provide goods or services on a reimbursable basis to other 

federal agencies when more specific statutory authority to do so does not exist. 

(28) Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18, USC, Section 1385). This statute limits the 

use of federal military personnel to perform civilian law enforcement activities. The PCA 

generally prohibits the use of US Army and US Air Force active duty (Title 10, USC), 

personnel for civilian law enforcement activities, except as authorized by the US 

Constitution or by statute. DOD policy extends the prohibitions of the PCA to US Navy and 

Marine Corps active duty (Title 10, USC) personnel. Specifically prohibited activities 

include interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or similar activity; search and/or seizure; 

arrest, apprehension, “stop-and-frisk” detentions, and similar activities; and use of military 

personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, 

investigators, or interrogators. DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law 

Enforcement Officials, sets forth several forms of military assistance to civilian authorities, 

which are allowed under the PCA. Further, DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian 

Law Enforcement Officials, details express statutory exceptions to the PCA, such as the 

Insurrections Act and emergency assistance involving WMD, which, upon appropriate 

notifications and approval, allow for the otherwise prohibited use of federal forces to support 

civilian law enforcement activities during CBRN CM operations. 
Key Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols 

A-5 

(29) Title 10, USC (Armed Forces). Title 10, USC, provides guidance on the 

Armed Forces. Guidance is divided into five subtitles. One covers general military law and 

one each for the US Army, US Navy and US Marine Corps, the US Air Force, and the RC. 

Chapter 18 (Sections 371–382) of Title 10, USC, is entitled and governs Military Support for 

Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. Title 10, USC, Section 375, directs SecDef to 

promulgate regulations that prohibit “direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, 

Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless 

participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.” 

(30) Title 14, USC (Coast Guard). Sections 2, 19, 89, 141, and 143, define the 

statutory authority of the USCG during HS missions. 

(31) Title 32, USC (National Guard). Specifically, statutes in Title 32, USC, 

authorize the use of federal funds to train NG members while they remain under the C2 of 

their respective state governors. In certain limited instances, specific statutory or 

Presidential authority allows for those forces to perform operational missions funded by the 

USG, while they remain under the control of the governor. Examples of those exceptions 

include the employment of WMD-CSTs, civil defense missions, and the President of the 

United States-directed airport security mission. 

(32) Memorandum of Understanding Between the Intelligence Community, 

Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security 

Concerning Information Sharing, 4 March 2003. This agreement provides a framework 

and guidance to govern information sharing, use, and handling among the following 

individuals and their agencies: Secretary of Homeland Security, Director of National 

Intelligence, the Attorney General, and any other organization having federal law 

enforcement responsibilities (other than those that are part of the DHS). The agreement 

mandates minimum requirements for information sharing, use, and handling and for 

coordination and deconfliction of analytic judgments. 

(33) Memorandum of Agreement Between DOD and DHS on Use of the USCG 

Capabilities and Resources in Support of the NMS, 23 May 2008. This agreement 

provides for the identification of certain national defense capabilities of the USCG and 

improves the process by which the USCG serves as a force provider for DOD missions. 

(34) National Response Framework. The NRF focuses on response and shortterm recovery, and articulates doctrine, principles, and architectures by which the US 

prepares for and responds to all-hazard disasters across all levels of government. The NRF 

and supporting annexes are available at www.fema.gov/nrf. 

(35) Inter-Departmental Memorandum of Understanding for Foreign 

Consequence Management Preparedness and Response. The purpose of this MOU is to 

synchronize and integrate USG FCM efforts. The MOU details the USG’s goals and 

objectives relating to FCM and provides policy relating to roles and responsibilities of 

departments and agencies to prepare for and respond to a CBRN incident on foreign soil. 
Appendix A 

A-6 JP 3-41 

b. Key DOD Guidance. The following discussion identifies a number of key 

documents to make commanders and planners more aware of material that may assist in the 

planning and execution of the CBRN mission areas. 

(1) Unified Command Plan. The UCP provides basic guidance to all unified 

CCDRs; establishes their missions and responsibilities; delineates the general geographical 

AORs for GCCs; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional CCDRs.

(2) National Defense Strategy. NDS establishes and directs how to accomplish 

broad strategic objectives. Provides HD implementation guidelines. 

(3) The National Military Strategy (NMS) to Combat WMD describes WMD 

consequence management as one of the eight military mission areas to combat WMD; it 

illustrates and explains how WMD consequence management contributes to the success of 

the military strategic objective. 

(4) National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism. This National 

Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism constitutes the comprehensive military plan 

to prosecute the global war on terrorism for the Armed Forces of the United States. It is the 

plan that guides the contributions of the combatant commands, the Military Departments, 

combat support agencies and field support activities of the United States to protect and 

defend the homeland, attack terrorists and their capacity to operate effectively at home and 

abroad, and support mainstream efforts to reject violent extremism. 

(5) DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism Program. This directive updates policies 

and assigns responsibilities for implementing the procedures for the DOD AT program. It 

establishes CJCS as the principal advisor and focal point responsible to SecDef for DOD AT 

issues. It also defines the AT responsibilities of the Military Departments, commanders of 

combatant commands, DOD agencies, and DOD field activities. Its guidelines are applicable 

for the physical security of all DOD activities both overseas and in the homeland. 

(6) DODD 2000.15, Support to Special Events. DODD 2000.15, Support to 

Special Events, provides definitions for a special event and support and outlines policy 

guidelines and responsibilities for DOD support of special events. It allows for the DOD 

component to designate a special events coordinator who is charged with providing timely 

information and technical support to the ASD (HD&ASA). 

(7) DODD 2060.2, Department of Defense (DOD) Combating WMD Policy. This 

directive recognizes the need for Services to be prepared to support CWMD operations and 

directs Services to organize, train, and equip their forces to support them. 

(8) The DODD 3025 series of directives, instructions, and manuals provides 

policy on and responsibilities for CS activities. As a result of the terrorist attack on 

September 11, 2001, the USG changed how it supports state, local, and tribal authorities in 

responding to incidents and events. In conjunction with the changes to the federal response 

DOD modified how it supports the federal response. 
Key Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols 

A-7 

(9) DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities. DODD 3025.18, 

Defense Support of Civil Authorities, provides guidance for the execution and oversight of 

DSCA when requested by civil authorities approved by the appropriate DOD official or as 

directed by the President. It authorizes immediate response authority for providing DSCA 

when requested and authorizes emergency authority for the use of military force under dire 

situations. 

(10) DODD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances. DODD 3025.12 

Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances, provides guidance on CS activities for civil 

disturbances and civil disturbance operations, including response to terrorist incidents, and 

covers the policy and procedures whereby the President is authorized by the Constitution and 

laws of the US to employ the Armed Forces to suppress insurrections, rebellions, and 

domestic violence under various conditions and circumstances. Planning and preparedness 

by the USG and the DOD for civil disturbances are important due to the potential severity of 

the consequences of such incidents for the nation and the population. 

(11) DODD 3150.08, DOD Response to Nuclear and Radiological Incidents. 

This directive promulgates policy and assigns responsibilities for DOD CBRM CM response 

to US nuclear weapon incidents and other nuclear or radiological incidents involving 

materials in DOD custody IAW the guidance in NSPD-28, US Nuclear Weapons Command 

and Control, Safety, and Security, the NRF, and the NIMS. 

(12) DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, details DOD policy for conducting 

DR operations which covers the scenarios of FCM and DOD-led CBRN CM on foreign soil. 

(13) DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and 

Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense. This directive establishes the 

Defense Investigative Program general policy, limitations, procedures, and operational 

guidance pertaining to the collecting, processing, storing, and disseminating of information 

concerning persons and organizations not affiliated with DOD. 

(14) DODD 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities. This directive is the primary 

authority used as guidance by DOD intelligence personnel and those performing an 

intelligence or counterintelligence function to collect, process, retain, or disseminate 

information concerning US persons. 

(15) DOD 5240.1-R, Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect 

United States Persons. This regulation sets forth procedures governing the activities of 

DOD intelligence components that affect US persons, to include the collection, retention, 

processing, and dissemination of US persons’ information. 

(16) DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials. 

This directive assigns responsibilities and provides policy and procedures to be followed 

with respect to support provided to federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts. 

(17) DOD Manual 3150.8-M, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures 

(NARP). This manual is issued under the authority of DODD 3150.8, DOD Response to 

Nuclear and Radiological Incidents. It provides a concept of operations as well as functional 
Appendix A 

A-8 JP 3-41 

information necessary to execute a comprehensive and unified response to a nuclear weapon 

accident. It provides information for planners and response elements to understand the 

overall response concept and roles of DOD and the Department of Energy/National Nuclear 

Security Administration. 

(18) DODI 2000.18, Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines. This 

instruction implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures to establish 

and implement a program for a worldwide DOD installation hazard response to manage the 

consequences of a CBRN and bulk HE incident. It provides guidance for the establishment 

of a CBRN and bulk HE preparedness program for emergency responders at all DOD 

installations. It also prescribes that DOD installation emergency responders must be 

prepared to respond to the effects of a CBRN or bulk HE incident to preserve life, prevent 

human suffering, mitigate the incident, and protect critical assets and infrastructure. 

(19) DODI 2000.21, Foreign Consequence Management. This document 

establishes policy and assigns responsibility for DOD support to USG FCM operations in 

response to a foreign CBRN and bulk HE incident. 

(20) DODI 3001.02, Personnel Accountability in Conjunction With Natural or 

Manmade Disasters. This instruction establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for 

accounting and reporting of specified DOD-affiliated personnel, within CONUS and outside 

the continental United States, following a natural or man-made disaster. 

(21) DODI 6055.17, DOD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program. 

This instruction is a reference for response of a DOD installation to a CBRN incident. 

(a) Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for 

developing, implementing, and sustaining installation emergency management (IEM) 

programs at DOD installations worldwide for “all hazards” as defined in the glossary. 

Establishes the goals of the DOD IEM Program as follows: 

1. Prepare DOD installations for emergencies. 

2. Respond appropriately to protect personnel and save lives. 

3. Recover and restore operations after an emergency. 

(b) Aligns DOD emergency management activities with NIMS, the National 

Preparedness Guidelines, and the NRF. 

(c) Establishes the DOD Emergency Management Steering Group. 

(22) DODI 6200.03, Public Health Emergency Management within the 

Department of Defense. Establishes DOD guidance IAW applicable law and ensures 

mission assurance and readiness by protecting installations, facilities, personnel, and other 

assets in managing the impact of public health emergencies caused by all-hazards incidents. 
Key Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols 

A-9 

(23) CJCSI 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement/Rules for the Use of Force 

for US Forces (Classified). This instruction provides the SRUF to be employed by US 

forces in a Title 10, USC, status performing DSCA missions. 

(24) CJCSI 3125.01, Defense Support of Civil Authorities for Domestic 

Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Incident. This instruction provides 

operational and policy guidance and instructions for US military forces responding to 

domestic CBRN and bulk HE incidents. This instruction applies only to domestic 

operations. This instruction is of specific importance to the geographic combatant 

commands with domestic CBRN and bulk HE responsibilities. It identifies that domestic 

support encompasses both deliberate and inadvertent CBRN and bulk HE situations 

including terrorism, acts of aggression, industrial accidents, and acts of nature. It recognizes 

that these operations may be conducted by US military forces under immediate response 

authority and in support of the designated LFA. 

(25) CJCSI 3214.01, Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory. This instruction provides guidance for US 

military forces supporting USG-led FCM operations and DOD-led CBRN CM operations in 

response to a CBRN incident. 

(26) Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). The GEF and the Joint 

Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) inform DOD how to employ, and in part manage, the 

force in the near term. The GEF provides strategic planning guidance and identifies security 

cooperation focus areas for campaign planning—both foreign language for US forces and 

English skills for allies. 

(27) Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The JSCP provides guidance to the 

CCDRs and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish tasks and missions based on current 

military capabilities. It apportions limited forces and resources to CCDRs, based on military 

capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions and intelligence 

assessments. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice 

provided to the President and SecDef. 

2. Key International Legal Documents

a. Canada-United States (CANUS) Agreements

(1) Canada-United States Integrated Lines of Communications (ILOCs) 

Agreements. The CANUS ILOCs agreements facilitate cooperation in training and 

operations and provides for reciprocal logistical support, supplies, and/or services in 

nonroutine situations. 

(2) Canada-US Agreement for Enhanced Military Cooperation. Under this 

agreement, both countries work together on contingency plans for defending against and 

responding to possible threats in Canada and the US including natural disasters and potential 

terrorist attacks. 
Appendix A 

A-10 JP 3-41 

(3) Temporary Cross-Border Movement of Land Forces Between the United 

States and Canada Agreement. This agreement provides principles and procedures for 

temporary cross-border movement of land forces between the two nations. 

(4) Canadian–United States Regional Emergency Management Agreements. 

Emergency management officials in Canada and the US have regional mutual assistance 

agreements to manage emergencies or disasters when the affected jurisdiction(s) requests 

assistance in response to natural disasters, technological hazards, man-made disasters, and 

civil emergencies. These agreements are compliant with the Agreement between the 

Government of the United States and the Government of Canada on Cooperation in 

Comprehensive Emergency Planning and Management. These agreements promote unity of 

effort with civil authorities in planning and executing military support to civilian authorities. 

Three regional agreements implement regional emergency management mutual assistance 

covering specific states and provinces: 

(a) Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Agreement. 

(b) Prairie Region Emergency Management Assistance Compact. 

(c) International Emergency Management Assistance Memorandum of 

Understanding. 

(5) Joint Radiological Emergency Response Plan (JRERP). The CANUS 

JRERP establishes the basis for cooperative measures to deal effectively with a potential or 

actual peacetime radiological incident involving Canada, the US, or both countries. The 

JRERP will apply whenever a potential or actual radiological incident occurs that can affect 

both countries or, although affecting one country, is of a magnitude that the affected country 

may need to request assistance from the other. The JRERP is designed to: 

(a) Alert the appropriate federal authorities within each country of the 

existence of a threat from a potential or actual radiological incident. 

(b) Establish a framework of cooperative measures to reduce, to the extent 

possible, the threat posed to public health and safety, property, and the environment. 

(c) Facilitate coordination between organizations of the federal government of 

each country in providing support to states and provinces affected by a potential or actual 

radiological incident. 

(6) Inland Pollution Contingency Plan, June 1998. The US EPA and 

Environment Canada recognize that there is a high probability that there will be a spill or 

other release of oil or HAZMAT along the common border between Canada and the US. 

The CANUS Joint Inland Pollution Contingency Plan provides for cooperative measures for 

dealing with accidental and unauthorized releases of pollutants that cause or may cause 

damage to the environment along the shared inland boundary and that may constitute a threat 

to the public health, property, or welfare. The Inland Plan is made up of five regional 

annexes or regional plans. 
Key Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols 

A-11 

b. Military Agreements

(1) Canada–US Civil Assistance Plan. The CANUS Civil Assistance Plan 

provides a framework for the military of one nation to provide support to the military of the 

other nation in the performance of CS operations. 

(2) Quadripartite Standardization Agreements (QSTAGs). The military forces 

of the US, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have agreed to adopt 

certain standard operational concepts in various QSTAGs. The military forces further agreed 

to consult and wherever possible, reach mutual agreement, before introducing changes to 

these agreements. 

(3) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Agreements 

(STANAGs). STANAGs are promulgated by the Director, NATO Standardization Agency. 

No departure may be made from these agreements without informing the tasking authority in 

the form of a reservation at the time of ratification. Ratifying nations have agreed that 

national orders, manuals, and instructions implementing these STANAGs will be developed. 

The aim of these agreements is to provide guidelines to commanders about operational 

issues. Participating nations agree that NATO armed forces will adopt the standards outlined 

in each agreement. 

c. Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America. The SPP agreement, 

designed to reduce barriers to trade and facilitate economic growth while improving the 

security of the continent, was signed on 23 March 2005 by the President of the United States, 

the Prime Minister of Canada, and the President of Mexico. DHS and the Homeland 

Security Council are the lead agencies for the agreement’s security components, with DOD 

as a supporting agency. The SPP Action Plan addresses goals and objectives associated with 

HS to include “protection, prevention, and response.” This includes a dual-binational 

(US/Canada and US/Mexico) objective on emergency management cooperation to develop 

and implement joint plans for cooperation in incident response, as well as conduct joint 

training and exercises in hazard response. This includes the development of a plan to build 

and strengthen mechanisms, protocols, and agreements for communicating and coordinating 

hazard response for mutual assistance and cooperation in the event of natural and 

technological/industrial disasters or malicious acts involving CBRN and bulk HE devices 

and hazards. 

d. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

(1) FM 3-11.21/MCRP 3-37.2C/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP(I) 3-2.27, Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for CBRN Consequence Management Operations. 

DOD personnel responding to a CBRN incident may be responsible for CBRN CM and/or 

crisis planning and may be required to execute plans across the conflict spectrum. This 

publication provides a reference for planning, resourcing, and executing CBRN CM in 

support of domestic or foreign agencies responding to a CBRN incident. 

(2) FM 3-11.34/MCWP 3-37.5/NTTP 3-11.23/AFTTP(I) 302.33, Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Installation CBRN Defense. This publication 
Appendix A 

A-12 JP 3-41 

provides doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures for planning, resourcing, and 

executing CBRN defense for various military installations as part of an overarching 

installation protection program. This manual incorporates the joint doctrine elements for 

CWMD, to include counterproliferation passive defense functions of CBRN sense, shape, 

shield, and sustain. It also ties installation CBRN defense to CBRN CM doctrine. 

e. International Agreements that Affect US CBRN Activities with Mexico

(1) Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 

Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. The Basel Convention on the Control of 

Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal is the most 

comprehensive global environmental agreement on hazardous and other wastes. While the 

US is not a party to the agreement, it is a signatory and conducts activities with many of the 

convention’s 178 parties to help protect human health and the environment against the 

adverse effects resulting from the generation, management, transboundary movements, and 

disposal of hazardous and other wastes. 

(2) Convention on the Transboundary Effect of Industrial Accidents. This 

convention applies to the prevention of, preparedness for, and response to industrial 

accidents capable of causing transboundary effects, including the effects of such accidents 

caused by natural disasters, and to international cooperation concerning mutual assistance, 

research and development, exchange of information, and exchange of technology in the area 

of prevention of, preparedness for, and response to industrial accidents. 

(3) International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness provides 

emergency response planning for oil pollution incidents. 

(4) The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development Guiding 

Principles for Chemical Accident Prevention, Preparedness, and Response. A 

comprehensive document to help public authorities, industry, and communities worldwide 

prevent and prepare for accidents involving hazardous substances resulting from 

technological and natural disasters, as well as sabotage. 
B-1 

APPENDIX B

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR LOGISTICS AND OTHER SERVICES 

FROM DOMESTIC BASE SUPPORT INSTALLATIONS AND FOREIGN 

THEATER ASSETS 

1. Purpose

a. The planning considerations contained in this appendix will assist commanders and 

their staffs in conducting mission analysis, preparing to meet logistics and other service 

support requirements, and coordinating the potential use of a military installation for support 

of DOD forces during CBRN response operations. These are considerations and not 

requirements. They are not unique to CBRN response, but the difficult nature of responding 

to the catastrophic no-notice incidents described in this publication make it appropriate that 

they be contained here. Managing the consequences of a CBRN incident often means that 

lifesaving forces deploy and are employed before the JFCs logistics structure is established. 

b. Depending on the physical location of the APOD and/or SPOD, the questions 

concerning airfield or port suitability may be analyzed separately or in conjunction with base 

support planning. Some requirements may be adequately met or even better suited to the 

operation when obtained from impacted nation or local community capabilities rather than 

from a US controlled installation. 

c. Serving as a BSI is a uniquely domestic function of DOD Service and defense agency 

installations because the GCC has limited or no control over resources on installations within 

the US and territories. This is particularly true for CDRUSNORTHCOM who, by special 

SecDef restriction, does not have the authority to assume OPCON of forces within the US 

during an emergency. SecDef establishes the supported/supporting relationship through an 

EXORD at the time of incident (or anticipation thereof) to task the specific installation to 

serve as a base for military forces engaged in either HD or CS operations. These planning 

considerations are helpful in selecting a BSI and arranging for necessary support. 

d. CBRN response operations in the foreign- or DOD-led military operational 

environments will find these planning considerations of value even when the affected 

country has unique relationships with the US in terms of access and support. 

e. Planning. All GCCs have the responsibility to plan coordinated responses to the 

possible use of WMD in their AORs. GCC plans for WMD CM are developed IAW DOD 

policies and law. These guidance documents are listed in Appendix A, “Key Legal, Strategy, 

and Policy Documents and International Protocols.” 

(1) Plan. The JFC plans CBRN CM actions to isolate and contain the physical 

effects, assure security, promote freedom of action, save lives, and provide essential services 

to continue operations. One of the most important aspects of planning is anticipating the 

need to coordinate and integrate joint, multinational, interagency, and HN actions. Planning 

should include the transition efforts to civil authority as soon as possible when supporting 

another agency or department other than DOD. 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-41 

(2) Prepare. Preparing and posturing actions set the conditions for successful 

execution of response operations. Preparation activities happen both before and after the 

incident. 

(a) Phase 0 mission analysis is critical to support the JFC’s response 

operation. Pre-incident activities are designed to collect and analyze militarily significant 

information on the operational environment such as industrial hazards (friendly, neutral, and 

enemy) in the operational area and any WMD actors’ intent. Mission analysis includes 

indicators and warnings focused on attack preparation and detection to provide early warning 

for response asset preparation and facilitating a rapid response to any intentional use of 

WMD or accidental release of any CBRN material. Advance situational assessment teams 

should be developed to facilitate JTF entry through communication with the COMs. 

Additional preparation tasks may include directing intelligence activities to include provision 

of indicators and warning of WMD attack for non-domestic operational areas; 

collaboratively assessing and monitoring the operational situation; developing and exercising 

C2 structures to integrate components (medical, logistics, engineering, security, 

communications), as well as any other partners and interagency support; integrating partner 

capabilities (first responder equipment, training, personal decontamination supplies, health 

care facilities, etc.) to maximize effectiveness; conducting exercises; providing passive 

defense capabilities that will allow all the interactive forces to maintain the necessary 

operational tempo; and identifying specialized individuals, teams, and forces needed to 

provide CBRN CM support. 

(b) Plan for post-incident activities to allow sensor and intelligence assets to 

begin surveillance of the affected area for the detection, identification, characterization, 

support to attribution forensics activities, and analysis of the CBRN hazards. Once the 

hazard and contaminated “hot zones” are established, the joint force concentrates upon 

hazard prediction and attribution analysis. The JFC also focuses upon the prevention of 

further injury, death, or illness. Post-incident operations include those designed to establish 

the extent and composition of a CBRN incident. This effort increases the commander’s 

awareness and feeds his understanding of the incident and its effect on the force. 

(3) Execute. The JFC may provide politico-military support to establish a secure 

environment that allows for the delivery of assistance and the introduction of civilian relief 

resources. A secure environment could include protection from the effects of contaminants 

as well as protection from external threats that may destabilize the affected area. Execution 

also includes supporting efforts to concurrent operations brought about by the CBRN 

incident.

(4) Assess. The JFC assesses progress along each response line of operation that 

may be part of the plan. The assessment facilitates the transition of response, remediation, 

and restoration efforts to civil authorities as desired conditions are met. Collected forensic 

information assists in establishing attribution for the incident to support appropriate followon action. 
Planning Considerations for Logistics and Other Services from Domestic 

Base Support Installations and Foreign Theater Assets 

B-3 

2. Checklists 

Planning considerations should take into account, at a minimum, the following areas 

related to the key functions of logistics, service support, and other enabling requirements of 

the JFC in a CBRN response. Those items that are solely domestic or foreign are annotated 

appropriately. 

a. General

(1) Is there a concise concept of the purpose of the supporting installation? Is there 

a description of the functions that the installation is to support? 

(2) What forces have been identified to support the operation? Has the deployment 

flow been analyzed to determine time phasing for induction of logistic elements? 

(3) What are the key assumptions the supporting installation operates under? 

(4) Is the installation a RC base? If so, what will be required to activate personnel 

to provide required support (e.g., mobilization and man-days)? Is funding available for 

activation? 

(5) Where is the incident response coordination center? For domestic response, 

where is the established JFO in the affected area? For foreign- or DOD-led military 

operations, where is the impacted nation emergency operation center, or where will the JTFCM be located? 

(6) Where are non-DOD equipment, personnel, and materials arrival and staging 

areas? For domestic CBRN incidents, where is the location(s) of the nearest FEMA incident 

support base(s)? For FCM, where are the nearest APOD, SPOD, and JRSOI points? 

(7) How long will the supporting installation be expected to provide support to the 

JFC? 

(8) Where will the BSI headquarters be established? (Domestic only) 

(9) Where is the support installation location relative to incident or venue? 

(10) Is the installation identified to support other agencies or organizations 

simultaneously? What is the current or projected utilization? 

(11) What are the proper coordination procedures to arrange for support? 

(12) What CBRN response capabilities are resident in the state and local 

jurisdictions? (Domestic only)

(13) Where are FEMA, state, and local staging areas? What is their capacity? 

(14) What CBRN response capabilities are resident in the impacted nation? Will 

the impacted nation offer use of military/civilian facilities? (Foreign only)
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 3-41 

(15) What mutual support agreements are in place for state/local support? 

(Domestic only) 

(16) What mutual support agreements are in place for impacted nation support? 

(Foreign only) 

(17) Develop the annex T, “Consequence Management,” for operation plans 

consistent with the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System format. 

b. Airfield Suitability

(1) Is the APOD contaminated or is the APOD in danger of becoming 

contaminated (weather, high threat)? If contaminated, can airlift operations be accomplished 

without contaminating the aircraft? 

(2) Is the APOD capable of handling the flow of forces and material moving in/out 

and around the operational area? 

(3) Are the personnel and cargo reception and staging capabilities of the airfield 

capable of handling the deployment flow for onward movement? (Refer to JP 3-35, Joint 

Deployment and Redeployment Operations.) 

(4) Is a contingency response element needed to manage air mobility activities? 

(5) What is the current condition of the airfield? What are the runway lengths? 

What is the current usage/throughput of the airfield? What is the working and parking 

maximum (aircraft) on ground? 

(6) Can the airfield support medical evacuation and utility helicopter operations? 

(7) Is the weight bearing capacity of the airfield sufficient to handle the type of 

aircraft that will be used for movement? 

(8) What impact does weather have on airfield operations? Night operations? 

(9) Are adequate personnel and equipment assets available to assist in 

arrival/departure airfield control group operations? What materials handling equipment 

(MHE) is available? Where can additional MHE be acquired (via contract and/or closest 

military installations)? 

(10) Is support available for mobile aeromedical staging facilities? 

(11) Is sufficient refueling capability/bulk fuel available? What is the resupply 

turn-around time? Has a stand-by bulk fuel vendor been requested? 

(12) Is direct support aircraft maintenance available? 

(13) What are the characteristics and capabilities of the main supply routes (MSRs) 

that access the airfield? Can the MSRs support over/out-sized vehicles? Have over/out-
Planning Considerations for Logistics and Other Services from Domestic 

Base Support Installations and Foreign Theater Assets 

B-5 

sized vehicles been identified? Who handles DD Form 1266 (request for Special Hauling 

Permit)? 

(14) What other nearby military or civilian airfields are available? 

(15) What is the threat level? 

(16) What type of physical security is available at the airport? 

(17) Are security personnel available? 

(18) After review of threat, vulnerability, and criticality assessments, what force 

protection measures are needed? 

(19) Coordinate with the appropriate military legal advisor to ensure that the 

operative RUF (domestic only) or ROE (foreign only) are properly tailored for the situation. 

(20) Are air traffic control and fire/crash/rescue available? 

(21) What type of aircraft does the airfield support? 

(22) What types of navigational aids are available? 

(23) Can the airfield support aircraft decontamination operations if required? 

c. Supply

(1) Does the site have adequate supply support capabilities in place to sustain the 

forces in the operational area? 

(2) What supply capabilities are available? Will military augmentation be 

required? 

(3) What is the process to establish requisition flow? What type of automated or 

non-automated requisition system is used? How will the forces tie into that system? 

(4) What supply support is available for common-user items in relation to the 

standard categories of supply? What type of storage, handling, shipping, security, and safety 

measures and procedures are in place? Is cold storage available? 

(5) What distribution capability is available? What MHE is available? Can it be 

moved to support multiple locations to include potential forward operating bases (FOBs)? 

(6) Is fuel storage and distribution available to support the rolling stock and 

potential FOBs? 

(7) What type of local support is available for FOBs or intermediate staging bases? 
Appendix B 

B-6 JP 3-41 

(8) Are other DOD assets available (for instance DLA) that can assist the 

supporting installation? 

d. Maintenance Support

(1) Does the site have adequate maintenance capabilities in place to sustain the 

units in the operational area? 

(2) What maintenance capability is available to support primarily automotive, 

communications, and medical equipment? Will military augmentation be required? 

(3) What are the procedures for disposal of contaminated fuel, oils, antifreezes, and 

other HAZMAT? Is there an environmental office available? 

(4) Is local support available for repair parts? 

e. Transportation

(1) Can the site accommodate deployment, sustainment, and redeployment flow 

and facilitate movement of units in/out and around the operational area? 

(2) What transportation capability is available? 

(3) What other transportation capabilities (rail lines or marine ports) are available 

to support military operations? 

(4) What transportation tracking systems are in place? What automation is 

available for in-transit visibility/total asset visibility? 

(5) Are loading ramps available? If so, what are their capabilities (i.e., weight, 

width restrictions)? Are the ramps fixed or portable? 

(6) What are the characteristics and capabilities of the MSRs that access the base? 

What are the primary and secondary routes? What are the dimensions and classifications of 

bridges/tunnels along the routes? Are there any restrictions or chokepoints? What routes are 

identified for evacuation? What are the grades of the primary and secondary routes? 

(7) What is the availability of installation transportation motor pool assets (truck, 

bus, passenger vehicles)? Are drivers available for these assets? Are rental vehicles 

available? 

(8) Does the installation transportation officer (ITO) have contract capability with 

local vendors (truck, bus, passenger vehicles) to support a surge? 

(9) Are the personnel and cargo reception and staging capabilities of the installation 

capable of handling the deployment flow for onward movement? (Refer to JP 3-35, Joint 

Deployment and Redeployment Operations.) 

(10) Will the ITO be able to support redeployment operations of DOD forces? 
Planning Considerations for Logistics and Other Services from Domestic 

Base Support Installations and Foreign Theater Assets 

B-7 

(11) What are the procedures for and availability of ground refueling? 

(12) Who will provide transportation management services to coordinate personnel 

and material movements into, within, and out of the JOA? 

(13) Who will provide daily operations briefings? 

(14) Who will provide technical guidance to subordinate units and civilian 

agencies? 

(15) Who will coordinate and deconflict transportation movement mission 

assignments? 

(16) Who will monitor freight and passenger movement by all modes in the JOA? 

(17) Who will coordinate transit clearances for highway movement? 

(18) Will there be a joint movement center (JMC) in the JOA? 

(19) What tracking systems will the JMC have access to? 

(20) Who will monitor flow and velocity in the supply distribution system? 

(21) Will an individual responsible for special assignment airlift mission validation 

be located in the JMC? 

(22) Will unit movement officers back brief the ITO on the deployment plan? 

(23) Has the unit created load plans for air movement/rail movement/sea 

movement? 

(24) Has the unit completed appropriate HAZMAT declarations? 

(25) Has the unit completed appropriate country clearances? (Foreign only)

f. Engineering, Environmental, and Public Works

(1) What engineering assets are in place and available to support forces in the 

operational area? 

(2) What are the water planning factors in use on the installation? Will sufficient 

water support be available to support the DOD forces? What procedures are used to ensure 

the water is potable? 

(3) What are the procedures for trash collection and disposal? 

(4) What are the procedures for hazardous waste collection and disposal? 

(5) What environmental rules and procedures are in place? 
Appendix B 

B-8 JP 3-41 

(6) Will the installation be able to handle the additional energy usage requirements 

or will supplemental generators be required? 

(7) What force protection considerations will require engineer support to 

implement? 

(8) What electrical power sources are available that may require voltage converters 

for DOD use? (Foreign only)

g. Health Services

(1) Does the site have adequate health service (medical, preventive medicine, 

dental, medical logistics, ground and aeromedical evacuation) support capabilities in place to 

sustain the forces in the operational area? 

(2) What medical assets are available and what capabilities do they have? 

(3) Is there a primary and secondary hospital available? What number of medical 

field units, operating rooms, and hospital beds are available? What type and how many 

medical specialists are available? 

(4) Are there ground and air ambulances available? Has an air ambulance helipad 

been identified? What are the grid coordinates and physical location? 

(5) Is medical supply available? 

(6) Is there a pharmacy available? What types of medicine are in short supply/not 

generally available? 

(7) What are the availability and power requirements of mobile drug/blood 

registration storage units? 

(8) What medical capabilities exist in the local community? 

(9) Are patient decontamination capabilities available? 

(10) What are the diseases endemic in the local population and vectors present in 

the area? 

(11) Is there adequate electrical, water, drainage, and space to accommodate up to 

an expeditionary medical support +25 (25-bed rapid response medical package)? 

(12) Do medical practitioners require licensing and credentialing to practice on the 

supporting installation? (Foreign only) 

h. Communications

(1) Does the support installation have look angles (latitude, azimuth, elevation, and 

longitude) to access required satellites? 
Planning Considerations for Logistics and Other Services from Domestic 

Base Support Installations and Foreign Theater Assets 

B-9 

(2) What are the building specifics that may affect the communications at the 

command post? Considerations: 

(a) Detailed description of proposed site (include drawings and photos). 

(b) Building composition. 

(c) Roof composition. 

(d) Roof shape. 

(e) Roof access. 

(f) Window description. 

(g) Power. 

(h) Phone and data lines. 

(i) Location of trees surrounding buildings. 

(j) Location of antennas surrounding buildings. 

(k) Telephone lines and numbers. 

(l) Can a communication room be secured? 

(3) What are the antenna placement factors that may affect the communications at 

the command post? Considerations: 

(a) Selected location of tactical radios from antenna location (distance will 

depend on type and capabilities of available radios). 

(b) Location of radio antennas of other units within area without interfering 

with each other. 

(c) Recommended radio room set up and location. 

(d) Recommended coax cable runs. 

(e) Recommended antenna grounds. 

(f) Placement (use roof as last resort). 

(g) Location of power lines which may affect signal strength. 

(4) Power planning considerations: 

(a) Communications room/closet number/location. 
Appendix B 

B-10 JP 3-41 

(b) Type of power available (110 volts/60 hertz or 220 volts/50 hertz). 

(c) Type of outlets available (two-prong or three-prong). 

(d) Location of circuit breaker boxes. 

(e) Access available to breakers. 

(f) Circuit breaker numbers. 

(g) Backup power. 

(h) Type of power (generator, auto switching) and how long will it last? 

(i) Power test plan. 

(5) JFC communication requirement considerations: 

(a) Defense Switch Network or commercial voice (prefix, number, extension). 

Commercial will be required if DOD communications are required to support commercial or 

government civilian agencies. 

(b) Commercial Internet, NIPRNET, or SIPRNET requirements. (Commercial 

will be required if DOD communications are required to support commercial or government 

civilian agencies). 

(c) Tactical single channel radios (primarily used for DOD-to-DOD 

communications). 

(d) Radio bridging capability (used to bridge disparate communication 

capabilities such as single channel tactical radios into commercial cell phones, etc). 

(e) Satellite phone requirements. 

(f) Communications on-the-move (enables communications while en route to 

the incident area or other locations). 

i. Public Affairs

(1) What type of PA assistance is available in the incident area or, if using a 

military facility, what military support is available? What PA personnel are already there? 

(2) Is there an appropriate non-classified facility for use by PA as well as members 

of the media? Is it separate from the main JOC area? 

(3) Is there a facility large enough to host a news conference that could include 

hundreds of media representatives? 
Planning Considerations for Logistics and Other Services from Domestic 

Base Support Installations and Foreign Theater Assets 

B-11 

(4) Does this facility offer Internet and cable/satellite television access? Does it 

have the capacity for multiple Internet connections so that all PA staff and supporting 

personnel have access? Is there enough capacity to allow media to use workstations if 

necessary? 

(5) Does the facility have adequate electrical plugs and wiring to support PA 

equipment? 

(6) What kinds of major media outlets (television, radio, print) are in the area? 

j. Other Services

(1) Is there a contracting office on the installation? What local contracting 

procedures are in place? What existing contracts are in place to support the major items 

previously listed? 

(2) Is financial management support available? Who is tracking costs associated 

with contracting and installation support? 

(3) Is there adequate infrastructure to support billeting and food service? If not, 

what contract lodging and food service options are available? How many can be handled per 

day at the current capacity? 

(4) Is there an adequate location to locate a JOC? 

(5) Are hardstand facilities available to support several large command operations 

centers? 

(6) What is the availability of laundry, shower, and latrine facilities? Will the 

installation provide portable facilities as required? 

(7) Are exchange facilities available? 

(8) Is there adequate infrastructure in place to support C2 communications 

requirements? 

(9) Are there adequate force protection and security procedures in place? Will this 

require military augmentation? 

(10) What are the procedures for receiving mail? 

(11) What type of RS is available? 

(12) Are adequate security forces and trained security augmentation forces 

available to: 

(a) Secure the site (mark areas around the site clearly)? 
Appendix B 

B-12 JP 3-41 

(b) Provide convoy security on to the installation or from one area of the 

installation to another for containment of the crisis? If convoys are required to travel outside 

of the installation, are there additional security requirements to protect from looting, 

vandalism, etc? 

(c) Implement force protection tasks as assigned. 

(d) Provide weapons and ammunition storage facilities. 

(13) Is there a CBRN response capability resident on the installation? 

(14) Is there a fire-fighting capability resident on the installation? 

(15) What intelligence support/infrastructure is available? 

(16) Is there an emergency 911 system in place? (Domestic only)

(17) Can the support installation coordinate off-installation law enforcement 

support/escort? 
C-1 

APPENDIX C 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DOMESTIC CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, 

RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR RESPONSE ENTERPRISE ASSETS 

1. General 

a. The DOD CBRN Response Enterprise focuses on life-saving activities and includes 

AC and RC forces. The following forces constitute the DOD CBRN Response Enterprise. 

All elements described below consist of assigned and allocated units, standardized to ensure 

they contain the required capabilities for that type element, and are trained and ready to 

deploy as a coherent element within prescribed timelines. WMD-CSTs, CERFPs, and HRFs 

are NG units in their respective states. The DCRF, C2CRE A, and C2CRE B are allocated to 

USNORTHCOM in the Global Force Management Allocation Plan. Figure C-1 identifies 

these units. 

b. NG forces in the WMD-CSTs, CERFPs, or HRFs responding to an incident under 

state active duty or Title 32, USC, authorities, such as governor deployment, interstate 

compact agreement, or EMACs request. Forces allocated to the DCRF and C2CRE A and B 

will conduct operations in Title 10, USC, status under federal control. The command and 

control structures in response to an incident are dependent on the nature and size of the 

incident. 

c. DOD CBRN Enterprise Mission. When directed (by SecDef for federal military 

forces and by the governor[s] concerned for NG forces under state C2), the DOD CBRN 

Response Enterprise conducts CBRN response operations within the US and its territories to 

support civil authorities in response to CBRN incidents in order to save lives and minimize 

human suffering. 

2. Response Forces 

a. National Guard WMD-CSTs. WMD-CSTs respond to a CBRN incident by 

providing a rapid response capability in the event of an intentional or unintentional release of 

CBRN threats and hazards. There are WMD-CSTs assigned to the NG. These are a high 

priority, rapid response unit made up of 22 full-time Title 32, USC, Active Guard and 

Reserve Army and ANG personnel assigned. These units were established by Congress, 

certified by SecDef to Congress after they meet DOD certification guidelines. By statute, 

each WMD-CST operates under the control of the governor, in Title 32, USC, status, and can 

be employed as a state asset without DOD authorization. TAG will direct employment of the 

WMD-CST to support either a state response or to provide support to another state’s 

response, if requested. Further, under Presidential mobilization, WMD-CST could be 

employed as part of the Title 10, USC, force package. Per direction of OSD, the NGB has 

established a national level response plan which provides a designated number of WMDCSTs for a rapid response to WMD incidents and national disasters. On site, a WMD CST is 

prepared to conduct continuous operations for 72 hours, using organic assets. 
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-41 

(1) The WMD-CST mission is to support civil authorities at a domestic incident 

site by identifying CBRN hazards/substances, assessing current or projected consequences, 

advising on response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for state support to 

facilitate additional resources. This includes the intentional or unintentional release of 

CBRN and natural or man-made disasters in the US that result, or could result, in the 

catastrophic loss of life or property. 

Figure C-1. Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Response Enterprise

C2CRE command and control chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear response element

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CERFP 

and high-yield explosives enhanced 

response force package

DCRF defense chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear response force

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,

FP 1 force package 1

FP 2 force package 2

HAZMAT hazardous materials

HRF homeland response force

ID identification

N+ notification +

NLT not later than

SecDef Secretary of Defense

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command

USPACOM United States Pacific Command

WMD-CST weapons of mass destruction–civil 

support team

Legend



























Command and control

CBRN assessment

Search and extraction

Decontamination

Emergency medical

Level 2 and 3 medical with 

surgical capability

Security

Engineering

Logistics

Transportation

Ground medical evacuation 

and casualty evacuation

Aviation lift

Aviation medical evacuation 

and casualty evacuation

Prepared to deploy 

NLT N+3 hours

Prepared to deploy 

NLT N+6 hours

Prepared to deploy 

NLT N+6-12 hours





Detection/ID

Rapid 

assessment of 

HAZMAT







Search and 

extraction

Decontamination

Emergency 

medical











Command and 

control

Search and 

extraction

Decontamination

Emergency 

medical

Security

Prepared to deploy 

NLT N+96 hours

Prepared to deploy

FP 1 NLT N+24 hours

FP 2 NLT N+48 hours

+ Additional forces, if required + Additional forces





















Command and 

control

CBRN assessment

Search and 

extraction

Decontamination

Emergency medical

Level 2 medical

Security

Engineering

Logistics

Transportation

WMD-CST

(57 Teams)

Allocated by SecDef to 

supported Governor

Allocated to

USNORTHCOM/USPACOM

CERFP

(17 Units)

HRF

(10 Units)

DCRF

FP 1

FP 2

C2CRE

A and B

Federal Response

(Title 10, United States Code)

State Response

(Title 32, United States Code)

National Guard assets may operate under 

state or federal control.

Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Response Enterprise
Department of Defense Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Response Enterprise Assets

C-3 

(2) WMD-CSTs are assigned to USNORTHCOM for training and readiness 

oversight (TRO) which is provided by USARNORTH. For WMD-CSTs in Hawaii, Guam, 

and Alaska, USPACOM has TRO, which is executed by US Army Pacific. 

b. National Guard CERFPs. The CERFP mission is, on order, to respond to a 

CBRNE incident or other catastrophic event and assist local, state, and federal departments 

and agencies in conducting CBRN CM by providing capabilities to conduct personnel 

decontamination, emergency medical services, and casualty search and extraction. There are 

17 CERFPs, consisting of 186 total personnel each, for a total of 3,162 personnel, to include 

5 Active Guard and reserves and 5 full-time equivalents, per CERFP. (This number does not 

include the 11 ANG fatalities search and recovery team personnel.) They are a state and 

federal NG capability. Personnel who augment the CERFPs are not in a Title 32, USC, 

“operational status,” which means they cannot assemble and deploy until the governor orders 

the unit members into state active duty. Units assigned to each of the 17 CERFPs remain 

under the control of the governor of the state in which they reside. Governors exercise their 

executive authority through TAGs. Out-of-state CERFP support is requested from the state 

EOC IAW interstate agreements or EMACs. The NG JFHQ-State JOC may enter the 

governor’s request into the Joint Information Exchange Environment (JIEE) for coordination 

with the several states and NGB. Requests are coordinated with other states and NGB based 

on a supporting/supported relationship and operational or TACON provided by the gaining 

supported state IAW established MOAs or other agreements. In some circumstances, the 

President may federalize NG assets, to include HRFs, CERFPs, and WMD-CSTs. CERFP 

capabilities are casualty search and extraction, emergency medical triage, treatment, and 

patient stabilization, and mass casualty decontamination, in a contaminated environment to 

support the incident commander’s IAP objectives. 

c. National Guard HRFs. The HRF mission is, on order, alert, assemble, and deploy 

within 6–12 hours of notification in response to a CBRN incident to save lives, mitigate 

human suffering, and prepare for follow-on forces in support of civil authorities. 

Capabilities include search and extraction, casualty decontamination, emergency medical 

triage and treatment, security element, and C2. There are 10 HRFs, one existing within each 

FEMA region, consisting of 566 personnel in each HRF with 25percent full time manning in 

each, for a total of 5,660 personnel. The HRFs will be sourced from the existing Army and 

Air NG force. NG units that are selected as part of the HRF remain under the direction and 

control of the governor of the state in which they reside. Governors exercise their command, 

operational authority, or TACON of military forces through TAGs. Requests for out-of-state 

HRF support is requested from the state EOC IAW interstate agreements or EMAC (via a 

Requisition A) of which all states are signatories. The NG JFHQ-State JOC may enter the 

governor’s request into the JIEE for coordination with other states and NGB. Requests are 

coordinated with other states and NGB based on a supporting/supported relationship and 

OPCON or TACON provided by the gaining/supported state IAW established MOAs or 

other agreements. The authority to notify, deploy, and employ an HRF, in almost all cases, 

is vested in the independent, sovereign state governors who control the NG capabilities with 

the understanding that HRFs are designed to be regional and national assets that support 

CBRN CM nationwide. In some circumstances, the President may federalize NG assets, to 

include HRFs, CERFPs, and WMD-CSTs. Capabilities include search and extraction, mass 

casualty decontamination, emergency medical triage and patient stabilization treatment, 
Appendix C 

C-4 JP 3-41 

security, and C2 in a contaminated environment to support the incident commander’s IAP 

objectives. Each HRF has a medical treatment area with no holding capacity. In addition, 

HRFs provide C2 and planning for all organic and attached units (WMD-CSTs and CERFPs) 

and provide security for CBRN site locations. They also coordinate and synchronize CBRN 

operations for designated areas and decontamination sites. The HRFs are the center of 

gravity for the DOD CBRN Response Enterprise integration in their respective FEMA 

region’s states’ planning. 

d. JTF-Civil Support. JTF-CS serves as the CBRN response headquarters for the 

DCRF. JTF-CS provides planning, training, and coordination for CBRN response 

operations. It serves as lead planning authority for development of operational JTF and 

tactical TF level CBRN response operation plans and develops projected CBRN response 

and DSCA force requirements and structures to support mission requirements for all CBRN 

national planning scenarios. JTF-CS is the C2 element responsible for executing domestic 

CBRN response by responding to federal request for assistance IAW the NRF and DOD 

policy to provide immediate actions to save lives, protect property and the environment, and 

meet basic human needs. The domestic CBRN response focuses on the operational to 

tactical levels in order to rapidly integrate and synchronize DOD capabilities in support of 

civil authorities. 

e. Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Force. The 

DCRF includes approximately 5,200 personnel sourced primarily from the AC (multiService). DCRF capabilities include CBRN incident assessment, search and rescue, 

decontamination of DOD personnel and equipment, evacuee and casualty decontamination, 

emergency medical, Role 2 medical care (patient triage, along with trauma and emergency 

medical care), patient holding, ground and rotary-wing air patient movement, Role 3 medical 

care (surgical and intensive care), force health protection measures, military personnel and 

equipment operational security, site accessibility horizontal engineering, logistics, general 

support to enhance lifesaving and reduce human suffering, C2 aviation lift, mortuary affairs, 

and transportation. The DCRF is designed to employ these capabilities in multi-function 

packages in order to provide critical lifesaving capabilities in a synchronized manner. There 

are two force packages, Force Package 1 (2,100 personnel) and Force Package 2 (3,100 

personnel). Commander, JTF-CS, has the flexibility to task organize the DCRF based on the 

situation and mission in order to provide the most effective support to a CBRN response. 

f. C2CRE A and B. The two C2CREs will include approximately 780 personnel each 

and be sourced from the AC and RC. C2CRE A and C2CRE B will contain much smaller 

elements of many of the capabilities contained in the DCRF. When directed, the C2CREs 

will begin initial operations, but must be quickly augmented with additional capabilities to 

sustain operations. These additional capabilities may include federalized NG assets 

(including WMD-CSTs, CERFPs, and HRFs) or forces from the AC and RC. Dedicated 

C2CRE capabilities include CBRN assessment, search and rescue, decontamination, 

emergency medical, Role 2 medical, engineering, C2, logistics, and transportation. 
Department of Defense Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Response Enterprise Assets

C-5 

3. Unity of Effort in the Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Enterprise 

The DOD CBRN Response Enterprise is only a small part of the national response. 

An effective, unified national response requires layered, mutually supporting capabilities. 

The NRF systematically coordinates private sector and NGO capabilities with those of local, 

tribal, state, and federal for commitment in response to a CBRN incident. If requested, 

SecDef is responsible for assisting DHS and the NRF primary and coordinating agencies in 

CBRN response operations for a domestic CBRN incident. The synergistic construct of the 

DOD CBRN Response Enterprise supports unity of effort by facilitating a rapid and 

echeloned response providing redundancy of critical lifesaving capabilities and a layered 

integration of NG resources reinforced by federal capabilities. 

 
Appendix C 

C-6 JP 3-41 

Intentionally Blank 
D-1 

APPENDIX D

REFERENCES 

The development of JP 3-41 is based upon the following references: 

1. General 

a. The Constitution of the United States. 

b. Title 10, USC (Armed Forces). 

c. Title 10, USC, Sections 331–336. 

d. Title 10 USC, Section 382 (Emergency Situations Involving Chemical or Biological 

WMD). 

e. Title 10 USC, Section 404 (Foreign Disaster Assistance). 

f. Title 14 USC (USCG). 

g. Title 18, USC, Section 831 (Prohibited Transactions Involving Nuclear Material). 

h. Title 18, USC, Section 1385 (Posse Comitatus Act). 

i. Title 22, USC (Foreign Assistance Act). 

j. Title 31, USC, Section 1535 (Economy Act). 

k. Title 32, USC, (National Guard). 

l. Title 42, USC, Section 5170 (The Public Health and Welfare). 

m. Public Law 84-99 (Flood Control and Coastal Emergency Act). 

n. Public Law 100-707 (Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act). 

o. Public Law 107-56 (USA Patriot Act). 

p. Public Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Homeland Security Act of 2002). 

q. EO-12966, Foreign Disaster Assistance. 

r. HSPD-1, Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council. 

s. HSPD-3, The Homeland Security Advisory System.

t. HSPD-4/NSPD-17, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

u. HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents.
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 3-41 

v. PPD-8, National Preparedness. 

w. HSPD-9, Defense of United States Agriculture and Food.

x. HSPD-10, Biodefense for the 21st Century. 

y. HSPD-14, Domestic Nuclear Detection.

z. HSPD-15, US Strategy and Policy on the War on Terrorism (U). 

aa. HSPD-18, Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

bb. HSPD-19, Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States.

cc. HSPD-20, National Continuity Policy. 

dd. HSPD-21, Public Health and Medical Preparedness. 

ee. HSPD-22, Domestic Chemical Defense (U).

ff. NDP-1, National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military 

Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.

gg. NSPD-28, United States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety, and 

Security.

hh. National Security Decision Memorandum 119, Disclosure of Classified United 

States Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations. 

ii. NSS. 

jj. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Glasstone and Dolan, DOD. 

kk. National Strategy for Homeland Security. 

ll. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. 

mm. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

nn. National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. 

oo. National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. 

pp. NSPI Implementation Plan. 

qq. NRF Resource Center: http://www.fema.gov/NRF. 

rr. NRF: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf. 
 References 

D-3 

ss. NRF, Catastrophic Incident Annex. 

tt. 4 March 2003, Memorandum of Understanding Between the Intelligence 

Community, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security 

Concerning Information Sharing. 

uu. Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation. 

vv. JFO Standard Operating Procedures and JFO Field Operations Guide: 

http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/jobaids.htm. 

ww. NIMS Resource Center: www.fema.gov/NIMS. 

xx. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Pocket Guide to Chemical 

Hazards: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/pdfs/2005-149.pdf. 

yy. US Department of Transportation’s Emergency Response Guidebook: 

http://hazmat.dot.gov/pubs/erg/guidebook.htm. 

zz. FEMA “Are You Ready Guides”: http://www.fema.gov/areyouready/terrorism.shtm. 

aaa. INDRAC: https://indrac.dtra.mil/Pages/default.aspx. 

bbb. National Disaster Recovery Framework: 

http://www.fema.gov/pdf/recoveryframework/ndrf.pdf. 

2. Department of Defense 

a. UCP. 

b. GEF.

c. 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. 

d. UJTL. 

e. NDS. 

f. NMS. 

g. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. 

h. The National Military Strategy for Combating Terrorism. 

i. The National Military Strategy (NMS) to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

j. DOD Global Concept Plan. 

k. DTRA Foreign Consequence Management Legal Deskbook. 
Appendix D 

D-4 JP 3-41 

l. DOD 3150.8-M, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP). 

m. DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 

n. DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence 

Components that Affect United States Persons.

o. DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism Program. 

p. DODD 2000.15, Support to Special Events.

q. DODD 2060.02, Department of Defense (DOD) Combating WMD Policy. 

r. DODD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances. 

s. DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 

t. DODD 3150.08, DOD Response to Nuclear and Radiological Incidents.

u. DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief.

v. DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations 

not Affiliated with the Department of Defense. 

w. DODD 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities.

x. DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials. 

y. DODI 2000.18, DOD Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and 

High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines.

z. DODI 2000.21, Foreign Consequence Management. 

aa. DODI 3150.09, The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Survivability Policy. 

bb. DODI 3150.10, DOD Response to US Nuclear Weapon Incidents.

cc. DODI 6055.17, DOD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program.

dd. DODI 6200.03, Public Health Emergency Management Within the Department of 

Defense. 

ee. Medical Management of Radiological Casualties Handbook, Armed Forces 

Radiobiology Research Institute: http://www.afrri.usuhs.mil. 

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

a. CJCSI 3110.01H, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).
 References 

D-5 

b. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force 

for US Forces (U).

c. CJCSI 3125.01B, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) for Domestic 

Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Incident. 

d. CJCSI 3214.01D, Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory.

e. CJCSM 3122 Series, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).

f. CJCSM 3150.13C, Joint Reporting Structure–Personnel Manual.

4. Joint Publications 

a. JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations.

b. JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations.

c. JP 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations. 

d. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

e. JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations.

f. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 

g. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Environments. 

h. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

i. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense.

j. JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

k. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

l. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

m. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

n. JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

o. JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

p. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.
Appendix D 

D-6 JP 3-41 

q. JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

r. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

s. JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

t. JP 4-05 Joint Mobilization Planning.

u. JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs.

5. Multi-Service Publications 

a. MCBRNCM 0026-02, Chemical Warfare (CW) Agent Exposure Planning Guidance. 

b. FM 3-11.21/MCRP 3-37.2C/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP(I) 3-2.37, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Consequence Management Operations. 

c. FM 3-11.5/MCWP 3-37.3/NTTP 3-11.26/AFTTP(I) 3-2.60, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Decontamination.

d. USTRANSCOM policy document: Policy for Patient Movement of Contaminated 

Contagious or Potentially Exposed Casualties. 

6. Army 

FM 5-19, Composite Risk Management. 

7. Air Force 

a. AFI 10-2603, Emergency Health Powers on Air Force Installations.

b. AFI 10-2604, Disease Containment Planning.

c. AFI 41-307 (Attachment 12), Aeromedical Evacuation Patient Considerations and 

Standards of Care.

8. International Documents

a. Canadian Legislation

(1) Emergencies Act (Revised Statutes of Canada: 1985 c.22 4th Supplement). 

(2) Emergency Preparedness Act (Revised Statutes of Canada: 1985 c.6 4th 

Supplement). 

b. CANUS Agreements
 References 

D-7 

(1) Canada–United States Integrated Lines of Communications (ILOCs) 

Agreement. 

(2) Canada–US Agreement for Enhanced Military Cooperation. 

(3) Temporary Cross-Border Movement of Land Forces Between the United States 

and Canada Agreement. 

(4) Canadian–United States Regional Emergency Management Agreements. 

(5) Canadian–United States Joint Radiological Emergency Response Plan. 

(6) Inland Pollution Contingency Plan. 

c. Canada–US Civil Assistance Plan. 

d. Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America. 

e. NATO Article 5. 

f. Chemical Weapons Convention Article X. 

g. SPP. 

 
Appendix D 

D-8 JP 3-41 

Intentionally Blank 
E-1 

APPENDIX E 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

1. User Comments 

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint 

Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting 

Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Support Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 

23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, 

and organization), writing, and appearance. 

2. Authorship 

The lead agent for this publication is the US Northern Command. The Joint Staff 

doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5). 

3. Supersession 

This publication supersedes JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and 

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management, 2 October 2006. 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// 

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint and 

Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Support 

Division and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JEDD. 

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change 

source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a 

proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other 

organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents 

reflected in this publication are initiated. 

5. Distribution of Publications 

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. 

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD 

Manual 5200.01, DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and 

Declassification.
Appendix E 

E-2 JP 3-41 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET) and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil (SIPRNET) 

and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant 

commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or 

foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to 

DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison Office/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base AnacostiaBolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100. 

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, 

the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CDROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally 

reproduced for use within the combatant commands and Services. 
GL-1 

GLOSSARY 

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

AC Active Component 

AFI Air Force instruction 

AFMAN Air Force manual 

AFRAT Air Force Radiation Assessment Team 

AFRRI Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute 

AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction) 

ALARA as low as reasonably achievable 

ANG Air National Guard 

AOR area of responsibility 

APOD aerial port of debarkation 

ARNG Army National Guard 

ARS acute radiation syndrome 

ASCC Army Service component command 

ASD(GSA) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic 

 Affairs 

ASD(HA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) 

ASD(HD&ASA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and 

 Americas’ Security Affairs) 

ASD(RA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) 

AT antiterrorism 

ATTP Army tactics, techniques, and procedures 

BSI base support installation 

C2 command and control 

C2CRE command and control chemical, biological, radiological, 

 and nuclear response element 

CANUS Canada-United States 

CAP crisis action planning 

CBIRF Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CBRN CM chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

 consequence management 

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 

 explosives 

CCDR combatant commander 

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

CDRUSARNORTH Commander, United States Army Forces North 

CDRUSNORTHCOM Commander, United States Northern Command 

CDRUSPACOM Commander, United States Pacific Command 

CDRUSSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations Command 

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-41 

CERFP chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 

 explosives enhanced response force package 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJTF commander, joint task force 

CMAT consequence management advisory team 

CMOC civil–military operations center 

CMST consequence management support team 

CNGB Chief, National Guard Bureau 

COA course of action 

COM chief of mission 

CONUS continental United States 

CS civil support 

CSA combat support agency 

CW chemical warfare 

CWMD combating weapons of mass destruction 

DCE defense coordinating element 

DCO defense coordinating officer 

DCRF defense chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

 response force 

DEPORD deployment order 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DLA Defense Logistics Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DODI Department of Defense instruction 

DOS Department of State 

DR disaster relief 

DSCA defense support of civil authorities 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

EMAC emergency management assistance compact 

EMP electromagnetic pulse 

EO executive order 

EOC emergency operations center 

EOD explosive ordnance disposal 

EP emergency preparedness 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

ESF emergency support function 

EXORD execute order 

FAA Foreign Assistance Act 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FCM foreign consequence management 

FCO federal coordinating officer 
Glossary 

GL-3 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FEST foreign emergency support team 

FM field manual (Army) 

FOB forward operating base 

FORSCOM United States Army Forces Command 

FPCON force protection condition 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GEF Guidance for Employment of the Force 

HA humanitarian assistance 

HAZMAT hazardous materials 

HD homeland defense 

HE high explosives 

HN host nation 

HRF homeland response force 

HS homeland security 

HSPD homeland security Presidential directive 

HSS health service support 

IAP incident action plan 

IAW in accordance with 

ICS incident command system 

IEM installation emergency management 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

ILOC integrated line of communications 

INDRAC Interagency Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 Database of Responsibilities, Authorities, and 

 Capabilities 

ITO installation transportation officer 

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff 

JCCSE Joint Continental United States Communications Support 

 Environment 

JDOMS Joint Director of Military Support 

JFC joint force commander 

JFLCC joint force land component commander 

JFHQ-NCR Joint Force Headquarters–National Capital Region 

JFO joint field office 

JIEE Joint Information Exchange Environment 

JMC joint movement center 

JMETL joint mission-essential task list 

JOA joint operations area 

JOC joint operations center 

JP joint publication 

JPAC joint planning augmentation cell 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-41 

JRERP Joint Radiological Emergency Response Plan 

JRSOI joint reception, staging, onward movement, and 

 integration 

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

JTF joint task force 

JTF-AK Joint Task Force - Alaska 

JTF-CM joint task force - consequence management 

JTF-CS Joint Task Force-Civil Support 

JTF-HD Joint Task Force-Homeland Defense 

JTF-State joint task force-state 

kt kiloton(s) 

LE low-order explosives 

LFA lead federal agency 

LNO liaison officer 

MCRP Marine Corps reference publication 

MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication 

ME/C medical examiner and/or coroner 

MHE materials handling equipment 

MOA memorandum of agreement 

MOU memorandum of understanding 

MRAT medical radiobiology advisory team 

MSR main supply route 

NARP Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NDP national disclosure policy 

NDS National Defense Strategy 

NGB National Guard Bureau 

NGCC National Guard coordination center 

NG JFHQ-State National Guard joint force headquarters-state 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NIMS National Incident Management System 

NIPRNET Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network 

NMCC National Military Command Center 

NMS National Military Strategy 

NRF National Response Framework 

NSAT United States Northern Command 

 situational awareness team 

NSF National Strike Force (USCG) 

NSPD national security Presidential directive 

NSPI National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza 

NSS National Security Strategy 

NTRP Navy technical reference publication 
Glossary 

GL-5 

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures 

OEG operational exposure guide 

OPCON operational control 

OPORD operation order 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

PA public affairs 

PCA Posse Comitatus Act 

PFO principal federal official 

PI pandemic influenza 

POD port of debarkation 

PPD Presidential policy directive 

PPE personal protective equipment 

QSTAG quadripartite standardization agreement 

RC Reserve Component 

RDD radiological dispersal device 

RED radiological exposure device 

RFA request for assistance 

RFF request for forces 

ROE rules of engagement 

RS religious support 

RST religious support team 

RUF rules for the use of force 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network 

SJA staff judge advocate 

SMRC Specialized Medical Response Capabilities 

SOFA status-of-forces agreement 

SPOD seaport of debarkation 

SPP Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America 

SROE standing rules of engagement 

SRUF standing rules for the use of force 

STANAG standardization agreement (NATO) 

TACON tactical control 

TAG the adjutant general 

TF task force 

TIC toxic industrial chemical 

TIM toxic industrial material 

TRO training and readiness oversight 

UCP Unified Command Plan 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 3-41 

UJTL Universal Joint Task List 

UN United Nations 

USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers 

USAEDS United States Atomic Energy Detection System 

USAFR United States Air Force Reserve 

USAMRICD United States Army Medical Research Institute of 

 Chemical Defense 

USAMRIID United States Army Medical Research Institute of 

 Infectious Diseases 

USAR United States Army Reserve 

USARNORTH United States Army Forces North 

USC United States Code 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USCGR United States Coast Guard Reserve 

USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

USG United States Government 

USMCR United States Marine Corps Reserve 

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command 

USNR United States Navy Reserve 

USPACOM United States Pacific Command 

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

WMD CM weapons of mass destruction consequence management 

WMD-CST weapons of mass destruction-civil support team 
GL-7 

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

active material. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

actual ground zero. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

background count. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

base surge. None. (Approved for removal JP 1-02.) 

blast effect. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

blast wave. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

chemical agent cumulative action. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management. Actions 

taken to plan, prepare, respond to, and recover from chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear incidents. Also called CBRN CM. (Approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives consequence 

management. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

chemical dose. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

chemical monitoring. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

chemical survey. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

chronic radiation dose. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

civil nuclear power. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

command assessment element. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

consequence management. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

conventional weapon. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

critical mass. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

decontamination station. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

disaster control. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

dispersion. 1. A scattered pattern of hits around the mean point of impact of bombs and 

projectiles dropped or fired under identical conditions. (JP 3-60) 2. The spreading 

or separating of troops, materiel, establishments, or activities, which are usually 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-41 

concentrated in limited areas to reduce vulnerability. (JP 5-0) 3. In chemical and 

biological operations, the dissemination of agents in liquid or aerosol form. (JP 3-

41) 4. In airdrop operations, the scatter of personnel and/or cargo on the drop zone. 

(JP 3-17) 5. In naval control of shipping, the reberthing of a ship in the periphery of 

the port area or in the vicinity of the port for its own protection in order to minimize 

the risk of damage from attack. (JP 4-01.2) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

emergency operations center. A temporary or permanent facility where the 

coordination of information and resources to support domestic incident management 

activities normally takes place. Also called EOC. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02.) 

exposure dose. The amount of radiation, as measured in roentgen, at a given point in 

relation to its ability to produce ionization. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-

02.) 

fallout prediction. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

fallout safe height of burst. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

fission products. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

flash burn. A burn caused by excessive exposure (of bare skin) to thermal radiation. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-41 as the source JP.)

foreign consequence management. United States Government activity that assists 

friends and allies in responding to the effects from an intentional or accidental 

chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident on foreign territory in order to 

maximize preservation of life. Also called FCM. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02.) 

ground zero. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

height of burst. The vertical distance from the Earth’s surface or target to the point of 

burst. Also called HOB. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-41 as 

the source JP.) 

incident of national significance. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

induced radiation. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

joint nuclear accident coordinating center. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-

02.)

joint operations center. A jointly manned facility of a joint force commander’s 

headquarters established for planning, monitoring, and guiding the execution of the 

commander’s decisions. Also called JOC. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 

with JP 3-41 as the source JP.) 
Glossary 

GL-9 

Joint Task Force-Civil Support. A standing joint task force established to plan and 

integrate Department of Defense support to the designated lead federal agency for 

domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives 

consequence management operations. Also called JTF-CS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-41) 

joint technical augmentation cell. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

lead federal agency. The federal agency that leads and coordinates the overall federal 

response to an emergency. Also called LFA. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02.) 

militarily significant fallout. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

military posture. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

national defense area. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

National Disaster Medical System. A coordinated partnership between Departments of 

Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Defense, and Veterans Affairs 

established for the purpose of responding to the needs of casualties of a public health 

emergency. Also called NDMS. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

National Incident Management System. A national crisis response system that 

provides a consistent, nationwide approach for federal, state, local, and tribal 

governments; the private sector; and nongovernmental organizations to work 

effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from 

domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. Also called NIMS. 

(Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02.) 

negligible risk (nuclear). None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

nonstrategic nuclear forces. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

nuclear detonation detection and reporting system. None. (Approved for removal 

from JP 1-02.) 

nuclear energy. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

nuclear exoatmospheric burst. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

nuclear incident. An unexpected incident involving a nuclear weapon, facility, or 

component, but not constituting a nuclear weapon(s) accident, resulting in any of the 

following: a. an increase in the possibility of explosion or radioactive contamination; 

b. errors committed in the assembly, testing, loading, or transportation of equipment, 

and/or the malfunctioning of equipment and materiel which could lead to an 

unintentional operation of all or part of the weapon arming and/or firing sequence, or 
Glossary 

GL-10 JP 3-41 

which could lead to a substantial change in yield, or increased dud probability; and c. 

any act of God, unfavorable environment, or condition resulting in damage to the 

weapon, facility, or component. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

nuclear proximity-surface burst. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

nuclear warning message. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

nuclear weapon(s) accident. An unexpected incident involving nuclear weapons or 

radiological nuclear weapon components that results in any of the following; a. 

accidental or unauthorized launching, firing, or use by United States forces or United 

States supported allied forces of a nuclear-capable weapon system that could create 

the risk of an outbreak of war; b. nuclear detonation; c. nonnuclear detonation or 

burning of a nuclear weapon or radiological nuclear weapon component; d. 

radioactive contamination; e. seizure, theft, loss, or destruction of a nuclear weapon 

or radiological nuclear weapon component, including jettisoning; and f. public 

hazard, actual or implied. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

nuclear weapons surety. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

peak overpressure. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

permissive action link. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

principal federal official. The federal official designated by the Secretary of Homeland 

Security to act as his/her representative locally to oversee, coordinate, and execute 

the Secretary’s incident management responsibilities under Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 5. Also called PFO. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-

02.)

radiant exposure. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

radiation exposure state. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

radiological accident. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

radiological defense. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

radiological environment. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

residual capabilities assessment. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

residual contamination. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

surface zero. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

technical nuclear forensics. The collection, analysis and evaluation of pre-detonation 

(intact) and post-detonation (exploded) radiological or nuclear materials, devices, 
Glossary 

GL-11 

and debris, as well as the immediate effects created by a nuclear detonation. 

(Approved for inclusion into JP 1-02.) 

thermal energy. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

thermal exposure. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

thermal radiation. 1. The heat and light produced by a nuclear explosion. 2. 

Electromagnetic radiations emitted from a heat or light source as a consequence of 

its temperature. (Approved for incorporation into to JP 1-02.) 

thermal X-rays. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

toxic chemical, biological, or radiological attack. None. (Approved for removal from 

JP 1-02.) 

types of burst. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

 
Glossary 

GL-12 JP 3-41 

Intentionally Blank 
Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

l

l

l

l

JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for 

signature 

l

l

l

l

l

l 

LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first 

draft (FD)

PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to 

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment 

matrix

FC joint working group

STEP #4 - Maintenance

l

l

l

l

JP published and continuously 

assessed by users 

Formal assessment begins 

24-27 months following 

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years 

after publication

Each JP revision is completed 

no later than 5 years after 

signature

STEP #1 - Initiation

l

l

l

l

l

l

Joint doctrine development 

community (JDDC) submission to fill 

extant operational void

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts frontend analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference 

validation

Program directive (PD) development 

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references, 

outline, milestones, and draft 

authorship

JS J-7 approves and releases PD to 

lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant 

command, JS directorate) 

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT

DOCTRINE

JP 1

LOGISTICS COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS PLANS SYSTEM

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

OPERATIONS

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint 

Publication (JP) 3-41 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below 

illustrates an overview of the development process: