NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

2023-132

In re: REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION,

Petitioner

______________________

2023-132

______________________

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States 

District Court for the Western District of Texas in No. 6:22-

cv-01162-ADA, Judge Alan D. Albright.

______________________

ON PETITION

______________________ 

Before CHEN, MAYER, and STARK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

O R D E R

This petition for a writ of mandamus is from a patent 

infringement suit brought by ParkerVision, Inc. against 

Realtek Semiconductor Corporation in the United States 

District Court for the Western District of Texas. When Realtek, which is based in Taiwan, contested the sufficiency 

of service of process and did not timely file an answer to the 

complaint, ParkerVision moved (though later withdrew) a 

motion for leave to effect alternative service of process and

subsequently moved for entry of default. Following a 

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2 IN RE: REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION

hearing, the district court denied the motion for default but 

ordered Realtek’s appearing attorney to accept service of 

process on his client’s behalf within 30 days. 

Realtek now petitions to vacate that order. Before we

may issue the “extraordinary remedy” of a writ of mandamus, three conditions must be satisfied: (1) the petitioner 

must have “no other adequate means to attain the relief [it] 

desires,” (2) the petitioner must show that the “right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable,” and (3) the 

court “in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied 

that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” 

Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 

(2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Realtek has not satisfied that demanding standard.*

In general, a party seeking to vindicate its right not to

be forced to appear before a court at all must ordinarily 

wait until after a final decision in order to seek appellate 

review. See In re Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 516 F.3d 1003, 

1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re TCT Mobile Int’l Ltd., 783 F. 

App’x 1028, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Because a defendant 

* We have also set out an alternative, narrow basis for 

granting mandamus: where such relief “is important to 

proper judicial administration.” Stingray, 56 F.4th 1379, 

1382 (Fed. Cir. 2023); see also In re Micron Tech., Inc., 875 

F.3d 1091, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (granting mandamus review to “reduce the widespread disparities in rulings on . . 

. fundamental legal standards”). The petition before us invokes this alternative basis as well as the general threeconditions basis for mandamus. See, e.g., Petition at 11-14; 

Reply at 4-7. However, we perceive here no “unusual” and 

“exceptional” circumstances as are necessary to warrant 

the exercise of our discretion to provide mandamus relief 

under this narrow, alternative basis, Stingray, 56 F.4th at 

1382, particularly given that the petition fails to satisfy 

any of the three Cheney conditions for granting mandamus. 

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IN RE: REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION 3

can obtain meaningful review of a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction after final judgment, mandamus is ordinarily not available.”); In re BNY ConvergEx 

Grp., LLC, 404 F. App’x 484, 485 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“To grant

mandamus simply because a party asserts it will be forced 

to expend unnecessary costs would make a large class of 

interlocutory orders routinely reviewable,” “clearly undermin[ing] the extraordinary nature” of mandamus relief). 

Moreover, Realtek has not shown a clear and indisputable right to relief. “Before a federal court may exercise 

personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.” Omni 

Cap. Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104

(1987). “[S]ervice of process in a federal action is covered 

generally by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. Realtek relies specifically on Rule 4(f)(2), which

provides that “if there is no internationally agreed means, 

or if an international agreement allows but does not specify 

other means,” process may be served “by a method that is 

reasonably calculated to give notice” as “prescribed by the 

foreign country’s law for service in that country in an action 

in its courts of general jurisdiction.” In support, Realtek 

cites to some district court cases that have concluded service under Rule 4(f)(2) must be administered by a court 

clerk of Taiwan. Because that was not done here, Realtek 

contends service is improper. 

But that argument does not account for the fact that

Rule 4(f)(3), which “stands independently” and “on equal 

footing” with Rule 4(f)(2), Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. Abbyy 

Software House, 626 F.3d 1222, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), authorizes 

courts to direct “other means” of service as long as such 

means are not “prohibited by international agreement.” 

While some courts in applying Rule 4(f)(3) “have looked to 

whether there has been a showing that the plaintiff has 

reasonably attempted to effectuate service . . . by conventional means,” those considerations merely “guide the 

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4 IN RE: REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION

exercise of discretion, and are not akin to an exhaustion 

requirement.” In re OnePlus Tech. (Shenzhen) Co., No. 

2021-165, 2021 WL 4130643, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 10, 

2021). 

Here, we find no clear abuse of discretion in the district 

court’s application of Rule 4(f)(3). Realtek identifies no international agreement prohibiting the ordered means of 

service, and other courts have concluded that “[t]his form 

of service is not prohibited by international agreement, as 

Taiwan is not a party to the Hague Convention or to any 

other treaty or agreement with the United States regarding service of process,” Wei Su v. Sotheby’s, Inc., No. 17-CV4577 (VEC), 2018 WL 4804675, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 

2018). 

Furthermore, the district court found that ParkerVision had attempted to serve Realtek in good faith and the 

amount of time that the case had been around justified its

intervention. While Realtek argues that the district court 

should have required ParkerVision to make more of an effort to serve via other means before resort to Rule 4(f)(3),

“[g]iven the broad discretion accorded to district courts in 

determining whether to grant relief under Rule 4(f)(3),” we 

cannot say that mandamus relief is warranted in these circumstances. OnePlus, 2021 WL 4130643, at *4. 

We also are unpersuaded by Realtek’s argument that 

service cannot be effective on its attorney, who Realtek contends was not authorized to receive service and appeared

only to contest service. Realtek cites to United States v. 

Ziegler Bolt & Parts Co., 111 F.3d 878 (Fed. Cir. 1997), but 

that case does not support its cause. In Ziegler, the Court 

of International Trade (“CIT”) found that attempts to serve

a corporation by mailing a copy of the complaint to its attorney were insufficient under a CIT rule materially the 

same as Rule 4(h)(1), which authorizes service for a corporation on an “officer, a managing or general agent, or . . . 

any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to 

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IN RE: REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION 5

receive service.” We affirmed on the ground that there was 

no evidence that the attorney had authority to accept service, noting that “[t]he mere relationship between a defendant and his attorney does not, in itself, convey authority to 

accept service.” Ziegler, 111 F.3d at 881. 

The problem for Realtek here is that none of the cases 

it has cited, including Ziegler, involved Rule 4(f)(3). In fact, 

other courts have held that “[t]he requirements of Rule 

4(h)(1) do not carry over to Rule 4(f)(3)” and “thus have 

sanctioned service on United States counsel as an alternative means of service under Rule 4(f)(3) without requiring 

any specific authorization by the defendant for the recipient to accept service on its behalf.” Freedom Watch, Inc. v. 

OPEC, 766 F.3d 74, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing cases). Realtek points to no contrary authority. 

Finally, Realtek argues that the court’s order directing 

alternative service to its counsel violated its due process 

rights. But it has failed to show that the means of service

was not reasonably calculated to provide notice of the action and afford an opportunity to respond. See Mullane v. 

Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 

Realtek has not shown that it was not in communication 

with its attorney who appeared before the district court at 

the hearing, and its attorney told the district court that 30 

days would be sufficient to inform Realtek to file its answer. Appx15. Under such circumstances, we discern no

clear and indisputable constitutional infirmity. 

Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED THAT: 

The petition is denied. 

 August 16, 2023 

 Date

FOR THE COURT

 /s/ Jarrett B. Perlow

 Jarrett B. Perlow

Clerk of Court

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