In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 19-1957 

GAIL A. MARTIN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division. 

No. 1:18-cv-33 — Susan L. Collins, Magistrate Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 3, 2019 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 7, 2020 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and SCUDDER,

Circuit Judges. 

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Gail Martin suffers from serious 

back pain and psychiatric conditions. Two administrative law 

judges have considered her application for disability benefits 

under the Social Security Act. The first ALJ determined that 

Martin’s severe impairments left her capable of performing 

only a limited range of sedentary jobs. On appeal the district 

court remanded for a more thorough consideration of 
2 No. 19-1957 

Martin’s mental health problems. A new ALJ then entered the 

mix and found that Martin had no physical limitations—none 

whatsoever—and declined to award disability benefits. Because the second ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence, we reverse. We also take the rare step of ordering the award of benefits. 

I 

A 

Gail Martin, a 67-year-old woman living in northeast Indiana, sought benefits due to physical and psychological problems. Her persistent back pain stems from two car accidents, 

and she likewise suffers from depression, anxiety, bipolar disorder, panic disorder, and PTSD. These conditions caused 

Martin to stop working in 2009. Before then she had worked 

as a home health aide, data entry clerk, and administrative 

assistant. 

For her back pain, Martin sought treatment from chiropractors. In 2004 a chiropractor ordered x-rays and saw that 

compressed discs were the source of Martin’s pain. He recommended a 20-pound lifting restriction, but also advised Martin that her condition would probably worsen even with ongoing treatment. Since then Martin has restricted her activities. She testified in her first hearing that her back pain prevents her from mopping floors, using a vacuum cleaner, or 

performing any housework beyond light dusting. She conveyed similar points at a second hearing. 

At the Commissioner’s request, Dr. David Ringel examined Martin before her first ALJ hearing. While not providing 

a diagnosis or prescribing workplace limitations, he found 

that Martin experienced back spasms, was slow to move off
No. 19-1957 3

and on the examination table, and had significantly limited 

range of motion in her neck, back, and hips. Two non-examining state agency doctors (J. Sands and M. Ruiz) reviewed 

Martin’s medical records and case file in 2011 for physical impairments and concluded that she could perform no more 

than a limited range of light work. Only in 2014 did one state 

agency doctor, Joshua Eskonen, conclude that Martin had no 

physical limitations. Dr. Eskonen offered that view without 

examining Martin or reviewing Dr. Ringel’s findings. 

For years Martin has received mental health treatment at 

the Northeastern Center in Indiana. Each of her providers has 

noted Martin’s psychiatric conditions and symptoms, including her difficulties concentrating and interacting with others. 

The therapist who met regularly with Martin found severe social anxiety and longstanding depression that would preclude 

her from working full-time. Before Martin’s second hearing in 

2016, a state agency psychologist reviewed her file and agreed 

that she was limited in her ability to remember and carry out 

detailed instructions, maintain attention and concentration, 

interact with the general public and supervisors, and respond 

to changes in the workplace. 

B 

Following the first hearing in 2012, the ALJ concluded that 

Martin had severe physical impairments but could work in a 

sedentary job requiring little social interaction, including in 

her previous positions as a data entry clerk or administrative 

assistant. On appeal, the district court remanded to reconsider whether the ALJ’s residual functional capacity or RFC 

determination—the analysis of what work activities Martin 

could perform—reflected all of Martin’s mental health challenges. The court noted that the appeal presented no 
4 No. 19-1957 

questions about the ALJ’s findings that Martin’s physical limitations left her able to perform only sedentary work. 

The case went to a new ALJ on remand. Martin took the 

position that the second ALJ was bound by the first ALJ’s finding of her physical limitations. The new ALJ disagreed and 

concluded that the first ALJ’s conclusions could be revisited. 

A hearing then ensued. Martin testified that, although she 

continued to experience back pain, she had not sought further 

treatment because her chiropractor told her that there was 

nothing she could do except avoid aggravating her back. After hearing this testimony, the ALJ remained skeptical of Martin’s allegation of ongoing back pain because the record revealed “an overall lack of treatment, treatment sought, [and] 

treatment received.” 

The second ALJ performed the required five-step analysis 

under the Social Security regulations and concluded that Martin was not disabled. The ALJ found that Martin’s psychological problems were serious and limited the work she could 

perform. When it came to Martin’s physical impairments, 

however, the ALJ concluded that Martin’s back pain was not 

severe and did not in any way affect her ability to work. The 

ALJ based that conclusion on the lack of treatment for back 

pain in the record and Dr. Eskonen’s finding that Martin had 

no physical impairments. At no point in its analysis of the 

medical record did the second ALJ discuss the first ALJ’s finding that Martin suffered from severe physical limitations. 

The second ALJ then turned to the RFC determination 

and, unlike the first ALJ, concluded that Martin had the physical ability “to perform a full range of work at all exertional 

levels.” From there the second ALJ found that Martin’s mental 

health conditions meant that she could work in a job 
No. 19-1957 5

involving only simple tasks with low stress, occasional 

changes, a flexible pace, and superficial interactions with others. Those limitations, the ALJ determined, prevented Martin 

from returning to any of the jobs she held in the past. But there 

were positions, including as a cleaner and warehouse worker, 

that the ALJ found did not exceed Martin’s abilities. In the 

end, the second ALJ concluded that Martin could perform 

these jobs and therefore was not disabled. The district court 

affirmed the denial of benefits. 

II 

In reviewing Martin’s appeal, we reverse only if the ALJ 

based the denial of benefits on incorrect legal standards or less 

than substantial evidence. See Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 

869 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence is not a demanding requirement. It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 

1154 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 

197, 229 (1938)). 

Martin presses three points on appeal. First, she argues 

that the second ALJ did not incorporate her full mental limitations into the RFC determination. She then posits that the 

law of the case doctrine required the second ALJ to adopt the 

first ALJ’s finding that she could perform only a restricted 

range of sedentary work. Alternatively, Martin contends that 

the second ALJ’s conclusion that she had no physical limitations was not supported by substantial evidence. 
6 No. 19-1957 

A 

We start with Martin’s contention that the second ALJ 

overestimated her mental abilities. Martin suggests that the 

ALJ’s RFC determination failed to translate her mental health 

symptoms into limitations related to concentration, persistence, and pace—often shorthanded as CPP in the lexicon of 

Social Security law. 

CPP limitations are familiar territory, especially in recent 

years. Over many cases we observed a recurring error: ALJs 

would limit a claimant to “unskilled work” and conclude that 

by doing so they had incorporated a claimant’s full range of 

CPP limitations—challenges concentrating, staying on task, 

and maintaining a given pace in the workplace. Time and 

again we have disagreed. See, e.g., Crump v. Saul, 932 F.3d 567, 

570 (7th Cir. 2019) (reversing and explaining that the observation that someone can perform simple tasks says nothing 

about whether she can do so over the course of a full workday); DeCamp v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 671, 675–76 (7th Cir. 2019) 

(emphasizing that there is no basis for concluding that eliminating jobs with production quotas can serve as a proxy for 

CPP limitations); Moreno v. Berryhill, 882 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 

2018) (reversing because the hypothetical question posed to a 

vocational expert about the claimant’s RFC did not include 

accommodations for CPP limitations). 

In this area of the law, “unskilled work” is a term of art 

(indeed one defined by regulations) and refers to tasks that 

are not complex and do not take long to learn. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1568(a). As we have labored mightily to explain, however, the relative difficulty of a specific job assignment does 

not necessarily correlate with a claimant’s ability to stay on 

task or perform at the speed required by a particular 
No. 19-1957 7

workplace. See, e.g., Winsted v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 472, 477 (7th 

Cir. 2019) (explaining that limiting a claimant to simple and 

routine tasks did not account for his concentration and functioning deficits). Put another way, someone with problems 

concentrating may not be able to complete a task consistently 

over the course of a workday, no matter how simple it may 

be. 

Martin’s argument sounds in the familiar. She suggests 

that the second ALJ erred when discussing her ability to complete work on time. The ALJ found that Martin could work 

only in “an environment that allowed her to sustain a flexible 

and goal oriented pace.” Invoking Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809 

(7th Cir. 2015), Martin asserts that this description is too 

vague to guide any determination of what work, if any, she 

can perform over an entire workday. Our holding in Varga did 

not root itself in vagueness, though. To be sure, we noted that 

the phrase “fast paced production” had more than one meaning. Id. But we reversed because the ALJ failed to include the 

claimant’s significant problems concentrating in the RFC determination. See id. at 814. 

A more general observation warrants reinforcing. The law 

does not require ALJs to use certain words, or to refrain from 

using others, to describe the pace at which a claimant is able 

to work. See, e.g., Crump, 932 F.3d at 570 (“As a matter of form, 

the ALJ need not put the questions to the [vocational expert] 

in specific terms—there is no magic words requirement.”). We 

decline to provide a glossary of adjectives for use in RFC determinations. What we do require—and our recent precedent 

makes plain—is that the ALJ must account for the “totality of 

a claimant’s limitations” in determining the proper RFC. See 

Moreno, 882 F.3d at 730 (internal citation omitted). 
8 No. 19-1957 

We see no error here. The second ALJ did not take any of 

the shortcuts on Martin’s CPP limitations that we have found 

problematic in other cases. To the contrary, the ALJ tailored 

Martin’s RFC to her CPP limitations without assuming that 

restricting her to unskilled work would account for her mental health impairments. 

Start with concentration. The second ALJ found that 

“[Martin] could maintain the concentration required to perform simple tasks, remember simple work-like procedures, 

and make simple work-related decisions.” Moving to persistence, the ALJ, in defining and tailoring the RFC, further determined that Martin could stay on-task and thereby “meet 

production requirements.” Of course, even if someone is ontask, it is still possible she may operate at such a slow pace 

that an employer would not find her work satisfactory. 

Hence, the second “P”—pace—must enter the equation. The 

ALJ incorporated pace-related limitations by stating that Martin needed flexibility and work requirements that were goaloriented. Ideally, the ALJ would have brought to the surface 

what is surely implicit in the determination—that any pacebased goals must be reasonable as a way of signaling that the 

employer could not set the bar beyond the person’s functional 

reach. We take comfort here from the fact that the jobs the vocational expert suggested inherently reflected such a reasonableness limitation. Although Martin complains that the pace 

requirements are too vague, there is only so much specificity 

possible in crafting an RFC. The law required no more. 

B 

This brings us to the second ALJ’s finding that Martin had 

no physical limitations whatsoever. Martin invites us to make 

quick work of this appeal by reversing on the ground that the 
No. 19-1957 9

law of the case doctrine bound the second ALJ to the first 

ALJ’s conclusion limiting her to sedentary work. We cannot 

do so, however, as the operation of the doctrine in this area is 

complex and underdeveloped. Our case law instructs that an 

administrative agency must “conform its further proceedings 

in the case to the principles set forth in the [appellate] decision.” See Wilder v. Apfel, 153 F.3d 799, 803 (7th Cir. 1998). But 

we have not explained how that directive applies to previous 

findings not reviewed on appeal—here to findings made by 

one ALJ that implicated issues reexamined by a second ALJ. 

We can leave the issue for another day, though, because 

the second ALJ’s determination that Martin could perform 

physical work “at all exertional levels” finds nowhere close to 

substantial support in the record. The second ALJ assigned 

little weight to every medical opinion related to physical conditions except for the one provided by Dr. Eskonen, an agency 

physician who never examined Martin nor reviewed her previous case file. The ALJ even credited Dr. Eskonen’s opinion 

over that of Dr. Ringel, the state-agency doctor who did perform a physical examination of Martin at the Commissioner’s 

request. See Kaminski v. Berryhill, 894 F.3d 870, 875 (7th Cir. 

2018) (finding error in overlooking consulting physician report and relying instead on non-consultative opinions); see 

also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(3)(v) (explaining that, in evaluating evidence, an ALJ must consider that an examining doctor 

may have more insights than a doctor reviewing evidence in 

a folder). 

Even more, in choosing to credit particular findings 

Dr. Ringel made about Martin’s physical ability, the second 

ALJ altogether ignored others making plain that Martin had 

serious neck and back problems. The ALJ’s analysis strikes us 
10 No. 19-1957 

as impermissible cherry-picking—highlighting facts that support a finding of non-disability while ignoring evidence to the 

contrary. See Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010). 

The details prove the point. The second ALJ made much 

of the fact that Martin walked without a limp during her appointment with Dr. Ringel and drove herself to the medical 

clinic. But Dr. Ringel’s report is replete with other findings on 

Martin’s physical abilities that the second ALJ discounted. 

Specifically, Dr. Ringel reported that Martin moved slowly in 

the examination room and experienced pain at several points 

during the exam. So, too, did Dr. Ringel note that Martin had 

extremely limited range of motion in her neck, back, and hips. 

Many of Dr. Ringel’s observations align with the first 

ALJ’s findings on Martin’s physical limitations. Recall that the 

first ALJ limited Martin to a restricted range of sedentary 

work, which involves “lifting no more than 10 pounds at a 

time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket 

files, ledgers, and small tools.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). Contrast those limitations with the second ALJ’s assessment that 

Martin had the physical capacity to perform any job. Crediting 

the second ALJ’s finding would mean—literally—that Martin 

can perform what the Commissioner considers “very heavy 

work,” which requires “lifting objects weighing more than 

100 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing 50 pounds or more.” Id. § 404.1567(e). On this 

view, Martin would be able to work full-time as a construction worker or a home builder. But the record evidence points 

in the opposite direction. If Martin can barely perform simple 

household tasks, it defies reality to conclude that she is able 

to perform physical labor at any level of exertion. Because the 
No. 19-1957 11

evidence falls far from supporting the second ALJ’s finding, 

we must reverse. 

What most concerns us is that the second ALJ did not 

grapple with the first ALJ’s findings that Martin could perform only sedentary work. And that was so even though the 

second hearing entailed the presentation of no new evidence 

bearing on Martin’s physical limitations. While the law may 

not compel a comparative analysis, we would have expected 

the second ALJ to explain the basis for reaching such a vastly 

different conclusion about whether Martin’s physical condition affected the jobs she could perform. 

III 

Martin asks us not only to reverse but also to remand with 

instructions to grant benefits. That remedy is a marked departure from our typical practice of remanding to the agency for 

further proceedings. See, e.g., Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 

425 F.3d 345, 357 (7th Cir. 2005); Wilder, 153 F.3d at 804. 

Martin is right that extraordinary circumstances weigh in 

favor of an outright award of benefits here because the record 

“can yield but one supportable conclusion.” Campbell v. 

Shalala, 988 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1993). Indeed, the agency’s 

own guidance compels this outcome. 

In the social security appeals that come to our court, we 

most often review the ALJ’s application of a five-step framework that ends with a vocational expert opining whether 

there are jobs in the economy that someone with the claimant’s qualifications and limitations could perform. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). But in many cases that approach is not 

required. In 1978 the Department of Health and Human Services (which at the time housed the Social Security 
12 No. 19-1957 

Administration) promulgated the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2. Those 

Guidelines are often called “the Grids” because they take the 

form of tables. See id. The three tables in the regulatory appendix apply to claimants limited to sedentary, light, and medium jobs. See id. Each chart directs a finding—disabled or 

not disabled—based on three work-related factors: the claimant’s age, education, and previous work experience. See id.; 

see also Cummins v. Schweiker, 670 F.2d 81, 82–83 (7th Cir. 

1982) (providing a detailed explanation of the regulations and 

the operation of the Grids). 

While the age and education factors in the Grids are 

straightforward, previous work experience is a bit more complicated. That factor, as it is incorporated into the Grids, requires not only identifying the skill level of a claimant’s past 

work, but also deciding whether she has skills from past jobs 

that can be transferred to other positions. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1568(d)(1). If skills are not transferable to new jobs that 

the claimant can perform, then even substantial previous 

work history does not weigh in favor of a non-disabled finding. See id. The transferability analysis is less searching for 

older workers, because the Administration does not expect 

claimants to change industries or work settings near the end 

of their careers. See id. § 404.1568(d)(4). 

A remand here would be futile because the Grids compel 

a finding that Martin is disabled. Here is how the analysis proceeds under Table 2 (for people limited to light work) and Table 1 (for sedentary work): 

 Age: Martin falls into the “advanced age” 

category because she is over 55. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1563(e). 
No. 19-1957 13

 Education: Martin graduated from high 

school and cannot perform skilled work because her RFC limits her to unskilled work. 

See id. § 404.1568(a)-(c) (explaining skill levels). 

 Previous Work Experience: The vocational expert considered Martin’s past work to be 

semi-skilled. The agency’s regulations state 

that those skills are not transferable to unskilled work. See id. § 404.1568(d). 

With those attributes, the Grids direct a finding of disabled 

because Martin, as a result of her severe physical conditions, 

is limited to either light or sedentary work: 

Rule Age Education Previous Work 

Experience 

Decision 

201.06 

(sedentary 

work) 

Advanced 

age 

High school 

graduate or more—

does not provide 

for direct entry into 

skilled work 

Skilled or semiskilled—skills not 

transferable 

Disabled 

202.06 

(light 

work) 

Advanced 

age 

High school 

graduate or more—

does not provide 

for direct entry into 

skilled work 

Skilled or semiskilled—skills not 

transferable 

Disabled 

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, §§ 201.06, 202.06. 

While the Administration invites us to find that Martin can 

perform more than light or sedentary work—a proposition 

that, as we have emphasized, is not supported by substantial 

evidence—it agrees that the Grids would direct a disabled 

finding on the basis that we decide this appeal. 
14 No. 19-1957 

* * * 

Eight years of proceedings have developed this record to 

the point of certainty: Martin’s physical limitations leave her 

unable to perform any work above the light level. Given her 

restricted range of motion and symptoms of pain, light exertion would likely be a challenge for Martin because it requires 

“a good deal of walking or standing.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). 

But we need not decide the precise scope of Martin’s physical 

limitations because it does not change the outcome. Applying 

the Grids shows that Martin is disabled. 

The vast majority of the time we will not award benefits 

and instead remand for further proceedings. But here the application of the Grids and the evidence developed in these 

prolonged proceedings combine to make Martin’s entitlement 

to benefits clear. By our estimation, and mindful of the administrative guidance embodied in the agency’s Program Operations Manual System, Martin’s benefits award should begin 

on March 9, 2010—the day after her first of three applications 

was denied and not further challenged on appeal. The record 

shows that she has been eligible under the Grids since that 

date. 

For these reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND with an 

instruction to award benefits.