NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DANIELLE WALLER; SUSAN SPENCER; 

MARGARET HARVEY, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

PAMELA ROGERS; SMILE TRAIN 

FOUNDATION; STANFORD HOSPITAL; 

JOHN MUIR HOSPITAL; CONTRA 

COSTA MEALS-ON-WHEELS; 

CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF OAKLAND, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 23-16152 

D.C. No. 3:23-cv-00808-VC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Vince Chhabria, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 14, 2024

San Francisco, California

Before: GOULD, TALLMAN, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff-Appellants Danielle Waller, Susan Spencer, and Margaret Harvey 

(“Appellants”) appeal the district court’s order dismissing their complaint against 

Defendant-Appellees, Pamela Rogers and charity beneficiaries Smile Train, 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

JUL 26 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Stanford Hospital, Children’s Hospital of Oakland, John Muir Hospital, and Contra 

Costa Meals-on-Wheels (“Appellees”). Appellants, beneficiaries of a family trust

(“family trust”), filed a complaint in the Northern District of California seeking 

declaratory relief arising out of the administration of three related inter vivos trusts

by the Contra Costa County Probate Court (“probate court”). We review de novo

the district court’s finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that 

Appellants’ complaint was barred by collateral estoppel and the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine. Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(citing Novak v. United States, 795 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 2015)). As the parties 

are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 

1. The district court did not err in determining that the California probate 

court had jurisdiction to determine the existence or ownership of property within a 

trust through a petition for instruction. Cal. Prob. Code § 17000(b)(6) explicitly 

vests California probate courts with the power to fully investigate matters brought 

to it through a trustee petition for instruction. Appellees’ petition for instruction 

from the California Superior Court was entirely permitted by the California Probate 

Code, as was the probate court’s response. See Estate of Baglione, 65 Cal. 2d 192, 

196–97 (1966) (“[A] superior court sitting in probate that has jurisdiction over one 

aspect of a claim to certain property can determine all aspects of the claim.”); Estate 
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of Mullins, 206 Cal. App. 3d 924 (1988). Once a petition for instruction is submitted, 

California courts have found that a probate court is “empowered to resolve 

competing claims over the title to and distribution of the decedent’s property.”

Estate of Heggstad, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 433, 442 (1993) (“It is of no legal significance 

that respondent/trustee chose to seek relief through a petition for instruction . . . .”).

The fact that Appellants could not independently file a complaint in the probate court

against Appellees regarding the administration of the individual trust does not negate 

this statutory procedure. 

2. The district court did not err in holding that collateral estoppel prohibits 

successive review of Appellants’ complaint. Collateral estoppel prevents parties 

from relitigating issues actually litigated and necessarily decided in a prior action. 

United States v. Real Prop. Located at Section 18, 976 F.2d 515, 518 (9th Cir. 1992); 

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue 

Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985). The California factors for collateral 

estoppel are: (1) the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical 

to that decided in the former proceeding; (2) the issue must have been actually 

litigated in the former proceeding; (3) the issue must have been necessarily decided 

in the former proceeding; (4) the decision in the former proceeding must be final and 

on the merits; and (5) the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same 
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as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. See Lucido v. Superior Ct., 

51 Cal. 3d 335, 341 (1990). 

Here, Appellants assert the district erred in applying collateral estoppel, 

arguing: (1) the issues in their complaint were never “actually litigated”; (2) there 

was no privity between Appellant Harvey and Appellants Waller and Spencer; and 

(3) even if the “actually litigated” and privity prongs are established, Appellees did 

not meet the burden of proof required. We do not find these arguments persuasive. 

First, Appellants were given fair opportunity to litigate. Janjua v. Neufeld, 

933 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2019). As the probate court stated: “at trial, 

[Appellant] Waller had the opportunity, and failed, to present any evidence in 

support of her claim that the [individual] trust held family trust funds. She was given 

‘a fair adversary proceeding in which to fully present [her] case’” and “Ms. Waller 

[did] not present evidence to support her allegation that there [were] still assets

[remaining].” The additional Appellants were given notice of the proceedings, and 

“had the opportunity to appear, object, and present evidence in support of [their] 

claims that the trust held family trust funds.” No party appealed the decision of the 

probate court or filed a motion for reconsideration. 

In Lucido, the California Supreme Court stated that an issue is “actually 

litigated” when both parties “presented evidence and witnesses in support of their 

positions, and . . . had the opportunity to present full cases.” 51 Cal. 3d at 354
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(emphasis added). There, the Court emphasized that “[a]lthough the People claim 

they did not present their entire case and, thus, collateral estoppel should not apply, 

it is enough that the People had ‘notice of the hearing as well as the opportunity and 

incentive to present [their] case . . . . The People cannot now take advantage of the 

fact that [they] avoided [their] litigation responsibilities and chose not to present 

evidence at the prior proceeding.’” Id. The same applies here. 

Second, Appellants Waller, Spencer, and Harvey stood in privity with one 

another as the beneficiaries of the family trust. It is well-established that “a nonparty may be bound by a judgment if one of the parties to the earlier suit is so closely 

aligned with the non-party’s interests as to be its virtual representative.” Mother’s 

Rest., Inc. v. Mama’s Pizza, Inc., 723 F.2d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (collecting 

cases); see also Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe Ltd. Liab. Co., 

692 F.3d 983, 996 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing to Wash. Mut. Inc. v. United States, 636 

F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)). Under California law, all beneficiaries of an estate 

are bound by the settling decision of the probate court, and inherently share privity 

as “the parties interested in the estate” if the privity scheme is consistent with due 

process. Carr v. Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 11 Cal. 2d 366, 369 

(Cal. 1938) (including minors who were not represented at the probate hearing by a 

guardian); see also Cal. Prob. Code § 11605 (order of probate court, including decree 
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of distribution, “binds and is conclusive as to the rights of all interested persons”); 

Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996) (due process). 

Each Appellant here had a clear shared interest in the estate. Each held a 

designated percentage distribution in the family trust, which could, and did, change 

based on the death of another named beneficiary. Under California law, any of them 

could object to the probate court proceedings, all were given notice, and all would 

be bound by the probate court’s decision. See Carr, 11 Cal. 2d at 366–68. Appellant 

Harvey’s failure to appear does not entitle Appellants to repetitive litigation already 

decided by the state court for similar parties and a mutual estate.

Finally, we reject Appellants’ argument that Appellees failed to “meet their 

burden of showing a sufficient record of the prior proceedings for [the district court]

to determine that the exact issues [Appellants] allege were previously litigated in 

Probate court.” In Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., we emphasized that the party 

moving for collateral estoppel must “introduce a sufficient record of the [prior 

proceeding] to enable the trial court to pinpoint the exact issues previously 

determined.” 966 F.2d 1318, 1322–23 (9th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. 

Lasky, 600 F.2d 765, 769 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating the party that asserts preclusion 

bears the burden of proof). Here, Appellees’ original motion to dismiss included not 

only the previous court order, and the minute order, but also a declaration in support 

of the motion, and it included the full Second Petition and Third Petition containing
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all objections and exhibits. This comprises a large amount of information previously 

presented to the probate court, which Appellees employed to “pinpoint” similarities 

in issues as required by Clark. 966 F.2d at 1321. Appellees met their burden of 

proof. Accordingly, the district court did not err in applying collateral estoppel to 

dismiss Appellants’ complaint. 

3. Nor did the district court err in holding that Appellants’ complaint is also 

prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as 

established in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Court of 

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), precludes federal district courts from 

exercising jurisdiction over cases that are de facto appeals from state court 

judgments. This doctrine has been consistently applied to a wide range of state court 

decisions, including probate proceedings. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 

2003). To constitute a de facto appeal, a district court looks to see if the complaint 

alleges a legal wrong committed by the state court and seeks relief from the judgment 

of that court. Id. at 1163. The doctrine also extends to claims that are “inextricably 

intertwined with a forbidden appeal.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 778–79 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting federal courts must “pay close attention to the relief sought” on 

appeal). However, the Supreme Court has emphasized that Rooker-Feldman is 

narrowly confined to cases where “state-court losers” seek federal court review, and 

does not apply to constitutional challenges or federal suits brought by non-parties to 
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the state court action. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 

284 (2005). 

Here, Appellants attempt to relitigate issues that they litigated and lost in front 

of the California probate court. The probate court had already litigated and decided 

the two key issues Appellants raised in their district court complaint, holding that

Appellee Rogers successfully fulfilled her duty as Trustee, and that no comingled

funds existed between the trusts. Appellants implicitly and explicitly challenge the 

correctness of that state-court judgment. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284; 

Tellez v. Proiettii, No. 1:24-cv-00408-KES-SKO, 2024 WL 1742028, at *4 (E.D. 

Cal. Apr. 22, 2024) (dismissing complaint where “Plaintiff essentially seeks an order 

overturning the adverse decisions of [a probate judge] establishing an estate’s claim 

of ownership to property and directing its transfer to the estate”). Appellants assert 

the probate court erred legally by failing to recognize comingled funds and by

finding that the Trustee successfully discharged her duties—and ask for relief from 

that judgment as a remedy. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 

2004) (citing Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163). 

We have previously emphasized that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine extends to 

claims that are “inextricably intertwined with a forbidden appeal,” meaning that “the 

relief requested” in those claims “would effectively reverse the state court decision 

or void its ruling.” Cooper, 704 F.3d at 778–79. This is the case here. The 
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introduction of a breach of fiduciary duty claim relies entirely on revisiting the very 

issues raised in front of the probate court—and asks the district court to find that 

Rogers knew or should have known that comingled funds existed between the trusts. 

To rule in Appellants’ favor on a breach of fiduciary duty claim, the district court 

would necessarily have to find that the probate court erred in determining no 

comingled funds existed, and therefore also erred in determining Rogers had 

properly fulfilled her role as trustee. This is clearly barred by Rooker-Feldman. 

As we lack jurisdiction, we decline to address whether the probate exception 

applies to inter vivos trusts. 

AFFIRMED.