UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-5105

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ISAIAH N. PRINCE,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, 

District Judge. (1:09-cr-00036-IMK-JSK-1)

Submitted: June 29, 2010 Decided: July 16, 2010

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Katy J. Cimino, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Clarksburg, 

West Virginia, for Appellant. Zelda Elizabeth Wesley, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Isaiah N. Prince pled guilty, pursuant to a plea 

agreement, to one count of aiding and abetting the distribution 

of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 

(b)(1)(C) (2006). His plea agreement included a waiver of his 

rights to appeal or collaterally attack any sentence imposed on 

him that fell within the applicable statutory maximum. The 

district court sentenced Prince to 108 months’ imprisonment, 

considerably less than the statutory maximum of twenty years. 

Prince appeals from that judgment.

Prince’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which she questions the 

district court’s sentencing procedure; however, counsel 

ultimately concludes that Prince has waived the right to appeal 

sentencing issues, and that there are no meritorious issues for 

appeal. Prince has filed a pro se brief, in which he challenges 

the credibility of one of the witnesses who testified against 

him at his sentencing hearing. The Government has moved to 

dismiss Prince’s appeal as barred by the plea agreement’s waiver

of appellate rights. 

This court reviews the validity of an appellate waiver 

de novo, United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 402-03 (4th Cir. 

2000), and will uphold a waiver of appellate rights if the 

waiver is valid and the issue being appealed is covered by the 
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waiver. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 

2005). A waiver is valid if the defendant’s agreement to the 

waiver was knowing and voluntary. United States v. Marin, 961 

F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Wessells, 936 

F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1991).

To determine whether a waiver is knowing and 

voluntarily, this court examines “the totality of the 

circumstances, including the experience and conduct of the 

accused, as well as the accused’s educational background and 

familiarity with the terms of the plea agreement.” United 

States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Generally, if a district court fully 

questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate rights 

during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, the waiver is valid. 

Wessells, 936 F.2d at 167-68. In this case, Prince does not 

assert that his waiver was not voluntary. 

Our review of the record discloses that Prince’s 

appellate waiver was knowing and voluntary and should be 

enforced to preclude any review of potential sentencing errors, 

including the issues raised in counsel’s Anders brief and in 

Prince’s supplemental pro se brief. The Government’s motion to 

dismiss is therefore granted with respect to any challenge to 

Prince’s sentence. Prince’s waiver does not, however, include a 

waiver of his right to appeal his conviction; thus, the 
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Government’s motion is denied to the extent it seeks dismissal 

of any non-sentencing issues.

Prior to accepting a guilty plea, a trial court, 

through colloquy with the defendant, must inform the defendant 

of, and determine that the defendant understands the nature of, 

the charges to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum 

penalty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the various 

rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(b). “In reviewing the adequacy of compliance with Rule 11, 

this court should accord deference to the trial court’s decision 

as to how best to conduct the mandated colloquy with the 

defendant.” United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th 

Cir. 1991).

Because Prince did not move in the district court to 

withdraw his guilty plea, any error in the Rule 11 hearing is 

reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 

517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). To establish plain error, Prince 

“must show: (1) an error was made; (2) the error is plain; and 

(3) the error affects substantial rights.” United States v. 

Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2009) (reviewing 

unpreserved Rule 11 error). “The decision to correct the error 

lies within [this court’s] discretion, and [the court] 

exercise[s] that discretion only if the error seriously affects 

the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
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proceedings.” Id. at 343 (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). 

Here, neither Prince nor his counsel has raised any 

specific issues relating to Prince’s Rule 11 colloquy, let alone 

shown that plain error occurred. See United States v. Goins, 51 

F.3d 400, 402-03 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing factors courts 

should consider in determining whether substantial rights were 

affected in decision to plead guilty). Moreover, our review of 

the record reveals that the district court substantially 

complied with the requirements of Rule 11 in accepting Prince’s 

guilty plea, and that it ensured that Prince’s guilty plea was 

knowing and voluntary and supported by a sufficient factual 

basis. See DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 116, 119-20. We therefore find 

no infirmity in the conduct of the Rule 11 proceeding.

We have reviewed the entire record in accordance with 

Anders and have not identified any meritorious issues for 

appeal. Accordingly, we affirm Prince’s conviction and grant 

the Government’s motion to dismiss any issues relating to 

Prince’s sentence. This court requires counsel to inform her 

client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court 

of the United States for further review. If the client requests 

that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a 

petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in this court to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 
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a copy of the motion was served on the client.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART