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FIPS PUB 201-2 

FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION 

Personal Identity Verification (PIV) 

of 

Federal Employees and Contractors 

REVISED DRAFT 

Computer Security Division 

Information Technology Laboratory 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900 

July 2012 

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Rebecca M. Blank, Acting Secretary 

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY

Patrick D. Gallagher, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Director
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

36 Acknowledgements 

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NIST would like to acknowledge the significant contributions of the Identity, Credential, and 

Access Management Subcommittee (ICAMSC) and the Smart Card Interagency Advisory Board 

(IAB) for providing valuable contributions to the development of technical frameworks on which 

this Standard is based. 

Special thanks to those who have participated in the business requirements meeting and provided 

valuable comments in shaping this Standard. 

 REVISED DRAFT ii 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

45 FOREWORD 

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The Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Series of the National Institute of Standards 

and Technology (NIST) is the official series of publications relating to standards and guidelines adopted 

and promulgated under the provisions of the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 

2002. 

Comments concerning FIPS publications are welcomed and should be addressed to the Director, 

Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau Drive, 

Stop 8900, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900. 

 Charles H. Romine, Director 

 Information Technology Laboratory 

ABSTRACT 

This Standard specifies the architecture and technical requirements for a common identification standard 

for Federal employees and contractors. The overall goal is to achieve appropriate security assurance for 

multiple applications by efficiently verifying the claimed identity of individuals seeking physical access 

to Federally controlled government facilities and electronic access to government information systems. 

The Standard contains the minimum requirements for a Federal personal identity verification system that 

meets the control and security objectives of Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 [HSPD-12], 

including identity proofing, registration, and issuance. The Standard also provides detailed specifications 

that will support technical interoperability among PIV systems of Federal departments and agencies. It 

describes the card elements, system interfaces, and security controls required to securely store, process, 

and retrieve identity credentials from the card. The physical card characteristics, storage media, and data 

elements that make up identity credentials are specified in this Standard. The interfaces and card 

architecture for storing and retrieving identity credentials from a smart card are specified in Special 

Publication 800-73, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification. The interfaces and data formats of 

biometric information are specified in Special Publication 800-76, Biometric Data Specification for 

Personal Identity Verification. The requirements for cryptographic algorithms are specified in Special 

Publication 800-78, Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification. The 

requirements for the accreditation of the PIV Card issuers are specified in Special Publication 800-79, 

Guidelines for the Accreditation of Personal Identity Verification Card Issuers. The unique 

organizational codes for Federal agencies are assigned in Special Publication 800-87, Codes for the 

Identification of Federal and Federally-Assisted Organizations. The requirements for card readers are 

specified in Special Publication 800-96, PIV Card to Reader Interoperability Guidelines. The format for 

encoding the chain-of-trust for import and export is specified in Special Publication 800-156, 

Representation of PIV Chain-of-Trust for Import and Export. The requirements for issuing PIV derived 

credentials are specified in Special Publication 800-157, Guidelines for Personal Identity Verification 

(PIV) Derived Credentials. 

This Standard does not specify access control policies or requirements for Federal departments and 

agencies. 

 REVISED DRAFT iii
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 REVISED DRAFT iv 

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Keywords: architecture, authentication, authorization, biometrics, credential, cryptography, Federal 

Information Processing Standards (FIPS), HSPD-12, identification, identity, infrastructure, model, 

Personal Identity Verification, PIV, public key infrastructure, PKI, validation, verification. 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

92 Federal Information Processing Standards 201 

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2012 

Announcing the 

Standard for 

Personal Identity Verification (PIV) 

of 

Federal Employees and Contractors 

REVISED DRAFT 

Federal Information Processing Standards Publications (FIPS PUBS) are issued by the National Institute 

of Standards and Technology (NIST) after approval by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to the 

Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002. 

1. Name of Standard. 

FIPS PUB 201-2: Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors.1

2. Category of Standard. 

Information Security. 

3. Explanation. 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 [HSPD-12], dated August 27, 2004, entitled “Policy for a 

Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors,” directed the promulgation of a 

Federal standard for secure and reliable forms of identification for Federal employees and contractors. It 

further specified secure and reliable identification that— 

115 (a) is issued based on sound criteria for verifying an individual employee’s identity; 

116 (b) is strongly resistant to identity fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist exploitation; 

117 (c) can be rapidly authenticated electronically; and 

118 (d) is issued only by providers whose reliability has been established by an official accreditation process. 

The directive stipulated that the Standard include graduated criteria, from least secure to most secure, to 

ensure flexibility in selecting the appropriate level of security for each application. Executive 

departments and agencies are required to implement the Standard for identification issued to Federal 

employees and contractors in gaining physical access to controlled facilities and logical access to 

controlled information systems. 

4. Approving Authority. 

Secretary of Commerce. 

1

 This Standard is in response to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12, which states that it is “intended only to improve

the internal management of the executive branch of the Federal Government.” 

 REVISED DRAFT v
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5. Maintenance Agency. 

Department of Commerce, NIST, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL). 

6. Applicability. 

This Standard is applicable to identification issued by Federal departments and agencies to Federal 

employees and contractors (including contractor employees) for gaining physical access to Federally 

controlled facilities and logical access to Federally controlled information systems, except for “national 

security systems” as defined by 44 U.S.C. 3542(b)(2). Except as provided in [HSPD-12], nothing in this 

Standard alters the ability of government entities to use the Standard for additional applications. 

Special-Risk Security Provision—The U.S. Government has personnel, facilities, and other assets 

deployed and operating worldwide under a vast range of threats (e.g., terrorist, technical, intelligence), 

particularly heightened overseas. For those agencies with particularly sensitive threats from outside the 

contiguous United States, the issuance, holding, and/or use of PIV Cards with full technical capabilities as 

described herein may result in unacceptably high risk. In such cases of extant risk (e.g., to facilities, 

individuals, operations, the national interest, or the national security), by the presence and/or use of fullcapability PIV Cards, the head of a department or independent agency may issue a select number of 

maximum security credentials that do not contain (or otherwise do not fully support) the wireless and/or 

biometric capabilities otherwise required/referenced herein. To the greatest extent practicable, heads of 

departments and independent agencies should minimize the issuance of such special-risk security 

credentials so as to support interagency interoperability and the President’s policy. Use of other riskmitigating technical (e.g., high-assurance on-off switches for the wireless capability) and procedural 

mechanisms in such situations is preferable, and as such is also explicitly permitted and encouraged. As 

protective security technology advances, the need for this provision will be re-assessed as the Standard 

undergoes the normal review and update process. 

7. Specifications. 

Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 201 Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal 

Employees and Contractors. 

8. Implementations. 

This Standard satisfies the control objectives, security requirements, and technical interoperability 

requirements of [HSPD-12]. The Standard specifies implementation of identity credentials on integrated 

circuit cards for use in a Federal personal identity verification system. 

A PIV Card must be personalized with identity information for the individual to whom the card is issued, 

in order to perform identity verification both by humans and automated systems. Humans can use the 

physical card for visual comparisons, whereas automated systems can use the electronically stored data on 

the card to conduct automated identity verification. In implementing PIV systems and pursuant to 

Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the Act), as amended, agencies have the responsibility to 

accommodate federal employees and contractors with disabilities to have access to and use of information 

and data comparable to the access to and use of such information and data by federal employees and 

contractors who are not individuals with disabilities. In instances where Federal agencies assert 

exceptions to Section 508 accessibility requirements (e.g., undue burden, national security, commercial 

non-availability), Sections 501 and 504 of the Act requires Federal agencies to provide reasonable 

accommodation for federal employees and contractors with disabilities whose needs are not met by the 

baseline accessibility provided under Section 508. While Section 508 compliance is the responsibility of 

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Federal agencies and departments, this Standard specifies options to aid in implementation of the 

requirements: 

170 + Section 4.1.4.3 specifies Zones 21F and 22F as an option for orientation markers of the PIV Card. 

171 + Section 2.8 describes an alternative to the National Criminal History Check (NCHC) in instances 

where an applicant has unclassifiable fingers. 

173 + Sections 2.8, and 2.9 specify alternative methods for the 1:1 biometric match required at PIV Card 

issuance, reissuance, renewal, and reset. 

175 + Section 6 defines authentication mechanisms with varying characteristics for both physical and 

logical access (e.g., with or without PIN, over contact, contactless, or virtual contact interface). 

Federal departments and agencies must use accredited issuers to issue identity credentials for Federal 

employees and contractors. For this purpose, NIST provided guidelines for the accreditation of PIV Card 

issuers in [SP 800-79]. The Standard also covers security and interoperability requirements for PIV 

Cards. For this purpose, NIST has established the PIV Validation Program that tests implementations for 

conformance with this Standard as specified in [SP 800-73] and [SP 800-78]. Additional information on 

this program is published and maintained at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/npivp/. The U.S. General 

Services Administration (GSA) has set up the FIPS 201 Evaluation Program to evaluate conformance of 

different families of products that support the PIV processes of this Standard – see Appendix A.5. 

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The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides implementation oversight for this Standard. The 

respective numbers of agency-issued 1) general credentials and 2) special-risk credentials (issued under 

the Special-Risk Security Provision) are subject to annual reporting to the OMB under the annual 

reporting process in a manner prescribed by OMB. 

9. Effective Date. 

This Standard is effective immediately and supersedes FIPS 201-1 (Change Notice 1). New optional 

features of this Standard that depend upon the release of new or revised NIST Special Publications are 

effective upon final publication of the supporting Special Publications. 

10. Implementation Schedule. 

This Standard mandates the implementation of some of the PIV Card features that were optional to 

implement in FIPS 201-1. To comply with FIPS 201-2, all new and replacement PIV Cards shall be 

issued with the mandatory PIV Card features no later than 12 months after the effective date of this 

Standard. 

Accreditations of PIV Card issuers (PCIs) that occur 12 months after the effective date of this Standard 

shall be in compliance with FIPS 201-2. 

FIPS 201-2 compliance of PIV components and subsystems is provided in accordance with M-06-18 

[OMB0618] and M-11-11 [OMB1111] through products and services from GSA’s Interoperability Test 

Program and Approved Products and Services List, once available. Implementation Guidance to PIV 

enabled federal facilities and information systems, in accordance to M-11-11 will be outlined in the 

“Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) Roadmap and Implementation 

Guidance.” 

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 REVISED DRAFT viii 

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11. Qualifications. 

The security provided by the PIV system is dependent on many factors outside the scope of this Standard. 

Upon adopting this Standard, organizations must be aware that the overall security of the personal 

identification system relies on— 

210 + assurance provided by the issuer of an identity credential that the individual in possession of the 

credential has been correctly identified; 

212 + protection provided to an identity credential stored within the PIV Card and transmitted between the 

card and the PIV issuance and usage infrastructure; and 

214 + protection provided to the identity verification system infrastructure and components throughout the 

entire lifecycle. 

Although it is the intent of this Standard to specify mechanisms and support systems that provide high 

assurance personal identity verification, conformance to this Standard does not assure that a particular 

implementation is secure. It is the implementer’s responsibility to ensure that components, interfaces, 

communications, storage media, managerial processes, and services used within the identity verification 

system are designed and built in a secure manner. 

Similarly, the use of a product that conforms to this Standard does not guarantee the security of the 

overall system in which the product is used. The responsible authority in each department and agency 

shall ensure that an overall system provides the acceptable level of security. 

Because a standard of this nature must be flexible enough to adapt to advancements and innovations in 

science and technology, NIST has a policy to review this Standard within five years to assess its 

adequacy. 

12. Waivers. 

As per the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, waivers to Federal Information 

Processing Standards are not allowed. 

13. Where to Obtain Copies. 

231 This publication is available through the Internet by accessing http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/. 

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14. Patents. 

Aspects of the implementation of this Standard may be covered by U.S. or foreign patents.
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

Table of Contents

1. Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1

1.2 Scope..........................................................................................................................1

1.1 Purpose.......................................................................................................................1

1.3 Change Management..................................................................................................2

1.3.1 Backward Compatible Change........................................................................2

1.3.2 Non-Backward Compatible Change ................................................................2

1.3.3 New Features ..................................................................................................2

1.3.4 Deprecated and Removed ..............................................................................2

1.3.5 FIPS 201 Version Management ......................................................................3

1.4 Document Organization ..............................................................................................3

2. Common Identification, Security, and Privacy Requirements.........................................5

2.2 Credentialing Requirements........................................................................................6

2.1 Control Objectives.......................................................................................................5

2.3 Biometric Data Collection for Background Investigations ...........................................6

2.4 Biometric Data Collection for PIV Card.......................................................................6

2.5 Biometric Data Use .....................................................................................................7

2.6 Chain-of-Trust .............................................................................................................7

2.7 PIV Identity Proofing and Registration Requirements.................................................8

2.8 PIV Card Issuance Requirements.............................................................................10

2.8.1 Special Rule for Pseudonyms .......................................................................11

2.8.2 Grace Period .................................................................................................12

2.9 PIV Card Maintenance Requirements.......................................................................12

2.9.1 PIV Card Renewal Requirements .................................................................12

2.9.2 PIV Card Reissuance Requirements.............................................................13

2.9.3 PIV Card Post Issuance Update Requirements ............................................14

2.9.4 PIV Card Verification Data Reset ..................................................................15

2.9.5 PIV Card Termination Requirements ............................................................16

2.10 PIV Derived Credentials Issuance Requirements.....................................................16

2.11 PIV Privacy Requirements ........................................................................................17

3. PIV System Overview.........................................................................................................19

3.1.1 PIV Front-End Subsystem.............................................................................20

3.1 Functional Components ............................................................................................19

3.1.2 PIV Card Issuance and Management Subsystem.........................................21

3.1.3 PIV Relying Subsystem.................................................................................21

3.2 PIV Card Lifecycle Activities .....................................................................................22

4. PIV Front-End Subsystem.................................................................................................24

4.1.1 Printed Material .............................................................................................24

4.1 PIV Card Physical Characteristics ............................................................................24

4.1.2 Tamper Proofing and Resistance..................................................................24

4.1.3 Physical Characteristics and Durability .........................................................25

4.1.4 Visual Card Topography................................................................................26

4.1.5 Color Representation ....................................................................................40

4.2 PIV Card Logical Characteristics ..............................................................................40

4.2.1 Cardholder Unique Identifier (CHUID)...........................................................41

 REVISED DRAFT ix

4.2.2 Cryptographic Specifications.........................................................................42
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

4.2.3 PIV Biometric Data Specifications.................................................................44

4.2.4 PIV Unique Identifiers....................................................................................46

4.3 PIV Card Activation...................................................................................................46

4.3.1 Activation by Cardholder ...............................................................................46

4.3.2 Activation by Card Management System ......................................................47

4.4 Card Reader Requirements ......................................................................................47

4.4.1 Contact Reader Requirements......................................................................47

4.4.2 Contactless Reader Requirements ...............................................................47

4.4.3 Reader Resilience and Flexibility ..................................................................47

4.4.4 Card Activation Device Requirements...........................................................48

5. PIV Key Management Requirements................................................................................49

5.2 PKI Certificate ...........................................................................................................49

5.1 Architecture...............................................................................................................49

5.2.1 X.509 Certificate Contents ............................................................................49

5.3 X.509 CRL Contents .................................................................................................50

5.4 Legacy PKIs..............................................................................................................50

5.5 PKI Repository and OCSP Responder(s) .................................................................50

5.5.1 Certificate and CRL Distribution ....................................................................50

5.5.2 OCSP Status Responders.............................................................................51

6. PIV ardho C .........................................................................................52

6.1 PIV Assurance Levels...............................................................................................52

lder Authentication

6.1.1 Relationship to OMB’s E-Authentication Guidance .......................................53

6.2 PIV Card Authentication Mechanisms.......................................................................53

6.2.1 Authentication Using Off-Card Biometric Comparison ..................................53

6.2.2 Authentication Using On-Card Biometric Comparison (OCC-AUTH)............55

6.2.3 Authentication Using PIV Asymmetric Cryptography ....................................55

6.2.4 Authentication with the Symmetric Card Authentication Key (SYM-CAK).....57

6.2.5 Authentication Using the CHUID ...................................................................57

6.2.6 Authentication Using PIV Visual Credentials (VIS)........................................58

6.3 PIV Support of Graduated Assurance Levels for Identity Authentication..................59

6.3.1 Physical Access ............................................................................................59

6.3.2 Logical Access ..............................................................................................60

List of Appendices 

Appendix A— PIV Validation, Certification, and Accreditation ............................................61

A.2 Application of Risk Management Framework to IT System(s) Supporting PCI ........62

A.1 Accreditation of PIV Card Issuers (PCI) ...................................................................61

A.3 Conformance Testing of PIV Card Application and Middleware...............................62

A.4 Cryptographic Testing and Validation.......................................................................62

A.5 FIPS 201 Evaluation Program ..................................................................................62

Appendix B— PIV Object Identifiers and Certificate Extension ...........................................63

B.2 PIV Certificate Extension..........................................................................................63

B.1 PIV Object Identifiers................................................................................................63

Appendix C— Glossary of Terms, Acronyms, and Notations ..............................................65

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C.1 Glossary of Terms.....................................................................................................65

C.3 Notations...................................................................................................................71

C.2 Acronyms ..................................................................................................................69

Appendix D— References ........................................................................................................72

Appendix E— Revision History ...............................................................................................76

List of Figures 

Figure 3-1. PIV System Notional Model.....................................................................................20

Figure 3-2. PIV Card Lifecycle Activities....................................................................................22

Figure 4-1. Card Front—Printable Areas and Required Data ....................................................32

Figure 4-2. Card Front—Optional Data Placement—Example 1 ...............................................33

Figure 4-3. Card Front—Optional Data Placement—Example 2 ...............................................34

Figure 4-4. Card Front—Optional Data Placement—Example 3 ...............................................35

Figure 4-5. Card Front—Optional Data Placement—Example 4 ...............................................36

Figure 4-6. Card Back—Printable Areas and Required Data ....................................................37

Figure 4-7. Card Back—Optional Data Placement—Example 1................................................38

Figure 4-8. Card Back—Optional Data Placement—Example 2................................................39

List of Tables 

Table 4-1. Name Examples .......................................................................................................27

Table 4-2. Color Representation................................................................................................40

Table 6-1. Relationship Between PIV and E-Authentication Assurance Levels ........................53

Table 6-2. Authentication for Physical Access...........................................................................60

Table 6-3. Authentication for Logical Access.............................................................................60

Table B-1. PIV Object Identifiers................................................................................................63

PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

202 1. Introduction 

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Authentication of an individual’s identity is a fundamental component of physical and logical access 

control processes. When an individual attempts to access security-sensitive buildings, computer systems, 

or data, an access control decision must be made. An accurate determination of an individual’s identity is 

needed to make sound access control decisions. 

A wide range of mechanisms is employed to authenticate an identity, utilizing various classes of identity 

credentials. For physical access, an individual’s identity has traditionally been authenticated by use of 

paper or other non-automated, hand-carried credentials, such as driver’s licenses and badges. Access 

authorization to computers and data has traditionally been based on identities authenticated through userselected passwords. More recently, cryptographic mechanisms and biometric techniques have been used 

in physical and logical security applications, replacing or supplementing the traditional identity 

credentials. 

The strength of the authentication that is achieved varies, depending upon the type of credential, the 

process used to issue the credential, and the authentication mechanism used to validate the credential. 

This document establishes a standard for a Personal Identity Verification (PIV) system based on secure 

and reliable forms of identity credentials issued by the Federal government to its employees and 

contractors. These credentials are intended to authenticate individuals who require access to Federally 

controlled facilities, information systems, and applications. This Standard addresses requirements for 

initial identity proofing, infrastructures to support interoperability of identity credentials, and 

accreditation of organizations and processes issuing PIV credentials. 

222 1.1 Purpose 

This Standard defines a reliable, government-wide identity credential for use in applications such as 

access to Federally controlled facilities and information systems. This Standard has been developed 

within the context and constraints of Federal law, regulations, and policy based on information processing 

technology currently available and evolving. 

This Standard specifies a PIV system within which a common identity credential can be created and later 

used to verify a claimed identity. The Standard also identifies Federal government-wide requirements for 

security levels that are dependent on risks to the facility or information being protected. 

230 1.2 Scope 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 [HSPD-12], signed by President George W. Bush on August 

27, 2004, established the requirements for a common identification standard for identity credentials issued 

by Federal departments and agencies to Federal employees and contractors (including contractor 

employees) for gaining physical access to Federally controlled facilities and logical access to Federally 

controlled information systems. HSPD-12 directs the Department of Commerce to develop a Federal 

Information Processing Standards (FIPS) publication to define such a common identity credential. In 

accordance with HSPD-12, this Standard defines the technical requirements for the identity credential 

that— 

239 (a) is issued based on sound criteria for verifying an individual employee’s identity; 

240 (b) is strongly resistant to identity fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist exploitation; 

241 (c) can be rapidly authenticated electronically; and 

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242 (d) is issued only by providers whose reliability has been established by an official accreditation process. 

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This Standard defines authentication mechanisms offering varying degrees of security for both logical and 

physical access applications. Federal departments and agencies will determine the level of security and 

authentication mechanisms appropriate for their applications. This Standard does not specify access 

control policies or requirements for Federal departments and agencies. Therefore, the scope of this 

Standard is limited to authentication of an individual’s identity. Authorization and access control 

decisions are outside the scope of this Standard. Moreover, requirements for a temporary card used until 

a new or replacement PIV Card arrives are out of scope of this Standard. 

250 1.3 Change Management 

Every revision of this Standard introduces refinements and changes that may impact existing 

implementations. FIPS 201 and its normative specifications encourage implementation approaches that 

reduce the high cost of configuration and change management by architecting resilience to change into 

system processes and components. Nevertheless, changes and modifications are introduced. Because of 

the importance of this issue, this Change Management section has been added to the Standard. 

This section provides change management principles and guidance to manage newly introduced changes 

and modifications to the previous version of this Standard. Specifically, this section provides a 

description of the types of changes expected in FIPS 201 revisions. 

259 1.3.1 Backward Compatible Change 

A backward compatible change is a change or modification to an existing feature that does not break the 

systems using this feature. For example, changing the Card Authentication certificate from optional to 

mandatory does not affect the systems using the Card Authentication certificate for authentication (i.e., 

using the PKI-CAK mechanism). 

264 1.3.2 Non-Backward Compatible Change 

A non-backward compatible change is a change or modification to an existing feature such that the 

modified feature cannot be used with existing systems. For example, changing the format of the 

biometric data would not be compatible with the existing system, because a biometric authentication 

attempt with the modified format would fail. Similarly, changing the PIV Card Application IDentifier 

(AID) would introduce a non-backward compatible change. As a result, all systems interacting with the 

PIV Card would need to be changed to accept the new PIV AID. 

271 1.3.3 New Features 

New features are optional or mandatory features that are added to the Standard. New features do not 

interfere with backward compatibility because they are not part of the existing systems. For example, the 

addition of an optional on-card biometric comparison (OCC) authentication mechanism is a new feature 

that does not affect the features in current systems. The systems will need to be updated if an agency 

decides to support the OCC-AUTH authentication mechanism. 

277 1.3.4 Deprecated and Removed 

When a feature is discontinued or no longer needed, it is deprecated. Such a feature remains in the 

current Standard as an optional feature but its use is strongly discouraged. A deprecated feature does not 

affect existing systems but should be phased out in future systems, because the feature will be removed in 

the next revision of the Standard. For example, existing PIV Cards with deprecated data elements remain 

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valid until they naturally expire. Replacement PIV Cards, however, should not re-use the deprecated 

features because the next revision of the Standard will remove the support for deprecated data elements. 

284 1.3.5 FIPS 201 Version Management 

Subsequent revisions of this Standard may necessitate FIPS 201 version management that introduces new 

version numbers for FIPS 201 products. Components that may be affected by version management 

include, for example, PIV Cards, PIV middleware software, and card issuance systems. 

New version numbers will be assigned in [SP 800-73], if needed, based on the nature of the change. For 

example, new mandatory features introduced in a revision of this Standard may necessitate a new PIV 

Card Application version number so that systems can quickly discover the new mandatory features. 

Optional features, on the other hand, may be discoverable by an on-card discovery mechanism. 

292 1.4 Document Organization 

This Standard describes the minimum requirements for a Federal personal identification system that 

meets the control and security objectives of [HSPD-12], including identity proofing, registration, and 

issuance. It provides detailed technical specifications to support the control and security objectives of 

[HSPD-12] as well as interoperability among Federal departments and agencies. This Standard describes 

the policies and minimum requirements of a PIV Card that allows interoperability of credentials for 

physical and logical access. The physical card characteristics, storage media, and data elements that make 

up identity credentials are specified in this Standard. The interfaces and card architecture for storing and 

retrieving identity credentials from a smart card are specified in Special Publication 800-73 [SP 800-73], 

Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification. Similarly, the requirements for collection and formatting of 

biometric information are specified in Special Publication 800-76 [SP 800-76], Biometric Data 

Specification for Personal Identity Verification. The requirements for cryptographic algorithms are 

specified in Special Publication 800-78 [SP 800-78], Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for 

Personal Identity Verification. The requirements for the accreditation of PIV Card issuers are specified in 

Special Publication 800-79 [SP 800-79], Guidelines for the Accreditation of Personal Identity 

Verification Card Issuers. The unique organizational codes for Federal agencies are assigned in Special 

Publication 800-87 [SP 800-87], Codes for the Identification of Federal and Federally-Assisted 

Organizations. The requirements for the PIV Card reader are provided in Special Publication 800-96 [SP 

800-96], PIV Card to Reader Interoperability Guidelines. The format for encoding the chain-of-trust for 

import and export is specified in Special Publication 800-156 [SP 800-156], Representation of PIV 

Chain-of-Trust for Import and Export. The requirements for issuing PIV derived credentials are specified 

in Special Publication 800-157 [SP 800-157], Guidelines for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Derived 

Credentials. 

This Standard contains normative references to other documents, and to the extent described in each 

citation these documents are included by reference in this Standard. Should normative text in this 

Standard conflict with normative text in a referenced document the normative text in this Standard 

prevails for this Standard. 

All sections in this document are normative (i.e., mandatory for compliance) unless specified as 

informative (i.e., non-mandatory). Following is the structure of this document: 

+ Section 1, Introduction, provides background information for understanding the scope of this 

Standard. This section is informative. 

 REVISED DRAFT 3
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

 REVISED DRAFT 4 

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+ Section 2, Common Identification, Security, and Privacy Requirements, outlines the requirements 

for identity proofing, registration, and issuance, by establishing the control and security 

objectives for compliance with [HSPD-12]. This section is normative. 

+ Section 3, PIV System Overview, serves to provide a PIV system overview. This section is 

informative. 

+ Section 4, PIV Front-End Subsystem, provides the requirements for the components of the PIV 

front-end subsystem. Specifically, this section defines requirements for the PIV Card, logical 

data elements, biometrics, cryptography, and card readers. This section is normative. 

+ Section 5, PIV Key Management Requirements, defines the processes and components required 

for managing a PIV Card’s lifecycle. It also provides the requirements and specifications related 

to this subsystem. This section is normative. 

+ Section 6, PIV Cardholder Authentication, defines a suite of authentication mechanisms that are 

supported by the PIV Card, and their applicability in meeting the requirements of graduated 

levels of identity assurance. This section is normative. 

+ Appendix A, PIV Validation, Certification, and Accreditation, provides additional information 

regarding compliance with this document. This appendix is normative. 

+ Appendix B, PIV Object Identifiers and Certificate Extension, provides additional details for the 

PIV objects identified in Section 4. This appendix is normative. 

+ Appendix C, Glossary of Terms, Acronyms, and Notations, describes the vocabulary and textual 

representations used in the document. This appendix is informative. 

+ Appendix D, References, lists the specifications and standards referred to in this document. This 

appendix is informative. 

+ Appendix E, Revision History, lists changes made to this Standard from its inception. This 

appendix is informative. 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

347 2. Common Identification, Security, and Privacy Requirements 

348 

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This section addresses the fundamental control and security objectives outlined in [HSPD-12], including 

the identity proofing requirements for Federal employees and contractors. 

350 2.1 Control Objectives 

[HSPD-12] established control objectives for secure and reliable identification of Federal employees and 

contractors. These control objectives, provided in paragraph 3 of the directive, are quoted here: 

(3) "Secure and reliable forms of identification" for purposes of this directive means identification that (a) 

is issued based on sound criteria for verifying an individual employee's identity; (b) is strongly resistant to 

identity fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist exploitation; (c) can be rapidly authenticated 

electronically; and (d) is issued only by providers whose reliability has been established by an official 

accreditation process. 

Each agency’s PIV implementation shall meet the four control objectives (a) through (d) listed above 

such that— 

360 + Credentials are issued 1) to individuals whose identity has been verified and 2) after a proper 

authority has authorized issuance of the credential. 

362 + A credential is issued only after National Agency Check with Written Inquiries (NACI) (or equivalent 

or higher) or Tier 1 or higher federal background investigation is initiated and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) National Criminal History Check (NCHC) portion of the background 

investigation is completed. 

366 + An individual is issued a credential only after presenting two identity source documents, at least one 

of which is a Federal or State government issued picture ID. 

368 + Fraudulent identity source documents are not accepted as genuine and unaltered. 

369 + A person suspected or known to the government as being a terrorist is not issued a credential. 

370 + No substitution occurs in the identity proofing process. More specifically, the individual who appears 

for identity proofing, and whose fingerprints are checked against databases, is the person to whom the 

credential is issued. 

373 + No credential is issued unless requested by proper authority. 

374 + A credential remains serviceable only up to its expiration date. More precisely, a revocation process 

exists such that expired or invalidated credentials are swiftly revoked. 

376 + A single corrupt official in the process may not issue a credential with an incorrect identity or to a 

person not entitled to the credential. 

378 + An issued credential is not duplicated or forged, and is not modified by an unauthorized entity. 

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PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

379 2.2 Credentialing Requirements 

Federal departments and agencies shall use the credentialing guidance issued by the Director of the Office 

of Personnel Management (OPM) to heads of departments and agencies when determining whether to 

issue or revoke PIV Cards (e.g., [SPRINGER MEMO], [FIS]

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2

). In addition to OPM’s [FIS], Federal 

department and agencies shall also apply credentialing requirements specified in applicable OMB 

memoranda (e.g., OMB Memorandum M-05-24 [OMB0524]).

385 2.3 Biometric Data Collection for Background Investigations 

The following biometric data shall be collected from each PIV applicant: 

387 + A full set of fingerprints. Biometric identification using fingerprints is the primary input to law 

enforcement checks. In cases where ten fingerprints are not available, then as many fingers as 

possible shall be imaged. In cases where obtaining any fingerprints is impossible, agencies shall seek 

OPM guidance for alternative means of performing the law enforcement checks. 

This collection is not necessary for applicants who have a completed and favorably adjudicated NACI (or 

equivalent or higher) or Tier 1 or higher federal background investigation that can be located and 

referenced. 

Fingerprint collection shall be conformant to the procedural and technical specifications of [SP 800-76]. 

395 2.4 Biometric Data Collection for PIV Card 

The following biometric data shall be collected from each PIV applicant: 

397 + Two fingerprints, for off-card comparison. These shall be taken either from the full set of fingerprints 

collected in Section 2.3, or collected independently. 

399 + An electronic facial image. 

The following biometric data may optionally be collected from a PIV applicant: 

401 + One or two iris images. 

402 + Two fingerprints, for on-card comparison, which may be the same as the two fingerprints collected 

for off-card comparison. 

If the biometric data that is collected as specified in this section and in Section 2.3 is collected on separate 

occasions, then a 1:1 biometric match of the applicant shall be performed at each visit against biometric 

data collected during a previous visit. 

Biometric data collection shall be conformant to the procedural and technical specifications of 

[SP 800-76]. The choice of which two fingers is important and may vary between persons. The 

recommended selection and order is specified in [SP 800-76]. 

2

 Federal Investigative Standards. [URL will be added for OPM’s new investigative standard once published ~July 2012.] 

 REVISED DRAFT 6 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

410 2.5 Biometric Data Use 

The full set of fingerprints shall be used for one-to-many identification in the databases of fingerprints 

maintained by the FBI. 

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The two mandatory fingerprints shall be used for preparation of templates to be stored on the PIV Card as 

described in Section 4.2.3.1. The fingerprints provide an interagency-interoperable authentication 

mechanism through a match-off-card scheme as described in Section 6.2.1. These fingerprints are also 

the primary means of authentication during PIV issuance and maintenance processes. 

The optional fingerprints may be used for preparation of the fingerprint templates for on-card comparison 

as described in Section 4.2.3.1. OCC may be used to support card activation as described in Section 4.3.1 

and cardholder authentication as described in Section 6.2.2. 

The electronic iris images may be stored on the PIV Card as described in Section 4.2.3.1. Agencies may 

choose to collect iris biometrics as a second biometric to support multimodal authentication to improve 

accuracy, operational suitability, to accommodate user preferences, or as a backup when the fingerprint 

biometric is unavailable. 

The electronic facial image: 

425 + shall be stored on the PIV Card as described in Section 4.2.3.1; 

426 + shall be printed on the PIV Card according to Section 4.1.4.1; 

427 + may be used for generating a visual image on the monitor of a guard workstation for augmenting the 

visual authentication process defined in Section 6.2.6; and 

429 + may be used for biometric authentication in operator-attended PIV issuance, reissuance, renewal and 

verification data reset processes. 

431 2.6 Chain-of-Trust 

A card issuer may optionally maintain, for each PIV Card issued, a documentary chain-of-trust for the 

identification data it collects. The chain-of-trust is a sequence of related enrollment data records that are 

created and maintained through the methods of contemporaneous acquisition of data within each 

enrollment data record, and biometric matching of samples between enrollment data records.3

It is recommended that the following data be included in the chain-of-trust: 

437 + A log of activities that documents who took the action, what action was taken, when and where the 

action took place, and what identification data was collected. 

439 + An enrollment data record that contains the most recent collection of each of the biometric data 

collected. The enrollment data record describes the circumstances of biometric acquisition including 

the name and role of the acquiring agent, the office and organization, time, place, and acquisition 

3

 For example, ten fingerprints for law enforcement checks may be collected at one time and place, and two fingerprints for PIV 

Card templates may be collected at a later time and different place, provided that the two fingerprints are verified as among the 

ten original fingerprints. 

 REVISED DRAFT 7
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

442 

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478 

method. The enrollment data record may also document unavailable biometric data or failed attempts 

to collect biometric data. The enrollment data record may contain historical biometric data. 

444 + The most recent unique identifiers (i.e., Federal Agency Smart Credential Number (FASC-N) and 

Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID)) issued to the individual. The record may contain historical 

unique identifiers. 

447 + Information about the authorizing entity who has approved the issuance of a credential. 

448 + Current status of the background investigation, including the results of the investigation once 

completed. 

450 + The evidence of authorization if the credential is issued under a pseudonym. 

451 + Any data or any subsequent changes in the data about the cardholder. If the changed data is the 

cardholder’s name, then the issuer should include the evidence of a formal name change. 

The biometric data in the chain-of-trust shall be valid for at most 12 years. In order to mitigate ageing 

effects and thereby maintain operational readiness of a cardholder's PIV Card, agencies may require 

biometric enrollment more frequently than 12 years. 

The chain-of-trust contains personally identifiable information (PII). If implemented, it shall be protected 

in a manner that protects the individual’s privacy and maintains the integrity of the chain-of-trust record 

both in transit and at rest. A card issuer may import and export a chain-of-trust in the manner and 

representation described in [SP 800-156]. 

The chain-of-trust can be applied in several situations to include: 

461 + Extended enrollment: a PIV applicant enrolls a full set of fingerprints for background investigations 

at one place and time, and two fingerprints for the PIV Card at another place and time. The chain-oftrust would contain identifiers and two enrollment data records, one with a full-set fingerprint 

transaction, and one with two fingerprint templates. The two fingerprint templates would be matched 

against the corresponding fingers in the ten-fingerprint data set to link the chain. 

466 + Reissuance: a PIV cardholder loses his/her card. Since the card issuer has biometric enrollment data 

records, the cardholder can perform a 1:1 biometric match to reconnect to the card issuer’s chain-oftrust. The card issuer need not repeat the identity proofing and registration process. The card issuer 

proceeds to issue a new card as described in Section 2.9.2. 

470 + Interagency transfer: a Federal employee is transferred from one agency to another. When the 

employee leaves the old agency, he/she surrenders the PIV Card and it is destroyed. When the 

employee arrives at the new agency and is processed in, the card issuer in the new agency requests the 

employee’s chain-of-trust from the card issuer in the old agency, and receives the chain-of-trust. The 

employee performs a 1:1 biometric match against the chain-of-trust, and the interaction proceeds as 

described in Section 2.8.2. 

476 2.7 PIV Identity Proofing and Registration Requirements 

Departments and agencies shall follow an identity proofing and registration process that meets the 

requirements defined below when issuing PIV Cards. 

 REVISED DRAFT 8 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

479 + The organization shall adopt and use an approved identity proofing and registration process in 

480 accordance with [SP 800-79]. 

483 

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493 ification: 

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481 + Biometrics shall be captured as specified in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. 

482 + The process shall begin by locating and referencing a completed and favorably adjudicated NACI (or 

equivalent or higher) or Tier 1 or higher federal background investigation record. In the absence of a 

record, the process shall ensure 1) the initiation of a Tier 1 or higher federal background investigation and 

2) the completion of the Automated Record Checks (ARC) of the background investigation. In cases where 

the ARC results are not received within 5 days of the ARC initiation, the FBI NCHC (fingerprint check) 

portion of the ARC shall be complete before credential issuance. 

488 + The applicant shall appear in-person at least once before the issuance of a PIV Card. 

489 + During identity proofing, the applicant shall be required to provide two forms of identity source 

documents in original form.4 The identity source documents shall be bound to that applicant and 

shall be neither expired nor cancelled. If the two identity source documents bear different names, 

evidence of a formal name change shall be provided. The primary identity source document shall be 

one of the following forms of ident

− a U.S. Passport or a U.S. Passport Card; 

− a Permanent Resident Card or an Alien Registration Receipt Card (Form I-551); 

− a foreign passport; 

− an Employment Authorization Document that contains a photograph (Form I-766); 

− a Driver's license or an ID card issued by a state or possession of the United States provided it 

contains a photograph; 

− a U.S. Military ID card; 

− a U.S. Military dependent's ID card; or 

− a PIV Card. 

The secondary identity source document may be from the list above, but cannot be of the same type 

as the primary identity source document. The secondary identity source document may also be any of 

the following: 

− a U.S. Social Security Card issued by the Social Security Administration; 

− an original or certified copy of a birth certificate issued by a state, county, municipal 

authority, possession, or outlying possession of the United States bearing an official seal; 

− an ID card issued by a federal, state, or local government agency or entity, provided it 

contains a photograph; 

4

 Departments and agencies may choose to accept only a subset of the identity source documents listed in this section. For 

example, in cases where identity proofing for PIV Card issuance is performed prior to verification of employment 

authorization, departments and agencies may choose to require the applicant to provide identity source documents that 

satisfy the requirements of Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, in addition to the requirements specified in this 

section. 

 REVISED DRAFT 9
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

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− a voter's registration card; 

− a U.S. Coast Guard Merchant Mariner Card; 

− a Certificate of U.S. Citizenship (Form N-560 or N-561); 

− a Certificate of Naturalization (Form N-550 or N-570); 

− a U.S. Citizen ID Card (Form I-197); 

− an Identification Card for Use of Resident Citizen in the United States (Form I-179); 

− a Certification of Birth Abroad or Certification of Report of Birth issued by the Department 

of State (Form FS-545 or Form DS-1350); 

− a Temporary Resident Card (Form I-688); 

− an Employment Authorization Card (Form I-688A); 

− a Reentry Permit (Form I-327); 

− a Refugee Travel Document (Form I-571); 

− an Employment authorization document issued by Department of Homeland Security (DHS); 

− an Employment Authorization Document issued by DHS with photograph (Form I-688B); 

− a driver's license issued by a Canadian government entity; or 

− a Native American tribal document. 

527 + The PIV identity proofing, registration, issuance, reissuance, and renewal processes shall adhere to 

the principle of separation of duties to ensure that no single individual has the capability to issue a 

PIV Card without the cooperation of another authorized person. 

The identity proofing and registration process used when verifying the identity of the applicant shall be 

accredited by the department or agency as satisfying the requirements above and approved in writing by 

the head or deputy secretary (or equivalent) of the Federal department or agency. 

The requirements for identity proofing and registration also apply to citizens of foreign countries who are 

working for the Federal government overseas. However, a process for identity proofing and registration 

must be established using a method approved by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security, except for employees under the command of a U.S. area military commander. These procedures 

may vary depending on the country. 

538 2.8 PIV Card Issuance Requirements 

Departments and agencies shall meet the requirements defined below when issuing identity credentials. 

The issuance process used when issuing credentials shall be accredited by the department as satisfying the 

requirements below and approved in writing by the head or deputy secretary (or equivalent) of the Federal 

department or agency. 

543 + Credentials are issued after a proper authority has authorized issuance of the credential. 

 REVISED DRAFT 10 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

544 + The organization shall use an approved PIV credential issuance process in accordance with 

545 [SP 800-79]. 

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546 + Before issuing the identity credential, the process shall ensure that a previously completed and favorably 

adjudicated NACI (or equivalent or higher) or Tier 1 or higher federal background investigation is on 

record. In the absence of a record, the required federal background investigation shall be initiated. The 

credential should not be issued before the results of the ARC are complete. However, if the results of the 

ARC have not been received in 5 days, the identity credential may be issued based on the FBI NCHC. In 

the absence of an FBI NCHC (e.g., due to unclassifiable fingerprints) the ARC results are required prior to 

issuing a PIV Card. The PIV Card shall be revoked if the results of the background investigation so justify. 

553 + Biometrics used to personalize the PIV Card must be those captured during the identity proofing and 

registration process. 

555 + During the issuance process, the issuer shall verify that the individual to whom the credential is to be 

issued is the same as the intended applicant/recipient as approved by the appropriate authority. 

Before the card is provided to the applicant, the issuer shall perform a 1:1 biometric match of the 

applicant against biometrics available on the PIV Card. The 1:1 biometric match requires either a 

match of fingerprint(s) or, if unavailable, other optional biometric data that are available. Minimum 

accuracy requirements for the biometric match are specified in [SP 800-76]. On successful match, the 

PIV Card shall be released to the applicant. If the match is unsuccessful, or if no biometric data is 

available, the cardholder shall provide two identity source documents (as specified in Section 2.7), 

and an attending operator shall inspect these and compare the cardholder with the facial image printed 

on the PIV Card. 

565 + The organization shall issue PIV credentials only through systems and providers whose reliability has 

been established by the agency and so documented and approved in writing (i.e., accredited) in 

accordance with [SP 800-79]. 

568 + The PIV Card shall be valid for no more than six years. 

PIV Cards that contain topographical defects (e.g., scratches, poor color, fading, etc.) or that are not 

properly printed shall be destroyed. The PIV Card issuer is responsible for the card stock, its 

management, and its integrity. 

572 2.8.1 Special Rule for Pseudonyms 

In limited circumstances Federal employees and contractors are permitted to use pseudonyms during the 

performance of their official duties with the approval of their employing agency. If an agency determines 

that use of a pseudonym is necessary to protect an employee or contractor (e.g., from physical harm, 

severe distress, or harassment),5

 the agency may formally authorize the issuance of a PIV Card to the 

employee or contractor using the agency-approved pseudonym. The issuance of a PIV Card using an 

authorized pseudonym shall follow the procedures in Section 2.8, PIV Card Issuance Requirements, 

except that the card issuer must receive satisfactory evidence that the pseudonym is authorized by the 

agency. 

5

 See, for example, Section 10.5.7 of the Internal Revenue Service Manual (http://www.irs.gov/irm/index.html), which authorizes 

approval by an employee's supervisor of the use of a pseudonym to protect the employee's personal safety. 

 REVISED DRAFT 11
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

581 2.8.2 Grace Period 

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In some instances an individual's status as a Federal employee or contractor will lapse for a brief time 

period. For example, a Federal employee may leave one Federal agency for another Federal agency and 

thus occur a short employment lapse period, or an individual who was under contract to a Federal agency 

may receive a new contract from that agency shortly after the previous contract expired. In these 

instances, the card issuer may issue a new PIV Card without repeating the identity proofing and 

registration process if the issuer has access to the applicant’s chain-of-trust record and the applicant can 

be reconnected to the chain-of-trust record. 

When issuing a PIV Card under the grace period, the card issuer shall verify that PIV Card issuance has 

been authorized by a proper authority and that the employee’s or contractor’s background investigation is 

valid. Re-investigations shall be performed if required, in accordance with OPM guidance. At the time 

of issuance, the card issuer shall perform a 1:1 biometric match of the applicant to reconnect to the chainof-trust. The 1:1 biometric match requires either a match of fingerprint(s) or, if unavailable, other 

optional biometric data that are available. On successful match, the new PIV Card shall be released to the 

applicant. If the match is unsuccessful, or if no biometric data is available, the cardholder shall provide 

the two identity source documents (as specified in Section 2.7), and an attending operator shall inspect 

these and compare the cardholder with the facial image retrieved from the enrollment data record and the 

facial image printed on the new PIV Card. 

599 2.9 PIV Card Maintenance Requirements 

The PIV Card shall be maintained using processes that comply with this section. 

The data and credentials held by the PIV Card may need to be updated or invalidated prior to the 

expiration date of the card. The cardholder may change his or her name, retire, or change jobs; or the 

employment may be terminated, thus requiring invalidation of a previously issued card. In this regard, 

procedures for PIV Card maintenance must be integrated into department and agency procedures to 

ensure effective card maintenance. In order to maintain operational readiness of a cardholder's PIV Card, 

agencies may require PIV Card update, reissuance, or biometric enrollment more frequently than the 

maximum PIV Card and biometric lifetimes stated in this Standard. Shorter lifetimes may be specified by 

agency policy collectively, or on a case-by-case basis as sub-par operation is encountered. 

609 2.9.1 PIV Card Renewal Requirements 

Renewal is the process by which a valid PIV Card is replaced without the need to repeat the entire 

identity proofing and registration procedure. The renewal process may be used to replace a PIV Card that 

is nearing expiration or in the event of an employee status or attribute change. The entire identity

proofing, registration, and issuance process, as described in Sections 2.7 and 2.8, shall be repeated if the 

issuer does not maintain a chain-of-trust record for the cardholder or if the renewal process was not 

started before the original PIV Card expired. 

The renewal process for a PIV Card starts when a proper authority authorizes renewal of the credential. 

The issuer shall verify that the employee’s or contractor’s background investigation is valid before 

renewing the card and associated credentials. Re-investigations shall be performed if required, in 

accordance with OPM guidance. 

The issuer shall perform a 1:1 biometric match of the applicant to reconnect to the chain-of-trust. The 1:1 

biometric match requires either a match of fingerprint(s) or, if unavailable, other optional biometric data 

that are available. Minimum accuracy requirements for the biometric match are specified in [SP 800-76]. 

 REVISED DRAFT 12 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

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On successful match, the new PIV Card shall be released to the applicant. If the match is unsuccessful, or 

if no biometric data is available, the cardholder shall provide the original PIV Card and another primary 

identity source document (as specified in Section 2.7), and an attending operator shall inspect these and 

compare the cardholder with the facial image retrieved from the enrollment data record and the facial 

image printed on the new PIV Card. 

Prior to receiving the new PIV Card, the cardholder shall surrender the original PIV Card, which shall be 

collected and destroyed when the new PIV Card is issued. 

If there is any data change about the cardholder, the issuer will record this in the chain-of-trust, if 

applicable. If the changed data is the cardholder’s name, then the issuer shall meet the requirements in 

Section 2.9.1.1, Special Rule for Name Change by Cardholder. 

Previously collected biometric data may be reused with the new PIV Card if the expiration date of the 

new PIV Card is no later than 12 years after the date that the biometric data was obtained. As biometric 

authentication accuracy degrades with the time elapsed since initial collection, issuers may elect to refresh 

the biometric data after reconnecting the applicant to their chain-of-trust. Even if the same biometric data 

is reused with the new PIV Card, the digital signature must be recomputed with the new FASC-N and 

UUID. 

A new PIV Authentication certificate and a new Card Authentication certificate shall be generated. The 

corresponding certificates shall be populated with the new FASC-N and UUID. For cardholders who are 

required to have a digital signature certificate, a new digital signature certificate shall also be generated. 

Key management key(s) and certificate(s) may be imported to the new PIV Card. 

643 2.9.1.1 Special Rule for Name Change by Cardholder 

Name changes frequently occur as a result of marriage, divorce, or as a matter of personal preference. In 

the event that a cardholder notifies a card issuer that his or her name has changed, and presents the card 

issuer with evidence of a formal name change, such as a marriage certificate, a divorce decree, judicial 

recognition of a name change, or other mechanism permitted by State law or regulation, the card issuer 

shall issue the cardholder a new card following the procedures set out in Section 2.9.1, PIV Card Renewal 

Requirements. If the expiration date of the new card is no later than the expiration date of the original 

PIV Card and no data about the cardholder, other than the cardholder’s name, is being changed, then the 

new PIV Card may be issued without obtaining the approval of a proper authority and without performing 

a re-investigation. 

653 2.9.2 PIV Card Reissuance Requirements 

Reissuance is the process by which a PIV Card that has been compromised, lost, stolen, or damaged is 

replaced by a new PIV Card without the need to repeat the entire identity proofing and registration 

procedure. The cardholder can also apply for reissuance of a valid PIV Card if one or more logical 

credentials have been compromised. The entire identity proofing, registration, and issuance process, as 

described in Sections 2.7 and 2.8, shall be repeated if the issuer does not maintain a chain-of-trust record 

for the cardholder or if the cardholder did not apply for reissuance before the original PIV Card expired. 

In case of reissuance, the card issuer shall verify that the employee’s or contractor’s background 

investigation is valid before reissuing the card and associated credentials. 

The issuer shall perform a 1:1 biometric match of the applicant to reconnect to the chain-of-trust. The 1:1 

biometric match requires either a match of fingerprint(s) or, if unavailable, other optional biometric data 

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held in the chain-of-trust (see Section 2.6). Minimum accuracy requirements for the biometric match are 

specified in [SP 800-76]. On successful match, the new PIV Card shall be released to the applicant. If 

the match is unsuccessful, or if no biometric data is available, the cardholder shall provide two identity 

source documents (as specified in Section 2.7), and an attending operator shall inspect these and compare 

the cardholder with the facial image retrieved from the enrollment data record and the facial image 

printed on the new card. 

When reissuing a PIV Card, normal revocation procedures must be in place for the compromised, lost, 

stolen, or damaged card to ensure the following: 

672 + The PIV Card itself is revoked. Any local databases that contain FASC-N or UUID values must be 

updated to reflect the change in status. 

674 + The certification authority (CA) shall be informed and the certificates corresponding to the PIV 

Authentication key and asymmetric Card Authentication key on the PIV Card shall be revoked. If 

present, the certificates corresponding to the digital signature key and the key management key shall 

also be revoked. 

The PIV Card shall be collected and destroyed if possible. In the case of a lost, stolen, or compromised 

card, normal revocation procedures shall be completed within 18 hours of notification. In certain cases, 

18 hours is an unacceptable delay and in those cases emergency procedures must be executed to 

disseminate the information as rapidly as possible. Departments and agencies are required to have 

procedures in place to issue emergency notifications in such cases. 

If the expiration date of the reissued PIV Card is later than the expiration date of the old card, the card 

issuer shall ensure that a proper authority has authorized reissuance of the credential, and that a reinvestigation is performed if required, in accordance with OPM guidance. The same biometric data may 

be reused with the new PIV Card if the expiration date of the new PIV Card is no later than 12 years after 

the date that the biometric data was obtained. 

688 2.9.3 PIV Card Post Issuance Update Requirements 

A PIV Card post issuance update may be performed without replacing the PIV Card in cases where none 

of the printed information on the surface of the card is changed. The post issuance update applies to cases 

where one or more certificates, keys, biometric data objects, or signed data objects are updated. A post 

issuance update shall not modify the PIV Card expiration date, FASC-N, or UUID. 

A PIV Card post issuance update may be done locally (performed with the issuer in physical custody of 

the PIV Card) or remotely (performed with the PIV Card at a remote location). Post issuance updates 

shall be performed with issuer security controls equivalent to those applied during PIV Card reissuance. 

For remote post issuance updates, the following shall apply: 

697 + Communication between the PIV Card issuer and the PIV Card shall occur only over mutually 

authenticated secure sessions between tested and validated cryptographic modules (one being the PIV 

Card). 

700 + Data transmitted between the PIV Card issuer and PIV Card shall be encrypted and contain data 

integrity checks. 

702 + The PIV Card Application will communicate with no end point entity other than the PIV Card issuer 

during the remote post issuance update. 

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PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

Post issuance updates to biometric data objects, other than to the digital signature blocks within the 

biometric data objects, shall satisfy the requirements for verification data reset specified in Section 2.9.4. 

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If the PIV Authentication key, asymmetric Card Authentication key, the digital signature key, or the key 

management key, was compromised, the corresponding certificate shall be revoked. 

708 2.9.4 PIV Card Verification Data Reset 

The Personal Identification Number (PIN) on a PIV Card may need to be reset if the cardholder has 

forgotten the PIN or if PIN-based cardholder authentication has been disabled from the usage of an 

invalid PIN more than the allowed number of retries stipulated by the department or agency.6

 PIN reset 

may be performed in-person at the issuer’s facility, at an unattended kiosk operated by the issuer, or 

remotely via a general computing platform: 

714 + When PIN reset is performed in-person at the issuer's facility, the issuer shall ensure that the 

cardholder's biometric matches the stored biometric on the reset PIV Card, through either an on-card 

or off-card 1:1 biometric match, before providing the reset PIV Card back to the cardholder. In cases 

where a biometric match is not possible, the cardholder shall provide the PIV Card to be reset and 

another primary identity source document (as specified in Section 2.7). An attending operator shall 

inspect these and compare the cardholder with the facial image retrieved from the enrollment data 

record and the facial image printed on the card. 

721 + PIN reset at an unattended issuer-operated kiosk shall ensure that the cardholder’s biometric matches 

the stored biometric on the PIV Card, through either an on-card or off-card 1:1 biometric match, and 

that the PIV Card is authenticated. If the biometric match or card authentication is unsuccessful, the 

kiosk shall not reset the PIV Card. 

725 + Remote PIN reset on a general computing platform (e.g., desktop, laptop) shall only be performed if 

the following requirements are met: 

o the cardholder initiates a PIN reset with the issuer operator; 

o the operator authenticates the owner of the PIV Card through an out-of-band authentication 

procedure (e.g., pre-registered knowledge tokens); and 

o the cardholder’s biometric matches the stored biometric on the PIV Card through a 1:1 oncard biometric comparison. 

The remote PIN reset operation shall satisfy the requirements for remote post issuance updates 

specified in Section 2.9.3. 

Departments and agencies may adopt more stringent procedures for PIN reset (including disallowing PIN 

reset). PIN reset procedures shall be formally documented by each department and agency. 

Verification data other than the PIN may also be reset (i.e., re-enrollment) by the card issuer. Before the 

reset, the issuer shall perform a 1:1 biometric match of the cardholder to reconnect to the chain-of-trust. 

The type of biometric used for the match shall not be the same as the type of biometric data that is being 

reset. For example, if fingerprint templates for on-card comparison are being reset, then a 1:1 iris match 

could be used to reconnect to the chain-of-trust. If no alternative biometric data is available, the 

cardholder shall provide the PIV Card to be reset and another primary identity source document (as 

6

 Cardholders may change their PINs anytime by providing the current PIN and the new PIN values. 

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specified in Section 2.7). An attending operator shall inspect these and compare the cardholder with the 

facial image retrieved from the enrollment data record and the facial image printed on the PIV Card. 

New verification reference data shall be enrolled. The PIV Card’s activation methods associated with the 

verification data shall be reset and the new verification data shall be stored on the card. 

Departments and agencies may adopt more stringent procedures for verification data reset (including 

disallowing verification data reset); such procedures shall be formally documented by each department 

and agency. 

749 2.9.5 PIV Card Termination Requirements 

The PIV Card shall be terminated under the following circumstances: 

751 + a Federal employee separates (voluntarily or involuntarily) from Federal service; 

752 + an employee of a Federal contractor separates (voluntarily or involuntarily) from his or her employer; 

753 + a contractor changes positions and no longer needs access to Federal buildings or systems; 

754 + a cardholder is determined to hold a fraudulent identity; or 

755 + a cardholder passes away. 

Similar to the situation in which the card or a credential is compromised, normal termination procedures 

must be in place as to ensure the following: 

758 + The PIV Card shall be collected and destroyed, if possible. 

759 + The PIV Card itself is revoked. Any local databases that indicate current valid (or invalid) FASC-N 

or UUID values must be updated to reflect the change in status. 

761 + The CA shall be informed and the certificates corresponding to PIV Authentication key and the 

asymmetric Card Authentication key on the PIV Card shall be revoked. If the PIV Card cannot be 

collected, the certificates corresponding to the digital signature and key management keys shall also 

be revoked, if present. If the PIV Card is collected and destroyed, then revocation of the certificates 

corresponding to the digital signature and key management keys is optional. 

766 + The PII collected from the cardholder is disposed of in accordance with the stated privacy and data 

retention policies of the department or agency. 

If the card cannot be collected, normal termination procedures shall be completed within 18 hours of 

notification. In certain cases, 18 hours is an unacceptable delay and in those cases emergency procedures 

must be executed to disseminate the information as rapidly as possible. Departments and agencies are 

required to have procedures in place to issue emergency notifications in such cases. 

772 2.10 PIV Derived Credentials Issuance Requirements 

A valid PIV Card may be used as the basis for issuing a PIV derived credential in accordance with NIST 

Special Publication 800-157, Guidelines for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Derived Credentials

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PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

[SP 800-157]. When a cardholder's PIV Card is terminated as specified in Section 2.9.5, any PIV derived 

credentials issued to the cardholder shall also be terminated. 

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777 2.11 PIV Privacy Requirements 

HSPD-12 explicitly states that “protect[ing] personal privacy” is a requirement of the PIV system. As 

such, all departments and agencies shall implement the PIV system in accordance with the spirit and letter 

of all privacy controls specified in this Standard, as well as those specified in Federal privacy laws and 

policies including but not limited to the E-Government Act of 2002 [E-Gov], the Privacy Act of 1974 

[PRIVACY], and OMB Memorandum M-03-22 [OMB0322], as applicable. 

Departments and agencies may have a wide variety of uses of the PIV system and its components that 

were not intended or anticipated by the President in issuing [HSPD-12]. In considering whether a 

proposed use of the PIV system is appropriate, departments and agencies shall consider the 

aforementioned control objectives and the purpose of this Standard, namely “to enhance security, increase 

Government efficiency, reduce identity fraud, and protect personal privacy” [HSPD-12]. No department 

or agency shall implement a use of the identity credential inconsistent with these control objectives. 

To ensure the privacy throughout PIV lifecycle, departments and agencies shall do the following: 

+ Assign an individual to the role of privacy official.7 790 The privacy official is the individual who 

oversees privacy-related matters in the PIV system and is responsible for implementing the privacy 

requirements in the Standard. The individual serving in this role shall not assume any other 

operational role in the PIV system. 

794 + Conduct a comprehensive Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) on systems containing PII for the 

purpose of implementing PIV, consistent with the methodology of [E-Gov] and the requirements of 

[OMB0322]. Consult with appropriate personnel responsible for privacy issues at the department or 

agency (e.g., Chief Information Officer) implementing the PIV system. 

798 + Write, publish, and maintain a clear and comprehensive document listing the types of information that 

will be collected (e.g., transactional information, PII), the purpose of collection, what information 

may be disclosed to whom during the life of the credential, how the information will be protected, and 

the complete set of uses of the credential and related information at the department or agency. 

Provide PIV applicants full disclosure of the intended uses of the information associated with the PIV 

Card and the related privacy implications. 

804 + Assure that systems that contain PII for the purpose of enabling the implementation of PIV are 

handled in full compliance with fair information practices as defined in [PRIVACY]. 

806 + Maintain appeals procedures for those who are denied a credential or whose credentials are revoked. 

807 + Ensure that only personnel with a legitimate need for access to PII in the PIV system are authorized to 

access the PII, including but not limited to information and databases maintained for registration and 

credential issuance.8

7

 Privacy official refers to the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP) or Chief Privacy Officer (CPO). 8

 Agencies may refer to NIST SP 800-122 [SP 800-122], Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of Personally Identifiable 

Information (PII), for a best practice guideline on protection of PII. 

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PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

 REVISED DRAFT 18 

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810 + Coordinate with appropriate department or agency officials to define consequences for violating 

privacy policies of the PIV system. 

812 + Assure that the technologies used in the department or agency’s implementation of the PIV system 

allow for continuous auditing of compliance with stated privacy policies and practices governing the 

collection, use, and distribution of information in the operation of the program. 

815 + Utilize security controls described in [SP 800-53], Recommended Security Controls for Federal 

Information Systems, to accomplish privacy goals, where applicable. 

817 + Ensure that the technologies used to implement PIV sustain and do not erode privacy protections 

relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of PII. Specifically, employees may choose to use an 

electromagnetically opaque sleeve or other technology to protect against any unauthorized contactless 

access to information stored on a PIV Card. 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

821 3. PIV System Overview 

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The PIV system is composed of components and processes that support a common (smart card-based) 

platform for identity authentication across Federal departments and agencies for access to multiple types 

of physical and logical access environments. The specifications for the PIV components in this Standard 

promote uniformity and interoperability among the various PIV system components, across departments 

and agencies, and across installations. The specifications for processes in this Standard are a set of 

minimum requirements for the various activities that need to be performed within an operational PIV 

system. When implemented in accordance with this Standard, the PIV Card supports a suite of 

authentication mechanisms that can be used consistently across departments and agencies. The 

authenticated identity information can then be used as a basis for access control in various Federal 

physical and logical access environments. The following sections briefly discuss the functional 

components of the PIV system and the lifecycle activities of the PIV Card. 

833 3.1 Functional Components 

An operational PIV system can be logically divided into the following three major subsystems: 

835 + PIV Front-End Subsystem—PIV Card, card and biometric readers, and PIN input device. The PIV 

cardholder interacts with these components to gain physical or logical access to the desired Federal 

resource. 

838 + PIV Card Issuance and Management Subsystem—the components responsible for identity 

proofing and registration, card and key issuance and management, and the various repositories and 

services (e.g., public key infrastructure (PKI) directory, certificate status servers) required as part of 

the verification infrastructure. 

842 + PIV Relying Subsystem—the physical and logical access control systems, the protected resources, 

and the authorization data. 

The PIV relying subsystem becomes relevant when the PIV Card is used to authenticate a cardholder who 

is seeking access to a physical or logical resource. Although this Standard does not provide technical 

specifications for this subsystem, various mechanisms for identification and authentication are defined in 

Section 6 to provide consistent and secure means for performing the authentication function preceding an 

access control decision. 

Figure 3-1 illustrates a notional model for the operational PIV system, identifying the various system 

components and the direction of data flow between these components. The boundary shown in the figure 

is not meant to preclude FIPS 201 requirements on systems outside these boundaries. 

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Figure 3-1. PIV System Notional Model 

855 3.1.1 PIV Front-End Subsystem 

The PIV Card will be issued to the applicant when all identity proofing, registration, and issuance 

processes have been completed. The PIV Card has a credit card-size form factor, with one or more 

embedded integrated circuit chips (ICC) that provide memory capacity and computational capability. The 

PIV Card is the primary component of the PIV system. The holder uses the PIV Card for authentication 

to various physical and logical resources. 

Card readers are located at access points for controlled resources where a cardholder may wish to gain 

access (physical and logical) by using the PIV Card. The reader communicates with the PIV Card to 

retrieve the appropriate information, located in the card’s memory, to relay it to the access control 

systems for granting or denying access. 

Card writers, which are very similar to the card readers, personalize and initialize the information stored 

on PIV Cards. Card writers may also be used to perform remote PIV Card updates (see Section 2.9.3). 

The data to be stored on PIV Cards includes personal information, certificates, cryptographic keys, the 

PIN, and biometric data, and is discussed in further detail in subsequent sections. 

PIN input devices can be used along with card readers when a higher level of authentication assurance is 

required. The cardholder presenting the PIV Card must type in his or her PIN into the PIN input device. 

For physical access, the PIN is typically entered using a PIN pad device; a keyboard is generally used for 

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PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

logical access. The input of a PIN provides a “something you know”9 authentication factor that 

activates

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10 the PIV Card and enables access to other credentials resident on the card that provide 

additional factors of authentication. A cryptographic key and certificate, for example, provides an 

additional authentication factor of “something you have” (i.e., the card) through PKI-based 

authentication. 

Biometric readers may be located at secure locations where a cardholder may want to gain access. These 

readers depend upon the use of biometric data of the cardholder, stored in the memory of the card, and its 

comparison with a real-time biometric sample. The use of biometrics provides an additional factor of 

authentication (“something you are”) in addition to entering the PIN (“something you know”) and 

providing the card (“something you have”) for cryptographic key-based authentication (“something you 

have”). This provides for a higher level of authentication assurance. 

883 3.1.2 PIV Card Issuance and Management Subsystem 

The identity proofing and registration component in Figure 3-1 refers to the process of collecting, storing, 

and maintaining all information and documentation that is required for verifying and assuring the 

applicant’s identity. Various types of information are collected from the applicant at the time of 

registration. 

The card issuance and maintenance component deals with the personalization of the physical (visual 

surface) and logical (contents of the ICC) aspects of the card at the time of issuance and maintenance 

thereafter. This includes printing photographs, names, and other information on the card and loading the 

relevant card applications, biometrics, and other data. 

The key management component is responsible for the generation of key pairs, the issuance and 

distribution of digital certificates containing the public keys of the cardholder, and management and 

dissemination of certificate status information. The key management component is used throughout the 

lifecycle of PIV Cards—from generation and loading of authentication keys and PKI credentials, to usage 

of these keys for secure operations, to eventual renewal, reissuance, or termination of the card. The key 

management component is also responsible for the provisioning of publicly accessible repositories and 

services (such as PKI directories and certificate status responders) that provide information to the 

requesting application about the status of the PKI credentials. 

900 3.1.3 PIV Relying Subsystem 

The PIV relying subsystem includes components responsible for determining a particular PIV 

cardholder’s access to a physical or logical resource. A physical resource is the secured facility (e.g., 

building, room, parking garage) that the cardholder wishes to access. The logical resource is typically a 

network or a location on the network (e.g., computer workstation, folder, file, database record, software 

program) to which the cardholder wants to gain access. 

The authorization data component comprises information that defines the privileges (authorizations) 

possessed by entities requesting to access a particular logical or physical resource. An example of this is 

an access control list (ACL) associated with a file on a computer system. 

The physical and logical access control system grants or denies access to a particular resource and 

includes an identification and authentication (I&A) component as well as an authorization component. 

9

 For more information on the terms “something you know,” ”something you have,” and “something you are,” see [SP 800-63]. 10 Alternatively, on-card biometric comparison can be used to activate the PIV Card. 

 REVISED DRAFT 21
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

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The I&A component interacts with the PIV Card and uses mechanisms discussed in Section 6 to identify 

and authenticate cardholders. Once authenticated, the I&A component passes information to the 

authorization component which in turn interacts with the authorization data component to match the 

cardholder information to the information on record. Access control components typically interface with 

the card reader, the PIN input device, the biometric reader, supplementary databases, and any certificate 

status service. 

917 3.2 PIV Card Lifecycle Activities 

The PIV Card lifecycle consists of seven activities. The activities that take place during fabrication and 

pre-personalization of the card at the manufacturer are not considered a part of this lifecycle model. 

Figure 3-2 presents these PIV activities and depicts the PIV Card request as the initial activity and PIV 

Card termination as the end of life. 

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Figure 3-2. PIV Card Lifecycle Activities 

Descriptions of the seven card lifecycle activities are as follows: 

925 + PIV Card Request. This activity applies to the initiation of a request for the issuance of a PIV Card 

to an applicant and the validation of this request. 

927 + Identity Proofing and Registration. The goal of this activity is to verify the claimed identity of the 

applicant, verify that the entire set of identity source documents presented at the time of registration is 

valid, capture biometrics, and optionally create the chain-of-trust record. 

930 + PIV Card Issuance. This activity deals with the personalization (physical and logical) of the card 

and the issuance of the card to the intended applicant. 

932 + PKI Credential Issuance. This activity deals with generating logical credentials and loading them 

onto the PIV Card. 

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 REVISED DRAFT 23

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934 + PIV Card Usage. During this activity, the PIV Card is used to perform cardholder authentication for 

access to a physical or logical resource. Access authorization decisions are made after successful 

cardholder identification and authentication. 

937 + PIV Card Maintenance. This activity deals with the maintenance or update of the physical card and 

the data stored thereon. Such data includes various card applications, PINs, PKI credentials, and 

biometrics. 

940 + PIV Card Termination. The termination process is used to permanently destroy or invalidate the 

PIV Card and the data and keys needed for authentication so as to prevent any future use of the card 

for authentication. 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

943 4. PIV Front-End Subsystem 

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944 This section identifies the requirements for the components of the PIV front-end subsystem. Section 4.1 

945 provides the physical card specifications. Section 4.2 provides the logical card specifications. Section 

946 4.3 specifies the requirements for card activation. Section 4.4 provides requirements for PIV Card 

947 readers. 

4.1 PIV Card Physical Characteristics 

References to the PIV Card in this section pertain to the physical characteristics only. References to the 

front of the card apply to the side of the card that contains the electronic contacts; references to the back 

of the card apply to the opposite side from the front side. 

The PIV Card’s physical appearance and other characteristics should balance the need to have the PIV 

Card commonly recognized as a Federal identification card while providing the flexibility to support 

individual department and agency requirements. Having a common look for PIV Cards is important in 

meeting the objectives of improved security and interoperability. In support of these objectives, 

consistent placement of printed components and technology is generally necessary. 

957 The PIV Card shall comply with physical characteristics as described in International Organization for 

958 Standardization (ISO)/International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 7810 [ISO7810], ISO/IEC 10373 

959 [ISO10373], ISO/IEC 7816 for contact cards [ISO7816], and ISO/IEC 14443 for contactless cards 

960 [ISO14443]. 

4.1.1 Printed Material 

962 The printed material shall not rub off during the life of the PIV Card, nor shall the printing process 

963 deposit debris on the printer rollers during printing and laminating. Printed material shall not interfere 

964 with the contact and contactless ICC(s) and related components, nor shall it obstruct access to machine965 readable information. 

4.1.2 Tamper Proofing and Resistance 

967 The PIV Card shall contain security features that aid in reducing counterfeiting, are resistant to tampering, 

968 and provide visual evidence of tampering attempts. At a minimum, a PIV Card shall incorporate one such 

969 security feature. Examples of these security features include the following: 

970 + optical varying structures; 

971 + optical varying inks; 

972 + laser etching and engraving; 

973 + holograms; 

974 + holographic images; and 

+ watermarks. 

976 Incorporation of security features shall— 

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PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

977 + be in accordance with durability requirements; 

978 + be free of defects, such as fading and discoloration; 

979 + not obscure printed information; and 

980 + not impede access to machine-readable information. 

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981 Departments and agencies may incorporate additional tamper-resistance and anti-counterfeiting methods. 

982 As a generally accepted security procedure, Federal departments and agencies are strongly encouraged to 

983 periodically review the viability, effectiveness, and currency of employed tamper resistance and anti984 counterfeiting methods. 

4.1.3 Physical Characteristics and Durability 

986 The following list describes the physical requirements for the PIV Card. 

987 + The PIV Card shall contain a contact and a contactless ICC interface. 

988 + The card body shall be white in accordance with color representation in Section 4.1.5. Only a 

security feature, as described in Section 4.1.2, may modify the perceived color slightly. Presence of a 

security feature shall not prevent the recognition of white as the principal card body color by a person 

with normal vision (corrected or uncorrected) at a working distance of 50 cm to 200 cm. 

992 + The card body structure shall consist of card material(s) that satisfy the card characteristics in 

[ISO7810] and test methods in American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 322 [ANSI322]. 

Although the [ANSI322] test methods do not currently specify compliance requirements, the tests 

shall be used to evaluate card material durability and performance. The [ANSI322] tests minimally 

shall include card flexure, static stress, plasticizer exposure, impact resistance, card structural 

integrity, surface abrasion, temperature and humidity-induced dye migration, ultraviolet light 

exposure, and a laundry test. Cards shall not malfunction or delaminate after hand cleaning with a 

mild soap and water mixture. 

1000 + The card shall be subjected to actual, concentrated, or artificial sunlight to appropriately reflect 2000 

hours of southwestern United States’ sunlight exposure in accordance with [ISO10373], Section 5.12. 

Concentrated sunlight exposure shall be performed in accordance with [G90-98] and accelerated 

exposure in accordance with [G155-00]. After exposure, the card shall be subjected to the 

[ISO10373] dynamic bending test and shall have no visible cracks or failures. Alternatively, the card 

may be subjected to the [ANSI322] tests for ultraviolet and daylight fading resistance and subjected 

to the same [ISO10373] dynamic bending test. 

1007 + There are methods by which proper card orientation can be indicated. Section 4.1.4.3, for example, 

defines Zones 21F and 22F, where card orientation features may be applied.11 Note: If an agency 

determines that tactilely discernible markers for PIV Cards imposes an undue burden, the agency 

must implement policies and procedures to accommodate employees and contractors with disabilities 

in accordance with Sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 

1012 + The card shall be 27- to 33-mil thick (before lamination) in accordance with [ISO7810]. 

11 For some individuals, the contact surface for the ICC may be sufficient for determining the orientation of the card. 

 REVISED DRAFT 25
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1013 + The PIV Card shall not be embossed. 

1014 + Decals shall not be adhered to the card. 

1015 + Departments and agencies may choose to punch an opening in the card body to enable the card to be 

oriented by touch or to be worn on a lanyard. Departments and agencies should ensure such 

alterations are closely coordinated with the card vendor and/or manufacturer to ensure the card 

material integrity and printing process is not adversely impacted. Departments and agencies are 

strongly encouraged to ensure such alterations do not— 

1016 

1017 

1018 

1019 

1020 

1021 

1022 

1023 

1024 

1025 

1026 

1027 

1028 

1030 

1031 

1032 

1033 

1034 

1035 

1036 

1037 

1038 

1039 

1040 

1041 

1042 

1043 

1044 

1045 

1046 

1047 

1048 

– compromise card body durability requirements and characteristics; 

– invalidate card manufacturer warranties or other product claims; 

– alter or interfere with printed information, including the photo; or 

– damage or interfere with machine-readable technology, such as the embedded antenna. 

+ The card material shall withstand the effects of temperatures required by the application of a polyester 

laminate on one or both sides of the card by commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment. The 

thickness added due to a laminate layer shall not interfere with the smart card reader operation. The 

card material shall allow production of a flat card in accordance with [ISO7810] after lamination of 

one or both sides of the card. 

1029 The PIV Card may be subjected to additional testing. 

4.1.4 Visual Card Topography 

The information on a PIV Card shall be in visual printed and electronic form. This section covers the 

placement of visual and printed information. It does not cover information stored in electronic form, such 

as stored data elements, and other possible machine-readable technologies. Logically stored data 

elements are discussed in Section 4.2. 

As noted in Section 4.1.3, the PIV Card shall contain a contact and a contactless ICC interface. This 

Standard does not specify whether a single chip is used or multiple chips are used to support the mandated 

contact and contactless interfaces. 

To achieve a common PIV Card appearance, yet provide departments and agencies the flexibility to 

augment the card with department or agency-specific requirements, the card shall contain mandated and 

optional printed information and mandated and optional machine-readable technologies. Mandated and 

optional items shall generally be placed as described and depicted. Printed data shall not interfere with 

machine-readable technology. 

Areas that are marked as reserved should not be used for printing. The reason for the recommended 

reserved areas is that placement of the embedded contactless ICC module may vary from manufacturer to 

manufacturer, and there are constraints that prohibit printing over the embedded contactless module. The 

PIV Card topography provides flexibility for placement of the embedded module, either in the upper 

right-hand corner or in the lower bottom portion. Printing restrictions apply only to the area where the 

embedded module is located (i.e., upper right-hand corner, lower bottom portion). 

1049 Because technological developments may obviate the need to have a restricted area, or change the size of 

1050 the restricted area, departments and agencies are encouraged to work closely with card vendors and 

 REVISED DRAFT 26 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1051 manufacturers to ensure current printing procedures and methods are applied as well as potential 

1052 integration of features that may improve tamper resistance and anti-counterfeiting of the PIV Card. 

1053 

1054 

1055 

1056 

1057 

1058 

1059 

1060 

1061 

1062 

1063 

1064 

1065 

1066 

1067 

1068 

1069 

1070 

1071 

1072 

1073 

4.1.4.1 Mandatory Items on the Front of the PIV Card 

Zone 1F—Photograph. The photograph shall be placed in the upper left corner, as depicted in Figure 4-1, 

and be a full frontal pose from top of the head to shoulder. A minimum of 300 dots per inch (dpi) 

resolution shall be used. The background should follow recommendations set forth in [SP 800-76]. 

Zone 2F—Name. The full name12 shall be printed directly under the photograph in capital letters. The 

full name shall be composed of a Primary Identifier (i.e., surnames or family names) and a Secondary 

Identifier (i.e., pre-names or given names). The printed name shall match the name on the identity source 

documents provided during identity proofing and registration to the extent possible. The full name shall 

be printed in the <Primary Identifier>, <Secondary Identifier> format. The entire full name should be 

printed on available lines of Zone 2F and either identifier could be wrapped. The wrapped identifier shall 

be indicated with “>” character at the end of the line. The identifiers may be printed on separate lines if 

each fits on one line. Departments and agencies shall use the largest font size of 7 to 10 points that allows 

the full name to be printed. The font size 7 point allows space for 3 lines and shall only be used if the full 

name is greater than 45 characters. Table 4-1 provides examples of separate Primary and Secondary 

Identifier lines, single line with identifiers, wrapped full names, and full name in three lines. Note that the 

truncation should only occur if the full name cannot be printed in 7 point font. 

Names in the Primary Identifier and the first name in the Secondary Identifier shall not be abbreviated. 

Other names and conventional prefixes and suffixes, which shall be included in the Secondary Identifier, 

may be abbreviated. The special character “.” (period) shall indicate such abbreviations, as shown in 

Figure 4-2. Other uses of special symbols (e.g., “O’BRIEN”) are at the discretion of the issuer. 

Table 4-1. Name Examples 

Name: John Doe 

Characteristics: simple full name of individual 

who does not have a middle name, two lines 

sufficient with 10 points. 

DOE, 

JOHN G

Name: Anna Maria Eriksson 

Characteristics: simple full name, two lines 

sufficient with 10 points. 

ERIKSSON, 

ANNA MARIA G

Name: Anna Maria Eriksson 

Characteristics: simple full name with abbreviated 

middle name, two lines sufficient with 10 points. 

ERIKSSON, 

ANNA M. G

 

12 Alternatively, an authorized pseudonym as provided under the law as discussed in Section 2.8.1. 

 REVISED DRAFT 27
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

Name: Anna Maria Eriksson 

Characteristics: simple full name, one line 

sufficient for full name with 10 points. 

ERIKSSON, ANNA MARIA G

Name: Susie Margaret Smith-Jones 

Characteristics: longer full name in two lines, 

sufficient space in 10 points. 

SMITH-JONES,

SUSIE MARGARET G

Name: Susie Margaret Smith-Jones 

Characteristics: longer full name wrapped, two 

lines sufficient with 10 points. 

SMITH-JONES, SUSIE MA>

RGARET G

Name: Chayapa Dejthamrong Krusuang 

Nilavadhanananda 

Characteristics: longer full name wrapped, two 

lines NOT sufficient with 10 points. Reduce the 

font size to 8 points. 

NILAVADHANANANDA, CHAYA>

PA DEJTHAMRONG KRUSUANG G

Name: Vaasa Silvaan Beenelong Wooloomooloo 

Warrandyte Warwarnambool

Characteristics: longer full name, two lines NOT 

sufficient with 8 point, 7 point allows sufficient 

space for three lines in Zone 2F. 

BEENELONG WOOLOOMOOLOO

WARRANDYTE WARWARNAMBOOL,

VAASA SILVAAN

G

Name: Vaasa Silvaan Beenelong Wooloomooloo 

Warrandyte Warwarnambool 

Characteristics: same as previous but full name is 

wrapped. 

BEENELONG WOOLOOMOOLOO W>

ARRANDYTE WARWARNAMBOOL, V>

AASA SILVAAN

G

Name: Dingo Pontooroomooloo Vaasa Silvaan 

Beenelong Wooloomooloo Warrandyte 

Warwarnambool 

Characteristics: truncated full name, three lines 

with 7 point NOT sufficient. 

BEENELONG WOOLOOMOOLOO W>

ARRANDYTE WARWARNAMBOOL, D>

INGO PONTOOROOMOOLOO VAASA

G

1074 

1075 

1076 

1077 

1078 

1079 

Zone 8F—Employee Affiliation. An employee affiliation shall be printed on the card as depicted in Figure 

4-1. Some examples of employee affiliation are “Employee,” “Contractor,” “Active Duty,” and 

“Civilian.”

Zone 10F—Agency, Department, or Organization. The organizational affiliation shall be printed as 

depicted in Figure 4-1. 

 REVISED DRAFT 28 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1080 

1081 

1082 

1083 

1089 

1090 

1091 

1092 

1093 

1094 

1095 

1096 

1100 

1101 

1102 

1103 

1107 

1108 

1109 

1110 

1111 

1112 

1113 

1114 

1115 

1116 

Zone 14F—Card Expiration Date. The card expiration date shall be printed on the card as depicted in 

Figure 4-1. The card expiration date shall be in a YYYYMMMDD format whereby the MMM characters 

represent the three-letter month abbreviation as follows: JAN, FEB, MAR, APR, MAY, JUN, JUL, AUG, 

SEP, OCT, NOV, and DEC. The Zone 14F expiration date shall be printed in Arial 6 to 9 point bold. 

1084 Zone 15F—Color-Coding for Employee Affiliation. Color-coding shall be used for additional 

1085 identification of employee affiliation as a background color for Zone 2F (name) as depicted in Figures 4-1 

1086 and 4-4. The following color scheme shall be used: 

1087 + Blue—Foreign National 

1088 + White—Government Employee 

+ Green—Contractor. 

Foreign National color-coding has precedence over Government Employee and Contractor color-coding. 

These colors shall be reserved and shall not be employed for other purposes. Also, these colors shall be 

printed in accordance to the color specifications provided in Section 4.1.5. Zone 15F may be a solid or 

patterned line at the department or agency’s discretion. 

Zone 18F—Affiliation Color Code. The affiliation color code “B” for Blue, “W” for White, or “G” for 

Green shall be printed in a white circle in Zone 15F as depicted in Figure 4-1. The diameter of the circle 

shall not be more than 5 mm. Note that the lettering shall correspond to the printed color in Zone 15F. 

1097 Zone 19F—Card Expiration Date. The card expiration date shall be printed in a MMMYYYY format in 

1098 the upper right-hand corner as depicted in Figure 4-1. The Zone 19F expiration date shall be printed in 

1099 Arial 12pt Bold. 

4.1.4.2 Mandatory Items on the Back of the PIV Card 

Zone 1B—Agency Card Serial Number. This item shall be printed as depicted in Figure 4-6 and contain 

the unique serial number from the issuing department or agency. The format shall be at the discretion of 

the issuing department or agency. 

1104 Zone 2B—Issuer Identification Number. This item shall be printed as depicted in Figure 4-6 and consist 

1105 of six characters for the department code, four characters for the agency code, and a five-digit number 

1106 that uniquely identifies the issuing facility within the department or agency. 

4.1.4.3 Optional Items on the Front of the PIV Card 

This section contains a description of the optional information and machine-readable technologies that 

may be used and their respective placement. The storage capacity of all optional technologies is as 

prescribed by individual departments and agencies and is not addressed in this Standard. Although the 

items discussed in this section are optional, if used they shall be placed on the card as designated in the 

examples provided and as noted. 

Zone 3F—Signature. If used, the department or agency shall place the cardholder signature below the 

photograph and cardholder name as depicted in Figure 4-3. The space for the signature shall not interfere 

with the contact and contactless placement. Because of card surface space constraints, placement of a 

signature may limit the size of the optional two-dimensional bar code. 

 REVISED DRAFT 29
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1117 

1118 

1119 

1120 

1121 

1122 

1123 

1124 

1125 

1126 

1127 

1128 

1129 

1130 

1131 

1132 

1133 

1134 

1135 

1136 

1137 

1138 

1139 

1140 

1141 

1142 

1143 

1144 

1145 

1146 

1147 

1148 

1149 

1150 

1151 

1152 

1153 

1154 

1155 

1156 

Zone 4F—Agency Specific Text Area. If used, this area can be used for printing agency specific 

requirements, such as employee status, as shown in Figure 4-2. 

Zone 5F—Rank. If used, the cardholder’s rank shall be printed in the area as illustrated in Figure 4-2. 

Data format is at the department or agency’s discretion. 

Zone 6F—Portable Data File (PDF) Two-Dimensional Bar Code. If used, the PDF bar code placement 

shall be as depicted in Figure 4-2 (i.e., left side of the card). If Zone 3F (a cardholder signature) is used, 

the size of the PDF bar code may be affected. The card issuer should confirm that a PDF used in 

conjunction with a PIV Card containing a cardholder signature will satisfy the anticipated PDF data 

storage requirements. 

Zone 9F— Header. If used, the text “United States Government” shall be placed as depicted in Figure 

4-4. Departments and agencies may also choose to use this zone for other department or agency-specific 

information, such as identifying a Federal emergency responder role, as depicted in Figure 4-2. 

Zone 11F—Agency Seal. If used, the seal selected by the issuing department, agency, or organization 

shall be printed in the area depicted. It shall be printed using the guidelines provided in Figure 4-2 to 

ensure information printed on the seal is legible and clearly visible. 

Zone 12F—Footer. The footer is the location for the Federal Emergency Response Official identification

label. If used, a department or agency may print “Federal Emergency Response Official” as depicted in 

Figure 4-2, preferably in white lettering on a red background. Departments and agencies may also use 

Zone 9F to further identify the Federal emergency respondent’s official role. Some examples of official 

roles are “Law Enforcement,” “Fire Fighter,” and “Emergency Response Team (ERT).” 

When Zone 15F indicates Foreign National affiliation and the department or agency does not need to 

highlight emergency response official status, Zone 12F may be used to denote the country or countries of 

citizenship. If so used, the department or agency shall print the country name or the three-letter country 

abbreviation (alpha-3 format) in accordance with ISO 3166-1, Country Codes [ISO3166]. Figure 4-4 

illustrates an example of Foreign National color-coding using country abbreviations. 

Zone 13F—Issue Date. If used, the card issuance date shall be printed above the expiration date in 

YYYYMMMDD format as depicted in Figure 4-3. 

Zone 16F—Photo Border. A border may be used with the photo to further identify employee affiliation, 

as depicted in Figure 4-3. This border may be used in conjunction with Zone 15F to enable departments 

and agencies to develop various employee categories. The photo border shall not obscure the photo. The 

border may be a solid or patterned line. For solid and patterned lines, red shall be reserved for emergency 

response officials, blue for foreign nationals, and green for contractors. All other colors may be used at 

the department or agency’s discretion. 

Zone 17F—Agency Specific Data. In cases in which other defined optional elements are not used, Zone 

17F may be used for other department or agency-specific information, as depicted in Figure 4-5. 

Zone 20F—Organizational Affiliation Abbreviation. The organizational affiliation abbreviation may be 

printed in the upper right-hand corner below the Zone 19F expiration date as shown in Figure 4-2. If 

printed, the organizational affiliation abbreviation shall be printed in Arial 12pt Bold. 

Zone 21F –Edge Ridging or Notched Corner Tactile Marker. If used, this area shall incorporate edge 

ridging or a notched corner to indicate card orientation as depicted in Figure 4-4. Departments and 

 REVISED DRAFT 30 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1157 

1158 

1164 

1165 

1166 

1167 

1168 

1169 

1170 

1171 

1172 

1173 

1174 

1175 

1176 

1177 

1178 

1179 

1180 

1181 

1182 

1183 

1184 

1185 

1186 

1187 

1188 

1189 

1190 

1191 

1192 

1193 

agencies should ensure such alterations are closely coordinated with the card vendor and/or manufacturer 

to ensure the card material integrity and printing process is not adversely impacted. 

1159 Zone 22F –Laser Engraving Tactile Marker. If used, tactilely discernible marks shall be created using 

1160 laser engraving to indicate card orientation as depicted in Figure 4-4. There shall be an opening in the 

1161 lamination foil where laser engraving is performed. Departments and agencies should ensure such 

1162 alterations are closely coordinated with the card vendor and/or manufacturer to ensure the card material 

1163 integrity and printing process is not adversely impacted. 

4.1.4.4 Optional Items on the Back of the PIV Card 

Zone 3B—Magnetic Stripe. If used, the magnetic stripe shall be high coercivity and placed in accordance 

with [ISO7811], as illustrated in Figure 4-7. 

Zone 4B—Return Address. If used, the “return if lost” language shall be generally placed on the back of 

the card as depicted in Figure 4-7. 

Zone 5B—Physical Characteristics of Cardholder. If used, the cardholder physical characteristics (e.g., 

height, eye color, hair color) shall be printed in the general area illustrated in Figure 4-7. 

Zone 6B—Additional Language for Emergency Response Officials. Departments and agencies may 

choose to provide additional information to identify emergency response officials or to better identify the 

cardholder’s authorized access. If used, this additional text shall be in the general area depicted and shall 

not interfere with other printed text or machine-readable components. An example of a printed statement 

is provided in Figure 4-7. 

Zone 7B—Standard Section 499, Title 18 Language. If used, standard Section 499, Title 18, language 

warning against counterfeiting, altering, or misusing the card shall be printed in the general area depicted 

in Figure 4-7. 

Zone 8B—Linear 3 of 9 Bar Code. If used, a linear 3 of 9 bar code shall be generally placed as depicted 

in Figure 4-7. It shall be in accordance with Association for Automatic Identification and Mobility (AIM) 

standards. Beginning and end points of the bar code will be dependent on the embedded contactless 

module selected. Departments and agencies are encouraged to coordinate placement of the bar code with 

the card vendor. 

Zone 9B—Agency-Specific Text. In cases in which other defined optional elements are not used, Zone 9B 

may be used for other department or agency-specific information, as depicted in Figure 4-8. For example, 

emergency response officials may use this area to provide additional details. 

Zone 10B—Agency-Specific Text. Zone 10B is similar to Zone 9B in that it is another area for providing 

department or agency-specific information. 

For Zones 9B and 10B, departments and agencies are encouraged to use this area prudently and minimize 

printed text to that which is absolutely necessary. 

In the case of the Department of Defense, the back of the card will have a distinct appearance as depicted 

in Figure 4-8. This is necessary to display information required by the Geneva Accord and to facilitate 

legislatively mandated medical entitlements. 

 REVISED DRAFT 31
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1194 

1195 Figure 4-1. Card Front—Printable Areas and Required Data 

 REVISED DRAFT 32 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1196 1197 

1198 Figure 4-2. Card Front—Optional Data Placement—Example 1 

 REVISED DRAFT 33
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1199 

1200 

1201 Figure 4-3. Card Front—Optional Data Placement—Example 2 

 REVISED DRAFT 34 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1202 

1203 Figure 4-4. Card Front—Optional Data Placement—Example 3 

 REVISED DRAFT 35
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1204 

1205 Figure 4-5. Card Front—Optional Data Placement—Example 4 

 REVISED DRAFT 36 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1206 

1207 

1208 Figure 4-6. Card Back—Printable Areas and Required Data 

 REVISED DRAFT 37
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1209 

1210 

1211 Figure 4-7. Card Back—Optional Data Placement—Example 1 

 REVISED DRAFT 38 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1212 1213 

1214 Figure 4-8. Card Back—Optional Data Placement—Example 2 

 REVISED DRAFT 39
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1215 

1216 

1217 

1218 

1219 

1220 

1221 

1222 

1223 

4.1.5 Color Representation 

Table 4-2 provides quantitative specifications for colors in three different color systems: sRGB 

Tristimulus, sRGB ([IEC 61966], Color management – default RGB color space), and CMYK (Cyan, 

Magenta, Yellow and Key or ‘blacK’). Since the card body is white, the white color-coding is achieved 

by the absence of printing. Note that presence of the security feature, which may overlap colored or 

printed regions, may modify the perceived color. In the case of colored regions, the effect of overlap 

shall not prevent the recognition of the principal color by a person with normal vision (corrected or 

uncorrected) at a working distance of 50 cm to 200 cm. 

Table 4-2. Color Representation 

Color Zone sRGB Tristimulus 

Value (IEC 61966-2-1) 

sRGB Value 

(IEC 61966-2-1)

CMYK Value 

{C,M,Y,K} 

White 15F {255, 255, 255} {255, 255, 255} {0, 0, 0, 0} 

Green 15F {153, 255, 153} {203, 255, 203} {40, 0, 40, 0} 

Blue 15F {0, 255, 255} {0, 255, 255} {100, 0, 0, 0} 

Red 12F {253, 27, 20} {254, 92, 79} {0, 90, 86, 0} 

1224 

1231 

1232 

1233 

1234 

 

The colors in Table 4-2 can be mapped to the Pantone13 1225 color cue; however, note that this will not 

1226 produce an exact match. An agency or department may use the following Pantone mappings in cases 

1227 where Table 4-2 scales are not available. 

1228 + Blue—630C 

1229 + White—White 

1230 + Green—359C 

+ Red—032C 

4.2 PIV Card Logical Characteristics 

This section defines logical identity credentials and the requirements for use of these credentials. 

1235 To support a variety of authentication mechanisms, the PIV logical credentials shall contain multiple data 

1236 elements for the purpose of verifying the cardholder's identity at graduated assurance levels. The 

1237 following mandatory data elements are part of the data model for PIV logical credentials that support 

1238 authentication mechanisms interoperable across agencies: 

1239 + a PIN; 

1240 + a CHUID; 

1241 + PIV authentication data (one asymmetric key pair and corresponding certificate); 

13 Pantone is a registered name protected by law. 

 REVISED DRAFT 40 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1242 + two fingerprint templates; 

1243 + an electronic facial image; and 

1244 

1248 

1254 

1255 

1257 

1258 

1259 

1260 

1261 

1265 

1266 

1267 

1268 

1269 

1270 

1271 

1272 

1273 

+ card authentication data (one asymmetric key pair and corresponding certificate). 

1245 This Standard also defines two data elements for the PIV data model that are mandatory if the cardholder 

1246 has a government-issued email account at the time of credential issuance. These data elements are: 

1247 + an asymmetric key pair and corresponding certificate for digital signatures; and 

+ an asymmetric key pair and corresponding certificate for key management. 

1249 This Standard also defines optional data elements for the PIV data model. These optional data elements 

1250 include: 

1251 + one or two iris images; 

1252 + one or two fingerprint templates for on-card comparison; 

1253 + a symmetric Card Authentication key for supporting physical access applications; and 

+ a symmetric PIV Card Application Administration key associated with the card management system. 

In addition to the above, other data elements are specified in [SP 800-73]. 

1256 PIV logical credentials fall into the following three categories: 

1. credential elements used to prove the identity of the cardholder to the card (CTC authentication); 

2. credential elements used to prove the identity of the card management system to the card (CMTC 

authentication); and 

3. credential elements used by the card to prove the identity of the cardholder to an external entity 

(CTE authentication) such as a host computer system. 

1262 The PIN falls into the first category, the PIV Card Application Administration Key into the second 

1263 category, and the CHUID, biometric credentials, symmetric keys, and asymmetric keys into the third. 

1264 The fingerprint templates for on-card comparison fall into the first and third categories. 

4.2.1 Cardholder Unique Identifier (CHUID) 

The PIV Card shall include the CHUID as defined in [SP 800-73]. The CHUID includes the Federal 

Agency Smart Credential Number (FASC-N) and the Global Unique Identification Number (GUID), 

which uniquely identify each card as described in [SP 800-73]. The value of the GUID data element shall 

be a 16-byte binary representation of a valid Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) [RFC4122]. The 

CHUID shall also include an expiration date data element in machine-readable format that specifies when 

the card expires. The expiration date format and encoding rules are as specified in [SP 800-73]. 

The CHUID shall be accessible from both the contact and contactless interfaces of the PIV Card without 

card activation. The FASC-N, UUID, and expiration date shall not be modified post-issuance. 

 REVISED DRAFT 41
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

This Standard requires inclusion of the asymmetric signature field in the CHUID container. The 

asymmetric signature data element of the CHUID shall be encoded as a Cryptographic Message Syntax 

(CMS) external digital signature, as specified in [SP 800-73]. Algorithm and key size requirements for 

the asymmetric signature and digest algorithm are detailed in [SP 800-78]. 

1274 

1275 

1276 

1277 

1284 

1285 

1286 

1287 

1288 

1289 

1290 

1291 

1292 

1293 

1294 

1295 

1296 

1297 

1298 

1299 

1300 

1301 

1302 

1303 

1304 

1305 

1306 

1307 

1308 

1309 

1312 

 

1278 The public key required to verify the digital signature shall be provided in the certificates field of the 

1279 CMS external digital signature in a content signing certificate, which shall be an X.509 digital signature 

1280 certificate issued under the id-fpki-common-devicesHardware, id-fpki-common-hardware, or id-fpkicommon-High policy of [COMMON].14 1281 The content signing certificate shall also include an extended 

1282 key usage (extKeyUsage) extension asserting id-PIV-content-signing. Additional descriptions for the PIV 

1283 object identifiers are provided in Appendix B. 

4.2.2 Cryptographic Specifications 

The PIV Card shall implement the cryptographic operations and support functions as defined in 

[SP 800-78] and [SP 800-73]. 

The PIV Card must store private keys and corresponding public key certificates, and perform 

cryptographic operations using the asymmetric private keys. At a minimum, the PIV Card must store two 

asymmetric private keys and the corresponding public key certificates, namely the PIV Authentication key 

and the asymmetric Card Authentication key. The PIV Card must also store a digital signature key and a 

key management key, and the corresponding public key certificates, unless the cardholder does not have a 

government-issued email account at the time of credential issuance. 

The PIV Card may include an asymmetric private key and corresponding public key certificate to 

establish symmetric keys for use with secure messaging, as specified in [SP 800-73] and [SP 800-78]. 

Secure messaging enables data and commands transmitted between the card and an external entity to be 

both integrity protected and encrypted. Secure messaging may be used, for example, to enable the use of 

on-card biometric comparison as an authentication mechanism. 

Once secure messaging has been established, a virtual contact interface may be established. 

Requirements for the virtual contact interface are specified in [SP 800-73]. Any operation that may be 

performed over the contact interface of the PIV Card may also be performed over the virtual contact 

interface. With the exception of the Card Authentication key and keys used to establish a secure 

messaging, the cryptographic private key operations shall be performed only through the contact interface 

or the virtual contact interface. 

Symmetric cryptographic operations are not mandated for the contactless interface, but departments and 

agencies may choose to supplement the basic functionality with storage for a symmetric Card 

Authentication key and support for a corresponding set of cryptographic operations. For example, if a 

department or agency wants to utilize Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) based challenge/response for 

physical access, the PIV Card must contain storage for the AES key and support AES operations through 

the contactless interface. Algorithms and key sizes for each PIV key type are specified in [SP 800-78]. 

1310 The PIV Card has both mandatory keys and optional keys: 

1311 + The PIV Authentication key is a mandatory asymmetric private key that supports card and cardholder 

authentication for an interoperable environment. 

14 For legacy PKIs, as defined in Section 5.4, the certificates may be issued under a department or agency-specific policy that has 

been cross-certified with the Federal Bridge CA (FBCA) at the Medium Hardware or High Assurance Level. 

 REVISED DRAFT 42 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1313 + The asymmetric Card Authentication key is a mandatory private key that supports card authentication 

1314 for an interoperable environment. 

1316 

1319 

1321 

1322 

1323 

1324 

1325 

1326 

1327 

1328 

1329 

1330 

1331 

1334 

1335 

1336 

1337 

1338 

1339 

1340 

1341 

1342 

1343 

1344 

1345 

1346 

1347 

1348 

1349 

1350 

1351 

1352 

1353 

1315 + The symmetric (secret) Card Authentication key supports card authentication for physical access, and 

it is optional. 

1317 + The digital signature key is an asymmetric private key supporting document signing. 

1318 + The key management key is an asymmetric private key supporting key establishment and transport. 

Optionally, up to twenty retired key management keys may also be stored on the PIV Card. 

1320 + The PIV Card Application Administration Key is a symmetric key used for personalization and postissuance activities, and it is optional. 

+ The PIV Card may include additional key(s) for use with secure messaging. These keys are defined 

in [SP 800-73] or [SP 800-78]. 

All PIV cryptographic keys shall be generated within a [FIPS140] validated cryptographic module with 

overall validation at Level 2 or above. In addition to an overall validation of Level 2, the PIV Card shall 

provide Level 3 physical security to protect the PIV private keys in storage. The scope of the validation 

for the PIV Card shall include all cryptographic operations performed over both the contact and 

contactless interfaces (1) by the PIV Card Application, (2) as part of secure messaging as specified in this 

section, and (3) as part of remote post issuance updates as specified in Section 2.9.3. Specific algorithm 

testing requirements for the cryptographic operations performed by the PIV Card Application are 

specified in [SP 800-78]. 

1332 Requirements specific to storage and access for each key are detailed below. Where applicable, key 

1333 management requirements are also specified. 

+ PIV Authentication Key. This key shall be generated on the PIV Card. The PIV Card shall not 

permit exportation of the PIV Authentication key. The cryptographic operations that use the PIV 

Authentication key shall be available only through the contact and the virtual contact interfaces of the 

PIV Card. Private key operations may be performed using an activated PIV Card without explicit 

user action (e.g., the PIN need not be supplied for each operation). 

The PIV Card shall store a corresponding X.509 certificate to support validation of the public key. 

The X.509 certificate shall include the FASC-N in the subject alternative name extension using the 

pivFASC-N attribute to support physical access procedures. The X.509 certificate shall also include 

the UUID value from the GUID data element of the CHUID in the subject alternative name extension. 

The UUID shall be encoded as a uniform resource identifier (URI), as specified in Section 3 of 

[RFC4122]. The expiration date of the certificate must be no later than the expiration date of the PIV 

Card. The PIV Authentication certificate shall include a PIV NACI indicator (background 

investigation indicator) extension; this non-critical extension indicates the status of the subject’s 

background investigation at the time of card issuance. Section 5 of this document specifies the 

certificate format and the key management infrastructure for the PIV Authentication key. 

+ Asymmetric Card Authentication Key. The asymmetric Card Authentication key shall be 

generated on the PIV Card. The PIV Card shall not permit exportation of the Card Authentication 

key. Cryptographic operations that use the Card Authentication key shall be available through the 

contact and the contactless interfaces of the PIV Card. Private key operations may be performed using 

this key without card activation (e.g., the PIN need not be supplied for operations with this key). 

 REVISED DRAFT 43
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

The PIV Card shall store a corresponding X.509 certificate to support validation of the public key. 

The X.509 certificate shall include the FASC-N in the subject alternative name extension using the 

pivFASC-N attribute to support physical access procedures. The X.509 certificate shall also include 

the UUID value from the GUID data element of the CHUID in the subject alternative name extension. 

The UUID shall be encoded as a URI, as specified in Section 3 of [RFC4122]. The expiration date of 

the certificate must be no later than the expiration date of the PIV Card. Section 5 of this document 

specifies the certificate format and the key management infrastructure for asymmetric PIV Card 

Authentication keys. 

1354 

1355 

1356 

1357 

1358 

1359 

1360 

1361 

1363 

1364 

1365 

1366 

1367 

1368 

1369 

1370 

1371 

1372 

1373 

1374 

1375 

1376 

1377 

1378 

1379 

1380 

1381 

1382 

1383 

1384 

1385 

1386 

1387 

1389 

1390 

1392 

 

1362 + Symmetric Card Authentication Key. The symmetric Card Authentication key is imported onto the 

card by the issuer. The PIV Card shall not permit exportation of this key. If present, the symmetric 

Card Authentication key shall be unique for each PIV Card and shall meet the algorithm and key size 

requirements stated in [SP 800-78]. If present, cryptographic operations using this key may be 

performed without card activation (e.g., the PIN need not be supplied for operations with this key). 

The cryptographic operations that use the Card Authentication key shall be available through the 

contact and the contactless interfaces of the PIV Card. This Standard does not specify key 

management protocols or infrastructure requirements. 

+ Digital Signature Key. The PIV digital signature key shall be generated on the PIV Card. The PIV 

Card shall not permit exportation of the digital signature key. If present, cryptographic operations 

using the digital signature key may only be performed using the contact and the virtual contact 

interfaces of the PIV Card. Private key operations may not be performed without explicit user action, 

as this Standard requires the cardholder to authenticate to the PIV Card each time it performs a 

private key computation with the digital signature key.15

The PIV Card shall store a corresponding X.509 certificate to support validation of the public key. 

The expiration date of the certificate must be no later than the expiration date of the PIV Card. 

Section 5 of this document specifies the certificate format and the key management infrastructure for 

PIV digital signature keys. 

+ Key Management Key. This key may be generated on the PIV Card or imported to the card. If 

present, the cryptographic operations that use the key management key must only be accessible using 

the contact and the virtual contact interfaces of the PIV Card. Private key operations may be 

performed using an activated PIV Card without explicit user action (e.g., the PIN need not be 

supplied for each operation). 

The PIV Card shall store a corresponding X.509 certificate to support validation of the public key. 

Section 5 of this document specifies the certificate format and the key management infrastructure for 

key management keys. 

1388 + PIV Card Application Administration Key. The PIV Card Application Administration Key is 

imported onto the card by the issuer. If present, the cryptographic operations that use the PIV Card 

Application Administration Key must only be accessible using the contact interface of the PIV Card. 

1391 4.2.3 PIV Biometric Data Specifications 

4.2.3.1 Biometric Data Representation 

1393 The following biometric data shall be stored on the PIV Card: 

15 [NISTIR7863], Cardholder Authentication for the PIV Digital Signature Key, addresses the appropriate use of PIN caching 

related to digital signatures. 

 REVISED DRAFT 44 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1394 + Two fingerprint templates. If no fingerprint images meeting the quality criteria of [SP 800-76] are 

available, the PIV Card shall nevertheless be populated with fingerprint records as specified in 

[SP800-76]. 

1395 

1396 

1397 

1400 

1403 

1404 

1405 

1406 

1407 

1408 

1409 

1410 

1411 

1412 

1421 

1424 

1425 

 

+ An electronic facial image. 

1398 The following biometric data may also be stored on the PIV Card: 

1399 + One or two iris images. 

+ Fingerprint templates for on-card comparison.16

1401 All biometric data shall be stored in the data elements referenced by [SP 800-73] and in conformance 

1402 with the preparation and formatting specifications of [SP 800-76]. 

4.2.3.2 Biometric Data Protection 

The integrity of all biometric data, except for fingerprint templates for on-card comparison, shall be 

protected using digital signatures as follows. The records shall be prepended with a Common Biometric 

Exchange Formats Framework (CBEFF) header (referred to as CBEFF_HEADER) and appended with the 

CBEFF signature block (referred to as the CBEFF_SIGNATURE_BLOCK) [CBEFF]. 

The format for CBEFF_HEADER is specified in [SP 800-76]. 

The CBEFF_SIGNATURE_BLOCK contains the digital signature of the biometric data and thus 

facilitates the verification of integrity of the biometric data. The CBEFF_SIGNATURE_BLOCK shall be 

encoded as a CMS external digital signature as specified in [SP 800-76]. The algorithm and key size 

requirements for the digital signature and digest algorithm are detailed in [SP 800-78]. 

1413 The public key required to verify the digital signature shall be contained in a content signing certificate, 

1414 which shall be issued under the id-fpki-common-devicesHardware, id-fpki-common-hardware, or id-fpkicommon-High policy of [COMMON].17 1415 The content signing certificate shall also include an extended 

1416 key usage (extKeyUsage) extension asserting id-PIV-content-signing. If the signature on the biometric 

1417 was generated with a different key than the signature on the CHUID, the certificates field of the CMS 

1418 external digital signature shall include the content signing certificate required to verify the signature on 

1419 the biometric. Otherwise, the certificates field shall be omitted. Additional descriptions for the PIV 

1420 object identifiers are provided in Appendix B. 

4.2.3.3 Biometric Data Access 

1422 The PIV biometric data, except for fingerprint templates for on-card comparison, that is stored on the card 

1423 + shall be readable through the contact interface and after the presentation of a valid PIN; and 

+ may optionally be readable through the virtual contact interface and after the presentation of a valid 

PIN. 

16 The on-card and off-card fingerprint reference data are stored separately and, as conformant instances of different formal 

fingerprint standards, are syntactically different. This is described more fully in [SP 800-76]. 17 For legacy PKIs, as defined in Section 5.4, the certificates may be issued under a department or agency-specific policy that has 

been cross-certified with the Federal Bridge CA (FBCA) at the Medium Hardware or High Assurance Level. 

 REVISED DRAFT 45
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1426 On-card biometric comparison may be performed over the contact and the contactless interfaces of the 

1427 PIV Card to support card activation (Section 4.3.1) and cardholder authentication (Section 6.2.2). The 

1428 fingerprint templates for on-card comparison shall not be exportable. If implemented, on-card biometric 

1429 comparison shall be implemented and used in accordance with [SP 800-73] and [SP 800-76]. 

1430 4.2.4 PIV Unique Identifiers 

1437 

1438 

1439 

1440 

1441 

1442 

1443 

1444 

1445 

 for 

t system. 

1451 

1452 

1453 

1454 

1455 

1456 

1457 

1458 

1459 

 

1431 A cardholder is authenticated through identification and authentication (I&A) using the PIV credential 

1432 (and its identifier) in authentication mechanisms described in Section 6. The authenticated identity may 

1433 then be used as the basis for making authorization decisions. Unique identifiers for both authentication 

1434 and authorization are provided in this Standard in order to uniquely identify the cardholder. The two 

1435 types of identifiers that serve as identification (of the cardholder) for authentication and authorization 

1436 purposes, are described as follows: 

+ Credential identifiers 

Each PIV card contains a UUID and a FASC-N that uniquely identify the card and, by 

correspondence, the cardholder. These two credential identifiers are represented in all of the 

authentication data elements for the purpose of binding the PIV data elements to the same PIV Card. 

+ Cardholder Identifiers 

Other identifiers may be present in credentials on the PIV Card that identity the cardholder rather than 

the card. Examples include the subject name and names that may appear in the subjectAltName 

extension in the PIV Authentication certificate. 

4.3 PIV Card Activation 

The PIV Card shall be activated18 to perform privileged19 1446 operations such as using the PIV 

1447 Authentication key, digital signature key, and key management key. The PIV Card shall be activated

1448 privileged operations only after authenticating the cardholder or the appropriate card managemen

1449 Cardholder activation is described in Section 4.3.1 and card management system activation is described in 

1450 Section 4.3.2. 

4.3.1 Activation by Cardholder 

PIV Cards shall implement user-based cardholder activation to allow privileged operations using PIV 

credentials held by the card. At a minimum, the PIV Card shall implement PIN-based cardholder 

activation in support of interoperability across departments and agencies. Other card activation 

mechanisms (e.g., OCC card activation), only as specified in [SP 800-73], may be implemented and shall 

be discoverable. For PIN-based cardholder activation, the cardholder shall supply a numeric PIN. The 

verification data shall be transmitted to the PIV Card and checked by the card. If the verification data 

check is successful, the PIV Card is activated. The PIV Card shall include mechanisms to block 

activation of the card after a number of consecutive failed activation attempts. 

1460 The PIN should not be easily guessable or otherwise individually identifiable in nature (e.g., part of a 

1461 Social Security Number, phone number). The required PIN length shall be a minimum of six digits. 

18 Activation in this context refers to the unlocking of the PIV Card Application so privileged operations can be performed. 19 A read of a CHUID or use of the Card Authentication key is not considered a privileged operation. 

 REVISED DRAFT 46 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1462 

1470 

1473 

1480 

1489 

1490 

1491 

1492 

1493 

1494 

1495 

4.3.2 Activation by Card Management System 

1463 PIV Cards may support card activation by the card management system to support card personalization 

1464 and post-issuance card update. To activate the card for personalization or update, the card management 

1465 system shall perform a challenge response protocol using cryptographic keys stored on the card in 

1466 accordance with [SP 800-73]. When cards are personalized, PIV Card Application Administration Keys 

1467 shall be set to be specific to each PIV Card. That is, each PIV Card shall contain a unique PIV Card 

1468 Application Administration Key. PIV Card Application Administration Keys shall meet the algorithm 

1469 and key size requirements stated in [SP 800-78]. 

4.4 Card Reader Requirements 

1471 This section provides minimum requirements for the contact and contactless card readers. Also, this 

1472 section provides requirements for PIN input devices. Further requirements are specified in [SP 800-96]. 

4.4.1 Contact Reader Requirements 

1474 Contact card readers shall conform to the [ISO7816] standard for the card-to-reader interface. These 

1475 readers shall conform to the Personal Computer/Smart Card (PC/SC) Specification [PCSC] for the reader1476 to-host system interface in general desktop computing environment. Specifically, the contact card readers 

1477 shall conform to the requirements specified in [SP 800-96]. In physical access control systems where the 

1478 readers are not connected to general-purpose desktop computing systems, the reader-to-host system 

1479 interface is not specified in this Standard. 

4.4.2 Contactless Reader Requirements 

1481 Contactless card readers shall conform to [ISO14443] standard for the card-to-reader interface and data 

1482 transmitted over the [ISO14443] link shall conform to [ISO7816]. In cases where these readers are 

1483 connected to general-purpose desktop computing systems, they shall conform to [PCSC] for the reader-to1484 host system interface. Specifically, the contactless card readers shall conform to the requirements 

1485 specified in [SP 800-96]. In physical access control systems where the readers are not connected to 

1486 general-purpose desktop computing systems, the reader-to-host system interface is not specified in this 

1487 Standard. This is necessary to allow retrofitting of PIV readers into existing physical access control 

1488 systems that use a variety of non-standard card reader communication interfaces. 

4.4.3 Reader Resilience and Flexibility 

The international standard ISO/IEC 24727 [ISOIEC 24727] enables a high degree of interoperability 

between electronic credentials and relying subsystems by means of an adaptation layer. To make 

interoperability among PIV System middleware, card readers, and credentials more resilient and flexible, 

the Department of Commerce will evaluate ISO/IEC 24727 and propose an optional profile of ISO/IEC 

24727 in [SP 800-73]. The profile will explain how profile-conformant middleware, card readers, and 

PIV Cards can be used interchangeably with middleware, card readers, and PIV Cards currently deployed. 

1496 Specifications of the profile will become effective, as an optional means to implement PIV System 

1497 readers and middleware, when OMB determines that the profile specifications are complete and ready for 

1498 deployment. 

 REVISED DRAFT 47
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

 REVISED DRAFT 48 

1499 

1500 

1501 

1502 

1503 

1504 

1505 

1506 

1507 

1508 

 

4.4.4 Card Activation Device Requirements 

When the PIV Card is used with OCC data or a PIN for physical access, the input device shall be 

integrated with the PIV Card reader. When the PIV Card is used with OCC data or a PIN for logical 

access (e.g., to authenticate to a Web site or other server), the input device is not required to be integrated 

with the PIV Card reader. If the input device is not integrated with the PIV Card reader, the OCC data or 

the PIN shall be transmitted securely and directly to the PIV Card for card activation. 

The specifications for fingerprint capture devices for on-card comparison are given in [SP 800-76]. 

Malicious code could be introduced into the PIN capture and biometric reader devices for the purpose of 

compromising or otherwise exploiting the PIV Card. General good practice to mitigate malicious code 

threats is outside the scope of this document.20

20 See SP 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations [SP 800-53]. 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1509 5. PIV Key Management Requirements 

1513 

1520 

1510 PIV Cards consistent with this specification will have two or more asymmetric private keys. To manage 

1511 the public keys associated with the asymmetric private keys, departments and agencies shall issue and 

1512 manage X.509 public key certificates as specified below. 

5.1 Architecture 

1514 The CA that issues certificates to support PIV Card authentication shall participate in the hierarchical PKI 

1515 for the Common Policy managed by the Federal PKI. Self-signed, self-issued, and CA certificates issued 

1516 by these CAs shall conform to Worksheet 1: Self-Signed Certificate Profile, Worksheet 2: Self-Issued CA 

1517 Certificate Profile, and Worksheet 3: Cross Certificate Profile, respectively, in X.509 Certificate and 

1518 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Extensions Profile for the Shared Service Providers (SSP) Program 

1519 [PROF]. The requirements for legacy PKIs are defined in Section 5.4. 

5.2 PKI Certificate 

1521 All certificates issued to support PIV Card authentication shall be issued under the X.509 Certificate 

1522 Policy for the U.S. Federal PKI Common Policy Framework [COMMON]. The requirements in this 

1523 certificate policy cover identity proofing and the management of CAs and registration authorities. CAs 

1524 and registration authorities may be operated by departments and agencies, or may be outsourced to PKI 

1525 service providers. For a list of PKI service providers that have been approved to operate under 

1526 [COMMON], see http://www.idmanagement.gov. 

1527 5.2.1 X.509 Certificate Contents 

1531 

1533 

1534 

1536 

1538 

1540 

 

1528 The required contents of X.509 certificates associated with PIV private keys are based on [PROF]. The 

1529 relationship is described below: 

1530 + Certificates containing the public key associated with an asymmetric Card Authentication key shall 

conform to Worksheet 8: Card Authentication Certificate Profile in [PROF]. 

1532 + Certificates containing the public key associated with a digital signature private key shall conform to 

Worksheet 5: End Entity Signature Certificate Profile in [PROF] and shall specify either the id-fpkicommon-hardware or id-fpki-common-High policy in the certificate policies extension. 

1535 + Certificates containing the public key associated with a PIV Authentication private key shall conform 

to Worksheet 9: PIV Authentication Certificate Profile in [PROF]. 

1537 + Certificates containing the public key associated with a key management private key shall conform to 

Worksheet 6: Key Management Certificate Profile in [PROF].21

1539 + Requirements for algorithms and key sizes for each type of PIV asymmetric key are given in 

[SP 800-78]. 

21 Note that key management certificates may assert the id-fpki-common-policy, id-fpki-common-hardware, or id-fpki-commonHigh policy in the certificate policies extension. Applications / relying systems sensitive to the assurance level may choose not to 

accept certificates that only assert id-fpki-common-policy. 

 REVISED DRAFT 49
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1541 

1544 

1554 

1555 

1556 

1557 

1558 

1559 

1560 

1561 

1562 

1563 

1564 

1565 

1566 

1567 

1568 

1569 

1570 

1575 

1576 

1577 

5.3 X.509 CRL Contents 

1542 CAs that issue certificates corresponding to PIV private keys shall issue CRLs as specified in 

1543 [COMMON]. The contents of X.509 CRLs shall conform to Worksheet 4: CRL Profile in [PROF]. 

5.4 Legacy PKIs 

1545 For the purposes of this Standard, legacy PKIs are the PKIs of departments and agencies that have cross1546 certified with the Federal Bridge CA (FBCA) at the Medium Hardware or High Assurance Level. Legacy 

1547 PKIs that issue PIV Authentication certificates and Card Authentication certificates shall meet the 

1548 requirements specified in Sections 5.2.1, 5.3, 5.5, 5.5.1, and 5.5.2, with respect to the PIV Authentication 

1549 certificates and Card Authentication certificates that they issue. Departments and agencies may assert 

1550 department or agency-specific policy object identifiers (OIDs) in PIV Authentication Certificates and 

1551 Card Authentication Certificates in addition to the id-fpki-common-authentication policy OID and the id1552 fpki-common-cardAuth OID, respectively. This specification imposes no requirements on digital 

1553 signature or key management certificates issued by legacy PKIs. 

5.5 PKI Repository and OCSP Responder(s) 

The PIV PKI repository and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responder provides PIV Card and 

key status information across departments, agencies, and other organizations, to support high-assurance 

interagency PIV Card interoperation. Departments and agencies will be responsible for notifying CAs 

when cards or certificates need to be revoked. CAs shall maintain the status of servers and responders 

needed for PIV Card and certificate status checking. 

The expiration date of the authentication certificates (PIV Authentication certificate and Card 

Authentication certificate) shall not be after the expiration date of the PIV Card. If the card is revoked, 

the authentication certificates shall be revoked. However, an authentication certificate (and its associated 

key pair) may be revoked without revoking the PIV Card and may then be replaced. The presence of a 

valid, unexpired, and unrevoked authentication certificate on a card is proof that the card was issued and 

is not revoked. 

Because an authentication certificate typically is valid several years, a mechanism to distribute certificate 

status information is necessary. CRL and OCSP are the two commonly used mechanisms. CAs that issue 

authentication certificates shall maintain a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) accessible web server that 

holds the CRLs for the certificates it issues, as well as any CA certificates issued to or by it, as specified 

in [PROF]. 

1571 PIV Authentication certificates and Card Authentication certificates shall contain the 

1572 crlDistributionPoints and authorityInfoAccess extensions needed to locate CRLs and the authoritative 

1573 OCSP responder, respectively. In addition, every CA that issues these authentication certificates shall 

1574 operate an OCSP server that provides certificate status for every authentication certificate the CA issues. 

5.5.1 Certificate and CRL Distribution 

This Standard requires distribution of CA certificates and CRLs using HTTP. Specific requirements are 

found in the Shared Service Provider Repository Service Requirements [SSP REP]. 

1578 Certificates that contain the FASC-N or UUID in the subject alternative name extension, such as PIV 

1579 Authentication certificates and Card Authentication certificates, shall not be distributed publicly (e.g., via 

1580 the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) or HTTP accessible from the public Internet). 

 REVISED DRAFT 50 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

 REVISED DRAFT 51

1584 

1585 

1586 

1587 

1588 

1581 Individual departments and agencies can decide whether other user certificates (digital signature and key 

1582 management) can be distributed via LDAP. When user certificates are distributed, the requirements in 

1583 Table IV—End-Entity Certificate Repository Service Requirements of [SSP REP] shall be satisfied. 

5.5.2 OCSP Status Responders 

OCSP [RFC2560] status responders shall be implemented as a supplementary certificate status 

mechanism. The OCSP status responders must be updated at least as frequently as CRLs are issued. The 

definitive OCSP responder for each certificate shall be specified in the authorityInfoAccess extension as 

described in [PROF]. 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1589 6. PIV Cardholder Authentication 

1600 

1605 

1606 

1607 

1608 

1620 

1590 This section defines a suite of authentication mechanisms that are supported by all the PIV Cards, and 

1591 their applicability in meeting the requirements for a set of graduated levels of identity assurance. This 

1592 section also defines some authentication mechanisms that make use of credential elements that may 

1593 optionally be included on PIV Cards. Specific implementation details of authentication mechanisms 

1594 identified in this section are provided in [SP 800-73]. Moreover, while a wide range of authentication 

1595 mechanisms is identified in this section, departments and agencies may adopt additional mechanisms that 

1596 use the identity credentials on the PIV Card. In the context of the PIV Card Application, identity 

1597 authentication is defined as the process of establishing confidence in the identity of the cardholder 

1598 presenting a PIV Card. The authenticated identity can then be used to determine the permissions or 

1599 authorizations granted to that identity for access to various physical and logical resources. 

6.1 PIV Assurance Levels 

1601 This Standard defines four levels of assurance for identity authentication supported by the PIV Card 

1602 Application. Each assurance level sets a degree of confidence established in the identity of the holder of 

1603 the PIV Card. The entity performing the authentication establishes confidence in the identity of the PIV 

1604 cardholder through the following: 

1) the rigor of the identity proofing process conducted prior to issuing the PIV Card; 

2) the security of the PIV Card issuance and maintenance processes; and 

3) the strength of the technical mechanisms used to verify that the cardholder is the owner of the 

PIV Card. 

1609 Section 2 of this Standard defines requirements for the identity proofing, registration, issuance, and 

1610 maintenance processes for PIV Cards and establishes a common level of assurance in these processes. 

1611 The PIV identity proofing, registration, issuance, and maintenance processes meet or exceed the 

1612 requirements for E-Authentication Level 4 [OMB0404]. The PIV Card contains a number of visual and 

1613 logical credentials. Depending on the specific PIV data used to authenticate the holder of the PIV Card to 

1614 an entity that controls access to a resource, varying levels of assurance that the holder of the PIV Card is 

1615 the owner of the card can be achieved. This is the basis for the following PIV assurance levels defined in 

1616 this Standard: 

1617 + LITTLE or NO Confidence—Little or no assurance in the identity of the cardholder; 

1618 + SOME Confidence—A basic degree of assurance in the identity of the cardholder; 

1619 + HIGH Confidence—A strong degree of assurance in the identity of the cardholder; 

+ VERY HIGH Confidence—A very strong degree of assurance in the identity of the cardholder. 

1621 Parties responsible for controlling access to Federal resources (both physical and logical) shall determine 

1622 the appropriate level of identity assurance required for access, based on the harm and impact to 

1623 individuals and organizations as a result of errors in the authentication of the identity of the PIV 

1624 cardholder. Once the required level of assurance has been determined, the authentication mechanisms 

1625 specified within this section may be applied to achieve the required degree of confidence in the identity of 

1626 the PIV cardholder. 

 REVISED DRAFT 52 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1627 

1628 

1629 

1630 

1631 

1632 

6.1.1 Relationship to OMB’s E-Authentication Guidance 

The levels of identity authentication assurance defined within this Standard are closely aligned with 

Section 2 of OMB’s E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies, M-04-04 [OMB0404]. 

Specifically, Table 6-1 shows the notional relationship between the PIV assurance levels and the M-04-04 

E-Authentication assurance levels. 

Table 6-1. Relationship Between PIV and E-Authentication Assurance Levels 

PIV 

Assurance Levels Comparable OMB E-Authentication Levels 

Level 

Number Description 

LITTLE or NO confidence Level 1 Little or no confidence in the asserted identity’s validity 

SOME confidence Level 2 Some confidence in the asserted identity’s validity 

HIGH confidence Level 3 High confidence in the asserted identity’s validity 

VERY HIGH confidence Level 4 Very high confidence in the asserted identity’s validity 

1633 

1642 

1648 

1649 

1650 

1651 

1652 

1653 

 

1634 [OMB0404] addresses “four levels of identity assurance for electronic transactions requiring 

1635 authentication” and prescribes a methodology for determining the level of identity assurance required 

1636 based on the risks and potential impacts of errors in identity authentication. In the context of the PIV 

1637 Card, owners of logical resources shall apply the methodology defined in [OMB0404] to identify the level 

1638 of identity authentication assurance required for their electronic transaction. Parties that are responsible 

1639 for access to physical resources may use a methodology similar to that defined in [OMB0404] to 

1640 determine the PIV assurance level required for access to their physical resource; they may also use other 

1641 applicable methodologies to determine the required level of identity assurance for their application. 

6.2 PIV Card Authentication Mechanisms 

1643 The following subsections define the basic types of authentication mechanisms that are supported by the 

1644 credential set hosted by the PIV Card Application. PIV Cards can be used for identity authentication in 

1645 environments that are equipped with card readers as well as those that lack card readers. Card readers, 

1646 when present, can be contact readers or contactless readers. The usage environment affects the PIV 

1647 authentication mechanisms that may be applied to a particular situation. 

6.2.1 Authentication Using Off-Card Biometric Comparison 

The PIV Card Application hosts the signed fingerprint templates and, optionally, the signed iris images. 

Either biometric can be read from the card following cardholder-to-card (CTC) authentication using a PIN 

supplied by the cardholder. These PIV biometrics are designed to support a cardholder-to-external 

system (CTE) authentication mechanism through a match-off-card scheme. The following subsections 

define two authentication schemes that make use of the PIV biometrics.22

1654 Some characteristics of the PIV Biometrics authentication mechanisms (described below) are as follows: 

22 As noted in Section 4.2.3.1, neither the fingerprint templates nor the iris images are guaranteed to be present on a PIV Card,

since it may not be possible to collect fingerprints from some cardholders and iris images collection is optional. When 

biometric authentication cannot be performed, PKI-AUTH is the recommended alternate authentication mechanism. 

 REVISED DRAFT 53
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1655 + Slower mechanism, because it requires two interactions (e.g., presentation of PIN and biometric) with 

1656 the cardholder. 

1658 

1662 

1663 

1666 

1670 

1671 

1672 

1675 

1677 

1679 

1680 

 

1657 + Strong resistance to use of unaltered card by non-owner since PIN and cardholder biometric are 

required. 

1659 + Digital signature on biometric, which is checked to further strengthen the mechanism. 

1660 + Does not provide protection against use of a revoked card. 

1661 + Applicable with contact card readers, and contactless card readers that support the virtual contact 

interface. 

6.2.1.1 Unattended Authentication Using PIV Biometric (BIO) 

1664 The following steps shall be performed for unattended authentication of the PIV biometric: 

+ The CHUID or another data element23 1665 is read from the card and is checked to ensure the card has not 

expired and that it is from a trusted source. 

1667 + The cardholder is prompted to submit a PIN, activating the PIV Card. 

1668 + The PIV biometric is read from the card. 

1669 + The signature on the biometric is verified to ensure the biometric is intact and comes from a trusted 

source. Note that the signature verification may require retrieval of the content signing certificate 

from the CHUID if the signature on the biometric was generated with the same key as the signature 

on the CHUID. 

1673 + The cardholder is prompted to submit a live biometric sample. 

1674 + If the biometric sample matches the biometric read from the card, the cardholder is authenticated to 

be the owner of the card. 

1676 + The FASC-N (or UUID) in the CHUID or other data element is compared with the FASC-N (or 

UUID) in the Signed Attributes field of the external digital signature on the biometric. 

1678 + A unique identifier within the CHUID or other data element is used as input to the authorization 

check to determine whether the cardholder should be granted access. 

6.2.1.2 Attended Authentication of PIV Biometric (BIO-A) 

1681 This authentication mechanism is the same as the unattended biometrics (BIO) authentication mechanism; 

1682 the only difference is that an attendant (e.g., security guard) supervises the use of the PIV Card and the 

1683 submission of the biometric by the cardholder. 

23 The PIV Authentication certificate or Card Authentication certificate may be leveraged instead of the CHUID to verify that the

card is not expired. 

 REVISED DRAFT 54 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1684 6.2.2 Authentication Using On-Card Biometric Comparison (OCC-AUTH) 

1685 

1686 

1687 

1688 

1689 

1690 

1691 

1692 

1693 

1694 

1699 

1703 

1707 

1708 

1710 

1713 

 

The PIV Card Application may host the optional on-card biometric comparison algorithm. In this case, 

on-card biometric comparison data is stored on the card, which cannot be read, but could be used for 

identity verification. A live-scan biometric is supplied to the card to perform cardholder-to-card (CTC) 

authentication and the card responds with an indication of the success of the on-card biometric 

comparison. The response includes information that allows the reader to authenticate the card. The 

cardholder PIN is not required for this operation. The PIV Card shall include a mechanism to block this 

authentication mechanism after a number of consecutive failed authentication attempts as stipulated by 

the department or agency. As with authentication using the PIV biometrics, if agencies choose to 

implement on-card biometric comparison, it shall be implemented as defined in [SP 800-73] and 

[SP 800-76]. 

1695 Some of the characteristics of the on-card biometric comparison authentication mechanism are as follows: 

1696 + Highly resistant to credential forgery. 

1697 + Strong resistance to use of unaltered card by non-owner. 

1698 + Applicable with contact and contactless card readers. 

6.2.3 Authentication Using PIV Asymmetric Cryptography 

1700 The PIV Card contains two mandatory asymmetric authentication private keys and corresponding 

1701 certificates to support cardholder-to-external system (CTE) authentication, as described in Section 4. The 

1702 following subsections shall be used to perform authentication using the authentication keys. 

6.2.3.1 Authentication with the PIV Authentication Certificate Credential (PKI-AUTH) 

1704 The following steps shall be performed for PKI-AUTH: 

1705 + The reader reads the PIV Authentication certificate from the PIV Card Application. 

1706 + The reader validates the PIV Authentication certificate from the PIV Card Application using 

standards-compliant PKI path validation24 to ensure that it is neither expired nor revoked and that it is 

from a trusted source. 

1709 + The cardholder is prompted to submit a PIN, which is used to activate the card. (If implemented, 

other card activation mechanisms, as specified in [SP 800-73], may be used to activate the card.) 

1711 + The reader issues a challenge string to the card and requests an asymmetric operation in response. 

1712 + The card responds to the previously issued challenge by signing it using the PIV Authentication 

private key. 

1714 + The reader verifies that the card’s response is the expected response to the issued challenge. 

24 Path validation should be configured to specify which policy OIDs are trusted. The policy OID for the PIV Authentication 

certificate is id-fpki-common-authentication. 

 REVISED DRAFT 55
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

+ A unique identifier from the PIV Authentication certificate is extracted and passed as input to the 

access control decision. 

1715 

1716 

1722 

1723 

1727 

1728 

1731 

1733 

1734 

 

1717 Some of the characteristics of the PKI-based authentication mechanism are as follows: 

1718 + Requires the use of certificate status checking infrastructure. 

1719 + Highly resistant to credential forgery. 

1720 + Strong resistance to use of unaltered card by non-owner since card activation is required. 

1721 + Applicable with contact card readers, and contactless card readers that support the virtual contact 

interface. 

6.2.3.2 Authentication with the Card Authentication Certificate Credential (PKI-CAK) 

1724 The following steps shall be performed for PKI-CAK: 

1725 + The reader reads the Card Authentication certificate from the PIV Card Application. 

1726 + The reader validates the Card Authentication certificate from the PIV Card Application using 

standards-compliant PKI path validation25 to ensure that it is neither expired nor revoked and that it is 

from a trusted source. 

1729 + The reader issues a challenge string to the card and requests an asymmetric operation in response. 

1730 + The card responds to the previously issued challenge by signing it using the Card Authentication 

private key. 

1732 + The reader verifies that the card’s response is the expected response to the issued challenge. 

+ A unique identifier from the Card Authentication certificate is extracted and passed as input to the 

access control decision. 

1735 Some of the characteristics of the PKI-CAK authentication mechanism are as follows: 

1736 + Requires the use of certificate status checking infrastructure. 

1737 + Highly resistant to credential forgery. 

1738 + Low resistance to use of unaltered card by non-owner of card. 

1739 + Applicable with contact and contactless readers. 

25 Path validation should be configured to specify which policy OIDs are trusted. The policy OID for the Card Authentication 

certificate is id-fpki-common-cardAuth. 

 REVISED DRAFT 56 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1740 

1745 

1747 

1750 

1752 

1753 

1760 

1761 

1762 

1766 

1768 

1769 

6.2.4 Authentication with the Symmetric Card Authentication Key (SYM-CAK) 

1741 The PIV Card Application may host the optional symmetric Card Authentication key. In this case, the 

1742 symmetric Card Authentication key shall be used for PIV cardholder authentication using the following 

1743 steps: 

1744 + The CHUID, PIV Authentication certificate, or Card Authentication certificate data element is read 

from the PIV Card and is checked to ensure the card has not expired. 

1746 + The digital signature on the data element is checked to ensure that it was signed by a trusted source 

and is unaltered. 

1748 + The reader issues a challenge string to the card and requests a response. 

1749 + The card responds to the previously issued challenge by encrypting the challenge using the symmetric 

Card Authentication key. 

1751 + The response is validated as the expected response to the issued challenge. 

+ A unique identifier within the data element is used as input to the authorization check to determine 

whether the cardholder should be granted access. 

1754 Some of the characteristics of the symmetric Card Authentication key authentication mechanism are as 

1755 follows: 

1756 + Resistant to credential forgery. 

1757 + Does not provide protection against use of a revoked card. 

1758 + Low resistance to use of unaltered card by non-owner of card. 

1759 + Applicable with contact and contactless readers. 

6.2.5 Authentication Using the CHUID 

The PIV Card provides a mandatory logical credential called the CHUID. As described in Section 4.2.1, 

the CHUID contains numerous data elements. 

1763 The CHUID shall be used for PIV cardholder authentication using the following steps: 

1764 + The CHUID is read electronically from the PIV Card. 

1765 + The digital signature on the CHUID is checked to ensure the CHUID was signed by a trusted source 

and is unaltered. 

1767 + The expiration date on the CHUID is checked to ensure that the card has not expired. 

+ A unique identifier within the CHUID is used as input to the authorization check to determine 

whether the cardholder should be granted access. 

1770 Some characteristics of the CHUID-based authentication mechanism are as follows: 

 REVISED DRAFT 57
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1771 + Can be used for rapid authentication for high volume access control. 

1772 + Low resistance to use of unaltered card by non-owner of card. 

1773 + Does not provide protection against use of a revoked card. 

1774 

1778 

1779 

1780 

1790 

1794 

1800 

+ Applicable with contact and contactless readers. 

1775 As the CHUID authentication mechanism provides LITTLE or NO assurance in the identity of the 

1776 cardholder, use of the CHUID authentication mechanism is deprecated. It is expected that the CHUID 

1777 authentication mechanism will be removed from this Standard at the next five-year revision. 

6.2.6 Authentication Using PIV Visual Credentials (VIS) 

Visual authentication of a PIV cardholder shall be used only to support access control to physical 

facilities and resources. 

1781 The PIV Card has several mandatory topographical features on the front and back that support visual 

1782 identification and authentication, as follows: 

1783 + Zone 1F – Photograph; 

1784 + Zone 2F – Name; 

1785 + Zone 8F – Employee Affiliation; 

1786 + Zone 10F – Agency, Department, or Organization; 

1787 + Zones 14F and 19F – Card Expiration Date; 

1788 + Zone 15F – Color-Coding for Employee Affiliation; 

1789 + Zone 1B – Agency Card Serial Number (back of card); 

+ Zone 2B – Issuer Identification Number (back of card). 

1791 The PIV Card may also bear optional components, some of which are: 

1792 + Zone 11F – Agency Seal; 

1793 + Zone 5B – Physical Characteristics of Cardholder (back of card); 

+ Zone 3F – Signature. 

1795 When a cardholder attempts to pass through an access control point for a Federally controlled facility, a 

1796 human guard shall perform visual identity verification of the cardholder, and determine whether the 

1797 identified individual should be allowed through the control point. The following steps shall be applied in 

1798 the visual authentication process: 

1799 + The guard at the access control entry point determines whether the PIV Card appears to be genuine 

and has not been altered in any way. 

 REVISED DRAFT 58 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1801 + The guard compares the cardholder’s facial features with the picture on the card to ensure that they 

1802 match. 

1805 

1807 

1808 

1809 

1810 

1817 

1818 

1819 

1820 

1821 

1822 

1823 

1824 

1833 

1834 

1835 

1836 

1803 + The guard checks the expiration date on the card to ensure that the card has not expired. 

1804 + The guard compares the cardholder’s physical characteristic descriptions to those of the cardholder. 

(Optional) 

1806 + The guard collects the cardholder’s signature and compares it with the signature on the card. 

(Optional) 

+ One or more of the other data elements on the card (e.g., name, employee affiliation, agency card 

serial number, issuer identification, agency name) are used to determine whether the cardholder 

should be granted access. 

1811 Some characteristics of the visual authentication mechanism are as follows: 

1812 + Human inspection of card, which is not amenable for rapid or high volume access control. 

1813 + Resistant to use of unaltered card by non-owner of card. 

1814 + Low resistance to tampering and forgery. 

1815 + Does not provide protection against use of a revoked card. 

1816 + Applicable in environments with and without card readers. 

6.3 PIV Support of Graduated Assurance Levels for Identity Authentication 

The PIV Card supports a set of authentication mechanisms that can be used to implement graduated 

assurance levels for identity authentication. The following subsections specify the basic PIV 

authentication mechanisms that may be used to support the various levels of identity authentication 

assurance as defined in Section 6.1. Two or more complementing authentication mechanisms may be 

applied in unison to achieve a higher degree of assurance of the identity of the PIV cardholder. For 

example, PKI-AUTH and BIO may be applied in unison to achieve a higher degree of assurance in 

cardholder identity. 

1825 Adequately designed and implemented relying systems can achieve the PIV Card authentication 

1826 assurance levels stated in Tables 6-2 and 6-3. Less adequately designed or implemented relying systems 

1827 may only achieve lower authentication assurance levels. The design of components of relying systems, 

1828 including card readers, biometric readers, cryptographic modules, and key management systems, involves 

1829 many factors not fully specified by FIPS 201, such as correctness of the functional mechanism, physical 

1830 protection of the mechanism, and environmental conditions at the authentication point. Additional 

1831 standards and best practice guidelines apply to the design and implementation of relying systems, e.g., 

1832 [FIPS140] and [SP 800-116]. 

6.3.1 Physical Access 

The PIV Card may be used to authenticate the identity of the cardholder in a physical access control 

environment. For example, a Federal facility may have physical entry doors that have human guards at 

checkpoints, or may have electronic access control points. The PIV-supported authentication mechanisms 

 REVISED DRAFT 59
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

 REVISED DRAFT 60 

1837 

1838 

1839 

1840 

1841 

1842 

1843 

1844 

1845 

1846 

1847 

1849 

1850 

1851 

1852 

1853 

1854 

1855 

1856 

1857 

for physical access control systems are summarized in Table 6-2. An authentication mechanism that is 

suitable for a higher assurance level can also be applied to meet the requirements for a lower assurance 

level. Moreover, the authentication mechanisms in Table 6-2 can be combined to achieve higher 

assurance levels.26

Table 6-2. Authentication for Physical Access 

PIV Assurance Level 

Required by 

Application/Resource 

Applicable PIV 

Authentication Mechanism 

LITTLE or NO confidence VIS, CHUID 

SOME confidence PKI-CAK, SYM-CAK 

HIGH confidence BIO 

 1848 VERY HIGH confidence BIO-A, OCC-AUTH, PKI-AUTH 

6.3.2 Logical Access 

The PIV Card may be used to authenticate the cardholder in support of decisions concerning access to 

logical information resources. For example, a cardholder may log in to his or her department or agency 

network using the PIV Card; the identity established through this authentication process can be used for 

determining access to file systems, databases, and other services available on the network. 

Table 6-3 describes the authentication mechanisms defined for this Standard to support logical access 

control. An authentication mechanism that is suitable for a higher assurance level can also be applied to 

meet the requirements for a lower assurance level. 

Table 6-3. Authentication for Logical Access 

PIV Assurance Level 

Required by 

Application/Resource 

Applicable PIV Authentication Mechanism 

Local Workstation 

Environment 

Remote/Network 

System Environment 

LITTLE or NO confidence CHUID 

SOME confidence PKI-CAK PKI-CAK 

HIGH confidence BIO 

VERY HIGH confidence BIO-A, OCC-AUTH, PKI-AUTH PKI-AUTH 

 

26 Combinations of authentication mechanisms are specified in [SP 800-116]. 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1858 Appendix A—PIV Validation, Certification, and Accreditation 

1861 

1862 

1863 

1864 

1865 

1866 

1867 

1868 

1869 

1870 

1871 

1872 

1873 

1874 

1879 

1885 

1859 This appendix provides compliance requirements for PIV validation, certification, and accreditation, and 

1860 is normative. 

A.1 Accreditation of PIV Card Issuers (PCI) 

[HSPD-12] requires that all cards be issued by providers whose reliability has been established by an 

official accreditation process. The accreditation of the PIV Card issuer shall be reviewed through a thirdparty assessment to enhance the trustworthiness of the credential. To facilitate consistent independent 

validation of the PCI, NIST developed a set of attributes as the basis of reliability assessment of PIV Card 

issuers in SP 800-79 and published this document in July 2005. Subsequent lessons learned in 

implementation experience (in credential management and PIV Card issuance) of various agencies 

together with the evolution of PCI organizations motivated NIST to develop a new accreditation 

methodology that is objective, efficient, and will result in consistent and repeatable accreditation 

decisions and published the substantial revision as SP 800-79-1 in June 2008 [SP 800-79]. The new PCI 

accreditation methodology is built on a foundation of four major accreditation topics, 13 accreditation 

focus areas, and a total of 79 control requirements distributed under the various accreditation focus areas. 

Associated with each control requirement is a set of assessment methods, the exercise of the latter will 

result in outcomes that form the basis for accreditation decisions. 

1875 The four major accreditation topics identified in [SP 800-79] are: 

1876 + organizational preparedness; 

1877 + security management and data protection; 

1878 + infrastructure elements; and 

+ (PIV) processes. 

1880 The entire spectrum of activities in the PCI accreditation methodology is divided into the following four 

1881 phases: 

1882 + initiation phase; 

1883 + assessment phase; 

1884 + accreditation phase; and 

+ monitoring phase. 

1886 The initiation phase involves communicating the goals of the assessment/accreditation to the key 

1887 personnel of the PCI organization and the review of documents such as the PCI operations plan. In the 

1888 assessment phase, the appropriate assessment methods stipulated in the methodology for each PCI control 

1889 are carried out and the individual results recorded. The accreditation phase involves aggregating the 

1890 results of assessment, arriving at an accreditation decision, and issuing the appropriate notification – the 

1891 authorization to operate (ATO) or the denial of authorization to operate (DATO), that is consistent with 

1892 the accreditation decision. 

 REVISED DRAFT 61
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

 REVISED DRAFT 62 

1893 

1905 

1917 

1928 

1929 

1930 

1931 

1932 

1933 

1934 

1935 

1936 

A.2 Application of Risk Management Framework to IT System(s) Supporting PCI 

1894 The accreditation of the capability and reliability of a PCI using the methodology outlined in [SP 800-79] 

1895 depends upon adequate security for the information systems that are used for PCI functions. The 

1896 assurance that such a security exists in a PCI is obtained through evidence of the application of the Risk 

1897 Management Framework guidelines specified in [SP 800-37]. The methodology in [SP 800-37] in turn 

1898 was created pursuant to a mandate in Appendix III of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular 

1899 A-130. An Information system authorization decision together with evidence of security control 

1900 monitoring compliant with [SP 800-37] guidelines signifies that a PCI organization’s official accepts 

1901 responsibility for the security (in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information) of the 

1902 information systems that will be involved in carrying out the PCI functions. Hence evidence of 

1903 successful application of Risk Management Framework consistent with [SP 800-37] guidelines is 

1904 mandatory for issuing PCI accreditation using SP 800-79. 

A.3 Conformance Testing of PIV Card Application and Middleware 

1906 Assurance of conformance of the PIV Card Application and PIV Middleware interfaces to this Standard 

1907 and its associated technical specifications is needed in order to meet the security and interoperability 

1908 goals of [HSPD-12]. To facilitate this, NIST has established the NIST Personal Identity Verification 

1909 Program (NPIVP). Under this program NIST has developed test procedures in SP 800-85A, PIV Card 

1910 Application and Middleware Interface Test Guidelines (SP 800-73 compliance), and an associated toolkit 

1911 for conformance testing of PIV Card Applications and PIV Middleware [SP 800-85A]. Commercial 

1912 products under these two categories are tested by the set of accredited test laboratories, accredited under 

1913 the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) program, using the NIST supplied 

1914 test procedures and toolkit. The outcomes of the test results are validated by NIST, which then issues 

1915 validation certificates. Information about NPIVP is available at 

1916 http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/npivp. 

A.4 Cryptographic Testing and Validation 

1918 All on-card cryptographic modules hosting the PIV Card Application and cryptographic modules of card 

1919 issuance and maintenance systems shall be validated to [FIPS140] with an overall Security Level 2 (or 

1920 higher). The facilities for [FIPS140] testing are the Cryptographic and Security Testing laboratories 

1921 accredited by the NVLAP program of NIST. Vendors wanting to supply cryptographic modules can 

1922 select any of the accredited laboratories. The tests conducted by these laboratories for all vendor 

1923 submissions are validated and a validation certificate for each vendor module is issued by the 

1924 Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), a joint program run by NIST and the 

1925 Communications Security Establishment (CSE) of the Government of Canada. The details of the CMVP 

1926 and NVLAP programs and the list of testing laboratories can be found at the CMVP Web site at 

1927 http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html. 

A.5 FIPS 201 Evaluation Program 

In order to evaluate the conformance of different families of products that support the PIV processes to 

this Standard and its associated technical specifications, the Office of Governmentwide Policy under GSA 

set up the FIPS 201 Evaluation Program. The product families currently include card personalization 

products, card readers, products involved in credential enrollment functions such as fingerprint and facial 

image capture equipment, biometric fingerprint template generators, etc. Products evaluated and 

approved under this program are placed on the FIPS 201 Approved Products List to enable procurement 

of conformant products by implementing agencies. The details of the program are available at 

http://fips201ep.cio.gov/. 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1937 Appendix B—PIV Object Identifiers and Certificate Extension 

1939 

1940 

1941 

1938 This normative appendix provides additional details for the PIV objects identified in Section 4. 

B.1 PIV Object Identifiers 

Table B-1 lists details for PIV object identifiers. 

Table B-1. PIV Object Identifiers 

ID Object Identifier Description 

PIV eContent Types 

The associated content is the concatenated contents 

of the CHUID, excluding the authentication key 

map27 and the asymmetric signature field. 

id-PIV-CHUIDSecurityObject 2.16.840.1.101.3.6.1 

The associated content is the concatenated 

CBEFF_HEADER + STD_BIOMETRIC_RECORD. 

id-PIV-biometricObject 2.16.840.1.101.3.6.2 

PIV Attributes 

The attribute value is of type DirectoryString and 

specifies the PIV cardholder’s name. 

pivCardholder-Name 2.16.840.1.101.3.6.3 

The attribute value is an X.501 type Name and 

specifies the DN associated with the PIV cardholder 

in the PIV certificate(s). 

pivCardholder-DN 2.16.840.1.101.3.6.4 

The attribute value is an X.501 type Name and 

specifies the subject name that appears in the PKI 

certificate for the entity that signed the biometric or 

CHUID. 

pivSigner-DN 2.16.840.1.101.3.6.5 

pivFASC-N 2.16.840.1.101.3.6.6 The pivFASC-N OID may appear as a name type in 

the otherName field of the subjectAltName extension 

of X.509 certificates or a signed attribute in CMS 

external signatures. Where used as a name type, 

the syntax is OCTET STRING. Where used as an 

attribute, the attribute value is of type OCTET 

STRING. In each case, the value specifies the 

FASC-N of the PIV Card. 

PIV Extended Key Usage 

This specifies that the public key may be used to 

verify signatures on CHUIDs and PIV biometrics. 

id-PIV-content-signing 2.16.840.1.101.3.6.7 

This specifies that the public key is used to 

authenticate the PIV Card rather than the PIV 

cardholder. 

id-PIV-cardAuth 2.16.840.1.101.3.6.8 

1942 

1944 

 

1943 The OIDs for certificate policies are specified in [COMMON]. 

B.2 PIV Certificate Extension 

1945 The PIV NACI indicator (background investigation indicator) extension indicates whether the subject’s 

1946 background investigation was incomplete at the time of credential issuance. The PIV NACI indicator 

1947 (background investigation indicator) extension is always non-critical, and shall appear in all PIV 

27 The authentication key map was deprecated in SP 800-73-2 and was removed from SP 800-73-3. 

 REVISED DRAFT 63
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

 REVISED DRAFT 64 

1951 

1952 

1953 

1954 

1955 

1956 

1957 

1958 

1959 

1960 

1961 

1962 

1963 

1964 

1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1948 Authentication certificates and Card Authentication certificates. The value of this extension is asserted as 

1949 follows: 

1950 + TRUE if, at the time of credential issuance, (1) the FBI National Criminal History Fingerprint Check 

has completed, and (2) a background investigation has been initiated but has not completed. 

+ FALSE if, at the time of credential issuance, the subject’s background investigation has been 

completed and successfully adjudicated. 

The PIV NACI indicator (background investigation indicator) extension is identified by the id-piv-NACI 

object identifier. The syntax for this extension is defined by the following ASN.1 module. 

PIV-Cert-Extensions { 2 16 840 1 101 3 6 10 1 } 

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= 

BEGIN 

-- EXPORTS ALL -- 

-- IMPORTS NONE -- 

id-piv-NACI OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2 16 840 1 101 3 6 9 1 } 

NACI-indicator ::= BOOLEAN 

END
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

1972 Appendix C—Glossary of Terms, Acronyms, and Notations 

1974 

1975 

1976 

1977 

1978 

1979 

1980 

1981 

1982 

1983 

1984 

1985 

1986 

1987 

1988 

1989 

1990 

1991 

1992 

1993 

1994 

1995 

1996 

1997 

1998 

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 

2003 

2004 

 

1973 This informative appendix describes the vocabulary and textual representations used in the document. 

C.1 Glossary of Terms 

The following terms are used throughout this Standard.

Access Control: The process of granting or denying specific requests: 1) obtain and use information and 

related information processing services; and 2) enter specific physical facilities (e.g., Federal buildings, 

military establishments, border crossing entrances). 

Applicant: An individual applying for a PIV Card/credential. The applicant may be a current or 

prospective Federal hire, a Federal employee, a government affiliate, or a contractor.28

Application: A hardware/software system implemented to satisfy a particular set of requirements. In 

this context, an application incorporates a system used to satisfy a subset of requirements related to the 

verification or identification of an end user’s identity so that the end user’s identifier can be used to 

facilitate the end user’s interaction with the system. 

Architecture: A highly structured specification of an acceptable approach within a framework for 

solving a specific problem. An architecture contains descriptions of all the components of a selected, 

acceptable solution while allowing certain details of specific components to be variable to satisfy related 

constraints (e.g., costs, local environment, user acceptability). 

Asymmetric Keys: Two related keys, a public key and a private key, that are used to perform 

complementary operations, such as encryption and decryption or signature generation and signature 

verification. 

Authentication: The process of establishing confidence of authenticity; in this case, in the validity of a 

person’s identity and the PIV Card. 

Biometric: A measurable, physical characteristic or personal behavioral trait used to recognize the 

identity, or verify the claimed identity, of an applicant. Facial images, fingerprints, and iris image 

samples are all examples of biometrics. 

Biometric Information: The stored electronic information pertaining to a biometric. This information 

can be in terms of raw or compressed pixels or in terms of some characteristic (e.g., patterns). 

Capture: The method of taking a biometric sample from an end user. [INCITS/M1-040211] 

Cardholder: An individual possessing an issued PIV Card. 

Card Management System: The card management system manages the lifecycle of a PIV Card 

Application. 

Certificate Revocation List: A list of revoked public key certificates created and digitally signed by a 

certification authority. [RFC 5280] 

28 See Page 2 of [OMB0524] for further details of individuals who are eligible to be issued PIV Cards. 

 REVISED DRAFT 65
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

2019 

2020 

2021 

2024 

2025 

2026 

2027 

2028 

2029 

2030 

2031 

2032 

2033 

2034 

2035 

2036 

2039 

2040 

Certification: The process of verifying the correctness of a statement or claim and issuing a certificate as 

to its correctness. 

Certification Authority: A trusted entity that issues and revokes public key certificates. 

Chain-of-trust: The chain-of-trust is a sequence of related enrollment data sets that is created and 

maintained by PIV Card issuers.

Comparison: The process of comparing a biometric with a previously stored reference. See also 

“Identification” and “Identity Verification”. [INCITS/M1-040211] 

Component: An element of a large system, such as an identity card, issuer, card reader, or identity 

verification support, within the PIV system. 

Conformance Testing: A process established by NIST within its responsibilities of developing, 

promulgating, and supporting FIPS for testing specific characteristics of components, products, and 

services, as well as people and organizations for compliance with a FIPS. 

Credential: Evidence attesting to one’s right to credit or authority; in this Standard, it is the PIV Card 

and data elements associated with an individual that authoritatively binds an identity (and, optionally, 

additional attributes) to that individual. 

Cryptographic Key (Key): A parameter used in conjunction with a cryptographic algorithm that 

determines the specific operation of that algorithm. 

2022 E-Authentication Assurance Level: A measure of trust or confidence in an authentication mechanism 

2023 defined in [OMB0404] and [SP 800-63], in terms of four levels: 

• Level 1: LITTLE OR NO confidence 

• Level 2: SOME confidence 

• Level 3: HIGH confidence 

• Level 4: VERY HIGH confidence 

Enrollment Data Set: A record including information about a biometric enrollment: name and role of 

the acquiring agent, office and organization, time, place, and acquisition method. 

Federal Agency Smart Credential Number (FASC-N): As required by FIPS 201, one of the primary 

identifiers on the PIV Card for physical access control. The FASC-N is a fixed length (25 byte) data 

object, specified in [SP 800-73], and included in several data objects on a PIV Card. 

Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS): A standard for adoption and use by Federal 

departments and agencies that has been developed within the Information Technology Laboratory and 

published by NIST, a part of the U.S. Department of Commerce. A FIPS covers some topic in 

information technology to achieve a common level of quality or some level of interoperability. 

2037 Hash Function: A function that maps a bit string of arbitrary length to a fixed length bit string. Secure 

2038 hash functions [FIPS180] satisfy the following properties: 

1. One-Way. It is computationally infeasible to find any input that maps to any pre-specified 

output. 

 REVISED DRAFT 66 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

2041 

2042 

2043 

2044 

2045 

2046 

2047 

2048 

2049 

2050 

2051 

2052 

2053 

2054 

2055 

2056 

2057 

2058 

2059 

2060 

2061 

2062 

2063 

2064 

2065 

2066 

2067 

2068 

2069 

2070 

2071 

2072 

2073 

2074 

2075 

2076 

2. Collision Resistant. It is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs that map to 

the same output. 

Identification: The process of discovering the identity (i.e., origin, initial history) of a person or item 

from the entire collection of similar persons or items. 

Identifier: Unique data used to represent a person’s identity and associated attributes. A name or a card 

number are examples of identifiers. 

Identity: The set of physical and behavioral characteristics by which an individual is uniquely 

recognizable. 

Identity Proofing: The process of providing sufficient information (e.g., identity history, credentials, 

documents) to establish an identity. 

Identity Registration: The process of making a person’s identity known to the PIV system, associating a 

unique identifier with that identity, and collecting and recording the person’s relevant attributes into the 

system. 

Identity Verification: The process of confirming or denying that a claimed identity is correct by 

comparing the credentials (something you know, something you have, something you are) of a person 

requesting access with those previously proven and stored in the PIV Card or system and associated with 

the identity being claimed. 

Interoperability: For the purposes of this Standard, interoperability allows any government facility or 

information system, regardless of the issuer, to verify a cardholder’s identity using the credentials on the 

PIV Card. 

Issuer: The organization that is issuing the PIV Card to an applicant. Typically this is an organization 

for which the applicant is working. 

Key: See “Cryptographic Key.” 

Match/Matching: The process of comparing biometric information against a previously stored biometric 

data and scoring the level of similarity. 

Model: A very detailed description or scaled representation of one component of a larger system that can 

be created, operated, and analyzed to predict actual operational characteristics of the final produced 

component. 

Off-Card: Refers to data that is not stored within the PIV Card or to a computation that is not performed 

by the Integrated Circuit Chip (ICC) of the PIV Card. 

On-Card: Refers to data that is stored within the PIV Card or to a computation that is performed by the 

Integrated Circuit Chip (ICC) of the PIV Card. 

On-Card Comparison: Comparison of fingerprint data transmitted to the card with reference data 

previously stored on the card. 

Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP): An online protocol used to determine the status of a public 

key certificate. [RFC 2560] 

 REVISED DRAFT 67
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

2077 

2078 

2079 

2080 

2081 

2082 

2083 

2084 

2085 

2086 

2087 

2088 

2089 

2090 

2091 

2092 

2093 

2094 

2095 

2096 

2097 

2098 

2099 

2100 

2101 

2102 

2103 

2104 

2105 

2106 

2107 

2108 

2109 

2110 

2111 

2112 

Path Validation: The process of verifying the binding between the subject identifier and subject public 

key in a certificate, based on the public key of a trust anchor, through the validation of a chain of 

certificates that begins with a certificate issued by the trust anchor and ends with the target certificate. 

Successful path validation provides strong evidence that the information in the target certificate is 

trustworthy. 

Personally Identifiable Information (PII): Information that can be used to distinguish or trace an 

individual's identity, such as name, social security number, biometric records, etc. alone, or when 

combined with other personal or identifying information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual, 

such as date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, etc. [OMB0716] 

Personal Identification Number (PIN): A secret that a cardholder memorizes and uses to authenticate 

his or her identity. 

Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Card: A physical artifact (e.g., identity card, “smart” card) issued 

to an individual that contains stored identity credentials (e.g., photograph, cryptographic keys, digitized 

fingerprint representation) so that the claimed identity of the cardholder can be verified against the stored 

credentials by another person (human readable and verifiable) or an automated process (computer 

readable and verifiable). 

PIV Assurance Level: A degree of confidence established in the identity of the holder of the PIV Card. 

Private Key: The secret part of an asymmetric key pair that is typically used to digitally sign or decrypt 

data.

Pseudonyms: a name assigned by a Federal department or agency through a formal process to a Federal 

employee for the purpose of the employee's protection (i.e., the employee might be placed at risk if his or 

her actual name were known) or for other purposes.

Public Key: The public part of an asymmetric key pair that is typically used to verify signatures or 

encrypt data. 

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): A support service to the PIV system that provides the cryptographic 

keys needed to perform digital signature-based identity verification and to protect communications and 

storage of sensitive verification system data within identity cards and the verification system. 

PKI-Card Authentication Key (PKI-CAK): A PIV authentication mechanism that is implemented by 

an asymmetric key challenge/response protocol using the Card Authentication key of the PIV Card and a 

contact or contactless reader. 

PKI-PIV Authentication Key (PKI-AUTH): A PIV authentication mechanism that is implemented by 

an asymmetric key challenge/response protocol using the PIV Authentication key of the PIV Card and a 

contact reader, or a contactless card reader that supports the virtual contact interface. 

Recommendation: A special publication of the ITL stipulating specific characteristics of technology to 

use or procedures to follow to achieve a common level of quality or level of interoperability. 

Registration: See “Identity Registration.” 

 REVISED DRAFT 68 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

2113 

2114 

2115 

2116 

2117 

2119 

2120 

2121 

2122 

2123 

2124 

2125 

2126 

2127 

2128 

2129 

2130 

2131 

2132 

2133 

2134 

2135 

2136 

2137 

2138 

2139 

2140 

2141 

2142 

2143 

2144 

2145 

2146 

2147 

2148 

2149 

2150 

2151 

2152 

2153 

Symmetric Key: A cryptographic key that is used to perform both the cryptographic operation and its 

inverse, for example to encrypt and decrypt, or create a message authentication code and to verify the 

code. 

Validation: The process of demonstrating that the system under consideration meets in all respects the 

specification of that system. [INCITS/M1-040211] 

2118 Verification: See “Identity Verification.” 

C.2 Acronyms 

The following acronyms and abbreviations are used throughout this Standard: 

ACL Access Control List 

AES Advanced Encryption Standard 

AID Application IDentifier 

AIM Association for Automatic Identification and Mobility 

ANSI American National Standards Institute 

ARC Automated Record Checks 

ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials 

CA Certification Authority 

CAK Card Authentication Key

CBEFF Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework 

CHUID Cardholder Unique Identifier 

cm Centimeter 

CMS Cryptographic Message Syntax 

CMTC Card Management System to the Card 

CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program 

COTS Commercial Off-the-Shelf 

CRL Certificate Revocation List 

CSE Communications Security Establishment 

CTC Cardholder to Card 

CTE Cardholder to External System

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DN Distinguished Name 

DOB Date of Birth 

dpi Dots Per Inch

ERT Emergency Response Team 

FASC-N Federal Agency Smart Credential Number 

FBCA Federal Bridge Certification Authority 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards 

FIPS PUB FIPS Publication 

FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act 

GSA U.S. General Services Administration 

GUID Global Unique Identification Number

 REVISED DRAFT 69
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

2154 

2155 

2156 

2157 

2158 

2159 

2160 

2161 

2162 

2163 

2164 

2165 

2166 

2167 

2168 

2169 

2170 

2171 

2172 

2173 

2174 

2175 

2176 

2177 

2178 

2179 

2180 

2181 

2182 

2183 

2184 

2185 

2186 

2187 

2188 

2189 

2190 

2191 

2192 

2193 

2194 

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol 

I&A Identification and Authentication 

IAB Interagency Advisory Board 

ICAMSC Identity, Credential, and Access Management Subcommittee 

ICC Integrated Circuit Chip 

ID Identification 

IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 

IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 

INCITS International Committee for Information Technology Standards 

ISO International Organization for Standardization 

IT Information Technology 

ITL Information Technology Laboratory 

LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 

mm Millimeter

MWR Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

NAC National Agency Check 

NACI National Agency Check with Written Inquiries 

NCHC National Criminal History Check

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 

NISTIR National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency Report 

NPIVP NIST Personal Identity Verification Program 

NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program 

OCC On-Card Biometric Comparison 

OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol 

OID Object Identifier

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

OPM Office of Personnel Management

PCI PIV Card Issuer 

PC/SC Personal Computer/Smart Card 

PDF Portable Data File 

PIA Privacy Impact Assessment 

PII Personally Identifiable Information 

PIN Personal Identification Number 

PIV Personal Identity Verification 

PKI Public Key Infrastructure 

RFC Request for Comments 

SES Senior Executive Service 

SP Special Publication 

SSP Shared Service Provider

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

 REVISED DRAFT 70 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

 REVISED DRAFT 71

2195 

2196 

2198 

2201 

2202 

2203 

URI Uniform Resource Identifier 

U.S.C. United States Code 

2197 UUID Universally Unique IDentifier 

C.3 Notations 

2199 This Standard uses the following typographical conventions in text: 

2200 + ASN.1 data types are represented in italics. For example, SignedData and SignerInfo are data types 

defined for digital signatures. 

+ Letters or words in CAPITALS separated with underscore represent CBEFF-compliant data 

structures. For example, CBEFF_HEADER is a header field in the CBEFF structure. 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

2204 Appendix D—References 

2205 

2206 

2207 

2208 

2209 

2210 

[ANSI322] ANSI INCITS 322 Information Technology, Card Durability Test Methods, ANSI, 

2002. 

[CBEFF] NISTIR 6529-A, Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework (CBEFF), NIST, 

2003. 

[COMMON] X.509 Certificate Policy for the U.S. Federal PKI Common Policy Framework, 

Version 3647 – 1.17, December 9, 2011, or as amended. Available at 

2211 http://www.idmanagement.gov/fpkipa/documents/CommonPolicy.pdf. 

2212 

2213 

2214 

[E-Gov] E-Government Act of 2002, U.S. Public Law 107-347, 2002. 

[FIS] Federal Investigative Standards, OPM. 

[FIPS140] FIPS Publication 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, NIST, 

2215 May 25, 2001, or as amended. Available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-

2216 

2217 

2218 

2219 

2220 

2221 

2222 

2223 

2224 

2225 

2226 

2227 

2228 

2229 

2230 

2231 

2232 

2233 

2234 

2235 

2236 

2237 

2238 

2/fips1402.pdf. 

[FIPS180] FIPS Publication 180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), March 2012, or as amended. 

Available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips-180-4.pdf. 

[FISMA] Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002. Available at 

http://csrc.nist.gov/drivers/documents/FISMA-final.pdf. 

[G155-00] ASTM G155-00, Standard Practice for Operating Xenon Arc Light Apparatus for 

Exposure of Non-metallic Materials, Vol. 14.04, ASTM, July 2000. 

[G90-98] ASTM G90-98, Standard Practice for Performing Accelerated Outdoor Weathering of 

Non-metallic Materials Using Concentrated Natural Sunlight, Vol. 14.04, ASTM, 2003. 

[HSPD-12] HSPD-12, Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and 

Contractors, August 27, 2004. 

[INCITS/M1-040211] ANSI/INCITS M1-040211, Biometric Profile—Interoperability and Data 

Interchange—Biometrics-Based Verification and Identification of Transportation Workers, 

ANSI, April 2004. 

[ISO10373] ISO/IEC 10373, Identification Cards—Test Methods. Part 1—Standard for General 

Characteristic Test of Identification Cards, ISO, 1998. Part 3—Standard for Integrated Circuit 

Cards with Contacts and Related Interface Devices, ISO, 2001. Part 6—Standard for Proximity 

Card Support in Identification Cards, ISO, 2001. 

[ISO14443] ISO/IEC 14443-1:2000, Identification Cards—Contactless Integrated Circuit(s) 

Cards—Proximity Cards, ISO, 2000. 

[ISO3166] ISO 3166-1:2006. Codes for the representation of names of countries and their 

subdivisions—Part 1: Country codes. 

[ISO7810] ISO/IEC 7810:2003, Identification Cards—Physical Characteristics, ISO, 2003. 

 REVISED DRAFT 72 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

2239 

2240 

2241 

2242 

2243 

2244 

2245 

2246 

2247 

2248 

2249 

2250 

2251 

2252 

2253 

2254 

2255 

2256 

2257 

2258 

2259 

[ISO7816] ISO/IEC 7816, Identification Cards—Integrated Circuits with Contacts, Parts 1-6, 

ISO. 

[NISTIR7123] NISTIR 7123, Fingerprint Vendor Technology Evaluation 2003: Summary of 

Results and Analysis Report, NIST, June 2004. 

[NISTIR7863] NISTIR 7863, Cardholder Authentication for the PIV Digital Signature Key, 

NIST. 

[OMB0322] OMB Memorandum M-03-22, Guidance for Implementing the Privacy Provisions of 

the E-Government Act of 2002, OMB, September 26, 2003. 

[OMB0404] OMB Memorandum M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies, 

OMB, December 2003. 

[OMB0524] OMB Memorandum M-05-24, Implementation of Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive (HSPD) 12 – Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and 

Contractors, OMB, August 2005. 

[OMB0618] OMB Memorandum M-06-18, Acquisition of Products and Services for 

Implementation of HSPD-12, June 2006. 

[OMB0716] OMB Memorandum M-07-16, Safeguarding Against and Responding to the Breach 

of Personally Identifiable Information, OMB, May 2007. 

[OMB1111] OMB Memorandum M-11-11, Continued Implementation of Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12–Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal 

Employees and Contractors, February 2011. 

[PCSC] Personal Computer/Smart Card Workgroup Specifications. Available at 

2260 http://www.pcscworkgroup.com. 

2261 

2262 

2263 

[PRIVACY] Privacy Act of 1974, U.S. Public Law 93-579, 1974. 

[PROF] X.509 Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Extensions Profile for the 

Shared Service Provider (SSP) Program, Version 1.5, January 7, 2008 or as amended. Available 

2264 at http://www.idmanagement.gov/fpkipa/documents/CertCRLprofileForCP.pdf. 

2265 

2266 

[RFC2560] RFC 2560, X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status 

Protocol - OCSP, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), June 1999. Available at 

2267 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2560.txt. 

2268 [RFC4122] RFC 4122, A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace, Internet 

2269 Engineering Task Force (IETF), July 2005. Available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4122.txt. 

2270 

2271 

2272 

[RFC5280] RFC 5280, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate 

Revocation List (CRL) Profile, IETF, May 2008. Available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt. 

[RFC5652] RFC 5652, Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), IETF, September 2009. Available 

2273 at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5652.txt. 

 REVISED DRAFT 73
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

2274 

2275 

2276 

2277 

2278 

2279 

2280 

2281 

2282 

2283 

2284 

2285 

2286 

2287 

2288 

2289 

2290 

2291 

2292 

2293 

2294 

2295 

2296 

2297 

2298 

2299 

2300 

2301 

2302 

2303 

2304 

2305 

2306 

[SP 800-37] NIST Special Publication 800-37-1, Guide for Applying the Risk Management 

Framework to Federal Information Systems: A Security Life Cycle Approach, NIST, February 

2010 or as amended. 

[SP 800-53] NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 3, Recommended Security Controls for 

Federal Information Systems and Organizations, NIST, August 2009 or as amended. 

[SP 800-59] NIST Special Publication 800-59, Guideline for Identifying an Information System 

as a National Security System, NIST, August 2003 or as amended. 

[SP 800-63] NIST Special Publication 800-63 Version 1.0.2, Electronic Authentication 

Guideline, Appendix A, NIST, April 2006 or as amended. 

[SP 800-73] NIST Special Publication 800-73-3, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification, 

NIST, February 2010 or as amended. 

[SP 800-76] NIST Special Publication 800-76-1, Biometric Data Specification for Personal 

Identity Verification, NIST, January 2007 or as amended. 

[SP 800-78] NIST Special Publication 800-78-2, Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for 

Personal Identity Verification, NIST, February 2010 or as amended. 

[SP 800-79] NIST Special Publication 800-79-1, Guidelines for the Accreditation of Personal 

Identity Verification Card Issuers, NIST, June 2008 or as amended. 

[SP 800-85A] NIST Special Publication 800-85A-2, PIV Card Application and Middleware 

Interface Test Guidelines (SP800-73-3 compliance), NIST, August 2010 or as amended. 

[SP 800-87] NIST Special Publication 800-87 Revision 1, Codes for the Identification of Federal 

and Federally-Assisted Organizations, NIST, April 2008 or as amended. 

[SP 800-96] NIST Special Publication 800-96, PIV Card to Reader Interoperability Guidelines,

NIST, September 2006 or as amended. 

[SP 800-116] NIST Special Publication 800-116, A Recommendation for the use of PIV 

Credentials in Physical Access Control Systems (PACS), NIST, November 2008 or as amended. 

[SP 800-122] NIST Special Publication 800-122, Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of 

Personally Identifiable Information (PII), NIST, April 2010 or as amended. 

[SP 800-156] NIST Special Publication 800-156, Representation of PIV Chain-of-Trust for 

Import and Export, NIST. 

[SP 800-157] NIST Special Publication 800-157, Guidelines for Personal Identity Verification 

(PIV) Derived Credentials, NIST. 

[SPRINGER MEMO] Final Credentialing Standards for Issuing Personal Identity Verification 

Cards under HSPD-12, July 31, 2008. 

 REVISED DRAFT 74 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

[SSP REP] Shared Service Provider Repository Service Requirements, June 28, 2007, or as 

amended. Available at 

2307 

2308 

2309 http://www.idmanagement.gov/fpkipa/documents/SSPrepositoryRqmts.pdf.

 REVISED DRAFT 75
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

 REVISED DRAFT 76 

2310 

2311 Appendix E—Revision History 

2312 The Revision History provides an overview of the changes to FIPS 201 since its initial release.

Version Release Date Updates 

FIPS 201 February 2005 Initial Release 

FIPS 201-1 March 2006 Added the requirement for electronically distinguishable from 

identity credentials issued to individuals who have a 

completed investigation (NACI Indictor). 

FIPS 201-1 

Change Notice 

1 

March 2006 Added clarification for variable placement of Agency Card 

Serial Number along the outer edge of the back of the PIV 

Card is allowed. Also, updated ASN.1 encoding for NACI 

Indicator (background investigation indicator). 

FIPS 201-2, 

Revised Draft 

May 2012 This version represents the 5-year review of FIPS 201 and 

change request inputs received from agencies. Following are 

the highlights of changes made in this version. 

Modified the requirement for accreditation of PIV Card issuer 

to include an independent review. 

Incorporated references to credentialing guidance and 

requirements issued by OPM and OMB. 

Made the facial image data element on the PIV Card 

mandatory. 

Added the option to collect and store iris biometric data on 

the PIV Card. 

Added option to use electronic facial image for authentication 

in operator-attended environments. 

Incorporated the content from Form I-9 that is relevant to 

FIPS 201. 

Introduced the concept of a “chain-of-trust” optionally 

maintained by a PIV Card issuer. 

Changed the maximum life of PIV Card from 5 years to 6 

years. 

Added requirements for issuing a PIV Card to an individual 

under a pseudonymous identity. 

Added requirements for issuing a PIV Card to an individual 

within grace period. 

Added requirements for post-issuance updates. 

Added option to allow for remote PIN resets. 

Introduced the ability to issue PIV derived credentials. 

The employee affiliation color-coding and the large expiration 

date in the upper right-hand corner of the card are now 

mandatory. 

Made all four asymmetric keys and certificates mandatory. 

Introduced the concept of a virtual contact interface over 

which all functionality of the PIV Card is accessible. 

Added a mandatory UUID as a unique identifier for the PIV 
PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

 REVISED DRAFT 77

Card in addition to the FASC-N. 

Added optional on-card biometric comparison as a means of 

performing card activation and as a PIV authentication 

mechanism. 

Removed direct requirement to distribute certificates and 

CRLs via LDAP. 

Updated authentication mechanisms to enable variations in 

implementations. 

Require signature verification and certification path validation 

in the CHUID, BIO, and BIO-A authentication mechanisms. 

The VIS and CHUID authentication mechanisms have been 

downgraded to indicate that they provide LITTLE or NO 

assurance in the identity of the cardholder. 

Deprecated the use of the CHUID authentication mechanism. 

The CHUID data element has not been deprecated and 

continues to be mandatory. 

2313