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i 

75–634 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–144] 

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES 

AND SECURITY LEAD TRANSITION: 

THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS, METRICS, 

AND EFFORTS TO BUILD CAPABILITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 24, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JORDAN HOLT, Professional Staff Member 

PAUL LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

CHRISTOPHER J. BRIGHT, Professional Staff Member 

ARTHUR MILIKH, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, July 24, 2012, Afghan National Security Forces and Security Lead 

Transition: The Assessment Process, Metrics, and Efforts To Build Capability ...................................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, July 24, 2012 ............................................................................................ 25 

TUESDAY, JULY 24, 2012 

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES AND SECURITY LEAD TRANSITION: THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS, METRICS, AND EFFORTS TO 

BUILD CAPABILITY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Wittman, Hon. Rob, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Oversight and Investigations ......................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Cordesman, Dr. Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies ............................................................. 2 

Felter, COL Joseph H., USA (Ret.), Ph.D., Senior Research Scholar, Center 

for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University ................... 4 

Johnson, Charles M., Jr., Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 7 

Moorefield, Amb. (Ret.) Kenneth P., Deputy Inspector General for Special 

Plans and Operations, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department 

of Defense ............................................................................................................. 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Cordesman, Dr. Anthony H. ............................................................................ 31 

Felter, COL Joseph H. ..................................................................................... 70 

Johnson, Charles M., Jr., joint with Sharon L. Pickup, Director, Defense 

Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office .. 97 

Moorefield, Amb. (Ret.) Kenneth P. ................................................................ 87 

Wittman, Hon. Rob ........................................................................................... 29 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES AND SECURITY 

LEAD TRANSITION: THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS, 

METRICS, AND EFFORTS TO BUILD CAPABILITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 24, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m. in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Rob Wittman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Mr. WITTMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, in the interest of time, 

since we have some votes coming up, we will get under way. I will 

call to order in an open session the Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations for a hearing on ‘‘Afghan National Security Forces 

and Security Lead Transition: The Assessment Process, Metrics, 

and Efforts To Build Capability.’’ 

And I want to welcome our panelists today. Thank you for taking 

time out of your busy schedules. 

And today our subcommittee convenes the fourth in our series of 

hearings related to the Afghan National Security Forces. Members 

have just received a closed classified briefing from the senior Department of Defense officials on the metrics used to assess the 

readiness of Afghan forces and current capability ratings. Now the 

subcommittee holds an open hearing on this topic. 

And we have assembled a panel of specialists to provide testimony about the sufficiency and reliability of the metrics used by 

the U.S. to track the progress of the development of the Afghan 

National Security Forces. We will also receive testimony on the effectiveness of the U.S. training effort and the challenges our troops 

face in readying the Afghan Army and police to assume the lead 

for security by 2014. 

The development of self-sufficient Afghan forces capable of providing internal and external security is a key goal for the U.S. 

strategy in Afghanistan. And in the public settings before this subcommittee and elsewhere, Department of Defense officials have 

said that the capability of the Afghan forces will inform decisions 

about the pace of the continued drawdown of U.S. troops and the 

size of an enduring U.S. presence. 

Our panel today includes Dr. Anthony Cordesman, the Arleigh A. 

Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Dr. Joseph Felter, a retired U.S. Army colonel 
2 

and senior research scholar at the Center for International Security 

and Cooperation at Stanford University; Ambassador Kenneth 

Moorefield, the Deputy Inspector General for Special Plans and Operations at the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General; Mr. Charles M. Johnson, Jr., Director of International Affairs 

and Trade at the United States Government Accountability Office. 

Mr. Johnson will be assisted in answering questions by his colleague, Ms. Sharon Pickup, also a director at GAO. 

Panelists, thank you for your participation today, and we look 

forward to your testimony. 

I note that all Members have received your full written testimony. This will also be entered into the record as submitted. 

Therefore, this afternoon I ask that you summarize your comments 

and highlight the significant points. This will allow our Members 

greater time to pose questions and ask for additional information. 

As an administrative note, I recognize that members of other 

subcommittees may join us. Pursuant to the committee rules, I will 

recognize these Members after all Oversight and Investigations 

Subcommittee members have had an opportunity to question the 

witnesses. 

I want to remind the panelists that we are on a strict 5-minute 

limit, so I would ask that you watch your timers. The gavel will 

sound at 5 minutes in the interest of time, since we have a large 

number of panelists and an upcoming vote. So I will ask that you 

strictly follow our time guidelines. 

And, with that, Mr. Cooper, I will go to you for an opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of time, 

I have no opening statement. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. 

With that, we will begin with our witnesses. 

Dr. Cordesman. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ARLEIGH A. 

BURKE CHAIR IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND 

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Dr. CORDESMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me begin by saying no one should approach the challenges 

of creating effective Afghan security forces and creating the right 

assessment process and metrics without remembering our failures 

in Vietnam and in Iraq. These were very different wars from Afghanistan, but they did have some things in common: We consistently exaggerated the progress being made in developing the forces 

in each country, and we made constant changes to our goals for 

force size, structure, and funding. Every year was the first year in 

Vietnam and Iraq, and, in many ways, every year is the first year 

in Afghanistan. 

We have also repeated our tendency to rush force development 

and focus on progress in numbers rather than problems. Our current assessment tools, like the CUAT [Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool] system, have taken years to envolve, and they still focus 

on force generation rather than the broader and far more impor-
3 

tant issue of determining whether we can create an affordable and 

sustainable force that can actually take over security and finding 

the right ways to measure progress toward that goal. 

At present, we lack any credible plan for the future development 

of Afghan forces. We use broad numbers like 352,000, 228,500, and 

4.1 billion. We rate units individually in ways that ignore key 

issues like corruption, political alignments, and the actual ability 

to deal with insurgent threats in the field. We have no public plan 

that explains the progress we expect in credible terms, the challenges we face, the real-world costs of sustaining progress, and 

what transition really means in terms of time—all of which are 

critical aspects of metrics and assessment. 

In my detailed testimony, I have laid out the challenges we need 

to meet in changing our assessment systems in considerable detail. 

And I have not done this casually. I fully recognize that we have 

made real progress in developing the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces], particularly since we first started to fund the effort on 

a credible basis in 2010. But the fact is, it remains a very highrisk effort. Our metrics and assessments are weak, and they focus 

on creating the force rather than transition. And I am deeply disturbed that NTM–A [NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan] has not 

issued a useful public report on ANSF development since 2010. 

With the exception of the Department of Defense semiannual report to Congress, there is no command transparency, no basis for 

public trust. And experience should tell us that if we are to have 

any chance of success, we need to look beyond today’s assessment 

and metrics. 

The main purpose of ANSF metrics should be to determine 

whether the ANSF has the will and ability to fight and act as a 

coherent force to develop the central government. Manning, equipment levels, and training are all secondary. We should never lump 

together the elements of the ANSF. They should all be assessed 

separately and in different ways, reflecting their function. 

Assessment should be tied to credible funding plans and estimates of what is being spent, the number of trainers, the number 

of mentors, and the number of partners actually there. No one 

should ever be allowed to report people as pledged as if they were 

present. We need to honestly assess the massive impact of corruption, ties to power brokers and warlords that affects every element 

of the ANSF. 

When we do these assessments and metrics, they should be by 

district, by region, and by critical area of engagement, not broad, 

national, or provincial figures that really do not reflect progress. 

We do need to have assessments of how the police and security 

forces are actually tied to the justice system and governance. A police-only assessment system is inherently meaningless. 

And, finally, we should tie all of our assessments to whether we 

can afford the overall activities of the government, whether the 

overall funding of transition is adequate, and not separate the 

funding of the ANSF from the overall fiscal problems of transition. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cordesman can be found in the 

Appendix on page 31.] 
4 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Dr. Cordesman. I appreciate your testimony. 

Dr. Felter. 

STATEMENT OF COL JOSEPH H. FELTER, USA (RET.), PH.D., 

SENIOR RESEARCH SCHOLAR, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY 

Dr. FELTER. Thank you, Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member 

Cooper, and members of the subcommittee. It is an honor and 

privilege to join this distinguished panel and to discuss the challenges of building and assessing the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces. 

My testimony draws on perspective gained in my career as a U.S. 

Army Special Forces officer with multiple operational deployments, 

most recently as commander of the International Security Assistance Force Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team from 

2010 to 2011. 

The ANSF can’t win the war in Afghanistan on its own, but it 

can lose it. Accomplishing its core mission of establishing security 

and protecting the population is critical to setting conditions and 

creating space for the Afghan Government to implement the development, governance, and other activities key to making progress 

and ultimately prevailing in this comprehensive counterinsurgency 

campaign. With security, sustainable gains are possible. Without it, 

progress along any other line of effort will be impeded and failure 

all but certain. 

One effort to bring this critically important security to areas beyond the current reach of the ANA [Afghan National Army] and 

ANP [Afghan National Police] is the MOI’s [Ministry of the Interior] Afghan Local Police program. To date, there has been steady 

and deliberate progress in fielding the ALP [Afghan Local Police]. 

And U.S. Special Operations Forces, working by, with, and through 

their Afghan counterparts and other coalition force members, have 

done and continue to do a remarkable job under extraordinarily 

challenging conditions. 

But there are serious potential risks associated with deploying 

the ALP or other similar security forces. A number of ANA forces 

I spoke with when ALP was fielded admitted concerns that they 

may have to fight these forces someday after ISAF [International 

Security Assistance Force] departs. 

Afghan Government leaders may determine that the ALP program should not be continued, and this is certainly their sovereign 

prerogative. However, I believe they would be abandoning the ALP 

at their own peril if they cannot adequately resource and field an 

alternative initiative to protect Afghanistan’s rural population in 

strategically important areas, deny these areas to the Taliban, and 

create space for state institutions to mature. 

Given the emphasis of this hearing on metrics and assessments, 

I will highlight a challenge on this topic. Gauging ANSF capacity 

has by and large relied on assessments presented in quantitative 

terms, just as Mr. Cordesman has emphasized, such as how many 

ANSF in various categories are trained and deployed. A less delib-
5 

erate effort has been invested in accounting for variation in the 

quality of these forces. 

Quality assessments are often based on the reports of U.S. trainers’ and mentors’ reports, and these are often not transparent. 

These can be quite accurate when they spend a considerable 

amount of time with the unit, but much less so in cases where they 

have limited real exposure to the units being assessed. Given this, 

at least in the case of the police and other units with frequent exposure to locals, I would advocate including some form of a community-based performance assessment, in which both public and anonymous feedback is regularly solicited through surveys, complaint 

hotlines, and other mechanisms, as an independent measure of performance. Such assessments might help increase public accountability. 

I will conclude with reasons for optimism and concern that 

should inform efforts to build ANSF capability and to develop 

standards to assess them by. 

Assessing ANSF capabilities relative to the standards of developed Western militaries can be disheartening. But, encouragingly, 

ISAF and GIRoA’s [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] challenge is building and sustaining security forces that are 

more capable than the Taliban and other likely threats that Afghanistan will face. This standard is arguable achievable, even 

with the well-documented ANSF weaknesses and shortcomings. 

Also, historical precedent provides some basis for optimism that 

the ANSF, with continued aid and support from the international 

community, may be able to secure the country and prevent a return 

of Taliban rule after U.S. forces leave. Following the redeployment 

of Soviet combat troops from Afghanistan in early 1989, for example, the security situation did not collapse, despite the many dire 

predictions at the time. 

But we have many reasons for concern as we build and assess 

ANSF capacity. Ultimately, counterinsurgency campaigns can only 

be as good as the governments they support, and even the best, 

most effective militaries cannot compensate long for failures in governance. 

It is likely that huge investments made in the ANSF have led 

to the purchasing of a certain amount of cooperation among various 

authority figures. As our investments are inevitably reduced and 

these incentives diminished, this cooperation will be harder to sustain. Given this, perhaps the biggest threat to the ANSF’s ability 

to secure the country after the departure of U.S. forces hinge less 

on its capabilities and more on its internal cohesion and the potential for ethnic divisions to fracture it. 

A capable ANSF is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 

success in the Afghanistan campaign. Improving the capabilities of 

this institution must not be addressed or assessed in a vacuum. 

Thank you for the honor of testifying here today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Felter can be found in the Appendix on page 70.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Dr. Felter. 

Ambassador Moorefield. 
6 

STATEMENT OF AMB. (RET.) KENNETH P. MOOREFIELD, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR SPECIAL PLANS AND OPERATIONS, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Ambassador MOOREFIELD. Good afternoon, Chairman Wittman, 

Ranking Member Cooper, and distinguished members of the House 

Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. 

Thank you for this opportunity today to discuss Office of Inspector 

General of the Department of Defense oversight of the Department’s efforts to develop the Afghan National Security Forces. 

Between now and the end of 2014, ISAF and U.S. military strategy is focused on developing the operational capability of Afghan 

forces to assume the security lead. Although planning is still ongoing, ISAF and U.S. commands have indicated that certain ANSF 

development efforts will likely continue past 2014. 

Oversight performance assessments undertaken by DOD IG [Department of Defense Inspector General] over the past year have addressed a number of these force development challenges. One recent assessment concerned efforts to build an Afghan Air Force by 

2016. Development of the Afghan Air Force became a command priority only in 2010. It is therefore in the early stages of building 

base infrastructure, procuring aircraft, and recruiting and training 

Afghan pilots and crews. 

Our team noted a potential systemic challenge in this regard, 

with reference to the need for a clear consensus between NATO 

[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and the Afghan Government 

concerning the roles and capabilities of the Afghan Air Force. Another issue identified concerned the ineffective maintenance, parts 

supply, and performance of the C–27A medium cargo aircraft, a 

key part of the Afghan Air Force fleet. And recruiting sufficient Afghan personnel with the educational background required to build 

and maintain a relatively modern air force presents a challenge. 

DOD IG also has completed an assessment of the progress made 

by U.S. Special Operations Forces and Marines in building the Afghan Local Police. ALP growth has not been without difficulties, 

but it has had success in denying insurgent forces access to ALP 

districts and villages. 

Recently, ALP’s strength reached 13,000, with a goal to expand 

to 30,000 by the end of 2014. However, there is a shortage of Special Operation Force personnel. The addition of several U.S. infantry battalions has helped, but they are not as well-prepared by 

training and experience to carry out this mission. 

Additionally, the ALP program was originally planned to last 2 

to 5 years. Given its relative success, the program’s longer-term duration, which ISAF recommends, needs to be confirmed. 

In April of this year, DOD IG conducted an assessment to determine whether the development of an effective command and control 

system to plan, communicate, and execute ANA operations was on 

track. Our team found that the ANA can, in fact, conduct basic C2 

[Command and Control] with other ANSF elements, but it is very 

dependent upon enabler support provided by the U.S. and coalition 

assets, especially in certain key areas as communications and intelligence. Building these key enabler capabilities in logistics, health 

care, and other areas, in addition, is a top command priority. 
7 

Another C2 challenge is adapting ANSF personnel to operate and 

manage the relatively complex information technology and automation systems that C2 requires. Qualified applicants for IT [information technology] positions remain limited. A number of ANA personnel who did get trained soon found better-paying jobs in the private sector. 

In June 2012, the DOD IG conducted an assessment of U.S. and 

coalition efforts to develop ANA leadership. Leadership, it is worth 

underscoring, is key to ANSF’s success. Progress continues to be 

made building the leadership corps through basic and advanced 

training programs, as well as by partnering with NATO and coalition units and mentors. 

Worth noting is that the National Military Academy, modeled 

along the lines of West Point, just graduated its largest class ever 

of 640 junior officers, compared to only 84, 5 years ago. On the battlefield, as the ANA lead operational role has increased, our forces 

report that so has ANA officer confidence increased. 

However, there is still much progress to be made. The advancement of officer personnel through assignments and promotions is 

insufficiently skill- or merit-based. This presents a disincentive to 

military personnel seeking increased responsibility and accomplishment. And Afghan military officers reflect the experience and views 

of multiple generations who trained and fought under the Soviet 

Army and the mujahideen and more recently with NATO–U.S. 

forces. Not surprisingly, they are evolving toward but are not yet 

a fully cohesive officer corps. 

In closing today, I would like to underscore the remarkable professionalism and determination we have witnessed consistently displayed by ISAF and U.S. trainers and advisers. They conduct their 

mission under arduous and increasingly dangerous conditions. We 

in DOD IG will continue our oversight efforts with respect to this 

mission through 2014 and beyond. 

I would welcome any questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Moorefield can be found 

in the Appendix on page 87.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ambassador Moorefield. 

Mr. Johnson. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES M. JOHNSON, JR., DIRECTOR, 

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Cooper, members of this 

subcommittee, I am pleased to be here to discuss the efforts to 

build, train, and sustain a capable Afghan National Security Force. 

I am accompanied by my colleague, Ms. Sharon Pickup, from our 

Defense Capabilities and Management team. I would like to thank 

her and her staff, as well as the staff for our International Affairs 

and Trade team, for assistance in preparing for this testimony. 

Let me first start by noting that, since 2002, the U.S. has allo- cated about $43 billion toward this effort, with an additional $11.2 

billion appropriated in fiscal year 2012 and $5.7 billion requested 

for fiscal year 2013. 
8 

In 2010, the U.S. Government, the Afghan Government, and 

international community agreed to transition lead responsibility for 

the Afghan security to the Afghan National Security Force by the 

end of 2014. The transition is in process, and the U.S. and NATO 

partners and coalition forces have begun evolving more toward an 

advise-and-assist effort. 

A successful transition requires that ANSF be fully capable of 

addressing security challenges on a sustainable basis. Today we 

will address three points: progress reported and tools used to assess ANSF capability; challenges affecting the development of 

ANSF; and the use of security forces teams to advise and assist the 

ANSF. 

With respect to progress, in April 2012 DOD reported that only 

about 7 percent of the Afghan National Army and about 9 percent 

of the Afghan National Police units were capable of operating independently with assistance from advisers. 

While we have previously found the tools being used to assess 

ANSF reliable for us to report on capability, it is worth noting that 

the definitions have changed several times. For example, when we 

reported on the Afghan National Army in 2011, the highest capability rating was referred to as ‘‘independent,’’ which meant that a 

unit was capable of performing its mission without assistance from 

coalition forces. At that time, no Afghan National Army unit was 

rated at that level. Now the highest level is ‘‘independent with advisers.’’ DOD has noted that this change has contributed, in part, 

to increases in the number of ANSF units assessed at the highest 

level. 

It is also worth noting that not until recently did DOD and the 

NATO forces begin assessing the Afghan National Police for civil 

policing capabilities, which is key to rule of law. 

Our second point is that several longstanding challenges may affect the progress and sustainment of the Afghan National Security 

Forces. There are three to highlight: the costs, skill gaps, and limited ministerial capacity. 

As for the costs, we have previously reported that the Afghan 

Government is dependent on donor contributions to support security forces and that the U.S. has contributed at least 90 percent of 

the Afghan security-related expenditures. Two months ago, the 

international community pledged to sustain the Afghan National 

Security Forces post-2014 at an estimated annual cost of about $4.1 

billion through 2017. Given the limited Afghan revenues, it is anticipated that the U.S. and international community would need to 

fund a significant portion of the projected $4.1 billion. IMF estimates that the Afghan Government will not be able to sustain its 

expenses or afford its expenses at least for another decade. 

Key skill gaps in the ANSF also persist, including shortfalls in 

leadership and logistics capability, which has been noted earlier. 

For example, DOD reported significant shortages in the number of 

noncommissioned Afghan officers needed to provide leadership to 

the ANSF. Some of the causes we have identified include shortages 

in trainers and low literacy rates, which remain an ongoing barrier 

to addressing skill gaps. 

We have recommended in 2011 that DOD, in conjunction with 

the international partners, takes steps to eliminate the shortage of 
9 

trainers. However, according to DOD’s latest 1230 report, about 16 

percent of the required instructor positions remain unfilled and 

lack pledges to fill them. 

Another challenge we have previously highlighted is limited capacity of the Afghan Ministry of Defense as well as the Ministry 

of Interior. As of April 2012, the MOD [Ministry of Defense] was 

assessed as requiring some coalition assistance to accomplish its 

mission, while the Ministry of Interior was assessed as needing significant coalition assistance. MOD and MOI are important to a successful transition over to the Afghan Government. 

Finally, with respect to the use of Security Forces Assistance 

Teams, the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps began deploying these 

teams earlier this year in support of the transition of lead security 

responsibility. These teams will advise the ANSF leaders in areas 

such as command and control, and logistics. 

We have previously identified areas we believe will be important 

considerations for DOD as it moves forward. Among these is the 

importance of assigning personnel to the adviser teams in a timely 

manner so that they can train and prepare in advance of being deployed; and, secondly, the need to set clear priorities between the 

advising mission and the other operational requirements that they 

will be expected to fulfill in-country. 

This concludes my opening statement. I would be happy to take 

any questions at this time. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Johnson and Ms. Pickup 

can be found in the Appendix on page 97.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. 

Panelists, thank you so much for your questions. 

As you have just heard, the tones have gone off for votes. What 

we will do is to try to get through at least several Members’ questions, and then we will recess to go vote, and then we will return. 

Dr. Cordesman, I would like to begin with you. I think it is very 

interesting that you bring up the metrics by which success is being 

measured with transition with ANSF units, and you talk about the 

Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool as probably not being the 

proper overall metric. 

Give us your thoughts. And you mentioned some other metrics 

there—the willingness to fight, allegiance, corruption, those sorts of 

things. Give us your thought about the current CUAT as an assessment tool versus other metrics that in your estimation or what you 

are saying should be out there. 

And how do we best do that evaluation as to those units’ capability, not just in the short term but also in the long term as a sustainable force as U.S. forces leave under any situation, regardless 

of how much support they have? And, you know, the metrics right 

now are based on some level of support all the way up to operating 

independently. And I wanted to get your thoughts about what else 

you think ought to be included in that assessment tool. 

Dr. CORDESMAN. Mr. Chairman, it has taken us about a decade 

to get to the CUAT system. Before then, we had the CM [Capability Milestone] system, which was essentially a series of forcegeneration measures, which historically have always grossly exaggerated the capability of the force, regardless of whether it was our 
10 

force or some other. This is not the way you assess capability, period. 

The CUAT system hopefully has a broader set of elements. It 

does look more realistically at the history of combat performance. 

And I am at least told that it looks at political alignments, corruption, and the actual nature of the unit structure relative to the government and the point of whether you have an effective link to policing and other activities. But it is broken out still as a force-generation measure. 

We have basically about 18 months in which we are supposed to 

transfer virtually every part of Afghanistan to actual operation 

largely by Afghan forces. Now, when I went through this list of 

issues in my summary testimony—I have gone through a much 

longer list in the written testimony—I focused on the fact, this is 

a force-on-force issue. It is a net assessment issue. You measure 

not whether you are generating forces but whether their overall 

performance in the field is actually performing this role of moving 

toward transition. And that is completely different from counting 

things and saying how many people are trained, as important as 

they are. 

It is also a grim reality that money is a critical issue here. We 

have to know whether they have, not simply the number of trainers, but whether any of them are qualified. If you could randomly 

pick out anyone in uniform and turn them into a trainer and a 

mentor, you are not meeting the kinds of capabilities that Dr. Felter or, I believe, anybody else would measure. 

If you are saying that basically we simply run as many people 

through the system as possible, that is not a metric of success. You 

need to know basically whether you are generating an affordable 

force, and you need to know whether you are providing the proper 

trainer component. And any assessment system that only focuses 

on Afghan forces is, by definition, a failure. 

The bulk of the forces will be army forces, as long as you only 

count ANSF. If you throw in the ALP and the APPF [Afghan Public 

Protection Force], the bulk of the forces numerically are not army, 

they are police and security forces, each of which has a different 

function, each of which is considerably more corrupt and more subject to political interference, on an average, than the army forces. 

You need to assess them accordingly. And you need to look at 

whether your spending and your training processes are solving 

this. 

In large parts of Afghanistan, there is no matching court system, 

there is no real government to support the police, there is no adequate detention system. If you look at the most recent 1230 report, 

buried away in the text is the statement that to get government 

presence in Kandahar and Helmand they had to waive all requirements for qualification for the personnel deployed. And there are 

many areas where we know that basically the Taliban or insurgents effectively run the justice system. 

Looking at this is a fundamentally different perspective from 

simply focusing on force numbers. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Dr. Cordesman. 

Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
11 

I thank the witnesses. 

Dr. Cordesman, your critique is devastating. And I believe it is 

an accurate summary to say that you point out that the U.S. does 

not have a credible policy in dealing with the transition right now. 

Is that a short way of summarizing it? 

Dr. CORDESMAN. Well, I think, Congressman, I would say that 

what we don’t have is any credible public plan. 

I know that people have worked in great detail on providing at 

a more classified level the kind of planning activity on a civil and 

military level that would help. I also know that, quite frankly, the 

numbers keep changing, the goals keep changing. It is, frankly, ridiculous to talk about a $4.1 billion figure as if we had the faintest 

idea what conditions would be in 2014 and 2015 or if that somehow 

this figure was a constant relative to time. It was basically all of 

about 12 months ago when we said we needed twice the money. 

And all of a sudden, we are at a completely different funding level, 

with no justification or public expenditure. 

We never had any credible way to get 352,000. That is no reflection on the people over there. There is no methodology that you can 

say requires a specific number. But to say that we are going down 

to 228,500 is not something anybody can really explain or sustain. 

And this, to me, is the problem. We have the right concepts. We 

have made real progress. I think in many areas we have the right 

priorities. What we don’t have is a credible plan, a credible management system, a credible way to look at advisers and money, and 

a way to tie the progress we are making to the overall progress in 

the war. 

Mr. COOPER. Again, a devastating critique. 

We are here in the public setting, so I wonder if a credible plan is even possible, given the 18-month time horizon, the $4.1 billion 

budget figure, and the other constraints that you have mentioned. 

Dr. CORDESMAN. Well, it is again an excellent question, Congressman, but the alternative is to let everything grow by topsy. 

Yes, the plan has to be regularly revised and updated. Yes, it is 

conditions-based. Yes, you have to put a lot of things together 

where you can’t properly quantify it and you have very uncertain 

data. That is pretty much a definition of public policy. And to say 

that you can’t do it because it is difficult and it can’t be perfect is 

simply not a credible excuse. 

Mr. COOPER. So here, on the one hand, we don’t have a credible 

policy, and then we don’t have a credible excuse for not having a 

good policy. So we are kind of caught in between here. 

In your opinion, have conditions in Pakistan made our task more 

difficult recently, now that supply lines are allegedly back open 

again? Is the political situation in Pakistan continuing to make it 

even more difficult than it would be otherwise? 

Dr. CORDESMAN. I think it is probably a very broad conclusion 

that none of our problems in Pakistan are over. And if you looked 

at today’s news and the fact that the tensions between Pakistan 

and Afghanistan have risen again in spite of meetings designed to 

ease them—we do have the ability, hopefully, to bribe them into 

opening the lines of communication long enough for transition. 

I don’t think I know of anyone who describes them seriously as 

allies or believes that we have solved the problems that we are 
12 

dealing with. When we have public opinion polls that show that 

Pakistanis think that Americans are more of an enemy than Indians, we know just how deeply in trouble we are. And I don’t think 

anyone is saying that somehow our problems with the ISI [InterServices Intelligence] sanctuaries and their links to various insurgent groups have in any way gotten better in the last year. 

Mr. COOPER. I see that my time is about expired, Mr. Chairman. 

In the interest of time, I will yield to my colleagues. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. 

We have about 5 minutes, I think, remaining in the vote. What 

we will do, in the interest of time, is to go ahead and leave for the 

vote, and we will come back after a recess. And I will recess the 

committee, ask the panelists to hang around. We have two votes, 

and then we will return, and we will pick up questions with Mr. 

Coffman. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. I call back to order the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Armed Services Committee. 

And we will now continue our questioning, and we will go to Mr. 

Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Cordesman, as we finish tranches 4 and 5 over the next 2 

years, some of the toughest areas to be handed off to, or handed 

back to, the Afghans are yet to be done. And as our overall level 

of troops decrease and the number of resources we have in-country 

decrease, can you talk to us about, how do you measure that 

metrics of, should things begin to happen that looks like the ANSF 

is not being successful, what should we be watching for to say, all 

right, that trend is going the wrong way? 

And how do we address the resource issue that might be presented since we will, over time, have fewer folks there to respond 

with? 

Dr. CORDESMAN. Well, it is a very good question, Congressman. 

I think that one of the critical aspects is that you appraise what 

is happening in terms of, not things like enemy-initiated attacks, 

but insurgent presence and influence; that you watch whether the 

pattern is one of expanding control in the—what I think you have 

been briefed on—the critical districts and the districts of interest, 

which are the most sensitive parts of Afghanistan. That is where 

the ANSF and the whole process of transition will probably succeed 

or fail, although there are insurgent elements in other parts of the 

country. 

And I think this is critical, because right now we tend to assess 

risk almost exclusively on whether there are times when the insurgents basically conduct organized attacks against us or we have, as 

part of the campaign plan, reasons to attack them. I don’t think 

that in any way portrays the risk of the problems we face. 

I think that you have to tie the success of the ANSF to what is 

happening in terms of governance and whether the Afghan Government is effective and capable of operating in that area. If we simply 

look at the Afghan security forces, we may see a lot of cases where 

the army can win, but it does not have any lasting impact. 

Half a century ago, I remember a very senior U.S. officer pointing out that if you couldn’t go there at night and without an ar-
13 

mored vehicle, you didn’t have security; and that the ratings in 

Vietnam in no way reflected what the actual level of security was. 

I think these are the key measures. I think we also have to look 

at what happens to Afghan units in combat and over time. What 

levels of attrition exist? What happens to their equipment? Are 

they actually being supplied? Do they become linked to power brokers and warlords? 

Now, that is the ANA. I would find it, frankly, amazing if we did 

not see in many elements of the police, as we go through this process, a very different problem: growing levels of corruption, growing 

levels of ties to narcotraffickers and power brokers, a tendency to 

try to get what they can at the command level while they can. 

I would also look very hard—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Give us a couple of sentences on why the distinction between the two. Why can the police not go the same route— 

I mean, obviously they started later, but why can’t they—— 

Dr. CORDESMAN. They are far more local by the very nature of 

things. They are far more tied to local power brokers, particularly 

where government is weak. They can easily, basically as they do— 

I mean, there are cases in Afghanistan where you can have a 

Taliban checkpoint and 10 kilometers away you have the Afghan 

police extorting money from truckers or whoever is moving. They 

are simply there. 

And, basically, the level of discipline, the level of rotation and 

training is different. The level of support and equipment is different. They are far more vulnerable to outside pressure. And if 

you can’t perform the mission and somebody offers you money, you 

might as well take the money as well as be vulnerable. If you are 

in the border police, it is a remarkably attractive business proposition. And raising salary doesn’t alter the pattern of corruption. 

Now, I don’t mean to say that this happens throughout the force. 

There are some very competent, very honorable Afghans in it. But 

this is a key process. 

Mr. CONAWAY. We tend to focus on the negatives, the corruption 

and those kinds of issues. And then you counter that with your 

statement that you don’t mean it is all. How do we get a handle— 

those of us policymakers decide which side to take on that limited 

statement? Is there a way to measure—and I am about to run out 

of time, but—— 

Dr. CORDESMAN. What I have seen in the field, Congressman, is 

you map out the areas where you know that you have corruption 

and you map out the areas where you know you have effective 

forces. And, basically, this a critical aspect of assessing those 

forces. We, after all, do it with provincial governors and district 

governors. We have a very good idea which are corrupt and which 

are honest, and we focus on the honest ones and we see the corrupt 

ones as a problem. 

But any assessment of the police, the Afghan Local Police, the 

APPF, that does not do this is, not necessarily a waste of time, but 

it is an invitation to get into extremely serious trouble. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
14 

In terms of the—I understand that the development of the police 

is behind the development of the Afghan Army. And I served in 

Iraq with the U.S. Marine Corps, and one thing that I remembered, 

when there wasn’t adequate security, it was very difficult to stand 

up a local police force. Because what would happen is we could rely 

on the Iraqi Army because they weren’t necessarily from the—they 

weren’t usually from that area. In the instance where I was, they 

were not from the area. So they would go—when they weren’t out 

on patrol, they would be in secure base camps. When the local police, if they were actually doing their job, the insurgents would follow them home at night and potentially kill them and their family. 

And so it was very difficult to stand up a police force. 

And so, to what extent is this the case in Afghanistan? Anyone? 

Dr. FELTER. Congressman Coffman, I can take a response at that 

one. 

I would say, you are absolutely right; without security, nothing 

is possible, as far as making progress with counterinsurgents. Certainly when you are standing up a local police force, an indicator 

that they are being successful and harming the insurgents’ interests is that they are attacked. And we see this in Afghanistan and 

certainly with the Afghan Local Police. 

And I think that is why, again, it is so important that you have 

to bring security. Nothing is possible without security. And right 

now, with three-quarters of the Afghan population residing in these 

rural areas where the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police is not, some of our only options are to try to find some deliberate way to carefully vet individuals at the local level and provide 

local security. 

And then build on the security, providing a security window 

while the institutions of the Afghan Government, to include the national police and the army, can develop and take over that mission 

and then eventually transition those local security forces to the actual police and military at some point when the conditions are 

right. 

Dr. CORDESMAN. Congressman, if I may supplement, I think we 

need to realize that we also will be reducing our presence. 

We also need to understand that this is not in any sense a homogenous country. Tribal areas in the east, tribal areas in the 

south operate under very different rules. A lot of those still, even 

if we are there, have justice systems which have strong Taliban 

elements actually running them. 

Security is a key issue, but, frankly, in civil policing, wherever 

you do not have an effective government presence, wherever the 

courts and the legal system doesn’t work, wherever you don’t have 

legal detention facilities, you can’t have a police function regardless 

of how well-trained and organized they are. 

And I think that what you may have seen in Iraq—and it is typical—is, the army has a chain of supply and command that operates more or less continuously. The police very quickly can become 

isolated locally by district, according to a provincial governor, get 

tied to power brokers, because that broad chain of command 

doesn’t function; it is the local authorities. And there is no clear solution to that problem. 
15 

Quite frankly, that is why so many of these police training efforts 

since World War II have been interesting exercises in a triumph 

of basically good intentions over experience. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Congressman, if I can add, Dr. Cordesman is correct; local governance is really critical to success in the transmission. And that is one of the four key elements that is being used 

to make the determination as to when we transition lead over to 

an Afghan security force in certain locations. 

The others, in addition to ANSF capability and the security environment, is also the ISAF posture at the time, the presence of 

ISAF as well. So there are four key elements that are being used 

to make those decisions. 

Mr. COFFMAN. We are talking about reducing the size of the Afghan security forces. And so, what is the methodology in doing 

that? Is it, to your knowledge, to anybody’s knowledge on the 

panel, is it taking units that are certainly lower in terms of readiness, capability than other units and making decisions along those 

lines? Could anybody tell me how those decisions are being made? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Much of the information we have is in an FOUO 

[For Official Use Only] report, which we would be happy to come 

and brief you on. 

But what we do know is that there is an effort to, obviously, reduce the costs, in terms of the coalition costs. Part of that may be 

driving some of the reduction. And, also, what the Afghan Government can sustain, that is part of the initiative there. I think Dr. 

Cordesman earlier raised a point about, how do you come up with 

these numbers? And, obviously, that is something that needs to be 

looked into. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Very well. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Coffman. 

And we will begin a second round of questions. 

Mr. Johnson, I want to go to you. You talked about financial stability, financial capability being critical in the long term there for 

the ANSF. We know that the NATO forces have committed about 

$4.1 billion in that effort. But we also know there is a big difference between pledges and money on the ground or money actually being put into an account for that to happen. Can you tell us, 

what pledges have actually been made by which NATO nations? 

And then we all know, too, in the strategic partnership agreement that the U.S. has entered into that our commitment goes 

through 2024. NATO’s commitment in the agreement goes to 2017. 

So is there an assumption that after 2017 that the U.S. will be the 

sole partner in that effort there in Afghanistan? I wanted to get 

your perspective on that. It looks to me like there are some elements there that potentially for us cause some concern. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yeah, I mean, I hate to repeat again. Much of the 

information we do have is considered ‘‘for official use only’’ by the 

Department, so I can’t discuss it in an open setting. 

What I would reiterate, though, is that the Afghan Government 

will remain dependent on donor contributions. The $4.1 billion figure that has been thrown out, I can tell you that the projected 

amount is that the Afghan Government will contribute about $500 
16 

million of that, with the hope that the donor community will step 

up to cover the rest of that. 

I would also say, as I noted earlier, the U.S. Government has 

paid about 90 percent of the security-related expenditures. All of 

the information in open sources allude to the fact that the U.S. will 

continue to pay probably a larger share of that, although my understanding is that the amount is coming down. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Do you have any specifics on pledges or commitments by NATO nations in this? I know we have heard what the 

commitment is by the Afghan Government, but it would be interesting to understand the remaining portion of that commitment. If 

it truly is a partnership, how much are the partners going to give? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yeah, again, most of that information is FOUO, 

and—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. 

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. We would be happy to brief you on it. 

Mr. WITTMAN. That will be great. I think it would be good information for the committee, so, with your indulgence, we will try to 

schedule a time—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. 

Mr. WITTMAN [continuing]. To get together with your office and 

members of the committee so that we can get at that information. 

Ambassador Moorefield, I wanted to ask you this. In talking 

about capability or capacity within the ANSF, do you believe that, 

with the plan currently in place with transition and with capability-building in the ANSF force, do you believe that there will be 

enough capability within that force within the proposed scheduled 

drawdown of U.S. forces so that capability will sufficiently transition from U.S. forces to ANSF forces, with, obviously, the accompanying support? 

And what do you believe is the critical element of support as 

these tranches are turned over in this transition? 

Ambassador MOOREFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think there is a good plan in terms of the build-out of the force 

to the current size of 352,000. That is army and police. That will 

be accomplished during this calendar year. 

It is not, of course, just to produce the forces, but it is the ongoing, I think, training and even, I would add, literacy, which is a 

critical element in terms of enabling them to take on more technical branch-type training or NCO [Non-Commissioned Officer] or 

officer development. 

So it is an ongoing process. I think that evaluating it just at the 

point they reached 352 is, frankly, not a very insightful way of understanding, you know, what their real capability is going to look 

like over next the 2 years. 

Now, I am just going to refer to what General Allen has already 

said in his testimony, but, I mean, it is evident that his concept, 

his strategy is to front-load the risk. So if they are going to move 

up—which apparently is the intention—the responsibilities, the 

lead security responsibilities for Afghan forces between now and— 

well, by this summer, but with the idea in 2013 to be able to measure whether or not they are stumbling or not, as it were, and be 

able to fortify them where they are weak, you are going to see evidence fairly quickly, I would project, as to where the weaknesses 
17 

are out there. And that includes Afghan Army and Afghan police 

forces. 

So it is a high-risk initiative, but it enables us, while we still 

have forces there, to respond to problems that do arise. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Ambassador Moorefield. 

Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Felter, you have an unusually good background to understand Afghanistan, both the military side and the political side. 

You state in your testimony that a capable ANSF is a necessary 

but not a sufficient condition for success there. 

What would you suggest on the political side that we should be 

trying to do to have a government in Kabul and the provinces that 

could create a more loyal Afghan Army? 

Dr. FELTER. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. 

I would even take it down to the local level. And I will use the 

example of, you know, the Village Stability Operations currently 

being managed by the U.S. Special Operations Forces, which the 

Afghan Local Police is a part of. 

The intent of that program is to connect, you know, the village 

to the district center, to the government. And the district center is 

the only government that these people in the village even know, so 

quality of governance really starts at the district level. And that is 

where we need to start building capabilities on the governance 

level. You know, the very best Special Operations Forces, whether 

they are U.S., coalition, or Afghan, they can’t convince locals to 

support their government if it is—they can’t sell a product that 

doesn’t sell, I guess is the bottom line. 

So quality governance at the district level is key. And once we 

start connecting Afghans to the district level to quality governance, 

then we can expand it from there. And, in a sense, the governance 

from the top down, from the central government, to the province, 

to the district, can be brought to the local Afghans. So I would say 

that is key. 

Buying time and space is key here. As the institutions of the central government develop and mature, we need to have security to 

buy time and space. So, again, that is a necessary but not sufficient 

condition, I think, for progress in the campaign. But maintaining 

that security at the local level, which in this case means village to 

district, is all-important as those other institutions develop at the 

national level. 

Mr. COOPER. So the VSO [Village Stability Operations] program 

is working? 

Dr. FELTER. I think it has made great progress, absolutely. It is 

not the silver bullet, it is not the panacea, it is not going to solve 

all the problems. But I think it is a great example of an effort to 

provide this local-level security that is all-important to make any 

progress along the other lines of effort in the counterinsurgency 

campaign—development, governance. All of them key on having 

some modicum of security at these levels. And this is an effort to 

do it. 

You know, today, three-quarters of the Afghan population are out 

in these rural areas where, at least at this point, the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police can’t be. So we can’t cede 
18 

these areas to the Taliban. We can’t defend everywhere, but we 

have to find the strategically important areas and develop the capacity to have the security so these institutions can develop, both 

at the central level in Kabul, all the way down to the provinces and 

to the district. 

Mr. COOPER. As you are well aware, we have already been involved in this conflict for over 10 years, and people’s patience is 

running thin. So we should plan on another 10 years or 20 years 

to get this working? 

Dr. FELTER. I think we should plan on using our remaining time, 

which has been determined by our political leadership here, to 

make as much progress as possible, to develop this capacity of the 

ANSF and allow the governance to develop as much as possible. 

But I would offer some encouraging news. You know, if you look 

at historical precedent, you know, when the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, you know, things held together. It wasn’t pretty, but 

they were able to prevent the complete collapse of the Najibullah 

government. 

I think we are leaving Afghanistan already in much better shape 

than the Soviets left it. And we are going to make progress between now and when we leave. So absolutely, I think we need to 

take advantage of all our remaining time, while we have forces 

there. We need to partner more effectively, while we have the capacity and competence-building and professionalizing opportunities 

of a large coalition force presence. But eventually, they are going 

to have to stand up and take it on their own. If we stay—there is 

a certain moral hazard, I think, if you have an open-ended commitment, where if there is no requirement to stand up and provide for 

your own security, then there is less of an incentive to do so. And 

again back to the—I use the Soviet experience as an example, 

where once the Soviets left, there were some encouraging signs 

that the Afghan military forces were able to stand up on their own. 

There was actually a certain sense of self-reliance now. And certainly much of the support for then the mujahideen and now I 

would say the Taliban might diminish when this large occupying 

force, if you will, leaves, and they realize they are going to have 

to defend themselves and can’t turn to the occupying power to fill 

that role. 

Mr. COOPER. My memory is faulty, but post the Soviet departure, 

wasn’t it just a series of warlords and not a central government? 

Dr. FELTER. It wasn’t pretty at all. The Najibullah government 

that was installed prior to the Soviets left, it was able to hold together. So I am not painting a rosy picture here, but I use it as 

an example that it wasn’t a complete collapse. Importantly, the Soviets maintained aid and assistance to the Najibullah government, 

and that kept it going. But it wasn’t until the actual collapse of the 

Soviet Union and the aid got cut off that the Najibullah government fell and that we saw the civil war that ensued that resulted 

in the Taliban taking over. 

So maybe apples to oranges here, but I think history doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme, a Mark Twain quote. I think this 

here is a case where we will be leaving Afghanistan I think in better shape than the Soviets left it. And I think we can expect certainly as good, if not better, results and that the government, you 
19 

know, may not collapse. There may be some challenges, we may be 

ceding some territory, but I think we can avoid a collapse of the 

government we leave behind. And I think the biggest threat is internal cohesion. I think the Afghan National Security Forces now 

have demonstrated they can prevail against the Taliban in the field 

head-to-head. I would say they are at least marginally better performers than the Taliban. They are not nearly to the level we 

would like, and Dr. Cordesman has pointed that out very eloquently, but they can prevail against the Taliban. They are marginally better. 

And given that, I think that we can expect some capability for 

them to keep the government in position. But should the government, should internal divisions fracture the Afghan National Security Forces, should they start to support warlords or other power 

brokers, I think that is where we are going to see our problem. So 

I really think the key variable here is political, not military. I think 

the ANSF has enough capacity to defend the country at some basic 

level, but it is all going to depend on political factors, and if they 

can avoid the division and factional strife and ethnic divisions that 

could tear the country apart. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I see my time has expired. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Assuming that the aid continues I think at the $4 billion level, 

if I understand it, that is the kind of post-2014 commitment, and 

we look back at the Soviets’ experience that the Najibullah government was able to remain in power at some level but then collapsed 

after that aid stopped when the Soviet Union dissolved. What does 

that tell us about—doesn’t it in a way—I mean, obviously from the 

standpoint of U.S. taxpayers, it is not a great thing, but doesn’t 

that give us some hope that if that aid, if that commitment were 

to continue, that the government would stay together and they 

would not be divided along ethnic tensions, and that the central 

government would obviously hold, the military would hold at some 

level, and although there might be areas dominated by the Taliban, 

for the most part the country would remain free of the Taliban? Is 

that a realistic scenario? 

Dr. CORDESMAN. Congressman, I would have to say maybe, but 

probably not. There are a couple of things to bear in mind here. 

First, until somebody can explain where they got that 4.1 [billion 

dollar] figure, I can only point out that as of May 2011, the figure 

was $7.2 billion to $9 billion for the same size force. So even if you 

fully fund the mystery number, you have no reason to basically 

trust it. If you do support the Afghan National Security Forces, and 

we can’t solve the problem of sustaining an effective civil government—and they face far more serious problems in terms of funding 

as we pull money out and troops out, according to World Bank and 

IMF studies than the ANSF—then we end up with what I think 

we would all warn about, which is a force without a government 

and without the sustaining money. 

I think, too, that I would remember here that a lot of our plans 

are tacitly linked to something people tend to forget about. The Af-
20 

ghan Government formally promised yet again to make the critical 

reforms to allow district, provincial, and other governments to 

work, and reduce corruption in specific detail at both the Bonn conference and Tokyo conference. But as yet, there are no plans as to 

how that will happen, to hold them accountable. And we have 10 

years of experience in which not one of those promises has ever 

been kept. And just in the last week, we have seen them fail to 

come to grips with something critical like investment in mining 

and petroleum. So you have asked a critical question, but you have 

got to address it in a much broader way. And you have to ask yourself, unless we can make that 4.1 credible, both as a cost estimate 

and in terms of funding, it is one of those horrible numbers like 

352,000 for which there is no known purpose or real source. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Dr. Felter. 

Dr. FELTER. Congressman, just to follow up, I think you are 

right, I think there is—with this continued aid, there will be some 

incentives to hold it together, to have this all-important cohesion 

within both the ANSF and the government itself. So, encouragingly, if the international community and the United States can 

provide some level of aid and assistance, we might expect there to 

be strong incentives to cooperate amongst these power brokers 

within the Afghan Government. But also, as we withdraw, in a 

sense, ISAF is there like a referee enforcing the rules. And as we 

draw down in numbers, it is like—you could liken it to a football 

game with the referees leaving the field. Will the teams continue 

to play by the rules? Not sure. But this aid and assistance will be 

a continued incentive for them to cooperate going forward if it is 

still provided at some level. 

Mr. COFFMAN. In terms of this culture of corruption and the dysfunction that we so often hear of in Afghan civil governance and 

Afghan security forces, but maybe perhaps right now they see the 

United States and our coalition allies as really the guarantor of 

their security, once we are gone, will that in effect, that absence 

inherently strengthen those institutions of Afghan governance and 

security and improve the situation, knowing that we are not there? 

Dr. CORDESMAN. We don’t know of any historical cases, not one, 

where that has been what has happened. We have seen other governments and successor groups over time survive in structure. But 

the fact is if the government can’t function as we leave and if it 

doesn’t make the reforms it has promised and if we don’t get a decent election and a new leader, confronting them basically may not 

make the Taliban and Haqqani Network win, but the end result is 

very likely to be fragmentation of the country on ethnic, sectarian, 

and regional lines. That may not be an unacceptable consequence. 

I think we need to be careful about Afghan good enough. But the 

idea that somehow pulling the plug makes people behave better is 

not one for which I know of much historical precedent. 

Dr. FELTER. May I add just a quick comment on that? So, in the 

case of the Afghan local police, there was a survey taken in the 

eastern part of Afghanistan where when the ALP had been effective at defending its villages, which is its main goal, the people 

thought that—they didn’t want to give the ALP credit, because 

they were still giving credit to ISAF. So, even in cases where we 

see success and positive performance, in some cases, and I don’t 
21 

disagree with Dr. Cordesman’s historical assessment, but there is 

cases in Afghanistan where we can see survey evidence that the 

people there still give credit to ISAF, or they are reluctant to give 

credit to the ANSF, in this case the ALP, because they think it is 

all attributed to ISAF’s presence. So if we can see them succeed 

when we leave, they might start getting the credit and maybe getting the support of the population, which is so critical. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you. This is for the whole panel. Obviously, the figure $4.1 billion is 

being bandied around how to pay for the security forces. But do we 

have any, at this point, estimate as to the economic impact on our 

leaving, and all of the caring and feeding that goes on in which 

much of that is based on—you know, sourced out at the local economy. What impact will that have on the economy? And does that— 

how does Afghanistan replace that near-term positive impact of 

stuff we buy locally? Do we know what that impact is? Anybody? 

Dr. CORDESMAN. There are World Bank and IMF estimates, Congressman. They would both be the first to tell you that they are 

little more than wags. We simply don’t know, out of the money we 

appropriate and disburse for Afghanistan, how much of it actually 

gets into the country and where it goes. The organization that is 

supposed to be assessing the overall aid process, which is called 

UNAMA [United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan], has 

never issued a report on aid or an estimate of the total spending. 

We do have work done by the GAO [Government Accountability Office], SIGAR [Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction], CBO [Congressional Budget Office], which looks at how 

the U.S. appropriates and audits individual programs. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I am not talking about aid. I am talking about, 

well, we have got bases all over the place where we hire locals 

to—— 

Dr. CORDESMAN. I am talking about military spending, which we 

call aid often. I am talking about direct spending in country. I am 

talking about State Department and other spending, which is not 

aid, which is a very substantial amount of the money, but does go 

in country, and aid together. And the estimates done from World 

Bank, IMF basically came up first within January an estimate that 

it would take about $20 billion to $24 billion a year in outside financing to keep the country from basically having problems with 

economic growth, and $10 billion in aid more recently in Tokyo, 

roughly, to sustain the effort, civil and military. But all of those estimates were made by people who explicitly said they could not assess the impact of reducing the military side of spending as distinguished from the civil aid side. 

Mr. JOHNSON. If I can chime in on that, we issued a report back 

in September 2011 on Afghan donor dependency. I guess a key 

point there, to follow up on what Dr. Cordesman said, is that a lot 

of the money has been off the books. So the Afghan Government 

itself has no visibility in the amount of money that is pouring into 

its country, that they don’t have any oversight and accountability 

over themselves. I know we have shifted more toward providing 
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some of our assistance—I think the goal was up to 50 percent—directly through the Afghan Government, whether it is through trust 

funds or other means and all. 

But until there is more visibility in terms of all the books, I 

think we kind of took an effort to pull it all together for one of the 

first times back in September of 2011. But that is something that 

has not been routinely done, and that is something that is probably 

needed. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Who should do that? 

Mr. JOHNSON. We would be happy to undertake a follow-up effort. 

Mr. CONAWAY. And not to be argumentative, but Dr. Felter, you 

used the phrase occupying force a while ago to describe the U.S. 

presence there. Do you consider us an occupying force as that term 

is typically used? 

Dr. FELTER. I would say some of the Afghans view us as an occupying force in the same way they viewed the Russians as an occupying force. And there are certainly very important differences between the two, and I would take offense if we were compared too 

closely to the Russian or to the Soviet occupation. But it is really 

important not how we perceive ourselves—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. I got that part. But you used it as your descriptor, 

and I was focusing on that. 

Dr. FELTER. I think that in the eyes of many Afghans, we are occupiers. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I get that. But I don’t think we view ourselves 

that way. 

Dr. FELTER. No, absolutely not. 

Mr. CONAWAY. And shouldn’t. 

Dr. FELTER. But it is very critical to understand how we are 

viewed. In some of these remote areas, you get the question occasionally that locals ask you if you are Russian. And it has happened on more than one occasion. That is just how disconnected 

some of these areas are. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Yeah. It speaks to the level of overall development. I mean, some of those back valleys are in a different century 

than the rest of the country. You know, that is okay. They like it, 

and that is not our job to drag them kicking and screaming into 

the 21st century. We sometimes get lost in that issue. I appreciate 

you not calling us an occupying force. 

Dr. FELTER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Conaway. 

Are there any other questions from the panel members? 

Mr. Coffman. Yes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just have one question. And that is that it appears that there 

has not been a credible election yet in Afghanistan by international 

standards. And what in your mind is going to be the transition of 

power when Mr. Karzai leaves? I wonder if you all could speak to 

that. Because that is obviously key to the success of Afghanistan, 

would be a peaceful and credible transition of power. 

Dr. CORDESMAN. I think that, first, the U.S., its allies, are making every possible effort to get an effective election in 2014. I think 

it is—the idea we could do it in 2013 has been abandoned. But it 
23 

isn’t just a matter of creating an honest election. It is the fact we 

don’t know who would really be the replacement to Karzai. We are 

not sure that there won’t be a Karzai attempt to create something 

as we saw in Russia, have a relative run or something similar, in 

spite of what he says. 

And the most serious problem we face is that even if there is an 

effective election, it will occur in 2014 in the middle of this economic problem and aid problem that Congressman Conaway pointed out. And basically speaking, unless we get the reforms that the 

Afghan Government has promised, the new leader basically will 

still have a system where there is no way the parliament can actually function and allocate money. And one man essentially is in 

charge of virtually all the funding that goes through the Afghan 

central government, the president, and there is no ability at the 

provincial or local level to raise money. So you have got to solve 

not only the election problem, but the leadership problem. And basically, those problems in governance reform, which the government has formally pledged to do in two international conferences, 

but for which as yet there is no deadline or implementation plan. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. Conaway, anything else? 

Mr. CONAWAY. No. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Panel members, thank you so much for joining us 

today. We really appreciate your perspective. 

Mr. Johnson, we look forward to getting a little more information 

to you about some of the finances. Members, if you have any additional questions for our panelists today, if you will make sure that 

you get them to us, we will get them to our panelists. We would 

ask your indulgence, if there are additional questions, if we could 

submit those to you in writing. And if you could get some answers 

back to us, that would be great. 

Again, thank you so much for your time and efforts today. 

And with that, the committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:52 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 24, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 24, 2012 

(29) 

Statement of Hon. Rob Wittman 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations 

Hearing on 

Afghan National Security Forces and Security 

Lead Transition: The Assessment Process, 

Metrics, and Efforts To Build Capability 

July 24, 2012 

Today the Oversight and Investigations subcommittee convenes 

the fourth in our series of hearings related to the Afghan National 

Security Forces. 

Members have just received a closed, classified briefing from senior Department of Defense officials on the metrics used to assess 

the readiness of Afghan forces and current capability ratings. 

Now, the subcommittee holds an open hearing on this topic. 

We have assembled a panel of specialists to provide testimony 

about the sufficiency and reliability of the metrics used by the U.S. 

to track the progress of the development of the Afghan National 

Security Forces. We will also receive testimony about the effectiveness of the U.S. training effort, and the challenges our troops face 

in readying the Afghan army and police to assume the lead for security by 2014. 

The development of self-sufficient Afghan forces capable of providing internal and external security is a key goal of the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan. 

In public settings before this subcommittee and elsewhere, Department of Defense officials have said that the capability of the 

Afghan forces will inform decisions about the pace of the continued 

drawdown of U.S. troops and the size of an enduring U.S. presence. 

Our panel today includes: 

 Dr. Anthony Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in 

Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; 

 Dr. Joseph Felter, a retired U.S. Army colonel and Senior 

Research Scholar at the Center for International Security 

and Cooperation at Stanford University; 

 Ambassador (ret.) Kenneth Moorefield, the Deputy Inspector 

General for Special Plans and Operations at the Department 

of Defense Office of the Inspector General; and 
30 

 Mr. Charles M. Johnson, Jr., a Director of International Affairs and Trade at the United States Government Accountability Office. Mr. Johnson will be assisted in answering 

questions by his colleague Ms. Sharon Pickup, also a Director at GAO. 

Thank you for your participation. We look forward to your testimony. 
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