NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

IN RE: JEANNINE A. STURGEON,

Appellant

______________________

2020-1644

______________________

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 14/212,028.

______________________

Decided: January 12, 2021

______________________

DAVID E. BENNETT, Coats & Bennett, PLLC, Cary, NC,

for appellant. Also represented by WILLIAM GABRIEL 

PAGAN, BRANDEE WOOLARD. 

 MOLLY R. SILFEN, Office of the Solicitor, United States 

Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for appellee 

Andrei Iancu. Also represented by THOMAS W. KRAUSE,

AMY J. NELSON, FARHEENA YASMEEN RASHEED.

 ______________________

Before LOURIE, DYK, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

DYK, Circuit Judge.

Patent applicant Jeannine A. Sturgeon appeals a decision of the United States Patent Trial and Appeal Board 

(“Board”) affirming the Examiner’s rejection of her 

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2 IN RE: STURGEON

application under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Because the Board 

properly determined that Sturgeon’s application claims unpatentable subject matter under § 101, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

This case involves U.S. Patent Application 

No. 14/212,028 (“the ’028 application”). The ’028 application was originally filed on March 14, 2014, with a single 

claim. In a preliminary amendment filed March 17, 2014, 

Sturgeon canceled the original claim and added independent claims 2, 10, and 17, and dependent claims 3–9, 11–16, 

and 18–20. On August 10, 2016, the United States Patent 

and Trademark Office (“Office”) issued a restriction requiring Sturgeon to elect between two groups of claims: either 

claims 2–9 and 17–20, or claims 10–16. On October 4, 

2016, Sturgeon elected claims 2–9 and 17–20 without traverse and subsequently withdrew claims 10–16.

Sturgeon and the Director of the United States Patent 

and Trademark Office (“Director”) agree that claim 2 is representative. Claim 2 discloses:

A method of creating a floral arrangement on an 

electronic display screen, the method comprising:

selecting a flower from an image library comprising 

a plurality of images for the flower, the plurality of 

images including images of the flower from different angular positions;

placing the flower at a user-selected location in a 

floral arrangement that is displayed on an electronic display screen; 

dynamically selecting one of the plurality of images 

of the flower based on the location of the flower in 

the floral arrangement; and

displaying the selected flower image in the floral 

arrangement displayed on the display screen.

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IN RE: STURGEON 3

’028 application.

On April 5, 2017, the Examiner issued a final rejection 

of claims 2–9 and 17–20 as ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 

and anticipated under § 102. Sturgeon appealed to the 

Board. The Board affirmed the rejections under § 101 and 

reversed the rejections under § 102. Sturgeon appealed to 

this court.

DISCUSSION

We review the Board’s legal determinations de novo, In 

re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2004), including 

patent eligibility under § 101, Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 

F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018). We review underlying 

factual findings for substantial evidence. Elsner, 381 F.3d 

at 1127 (citing In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. 

Cir. 2000)).

I

The question of eligibility under § 101 is governed by 

the two-step framework set out by the Supreme Court in 

Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 

208 (2014), and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 

Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 

In the first step of the inquiry, we must “determine 

whether the claims at issue are directed to” a patent-ineligible concept, i.e., a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or 

abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. 

at 77). “If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible 

concept under Alice step 1, ‘the claims satisfy § 101 and we 

need not proceed to the second step.’” Data Engine Techs. 

LLC v. Google LLC, 906 F.3d 999, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 

(quoting Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 

880 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).

Conversely, if we find the subject matter abstract in the 

first step, we must proceed to the second step, in which “we 

consider the elements of each claim both individually and 

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4 IN RE: STURGEON

‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a 

patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting 

Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78–79). That is, the second step must 

reveal an “inventive concept” to “ensure that the patent in 

practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon” 

an ineligible concept. Id. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 

U.S. at 72–73). 

For us to find an “inventive concept” in the second step, 

the patent must do more than recite an abstract idea “while 

adding the words ‘apply it.’” Id. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566 

U.S. at 72). “[S]imply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality, to laws of nature, natural 

phenomena, and abstract ideas cannot make those laws, 

phenomena, and ideas patentable.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 82. 

In particular, “the mere recitation of a generic computer 

cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a 

patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (summarizing survey of case law). 

II

Sturgeon concedes that merely creating a floral arrangement using a computer is an abstract idea, but at 

step 1, she argues that the claim is not abstract because it 

adds an element of realism to the floral arrangement. The 

Board properly found that the claim is directed to “mental 

processes,” “the abstract idea of managing personal behavior,” and “methods of organizing human activity”—in this 

case, arranging flowers—and is thus abstract at step 1. See 

J.A. 7–8. As we have explained, methods

which can be performed entirely in the human 

mind are unpatentable . . . because computational 

methods which can be performed entirely in the human mind are the types of methods that embody 

the “basic tools of scientific and technological work” 

that are free to all men and reserved exclusively to 

none.

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IN RE: STURGEON 5

Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1378

(Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). The 

Board correctly determined that claim 2 is directed to an 

abstract idea.

At step 2, Sturgeon argues that claim 2 involves an inventive concept by specifying that an image of the flower at 

an appropriate angle must be selected from an image library based on the location the user has selected for placing 

the flower. The Director responds that the ’028 application 

lacks an inventive concept because it does not describe any 

specific steps that the computer takes to select an appropriate image from an image library and does not disclose 

an improvement in computer technology.

We agree with the Director and the Board that claim 2 

is not directed to an inventive concept as required under 

the second step of Alice. Claim 2 recites a method of “selecting a flower from an image library,” “placing the flower 

at a user-selected location,” “dynamically selecting” an image from the library based on the chosen location, and “displaying the selected flower . . . on the display screen.” ’028 

application (emphases added). As the Board properly 

found, these steps do not differentiate the claim from ordinary mental processes and conventional computer activity. 

All of these elements are described at a high level of generality and require only generic computer implementation. 

There is no inventive concept here that meaningfully adds 

to the existing practice of simulating a floral arrangement 

by creating a digital collage—which Sturgeon concedes is 

an abstract idea performed on a conventional computer. 

See Appellant’s Br. at 18. Nor do the highly general recitations of claim 2 disclose any improvement in computer 

functionality. 

In these respects, this case is distinguishable from

McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 

1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and DDR Holdings, LLC v. 

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Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In those 

cases, we found that the claimed inventions improved computer functionality and recited more than generic computer implementation. See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314 

(quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 223) (“It is the incorporation of 

the claimed rules, not the use of the computer, that ‘improved [the] existing technological process’” (alteration in 

original).); DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257–59 (“[T]he 

claimed solution is necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in 

the realm of computer networks.”).

Because claim 2 lacks an inventive concept, it fails to 

“amount[] to significantly more than a patent upon” an ineligible abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73). The ’028 application is 

therefore ineligible under § 101.

AFFIRMED

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