08 November 2009

Joint Urban Operations

Joint Publication 3-06
PREFACE

1. Scope 

 This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment 

of joint operations in an urban environment and explains how they differ from operations 

undertaken in other environments. 

2. Purpose 

 This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and 

other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, 

education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in 

preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the 

authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the 

JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the 

overall objective. 

3. Application 

 a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders 

of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate 

components of these commands, and the Services. 

 b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances 

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the 

contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. 

Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military 

command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United 

States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should 

evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where 

applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

 LLOYD J. AUSTIN III 

 Lieutenant General, USA 

 Director, Joint Staff 

i 
Preface 

ii JP 3-06 

Intentionally Blank 
SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-06 

DATED 16 SEPTEMBER 2002 

 Changes the publication title from Joint Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations to 

Joint Urban Operations

 Updates the discussion on the urban environment

 Establishes fundamentals of joint urban operations

 Adds a chapter on understanding the urban operational environment

 Reorganizes the discussion of the urban environment in terms of political, 

military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) systems

 Expands the discussion on physical urban terrain

 Removes the concept for joint urban operations (i.e., understand, shape, engage, 

consolidate, transition) discussion

 Removes references to military operations other than war

 Removes the chapters on noncombatants and infrastructure and consolidates the 

discussion within the PMESII discussion

 Updates the discussion on operational design and phasing

 Adds a discussion on urban search and rescue

 Adds a discussion on military deception

 Revises the discussion on legal considerations

 Revises and expands the appendix on joint intelligence preparation of the 

operational environment

 Adds an appendix on assessment

 Deletes the appendix on joint fires for urban operations and reorganizes the 

discussion within chapter text

 Adds an appendix on urban maritime considerations and capabilities

 Modifies the definitions of the terms “joint urban operations” and “urban triad”

iii 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-06 

 Adds definitions for the terms “objective area” and “turning movement”

 Removes the term “critical node,” from joint publication 1-02, Department of 

Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

 PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ vii 

CHAPTER I 

 INTRODUCTION 

• General ...................................................................................................................... I-1 

• Urban Environment ................................................................................................... I-2 

• Characteristics of Joint Operations in Urban Environments ..................................... I-3 

• Air Operations Considerations .................................................................................. I-9 

• Conditions for Urban Engagement ........................................................................... I-9 

• Fundamentals of Operations in Urban Environments.............................................. I-11 

CHAPTER II 

 UNDERSTANDING THE URBAN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 

• General .................................................................................................................... II-1 

• Political ................................................................................................................... II-4 

• Economic ................................................................................................................ II-5

• Special Social and Cultural Considerations for Urban Areas ................................. II-5 

• Information Considerations for Urban Areas ......................................................... II-8 

• Infrastructure Considerations for Urban Areas ....................................................... II-8 

• Other Considerations for Urban Areas ................................................................. II-10 

CHAPTER III 

 PLANNING 

• General ................................................................................................................... III-1 

• The Strategic and Operational Context................................................................... III-1 

• Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment .......................... III-12 

• Operational Art and Operational Design ............................................................. III-12 

• Phasing ................................................................................................................. III-19 

• Range of Military Operations .............................................................................. III-21 

• Other Operation Considerations for Urban Areas ................................................ III-22 

CHAPTER IV 

 JOINT FUNCTIONS 

• General ................................................................................................................... IV-1 

• Command and Control ........................................................................................... IV-1 

• Intelligence ........................................................................................................... IV-11

• Fires ...................................................................................................................... IV-16 

• Movement and Maneuver .................................................................................... IV-27 

• Protection ............................................................................................................. IV-32

• Sustainment .......................................................................................................... IV-38 

v 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-06 

APPENDIX 

 A Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment 

in Urban Areas ............................................................................................... A-1 

 B Assessment ...................................................................................................... B-1 

 C Planning Considerations for Port and Airfield Complexes ............................. C-1 

 D Considerations for Airspace Control in an Urban 

 Environment ................................................................................................... D-1 

 E Maritime Considerations in Urban Operations ............................................... E-1 

 F References ....................................................................................................... F-1 

 G Administrative Instructions ............................................................................ G-1 

GLOSSARY 

 Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1 

 Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................... GL-4 

FIGURE 

 I-1 Comparison of Operations in Urban and Other 

 Environments ................................................................................................ I-5 

 I-2 The Decision to Conduct Joint Urban Operations ...................................... I-11 

 II-1 Urban Terrain ............................................................................................ II-12 

 II-2 Urban Functional Zones ............................................................................ II-13 

 III-1 Key Facility Analysis (Transportation) ................................................... III-10 

 III-2 Consequence Management Planning Factors ........................................... III-26 

 IV-1 Command and Control and the 

 Urban Environment .................................................................................... IV-2 

 IV-2 Civil-Military Operations ........................................................................... IV-7 

 IV-3 Examples of Operational Maneuver ........................................................ IV-29 

 IV-4 Health Threats to Civilians in Urban Environments ................................ IV-45 

 IV-5 Health Service Assessment Factors ......................................................... IV-45 

 A-1 Illustrative Questions for Defining the Area of Operations and 

Area of Interest ........................................................................................ A-4 

 B-1 Illustrative Urban Assessment Measures ..................................................... B-3 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

vii 

• Introduces the Nature and Challenges of Military Operations in Urban Areas

• Discusses the Fundamentals for Understanding the Urban Operational 

 Environment

• Discusses the Fundamentals for Planning Joint Urban Operations (JUOs)

• Explains Joint Functions with Regard to JUOs 

Introduction

Joint urban operations 

(JUOs) are defined as joint 

operations across the range 

of military operations 

planned and conducted on, 

or against objectives within, 

a topographical complex 

and its adjacent natural 

terrain, where man-made 

construction or the density 

of population are the 

dominant features. 

Urban areas present the most complex environment for 

military operations. This complexity is derived from numerous 

factors such as location, history, economic development, 

climate, available building materials, the natural terrain on 

which they are built, the cultures of their inhabitants, and many 

other factors. There are many ways to frame an understanding 

of the factors influencing the urban environment, one of which 

is to view the urban environment as an urban triad 

consisting of complex man-made physical terrain, a population 

of significant size and density, and an infrastructure. A 

complex man-made physical terrain consisting of manmade structures of varying types, sizes, materials, and 

construction. A population of significant size and density 

inhabits, works in, and uses the man-made and natural terrain. 

An infrastructure upon which the area depends also 

occupies man-made terrain and provides human services and 

cultural and political structure for the urban area and often 

beyond, perhaps for the entire nation. 

An urban area is dynamic 

— in a constant state of 

motion. Understanding the 

urban environment 

requires continuous study 

and analysis as it is 

complex, dynamic, and 

perpetually evolving. 

Operations in urban areas may occur within the context of a 

campaign or major operation. These operations may take place 

entirely within a city or may include multiple urban areas and 

may be influenced by interconnected surrounding areas. The 

joint force commander (JFC) will determine whether or not 

operating in an urban environment is essential for the conduct 

of the campaign or major operation and, if so, where and when 

to conduct joint urban operations (JUOs). 
Executive Summary 

Understanding the Urban Operational Environment 

The Nature of the Urban 

Operational Environment. 

The urban environment is made up of adaptive system with a 

wide range of structures, processes, and functions that have 

evolved to sustain concentrated human societies in confined 

space. These structures are all the various familial, tribal, 

professional, commercial, governmental, social, religious, 

educational, and media institutions that typify urban society. 

Special Social and Cultural 

Considerations For Urban 

Areas.

The dense populations inherent to urban areas require that 

JFCs pay greater attention to the relationship between 

civilians and military operations than in other types of 

operations. The commander should keep in mind the overall 

objectives regarding the civilian populace: to minimize 

civilian interference with military operations, minimize 

mission impact on the population, and observe the necessary 

legal, moral, and humanitarian obligations toward civilians. 

Information 

Considerations for Urban 

Areas.

Information is the pervasive back-drop to the physical domains 

of the urban environment. The information environment 

should be examined in the context of global interconnectivity, 

the national level, and the local level. 

Infrastructure 

Considerations For Urban 

Areas.

The total functioning of an urban area is supported by 

infrastructure which is itself composed of systems. Each 

component of infrastructure affects the population, the normal 

operation of the city, and the nature and long-term success of 

JUOs. 

Other Considerations For 

Urban Areas.

Other considerations for urban areas include: physical factors

- the geography and man-made structures in the operational 

area; history - past wars and military conflicts; territorial 

claims and disputes; and ethnic, religious, or social strife; 

urban patterns and rhythms - market locations, travel routes, 

holidays, festivals, sports, and other events; climate and 

weather; and water. 

Planning 

Planning must give 

appropriate weight to 

considerations of civilians, 

infrastructure, the cultural 

and political situation, 

demographics, and other 

urban characteristics that 

Planning for operations conducted in urban environments 

generally follows the same basic process as planning for 

operations in other environments. The challenges inherent in 

operating in an urban area are sufficiently different and 

complex. The essential problem is how to operate in an urban 

environment to defeat adversaries embedded and diffused 

within populated urban areas without causing catastrophic 

viii JP 3-06 
Executive Summary 

may affect the outcome of 

the operation.

damage to the existing, functioning society. If a major JUO is 

to be undertaken as part of a larger campaign, then plans 

should address the difficult balance, synchronization, and 

integration between the JUO and the rest of the campaign. 

Military efforts in JUOs are 

only effective when 

integrated into a 

comprehensive strategy 

employing all instruments 

of national power. 

The strategic and operational context of JUOs is multifaceted 

to include the integration of government policies as well as the 

execution of tactical level tasks. The requirements and nature 

of JUOs will make unified action more difficult and complex, 

and present the JFC with significant challenges in the practice 

of operational art and operational design. 

When planning JUOs, the 

joint force commander 

(JFC) should consider 

how civilians affect 

operations and vice versa.

The effects of operations on the civilian populace will likely 

influence both the commander’s ability to conduct operations 

and the determination of the military end state. The human 

capital of an urban area may be a tremendous resource for the 

provision of essential services, rebuilding efforts, and 

reconstituting government systems. The joint force 

commander should plan to leverage and capitalize on human 

resources as well as other resources that may be available. 

Collateral Damage and 

Environmental 

Considerations. 

Coordination of JUOs through the joint targeting coordination 

board can significantly reduce collateral and environmental 

damage. In the end, analysis of potential collateral and 

environmental damage must be weighed against the 

importance of the target in achieving operational and strategic 

objectives. 

The reality of the urban 

environment presents a 

unique set of circumstances 

and parameters, which will 

significantly influence the 

approach to operational 

art. 

When designing an operation or campaign to deal with 

adversaries within urban environments, the JFC must go 

beyond the idea of attacking the embedded adversary. The 

entire urban environment must be treated comprehensively, 

applying power to disable hostile elements and enabling those 

elements that are essential to the city’s functioning. 

Commanders at all levels must fit the execution of short-term 

operations into a larger operational design, and this design 

must link their near-term actions to the strategic aim of the 

campaign or major operation. 

Other Operation 

Considerations for Urban 

Areas.

Some other operational considerations are consequence 

management, foreign humanitarian assistance, and populace 

and resources control. First, consequence management (CM) 

may be the primary focus of a JUO, or an event may occur 

during an ongoing operation that requires the joint force to 

conduct CM. For the simple reason that chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear industries are located near urban areas 

ix 
Executive Summary 

and the target of terrorists are usually located in urban areas, 

commanders should consider the aspects of urban areas and 

operations when planning CM response. Second, many 

operations in urban areas will have a requirement for foreign 

humanitarian assistance (FHA). US forces generally 

supplement the efforts of the host nation (HN) civil 

authorities or agencies that may have the primary 

responsibility for providing FHA by conducting operations 

limited in scope and duration. Finally, population and 

recourses control normally assists HN governments or de facto 

authorities in retaining control over their population centers, 

thus precluding complicating problems that may hinder 

accomplishment of the JFC’s mission. 

Joint Functions 

In any joint operation, the 

JFC can choose from a 

wide variety of joint and 

Service capabilities and 

combine them in various 

ways to perform joint 

functions and accomplish 

the mission. 

Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped 

together to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint 

operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at 

all levels of war fall into six basic groups — command and 

control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, 

protection, and sustainment. A number of subordinate tasks, 

missions, and related capabilities help define each function. 

Some tasks, missions, and capabilities could apply to more 

than one joint function. 

Command and Control. The ability of the JFC to influence the outcome of operations 

conducted in urban areas is the result of leadership and the 

ability to control forces and functions in order to execute the 

intent. The key to understanding the urban operational 

environment at all levels is the ability to rapidly collect and 

disseminate information. Since any JUO contains a great deal 

of uncertainty, and since knowledge is a perishable asset, then 

speed and precision are necessary to get the right information 

in the right hands as expediently as possible. 

Intelligence. Intelligence activities in JUOs are significantly different from 

other operations because of the vast number of variables found 

in urban areas in comparison with the conventional battlefield. 

Fires. The JFC can use fires to shape the operational environment 

and to engage the adversary, but perhaps the most important 

use of fires is in the isolation of the urban area or points within 

the urban area. In urban combat, experience has shown that a 

strong combined arms capability is necessary for success; fires 

x JP 3-06 
Executive Summary 

xi 

and maneuver are complementary functions that are essential 

to achieving JFC objectives. 

Movement and Maneuver. Operational movement and maneuver allow the JFC to engage 

the adversary on terms most favorable to friendly forces. Once 

the decision has been made to conduct operations in urban 

areas, movement can range from efforts to position forces to 

best conduct forcible entry into an urban area to advantageous 

positioning in preparation for an operation unlikely to involve 

combat. 

Protection. Although protection will not ensure the success of JUOs, 

failure to take adequate protection measures can cause 

the operation to fail. The protection function focuses on 

conserving the joint force’s fighting potential in four primary 

ways — active defensive measures that protect the joint force 

(including Department of Defense [DOD] civilians and DOD 

contractors), its information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, 

and lines of communications from an adversary’s attack; 

passive defensive measures that make friendly forces, systems, 

and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy; applying 

technology and procedures to reduce the risk of fratricide; and 

emergency management and response to reduce the loss of 

personnel and capabilities due to accidents, health threats, and 

natural disasters. 

Sustainment. The nature of JUOs creates unique support demands. All 

movement will entail more risk and be more difficult to 

accomplish. JUOs normally will require more of many types 

of resources (e.g., personnel, munitions, subsistence, medical 

support) than other operations. 

CONCLUSION 

This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, 

execution, and assessment of joint operations in an urban 

environment and explains how they differ from operations 

undertaken in other environments. 
Executive Summary 

xii JP 3-06 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION

“Urban warfare, fighting in cities, war in ‘complex terrain.’ To the casual 

observer, the words seem detached, almost pristine. However, the words 

are strikingly real to military professionals who have seen the images of 

great destruction and excessive casualties in cities such as Berlin, 

Stalingrad, Hue, and Beirut. Urban warfare, a subject that many military 

professionals would prefer to avoid, is still with us. Moreover, it may be the 

preferred approach of future opponents.” 

Armed Forces Journal International (1998): The Indirect Approach: 

How US Military Forces Can Avoid the Pitfalls of Future Urban Warfare, 

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., US Army

1. General 

a. Cities have played a strategic role in military campaigns throughout history, from 

the Trojan War to the fall of Berlin and up to the present day. Because of their 

geographic location, concentration of wealth and power, or symbolic value, cities have 

been closely associated with strategic objectives in most of history’s conflicts. While this 

basic concept remains true today in military parlance the city has evolved to become an 

urban area thus including the key infrastructure, critical services, and other important 

military considerations that exist outside the traditional city boundary. Recent changes in 

demography indicate a significant increase in the number and size of urban areas 

throughout the world. These changes drastically increases the possibility of future 

military operations taking place in urban environments. This change is evident by the 

numerous US military operations conducted in the last two decades (e.g., Baghdad, 

Khafji, Kuwait City, Monrovia, Mogadishu, Port-au-Prince, Ramadi, Fallujah, and cities 

in Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo). This clearly indicates an increase in the frequency of US 

joint operations in urban environments. History and lessons learned demonstrate that the 

urban environment offers significant operational challenges. The complexity of a 

specific urban area impacts the planning, decision making, and assessment of operations. 

Therefore, commanders and their staffs require specific information and analysis to 

develop an understanding of that environment. This knowledge is necessary to develop 

the commander’s intent and concept of operations (CONOPS) required to attain military 

objectives while maintaining flexibility to make changes necessary to exploit unforeseen 

opportunities. 

b. This joint publication (JP) focuses on capabilities and tasks that are unique to, or 

significantly challenged by urban environments at the operational level. It does not 

attempt to replace or reiterate doctrine in overlapping areas; instead, it examines the 

special considerations required when conducting operations in the complex modern urban 

environment. It is important to note that urban challenges are such that many solutions, 

approaches, and adaptations applying to operations in the urban environment have 

application in other environments. 

c. Joint urban operations (JUOs) are defined as joint operations across the range 

of military operations planned and conducted on, or against objectives within, a 

I-1 
Chapter I 

topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain, where man-made construction or 

the density of population are the dominant features. Commanders and their staffs should 

consider the complex and dynamic interactions and relationships of the population with 

the physical terrain and infrastructure. 

2. Urban Environment 

a. General

(1) Urban areas present the most complex environment for military operations. 

This complexity is derived from numerous factors such as location, history, economic 

development, climate, available building materials, the natural terrain on which they are 

built, the cultures of their inhabitants, and many other factors. These factors also 

contribute to urban areas varying in size (both infrastructure density and area covered), 

population density, interconnectedness, and dependence on other urban centers. This 

complexity makes every urban environment unique. There are many ways to frame an 

understanding of the factors influencing the urban environment, one of which is to view 

the urban environment as an urban triad consisting of complex man-made physical 

terrain, a population of significant size and density, and an infrastructure. 

(a) A complex man-made physical terrain is superimposed on existing 

natural terrain. This physical terrain consists of man-made structures of varying types, 

sizes, materials, and construction arranged sometimes in an orderly manner and 

sometimes randomly. It may be modern or built around an ancient core; it may contain 

towering buildings or none over three stories. 

(b) A population of significant size and density inhabits, works in, and 

uses the man-made and natural terrain. Urban areas are frequently defined according to 

size, from villages of fewer than 3,000 inhabitants to large cities with populations of over 

100,000. Large cities vary enormously in size, ranging in population from 100,000 to 

over 20,000,000 and in area from several to hundreds of square miles. 

(c) An infrastructure upon which the area depends also occupies manmade terrain and provides human services and cultural and political structure for the 

urban area and often beyond, perhaps for the entire nation. An urban area may have a 

significant influence beyond a city’s boundaries. It may influence a region within the 

nation, the nation itself, or other countries within a geographical region. 

(2) This urban triad view establishes a foundational perspective that reveals an 

intertwined and virtually inseparable interaction between the physical terrain, the 

population, and the infrastructure of an urban area. This view also reveals the urban area 

as a complex and dynamic system, with unique political, economic, social, information, 

infrastructure, and other components. Each element impacts, constrains, and influences 

military operations. The physical terrain presents significant challenges to military 

operations, particularly maneuver and communications. Infrastructure serves as the 

essential enabler for economic, information, and social systems which create varying 

I-2 JP 3-06 
Introduction 

limitations on military operations if interrupted. While all three elements of the urban 

triad are important, it is the impact of military operations on the urban population, and 

vice versa, that fundamentally distinguishes operations in urban environments from 

operations in other environments. 

(3) Dense urban geography changes the nature of spatial and temporal 

relationships and our understanding of them. An overriding aspect of the urban 

environment is that of density — density of structures, density of people, and density of 

infrastructure. Structural density can create complex social and political interactions by 

compressing large numbers of people into a small geographic area. Critical 

infrastructures (physical, economic, governmental, social, etc.) are in such close 

proximity and, in most areas, so intertwined that even minor disruptions by military 

operations can cause significant repercussions. Distances are compressed, often limiting 

line of sight (LOS) to only a few meters. A very small area can contain a large adversary 

force, arrayed in three-dimensional depth. For instance, depth may need to be measured 

in city blocks instead of kilometers. Airspace will consist of layers, with the lower layer 

perhaps punctured by high-rise buildings or canalized by “urban canyons.” The urban 

tangle, debris, and rubble can slow down all movement to a far slower pace than in other 

types of terrain. A ten-story building may take up the same linear space on a twodimensional map as a small field, but the building has eleven times the actual defensible 

space — ten floors plus the roof and any associated subterranean structures. Volume, not 

area, is the more pertinent spatial measure of the urban environment. Buildings can block 

or reduce communications capabilities, resulting in the isolation of a unit. Man-made 

terrain features can also easily mask other man-made features. Urban areas also tend to 

have higher densities in a temporal sense; that of more activities to unit time. This form 

of density, one less often recognized, directly influences intelligence gathering as well as 

other operations. This may affect both the types and number of resources that may be 

required to conduct a JUO. 

b. An urban area is dynamic — in a constant state of motion. Understanding the 

urban environment requires continuous study and analysis as it is complex, dynamic, and 

perpetually evolving. To understand a particular urban area, it is necessary to 

comprehend the underlying characteristics, patterns, change dynamics, and its 

interconnectedness with the surrounding area. 

See Chapter II, “Understanding the Urban Operational Environment,” for a more detailed 

description of the operational environment in urban areas. 

3. Characteristics of Joint Operations in Urban Environments 

a. Historical Background. Military thinkers and planners have long been aware of 

the pitfalls of fighting in urban areas. As early as circa 500 B.C., Sun Tzu advised that 

“the worst policy is to attack cities,” and his advice is echoed in military writings and 

doctrine to this day. However, despite that sensible advice, wars have been fought in 

cities repeatedly throughout the centuries, from the sack of Troy to the battles of Fallujah. 

I-3 
Chapter I 

URBAN TRENDS 

Urbanization continues rapidly as the world closes in on having a 

majority of its population living in cities. The current level of 

urbanization sits at 49 percent and by some estimates is expected to 

grow to 60 percent by 2030, as some 1.7 billion people are added to the 

world’s cities. This hasty growth will continue to complicate the 

dynamic nature of urban environments. Two urbanization trends that 

stand out are that the developing world’s cities are growing fastest and 

that the world’s large cities continue to grow. In 1950 there was only 

one megacity, New York City, as compared to 26 megacities in 2007. 

By 2015, there will be 59 megacities, 48 of which will be located in less 

developed countries. 23 will have populations well over 10 million, and 

all but four will be located in developing nations. The fastest growing 

cities lie in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin America; 

where up to 90 percent of the urban population are currently living in 

megaslums in which there are no basic utilities and essentially no 

effective police presence. 

SOURCE: 

http://www.globalchange.umich.edu/globalchange2/current/lectures/ur

ban_gc/ 

(1) Since the beginning of World War II, military operations in urban areas 

have run the full operational gamut: full-scale ground combat with huge numbers of 

casualties (Stalingrad, Manila, Seoul); aerial bombing producing hundreds of thousands 

of casualties in a single day (Dresden and Tokyo); civil war (Beirut, Monrovia); 

revolution (Managua, Budapest); precision bombing (Baghdad, Belgrade); 

counterterrorism (CT) (Belfast); noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) (Monrovia, 

Beirut); peacekeeping (Sarajevo); foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) (Mogadishu); 

nation-assistance (Haiti); and others. 

(2) Urban battle became particularly common in the 20th century. The control 

of political, industrial, commercial, transportation, and communication centers decisively 

affected the outcome of battles, campaigns, and wars. Technological advances, 

particularly in aviation, have made it possible to take war to the cities in a more precise 

manner than in the past with significantly fewer civilian casualties and less collateral 

damage. Cities themselves have increased in number, size, and strategic importance, 

resulting in an increased in limited contingency operations. This included a 

corresponding increase in the operational limitations placed upon military forces 

conducting these operations. 

b. Modern Joint Operations in Urban Environments. Figure I-1 compares 

operations in urban environments with those in other environments. Although JUOs may 

vary greatly in detail, they share a number of common characteristics. 

(1) Cities may reduce the advantages of the technologically superior force. 

The physical terrain of some cities may reduce visual LOS as well as the ability to 

I-4 JP 3-06 
Introduction 

ASPECT

COMPARISON OF OPERATIONS IN URBAN AND 

OTHER ENVIRONMENTS

URBAN DESERT JUNGLE MOUNTAIN

Number of civilians

Amount of valuable infrastructure

Multidimensional operational environment

Restrictive rules of engagement

Detection, observation, engagement ranges

Avenues of approach

Freedom of vehicular movement and maneuver

Communications functionality

Logistics requirements

High

High

Yes

Yes

Short

Many

Low

Degraded

High

Low

Low

No

Some

Long

Many

High

Fully

Capable

High

Low

Low

Some

Some

Short

Few

Low

Degraded

High

Low

Low

Yes

Some

Medium

Few

Medium

Degraded

Medium

Figure I-1. Comparison of Operations in Urban and Other Environments 

observe fires. It may also inhibit the command and control (C2) processes, some types of 

communications reliability, in addition to making aviation operations and airspace 

deconfliction extremely difficult. Moreover, it can decrease the effectiveness of joint fire 

support. It may also degrade logistics, and reduce ground operations to the level of small 

unit combat. Additionally, the constraints (a requirement that dictates an action) and 

restraints (a requirement that prohibits an action) imposed by the need to minimize 

civilian casualties and preserve infrastructure may further reduce the technological 

advantage. 

(2) Ground operations can become manpower-intensive. During phase II 

(seize the initiative) through phase IV (stabilize) of an operation or campaign, (using the 

notional operation plan phases described in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning) the joint 

force requires sufficient ground and other combat forces to clear buildings and control or 

secure the existing infrastructure and population and to perform other tasks. There will 

not be a smooth linear transition between phases. This my require requiring forces to be 

engaged in combat, while other forces engage in stability operations, each having its 

specific impact on the number and capability of employed troops. Additionally, as the 

operation or campaign transitions from phase IV (stabilize) to phase V (enable civil 

authority), the number and capability of forces will change, often increasing the 

requirement for ground forces, especially if there is an insurgency or terrorist threat. The 

structure and duration of this presence will also be influenced by the ability of the host 

nation’s (HN’s) security forces and other multinational forces to protect the population an 

establish a governing structure. 

(3) Ground operations become decentralized. The dispersal of units into 

buildings, underground passages, streets, and alleys decentralizes ground operations. 

This decentralization, combined with the nature of various tasks normally being 

I-5 
Chapter I 

accomplished by small units, complicates C2, combat identification (CID), information 

sharing, and target identification. 

(4) Operations are time-consuming. Nearly all operations in urban areas take 

significantly longer than originally expected. The prolonged battles for Stalingrad, 

Aachen in 1944, and Khorramshahr during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) all delayed the 

attacker longer than was estimated, resulting in the modification of operational or 

strategic plans. During the battle for Hue, it took US Marines three weeks of door-todoor fighting to clear a seven-block area. 

(5) Combat operations in urban areas may result in large ratios of civilian to 

military casualties. 

(6) Operations conducted in urban areas may have more restrictive 

operational limitations than operations elsewhere. The presence of civilians and the 

need to preserve infrastructure greatly influence operations and help shape the rules of 

engagement (ROE) and rules for the use of force (RUF). Operations-specific ROE or 

RUF are often clarified and refined as required by the situation to allow flexibility in 

accomplishing the mission while limiting civilian collateral damage and friendly 

casualties. The majority of urban battles since 1967 have had one or more of the 

following constraints or restraints imposed on the forces engaged: limiting friendly 

casualties; minimizing civilian casualties and/or collateral damage; or restrictions in the 

use of ground or air weapons. 

In Hue, for example, the North Vietnamese Army took advantage of US 

and South Vietnamese reluctance to bombard a place of national 

cultural importance inhabited by a friendly population. When the heavy 

ground fighting made it necessary to use air and artillery against 

targets within the city, all carried out under the lens of the news 

cameras, the US tactical victory of Hue became part of the strategic 

defeat resulting from the Tet offensive. 

(7) Urban terrain and infrastructure impact weapons employment and 

munitions effectiveness. Targets are easily masked by structures. The composition of 

buildings and surrounding structures changes weapons effects. The layout of the city 

(streets and building structure) tends to channelize the blast effects of munitions. 

Historically some indirect-fire weapons systems have been used more effectively in a 

direct fire mode (e.g., artillery), and others used for different purposes (e.g., antitank 

weapon, used to breech walls or provide openings to buildings). In urban battles since 

World War II, artillery, antitank weapons, and antiaircraft weapons have proven more 

valuable in a direct fire role against targets than in their primary roles. Precision 

munitions can be employed during a JUO to prevent fratricide, minimize civilian 

casualties, and limit collateral damage. Consideration should be given to the method of 

marking of targets within the potentially restrictive urban terrain. The impact of the 

urban environment on weapons employment makes the inclusion of joint intelligence 

preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) and human intelligence (HUMINT) 

I-6 JP 3-06 
Introduction 

in the planning process that much more critical. The results of JIPOE and HUMINT may 

minimize the need to employ weapons or may lead to more accurate targeting, thereby 

reducing collateral damage. 

(8) Urban areas provide advantages to defenders. Urban areas reduce the 

advantages in numbers and equipment of attacking forces. In both combat and limited 

contingency operations, urban areas provide benefits to those who could use the civilian 

population and infrastructure to their advantage. Conversely, isolation of an urban 

defender affords the attacker a significant, often decisive advantage. 

(9) Urban areas generally have a concentration of media outlets representing all 

types of format (print, broadcast, internet) with a variety of allegiances. This 

concentration makes it easy to cover operations without relying on outside assistance – 

including that of the US military. Real time reporting from the urban battlefield and 

subsequent public and political reaction can limit the options available to commanders 

particularly with regard to use of force. Media hostile to the US can misrepresent or lie 

about the results of military operations to further their agenda. Additionally, mass 

information dissemination is no longer the sole purview of commercial media. Any 

individual observing military operations with access to the internet can post information 

and images that have the potential to reach millions of people influencing their 

perceptions about military operations. This is particularly true in urban environments 

where operations are often conducted under the observation of the citizenry. The onscene commander has the responsibility to understand the media situation and ensure that 

it is addressed in the planning process and that troops are prepared for these eventualities. 

 (10) Despite its many disadvantages, ground combat may be the most effective 

and efficient way for a commander to accomplish operational or strategic objectives. 

Urban ground operations, although infantry intensive, require effective combined arms 

integration at all levels. Offensive operations with the purpose of securing an urban area 

and destroying the adversary defending it, or defensive operations with the objective to 

deny the urban area to the adversary, are difficult and costly. All those aspects of urban 

ground combat that have historically extracted a terrible price on attacker, defender, and 

civilian alike remain present today, multiplied by the increased size and complexity of 

urban areas and increase in the number of inhabitants. Even if ground combat operations 

are necessary, appropriate shaping of the operational environment, identification of the 

center of gravity (COG), and precise application of force may prevent full-scale urban 

combat. The JFC should consider forces and functions in unusual combinations and 

relations when conducting JUOs, befitting the nature of the urban operational 

environment. 

(11) The requirements to protect and aid civilians and to preserve and restore 

infrastructure create competing demands with tasks requiring defeat of the adversary. 

Increased use of fires may kill more of the foe and preserve friendly force lives, but it 

may also be counterproductive because of the extent of collateral damage and civilian 

casualties caused. These issues must be continually assessed to capitalize on 

opportunities, limit risk, and adjust operations accordingly. 

I-7 
Chapter I 

(12) The presence and involvement of organizations from other government 

agencies (OGAs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental 

organizations (IGOs), and the private sector will impact military operations. 

(13) Intelligence support requirements are different and more demanding in 

urban areas. An analysis of the threat is essential as is detailed intelligence and 

information on the physical terrain and infrastructure characteristics of the urban 

environment. This intelligence will be developed during the JIPOE process. 

Furthermore, input regarding the population - civilian leaders, civilian groups, and the 

relationships between these and other non-threat related factors - will be crucial to 

ultimate operational success. Developing the necessary intelligence products to support 

operations in an urban environment is a cross-functional effort. It is driven by the 

primary theater intelligence production element, the joint intelligence operations center, 

but includes joint task force (JTF) directorates, Department of Defense (DOD), and other 

government and nongovernment agencies. 

(14) Cities are heterogeneous; the challenges and solutions in one area of a city 

may be greatly different from those in other areas of the city. 

(15) JUOs are not conducted in isolation from the city’s rural and suburban 

surroundings. Rural areas may allow enemy forces or insurgents the opportunity to store 

weapon caches and threaten lines of communications (LOCs). Forces must be prepared 

to conduct operations in both urban and rural areas simultaneously. Commanders should 

not become overly focused on an urban area within a larger joint operations area (JOA). 

Threats and other influences can come from elsewhere. The area of interest (AOI) 

therefore extends well beyond an urban area and its immediate environs. 

(16) The requirement for the relative emphasis among offense, defense, and 

stability operations may vary unpredictably. Cities tend to increase the density among 

the multiple tasks inherent in providing support, maintaining stability, and waging 

combat. 

(17) The ability to detect deviations from “normal” urban patterns is an 

invaluable capability. Understanding what “normal” is in an urban area inherently allows 

the joint force to detect what is otherwise. Understanding urban patterns supports 

assessment and has value at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Understanding 

urban patterns is a time consuming effort and requires patience, attention and the focused 

observation skills of the joint force. 

(18) Forces conducting JUOs may face increased exposure to communicable 

diseases, industrial and chemical accidents, and attacks with toxic industrial materials 

(TIMs) (e.g., chemicals and radiological material). Risks and consequences of these 

threats will vary based on the unique environment of a particular city (e.g., weather, 

density, sanitation). In some instances, the urban environment might assist in mitigating 

the effects of such weapons. The environment may also exacerbate the effects of agents 

I-8 JP 3-06 
Introduction 

which may stagnate in closed areas or be communicated to combatants through contact 

with civilians. 

(19) Forces will likely face increased exposure to potential isolating incidents. 

The risks of overreacting in the urban environment include additional opportunities for 

the enemy to take hostage friendly, allied, or coalition personnel for monetary, 

ideological, psychological, and/or propaganda purposes. 

4. Air Operations Considerations 

 a. Air operations must adapt to the unique urban environment. The urban 

environment includes challenges such as combatant identification, propensity for 

collateral damage, preservation of infrastructure, restrictive rules of engagement, line of 

sight obstructions (to include targeting and communications), and freedom of maneuver. 

Although C2 of air power does not change in the urban environment, tactics, techniques, 

and procedures may be vastly different from those employed on the open battlefield. 

Planners need to consider that urban ground operations will be largely decentralized and 

coordination will be more time consuming. For example, large munitions may be traded 

for increased loiter time in fuel as smaller precise weapons are more desirable for 

employment to reduce collateral damage in cities or towns. Public affairs (PA) planners 

should be involved early in the process to mitigate negative events. Finally, air 

operations in an urban environment involve significant law of war considerations. In 

particular, commanders, planners, and aircrew must determine whether the operation is a 

military necessity and whether the potential harm to civilians outweighs the importance 

of the operation. 

 b. Close air support (CAS) may also be difficult when supporting house-to-house 

ground fighting, where locating and identifying friendly positions may prove highly 

demanding. Techniques such as overlaying tactical charts and local street maps may 

prove useful in identifying enemy and friendly positions. CAS in an urban environment 

requires increased reliance on friendly ground forces to locate and mark targets. Aircrew 

should give extra attention to the axis of attack and target designation. When performing 

CAS in urban environments, buildings may interfere with communications between air 

and ground, complicating the coordination process. Ground forces may also have 

difficulty marking targets for CAS aircraft in an urban environment, and careful 

consideration must be given to the type of terminal attack control selected. Armed 

unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), gunships, and precision guided munitions equipped 

fighters have proven particularly effective in many urban operations. For example, the 

AC-130 and armed UASs have been useful in urban environments, where extended loiter 

times are often necessary to pinpoint target sets in close proximity to civilians and 

friendly forces. 

5. Conditions for Urban Engagement 

a. When necessary to accomplish strategic or operational objectives the joint force 

commander (JFC) designs, plans, and executes operations in urban areas with due 

I-9 
Chapter I 

consideration of the strategic environment as well as existing and potential operational 

limitations. 

b. Operations in urban areas may occur within the context of a campaign or major 

operation. These operations may take place entirely within a city or may include multiple 

urban areas and may be influenced by interconnected surrounding areas. The JFC will 

determine whether or not operating in an urban environment is essential for the conduct 

of the campaign or major operation and, if so, where and when to conduct JUOs. The 

following strategic and operational considerations and requirements may determine 

whether JUOs are necessary: 

(1) A hostile force must be defeated, and that force chooses to occupy an urban 

area, or the enemy uses the urban environment to mitigate the overwhelming 

technological superiority of friendly, allied, or coalition forces. 

(2) An urban area may have infrastructure and/or capabilities that have strategic 

or operational value, and the military necessity of destroying, degrading, denying, 

neutralizing, exploiting, or seizing these critical features must be carefully weighed 

against not only the impact on the populace, but also the costs and risks to the operation. 

(3) It may be necessary to isolate an adversary in an urban area to facilitate a 

battle larger operation or campaign in another location. 

(4) The geographical location of an urban area may dominate a region or 

avenue of approach. 

(5) The political and cultural significance of the urban area may be such that it 

is itself a strategic or operational COG or has a relationship to the designated COG. 

c. When faced with the prospect of operating in urban areas, the JFC should 

carefully consider whether or not the means are available to conduct the operation 

successfully considering the demands of the urban environment. In addition to the 

questions outlined in Figure I-2, the JFC should consider force strength, force types, 

required munitions and equipment, potential casualties, potential personnel recovery (PR) 

incident risks, the effects of time and momentum, the potential for collateral damage, the 

prospects of escalation, and alternative courses of action (COAs). These alternatives 

might include seizure or construction of alternate facilities (such as port or airfield) or 

bypassing and isolating the urban area rather than entering it. 

d. The commander must set the conditions that will lead to the accomplishment of 

certain tasks. These tasks may include (but are not limited to) isolating the urban area; 

avoiding “template” planning and predictability; developing accurate situational 

awareness, including knowledge of the population; taking advantage of local expertise; 

and leading disciplined troops possessing necessary skills gained through realistic urban 

training and experience. 

I-10 JP 3-06 
Introduction 

THE DECISION TO CONDUCT JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS

What is the desired strategic end state?

Is political, military, control of an urban area necessary to 

achieve the desired strategic end state? If yes, what degree of control is 

required?

What operational objectives are necessary in order to achieve the level of 

desired political, military, control of an urban area?

Can the joint force accomplish the necessary operational objectives with the 

means and time available?

Are the anticipated consequences and costs of accomplishing the necessary 

operational objectives justified by the importance of the desired strategic 

end state?

and/or economic

and/or economic

Figure I-2. The Decision to Conduct Joint Urban Operations 

6. Fundamentals of Operations in Urban Environments 

This publication provides a framework on how to operate in an urban environment to 

defeat adversaries embedded and diffused among the population, without causing 

catastrophic damage to the functioning of the society. The embedded adversary must not 

merely be attacked with destructive force, but must be attacked comprehensively. The 

entire urban environment must be addressed simultaneously and systematically by 

applying power to disable hostile elements and enable those environmental elements that 

are essential to the city’s functioning. A comprehensive and systematic approach 

requires a combination of isolating, protective, improving, sustaining, persuasive, 

destructive, and disruptive actions or capabilities. 

a. Conduct a systemic assessment. The basis for planning and executing is an 

understanding of the urban area as a complex dynamic environment with various 

structures, processes, and functions, which will be disrupted by military operations but 

which are essential to the continued viability of the area. 

b. Integrate all actions within the context of an overarching major operation or 

campaign. Combine the various isolating, protective, improving, sustaining, persuasive, 

destructive, and disruptive actions, military and nonmilitary, into a cohesive, mutually 

reinforcing whole. 

c. Learn and adapt. Since an urban environment will defy comprehensive 

understanding because of its complexity, and since it is ever evolving, design operations 

with a flexibility to adjust timing, forces, and other aspects to seize opportunities and 

react to unforeseen challenges. 

I-11 
Chapter I 

I-12 JP 3-06 

d. Selectively isolate the urban environment. Control the influx into the urban 

environment of people, materiel, and information that could help support the adversary. 

e. Apply highly discriminate destructive or disabling force to disrupt an 

adversary’s ability to pursue its objectives. Actively locate and attack enemy elements 

while minimizing impact on other elements of the urban environment. 

f. Establish and extend control and protection of urban sectors and subsystems. 

Create a secure environment that allows enabling actions to occur and may help gain the 

allegiance of the population, while at the same time denying the adversary access to 

segments of the population and other key resources. 

g. Persuade municipal governments, groups, and population segments to 

cooperate with joint force operations. Influence indigenous perceptions and attitudes 

through the military’s contribution to strategic communication (SC) efforts. 

h. Provide essential support into the urban environment to sustain it during the 

ordeal of combat operations to improve its ability to survive. 

i. Make improvements to urban institutions and infrastructure. Restore or 

create essential subsystems as a means to enable the urban environment to better sustain 

itself. 
CHAPTER II 

UNDERSTANDING THE URBAN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

II-1 

1. General 

a. Introduction. Operational environment is defined as a composite of the 

conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and 

bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors (of 

the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment. Included 

within these are the adversary, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific 

joint operation. By understanding key aspects of the operational environment through a 

systems perspective, the JFC and joint planners can then choose dynamic ways to achieve 

operational objectives. It is important to note, the complexity of the urban environment 

increases the possibility and incidence of undesired effects or unforeseen consequences 

from any military operation. 

b. Precepts for Joint Urban Operations 

 (1) Cities are human-built for human purposes to sustain human life. Of all 

facts about cities, this one is the most significant and forms the foundation of all the other 

precepts. 

 (2) Cities are not natural entities, in that they do not arise without human 

intervention upon a given natural environment. Since cities arise for the reasons of those 

who build them, the shape, design, and functions of a city are well within the reach of 

understanding, and if this is true, then cities may be analyzed on a military as well as any 

other basis. A military analysis of a city must be founded upon information that is 

pertinent to one’s mission or tasks, and a significant part of this analysis will derive from 

the character of the city itself. 

 (3) Cities normally do not exist in a vacuum. Every city exists within a 

physical network of other cities, towns, villages, suburbs, or exurbs. Every one of these 

lesser aggregations defines itself at least partly by reference to the greater city, just as the 

greater city defines itself, at least partly, by reference to its surroundings. The existence 

of greater and lesser urban zones within mutually supporting distance should alert any 

military analyst or planner to how forces might be disposed. 

 (4) Cities should not be regarded as inert. Malfunction of public systems, 

catastrophes, natural disasters, civic disorder, crime, riot, insurrection, or invasion and 

occupation -- all these impact the relationship among physical terrain, population, and 

infrastructure. 

“If you don’t understand the cultures you are involved in; who makes decisions 

in these societies; how their infrastructure is designed; the uniqueness in their 

values and in their taboos — you aren’t going to be successful.” 

George Wilson, Air Force Times
Chapter II 

 (5) At a certain point in their growth, cities attain a level of complexity that is 

the product of human and physical synergy. That point occurs when some degree of 

higher management is required. Urban complexity, improperly managed, can act as a 

dysfunctional force in a city. The military significance of urban complexity is that its 

dysfunctional tendency can be accelerated. It is not only that there are more moving 

parts, it is that those parts are moving differently. 

 (6) The inherent social and material order of a city may be described as urban 

cohesion. Urban cohesion manifests itself continuously and practically by acting as a 

counterbalance to urban complexity. In essence, urban cohesion is attained when an 

individual subordinates oneself to a larger group in order to benefit less immediately but 

more reliably. Urban organization is made possible by widespread social agreement. 

 (7) Cities tend to persist. Cities exhibit adaptive capacities that often strain 

credulity. Toward the end of the latest battle of Grozny (1999-2000), Russian authorities 

estimated that upwards of 35,000 civilians had remained in a city where no buildings had 

escaped serious damage, where no regular services existed, and where movement was 

possible only at night, if then. Cities are highly adaptive entities. 

c. The nature of the urban operational environment. The urban environment is 

made up of adaptive systems with a wide range of structures, processes, and functions 

that have evolved to sustain concentrated human societies in confined space. These 

structures are all the various familial, tribal, professional, commercial, governmental, 

social, religious, educational, and media institutions that typify urban society. The 

processes include all the various official and unofficial social, criminal, economic, 

governmental, informational, and cultural interactions that take place within the ebb and 

flow of urban life. Functionally, the urban environment consists of governance, cultural 

center, manufacturing center, services, a source of jobs, and a marketplace for goods and 

services. Some of these structures, processes, and functions are fundamental to the 

functioning of the urban system, providing for basic human needs. These structures, 

processes, and functions may be generically common to all urban environments, but each 

urban environment is unique in its specifics. Combat changes urban environments, often 

significantly and generally for the worse. The essential quality of urban areas by this 

view is not merely the presence of people, but the presence of intense societal interaction 

(although not necessarily interactions that are functioning smoothly). 

d. Cohesion

(1) Urban cohesion has often figured importantly in war and conflict. Armed 

forces throughout history have struggled against cities’ power to resist, to withstand 

sieges lasting months or years, or to absorb the punishment of entire armies fighting 

within their precincts. 

(2) Cities are normally designed and constructed to function in a peacetime 

environment. Once established, cities operate at a certain pace and rhythm unique to 

themselves, depending on the vitality of their social and material cohesion. A city’s 

II-2 JP 3-06 
Understanding the Urban Operational Environment 

infrastructure, common systems, and functioning can be tested by natural disasters, 

industrial disasters, civil disorder, military conflict, or outright war. Though persistent, 

urban systems are dramatically affected, whether intentionally or not, through military 

and other action. 

GROZNY —THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 

Near the end of 1994, Russia’s Yeltsin Administration, faced with the 

continuing dissolution of the Soviet empire, committed military forces to 

restore the Russian Federation’s authority throughout the Caucasus 

region. The Russians originally thought the operation would be a simple 

demonstration of force in the capital city of Grozny that would rapidly 

culminate with the collapse of the “rebel” government. This show of 

force quickly evolved into a military campaign that eventually ended in 

total failure. Russian commanders may well have avoided this failure, 

however, had they correctly understood and shaped the battlespace 

within their theater of operations. Instead, they believed the erroneous 

assumptions generated at the strategic level and subsequently directed 

a woefully inadequate effort to understand the battlespace in all its 

complexity. This disregard for intelligence adversely affected virtually 

every other warfighting function at the operational level. On the other 

hand, the Chechen rebels made extensive use of their familiarity with the 

region and their own first-hand knowledge of the strengths and 

weaknesses of the Russian Army to the fullest advantage. 

SOURCE: Timothy L. Thomas, The Battle of Grozny: 

Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat 

e. Threat. The type of threat present in a particular urban area may vary. The 

threat may consist of a conventional hostile military force, an unconventional militia or 

guerilla force (such as those found in Beirut or Mogadishu), terrorists, criminal 

organizations or gangs, an opposing political group, or a phenomenal threat such as a 

force of nature, hunger, or disease. Friendly forces conducting JUOs may encounter 

these threats in isolation, but the nature of urban areas makes it increasingly likely that 

these threats will be found in combination. Military operations may lead to hunger and 

disease in the civilian population; natural disaster may produce enough instability to 

encourage action by guerillas or militia groups; destruction of infrastructure may lead to 

increased criminal activity. In any case, the existing and potential threats must overlay 

the characteristics of the urban area in the commander’s thinking concerning the urban 

operational environment. 

(1) The ways in which adversaries are organized often add to the complexity of 

the threat. In many cases, the adversaries are indistinguishable from the rest of the 

population. Their organizations and objectives are not just different than the regular 

armies of states; they have a completely different logic, one that makes the recognition of 

cultural narratives and the study of anthropology essential and may provide a clearer 

understanding of the nature of the conflict. 

II-3 
Chapter II 

 (2) The speed with which even irregular forces learn and adapt adds a temporal 

dimension to complexity. The ability to learn and adapt while fighting marks future 

adversaries and the societies from which they come. Irregular forces, because they are 

less regimented and hierarchical, can change not only their fighting techniques, but also 

their organization and the very objectives for which they are fighting. 

(3) It is important to note the systems that comprise the adversary are not the 

only ones capable of adaptation. The wider environment and friendly systems, such as 

domestic public opinion, also adapt in response to operations and perceptions of 

operations. The ability of all these systems to change makes it essential for joint forces to 

learn while operating. As the enemy and other elements in the operational environment 

have adapted to earlier actions, a commander may discover that the original 

understanding of a problem is no longer valid. 

f. Understanding the operational environment. Understanding this operational 

environment requires a holistic view that extends beyond the adversary’s military forces 

and other combat capabilities within the operational area. This understanding is achieved 

through the JIPOE process. 

(1) A holistic view of the physical areas and factors of the air, land, maritime, 

and space domains and the information environment (which includes cyberspace). 

Included within these are the adversary, friendly, and neutral political, military, 

economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) systems that are relevant to a 

specific joint operation. Understanding the operational environment is fundamental to 

identifying the tasks required to attain stated objectives; avoiding unintended 

consequences that may hinder mission accomplishment; and assessing the impact of 

friendly, adversary, and other actors, as well as the local populace, on the commander’s 

CONOPS and progress toward the military end state. 

(2) A systems perspective of the operational environment strives to provide an 

understanding of significant relationships within interrelated PMESII and other systems 

relevant to a specific joint operation, without regard to geographic boundaries. Among 

other benefits, this perspective helps identify potential sources from which to gain 

indications and warning, and facilitates understanding the continuous and complex 

interaction of friendly, adversary, and neutral systems. A systems perspective is 

developed through node-link network analysis and helps to identify COGs, critical 

vulnerabilities and decisive points (DPs). 

See JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, for more 

information on the development of a systems perspective as part of the JIPOE process. 

2. Political 

The political system describes a structure in which economic interests, political 

actors, and civic organizations interact to make policy decisions. At the heart of this 

structure is the delineation of the civil authority known to the population. Unique to 

II-4 JP 3-06 
Understanding the Urban Operational Environment 

JUOs is the requirement to influence political/civil institutions in order to shape outcomes 

to meet the US political end state. In conjunction with other US Government (USG) 

entities, the JFC needs to plan for what elements, to what degree, and to what standards, 

the JFC will shape the political landscape in accordance with achieving US goals. 

3. Economic 

 a. The economic system describes a structure that provides basic needs and 

improves quality of life for the population. Processes within this system are designed to 

meet the basic needs of the population for health, safety, and economic success. 

 b. Providing economic assistance in a JUO is a difficult and complicated task that 

requires coordination and synchronization throughout the economic area of influence. 

JFCs should set realistic objectives, expect slow progress and setbacks, and prepare their 

forces for the same. Because incomes have often fallen sharply during the conflict, 

“normal” living conditions or levels of service are often impossible to define. It is not the 

job of the military to restore public services or incomes to prewar or other desired levels; 

that is the job of the citizens of the host nation themselves. Depending on the state of the 

economy, doing so may take considerable time. It is, however, part of the mission of 

personnel engaged in joint operations to help create the security conditions that can make 

growth and development possible. 

4. Special Social and Cultural Considerations For Urban Areas 

a. The social variable describes societies within an operational environment. A 

society is a population whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy 

a common territory, have a common culture, and share a sense of identity. The dense 

populations inherent to urban areas require that JFCs pay greater attention to the 

relationship between civilians and military operations than in other types of operations. 

The presence of large numbers of civilians will affect military operations, and military 

operations will affect the lives of the civilians. The commander should keep in mind 

the overall objectives regarding the civilian populace: to minimize civilian 

interference with military operations, minimize mission impact on the population, 

and observe the necessary legal, moral, and humanitarian obligations toward 

civilians. Failure in any case may adversely influence the achievement of strategic and 

operational objectives. However, depending on the mission, these objectives could be 

negative and too simplistic. Commanders should view civilians as sources of 

information, components of post-combat success during rebuilding, and – perhaps – those 

to whom the city will ultimately be turned over. 

b. There are several reasons why urban populations complicate, disrupt, and even 

threaten the success of operations and their attendant intelligence support functions. 

Some examples include: 

(1) Urban populations are composed of many groups and subgroups that may 

not cooperate with each other or with military forces. 

II-5 
Chapter II 

(2) Each group has its own needs, interests, intentions, and capabilities. 

(3) Relationships that exist among groups might play critical roles in 

operations. 

(4) Cultural differences can strain relations between the friendly force and the 

resident population if not understood and appreciated. 

(5) People going about their daily routines can unwittingly hamper friendly 

objectives. 

(6) The resident population has survival and living needs that cannot be 

ignored. 

(7) Urban population groups and subgroups increase the number of elements to 

be identified and assessed as potential threats to the friendly force. They also increase the 

number of potential groups able to assist the friendly force. 

(8) The presence of civilians can escalate tactical actions to episodes of 

strategic importance. 

(9) Tactical forces often adopt an adversarial mentality towards the population 

that might create gaps in intelligence and barriers to complete analysis. 

c. Human Environment. Information about the physical security, economic 

security, ideology and belief systems, authority figures, and organizations relevant to 

major social groups in the area under study comprises the human environment. This 

information may come from open source, unclassified collection and is referenced 

geospatially, relationally, and temporally to enable the creation of various “maps” of the 

human dynamics in areas where the joint force has committed resources. Information on 

social groups and their interests, beliefs, leaders, and the drivers of individual and group 

behavior is needed to conduct effective operations in urban environments. 

(1) The concentration of people has its own demographic characteristics: 

population density, neighborhoods and their make-up, ethnicity, race, age, daily 

movement in and around the city, and other considerations based on the nature and 

behavior of the populace. Other sociocultural characteristics may include religion, 

political leanings and activity, economics, clan or tribal affiliation, criminal organizations 

and activities, and class divisions. The population in an urban environment must be 

considered as a distinct and critical aspect of the commander’s assessment. The human 

dimension is the very essence of the urban environment. Understanding local cultural, 

political, social, economic, and religious factors is crucial to successful JUOs and 

becomes central to mission success. 

(2) It is important to understand that urban populations are extremely 

heterogeneous. The overall population is composed of several groups, each with its own 

II-6 JP 3-06 
Understanding the Urban Operational Environment 

interests. Relationships between groups might be congenial, hostile, or dependent. 

Understanding this diversity and complexity requires a significant amount of mental 

effort and flexibility. 

(a) The cultural tendencies of urban residents might be very different from 

what friendly forces are accustomed to. Food, habits, living conditions, laws, religious 

customs, and beliefs may initially distance a warfighter from the city’s residents. The 

differences must be appreciated by the friendly force in order to achieve and maintain 

legitimacy within a foreign operational area. 

(b) Cultural differences can also affect tactical efforts. In Mogadishu, for 

instance, groups of civilians protected Somali gunmen by using their own bodies as 

cover. This unfamiliar tactic created a dilemma for soldiers constrained by the ROE and 

the law of war. It is important to recognize, however, that not all sectors of the 

population, including those that at first glance may appear threatening, necessarily work 

against the friendly force. Individuals and groups of all backgrounds can be co-opted or 

influenced by the friendly force to serve a friendly or benign objective. 

(c) The abundant population groups and subgroups inherent to cities make 

threat identification difficult. Unlike more traditional operations on open terrain, where 

merely spotting an unknown entity would assist in deciphering friend from foe, urban 

areas are packed with individuals and groups that might have the capabilities, interests, or 

intentions that can threaten a unit’s mission. An analyst may not be able to distinguish 

urban friend from foe just by simple observation. Knowing what groups exist within the 

operational area and understanding the interests and intentions of each can help in 

planning operations that, per the commander’s intent, exploit all capabilities and 

opportunities to accomplish military objectives and support other agencies or 

organizations in attaining the desired end state. 

 d. Culture. Cultural understanding is a key to success in every aspect of joint 

operations conducted in urban environments. An urban environment acts like a cultural 

centrifuge on complex operations. The velocity of events is unforgiving, the pressure 

becomes unrelenting, and there is a constant threat of separation from the people. 

e. Religion. In addition to the commonly understood military limitations associated 

with religious infrastructure (e.g., churches, mosques, temples, shrines) the religious 

beliefs and practices of a population play a central role in the culture of a society and thus 

impact operations in urban environments. Considerations may include but are not limited 

to: geographic or regional patterns of religious affiliation; past and present religious 

conflicts among population groups; religious peculiarities and sensitivities; and 

relationship of religion to other sources of social affiliation (e.g., ethnicity, economic 

class, political ideology, family, clans, and tribes). Cities may contain religious shrines 

and significant religious structures. 

f. Criminal Activity. The density of population and complex physical terrain allow 

criminals to blend into the population. Some discount organized criminal groups as a 

II-7 
Chapter II 

national security or military threat. However, a band of criminals without any political 

ideology could use the same methods for profit and cause significant disruptions, such as 

through kidnappings or hostage taking. Sometimes these syndicates may have better 

resources than insurgent. 

(1) Within a city, many factors including squalor, decay, and unemployment are 

conducive to the recruitment of youth into criminal organizations. 

(2) The percentage of a population that involves itself in organized criminal 

behavior need not be great to present a threat to stability. A criminal group that can 

control one district of a 10-million plus megacity has more power than most rural 

insurgents could gain over 20 years of operations. Such power will need to be addressed 

by any intervening force. 

g. Social Trends 

(1) Urbanization has significant environmental consequences. Shortages of 

shelter, water, food, and poor sanitization in a densely populated urban environment will 

inherently cause more casualties, than more sparsely populated rural communities. 

Additionally, the dense population also will allow for rapid transmission of diseases. 

 (2) Poor urban areas have unique characteristics and exhibit many special 

problems, including unachievable resource requirements, significant pollution, and social 

stresses caused by high population densities. They are also breeding grounds for extreme 

political and terrorist movements, and they present enormous problems to policing and 

maintaining civil order. 

5. Information Considerations for Urban Areas 

a. Information is the pervasive back-drop to the physical domains of the urban 

environment. It is continuously changing and requires that plans and operational 

decisions be based on this knowledge and on the results of constant monitoring, 

assessment, and analysis. 

 b. In urban settings, the density of population includes a density of media of all 

types, whose reporting may be friendly, neutral, or opposed to US interests. 

c. Informational nodes may include but are not limited to: newspapers, television 

networks, radio stations, computer networks, information technology centers, and postal 

facilities. The information environment should be examined in the context of global 

interconnectivity, the national level, and the local level. 

6. Infrastructure Considerations For Urban Areas 

a. The total functioning of an urban area is supported by infrastructure which is 

itself composed of systems. Each component of infrastructure affects the population, the 

II-8 JP 3-06 
Understanding the Urban Operational Environment 

normal operation of the city, and the nature and long-term success of JUOs. 

Commanders and their staffs must understand the functions and interrelationships of 

these systems in order to achieve success. 

 

b. In urban areas, buildings and people are interconnected with phone lines, 

roadways, sidewalks, electrical wires, drainage pipes, and gas mains, the layout of which 

often cannot be easily surmised. These connections pose dilemmas for C2, the health and 

welfare of a unit and the civilian population, logistics, and other aspects of an operation. 

c. Urban areas will contain varying degrees of engineered features as part of their 

infrastructure. Variations on the infrastructure will be influenced by the social, cultural, 

economic, political, and historical composition of the city. In general, cities are built to 

meet the requirements of the day. Urban planners, architects, civil engineers, and other 

experts can provide critical insight into the ways in which an urban area operates that can 

influence the development of a CONOPS. The knowledge supports the attainment of 

military objectives while preserving critical functionality and minimizing the need for 

certain stability and reconstruction efforts. While civil affairs (CA), engineer, and other 

military personnel have some of the skill sets required to accomplish this, the JFC relies 

on involving experts from the Department of State (DOS) and OGAs, displaced and 

expatriated local officials, civil engineers, and others in a unified assessment and 

planning effort. The JFC must be able to understand the city from a military point of 

view – quite a different view from that taken by a resident or even an urbanologist. Seen 

as a military problem, an elevated expressway curving through a central urban core 

district is a problem different in kind from the one considered by the planner who 

designed it. In short, the commander must be prepared to “read” the city. A 

commander’s knowledge about cities in general, particularly how structures relate to city 

functions, and how functions change under different circumstances is essential. 

d. This infrastructure may include a transportation network, utilities, government 

buildings, hospitals, schools, food processing and distribution centers, and 

communications facilities. The infrastructure may be relatively simple or it may be 

highly complex and sophisticated. For example, transportation infrastructure in one city 

may be a simple network of streets; in another city, it may consist of sophisticated port 

facilities, rail networks, airports, large highways, subways, bus system, taxis, and other 

modes of public transportation. In the latter case, such a city may be the transportation 

hub for the region in which it is located — if not the entire nation. 

e. Disrupted public utilities can create significant obstacles to maneuver, 

communications, and the use of firepower. Broken water hydrants can deplete a 

municipality’s water resources. Phone and electrical lines inhibit helicopter airspace. 

The capability of utilities to affect many regions of the city gives them the potential to be 

used as weapons or as weapons platforms. For instance, if the water flow into a city can 

be controlled, an adversary can intentionally limit that flow and create an urgent need that 

a joint force must address. This manipulation of the water supply serves as a potentially 

lethal weapon (people can become dehydrated or overheated) as well as a weapon of 

influence (fear of having an adversary control a critical need). As a weapon’s platform, 

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Chapter II 

this same water supply can be tainted with a biological agent that can infect anyone who 

drinks it, creating disease of epidemic proportions as well as considerable terror in the 

population. 

f. In addition to the physical infrastructure of power plants, transportation networks, 

and the like, cities also have a service infrastructure: police, fire, and other government 

services; food and water availability and distribution; medical services; fuel and 

electricity; sanitation; the news media and information flow; education; and others. This 

sort of infrastructure may be quite sophisticated and an integral part of the city’s life, it 

may be virtually nonexistent, or it may exist in a state of ineffectiveness. 

g. One of the most overlooked aspects of infrastructure that may impact operations 

is the radio frequency (RF) backbone that supports many of the population’s needs. Each 

nation maintains a frequency allocation table which divides the RF spectrum into usable 

and protected segments to support such items as air traffic control, emergency 

communications, navigation systems, and a wide variety of essential systems and 

services. Many of these segments should be protected even during combat operations 

because disrupting them may cause more harm to operations than good. 

h. The impact of infrastructure on operations depend on a number of factors: the 

unique nature of the urban area; the type of operation; operational objectives; the 

infrastructure’s effectiveness; and friendly ability to disrupt, control, or make use of it. In 

some cases, infrastructure may primarily support adversary forces. In other cases, it may 

provide support to both the adversary and the civilian populace or it may only provide 

support to civilians. The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) 2700-002-03, 

Urban Generic Information Requirements Handbook (UGIRH), addresses the 

complications created by public works and public infrastructure. The UGIRH includes a 

section devoted to questions about the location, composition, and materials associated 

with public works. The handbook also lists questions about the significance of 

infrastructure like utilities and religious centers which can assist the intelligence analyst 

in deciphering the key aspects of urban infrastructure that can impact operations. 

7. Other Considerations For Urban Areas 

 

a. Physical Factors

(1) The physical environment includes the geography and man-made structures 

in the operational area. Urban terrain, both natural and man-made, is the foundation upon 

which the population and infrastructure of the urban area are superimposed. A single city 

may incorporate high-rise business or administrative sections, suburbs, shantytowns, 

industrial areas, extensive parklands or other open areas, waterways, and various patterns 

of street grids and other transportation infrastructure. City patterns may consist of a 

central hub surrounded by satellite areas, or they may be linear, a network, or segments. 

Dominating natural terrain features such as coastlines, rivers, and mountains will 

influence the pattern. Cities may contain street patterns that are a rectangular grid, radial, 

concentric, or irregular. Additionally, street names may change as they transition from 

II-10 JP 3-06 
Understanding the Urban Operational Environment 

one neighborhood to another. The city also can be viewed in terms of form and function. 

A city may consist of a core, surrounded by various commercial ribbons, industrial areas, 

outlying high-rise areas, residential areas perhaps including shantytowns, and military 

areas. Buildings may range from single-story wooden or mud dwellings to high-rise 

apartments and office buildings, from galvanized metal shops to petrochemical plants. 

They may be closely packed where land space is at a premium or dispersed over several 

square miles. The infinite ways in which these features may be combined make it 

necessary to approach each urban area as a unique problem. 

(2) The natural terrain features that lie beneath urban edifices influence unit 

operations. They dictate where buildings can be constructed and how streets align, 

thereby influencing a unit’s scheme of maneuver. In addition, the slope of roads within 

urban areas often follows the underlying terrain’s natural contours. Thus, terrain features 

within an urban area are included in the overall terrain analysis of a city. 

(3) Understanding the physical characteristics of urban areas requires a different 

way of thinking about terrain. It requires the comprehension of the multidimensional 

nature of urban terrain, its general forms and functions, and size. The total size of the 

surfaces and spaces of an urban area is usually many times that of a similarly sized piece 

of natural terrain because of the complex blend of horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior, 

and subterranean forms superimposed on the natural landscape. Like other terrain, urban 

areas consist of airspace and surface areas. Additionally, there are man-made 

‘supersurface’ and ‘subsurface’ areas. Figure II-1 illustrates the types of physical 

characteristics found in urban terrain. The following terms are provided as they relate 

only to ground “urban” operations: 

(a) Airspace is the area above the ground usable by aircraft and aerial 

munitions. In urban areas, airspace is broken up by man-made structures of different 

heights and densities in addition to the irregularities in natural terrain. This produces an 

“urban canyon” effect that can adversely impact operations. Urban canyons often cause 

higher wind speeds with unpredictable wind direction and turbulence that can cause some 

munitions to miss their targets (increasing risk for both collateral damage and fratricide) 

and significantly increase risks for rotary wing operations near the surface. 

(b) Surface areas include exterior ground level areas of streets and roads, 

parks and fields, and any other exterior space. These surface areas follow the natural 

terrain and are themselves broken up by man-made features. 

(c) Supersurface areas are the roofs and upper floors of buildings, 

stadiums, towers, or other structures that can be used for movement, maneuver, 

observation, firing positions, or other advantage. 

II-11 
Chapter II 

URBAN TERRAIN

Supersurface

Interior

Airspace

Airspace

Exterior

Surface Surface

Subsurface

Figure II-1. Urban Terrain 

(d) Subsurface areas are areas below ground level that consist of sewer 

and drainage systems, subway tunnels, utility corridors, or other subterranean spaces. 

These areas can be used for cover and concealment, movement, and engagement, but 

their use requires intimate knowledge of the area. 

(e) Equally important are considerations of exterior and interior space: 

what is visible from outside buildings or subsurface areas, and the significant range of 

people, infrastructure, and activity that occurs unseen in the interior of those structures. 

Understanding the full physical nature of an urban area requires a multidimensional 

approach, with an appropriate awareness of the lateral, horizontal, and vertical, and 

interior and external nature of the city. 

(4) Throughout the world, urban areas have similar form and function. In form, 

urban areas contain like characteristics, readily divisible into distinct sections or areas. 

Functionally, they tend to be the centers of population, finance, politics, transportation, 

industry, and culture. While urban areas may be modeled by several different means, 

Figure II-2 illustrates one example of general forms and internal functions. Some forms 

and functions may overlap. For example, high-rise buildings are located in core areas as 

well as in outlying areas and may be used for residential purposes. Visualization in terms 

of zones enhances understanding of urban patterns and rhythms. 

For a more detailed discussion of urban terrain, urban patterns, and urban functional 

zones, see Field Manual (FM) 3-06, Urban Operations. 

II-12 JP 3-06 
Understanding the Urban Operational Environment 

URBAN FUNCTIONAL ZONES

Figure II-2. Urban Functional Zones 

(5) FM 2-91.4, Intelligence Support to Urban Operations, addresses how to 

investigate the underlying terrain of a city. It describes how a city’s layout affects a 

unit’s ability to operate within it. It also explains how the underlying terrain affects a 

city’s street patterns as well as its distance from other urban areas. Additionally it 

discusses how a city’s history, ecology, economy, politics, or culture can be influenced 

by the ground on which it sits. For instance, the historical significance of many sites in 

Israel, such as Temple Mount, is often more salient to the essence of a conflict than are 

the buildings that mark them. 

(6) Buildings complicate all aspects of military operations in urban areas. Their 

composition, frontages, size, and window locations affect force positioning and weapons 

deployment considerations. Angles, displacement, surface reflection, and antenna 

locations influence communications and intelligence collection. Considerations such as 

snipers, rubble, booby traps, interfloor movement, and the like are often directly related 

to urban construction. For instance, buildings increase the numbers of viable approaches 

for foot soldiers, but limit them for other ground maneuver elements. Snipers, able to 

hide at any elevation, can become a highly potent weapon for any size force. Rubble is 

often used for concealment, booby trap locations, or obstacles. The psychological effects 

of JUOs are also augmented by buildings. Having the adversary able to maneuver and 

shoot at a multitude of angles and through walls, ceilings, and floors creates 

psychological and physiological stress in any force. 

(a) Buildings also create possible social, cultural, or political dilemmas. 

Places of worship, government edifices, schools, hospitals, parks, and the like all need to 

be understood in terms of their significance. Because many cities are peppered with 

culturally and politically significant buildings, analysts seeking to describe cities face the 

II-13 
Chapter II 

challenge of accurately identifying and describing them in order to avoid unintended 

effects. 

(b) Under the law of war only those buildings which by their nature, 

location, purpose, or use, make an effective contribution to military action may be 

targeted. Furthermore, certain types of buildings, particularly hospitals and religious 

sites, have a specific protected status under the law of war. ROE may contain further 

limitations on targeting. An adversary, however, might not feel bound by the law of war 

and intentionally target a civilian-use building. Understanding how an adversary might 

abide by or exploit similar conventions should be part of the planning and analysis 

process. 

(c) Buildings can impede intelligence collection efforts. The amount of 

information that must be collected and assessed regarding structures in urban areas is 

enormous. Ideally, information about a particular building should include its floor plan 

in addition to a description of its building materials. Who owns a particular building, 

who its tenants are, and how it is connected to water and power facilities might also be 

valuable information. Collecting all of this information, or even knowing which 

buildings to collect it for, might prove overwhelming. The challenge of assimilating it 

into an overall analysis of an urban operational area is equally staggering. 

(d) Buildings also conceal other relevant operational data. Interior mobility 

corridors cannot be identified. The condition of the interior can sometimes only be 

surmised; floor and ceiling stability, the possibility of exposed electrical wires or sewage 

pipes, and the amount of debris inside a building are indeterminable. The presence of 

people, both combatant and civilian, is consistently in question. People could be hiding 

inside buildings, basements, or alleyways waiting to ambush a patrol or waiting for that 

same patrol to bring them food. 

(e) Urban construction has received increased attention in Service doctrinal 

materials. FM 2-91.4, Intelligence Support to Urban Operations, FM 3-06, Urban 

Operations, FM 5-33, Terrain Analysis, FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in 

Urban Terrain, and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-35.3, Military 

Operations on Urbanized Terrain, establish procedures for investigating and analyzing 

the impact of building construction on the employment of forces within an urban area. 

These manuals describe how to assess the layout of a city, how to analyze the structural 

characteristics of most buildings, how to deploy and maneuver the appropriate weapons 

based on these structural characteristics, and how to perform a variety of tactical actions 

such as clearing a room and breaching walls. 

b. History. Historic considerations that impact on the operational environment may 

include but are not limited to: past wars and military conflicts; territorial claims and 

disputes; and ethnic, religious, or social strife. Cities may contain areas and structures of 

historical significance. 

II-14 JP 3-06 
Understanding the Urban Operational Environment 

c. Urban patterns and rhythms. Urban areas exhibit patterns that vary both along 

physical and temporal lines. Discerning these patterns and changes provide insight to 

social, economic, and other variables. Determining what are normal and abnormal 

patterns can assist in developing assessment measures. Movement, compressed in space 

and time, is a normal state of a city, some of whose most important functions entail the 

sustainment and movement of people, goods, and information. No city can be said to 

operate at constant velocities, but anyone knows that certain cities have certain rhythms, 

peculiar to themselves—the most obvious example being their rush hours and early 

morning cart and truck convoys with goods for the market. These rhythms can be 

managed—indeed, they are managed all the time—and they can be disrupted as well. 

Some of these rhythms are critical to maintaining the optimum space-time distributions to 

which the city has become accustomed. Because these rhythms affect more or less every 

inhabitant (even if the person is not going anywhere), and because they can be 

manipulated rather easily, they are militarily significant. 

(1) Physical patterns such as market locations and travel routes may provide 

information regarding security issues and the functioning of other systems. 

(2) Urban areas have their own unique calendar with daily, weekly, monthly, 

seasonal, and yearly rhythms. Holidays, festivals, sports, and other events, or their 

unexpected cancelations may also provide relevant information. 

d. Climate and weather. Cities are generally warmer than their surrounding areas; 

however, at night some portions may cool more quickly than others, so wide temperature 

variation can occur. Cities may contain heat islands where the daytime temperature may 

be significantly higher than adjacent areas. Storms and heavy rains may cause flooding 

and disrupt the infrastructure. 

e. Water. Urbanization deprives surrounding areas of water. Instead of sinking into 

the ground, rain is collected, piped to the city, used, treated, and then discarded. In some 

regions, water levels in local aquifers are declining rapidly because the water that once 

replenished them now is lost. 

II-15 
Chapter II 

II-16 JP 3-06 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER III 

PLANNING 

III-1 

1. General 

a. Planning for operations that will be conducted in urban environments generally 

follows the same basic process as planning for operations in other environments. The 

challenges inherent in operating in an urban area are sufficiently different and complex 

requiring commanders and their staffs to give due consideration to the unique 

requirements of the urban environment. The essential problem is how to operate in an 

urban environment to defeat adversaries embedded and diffused within populated urban 

areas without causing catastrophic damage to the existing, functioning society. 

b. Operations in urban areas should not be contemplated without an awareness of the 

characteristics of the area and the lessons derived from past operations. 

c. If a major JUO is undertaken as part of a larger campaign, then plans should 

address the difficult balance, synchronization, and integration between the JUO and the 

rest of the campaign — including differences in force requirements, tempo of operations, 

types and quantity of fires and munitions, types and amounts of logistic support, civilmilitary operations (CMO) requirements, consequence management (CM), SC, and many 

other areas. Whether a JUO is conducted as a major operation during a phase of a 

campaign or throughout the entire campaign, planning must give appropriate weight to 

considerations of civilians, infrastructure, the cultural and political situation, 

demographics, and other urban characteristics that may affect the outcome of the 

operation. 

d. Homeland defense and civil support conducted in an urban environment will be 

especially demanding in both planning and execution. 

Refer to JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, and JP 3-28, Civil Support, for additional 

information. 

2. The Strategic and Operational Context 

a. General. The strategic and operational context of operations conducted in urban 

environments is multifaceted to include the integration of government policies as well as 

the execution of tactical level tasks. Events at the tactical level may (because of media 

“Once General Rich Natonski [MajGen Richard F.], the 1st Marine Division 

Commander, and his staff did their troop-to-task analysis, they asked me for 

additional forces. So we brought together an operational planning team and 

worked out a holistic plan to cover ground combat, aviation and combat 

support, to include operations in Phase IV [after major combat operations], 

and the forces we’d need to execute the plan. The planning started about a 

month out...” 

Lieutenant General John F. Sattler, US Marine Corps 

Commander, Marine Forces Central Command 

Second Battle of Fallujah, 2004 
Chapter III 

coverage, effects on civilians, or other reasons) have significant ramifications at the 

operational or even strategic levels. Often, the decision whether or not to conduct 

operations in urban environments is itself a strategic one, taken to control, dominate, or 

otherwise accomplish objectives in a strategically significant area. Such a decision may 

also occur at the operational level of war, as part of an operation or campaign plan. As 

recent history indicates, JUOs will likely have implications at all levels of war. 

b. The Strategic Context

(1) The decision to conduct a combat operation within an urban area must have 

a specific tie to the overall end state. Major urban areas are frequently the locations for 

the airports, harbors, and major road junctions that may be vital for the sustainment of a 

campaign or operation. From a broader perspective, the JFC must take into account 

aspects of all the instruments of national power when considering undertaking military 

actions within the urban confines. 

(2) Military efforts in urban areas are only effective when integrated into a 

comprehensive strategy employing all instruments of national power. A successful JUO 

will not only accomplish eradication of adversaries, but also will consider the needs of 

the population and government within the urban structure. Political, social, information, 

and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations 

in addressing the root causes of conflict and undermining an adversary. 

STALINGRAD — THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT 

In the summer of 1942, the Germans launched a strategic offensive in 

southern Russia. The ultimate goal of this offensive was the valuable 

oil fields of the Caucasus. Capture of the city of Stalingrad would 

anchor the German defense and simultaneously interdict the critical 

flow of supplies from the Caspian Sea via the Volga River into central 

Russia. Stalingrad, by virtue of its name, also had important political 

and cultural value to the Germans and Soviets. 

The opening phases of the German offensive were very successful: 

German forces — the 6th Army and 4th Panzer Army — entered the 

outskirts of Stalingrad in late August 1942. By late September, after a 

month of intense fighting, the Germans possessed 90 percent of the 

city. The Soviet 62nd Army’s defense was reduced to a front only a few 

hundred meters deep and a couple of kilometers long on the banks of 

the Volga. The Soviet defense hinged on fortress-like concrete 

industrial buildings and the fanatical bravery and tenacity of Soviet 

soldiers and civilians fighting within the remnants of the city. 

Regiments and divisions fought for a few square blocks or even single 

factories. Some were swallowed whole by the intense fighting, 

suffering nearly 100% casualties. Beginning in mid-September the 

Soviet command began looking at how to convert the defense of 

Stalingrad into an operational opportunity. Throughout October and 

November, the 62nd Army held on to its toehold in Stalingrad. 

III-2 JP 3-06 
Planning 

While maintaining the defense of Stalingrad, the Soviets secretly began 

to build up strength on both flanks of the German 6th Army. Powerful 

German divisions were moved into the city and rotated with German 

divisions that were largely exhausted by urban combat. 

On 19 November, the Soviets launched a counteroffensive that attacked 

two Romanian Armies with seven Russian Armies. Simultaneously an 

eighth Russian Army attacked to aid the 62nd Army in further fixing the 

Germans in Stalingrad. Within five days the Soviet encirclement of the 

German 6th Army in Stalingrad was complete, due to the German high 

command’s refusal to allow it to withdraw. On 12 December, the 

German LVII Panzer Corps launched an offensive north to break 

through to Stalingrad. This offensive made progress until another 

Soviet Offensive on 16 December forced its cancellation. This ended 

any hope of recovering Stalingrad and the 6th Army. On 31 January 

1943, the 6th Army surrendered after sustaining losses of almost twothirds of its strength. The Soviets took over 100,000 prisoners. 

Numerous lessons emerge from the successful defense of Stalingrad, 

but foremost among them are the strategic and operational 

ramifications of the battle. The entanglement of the German forces at 

Stalingrad bought time for the Soviets to mobilize their own forces and 

launch a powerful counteroffensive. Operationally, the Germans’ 

tactical failure resulted in the destruction of the 6th Army, over 300,000 

men. The strategic consequences were even more devastating to the 

Germans: the drive toward the Caucasus was halted and the oil fields 

given up; German armies to the south withdrew northward to resist the 

Soviet offensive; Hitler made major changes in his General Staff and 

distanced himself from his military leadership; and the confidence of 

the German Army and the German people was shaken. 

SOURCE: William Craig, Enemy at the Gates: 

The Battle for Stalingrad, 1973 

c. The Operational Context

(1) At the operational level, JFCs plan, conduct, and sustain campaigns and 

major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other operational 

areas. The requirements and nature of JUOs will make unified action more difficult and 

complex, and present the JFC with significant challenges in the practice of operational art 

and operational design. 

(2) Because of their physical and human complexity, operations in urban areas 

tend to be extremely demanding in terms of time, manpower, and certain types of 

information, equipment, and supplies. Physical and mental drain and the high probability 

of casualties are realities that must be incorporated into the JFC's plan. The 

synchronization and integration of time, space, and purpose thus becomes more difficult. 

Commanders must carefully analyze urban areas in relation to the overall campaign or 

III-3 
Chapter III 

operation and determine how best to synchronize and integrate operations while 

preventing urban areas from disrupting the tempo of operations or diverting attention 

from the accomplishment of higher priority operational objectives. 

d. Mission Analysis. The primary purpose of mission analysis is to understand the 

problem and purpose of the operation and issue appropriate guidance to drive the rest of 

the planning process. This involves appreciating each key element of the urban 

environment as a distinctive system in its own right. Critically, this means appreciating 

each adversary as a dynamic system as to the basis for defeating it as effectively and 

efficiently as possible. Different adversaries will require different approaches, as will 

different elements within the same adversary system. Some could be co-opted, others 

marginalized or effectively isolated, while some may have to be physically destroyed. 

Finally, understanding involves analyzing how the adversary interacts with its urban 

environment; in particular, how each element of the adversary subsists off the systems in 

its environment, as a means to understanding how to disassociate the two. 

(1) Developing a comprehensive understanding will routinely need to be a 

collaborative effort involving key stakeholders and subject matter experts from various 

fields, as the type of complex operational problem in a JUO may exceed any one 

organization’s ability to solve, or even comprehend. Operations in urban areas require 

these stakeholders to form a cohesive entity to solve the problem. Assessing the 

operational situation will typically require people to interact across organizations, 

institutions, jurisdictions, languages, and cultures to recognize the dynamics of the 

situation. It will require the extensive sharing of information, including tacit knowledge 

that is a function of expertise and cannot be captured in any database. The requirement 

for functional knowledge about any given urban environment will place a premium on 

subject matter experts. 

(2) During mission analysis, commanders and staffs review their organization 

and available assets. The complexities and demands of operations in urban environments 

will always require a complete understanding of the friendly situation. JUOs require 

unique unit combinations; larger numbers of certain types of assets, units, and equipment; 

and a specific level/type of unit training. The JFC must accurately determine the 

capabilities of friendly forces, to include units’ proficiency in JUOs and the availability 

of specialized equipment. Through all phases of the joint operation, the JFC and staff 

must consider the following questions as a minimum. 

(a) Must the joint force physically enter the urban area? 

(b) What operational objectives must be achieved in urban areas to support 

the overall plan? 

(c) What are the enemy’s centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, and 

decisive points? 

III-4 JP 3-06 
Planning 

(d) What activities and events, and sequencing of these events, are needed 

to achieve operational objectives? 

(e) What resources and application of resources are required to bring about 

and sustain these activities and events? 

(f) What degree, if any, of political and/or military control of the urban area 

is necessary? 

(g) Should the joint force encourage civilians to leave the city, or to remain 

behind? If the civilians leave, planning should be specific, detailed, and include 

designated evacuation routes that will not interfere with joint operations, a final 

destination, and support requirements and plans for their return to the departed areas. If 

they remain behind, efforts should be made to ensure that they are persuaded to at least 

remain neutral. Basic emergency services should be planned for those civilians under the 

JFC’s control. 

(h) What operational limitations would affect the proposed operation? 

(i) Which zones of the city are essential for operational objectives (political 

centers, military assets, economic centers, social/religious centers, service/transportation 

nodes-routes-links, information centers, LOCs, historical sites, etc.) and what are the 

desired results - isolate, neutralize, secure, clear, control, influence, avoid? 

(j) What cultural/historical sites must be preserved and how will that 

impact the operation due to the strategic ramification if damaged or destroyed (e.g., the 

Mosque, Eiffel Tower, Statue of Liberty)? 

e. Civilians influence the operational limitations faced by the joint force. Their 

presence places certain constraints and restraints on the JFC. 

(1) The joint force may be required to take certain actions toward civilians; 

these may include protection, control, support, and influence. 

(a) Protection can take the forms of security against terrorism, law 

enforcement, removal from combat areas, separation of hostile factions, or other actions. 

(b) Control includes control of civil unrest and restoration of order, 

managing civilian movement, and controlling the resources and services on which the 

populace depends. 

(c) Inherent in support are all those aspects of support operations, 

including provision of basic sustenance, health services, and restoration of services, 

designed to relieve conditions caused by man-made or natural disaster or other endemic 

conditions. 

III-5 
Chapter III 

(d) Influence includes those actions taken by the force to foster support for 

US objectives by the civilian populace. 

(2) Restrictions on the joint force can take the form of restrictions on actions in 

regard to civilians or restrictions on operations themselves. The law of war identifies 

those restrictions regarding civilians, and they may be supplemented by specific 

constraints and restraints provided by the President or Secretary of Defense. The 

presence of large numbers of civilians can also affect mobility, fires, and the employment 

of obstacles. 

CIVILIANS — OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE, 1982 

Israeli commanders paid a high price for failure to understand the 

importance of civil affairs. Local Israeli defense force (IDF) 

commanders did not understand the vital importance of civil affairs for 

ongoing urban combat operations. Thus, civil affairs efforts were 

ineffectual. Commanders failed to grasp the immediate combat 

implications or the larger political implications of poor population 

management. Israeli psychological operations convinced 30,000 

noncombatants to flee Tyre and head for beaches outside the city. The 

subsequent inability of the IDF to provide food, water, clothing, shelter, 

and sanitation for these people produced predictable consequences. 

Many tried to return to the city; a process that complicated the 

northward movement of Israeli troops and the delivery of ordnance on 

selected targets in Tyre. IDF commanders compounded these 

oversights by interfering with the efforts of outside relief agencies to 

aid the displaced population of Tyre lest the Palestine liberation 

organization (PLO) benefit in some way. This second civil affairs 

failure created an adverse situation that was quickly exploited by PLO 

psychological warfare specialists. The IDF also failed to educate its 

troops in dealing with Lebanese civilians. Although the Shi’a Muslim 

population of southern Lebanon either initially welcomed or was 

neutral to Israeli presence, it soon became hostile because of the 

behavior of IDF personnel and other factors. 

SOURCE: MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY Urban Warfare 

Study: City Case Studies Compilation 

f. When planning for operations in urban areas, the JFC should consider how 

civilians affect operations and vice versa. These assessments should be part of the joint 

operation planning process and are a distinct and critical aspect. In addition, the impact 

of operations on the civilian populace will likely influence both the commander’s ability 

to conduct operations and the determination of the military end state. Therefore, civilian 

considerations should form a discrete overall planning area. The human dimension is the 

very essence of the urban environment. Understanding a wide variety of local cultural, 

political, social, economic, and religious factors (e.g., racial groups, ethnic groups, 

religious groups, castes and classes, social grievances, unions, associations, schools, 

cultural centers, health and welfare facilities, clans, tribes, moral beliefs, social mores, 

III-6 JP 3-06 
Planning 

norms of behavior, family structure, and affinity groups) is crucial to successful 

operations and becomes central to mission success. The human capital of an urban area 

may be a tremendous resource for the provision of essential services, rebuilding efforts, 

and reconstituting government systems. The JFC should try to leverage and capitalize on 

human resources as well as other resources that may be available. 

(1) The JFC must consider, as part of the overall determination of operational 

objectives, the objectives in regard to civilians. In doing so, the JFC determines the 

desired physical and psychological condition of the civilian populace upon termination of 

hostilities. The commander may then examine civilian considerations through all phases 

of a joint operation. 

(2) Civilians and their actions present operational challenges that influence a 

commander’s decisions and most joint force actions (e.g., psychological operations 

(PSYOP), development of ROE, development of HUMINT sources, CMO, assessing 

humanitarian needs, CA operations, FHA, and population control measures). Prior to 

high-intensity urban battles, PA and PSYOP should focus on influencing civilians to 

leave the prospective operational area or otherwise take actions to minimize their 

exposure to injury. Where PA and PSYOP efforts do not prove sufficiently convincing, 

other enticements need to be considered and offered. 

g. When conducting operations in urban environments, several activities regarding 

the civilian populace must be considered. 

(1) Populace and resources control (PRC) may be of most critical importance 

in operations involving combat, but it can also play a key role in noncombat operations. 

Depending on the location and situation, PRC may be well within the capabilities of the 

joint force, or it may be an overwhelming task that requires many more resources than the 

JFC can bring to bear. 

(2) Health support to civilians is likely to be of vital concern and may require 

significant action by the joint force. 

(3) The joint force may need to provide logistic support to civilians and 

civilian agencies, particularly in the early stages of operations. 

(4) Security issues relating to civilians include protection of the joint force, 

security of the civilian population, and security of civilian agencies. 

(5) FHA operations may require the joint force to plan and conduct activities in 

support of civilians. Although these support activities are primarily the responsibility of 

the HN, that nation may be incapable of providing that support, and the joint force may 

be the only capable support organization for a period of time. It is also highly likely that 

in any situation where support of large numbers of civilians is required, there will be a 

strong presence of IGOs and NGOs also trying to relieve suffering and provide for the 

needs of the civilian populace. The JFC will have to coordinate with those agencies. 

III-7 
Chapter III 

This coordination may best be accomplished through the actions of the respective 

directorate and/or the civil-military operations center (CMOC). 

h. Logistic support requirements are different and often more demanding in 

urban areas. The complexity of the urban environment places unique demands on 

sustainment. Operations in urban areas require a significant increase in ammunition 

expenditure, need for personnel replacements, medical personnel and supplies, casualty 

evacuation, and food and water. Items most likely to be needed on short notice (such as 

certain ammunition types, water, and medical supplies) will need to be prepared for quick 

movement. Vehicles often cannot be evacuated for maintenance. Clothing and 

equipment are damaged at higher rates. During the 1978 siege of Beirut, Syrian forces 

required up to 120 truckloads of artillery ammunition per day. 

i. Like civilians, infrastructure plays a key role in the planning and execution of all 

types of operations that will be conducted in urban areas. The nature of that role can vary 

depending on the type of operation, the operational objectives, even the phase of an 

operation. For example, it may be necessary to protect electrical power facilities during 

foreign internal defense (FID) operations, disrupt them during combat operations, and 

restore electrical power during the transition phase. The commander must determine 

the role and importance of key infrastructure for each phase of the operation and 

for the end state. The role and importance falls into two categories: the impact of 

individual services, facilities, or systems on planned JUOs; and the impact 

operations may have on key infrastructure. In either case, the impact may be either 

direct or indirect — direct, for example, in the disruption of electrical power or the 

restoration of water services; indirect in the damage to buildings of cultural significance 

or the improvement of roadways. 

j. The JFC and his staff, preferably the CMO section, need to perform an analysis of 

the infrastructure to determine the relationship between infrastructure and operations. 

Such an analysis of key facilities will help the commander make certain informed 

decisions, such as: action to be taken in regard to key infrastructure; requirements for 

protection, restoration, and joint usage; and estimate of the likelihood and potential 

effects of collateral damage, both physical and environmental. This analysis must take 

into account all phases of an operation and include considerations for air, land and 

maritime components. The SWEAT [sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash] model 

can provide a framework for analysis. 

k. Key Facility Analysis

(1) Before a key facility analysis is conducted, the commander determines what 

factors make facilities important enough to be considered “key.” These factors may 

include such elements as whether and by whom a facility or service is required, the 

probable effects of its neutralization or use by friendly or adversary forces, and its 

importance to the civilian population. Planners take these factors and examine all 

systems and subsystems of the urban infrastructure, both physical and service, in order to 

III-8 JP 3-06 
Planning 

identify the key facilities. These systems can generally be grouped as one of the 

following: 

(a) Communications and information. 

(b) Transportation and distribution. 

(c) Energy. 

(d) Economics and commerce. 

(e) Administration and human services, which includes law enforcement, 

health and sanitation services, water distribution, and structures of social, political, or 

cultural significance. 

(2) Key facility analysis is a combination of intelligence preparation, the 

targeting process, and staff planning. Its purpose is to examine closely the nature of the 

infrastructure systems and their components. 

(a) Examine each system in terms of its characteristics, organization, and 

capabilities. 

(b) Determine how the system affects the civilian population, how it might 

support or hinder operations, and what potential effects different operational actions 

might have. 

(c) Break the system down into its components. Consider not only the 

components, but also the relationships between them as interactions may be just as 

important as components, and sometimes more so. 

(d) Analyze each facility making up each infrastructure system, using the 

same measures used for the system as a whole. 

(e) Recommend COAs for each key facility, with short and long-term 

potential effects. 

(3) The simplified example of a key facility analysis for the transportation 

system in Figure III-1 illustrates the procedures involved. 

l. Selection, Protection, Restoration, and Joint Usage

(1) Selection. The initial steps in the key facility analysis will identify certain 

infrastructure to be preserved, protected, or to which damage should be minimized. 

These systems and facilities may be selected for several reasons: 

III-9 
Chapter III 

KEY FACILITY ANALYSIS (TRANSPORTATION)

1. The urban transportation system may consist of a port, airfields, 

 rivers/canals, a road network, railways, bridges, and subways.

2. An analysis of bridges will look at them collectively and at each bridge 

 by itself.

3. For each individual bridge, the analyst would complete a two-step 

 procedure:

 Conduct a close examination of the bridge

 Characteristics

 

 Organization

 

 Capabilities

 

 Role as infrastructure

 

 Use by friendly forces

 

 

 Recommend courses of action

 

may include length, width, type, structure make-up, number of spans, 

 information

may include obstacle crossed, route designation, condition of bypasses 

of banks and support structures, safety and

 security features, traffic control, and others

 may consist of maximum load capacity, daily traffic use, effects of weather 

how the bridge functions in the overall transportation system and its role 

 civilian populace

whether and how friendly forces might use the bridge in the future

how the bridge is or may be used to support adversary forces and actions

recommend joint force action toward the bridge and project the effects each 

and on the rest of the urban area’s infrastructure.

 condition, clearances, and other 

 and approaches, condition 

 and climate, and others

 in support of the 

course of action may have on the adversary, on friendly forces, on the civilian 

opulace, 

 Use by adversary forces

 

 p

Figure III-1. Key Facility Analysis (Transportation)

(a) Features of cultural, religious, medical, or other significance whose 

protection is required under the law of war. 

(b) Infrastructure whose destruction would cause hardship for civilians. 

(c) Infrastructure which, for strategic or other reasons, is protected by the 

ROE and 

(d) Infrastructure that the joint force will require for its own use. 

(2) Protection. The JFC has several methods of protecting selected 

infrastructure. The targeting process should recognize these facilities or structures to be 

protected and give careful consideration to potential collateral damage resulting from 

attacks on nearby targets. ROE can include restrictions on actions related to protected 

sites. In order to reduce damage when necessary to attack protected sites, alternative 

methods can be used (e.g., precision guided munitions, weapons restrictions, nonlethal 

capabilities). 

III-10 JP 3-06 
Planning 

(3) Restoration

(a) In the case of certain infrastructure, the JFC will desire to 

minimize damage on an otherwise legitimate target. In this case, the objective will be 

to temporarily disrupt the service that infrastructure provides in order to accomplish 

strategic or operational objectives, but be able to restore that service when desired. 

Planning should therefore include an understanding of the functioning of that 

infrastructure system and what may be required in order to repair or restore it. For 

example, if the JFC decides to disrupt electrical power to an urban area, planners would 

require advice from an engineer familiar with the provision of electrical power to an 

urban area. That engineer would advise planners concerning key parts of the system, 

feasible ways to disable those parts, and the requirements in time and assets required to 

restore the system to operation. The JFC can then take the necessary steps to restore 

usage when appropriate. 

(b) Restoration of infrastructure is not restricted to the repair of facilities or 

systems. It can also consist of the restoration of services such as law enforcement, 

emergency services, or medical services. Restoration of these services may be a lengthy 

process and must be incorporated in the JFC’s CMO, planning. 

(4) Joint Usage

(a) In any ground operations in an urban area, the joint force will use 

existing infrastructure. This usage may be as simple as driving vehicles on city streets, 

the appropriation of an entire system such as an airport, or a complex sharing of many 

infrastructure systems that serve the urban area. Before a decision is made to use existing 

infrastructure, planners must examine its characteristics, functions, availability and 

suitability, and the effects of joint use on operational objectives, including the effects on 

the population. 

(b) Most of the information required to plan joint usage will come from the 

key facility analysis, particularly data concerning characteristics, capabilities, and 

functions. From that data and the needs of the joint force, planners must determine the 

availability and suitability for joint use. When infrastructure is selected for possible joint 

usage, planners should determine the potential effects joint use would likely have on the 

civilian populace, local government, and other infrastructure. Planners then determine 

the impact the availability and suitability of key facilities will have on the 

accomplishment of operational objectives. Finally, the legal advisor should review any 

plans for joint force use of infrastructure for adherence to applicable laws and 

regulations. 

m. Collateral Damage and Environmental Considerations

(1) Coordination of JUOs through the joint targeting coordination board can 

significantly reduce collateral and environmental damage. The objective is to control as 

III-11 
Chapter III 

carefully as possible the effects of operations on infrastructure and the civilian 

populace. 

(a) Key facility analysis can aid in the selection of targets in urban 

infrastructure to ensure that they meet specific objectives. Target analysis and 

weaponeering can determine the potential for collateral and environmental damage 

resulting from attack of a particular target. 

(b) In urban concentrations of people and infrastructure, the potential for 

serious environmental consequences is typically greater than in less populated areas. To 

accurately predict the environmental damage and its consequences that may occur as a 

result of attacks, planners require expert advice in the particular areas concerned. For 

example, an attack on a chemical plant in a predominantly rural area is likely to directly 

affect fewer people in the near-term than if the plant were in an urban area, but the full 

extent of environmental damage may not be understood for years. When assessing key 

facilities that have environmental hazards, careful assessment of not only first order 

effects, but also second and third order effects must be considered. Subject-matter 

experts can predict the effects not only on the target area but also in the surrounding 

areas, to include pollution, spillage, and persistence. 

(2) In the end, analysis of potential collateral and environmental damage must 

be weighed against the importance of the target in achieving operational and strategic 

objectives. In making that determination, the JFC should examine the short- and longterm operational and strategic consequences that any damage might have on the conduct 

of operations, friendly forces, the civilian populace, infrastructure, and public perception. 

3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment 

JIPOE is the analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce 

intelligence estimates and other intelligence products in support of the JFC’s decisionmaking process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the operational 

environment; describing the impact of the operational environment; evaluating the 

adversary; and determining adversary COAs. Using the JIPOE process, the intelligence 

directorate of a joint staff manages the analysis and development of products that provide 

a systems perspective of the increasingly complex and interconnected operational 

environment — the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect 

the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. 

For additional information, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 

Operational Environment, and Appendix A, “Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 

Operational Environment in Urban Areas.” 

4. Operational Art and Operational Design

a. General. With an understanding of the urban environment and application of 

operational art, a JFC can successfully conduct a JUO, even in situations where an 

III-12 JP 3-06 
Planning 

adversary has been able to use the urban environment to achieve a temporary advantage. 

Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. 

For more detailed discussion of operational art and design see JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 

and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

(1) When designing an operation or campaign to deal with adversaries within 

urban environments, the JFC must go beyond the idea of attacking the embedded 

adversary. The entire urban environment must be treated comprehensively, applying 

power to disable hostile elements and enabling those elements that are essential to the 

city’s functioning. 

(2) The reality of the urban environment presents a unique set of circumstances 

and parameters which will significantly influence the approach to operational art. 

Commanders at all levels must fit the execution of short-term operations into a larger 

operational design, and this design must link their near-term actions to the endstate. 

(3) Design, as used within the urban context, seeks shared understanding. It 

seeks to explain the qualitative relationships embedded within the urban environment, 

including the history, dynamics, propensity, and trends. Nevertheless, it recognizes that 

complete knowledge is not achievable, and therefore constantly questions the limits of 

existing knowledge and prevailing public myths or paradigms. JFCs and their staff may 

have difficulty agreeing on the structure of a specific urban environment, but they must 

agree on shared starting assumptions and interpretations of the situation and conditions 

before they can develop proposed solutions. Having shared understanding of the 

OPERATIONAL ART IN RAMADI 

In the past, dealing with complexity was the writ of generals and 

admirals, usually performed by strategic leaders down to the 

commander of a theater of operations in charge of a campaign. Today, 

commanders at much lower levels must master these skills. Consider, 

for instance, the recent experience of Colonel Sean MacFarland, 

commander of 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division. In June 2006, 

Colonel MacFarland was ordered from Tal Afar in northern Iraq to 

Ramadi in the west. “I was given very broad guidance,” he said. “Fix 

Ramadi, but don’t destroy it. Don’t do a Fallujah.” He had to determine 

how to forge relationship with the residents and take the city back from 

insurgents without launching a general assault. It was his 

responsibility to share his understanding of his piece of the overall 

problem with his superiors, not the other way around. He is not the 

only brigade commander who has used operational art. Some of what 

the average battalion commander does today is much more like 

operational art than tactics. Commanders at lower echelons will face 

ill-structured problems like this where the burden of understanding is 

squarely on their shoulders alone. 

SOURCE: Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design 

US Army, 2008 

III-13 
Chapter III 

situation is the core of the discussion in Chapter II, “Understanding the Urban 

Operational Environment.” 

b. Termination. Urban areas have their own underlying political, cultural, and 

religious forces that can affect conditions for termination. Termination requires an 

orderly transition to civilian control, either local or otherwise. During stability operations 

many considerations such as FHA, level and quality of government services, capability of 

indigenous forces, administration, and security will influence the nature and timing of 

transition to civilian control. The complexity of a JUO requires transition planning to be 

an integral part of operational planning and mission analysis. Transferring control of an 

operation is situationally dependent. In JUOs, partial or full transition may occur in one 

part of an urban area while operations continue in another. In crisis response and limited 

contingency operations, quick and efficient transition may be a critical mission objective, 

and thus a fundamental goal is setting the conditions for transition. In all operations, it is 

essential that routine activities such as providing sanitary services, food, law 

enforcement, and health services be returned to civilian agencies as quickly as possible 

because of the demand they can place on joint force resources. An exit strategy is usually 

thought of in terms of military redeployment. However, until the local authorities have 

established a relatively safe and secure environment, law enforcement unit, a judicial 

presence, and a recognized and functioning governmental office with oversight of civilian 

reconstruction efforts, US capabilities (both military and nonmilitary) may continue to be 

required. 

c. End State and Objectives. In general, the end state of operations in urban 

environments is the termination of operations after strategic and operational objectives 

are achieved. This may include the transfer of routine responsibilities over the urban area 

from military to civilian authorities, another military force, or NGOs and IGOs. In each 

case, the JFC must clearly understand the military conditions that will achieve the 

strategic objectives. Another military consideration is the follow-up political exploitation 

of completed military action and the military role in the transition to peace or stability 

operations. This exploitation includes matters such as CMO and FHA, and requires 

planning, liaison, and coordination both at the national level and in theater among 

diplomatic, military, political, NGO, and IGO leadership. 

d. Effects. Joint operation planning uses the design element "effects" to help clarify 

the relationship between objectives and tasks. The use of the design element “effects” in 

conjunction with a systems perspective of the operational environment helps the JFC and 

staff determine the best combination and integration capabilities to accomplish tasks that 

create the right conditions to achieve objectives. For example, in most urban area 

operations the destruction of structures such as churches, medical facilities, and utilities 

will create long-term adverse results because of their importance to the general morale 

and welfare of the populace. (This consideration is in addition to the law of war issues 

with targeting churches and medical facilities.) This situation could hinder the joint 

force's ability to accomplish its mission. Unless the mission and objectives dictate 

otherwise, the JFC could establish a broad desired effect (condition), such as "Basic 

services for the populace remain operational" To support this effect, planners can 

III-14 JP 3-06 
Planning 

establish ROE that restrict the use of destructive capabilities in specific areas. Planners 

also could develop tasks that require joint force components to protect specified facilities 

from enemy action. 

e. Center of Gravity. Crucial to the commander’s ability to organize, arrange, and 

employ forces in JUOs is the accurate identification and analysis of the adversary COG. 

When considering the desired strategic end state, an urban area may be the strategic 

COG. Because major urban areas may house the centers of government, primary means 

of communications, and the hub of national culture, JFCs must determine whether an 

urban area itself is a COG or whether a strategic or operational COG is located within 

that urban area or outside the urban area, but with a strong influence on it. Once JFCs 

identify the COG, they must decide how the capabilities at their disposal can be applied 

in the most effective manner. The population is a critical element to operations in urban 

areas and therefore critical vulnerabilities entailing civil aspects of the operational 

environment, such as health, food, water, and sanitation that JFCs must take into account. 

Since the JFC will base the operation plan largely on this identification, a thorough 

knowledge and understanding of all aspects of the urban area is of great importance. An 

operational COG within the urban area may be physical, psychological, or social. It may 

be adversary forces and capabilities, key infrastructure, the civilian population, 

individual, group, relationship, or other social factor/interaction or aspects of each. The 

JFC must use knowledge and understanding of both the adversary and the urban area to 

identify and then destroy, defeat, or neutralize the COG. The JFC must also anticipate 

and influence those events that may affect the friendly COG, such as public opinion. 

CHECHNYA — IDENTIFYING THE CENTER OF GRAVITY 

False assumptions based on a strategic intelligence assessment 

caused Russian commanders to incorrectly identify the rebel 

leadership as the Chechen strategic center of gravity — the primary 

source of their strength and power. In reality, ethnic nationalism, the 

true center of gravity, ran much deeper than the rebel leadership itself. 

Moreover, the Russians identified rebel leader Dudayev’s personal 

security as a critical vulnerability at the operational level. They 

believed that by removing Dudayev (which they felt was a relatively 

easy task), they could readily put an end to the Chechen separatist 

movement. As an extension of this reasoning, they viewed Grozny, 

Dudayev’s seat of government and the region’s major transportation 

and industrial hub, as a decisive point. Thus, Grozny became the initial 

operational objective. 

SOURCE: Timothy L. Thomas, The Battle of Grozny: 

Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat 

f. Decisive Points. DPs may be geographical, but are not necessarily traditional 

military terrain features, particularly in urban environments. They are not a COG; they 

are the keys to attacking the protected COG. They may be key cultural or political 

locations or locations of key infrastructure. They may also be psychological, such as the 

III-15 
Chapter III 

co-opting of a key tribal leader, avoiding activities which antagonize the population 

(entering religious buildings or sites, defaming historical sites, culturally inappropriate 

interaction with women) in order to undermine the influence of the main adversary 

leader or the molding of public opinion in friendly favor. 

g. Direct Versus Indirect Approach. In considering whether to opt for direct or 

indirect approach of a COG, the JFC needs to understand the nature of the COG and its 

relation to the urban area. 

h. Lines of Operations. As JFCs visualize the design of the operation, they may 

use several lines of operations (LOOs) to help visualize and organize key operational 

elements/themes, which lead toward achieving operational and strategic objectives. 

LOOs define the orientation of the force in time and space or purpose in relation to an 

adversary or objective. Commanders may describe the operation along LOOs that are 

physical, logical, or both. Logical and physical LOOs are not mutually exclusive and 

JFCs often combine them. 

i. Operational Reach and Approach. When considering the distance, direction, 

and duration across which the joint force can successfully employ military capabilities, 

urban areas are often significant aspects of an operation. Operations in urban areas may 

be conducted initially for the seizure of lodgments (e.g., ports, airfields, and railheads) 

that facilitate future operations or the approach of the joint force; they may also be 

conducted to secure LOCs that extend the operational reach of the force. Controlling 

urban areas can have significant impact on operational reach and approach. 

LINES OF OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 

Commanders in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM have used four (i.e., 

security, governance, economic development, communications) or six 

(i.e., security, transition, governance, economics, rule of law, 

communications) lines of operations (LOOs) to orient operations. 

Provincial reconstruction teams used: increase effectiveness of 

legitimate authorities, decrease effectiveness of illegitimate entities, 

increase legitimacy of legitimate authorities, and decrease legitimacy 

of illegitimate entities as LOOs. 

Various Sources 

j. Simultaneity and Depth. The increase in time required to conduct operations in 

urban environments, the presence of civilians, and the constriction of the urban 

operational environment affect simultaneity and depth. Simultaneity will mean not 

only the conduct of combat operations against an adversary, but also the simultaneous 

conduct of stability operations. Depth in JUOs can extend outside the actual urban area 

or be measured in a matter of city blocks. 

k. Timing and tempo are potentially the factors most affected by the urban 

environment. The nature of the terrain, difficulties in communication, and the presence 

III-16 JP 3-06 
Planning 

of civilians slows down the actions of land forces. Operational limitations intended to 

protect civilians and infrastructure may inhibit and/or delay joint operations. Slowing 

down the pace of operations and buying time are often priorities of the urban defender. 

More time may lead to more casualties and a greater chance of an intervening event 

influencing strategic objectives. The JFC must recognize that the speed of operations in 

urban areas, particularly ground operations, will probably be slower than that of other 

operations, but the operational tempo may be very high. The JFC must still achieve a 

synchronization and integration of timing and tempo that leaves the opponent unable to 

act effectively. The tempo with which the commander can react to events, take action, 

and maneuver the force is key to success in JUOs. When operations in urban areas are 

part of a larger campaign, the high operational temp of these operations may be 

conducted at very different tempos and timings, from operations conducted outside the 

urban area, making overall synchronization and integration difficult. 

l. Forces and Functions. Defeating enemy forces and disrupting enemy functions 

that may be deeply entwined in the area’s infrastructure is a considerable challenge for 

the JFC who must do so without causing unacceptable civilian suffering. To this end, the 

ability to take precise action is critical, whether that entails fires using precision 

munitions, direct action (DA) against specific targets, creating nonlethal effects on 

selected infrastructure, or some other type of action. 

m. Leverage. Isolation of the urban area is critical to achieving leverage; therefore, 

US forces frequently use technological superiority to achieve leverage. However, the 

advantages afforded by technological superiority may be different in urban environments 

compared to other operational environments. Advanced sensors, and chemical and 

biological defense technologies that include medical prophylaxis and treatments, will 

enable the JFC to minimize casualties in an urban environment. Activities such as PA, 

IO, and CMO can also provide a force with greater leverage in operations conducted 

urban environments. Operations that lead to physical, informational, and moral isolation 

have a major impact on the ultimate success of JUOs. At the operational level, isolate 

means cutting the adversary off from the functions necessary to be effective and denying 

access to capabilities that enable the exercise of coercion, influence, potential advantage, 

and freedom of action. Isolation has both an external aspect of cutting off outside support 

and information and an internal aspect of cutting off mutual support. Isolating the 

adversary also includes precluding any retreat. 

(1) Isolation cannot be complete and indiscriminate, nor is it simply a matter of 

geographically surrounding an urban area with blocking positions or checkpoints 

(although it certainly may include that). Isolation attempts to close the openness of the 

urban environment with respect to support for the adversary—to choke off adversary 

growth from the outside so that joint operations are dealing with a fixed problem rather 

than one that continues to develop. 

(2) Isolation involves identifying and controlling the most important ingress 

points into the urban area (and adapting as the adversary finds different routes). The 

level of granularity required in isolating an urban area will depend on the nature of the 

III-17 
Chapter III 

threat. In the case of a conventional adversary, it may require detecting and intercepting 

combat formations, while with an irregular adversary it may require intercepting 

individual persons, civilian vehicles, or shipments. Isolation could involve the use of a 

wide variety of detection technologies and techniques (e.g., biometrics), especially those 

that can detect hostile persons, materiel, or information attempting to blend in with the 

general flow of the urban environment. 

(3) Physical isolation involves interdicting the movement of units, persons, 

weapons, supplies, funds, contraband, and other shipments into the urban area. The 

physical isolation of a large urban area clearly has ground, air, space, and likely maritime 

implications for the identification and control of the movement of personnel and 

equipment. The capabilities provided by space-based C2, communications, and 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support systems may also be used to 

isolate urban areas. Physical isolation may not be limited to terrain. Isolation via denial 

of resources (e.g., power, water, food, ammunition, foreign support) may also be feasible. 

(4) While physical isolation is very difficult, this is only one aspect of a larger 

issue. The JFC may also isolate the urban area in terms of information. Informational 

isolation involves interrupting hostile military, political, ideological, and financial or 

media communications. The JFC should have the capability to achieve and sustain 

information superiority over adversaries and potential adversaries. Information going 

into and out of the urban area should be under the control of the JFC as quickly and to the 

maximum extent possible. The joint force may not only cut off internal and external 

adversary communications, but may also control indigenous radio, television, and other 

media. One method to influence the information flow into and out of an urban area is to 

separate the adversary C2 system from its operational and strategic leadership. 

Informational isolation also can prevent the adversary from communicating with the civil 

population through television, radio, telephone, and computer systems. The overall result 

is to prevent adversary unity of effort within the urban area. 

(5) Moral isolation is a function of both actions and the reaction by the larger 

community (e.g., other states, civilian populations) and can both deny the adversary 

political and military allies and separate the political leadership from the civilian 

populace. Moral isolation occurs when a force or individual violates rules of behavior 

they are expected to uphold (standards of conduct) and that violation is noticed and not 

forgiven by the larger community. The presence of legitimate international news 

organizations places special importance on the JFC’s PA operations. The JFC’s goals are 

thus to physically and psychologically isolate the adversary force and to ensure that the 

civilians in the area receive the JFC’s messages and reject any messages from the 

adversary force. Similarly, joint force PSYOP may leverage the violations or moral 

isolation to influence adversary forces or decision makers. 

n. Balance is more difficult to achieve, and may require combining forces and 

capabilities in ways outside the normal organization of forces. 

III-18 JP 3-06 
Planning 

o. Anticipation is just as important as planning, but the information required to 

correctly anticipate events is more difficult to obtain. HUMINT and an understanding of 

the social and political fabric of the area may outweigh technical means of gathering 

information. 

p. Synergy becomes more complicated, requiring the synchronization and 

integration not only of military forces both inside and outside the urban area, but also of 

civilian agencies and organizations both local and international. 

q. Culmination. The nature of JUOs requires careful consideration of culmination. 

The severe drain that JUOs can have on resources can cause either attacker or defender to 

exhaust capabilities earlier than anticipated. This may lead to an early culmination both 

on the operational and strategic levels. 

r. Arrangement of Operations. JFCs must determine the best arrangement of 

operations to achieve full-spectrum superiority. This arrangement will often be a 

combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to dominate and achieve the 

desired end state conditions. Commanders consider such factors as geography of the 

operational area, logistic buildup and consumption rates, adversary reinforcement 

capabilities, and public opinion. These factors are often intensified in JUOs and can 

significantly affect considerations for arrangement. Operational pauses may be required 

when a major operation may be reaching the end of its sustainability. In JUOs, the 

planning for branches and sequels should consider the potential effects not only of 

adversary action, but also of such events as political changes, public reaction to press 

reports, suffering among civilians, damage to infrastructure or culturally important 

structures, and breakdown of order. How well planners can anticipate and plan for 

branches and sequels may in large part determine how closely the JFC attains the desired 

end state. 

5. Phasing 

a. General. Arranging operations is an element of operational design, and phasing 

is a key aspect of this element. Phasing is a useful tool for any type of operation, from 

those that require large-scale combat to operations such as FHA, NEO, and 

peacekeeping. JUOs can normally be divided into phases to logically organize a 

campaign’s or operation’s diverse, extended, and dispersed activities. The primary 

benefit of phasing is that it assists commanders in systematically achieving objectives 

that cannot be achieved concurrently by arranging smaller, related operations in a logical 

sequence. 

(1) Although the commander will determine the number and actual phases used 

during a JUO, the use of the six phases – shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, 

enable civil authority – provides a flexible model to arrange operations. Within the 

context of the phases established by a higher-level JFC, subordinate JFCs and component 

commanders may establish additional phases that fit their CONOPS. For example, the 

joint force land component commander (JFLCC) or a subordinate JTF might have the 

III-19 
Chapter III 

following four phases inside the combatant commander’s (CCDR’s) seize initiative 

phase: deploy, forcible entry, defense, and offense. The JFLCC could use the offense 

sub-phase as a transition to the CCDR’s dominate phase. 

(2) Operations in a single phase are unlikely to prove decisive in a JUO. 

Defeating a traditional military force in the dominance phase may not achieve strategic 

objectives and the desired end state until actions in the stabilization and enable civil 

authority phases are complete. Backward planning from enable civil authority is critical 

in this regard. 

See JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, for a more detailed discussion of the use of phasing 

in planning. 

b. Considerations for Shaping, Deterrence, and Seizing the Initiative in Urban 

Areas. Considerations for shaping, deterrence, and seizing the initiative in urban areas 

will only differ slightly from those of military operations conducted in other 

environments. The JIPOE products for specific urban areas will identify specific 

considerations that will apply.

c. Considerations for Dominance in Urban Areas. In combat operations, success 

requires full spectrum superiority of the operational environment through the seizure, 

disruption, control, or destruction of the adversary’s critical factors, to include the 

operational and strategic COG. In JUOs, these may include tangible components of the 

infrastructure such as power grids, communications centers, transportation hubs, or basic 

services. They may also be intangible socioeconomic or political factors such as 

financial centers and capabilities, particular demographic groups and sites, and cultural 

sensitivities. Offensive operations may also mean controlling key terrain or 

infrastructure, disrupting the adversary’s decision cycle, cutting or controlling intercity 

and intracity mobility and communications, triggering an adversary response, or 

positioning forces to conduct another phase. Defensive operations focus on denying the 

adversary control of those same DPs and the COG. The goal is not just movement to 

positions inside a city. The goal is to apply strength against the adversary’s weakness, 

using tempo as a weapon to shatter adversary cohesion, organization, command, and 

psychological balance. Similarly, joint forces must learn to organize and integrate 

ground, maritime, air, and special operations combat power in the city, and to design and 

execute the sustainment schemes, including the use of precision aerial delivery, that build 

and maintain tempo. Both offensive and defensive operations in urban environments will 

probably entail heavy use of IO, PA, and CMO. 

d. Considerations for Stabilization in Urban Areas. The focus of stabilization in 

an urban area is an ongoing process of organizing and strengthening the joint force 

position with respect to the urban area, combined with controlling the adversary within it. 

Stabilization also requires activities geared at neutralizing bypassed adversary forces and 

processing adversary prisoners. 

III-20 JP 3-06 
Planning 

(1) Stabilization may place heavy emphasis on logistic support and CMO. The 

nature of the urban environment ensures that the JFC will have to contend with issues 

concerning physical damage, civilians, and infrastructure as part of stabilization. CA 

units and other units conducting CMO may continue to be especially critical in this 

aspect, as well as engineering efforts ranging from destruction to repairs to new 

construction. Equally important are the expected issues of infrastructure collapse and the 

tasks of FHA and disaster relief. The rapid restoration of essential services to the 

population is critical to the stabilization effort. JFCs should ensure that sufficient 

resources are allocated to this effort. 

(2) CMO Planning Considerations

(a) CMO planning must carefully consider the nature of the urban area and 

the specific operation to be conducted. For example, if the JFC considers administrative, 

logistic, and communications interoperability support requirements, additional 

requirements necessitated by the urban area must be considered by the JFC, both for 

CMO support and for support of other aspects of the operation. Where CMO is the 

primary focus of the operation, the JFC may wish to establish a joint CMO task force. 

(b) CMO planners should carefully consider those aspects of the urban area 

— terrain, human, and infrastructure — that may impact CMO, in addition to potential 

human or environmental threats. Some of these planning factors include legal 

implications, communications, culture, education, economic, religious, labor, health, and 

administrative considerations. Since these factors are also key items of intelligence 

planning, CMO planning should be closely coordinated with intelligence efforts. 

e. Considerations for Enabling Civil Authority for Urban Areas. Considerations 

for enabling civil authority for urban areas is the same as for other areas and will only 

differ based on specifics of the urban area involved. 

6. Range of Military Operations 

a. Operations across the entire range of military operations can take place in urban 

environments. These operations may occur as a standalone operation, sequentially, or 

more probably simultaneously. 

 b. Simultaneous Operations. The nature of the urban environment often requires 

different types of operations to occur simultaneously or in rapid sequence, sometimes in 

close proximity. A situation can easily arise where members of the same friendly unit 

may at one moment be feeding and clothing dislocated civilians, at the next holding two 

warring tribes apart, and the next fighting a highly lethal battle — all within the same 

urban area. In a larger context, the joint force may have to conduct FHA and other 

operations at the same time and in the same area where combat operations are taking 

place. Such action may not wait for the stabilize and enable civil authority phases, but 

may be an integral part of the overall operation. Urban combat will bring with it 

requirements normally associated with noncombat crisis response and limited 

III-21 
Chapter III 

contingency operations. Further, crisis response and limited contingency operations may 

very well entail urban combat (e.g., In Somalia in the early 1990s, a humanitarian 

operation ended in urban combat). 

7. Other Operation Considerations for Urban Areas 

a. Special Operations

(1) General 

(a) Special operations forces (SOF) give the JFC the flexibility to tailor a 

response to meet a wide range of potential urban requirements. Unique SOF capabilities 

can support the JFC’s campaign by identifying and destroying designated targets, seizing 

key terrain or facilities in denied areas, securing or capturing key personnel, countering 

insurgencies with and through indigenous forces, or conducting unconventional warfare 

(UW) in an adversary-held urban area. SOF can emplace sensors, provide clandestine 

intelligence collection, and provide target acquisition information in the highly restricted 

terrain of the urban environment. In these ways, SOF can achieve results not always 

attainable with the application of a larger conventional force. SOF can enhance the JFC’s 

unity of effort by providing trained, culturally aware, language proficient, military liaison 

personnel with communications connectivity that can offer the commander a conduit to 

multinational forces operating under the JFC or in concert with the operation. The dayto-day regional access SOF maintains provides the JFC accurate information and area 

assessments to enhance situational awareness. 

(b) Although the complexities of the urban environment change the way 

missions are conducted, SOF can perform their nine core tasks in an urban environment 

unilaterally and in conjunction with conventional forces. These core tasks categorize 

potential SOF operations conducted throughout the range of military operations. 

For further information, refer to US Special Operations Command Publication, 3-33, 

Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability 

Handbook and Checklist. 

(2) Special Operations Considerations in Urban Environments

(a) The ability of language-proficient, culturally astute SOF to blend into 

the local population facilitates their ability to traverse the urban area more readily than 

conventional forces. SOF can gain timely and first-hand knowledge of the urban terrain 

difficult to obtain from imagery or overhead observation, and their ability to position 

themselves to observe key targets in detail facilitates precision actions against those 

targets. In doing so, SOF offers a critical surveillance and intelligence source, a reliable 

form of HUMINT. 

(b) Direct Action (DA). The ability to penetrate denied areas in all 

weather, day or night, and to precisely strike a designated target with minimal collateral 

III-22 JP 3-06 
Planning 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN PANAMA, 1989 

Special operations forces (SOF) were involved in Panama throughout 

the entire campaign, and included Army Special Forces, Army Rangers, 

Army Special Operations Aviation, Naval Special Warfare, and Air 

Force Special Operations Forces. SOF participated in almost every 

action during Operation JUST CAUSE including infiltration, special 

reconnaissance, precision strike, and underwater demolition. These 

small, highly skilled units conducted attacks, often supported by AC130 gunships, and were able to penetrate densely populated 

operational areas successfully as quick reaction forces. Before the 

airborne landing, SOF helped to prepare the battlefield and then 

reinforced the main effort once the airborne attack was over. Other 

uses of SOF included the attachment of psychological operations and 

civil affairs personnel to various task force units to serve as advisors, 

translators, liaisons, and assist in refugee control. This proved highly 

effective and aided in reestablishing law and order, promoting stability, 

and assisting in the establishment of a new Panamanian government. 

SOF capabilities can be force multipliers in the multifaceted urban 

environment. 

SOURCE: Joint Military Operations Historical Collection

damage using a small highly trained tailored force can achieve significant strategic- or 

operational-level results. In the urban environment, this precision strike capability is 

invaluable when the desire is to limit collateral damage and civilian casualties. A number 

of DA missions may be performed in urban areas such as raids, ambushes, direct assault, 

and terminal guidance. 

(c) Special Reconnaissance (SR). In the condensed urban environment, it 

is often difficult to gain accurate observation and surveillance through technological 

means. SOF can provide visual observation to obtain or verify information and can place 

sensors by hand in key locations. SOF can provide a form of HUMINT to supplement 

other sources of information. SR missions that may support operations in urban areas 

include environmental reconnaissance, armed reconnaissance, target and threat 

assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance. 

(d) Foreign Internal Defense (FID). SOF support or conduct 

counterinsurgency operations with indigenous forces, as part of FID, can provide the JFC 

a tool for consolidation and transition of operations, and also to combat an urban 

insurgency without the use of large scale, visible conventional force involvement. 

(e) Unconventional Warfare (UW). SOF conducting UW operations 

provide the JFC the capability to use indigenous surrogates to accomplish some or all of 

his objectives. This capability ranges from conducting small unit offensive and defensive 

operations to providing up-to-date intelligence on adversary activities inside the urban 

milieu. This capability may be particularly useful for operations that US or the HN 

forces would be poorly suited to due to security or logistical considerations. When using 

III-23 
Chapter III 

indigenous surrogates the JFC must clearly understand that the limitations and 

capabilities of different forces varies significantly. 

(f) Counterterrorism. CT consists of actions taken directly against 

terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global environments inhospitable 

to terrorist networks. SOF’s activities within CT include, but are not limited to, 

intelligence operations, attacks against terrorist networks and infrastructures, hostage 

rescue, recovery of sensitive material from terrorist organizations, and activities aimed at 

the ideologies or motivations that spawn terrorism. 

For further information on CT, refer to JP 3-26, Counterterrorism. 

(g) Counterproliferation (CP) of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

(WMD). CP refers to actions (including WMD offensive operations, WMD interdiction, 

WMD elimination, WMD active defense, and chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear [CBRN] passive defense) taken to defeat the threat or use of WMD against the 

US, our forces, friends, and allies. These actions may call for seizing, destroying, 

rendering safe, capturing, or recovering WMD. SOF provide capabilities to conduct or 

support DA, surveillance, CT, and IO missions to deter or prevent the acquisition or use 

of WMD and operate against the threats posed by WMD and their delivery means. 

Terrorism is widely practiced against existing governments, civilian populations, and US 

forces abroad. There have already been limited attacks using CBRN elements as a means 

of urban terror and the likelihood is great that there will be other attempts. SOF may be 

the best means available — perhaps the only suitable means — to take appropriate action 

to prevent the use of WMD in an urban area. 

(h) Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). CAO are those military operations 

that enhance the relations between military forces, governmental organizations and 

authorities, NGOs, IGOs, indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), and the private 

sector within the urban environment. CAO are performed or supported by CA and 

embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in urban areas and 

involve application of CA functional areas in functional specialties normally the 

responsibility of civilian government. In urban areas, these include PRC, FHA, and 

emergency services. All CAO support CMO. 

(i) Psychological Operations. PSYOP influence the emotions, motives, 

objective reasoning, and behavior of the government, organizations, groups, and 

individuals in the urban area. One of the most effective weapons available to the JFC, 

particularly in urban areas, PSYOP can positively dispose local officials and civilians 

toward the joint force objectives. It can also reduce the morale and effectiveness of 

enemies and political adversaries by creating dissidence and disaffection, encouraging 

defections, promoting resistance, and reducing support among the civilian population. In 

the urban environment, the task for PSYOP to get out the JFC’s approved message is 

enhanced by the large number of communication devices available to urban residents 

(cellular phones, facsimile machines, computers, newspapers, radios, televisions, and 

others). 

III-24 JP 3-06 
Planning 

(j) Information Operations. The unique capabilities of SOF enable the 

JFC to access, alter, degrade, delay, disrupt, deny, or destroy adversary information 

systems. Special operations missions that support IO may include DA, SR, PSYOP, 

CMO, and FID. 

(k) US forces often participate in operations involving coalitions providing 

forces in a combined military effort. SOF can provide a valuable link in this effort. The 

ability to coordinate and deconflict operations among various multinational components 

within a military operation is critical to successful operations, but even more so in the 

rapidly evolving, close-in, urban fight. 

See JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, and JP 3-05.1, Joint Special 

Operations Task Force Operations, for detailed discussions of special operations.

 b. Foreign Consequence Management 

 (1) Foreign CM in urban areas may include population evacuation, 

decontamination, transportation, communications, public works and engineering, 

firefighting, mass care, resource support, health and medical services, urban search and 

rescue, hazardous materials control, food distribution, and energy provision. Industries 

that work with TIMs near urban centers may need to be secured to avoid unintentional 

release or prevent a terrorist attack. 

 (2) The complex physical urban terrain becomes even more complex in a 

CBRN environment. Buildings and public areas can be contaminated by biological and 

radiological dispersal devices, and in the case of some biological agents carried 

throughout a building by way of the building’s heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 

system, contaminated material, and person-to-person contact. The introduction of 

virulent and highly communicable diseases into an urban environment, with rail, road, 

ship, and air connections with the rest of the country could be a major catastrophe. 

Subways and interior spaces offer ideal areas for limited chemical or biological attacks. 

Nuclear attacks can produce catastrophic results due to the effects of collapsing 

structures, flying debris, and fires. The urban terrain can hinder rescue and relief efforts, 

either because of destruction or simply because of urban complexities, and significant 

engineering efforts may be required as part of CBRN response. 

 (3) A CBRN incident can cause the population to panic requiring civilian 

authorities to restore order as well as provide relief services. Sizable numbers of 

dislocated civilians can clog the transportation system and overload support capabilities. 

The size and nature of the event, the capabilities of the HN, and the effects on the civilian 

population will have an influence on the type and amount of response a joint force will 

provide. 

 (4) Infrastructure also affects the CBRN response requirements. An event 

involving physical destruction may affect medical services, sanitation, power, 

III-25 
Chapter III 

III-26 JP 3-06 

communications, and law enforcement. Even if physical damage is limited, casualties 

and displacement of civilians may overload local and regional capabilities, particularly in 

less developed nations. The HN and local government capabilities may only be able to 

provide limited response in only certain areas and none in others. 

 (5) A number of special considerations are important in urban CBRN response. 

Figure III-2 depicts consequence management planning factors. 

 (a) Port and airfield facilities may be affected and therefore unusable or 

operate at a reduced capacity until repaired. 

 (b) Dispersion patterns are affected by the urban terrain and more difficult 

to predict and monitor. 

 (c) C2 is complicated by the nature of the urban area, being in a supporting 

role to DOS and HN civilian authorities, and the likely presence of NGOs. 

 (d) Requirements for decontamination, medical services, and basic life 

support may overwhelm the force’s capabilities, even with augmentation of personnel 

and equipment from the continental United States. 

 (e) Urban areas often include manufacturing plants which may be a source 

of TIMs. These hazardous materials might be used to improvise CBRN weapons for use 

against the joint force or other people in the urban area. 

Refer to JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield 

Explosives Consequence Management, for detailed considerations when the JFC must

conduct CBRN response operations. 

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT PLANNING FACTORS

Scope of the anticipated mission

Anticipated threat during deployment, employment, and redeployment

Estimated reaction time

Physical characteristics of the urban area--size, natural topography, urban 

pattern and construction, and any special characteristics

Demographics and characteristics and situation of the civilian population, 

to include considerations of law enforcement and population control

Political situation in the urban area, region, and nation

Available support from host nation, including infrastructure, equipment, and 

supplies

Figure III-2. Consequence Management Planning Factors 
Planning 

c. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 

(1) FHA consists of DOD activities, normally in support of the United 

States Agency for International Development (USAID) or DOS, to relieve or reduce 

human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. FHA operations are limited in scope 

and duration. Because of the numbers and density of civilians a significant CMO 

(CAO) effort on the part of the joint force may be required. However, the primary 

responsibility for US response to FHA requirements lies within the USAID. 

(2) Most operations in urban areas will have a requirement for FHA. Some 

degree of assistance may be undertaken in concert with combat operations, peacekeeping, 

or other operations whose intent is not the provision of FHA. Because a United Nations 

or US civilian framework may not exist within which the JFC can support FHA, the joint 

force may need to perform immediate-response FHA. 

(3) When assigned an FHA mission in an urban area, the JFC should take into 

consideration the characteristics of the urban area when planning the operation. When 

FHA is not assigned as part of an operation, the JFC should be prepared to conduct FHA 

if directed. These preparations should include the readiness to: 

(a) Assess the nature and extent of humanitarian requirements in the urban 

area, to include available food and water, civilian casualties and loss of life, dislocated 

civilian population and location, status of local government or authority, and degree of 

destruction to property and infrastructure; 

(b) Establish a CMOC to coordinate and facilitate US and multinational 

forces’ humanitarian operations and to coordinate with those of local, HN, NGOs, and 

IGOs involved in relief operations, either from the outset or as civilian agencies become 

involved; and 

(c) Take steps to alleviate the suffering and hardship of the civilian 

population until government agencies, NGOs, or IGOs are on-scene and functioning. 

(4) Urban FHA Considerations 

(a) Particularly during combat operations in urban environments, it may be 

difficult to provide relief for the civilian populace. There may be no agency immediately 

available to accept primary responsibility for FHA. By necessity, the JFC may find that 

the joint force must perform some FHA, and possibly provide extensive support, as well 

as conduct combat operations. 

(b) The urban environment will affect the ability to conduct FHA. The 

same tendency toward fragmentation, hindrances to movement and communications, 

proximity of the press, and security requirements that accompany other types of 

operations conducted in urban areas will also affect urban FHA. 

III-27 
Chapter III 

(c) Interagency coordination is key to successful FHA. Normally, the 

accessibility of urban areas makes it easier for NGOs and IGOs to participate, therefore 

increasing the number of agencies with which the joint force must deal. 

(d) FHA requirements are more concentrated in urban areas, but so are the 

dangers: disease spreads more rapidly, unrest is more concentrated, rivalries are 

exacerbated by close contact, media attention is more pervasive, security is more 

problematic, and the population is significantly denser. 

(5) Populace and Resources Control 

(a) PRC normally assists HN governments or de facto authorities in 

retaining control over their population centers, thus precluding complicating problems 

that may hinder accomplishment of the JFC’s mission. However, civil authorities may be 

either unable or unwilling to undertake responsibility for controlling the civilian 

population, in which case the joint force may have to conduct PRC alone or in 

coordination with civilian agencies. In friendly areas, these operations are conducted with 

the consent of the local government; in hostile territory, PRC is conducted in accordance 

with international law and the law of war. 

(b) Successful PRC mobilizes and provides security for the population and 

material resources of an urban area. It can deny an adversary ready access to the 

population and to both internal and external sources of supply. PRC measures seek to 

reduce, relocate, or access populace and resources that may impede or otherwise threaten 

the success of military and supporting logistic operations. 

(c) Populace control measures normally used in PRC include curfews, 

movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement. Resource 

control measures can include licensing, regulations, checkpoints, ration controls, and 

inspection of facilities. In urban areas, however, the size and density of the civilian 

populace add a number of complications to PRC operations. 

(d) Urban PRC Considerations 

1. The potential magnitude of the PRC task in urban areas cannot be 

overstated. The JFC could be at least partially responsible for the care and control of 

hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of civilians, no matter what the original mission. 

2. With the potential of huge numbers of civilians, urban PRC will be 

difficult to enforce. The standard control measures of passes, permits, and resettlement 

may be beyond the capabilities of the joint force for some time. 

3. The JFC must give great care in the establishment of population 

control measures, depending on the situation and characteristics of that population. 

Inappropriate controls could exacerbate the PRC problem. 

III-28 JP 3-06 
Planning 

4. PRC measures must take into consideration the presence of factions, 

ethnic groups, and criminal organizations that may be hostile to one another or to the 

joint force. Further, these groups may have ways of controlling their members that are 

not readily apparent to the joint force. 

III-29 

POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL OPERATIONS 

— BELFAST, 1921 - Present 

While civilians are always a factor in urban operations, controlling the 

civilian population of Belfast is actually the primary focus of the entire 

operation and is integral to achieving stability. Because the conflict 

does not have distinguishable uniformed combatants, but rather draws 

its combatants from the civilian population, controlling and influencing 

the populace is key to identifying combatants, pre-empting and 

deterring violence, and stemming support for terrorist activities. More 

broadly, although stability can be temporarily created by force, longterm stability is ultimately dependent on changed popular perceptions, 

attitudes, and behavior. The task of controlling the civilian population 

while fighting terrorism has proved challenging for British forces not 

only because “combatants” are difficult to identify, but also because 

overly aggressive enforcement to root out combatants risks the danger 

of provoking the civilian populace toward militancy. Moreover, the 

nature of the mission has required British forces to perform a range of 

“police” functions that are atypical of normal military duties. 

The key to controlling the urban population has been the 

synchronization of military and police responsibilities within the city. 

The nature of stability operations has blurred the line normally present 

between military and police objectives. While the Royal Ulster 

Constabulary (RUC) is the law enforcement agency within Northern 

Ireland, it has evolved into more of a paramilitary force in order to deal 

with the extreme cases of violence in the city. To support the RUC 

properly, British commanders have adapted their military force to 

accomplish both military and police tasks. For example, British forces 

have modified their intelligence units to enable tracking of informants, 

often exploiting typical police tools such as working dogs. Special Air 

Service units have adopted many of the functions of a special weapons 

and tactics team to extract terrorists. More generally, British forces 

have taken on basic policing duties such as street patrolling. 

To accomplish their tasks, the military forces in Northern Ireland have 

been granted special legal and police powers, to include the authority 

to: 

 • Stop and question any person about his identity and 

movements 

 • Stop and search any person for weapons 

 • Arrest without warrant and detain for four hours 
Chapter III 

 • Enter premises and search with only the permission of a 

commissioned officer 

 • Stop vehicles/vessels for search 

 • Control and restrict highways, rights of way, and access to 

buildings 

Exercise of these powers has been instrumental in enabling the 

British forces to assist the RUC in maintaining a stable environment. 

However, in some instances, real or perceived abuses of these 

powers have incited the local populace. The nationalists (and some 

loyalists) have always felt these “special powers” were too broad and 

allowed the soldiers to violate their civil rights. In recognition of 

these sentiments, British commanders have generally been extremely 

careful in monitoring the use of these powers and ensuring that their 

soldiers do not abuse them. The British rules of engagement (ROE) 

have allowed their soldiers to use reasonable force to prevent a crime 

or assist in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders. 

Violations of ROE by British soldiers have been prosecuted under 

United Kingdom law, and the offenders have been punished, although 

too lightly in the eyes of some factions. Despite some criticism, the 

British have been generally successful in exercising control of the 

urban population without provoking popular backlash by their 

presence. In large part, they have done this by adapting to the 

exigencies of the mission and by coordinating extensively with their 

police counterparts. 

The British performance in Belfast provides a model of both interService and inter-agency cooperation. Militarily, the British have 

established a solid chain of command based on regional areas in 

which all members of the armed forces are subordinate. The 

integration of Regular Army forces with special forces, intelligence, 

and explosive ordnance disposal units has been seamless. The 

British have also done a remarkable job interfacing with the local RUC 

units, and have effectively modified their forces to perform police 

functions. 

SOURCE: Handbook for Joint Urban Operations

 5. The complexities of the physical urban terrain could result in 

fragmentation of effort and difficulty in imposing controls in a consistent manner 

throughout the urban area. Physical aspects of urban terrain can hamper CMO. 

6. Security of civilians could be difficult and require significant 

resources. 

III-30 JP 3-06 
Planning 

7. There is a strong potential for the use of civilians by the adversary. 

This use can range from using them as human shields to fomenting riots to conducting 

terrorist attacks on civilians to influence US policy and actions. 

8. As with any dealings with the civilian population, PRC operations 

require an understanding of the culture. 

9. The objectives of PRC are to move civilians away from combat 

areas or other areas of concern within the city, to centralize them into one or more 

locations, to provide for their basic needs, and to foster cooperation and good will. 

(e) Operations involving dislocated civilians can be a special category

of PRC. In situations of crisis and adversity, whether from war or other cause, people 

converge on urban areas from the surrounding regions, so it is possible that the 

commencement of operations in urban areas will find dislocated civilians already present. 

Urban combat will create many more displaced persons, either through design or as an 

inadvertent result of urban fighting. 

For further guidance on FHA, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

d. Urban Search and Rescue Program (SAR). The US Army Corps of Engineers 

Urban SAR program provides technical and operational support to the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency urban SAR program and other state, local, and 

international urban SAR programs. The US Army Corps of Engineers leads the training 

for structures specialists, and maintains a cadre of structures specialists that are deployed 

as part of incident support team engineering cell, and urban SAR task forces. 

(1) Urban SAR is a dangerous undertaking when conducted in buildings that are 

fully or partially collapsed. Typically, these structures are multi-storied and contain 

heavy debris with a high potential for additional collapse. Engineers trained as structures 

specialists can evaluate a damaged building in order to reduce the risks to rescue 

personnel and victims. Structures specialists design shoring systems to stabilize 

structures for rescuers to gain safe access to the victims. The structures specialists are 

trained in Rescue Systems 1 (a basic rescue skills course), critical incident stress 

awareness and management, and hazardous material awareness. They also receive 

instruction in structural collapse patterns, hazard identification and building monitoring, 

rapid assessment of buildings, building triage and marking systems, and advance shoring 

and shoring calculations. 

(2) The US Army Corps of Engineers structures specialist cadre is an essential 

component of the urban SAR task forces and the incident support team with the ability 

for fast deployment in a life saving mission. The structures specialist brings engineering 

expertise to the urban SAR task force. Responsible for evaluating the immediate 

structural conditions at the incident and recommending the appropriate hazard mitigation, 

the structures specialist serves a vital function to the task force. 

III-31 
Chapter III 

III-32 JP 3-06 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER IV 

JOINT FUNCTIONS

“In Somalia, Lebanon, and Iraq, the enemy also learned that America’s 

vulnerable center of gravity is dead American soldiers. Thus, killing 

Americans has gravitated from merely a means to an end to an end itself, 

and the most efficient killing ground is in cities, where urban clutter allows 

the enemy to hide. Familiar terrain, the presence of supporting populations, 

and a useful infrastructure gives the enemy the advantage of sanctuary in 

the midst of the occupying power, an advantage impossible to achieve in 

open terrain. He can literally hide in plain sight and become 

indistinguishable from the indigenous urban masses that shield, protect, and 

sustain him.” 

Urban Warfare: A Soldier’s View 

Major General Robert H. Scales, US Army, Retired 2005

1. General 

a. Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help 

JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to 

joint operations at all levels of war fall into six basic groups — C2, intelligence, fires, 

movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. A number of subordinate tasks, 

missions, and related capabilities help define each function. Some tasks, missions, and 

capabilities could apply to more than one joint function (e.g., IO capabilities are applied 

across the joint functions and independently). 

b. In any joint operation, the JFC can choose from a wide variety of joint and 

Service capabilities and combine them in various ways to perform joint functions and 

accomplish the mission. This chapter discusses the key considerations related to the 

application of joint functions and their related tasks in an urban environment. 

2. Command and Control 

a. General

(1) The ability of the JFC to influence the outcome of operations conducted in 

urban areas is the result of leadership and the ability to control forces and functions in 

order to execute the intent. C2 is supported a reliable and secure communications 

systems. These systems process and integrate data and information, pass it to where it is 

needed, and display it in a useable format in time to be acted upon. This combination of 

C2 and the tools for its implementation is fundamental to the conduct of modern military 

operations. The nature of the urban environment accentuates the challenges to the JFC, 

and offers significant hindrances to effective C2. 

(2) It is more challenging to understand and shape the operational environment 

in an urban area than in other environments. The key to understanding the urban 

operational environment at all levels is the ability to rapidly collect and disseminate 

information. Urban areas contain a great deal of uncertainty, and since knowledge is a 

IV-1 
Chapter IV 

perishable asset, then speed and precision are necessary to get the right information in the 

right hands as expediently as possible. 

b. Command and Control Considerations in JUOs

(1) The complex physical urban terrain inhibits the performance of some 

technologies supporting C2, including LOS communications and overhead surveillance. 

Subterranean and interior spaces make timely knowledge and understanding of the urban 

operational environment more difficult. Figure IV-1 illustrates these challenges. 

(2) The presence of civilians further complicates C2. The JFC must consider 

the effects of operations on civilians, and their presence in large numbers will require 

great attention to areas such as interagency support, CMO, and PA. 

(3) Existing infrastructure such as transportation and communication systems 

can both facilitate and hinder C2. Service infrastructure such as police, fire, and medical 

services may offer control and intelligence opportunities, but its absence will certainly 

add to the requirements of the joint force. 

(4) As ground operations tend to become decentralized, it is important that 

C2 be flexible, adaptive, and decentralized as well. Essential to decentralized C2 is the 

thorough knowledge and understanding of the commander’s intent at every level of 

command. To further enhance decentralized C2, commanders at all levels should issue 

mission-type orders and use implicit communications wherever possible. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL AND THE URBAN 

ENVIRONMENT

Man-made terrain in urban areas degrades communications capabilities, 

particularly line of sight, over-the-horizon, long-haul, and air-to-ground 

capabilities.

Terrain in urban environments can impede a land force’s ability to send and 

receive data directly to satellites. This can impact global positioning system 

receivers and inhibit their ability to provide accurate data.

Characteristics of urban areas increase the importance of socioeconomic 

(e.g., history, demographics, traditions, and norms) and infrastructure data 

(e.g., water distribution, waste treatment, and power distribution facilities) on 

military operations.

Figure IV-1. Command and Control and the Urban Environment 

IV-2 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

GROZNY — PROBLEMS IN COMMAND AND CONTROL 

Command and control is especially important in a joint urban operation 

when coordination of forces is required to negotiate a complex 

environment. Russian command and control was convoluted, resulting 

in poor synchronization of Russian forces during the 1994-95 battle for 

Grozny. Russian units had no unity of command; command was 

scattered between the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense, 

and the Federal Counterintelligence Service, the successor to the KGB. 

Commanders did not coordinate with Russian units on their flanks. In 

fact, they moved in almost autonomous columns along four main 

routes. The organization and sequencing of force caused many 

command and control problems for Russian troops. For example, 

General Anatoly Kvashin commanded the Main Assault Force that 

entered Grozny from the north. As Kvashin advanced, Chechen rebels 

focused most of their firepower on his force because, unknown to 

Kvashin, the Russian commanders from the east and west gave false 

reports about their whereabouts. It was not until the second day of the 

operation that Kvashin realized that he was fighting in the city without 

the help of Groups East and West. 

On the other side, Chechen mobility and innate knowledge of the city 

exponentially increased their ability to command and control their 

forces. The Chechens generally did not maintain strongholds, but 

remained mobile. Hit and run tactics made it very difficult for the 

Russian force to locate pockets of resistance and impossible to bring 

its overwhelming firepower to bear against the enemy force. Moreover, 

high-rise buildings and structures impeded Russian transmissions, 

especially those in the high frequency and very high and ultra high 

frequency ranges, making it difficult to communicate unit locations. 

The Chechens overcame this problem by using cellular phones and 

commercial scanner systems, which allowed them to communicate 

easily with one another and ensured the coordination of their combat 

operations. 

SOURCE: Timothy L. Thomas, The Battle of Grozny: 

Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat 

(5) The commander’s critical information requirements categories of 

friendly, adversary, and environmental information must also include pertinent 

information concerning the urban environment. Friendly information may include items 

such as anticipated political actions by a HN, the ability of the HN to support civilians, or 

the presence of sufficient precision munitions in the joint force. Although the adversary 

may consist of a traditional armed force, priority intelligence requirements on criminal 

elements, guerrillas, terrorists, and tribal or political factions may be necessary. 

Environmental information requirements may include elements of the urban environment, 

such as the behavior and needs of civilians or the presence or likelihood of disease or 

hunger. 

 IV-3 
Chapter IV 

(6) In JUOs, it is likely that a JOA will be established that will include the 

urban area and sufficient surrounding area for the joint force to achieve its objectives. 

The area of interest should include any area from which influence can be exerted on the 

urban area. Other operational areas may be designated outside or inside the JOA. 

Maneuver and movement control measures must be carefully considered and delineated 

to allow maximum flexibility on the part of subordinate commanders and to prevent 

fratricide.

(7) The joint force headquarters should be organized based on the nature and 

requirements of the operation. The JFC may need to establish cross-functional 

organizations specifically tasked to deal with some aspect of the operation. In particular, 

the JFC coordinates with allies, coalition partners, and OGAs to facilitate cooperation, 

mutual support, and understanding. In urban areas, coordination will include HN 

agencies, local elements, IGOs, and NGOs. The support of these organizations may be 

critical to the accomplishment of strategic and operational objectives. These groups can 

offer the JFC a wealth of information, knowledge, and insight concerning the particular 

urban area, and their cooperation may enhance the JFC’s understanding of the area and 

provide critical assistance in dealing with local groups and the civilian populace. In any 

case, close support and cooperation will foster unified action and the attainment of the 

desired end state. The extensive liaison required during operations in urban areas means 

it is very likely many of these organizations will be represented in the force headquarters 

or liaison with the CMOC. The force may also provide liaison to them, as well as to HN 

agencies such as police or local government, different tribes, clans, or factions, or any 

other of the myriad groups that may be influential in a particular urban area. 

(8) Depending on the type of operation, there will almost certainly be 

operational limitations placed on the JFC in the accomplishment of the strategic and 

operational objectives. In the development of ROE, the President and Secretary of 

Defense will provide guidance based upon input from the JFC and attempt to balance 

constraints, restraints, mission accomplishment, applicable law, and protection of the 

force. Based on experience from recent operations, future adversaries may try to take 

advantage of the fact that US military forces will comply with the law of war. In 

developing ROE, the commander must consider the potential for civilian casualties, 

collateral damage, or friendly casualties to influence the accomplishment of operational 

objectives. See paragraph 7.f, “Legal,” for a discussion of the legal aspects of operations 

in urban areas. 

c. Communications. The nature of the urban environment presents certain 

challenges to C2 and communications. Communications challenges are influenced by 

decentralization, the three-dimensional nature of the urban environment, urban 

hindrances to radio communications, and the existence of an urban communications 

infrastructure. 

See JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, for a full discussion of communications 

considerations. 

IV-4 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

(1) The decentralization inherent in urban ground operations requires the ability 

to communicate quickly outside the normal communications patterns. Due to the 

complexity of urban terrain; maintaining situational awareness and developing a common 

operational picture are very difficult. The communications system must support the joint 

force throughout the entire urban terrain including the exterior and interior, surface and 

subsurface portions. 

(2) Radio communications reliability is degraded in the urban environment by 

the presence of tall buildings, poorly maintained power distribution systems, a noisy 

electromagnetic environment, saturated radio frequency environment, and physical urban 

features that result in radio link obstructions, ducting, scattering, shadowing, and reduced 

radio link ranges. When developing the information management plan, considerations 

must be given to employing more ground-based transceiver nodes; augmenting groundbased systems with airborne relays; or using diverse radio modulation techniques to allow 

frequency spectrum reuse. The need to increase communications transceiver density in 

urban areas adds significantly to the equipment, resupply, and manpower requirements of 

engaged forces. At the very least, the JFC will need to provide a large amount of 

additional equipment to subordinate forces. Existing communications systems in an 

urban area may range from the very sophisticated to the rudimentary. However, all offer 

the possibility of use by the joint force to augment its organic communications capability, 

compensate for shortages, or meet early communications requirements during initial 

deployment. The JFC may be able to make efficient use of existing communications 

infrastructure, from basic telephone lines to video and data transmission. The urban 

environment presents an increased probability of capture of sensitive information. 

Information protection measures should also be considered as part of this infrastructure. 

(3) As the single control agency for the management and operational direction 

of the joint communications network, the joint network operations control center (JNCC) 

must know the requirements of communications in the urban environment, 

especially in the specific operational area. The JNCC must be aware of the capabilities 

present in the urban area, their potential use, and any problems associated with that use. 

Vital to communications management is the need to support planning and execution to 

include information exchange requirements, radio frequency spectrum management and 

allocation, communications equipment dispersion, and continual assessment of 

communications effectiveness. 

d. Space Capabilities for Command and Control

(1) The same urban characteristics that interfere with the ability to communicate 

on the ground can diminish the information derived from space-based systems. 

(2) Space systems may be employed to monitor an urban area before friendly 

forces are established. 

(3) Space systems provide C2 and communications. Considering the 

difficulties in communications in and around urban areas, the C2 capability offers the 

 IV-5 
Chapter IV 

JFC the ability to exchange information inside the urban area, between elements of the 

joint force, and also facilitates intertheater and intratheater communications. Space 

systems may form a critical link in the C2 architecture that rapidly passes data and 

information. 

(4) The space-based Global Positioning System (GPS) provides a critical 

capability during operations in urban areas. GPS can provide position, location, timing, 

and velocity for weapon accuracy, ingress and egress, location, and silent rendezvous 

coordination. 

(5) The ability of space systems to provide terrain information and imagery is 

crucial to the success of land forces. 

See JP 3-14, Space Operations, for a full discussion of space operations. 

e. Risk Management. High-tempo operations may increase the risk of injury and 

death due to mishaps. Asphalt, concrete, and heights cause injuries not normally seen in 

large numbers in other types of terrain. JUOs in general also tend to produce a 

significant number of injuries due to the nature of the terrain — falls from walls or 

windows, vehicular injuries, injuries caused by contact with building walls. Cities pose 

their own safety hazards even in the absence of an enemy. Command interest, discipline, 

risk mitigation measures, and training lessen those risks. The JFC reduces the chance of 

mishap by conducting risk assessments, assigning a safety officer and staff, implementing 

a safety program, and seeking advice from local personnel. Safety considerations could 

include weather, local road conditions and driving habits, uncharted or uncleared mine 

fields, and special equipment hazards. 

f. Public Affairs 

 (1) The density of media representatives in urban areas increases the likelihood 

of formal news media coverage of operations. Those hostile to US intentions may have 

unfettered access to mass media outlets to spread misinformation about operations and, as 

previously noted, much of the population may have the capability to capture and post 

images and information to the internet or send them to the media in near real time. These 

possibilities demand an aggressive public communication effort by the joint force to put 

operational actions into context (before others have the chance to exploit them) or to 

counter erroneous information. PA participation throughout the planning, execution, and 

assessment process is critical to ensure that the public implication of operation plans are 

considered, addressed, and assessed. 

 (2) The close proximity of cultural and political centers and the willingness of 

adversaries to exploit US actions makes it relatively easy for media representatives to 

find “authoritative” sources of information for stories about US operations without US 

support. The JFC must therefore plan and execute PA operations that media find credible 

and timely and serve as a valuable source of current news and information to reduce the 

need for the media to go elsewhere. Integration of PA is critical to the success of all 

IV-6 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

military operations or campaigns, but even more important in an urban environment due 

to the proximity and abundance of observers and media. 

g. Civil-Military Operations 

(1) General

(a) CMO performed in urban areas will require a significant effort on the 

part of the joint force. 

(b) Strategic CMO focus on long-term global and regional issues such as 

reconstruction, economic development, and stability. At the operational level, CMO 

support strategic CMO objectives and focus on near-term and immediate issues such as 

health service infrastructure, NEO, movement, feeding, and sheltering of dislocated 

civilians, police and security programs, building foreign nation government legitimacy, 

integration of interagency operations with military operations, and synchronization and 

integration of CMO support to tactical commanders. Figure IV-2 provides further details 

about CMO. 

(c) CMO in urban areas have three primary objectives. 

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

Facilitate military and civilian operations

Consolidate and achieve operational US objectives

Integrate civil and military actions

OBJECTIVES

Foreign humanitarian assistance

Populace and resource control

Nation assistance

Civil information management

Support to civil administration

TYPES

Civil affairs operations

Psychological operations

Engineering

Health service support

Military police and security forces

Transportation

SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Figure IV-2. Civil-Military Operations 

 IV-7 
Chapter IV 

1. Enhance military operations by minimizing civilian interference. 

2. Support friendly, allied, or coalition forces objectives by assisting 

the HN achieve its political, economic, and psychological objectives. 

3. Integrate civil and military actions to help hasten an end to 

hostilities and attempt to limit collateral damage on IPI from offensive, defensive, or 

stability operations. These negative impacts can range from civilian casualties and loss 

of property to destruction of supporting infrastructure. The effects of civilian suffering 

often have a profound influence on the attainment of strategic and operational objectives. 

Commanders must meet the legal obligations and moral responsibilities to the civilian 

populations within the operational environment. 

(2) CMO Considerations in Urban Environments

(a) It may be difficult to find and reach all those in need of support. 

Restricted terrain makes it more difficult to control large numbers of people in PRC 

operations. Although urban areas normally offer many buildings usable for shelter, 

medical care, and other forms of support, the damage to those structures from military 

operations or natural or man-made disaster can make them unusable, thus adding to the 

infrastructure support difficulties. 

(b) Many civilians will be displaced and in need of basic support. Services 

may be degraded or nonexistent. The requirement to control and support the civilian 

population can easily overwhelm local capabilities. For example, at the onset of an 

operation in an urban area there might be a portion of the population without daily 

employment or activity, having literally nothing to do. This stagnant population is 

looking for some form of employment activity and can easily be influenced by the 

adversary to hinder or harm the operation. This very segment of the population can be 

used by the JFC as the resource to jumpstart the rebuilding of the urban environment. 

Temporarily employing this population not only denies the adversary a resource pool, but 

also starts the urban environment on the road to recovery. Urban areas are rarely 

homogeneous, and effective CMO will require understanding of the local culture, 

ethnicity, neighborhoods, tribal relations, and the basic allegiances and daily life of the 

inhabitants. 

(c) Urban infrastructure may be functioning with some degree of 

effectiveness, in which case CA must work through and with local authorities and 

services. It may be necessary to repair physical infrastructure facilities and means, such 

as power plants or water stations, as part of CMO. Existing service infrastructure may be 

totally lacking or overwhelmed by circumstances, requiring the joint force to provide not 

only basic subsistence and shelter, but the full gamut of support personnel — security, 

legal, administration, engineer, sanitation, medical, transportation, and other. 

IV-8 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

(d) CMO can support overall operational objectives or be the focus of 

operations. CMO may be conducted to shape the operational environment, engage a civil 

problem, or assist in the transition to civil authority. 

(e) JUOs will always require the conduct of CMO in one part of an urban 

area while another is still being contested in conventional combat, thus calling for close 

synchronization and integration of combat and CMO requirements and actions. CMO 

may take place in the urban area itself or, in the case of massive civilian displacement, in 

areas nearby. 

(f) CMO will require support in a number of key areas from forces and 

organizations who themselves understand the nature of operations in urban environments. 

1. CA staff, and supporting units, should form the nucleus of CMO 

planning efforts. CA forces are a multiplier for JFCs and can provide valuable 

information and analysis with respect to the civil dimension of the operational 

environment; as well as, plan and execute targeted nonlethal operations focused at 

specific populations. CA operations require a strong relationship between military 

forces, NGOs, IGOs, and civil authorities and population in the urban areas where 

military forces are present. 

2. Engineering support could be critical to CMO, particularly in 

combat and FHA operations. This support may consist of firefighting services, facilities 

repair and management, power generation, construction of fuels and water supply, 

erection of temporary shelter, construction and repair of ports and airfields, repair and 

maintenance of transportation and communications systems, explosive ordnance disposal, 

bridging, contingency construction/services contracting and mapping/geospatial 

information and services, or many other actions. 

3. Health service support (HSS) may be the most immediately 

critical asset of CMO. HSS activities in urban areas may consist of medical and dental 

treatment, preventive medicine services, medical logistics, training, and medical 

evacuation. In JUOs, HSS activities should pay particular attention to the development 

of medical intelligence and threat analysis due to the strong potential for epidemic 

outbreaks. 

4. Transportation support is necessary for the distribution of food, 

water, and medicines, for medical evacuation, and for the movement of dislocated 

civilians to a safe environment. 

5. Military police and security forces may be vital to establishing 

sufficient control for CMO to successfully take place, as well as providing a normal law 

enforcement capability when none is present. 

 IV-9 
Chapter IV 

HAITI — CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS 

The large civilian population in Port-au-Prince and the complexities of 

the humanitarian mission required the United States to interact 

constantly with other US governmental entities. These agencies 

included US Agency for International Development and the State and 

Justice Departments, along with a variety of nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs) that also supported nation-building in Haiti. To 

help resolve the cultural and operational differences between the 

military and civilian organizations, the joint task force created a formal 

political-military operations plan that included a civil-military 

operations center (CMOC). US forces also established a humanitarian 

assistance coordination center as a part of the CMOC to serve as a 

clearinghouse for all humanitarian requests for assistance and to 

prevent NGOs from inundating the headquarters. Civil affairs and 

Army Special Forces personnel were instrumental in manning and 

facilitating these activities. In retrospect, the relative smoothness of 

the operation owes much to the intensity of civil-military cooperation 

that the CMOC helped to foster. 

In addition to the CMOC, Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) 

were established in June of 1994 to support US policy to restore Haiti’s 

democratic government, counteract misinformation broadcasts by 

Haiti’s de facto military regime, and disseminate messages from 

Aristide to the Haitians. The MISTs were typically five-person teams 

composed of a psychological operations (PSYOP) officer; a 

noncommissioned officer; two PSYOP specialists with photography, 

videography, journalism, or editing skills; and a civilian analyst with 

linguistic and area specialist skills. The MISTs interacted with both US 

and host nation militaries and law enforcement agencies to develop 

appropriate PSYOP missions, information campaigns, and military 

intelligence support. 

SOURCE: Joint Military Operations Historical Collection

(g) CMO will most likely occur simultaneously with, not subsequent to, 

other operations including combat, both defensive and offensive. 

1. During defensive operations in urban areas, CMO contributes to the 

military effort by maintaining liaison with civil and interagency organizations and 

officials, which provides better situational awareness and contributes to force protection. 

Additionally, coordination with the international relief community can result in a 

diminution of requirements for US military support to nonmilitary missions, helping to 

conserve military resources. Finally, PRC measures minimize adversary access to the 

area (which supports force protection) as well as adversary access to HN logistic support. 

The commander must also consider the effects of defensive operations on the civilian 

populace and take the appropriate CMO measures. 

IV-10 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

2. CMO contributes to the military effort during offensive operations 

as well. Liaison with local officials and the local populace again provides an additional 

source of situational awareness, some of which can be used for the targeting of adversary 

forces and positions. Coordination with the relief community helps conserve military 

resources. Most importantly, PRC measures can be used to minimize civilian 

interference with military operations, supporting the JFC’s mobility requirements. 

Again, the JFC must consider the effects of operations on the civilian populace and 

conduct CMO both to support that populace and to enhance operational capabilities. 

For additional information on CMO and CAO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military 

Operations. 

3. Intelligence 

a. Intelligence activities in urban environments are significantly different from other 

environments because of the vast number of variables found in urban areas in comparison 

with the conventional operational environment. Numerous factors, make JIPOE for 

urban areas a complex and detailed undertaking, including the nature of the urban 

environment. Attaining situational awareness, visualizing operations, and providing 

timely intelligence and information to support decision making are critical JIPOE 

functions in an urban environment. A detailed discussion of JIPOE for JUOs is found in 

Appendix A, “Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment in Urban 

Areas.” The density of the urban operational environment often requires vast amounts of 

intelligence received from many different sources and channels to be processed 

efficiently. Furthermore, to be effective in an urban environment, intelligence must be 

processed and disseminated to operating forces in real time. This method has been proven 

to enable operating forces to take advantage of opportunities garnered by the cascading 

effect of tactical successes, wherein information discovered during an ongoing operation 

in turn provides actionable intelligence for immediate follow-on actions. To properly 

fuse the breadth and depth of information and intelligence, additional resources may be 

required. 

b. Intelligence on more than threat issues alone is important in JUOs. The desire to 

employ precision munitions and reduce collateral damage places increased demand on 

ISR systems to provide high-fidelity, geospatially accurate intelligence for targeting, in 

near-real time. Many adversaries will be non-uniformed irregular forces, employing 

nonmilitary vehicles, therefore reliance on HUMINT reporting and intelligence sensors 

that both detect and discriminate enemy from civilians will place increased demands on 

intelligence staffs at all levels. 

c. UASs play a major role in JUOs and provide a distinct advantage over other 

airborne collection assets. Unmanned aircraft with their longer loiter times, persistent 

surveillance, ability to downlink directly to maneuver elements, and point targeting 

capabilities enable increased situational awareness to the commander. 

 IV-11 
Chapter IV 

d. Information superiority is an integral and necessary requirement for JUOs, and 

intelligence is one of the primary means to achieve that it. During JUOs, the JFC relies 

on comprehensive intelligence to determine the social, political, and cultural 

environment, the physical terrain, adversary capabilities, demographics, and other 

characteristics of the urban operational environment. 

e. Information requirements normally focus on adversary forces and the physical 

environment, but for operations in urban areas they must include detailed information 

concerning the nature and characteristics of the urban area — terrain, populace, and 

infrastructure as well as political, cultural, economic, and other considerations. These 

requirements will also have different priorities in JUOs, with intelligence concerning 

civilian population or infrastructure potentially as important as that concerning the 

adversary. Intelligence centers should work with the JFC to determine intelligence 

requirements, collecting information concerning the urban area(s) in the theater and JOA, 

and producing intelligence products that focus on a specific urban area for a specific 

operation. Among the areas for the centers’ attention might be the threat, biographic 

information on urban civilian leaders, and economic, geographic, sociocultural, and 

political factors. Civil information management can contribute to this effort, 

f. A large amount of the information needed to support JUOs is available well 

before a decision is made to commit US forces to a particular urban area. Information is 

often readily available on urban terrain, demographics, and infrastructure, but the precise 

and detailed information required to conduct operations may be more difficult to obtain. 

Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) have often provided 

timely and fairly complete information to the commander, but both of these sources 

contain drawbacks when used to gather information in urban areas. GEOINT can provide 

a picture of the layout of a city, the functions of some structures, the location of 

communications sites, vehicular movement patterns, and other facilities and activities that 

can be viewed from the outside. Measurement and signature intelligence could provide 

information concerning the presence of certain elements such as WMD or other covert 

indications. The same is true of SIGINT. Experience in JUOs clearly indicates that 

HUMINT is essential in understanding the local behavior and psychology, pinpointing 

locations within structures or underground, identifying targets that cannot be seen by 

GEOINT, and developing situational awareness. While the reliability of information 

gained from HUMINT sources can be questionable, the information should be verified by 

other human sources or technical means. 

MOGADISHU — INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 

Every urban area is defined by a unique set of physical, social, 

economic, cultural, and historical circumstances. In Mogadishu, 

Somali social, economic, and political relations are mediated by an 

unwritten social code dictated by kinship and religious precepts. Even 

though Somalis share a single ethnic background, a single language, 

and a single religion (Sunni Islam), clan rivalry and a patrilineal 

hierarchy divide the country. These cultural differences contribute to a 

volatile political atmosphere in which clan personalities and historical 

relationships govern decisionmaking. Understanding this foreign 

IV-12 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

system of government significantly helped the joint force commander 

(JFC) of Operation RESTORE HOPE to make use of local assets and 

provided him with the situational awareness necessary to achieve 

mission success. In comparison, during United Nations (UN) 

Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II, US leaders failed to take certain 

factors of Somali culture into consideration, contributing to the 

operation’s failure. 

During Operation RESTORE HOPE, human intelligence (HUMINT) 

gathering was conducted on the ground in Mogadishu prior to the 

formation of unified task force (UNITAF). HUMINT sources developed 

relationships with official contacts, observed first-hand the dynamics 

of Somali politics, and were able to provide significant intelligence on 

militia activities. This type of HUMINT is essential in urban operations. 

Continuous monitoring of the local population’s disposition and the 

adversary’s intentions ensures that diplomatic and/or military efforts 

are appropriate to the situation and well received by relevant political 

leaders. 

To track and disperse this type of intelligence, US forces established a 

civil-military operations center (CMOC) to serve as a clearinghouse for 

information between the humanitarian agencies and the multinational 

coalition force. The CMOC communicated daily with State Department 

Presidential Envoy Robert Oakley, a former US Ambassador to Somalia 

who knew most of the major Somali political players. Clearing a 

political path for the US-led relief effort, Oakley and a small staff 

traveled into southern Somalia explaining to local leaders what to 

expect as troops arrived at distribution sites. 

The importance of understanding local politics and integrating 

indigenous decision makers into an urban operation cannot be 

overstated. Leveraging local support ensured that US-led forces would 

be welcomed and helped sustain a calm political atmosphere in 

Somalia throughout the entire relief effort. UNITAF units tried to build 

on local leadership and reestablish elements of the Somali National 

Police — one of the few respected national institutions in the country 

that was not clan-based. The police force staffed checkpoints 

throughout Mogadishu and provided crowd control at feeding centers. 

The local police force provided both security and valuable HUMINT to 

UNITAF. 

In contrast, as the mission in Somalia changed from peacekeeping to 

peace enforcement during UNOSOM II, the UN failed to develop a full 

awareness of the local population’s disposition and did not obtain 

adequate intelligence on the adversary’s intentions and capabilities. 

In-depth intelligence gathering could have helped the JFC to predict 

the proclivities of adversaries, their method of operation, and the way 

in which they interacted with their environment. For example, a greater 

commitment to intelligence during UNOSOM II would have uncovered 

the fact that many militia officers had extensive training from the Soviet 

military academy in Odessa and from Italian military schools. The JFC 

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Chapter IV 

underestimated the military capabilities of rival factions, and as a 

result, UN forces were not adequately prepared for contingency 

situations. 

Intelligence gathering is essential to developing operational awareness 

in the urban environment. A JFC planning an urban operation should 

attempt to understand the social norms and political customs that 

define the urban area. A range of HUMINT sources exists to assist the 

JFC in developing an understanding of the adversary in relation to the 

urban area. It may be necessary for a JFC planning a joint urban 

operation to call upon a variety of nontraditional human sources, such 

as NGOs, foreign experts, anthropologists, regional specialists, 

expatriates, civil affairs personnel, and special operations forces, for 

vital information on the urban area. 

SOURCE: Joint Military Operations Historical Collection

g. SOF and other joint reconnaissance assets can provide support to the JFC in the 

collection of operational information, including target intelligence. These assets may 

already be deployed to the JOA or can be deployed early to help bridge the gap between 

other forms of information and the current situation. The presence of these assets in the 

urban area can be beneficial in understanding and shaping the operational environment, 

target identification, and meeting critical information requirements. 

h. Because urban terrain is primarily man-made, it is subject to frequent and 

substantial change, and maps and other representations can easily become out of date. In 

addition, maps and even near-real time imagery are primarily two-dimensional, making 

accurate visualization of the operational environment difficult. Additionally, the 

urban terrain hampers geo-positioning by making it difficult to determine at any given 

time the exact locations of friendly forces. Accurate maps of the urban areas, in a scale 

useful at the lowest levels, and visual representations are a necessity in JUOs. Defense 

Intelligence Agency and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) gridded 

reference graphics are required to assist the air-to-ground coordination required for all 

combat air support missions such as CAS, resupply, air assault, infiltration, and 

exfiltration. These representations could take the form of line maps, images, image 

maps, three-dimensional perspective views, computer simulated fly-throughs, or other 

specialized representations of the operational environment. NGA currently provides 

numerous intelligence services and products to the joint force, including: city maps with 

street names in both English and the native language, image city maps, traditional aerial 

imagery, and other products. 

i. In some operations, the threat may be environmental, as in the case of a natural 

disaster. In others, it may be hunger. In still others, there may not be a direct adversary 

at the onset of operations, but the potential increases for numerous adversaries to arise as 

the operation develops. The threat may include organized military units, militia groups, 

clans or tribes, criminal elements, insurgents, terrorists, political factions, or a 

IV-14 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

combination of two or more. For each potential threat, a determination must be made 

concerning the operational capabilities, COAs, and intentions. 

j. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is important in planning and supporting JUOs. 

The primary source of OSINT is media (radio, television, newspaper, bulletin board). An 

enormous amount of useful urban information is available from geospatial and 

infrastructure maps, building blueprints, cultural and historical information, and key 

leaders. The use of native linguists who possess cultural knowledge to fully exploit 

foreign language sites on the World Wide Web is one key to obtaining the fullest range of 

useful OSINT. Anonymous tip lines, “rumor mills,” text-messaging, and other 

anonymous ways to pass information can be a source of OSINT. 

k. Counterair Threats. Urban terrain provides excellent cover and concealment for a 

variety of adversary weapons systems. The urban environment also affects the 

employment of antiaircraft weapons, including antiaircraft artillery (AAA), man-portable 

air defense systems, and surface to air missile systems. Adversary light to medium AAA 

may be employed from ground sites, from the tops of buildings, or weapons mounted on 

civilian vehicles. The terrain may limit suppression options. The cluttered environment 

with lights, fires, and smoke will make threat and target acquisition difficult. 

l. Space Support to Intelligence

(1) The nature of space-based capabilities makes them an important part of ISR 

in the urban environment. 

(a) Space-based systems have access to denied areas that allow them to 

conduct ISR activities before, during, and after hostilities without being detected by 

hostile forces or endangering friendly forces. Hostile forces, however, may be aware of 

over flight times. 

(b) Long-term, repeatable observation by space-based ISR assets allows 

trending and change detection that are particularly useful in the urban environment. 

1. Space systems may detect disturbances such as buried facilities and 

construction sites, however built-up areas are particularly challenging since they may 

contain many such areas that are part of the city landscape and not related to militarily 

important sites. 

2. Of particular importance, space systems may be able to provide 

route and target information for targeting — critical for precision fires. 

3. Space systems may also be able to detect camouflage and aid in 

assessing adversary movements and operations. However, in urban areas concealment is 

often provided by buildings and structures themselves and not by camouflage. The 

movement of civilian traffic and the sheer volume of vehicles can mask adversary 

movement and make identification difficult. 

 IV-15 
Chapter IV 

4. Space systems may be able to provide warning of hostile acts and 

reconnaissance against friendly forces, depending on the size and nature of the urban 

area, but the availability of covered avenues of approach make that capability 

problematic. 

5. The ability of space systems to detect, track, assess, and report 

aircraft and vehicular threats is valuable. Again, the presence of a significant number of 

civilian aircraft and vehicles may make timely identification a problem. 

6. The physical terrain is complex and crowded, with equipment and 

movement masked by the huge amount of activity in the urban area making surveillance 

and reconnaissance more difficult. Space systems have little capability to observe 

interior or subterranean activity. Because urban areas tend to be communications hubs, 

SIGINT must be gleaned from the multitude of signals that are not operationally 

significant. The complex physical terrain, large numbers of civilians working and 

moving in the urban area, and presence of significant communications, transportation, 

and other infrastructure can affect the rapid fusion of information to create a complete 

picture of the operational environment. Because communications are a key part of 

coordinating operations in an urban environment, space-based SIGINT can be very useful 

for identifying enemy command centers and their command structure, locating enemy 

positions, tracking persons of interest, and predicting enemy activities. 

m. Pattern analysis and recognition may detect pending events of interest. This will 

require the use of subject-matter experts and other resources who understand the cultural 

implications of patterns in both adversaries and civilians within the urban area and the 

AOI. 

n. Civil Information Management. Civil information is critical to the JFC’s 

situational awareness and understanding. Civil information is developed from data about 

civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events that can be fused, 

processed, and shared to increase interagency, IGO, and NGOs situational awareness. 

For more information, see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

4. Fires 

a. General

(1) Fires play a key role in JUOs. In the case of operations involving combat, 

the JFC can use fires to shape the operational environment and to engage the adversary, 

but perhaps the most important use of fires is in the isolation of the urban area or points 

within the urban area. Precision munitions make attacks on specific urban targets much 

more feasible and effective although their “precision” doesn’t ameliorate all risk. 

Operations such as those in Yugoslavia, Kosovo, and Iraq have made significant use of 

precision fires. Even if the operation is not likely to involve combat, fires are an essential 

capability in force protection and should be planned. In urban combat, experience has 

IV-16 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

shown that a strong combined arms capability is necessary for success; fires and 

maneuver are complementary functions that are essential to achieving JFC objectives. 

(2) Even when the joint force employs precision weapons, fires can still 

adversely affect the achievement of objectives. Fires can cause displacement of the 

civilian population, destruction of critical infrastructure, alienation of local inhabitants 

and the international community, and increased determination on the part of the 

adversary. 

For further information, see JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. 

b. Fires Considerations in Operations Conducted in Urban Environments

(1) Urban environments present unique considerations for the planning and 

execution of fires. In an urban environment, both the ability to use fires to support 

missions and the ability to synchronize and integrate fires are considerably more difficult 

than in other operations. Direct fires sometimes become the firepower means of choice, 

and can have operational-level significance. In many environments, restrictive ROE and 

political constraints may compound these problems. The JFC must consider the potential 

for collateral damage, the possibility of hazardous material contamination, the effects on 

the civilian populace, the requirements for critical infrastructure in later phases, and any 

other possibilities that may affect the achievement of operational and strategic objectives. 

(2) The complex physical terrain of urban areas — horizontal and vertical 

surfaces, interior and exterior space, surface and subsurface areas — can severely limit 

the ability of joint forces to employ fires. The vertical surfaces of buildings can easily 

mask targets from surface attack and create urban canyons that diminish air capabilities 

and can cause high and turbulent winds that can reduce the accuracy of fires. Height and 

proximity of surrounding buildings, different types of structures, construction materials, 

and structural density all may have an adverse effect on fires. Interior and subterranean 

spaces offer an adversary positions that are both difficult to locate and hard to reach. 

Damage caused by combat can create even more protection as rubbled areas may offer 

defensive advantages. The clutter of closely spaced structures can also adversely affect 

targeting and assessment. Communications difficulties caused by urban terrain can 

interfere with effective fire support and control. The characteristics of some weapons 

make them less suitable in urban terrain than in other areas. 

(3) The presence of large numbers of civilians can also severely inhibit the use 

of fires. There is a real potential for tactical events to have operational or strategic level 

implications — particularly events such as civilian casualties or damaged infrastructure. 

Since most JUOs will include constraints designed to minimize civilian casualties, the 

joint force will be required to use fires accordingly. These measures can take several 

forms: prohibiting attacks on targets located in heavily populated areas, restricting 

munitions used in attacks, restricting attacks to certain times of the day, giving warning 

prior to attacks so that civilians can evacuate the area, and aborting attacks unless 

accuracy can be guaranteed. 

 IV-17 
Chapter IV 

(4) Preservation of infrastructure is a concern during planning and execution of 

JUOs. The presence of critical infrastructure is common in urban areas and, depending 

on the operational objectives, the JFC may need either to preserve all infrastructure, 

render selected infrastructure temporarily unusable, or destroy some or all. In addition, 

urban areas probably contain a number of culturally significant sites that are also likely to 

have a protected status. In any case, the presence of significant infrastructure and 

protected sites increases the requirements for accurate identification and targeting, 

precise delivery of fires, and concern for collateral damage. 

(5) Combat assessment includes battle damage assessment (BDA) on 

operational targets, munitions effectiveness assessment, and reattack recommendations. 

Assessment of munitions effectiveness is difficult in urban areas, but an on-the-ground 

assessment can reveal different types of construction, materials used, structural 

dimensions, and other aspects of man-made construction that may affect weapons 

effectiveness. 

(6) Nonlethal Fires. Creating nonlethal effects during operations in urban 

environments is important due to limitations imposed on using lethal fires and greater 

public sensitivity to military and civilian casualties. JFCs s seek options to mitigate 

collateral damage and minimize civilian casualties, particularly in heavily populated 

areas. Nonlethal fires can be used to incapacitate, suppress, deny access, and move 

targeted personnel, and to stop or disable materiel while minimizing fatalities, permanent 

injury, and undesired damage to property in the target area. 

(a) Employment of nonlethal capabilities must be integrated into operations 

to produce synergistic results. Examples are obscuration smoke, illumination fire to 

disrupt enemy activity or support friendly forces, electric muscular incapacitation 

devices, and employment of some IO capabilities, such as electronic attack and computer 

network attack that deceive the enemy, disable the enemy’s C2 systems, and disrupt 

operations. But the employment of nonlethal fires in supporting these operations must 

consider their potential political impact as well as the potential for indirect second and 

third order lethal collateral effects. 

(b) Nonlethal Weapons Employment. Nonlethal weapons and weapons 

that produce low collateral damage may have greater utility in urban areas. When 

civilians and hostile forces are intermingled, nonlethal weapons will provide the JFC a 

broader range of capabilities intended to significantly reduce undesired injuries to 

civilians and damage to infrastructure. The synergies provided by both lethal and 

nonlethal force can minimize undesired casualties and damage to materiel, which reduces 

the potential for conflict escalation, and eases the burden of post-conflict transition and 

reconstruction. 

(7) Fratricide Prevention Measures. The very nature of the physical terrain in 

urban areas creates a situation of reduced visibility, with resultant unique and significant 

challenges. Commanders must identify and assess situations that increase the risk of 

fratricide in urban areas. The primary preventive measures for limiting fratricide are 

IV-18 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among component 

commands, rehearsals, reliable CID, effective procedures, and enhanced situational 

awareness. Detailed grid maps or photos aid in target description and accurate location 

and ultimately fratricide prevention. Prior coordination is required to ensure all units, 

both on the ground and in the air, have the correct charts or imagery. 

c. Targeting

(1) In order to maximize the effects of fires on the adversary while at the same 

time minimizing the adverse effects on the city and its inhabitants, fires must be as 

accurate as technology and planning will allow and synchronized with other operations. 

The targeting process must take into consideration all the factors associated with 

fires and the urban environment when developing target lists. Target development is 

a combination of art and science. It examines the components and relationships among 

systems such as military, political, or economic to establish their criticality and 

vulnerability to attack. 

(2) Characteristics of Targets in Urban Areas

(a) Although single targets exist, most often a target’s significance lies in 

its relationship to other targets or to a greater system. A group of targets related 

functionally within a country forms a target system. The basis for target development is 

to identify and analyze target systems and their effects on the adversary’s military 

capabilities. Since the urban area is itself a composite of systems, this approach to target 

development is appropriate for all targets in urban areas. 

(b) Identification of time-sensitive targets (TSTs) is an important 

consideration for the JFC conducting operations in urban environments. A TST is 

defined as a JFC-designated target requiring immediate response because it is a highly 

lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity or it poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly 

forces. The JFC normally provides specific guidance and prioritization for TSTs within 

the operational area. 

See Appendix A of JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for additional information on TST 

considerations. 

(3) No-Strike and Restricted Target Considerations The JFC may prohibit 

or restrict joint force attacks on specific targets or objects without specific approval based 

on political considerations, military risk, collateral damage risk, the law of war, and ROE. 

CA can play a critical role in the development of a restricted target list. 

Refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for additional information. 

 IV-19 
Chapter IV 

d. Joint Fire Support

(1) Because the conduct and coordination of indirect fires in urban areas is 

difficult, fires in support of operational maneuver must be closely coordinated and 

planned in detail, to include considerations of weapons effects, psychological effects on 

the populace, and potential collateral damage. For air-delivered munitions, terminal 

control and guidance can help ensure the delivering platform has acquired the correct 

target, thus reducing the risk of fratricide. Effective airspace control measures can ensure 

other missions (for example, reconnaissance, and strike packages) can simultaneously 

transit or operate in the airspace above and around the urban area. 

(2) Weapons Effects Considerations. The effects of weapons and munitions 

in urban areas can be significantly different from the effects in other environments. The 

characteristics of the terrain and the nature of urban combat affect both the results and 

employment of weapons of all types. Specific weapons effects considerations in urban 

areas include the type and size of the weapon and round, the construction of the building, 

and the ability to engage the target. 

(3) CAS. The compressed urban environment creates unique considerations for 

planning and conducting CAS operations. These include operations in urban canyons, 

deconfliction in confined airspace, restrictive ROE, difficulty in threat analysis, the 

presence of civilians, the potential for collateral damage, and the increased risk of 

fratricide. For fixed-wing aircraft, the nature of the urban canyons and irregular shape of 

large targets may necessitate the need for very specific ingress headings to potential 

targets. Additionally, the laser designation of some targets by an airborne platform may 

require very restrictive headings and altitudes. The employment of CAS requires special 

considerations regarding urban terrain. These considerations include, but are not limited 

to: 

(a) Target Acquisition

1. Though there may be an increased need for marking and designating 

CAS targets, observing or acquiring targets may be adversely affected by urban 

structures. 

2. The ability of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft to provide fires may be 

limited by the structural make up of the urban location. 

3. Tall buildings make it difficult for pilots to identify targets and may 

require specific attack headings to achieve LOS with the target. 

4. Detailed gridded maps or photos annotated during planning will aid 

in target description and location. Roads and buildings may be numbered to speed the 

target acquisition process from the air. Prior coordination is required to ensure all units, 

both on the ground and in the air, have the correct charts or imagery. 

IV-20 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

For additional information and examples of urban grid labeling systems, refer to JP 3-

09.3, Close Air Support.

(b) Observation/Terminal Attack Control. Consider the use of forward 

air controller (airborne) (FAC[A]). Observers may be placed on upper floors of buildings 

to improve visibility and communications. 

(c) Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) Requirements. If the 

enemy air defense threat is significant, air support may be limited until the threat is 

reduced. SEAD support may be required against air defenses both in and outside the 

urban area, with internal SEAD targets more difficult to find and anticipate. An 

aggressive, proactive SEAD effort may be necessary during the early stages of JUOs. 

(d) Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) Considerations. The 

JTAC must plan for redundant communication and marking tools. A single tool will not 

work in all urban environments. JTAC proficiency in the conduct of urban operations is 

critical in order to step into an urban environment with no previous urban training. 

Navigation over urban terrain can be more difficult than over natural terrain. A gridded 

reference graphic/urban grid system labels structures and prominent features. Target 

reference points can also be used, which require labeling buildings or distinctive urban 

structures in and around the objective area. Due to the uncertainty of urban warfare, it is 

possible to receive fire from a position that cannot be covered by one of the sectoring 

methods used. When using reactive talk-on, describing the target location as it relates to 

surrounding structures is essential. Establishing objectives and phase lines assists in 

understanding the ground scheme of maneuver and is one method to integrate air and 

ground operations. Weapons selection in the urban environment must focus on rapid 

employment, the target set, minimum collateral damage, minimum rubbling, the ability to 

employ in proximity to land forces, and high accuracy both of targeting and delivery. 

Refer to JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support (CAS), for additional information. 

e. Interdiction is a crucial step in isolating the urban area. Interdiction is an action 

to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy an enemy’s military surface capability before it can be 

used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. Interdiction 

can divert adversary forces intended for urban combat, disrupt C2, communications, 

intelligence and other systems and capabilities, and delay or destroy forces and supplies. 

Fires and/or maneuver can be used to interdict. Interdiction operations in urban areas can 

be problematic and require special considerations. Weather effects caused by the urban 

environment include increased pollution and aerosols affecting target detection, warmer 

temperatures affecting infrared signatures, and variable wind speeds and directions 

affected by building layout. The axis of attack and target designation require extra 

attention; the problem may be similar to attacking enemy forces in steep mountainous 

terrain. Larger urban areas with more vertically developed buildings add increased target 

elevation issues to the targeting problem, and the combination of tall buildings and 

narrow streets can cause an “urban canyon” effect leading to masking issues for line-ofsight munitions and targeting sensors. Munitions effects will vary greatly depending on 

 IV-21 
Chapter IV 

whether the enemy can be attacked in the open versus inside buildings. It requires great 

care to choose the correct delivery method and munition and fusing option when 

employing fires in an urban environment. 

For additional guidance on interdiction refer to JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction. 

f. Information Operations (IO) Capabilities. IO are described as the integrated 

employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations, PSYOP, military 

deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related 

capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated 

decision making while protecting our own. IO capitalize on the growing sophistication, 

connectivity, and reliance on information technology as well as the human factors 

associated with every JUO. IO are a means to shape the operational environment and 

also a tool to engage the adversary by selectively targeting infrastructure and weapons 

systems. The IO cell should include representatives of those elements or agencies 

specifically concerned with the urban aspects of the operation or campaign. Intelligence 

support is critical to the planning, execution, and assessment of IO. Intelligence support 

to IO includes the intelligence specific to the urban area concerned. 

For further information on IO, see JP 3-13, Information Operations.

(1) General IO Considerations in JUOs. IO can affect both civilians and 

infrastructure. Leadership may include not only military leadership, but civilian political, 

social, and cultural leadership as well. Urban infrastructure may include communications 

and information, transportation and distribution, energy, economics and commerce, and 

administration and human services. All of these are most likely to be located in an urban 

area. Also located in the same urban areas are the means to influence them — 

communication channels, cultural and societal organizations, political headquarters, and 

concentrated popular opinion. Even when JUOs are but part of a larger operation or 

campaign, many of the targets of IO will be located in urban areas. 

 (a) Enlist influential local indigenous authorities to communicate key 

information to the population. Efforts should be taken to ensure that association with US 

forces does not compromise the credibility of these local authorities. 

 (b) All enemy violations of the law of war can be used to shape local 

and international opinions. When possible, these violations should be captured on video, 

distributed to media outlets, and incorporated into the joint force’s own PSYOP. Just as 

the media will cover adversarial violations, they will cover joint force violations. All 

joint force members should be alert as to their actions and the potential consequences 

regardless of who may be watching. 

 (c) Following enemy attacks, the civilian population may fear direct 

reprisal from enemy forces. Under such circumstances, inform the population that only 

the perpetrators and those who support them are the target of operations, and that efforts 

will be taken to avoid indiscriminate civilian casualties. Employ local law enforcement 

IV-22 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

authorities and judicial systems in redressing such attacks to the extent possible, thereby 

acting to restore the rule of law. 

(2) PSYOP Considerations in Urban Environments. PSYOP have a 

fundamental role in JUOs, where the civilian populace and infrastructure often are as 

important as adversary forces. PSYOP can do much to shape the urban operational 

environment before, during, and after actual engagement. PSYOP can be used 

independently of or in conjunction with economic, social, and political activities to limit 

or preclude the use of military force. PSYOP may be the predominant application of IO 

used in JUOs. 

(a) The physical terrain of the urban area does not have the adverse effect 

on PSYOP as it does for many other activities, since PSYOP generally depend on open 

sources to disseminate information. The physical nature of the urban area allows the 

concentration of people and institutions and may make them easier to reach with PSYOP. 

(b) The civilian populace forms one of the primary audiences of PSYOP, 

and the urban area contains large numbers of civilians in a relatively small physical area. 

However, that density also makes it easier for local, tribal, gang, or other group leaders to 

counteract joint force PSYOP efforts. The potential complexity of the civilian populace 

can make PSYOP efforts challenging, but this complexity also offers a multitude of 

options and resources for PSYOP activities. 

(c) The physical and service infrastructure of an urban area may enhance 

PSYOP by providing the means to disseminate information throughout the operational 

area. Existing communications systems — television, radio, computers, newspapers and 

journals — can provide multiple avenues for PSYOP that are already used by the civilian 

populace. 

(d) The complexity of the urban area enables changes in opinion or attitude 

to occur quickly. In addition, a PSYOP activity that is effective for a portion of the target 

audience may leave another target or segment indifferent or even hostile. Continuous 

assessment, in coordination with up-to-date intelligence, can reduce the possibility of 

adverse effects resulting from PSYOP activities and enable PSYOP planners to make 

necessary adjustments. 

(e) Fundamental to the planning of urban PSYOP is an understanding of 

the urban area — language, urban demographics, ethnicity, customs, culture, economics, 

politics, religion, local and neighborhood allegiances, and other characteristics of the 

target population that can affect the way that PSYOP are perceived. 

(f) PSYOP can be crucial in undermining adversary will. It takes a 

formidable willpower to fight the urban battle, especially when the resulting destruction 

is of one’s own city, and PSYOP should be considered an essential weapon in the 

commander’s arsenal. Support from the local populace can enhance the success of JUOs. 

 IV-23 
Chapter IV 

Accordingly, PSYOP can gain support for the joint force while reducing support for 

adversary forces. 

(g) PSYOP can support all types of operations in urban areas, whether or 

not they involve the use or threat of force. Urban areas are rich with PSYOP 

opportunities and resources. 

For additional information, refer to JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN RECENT US OPERATIONS 

Haiti — Support of Pre-hostility Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (1994-1995) is an excellent example of 

effective PSYOP being employed before committing US forces. 

Elements from the 4th PSYOP Group deployed to Washington, DC and 

worked closely with members of the Joint Staff, Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) and the State 

Department to construct and execute an integrated and effective 

strategic and operational PSYOP plan. General Henry H. Shelton, 

Commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps for UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, 

noted: “. . . it is my belief that the integration of PSYOP early in the 

planning process was critical to the successful execution of the 

operation. Long before any American military forces stepped ashore, 

PSYOP helped us quickly accomplish our political and military 

objectives by laying the foundation for transition. There is no question 

PSYOP saved lives, on both sides, during Operation UPHOLD 

DEMOCRACY. It proved to be the unsung, yet vitally important, factor in 

this operation — a true force multiplier.” 

Panama — Support of PSYOP during Hostilities

In Operation JUST CAUSE (1989) one of the earliest indicators of PSYOP 

effectiveness was the successful employment of loudspeakers and 

leaflets in support of US Marines at La Chorrera, a small village on the 

outskirts of Panama City and Howard Air Force Base. The Marines 

encountered heavy resistance from the Panamanian Defense Force and 

Dignity Battalion members for the first 24 hours and ceased fire for the 

night. Surrender appeals were then blared over loudspeakers as safe 

passage PSYOP leaflets were dropped. Resistance ceased early the 

next morning without an additional shot being fired. Surrendering 

personnel came forward clenching the safe conduct passes. 

Bosnia — Support of PSYOP during Post-Hostilities

PSYOP forces played a key role during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR 

(1995-1996), as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led 

Implementation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the conflict in 

Bosnia ended, many rural sections were abandoned and the numerous 

cities and towns in the country were swollen with displaced persons. 

IV-24 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

PSYOP forces were instrumental in helping to start the US State 

Department-sponsored Open Broadcast Network, an alternative daily 

television venue for the people of Bosnia. In addition, Robert Frowick, 

the head of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

Bosnian mission, overseeing the Bosnian national elections in 1996, 

credited the actions by PSYOP forces in helping ensure the elections 

were peaceful and successfully administered. 

Iraq – The Second Battle of Fallujah

Weeks ahead of the fight, shaping the operational environment 

included dropping leaflets inside the city with psychological messages 

and messages from the Prime Minister to the people of Fallujah. It was 

clear that if the intimidators were not turned in or if they did not leave 

the city of their own volition, the Prime Minister would not tolerate the 

situation in Fallujah. 

The leaflets also told the people what was being “stolen” from them by 

the intimidators—projects to improve the city’s sewage, water and 

schools that could not be initiated as long as thugs dominated the city. 

They were also told when the attack was coming, so they could leave 

the city, which really helped limit civilian injuries, keeping them down 

to almost zero. 

Various Sources 

(3) Military Deception Considerations for Urban Environments

(a) The conditions that make operating in an urban environment so 

challenging are well suited to facilitating deception. While tactics and techniques of 

deception remain relatively unchanged, the means utilized for execution may be altered 

and abetted in function by the urban environment. This relationship between urban 

terrain and deception has six factors: 

1. The scope of deceptions is greater in the urban environment than in 

any other; 

2. The cacophonous “background noise” of urban environments 

hampers counterdeception capabilities; 

3. Cities offer a rich trove of materials with which to conduct 

deception; 

4. Decisionmaking is generally impaired in urban environments 

relative to other environments; 

5. The presence and proximity of civilians complicate the intelligence 

picture at all levels; 

 IV-25 
Chapter IV 

6. Urban clutter attenuates the leverage of technology. 

(b) The above six factors represent a considerable hindrance when facing 

adversary deception in urban areas, but also create opportunities for US forces 

conducting JUOs themselves. Historically, deception has offered considerable leverage 

during operations in an urban environment. It may be both an enhancement to traditional 

military operations as well as an alternative to them. Although deception is recognized 

and respected as a potential source of great advantage for adversaries, it has been 

undervalued as a tool for friendly forces as it is often viewed as an ancillary activity. 

Deception may exploit technology, but it does not always have to depend on it, thus 

presenting a capability for JUOs in both high- and low-technology contexts. 

(c) Deception applies to urban combat operations no less than elsewhere. 

Consider its employment to turn enemy forces out of their determined positions or cause 

them to concentrate, among other potential uses. 

For additional information, refer to JP 3-13.4, Military Deception. 

g. Limiting Collateral Damage. The inadvertent or secondary damage occurring 

as a result of actions initiated by friendly or adversary forces is a consideration when 

delivering fires. Choosing an appropriate weapons system, munition warhead, warhead 

fuzing, and final attack axis are all methods used to mitigate collateral damage. 

For further information on mitigating collateral damage, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 

and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3160.01B, Joint 

Methodology for Estimating Collateral Damage and Casualties for Conventional 

Weapons: Precision, Unguided, and Cluster (U).

SARAJEVO — MINIMIZING COLLATERAL DAMAGE 

The focus of the international media was so concentrated in Sarajevo 

that the Commander in Chief [Allied Forces, South] stated, “Every 

bomb was a political bomb.” If Serbian forces had the opportunity to 

exploit public opinion in a manner that influenced diplomatic efforts, 

the military’s credibility and support could have suffered. Accordingly, 

the intent was to preserve as much of the infrastructure of Sarajevo as 

possible, while destroying the military foundations of Serbian power. 

To this end, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) employed 

precision-guided munitions during air strikes to minimize collateral 

damage. The minimal collateral damage resulting from air strikes 

relieved political pressure on NATO, and NATO was able to sustain the 

intensity of the operation and increase pressure on the Bosnian Serbs 

to negotiate a diplomatic settlement to the conflict. 

SOURCE: Joint Military Operations Historical Collection 

IV-26 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

5. Movement and Maneuver 

a. General. Operational movement and maneuver allow the JFC to engage the 

adversary on terms most favorable to friendly forces. Once the decision has been made 

to conduct operations in urban areas, movement can range from efforts to position forces 

to best conduct forcible entry into an urban area to advantageous positioning in 

preparation for an operation unlikely to involve combat. 

b. Movement and Maneuver Considerations in Urban Environments

(1) The physical terrain of most urban areas makes the movement of large 

forces difficult, even in times of peace and stability. In situations of turmoil, the 

difficulties are magnified. The patterns of streets and structures can be confusing to 

navigate, tend to break up large formations or canalize them toward city centers, are 

easily interdicted by fire, and can be easily turned into obstacles and barriers. 

Conventional avenues of approach in urban areas — highways, wide thoroughfares, 

railways, and rivers — are easily blocked or interdicted. 

(2) Civilians, by their sheer numbers, can act as an impediment to both 

movement and maneuver. LOCs and avenues of approach to and from assembly areas 

may be choked with civilians leaving the urban area. Normal civilian traffic can make it 

nearly impossible to conduct movement except during certain hours of the day. In urban 

combat, the presence of civilians will certainly affect the ability to use fires in support of 

maneuver. 

(3) Debarkation and staging areas, such as ports or airfields, may also be 

located within or close to significantly built-up areas and may themselves be vulnerable 

to interdiction. Routes to and from ports and airfields often pass through the very densely 

populated and built up areas the joint force is trying to control. There may be no suitable 

areas for reception and staging near the debarkation points. Roads, railway lines, and 

rivers may also offer routes into the urban area, but they are also subject to interdiction 

and blockages. Air routes into the urban area may be less prone to obstruction. 

However, a determined adversary with even rudimentary air defense weapons can impede 

movement of aircraft. Even if the debarkation points are part of the urban area, 

commanders should attempt to find a secure area large enough to stage and posture 

operational forces even when forced entry into the JOA is not expected. The commander 

should be aware of the effects this influx of joint military force may have on the local 

population. These effects may be in the form of resentment or anxiety, disruption of 

normal movement patterns, displacement of port or airfield workers, overburdening of 

services such as water and electricity, or other disruptions. The JFC should take steps to 

lessen any adverse effects among the civilian populace during this initial deployment of 

forces. The infrastructure required for debarkation and movement within the JOA may 

require improvement or restoration before it can be fully utilized. Port facilities, 

runways, and roads may be inadequate for the movement of forces and may require the 

early deployment of assets capable of making the necessary modifications to enable full 

deployment to occur. 

 IV-27 
Chapter IV 

(4) The local infrastructure may be insufficient for the introduction of joint 

forces and may require substantial improvement before being fully usable. Infrastructure 

considerations such as dependable electric power, water, and sanitation may also affect 

the movement of forces into the urban area. For operational maneuver, the quality of the 

transportation system within the urban area can be key to the joint force’s ability to 

maneuver. Adversaries with knowledge of the transportation system — roads, subways, 

utility tunnels, alleys, sewers, and other routes — can both enhance their ability to 

maneuver and prevent friendly maneuver from achieving its objectives. 

(5) Posturing and concentrating forces within the urban area may affect the 

urban environment, particularly civilians. Dismounted maneuver, when feasible, 

facilitates social contact with the populace and may provide distinct advantages over 

mounted maneuver. 

(6) Forces designated to perform operations in urban areas should move, if 

possible, to reception and staging areas outside the urban area where they will conduct 

operations. 

(7) Although airmobile operations offer another option for movement and 

maneuver in urban areas, the close spacing of buildings, narrow streets, and higher 

turbulent winds in some circumstances, may negate the joint force’s ability to conduct 

these operations. Consequently, the airdrop and airland of personnel, equipment, and 

supplies may have to be conducted at a staging area outside of the urban area. 

(8) Operations in depth may consist of attacks far beyond the urban area 

itself, on targets that affect the JUO, or they may take place within or near the 

urban area itself. When the urban area itself is the focus of the campaign or major 

operation, the operational environment is constricted and operational depth may be 

measured in miles, not hundreds of miles. Even in that case, however, operations in 

depth may include such distant targets as water supply, power plants, communications 

relay sites, adversary C2 or assembly areas, or key transportation nodes. Within the 

urban area, an example of operations in depth could be the simultaneous seizure of key 

objectives in different parts of the urban area. Such operations may frequently be 

conducted as forcible entry by land or maritime forces, or SOF. 

(9) While all forms of maneuver apply to urban combat, some have greater 

application than others. The JFC may use ground, air, maritime, cyberspace, and spacebased assets to isolate the urban area. In addition, land forces provide the capability to 

seize important objectives and DPs, to facilitate the removal of civilians, monitor and 

influence behavior, and conduct systematic sweeps of the urban environment. Air assets 

can be employed to penetrate an area on multiple axes and rapidly project power. In any 

urban combat maneuver, the best approach is to use the full range of combined arms 

technology and weaponry available to the joint force, supported by IO. Figure IV-3 

provides examples of operational maneuver in a JUO. 

IV-28 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

EXAMPLES OF OPERATIONAL MANEUVER

The Israelis struck to the east of Beirut during the 1982 Operation PEACE FOR 

GALILEE, linking up with the Christian militias and severing the Beirut-Damascus road, 

thereby cutting off all supply and reinforcement to the Palestine Liberation 

Organization.

During the Summer 1942 offensives on the Eastern Front, German forces enveloped the 

heavily defended fortress city of Sevastopol by land, sea, and air, isolating it from Soviet 

reinforcements. Despite difficult terrain, determined military and civilian defenders, and 

rough parity in ground forces, the Germans were able to secure the town.

ENVELOPMENT

TURNING 

MOVEMENT

Operation CHROMITE (1950) uncovered Seoul and caused the headlong retreat of the 

North Korean armies.

The sweep westward during Operation DESERT STORM (1991) forced the Iraqis to 

abandon Kuwait City without offering a significant resistance.

INFILTRATION

In Hue, the North Vietnamese Army quietly infiltrated two regiments and seized most of 

the city in a single day (1968).

In Operation JUST CAUSE (1989), units were staged unnoticed at bases throughout 

Panama and special operations forces infiltrated key locations. The simultaneous 

attack on key locations throughout the country made adversary response weak and 

disjointed.

PENETRATION

After crossing the Suez Canal in 1973, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) attempted a 

quick armored penetration to seize Suez City. Egyptian regular and irregular forces 

turned back the attack and inflicted heavy losses on IDF units.

In the initial attack on Grozny in 1994, Russian forces tried a similar armored 

penetration, with even worse results.

FRONTAL ATTACK

Operational level frontal attacks include the German attack at Stalingrad, the Marines’ 

battle to retake Hue, and the Russian attack on Grozny after the failed penetration.

Figure IV-3. Examples of Operational Maneuver 

(10) Maneuver Within the Urban Area. The urban environment significantly 

affects the ability of the joint force to maneuver by canalizing, increasing vulnerability, 

reducing options, and slowing movement. Structures pose obstacles that force movement 

along streets and block movement between streets, thus canalizing and 

 IV-29 
Chapter IV 

compartmentalizing units and exposing them to fires. This in turn affects the joint force’s 

ability to change directions, reposition, reinforce, bypass adversary resistance, and/or 

maneuver to the flank. Buildings and the urban population provide adversary cover and 

concealment and increase the vulnerability of the maneuvering forces, whether land or 

air. The nature of urban terrain slows maneuver, partly because of the barriers and 

obstacles either already present or created during operations and because of the physical 

demands of these operations. In addition, the urban defender generally has interior 

LOCs, allowing defenders to quickly react to maneuver on the part of an attacking force. 

Coordinated and integrated horizontal and vertical maneuver in the urban area can slow 

the defender’s ability to react and use interior lines. 

(a) Envelopment inside an urban area can be difficult to accomplish. The 

density of the adversary force and the physical terrain it occupies may make it difficult to 

find an exposed surface flank or make an airborne assault impractical. In those cases, it 

may require a frontal assault to create an assailable flank. Effective employment of air, 

land, maritime, space, cyberspace, and SOF capabilities can significantly increase the 

speed of maneuver to exploit the situation. Envelopment in JUOs can be vertical, rather 

than horizontal, and requires visualization and planning in three dimensions. 

(b) A turning movement typically requires greater depth than other forms 

of maneuver. The required depth may not be available in an urban area. 

(c) Infiltration depends on situational awareness and understanding of the 

urban area, careful selection of objectives, detailed planning, and efficient support and 

deception. Infiltration is not likely to be attempted by large conventional forces, but 

rather small units. A hostile civilian population reduces the prospects for success. 

(d) Penetration requires surprise and careful planning. Care must be taken 

to secure the flanks of the penetrating force. 

(e) During combat operations in urban ares, frontal assault by land forces 

may be inevitable. The joint force’s chances of success in executing this form of 

maneuver can be greatly enhanced by its ability to apply overwhelming combat power 

against specific objectives with speed, firepower, and shock. 

(11) As difficult as urban maneuver may be, there are several actions the JFC 

can take to reduce risk and increase the likelihood of success. 

(a) Isolation of the urban area is nearly always a prerequisite for 

success. The joint force can cut off or control outside support, information, and influence 

through air, space, land, and maritime and information dominance by interdiction, 

physical presence, control of basic services, and control of lines and means of 

communications. The purpose is to control the flow of supplies, personnel, and 

information into and within the urban area and to physically and psychologically isolate 

the area. Within the urban area itself, isolation of selected areas may be a prerequisite for 

IV-30 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

controlling them. The JFC should consider both the beneficial and detrimental effects of 

such control and isolation on the civilian populace. 

(b) Combined arms organization ensures that forces have all the 

elements at hand to conduct operations in urban environments. The difference 

between the makeup of combined arms organizations needed for operations in urban 

areas and operations conduced in other environments is the proportion and organizational 

level of different types of forces. For example, armored forces may not be required in the 

same strength and organization as in operations in open country, while need for engineer 

capability increases. The sometimes-accepted presumption that tracked vehicles are 

undesirable during JUOs has repeatedly proven false; however, a mix of tracked and 

wheeled armored vehicles is often appropriate. Thermal sights on armored vehicles can 

be used effectively to locate enemy units hiding in buildings. 

(12) The JFC may employ unexpected maneuver. The early seizure of key 

operational objectives by penetration can facilitate control of the populace and local 

infrastructure. Shows of force throughout the urban area can discourage resistance. 

(13) It may be necessary to conduct defensive operations in urban areas, either 

to deny the adversary strategic or operational objectives, to retain a key economic or 

political center, to control LOCs and avenues of advance, or for reasons of economy of 

force. Operational considerations in urban defense mirror those of offensive operations: 

the purpose of the defense; the degree of delay and denial desired; impact on civilians; 

acceptable friendly casualties; the type of defense; whether to defend inside or outside the 

city; whether to defend the entire urban area, a key sector, or COG; and the amount of 

physical destruction anticipated and allowable. 

(14) The JFC must counteract the impact of natural and man-made barriers, 

obstacles, and mines. In JUOs, these may include ports and airfields and their 

approaches, transportation systems (roads, railroads, and canals), natural formations such 

as mountains or rivers, minefields, risks from industrial and chemical hazards, and even 

highly congested sections of the urban area itself. In order to overcome urban barriers 

and obstacles and provide operational mobility, the JFC may have to employ 

substantial engineering or other support assets immediately after initial seizure of the 

immediate area around the barrier or obstacle. Sea mines and some land minefields can 

be cleared prior to the introduction of land forces, but other barriers and obstacles require 

hands-on preparation, restoration, or improvement. These actions can be more difficult 

in urban areas because of the difficulty in securing areas dominated by vertical structures 

or natural terrain, and a substantial investment in forces may be necessary to protect the 

mobility effort. 

(15) Operational countermobility can be achieved by the employment of 

operational obstacles, the institution of embargo or blockade, or by maritime interdiction. 

In JUOs, any and all of these methods may be pertinent. Defense of an urban area in 

itself can constitute the employment of a system of obstacles. Joint forces can create 

 IV-31 
Chapter IV 

urban obstacles in a number of ways: enhance natural or man-made choke points, 

destroy bridges and tunnels, establish minefields, or create other obstacles. 

For more information see JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint 

Operations. 

(16) The JFC may take steps to dominate or control those aspects of the urban 

environment whose possession or control provides either side with an operational 

advantage. Denial of an operational area can be accomplished either by occupying the 

key area itself or by limiting use or access to the area. For an area, critical factor, or 

function to be operationally key, its dominance or control must achieve operational or 

strategic results or deny the same to the adversary. In JUOs, the key areas, critical factor, 

or function may be approaches to the urban area, dominating physical terrain and airspace 

within or near the urban area, man-made features important to the success of the 

operation, or nonphysical activities such as the social, cultural, economic, or political. 

The joint force can dominate or control an operationally significant land area by physical 

occupation, through fire, or through the threat of fires. It may be possible to dominate 

other key urban areas without entering the urban area, by entering only in selected places, 

or by attacking critical targets. Sustained domination of key urban areas, though, 

normally requires either physical occupation or physical destruction. 

6. Protection 

a. General. Although protection will not ensure the success of operations in 

urban areas, failure to take adequate protection measures can cause an operation to 

fail. The protection function focuses on conserving the joint force’s fighting potential in 

four primary ways — active defensive measures that protect the joint force (including 

DOD civilians and DOD contractors), its information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, 

and LOCs from an adversary’s attack; passive defensive measures that make friendly 

forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy; applying technology 

and procedures to reduce the risk of fratricide; and emergency management and response 

to reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to accidents, health threats, and 

natural disasters. 

See JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in a Theater, for additional discussion of joint 

security operations.

b. Protection Considerations in Urban Environments

(1) The physical urban terrain makes protection more difficult in many ways. 

The vertical terrain means that observation of friendly formations, movement, and bases 

is much easier. It becomes difficult to secure LOCs, joint security areas, bases, and 

installations when the nature of urban terrain means that they are easily observed and 

interdicted. Dispersion within the urban area means that more sites and nodes may 

require hardening and defense. Threats can be vertical rather than horizontal, and require 

visualization in three dimensions. The compartmented, three-dimensional nature of 

IV-32 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

urban terrain places a premium on all-around security. Units that do not heed this 

stricture often find themselves attacked from the rear or from above. 

(2) Civilians pose an even more severe problem. Their large numbers and their 

presence in all parts of the urban area make operations security challenging. Adversaries 

may use civilians as camouflage, shields, and even targets. Their presence inhibits 

protective fires and adds to the difficulty of evasion and PR. The effects of attacks using 

WMD, terrorism, or conventional attacks on friendly forces are magnified by the 

presence of civilians. Their suffering, even when minimized, can have operational and 

strategic consequences. 

(3) Some HN infrastructure can aid in the protection of the force. However, 

local infrastructure —when used by the force — may become a protection responsibility 

that can be more difficult than military infrastructure. Civilian buildings are more 

difficult to defend and to maintain security. Civilian communications facilities are 

difficult to secure. The often large and sprawling nature of water systems, power plants, 

transportation systems, and government buildings make their protection a challenging 

proposition. Communications security and electronics security should take into 

consideration the presence and potential use of local communications and 

electromagnetic radiation. 

(4) The urban environment offers a unique set of actual or potential hazardous 

conditions. The JFC must identify hazards, actual or potential, that can result in injury, 

illness, or death to personnel or civilians, damage to equipment, property, or 

infrastructure, or any other condition that can degrade the mission.

(5) To assess the identified hazards in terms of probability and severity, the JFC 

must have an accurate understanding of the threat, the urban area itself, and the current 

conditions within the urban area. The JFC can then determine the risk level of each 

identified hazard or condition that can adversely affect the achievement of operational or 

strategic objectives, either directly or through branches or sequels. When an urban 

hazard exists, such use or threat of use of WMD by a terrorist, with potentially 

catastrophic effects on operations, the commander is alerted to take protection measures 

against it. A sniper attack on friendly, allied, and coalition personnel in the urban area 

may only marginally degrade operational capability, but since its likelihood is judged to 

be frequent, again the commander is obliged to take preventive measures. 

(6) Based on the assessment of hazards in the urban area, the JFC develops 

controls to either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk. Some hazards can be partially 

controlled by a thorough understanding of the urban area. Other controls may take the 

form of barriers and defenses, IO, increased security precautions, PRC, personnel 

rotation, development of response plans and capabilities, drills, warning systems, 

communications, or intelligence. Despite control measures, the residual risk is likely to 

be high due to the inability to fully control all conditions in such a large and complex 

area. 

 IV-33 
Chapter IV 

(7) Faced with the superiority of US forces, most adversaries seek an 

asymmetrical advantage. Urban areas are a natural battleground for insurgents 

and terrorists: the effects of their acts are greater and more noticeable and the 

groups themselves more difficult to locate and identify. Urban areas offer terrorists 

both a wide range of targets and an environment that facilitates the use of a variety of 

means and methods of attack (e.g., sabotage, DA with conventional munitions, or attacks 

using WMD). Targets may include barracks and bases, military movement routes, small 

units, individual personnel, USG agencies, NGOs, civilian or military infrastructure, or 

civilians. Friendly, allied, and coalition forces are a likely target for terrorist attacks, and 

remain so. Terrorists receive significant operational and strategic results from even a 

low-level attack. Further adding to the protection problem is the presence of large 

numbers of civilians and key civilian infrastructure. Attacks on civilians may provide 

terrorist organizations with similar benefits and less risk than attacks on friendly, allied, 

and coalition forces. 

(8) Improvised explosive device (IED) awareness, including vehicle-borne 

IEDs, and lessons learned and counter-IED tactics are an important protection 

consideration in urban areas. 

(9) Serious consequences occur if adversaries use CBRN weapons in urban 

areas or if there is a deliberate or accidental release of TIMs. Expect significant 

numbers of casualties to civilian populations and to unprotected military forces if 

adversaries create a CBRN incident in an urban environment. There will be personnel, 

equipment, and site contamination; dislocated civilians; medical facilities may be 

overwhelmed; and diseases may spread. It is very difficult to detect release of CBRN 

before symptoms manifest in the population. 

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND 

NUCLEAR INCIDENT IN AN URBAN AREA 

On 2 April 1979, there was an anthrax outbreak which affected 94 

people and killed at least 64 of them in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk, 

which contained a biological warfare development facility. As it turned 

out, it was an accidental release, and the wind carried the anthrax away 

from the city. If the wind had been in the opposite direction that day – 

toward the city of Sverdlovsk – the death rate could have been in the 

hundreds of thousands and many facilities would have been 

contaminated. 

Various Sources 

(a) Urban areas often include manufacturing plants which may be a source 

of TIMs (i.e., toxic industrial chemicals, biologicals, and radiologicals). An adversary 

could intentionally target these types of facilities in order to cause destruction and 

widespread contamination for the force or other people in the urban area. Joint forces 

may inadvertently strike or damage TIM infrastructure causing serious collateral effects. 

JFCs must consider the presence of TIM facilities during planning and, if possible, 

IV-34 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

determine the risk and impact of intentional or unintentional release. The industrial 

accident at Chernobyl’s nuclear power plant in April 1986 highlights the potential serious 

effects of the release of radioactivity upon an urban area. Hundreds of thousands of 

civilians had to abandon entire cities and settlements within the thirty-kilometer zone of 

extreme contamination. 

(b) Improvised chemical devices can be a threat and JFCs should monitor 

and possibly control the distribution of industrial or agricultural chemicals that could be 

used in constructing a chemical weapon. 

c. Security in Urban Environments

(1) Security in urban environments consists of three main areas, and all involve 

the security of civilians to some degree. 

(a) Security of the force. Force protection is a required task in any 

operation. In JUOs, where support and protection of civilians is a legal requirement and 

may be a mission objective, the ability of the force to provide support depends on the 

security with which it can do so. 

(b) Security of civilians. Commanders have an obligation to protect 

civilians, as combat operations and force protection will allow. In many operations 

security of civilians is a stated operational objective. These operations may include 

peacekeeping, combating terrorism, civil support, or FID. Security of civilians may 

consist of protection from military operations, from terrorism, from opposing groups or 

factions, or from criminal activity. 

(c) Security of civilian agencies. Governmental agencies, IGOs, and 

NGOs will operate within the urban area. These civilians, while not part of the local 

populace, may require various forms of security from the force, ranging from perimeter 

and point security to armed escort. 

(2) Aggressive actions on the part of the force enhance security, both for 

civilians and the force itself. These actions include close contact and communications 

with local civilians and organizations and with other civilian agencies, extensive 

patrolling, PSYOP, barrier construction, mine and obstacle clearance, movement control, 

and provision of needed support. The JFC must avoid complacency in urban areas where 

the threat may be difficult to identify. 

(3) The maritime expeditionary security force (MESF) can protect strategic port 

facilities and strategic commercial shipping and naval ships in harbor approaches, at 

anchorages and in ports, from bare beach to sophisticated port facilities, in order to 

ensure the uninterrupted flow of cargo and personnel to the CCDR. MESF operations 

protect these assets from waterborne and land-based threats. 

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Chapter IV 

For more information on MESF see Appendix E, “Urban Maritime Considerations and 

Capabilities.” 

d. Personnel Recovery. PR is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to 

prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. Isolated 

personnel are those US military, DOD civilians and contractor personnel (and others 

designated by the President or Secretary of Defense) who are separated from their unit (as 

an individual or a group) while participating in a US-sponsored military activity or 

mission and are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or 

escape. 

(1) Evasion in an Urban Area. The likelihood of being isolated in an urban 

area is increasing. With so few available helicopter landing zones and the high 

vulnerability of recovery vehicles or forces in any given urban area, it is likely that 

isolated personnel will need to evade for a substantial amount of time, avoiding 

observation and contact. The evader must always be ready to fight, if necessary, and 

travel extended distances to get to a feasible recovery site or friendly forces. Generally, 

successful evasion in an urban area requires an in-depth knowledge of the local area and 

attitude of the populace, and a detailed map/diagram of the urban area. In most cases, 

isolated personnel should leave urban areas as quickly as possible. 

(2) PR in urban environments presents unique challenges for commanders 

during operations. Urban environments also present significant challenges for isolated 

personnel. Escape and evasion is particularly problematic under urban conditions and, 

depending on the demographic/sociocultural characteristics of the local population, may 

be impossible without assistance from indigenous personnel or through nonconventional 

assisted recovery means. 

(3) In the urban operational environment seizure of personnel through 

kidnapping/hostage taking for ransom or propaganda purposes can no longer be 

considered isolated or aberrant acts, but must be regarded as a normal enemy tactic. 

Because of the significant detrimental effects such incidents can have on morale and 

public support for the military mission, this tactic and its implications for PR must be 

recognized as an important consideration when planning operations in urban 

environments. 

(4) Risk mitigation/prevention of seizure of personnel is accomplished through 

threat-specific operational procedures and properly focused force protection training. 

Successful PR following a seizure of personnel event is far more likely if the personnel 

involved are properly organized, trained, equipped, and employed. JFCs are responsible 

for accomplishing PR execution tasks throughout the operational area. They must 

consider all available PR options and categories to successfully plan for recovery 

operations. 

(5) Civilians can pose a significant danger to isolated personnel in urban areas. 

In the absence of a nearby combat SAR helicopter, pilot rescues become a friendly, 

IV-36 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

allied, and coalition force problem. Ground and air units that operate in urban areas 

should understand that they may be tasked to participate in recovery and train for that 

eventuality. 

For further guidance on PR, refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery. 

e. Combat Identification. CID in urban environments is an important issue for 

ROE considerations. CID is the process of attaining an accurate characterization of 

detected objects in the operational environment sufficient to support an engagement 

decision. Depending on the situation and the operational decisions that must be made, 

this characterization may be limited to, “friend,” “enemy,” or “neutral.” In other 

situations, other characterizations may be required — including, but not limited to class, 

type, nationality, and mission configuration. Considerations include: 

(1) How does the urban environment impact visualization of friendly forces? 

(2) How are coalition and indigenous force tracking capabilities integrated? 

(3) How are CID systems and blue force tracking capabilities effectively 

integrated for effective C2? 

(4) What degree of latency is acceptable for visualization of friendly force 

locations; real-time or near real-time? 

f. Force health protection (FHP) complements force protection efforts and 

includes all measures taken by the JFC and the Military Health System to promote, 

improve, and conserve the mental and physical well-being of Service members. FHP 

measures focus on the prevention of illness and injury. Breakdown in urban hygiene and 

sanitation systems, as well as disruption to the area’s area food supply, may contribute to 

localized or widespread outbreaks of famine, disease, and infections, especially if the 

region is already experiencing a natural, periodic epidemic. The JFC must ensure 

adequate capabilities are available to identify health threats and implement appropriate 

FHP measures. Health threats arise from potential and ongoing enemy actions to include 

employment of CBRN capabilities; environmental, occupational, industrial, and 

meteorological conditions; endemic human and zoonotic diseases; and other medical 

considerations that can reduce the effectiveness of military forces. Therefore, a robust 

health surveillance system is critical to FHP measures. 

For further guidance on FHP, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support. 

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Chapter IV 

STALINGRAD – THE SPREAD OF AN EPIDEMIC 

Already in January 1942, the region that encompasses Stalingrad was 

experiencing the effects of a tularemia epidemic. 14,000 cases were 

reported that winter. With the onset of the battle in August 1942, the 

entire public health system supporting Stalingrad collapsed. The 

hygiene and sanitation systems were disrupted. 

According to one Soviet retrospective: in the fall of 1942 at the height 

of the battle, “more than 75 percent of the population was hit by 

tularemia in individual locations of the Stalingrad area.... As the health 

centers were practically out of order, the entire burden of the treatment 

of the infected population was taken up by the military medical front 

service.” 

Exacerbating the epidemic was that the fighting had disrupted the 

harvest activities in the area. Crops were not harvested, which 

provided a large source of food for the resultant explosion in the 

rodent population. Rodents were a disease vector for the spread of the 

epidemic, as were mosquitoes and by inhalation. Tularemia infected 

rodents got into everything (bedding, food, water), and affected the 

fighting capacity of both armies. 

After the battle, the number of cases of tularemia returned to pre-battle 

levels. 

SOURCE: Eric Croddy, MA, Tularemia, Biological Warfare 

and the Battle of Stalingrad 1942-43, an editorial from 

Military Medicine, Vol 166, #10, Oct 2001. 

7. Sustainment 

a. General. The nature of operations in urban environments creates unique support 

demands. Increased densities but the potential for greater dispersion may mean more 

nodes to supply, maintain, and support. The quantities of supplies required will differ 

from other types of operations, as will the types and amount of medical services required. 

Forces will need reconstitution more frequently. All movement will entail more risk and 

be more difficult to accomplish. Navigation and communications will be more difficult. 

Map accuracy may be insufficient for navigation and calls for fire. Landmarks may be 

destroyed, signs missing or deliberately altered. GPS signals will suffer interruptions. 

Night operations may be favored, but this will make navigation even more difficult. 

Spellings may differ on various maps and signs. Sustaining bases may not be possible, or 

may be difficult to secure. Support requirements to HN and civilian agencies will likely 

be much greater than in other operations, and may be the focus of the JUO itself. 

Commanders should consider the way the urban area affects the conduct of service 

support functions, particularly when those functions are located or performed within an 

urban area. Operations in urban areas normally will require more of many types of 

resources (e.g., personnel, munitions, subsistence, medical support) than other 

IV-38 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

operations. Commanders must make every effort to anticipate and specifically plan for 

these resources. It is important for the JFC to clearly specify appropriate supporting and 

supported relationships to ensure that subordinate commanders conducting JUOs will 

have sufficient forces and means. The JFC may also need to task organize forces in 

innovative formations depending on the characteristics of the urban area and the 

operational objectives. In order to preclude stripping other theater forces of assets 

required for JUOs, the JFC should identify early in planning those capabilities required 

from supporting commands. Support activities will play a large role in the transition 

phase of operations conducted in urban areas. 

b. Sustainment Considerations in Urban Environments

(1) The complex physical geography of urban areas can have significant effects 

on support. The close spacing of buildings and streets can affect distribution. There may 

not be large spaces available for bases. The need to operate in buildings, on streets, and 

in sewers offers a variety of medical challenges. Communications will be difficult due to 

blocked signals by buildings and metal structures in the area. Personnel operating in 

urban areas will be exposed to electrical and fire hazards from downed power lines, fuel 

leaks, and industrial chemical spills and contamination. Urban terrain can have 

restrictive natural terrain features such as rivers as well as narrow roads and closely built 

structures that impede distribution. Urban areas present an additional vertical dimension 

that may require operations and sustainment of personnel in multistory buildings and 

structures that create additional hazards and security considerations. 

(2) The presence of large numbers of civilians can easily affect the ability to 

support joint forces. Sickness and injury can burden medical services. Crowds and 

congestion can inhibit vehicular movement. The sheer numbers can drain the support 

capability of the joint force if not considered beforehand. 

(3) Infrastructure can help or hinder sustainment operations. Existing services 

may be able to support the joint force to some extent, but it is more likely that the joint 

force will need to support local services, to include food and water, health service, 

transportation management, and utilities. The densely packed civilian population may 

present myriad mouths to feed or patients to support. Transportation, medical, and other 

unit types can be overwhelmed. Local government can be of assistance in the contracting 

of services and supplies, but may be too ineffective to help in a meaningful way. The 

failure of basic services can place on the joint force the burden for providing them. The 

presence of a capable local infrastructure means that the joint force must only support 

itself, but the likelihood in JUOs is that such infrastructure will not be available. Local 

infrastructure will likely either be incapable of fully meeting the demands of the 

population or absent altogether. Because of this, any JUO will probably see a significant 

presence of NGOs and IGOs. It is important that the JFC and staff coordinate fully with 

these agencies in order to both relieve any potential burden on the joint force and to 

ensure that the needs of the civilian population are met. The joint force is better able to 

accomplish its objectives with the active and efficient cooperation of NGOs and IGOs. 

 IV-39 
Chapter IV 

(4) Historically in urban combat operations, ammunition expenditures 

(particularly for small-arms ammunition) increase dramatically. On the other hand, fuel 

requirements in for operations conducted in urban areas are often less than for operations 

in open terrain. These different usage rates are an important logistic consideration. 

(5) The JFC’s responsibility for equipment maintenance in the JOA usually 

entails the establishment of facilities in joint security areas or offshore aboard the sea 

base for the repair and replacement of materiel. In JUOs, the establishment of such 

facilities may not be feasible if there is no joint security area or any area large enough for 

the repair of major items. In urban combat, it is difficult to evacuate damaged equipment, 

and in a constantly shifting urban battle, there may be no secure routes to maintenance 

facilities. Maintenance service providers may be forced to come to the equipment rather 

than have the equipment come to them. In urban combat, it is often easier to replace than 

to repair, and planners should allow for increased replacement of what might normally be 

repairable equipment. Maintenance may encompass the full range of vehicles, 

equipment, and personal gear. Vehicle maintenance must be done quickly as stopped or 

immobile vehicles can block urban arteries. Engineer capabilities such as bulldozers may 

be needed to clear damaged vehicles. Maintenance may be performed while exposed to 

hostile fire. Transport time to deliver spare parts for maintenance may be longer despite 

the shorter distances to travel. 

(6) Historically, it is necessary to pull units back for rest and reconstitution far 

more frequently in urban combat than in other types of operations. In intense fighting, 

units often can last only a few hours before needing relief. When coupled with the high 

casualty rates normally associated with urban combat, reconstitution can be challenging. 

(7) Personal clothing and equipment will need replacement on a regular and 

frequent basis. Tactical units will desire special urban equipment and capabilities such as 

knee and elbow pads, ropes, goggles, gloves, small-unit radios and batteries, thermal 

sights, ladders, breaching tools, military working dog teams, robots, biometric 

identification, nonlethal weapons, and others. 

(8) Friendly, allied, and coalition forces will be at risk from a wide variety of 

endemic diseases. Environmental and industrial hazards may pose a threat to deployed 

forces. An HSS plan should include a medical surveillance program, the establishment of 

a joint patient movement requirements center, and the activation of the JTF joint blood 

program office. 

(a) As previously indicated, urban combat produces high casualties. 

Because of the high concentration of people and often-poor sanitation, urban areas have 

the strong potential for the outbreak of disease among joint forces. More robust HSS will 

be required for all JUOs, but particularly for those involving combat. 

(b) Infectious diseases pose one of the greatest threats in JUOs. Planning 

for dealing with large numbers of civilians (and casualties) should include measures to 

IV-40 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

protect friendly forces in the JOA from communicable diseases. Proper sanitation and 

preventive medicine, including animal, rodent, and pest control, should be considered. 

(c) Combat stress reactions are magnified in urban combat and require 

effective psychological prevention and management. Urban combat is mentally, 

physically, and emotionally exhausting, and the psychological effects on all participants 

(including health care personnel) can be devastating. While rapid treatment and/or 

removal from the combat area can often enable combatants to quickly return to duty, it 

may be more difficult to take these actions with scarce medical personnel. JFCs must 

plan for the timely recognition and treatment of psychological casualties among both 

combatants and health care personnel and arrange for replacement of affected personnel. 

PSYCHOLOGICAL CASUALTIES IN BEIRUT AND GROZNY 

Recent urban conflicts suggest that the psychological casualty rates 

are much higher in urban operations than in other types. The tempo 

and experience of urban operations is so intense that soldiers tend to 

“burn out” quickly. 

After-action assessments of Israeli Defense Force (IDF) performance 

during urban operations during the 1982 Lebanon war point out the 

difficulty the IDF had sustaining combat operations because of the 

high stress level urban combat imposed on individual soldiers. This 

observation is borne out by Israeli casualty figures: 10-24% of Israeli 

soldiers serving in Lebanon experienced psychological problems as a 

result of their battle experience. This, compared with a psychological 

casualty rate of only 3.5% to 5% in the 1973 war means that combat 

stress casualties suffered in Lebanon were two to five times more 

serious. 

After Russia’s 1994-1996 conflict with Chechnya, one medical survey 

found 72 percent of the soldiers screened had some sort of 

psychological disorder symptoms. Further, 46 percent of the soldiers 

exhibited asthenic depression (a weak, apathetic, or retarded motor 

state) and the other 26 percent exhibited psychotic reactions such as 

high states of anxiety, excitement or aggressiveness, and a 

deterioration of moral values or interpersonal relations. The statistics 

also revealed that the percentage of troops with combat stress 

disorders was higher than experienced during their 1980s war in 

Afghanistan. One of the primary differences was that, in Chechnya, 

Russian forces conducted combat mostly in cities rather than in 

mountains, valleys, and other rural areas. 

SOURCE: Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Urban Warfare Study: 

City Case Studies Compilation

(d) The physical terrain of urban areas may preclude vehicular or aerial 

evacuation of casualties. Consequently, units may require more litter bearers to move 

casualties to collection points where they can be further evacuated by ground or air 

 IV-41 
Chapter IV 

transport. Lengthy evacuation routes will increase the number of litter bearers required 

due to fatigue, so commanders may need to augment combat units with additional 

personnel to perform evacuation. Commanders and staff at all echelons must develop 

detailed medical evacuation plans, to include engineer support to clear routes for medical 

evacuation. The compartmented nature of the urban environment, transportation 

restrictions, communications difficulties, and the finite number of combat medics 

increases the demand for self-aid and buddy aid. Commanders should plan and train their 

units accordingly. 

(e) Civilian medical facilities that joint forces can use may be present in 

the urban area. However, it is likely that these facilities will not have the required 

capabilities to meet the medical needs of the local population. The joint force should 

include sufficient organic medical capability to treat its wounded, sick, and injured and 

either return them to duty or evacuate them from the theater or JOA. 

(9) Other support areas have particular requirements: 

(a) When local capabilities or operations of port or air facilities are 

insufficient, the JFC provides that capability. There also may exist a need to expand the 

capabilities of these ports of debarkation early in the deployment process. The JFC may 

also need to provide rail and road management and control within and perhaps outside the 

urban area itself in order to ensure efficient movement. 

(b) Basing and Sustainment. Sustainment activities for JUOs should be 

located close enough to the urban area to ensure provision of adequate support. Yet, if 

they are located within the urban area, they are subject to actions by the adversary and the 

local populace and to the difficulties inherent in the urban infrastructure. There may not 

be a single area that can house a complete base, and it may be necessary to construct 

smaller bases for specific types of support. Engineer reconnaissance, geospatial 

engineering, and early involvement of the joint force engineer are crucial to this element 

of mission planning. 

(c) The requirement to provide law enforcement and detainee operations 

can range from support only for the joint force to extensive support to the local 

government and populace. An increasingly likely scenario for a JUO is one in which 

local law enforcement is ineffective, and criminal elements pose a threat to the HN or the 

joint force. Significant law enforcement support may be required. 

See JP 3-63, Detainee Operations, for more information on the conduct of detainee 

operations.

(10) In some JUOs, the largest single operational task is the requirement to 

provide support to other nations, groups, and agencies. Actions in this area may 

include providing transportation support, security assistance to the HN, CMO, and 

interagency support and coordination to transition to civil administration. 

IV-42 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

c. Logistic Support to Civilians

(1) In JUOs, logistic elements may be employed in nonstandard tasks and in 

quantities disproportionate to their normal military roles. Part of the reason for this is the 

demands JUOs put on certain types of logistic support. Another factor is the 

concentration of civilians also requiring support. Logistic elements may have to support 

both military operations and civilians. They may precede other military units or be the 

only forces deployed, or they may have continuing responsibility after the departure of 

combat forces in support of multinational forces or NGOs and IGOs. 

(2) Logistic support to civilians will fall into one of four categories. It may 

comprise more than one, or even all, depending on the mission and the situation. This 

support is limited by applicable laws and regulations, and consultation with Service legal 

personnel is critical to assure compliance. These categories are as follows: 

(a) Support directly to civilians, such as the provision of food, water, 

shelter, and medical treatment. 

(b) Support that indirectly benefits civilians, such as the restoration of 

basic infrastructure and services. 

(c) Support to military and government organizations dealing with 

civilians, such as support of multinational forces, diplomatic missions, or government 

agencies. 

(d) Support to HN, NGOs, and IGOs, such as construction, warehousing, 

and distribution of supplies. 

(3) The density of civilians is the single greatest influence on logistic support. 

In JUOs, the concentration of civilians can add a considerable support requirement. 

Provision of support to civilians may be the primary focus of the operation. All core 

logistic capabilities — supply, maintenance operations, deployment and 

distribution, HSS, engineering, logistic services, and operational contract support — 

are likely to be taxed to support civilians in JUOs. The deployment and distribution 

capability supports the movement of forces and unit equipment during the movement 

phase of the deployment and redeployment processes, and supports materiel movement 

during the logistical sustainment of operations. Other services will probably include 

above-average requirements for such capabilities as waste disposal, contracting, mortuary 

services, and civil administration, to name but a few. 

(4) Increased outsourcing of joint logistics must be recognized. The civil 

augmentation programs (e.g., logistics civil augmentation program, Air Force contract 

augmentation program) and properly integrating contingency contractors authorized to 

accompany the force can significantly impact JUOs. 

 IV-43 
Chapter IV 

d. Health Service Support to Civilians

(1) The HSS mission is to conserve the fighting strength of the joint force and 

to provide the CCDR with a source of trained manpower. For combat operations, HSS 

focuses primarily on the treatment and evacuation of wounded and injured and the 

prevention and treatment of disease. The presence of large numbers of civilians, 

however, will probably require HSS units also to support the civilian populace to some 

degree in all JUOs within the limits of applicable laws and regulations. Assistance may 

be required at the same time as HSS for the engaged force. 

(2) In urban areas, joint force medical units will likely not have primary HSS 

responsibility, but will focus on furnishing assistance to the populace that the local 

government is not capable of providing. Local medical services may be nonexistent, or at 

least unable to provide sufficient care for the sick and injured. Relief agencies may or 

may not be able to alleviate the situation. Military HSS may be the only source of 

medical relief for civilians until other agencies and organizations are functioning. This 

assistance normally requires a great deal of interaction with HN services and authorities, 

government agencies, NGOs, and IGOs. 

For additional information on working with nonmilitary agencies, refer to JP 3-08, 

Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, and JP 4-02, Health Service 

Support. 

 (3) The health threat to civilians in urban areas is a combination of injuries 

resulting from combat (including terrorism), injuries and disease occurring naturally. Or 

lack of safe food and water. Because of the density of the population, civilian casualties 

will occur more frequently and in greater numbers than in other operational 

environments: weapons effects will injure more civilians; poor sanitation is more likely to 

cause endemic disease; infectious diseases will spread more quickly. As Figure IV-4 

indicates, certain civilian health threats are likely to occur in urban environments. 

 (4) The JFC should organize HSS elements based on the anticipated needs of 

both the joint force and the civilian populace, within the limits of applicable laws and 

regulations. HSS representatives should be members of all groups, centers, or teams 

concerned in any way with the civilian populace, such as the humanitarian assistance 

survey team, the humanitarian assistance coordination center, or the CMOC. In order to 

adequately anticipate civilian needs, health service planners must conduct a health service 

assessment that examines the factors listed in Figure IV-5. 

(5) Using the information developed in the HSS assessment, the HSS plan 

should consider factors significant to the urban area. 

IV-44 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

HEALTH THREATS TO CIVILIANS IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS

Infectious diseases

Extreme environmental conditions

Conventional warfare munitions

Biological warfare

Chemical warfare

Blast effect weapons

Flame and incendiary systems

Nuclear warfare

Directed-energy weapons

Radiological dispersal devices

Landmines and other explosive remnants of war

Unexploded Ordnance

Figure IV-4. Health Threats to Civilians in Urban Environments

HEALTH SERVICE ASSESSMENT FACTORS

Population demographics

Sanitation and personal hygiene

Endemic diseases

Available medical intelligence

Availability and accessibility of 

health care delivery systems and 

processes

Cultural factors related to health 

service support (HSS)

Primary care capabilities

General health of the population

Political impact of providing care 

to the local population

Anticipated type, number, and 

capabilities of relief organizations

Secondary and tertiary hospital 

facilities and supporting 

transportation

Local facilities for production of 

medical equipment and supplies

Education and training levels of 

HSS professionals and 

technicians

Figure IV-5. Health Service Assessment Factors 

 IV-45 
Chapter IV 

(a) Intent of the HSS to be provided to civilians. Is the intent to provide 

only minimal HSS to the civilian populace, or is nation assistance or FHA a primary 

mission? 

(b) Special restrictions on the medical care to be provided. Restrictions 

may be necessary because of a shortage of medical supplies, cultural considerations, 

financial or legal constraints, or an attempt to keep the level of care consistent with that 

normally provided by local health services. 

(c) Most immediate threats in urban area. Often, regardless of the major 

event precipitating HSS, the most immediate threats will result from extreme 

environmental conditions in the form of heat, cold, and high humidity. 

(d) Nature and behavior of the particular prevalent diseases. 

Communicable diseases spread more rapidly in densely populated urban areas, and any 

disruption in basic services increases the threat from serious communicable diseases. 

(e) Patient movement. The need for clear guidance concerning the 

medical evacuation and treatment of civilians is critical. Unless otherwise specifically 

authorized by the stated mission, force members will provide only emergency medical 

services to civilian casualties. Unless otherwise authorized, civilian casualties will be 

transferred to the nearest available civilian treatment facility when the medical condition 

is stabilized. 

(f) Required preventive medicine measures. Provision of safe water and 

food, immunizations, and prophylactic medications can reduce the chances of endemic 

diseases reaching epidemic proportions. 

(g) Medical logistic requirements. Whatever the anticipated level of HSS 

for civilians, the medical logistic requirements will be greater than those for the force 

only. Accurate logistic planning will reduce the likelihood of conflict between HSS 

requirements in support of the joint force and those in support of civilians. 

(6) All HSS units must have the capability to react quickly and decisively to a 

terrorist incident. Medical treatment facilities should have well-conceived mass casualty 

control plans and contingency support plans. These plans should consider the urban 

terrain, population densities, major roads, possible landing zones, location of all medical 

facilities, and reaction procedures. 

e. Personnel Service Support. Personnel support has several unique considerations 

in JUOs. The areas of replacement/rotation policies; morale, welfare, and recreation; 

contingency operation benefits and entitlements; medical returnees to duty; and casualty 

reporting take on added importance. Personnel augmentation and manning requirements, 

joint personnel reception and processing; joint personnel accountability and reporting; 

military postal services; and NEO may require emphasis. 

IV-46 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

f. Legal

(1) General. JUOs are likely to involve a myriad of unique legal and policy 

considerations. Because of the nature and complexity of the operational legal issues 

involved, (e.g., law of war, ROE, RUF, enemy prisoners of war/civilian internees,

dislocated civilians, negotiations and involvement with local and HN governments) the 

staff judge advocate (SJA) must be consulted early and frequently. 

For further information, see JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations. 

(2) Legal Considerations in JUOs. The large numbers of civilians potentially 

affected by a JUO are a major legal concern and increase the requirement for 

knowledgeable and active legal support to the joint force. Whether these civilians suffer 

the negative effects of urban combat or benefit from FHA, there are legal requirements 

and ramifications to every aspect of the operation. 

(3) Law of war imposes the obligation on the commander to evaluate all uses of 

force in light of certain principles. Four of the most important ones are: 

(a) Military Necessity. Authorizes that use of force required to 

accomplish the mission, but does not authorize acts otherwise prohibited by the law of 

war. 

(b) Unnecessary Suffering. In determining whether a means or method of 

warfare causes unnecessary suffering, the commander must balance the lawful force 

dictated by military necessity to achieve a military objective and the injury or damage 

that may be considered superfluous to achieving the stated or intended objective. 

(c) Distinction. This principle is fundamental to avoiding unnecessary 

suffering, and imposes the obligation to engage only in military operations the effects of 

which distinguish between the civilian population or individual civilians not taking a 

direct part in hostilities, and combatant forces, directing the application of force solely 

against the latter. Similarly, military force may be directed only against military objects 

or objectives, and not against civilian objects. 

(d) Proportionality. This principle requires the commander to weigh 

whether, in engaging in offensive or defensive operations, his actions may be expected to 

cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 

combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 

military advantage anticipated by those actions. 

(4) One of the major areas affected by the law of war is targeting. Military 

power may be directed only against an enemy nation’s ability to wage war, and not 

against its civilian population as such. Accordingly, the law of war authorizes the attack 

of military objectives, while prohibiting the intentional attack of the enemy civilian 

population as such, individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities, or civilian 

 IV-47 
Chapter IV 

objects. Military objectives are those objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or 

use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 

destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a 

definite military advantage. 

(5) The law of war and DOD policy prohibit or restrict the use of certain 

weapons such as landmines, booby traps, incendiary devices, and lasers specifically 

designed to cause permanent blindness. Some aspects of the law of war provisions are 

particularly relevant to JUOs and uses of these weapons must be part of the legal review 

conducted of all operation plans. 

(6) War crimes are violations of the law of war by any person or persons, 

military or civilian. A key to preventing war crimes by US or allied forces is awareness 

of the factors that have historically led to their commission. Several of these factors are 

frequent products of urban combat: 

(a) High friendly losses; 

(b) High turnover rate in the chain of command; 

(c) Dehumanization of the adversary; 

(d) Poorly trained or inexperienced troops; 

(e) The lack of a clearly defined adversary; 

(f) Unclear orders; and, 

(g) High frustration level among the troops. 

(7) The legal requirements and prohibitions regarding civilians are not found in 

a single legal source. Laws protecting civilians include a wide array of treaties, HN 

laws, agreements, and policy including the Hague Conventions and the four Geneva 

Conventions, that cover civilian protection. The SJA or legal advisor must examine the 

purpose and method of the operation to determine how and to what extent civilians might 

be affected. The SJA or legal advisor can then advise the commander on the legal 

ramifications of the operation and, more importantly, provide significant support as the 

specific ROE for the operation are developed. 

(8) ROE delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces 

will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Legal 

factors are but one element of the ROE; nonlegal issues such as national policy and 

political objectives also play an essential role in the drafting of ROE. Often the ROE will 

include some restrictions on weapons and targets, and provide the operational 

commander with guidelines to ensure the greatest possible protection of civilians 

consistent with military necessity. 

IV-48 JP 3-06 
Joint Functions 

(9) Other legal considerations applicable to JUOs fall into the area of 

administrative law, including environmental law, acquisition, claims, contracts, and fiscal 

law. These areas require knowledge of US and HN laws, international law, and USG 

regulations, and they are generally applicable to peacetime exercises and deployments as 

well as military operations. Special operations have unique legal issues that should be 

addressed by SJAs familiar not only with the law, but also with the nature and 

requirements of those operations. 

 IV-49 
Chapter IV 

IV-50 JP 3-06 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX A 

JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE 

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN URBAN AREAS 

A-1 

1. General 

a. JIPOE is a systematic approach used by intelligence organizations to produce 

intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the 

JFC’s decision-making process. The process is used to analyze the physical domains (air, 

land, maritime, and space); the information environment (which includes cyberspace); 

PMESII systems; and all other relevant aspects of the operational environment, and to 

determine an adversary’s capabilities to operate within that environment. 

b. The JIPOE process also emphasizes a holistic approach by analyzing both 

military and nonmilitary aspects of the operational environment that are relevant to the 

joint mission. This holistic approach enables JIPOE analysts to develop a general 

assessment of the adversary’s diplomatic, informational, military, economic, or cultural 

options. 

c. The JIPOE effort must be fully coordinated, synchronized, and integrated with the 

separate intelligence preparation of the battlespace efforts of the component commands 

and Service intelligence centers. All staff elements of the joint force and component 

commands participate in the JIPOE effort by providing information and data relative to 

their staff areas of expertise. 

d. The JFC evaluates the urban operational environment to determine the 

implications for military operations. This evaluation extends from complex terrain 

considerations to the even more complex impact of the sheer number of actors operating 

in an urban operational environment. There may be adversary military troops, criminal 

gangs, vigilantes, and paramilitary factions operating among the civilian population. The 

situation may be further complicated by the presence of nonmilitary government 

departments and agencies, to include intelligence, law enforcement, and other specialized 

entities or religious/social influencers and cultural norms/expectations. Crucial to 

planning operations that will be conducted in an urban environment is the understanding 

gained by both JIPOE and mission analysis. 

e. JIPOE must particularly consider the impact of the civilians, whose normal - 

though potentially significant - activities and presence in the urban area may be 

substantial and dynamic. The availability of highly trained individuals who 

understand the culture and the language will prove indispensable to commanders at 

all levels in sorting out combatants and civilians. Determining the ethnic and religious 

composition of the population and, if possible, their intent (e.g., to flee or remain in the 

urban areas, to remain neutral, or support one side of the conflict) may prove crucial. 

Human behavior is difficult to predict and control on a mass scale; to do so with persons 

of a different culture under the strains of conflict is a significant requirement of any JUO. 

For example, combat may drive agricultural workers from the surrounding areas into the 

perceived shelter of the urban environment, which may leave fields unattended. The 

consequence may contribute to famine and the spread of diseases, further stress limited 

service capabilities, create more crime, and exacerbate cultural tensions. These potential 
Appendix A 

consequences highlight the need for more intelligence capabilities in an urban setting, 

specifically the importance of HUMINT. 

f. JIPOE for a JUO will likely require inputs, collaboration and dialogue with 

numerous agencies, some of which are not only external to DOD but the USG as well. 

Joint forces must have the technical capability and the operational acumen to use multisource information and intelligence fusion, rapid analysis, and dissemination down to the 

lowest level. Before and during hostilities within the theater, ground, airborne, maritime, 

and space-based ISR assets may bridge the information gap often present in an enclosed 

and quickly changing environment such as the urban environment. 

g. The densities of urban areas present numerous challenges for the intelligence 

analyst because the same factors that complicate the operational aspects of JUOs—the 

terrain, infrastructure, and population—also stress the existing methods of collection, 

intelligence analysis, and decision making. Unique urban attributes generate large 

quantities of information that challenge existing JIPOE techniques. For JIPOE to remain 

effective for a JUO, its analysis must include a city’s unique attributes—buildings, 

infrastructure, and people—along with an evaluation of the attributes traditionally 

included in JIPOE, namely, the underlying terrain and the known threat. 

2. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Process for Joint 

Operations in an Urban Environment 

a. In JUOs, tactical level detail often has operational or strategic significance. 

Therefore, JIPOE support to JUOs must provide a finer degree of detail than would be 

required of operations over a broader operational area. JIPOE products (e.g., modified 

combined obstacle overlays, doctrinal templates, situation templates, and event 

templates) should be tailored to the situation, but should follow the general formats 

prescribed in JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

Recognizing what is unknown and adapting guidance to units based on these gaps in 

information are fundamental to the effectiveness of the ever-ongoing JIPOE process. 

JIPOE support to JUOs follows the basic four-step process outlined below. 

b. Define the Operational Environment

(1) The procedures for delineating an urban area of operations (AO) are 

fundamentally differ little from those used for other terrain; however, the elements 

considered in each may be both more numerous and more complex. Analysis in support 

of JUOs is often more complicated than when the mission involves a readily identified 

enemy on open terrain. Specified, implied, and essential tasks may be very 

heterogeneous and will often include such diverse responsibilities as combat actions 

directed against the enemy, support activities to ensure that civilians do not needlessly 

suffer, and stability requirements only marginally related to the maneuver and combat 

support demands. This may result in a greater number of specified and implied tasks. 

Picking out the essential tasks from this mass becomes especially difficult. In addition, 

actions taken by a friendly or opposing unit can lead to several unintended consequences. 

A-2 JP 3-06 
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 

Operational Environment in Urban Areas 

 A-3 

The 1968 fighting in Hue, for instance, caused large numbers of South Vietnamese 

civilians to seek refuge with their American allies, placing unanticipated demands on US 

logistics and tactical units. The Marine Corps has articulated such possibilities in its 

“three-block war” concept: three adjacent city blocks may simultaneously present a 

commander with combat, stability, and support taskings. Mission articulation needs to 

balance these myriad demands with unit capabilities when defining areas of operation. 

(2) Other attributes may be similarly complicated during JUOs. The enemy can 

include a recognizably uniformed adversary, but threat analysis will also have to review 

many civilian, police, and paramilitary groups. Some of these will favor the enemy, 

others friendly forces, while yet others will seek only to be left alone by opposing 

factions. Even this too simply states the probable state of affairs. Groups are fickle in 

their favoritism. Their dispositions may repeatedly change in response to propaganda, 

bribes, coercion, or other pressures. Further, demographic groups are by no means 

homogeneous in their support; a clan aligned with one side may well have members with 

agendas diverging from those of their leaders. 

(3) Terrain includes not only the natural surface confronted during any military 

undertaking, but also the aforementioned structures on it, beneath it, and the 

infrastructure throughout. Building construction type will influence the force needed for 

a particular mission and the type of equipment required. Yet analysis must delve far 

deeper than simple identification of a feature’s characteristics. The number of such 

features per unit space (density) and the density of features within features (e.g., rooms 

within apartments within an apartment building) will similarly have a significant 

influence on the quantity and composition of a force selected for a given urban mission. 

In addition, there might exist a single street, avenue, or boulevard that might be assigned 

as its own AO because of buildings of religious, governmental, or cultural importancesuch as LeLoi Street in Hue or Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, DC. 

(4) The forces available for actions in built-up areas cannot be determined using 

traditional force design; the number of tasks and varied terrain may demand extraordinary 

force ratios, nontraditional force structures, or other adjustments. The time necessary for 

a JUO cannot be extrapolated from that needed to maneuver on less-complex terrain. 

The urban topography increases the overall surface area that the proposed mission will 

involve; intersections and multiple layers of “ground” increase the number of fronts that 

drain a unit of men, materiel, and time. Finally, civilians complicate matters not only 

from the perspective of threat as noted above, but also from that of the support they 

require to survive, the constraints their presence imposes on friendly force firepower 

employment, and the need to coordinate with agencies seeking to assist those in need. 

The density of the population will impact on the tactics, techniques, and procedures 

(TTP) most appropriate for a mission, as it will on the demand for food, water, medical 

care, and the likelihood of epidemics. Whereas rural environments generally contain 

fairly homogeneous social groups, the requirements for cultural awareness in towns and 

cities are complicated by the multiplicity of indigenous and international demographic 

factions. In short, buildings, infrastructure, and diverse populations tend to introduce 

intricacies into every element of the process of defining the AO. 
Appendix A 

(5) Compared to other types of operations, civilian considerations have a 

disproportionately large influence on JUOs. Social and cultural awareness is essential to 

helping see and understand the city as its residents understand it. An educated 

perspective assists in identifying key features of the population and terrain. What are the 

defining social characteristics? Do the apparent instruments of control (police, 

politicians) represent the people or some other interest group? How are the 

neighborhoods configured? Are they segregated by physical or ethnic boundaries? What 

are the true sources of power and influence in the area of concern? Answers to these 

kinds of questions will lead to better understanding of the urban environment. 

(6) Figure A-1 provides several sample questions that might be asked during the 

AO and AOI definition processes. The MCIA 2700-002-03, Urban Generic Information 

Requirements Handbook, includes other questions of potential value during analysis for 

the first step of the JIPOE process. 

ILLUSTRATIVE QUESTIONS FOR DEFINING THE AREA

OF OPERATIONS AND AREA OF INTEREST

What types of buildings are in the proposed area of operations 

(AO)?

What is the interrelationship between the infrastructure in the 

proposed AO and that in other operational areas?

Are there clear demographic boundaries that have a greater 

influence on mission success than do readily identifiable physical 

boundaries?

How can the AO be defined to ease coordination between the unit 

and representatives of key demographic or governmental groups?

How are demographic groups structured within the AO?

Are there unique or culturally salient buildings within the area of 

concern?

Are there particular buildings or areas that are currently contested 

among different demographic groups?

Are there significant streets, avenues, or boulevards that contain key 

buildings of government, religious, or cultural interest?

Figure A-1. Illustrative Questions for Defining the Area of Operations and Area of 

Interest 

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(7) The vertical character of the AO, indeterminable via most overhead 

imagery, could dramatically influence helicopter and tiltrotor aircraft operations. 

Pending determination of whether rotary-wing support is feasible, an assigned AO may 

have to be drawn to include additional ground-level LOCs. 

(8) Urban Area(s) of Interest. Urban AOIs are geographic areas from which 

information and intelligence are required to plan and execute successful operations. 

Traditional JIPOE usually limits the AOI to geographical areas from which the threat has 

the ability to jeopardize friendly force mission accomplishment. Urban AOIs must 

encompass more than this. Urban architecture, social and physical infrastructure, and 

populations are entities linked by physical, economic, political, social, and cultural ties. 

The delineation of urban AOIs must consider how these many links can influence 

mission accomplishment within the AO. 

(a) Building design and physical infrastructure may influence AOI 

definition. Street layout, LOS into and out of the AO, and subterranean access are three 

possible considerations of importance. Designation of nodal AOIs (those noncontiguous 

to the AO) may also be warranted. Monitoring local fire stations, police headquarters, 

religious centers, and the like could provide information on civil readiness and pending 

crises. Information on such areas could also explain what might mistakenly appear to be 

activities of potential concern, such as sudden movements of large numbers of the 

indigenous population due to a pending sports event. 

(b) Urban infrastructure more clearly demonstrates the need to consider 

geographically distant or disconnected components of the AOI. Electrical wires, water 

treatment and supply systems, and media outlets are among the elements to consider. Is 

the electricity used within the AO generated in a distant area? Are there other means of 

energy transmission? Is electricity necessary for mission accomplishment? Are there 

antennas or transmission elements outside of the AO that can influence those within it? 

(c) Population groups complicate the AOI definition not only because of 

their widespread interrelationships, but also because of their mobility. Citizens residing 

in the AO may move to another area for reasons as straightforward as commuting to work 

or for less savory purposes that have significant mission implications. NGOs may 

deliberately or inadvertently influence civilian actions in ways that could likewise 

concern a military force. These organizations’ activities are the result of decisions made 

both locally and at headquarters that may be thousands of miles distant. There may be a 

need to monitor these decisions if they could impact friendly force operations. Insurgent 

groups, organized crime elements, and other potential threats may receive support from 

diaspora or other entities in networks that channel funds, weapons, or other resources to 

groups within the AO. Recognizing and monitoring such relationships could be critical 

to both local operations and those distant from the AO. 

(d) The presence of media is also important to consider when delineating 

the AOI. Television, radio signals, the Internet, and other forms of media can all connect 

the AO with nonadjacent outside areas. The media can affect the PA and IO component 
Appendix A 

of any mission as critically as the physical component. Being able to identify means of 

transmission and possible audiences to any kind of mission becomes a key component of 

defining an AOI for an operation in an urban environment. 

(9) Obviously the scope of influences pertinent to a unit’s mission can 

potentially overwhelm its limited information-collection and processing capabilities. 

Barring the addition of supplemental assets, commanders and their staffs will have to 

focus on issues of notable importance while relegating the others to a lower priority. 

Ultimately the discrimination will depend on two questions: 

(a) Could the issue under consideration influence actions in the AO so as to 

demonstrably affect mission accomplishment? 

(b) If so, how? 

(c) Answering these questions will assist in identifying second- and higherorder effects of decisions and actions, a key element in properly defining the AOI. 

c. Describe the impact of the operational environment. The urban operational 

environment contains significant differences from other environments. These differences 

include more complex physical terrain, concentrated infrastructure, and relatively dense 

population. JIPOE analysts help develop a holistic view of the operational environment 

by analyzing the physical and nonphysical aspects of the operational environment, and by 

developing a systems perspective of relevant PMESII links and nodes. This step begins 

with the identification and analysis of all militarily significant existing and projected 

characteristics of the operational environment. These characteristics are then analyzed to 

determine their impact on the capabilities and broad COAs of both adversary and friendly 

forces. Products developed during this step might include, but are not limited to, 

overlays and matrices that depict the military impact of geography, meteorological 

factors, demographics, and the information environment. Other products may include 

network analysis diagrams associated with adversary and neutral PMESII and other 

systems. 

(1) Because of a population’s ability to affect a military operation in a variety of 

ways, analysis should place a primary focus on the city’s inhabitants. With a better 

understanding of the people who drive urban activity, analysis of other urban features 

such as building and infrastructure can be better focused to address the unit’s mission and 

the needs of the people. 

(2) Population Analysis. Accommodating the social fabric of a city is 

potentially the most influential factor in the conduct of a JUO. The fastest way to 

damage the legitimacy of an operation is to ignore or violate social mores or precepts of a 

particular population. Any discussion of a city’s population requires a two-pronged 

approach. Developing a clear picture of a city’s population requires delineating its 

primary attributes, such as age, wealth, gender, ethnicity, religion, and employment 

statistics. Collecting this information and reporting its significance is considered 

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demographic analysis. The second component, cultural intelligence, describes the 

process by which cultural information—food preferences, mores, values, relationships 

and rivalries between particular groups, to name a few—is incorporated with 

demographic information to uncover the underlying characteristics of the population that 

the unit will face. Demographic analysis describes the physical characteristics of a 

population group, while cultural intelligence helps explain the behavior and moral 

characteristics of a population group. 

(3) Demographic Analysis and Cultural Intelligence. Demographic analysis 

seeks to characterize population groups and subgroups within a commander’s operational 

area. Both the MCIA 2700-002-03, Urban Generic Information Requirements 

Handbook, and Army FM 2-91.4, Intelligence Support to Urban Operations, provide 

useful checklists of the factors that should be considered when conducting demographic 

analysis. Using these lists, the analyst can create pictures—often in the form of 

templates, overlays, or descriptions—of a city’s key societal characteristics. They 

delineate the critical factors that define each population group and show where 

differences exist. Some examples are: population status overlay, congregation points 

overlay, building type overlay, traffic conditions, times and locations, nocturnal and 

diurnal conditions, and overlay of most likely threat locations. 

(a) These tools only generate a picture of a city based on static information. 

They do not necessarily describe the population as a thinking component of the 

operational area, nor do they attribute any type of dynamism or reactiveness to the 

people. Often, the joint operation planning process might require a more in-depth 

understanding of the population. How demographic traits influence the population’s 

actions, expectations, and relationships with other groups within the AO, associated AOI, 

and operational environment might be critical to maintaining stability within the host 

city. This information might also prove useful in establishing legitimacy or obtaining 

allegiance from populations. It will be critical for some IO efforts; without cultural 

understanding, a PSYOP mission, for example, might be completely ineffective. 

(b) Understanding a culture means more than knowing the habits, likes and 

dislikes of a neighborhood’s inhabitants; it means making a concerted effort to explain 

the underlying value system which informs these actions, and thus provide the JFC with a 

greater awareness of how the local populace will affect and be affected by operations. It 

augments demographic analysis by describing how demographic traits and relationships 

between groups can act, or have already acted, to stabilize or destabilize conditions. 

Some examples of cultural intelligence tools include: lists and timelines of salient 

cultural and political events, culture description or cultural comparison charts or matrices, 

a line of confrontation overlay or matrix, a culturally significant structures overlay, 

“power” templates, and a status quo ante bellum overlay. 

(4) There are two additional cultural intelligence products that seek to assist in 

developing a deeper understanding of how the population within the operational area can 

actively affect the ongoing operation. Both are dynamic tools—they should be constantly 

updated to measure changing conditions. These products are also introduced in very 
Appendix A 

simplified form, for use in any type of operation. They can be modified, refined, 

augmented, and automated to suit the more sophisticated needs of intelligence or law 

enforcement agencies. 

(a) Relationship Matrices. Relationship matrices are intended to depict 

the nature of relationships between elements of the operational area. The elements can 

include members from the civilian population, the friendly force, IGOs, and an 

adversarial group. Utility infrastructure, significant buildings, and media might also be 

included. The nature of the relationship between two or more components includes 

measures of contention, collusion, or dependency. The purpose of this product is to 

demonstrate graphically how each component of the city interacts with the others and 

whether these interactions promote or degrade the likelihood of mission success. The 

relationships represented in the matrix can also begin to help the analysts in deciphering 

how to best use the relationship to help shape the environment. 

For an example of a relationship matrix, see FM 2-91.4, Intelligence Support to Urban 

Operations. 

(b) Perception Assessment Matrices. Perception is the interpretation of 

sensory input from seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, or touching. Perception is also 

influenced by physiological capacities, frames of reference, learning, past experiences, 

and cultural and social environments. Friendly force activities intended to be benign or 

benevolent might have negative results if a population’s perceptions are not first 

investigated and subsequently measured or managed. This is true because perceptions—

more than reality—drive decisionmaking and in turn could influence the reactions of 

entire populations. The perception assessment matrix seeks to provide some measure of 

effectiveness for the unit’s ability to maintain legitimacy during an operation. In this 

sense, the matrix can also be used to directly measure the effectiveness of the unit’s CA, 

PA, and PSYOP efforts. 

For an example of a perception assessment matrix, see FM 2-91.4, Intelligence Support 

to Urban Operations. 

1. Perception can work counter to operational objectives. Perceptions 

should therefore be assessed both before and throughout an operation. Although it is not 

possible to read the minds of the population, there are several means to measure its 

perceptions. 

a. Demographic analysis and cultural intelligence are key 

components of perception analysis. 

b. Understanding a population’s history can help predict 

expectations and reactions. 

c. HUMINT can provide information on population perceptions. 

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d. Reactions and key activities can be carefully observed in order 

to decipher whether people act based on real conditions or perceived conditions. 

e. Editorial and opinion pieces of relevant newspapers can be 

monitored for changes in tone or opinion shifts that can steer or may be reacting to the 

opinions of a population group. 

2. Perception assessment matrices aim to measure the disparities 

between friendly force actions and what population groups perceive. In addition to trying 

to assess the perceptions of each population group within an operational area, it might 

serve the interests of the unit to assess its own perceptions of its activities. Are members 

of the unit exhibiting decidedly Western or American values that are not appreciated by 

the HN population? Are embedded American beliefs preventing the unit from 

understanding the HN population or its coalition partners? Is what the intelligence and 

command staff is perceiving really what is going on in the operational area? Does the 

population believe what the unit believes? Is there something that is part of the 

population’s (or a subgroup’s) perception that can be detrimental to the unit? All these 

questions can begin to be addressed by the unit’s scrutinizing its view of an operation. 

(5) Multinational, NGO, and IGO Analysis. Given the scope of US alliances, 

the likelihood that US forces will work side by side with forces of other nations during 

any type of operation is virtually guaranteed. Humanitarian obligations also necessitate 

the presence of NGOs and IGOs to assist the local populace. During domestic 

operations, soldiers will work alongside local police officers, firefighters, National Guard 

troops, and other actors not inherent to their unit. 

(a) Civilian actors can be beneficial sources of HN cultural information. 

During the 1999 fighting in Kosovo, the Red Cross provided the most accurate figures on 

the number of Kosovo refugees, helping US and other coalition services to estimate the 

appropriate level of support required to handle their needs. Civilian agencies also 

develop a network of influential contacts, compile historical and specialty archives, and 

establish relationships with local leaders and business people. They understand the 

infrastructure of the region, and the political and economic influences. International aid 

organizations sometimes keep up-to-date web sites with maps and pertinent information 

on local and regional areas that could be of potential value to military planners. 

(b) Partners in a coalition environment have different capabilities, 

procedures, doctrine, ROE, and methods of disclosing information. These differences 

can be at once frustrating and useful. For instance, soldiers of the United Kingdom and 

United States working side by side in Bosnia had different methods of collecting and 

sharing intelligence. This frustrated intelligence analysts’ ability to work as a cohesive 

group but provided HUMINT resources to the United States that would not otherwise 

have been available. 

(c) Multinational, NGO, and IGO analysis should seek to list all the key 

similarities and differences among all groups in an operational area. Population status 
Appendix A 

overlays or relationship matrices that contain categories like ROE, information-sharing 

capabilities, aid resources, and other pieces of relevant information can be constructed to 

evaluate each of the nonorganic actors with which the joint force is dealing. A 

relationship matrix focusing on how the United States relates to each nonorganic actor 

and ways in which those actors might pursue relationships with members of the 

population will also be helpful in determining how coalition members, NGOs, the media, 

and other participants could influence the mission. A matrix containing each NGO’s 

capabilities, location, and relationships will assist both operators and intelligence 

analysts. 

(6) Urban Weather Analysis. Along with typical weather patterns, cities have 

their own microclimates that can affect operations. Dust, smog, wind channeling, night 

illumination, and sun reflection off buildings are all conditions that could alter a unit’s 

normal TTP. These conditions are often transitory or initiated by friendly force actions. 

Dust plumes from helicopters are one example. There are certain conditions related to 

natural occurrences that, although not necessarily weather-related, fit most logically into 

the weather analysis category. For instance, certain cities, or parts of a city, may have a 

particular odor that can distract the soldier. A product used to map the path this odor 

generally follows might better prepare the soldier for the potential distraction. This same 

logic can be used to track how hazardous gases can disperse in the atmosphere, or how a 

fire might spread. Therefore, in addition to the weather products that are traditionally 

created for all types of operations, some that are specifically adapted to accommodate 

urban weather effects must also be constructed. Considerations that might be included in 

urban weather analysis are: 

(a) Dust clouds created by helicopter or tiltrotor aircraft blades kicking up 

the dirt from the street, inhibiting troop movement and deployment. 

(b) Extreme heat from being confined to small places or from the sun 

reflecting off asphalt may also hamper troop effectiveness. 

(c) The city’s effect on night operations may also be significant. The extra 

luminescence provided by the ambient light of the city may neutralize the perceived 

advantage of US night vision technology. In addition, residents of the city are familiar 

with its layout and can maneuver easily in darkness. 

(d) Smog inversion layers are common over cities. An inversion layer may 

trap dust, smoke, and chemicals in the air that can be detrimental to the health of soldiers. 

If the conditions are severe enough, protective gas masks may be needed during some 

types of operations. Weather analysis products for urban JIPOE are similar to those for 

traditional JIPOE but should include these peculiarities. 

(7) Terrain and Infrastructure. The analysis must consider the following 

factors: 

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(a) Urban terrain: building construction, subterranean features, and 

physical layout and subdivisions of the urban area. 

(b) Infrastructure

1. Key facilities, (e.g., CBRN - related: pharmaceutical, chemical, 

nuclear). 

2. Critical urban services (e.g., schools, municipal buildings). 

3. Power plants (e.g., nuclear, conventional, hydroelectric). 

4. Water system (e.g., dams, reservoirs, aqueducts, pumping stations). 

5. Sewage and waste disposal. 

6. Medical facilities. 

7. Communications lines and nodes. 

8. Ports and harbors. 

9. Airfields. 

10. Helicopter landing zones. 

11. Roadways. 

12. Railways and rail yards. 

13. Bridges. 

14. Subways. 

15. Civil defense shelters. 

16. Petroleum and natural gas lines and storage facilities. 

17. Resources and material production. 

(c) Surrounding environs: sources of electric power generation (e.g., dams, 

nuclear power plants), sources of food and water, and base camps or support areas for 

insurgents. 

(d) Adjoining countries’ terrain and airspace restrictions. 
Appendix A 

d. Evaluate the Adversary. In JUOs, the adversary could be greatly different from 

an adversary normally associated with operations in nonurban environments. The third 

step in the JIPOE process identifies and evaluates the adversary’s military and relevant 

objectives, civil COG, their critical factors, limitations, and the doctrine, TTP employed 

by adversary forces, absent any constraints that may be imposed by the operational 

environment. During this step, models are developed that accurately portray how 

adversary forces normally execute military operations or how they have reacted to 

specific military situations in the past. Adversaries may choose to make widespread use 

of snipers, ambushes, and HUMINT networks, and may choose to deliberately avoid 

decisive engagements. 

(1) The Challenge of Threat Evaluation for JUOs. The people, buildings, 

and infrastructure in an urban area inhibit straightforward threat evaluation by obscuring 

both threat identity and threat capabilities, and by introducing myriad other influences 

that may negatively, positively, or benignly influence friendly force operations. There is 

also a multitude of such possible threats and influences. A variety of active, passive, and 

latent population elements can potentially influence friendly and enemy (if present) force 

operations in any type of urban mission. Being able to assess the level of threat or 

opportunity each element imposes is fundamental to mission success. 

(2) The greater density and multiple interrelationships of individuals found in 

built-up areas increase the complexity of categorization. Nevertheless, for the purposes 

of planning, force protection, and conducting operations it is necessary to have a way to 

place each group on a continuum that effectively depicts “threatening” and 

“nonthreatening” sectors of the population. 

(3) The effort is not a one-time undertaking. The categorization will require 

constant review. Groups and individuals can be cajoled, forced, or co-opted into 

providing or withholding services to either the friendly or opposing force. The posture of 

groups, and members within groups, should therefore be considered variable. 

(4) Even seemingly passive and law-abiding members of a populace may 

conduct themselves in unexpected ways given the right conditions. During the Los 

Angeles riots of 1992, for example, looting and destruction of property was perpetrated 

by otherwise law-abiding citizens. The opportunistic nature of conditions is one cause of 

this phenomenon. Instability, the breakdown of legal authority, and the chance to 

immerse oneself in the protective environment of a crowd are all conditions that stimulate 

such behavior. All are conditions frequently apparent during operations in urban areas. 

(5) Population groups or individuals can unwittingly interfere with operations 

and thereby increase friendly force exposure. Refugee flows and members of the media 

have already been used as examples of how people can impede friendly force actions by 

merely doing what is necessary for their own well-being. 

(6) Groups or individuals can also be manipulated by either the friendly or 

opposing force, by other parties, or by events themselves. Such manipulation may be 

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with or without the knowledge of the subjects influenced. A captured opponent asked to 

provide HUMINT is an example of the former circumstance; the use of PSYOP or CAO 

to influence the activity of a population exemplifies the latter. 

(7) These and other challenges require modification of JIPOE traditional step 

three. Step three for a JUO must first identify the elements, human and otherwise, that 

can harm, interfere with, or otherwise significantly influence friendly force activities. 

Once identified, the most mission-significant elements can be prioritized for fuller 

evaluation. Others can be handled as time allows. Step three should include the 

following: 

(a) An identification phase in which all population groups and subgroups 

are arrayed along a continuum denoting their interests relative to the friendly force (or to 

each other). Entities that can threaten, interfere with, or otherwise significantly influence 

operations are noted for further evaluation. 

(b) A prioritization of these entities based on the degree to which they can 

impact mission accomplishment. 

(c) Evaluation that includes TTP perhaps not generally encountered in 

other environments. 

(8) Urban Adversary and Relevant Influences Evaluation. Strategies and 

tactics, typically labeled “asymmetric,” can take a variety of forms; from no-tech and 

low-tech approaches to high-tech. These adversaries may have no known doctrine. What 

can be known about them is what can be gained from the lessons-learned literature and 

recent journalistic accounts of urban battles, some of which is listed below. This 

information is meant to be illustrative, not comprehensive. It can be used as a starting 

point in identifying the ways that an adversary might fight in an urban environment. 

Clearly, the modern urban adversary does not rely entirely on maneuver warfare to win 

battles—his technological inferiority and the nature of the terrain do not allow it. This 

fact makes it very difficult to identify high value targets associated with adversary tactics. 

There may be no key C2 node to target. Frequently there is no flank against which to 

advance. The intelligence analyst needs to determine ways to neutralize tactics such as 

those described below; related high value targets and COGs may be as nontraditional as 

are the tactics themselves. 

EXAMPLES OF ENEMY URBAN WARFARE TACTICS, STRATEGIES, AND 

WEAPONS 

Units tend to be small, somewhat autonomous groups that require limited 

guidance and intergroup communication. 

Decentralization of Chechen command and control created difficulties for 

the Russians during both battles for Grozny. Chechen groups employed 

varied and nontraditional tactics, at times deliberately, in other instances 
Appendix A 

because small-unit leaders were adapting to situations they had failed to 

foresee. 

Weapon systems tend to be small and portable. 

A typical urban threat arsenal might contain rifles, rocket-propelled 

grenades (RPGs), and other anti-tank weapons. Employing such weapons 

requires little preliminary training or logistical support, but they can be 

extremely effective. Urban canyons and close quarters make these handheld weapons all the more effective. Chechen hunter-killer RPG teams 

were fundamental to neutralizing the Russian armor threat in Grozny. 

Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies are common. 

Scanners, mobile TV equipment, jammers, radios, and computers help a 

less sophisticated force in its efforts to close the technological gap 

between itself and a regular military organization. Adversaries confronted 

in Mogadishu, Chechnya, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and Kosovo all made 

use of COTS technologies. 

Tactics include kidnappings, swarming, raids, ambushes, and the use of 

snipers, assassinations, and booby traps. 

The Provisional Irish Republican Army, Chechens, and Colombian guerillas 

are all known to have used these tactics. An important element in their 

employment is the psychological effect they have on the adversary. That 

an attack can come from any one of five directions—above, below, from the 

side, front, or behind—increases the degree of mental stress. 

Urban adversaries battle for hearts and minds through the use of 

information, disinformation, propaganda, and manipulation of the press. 

Information operations are increasingly critical to the urban adversary. 

Because he is striking at the US will to fight, one of the asymmetric 

adversary’s primary methods is to use information warfare tactics. They 

are relatively cheap and nonlethal. It is generally accepted that Russia lost 

the information warfare battle during the first Grozny invasion. Media were 

allowed almost unlimited access to the fighting. As a result, Russian 

public support for the fighting was low. During the second campaign, 

media personnel were restricted from entering the operational area and 

were given stories approved by Russian military or government officials. 

Domestic support for the Russians was markedly improved as a result. 

Thwarting the high-technology assets of a Western force is sought via lowtech or no-tech means. 

During the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air strikes on 

Kosovo, the Serbs used smoke and other methods to disrupt precisionguided munitions engagements. In Mogadishu, unarmed civilians 

employed kites in attempts to down American helicopters. 

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The restrictions placed on friendly force activities by treaties, laws of land 

warfare, and rules of engagement are frequently exploited. 

The Chechens positioned a command post in a hospital, demonstrating 

their disregard for international law. Dropping live power lines over 

roadways or poisoning water supplies to create panic are other examples 

of how terror can be used by those who consider themselves 

unencumbered by Geneva Convention and other standards. 

Psychological operations (PSYSOP) deception, Civil Affairs, and Public 

Affairs are often employed. 

The two battles for Grozny offer considerable anecdotal evidence of 

PSYOP and deception use. The Chechens altered Russian operations by 

giving commands in Russian on their enemy’s radio nets. Chechens fired 

from behind the hanging bodies (alive or dead) of Russian soldiers and 

booby trapped Russian wounded. Carlos Marighella, in his treatise the 

Minimanual for the Urban Guerilla, instructs his readers to undermine the 

psyche of the more advanced enemy. 

Adversaries use the three-dimensional character of urban terrain to their 

advantage—operating from all four sides, above, and below. 

The Chechens often secured the top floors of buildings in Grozny. Once 

Russian soldiers entered the building, the Chechens would begin firing 

through the floor. 

Adversaries use the interconnectedness of the city to exploit nodal 

capabilities. 

Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic recently demonstrated the power 

of this capability. “By ingenuity, discreet purchases and some help from 

its neighbors, Milosevic’s government has kept electricity flowing despite 

NATO’s high-tech strikes against distribution grids.” In addition, 

“transnational communities, or diasporas, are taking on new importance. 

Diasporas provide money, arms, fighters and leaders to their ancestral 

groups struggling for freedom.” 

SOURCE: 

Street Smart Intelligence: Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban 

Operations 

e. Determine and Describe Potential Adversary Courses of Action. COA 

development for JIPOE in an urban environment, the fourth step, follows the same 

procedures as traditional JIPOE. Rather than just consider the enemy, however, COA 

development considerations must be made for each relevant population group. The final 

step of urban JIPOE should seek to develop a COA for groups that are potential threats, 

as well as a COA for groups that might act together against the joint force. COA should 

also be developed for groups that do not at the outset appear to be threatening but might, 
Appendix A 

because of a series of events, become involved in activities that could impact the overall 

mission of the unit. The following factors should be considered when determining 

possible adversary COAs in urban environments. 

(1) Identify each population group’s desired end state. The interests and 

intentions of each of the population elements, identified in step three of urban JIPOE, can 

help to define the desired end state for each of the identified relevant populations. This 

information is derived from cultural intelligence, HUMINT, media analysis, and other 

sources. 

(2) Work backward, from end state to initiation point, to develop COAs for 

each non-US actor. For this step, deriving the capabilities and intentions of each relevant 

population group will assist in developing COAs and identifying their associated named 

AOIs and target AOIs. The capabilities matrix in conjunction with the relationship 

matrix can be used to help build a COA for each relevant group. An additional technique 

involves analysis of COAs that seem unlikely. Start with an assumption that an 

unexpected event has actually occurred. Then, work backward to explain how this could 

have happened. This will help develop a list of COAs that may not otherwise have been 

considered. These techniques can generate a COA for each population group. In 

addition, when evaluating a known adversary for a combat operation, they can be used in 

conjunction with any analysis of known and supposed tactics of the adversarial force to 

create enemy COAs. The following sample questions can assist when developing these 

COAs. 

(a) Does the population element in question have all of the capabilities 

required to complete the COA? 

(b) Does the population element have the capability to make the United 

States or other population elements resident in the AO believe that it can complete the 

proposed COA? 

(c) Does the population element know of its inherent capability, or is the 

capability something that can unwittingly affect operations? 

(d) How is each of the capabilities going to be integrated in order to 

achieve the desired end state? 

(e) Are there several different ways to integrate capabilities to achieve the 

desired end state? 

(f) What are the interests of the relevant groups? Can they be shaped by 

the friendly or adversarial force? Have they been shaped already? 

(g) What are the friendly force critical vulnerabilities? Which population 

groups are aware of these critical vulnerabilities? 

A-16 JP 3-06 
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 

Operational Environment in Urban Areas 

 A-17 

(h) What are the known tactics of the adversary? 

(3) Analyzing the Higher-Order Effects. COA development too rarely 

considers how activities—friendly force, enemy, or civilian—might produce unintended 

consequences. The likelihood of such second- and higher-order effects are of notable 

concern in urban environments. The increased density of individuals, infrastructure, and 

buildings means that a given action is more likely to have unintended consequences; 

further, those consequences will be more widely felt and their impact will spread in less 

time than in other environments. For instance, a broken sewer pipe or chemical spill in 

the middle of town can immediately disrupt traffic flow over several square kilometers 

and threaten an outbreak of disease or other problems rapidly spread by citizens or 

contaminated materials moving about the city. Spillage of the waste can poison the water 

supply, relied upon by thousands or tens of thousands within a few kilometers of the spill. 

A military force manned with engineer, transport, and medical personnel sufficient only 

to care for its own soldiers could find itself quickly overwhelmed by the need to repair 

the break, coordinate delivery of fresh water, and treat those who might have been 

affected. 

(a) Determining the higher-order effects of an activity is not unlike 

assessing the reactions of population groups. It involves an evaluation of the 

interconnectedness of relevant factors and how interactions can cause unintended 

outcomes. The capabilities matrix introduced in the previous paragraph can assist in 

determining the relationships that exist in the operational area. There are also several 

technologies that can help predict the spread of disease or airborne agents that are 

currently being used by disaster relief agencies and intelligence organizations. These 

technologies, while useful, do not take into consideration all of the possible consequences 

that can be imagined. 

(b) In short, COA development for step four of urban JIPOE will normally 

involve far more than evaluation of a single adversary. COAs for all population elements 

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 

An example of several immediate and lasting higher-order effects can 

be gleaned from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

bombing of Kosovo in 2000. Almost immediately, Kosovo suffered a 

refugee problem when Serbs reacted by purging entire areas of 

Albanian residents. This migration had the second-order effect of 

complicating NATO targeting, for the Serbs used the refugees as cover 

by positioning them close to their own forces, deliberately putting them 

at risk should NATO aircraft engage the legitimate targets. Further, at 

the operational and strategic levels, the massive population 

displacement created shelter and sustenance shortfalls in Albania, 

requiring delays in the delivery of military supplies so that tents, food, 

and other aid could be provided to refugee camps. 

SOURCE: Various Sources 
Appendix A 

A-18 JP 3-06 

should be considered, prioritized, and incorporated into the process to adequately assess 

all effects on any type of operation. They must thereafter be continuously monitored and 

updated to reflect changes in the environment, group dynamics, or interrelationships. 

JIPOE step four for a JUO expands the scope of traditional JIPOE to assimilate all 

relationships and interconnections that exist in an urban operational area. 
APPENDIX B 

ASSESSMENT 

1. General 

Assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission 

accomplishment. A constant challenge in JUOs is the difficulty to effectively analyze 

progress using systematic reliable indicators and data collection methods. Every JUO 

will be unique and a standardized assessment cannot be provided in this appendix. This 

generic discussion of assessment must be tailored to the situation. Success can be 

measured by a wide variety of measures such as the reduction of ethnic-on-ethnic 

violence, reduction in crime, reduced IED attacks, or improvement in public utility 

performance. An assessment criteria used one week may not be valid the subsequent 

week. Assessment in JUOs can be highly subjective due to variations in urban patterns. 

Commanders’ intuition at all levels may be a useful measure. 

For further information on assessment, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, JP 5-0, Joint 

Operation Planning, and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

2. Measures of Effectiveness 

Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) assess changes in system behavior, capability, or 

operational environment. They measure the attainment of an end state, achievement of 

an objective, or creation of an effect; they do not measure task performance. These 

measures typically are more subjective than measures of performance (MOPs), and can 

be crafted as either qualitative or quantitative. MOEs can be based on quantitative 

measures to reflect a trend and show progress toward a measurable threshold. 

a. In JUOs, measurable results to a particular action may not appear for some time. 

This time lag complicates assessment enormously, because in the meantime the joint 

force may have executed other actions, which will make assessing cause and effect even 

more difficult. 

b. Assessment of ongoing operations can provide more then just a measure of 

progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. In JUOs, assessment can 

provide information to assist in answering the following questions: 

(1) How to execute the planned COA for a specific operation; 

(2) Whether another COA needs to be adopted; 

(3) Whether the operational design is producing results; 

(4) Whether the mission analysis needs adjusting; and 

(5) Whether the joint force is adapting to the particular operational problem. 

B-1 
Appendix B 

3. Measures of Performance 

Tactical-level assessment typically uses MOPs to evaluate task accomplishment. 

The results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature, but also can reflect the impact on 

specific functions and systems. Tactical-level assessment may include assessing progress 

by phase lines; neutralization of enemy forces; control of key terrain or resources; and 

security, relief, or reconstruction tasks. Assessment of results at the tactical level helps 

commanders determine operational and strategic progress, so JFCs must have a 

comprehensive, integrated assessment plan that links assessment activities and measures 

at all levels. 

4. Intelligence Assessment in an Urban Environment 

An intelligence assessment in the urban environment should include all information 

relating to the operation within the construct of a framework such as the ASCOPE [areas, 

structures, capabilities, organizations, people and events] factors plus weather effects. 

Illustrative intelligence assessment measures are presented in Figure B-1. 

5. Combat Assessment 

Combat assessment measures many tactical-level actions and their implications at 

the operational level as well. Combat assessment typically focuses on determining the 

results of weapons engagement (with both lethal and nonlethal capabilities), and thus is 

an important component of joint fires and the joint targeting process. To conduct combat 

assessment, it is important to fully understand the linkages between the targets and the 

JFC’s objectives, guidance, and desired effects. Combat assessment is composed of three 

related elements: battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness assessment, and 

reattack recommendations or future targeting. 

a. Battle damage assessment. The purpose of BDA is to compare post-execution 

results with the projected results generated during target development. Comprehensive 

BDA requires a coordinated and integrated effort between joint force intelligence and 

operations functions. Traditionally, BDA is composed of physical damage assessment, 

functional damage assessment, and target system assessment, typically taking a threephased approach to proceed from a micro-level examination of the damage or effects 

inflicted on a specific target, to ultimately arriving at macro-level conclusions regarding 

the functional outcomes created in the target system. 

b. Munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA). MEA studies how combat systems 

performed and the method in which they were applied. It examines the evidence after 

attacks to determine whether weapons and weapon systems performed as expected. The 

purpose of MEA is to compare the actual effectiveness of the means employed to their 

anticipated effectiveness calculated during the capability analysis phase of the joint 

targeting cycle. The results of MEA support both near term improvement in force 

employment tactics and techniques and long-term improvements in lethal and nonlethal 

capabilities. 

B-2 JP 3-06 
Assessment 

ILLUSTRATIVE URBAN ASSESSMENT MEASURES

RED: Insufficient amounts of water causing dehydration for the population. 

 Sufficient amounts of water to prevent population dehydration, but not 

enough for adequate hygienic support or food production.

 Adequate amounts of water for continued health improvements and 

sustenance programs. 

AMBER:

GREEN:

WATER

RED: Sewage/disposal services are unavailable.

 Periodic sewage/disposal services.

 Constant sewage/disposal services

AMBER:

GREEN:

SEWAGE

RED: Internal electricity is not available.

 Operational electricity is able to power essential functions (emergency 

service, transportation, etc.).

Electricity is readily available to all citizens.

AMBER:

GREEN:

RED: Schools or teachers unavailable.

 Schools are available, but teachers are part time.

 Each school has a full time teacher.

AMBER:

GREEN:

RED: Trash disposal service unavailable.

 Periodic trash disposal service available.

 Normal (steady state) trash disposal service available.

AMBER:

GREEN:

RED: Inadequate food supply (growing, harvesting, or importing) for the 

population. The population cannot sustain itself without assistance. 

Famine/starvation is imminent for a portion of the population.

 Adequate food supplies that prevent immediate famine for the population, but 

may not sustain a 6 month continuous period without an increase in certain 

staples. 

 Food supplies are adequate for the season (normally based on a 1-year 

continuous period).

AMBER:

GREEN:

ELECTRICITY

ACADEMICS

TRASH

FOOD

Figure B-1. Illustrative Urban Assessment Measures 

B-3 
Appendix B 

ILLUSTRATIVE URBAN ASSESSMENT MEASURES (cont.)

RED: NGOs are unavailable.

 NGOs are periodically available. 

 NGOs are on station. 

AMBER:

GREEN:

Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)

RED: Lawlessness is prevalent. Legislative body, judicial council, or police force 

are unrecognized. 

 Local leadership established; functioning legislative body; and police force is 

recognized.

Appointed officials, legislative/judicial body instituted, and police force 

enforces the laws. 

AMBER:

GREEN: 

GOVERNMENT

POLICE

MEDIA

INSURGENCY

RED: No police or corrupt police presence in city.

 Some police presence in city.

 Constant police presence throughout city.

AMBER:

GREEN:

RED: Community has no regular access to media of any kind (television, internet, 

newspaper, or magazine).

 Community has limited access to some media.

 Community has access to a wide variety of media, including local sources.

AMBER:

GREEN:

RED: A high frequency of violent acts directed against local or governmental 

agencies with weapons.

 A lower frequency of violent acts against local or governmental agencies 

without weapons.

 No indicators of insurgency present.

AMBER:

GREEN:

Figure B-1. Illustrative Urban Assessment Measures (Continued) 

B-4 JP 3-06 
Assessment 

ILLUSTRATIVE URBAN ASSESSMENT MEASURES (cont.)

ETHNIC TENSION

CRIME

SUBVERSION/ESPIONAGE

RED: High activity of protests and frequent incidents that become riotous.

 Medium activity that occasionally has serious incidents, but not riotous.

Low activity with infrequent incidents; generally characterized as peaceful 

gatherings.

AMBER:

GREEN: 

RED: High activity of burglary, robbery, or mugging with the use of a weapon.

 Medium activity of petty theft, stealing, and aggravated assault without the 

use of a weapon. 

 Low to no activity of abuse; generally characterized by disagreements or 

civil disputes. 

AMBER:

GREEN:

RED: Constant subversive articles, sermons, acts, or demonstrations 

toward local government or elected leadership. 

 Regular subversive articles, sermons, acts, or demonstrations against 

the interim government.

 No identified subversion directed against the interim government or 

the coalition forces. 

AMBER:

GREEN:

Figure B-1. Illustrative Urban Assessment Measures (Continued) 

c. Future targeting or reattack recommendations. Future target nominations and 

reattack recommendations merge the picture of what was done (BDA) with how it was 

done (MEA) and compares the result with predetermined MOEs that were developed at 

the start of the joint targeting cycle. The purposes of this phase in the process are to 

determine degree of success in achieving objectives and to formulate any required 

follow-up actions, or to indicate readiness to move on to new tasks in the path to 

achieving the overall JFC objectives. 

6. Assessment Metrics 

The staff develops metrics to determine if operations are properly linked to the JFC’s 

overall strategy and the larger hierarchy of operational and national objectives. These 

metrics evaluate the results achieved during joint operations. Metrics can either be 

objective (using sensors or personnel to directly observe damage inflicted) or subjective 

(using indirect means to ascertain results), depending on the metric applied to either the 

objective or task. Both qualitative and quantitative metrics should be used to avoid 

unsound or distorted results. Metrics can either be inductive (directly observing the 

operational environment and building situational awareness cumulatively) or deductive 

B-5 
Appendix B 

B-6 JP 3-06 

(extrapolated from what was previously known of the adversary and operational 

environment). Success is measured by indications that the effects created are influencing 

enemy, friendly, and/or neutral activity in desired ways among various target systems. 
APPENDIX C 

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR PORT AND AIRFIELD COMPLEXES 

1. General 

a. Ports and airfields play a vital role to an expeditionary force. They are generally 

located in, or very near, urban areas. In many countries, ports and airfields provide the 

only means through which large numbers of personnel, equipment, and supplies can enter 

the operational area. 

b. In general, most coastal cities were established around seaports, which 

contributed to the very existence of port cities. Although some port cities have 

constructed new port facilities which can be found quite some distance from the urban 

area, the average port is still located in the center of the most heavily populated and 

congested part of the urban area. Airfields are generally located farther from the built-up 

sections of the urban area, depending on their size and when they were first established. 

Older airfields are normally located closer to the heart of the city, while newer airfields 

can be located miles away from the outskirts of the urban area. 

c. Sea and aerial ports should be viewed as “complexes.” In addition to the terminal 

itself, the complex may include areas and functions such as driver holding areas, 

container holding and handling areas, staging and marshalling areas, frustrated cargo 

holding areas, assembly areas, and land explosive storage and handling areas. Activities 

might be conducted simultaneously in all of these areas, and all require valuable space on 

or near the port complex. 

2. Planning Considerations 

a. The JFC must plan for both the entry into and the sustainment of the joint force in 

the operational area. Most of the time, this means planning for the use of available ports 

and airfields. 

b. Although planning for the use of ports has somewhat different considerations than 

planning for airfields, certain general planning considerations pertain to both. 

c. In urban combat operations, it may be necessary to target a port or airfield to 

prevent its use by the adversary. In this case, the same considerations apply as for other 

key infrastructure, and if future use by the joint force is contemplated, steps should be 

taken to limit damage. The same is true if land forces need to physically seize the 

facilities. 

d. Global Distribution Networks. The four networks of the integrated global 

distribution system are the physical, financial, information, and communications 

networks. Understanding the interdependencies and interrelationships of these networks 

is essential in planning for global distribution in support of operations. Assurance of the 

critical infrastructures that support each of the networks ensures continuity of global 

distribution. 

C-1 
Appendix C 

(1) Physical Network. The physical network of the distribution system 

consists of the quantity, capacity, and capability of fixed structures and established 

facilities supporting distribution operations. It includes roads, railroads, structures (such 

as warehouses, depots, or storage facilities), ports, waterways, and pipelines. The 

physical network can be thought of as the skeletal and muscular structure of global 

distribution. General engineer capability allows global distribution to expand the 

capacity of the physical network (e.g., terminals, airfields, roads, waterways). Engineer 

reconnaissance provides information on the capacities of the physical system as well as 

identified potential barriers or bottlenecks. 

See JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, and JP 4-09, Distribution 

Operations, for more information. 

(2) Transportation Infrastructure Assessment. A transportation infrastructure 

assessment is key to understanding the capabilities and limitations of the urban 

operational area to support deployment operations. It serves as a basis to determine the 

forces, equipment, and materiel that must be deployed and facility upgrades required to 

enhance operations. A lesser developed, austere, or damaged infrastructure impedes 

deployment operations and may require an early deployment of support capabilities such 

as joint logistics over-the-shore, or engineer units. The combatant command engineer 

and staff prepare an engineer support plan (ESP) to ensure that essential civil engineering 

capabilities are identified and will be provided at the required locations and at the 

appropriate times to support the mobilization; deployment; (movement and joint 

reception, staging, onward movement, and integration phases); employment; sustainment; 

and redeployment of the joint force in support of joint operations. The ESP establishes 

theater-level requirements for facilities, Class IV (construction materiel), and civil 

engineering capability in support of deployed US forces. 

Additional information on ESP can be found in JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, and 

Appendix 6 to Annex D to Enclosure E of CJCSM 3122.03B, Joint Operation Planning 

and Execution System Volume II: Planning Formats. 

3. Port Considerations 

a. The planning and execution of port operations at the operational level requires a 

detailed analysis of a wide range of factors including: 

(1) Overall concept of the operation. 

(2) Logistic support requirements. 

(3) Physical characteristics and layout of the port and/or beaches. 

(4) Relative location of highway, rail, air, and inland waterway networks. 

(5) Location of supported and supporting units. 

C-2 JP 3-06 
Planning Considerations for Port and Airfield Complexes 

(6) Required repair and rehabilitation of existing facilities. 

(7) Requirement for new construction. 

(8) Requirement for security, especially if HN support is not available. 

(9) Required communications infrastructure, information systems to facilitate 

in-transit visibility, manifesting, and documentation requirements during vessel loading 

and discharge operations. 

b. The probable location of port facilities within the urban area makes smooth 

operations problematic. The most significant factors influencing operations of the port 

are physical layout, the handling capabilities, the transportation infrastructure, and 

security. 

c. Seaport adequacy is based on physical considerations that are often difficult to 

improve in the short term. Navigability, channel depths, numbers and sizes of ship 

berths, intermodal cargo handling equipment, and explosive handling limitations are 

significant factors that will affect materiel throughput. Another significant consideration 

is the impact of simultaneous commercial transportation, industrial operations, and other 

activities in the port area. Expansion of fixed port facilities by US forces requires a long 

lead-time and significant resources. 

4. Airfield Considerations 

a. Air terminal operations involve numerous interdependent functions ranging from 

ensuring that sufficient airlift facilities are available to meeting any threat to operations. 

b. Many large urban areas have relatively modern airports serving them, even if they 

are some distance from the central parts of the city. Other urban areas may be serviced 

by smaller, less modern facilities. Factors influencing airfield operations include the 

need to use the airfield for different types of flight operations (including civilian 

operations), the distance from joint force units and supply facilities, road capabilities, 

security, airfield capabilities, and adversary’s capabilities to threaten airfield operations 

to include the use of CBRN weapons. Aircraft pose difficult decontamination challenges. 

JFC plans must take into account these challenges in sustaining employment of aircraft 

into, within, and from contaminated areas. 

For further information on logistic planning considerations in CBRN environments, see 

JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Environments. 

c. Factors such as runway length and weight bearing capability, taxiway systems, 

ramp space, materials handling equipment and personnel, maximum on the ground, 

aircraft servicing and maintenance, navigation aids, and communications systems affect 

maximum aircraft on the ground and throughput capacity of aerial ports. Again, a 

 C-3 
Appendix C 

C-4 JP 3-06 

significant consideration in determining capabilities of an aerial port of debarkation 

(APOD) to support deployment and distribution operations is the effects of commercial 

transportation, industrial operations, and other activities in the port area. Construction or 

rehabilitation efforts can overcome some APOD shortcomings. 

For additional information on planning development refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation 

Planning. 

5. Security Considerations 

a. Both port and airfield facilities will be susceptible to attack by conventional and 

unconventional means. As stationary targets, they are vulnerable to air, missile, and 

indirect fire attack, especially using CBRN munitions. Their size and probable locations, 

along with the presence of civilians, may encourage sabotage, terrorism, mining, and 

espionage. 

b. The first step to providing security is threat assessment. Based on the assessed 

threat, the JFC can determine where to accept risks, where to focus protection efforts, and 

how much of the force should be devoted to protection of port and airfield facilities. 

Most terminals, ports, and airfields are physically laid out so that limited dispersion can 

be achieved within the boundaries of the port itself. In any case, dispersion does not 

permit maximum port use. The JFC increases his accepted risk to operations as he 

increases the use of established ports and airfield. 

See JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in a Theater, for more information. 
APPENDIX D 

CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIRSPACE CONTROL IN AN URBAN 

ENVIRONMENT 

D-1 

1. General 

a. Airspace control includes coordinating, integrating, and regulating airspace to 

increase operational effectiveness by providing the commander the operational flexibility 

to employ forces effectively in a joint campaign or operation. Airspace control 

increases the effectiveness of operations in urban areas by promoting the safe, 

efficient, and flexible use of urban airspace. Airspace control in an urban environment 

is conducted the same as in any other environment; however there are unique 

considerations. 

b. The distinguishing features of urban airspace are compressed airspace and a 

unique three-dimensional ground environment. These factors increase planning and 

execution challenges, especially when in close proximity to friendly forces and civilians. 

(1) Compressed airspace brings separate and diverse missions into close 

proximity. Fixed-wing, rotary-wing, UAS, ground fires, and ground scheme of maneuver 

must be integrated, deconflicted, and coordinated. Planning and execution becomes more 

difficult given the enemy’s close proximity to friendly forces, protected sites, and 

civilians. For example, an aeromedical evacuation or an airdrop of supplies could be 

performed simultaneously with CAS missions protecting the unit being supported. 

Knowledge of other missions tasked for the same area is vital to avoid interference. 

Planning and deconfliction efforts must be undertaken to ensure all operations in the 

operational environment are coordinated and complement the overall objectives and 

commander’s intent. 

(2) The three-dimensional ground environment reaches into low-level airspace 

potentially used by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, and UASs. 

(3) The location of major airports in or near urban areas often puts the APOD 

inside the urban airspace. 

(4) During operations in urban areas, a number of different types of aircraft may 

share the airspace — tactical aircraft, airlift assets, rotary-wing aircraft, UAS, and civilian 

aircraft. 

2. Considerations 

a. The JFC will normally designate a joint force air component commander 

(JFACC) to integrate the capabilities and C2 of joint air assets. The JFC also designates 

both the airspace control authority (ACA) and the area air defense commander (AADC). 

For more information regarding the responsibilities and relationships of the JFACC, 

ACA, and AADC, see JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations; JP 3-52, 

Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone, and JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile 

Threats. 
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 3-06 

b. The methods of airspace control may vary depending on the specific operation 

and the nature of the urban area. Methods range from full positive control to full 

procedural control of all air assets, or any effective combination of the two. Urban 

airspace control, in most instances, will require both positive and procedural control 

methods. Airspace coordinating measures must be developed in order to eliminate 

airspace conflicts. These measures must consider ongoing HN and foreign military 

airspace requirements, as well as UAS, SOF, OGA, and NGO operations. The joint air 

tasking order (ATO)/airspace control order (ACO) aids deconfliction and synchronization 

of joint force aviation assets, which may include multinational air assets. The joint 

ATO/ACO must be made available for use by all participating forces to ensure greatest 

visibility on planned/ongoing airspace operations. Additionally, the use of FAC(A) 

and/or tactical air coordinator (airborne) can assist in the management of urban airspace 

either in support of air control agencies or joint terminal attack controller (JTACs). 

Heightened awareness of other missions operating in and throughout the general area 

must be maintained. 

c. The completed airspace control plan (ACP) will fully describe the airspace 

considerations, methods, and procedures that govern air and air defense operations in the 

urban area, including procedural airspace coordinating measures. 

d. The control of urban airspace demands careful coordination to limit the potential 

conflict among aircraft needed for operations within that airspace. The ACA establishes 

airspace coordinating measures to facilitate this control. 

e. The methods and procedures for airspace control in an urban environment depend 

on the type of operation, the mission of the joint force, and the physical conditions of the 

urban area. 

3. Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

Integration/deconfliction of ISR assets is critical to safe operations. With the 

proliferation of tactical UASs, planners must pay close attention to integration and 

deconfliction within the objective area and ensure all units are informed of the plan. If 

present, the FAC(A) or JTAC must know the location and altitude of UASs within the 

objective area. Furthermore, when nontraditional strike platforms are re-tasked or 

transitioned from ISR to strike missions, a clear transfer of C2 must occur. Air liaison 

officer and JTAC teams are resident in land maneuver forces. These teams have 

situational awareness of where UASs are employed. Any conflicts with airspace for UAS 

and manned platforms will be resolved by airspace control entities designated in the 

ACP. 

For further details refer to FM 3-06.1, Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-

35.3A, Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-01.04, Air Force Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) [AFTTP(I)] 3-2.29, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations. 
APPENDIX E 

MARITIME CONSIDERATIONS IN URBAN OPERATIONS 

1. General 

 As the number of key urban areas continues to expand along the littorals the 

capabilities of maritime forces will remain relevant. From deployment, through forcible 

entry and sustainment, to stability operations and redeployment, maritime forces play an 

important role in operations conducted in urban areas. 

2. Port Security and Infrastructure Protection 

 a. In urban areas that also house key port facilities, security of the port and its 

infrastructure are important for numerous reasons. For example, sea ports facilitate the 

flow of follow-on forces and sustainment (e.g., reception, staging, onward movement, 

and integration, logistic distribution center, evacuation and maintenance site). 

Additionally, they support the flow of sustainment to the local population as well as the 

raw materials and finished products that support their economy, not to mention the large 

employment opportunities provided by the operating port and ancillary jobs base (e.g., 

warehousing, trucking). Both maritime expeditionary security forces and US Coast 

Guard (USCG) units can play a significant role in not only providing port and harbor 

security but in the development of HN capabilities. Specific details on capabilities and 

procedures can be found in respective Service publications. 

 b. US Navy (USN) riverine forces support urban operations and augment port 

security and key infrastructure protection operations by denying an enemy the adversary 

use of navigable waterways. USN riverine forces operate in lakes, rivers, harbors, and 

deltas in both littoral and inland regions. The introduction of USN riverine forces 

requires an established forward operating base or a forward logistic site, which can be 

land- or sea-based. USCG forces may augment riverine forces with specialized units, 

such as port security units, maritime safety and security teams. 

3. Seabasing in Support of Urban Operations 

 a. Maritime forces provide a distributed, persistent, sea-based presence without the 

increased destabilization that can be the unintended consequence of a local heavy 

footprint ashore. Seabasing supplies, reserves, and administrative functions of the joint 

force may also enhance force protection. 

 b. As the “dominate phase” of urban operations transitions into the “stabilize” and 

“enable civil authority” phases, sea-based maritime forces continue to defend the seaward 

avenue of approach and can assist in training the local, indigenous security forces and in 

the restoration of provision of essential services (e.g., potable water, electricity, waste 

removal, basic medical care). 

 c. Discrete, tailored, less obtrusive support by sea-based forces minimize resentment 

among the local populace, disparate host nation and civil support organizations and 

E-1 
Appendix E 

E-2 JP 3-06 

reduces the risk of becoming a disruptive influence as the government reestablishes 

legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. 

4. Coast Guard Support to Joint Urban Operations 

 a. The USCG is inherently flexible as both a military service and law enforcement 

agency within the Department of Homeland Security. The USCG supports DOD in its 

national defense role, across the forward regions, the global commons, the approaches, 

and within the US homeland. The USCG core competency in waterways management 

and littoral operations complement USN operations and enhances US capability to 

conduct unrestricted maritime operations worldwide. 

 b. The USCG brings unique skill sets and legal authorities which can facilitate support 

to JUOs. USCG units and boarding teams are highly trained in maritime interception 

operations as well as visit, board, search and seizure operations and tactics. USCG port 

security units, maritime safety and security teams and law enforcement detachments are 

trained and authorized to make arrests at sea and can operate with the maritime 

expeditionary security force. USCG units are also expert in broad scope defensive and 

offensive maritime operations ranging from protection of military and other high value 

assets in ports, waterways and harbor approaches, to coastal sea control operations, to port 

operations, security, and defense which is conducted to ensure port and harbor areas are 

maintained free of hostile threats in seaports of embarkation and debarkation. 

5. Other Support 

 a. In addition to the discussions above capabilities of maritime forces can be used to 

conduct or support ISR activities, IO, provide CAS, and naval surface fire support and if 

required, a C2 platform in support of urban operations. 

 b. With a large proportion of cities and urban areas located on or near the littorals, 

seabasing provides an additional capability to support JUOs. Seabasing is the 

deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint 

combat power from the sea without the reliance on land bases. It allows operational 

maneuver, and assured access to the joint force, while significantly reducing the footprint 

ashore, and minimizing permissions required to operate from host nations. The situation 

on the ground, for instance, may require the JFC to minimize or optimize forces ashore in 

an urban area. The seabasing construct allows certain support functions to remain aboard 

ship. With a logistics tail safely at sea, the sea base is able to operate from international 

waters, while providing support to JUOs on land. Seabasing improves freedom of 

action, achieved through sea control, and increases the maneuver options for urban forces 

by reducing the need to protect elements such as C2 and logistic supplies. A sea base can 

be used to provide a floating forward operating base or a helicopter platform as was used 

in Haiti in 1994. 

For more information, see JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations, and Navy Warfighting 

Publication (NWP) 3-62M / MCWP 3-31.7, Seabasing.
APPENDIX F 

REFERENCES 

The development of JP 3-06 is based upon the following primary references: 

1. Department of Defense Issuances 

 a. DOD Directive 5101.5, DOD Executive Agent for Joint Urban Operations. 

 b. DOD Instruction 1322.27, DOD Urban Training Facilities.

2. Joint Publications 

 a. CJCSI 3160.01, No-Strike and The Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology 

(U). 

 b. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

c. JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations.

 d. JP 2-01.2 Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint 

Operations (U). 

 e. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

 f. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

 g. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

 h. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 

 i. JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations. 

 j. JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

 k. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations: Vol. I. 

 l. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

 

 m. JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support. 

n. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in a Theater.

 o. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

(CBRN) Environments. 

 p. JP 3-13, Information Operations.

F-1 
Appendix F 

 q. JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.

 r. JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations. 

 s. JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.

 t. JP 3-14, Space Operations.

 u. JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations.

 v. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

 w. JP 3-26, Counterterrorism. 

x. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense. 

 y. JP 3-28, Civil Support. 

 z. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

 aa. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 

 bb. JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations.

 cc. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

 dd. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

 ee. JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

 

 ff. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives 

Consequence Management.

gg. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

 hh. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone.

 ii. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

 

 jj. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

 kk. JP 3-61, Public Affairs. 

ll. JP 3-63, Detainee Operations. 

mm. JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

F-2 JP 3-06 
References 

 nn. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 

 oo. JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations. 

 pp. JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

 qq. JP 4-09, Distribution Operations.

 rr. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

 ss. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 

3. Air Force Publications 

 AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare.

4. Army Publications 

 a. FM 1-27.10, The Law of Land Warfare.

 b. FM 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

 c. FM 2-91.4, Intelligence Support to Urban Operations.

 d. FM 3-0, Operations.

 e. FM 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces.

 f. FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations.

 g. FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations.

 h. FM 3-06, Urban Operations. 

 i. FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain.

 j. FM 3-07, Stability Operations.

 k. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

l. FM 3-90.31, Maneuver Enhancement Brigade. 

 m. FM 5-33, Terrain Analysis. 

F-3 
Appendix F 

5. Marine Corps Publications 

 a. MCIA 2700-002-03, Urban Generic Information Requirements Handbook 

(UGIRH). 

 b. MCIA, Urban Warfare Study: City Case Studies Compilation, February 1999. 

 c. Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1-0, Marine Corps Operations. 

d. MCDP 3, Expeditionary Operations. 

 e. MCWP 3-35.3, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain.

6. Navy Publications 

 a. Naval Doctrinal Publication 1, Naval Warfare. 

 b. NWP 3-10, Naval Coastal Warfare. 

c. NTTP 3-06.1, Riverine Operations. 

d. NTTP 3-10.1, Naval Coastal Warfare Operations. 

7. Miscellaneous Publications 

 a. 10th Mountain Division (LI), Somalia. US Army Forces: After Action Report: 

Summary. Fort Drum: 10th Mountain Division, Headquarters. June 1993. 

 b. Adams, Thomas. “Intervention in Haiti: Lessons Relearned.” Military Review. 

September/October 1996: pp. 45–56. 

 c. Air Land Sea Bulletin 2008-1, Jan 2008 MOUT Military Operations in Urban 

Terrain.

 d. Allard, Kenneth. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. Ft. McNair: National 

Defense University Press. 1995. 

 e. “The Balkan Air Campaign Study: Part II.” Air Power Journal. Vol. XI, No. 3, 

Fall 1997: pp. 4–24. 

 f. Celestan, MAJ Gregory J., USA. Wounded Bear: The Ongoing Russian 

Military Operation in Chechnya. Center for Army Lessons Learned, August 1996. 

 g. Collins, John M. Military Geography. National Defense University Press: 

Washington, DC, 1998. 

F-4 JP 3-06 
References 

 h. Cooling, Norman L. Shaping the Battlespace to Win the Street Fight. United 

States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1999. (unpublished thesis) 

 i. Department of Defense, Joint Urban Operations Joint Integrating Concept, 23 

July 2007.

 j. Doerrer, Eric A. “Civil Affairs in Haiti.” Military Review. March/April 1996: 

pp. 73–79. 

 k. Finch, MAJ Raymond C., III, USA. Why the Russian Military Failed in 

Chechnya. Center For Army Lessons Learned. 

 l. Glenn, Russell W. An Attack on Duffer’s Downtown. RAND, 2001. 

 m. Glenn, Russell W. The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations. 

2000. 

 n. Glenn, Russell W. Combat in Hell: A Consideration of Constrained Urban 

Warfare. RAND, 1996. 

 o. Glenn, Russell W. and Gina Kingston, Urban Battle: Command in the TwentyFirst Century, RAND, 2005. 

 p. Glenn, Russell W, Urban Combat is Complex, RAND, 2002. 

 q. Glenn, Russell W, Marching Under Darkening Skies: The American Military 

and the Impending Urban Operations Threat, RAND, 1998. 

 r. Glenn, Russell W, Managing Complexity During Military Urban Operations: 

Visualizing the Elephant, RAND, 2004. 

 s. Glenn, Russell W., Jamison Jo Medby, Scott Gerwehr, Frederick J. Gellert, and 

Andrew O'Donnell, Honing the Keys to the City: Refining the United States Marine 

Corps Reconnaissance Force for Urban Ground Combat Operations, RAND, 2003. 

 t. Glenn, Russell W., Randall Steeb, and John Matsumura, Corralling the Trojan 

Horse: A Proposal for Improving US Urban Operations Preparedness in the Period 

2000-2025, RAND, 2001. 

 u. Glenn, Russell W., Christopher Paul, Todd C. Helmus, and Paul Steinberg, 

''People Make the City,'' Executive Summary: Joint Urban Operations Observations and 

Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq, RAND, 2007. 

 v. Glenn, Russell W., Steven Hartman, and Scott Gerwehr, Urban Combat Service 

Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas, RAND, 2004. 

F-5 
Appendix F 

 w. Glenn, Russell W., Jody Jacobs, Brian Nichiporuk, Christopher Paul, Barbara 

Raymond, Randall Steeb, and Harry J. Thie, Preparing for the Proven Inevitable: An 

Urban Operations Training Strategy for America’s Joint Force, RAND, 2006. 

 x. Glenn, Russell W. Heavy Matter: Urban Operations’ Density of Challenges. 

RAND, 2000. 

 y. Grau, Lester W. “Changing Russian Urban Tactics: The Aftermath of the Battle 

for Grozny.” INSS Strategic Forum, no. 38, July 1995. 

 z. Grau, Lester W., ed. The Bear Went Over the Mountain. Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, 1996. 

 aa. Grau, Lester W. and Jorgensen, Dr. William A. “Handling the Wounded in a 

Counter-Guerrilla War: the Soviet/Russian Experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya.” 

US Army Medical Department Journal, January/February 1998. 

 bb. Grau, Lester W. “Russian Urban Tactics: Lessons from the Battle for Grozny.” 

National Defense University’s Strategic Forum. Institute for National Strategic Studies. 

 cc. Grau, LTC Lester W., USA (Ret.) and Thomas, LTC Timothy L., USA (Ret.). 

“Soft Log’ and Concrete Canyons: Russian Urban Logistics in Grozny.” Marine Corps 

Gazette Volume 83, Issue 10 (October 1999): 67-75. 

 dd. Helmus, Todd C. and Russell W. Glenn, Steeling the Mind: Combat Stress 

Reactions and Their Implications for Urban Warfare, RAND, 2005. 

 ee. Helmus, Todd C., Christopher Paul, and Russell W. Glenn, ENLISTING 

AVENUE The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of 

Operation, RAND, 2007. 

 ff. Joint Military Operations Historical Collection.

 gg. Handbook for Joint Urban Operations.

 hh. Manwaring, Max G., Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency, Strategic 

Studies Institute, US Army War College, March 2005. 

 ii. Matthews, M., Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint 

Operations, Combat Studies Institute, 2006. 

 jj. McLaurin, R. D. and Miller, R., Urban Counterinsurgency: Case Studies and 

Implications for US Military Forces, Abbott Associates, Inc., October, 1989. 

 kk. Medby, Jamison Jo and Russell W. Glenn, Street Smart Intelligence: 

Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations, RAND, 2002. 

F-6 JP 3-06 
References 

 ll. Mordica, George J., II. It’s a Dirty Business, But Somebody Has to Do It 

(Urban Combat). Center for Army Lessons Learned. 

 mm. Owen, Robert C., Lieutenant Colonel, USAF. “The Balkan Air Campaign 

Study: Part I.” Air Power Journal. Vol. XI, No. 2, Summer 1997: pp. 4–24. 

 nn. Peters, Ralph. “The Human Terrain of Urban Operations.” Parameters. Spring 

2000: pp. 4-12. 

 oo. Robertson, William G. (General Editor), Block by Block: The Challenges of 

Urban Operations, Combat Studies Institute, 2003. 

 pp. Scales, MG Robert H., Jr., USA. Future Warfare. US Army War College, 

1999. 

 qq. Schnaubelt, Christopher M. “The 1992 Los Angeles Riots, Lessons in Command 

and Control from the Los Angeles Riots.” Parameters, Summer 1997: pp. 88-109. 

 rr. Scott Gerwehr, Russell W. Glenn, Unweaving the Web: Deception and 

Adaptation in Future Urban Operations, RAND, 2003. 

 ss. Shelton, Lieutenant General. H. Hugh and Lieutenant Colonel Timothy D. Vane. 

“Winning the Information War in Haiti.” Military Review, November/December 1995: 

pp. 3–9. 

 tt. Simmons, Dean, Phillip Gould, Verena Vomastic, and Phillip Walsh. “Air 

Operations over Bosnia.” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1997. 

 uu. Spiller, Rojer J. Sharp Corners: Urban Operations at Century’s End US Army 

Command and General Staff College Press, 2001. 

 vv. Thomas, Timothy L. “The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban 

Combat.” Parameters (Summer 1999): 87-102. 

 ww. Thomas, Timothy L. “The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The 

Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol. 8. 

No. 2 (June 1995): 233-290. 

 xx. Thomas, Timothy L. “The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The 

Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya III. The Battle for Grozny, 1–16 January 

1995.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 10 (March 1997), pp. 50–108. 

 yy. US Special Operations Command Pub 3-33, Conventional Forces and Special 

Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability Handbook and Checklist. 

F-7 
Appendix F 

F-8 JP 3-06 

 zz. Vick, Allen, et. al., Aerospace Operations in Urban Environments: Exploring 

New Concepts, RAND, 2000. 

8. Multi-Service Publications 

 FM 3-06.1, MCRP 3-35.3A, NTTP 3-01.04, AFTTP(I) 3-2.29, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations. 

9. Joint Courseware 

 a. Introduction to Joint Urban Operations Course, J3OP-US017, 

https://jkolms.jfcom.mil. 

 b. Joint Urban Operations for Joint Force Commander and Staff, J3OP-US120, 

https://jkolms.jfcom.mil. 

10. Internet Resources 

 a. Ambush in Mogadishu: 

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush. 

 b. City Population: http://www.citypopulation.de/cities.html. 

 c. Joint Urban Operations Education Program Community of Interest, 

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/426393. 

 d. Small Wars Journal, Urban Operations Reference Library: 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/reference/urbanoperations.php. 
APPENDIX G 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

1. User Comments 

 Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: 

Joint Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These 

comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), 

writing, and appearance. 

2. Authorship 

 The lead agent for this publication is the US Joint Forces Command. The Joint Staff 

doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Force Structure, Resources, and 

Assessment (J-8). 

3. Supersession 

 This publication supersedes JP 3-06, 16 September 2002, Doctrine for Joint Urban 

Operations. 

4. Change Recommendations 

 a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JT10// 

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// 

 Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting 

Center, Joint Doctrine Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational 

Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. 

 b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this 

publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an 

enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify 

the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are 

initiated. 

 c. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

G-1 
Appendix G 

G-2 JP 3-06 

5. Distribution of Publications 

 Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is 

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint 

publications must be in accordance with DOD 5200.1 R, Information Security Program. 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

 a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET) and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

 b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside 

the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint 

publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the 

local embassy (defense attaché office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 

1E811, 7400 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301 7400. 

 c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and 

deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications. 
GLOSSARY

PART I– ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

GL-1 JP 3-06 

AAA antiaircraft artillery 

AADC area air defense commander 

ACA airspace control authority 

ACO airspace control order 

ACP airspace control plan 

AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction) 

AO area of operations 

AOI area of interest 

APOD aerial port of debarkation 

ATO air tasking order 

BDA battle damage assessment 

C2 command and control 

CA civil affairs 

CAO civil affairs operations 

CAS close air support 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CCDR combatant commander 

CID combat identification 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

CM consequence management 

CMO civil-military operations 

CMOC civil-military operations center 

COA course of action 

COG center of gravity 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CP counterproliferation 

CT counterterrorism 

DA direct action 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOS Department of State 

DP decisive point 

ESP engineer support plan 

FAC(A) forward air controller (airborne) 

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance 

FHP force health protection 

FID foreign internal defense 

FM field manual (Army) 

GEOINT geospatial intelligence 

GPS Global Positioning System 
Glossary 

HN host nation 

HSS health service support 

HUMINT human intelligence 

IED improvised explosive device 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

IO information operations 

IPI indigenous populations and institutions 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

JFACC joint force air component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFLCC joint force land component commander 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

JNCC joint network operations control center 

JOA joint operations area 

JP joint publication 

JTAC joint terminal attack controller 

JTF joint task force 

JUO joint urban operation 

LOC line of communications 

LOO line of operations 

LOS line of sight 

MCDP Marine Corps doctrine publication 

MCIA Marine Corps Intelligence Activity 

MCRP Marine Corps reference publication 

MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publications 

MEA munitions effectiveness assessment 

MESF maritime expeditionary security force 

MOE measure of effectiveness 

MOP measure of performance 

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation 

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures 

NWP Navy warfare publication 

OGA other government agency 

OSINT open-source intelligence 

PA public affairs 

PMESII political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure 

PR personnel recovery 

GL-2 JP 3-06 
Glossary 

 GL-3 

PRC populace and resources control 

PSYOP psychological operations 

RF radio frequency 

ROE rules of engagement 

RUF rules for the use of force 

SAR search and rescue 

SC strategic communication 

SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses 

SIGINT signals intelligence 

SJA staff judge advocate 

SOF special operations forces 

SR special reconnaissance 

TIM toxic industrial material 

TST time-sensitive target 

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 

UAS unmanned aircraft system 

UGIRH Urban Generic Information Requirements Handbook 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USG United States Government 

USN United States Navy 

UW unconventional warfare 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 
PART II– TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

GL-4 JP 3-06 

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions 

found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, will reflect this publication as the source document for 

these terms and definitions. 

critical node. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

joint urban operations. Joint operations across the range of military operations planned 

and conducted on, or against objectives within a topographical complex and its 

adjacent natural terrain, where man-made construction or the density of population are 

the dominant features. Also called JUOs. (This term and its definition modify the 

existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

objective area. A defined geographical area within which is located an objective to be 

captured or reached by the military forces. This area is defined by competent authority 

for purposes of command and control. Also called OA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-06) 

turning movement. A variation of the envelopment in which the attacking force passes 

around or over the enemy’s principal defensive positions to secure objectives deep in 

the enemy’s rear to force the enemy to abandon his position or divert major forces to 

meet the threat. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-06) 

urban triad. The three elements that compose the urban environment: complex manmade physical terrain, a population of significant size and density, and an 

infrastructure. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition 

and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATION

PLANS SYSTEMS

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to

fill extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of

the development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-06 Operations