COUNTERTERRORISM

U.S. Agencies Face 

Challenges Countering the 

Use of Improvised 

Explosive Devices in the 

Afghanistan/Pakistan 

Region 

Statement of Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 

Director, International Affairs and Trade

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on 

Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, 

and Security Technologies, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, July 12, 2012

GAO-12-907T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
 

Page 1 GAO-12-907T 

Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here to discuss the collaborative efforts of U.S. 

agencies to detect and prevent the smuggling into Afghanistan of calcium 

ammonium nitrate (CAN) fertilizer produced in Pakistan. Approximately 

80 percent of the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan 

contain homemade explosives, primarily CAN smuggled from Pakistan. 

These IEDs have been a major source of fatalities among U.S. troops in 

Afghanistan and have been used by various insurgent groups in Pakistan 

to kill thousands of Pakistani civilians and members of Pakistani security 

forces. U.S. officials recognize the threat posed by the smuggling of CAN 

and other IED precursors from Pakistan into Afghanistan, and various 

U.S. departments, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

are assisting Pakistan’s government in countering this threat. My remarks 

today are based on our May 2012 report on this issue.1

According to the Department of Defense (DOD), CAN is produced in 

Pakistan at two factories. DOD estimates that about 240 tons of CAN—

representing less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the two factories’ total 

annual production capacity—is used by insurgents to make IEDs for use 

in Afghanistan. When processed and mixed with fuel oil, CAN fertilizer 

becomes a powerful homemade explosive. DOD officials noted that only 

a small amount of CAN is required to make powerful IEDs. According to 

DOD, a 110-pound bag of CAN yields about 82 pounds of bomb-ready 

explosive material. This small quantity has the capacity to destroy an 

armored vehicle or detonate 10 small blasts aimed at U.S. forces 

conducting foot patrols. 

Afghanistan outlawed CAN in 2010, but because of demand for CAN as 

fertilizer and for IEDs, smugglers bring it into the country, for example, on 

trucks hidden under other goods. Afghanistan and Pakistan face

challenges similar to those that the United States and Mexico face in 

trying to prevent smuggling across sections of our shared border. U.S. 

officials note that Pakistan maintains two primary border crossings along 

the approximately 1,500-mile border with Afghanistan, and only a small 

 

1

GAO, Combating Terrorism: State Should Enhance Its Performance Measures for 

Assessing Efforts in Pakistan to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices, GAO-12-614

(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2012). 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-907T 

percentage of the trucks crossing the border are inspected. Our May 

2012 report contains a video of activity at border crossings along the 

Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

Our May 2012 report (1) described the status of U.S. efforts to assist 

Pakistan in countering IEDs and (2) reviewed the Department of State’s 

(State) tracking of U.S.-assisted efforts in Pakistan to counter IEDs. To 

describe these efforts, we reviewed documentation from multiple U.S. 

agencies—including DHS, State, the Department of Defense (DOD), and 

the Department of Justice—to inventory and describe their relevant 

activities and performance measures. We also interviewed 

representatives of U.S. agencies and international partners in the United 

States and Pakistan.2

In summary, we identified four categories of assistance U.S. agencies 

have provided: (1) counter-IED training and equipment, (2) a counter-IED 

public awareness campaign, (3) training of border officials, and (4) legal 

assistance for laws and regulations to counter IEDs and IED precursors. 

We found that each agency providing counter-IED assistance to Pakistan 

performs a unique role based on its specialized knowledge and expertise. 

DHS, for example, takes primary responsibility for border management 

and customs investigation training. DHS conducts joint regional training 

and operational exercises for both Pakistani and Afghan border officials, 

including international border interdiction training and cross-border 

financial investigation training. DHS also plays a lead role in Program 

Global Shield to foster cross-border cooperation and initiate 

complementary border management and customs operations.3

 

2

More detail on our scope and methodology is available in the issued report. We 

conducted this performance audit from October 2011 to May 2012 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives.

According 

3

Program Global Shield is an international effort to counter the smuggling of chemical 

precursors that could be used to manufacture IEDs, including CAN. The World Customs 

Organization, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Interpol, and DHS jointly 

initiated this project in 2010 and established it as a program in June 2011 with funding of 

about $5.9 million that State provided through its Bureau of International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs, according to the Bureau’s Global Shield liaison officer. 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-907T 

to DHS, the main goals of Program Global Shield are (1) to identify and 

interdict falsely declared explosive precursor chemicals, (2) to initiate 

investigations of smuggled or illegally diverted IED materials, and (3) to 

uncover smuggling and procurement networks that foster illicit trade.

According to agency officials, U.S. agencies work through various 

organizations to coordinate and share information related to assisting 

Pakistan with counter-IED efforts. These include the following:

• The U.S. Embassy-Pakistan Counter-IED Working Group helps to 

keep counter-IED efforts a priority. Coordinated by State, the group 

also includes participants from DHS, DOD, and the Departments of 

Justice and Agriculture as well as the U.S. Agency for International 

Development, the British High Commission, and the United Nations 

Office of Drugs and Crime.

• The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

(JIEDDO)4

• The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan 

participates in regular discussions on counter-IED issues with Central 

Command (CENTCOM), Special Operations Command (SOCOM), 

JIEDDO, and the Counter-IED Working Group at the U.S. Embassy in 

Pakistan, which includes DHS. 

leads DOD’s counter-IED efforts by providing intelligence 

and expertise on IEDs. For example, JIEDDO hosted a global 

conference on homemade explosives in fall 2011 that was attended 

by fertilizer producers and representatives from several agencies. 

JIEDDO conducted several studies and provided technical assistance 

to fertilizer producers on how they could mark the product to help 

inhibit smuggling.

In providing assistance to Pakistan, which adopted a counter-IED strategy 

in 2011, U.S. agencies have encountered a range of challenges. U.S. 

officials in Washington, D.C., and Islamabad, Pakistan identified the 

following key difficulties that hamper the provision of training and 

equipment.

 

4

JIEDDO is an agency of DOD.
 

Page 4 GAO-12-907T 

• Obtaining visas for U.S. officials. We have previously reported that 

U.S. officials face delays in obtaining visas to travel to Pakistan.5

• Vetting Pakistani officials to receive U.S. training. U.S. law requires 

that U.S. agencies determine whether there is credible evidence of 

gross violations of human rights by security force units or individuals 

slated to receive security assistance.

During our January 2012 meetings at the U.S. Embassy, officials from 

several agencies told us that it is difficult to obtain visas for U.S. 

officials, including trainers, to travel to Pakistan. According to officials, 

visa renewals sometimes take up to 6 weeks, which can force trainers 

to leave the country until they get their visa renewed. This has 

sometimes resulted in disruptions and cancelled training courses.

6

• Ensuring timely delivery of equipment. Problems clearing customs 

and other issues have delayed the transfer of counter-IED equipment 

from the United States to Pakistani forces. For example, as of April 

2012, of the 110 IED jammers that DOD procured in 2009 for Pakistan 

at a cost of about $22.8 million, 55 jammers were still in Karachi 

awaiting release from Pakistani customs. The remaining 55 jammers 

were being kept in storage in the United States until the initial 55 were 

released.

According to U.S. officials, 

Pakistan must provide in advance the names of individuals who will 

be receiving U.S. training in order for them to be vetted. In addition 

U.S. officials stated that Pakistan has not always been timely in 

releasing the names of officials who are to receive the training, which 

can create logistics and scheduling difficulties. For example, 

according to DHS officials, lack of sufficient time to complete the 

vetting process resulted in the cancellation of a Program Global 

Shield training session in October 2011.

• Reaching agreement on the specifics of U.S. assistance projects. 

Efforts by the United States to reach agreement with Pakistan on the 

 

5

GAO, Accountability for U.S. Equipment Provided to Pakistani Security Forces in the 

Western Frontier Needs to Be Improved, GAO-11-156R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 

2011).

6

See 22 U.S.C. 2378d regarding assistance furnished under the Foreign Assistance Act or 

the Arms Export Control Act. For programs funded by DOD appropriations, the provision is 

limited to training programs and is incorporated annually in the Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act. See, for example, Pub. L. No. 112-10, Div. A. sec. 8058. 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-907T 

specific terms of assistance projects can be challenging. For example, 

the United States and Pakistan planned to establish a facility capable 

of exploiting chemical, technical, biometric, and documentary 

evidence to enable Pakistan to disrupt insurgent networks. According 

to DOD officials, once it became clear that the United States and 

Pakistan could not reach agreement on joint use of the facility, DOD 

terminated its support for establishing this facility. 

In addition to these challenges to U.S. efforts to assist Pakistan, U.S. 

officials identified several broader challenges to Pakistan’s ability to 

counter IEDs and, more specifically, to suppress the smuggling of CAN 

and other IED precursors across the Pakistani border with Afghanistan.

• History of smuggling across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. 

Segments of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border remain porous and are 

difficult to patrol. The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is 

approximately 1,500 miles long and much of the terrain along the 

central and northern border is rugged and mountainous. There is a 

history of smuggling goods in both directions at many points along this 

porous border.

• Availability of CAN substitutes for IEDs. Even if the smuggling of CAN 

could be suppressed, insurgents can readily use another precursor 

chemical to make IEDs. According to DOD, other products available in 

Pakistan—such as potassium chlorate, used in making matches, and 

urea, another commonly used fertilizer—can also be used to produce 

IEDs. At a JIEDDO conference on homemade explosives, a panel of 

experts agreed that insurgents could easily substitute these 

commodities to make IEDs if it becomes more difficult for them to 

access CAN.

• Smuggling of IED precursors into Afghanistan from other bordering 

countries. While Pakistan is the principal source of CAN coming into 

Afghanistan, China and Iran are also reported to be suppliers of IED 

precursor chemicals. According to State officials, other substitutes for 

CAN, including potassium chlorate and urea, are exported by 

countries other than Pakistan.

• Delay in finalizing Pakistan’s National Counter-IED Implementation 

Plan. Pakistan’s Directorate General for Civil Defense has developed 

a National Counter-IED Implementation Plan as outlined in the 

National Counter-IED Strategy. However, as of April 2012, the plan 

had not been approved due to concerns over resourcing and other 

issues. 

Our May 2012 report also found that U.S. agencies have developed a 

new performance indicator and three targets to track some U.S. assisted 
 

Page 6 GAO-12-907T 

Pakistani counter-IED efforts. Specifically, State’s fiscal year 2013 

Mission Strategic and Resource Plan—which is designed to reflect U.S. 

priorities in Pakistan—included a performance indicator to monitor 

Pakistan’s implementation of effective measures to prevent illicit 

commerce in sensitive materials, including chemical precursors used to 

make IEDs in Afghanistan. To measure progress toward this performance 

indicator, the plan included three targets: (1) implementation of the 

Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement for fiscal year 2011, (2) 

improved competency of Pakistani customs and border officials and 

improved monitoring at border stations for fiscal year 2012, and (3) 

Pakistan’s implementation of a real-time truck-tracking system for fiscal 

year 2013.

While the inclusion of a counter-IED performance indicator and targets to 

measure progress toward the indicator in the fiscal year 2013 MSRP is a 

positive step, it does not reflect the broad range of U.S. assisted counterIED efforts in Pakistan. As a result, our report included a recommendation 

to State to enhance its counter-IED performance measures to cover the 

full range of U.S. assisted efforts. State concurred with our 

recommendation and noted that comprehensive metrics would better 

enable evaluation of progress in counter-IED efforts in Pakistan. State 

committed to improve assessment of its programs by looking for ways to 

broaden the scope of existing metrics in order to better reflect and 

evaluate interagency participation in counter-IED efforts. In its comments 

on a draft of our report, DHS noted that it is committed to working with 

interagency partners to improve capacity for tracking counter-IED efforts 

in Pakistan.

Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer 

any questions you may have at this time.

For further information on this statement, please contact Charles Michael 

Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331. In addition, contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this statement.

Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony include Jason 

Bair, Assistant Director; Aniruddha Dasgupta; David Dayton; Cindy 

Gilbert; Reid Lowe; Mark Speight; Eddie Uyekawa; and Tom Zingale.

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

(320927)
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