Reverse and Remand and Opinion Filed November 19, 2013 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-12-01126-CV 

CITIMORTGAGE, INC., Appellant 

V. 

ERIC A. SCZEPANIK AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CC-11-08775-A 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices FitzGerald, Francis, and Myers 

Opinion by Justice Francis 

In this suit for forcible detainer, CitiMortgage, Inc. appeals the trial court’s take nothing 

judgment in favor of Eric A. Sczepanik and all other occupants of 421 Cambridge Drive, 

Richardson, Texas. In four issues, CitiMortgage contends the trial court erred by sustaining 

Sczepanik’s objections and excluding the trustee’s deed (by substitute trustee) from evidence. 

We agree. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. 

Sczepanik purchased the house at 421 Cambridge Drive in Richardson on November 8, 

2004. He signed a promissory note for $123,750 and executed a deed of trust. Under the deed of 

trust, Sczepanik agreed that if the property were sold at a foreclosure sale, as borrower on the 

note, he and any person holding possession of the house through him would “immediately 

surrender possession of the Property to the purchaser at that sale.” If he did not surrender 
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possession, he would become a tenant at sufferance and could be removed by writ of possession 

or other court proceeding. When he defaulted on his note, the property was posted for 

foreclosure, and CitiMortgage purchased the property. CitiMortgage sent Sczepanik a demand to 

vacate the premises and, when he did not do so, filed suit for forcible detainer in justice of the 

peace court. After that court awarded judgment in favor of CitiMortgage, Sczepanik appealed to 

the county court at law. 

On appeal, CitiMortgage offered the trustee’s deed to establish it had the right to 

immediate possession of the property. Sczepanik objected to the document on the grounds it was 

“hearsay within hearsay.” The trial court sustained the objection and entered a take nothing 

judgment in favor of Sczepanik. The trial court did not file findings of fact and conclusions of 

law despite CitiMortgage’s request for the same. This appeal followed. 

Evidentiary rulings are committed to the trial court’s sound discretion. Bay Area 

Healthcare Grp., Ltd. v. McShane, 239 S.W.3d 231, 234 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam). A trial court 

abuses its discretion when it acts without regard for any guiding rules or principles. Owens–

Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998). 

We recently considered whether the recitals in a trustee’s deed were hearsay within 

hearsay subject to exclusion under the hearsay rule. See Mason v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 

05-12-01590-CV, 2013 WL 5948077, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 5, 2013, no pet. h.) (mem. 

op.). Rule of evidence 803(15) provides that statements of document affecting an interest in 

property are not excluded by the hearsay rule. TEX. R. EVID. 803(15); see Mason, 2013 WL 

5948077, at *2. The trustee’s deed in this case is “a document purporting to establish or affect 

an interest in property.” TEX. R. EVID. 803(15). 

As was the case in Mason, the issue here is whether the recitals Sczepanik objected to 

were “relevant to the purpose of the document.” The purpose of the trustee’s deed was to 
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transfer the property following a foreclosure sale, and the recitals in the trustee’s deed, setting 

out the facts on which the foreclosure sale was based, were germane to the deed’s purpose. We 

therefore conclude that, under rule 803(15), the recitals are “relevant to the purpose of the 

document” and are not excluded by the hearsay rule. See Mason, 2013 WL 5948077, at *3. 

Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining Sczepanik’s hearsay within 

hearsay objection to the deed and by excluding the deed. 

Having concluded the trial court erred, we must determine whether the error probably 

caused the rendition of an improper judgment. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a). A forcible detainer 

action is a procedure to determine the right to immediate possession of real property where there 

was no unlawful entry. Williams v. Bank of New York Mellon, 315 S.W.3d 925, 926 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). It is intended to be a speedy, simple, and inexpensive means to 

obtain possession without resort to an action on the title. Scott v. Hewitt, 127 Tex. 31, 35, 90 

S.W.2d 816, 818–19 (1936). To maintain simplicity, the applicable rule of procedure provides 

that “the only issue shall be as to the right to actual possession; and the merits of the title shall 

not be adjudicated.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 746. Thus, the only issue in a forcible detainer action is 

which party has the right to immediate possession of the property. Williams, 315 S.W.3d at 927. 

CitiMortgage offered the trustee’s deed to establish it purchased the property at 

foreclosure and had a right to immediate possession. The trial court erroneously excluded the 

evidence and found in favor of Sczepanik. Under these facts, we conclude the erroneous 

exclusion of the deed showing CitiMortgage’s ownership probably caused the rendition of an 

improper judgment. We sustain CitiMortgage’s issues. 

 
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We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

 

121126F.P05 

 

/Molly Francis/ 

MOLLY FRANCIS 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

CITIMORTGAGE, INC., Appellant 

No. 05-12-01126-CV V. 

ERIC A. SCZEPANIK AND ALL OTHER 

OCCUPANTS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the County Court at Law 

No. 1, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CC-11-08775-A. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Francis. 

Justices FitzGerald and Myers participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

REVERSED and this cause is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

 It is ORDERED that appellant CITIMORTGAGE, INC. recover its costs of this appeal 

from appellee ERIC A. SCZEPANIK AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS. 

Judgment entered this 19th day of November, 2013. 

/Molly Francis/ 

MOLLY FRANCIS 

JUSTICE