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Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

AGAINST ALL ODDS:

RELATIONS BETWEEN NATO AND 

THE MENA REGION

Florence Gaub

August 2012

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ii

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ISBN 1-58487-535-6
iii

FOREWORD

The Middle East and North Africa might not be the 

first region that comes to mind when one contemplates 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). To 

many, the Alliance was founded largely to unite Europe 

and North America, and to counter threats emerging 

from the Soviet bloc. The end of the Cold War changed 

these assumptions—not least to be proven by NATO’s 

Operation in Libya in 2011, sanctioned by the League of 

Arab States.

In this monograph, Dr. Florence Gaub describes how 

the region has moved from the rim of the Alliance’s security perspective toward a more nuanced vision that 

recognizes the region’s role in an ever-changing and 

more-complex world. NATO has understood the security implications emerging from the changes taking place 

among its southern neighbors and the need for dialogue 

and cooperation. Dr. Gaub gives not only an overview of 

the different frameworks of cooperation that NATO has 

with the Middle East and North Africa, but also explains 

their evolution and potential. 

As the Arab world is undergoing change on an unprecedented scale, NATO’s need for dialogue and exchange with this part of the world is even more important than before. Yet, there are obstacles along the way: 

burdened by historical precursors, NATO’s strategic 

communication, and the use of antagonistic rhetoric tapping into the Clash of Civilizations, the Alliance faces a 

number of challenges in its cooperation with its southern partners.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

FLORENCE GAUB is a researcher and lecturer in 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defense College’s Middle East Faculty. Her areas of 

interest include the Arab world, military sociology, 

post-conflict reconstruction, and intercultural communication. Previously, she has served as a research 

fellow in the German Parliament, focusing on issues 

of defense, internal security, and development. She 

has also held positions with the French Defence Ministry’s Research Centre in the Social Sciences of Defence (Centre d’études en sciences sociales de la defense), the Centre for Security Studies in Sarajevo, the 

Centre for Applied Policy Research in Munich, as well 

as with the United Nations Institute for Training and 

Research in New York, where she coordinated courses 

for diplomats posted at the United Nations. She has 

conducted extensive field studies in Lebanon, Iraq, 

Nigeria, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. She has published 

several articles and two books on these topics, and has 

lectured widely with The NATO School, Oberammergau, Germany; Allied Joint Forces Command Naples; 

and several think tanks and universities in the Middle 

East, Europe, and the United States. Dr. Gaub graduated from Sorbonne University in Paris, France, and 

the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich, Germany. She holds a Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science at Humboldt University of Berlin.

vii

SUMMARY

While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) was founded in 1949 first and foremost to 

strengthen the transatlantic link in the wake of the Soviet threat, one of the immediate neighboring regions 

was left largely unnoticed for the Alliance’s first 4 

decades. Although some of the Allies had recognized 

the importance of the Middle East and North Africa 

(MENA) region, it was dealt with largely on a bilateral 

basis. Events such as the Suez crisis of 1956 and the 

wars of 1967 and 1973 did have an impact on NATO 

and its cohesion, overall its focus remained on the 

Central Front in Germany. This was where a Soviet attack would have likely occurred, and led to an Allied 

bias in geographic terms.

Although the southern allies recognized the importance of the region for NATO’s security, they failed 

to set the agenda within the Alliance to a significant 

extent. This was not helped by the fact that some of 

the southern allies (such as Greece and Turkey) had 

their own conflicts to deal with, or were not part of 

NATO’s integrated command structure (such as Spain 

and France). The Alliance blindness to the strategic 

relevance of the Middle East and North Africa is thus 

an outcome of not only a strategic bias in favor of the 

Central Front, but also of issues internal to the Alliance.

These situations changed with the end of the Cold 

War. The invasion of Kuwait and subsequent war 

against Iraq, promising developments in the IsraeliPalestinian peace process, and the establishment of 

the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program designed for 

European states all created circumstances conducive 

for the launch of a similar network with the Alliance’s 

southern neighbors.
As the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) was born in 

1994, it counted initially five member states (Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Israel) and had no 

political ambitions beyond the exchange of views and 

information. Yet, as the MD grew with the inclusion 

first of Jordan and later Algeria, it served as an important platform for the Alliance’s other outreach efforts, 

which received further input in 2004. Following the 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the invasion of 

Iraq, and the discovery of a potential nuclear program 

in Iran, the region received renewed attention from 

the Allies. While the MD was elevated to the status 

of partnership, a separate program was developed for 

the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 

The invitation to the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 

(ICI) has been accepted by Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, 

and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), but has received 

no official response from Saudi Arabia and Oman. 

Both frameworks are decidedly more ambitious than 

the original dialogue and aim not only for political but 

also military cooperation and interoperability. In addition, the Alliance initiated its first training mission 

in Iraq. A small endeavor of 150 people, it contributed 

particularly to the formation of the new Iraqi security 

forces’ officer corps. Initial contact was also established with the League of Arab States. By the time the 

Arab Spring began, NATO had established relations 

with half of the League’s member states.

Yet a few states remain outside of NATO’s network 

with the MENA region; this fact alone reflects accurately the binary relations most Allies, particularly the 

United States, have with the region’s governments. 

The fact that Libya, Lebanon, and Syria (and originally Algeria) were excluded from the MD although 

they are Mediterranean states is a clear indication of 

viii
ix

political relationships in disarray. While the absence 

of Lebanon and Syria is clearly connected to the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Libyan case is a 

result of decades of support to international terrorism.

As a result of these difficulties, NATO has attempted to work around existing conflicts within 

and without the region, be it the Western Sahara issue between Algeria and Morocco or the Palestinian 

conflict. In spite of these attempts, the Alliance’s relationships are affected by low levels of political and 

economic integration in the region proper as a result 

of high- and low-intensity conflicts. In addition, the 

existing partnerships are hampered by NATO’s rather 

negative image on the public level. This is in part due 

to a lack of distinction between the Alliance as a collective and its individual member states. A history 

of colonization (France, Spain, Italy, and the United 

Kingdom) and bilateral interventionism has created 

with the wider public an ambiance of distrust, which 

affects NATO as well, although the Alliance itself intervened in the region only in 2011, and then with a 

mandate from the League of Arab States. Nevertheless, NATO is frequently seen as an expansionist tool 

and not to be trusted. This image is particularly fueled by the Alliance’s mission in Afghanistan, which 

is seen as an anti-Muslim operation, as well as by the 

lack of support for the Palestinian cause. In addition, 

NATO itself has struggled to adjust to the region in 

partnership terms: translations into Arabic as well as 

Arabic-speaking personnel are scarce, and within the 

Alliance there are divergent views of the region’s relevance to Allied security.

Yet, in times of transnational challenges, such as 

terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, migration, climate change, and energy se-
x

curity, NATO has no other choice but to extend its 

understanding of security beyond traditional lines. 

Defense and security cannot be understood in territorial terms any longer; only in a comprehensive 

manner can both NATO and its partners confront the 

challenges of the 21st century. It is precisely for this 

reason that the Alliance will continue to improve the 

existing relationships and overcome the remaining 

challenges—conflict, war, and security are not matters 

of choice, but of necessity.
1

AGAINST ALL ODDS:

RELATIONS BETWEEN NATO AND 

THE MENA REGION

An analysis of current relations linking the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with the Middle 

East and North Africa (MENA) prompts the observation that the likelihood of such ties developing in the 

first place must have seemed at best remote. Too substantial were (and still are) the differences between 

the institution embodying the Transatlantic Link and 

the Arab world; too extensive were the mutual suspicions; and too great was the historical burden, which 

weighed on such relations from the outset. And yet, 

against all odds, a web of relationships developed 

from 1991 onward and continues to grow, culminating in 2011 in the first NATO operation in an Arab 

country—Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) 

in Libya, sanctioned by the League of Arab States, 

and assisted by four Arab countries (Morocco, Jordan, 

United Arab Emirates [UAE] and Qatar). Relations 

between the Alliance and the Arab world have thus 

made an about-turn in the space of 2 decades. Yet, 

while profound progress has been made, a number of 

obstacles remain on the way to a comprehensive relationship between NATO and the vast region ranging 

from Mauritania to Iraq.

NEIGHBORS WITHOUT CONTACT: NATO AND 

THE MENA REGION BEFORE 1991

To say that the Middle East and North Africa at 

one time did not matter at all to NATO would be an 

exaggeration, and yet, it is to a certain extent true. As 

NATO’s creation in 1949 was intended to counter the 
2

threat of the Soviet Union to the Free World, the Mediterranean and adjacent regions occupied a secondary 

place among the priorities of the Alliance’s founding 

fathers. Yet, they were not completely absent from the 

agenda: the question of Italian membership was closely connected to Mediterranean security, as was that 

of the French territories in North Africa. Although 

NATO felt that a Member State mostly surrounded 

by the Mediterranean Sea would distract from the 

Atlantic outlook of the Alliance, Italy was included 

among the founding Allies, since it was feared that 

its exclusion would strengthen the country’s Communist party.1

 Thus, NATO had a definite Mediterranean 

component with French, Italian, and later Greek and 

Turkish membership. This ultimately resulted in the 

creation of Armed Forces South (AFSOUTH), a command dedicated solely to the Mediterranean region. 

Yet, although almost a third of NATO’s members during the Cold War bordered on the Mediterranean (as 

compared to a fifth today, following large intakes from 

Eastern Europe), they failed to formulate a coherent 

vision and strategy for the adjacent MENA region and 

thus shape NATO’s approach to it as a whole. France’s 

and Spain’s long-standing absence from the Alliance’s 

integrated military structure contributed to this, as did 

the tensions between Greece and Turkey, mainly over 

Cyprus. In addition, the Allies with a strong interest 

in the region, such as France, Great Britain, and the 

United States, favored engagement with the MENA 

region outside the NATO context. 

This attitude was fueled by the perception that 

NATO as a mutual defense alliance was not supposed 

to act outside the territory of its Member States (the 

so-called out-of-area debate). The MENA region, being outside the territory of NATO member states, did 
3

not play an independent role during the Cold War, 

when security was envisioned in a rather classical 

perspective. Territoriality, and attacks on it, were the 

dominant theme, and thus left no room for a grasp 

of security going beyond this. As a consequence, the 

MENA region was seen first and foremost as a possible sideshow in the antagonism between communism 

and capitalism. After attempts to create a Middle Eastern counterpart to NATO failed, Greece and Turkey 

were invited to join the Alliance in 1952—as in the 

case of Italy, concern with potential expansion of Soviet influence overruled the Alliance’s vocational concentration on Western Europe.2

 By the same token, the 

Eisenhower Doctrine, issued in 1957 as a reaction to 

the Suez War of 1956, offered military and economic 

support to Middle Eastern states threatened by Soviet 

influence.3 This followed the example of the Truman 

Doctrine of 1947, which had offered the same sort of 

assistance to Greece and Turkey. The MENA region 

was thus seen, in Western eyes, only as an area where 

expanding Soviet influence could cause a greater 

threat to the West.

Indeed, within the North Atlantic Alliance, security and defense were seen solely through the prism 

of the Soviet threat, and major emphasis was placed 

on the so-called Central Front (known as the “Central 

Front bias”) to the detriment of other regions such as 

the South. Structurally, this perspective could be seen 

in the limited attention NATO Headquarters gave to 

the MENA region, monitored by an Expert Working 

Group that later evolved into a slightly more political 

Ad Hoc Group. Meeting only twice a year for 2 days 

at the expert level,4

 “neither group proved as active, 

informed or forward-looking as events warranted.”5
4

The Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 slightly 

changed the stance on out-of-area concerns: the Soviet 

Union’s strong support to Egypt and its breaking off 

of relations with Israel in 1967 enhanced the region’s 

status as a Cold War sideshow. As a reaction to American military support to Israel, the Arab members of 

the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 

(OPEC) imposed an oil embargo, highlighting European dependency on the region’s energy supplies—at 

the time, 80 percent of Europe’s oil came from Arab 

countries.6

 Most importantly, the conflict also brought 

to the forefront the rift that ran through the Alliance 

when it came to Middle Eastern policy: most European Allies (except for Portugal and the Netherlands) 

denied the United States access to their national facilities to supply Israel, whereas the United States put its 

global forces on nuclear alert without prior consultation in the North Atlantic Council.7

While neither crisis led to an active NATO role in 

the region, the Alliance nevertheless acknowledged 

the importance of world regions other than Eastern 

Europe, thereby reducing its strict “in-area” policy 

somewhat. The 1974 summit declaration included the 

Allies’ statement of their resolve to “keep each other 

fully informed and to strengthen the practice of frank 

and timely consultations by all means which may be 

appropriate on matters relating to their common interests as members of the Alliance, bearing in mind 

that these interests can be affected by events in other 

areas of the world.”8 The Alliance realized that the 

Arab world could no longer be overlooked as a strategic region.
5

A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATO AND 

THE ARAB WORLD: AN OVERVIEW

The established vision of the Middle East and 

North Africa as a mere sideshow in the Cold War 

changed in the early 1990s: the collapse of the Soviet 

Union removed the threat of the Warsaw Pact, the 

Gulf War against Iraq highlighted the importance of 

the MENA region for Allied security (independent of 

any Soviet threat), and the Israeli-Palestinian peace 

process was thought at the time to indicate an era of 

stability ahead. 

Thus, the Strategic Concept adopted in 1991 in 

Rome acknowledged the region as a whole for the 

first time in Alliance history: “The Allies also wish 

to maintain peaceful and non-adversarial relations 

with the countries in the southern Mediterranean and 

Middle East. The stability and peace of the countries 

on the southern periphery of Europe are important 

for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf war 

has shown.”9

 In addition, the Concept recognized the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

in the region as a potential threat. Forty-two years after NATO’s creation, the region thus emerged in the 

Allied strategic vision, as stated in the North Atlantic 

Council Communiqué of 1993: “Security in Europe is 

greatly affected by security in the Mediterranean.”10

The interdependence of security had finally been acknowledged by the Alliance, and an out-of-area role 

for NATO was soon after confirmed with its engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995.
6

The Mediterranean Dialogue.

After the Cold War came to an end, the Alliance 

entered a new era in which concepts of security, territoriality, and defense were rethought. Former Warsaw Pact members entered first the Partnership for 

Peace (PfP) program, and eventually the Alliance 

itself. A timid engagement with the Mediterranean 

region emerged in the form of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), which came into being toward the end of 

1994. While some Allies, particularly Italy and Spain, 

were pushing for a full-blown partnership structure 

like the far-reaching PfP program dedicated to European states, most were concerned that NATO would 

be overburdened by reaching out in two different 

directions. This meant that the MD was at first little 

more than a consultative forum, its stated aims being 

“to contribute to security and stability in the Mediterranean as a whole, to achieve better mutual understanding and to correct any misunderstandings of the 

Alliance’s purposes that could lead to a perception of 

threat.”11 In other words, the goal of the Dialogue is to 

deconstruct the myth of an Alliance searching for new 

enemies, and to dispel fears that a new European security structure might exclude—and harm—its southern 

neighbors. By the same token, the Dialogue seeks to 

improve Allied understanding of Partner Countries’ 

security perceptions and concerns—a feature that had 

not existed throughout the Cold War, when the Alliance understood Middle Eastern security merely as 

an extension of East-West antagonism, or worse, of its 

own security.12

The original members of the MD were chosen by 

consensus in the Alliance. This is an important point, 

as it explains why the first MENA partners of NATO 
7

were all states considered stable and friendly toward 

the West—Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Israel 

and, a few months later, Jordan. The criterion has been 

bemoaned by MD members, who would have liked to 

see Syria, Lebanon, and Libya (under Gaddafi) invited 

as well.

The Dialogue started timidly and was designed 

from the outset to evolve. Originally limited to twiceyearly meetings between Brussels, Belgium, embassies, 

and members of NATO Headquarters’ international 

staff, the bilateral forum developed over the years into 

a more substantial cooperation. First elevated into a 

separate Committee involving representatives of the 

Alliance’s Member States, the MD progressively became more significant in both military and political 

terms. In 2000, Algeria was invited to join; in 2004, the 

Dialogue was elevated to the status of a full partnership. A policy document called for a more ambitious 

and expanded framework, including high-level political meetings, military interoperability, and defense 

reform.13 The menu of practical cooperation activities 

was increased from just a handful of items to several 

hundred, offering seminars, workshops, and courses 

in areas such as civil emergency planning, scientific 

and environmental affairs, crisis management, defense 

policy and strategy, small arms and light weapons, and 

proliferation. A number of meetings have now been 

held at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of 

Defense, as well as of Chiefs of Defense. In addition, 

officers and civil servants from MD countries have for 

some years been attending seminars, workshops, and 

courses at NATO Headquarters, the NATO Defense 

College, and the NATO School Oberammergau. MD 

countries can observe NATO military exercises, and 

their participation can be funded by the Alliance. 
8

When the Alliance drafted its new Strategic Concept in 2010, MD member states were consulted. A 

trust fund was created to contribute to the elimination 

of explosive remnants of war in Jordan, and another 

fund exists to destroy obsolete and unserviceable munitions, build adequate storage sites for remaining 

munitions, enhance specialized personnel skills, and 

provide training for the reintegration of military personnel returning to civilian life.14 Most importantly, 

MD countries (Morocco and Jordan) have contributed 

to NATO operations in Kosovo, Libya, and Afghanistan. Six of the seven MD countries have concluded 

Individual Partnership Cooperation Programs, designed to deepen their relationship with NATO by offering tailored advice on reforms.

Overall, the MD thus seems like a successful 

program, especially when one considers the circumstances in which it was initiated. However, the comparison with efforts like the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 

Council (EAPC) involving the 28 Allies and 22 PfP 

Partners makes it clear that the Dialogue is more of 

a confidence-building measure than a real partnership. The Alliance has failed so far to develop jointly 

defined challenges with its Mediterranean partners, 

or determine the benefits for both sides involved in 

the partnership. As a result, NATO’s intentions in the 

region are not always clear; this continues to be a hindrance, particularly at the political level.

As the MD is based on an imbalance between supply and demand, NATO remains its driving force. This 

is partly the result of the Partners not understanding 

fully what the Alliance can offer, but also of the silence 

maintained by their security community and their 

total lack of a common strategic voice. In addition, 

though the Alliance is politico-military in nature, 90 
9

percent of its cooperation with these countries is military, indicating difficulties in improving the political 

aspect of the partnership. Despite the considerable 

progress made between the Alliance and its Mediterranean partners, there is thus room for improvement. 

Possible synergies could be developed with a second 

partnership that NATO created in the MENA region 

in 2004, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). 

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

September 11, 2001 (9/11) affected the Alliance’s 

relationship with the MENA region significantly. 

Where some Member States (particularly Germany, 

Canada, and the Scandinavian countries) had previously doubted the relevance and importance of the 

MD, the tragic events of that day spurred the realization that dialogue and cooperation with this region 

were vital for Allied security. The invasion of Iraq in 

2003, its subsequent instability, the shift of the balance 

of power toward Iran, and Iran’s likely quest for a nuclear weapon added to the perceived need for stability 

in the Gulf region, encouraging the hope that transatlantic engagement would foster it. As then NATO 

Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer declared on a 

visit to Qatar in 2005, “This region faces formidable security challenges. Several countries in this region have 

been the target of terrorist attacks. And your immediate neighborhood remains a flashpoint of unresolved 

regional issues, of proliferation risks, and of political 

and religious extremism.”15

As a consequence, the Istanbul Summit of 2004 

launched a partnership with the countries of the Gulf 

Cooperation Council (GCC), inviting all of them to 

join. To date only Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait 
10

have done so, while Saudi Arabia and Oman (which 

together account for 70 percent of the Gulf peninsula’s 

defense spending) have so far proved reluctant.

Compared to the MD, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) focuses less on mutual understanding and 

dispelling of misperceptions; instead, the emphasis is 

on contributing to “regional security and stability”16

in the broader Middle East region. From the outset, 

the Initiative thus took a noticeably more practical approach in the security area rather than focusing on the 

deconstruction of mutual suspicions. In part, this was 

due to the previous engagement with the MD, which 

allowed the Alliance to build on established mechanisms and tools. In addition, the Gulf States’ initial 

interest in NATO was rather greater than in the case 

of the MD: since they had already pursued a strategic 

internationalization of their security (e.g., by concluding bilateral agreements with France, Britain, and the 

United States), a relationship with the Alliance could 

be seen as another card in the deck to achieve this goal. 

Yet, there is also distrust and a lack of understanding 

regarding the way NATO functions, which ultimately has prevented the Initiative from reaching its full 

potential. The Initiative’s rather prominent practical 

component and its bilateral rather than multilateral 

framework are what distinguish it from the MD.

NATO outreach in the MENA region is further 

complemented by its Training and Cooperation Initiative, launched in 2006 with the aim of making NATO’s 

training expertise more widely available to its regional interlocutors.17 This was what had been done after 

the end of the Cold War in offering advice and support on security sector reform to all former Warsaw 

Pact members seeking to join the Alliance, a rather 

successful contribution to transformation in the states 
11

concerned. Niche expertise of this kind has resulted 

in education and training, effectively becoming a diplomatic tool in the Alliance’s portfolio—the training 

mission in Iraq being an important example of such 

activity. Education and training are attractive tools, 

as they allow for a certain level of engagement when 

the time might not be ripe for political acceptance of a 

partnership agreement. As an example, Saudi Arabia, 

which has so far not accepted the invitation to join the 

ICI, is participating in seminars, courses and conferences, which could be seen as indicative of tentative 

engagement. 

So far, the ICI has failed to develop the depth and 

strength anticipated. There is to date no framework 

document and no established military forum; in spite 

of the Initiative’s strong emphasis on military cooperation, the level of participation in the activities concerned (such as seminars, workshops, mutual visits, 

and participation in exercises) is low. In 2008, the ICI 

states participated in 57 cooperation activities (25 by 

the UAE, 13 by Qatar, 12 by Bahrain, and 7 by Kuwait)—while this is a 72 percent increase compared 

to 2005, it is still only 10 percent of the total activities 

offered.18 At the same time, NATO has tripled its offer 

on activities that are largely (85 percent) of a military 

nature. To date, there have been no regular meetings 

at the level of Defense Ministers or Foreign Ministers, 

and no Individual Partnership Cooperation Program 

has been concluded with any of the states involved.

This stands in stark contrast to active participation 

by three of the four ICI states in NATO’s operations—

Qatar and the UAE in the Libya Operation, and the 

UAE and Bahrain in the International Stabilization 

and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In addition, NATO has intelligence-sharing agreements with 
12

the UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain. This seems to indicate 

that the problem in deepening military cooperation 

is not merely political but also structural. The Gulf 

armed forces engaged with NATO are rather small in 

size, ranging from 8,200 troops in Bahrain, to 11,800 

in Qatar, 15,500 in Kuwait, and 51,000 in the UAE.19

Hence, their personnel pool is rather limited, particularly when it comes to the officer level.

More importantly, the ICI suffers from the absence 

of Oman and, to an even greater extent, Saudi Arabia—the Gulf giant in terms not only of size, but also 

of political and economic influence. The inclusion of 

these absentees would give the Initiative the credibility and visibility necessary for its success. For this 

reason, the Alliance has kept the door open to both 

states, and Saudi Arabia has started sending officers 

to attend the NATO Regional Cooperation Course at 

the Alliance’s Defense College.

There are several reasons that explain why these 

countries have not joined. Oman’s foreign policy traditionally seeks to maintain the fragile balance entailed in its close relations with Iran and its peninsular

neighbors, while Saudi Arabia prefers bilateral ties 

and is generally concerned about foreign military on 

its territory. 

Overall, the Gulf States have failed to devise a 

coherent strategic vision themselves: the common 

defense force Al-Jazeera Shield, consisting of 7,000 

troops and theoretically designed as an intervention 

force in the event of an attack, has therefore remained 

weak, although it was used in 2011 to quell uprisings 

in Bahrain. Strategic cooperation remains limited if the 

parties involved have unclear ideas about the overall 

goal.
13

This explains, in part, why the MD and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative remain separate—despite 

the cultural and historic connections, the security concerns, the strategic vision, and therefore the approach 

to defense in the states concerned are not the same. 

The Special Case: The Structured Security 

Cooperation Framework in Iraq.

Although the invasion of Iraq did not take place 

under the NATO flag, some might argue that it hurt 

the Alliance’s cohesion more than anything else since 

its foundation, since the Allies disagreed over the justification for it. Nicholas Burns, U.S. Ambassador to 

NATO at the time, termed the invasion “a near-death 

experience.”20 Nevertheless, the Allies agreed in 2005 

to respond to a request by the Iraqi government to assist with the training of its new security forces. NATO’s Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) is not only the 

first of its kind, it is also the gateway to a stronger and 

longer-lasting relationship between the Alliance and 

the so-called Eastern gate of the Arab world. 

NTM-I is small in size (150 troops), and not a combat mission. Folded into the American training effort 

(the two share a commander), its niche contribution 

focuses almost exclusively on the Iraqi Army’s officer 

corps, although a substantial number of Italian Carabinieri—about two thirds of the mission overall— 

contribute to training the Internal Security Forces 

under this umbrella as well. Assistance in rebuilding 

the different levels of officer education, be it the Staff 

College, the War College, or the National Defense 

College; advice in the development of education programs; and the establishment of a noncommissioned 

officer (NCO) corps are all part of NTM-I’s portfolio.
14

Despite its limited size, this mission works at a 

crucial junction in the newly emerging Iraqi security 

sector. Armed forces rely for their functioning on the 

officer corps; large numbers of enlisted personnel cannot fulfill their duties without the leadership and guidance provided by the officers commanding them. Yet, 

this is exactly where the Iraqi Armed Forces are currently challenged; 157 percent of its enlisted personnel 

requirements are filled, as opposed to only 73 percent 

coverage at the officer level.21 Since the disbanding of 

the old Iraqi armed forces, the new security structures 

have had to grow at an impressive speed; 14,000 new 

troops were brought in every 5 weeks in 2007, and the 

comprehensive De-Ba'athification program, originally 

designed to dismiss all former Iraqi military members 

above the rank of colonel, had to be curtailed. Today, 

about 70 percent of the country’s officer corps had 

served in the old Iraqi military. 

In this context, training and education are the 

key elements in securing the new structure. NTMI’s efforts seem to pale alongside the American contribution: 2,500 officer cadets, 200 NCOs, 460 Joint 

Staff College officer graduates, and 1,800 individuals trained abroad at the NATO Defense College, 

the NATO School Oberammergau, the Joint Warfare 

Center Stavanger, and the Center of Excellence in the 

Defense against Terrorism22 seem a rather limited contribution, considering the overall manning level of 

nearly 200,000 troops and about 20,000 officers. Yet, 

training can be effective only in units with existing 

structures and experienced officers, NCOs, and team 

members—all of which are currently understaffed by 

the Iraqi army. NATO’s limited efforts are thus providing a contribution where it really counts. In total, 

NTM-I is a rather inexpensive mission, with a budget 

of 22.5 million euros per year. The mission’s future, 
15

both in terms of scope and finances, will depend on 

the situation after the U.S. withdrawal at the end of 

2011. 

As the mission has relied heavily on U.S. force 

protection and logistics, it is not clear how it will be 

affected by the American withdrawal from Iraq. In the 

context of the negotiations between the U.S. and Iraqi 

governments regarding the stay of American trainers 

on Iraqi soil beyond the withdrawal (approximately 

between 8,000 and 25,000 trainers), Baghdad indicated 

a possible extension under the NATO mission.23 This 

hints at a preference for the Alliance, as its multinational character and its low level of visibility in Iraq in 

general have made it more acceptable to the population. Politically and legally speaking, the mission has 

moved from United Nations (UN) Resolution 1546 to 

a Structured Cooperation Framework between NATO 

and Iraq; this very likely serves as the first stepping 

stone toward a more comprehensive relationship between the two, which could ultimately result in a partnership within, or outside, the ICI framework. 

The Missing Links: Libya, Syria, Lebanon, 

Palestine.

While it is useful to assess NATO’s existing relations with the MENA region, it is equally interesting 

to take a closer look at the states with which it has 

none. Although the Alliance has now developed some 

kind of relationship with 11 Arab countries (which is 

half of the Arab League’s members) plus Israel, and 

has extended invitations to two more (Oman and Saudi Arabia), a number of states are missing from the 

network. These states fall broadly into two categories: 

those that can be deemed as politically unreliable or 
16

unfriendly to NATO, and those that are too weak in 

their statehood to forge a relationship with the Alliance.

The first category comprises Syria, Libya (before 

the 2011 operation), and Iraq (before 2004). Not surprisingly, these were all part of the list of “rogue 

states” established in the late 1990s and, as such, considered a threat to world peace.24 The list coincided 

to a considerable extent with what John R. Bolton, 

then U.S. Ambassador to the UN, referred to in 2002 

as the “Axis of Evil”25—states seen to be sponsors of 

terrorism and in pursuit of WMDs. The absence of 

Syria and Libya clearly reflects the bilateral relationship most Allies have, or had, with those two states 

outside the Allied context. While programs similar to 

NATO’s outreach initiatives into the region, such as 

the Five plus Five Dialogue between five European 

and five Maghreb countries or the European Union’s 

(EU) Union for the Mediterranean, do not ostracize 

Libya or Syria, the Alliance’s approach to both of these 

states has been strongly influenced by two elements: 

continuing American reservations about them, and 

their own reservations toward the Alliance.

This becomes particularly evident in the case of 

Libya: while UN sanctions for the support of terrorism and pursuit of a program to develop WMDs made 

initial Libyan membership of the MD out of the question at the inception of the MD in 1994, things changed 

after 2003. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi had already 

agreed a few years earlier to hand over the suspects 

charged with the Lockerbie terrorist attack to a court 

in the Netherlands, and to compensate the families of 

the victims of Lockerbie and Niger. Eventually, he also 

agreed to destroy all chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. The state was thus considered repentant 

and welcomed back into the international community. 
17

Yet, while the suggestion that Libya be invited to 

join the MD circulated briefly, it never materialized 

because the regime was not interested; considering 

the very negative attitude the Libyan government expressed at the time of the Dialogue’s foundation, this 

can hardly be considered a surprise. Gaddafi even 

threatened to launch a jihad in the event of NATO 

expansion into North Africa, warning his Maghreb 

neighbors of foreign interference in their affairs as a 

result of the MD.26 Prospects are different under a new 

Libyan government, which has benefited greatly from 

the Alliance’s support. In March 2011 NATO decided 

to implement the military aspects of UN Resolution 

1973, adopted after an appeal to the UN Security 

Council by the League of Arab States, calling for a nofly zone, a maritime arms embargo, and the protection 

of civilians.27 

The position adopted by the Arab League following a violent uprising against the Gaddafi regime was 

the regional green light that enabled the UN Security 

Council to issue the resolution calling for the protection of civilians, and prepared the way for NATO to 

address the military needs arising as a consequence of 

this resolution. Politically, it seems very unlikely that 

the Alliance would have taken on this mission without 

the strong regional support shown in this case. During 

Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, the Alliance was 

assisted by partner states from the region, namely, the 

UAE, Jordan, Morocco, and Qatar. It is important to 

point out that the mandate ruled ground troops out, 

and was enacted solely from the air and sea.

Gaddafi’s regime finally fell after 7 months of 

operations, and a new provisional government has 

emerged that seems to have a rather positive attitude 

toward the Alliance—so much so that the head of the 
18

Libyan Transitional National Council has asked the 

Allies to extend their mission until the end of 2011 in 

order to control surplus weapons and deal with possible Gaddafi loyalists who might still be active.28 While 

further engagement by the Alliance will be limited (a 

training mission, as in Iraq, is conceivable), Libyan involvement in the MD or in a different framework of 

partnership is now a distinct possibility, thus closing 

the North African gap in the program. 

The foreseeable evolution in Libya’s relations with 

the Alliance is unlikely to repeat itself in the case of 

Syria. Although some Syrian opposition members 

called on NATO to act following the violent crackdown on the wave of protests in late 2011,29 there is 

no appetite in the Alliance to engage in a situation 

that is very different from that in Libya in a number 

of respects—absence of a UN or League of Arab States 

mandate, an immediate, neighborhood with a NATO 

country (Turkey), strong relations with Iran, much 

more developed military capabilities, and a possible 

spillover effect into a region already under tension are 

all reasons not to engage in this case. Most importantly, 

in contrast to the Libyan National Transitional Council, the Syrian opposition has not made a concerted 

call on NATO. Regardless of the events surrounding 

the Arab Spring, Syria has not had any relations with 

the Alliance, although it did have some contacts with 

the EU. Syria’s isolation, particularly vis-à-vis the 

United States, stems among other things from its belligerence toward its neighbor Israel, but also from its 

long-standing occupation of Lebanon and its hostility 

toward other Arab states (such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 

and Jordan). In this context, Syrian absence from any 

Allied framework is a logical continuation of its own 

foreign policy.
19

The case of the three other states that have no relationship with NATO—Lebanon, the Palestinian 

Authority, and Yemen—is slightly different; their 

absence can be understood as a result of their weak 

statehood rather than a definite stance toward the Alliance. Lebanon, a multi-religious state that brought 

15 years of civil war to an end in 1990, only to remain 

occupied by Syrian forces and various militia groups, 

was—and still is—considered a Syrian vassal state in 

spite of the Syrian withdrawal in 2005. The presence 

of the Shia militia organization Hezbollah, an ally of 

Syria and Iran, was not only the reason for Israel’s 

invasion in 2006, but it has also undermined Lebanon’s credibility as a strong state that acts independently from Syria. Lebanon’s opposition toward a UN 

resolution condemning the violence in Syria in 2011 

continues a long tradition of aligning its politics with 

those of its neighbor. It thus comes as no surprise that 

neither NATO nor Lebanon are really at all interested 

in a partnership with each other. In addition, Lebanon—like Syria—is still officially at war with Israel 

and, while all three states are members of the Union 

for the Mediterranean, relevant business within the 

Union has been largely blocked because of the ongoing conflict.

Nevertheless, a possible role for NATO was voiced 

in the media in 2006 for a Lebanon peacekeeping force 

after the war between Israel and Hezbollah.30 Actually, nothing came of the proposal as a result of budgetary restrictions, NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan 

and, most importantly, the absence of regional support for such an option. Instead, the existing UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was expanded, with 

15,000 troops from 36 nations (of which 14 happen to 

be NATO Allies).31
20

Another case in point is the Palestinian Authority, also absent from formal relations with NATO. 

While Palestine has been recognized by eight NATO 

Allies,32 there is no unified position in the Alliance 

on the conflict, or, rather, on its resolution. Though 

all Allies support the two-state solution, there is no 

unanimous consensus on how to achieve it. Nevertheless, NATO opened exploratory information contacts 

with the Palestinian Authority in 2005, as the Istanbul 

Summit declaration had clearly stated that it would 

not exclude its future participation in any of the Alliance’s partnership frameworks.33 Yet, this never materialized, because the Israeli war with Lebanon in 2006 

and the hostilities on the Gaza strip in 2008 and 2009 

brought the peace process to a complete halt after it 

had been kept on hold for some time. 

However, a role for NATO in the resolution of the 

conflict has been mentioned several times, more outside than inside the Alliance. For example, the option 

of an international peacekeeping force for Palestine 

after a peace agreement featured in the 2000 Clinton 

parameters, and New York Times journalist Thomas 

Friedman suggested that such a role would be perfect 

for NATO. The idea has been pushed several times by, 

among others, former National Security Advisor to 

President Barack Obama and former Supreme Allied 

Commander Europe James Jones; however, it remains 

unpopular with a number of NATO Allies, who fear 

the political danger of such a mission.34 As a consequence, then NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 

Scheffer declared in January 2009 that three preconditions would have to be fulfilled before one could even 

think about a role for NATO in Palestine. These are 

a comprehensive peace agreement, the consent of the 

parties, and a UN mandate—not to mention NATO 
21

consensus.35 Considering the high political visibility 

of such a mission, and its difficulties in terms of military feasibility, the time is not ripe for the Alliance to 

take on a mission in Palestine, or on the Golan Heights 

for that matter.36

The last state missing from the web of relations is 

Yemen, alone among the Arabian Peninsula states in 

not being invited to join the ICI in 2004. The reason 

that Yemen was left out is that it is not a member of 

the GCC, despite its repeated attempts to join. From 

the perspective of both the GCC and the ICI, prospects 

for stabilization are grim in a state as close to collapse 

as Yemen. Half of its population lives below the poverty line, its petroleum resources are declining, and its 

security sector is in disarray. Yemen is thus hardly in a 

position to become a viable partner, particularly since 

the uprisings of 2011 that brought it close to another 

civil war.

In addition to these missing states, NATO has no 

formal relations with the League of Arab States, an 

organization that represents 22 Arab countries and 

was founded in 1945. Yet, in 2008, the League’s then 

Secretary General, Amr Moussa, visited NATO Headquarters; visits to the League Secretariat by NATO 

delegations of different levels have taken place, and 

the League has been sending course members to the 

NATO Regional Cooperation Course at the Alliance’s 

Defense College in Rome since 2010. While the relationship is timid at this stage, the League’s call for a 

no-fly zone over Libya was seen as the regional green 

light for NATO to take action there. Therefore, the 

League’s political support cannot be overestimated.
22

OBSTACLES ON THE WAY AHEAD

Formally, NATO has achieved a lot in the space of 

17 years: it has increased its relations with the MENA 

region from 0 to 11, has regional partners participating in a number of its operations and, in 2011, even 

started hosting permanent missions of these partners 

in its Headquarters—the UAE was the first to open 

one.37 Yet, while all looks good on paper, relations are 

not as profound as they could be, especially in comparison with the Alliance’s PfP program. To date, 

there is no founding document between NATO and 

its southern partners; there is no standing multilateral 

consultation forum like the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 

Council, which brings the Alliance and its PfP partners together on a monthly basis at the ambassadorial 

level, and annually at the level of Foreign or Defense 

Ministers and Chiefs of Defense. There is no military 

forum with the partners of the ICI, and no high-level 

meetings. In other words, there is room for improvement. 

Three main reasons have obstructed the deepening of existing relations: the Alliance’s negative image in the region; a limited understanding of it within 

NATO; and the low- (and high-) intensity conflicts 

and diverging security interests that characterize the 

region.

Addressing the Problems of a Negative Image.

The Alliance was well aware of its own image in 

the region when it created its first timid outreach activities there in the form of the MD, as its stated goal 

included the correction of misunderstandings.38 Early 

on, NATO Headquarters had realized that diplomatic 
23

or military cooperation with these states would be 

very difficult, given the many negative connotations 

associated with the Alliance in the region. A number 

of root causes were, and still are, responsible for this: 

the historically burdened relationship with a number 

of NATO Allies, the lack of differentiation between 

the Alliance as a collective and its individual member 

states, the impact of the Cold War, inadequate strategic communication by NATO, and a general perception in the Arab world that the Alliance had identified 

Islam as the next enemy now that the Soviet Union has 

fallen.

Although the North Atlantic Alliance as such was 

of course not a colonial enterprise, a number of Member States—France, Great Britain, and Italy as founder 

Allies, later joined by Spain—had colonized parts of 

North Africa and the Middle East. Almost all the Arab 

states, except for Saudi Arabia, had been occupied at 

some point in the 19th and 20th centuries by one or 

several European powers; many of them had previously been part of the Ottoman Empire—in a sense 

the forerunner of modern Turkey, also a NATO nation. It goes without saying that experiences with colonialism have not been positive. Algeria, at the time 

of the Alliance’s creation still a part of France and 

specifically mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty, 

fought a bloody and protracted war for independence; 

Britain oversaw Jewish migration into Palestine and 

sanctioned the creation of a Jewish state with the Balfour Declaration of 1917; Italy fought a long war of 

suppression in Libya. 

American influence on the Alliance meant that, as 

a collective, it took a clear stand toward colonialism 

early on. Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty specifies that the Allies’ collective defense agreement ap-
24

plies in the event of armed attack “on the territory of 

any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the 

Algerian Departments of France [this section became 

inapplicable as of June 1962], on the territory of or on 

the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of 

Cancer.”39 While the Tropic of Cancer lies just south of 

Algeria, Egypt, and Libya, the explicit reference to the 

North Atlantic area makes it clear that mutual defense 

in practice excludes territories such as Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, or Egypt—although Allied forces at the 

time of the Treaty were posted in them (British forces 

on the Suez Canal), controlled them in part or completely (France in Tunisia and parts of Morocco), or 

claimed ownership over them (as in the case of Italy, 

which accepted the end of its Libyan territories only 

in 1949, when the Bevin Sforza Plan failed).40 This exclusion from the treaty area did not take into account 

the strong interest of the European colonial powers, 

particularly France, in including the territories concerned.41 Nevertheless, the Alliance should not be seen 

as an anti-colonial club either; while the Algerian war 

was not actively supported by NATO, NATO’s silent 

acquiescence is seen by Algerians today as a form of 

support—regardless of the fact that the war frustrated 

France’s relations with the other Allies and eventually 

led to its withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military 

structure in 1966.42 When decolonization became imminent, France and Britain agreed at a NATO Council 

meeting to secure control of strategic installations in 

the MENA region—for the Alliance’s security, not just 

their own.43 While the era of colonialism came to an 

end (except in the case of Portugal) rather early in the 

Alliance’s history, its heritage nevertheless affected, 

and continues to affect, the Alliance’s relations with 

the former colonies of individual Allies. 
25

This is exacerbated by the fact that there is significant conflation of “the West” and NATO, as well 

as by action within the MENA region by individual 

Member States and by the Alliance as a whole. In 1956, 

Great Britain and France conspired with Israel against 

Egypt, which had just nationalized the Suez Canal; in 

1967, the United States supported Israel logistically 

during the war against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria; in 

1986, the United States bombed Libya as a reaction to 

Libyan-supported terrorist attacks in Berlin; in 1991, 

an international coalition including almost all NATO 

Allies at the time (except for Germany and Turkey) 

liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Likewise, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan and 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in Iraq are conducted by 

a number of states that are also members of NATO. It 

was not NATO, the collective Alliance, that undertook 

these actions, but in the general Arab public eye this 

makes no difference. These actions are seen as part of 

a larger paradigm in which the West conspires against 

the East, seeking to control its trade routes and access 

to oil.44

The sense of grievance that has permeated the 

region since the end of World War I and the double 

standards applied to international law (be it for the 

Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the pursuit of WMD) 

have resulted in a difficult relationship marked by distrust on the Arab side. The sense of victimization has 

been further exacerbated by the sensation that 9/11 

has been exploited to initiate a crusade (as former 

President George W. Bush named the War on Terror)45

against Muslims. The death of over 10,000 civilians in 

Afghanistan,46 where NATO has led the ISAF since 

2002, combined with the statement of then NATO 

Secretary General Willy Claes that Islamic fundamentalism had emerged as perhaps the greatest threat to 
26

Western security since the collapse of communism in 

Eastern Europe,47 did much to strengthen the impression that the Alliance was hunting Muslims.

This impression disregards several facts. To begin with, Claes’s comment caused a strong reaction 

among the Allies (particularly Turkey, a largely Muslim country), forcing him to retract his statement immediately and declare that Islamic fundamentalism 

would “not even be on the agenda when we talk to 

these countries [the countries of the Mediterranean 

Dialogue],”48 since as religious fundamentalism of 

any kind was not a concern for NATO. Second, the 

Alliance has in Albania (since 2009) and Turkey two 

Member States that are largely Muslim. Third, NATO 

intervened in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, and in 

Kosovo in 1999, to save Muslim lives. However, the 

current perception, built on decades of mutual distrust, is that NATO is an imperialist, militarist bloc 

seeking the domination of Arab states. NATO’s image 

is thus the victim of a more widespread antagonism 

between the “Western” and the Arab worlds.49

Improving Understanding of the Region.

It is not just the population of Arab states that has 

misperceptions about NATO. There is an equally incomplete—and to a certain extent mistaken—comprehension of the region in general by NATO, or rather, 

by the various Allies. While the Alliance’s headquarters has built up a dedicated (albeit small) division for 

its MD and ICI partners, and an equally small faculty 

in its Defense College in Rome, there is difficulty in 

focusing on a region so diverse and yet so homogenous—a challenge that Edward Said has famously 

termed as Orientalism, the difficulty of Western schol-
27

ars and thinkers in understanding and analyzing the 

region for what it is rather than for what one wants it 

to be.50 While such a perspective has been criticized, 

misunderstandings between East and West do exist.

The difficulty of understanding the combination of 

similarities and differences characterizing the region 

as a whole emerges in a number of respects. Apart 

from Iran, Turkey, and Israel, the region includes a 

large number of Arab states. These share a range of 

linguistic, social, and cultural traits, as well as a common history, but at the same time differ vastly with 

regard to such parameters as size, economy, political 

systems, ethnic and religious makeup, international 

relations, geography, and educational standards. In 

other words, while looking similar on the surface, 

these states differ markedly along crucial points. As 

a result, approaches to the region have to strike a difficult balance between adopting too broad or too narrow a perspective. This is particularly visible in NATO’s partnership programs, which divide the region 

along geographic lines according to whether the states 

concerned border on the Mediterranean or the Arabian Gulf. While critics see this division as a refusal 

to deal with the region as a whole in a comprehensive 

manner, some Arab states actually show a preference 

for this separation.

Overall, partner states have complained that their 

security needs and their strategic cultures have not 

been sufficiently understood by NATO; this is particularly the case in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian 

issue, which most regional states view as a platform 

for other security issues, such as terrorism, political 

fundamentalism, migration, and nonstate security actors. The fact that the Alliance prefers to work around 

the issue rather than solve it is seen as a failure to understand how much is at stake. 
28

A Region of Crisis.

Finally, the relationship between NATO and its 

Arab partners is marred by the same factors that have 

impeded the region’s development in the past: the 

presence of a number of ongoing or recent conflicts (be 

it the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Western Sahara, 

Iraq-Iran, or Iraq-Kuwait) and protracted instability 

(best seen during the Arab Spring in Egypt, Tunisia, 

Syria, and Yemen) make cooperation with the states 

concerned difficult. Conflict and instability not only 

engender political issues such as lack of legitimacy 

and human rights abuses, but also impede economic 

development by discouraging investors, prompting a 

brain drain, and slowing infrastructure development. 

In the Arab world, this has led to the world’s lowest 

rates of political and economic integration (less than 

2 percent of the North African countries’ trade is inter-Maghreb51). Conflict also affects cooperation with 

NATO in a number of ways.

For a start, the limited finances of a number of the 

MD countries impede participation at seminars and 

workshops. The self-funding principle of the Alliance 

has been curtailed as a result, with NATO occasionally funding between 80 percent and 100 percent of 

participation for countries below a certain Gross Domestic Income. Another issue is an educational concern, a direct outcome of the generally underperforming educational sector in the Arab world. English at a 

working level is not widespread in the Arab partner 

countries; in North Africa, French is widely spoken 

to a reasonably good level,52 but the same is not true 

of NATO Member States (although French is one of 

the Alliance’s two official languages). In small frameworks, such as the NATO Defense College’s dedicated 
29

Middle East faculty, continuous interpretation into 

English, Arabic, and French is provided at a considerable cost; the same is not always possible during operations and exercises, with obvious effects on communication and, ultimately, on the effectiveness of the 

Alliance’s outreach efforts.

NATO has (albeit still to a very limited degree) 

started to feature translation into Arabic of some items 

it posts on the Internet, reflecting the Alliance’s awareness that language remains an issue when communicating with this region. This was particularly visible 

during the Alliance’s Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya: while the Arabic content of the NATO 

website itself remained minimal, as the Alliance does 

not have a standing team of Arabic interpreters and 

translators, videos in Arabic were posted on a separate 

YouTube Channel named “Natoarabic.”53 That access 

to the channel remained relatively infrequent—3,300 

visits after the beginning of the operation, as compared to almost 1 million in English—and can be partly explained by the low level of Internet access in the 

region (estimated at 10 percent in North Africa and 57 

percent in the Gulf, compared to about 80 percent in 

the Western world54), but also by the absence of direct 

links to this channel on NATO’s main website.

The final section of this monograph will briefly 

examine the reasons for which, notwithstanding the 

challenges to be addressed in the MENA region, its 

relationship with NATO is one that will continue to 

develop.
30

AGAINST ALL ODDS: RELATIONS BETWEEN 

NATO AND THE MENA REGION 

In spite of the obstacles listed above, the relationship between NATO and the MENA region is expected to deepen. To begin with, geographic proximity is 

not a matter of choice: Syria and Iraq both border on 

a NATO country; it is no more than 468 miles from 

Algiers to Marseille, 375 miles from Rome to Tunis, 

and 477 miles from Ankara to Damascus. In addition, 

the region boasts 65.4 percent of the world’s oil reserves and is one of the most important trade routes 

linking the Western to the Eastern Hemisphere. Not 

only oil but also goods from Asia find their way to 

Europe along this route—one that is quite vulnerable, 

since it harbors seven chokepoints between the Strait 

of Hormuz and Gibraltar, making it very easy to shut 

the whole route down, as Egypt did in 1967. 

These are not the only reasons for which the region is important. Political turmoil in the form of wars 

(both civil and interstate), coups d’état, insurgencies, 

and terrorism shook the region to the core in the last 

century, accelerating transformation and resulting in 

an unstable construct that is of strategic concern to 

NATO. Allies are concerned about the proliferation of 

WMDs in the region, about new interstate wars, failed 

states, immigration, civil war, and, of course, terrorism spilling over from this region into NATO Member 

States. All of this is taking place in NATO’s immediate 

neighborhood, along its southern flank. The Alliance 

thus has more strategic interest in this region than in 

any other—as recognized by the Americans in particular, though they are geographically far removed 

from it.55 In other words, the Southern Front is now 

the Central Front of the Alliance’s strategic interest.
31

This explains why the Alliance has, in the past 15 

years, shown great adaptability to circumstances in 

its two partnership programs. NATO realized early 

on that further cooperation with the region was hampered by a range of misunderstandings, giving the Alliance a rather negative image. The aim of the MD was 

thus, from the outset, the deconstruction of mutual 

misperceptions rather than military cooperation—as 

the latter could not be achieved without the former. 

The correct identification of the problem was the first 

step toward closer cooperation, and eventually partnership. 

Most importantly, both NATO and the states in the 

region have a long list of common security interests; 

partnership can create a win-win situation that aims 

at a cooperative rather than an antagonistic security 

scenario. Security across the globe is now interlinked; 

in the complexity of the modern world, it is no longer 

divisible but needs to be tackled collectively. In spite 

of historical and cultural obstacles, the Alliance and 

its immediate southern neighborhood will thus come 

together out of strategic necessity for their mutual 

benefit.

In order to achieve this, NATO will have to negotiate the hurdles detailed above. Improving Strategic 

Communication with this region of the world would 

be a first step toward overcoming the rather negative 

image of the Alliance; as the Internet is not widespread in the region (with the exception of the Gulf), 

public diplomacy should focus on television as the 

primary means for communication. In addition, the 

Allies should develop a coherent vision—and thus a 

strategy—for the Middle East and North Africa. What 

has hampered NATO’s engagement in the past was in 

part a result of the Allies’ divergent visions of the re-
32

gion, or the preference for bilateral engagement. The 

Alliance’s operation in Libya could be an indication 

that there is readiness now to manage relations with 

the MENA region within NATO. Furthermore, Allies 

should invest in subject matter expertise within Alliance structures and draw on this in times of crisis.

ENDNOTES

1. Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of NATO, Boulder, CO: 

Westview Press, 1983, p. 73.

2. George McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection, London, UK: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 19–34.

3. The American Presidency Project, “Dwight D. Eisenhower: 

Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle 

East,” January 5, 1957, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/

index.php?pid=11007&st=&st1=#axzz1bbBVKpTF.

4. F. Stephen Larrabee, Jerrold Green, Ian O. Lesser, and Michele Zanini, NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998, p. 45.

5. NAA, Presidential Task Force, Final Report—America and 

Europe: The Future of NATO and the Transatlantic Relationship, CoChairmen Loic Bouvard and Charlie Rose, Brussels, Belgium: International Secretariat, September 1993, p. 21.

6. Joel Darmstadter and Hans H. Landsberg, “The Economic 

Background,” R.A. Vernon, ed., The Oil Crisis, New York: W. W. 

Norton and Co., 1974, p. 21.

7. Sten Rynning, “NATO and the Broader Middle East, 1949-

2007: The History and Lessons of Controversial Encounters,” The 

Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 6, December 2007, p. 916; 

Charles A. Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West: Dilemmas of 

Security, London, UK: Allen & Unwin, 1987, p. 167.
33

8. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Declaration on Atlantic Relations: 18-19 June 1974,” available from www.nato.int/cps/en/

SID-AAB10714-03575DFE/natolive/official_texts_26901.htm.

9. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The Alliance’s New 

Strategic Concept,” November 7-8, 1991, available from www.

nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm.

10. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Final Communique,” Athens, Greece, June 1993, available from www.nato.int/

docu/comm/49-95/c930610a.htm.

11. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Press Release (95)12, 

Statement by the NATO Spokesman on NATO’s Mediterranean 

Initiative, February 8, 1995, available from www.nato.int/docu/

pr/1995/p95-012.htm.

12. NATO, “Mediterranean Dialogue,” available from www.

nato.int/cps/en/SID-31C3338B-27980DD9/natolive/topics_60021.

htm?

13. NATO, “A More Ambitious and Expanded Framework 

for the Mediterranean Dialogue,” March 8, 2007, available from 

www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/docu-meddial.htm.

14. NATO, “New NATO Trust Fund Signed with Jordan,” 

November 19, 2009, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/

news_59333.htm.

15. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO’s Role in 

Gulf Security,” Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 

Scheffer, December 1, 2005, available from www.nato.int/docu/

speech/2005/s051201a.htm.

16. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative,” June 28, 2004, available from www.nato.int/docu/

comm/2004/06-istanbul/docu-cooperation.htm.

17. NATO Review, “The NATO Training Cooperation Initiative,” Spring 2007, available from www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/

issue1/english/art3.html.
34

18. Pierre Razoux, “What future for NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative?” NATO Defense College Research Paper, n. 55, 

January 2010, p. 3.

19. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011, London, UK: Routledge, 2011, pp. 304, 317, 327, 

333.

20. BBC News, “NATO turns to terrorism fight,” October 18, 

2003, available from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3201578.stm.

21. Florence Gaub, “Building a New Military? The NATO 

Training Mission-Iraq,” NATO Defense College Research Paper,

No. 67, April 2011, p. 2.

22. Gaub, p. 3.

23. BBC Monitoring, “Iraq: National consensus possibly needed to keep US trainers under NATO umbrella,” October 10, 2011, 

Al-Iraqiyah TV; “Iraqi premier comments on future ties with US 

after pullout,” October 22, 2011, Al-Iraqiyah TV; “USA said seeking to keep six army bases in Iraq after 2011,” August 24, 2011, 

Al-Hayat; “Iraqi experts says US trainers to gain partial immunity 

after troop pullout,” October 10, 2011, Al-Jazeera TV.

24. Inter Press Service English, “Who Are Today’s Rogue 

Nations?” May 30, 2001, available from www.highbeam.com/

doc/1P1-44881194.html.

25. BBC News, “US expands ‘axis of evil’,” May 6, 2002, available from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1971852.stm.

26. Gareth M. Winrow, Dialogue with the Mediterranean: The 

Role of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, New York: Garland Publishing, 2000, p. 173.

27. United Nations, “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly 

Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians,” March 17, 2011, available from www.un.org/News/

Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm; “Arab League Urges Libya ‘NoFly’ Zone,” The Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2011, available from 

online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870483880457619668160952

9882.html.
35

28. BBC News, “Libya’s Mustafa Abdul Jalil asks NATO to 

stay longer,” October 26, 2011, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/

world-africa-15459473?print=true.

29. Ynetnews.com, “22 killed in Syria; activists urge NATO 

action,” October 28, 2011, available from www.ynetnews.com/

articles/0,7340,L-4140641,00.html; Zeit Online, “NATO must help 

us!,” August 31, 2011, www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2011-08/syrienhoms.

30. “Israeli Leaders Open to NATO Force in Lebanon,” Washington Times, July 23, 2006, available from www.washingtontimes.

com/news/2006/jul/23/20060723-115255-5159r/; Forbes.com, “Large 

NATO Role Unlikely In Lebanon,” Oxford Analytica, August 3, 

2006, available from www.forbes.com/2006/08/02/nato-lebanonisrael-cx_0803oxford.html.

31. United Nations, “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,” available from www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/

facts.shtml.

32. Turkey, Albania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia (not 

separate states at the time), Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland recognized Palestine as an independent state in 1988, after it 

was proclaimed in Algiers by the Palestine National Council. In 

all cases except Turkey, this predated NATO membership.

33. NATO, “NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul 

Cooperation Initiative,” available from www.nato.int/cps/en/SID9F468A4D-435FA6A1/natolive/topics_59419.htm?

34. Thomas L. Friedman, “How About Sending NATO 

Somewhere Important?” The New York Times, September 4, 2001, 

available from www.nytimes.com/2001/09/04/opinion/foreign-affairshow-about-sending-nato-somewhere-important.html; Jolyon Howorth, “ESDP and NATO? Wedlock or Deadlock?” Cooperation 

and Conflict, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2003, p. 243; Kevin Peraino, “NATO 

in the West Bank,” Newsweek, December 6, 2008, available from 

www.newsweek.com/id/172638.

35. NATO, Speech by NATO Secretary General at an event 

jointly organized by the Institute for National Security Studies 
36

and the Atlantic Forum of Israel, January 11, 2009, available from 

www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-FA832B39-70CC352E/natolive/opinions

_49673.htm?selectedLocale=en.

36. Florence Gaub, “NATO: Peacekeeping the Holy Land?” 

NATO Defense College Research Paper, No. 57, March 2010, available from www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=182; 

Celine Touboul, “Planning Ahead for a Peacekeeping Mission on 

the Golan Heights: a Role for NATO?” NATO Defense College 

Forum Paper, n.19, September 2011, available from www.ndc.nato.

int/download/downloads.php?icode=305.

37. Al-Arabiya, “UAE to be first Arab country with NATO 

embassy,” May 19, 2011, available from www.alarabiya.net/

articles/2011/05/19/149686.html.

38. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Press Release (95)12, 

Statement by the NATO Spokesman on NATO’s Mediterranean 

Initiative, February 8, 1995, available from www.nato.int/docu/

pr/1995/p95-012.htm.

39. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic 

Treaty,” April 4, 1949, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/

official_texts_17120.htm.

40. Ronald Bruce St John, Libya: Continuity and Change, London, UK: Routledge 2011, p. 36.

41. Henderson, p. 81.

42. Irwin M. Wall, “France, NATO and the Algerian War,” 

in Wilfried Loth, ed., Europe, Cold War and Coexistence, 1953-1965, 

Hove, East Sussex, UK: Psychology Press, 2004, pp. 52–62.

43. Christopher Coker, “NATO and Africa 1949-89: An Overview,” in Gustav Schmidt, ed., A History of NATO: The First Fifty 

Years, Vol. 1, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Publishers: 2001, p. 155.

44. Mohamed Abdel Salam, “The Modes of Arab Conspiracy 

Theories,” Arab Insight, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 2008, pp. 89-101,

available from www.google.it/url?q=www.arabinsight.org/aiarticles/200.pdf&sa=U&ei=UsSyTuGQLMTHtAbGvqGYBA&ved=0CBI

QFjAA&usg=AFQjCNFM_8omB6S1rHTBrtXe_llRhRYqWw.
37

45. “Europe Cringes at Bush ‘Crusade’ Against Terrorists,” 

The Christian Science Monitor, September 19, 2001, available from 

www.csmonitor.com/2001/0919/p12s2-woeu.html.

46.“Afghanistan civilian casualties: year by year, month by 

month,” The Guardian, available from www.guardian.co.uk/news/

datablog/2010/aug/10/afghanistan-civilian-casualties-statistics.

47. “NATO Chief under Fire for Islamic Remark,” International Herald Tribune, February 15, 1995.

48. “NATO’s Agenda for New European Order,” Financial 

Times, February 20, 1995.

49. “Arab Perspectives on NATO,” NATO Review, Spring 

2005, available from www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue4/english/

art3.html.

50. Edward Said, Orientalism, London, UK: Vintage Books, 

1979.

51. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, The Cost 

of non-Maghreb: Achieving the Gains from Economic Integration, Addis Ababa: African Trade Policy Center, November 2006, p. 1.

52. United Nations Development Program, Arab Human Development Report 2003: Building a Knowledge Society, New York: Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2003, p. 54.

53. NATO Arabic’s Channel, available from www.youtube.

com/user/NATOArabic.

54. Internet World Stats, Middle East and Africa Data for 

2011, available from www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm.

55. David Capezza: “Iraq Training Mission Shows NATO’s 

Future,” Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, October 28, 2008.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Dr. Florence Gaub

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil