10 June 2009

Combating Weapons of

Mass Destruction

Joint Publication 3-40
PREFACE 

1. Scope 

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for combating 

weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) and their means of delivery. 

2. Purpose 

 This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth CWMD doctrine to govern the activities and performance of 

the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis 

for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. 

It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and 

other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations. It 

provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate 

plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from task 

organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most 

appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, 

commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, 

subordinate components of these commands, and the Services. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances 

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the 

contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. 

Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military 

command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United 

States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should 

evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where 

applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

STANLEY A. MCCHRYSTAL 

Lieutenant General, USA 

Director, Joint Staff 

i 
Preface 

ii JP 3-40 

Intentionally Blank 
SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-40 

DATED 08 July 2004 

iii 

• Highlights the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and the 

National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction as critical pieces of 

combating weapons of mass destruction strategic guidance 

• Introduces the combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) construct, consolidating 

the discussion of the three pillars of combating weapons of mass destruction: 

nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and WMD consequence management 

• Discontinues the discussion of tasks as part of the three pillars 

• Introduces ìmilitary strategic objectives,î ìstrategic enablers,î and ìmilitary mission 

areasî as part of the combating weapons of mass destruction strategic framework 

• Replaces combating weapons of mass destruction enablers of ìcommand, control, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;î ìinformation operations;î 

ìinteroperability;î ìreadiness;î ìmobility;î and ìsustainmentî with strategic enablers 

of ìintelligence,î ìpartnership capacity,î and ìstrategic communications supportî 

• Describes the relationship between combating weapons of mass destruction, the war on 

terrorism, and homeland defense 

• Expands discussion of weapons of mass destruction consequence management, to 

include domestic WMD consequence management, foreign WMD consequence 

management, and Department of Defense (DOD) led consequence management 

operations 

• Introduces ìtraditionalî and ìnontraditional threatsî 

• Introduces proliferation networks as part of the combating weapons of mass 

destruction threat 

• Highlights the role of deterrence against state and non-state actors 

• Introduces DOD combating weapons of mass destruction organizational and command 

relationships 

• Describes the critical role of interagency and intergovernmental cooperation in 

combating weapons of mass destruction success 

• Establishes enhanced definitions and critical distinctions for the eight military mission 

areas of combating WMD 

• Introduces importance of integrating combating weapons of mass destruction planning 

into all types of military operations 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-40 

• Discusses the unique combating weapons of mass destruction aspects of offensive and 

defensive operations 

• Consolidates the planning considerations for nonproliferation, counterproliferation and 

consequence management into a single chapter on combating weapons of mass 

destruction planning considerations 

• Eliminates chapter on combating weapons of mass destruction training and exercises 

• Incorporates the Joint Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Handbook into the 

publication as an appendix. 

• Introduces an appendix for weapons of mass destruction interdiction operations 

• Establishes new definitions for the terms ìchemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear passive defense,î ìnuclear reactor,î ìproliferation,î ìthreat reduction 

cooperation,î ìweapons of mass destruction active defense,î ìweapons of mass 

destruction consequence management,î ìweapons of mass destruction elimination,î 

ìweapons of mass destruction interdiction,î weapons of mass destruction offensive 

operations,î and ìweapons of mass destruction security cooperation and partner 

activitiesî 

• Modifies the definitions for the terms ìcounterproliferation,î ìnonproliferation,î 

ìweapons of mass destruction,î 

• Removes the terms ìbalance,î ìtacit arms control agreement,î and ìunilateral arms 

control measureî from Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

v 

 PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... ix 

CHAPTER I 

 INTRODUCTION TO COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

• General .............................................................................................................................. I-1 

• National Strategy and Guidance ...................................................................................... I-2 

• Military Strategic Guidance ............................................................................................. I-3 

• Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Construct...................................................... I-6 

• Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Outside the United States............................ I-8 

• Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, the War on Terrorism, and Homeland 

 Defense...........................................................................................................................I-9 

• Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Civil Support......................................... I-9 

• Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Consequence Management................. I-10 

CHAPTER II 

 THE CHALLENGE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THREATS 

• General ............................................................................................................................. II-1 

• State Actors and Programs .............................................................................................. II-2 

• Non-State Actors and Programs...................................................................................... II-2 

• Traditional and Nontraditional Threats........................................................................... II-3 

• Proliferation Continuum.................................................................................................. II-4 

• Dual-Use Technology and Facilities............................................................................... II-5 

• Proliferation Networks .................................................................................................... II-6

• Role of Deterrence........................................................................................................... II-9 

CHAPTER III 

 ORGANIZATIONAL AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS 

• Organizations and Functions.......................................................................................... III-1 

• Command Relationships................................................................................................. III-6 

CHAPTER IV 

 PLANNING AND EXECUTION 

• General ........................................................................................................................... IV-1 

• Operation and Campaign Planning................................................................................ IV-6 

• Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence Execution.................. IV-15 

• Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations .............................................. IV-21 

• Major Operations and Campaigns ............................................................................... IV-24 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-40 

CHAPTER V 

COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PLANNING 

CONSIDERATIONS 

• General ............................................................................................................................ V-1 

• Strategic Considerations.................................................................................................. V-1 

• Operational Considerations ............................................................................................ V-3 

APPENDIX 

 A Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Operations ............................................. A-1 

 B Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Operations ............................................. B-1 

 C References .................................................................................................................... C-1 

 D Administrative Instructions ......................................................................................... D-1 

GLOSSARY 

 Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ............................................................................ GL-1 

 Part II Terms and Definitions ....................................................................................... GL-5 

FIGURE 

 I-1 Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Framework.......................................... I-4 

 II-1 Proliferation Continuum ........................................................................................ II-5 

 III-1 Notional Command and Control with Functional Combating Weapons of Mass 

 Destruction Joint Task Force Reporting to Combatant Commander ............ III-8 

 III-2 Notional Command and Control with Functional Combating Weapons of Mass 

 Destruction Joint Task Force as Subordinate Joint Task Force...................... III-9 

 III-3 Notional Command and Control with Functional Combating Weapons of Mass 

 Destruction Task Force Subordinate to a Component Commander ............ III-10 

 IV-1 Sample Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction-Related Activities .............. IV-5 

 IV-2 Integration of Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction in Joint Operations... IV-7 

 IV-3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Considerations IV-9 

 IV-4 Sample Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction-Related Activities Across 

 the Phasing Model.......................................................................................... IV-12 

 IV-5 Notional Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction-Related Flexible Deterrent 

 Options............................................................................................................ IV-14 

 IV-6 Notional Strategic Communication Themes...................................................... IV-15 

 IV-7 Actions Supporting the Eight Military Mission Areas ...................................... IV-25 

 A-1 Elimination Mission Schematic............................................................................. A-2 

 A-2 Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Concept of Operations .................... A-3 

 A-3 Notional Joint Task Force-Elimination Headquarters Composition.................. A-11 

 A-4 Notional Joint Task Force-Elimination Construct.............................................. A-14 

 B-1 National Security Council/Homeland Security Council Organization .............. B-11 

B-2 Weapons of Mass Destruction-Interdiction Operational Design ....................... B-17 
Table of Contents 

vii 

B-3 Generalized Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Transaction, Pathway, 

 or Network....................................................................................................... B-18 

 B-4 Line of Operations for Specific Weapons of Mass Destruction- 

 Interdiction Operations.................................................................................... B-20 

 B-5 Example Weapons of Mass Destruction-Interdiction Phasing Model............... B-26 
Table of Contents 

viii JP 3-40 

Intentionally Blank 
ix 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDERíS OVERVIEW 

• Provides an Overview of Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) 

• Discusses the Challenge of Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats 

• Discusses CWMD Organizational and Command Relationships 

• Discusses CWMD Planning and Execution 

• Discusses CWMD Planning Considerations 

• Provides Further Guidance on CWMD Elimination Operations 

• Provides a CWMD Interdiction Operations Reference for Staff Officers 

Overview 

Combating weapons of 

mass destruction 

(CWMD) is a continuous 

campaign conducted and 

supported by the entire 

United States 

Government. 

CWMD is a global 

mission that requires the 

coordinated action of 

interagency and 

multinational partners; 

and integrated, 

synchronized effort to be 

effective. 

Combating weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) and their 

means of delivery is one of the greatest challenges the 

United States (US) faces. Weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) have the potential to severely disrupt and damage 

the United States, its forces, allies, multinational partners, 

and other friendly nations. It is important for commanders 

and their staffs to keep the perspective that WMD is not an 

adversary, but a capability an adversary can use. 

Adversaries may use WMD as a tool to inflict casualties on 

civilian populations, degrade the instruments of our national 

power, or to counter US military superiority. 

 

CWMD is a global mission crossing geographic areas of 

responsibility (AORs) boundaries, requires an integrated and 

synchronized effort, and requires numerous interagency and 

multinational partners for effective mission accomplishment. 

Rather than a discrete, specialized mission, CWMD requires 

a continuous campaign conducted and supported by the 

entire United States Government (USG). CWMD actions 

are conducted across the range of military operations and 

DOD will often be acting in support of another lead agency, 

or even supporting a multinational effort. 

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of 

America identifies as an essential task to ìprevent our 

enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with 
Executive Summary 

x JP 3-40 

Shaping, 

nonproliferation, 

counterproliferation, 

and consequence 

management provide the 

United States (US), its 

forces, allies, partners, 

and interests with ways 

to avoid coercion or 

attack from those armed 

with weapons of mass 

destruction

weapons of mass destructionî for ensuring national security. 

The United States advances this strategy through 

strengthened alliances, the establishment of new 

partnerships, proactive counterproliferation (CP) efforts, 

modern technologies, and increased emphasis on 

intelligence collection and analysis. The National Strategy 

to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NS-CWMD) 

provides additional guidance concerning CWMD: 

nonproliferation (NP), CP, and WMD consequence 

management (CM), as highlighted in the NSS, and 

introduces the construct of the three pillars which provides a 

common framework for the interagency conduct of CWMD 

activities. The National Military Strategy to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMS-CWMD) provides 

Department of Defense (DOD) components with guidance 

and a strategic framework for CWMD. The NMS-CWMD 

uses an ends, ways, and means approach to planning, 

executing, resourcing, and emphasizes those CWMD 

missions in which the military plays a prominent role. It 

defines strategic end states, strategic enablers, military 

strategic objectives, and eight military mission areas 

(MMAs) the Armed Forces of the United States may be 

called upon to perform. 

Shaping activities are performed to dissuade or deter 

potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships 

with friends and allies. NP activities are those actions taken 

to prevent the proliferation of WMD by dissuading or 

impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive 

technologies, material, and expertise. CP activities are 

those actions taken to defeat the threat and/or use of WMD 

against the United States, our forces, allies, and partners.

WMD CM activities are those actions authorized by the 

President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to mitigate the 

effects of a weapon of mass destruction attack or event and 

provide temporary essential operations and services at 

home and abroad. DOD can act as both a supported and a 

supporting entity during CWMD operations outside of the 

United States. Moreover, CWMD must be synchronized 

with the homeland defense (HD) mission to prevent a 

terrorist group from striking the US homeland with WMD. 

This normally omits high-yield explosive (HYE) weapons as 

a WMD-CM consideration; however, certain domestic 

response plans include HYE and other weapons. When 

CWMD operations involve significant or complex 

interactions with foreign civil authorities or 
Executive Summary 

xi 

intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), the commander 

should consider forming a civil-military operations center 

(CMOC) or supplementing an existing CMOC with CWMD 

expertise.

The Challenge 

While the challenges of 

combating weapons of 

mass destruction may be 

daunting, they are 

defined and can be 

countered through 

strong partnership 

action between the US, 

its allies, and other 

friendly nations. 

Effective strategic 

communications, robust 

active weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) 

defense; complementary 

The primary challenges facing the joint force commander 

(JFC) are: the diversity of threat actors, including the 

emergence of nontraditional WMD threats; the varied nature 

of WMD demands a varied approach to deterrence; a 

complex WMD proliferation continuum; the dual-use nature 

of much of the related technology and expertise; and the 

increasing complexity and number of WMD proliferation 

networks. 

State actors and their associated WMD programs vary in 

their level of activity and sophistication and remain a 

credible threat to the United States. Since the fall of the 

Soviet Union in 1991, and with the possible decline of 

authority in other states with WMD programs, the US faces 

an increasingly challenging dilemma involving states that 

may not be able to control their chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, material, 

technology, or expertise. In such cases, these items can fall 

into the hands of other states or non-state actors. Proactive 

actions can be taken at every stage of the proliferation 

continuum to successfully combat the WMD proliferation. 

However, the JFC should look to combat these threats early 

in the continuum to minimize risk of further proliferation or 

use. The generic activities include: a decision to pursue 

WMD capability; infrastructure and expertise development; 

production; weaponization; deployment; and employment. 

Proliferation networks are multifunctional and 

multidimensional; consist of state and, increasingly, 

independent non-state actors; are dynamic, adaptive, and can 

be transnational; have differing motivations and desired end 

states; and operate in secrecy to avoid detection and 

counteraction. 

The JFC must consider the changing role of deterrence 

against state actors and, more importantly, the role of 

deterrence against non-state actors. The general principles 

of deterrence against a state actor have not significantly 

changed. 
Executive Summary 

xii JP 3-40 

passive chemical, 

biological, radiological, 

and nuclear defense; 

and effective 

consequence 

management are 

important in deterring 

WMD use or effort to 

obtain WMD capability. 

Deterring non-state actors is a difficult challenge because it 

may not be possible to deter the most devoted violent 

extremists. However, a measure of WMD deterrence may be 

achieved by demonstrating capabilities such as robust WMD 

active defense and CBRN passive defense, as well as 

exercising WMD. 

Organizational and Command Relationships 

The Secretary of 

Defense, the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, the Services, 

combatant commanders, 

and combat support 

agencies play important 

and continuing roles in 

CWMD. 

CWMD operations are 

planned and executed by 

geographic combatant 

commanders 

Expertise in 

synchronizing CWMD 

planning; advocating 

capability; 

transportation; locating, 

tagging, and tracking 

WMD; direct-action 

operations; and other 

specialized capabilities 

are provided by the 

functional combatant 

commands. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) develops, 

coordinates, and oversees implementation and integration of 

DOD CWMD policy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff (CJCS) serves as the principal military advisor to the 

President, National Security Council, and SecDef regarding 

CWMD activities and apportions CWMD resources for 

planning and execution of the mission. 

Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) plan and 

execute CWMD operations within their AORs. GCCs also 

provide for movement of specialized CWMD personnel and 

equipment and coordinate transition of WMD-related 

material for short- to long-term storage, protection, 

dismantlement, destruction, or disposal. Combatant 

commanders (CCDRs) coordinate with OSD and the Joint 

Staff to plan for transition or transfer of responsibility of 

CWMD operations. When applicable, they develop threat 

reduction and cooperation plans to allow for transfer and 

termination of CWMD missions. 

The functional combatant commanders have specific roles in 

CWMD: United States Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM) is responsible for synchronizing DOD 

CWMD planning and advocating for CWMD capabilities. 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command in 

coordination with USSTRATCOM, develops and makes 

recommendations to the CJCS regarding joint force 

integration for CWMD. As the joint force provider, United 

States Joint Forces Command provides forces, resources, 

and capabilities, as directed, to the supported CCDRís 

CWMD operations. United States Transportation Command 

(USTRANSCOM) plans and executes the common user 

transportation aspects of global CWMD operations. As the 
Executive Summary 

xiii 

Coordination is critical 

to the success of CWMD 

operations. 

mobility force provider, USTRANSCOM supports 

intertheater and intratheater transportation of CWMD forces, 

equipment, and material, including specialized WMD 

shipments or certified containers provided by the 

appropriate agency. USTRANSCOM is prepared to 

expeditiously conduct retrograde movements of samples and 

specialized WMD tools for identification and attribution, 

providing in-transit visibility for positive control of CWMD 

shipments. 

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is 

the lead combatant command for planning, synchronizing, 

and, as directed, executing global operations against terrorist 

networks. USSOCOM provides the following CWMD 

capabilities: expertise, material, and teams to supported 

GCC teams to locate, tag, and track WMD, as required; 

capabilities to conduct direct action operations in limited 

access areas, as required; and other specialized CWMD 

capabilities. 

The Services organize, train, equip, and otherwise prepare 

their respective forces to combat WMD, means of delivery, 

and related materials. Specifically, the Services provide 

forces with the capability to conduct WMD interdiction, 

WMD elimination, WMD offensive operations, WMD 

active defense, CBRN passive defense, and WMD CM 

operations. 

There are two principal combat support agencies with 

significant responsibilities related to CWMD: the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Defense 

Intelligence Agency (DIA). DTRAís mission is to provide 

capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the WMD 

threat, and mitigate its effects. DIA advises SecDef, CJCS, 

and CCDRs on WMD intelligence and provides military 

intelligence support for CWMD planning. They support 

CCDR preparation of strategic estimates, priorities, and joint 

operation plans for CWMD operations. 

 

Coordination between DOD and other government agencies 

(OGAs), nongovernmental organizations, and IGOs is 

critical to the success of CWMD operations. In particular, 

security cooperation and partner activities; threat reduction 

cooperation; and the WMD elimination, interdiction, and 

consequence management missions require significant 

interagency and intergovernmental coordination. 
Executive Summary 

xiv JP 3-40 

Command relationships 

are established as 

appropriate to the 

situation. US forces 

supporting other 

agencies will normally 

remain under 

Department of Defense 

(DOD) command 

structures. 

Protection of the 

homeland is provided by 

DOD through actions in 

homeland defense and 

through civil support.

Specific command relationships for CWMD operations are 

established by tasking orders, CCDR plans, and operation 

orders, as appropriate. Because of the interagency aspects 

of CWMD operations, agencies other than DOD may lead 

efforts with DOD providing support; however, US military 

forces; other than National Guard forces due to their unique 

status when operating under Title 32, United States Code 

authority, will remain under the DOD command structure 

while supporting other agencies. SecDef, a CCDR, a 

subordinate unified command commander, or an existing 

commander, joint task force can establish a joint task force 

to execute a specific CWMD mission or when CWMD 

operations require joint resources on a significant scale. 

DOD protects the homeland through two distinct but 

interrelated missions: HD and civil support. The purpose of 

HD is to protect against, and mitigate the impact of, 

incursions or attacks on sovereign territory, the domestic 

population, and critical defense infrastructure. DOD is the 

federal agency with lead responsibility, supported by other 

agencies, in defending against external threats or aggression. 

DOD provides support to civil authorities for domestic 

emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other 

activities. 

Planning and Execution 

Eight military mission 

areas provide logical 

grouping for planning 

for CWMD, help joint 

force commanders relate 

CWMD capability with 

the strategic pillars, 

determine operational 

tasks, integrate activities, 

and inform their 

decisions. 

This chapter translates strategic CWMD guidance into an 

operational approach leveraging capabilities from the six 

joint functions across campaign phases and across the range 

of military operations. The eight CWMD MMAs provide 

JFCs with a logical grouping of CWMD activities. These 

enhanced descriptions offer the JFC a more precise and 

operational perspective to combat WMD: WMD security 

cooperation and partner activities (activities to improve 

or promote defense relationships and capacity of allied and 

partner nations to execute or support the other MMAs to 

combat WMD through military-to-military contact, burden 

sharing arrangements, combined military activities, and 

support to international activities); threat reduction 

cooperation (activities undertaken with the consent and 

cooperation of host nation (HN) authorities in a permissive 

environment to enhance physical security, and to reduce, 

dismantle, redirect, and/or improve protection of a stateís 
Executive Summary 

xv 

existing weapons of mass destruction program, stockpiles, 

and capabilities); WMD interdiction (operations to track, 

intercept, search, divert, seize, or otherwise stop the transit 

of WMD, its delivery systems, or related materials, 

technologies, and expertise. In peacetime, WMD 

interdiction operations are planned and executed in order to 

intercept dual-use materials and expertise in transit aboard 

nonmilitary transports); WMD offensive operations 

(actions to disrupt, neutralize, or destroy a WMD threat 

before it can be used, or to deter subsequent use of such 

weapons improves or promotes relationships and capacity); 

WMD elimination (actions undertaken in a hostile or 

uncertain environment to systematically locate, characterize, 

secure, and disable, or destroy WMD programs and related 

capabilities); WMD active defense (active measures to 

defeat an attack with chemical, biological, radiological, or 

nuclear weapons by employing actions to divert, neutralize, 

or destroy those weapons or their means of delivery while en 

route to their target); CBRN passive defense (passive 

measures taken to minimize or negate the vulnerability to, 

and effects of, chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 

attacks causing a high order of destruction or mass 

casualties. This mission area focuses on maintaining the 

joint forceís ability to continue military operations in CBRN 

environments); and WMD consequence management. 

(actions authorized by the SecDef to mitigate the effects of a 

WMD attack or event and restore essential operations and 

services.) 

The CWMD MMAs are useful to the JFC as logical 

groupings of capabilities and in order to relate them to the 

strategic pillars. However, the distinctions and subtleties 

between several of CWMD MMAs are also important in 

determining the operational tasks and related activities to a 

successful CWMD program. It also informs JFC decisions 

for future actions, some of which may have diplomatic 

implications. And finally, it provides architecture within 

which to frame, organize, mass, and optimize friendly 

capabilities necessary for the CWMD program. CWMD 

actions and activities must not be planned or executed in 

isolation but must be integrated throughout the range of 

military operations. CWMD must be integrated into all 

types of military operations. 

CWMD planning is not a separate process; it is the 

integration of WMD-specific knowledge, experience, and 
Executive Summary 

xvi JP 3-40 

Joint intelligence 

preparation of the 

operational environment 

is also critical to CWMD 

operations success. 

Planning for CWMD 

promotes unified action 

by clarifying the 

relationship between 

strategic objectives and 

CWMD tasks. 

capabilities into the existing joint operation planning 

process. Commanders at every level must be aware that in a 

world of constant, immediate communications, any single 

action may have consequences at all levels.

Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

(JIPOE) underpins planning for CWMD operations. JIPOE 

is the analytical process used by joint intelligence 

organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, 

and other intelligence products in support of the JFCís 

decision-making process. 

JFCs approve strategic military objectives which comprise 

the military end state. The military end state (whether 

focused specifically on WMD or not) is the point in time, or 

circumstances, beyond which the President does not require 

the military instrument of national power to achieve the 

remaining objectives of the national strategic end state. The 

identification of desired and undesired effects clarifies the 

relationship between objectives and tasks and helps 

commanders and their staffs gain a common picture and 

shared understanding of the operational environment that 

promotes unified action.

WMD-related targets represent highly sensitive and critical 

capabilities of many states and non-states and carry unique 

targeting considerations. Holding these targets at risk is a 

priority for the JFC and requires a wide array of capabilities, 

both lethal and nonlethal. A detailed analysis to determine 

the potential release of hazards when targeting adversary 

WMD storage sites, weapon systems, or production facilities 

is required; the utility of employing agent defeat weapons to 

minimize the dispersal and collateral effects of CBRN 

hazards should be considered. JFCs should seek to minimize 

collateral damage consistent with higher-level guidance as 

well as plan for follow-on WMD CM operations, as 

appropriate. 

Logical lines of operation (LOOs) are often the most 

appropriate for CWMD operations or campaigns. A LOO 

depiction at this level can help the commander and staff 

discuss the relationship and status of decisive points or key 

tasks, as required. CWMD operations can occur throughout 

all phases of a campaign or operation. Phasing is most 

directly related to arranging of operations and LOOs during 

operational design. Many plans require adjustment beyond 
Executive Summary 

xvii 

CWMD integration and 

synchronization must be 

carefully considered and 

executed in support of 

the military objectives of 

each and all types of 

military operations. 

the initial stages of the operation. Consequently, JFCs build 

flexibility into their plans by developing branches and 

sequels to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing 

conditions. Branches and sequels directly relate to phasing. 

Flexible deterrent options are preplanned, deterrenceoriented actions carefully tailored to bring an issue to early 

resolution without armed conflict.

Strategic communication planning is critical to CWMD and 

must create a responsive and agile whole-of-government 

effort to synchronize crucial themes, messages, images, and 

actions. JFC planning must consider public diplomacy, 

public affairs (PA), and information operations requirements 

when confronting the WMD threat or use. Public interest in 

WMD-related developments may be intense and may affect 

US and multinational partner decision-making. Therefore, 

the JFC must be a source of timely, accurate information, 

with particular emphasis on the explanation of actions taken 

in response to WMD threats or use. 

Force planning for CWMD encompasses all those activities 

performed by the supported CCDR, subordinate component 

commanders, and OGAs to select (source and tailor), 

prepare, integrate, and deploy forces and capabilities 

required to accomplish CWMD-related missions. It should 

provide an active, layered defense against WMD and 

prepare for the possibility of rapid escalation to counter or 

respond to WMD use by an adversary. A challenge for the 

JFC is in managing expectations for employing CBRNspecific forces. An additional, yet related, challenge is 

balancing the use of low-density, CBRN-specific units with 

assigned forces that can accomplish many of the CWMD 

related tasks. An additional, yet related, challenge is 

balancing the use of low-density, CBRN-specific units with 

assigned forces that can accomplish many of the CWMD 

related tasks. 

Successful shaping activities can be a very cost effective 

approach to combating WMD by investing relatively few 

resources in engagement versus costly responses to 

adversary use of WMD. CWMD MMAs that support 

shaping the environment can include security cooperation, 

threat reduction cooperation, and WMD interdiction. 

Success in CWMD relies heavily on military engagement 

opportunities. Military engagement is the routine contact 

and interaction between individuals or elements of the 
Executive Summary 

xviii JP 3-40 

Armed Forces of the United States and those of another 

nationís armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian 

authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share 

information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain 

influence. Security cooperation is a key element of global 

and theater shaping operations and the WMD security 

cooperation MMA. Security cooperation involves all DOD 

interactions with foreign defense establishments to build 

defense relationships that promote specific US security 

interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for 

self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US 

forces with peacetime and contingency access to a HN. 

Deterrence prevents an action by an adversary through the 

perception of cost imposition, benefit denial, or the 

consequences of restraint. Having a credible threat of 

response in the form of WMD interdiction, WMD 

elimination, WMD offensive operations, WMD active and 

CBRN passive defense, and WMD CM capabilities supports 

the overall USG deterrence goal 

 

CWMD MMAs that support crisis response and limited 

contingency operations include WMD interdiction, WMD 

offensive operations, WMD active defense, CBRN passive 

defense, and WMD CM. CWMD in crisis response and 

limited contingency operations includes: peace operations, 

consequence management operations, defense support of 

civil authorities, homeland defense, strikes, and raids

When required to achieve national strategic objectives or 

protect national interests, US national leadership may decide 

to conduct a major operation or campaign. In such cases, 

the goal is to prevail against the adversary as quickly as 

possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions 

favorable to the HN, United States, and multinational 

partners. Establishing these conditions often requires 

CWMD considerations for termination objectives and end 

states. All eight CWMD MMAs could be part of a major 

operation or campaign. While offensive CWMD operations 

support the decisive operation, defensive CWMD operations 

protect friendly force critical assets and centers of gravity. 

Conducting offensive and defensive operations 

independently detracts from the efficient employment of 

CWMD assets. At best, independent operations expend 

more resources than would be required if done in concert. At 

worst, uncoordinated efforts increase conflicts and mutual 

interference. In the extreme, they may compromise friendly 
Executive Summary 

xix 

intentions or result in loss of operational momentum. Fully 

integrating CWMD offensive and defensive operations 

requires JFCs and their staffs to treat CWMD as a single, 

integrated function. 

CWMD Planning Considerations 

Planning for CWMD 

military operations are 

complicated by being 

only part of a 

comprehensive US 

government effort and 

by the very broad range 

of considerations 

particularly important to 

joint task forces. 

CWMD operations are a component of a comprehensive 

USG effort requiring a coordinated interagency approach 

and the cooperation of the international community. These 

activities require early coordination with these OGAs and 

often require the participation of multinational partners 

during planning. The staff judge advocate should be 

involved throughout the planning process, including mission 

analysis and course of action development, to ensure the 

JFC is aware of potential CWMD related legal issues. 

International law, policies, treaties, and agreements to which 

the United States is a signatory identify certain rights and 

obligations that may impact joint operations. These legal 

requirements may pose constraints and restraints. Arms 

control and NP treaties and regimes establish global norms 

against the proliferation of WMD precursors, weapons, their 

means of delivery, and weapons manufacturing equipment. 

Treaties provide international standards to gauge and 

address the activities of potential proliferators. Through 

security assistance activities, the Armed Forces of the 

United States can help multinational partners develop the 

ability to cope with a WMD attack as well as reduce their 

vulnerability to armed aggression. An important aspect of 

NP is preventing the spread of WMD technology through 

physical security and export controls. NP and CP initiatives: 

various international cooperation programs have been 

initiated to defeat the proliferation of WMD and the 

materiel, technology, and expertise necessary to create and 

sustain a WMD program 

Operational planning considerations of particular 

importance to the JFC are: task organization; intelligence, 

surveillance & reconnaissance; military operations; logistics 

operations; PA; civil-military operations; meteorological 

and oceanographic operations; environmental 

considerations; health service support; consequence 

management; and interagency coordination. 
Executive Summary 

xx JP 3-40 

CONCLUSION 

This publication establishes joint doctrine for the conduct of 

CWMD operations across the range of military operations. 
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

I-1 

1. General 

 a. Combating weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) and their means of delivery is 

one of the greatest challenges the United States (US) faces. Weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) have the potential to severely disrupt and damage the US, its forces, allies, 

multinational partners, and other friendly nations. Adversaries may use WMD to inflict 

casualties on civilian populations, degrade the instruments of our national power, or 

counter US military superiority. 

 b. This publication forms the foundation for all other joint and Service doctrine for 

CWMD and provides overarching guidelines and principles to assist in planning and 

conducting operations to combat WMD. WMD are defined as chemical, biological, 

radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons or devices capable of a high order of 

destruction WMD and/or causing mass casualties and exclude the means of 

transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and 

divisible part from the weapon. CWMD does not include countering the 

employment of high-yield explosives (HYE). Efforts to combat WMD must take into 

account an actor’s motivations for and decision to undertake efforts to engage in WMDrelated activities, as well as the weapons themselves. The existence of CBRN materials 

and the potential for adversaries willing to employ them as a weapon precipitates the 

need to plan, prepare for, and combat their use. CWMD entails those activities 

conducted across the US Government (USG) to ensure the US, its Armed Forces, allies, 

partners, and interests are neither coerced nor attacked with WMD. Thus, CWMD 

operations should be considered a set of activities integrated into all joint operations. 

This chapter provides a brief synopsis of relevant national-level and Department of 

Defense (DOD) guidance for CWMD, highlights some overarching CWMD constructs, 

and discusses the relationship of CWMD with the war on terrorism (WOT) and homeland 

defense (HD). 

 c. It is important for commanders and their staffs to keep the perspective that WMD 

is not an adversary, but a capability an adversary may use. CWMD is a global mission 

crossing geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) boundaries, requires an integrated 

and synchronized effort, and requires numerous interagency and multinational partners 

for effective mission accomplishment. Rather than a discrete, specialized mission, 

CWMD requires a continuous campaign conducted and supported by the entire USG. 

CWMD actions are conducted across the range of military operations and DOD will often 

be acting in support of another lead agency, or even supporting a multinational effort. 

“There are few greater challenges than those posed by chemical, biological, 

and particularly nuclear weapons. Preventing the spread of these weapons, 

and their use, requires vigilance and obligates us to anticipate and counter 

threats. Whenever possible, we prefer nonmilitary options to achieve this 

purpose.” 

National Defense Strategy, 2008 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-40 

 d. WMD proliferation is the transfer of WMD, related materials, technology, and 

expertise from one actor to another. The actors may be state or non-state. WMD 

proliferation represents an adversarial intent to either possess WMD, develop WMD 

programs, or to endorse WMD possession and/or programs to other actors. 

2. National Strategy and Guidance 

 a. The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America identifies 

as an essential task to “prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our 

friends with weapons of mass destruction” for ensuring national security. To achieve this 

goal, the NSS of the United States of America sets forth an active strategy to counter 

transnational terror networks, rogue nations, and aggressive states that possess, or are 

working to acquire, WMD. The United States advances this strategy through 

strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships, proactive 

counterproliferation (CP) efforts, modern technologies, and increased emphasis on 

intelligence collection and analysis. The NSS highlights nonproliferation (NP) concerns 

in its examination of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and 

its special emphasis on stemming the spread of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, and 

the diversion of nuclear energy materials to nuclear weapons programs. Both proactive

CP and improved protection are reemphasized in order to “defend against and defeat 

WMD and missile threats before they are unleashed,” and “to mitigate the consequences 

of WMD use,” respectively. 

 b. The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NS-CWMD)

provides additional guidance concerning CWMD: NP, CP, and WMD consequence 

management (CM), as highlighted in the NSS, and introduces the construct of the three 

pillars which provides a common framework for the interagency conduct of CWMD 

activities. It describes how critical enabling functions (improved intelligence collection 

and analysis; research and development (R&D); strengthened international cooperation; 

and targeted strategies against proliferants) help to integrate the three pillars into one 

seamless, comprehensive approach to CWMD. In order for this strategy to be successful, 

DOD will dissuade the development and production of WMD; deter its use or mitigate its 

effects; prevent or reverse its proliferation; ensure stockpiles are secure and progressively 

reduced or destroyed. If WMD is used against the United States, DOD will defend 

against it, mitigate its consequences, and respond appropriately. These three pillars are 

discussed in detail later in this chapter. 

 c. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism articulates four priorities of 

action that the USG intends to take in reference to combating terrorism. One of them is 

to deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them. This priority 

identifies the need to develop a comprehensive approach for addressing WMD terrorism, 

specifically through six objectives that are intended to drive focus and action from the 

international community: 

 (1) Determine terrorists' intentions, capabilities, and plans to develop or acquire 

WMD. 
Introduction to Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

I-3 

 (2) Deny terrorists access to the materials, expertise, and other enabling 

capabilities required to develop WMD. 

 (3) Deter terrorists from employing WMD. 

 (4) Detect and disrupt terrorists' attempted movement of WMD-related 

materials, weapons, and personnel. 

 (5) Prevent and respond to a WMD-related terrorist attack. 

 (6) Define the nature and source of a terrorist-employed WMD device. 

3. Military Strategic Guidance 

 a. The National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMSCWMD) provides DOD components with guidance and a strategic framework for 

CWMD, as outlined in Figure I-1. The NMS-CWMD uses an “ends, ways, and means” 

approach to planning, executing, resourcing, and emphasizes those CWMD missions in 

which the military plays a prominent role. It defines strategic end states, strategic 

enablers, military strategic objectives (MSOs), and eight military mission areas (MMAs) 

the Armed Forces of the United States may be called upon to perform. 

 (1) The MSOs identified in the NMS-CWMD serve as the “ways” in the “ends, 

ways, means” approach to achieving the US strategic CWMD goal. These are conducted 

across all three pillars and the eight MMAs and may cut across all phases of joint 

operations (shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil 

authority). 

 (a) Prevent, Dissuade, or Deny WMD Proliferation or Possession. The 

purpose of this MSO is to keep WMD out of the hands of adversaries and potential 

adversaries, while simultaneously increasing multinational partner capability and support 

for CWMD activities. This includes conveying to current and potential adversaries the 

futility of using WMD possession or proliferation is not an avenue to impose their will on 

the United States. Moreover, the US will assure multinational partners that they do not 

need to possess WMD to ensure their security or stability. The WMD offensive 

operations, WMD interdiction, and WMD security cooperation MMAs link directly to 

this MSO. The activities associated with this MSO principally occur in phase 0 (Shape) 

and phase 1 (Deter) operations. Successfully attaining this MSO requires significant 

interagency coordination, especially between DOD and the Department of State (DOS). 

For further guidance to indicate what different phases are and where they are defined, 

refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, Chapter IV, Planning, Operational 

Art and Design, and Assessment. 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-40 

 (b) Reduce, Destroy, or Reverse WMD Possession. The purpose of this 

MSO is to destroy or secure WMD when there is an agreement to do so. This includes 

reversing WMD programs and reducing WMD and related material stockpiles. This 

MSO focuses on threat reduction cooperation while operating in a permissive 

environment. The activities associated with this MSO predominantly occur in phase 0 

(Shape) and phase 1 (Deter) operations. Current and potential allies and partners might 

COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

FRAMEWORK

WAYS

Intelligence

Partnership Capacity

Strategic Communication Support

Strategic Enablers

MEANS ENDS

USG

Instruments 

of National 

Power

Pillars MSOs Mission Areas

DOD

OSD

Joint Staff

CCDRs

Services

CSAs

Friends

Allies

Partners

The United 

States, its 

Armed 

Forces, allies, 

partners, and 

interests are 

neither 

coerced nor 

attacked with 

weapons of 

mass 

destruction.

Nonproliferation

Prevent

Dissuade

Deny

Reduce 

Destroy 

Reverse

Defeat 

Deter

Security Cooperation

and

Partner Activities

CounterproliferationWMD Interdiction

WMD Elimination

Active Defense

CBRN Passive 

Defense

Consequence 

Management

Offensive Operations

Threat Reduction 

Cooperation

WMD Consequence 

Management

LEGEND

CBRN chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear

CCDR combatant commander

CSA combat support agency

DOD Department of Defense

MSO military strategic objective

USG United States Government

WMD weapons of mass destruction

OSD Office of the Secretary of 

Defense

Defend

Respond

Recover

Figure I-1. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Framework
Introduction to Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

I-5 

desire to give up possession of WMD or associated technology at any point in the 

development process. 

 (c) Defeat and Deter WMD Use and Subsequent Use. The purpose of 

this MSO is to counter an adversary’s willingness and capability to use WMD. 

Adversaries must believe they will suffer severe consequences and that their objectives 

will be denied if they threaten or resort to WMD use. If deterrence fails, the WMD 

offensive operations, WMD elimination, WMD interdiction, CBRN passive defense, and 

WMD active defense MMAs could be conducted to support this MSO. The emphasis on 

deterrence and defeat in this MSO shows that, while phase 0 (Shape) is an especially 

critical phase for the CWMD mission, CWMD considerations must be integrated into all 

phases of joint operations. 

 (d) Defend, Respond, and Recover from WMD Use. The purpose of this 

MSO is to respond to an adversary that has used WMD in an operational area or against 

US strategic interests. This includes not just minimizing the effects of WMD on military 

operations but, if directed, supporting the response to a WMD event in the homeland or 

against multinational partners, as well. The CBRN passive defense, WMD active 

defense, and weapons of mass destruction consequence management (WMD CM) MMAs 

are directly linked to this MSO. The execution of these MMAs highlight the importance 

of interagency coordination in order to effectively combat WMD. The Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) and DOS play significant roles in CBRN passive defense and 

WMD CM. CWMD, from beginning to end, must be a synchronized effort of the USG. 

 (2) CWMD MMAs. The NMS-CWMD outlines eight MMAs for CWMD: 

offensive operations, WMD elimination, WMD interdiction, active defense, CBRN 

passive defense, WMD CM, security cooperation and partner activities, and threat 

reduction cooperation. These eight MMAs provide joint force commanders (JFCs) with a 

logical grouping of CWMD capabilities. These MMAs are described in greater detail in 

Chapter IV, “Planning and Execution.” 

 (3) Strategic Enablers. The strategic enablers identified in the NMS-CWMD 

are cross-cutting capabilities that facilitate execution of the military strategy by 

enhancing the effectiveness and integration of military CWMD mission capabilities. 

Intelligence, partnership capacity, and strategic communication (SC) support are 

applicable across the four CWMD MSOs, eight CWMD mission areas and the six phases 

of joint operations. They also highlight the important role phase 0 (Shape) operations 

play in the CWMD mission. 

 (a) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). This strategic 

enabler directly supports strategy, planning, and decision making; facilitates 

improvements in operational capabilities; and informs risk management. Recognizing 

the limits of combating WMD intelligence, planning and execution decisions will be 

made using limited or incomplete information. To reduce uncertainty, our intelligence 

capability must exploit a variety of sources, facilitate information sharing, and improve 

situational awareness. 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-40 

 (b) Partnership Capacity. Building partnership capacity bilaterally and 

multilaterally enhances US capability to combat WMD. Partnership capacity empowers 

other nations, increases regional stability, and reduces potential burdens on the United 

States. Assistance from the international community could be a force multiplier in US 

efforts to combat WMD effectively. This enabler is linked directly to security 

cooperation activities within a geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) AOR. 

 (c) Strategic Communication Support. This enabler, a USG-wide effort 

in which the military plays a significant supporting role, helps shape perceptions at the 

global, regional, national, and local levels. Synchronized themes, messages, images, and 

actions reassure multinational partners and underscore to potential adversaries the costs 

and risks associated with WMD acquisition and use. SC is an especially important 

enabler and deterrent for achieving deterrence and defeat of WMD use. If an adversary 

can be convinced of the futility of pursuing WMD prior to developing or acquiring it, 

then the risk of having to defeat a WMD-armed adversary is decreased. 

4. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Construct 

 a. CWMD requires a long-term, strategic approach that places heavy emphasis on 

interagency support and international coordination and cooperation to create an 

environment inhospitable to the acquisition, development, proliferation, and use of 

WMD, denying adversaries safe havens, and disrupting WMD-enabling networks. 

CWMD thus involves execution of a broad global strategy where DOD is often not the 

lead agency, but military capabilities are essential to reinforce these efforts, and therefore 

must be integrated and synchronized with a larger USG effort. CWMD operations 

integrate into their theater campaign plans, particularly security cooperation and shaping 

activities, with the realization that these actions will produce few immediate results. 

Combatant commanders’ (CCDRs) efforts will consist of a wide variety of CWMD 

actions across discrete lines of operations (LOOs) being executed in conjunction with 

other USG efforts and the theater campaign strategy. 

 (1) CWMD Operational Environment. Another aspect of CWMD operations 

is the global nature of the operational environment. Increasingly, adversaries are 

pursuing asymmetric approaches, including WMD, to counter US military superiority and 

as a means to coerce the United States, its friends, and allies. With the growth of 

transnational extremist movements and the increasing complexity of global proliferation 

and terrorist networks, threats are no longer confined to states or within a given GCC’s 

AOR. Because potential adversaries with WMD operate globally, the US and its partners 

must combat WMD globally. CWMD actions are conducted across all instruments of 

national power. To effectively achieve CWMD-related objectives, these instruments 

must be applied concurrently, as appropriate. 

 (2) Shaping Activities. Shaping activities are performed to dissuade or deter 

potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. 

CWMD shaping activities include security cooperation activities that support a theater 

campaign and also contribute to a global comprehensive approach to combating WMD 
Introduction to Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

I-7 

across all three CWMD pillars. Actions in phase 0 (Shape) could preclude the need to 

employ offensive capabilities by deterring adversarial WMD inclinations with 

demonstrated US resolve and increased US and multinational partner capabilities to 

respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of WMD use. These activities 

encourage cooperation in a crisis or WMD event. 

 (3) CWMD and Major Contingencies. CWMD should be integrated 

throughout major contingency planning and execution to ensure successful prosecution. 

In any contingency, JFCs should consider the interrelationship of CWMD mission areas 

with other contingency operations. The global nature of CWMD operations should be 

considered, as even tactical actions within an operational area may have far-reaching 

implications and interagency and international considerations may outweigh military 

considerations. 

 b. The challenges of CWMD require an integrated approach that leverages the 

pillars of NP, CP, and WMD CM. CWMD success depends on how effectively 

commanders apply all three pillars against WMD challenges. Since each WMD scenario 

poses unique challenges, commanders must determine the most effective blend of the 

three pillars best suited to achieve the CWMD end states. Such activities, while often 

requiring quick-response measures, should be planned for and integrated into a 

comprehensive strategy. 

 (1) Nonproliferation. NP activities are those actions taken to prevent the 

proliferation of WMD by dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, 

sensitive technologies, material, and expertise. NP efforts use all instruments of 

national power to prevent the development and proliferation of WMD. While NP is 

applied usually to prevent the acquisition of WMD by state or non-state actors during the 

early stages of WMD development, it may also be employed in latter stages of WMD 

program dismantlement. NP efforts dissuade or impede the proliferation of WMD, as 

well as slow and make more costly access to sensitive technologies, material, and 

expertise. The NP pillar can encompass the MMAs of WMD interdiction, security 

cooperation and partner activities, and threat reduction cooperation. NP activities include 

providing inspection, monitoring, verification, and enforcement support for NP treaties 

and WMD control regimes; supporting cooperative threat reduction (CTR) and export 

control activities; participating in domestic research activities; conducting military-tomilitary exchanges; and assisting in the identification of potential proliferators before 

they decide to acquire or expand their WMD capabilities. WMD proliferation is the 

transfer of WMD, related materials, technology, and expertise from one actor to another. 

The actors may be state or non-state. WMD proliferation represents an adversarial intent 

to either possess WMD, develop WMD programs, or to endorse WMD possession and/or 

programs to other actors. 

 (2) Counterproliferation. CP activities are those actions taken to defeat the 

threat and/or use of WMD against the United States, our forces, allies, and partners. 

CP operations are taken in response to proliferation and to stop or roll back current WMD 

programs, defeat delivery systems, and protect US interests from the threat, or use, of 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-40 

WMD. CP activities may be applied against adversaries early on in the WMD 

development and acquisition stages, as well as later after they have developed or acquired 

WMD, threatened to use it or have used it, and to eliminate any residual WMD 

capabilities. The CP pillar primarily encompasses the MMAs of WMD offensive 

operations, WMD interdiction, WMD elimination, WMD active defense, and CBRN 

passive defense, but may also include WMD security cooperation. 

 (3) Weapons of Mass Destruction Consequence Management. WMD CM 

activities are those actions authorized by the President or Secretary of Defense 

(SecDef) to mitigate the effects of a weapon of mass destruction attack or event and 

provide temporary essential operations and services at home and abroad. WMD 

CM procedures may assist in the restoration of essential operations and services at home 

and abroad. WMD CM capabilities can also be useful in dissuading adversaries from 

developing or using WMD and may be necessary in response to certain CP activities. 

The WMD CM pillar primarily encompasses the MMAs of CBRN passive defense and 

WMD CM, but may also include the MMA of security cooperation and partner activities. 

 c. The term CBRN hazards is often used in conjunction with the effects of a WMD 

device, to lend greater fidelity to the hazards encountered from the agent or substance or 

their dispersal. CBRN hazards are those CBRN elements that could cause adverse affect 

through their accidental or deliberate release, dissemination, or impacts. These hazards 

include those created from accidental or intentional releases of CBRN from a weapon, 

device, or facility, including toxic industrial materials (TIMs), biological pathogens, and 

radioactive matter. Also included are any hazards resulting from WMD employment. 

The key distinction between WMD and CBRN hazards is that the former refers to the 

actual weapon, while the latter refers to the effects resulting from the employment of 

those weapons and from the dispersal of CBRN materials. When DOD capabilities are 

called upon to conduct WMD CM activities, (i.e., to reduce the effects of a WMD event) 

they will essentially be responding to CBRN hazards. 

For further guidance on CBRN hazards, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments. 

5. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Outside the United States 

 DOD can act as both a supported and a supporting entity during CWMD operations 

outside of the United States. The broad nature of the task requires DOD, even when 

acting as the supported entity, to recognize the importance of interagency coordination, as 

well as working closely with multinational partners. Outside of the United States, DOD 

activities span the entire CWMD mission and encompass all eight MMAs.

For further guidance on the interagency process, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational 

Coordination During Joint Operations.
Introduction to Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

I-9 

6. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, the War on Terrorism, and 

Homeland Defense 

 a. CWMD is not a separate and isolated mission set, but is intertwined with WOT 

and HD. Therefore, to accomplish the goals of CWMD, a JFC must be prepared to 

synchronize the efforts of CWMD, WOT, and HD activities during all phases of joint 

operations. The NSS emphasizes the danger stemming from the crossroads of radicalism 

and technology. Accordingly, the CWMD mission must be integrated with the WOT to 

prevent terrorist networks from acquiring finished WMD or precursor technology. 

Moreover, CWMD must be synchronized with the HD mission to prevent a terrorist 

group from striking the US homeland with WMD. 

 b. Combating WMD and the War on Terrorism. It is important to understand 

that not all terrorist incidents are WMD incidents. For a terrorist incident to be 

categorized as a WMD incident, some element of CBRN that results in a high order of 

destruction or causes mass casualties from the weapon must be involved. This normally 

omits HYE weapons as a WMD CM consideration, however, certain domestic response 

plans include HYE and other weapons. 

For further guidance on counterterrorism, refer to JP 3-26, Counterterrorism. 

 c. Combating WMD and Homeland Defense. The homeland is confronted by a 

variety of threats. These include transnational threats—defined in Title 50, United States 

Code (USC), Section 402, as “any transnational activity (including international 

terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the 

delivery systems for such weapons, and organized crime) that threatens the national 

security of the United States.” HD operations will be conducted in a complex 

environment characterized by multiple jurisdictions, and authorities, and therefore require 

the participation of nontraditional partners, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and 

international partners. Coordination among these various organizations will be 

imperative to ensure synchronized and integrated operations. CWMD contributes to HD 

by protecting the United States, multinational partners, and interests through an active, 

layered defense in depth. DOD plays an essential role in CWMD through a full range of 

operational capabilities to protect the United States, its military forces, and multinational 

partners from the threat or actual use of WMD. DOD, as directed by the President, may 

conduct preemptive HD actions in support of CWMD and in accordance with 

international and domestic law, national policy, and directives. 

For further guidance on HD, refer to JP 3-27, Homeland Defense. 

7. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Civil Support 

 DOD provides support to civil authorities for domestic emergencies and for 

designated law enforcement and other activities. Joint forces supporting civil authorities 

in response to a domestic WMD incident are part of domestic incident management and 

operate in accordance with the National Response Framework (NRF). The National 
Chapter I 

I-10 JP 3-40 

Incident Management System (NIMS) forms the foundation for conducting domestic 

response operations. When emergency conditions dictate, and when time does not permit 

approval from higher headquarters (HQ), local military commanders and responsible 

DOD component officials are authorized to respond to requests from local authorities and 

to initiate immediate response actions to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate 

great property damage under imminently serious conditions. For foreign incidents, this is 

restricted to saving lives as per current memorandums of understanding, memorandums 

of agreement, and status-of-forces agreements. Within the US, DOD activities are 

primarily related to the WMD CM MMA. 

For further guidance on civil support (CS), refer to JP 3-28, Civil Support. 

8. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Consequence Management 

 a. WMD CM is an integral part of CWMD efforts. It is important to note the 

difference between chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives 

(CBRNE) CM response to an incident involving the deliberate or inadvertent release of 

CBRNE materials and WMD CM which deals with the consequences of CBRN weapons 

and associated materials intentionally used in creating a high order of destruction or 

causing mass casualties. The WMD CM mission area highlights the complexity of the 

various lexicons, laws, and agreements for conducting CWMD with interagency, 

multinational, intergovernmental organization (IGO), and NGO partners. Chapter III, 

“Organizational and Command Relationships,” contains a discussion of interagency and 

multinational considerations and command and control (C2) for domestic operations. 

For further guidance on CBRNE CM, refer to JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management. 

 b. Domestic WMD CM Operations. DOD will generally be operating in support 

of another federal agency whenever it conducts CM for a domestic WMD incident. USG 

coordination in such an event is outlined in the NRF. Therefore, domestic WMD CM 

response will also include capabilities to perform CBRNE CM response operations. 

Domestic CM operations include CM activities in Alaska, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of 

Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, Navassa Island, US Pacific territories of Guam, 

American Samoa, Jarvis Island, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 

Wake Atoll, Midway Atoll, Johnston Atoll, Baker Island, Howland Island, Palmyra Atoll, 

and Kingman Reef, and the Freely Associated States of Micronesia and the Republic of 

the Marshall Islands. 

For further guidance on domestic CM, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Instruction (CJCSI) 3125.01A, Defense Support to Civil Authorities for Domestic 

Consequence Management Operations in Response to Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear or High-Yield Explosives Incident.

 c. Foreign CM Operations. DOS is the lead agency for coordinating USG foreign 

consequence management (FCM) operations when there is a host nation (HN) request 
Introduction to Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

I-11 

for, or acceptance of, USG assistance unless otherwise directed by the President. In this 

instance, DOD is a supporting agency for FCM operations. For most FCM operations, 

DOD will be in support of another government agency, and that organization may be 

supporting a partner nation or an IGO. Proper coordination of these operations will be 

very complex, will vary by country and combatant command AOR, and requires 

considerable effort by all parties. FCM policy more closely aligns with the response 

limitations of WMD CM and only applies to incidents that involve CBRN materials.

For further guidance on FCM operations, refer to Department of Defense Instruction 

(DODI) 2000.21, Foreign Consequence Management (FCM) or CJCSI 3214.01C,

Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations for Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents. 

For further guidance on multinational operations, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational 

Operations. 

 d. DOD Led CM Operations. In both domestic and foreign environments, CM 

actions are initiated at the national level with DOD providing support as directed by the 

President or SecDef. DOD forces may, however, be directed to lead CM operations as a 

direct result of US military operations in a foreign country where DOS does not have an 

established presence. 

For further guidance on CM operations on DOD installations, refer to DODI 2000.18, 

Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and 

High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines. 
Chapter I 

I-12 JP 3-40 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER II

THE CHALLENGE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THREATS 

 II-1 

1. General 

 a. This chapter identifies and describes the challenges of WMD threats faced by the 

JFC and highlights the general characteristics of WMD threats and threat actors. The 

WMD threat and US perception of that threat has evolved along with the security 

environment. In the latter half of the 20th century, CWMD strategy was largely based on 

deterrence of a very small number of nation-states. The threats at the time were 

characterized by established, effective governments; stringent control and accountability 

measures for WMD weapons; large conventional militaries with near parity; set 

geographic areas; substantial economic and industrial bases; and, perhaps most 

importantly, a relatively clear understanding of adversary motivations and risk 

calculations. Today’s security environment consists of a wide variety of threat actors 

ranging from state actors, with characteristics similar to earlier threats, to non-state 

actors, including terrorists, other transnational groups, and even industrial concerns, with 

vastly different characteristics. These actors may have little to no established 

government or leadership structure; few controls on weapons or operations; small cells or 

even no conventional military capability; operate across political and geographic 

boundaries; no clear economic base that can be held at risk; and differing or even 

competing agendas, motivations, and objectives. 

 b. CWMD requires a strong partnership between the United States, its allies, and 

other friendly nations to assure them and to dissuade, deter, and defeat the potential 

WMD threat that could result in devastating consequences to all concerned. Because of 

US overall military superiority, many actors seek asymmetric capabilities, like WMD, 

due to these weapons’ ability to drastically alter any imbalance of conventional force. 

Such asymmetric capability may allow an actor to give them a strategic advantage and to 

influence public or political will, and coerce the United States or its friends and allies 

with the threat of large-scale destruction. To compound this threat, the technology 

associated with WMD has proliferated globally in the past several decades as information 

and capabilities have become more accessible. An adversary’s threat or use of WMD and 

the proliferation of these capabilities will continue to challenge commanders at all levels. 

 c. The evolution of the WMD threat has created new challenges for JFCs beyond 

dealing with adversary WMD use. The primary challenges facing the JFC are: 

 (1) The diversity of threat actors, including the emergence of nontraditional 

WMD threats; 

“We will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes and terrorists to 

threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons. We must accord the 

highest priority to the protection of the United States, our forces, and our 

friends and allies from the existing and growing WMD [weapons of mass 

destruction] threat.” 

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 

December 2002
Chapter II 

 (2) The varied nature of WMD demands a varied approach to deterrence; 

 (3) A complex WMD proliferation continuum; 

 (4) The dual-use nature of much of the related technology and expertise; 

 (5) The increasing complexity and number of WMD proliferation networks. 

2. State Actors and Programs 

 a. State actors and their associated WMD programs vary in their level of activity and 

sophistication and remain a credible threat to the United States. There are strong 

indications that nuclear weapon capabilities continue to grow and proliferate. New 

classes of nontraditional biological and chemical agents and threats continue to emerge 

and challenge our defenses. Advances in delivery systems, both conventional and 

unconventional, continue to increase. States possessing or seeking WMD see them as a 

source of strategic leverage, international prestige, regional dominance, local deterrence, 

or as a means to counter US and western power in areas of potential conflict. A 

significant challenge lies in assessing the intent and capabilities of the state’s leadership. 

Furthermore, states may intentionally or unintentionally provide WMD resources to nonstate actors. In the former case, a state may exploit an all too willing non-state entity as a 

proxy so that the state can claim plausible deniability of an attack. In the latter case, a 

state’s non-secured WMD may fall into the hands of non-state actors. 

 b. Control of State Programs. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and with 

the possible decline of authority in other states with WMD programs, the US faces an 

increasingly challenging dilemma involving states that may not be able to control their 

CBRN weapons, material, technology, or expertise. In such cases, these items can fall 

into the hands of other states or non-state actors. As government power ebbs and flows 

in many parts of the world due to local and regional instability, the JFC should plan for 

the increasing dispersal of state-owned and state-controlled weapons, material, 

technology, or expertise to rogue factions within states or non-state actors. In some 

cases, determining the level of security and control of these items will be the source of 

new challenges. 

3. Non-State Actors and Programs 

 a. There is continuing interest by non-state actors in acquiring WMD. Non-state 

actors can be categorized as terrorists (including their networks) and other nonstate entities. The category of other non-state entities include extremists, insurgents, 

transnational threats, NGOs, businesses, rogue scientists/technicians, as well as, 

individuals acting independently of any organization. The main difference between 

terrorists and other non-state actors is that of intended use. Whereas terrorists seek to 

acquire and use WMD, other non-state entities lack the intent to use and may be witting 

or unwitting participants in WMD proliferation. If they are witting participants, they are 

II-2 JP 3-40 
The Challenge of Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats 

likely seeking financial gain. Where efforts against state actors and terrorists can fall 

within the realm of the JFC, a significant percentage of the effort against other non-state 

entities may fall outside the purview of the JFC and reside either with the interagency or 

multinational partners. 

 b. Scale and Complexity. An additional consideration for the JFC is the scale 

and/or complexity of non-state actor programs. Traditionally, a state program is vast in 

resources and physical size. The scale of production from non-state actors (and more 

specifically terrorists) is typically much smaller in scale and complexity. In fact, many 

small-scale chemical and biological production facilities for a terrorist organization, such 

as clandestine laboratories, can occur within a typical bedroom-sized area. Commanders 

at all levels must be aware of the potential significant threat of these small scale facilities 

and take appropriate measures. Care must be taken to exploit the intelligence value that 

can be gained from these production facilities even though they may seem insignificant 

based on their size and the nondescript nature of much of the equipment. Both scale and 

complexity of a program is a factor for the JFC in determining the appropriate mix of 

forces.

4. Traditional and Nontraditional Threats

Traditional threats are those threats delivered by conventional military delivery 

means (e.g., aircraft-delivered bombs, rockets, missiles, mortars, and artillery); 

nontraditional threats are those delivered using improvised weapons or material against 

either conventional or unconventional targets. 

 a. Traditional WMD Threats. Advances in conventional delivery means and modern 

infrastructure construction technology continue to make the traditional WMD threat a 

concern for national security both regionally and globally. Many of the weapon system 

advances include increasingly capable cruise missile technology, unmanned aircraft 

system (UAS) technology, and the continuing development of improved medium- and 

long-range ballistic missiles. The existence of deeply buried underground facilities has 

emerged as one of the more difficult operational challenges to confront US military 

forces. They may be used to manufacture and store WMD delivery systems, as well as 

used for C2. Because of the nature of their construction, they are difficult to locate and 

target. As WMD technology and materials advance, the ability to employ WMD 

technologies and material by our adversaries will become more lethal. Our adversaries 

possess and will continue to explore unconventional means to employ WMD materials 

through biological dispersion devices, remote controlled roadside bombs, and improvised 

explosives devices (IEDs). On the other hand, the following are examples that state 

sponsored terrorists can use or employ WMD technologies and material by our 

adversaries: nanotechnology, biotechnology, advanced genetics, space-based capabilities, 

and advances in computing to allow non-state actors more efficient access to information 

or production techniques. 

 b. Nontraditional WMD Threats. As nontraditional threats are the most open-ended. 

The JFC must leverage a detailed joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

 II-3 
Chapter II 

environment (JIPOE) and mission analysis to identify potential nontraditional threats 

within the area of interest. The employment of WMD by nonmilitary means may pose 

one of the most significant challenges due to detection limitations. Nonmilitary means of 

delivery may include sprayers (e.g., crop dusters, backpack); existing transportation 

infrastructure (e.g., air, rail, subway, bus, and ship); private transportation assets (e.g., 

vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft); IEDs, or UAS technology. Public targets can include, but 

are not limited to, malls, stadiums, religious gatherings, financial institutions, and 

industrial facilities. 

ADVANCES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 

Advances in biotechnology and life sciences—including the spread of 

expertise to create modified or novel organisms—present the prospect 

of new toxins, live agents, and bioregulators that require new detection 

methods, preventive measures, and treatments. Additionally, the 

proliferation of biological materials, technologies, and expertise 

increases the potential for adversaries to design pathogens to evade 

our existing medical and nonmedical countermeasures. 

VARIOUS SOURCES 

5. Proliferation Continuum 

a. The development and employment of WMD capabilities is a complex but 

identifiable process with several generic activities that together constitute an adversary’s 

proliferation continuum (Figure II-1). This proliferation continuum represents key 

decision points by an adversary to either possess or proliferate WMD. It also represents a 

transition in our CWMD activities across the three pillars. Adversaries may, at any point 

along the proliferation continuum, effectively bypass one of the steps by acquiring (by 

theft, barter, or purchase) the capability, thereby accelerating the WMD development 

process. Proactive actions can be taken at every stage of the proliferation continuum to 

successfully combat the WMD proliferation. However, the JFC should look to combat 

these threats early in the continuum to minimize risk of further proliferation or use. The 

generic activities include: a decision to pursue WMD capability; infrastructure and 

expertise development; production; weaponization; deployment; and employment. In 

some cases, infrastructure and expertise development, facility preparation, and production 

may be concealed within industrial or agricultural production (so-called dual use 

materials), academic institutions, or within underground facilities, making intelligence 

collection efforts more difficult. Furthermore, JFCs should bear in mind that Article IV 

of the NPT guarantees its signatories the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful 

purposes, which may also mask the development of fissile material for warheads. 

 b. Secondary Proliferation. There is a growing concern that states that were once 

recipients of WMD related technologies and materials may begin to indigenously 

produce and export these same technologies to other countries of proliferation concern. 

The ability and willingness of these states to export WMD-related technologies and 

materials to other states outside of, or in noncompliance with, international NP rules are a 

II-4 JP 3-40 
The Challenge of Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats 

PROLIFERATION CONTINUUM

TR

A

TRANSFER

NSFER

DECISION

INFRASTRUCTURE AND 

EXPERTISE DEVELOPMENT

PRODUCTION

WEAPONIZATION

DEPLOYMENT

EMPLOYMENT

Figure II-1. Proliferation Continuum 

serious threat. Furthermore, a secondary proliferation threat exists from non-state actors 

(e.g., scientists, businesses, and their networks) who proliferate WMD-related 

technologies and materials. Secondary proliferation compounds the risks of terrorists 

acquiring WMD. All of this secondary proliferation occurs outside of international 

controls and, while difficult to detect, must remain a JFC concern. 

6. Dual-Use Technology and Facilities 

 a. Dual-use technology is technology that can be used for both commercial and 

military applications and is an area of exploitation by adversaries seeking to develop 

weapons programs. Furthermore, the dual-use nature of most biological and chemical 

related technologies makes procurement easier to mask, monitoring efforts more difficult, 

and enables proliferators to bypass control regimes. The opportunities for WMD 

acquisition facilitated by dual-use technology will continue to be difficult to detect and 

 II-5 
Chapter II 

track. Even though a number of states follow certain NP agreements, development times 

for some WMD programs could be shortened because of the relatively advanced research 

institutes throughout the world; the availability of relevant dual-use studies and 

information; scientists’ enthusiasm for sharing research; and the availability of dual-use 

training and education. 

 b. Dual-Use Facilities. The use of dual-use facilities is a technique whereby states 

utilize industrial or agricultural facilities to produce legitimate commercial products; 

however, with modification, these facilities can be converted to produce CBRN weapons 

or material. This modification can take anywhere from days to months and can turn 

otherwise legitimate commercial facilities into a crucial component of a nation-state’s 

WMD program. 

7. Proliferation Networks 

 a. Proliferation networks are the supporting infrastructure that a state or non-state 

actor uses to gain or transfer access to weapons, material, technology, or expertise. It is 

important to note that many of these networks are not organized specifically for the 

proliferation of WMD. In fact, many existing networks may be utilized out of 

convenience. Examples of existing networks include human trafficking, counterfeiting, 

and drug trafficking. As an additional consideration, some nodes within these networks 

may be unwitting partners. The threat is further complicated by the operations of 

multinational networks, potentially with the support of state resources. These global 

proliferation activities employ a combination of secrecy, dispersion, and fiscal resources 

that must be located, monitored, and ultimately targeted. The JFC should use a systems 

perspective to better understand the complexity of the operational environment and 

associated adversary networks. This perspective looks across the political, military, 

economic, social, information, infrastructure, and other systems to identify the nodes, 

links, centers of gravity (COGs), and potential vulnerabilities within the network. The 

JFC must understand that as these networks expand in scope and area, the actions needed 

to adequately identify and affect them may reside outside DOD influence and may 

require interagency or IGO efforts. Depending on joint force organization, the JFC may 

lack a full range of capabilities that can support unity of effort to proactively and 

comprehensively dissuade, deter, defeat, or deny these networks. To adequately 

influence all of these networks, the JFC must leverage other instruments of national 

power. 

For further guidance on systems analysis, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence 

Preparation of the Operational Environment, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

 b. Characteristics of a Network. Proliferation networks are multifunctional and 

multidimensional; consist of state and, increasingly, independent non-state actors; are 

dynamic, adaptive, and can be transnational; have differing motivations and desired end 

states; and operate in secrecy to avoid detection and counteraction. They respond to 

changes in their environment, learn, and acquire new knowledge through study. Many 

networks are selectively active. They lie dormant when their support is not required and 

II-6 JP 3-40 
The Challenge of Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats 

become active when the WMD development process requires (e.g., executing financial 

activities when buying expertise or knowledge or executing logistic activities when 

moving or deploying a weapon). Networks may be limited in their duration (days, 

weeks, months) and may be dissolved once its purpose is achieved. 

A.Q. KHAN PROLIFERATION NETWORK 

The Khan network was, first and foremost, an elaborate and highly 

successful illicit procurement network that Khan created in the 1970s 

to supply Pakistan’s gas centrifuge program. The developing program 

aimed to make highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons. He 

built his centrifuge procurement network on an extensive collection of 

sensitive information that he stole or otherwise acquired in Europe in 

the middle and late 1970s. In addition, he was involved in acquiring 

overseas nuclear weapon technology for Pakistan and procuring 

equipment and materials for this endeavor. 

Because of Pakistan’s weak industrial infrastructure, it was unable to 

develop gas centrifuges or nuclear weapons without extensive foreign 

assistance. Khan relied on the support of many foreign businessmen 

and experts and on the supply of goods and technologies from foreign 

countries, especially in Europe. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program 

is still dependent on the foreign supply of spare parts, special 

materials, and instruments. 

Khan and his associates slowly expanded their import operation into a 

transnational illegal network that exported whole gas centrifuges and 

production capabilities, as well as designs for nuclear weapons, mostly 

to Muslim countries. By the late 1990s, the Khan network had evolved 

into an organization that could provide “one-stop shopping,” both for 

the wherewithal to produce weapons-grade uranium and for nuclear 

weapons designs and instructions. The motive was to turn a profit 

while providing additional business for their international 

collaborators. In addition to money, Khan was also motivated by panIslamism and its hostility to Western controls on nuclear technology. 

Khan has admitted that his main customers were Iran, Libya, and North 

Korea. Reports indicate that other countries, including Egypt, Iraq, and 

Syria, were offered assistance, but they purportedly turned down the 

offers. However, investigators are still trying to verify these claims and 

determine exactly what assistance each country accepted or refused. 

In addition, questions remain as to whether members of the Khan 

network, including Khan himself, offered nuclear weapon assistance to 

terrorists in Afghanistan prior to the fall of the Taliban. 

SOURCE: The A.Q. Khan Illicit Nuclear Trade Network and Implications 

for Nonproliferation Efforts, Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 6 (July 

2006) by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein 

 II-7 
Chapter II 

 c. Many of these networks, whether focused solely on WMD proliferation or not, are 

comprised of several common functions. While this list is not all-inclusive, these 

networks can include: 

 (1) Leadership. Activities to provide motivation and the physical means to 

control activities of the WMD program. This includes providing strategic direction, 

coordinating the activities of other networks, facilitating the flow of information and 

resources throughout the networks, and providing the motivation to acquire WMD. This 

function may be state-directed or may reflect ideological, financial, business, or other 

concerns that motivate WMD proliferation. 

 (2) Finance. Activities to secure and transfer the financial resources to fund all 

aspects of a WMD program. These activities can include brokers, middlemen, financial 

institutions, banking systems, and charities. 

 (3) Scientific and Technical Expertise. Activities to provide the knowledge 

and expertise necessary to produce WMD and related infrastructure (e.g., designing, 

producing, machining, testing, storing). This function harnesses information and 

expertise from scientists, researchers, engineers, and technicians necessary to support 

capability development. 

 (4) Communications. Activities to provide the necessary information 

throughout the network. Because of the importance of these programs, great effort will 

be taken to protect communication channels. 

 (5) Logistics. Activities to acquire, produce, and transport the raw material, 

people, production materiel, and finished products. This function acquires missing 

components or technology; trains and recruits needed expertise, as required; and may

support the theft of WMD technology, components, and fully-weaponized WMD. This 

facet includes a significant portion of the network, such as front companies (clandestine 

or legitimate), shipping companies, producers, import/export companies, and other means 

of conveyance. 

 (6) Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Activities to acquire 

detailed target data and determine potential sources of WMD components, technology, 

and expertise. 

 (7) Weapon Delivery. Activities to deliver the WMD to the target and direct 

its firing. These activities can be both conventional and unconventional. 

 (8) Security. Activities to protect the identity of the leadership or the 

operations being conducted (e.g., finance, production of WMD, acquisition, and 

logistics). This action allows the organization the ability to operate undetected while 

preparing for future operations. 

II-8 JP 3-40 
The Challenge of Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats 

8. Role of Deterrence 

 a. The JFC must consider the changing role of deterrence against state actors and, 

more importantly, the role of deterrence against non-state actors. WMD deterrence has 

shifted from a Cold War focus on a very small number of actors to a wide perspective on 

multiple and varied actors. Traditional economic, diplomatic, informational, and military 

deterrent measures, including the threat of overwhelming response, remain key aspects of 

deterrence, especially against state actors and state-sponsored WMD threats. However, 

the difficulty of definitively attributing use, as well as the emergence of non-state actors 

whose values and decision making may be difficult to analyze, makes the capability to 

deny adversaries’ objectives an increasingly important element of WMD deterrence. 

Finally, the diversity of the types of threats and number of threat actors requires a broader 

deterrence construct and themes and messages tailored to each adversary. 

 b. The general principles of deterrence against a state actor have not significantly 

changed. An established state would carefully consider US defense capabilities, the 

potential US response against its use of WMD, and the political will of the US to react. 

Deterrent measures, in close coordination with SC, have proven effective against states. 

However, the current security environment has two new aspects with regard to state 

actors. The first is an increased number of state actors possessing or developing WMD 

and the second is the rise of state-sponsored terrorist groups. 

 (1) During the Cold War, the “nuclear umbrella” of the superpowers provided a 

measure of security to their allies and client states. Also, the major powers wielded 

considerable influence over the development of military capabilities of their allies and 

clients. The superpowers had a strong incentive to maintain the balance of power and to 

prevent WMD development by countries under their influence. With the end of the Cold 

War, the foundation of many of the security guarantees shifted and economic and military 

support to some states was withdrawn. This increased the desire of certain states to 

obtain WMD to enhance their own security, while simultaneously reducing the influence 

of the major powers in the decision-making process of these nations. Thus, some nations 

that had not shown interest in WMD began programs to obtain them. State actors are 

generally driven to obtain WMD to enhance state or regime security, to gain influence, or 

to enhance national prestige. Additionally, states with WMD capabilities may desire to 

proliferate those capabilities to gain influence and enhance prestige for economic gain or 

for ideological reasons. 

 (2) The end of the Cold War also saw an increase in state sponsored terrorists, 

which states use as a means to mask hostile activities, gain influence, or increase internal 

political support. While the desire of a terrorist group itself to obtain or use WMD may 

not be directly influenced, an element of WMD deterrence may be achieved by applying 

pressure on the state sponsor to control the group’s activity or reduce the state’s support 

to that actor. While not generally thought of as deterrent measures, many NP activities 

and capabilities provide a deterrent effect by creating an environment hostile to 

proliferators. The “guilt by association” may influence states to withhold support to 

groups that are attempting to obtain or use WMD. Furthermore, US nuclear forensics 

 II-9 
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-40 

capabilities, which tie nuclear and radiological devices to their point of origin, could also 

deter states from employing or proliferating such devices. 

 c. Deterring non-state actors is a difficult challenge because it may not be possible 

to deter the most devoted violent extremists. However, a measure of WMD deterrence 

may be achieved by demonstrating capabilities such as robust WMD active defense and 

CBRN passive defense, as well as exercising WMD CM, to deny adversaries 

accomplishment of their objective. A strong SC program could create an environment 

unfavorable to WMD use. The actor may not only fail to achieve its goals, but may risk 

erosion of popular and political support by using or attempting to use WMD. For 

example, the conduct of direct action operations against locations and key personnel 

suspected of WMD-related activities may compel surviving leadership to abandon efforts 

to obtain WMD capabilities. While non-state actors’ values, decision making, and risk 

calculations may be dramatically different from those of state actors, each actor desires to 

accomplish some goal or objective by obtaining or using WMD. By determining those 

goals and demonstrating the ability to deny success the JFC can limit the options 

available to the adversary. 

 d. An effective WMD deterrence capability rests on understanding the adversary. 

To be effective, deterrent measures must consider factors such as values, motivation, 

objectives, leadership and decision making, risk calculations, and tolerance. The 

increasing number of WMD actors and the diversity of their characteristics require the 

JFC to develop an understanding of each of the actors and to tailor specific operations to 

deter each one. The nuances involved do not permit a “one size fits all approach” to 

WMD deterrence in today’s strategic environment.
CHAPTER III 

ORGANIZATIONAL AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS 

 III-1 

1. Organizations and Functions 

 a. Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) develops, coordinates, and oversees implementation and integration of DOD 

CWMD policy. OSD coordinates with the interagency for the transition or transfer of 

responsibility of CWMD operations from the Armed Forces of the United States to other 

government agencies (OGAs), international agencies, or other countries, as appropriate. 

OSD coordinates with both DOS and the Joint Staff (JS) to obtain international CWMD 

legal authorities, protocols, standards, and agreements; multinational support for CWMD 

operations; and, when required, HN support. They coordinate with DOS to notify the 

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of discoveries or destruction of 

chemical weapons materials and former production facilities. They coordinate with the 

National Counterproliferation Center to enhance intelligence support regarding WMD 

capabilities of all state and non-state actors. They coordinate with partner agencies and 

organizations of the USG in support to the homeland in the conduct of CS operations, 

such as domestic CBRNE CM or nuclear forensics. They also will coordinate DOD 

processes and procedures within the USG National Technical Nuclear Forensics 

interagency community. 

 b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The CJCS serves as the 

principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and SecDef 

regarding CWMD activities and apportions CWMD resources for planning and execution 

of the mission. The JS coordinates with combatant commands and Services to ensure 

CWMD operations are executed in compliance with domestic, international, and foreign 

laws, policies, treaties, and agreements. They assist with interagency support for CWMD 

operations and assist in planning and exercising CWMD activities within the interagency 

process. They also coordinate and provide intelligence support to the CCDRs for target 

identification and prioritization. When required after SecDef approval, CJCS will 

publish appropriate execution orders for CWMD activities. 

 c. Geographic Combatant Commanders. GCCs plan and execute CWMD 

operations within their AORs. They develop regional CWMD plans for their AORs and 

incorporate CWMD operations into their other plans. CCDR planning includes preparing 

strategic estimates, priorities, and joint operation plans for CWMD; incorporating 

“...The United States, through a concerted interagency and partner nation 

effort, must be prepared to detect, tag and track, intercept, and destroy 

WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and related materials. We must also 

be prepared to act quickly to secure those weapons and materials in cases 

where a state loses control of its weapons, especially nuclear devices. 

Should the worst happen, and we are attacked, we must be able to sustain 

operations during that attack and help mitigate the consequences of WMD 

attacks at home and overseas.” 

National Defense Strategy 2008
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-40 

CWMD-related activities in theater security cooperation planning; and planning for 

minimizing or mitigating potential WMD collateral effects from WMD offensive 

operations and WMD active defense. GCCs also provide for intratheater movement of 

specialized CWMD personnel and equipment and coordinate transition of suspect or 

confirmed WMD-related material, to include weapons, agents, delivery systems, and 

infrastructure for short- to long-term storage, protection, dismantlement, destruction, or 

disposal. This includes tracking, documenting, accounting, and reporting WMD 

weapons, material, facilities, and personnel discovered, stored, or destroyed in the AOR. 

In support of phase IV (Stabilize) and phase V (Enable Civil Authority) operations, 

CCDRs coordinate with OSD and JS to plan for transition or transfer of responsibility of 

CWMD operations to or from the Armed Forces of the United States from or to other 

multinational forces or nation-states. When applicable, they develop threat reduction and 

cooperation plans to allow for transfer and termination of CWMD missions. Finally, they 

coordinate with OSD and JS to ensure CWMD operations are in compliance with US 

obligations under international laws, policies, treaties, and agreements. 

 (1) Commander, United States Northern Command is responsible for 

conducting HD and CS operations (including WMD CM and CP operations) within the 

United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) AOR. USNORTHCOM organizes 

and executes its missions through assigned Service components, designated functional 

components, and subordinate standing joint task forces (JTFs). The standing subordinate 

JTFs have specific missions to prevent transnational threats to the homeland or to plan 

and integrate DOD domestic CBRN response to WMD incidents or accidents. 

 (2) Commander, United States Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM). When 

directed by the President or SecDef, CDRUSPACOM conducts domestic CM and 

defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) in support of the lead agency to mitigate the 

effects of, and assist in the recovery from, CBRNE events, natural or man-made disasters 

situation in the US states and territories within its AOR. 

 d. Functional Combatant Commanders. Each functional CCDR has a specific role 

in CWMD as described below: 

 (1) United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Commander, 

United States Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM). USSTRATCOM is 

responsible for synchronizing DOD CWMD planning and advocating for CWMD 

capabilities. 

 (2) United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). Commander, 

United States Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM) in coordination with 

USSTRATCOM, develops and makes recommendations to the CJCS regarding joint 

force integration for CWMD. As the joint force provider, USJFCOM provides forces, 

resources, and capabilities, as directed, to the supported CCDR’s CWMD operations. As 

the designated establishing authority for joint task force - elimination (JTF-E), 

CDRUSJFCOM is responsible for those activities outlined in JP 3-33, Joint Task Force 
Organizational and Command Relationships 

III-3 

Headquarters. CDRUSJFCOM exercises combatant command (command authority) 

over JTF-E. 

 (3) United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

Commander, United States Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM). 

USTRANSCOM plans and executes the common user transportation aspects of global 

CWMD operations. As the mobility force provider, USTRANSCOM supports 

intertheater and intratheater transportation of CWMD forces, equipment, and material, 

including specialized WMD shipments or certified containers provided by the appropriate 

agency. USTRANSCOM is prepared to expeditiously conduct retrograde movements of 

samples and specialized WMD tools for identification and attribution, providing in-transit 

visibility for positive control of CWMD shipments. In a contaminated environment, 

USTRANSCOM may restrict the retrograde of contaminated cargo to “mission critical” 

equipment (as determined by the GCC and authorized by SecDef.) Transportation of 

contagious and contaminated casualties is also very limited and requires GCC and 

CDRUSTRANSCOM coordination and endorsement, as well as SecDef approval. 

Logistics planners must be cognizant of the potential effects of large-frame aircraft or 

ship contamination on international mobility operations and implement contamination 

avoidance and control measures to preserve mobility capabilities. If unable to avoid 

contaminated areas, then planners must obtain the appropriate transit country 

clearances for contaminated vessels and equipment.

 (4) United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). 

Commander, United States Special Operations Command. USSOCOM is the lead 

combatant command for planning, synchronizing, and, as directed, executing global 

operations against terrorist networks. CWMD planning and operations must be closely 

coordinated with USSOCOM. USSTRATCOM and USSOCOM integrate and 

synchronize their global campaigns. USSOCOM provides the following CWMD 

capabilities: 

 (a) Expertise, material, and teams to supported combatant command teams 

to locate, tag, and track WMD, as required. 

 (b) Capabilities to conduct direct action operations in limited access areas, 

as required. 

 (c) Other specialized CWMD capabilities. 

 e. Services. The Services organize, train, equip, and otherwise prepare their 

respective forces to combat WMD, means of delivery, and related materials. Services 

play a vital role in contributing to shaping an international environment hostile to 

proliferation and strengthening deterrence through building partners’ CWMD-related 

capabilities and capacities. Specifically, the Services provide forces with the capability 

to conduct WMD interdiction, WMD elimination, WMD offensive operations, WMD 

active defense, CBRN passive defense, and WMD CM operations. 
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 3-40 

 f. National Guard Bureau (NGB). NGB is responsible for formulating, 

developing, and coordinating all policies, programs, and plans affecting CWMD assets 

within the National Guard. 

 g. Combat Support Agencies (CSAs). There are two principal CSAs with 

significant responsibilities related to CWMD: the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

(DTRA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). 

 (1) Defense Threat Reduction Agency. DTRA’s mission is to provide 

capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the WMD threat, and mitigate its effects. 

The Director, DTRA, also serves as the Director, United States Strategic Command 

Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC-WMD). In these roles, 

DTRA provides the following: 

 (a) Provides planning support, real-time technical reachback for the GCCs, 

technical development, and capabilities analysis. 

 (b) Manages and oversees research, development, testing, and evaluation 

needed to counter the threat and use of WMD; supports CCDR CWMD planning; and 

assists in the development and integration of capabilities to support DOD CWMD efforts 

and activities. 

 (c) Supports the construction, operation, and maintenance of a central 

destruction or offshore facility for the destruction and demilitarization of WMD agents, 

weapons, and material, if required, in support of WMD elimination operations and/or 

threat reduction cooperation requirements. 

 (d) Leads the development of the Interagency Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Database of Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities (INDRAC). 

INDRAC provides the CWMD community a web-based reference resource for 

understanding DOD and other USG departments and agencies’ CWMD roles, authorities, 

and capabilities. INDRAC is designed to be a reference tool to inform and assist 

government departments and agencies tasked with integrating and synchronizing 

applicable interagency-wide CWMD efforts. INDRAC is not designed or intended to be a 

Global Force Management tool to assess readiness levels or for units to be tasked outside 

existing processes. 

 (2) Defense Intelligence Agency. DIA advises SecDef, CJCS, and CCDRs on 

WMD intelligence and provides military intelligence support for CWMD planning. They 

support CCDR preparation of strategic estimates, priorities, and joint operation plans for 

CWMD operations. This includes threat prioritization data on WMD actors; 

development of dynamic threat assessments; network analysis and interdiction planning 

data; WMD facility and program assessments and projections; and database support for 

WMD facilities, individuals, and organizations. DIA assesses the importance of a current 

or pending movement or transfer of WMD-related materials, precursors, funding, 

information, or personnel and coordinates with the supported commander to exploit 
Organizational and Command Relationships 

III-5 

personnel, data, information, and materials obtained during CWMD operations. DIA 

provides capabilities, as directed, to the supported CCDR’s CWMD operations using 

established policies and procedures and provides expertise, if required, for identifying 

WMD materials. 

 h. Interagency and Intergovernmental Considerations. Coordination between 

DOD and OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs is critical to the success of CWMD operations. In 

many cases, the JFC will be supporting an OGA and that organization may be supporting 

a partner nation or IGO. In particular, security cooperation and partner activities; threat 

reduction cooperation; and WMD elimination, WMD interdiction, and WMD CM 

missions require significant interagency and intergovernmental coordination. 

 (1) CWMD operations may be subject to monitoring by various government 

agencies or IGOs; therefore, planning should anticipate specific national level guidance. 

CWMD operations must be coordinated and authorized at the appropriate level in 

accordance with approved WMD specific rules of engagement (ROE) and rules for the 

use of force (RUF). Commanders must also determine legal and policy authorities and 

requirements, to include a review of applicable laws, policies, treaties, and agreements. 

When CWMD operations involve significant or complex interactions with foreign civil 

authorities or IGOs, the commander should consider forming a civil-military operations 

center (CMOC) or supplementing an existing CMOC with CWMD expertise. 

For further guidance on CMOCs, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

 (2) In addition to IGO participation, CWMD operations often involve 

multinational partners since they also possess unique military CWMD capabilities. In 

many cases, the JFC will be part of a multinational force or be supporting a multinational 

operation. 

For further guidance on multinational operations, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational 

Operations. 

 (3) CWMD operations require commanders and their staffs to coordinate and 

integrate with all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies bring the 

best capabilities to meet the objective(s). The combatant command’s joint interagency 

coordination group (JIACG) is an important tool to assist in this effort by promoting 

interaction and cooperation among diverse agencies. The JIACG is an interagency staff 

group that can synchronize, while promoting working relationships with OGA (e.g., 

Central Intelligence Agency, DOS, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and US 

Department of the Treasury) representatives and military operational planners at the 

combatant commands. The JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes 

place at the national level through DOD and the National Security Council System and 

provide a conduit back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint operations 

with OGA efforts. 
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-40 

For further guidance on interagency coordination and JIACGs, refer to JP 3-08,

Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

 (4) As soon as practical, JFCs must begin planning and close coordination with 

OGAs and/or IGOs for the transition of CWMD operations to civilian entities. Military 

forces may transition to a supporting role with support not ceasing until the activity is 

complete. 

2. Command Relationships 

 a. General. GCCs plan and execute CWMD operations in accordance with their 

Unified Command Plan responsibilities and as directed by SecDef. USSTRATCOM is 

responsible for synchronizing DOD CWMD planning. Specific command relationships 

for CWMD operations are established by SecDef tasking orders or CCDR plans and 

operation orders, as appropriate. Because of the interagency aspects of CWMD 

operations, agencies other than DOD may lead effort with DOD providing support; 

however, US military forces, other than National Guard forces due to their unique status 

when operating under Title 32, USC authority, will remain under the DOD command 

structure while supporting other agencies. 

 b. Command and Control 

 (1) Day-to-Day Operations. Many critical CWMD activities take place as 

phase 0 (Shape) activities. These operations should be included in regional CWMD plans 

and supporting plans; integrated into theater campaign plans and executed as part of the 

theater security cooperation strategy. The day-to-day integration of these activities is 

particularly important as successful application of integrated, balanced CWMD strategies 

across the three pillars of CWMD: NP, CP, and WMD CM help deter adversarial WMD 

acquisition, use, or threat of use. They also may produce an environment that prevents an 

actor from obtaining or successfully employing WMD and may prevent the necessity of 

dealing with a WMD armed adversary or responding to a WMD attack. 

 (2) Contingency Operations. C2 arrangements for CWMD operations are 

tailored for the requirements of each contingency and are determined by the supported 

commander. The size and scope, as well as preplanned integration, of CWMD operations 

determine the requirements for specific CWMD C2 functions. Small-scale CWMD 

operations may not require formation of a separate C2 structure. A combatant 

command’s preexisting command structure, with limited technical augmentation, may 

suffice. This could take the form of a small task force using the combatant command’s 

standing joint force HQ, or a component HQ. For a large-scale effort, CWMD operations 

may be integrated into overall JTF operations or a functional JTF for CWMD operations 

could be formed. The following discussion can apply to the formation of a JTF to 

execute a single CWMD mission or to the consolidation of several CWMD operations or 

functions under a single functional JTF for CWMD. 
Organizational and Command Relationships 

III-7 

 (a) Functional JTF Considerations. SecDef, a CCDR, a subordinate 

unified command commander, or an existing commander, JTF (CJTF) can establish a JTF 

to execute a specific CWMD mission or when CWMD operations require joint resources 

on a significant scale. Examples of functional CWMD JTFs are JTF-CM as described in 

JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives 

Consequence Management, and JTF-E, as described in Appendix A, “Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Elimination Operations.” 

For further guidance on the responsibilities and formation of a functional JTF HQ, refer 

to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

 1. Functional JTFs are created by an establishing authority, usually a 

CCDR, and are dissolved when the mission is complete or transitioned to another agency 

or government. Functional JTF activities are generally coordinated and integrated by the 

supported combatant command with its own intelligence, planning, and operations as 

well as the activities of other tasked agencies (e.g., Department of Energy (DOE), DOS, 

and the intelligence community). 

 2. Subordinate Commands and Forces. Forces conducting CWMD 

operations are often highly technical in nature and drawn from a limited resource pool. 

These forces may be a combination of conventional forces and functional or technical 

experts from the Services or CSAs, augmented by non-DOD or non-US personnel, as 

appropriate. These forces often require real-time reachback capability to national level 

technical experts. 

 3. Command and Control Relationships. Specific C2 relationships 

are determined by the supported commander. Figures III-1 through III-3 provide notional 

C2 relationships for a functional CWMD JTF. 

 a. Figure III-1 is an option to establish a separate JTF at the 

combatant command level, with the CJTF reporting directly to the CCDR. This option 

supports a situation in which the CCDR requires a direct command link to the activities 

of the CWMD JTF. This option maximizes coordination between the CWMD JTF and 

interagency support without having to coordinate through additional intermediate HQ. 

This option also assumes that the CWMD JTF can operate independently. 

 b. Figure III-2 is an option to establish the CWMD JTF as a JTF 

under an existing JFC. This option best suits operational environments in which the 

CWMD JTF must be better synchronized with other JTF operations. It provides 

flexibility for inter-service support to the CWMD JTF from other components when such 

support is only needed for specific periods of time or specific missions. 

 c. Figure III-3 is an option to establish a CWMD task force under 

a component commander. This option provides a CWMD task force capability when 

joint interdependency is not critical for mission success. This option may apply when a 
Chapter III 

III-8 JP 3-40 

WMD program is not sufficiently large scale or complex, but still requires a higher level 

organization with multiple organizational capabilities to achieve CWMD objectives. 

 (b) JTF Headquarters. At a minimum, and as required by the supported 

commander to conduct a specific CWMD operation, the functional JTF HQ should 

possess the capabilities to: 

 1. Conduct the assigned CWMD mission, C2, and coordinate 

operations of assigned forces. 

 2. Coordinate with US forces, OGAs, foreign governments, IGOs, and 

HNs. 

NOTIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL WITH FUNCTIONAL 

COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION JOINT 

TASK FORCE REPORTING TO COMBATANT COMMANDER

CCDR

JTF-E /JTF-CM 

/OTHER JFC

JFACC JFLCC JFMCC JSOTF

LEGEND

CCDR combatant commander

JFACC joint force air component 

commander

JFC joint force commander

JFLCC joint force land component 

commander

JFMCC joint force maritime component 

commander

JSOTF joint special operations task force

JTF-CM joint task force - consequence 

management

JTF-E joint task force - elimination

Figure III-1. Notional Command and Control with Functional Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Joint Task Force Reporting to Combatant Commander
Organizational and Command Relationships 

III-9 

 3. Provide overall assessment, analysis, and planning for CWMD 

operations. 

 4. Coordinate CWMD planning activities with other commands. 

 5. Plan for JTF deployment, employment, and redeployment. 

 6. Plan for transfer of responsibility of CWMD operations to or from 

the CCDR and from or to OGAs, IGOs, and HNs, as appropriate. 

 7. Plan for minimizing or mitigating potential CWMD collateral 

effects. 

NOTIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL WITH FUNCTIONAL 

COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION JOINT 

TASK FORCE AS SUBORDINATE JOINT TASK FORCE

CCDR

JFC

JFACC JFLCC JFMCC JSOTF JTF-E /JTF-CM 

/OTHER

LEGEND

CCDR combatant commander

JFACC joint force air component 

commander

JFC joint force commander

JFLCC joint force land component 

commander

JFMCC joint force maritime component 

commander

JSOTF joint special operations task force

JTF-CM joint task force - consequence 

management

JTF-E joint task force - elimination

Figure III-2. Notional Command and Control with Functional Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Joint Task Force as Subordinate Joint Task Force
Chapter III 

III-10 JP 3-40 

 8. Maintain situational awareness of CWMD activities and operations, 

both friendly and adversary. 

 9. Recommend prioritization of CWMD resources and forces. 

 10. Integrate into the supported combatant command’s C2 and 

coordination processes (e.g., joint targeting coordination board). 

 (3) Domestic Operations. Domestic CWMD operations involve complex 

command relationships; in most cases, DOD will act in a supporting role to another USG 

department or agency. DOD will support civil authorities in minimizing the damage and 

recovering from domestic WMD incidents or attacks. USNORTHCOM is the DOD 

designated planning agent and the supported commander for CS missions in the 

NOTIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL WITH FUNCTIONAL 

COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TASK 

FORCE SUBORDINATE TO A COMPONENT COMMANDER

CCDR

JFC

JFACC JFLCC JFMCC JSOTF

JTF-E /JTF-CM 

/OTHER

LEGEND

CCDR combatant commander

JFACC joint force air component 

commander

JFC joint force commander

JFLCC joint force land component 

commander

JFMCC joint force maritime component 

commander

JSOTF joint special operations task force

JTF-CM joint task force - consequence 

management

JTF-E joint task force - elimination

Figure III-3. Notional Command and Control with Functional Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Task Force Subordinate to a Component Commander 
Organizational and Command Relationships 

III-11 

USNORTHCOM AOR. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) is the DOD 

planning agent and supported commander for CS missions in the USPACOM AOR. 

 (a) DOD protects the homeland through two distinct but interrelated 

missions: HD and CS. While these missions are separate, they have areas where roles 

and responsibilities may overlap or lead and supporting roles may transition between 

organizations. DOD serves as the lead for HD, which may be executed by DOD alone or 

include support by OGAs. CS is the overarching term for DOD support to civil 

authorities for domestic emergencies; designated law enforcement; and other activities. 

HD and CS operations may occur in parallel and require extensive integration and 

coordination. In addition, operations may transition from HD to CS and vice versa with 

the lead agency dependant on the situation. When emergency conditions dictate, and 

when time does not permit approval from higher HQ, local military commanders and 

responsible DOD component officials are authorized to respond to requests from local 

authorities and to initiate immediate response actions to save lives, prevent human 

suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. 

Domestic WMD CM operations generally are CS operations, whereas WMD active 

defense and CBRN passive defense generally fall under HD operations. 

 (b) National Response Framework. The NRF is the USG’s 

comprehensive approach to domestic incident management built on the template of the 

NIMS. As part of a comprehensive national response, DOD supports a primary federal 

agency to prevent or to respond to an emergency. The NRF provides the structure and 

mechanisms for national-level policy and operational direction for managing this national 

response. The NRF identifies how federal departments and agencies will respond to 

state, tribal, or local requests for assistance. The NRF provides the framework for most 

DOD support to civil authorities. The NRF is designed to encompass all hazards 

including high-yield explosives incidents. 

For further guidance on CS operations and responsibilities, refer to JP 3-28, Civil 

Support. 
Chapter III 

III-12 JP 3-40 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER IV

PLANNING AND EXECUTION 

 IV-1 

1. General 

 a. This chapter translates strategic CWMD guidance into an operational approach 

leveraging capabilities from the six joint functions across campaign phases and across the 

range of military operations. This chapter will discuss the types of operations for which 

CWMD activities will be planned and conducted; joint operation and campaign planning; 

and the integration of CWMD actions and activities into operations and campaigns 

supporting the other instruments of national power in the accomplishment of USG 

strategic objectives. 

For further guidance on the six joint functions refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

 b. CWMD Military Mission Areas. The eight CWMD MMAs provide JFCs with 

a logical grouping of CWMD activities. It should be noted that the following definitions 

differ from those previously introduced in the NMS-CWMD. These enhanced 

descriptions offer the JFC a more precise and operational perspective to combat WMD: 

 (1) Weapons of Mass Destruction Security Cooperation and Partner 

Activities. Activities to improve or promote defense relationships and capacity of allied 

and partner nations to execute or support the other MMAs to combat WMD through 

military-to-military contact, burden sharing arrangements, combined military activities, 

and support to international activities. 

 (2) Threat Reduction Cooperation. Activities undertaken with the consent 

and cooperation of HN authorities in a permissive environment to enhance physical 

security, and to reduce, dismantle, redirect, and/or improve protection of a state’s existing 

weapons of mass destruction program, stockpiles, and capabilities. 

 (3) Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction. Operations to track, 

intercept, search, divert, seize, or otherwise stop the transit of WMD, its delivery 

systems, or related materials, technologies, and expertise. In peacetime, WMD 

interdiction operations are planned and executed in order to intercept dual-use materials 

and expertise in transit aboard nonmilitary transports. 

 (4) Weapons of Mass Destruction Offensive Operations. Actions to disrupt, 

neutralize, or destroy a WMD threat before it can be used, or to deter subsequent use of 

such weapons. 

“The strategy uses an “ends, ways, means” approach to planning, executing 

and resourcing that emphasizes those combating WMD [weapons of mass 

destruction], missions in which the military plays a prominent role.” 

National Military Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, 

13 February 2006
Chapter IV 

 (5) Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination. Actions undertaken in a 

hostile or uncertain environment to systematically locate, characterize, secure, and 

disable, or destroy WMD programs and related capabilities. 

 (6) Weapons of Mass Destruction Active Defense. Active measures to defeat 

an attack with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons by employing 

actions to divert, neutralize, or destroy those weapons or their means of delivery while en 

route to their target. 

 (7) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Passive Defense. 

Passive measures taken to minimize or negate the vulnerability to, and effects of, 

chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks causing a high order of destruction 

or mass casualties. This mission area focuses on maintaining the joint force's ability to 

continue military operations in CBRN environments. 

 (8) Weapons of Mass Destruction Consequence Management. Actions 

authorized by the SecDef to mitigate the effects of a WMD attack or event and restore 

essential operations and services. 

 c. Operational Construct for CWMD. The CWMD MMAs are useful to the JFC 

as logical groupings of capabilities and in order to relate them to the strategic pillars. 

However, the distinctions and subtleties between several CWMD MMAs are also 

important in determining the operational tasks and related activities to a successful 

CWMD program. In doing so, the JFC uses logical flow of simultaneous or sequential 

military activities that determine whether or not his CWMD program is successful. It 

also informs JFC decisions for future actions, some of which may have diplomatic 

implications. And finally, it provides an architecture within which to frame, organize, 

mass, and optimize friendly capabilities necessary for the CWMD program. 

 (1) WMD Interdiction and WMD Offensive Operations. WMD 

interdiction operations include a broad spectrum of military and USG activities, 

short of WMD offensive operations, to detect and disrupt potential proliferation 

networks. Examples of WMD interdiction can include maritime surveillance, intercept, 

search, and seizure of WMD materials carried by merchant vessels. These operations can 

be executed unilaterally, in cooperation with other agencies, or in concert with foreign 

partners. WMD interdiction can also include cooperation with interagency or foreign 

partners in the sea and airport surveillance activities. WMD interdiction operations 

support the non-proliferation and counter-proliferation pillar of CWMD and are an 

important activity in phase 0 shaping activities with a GCC’s AOR. WMD offensive 

operations are military activities to destroy WMD, WMD-related installations, or 

other supporting infrastructure. WMD offensive operations likely involve the use of 

force. WMD offensive operations support the counter-proliferation pillar of CWMD. 

 (2) WMD Interdiction, WMD Offensive Operations and WMD 

Elimination. All three of these MMAs represent failure in cooperative actions 

associated with NP, but in which an adversary has not employed weapons. WMD 

IV-2 JP 3-40 
Planning and Execution 

interdiction is aimed at early defeat of an adversary WMD program before it matures and 

focuses primarily on moving targets. The operational distinctions between WMD 

offensive operations and WMD elimination operations lie in the overall end state of the 

actions associated with the MMA. While WMD elimination operations focus on 

systematic elimination of the entire WMD program, WMD offensive operations focus 

only on distinct targets or nodes of the WMD program or capabilities. WMD offensive 

operations therefore support achieving the objectives of WMD elimination operations. 

The following vignette, entitled Operation OPERA, is an example of a WMD offensive 

operation. 

OPERATION OPERA 

At 1255 Greenwich Mean Time on Sunday June 7, 1981, eight Israeli 

F-16 fighter-bombers take off along with two F-15 interceptors from 

Etzion air force base in Egypt's Sinai Desert (occupied at the time by 

Israel). A number of other F-15s head elsewhere in Iraq as back-up. 

The 10 planes fly about 1,000 kilometers (km) (600 miles) through 

Jordanian and Saudi airspace unchallenged, hugging the desert. 

Entering Iraqi airspace, the planes descend to 30meters (m) to avoid 

radar detection. At 1735, the bombers are about 20km east of the 

Tammuz 1 nuclear reactor - better known as Osirak - just south of 

Baghdad. The reactor has still to load its first nuclear fuel. The F-16 

pilots ignite their afterburners and climb for the attack run. They 

dive towards the reactor dome and release eight pairs of 1,000 

kilogram (kg) bombs at 5-second intervals. All 16, each fitted with a 

time-delay fuse, hit Osirak, though two fail to explode. As Iraqi antiaircraft fire goes up, the planes climb for the trip home. Fears of 

Iraqi interceptors appearing on the Israeli planes' tails prove 

unfounded. By dusk, all 10 planes are back at base unscathed. 

They have an average of just 450kg (1,000 pounds) of fuel left - 

enough for about 270km in the air. At Osirak, a French-designed 

reactor, the death toll is 10 Iraqi soldiers and a French civilian 

researcher. The reactor lies in ruins, having never entered 

operation. On 19 June, the United Nations Security Council 

condemns the attack in a resolution. Israel ignores the 

condemnation, insisting it was acting to preempt a nuclear threat. 

Following this attack, Iraq restarted the program as a clandestine 

nuclear weapons program distributed at multiple sites across the 

country. The program continued at an accelerated rate until 1991. 

Following the 1991 Gulf War, United Nations inspectors undertook 

an effort to characterize and reduce the threat from this program. 

They were surprised at both the progress and size of the nuclear 

program. Over seven years of extensive effort to defeat Iraqi cover, 

concealment, and deception, United Nations Special Commission 

dismantled most of the remnants of the program but it is not certain 

that they uncovered the full range of activities. 

VARIOUS SOURCES

 IV-3 
Chapter IV 

For further guidance on WMD elimination operations, refer to Appendix A, “Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Elimination Operations.” 

 (3) WMD Elimination and Threat Reduction Cooperation. These two 

MMAs are habitually linked, but very different. The difference comes down to consent 

and cooperation of the HN and the operational environment in which they take place. 

While the ultimate goal may be the same—to characterize and reduce or eliminate the 

threat of WMD—the operational aspects are very different. Threat reduction cooperation 

activities occur in a permissive environment. WMD elimination operations may 

ultimately transition to threat reduction cooperation activities as the operational 

environment changes. 

 (4) WMD Interdiction and WMD Active Defense. The focus of WMD 

interdiction and WMD active defense operations differ. While WMD active defense 

focuses on weapons on their means of delivery en route to a target, WMD interdiction 

focuses on stopping the transit of WMD capabilities. The distinction can be illustrated by 

an example involving a nuclear weapon being shipped to a given port. In the case of 

nuclear weapon pieces and/or parts being shipped to a buyer, only interdiction is 

applicable. If a complete nuclear weapon was being delivered to a buyer, both mission 

areas could be applicable. However, if the port was the target for the employment of the 

nuclear weapon, then it would be an active defense mission. 

For further guidance on WMD interdiction operations, refer to Appendix B, “Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Interdiction Operations.” 

 (5) CBRN Passive Defense and WMD CM. These two MMAs have a strong 

relation when an adversary employs CBRN weapons that are not defeated, and 

subsequently produce adverse effects, such as casualties and/or contamination. CBRN 

passive defense measures may preclude the need to implement WMD CM measures if the 

magnitude of the effects are mitigated by immediate response. 

For further guidance on CBRNE CM, refer to JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management. 

 d. Range of Military Operations. Joint CWMD actions and activities span the 

range of military operations. CWMD actions and activities are a part of military 

engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence; crisis response and limited 

contingency operations; and major operations and campaigns. CWMD actions and 

activities must not be planned or executed in isolation but must be integrated 

throughout the range of military operations. CWMD actions and activities can take 

place in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments. 

For further guidance on range of military operations and types of military operations see 

JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

IV-4 JP 3-40 
Planning and Execution 

 e. Types of Military Operations. CWMD must be integrated into all types of 

military operations. Three key aspects of CWMD actions include the execution of 

regional campaigns to shape the environment into one inhospitable to proliferators; 

specific, limited CWMD actions to respond to an emerging event (e.g., WMD 

interdiction or WMD offensive operations); and CWMD actions conducted as part of a 

major operation or campaign (e.g., WMD elimination) to deter an opponent, preempt 

adversary use of WMD, protect against WMD attack and, if required, recover from 

WMD effects within the operational area. Examples of how the eight CWMD MMAs 

support the types of military operations are outlined in Figure IV-1 and are discussed 

throughout this chapter. 

SAMPLE COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS 

DESTRUCTION – RELATED ACTIVITIES

Major Operations

• WMD Interdiction, WMD 

Elimination, WMD Offensive 

Operations, WMD Active Defense, 

CBRN Passive Defense, WMD CM

Homeland Defense

• WMD Interdiction, WMD Active 

Defense,

CBRN Passive Defense, WMD CM

Civil Support

• CBRN Passive Defense, WMD CM

Strikes

• WMD Offensive Operations

Raids

• WMD Interdiction, WMD Offensive 

Operations

Show of Force

• Security Cooperation

Protection of Shipping

• WMD Interdiction

Peace Operations

• Security Cooperation, Threat 

Reduction Cooperation, WMD 

Interdiction, WMD Active Defense, 

CBRN Passive Defense, WMD CM

Support to Insurgency

• Security Cooperation

Counterinsurgency Operations

• Security Cooperation, WMD 

Offensive Operations

Combating Terrorism

• Security Cooperation, WMD 

Interdiction, WMD Offensive 

Operations

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

• CBRN Passive Defense, WMD CM

Recovery Operations

• CBRN Passive Defense, WMD CM

WMD Consequence Management

• WMD CM

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

• Security Cooperation, WMD CM

Enforcement of Sanctions

• WMD Interdiction

Nation Assistance

• Security Cooperation

Arms Control and Disarmament

• Security Cooperation, Threat 

Reduction Cooperation

Routine, Recurring Military Activities

• Security Cooperation, CBRN 

Passive Defense

LEGEND

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CM consequence management

WMD weapons of mass destruction

Figure IV-1. Sample Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction - Related Activities 

 IV-5 
Chapter IV 

 (1) While understanding and planning the integration of CWMD operations into 

major campaigns and the interrelationship of CWMD mission areas with other 

contingency operations is critical when joint forces are faced with an adversary 

possessing WMD it is just as important to focus CWMD planning and activities at a 

strategic level. As noted earlier, CWMD is a global, continuous campaign that crosses 

AOR boundaries and requires close coordination and cooperation with interagency and 

multinational partners. The importance of effectively planning and conducting activities 

along the WMD security cooperation, threat reduction cooperation, CBRN passive 

defense, and WMD CM MMAs cannot be emphasized enough—the former two MMAs 

for reducing the existence of the WMD threat, and the latter two MMAs for deterring the 

use of WMD once they are developed. Even during major contingency operations, the 

global effects of CWMD operations must be considered when executing actions at the 

tactical or operational level. 

 (2) The global reach of networks and technology enabling WMD proliferation 

requires an interagency approach to effectively meet these challenges. The JFC may 

desire to create effects that cannot be created with the military instrument of national 

power alone and require interagency support and coordination. In many operations, DOD 

may not be the lead agency and military programs and activities must be integrated with a 

larger USG or international action. 

 (3) In the best case, successful execution of CWMD shaping activities may 

prevent or disrupt adversary acquisition or employment of WMD, alleviating the need for 

more aggressive and costly CWMD action later or in combat operations. Even if these 

actions do not have the desired effect on the adversary, they build partner capabilities and 

stronger security relationships with friends and allies, which will enhance the JFC’s 

response to a crisis. 

 f. Joint CWMD Operations. CWMD could require either CWMD-specific forces 

or assets, or the unique application of conventional forces. To this end, a JFC can 

leverage capabilities from the six joint functions as required and during any campaign 

phase to accomplish CWMD-related tasks, generate the effects to precipitate desired 

behavior or circumstances, and achieve objectives. Figure IV-2 illustrates how CWMD 

is integrated into joint operations. 

2. Operation and Campaign Planning 

 a. This section presents a broad overview of the CWMD aspects of joint operation 

planning and operational art and design. Chapter V, “Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Planning Considerations,” describes CWMD planning considerations of 

particular concern to JFCs and operational planners. 

For further guidance on joint operation planning and operational design, refer to JP 5-0, 

Joint Operation Planning. 

IV-6 JP 3-40 
Planning and Execution 

INTEGRATION OF COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS 

DESTRUCTION IN JOINT OPERATIONS













Conventional 

forces

Special 

Operations 

forces

Specialized 

CBRN forces

Medical 

capabilities

Transportation 

capabilities

Logistical 

capabilities





























Destroy (1)

Disrupt

Degrade

Deny

Neutralize

Seize

Secure

Control

Exploit

Detect

Intercept

Characterize

Defend

Recover

(1) This list is not exhaustive

Joint Forces ...

....as part of US 

Government 

CWMD efforts ...

...perform six joint functions ... to execute 

tasks across 

all campaign 

phases...

... to generate 

effects and 

achieve 

objectives

... across the 

range of 

military 

operations ... Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations Military Engagement, Security Operations, and Deterrence Major Operations and Campaigns

Movement 

and 

Maneuver

Command 

and Control

Fires

Protection

Intelligence

Sustainment

Leadership

LEGEND

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear

CWMD combating weapons of mass destruction

Figure IV-2. Integration of Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

in Joint Operations 

 b. Joint strategic planning has three subsets: security cooperation planning, force 

planning, and joint operation planning. This section touches on all three but focuses on 

joint operation planning. CWMD planning is not a separate process; it is the 

integration of WMD-specific knowledge, experience, and capabilities into the 

existing joint operation planning process (JOPP). Like planning for any other 

campaign or operation, the process is meant to guide JFCs in developing plans to combat 

WMD and employ conventional or specialized CBRN units to shape events, respond to 

crises, and meet contingencies. This planning is an adaptive, collaborative process 

between superior and subordinate levels within the context of strategic guidance and end 

states. 

 c. Levels of War. The three levels of war help clarify the links between national 

strategic objectives and tactical actions and are not unique or different for CWMD. 

Commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate 

communications, any single action may have consequences at all levels. Nowhere is this 

more evident than in joint operations involving WMD, where action or inaction at the 

 IV-7 
Chapter IV 

tactical level can have profound strategic repercussions. Commanders must consider this 

as part of their campaign and operation planning. 

 d. Planning for joint operations uses two closely related, integrated, collaborative, 

and adaptive processes – the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

(JOPES) and the JOPP. The majority of JOPES activities and products occur prior to 

SecDef approving and the CJCS transmitting the execute order. While there is a distinct 

location for CWMD considerations within the structure of a plan - appendix 2 

(Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction [WMD]) to annex C (Operations), planners 

must fully integrate CWMD tasks and required resources throughout the remainder of a 

plan or order. In addition, planning for CWMD operations must be integrated in the less 

formal, but proven, JOPP. Including WMD considerations throughout the seven steps of 

JOPP – the most crucial of which is mission analysis – is critical for a successful 

operation or campaign. 

 e. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. JIPOE is the 

analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence 

assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the JFC’s decisionmaking process. 

 (1) JIPOE underpins planning for CWMD operations. JIPOE enables 

identification of actors, characterization of networks enabling WMD proliferation and 

use, and assessment of network vulnerabilities to facilitate development of the 

operational design elements and effective targeting (see Figure IV-3). At the national 

strategic level, intelligence preparation focuses on strategic assessment of existing WMD 

threats. The process seeks to identify actors, determine their intent and the nature of their 

activities, and assess the methods those actors use to proliferate, acquire, or use WMD. 

Analysis of potential transformational events, such as the rise of new actors and the 

impact of technology breakthroughs, facilitates national-level determination of end states, 

objectives, and priorities. JIPOE supports CWMD planning efforts by identifying 

potential threat streams, resource allocation, and the development of friendly and threat 

courses of action (COAs). The JFC and their staff must view CWMD challenges as 

network-based. The approach must be holistic in its methodology – identifying state and 

non-state actors (individuals, terrorist groups, and nongovernmental entities) in a 

comprehensive fashion, not as singular entities operating independent from one another. 

 (2) Systems Perspective. A JFC must understand the system (i.e., proliferation 

network or state WMD program) to be able to influence that system in a way that 

achieves and does not hinder CWMD-related objectives and end states. As identified in 

Chapter II, “The Challenge of Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats,” one of the primary 

challenges facing the JFC is the proliferation of WMD technology and products. This 

proliferation takes place through systems. The JFC must understand the continuous and 

complex interaction of friendly, adversary, and neutral systems. 

IV-8 JP 3-40 
Planning and Execution 

JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE 

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Red Team Vulnerability 

Assessment

Systems Analysis

Transformational Strategic Assessment

Analysis





Assess adversary 

reaction to diplomatic, 

informational, military, 

and economic actions

Determine friendly 

centers of gravity and 

critical vulnerabilities





Assess susceptibility of 

nodes/links to diplomatic, 

informational, military, 

and economic actions

Determine critical 

vulnerabilities









Identify actors

Determine actor intent 

and nature

Assess techniques to 

achieve adversary intent

Determine priority of 

action against adversaries

 Identify emergent and 

transformational threats 

that may undermine 

fundamental assumptions 

(e.g., new technology, 

new actors, new 

operating methods)

Activities/Actions Targeting







Determine decisive 

points

Determine desired effects

Identify tasks necessary 

to create effect







In depth characterization 

of nodes/links

Determine targeting 

effects

Identify resources 

required







Characterize system

Identify key 

nodes/links/relationships

Determine centers of 

gravity

National Strategic

Theater Strategic

Operational/

Tactical

Figure IV-3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment 

Considerations 

 (3) Examining and planning appropriate responses to adversary counter-actions 

is essential to mitigate potentially undesirable effects of a set of actions. For example, an 

offensive operation to destroy a WMD capability may result in the adversary undertaking 

additional camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD) activities to protect that 

capability. These CCD activities will potentially complicate follow-on WMD 

elimination and WMD offensive operations. 

 IV-9 
Chapter IV 

For further guidance on intelligence support to joint operations, refer to the JP 2-0 

series. For further guidance on JIPOE, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation 

of the Operational Environment.

 f. End State and Objectives. Due to its strategic implications, the President or 

SecDef will provide criteria for the termination of most CWMD operations. JFCs 

approve strategic military objectives which comprise the military end state. The 

military end state (whether focused specifically on WMD or not) is the point in time, or 

circumstances, beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of 

national power to achieve the remaining objectives of the national strategic end state. An 

example of this is the transition of WMD site security to an international body for which 

DOS leads the effort. Commanders should include the military end state or objectives 

related to CWMD early in their planning guidance and commander’s intent during 

mission analysis. 

NOTE: In the case of security cooperation, termination criteria may be 

associated with long-term strategic goals requiring years to achieve. 

For further guidance on end states and objectives, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation 

Planning.

 g. Effects. The identification of desired and undesired effects clarifies the 

relationship between objectives and tasks and helps commanders and their staffs gain a 

common picture and shared understanding of the operational environment that promotes 

unified action. When campaigns or operations include CWMD operations, the 

commander and staff must identify CWMD-related desired and undesired effects that 

support the commander’s objectives. Effects must be observable and measurable to 

support the assessment process. 

For further guidance on effects, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

NOTIONAL COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION END 

STATE-OBJECTIVE-EFFECT LINKAGE 

End State: US, the Armed Forces of the United States, multinational 

partners, and interests are neither coerced nor attacked by enemies 

using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (strategic goal).

Objective: Proliferation of WMD technology from Country X is 

contained. 

Effect: Decrease in WMD technology leaving Country X. 

VARIOUS SOURCES 

IV-10 JP 3-40 
Planning and Execution 

 h. Targeting. CWMD considerations must be taken into account during the entire 

targeting process. WMD-related targets should not be considered in a separate 

targeting board; they must be integrated into the existing JFC targeting process or 

board. 

 (1) WMD Targets. WMD-related targets represent highly sensitive and critical 

capabilities of many states and non-states and carry unique targeting considerations. In 

many cases, hard and deeply buried facilities and extensive CCD measures protect 

critical WMD capabilities. Many WMD delivery systems are highly mobile and, once 

detected, become time-sensitive targets. Adversary CCD measures may complicate 

target identification and selection. An extensive ISR effort may be necessary to identify, 

characterize, and assess the vulnerabilities of these targets. Holding these targets at risk 

is a priority for the JFC and requires a wide array of capabilities—both lethal and 

nonlethal. 

 (2) Collateral Damage and Consequence of Execution Considerations. 

Although the initial impact of a conventional munition on a WMD-related target may 

cause little collateral damage, secondary effects could include a release or dispersal of 

chemical, biological, or radiological material or even an imperfect detonation of a nuclear 

device. For this reason, WMD-related targets are usually placed on a restricted target list; 

however, CWMD mission priorities or military necessity may require engagement of 

WMD-related targets. A detailed analysis to determine the potential release of hazards 

when targeting adversary WMD storage sites, weapon systems, or production facilities is 

required; the utility of employing agent defeat weapons to minimize the dispersal and 

collateral effects of CBRN hazards should be considered. Joint forces throughout the 

operational area must be advised of the predicted hazard area and must be given enough 

time to take appropriate force protection measures. Effects on local civilians and critical 

infrastructure must be anticipated and planned for as well. This planning must be done 

not only for WMD sites, but also for targets known or suspected to contain toxic 

industrial chemicals or materials. JFCs should seek to minimize collateral damage 

consistent with higher-level guidance as well as plan for follow-on WMD CM operations, 

as appropriate. 

For further guidance on mitigating collateral damage, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 

and the methodology contained within Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 

(CJCSM) 3160.01, Joint Methodology for Estimating Collateral Damage and Casualties 

for Conventional Weapons: Precision, Unguided, and Cluster. 

 i. Line of Operations. Logical LOOs are often the most appropriate for 

CWMD operations or campaigns. A LOO depiction at this level can help the 

commander and staff discuss the relationship and status of decisive points or key tasks, as 

required. 

 j. Phases. CWMD operations can occur throughout all phases of a campaign or 

operation. Phasing is most directly related to arranging of operations and LOOs during 

operational design. Figure IV-4 illustrates the integrated nature of CWMD-related 

 IV-11 
Chapter IV 

activities throughout the phasing model of a campaign or operation, but is not meant to be 

all inclusive. Planning for CWMD must consider operations or actions that must be 

completed within or throughout the various phases. 

For further guidance on LOOs and phases, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

 k. Branches and Sequels. Many plans require adjustment beyond the initial stages 

of the operation. Consequently, JFCs build flexibility into their plans by developing 

branches and sequels to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions. 

Branches and sequels directly relate to phasing. 

 (1) Branches are contingency options built into the basic plan. Examples of 

CWMD-related branches could include adversary use of WMD against the HN civilian 

population; adversary threat of use of WMD against multinational partners; adversary use 

of WMD against multinational partners; adversary transfer of WMD to a terrorist 

SAMPLE COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTIONRELATED ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE PHASING MODEL



















Weapons of 

Mass 

Destruction 

(WMD) Security 

Cooperation

Flexible 

Deterrent 

Options (FDOs)

Threat 

Reduction 

Cooperation

Exercises

Military-toMilitary 

Engagement

Intelligence, 

Surveillance, 

and 

Reconnaissance (ISR)

WMD 

Interdiction

Targeting 

Support

Strategic 

Communication

1

Deter

3

Dominate

5

Enable Civil 

Authority

0

Shape

2

Seize 

Initiative

4

Stabilize

























WMD Security 

Cooperation

FDOs

Exercises

Military-toMilitary 

Engagement

Military 

Demonstration

ISR

WMD 

Interdiction

WMD Active 

Defense

Chemical, 

Biological, 

Radiological, 

and Nuclear 

(CBRN) 

Passive 

Defense

WMD 

Consequence 

Management 

(CM)

Targeting 

Support

Strategic 

Communication



















ISR

Joint 

Reception, 

Staging, 

Onward 

Movement, and 

Integration

WMD 

Interdiction

WMD Active 

Defense

WMD 

Offensive 

Operations

CBRN Passive 

Defense

WMD CM

Targeting 

Support

Strategic 

Communication



















ISR

WMD 

Interdiction

WMD Active 

Defense

CBRN Passive 

Defense

WMD Offensive 

Operations

WMD 

Elimination

WMD CM

Targeting 

Support

Strategic 

Communication

















ISR

WMD Security 

Cooperation

WMD 

Interdiction

WMD Active 

Defense

CBRN Passive 

Defense

WMD 

Elimination

WMD CM

Strategic 

Communication



















ISR

WMD Security 

Cooperation

WMD 

Interdiction

CBRN Passive 

Defense

WMD 

Elimination 

transitioned to 

Threat 

Reduction 

Cooperation

WMD CM

Exercises

Military-toMilitary 

Engagement

Strategic 

Communication

Figure IV-4. Sample Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction-Related Activities Across 

the Phasing Model 

IV-12 JP 3-40 
Planning and Execution 

organization; or alternate areas of embarkation for scenarios involving contaminated 

sites. 

 (2) Sequels are major operations that follow the current operation. 

Examples of CWMD-related sequels could include transition of WMD elimination 

operations to threat reduction cooperation activities within Country X, or operations to 

secure WMD-related sites based on the collapse of a country’s leadership and control. 

For further guidance on branches and sequels, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

 l. Flexible deterrent options (FDOs) are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions 

carefully tailored to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict. Figure IV5 provides examples of CWMD-related FDOs across all instruments of national power. 

For further guidance on FDOs, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning.

 m. Strategic Communication. SC planning is critical to CWMD and must create a 

responsive and agile whole-of-government effort to synchronize crucial themes, 

messages, images, and actions (see Figure IV-6). JFC planning must consider public 

diplomacy, public affairs (PA), and information operations (IO) requirements when 

confronting the WMD threat or use. Public interest in WMD-related developments may 

be intense and may affect US and multinational partner decision making. Therefore, the 

JFC must be a source of timely, accurate information, with particular emphasis on the 

explanation of actions taken in response to WMD threats or use. Establishing productive 

relationships with diplomatic channels and media organizations is an inherent element of 

JFC planning. 

 n. CWMD Force Planning. Force planning for CWMD encompasses all those 

activities performed by the supported CCDR, subordinate component commanders, and 

OGAs to select (source and tailor), prepare, integrate, and deploy forces and capabilities 

required to accomplish CWMD-related missions. Force packaging must provide a range 

of CWMD-related capabilities tied to the six phases of an operation. It should provide an 

active, layered defense against WMD and prepare for the possibility of rapid escalation to 

counter or respond to WMD use by an adversary. Many of the tasks necessary for 

CWMD can be accomplished by conventional forces or OGAs. However, force 

planning also encompasses activities performed by force providers to develop forces with 

unique CBRN-related capabilities and integrate them with conventional forces. It is 

important to note there are few CBRN-specific units and capabilities, but this does not 

exhaust the potential forces that can conduct CWMD operations. A challenge for the JFC 

is in managing expectations for employing CBRN-specific forces. An additional, yet 

related, challenge is balancing the use of low-density, CBRN-specific units with assigned 

forces that can accomplish many of the CWMD related tasks. 

 IV-13 
Chapter IV 

NOTIONAL COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS 

DESTRUCTION-RELATED FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS





Take actions to gain support of multinational partners

Signal US opposition by reducing economic, social, and cultural events









Deploy missile defenses to area of responsibility

Increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of weapons of 

mass destruction-related sites

Increase chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear-related exercise 

activities

Enforce sanctions through weapons of mass destruction interdiction 

operations

INFORMATIONAL

ECONOMIC

DIPLOMATIC

MILITARY





Ensure consistency of strategic communication themes and messages

Promote US combating weapons of mass destruction policy objectives 

through public policy statements







Enforce sanctions from United Nations Security Council resolutions

Freeze transactions to and from Bank X

Reduce security assistance programs

Figure IV-5. Notional Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction-Related Flexible 

Deterrent Options 

 o. Health service support (HSS) planning is an important aspect in CWMD 

operations. HSS is related to three joint functions: sustainment, movement and 

maneuver, and protection. Organization of the HSS system is determined by the joint 

force’s mission, the threat, intelligence, anticipated number of patients, duration of the 

operation, the theater patient movement policy, available lift, and hospitalization and 

movement requirements. HSS considerations include, but are not limited to, health 

threat, medical intelligence, patient movement, clinical capabilities and health 

IV-14 JP 3-40 
Planning and Execution 

NOTIONAL STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION THEMES













Assurances of US assistance to combat weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD)

Reiterate the dangers of WMD falling into terrorist hands

Combating WMD is a global fight that is in the best interest of all nations

Reiterate the established global partnerships and successes of the 

Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 

Terrorism

Advocate for the role of secure borders to combat WMD

Statements on forensic and attribution capabilities

Figure IV-6. Notional Strategic Communication Themes 

service logistics, preventive medicine and health surveillance, to include force health 

protection (FHP) products, and mass casualty situations. 

For further guidance, see JP 4-02, Health Service Support, and DOD Instruction 

6490.03, Deployment Health. 

3. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence Execution 

 a. This section begins the execution portion of this chapter. Up until now, this 

chapter focused on defining the operation environment and the unique CWMD 

considerations for campaign and operational planning. The remaining sections discuss 

the integration of CWMD into the range of military operations (execution). 

 b. This section discusses the JFC’s ability to shape the environment through military 

engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence, underpinned by situational awareness 

and SC, to create an environment hostile to the development, proliferation, or use of 

WMD. Shaping activities establish the conditions to combat WMD across the range of 

military operations. Shaping focuses on building multinational partner capacity and will, 

as well as creating the relationships required to undertake crisis response or combat 

operations. These actions support many of the goals of the National Defense Strategy 

and NMS-CWMD: 

 (1) Assuring friends and allies by demonstrating US resolve and capabilities for 

mutual defense; 

 (2) Dissuading actors from developing WMD by creating an environment 

hostile to proliferation; 

 IV-15 
Chapter IV 

 (3) Deterring use of WMD by demonstrating capabilities to deny adversary 

objectives and respond to an attack; and 

 (4) Increasing partner capabilities to defeat use and mitigate the effects of 

WMD. 

 c. Successful shaping activities can be a very cost effective approach to combating 

WMD by investing relatively few resources in engagement versus costly responses to 

adversary use of WMD. CWMD MMAs that support shaping the environment can 

include security cooperation, threat reduction cooperation, and WMD interdiction. These 

MMAs tend to be NP in nature. As previously discussed, security cooperation is a 

unique MMA that supports the other MMAs and is extremely useful in shaping the 

operational environment. This section also identifies other existing military engagement 

and security cooperation programs available to the JFC that, with minimal input or 

modifications, could shape the operational environment for CWMD. 

 d. Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between individuals 

or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed 

forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and 

confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. 

Success in CWMD relies heavily on military engagement opportunities. Activities 

and initiatives could involve developing CBRN contacts; establishing programs for 

regular senior official visits; visits to foreign military CBRN sites; counterpart staff 

exchange visits and military-to-military talks (on a regular or ad hoc basis); and 

sponsorship of, or attendance at, WMD-related conferences; and bilateral exercise 

program that establishes and develops military to military contacts with targeted nations. 

 e. Security cooperation involves all DOD interactions with foreign defense 

establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, 

develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational 

operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a HN. 

Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations and the 

WMD security cooperation MMA. Security cooperation requires close coordination and 

integration with DOS’s country plans, USSOCOM and USSTRATCOM global plans. 

Combatant command and component command planning should complement DOS 

country plans and link security cooperation and partner capacity improvement activities 

to national CWMD objectives by identifying, prioritizing, and integrating efforts within 

and across AORs. Security cooperation activities could include, but are not limited to, 

multinational planning, security assistance, or multilateral assistance aimed at: 

IV-16 JP 3-40 
Planning and Execution 

COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (CWMD) 

EXERCISES IN AZERBAIJAN 

Since 1999, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency has conducted 

CWMD classes in Azerbaijan, providing the former Soviet Union state 

with a strong foundation to deter, detect, identify, and investigate 

situations involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

(CBRN) agents. These courses included crime scene investigation, 

criminal investigation, radiation detection and response, and other 

CBRN related subjects. The classes culminated on June 8, 2006 when 

a Department of Defense (DOD)-led interagency team conducted a 

three-day field exercise in Baku as part of the International 

Counterproliferation Program (ICP), designed to combat the spread of 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Forty representatives from DOD, 

the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, the US Customs and Border 

Protection Service and their contractors served as instructors for over 

100 personnel from numerous Azerbaijan military and law enforcement 

agencies. 

The exercise was designed for Azerbaijan participants to practice and 

assess their capability for WMD material detection and multiagency 

coordination and problem solving. It also presented Azerbaijan 

authorities the opportunity to integrate the ICP training in a realistic, 

no-fault environment. The overall scenario focused on WMD response 

procedures, crime scene management, use of an incident command 

system, and interagency coordination. 

These exercises led to continuing security cooperation activities with 

Azerbaijan ministries to further develop CMWD and related capabilities. 

VARIOUS SOURCES 

 (1) Improving the defense relationships with and capacity of allied and partner 

nations to combat WMD. 

 (2) Education, training, and exercises focused on WMD-related activities (e.g., 

WMD elimination and interdiction, response to mitigate effects of a CBRN incident). 

 (3) Initiatives aimed at building cooperation and support for WMD-related arms 

control and treaty monitoring activities. 

 (4) Building regional alliances or regional capabilities for mutual support. 

 (5) WMD Security Cooperation and All Other MMAs. The security 

cooperation MMA supports all other MMAs and the strategic enabler of building partner 

capacity. The GCC must tie this CWMD MMA in with all other ongoing security 

cooperation activities in the AOR. As an example, equipping and training border guards 

 IV-17 
Chapter IV 

with radiological detectors is security cooperation supporting WMD interdiction 

activities. 

 f. Deterrence prevents an action by an adversary through the perception of cost 

imposition, benefit denial, or the consequences of restraint. As discussed in Chapter II, 

“The Challenge of Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats,” the role of deterrence for both 

state and non-state actors is varied. Threats (including terrorism involving WMD) 

directed against the United States, multinational partners, or other friendly nations require 

the maintenance of a full array of response capabilities. Effective deterrence requires 

security cooperation plans that emphasize the willingness of the United States to employ 

forces in defense of its interests. Various joint operations (e.g., show of force and 

enforcement of sanctions) support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve and 

willingness to use force when necessary. Others (e.g., nation assistance and foreign 

humanitarian assistance) support deterrence by enhancing a climate of peaceful 

cooperation, thus promoting stability. Having a credible threat of response in the form of 

WMD interdiction, WMD elimination, WMD offensive operations, WMD active defense, 

CBRN passive defense, and WMD CM capabilities supports the overall USG deterrence 

goals. 

 g. Joint actions that support military engagement, security cooperation, and 

deterrence objectives include emergency preparedness (EP); enforcement of sanctions; 

nation assistance (to include security assistance and foreign internal defense [FID]); show 

of force operations; joint and combined exercises and training; and arms control and 

disarmament activities. 

 (1) Emergency preparedness encompasses those measures taken in advance of 

an emergency to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect a nation’s institutions 

from all types of hazards through a comprehensive emergency management program of 

preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. Activities may include continuity of 

operations (COOP) and continuity of government. National security emergencies, as a 

result of domestic WMD incidents, will have unique activities and must be considered as 

part of COOP and continuity of government plans. EP is not a stand-alone activity, but 

an integral part of training, mitigation, and response for both HD and CS. EP 

actions largely fall within CBRN passive defense and WMD CM. 

 (2) Enforcement of sanctions are operations that employ coercive measures to 

interdict the movement of certain types of designated items (including WMD and dualuse equipment) into or out of a nation or specified area. Many of the activities and 

actions the JFC can employ to support these efforts support larger interagency goals and 

end states. These operations are multinational and interagency dependent. These 

operations are military in nature and serve both political and military purposes. The 

political objective is to compel a country or group to conform to the objectives of the 

initiating body, while the military objective focuses on establishing a barrier that is 

selective, allowing only authorized goods to enter or exit. Depending on the geography, 

sanction enforcement normally involves some combination of air and surface forces.

Assigned forces should be capable of complementary mutual support and 

IV-18 JP 3-40 
Planning and Execution 

communications interoperability. The JFC may also be asked to support the 

enforcement of CWMD-related sanctions as part of United Nations Security Council 

resolutions. 

 (a) WMD interdiction operations can support the enforcement of 

sanctions. For example, DOD is one of many USG departments or agencies that support 

the multinational Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). This activity, supported by the 

United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea, is designed 

specifically to prevent and, if required, counter the proliferation of WMD capabilities. 

The following vignette, entitled “Maritime Interdiction Operations: So San (December 

2002)”, exemplifies the type of efforts required to support the task of offensive operations 

and both its associated subtasks: specifically, the interception and/or diversion of 

shipments of WMD-related technologies and the seizing of WMD and related 

technologies. 

MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS: SO SAN 

(DECEMBER 2002) 

The North Korean (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) marine 

vessel So San, an 83-meter long cargo carrier, was interdicted via a 

noncompliant boarding on 9 December 2002, in waters south of Yemen. 

United States Pacific Command and United States Central Command 

tracked the So San throughout its voyage. Spanish forces conducted a 

noncompliant boarding of the So San and discovered 16 Scud missiles 

and containers of related parts and fuel that were eventually released 

for delivery to Yemen. The operation was the first implementation of 

the latest weapons of mass destruction interdiction strategy (13 

November 2002). 

The interdiction of the So San was accomplished using a standing 

combined task force, with existing tactics, techniques, and procedures 

(TTP) for maritime interdiction operations. The existing TTP 

significantly reduced the amount of time needed to plan, coordinate, 

and execute the So San interdiction operation. The intercept force was 

augmented by technical expertise from the US to assist in the 

characterization of the suspected cargo. 

VARIOUS SOURCES 

For further guidance on WMD interdiction, refer to Appendix B, “Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Interdiction Operations.” 

 (b) To execute the WMD interdiction MMA, a JFC would plan actions to 

interdict WMD and WMD enablers in order to prevent their proliferation. This includes 

operations that track, divert, disrupt, intercept, delay, and/or deny enemy use or transfer 

of CBRN knowledge and materials. WMD interdiction operations could include the use 

of forces in the physical domains of air, land, maritime, and space as well as the 

 IV-19 
Chapter IV 

cyberspace portion of the information environment. WMD interdiction operations may 

complement, support, or be supported by other joint operations. 

 (3) Nation assistance is civil or military assistance. A JFC can use nation 

assistance programs to support their CWMD goals and objectives, and integrate them into 

the US ambassador’s country plan goals and objectives. 

 (4) Foreign Internal Defense. DOS is generally the lead government 

agency in executing US FID programs. Threats posed through illegal drug trafficking, 

terrorism, acquisition of WMD, and civil unrest affect all aspects of a nation’s defense 

and development. The military plays an important supporting role in the FID program. 

FID provides an existing structure to support the internal defense and development of a 

nation against the proliferation of WMD and commanders should integrate CWMD 

considerations into FID programs and activities. 

For further guidance on FID, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. 

 (5) Show of force operations are designed to demonstrate US resolve. 

 (6) Arms control and disarmament is the identification, verification, 

inspection, limitation, control, or reduction of armed forces and armaments of all kinds 

under international agreement. This includes the steps taken under such an agreement to 

establish an effective system of international control, or to create and strengthen IGOs, 

for the maintenance of peace. Although it may be viewed as a diplomatic mission, the 

military plays an important role. For example, US military personnel may be involved 

in monitoring an arms control treaty; seizing WMD; escorting authorized deliveries of 

weapons and other materials (i.e., enriched uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use 

of these assets; or dismantling, destroying, or disposing of weapons and hazardous 

materials. Additionally, the JFC may have responsibility to help establish and enforce 

the initial stages of WMD disarmament, inspection, or monitoring regimes mandated by a 

ceasefire or peace accord. This responsibility may transition, in full, to an IGO (e.g., the 

United Nations [UN]) within a relatively short period of time. 

 (7) To support the WMD security cooperation, a JFC would engage with 

partner nations to help them develop an indigenous CWMD capacity; this independent 

capability could subsequently reduce the US forces’ deployment and resource allocation 

to support regional stability. This effort could include multinational training events and 

exercises, joint combined exchange training, and state partnership programs. Security 

cooperation and partner activities could include joint activities that enable partner 

countries to secure, reduce, reverse, or eliminate CBRN materials, and respond to their 

potential effects in the case of dispersal. 

 (8) To support the WMD threat reduction cooperation MMA, a JFC could 

conduct activities to help eliminate the WMD threat and ensure nations are following 

international treaties and agreements. Missions could include recovery operations, nation 

assistance by enhancing the security of existing WMD programs, assuming the 

IV-20 JP 3-40 
Planning and Execution 

responsibility for residual, long-term tasks transferred from a WMD elimination 

operation, removing and consequently eliminating some or all of a state’s WMD 

capabilities in a permissive environment, and implementing arms control agreements. 

The joint force may provide intelligence, security, transportation, and operational and 

technical support to other government agencies or HNs for the implementation of treaties, 

agreements, sanctions, and export-control procedures. 

4. Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations 

 a. CWMD MMAs that support crisis response and limited contingency operations 

include WMD interdiction, WMD offensive operations, WMD active defense, CBRN 

passive defense, and WMD CM. 

 b. CWMD in Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations 

 (1) Peace operations (PO). CWMD in PO can vary in duration and scope, but 

primarily falls in one of three types of PO: peacekeeping operations (PKO), peace 

enforcement operations (PEO), and peace building (PB). The JFC must understand that 

even during PO, CWMD can play a critical role. 

 (a) PKO can include the verification or supervision of the storage or 

destruction of certain categories of WMD or dual-use equipment specified in relevant 

agreements. 

 (b) PEO. Due to their increased threat postures, commanders should 

consider the requirement for CBRN defense forces during PEO if there is evidence 

belligerent forces may employ such capabilities. A mix of different units 

(decontamination units or CBRN reconnaissance elements) is often necessary to achieve 

the proper balance. These capabilities may include local security, spray, storage, 

personnel shower, and firefighting capability. CBRN staff officers may advise on 

commercial CBRN threats, as well as on the collection, packaging, storage, disposal, and 

clean-up of hazardous materials or wastes. Additionally, commanders may be tasked to 

secure specific WMD technology sites as part of these operations. 

 (c) PB tasks may include assisting a HN with decontamination of residual 

effects from WMD use; reducing the WMD threat within the HN by helping to enhance 

the physical security; and reducing, dismantling, or redirecting their WMD programs. 

For further guidance on PO, refer to JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations. For further guidance 

on CBRN defense and decontamination, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments. 

 (2) CM operations involve actions taken to maintain or restore essential 

services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, 

including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. WMD CM is a specific type of CM. 

WMD CM operations/missions respond to the effects of a WMD attack or effects 

 IV-21 
Chapter IV 

resulting from the deliberate or inadvertent release of CBRN materials and to help restore 

essential operations and services. Within WMD CM, there are three types the JFC must 

consider – foreign, domestic, and WMD CM conducted as part of a major operation or 

campaign. This section will briefly discuss the basics of both domestic and FCM. WMD 

CM conducted as part of a major campaign or operation is discussed in paragraph 5, 

“Major Operations and Campaigns.” Additionally, the JFC and staff must understand the 

effects on the populace and infrastructure to apply the right resources at the right time. 

For further guidance on CM, refer to JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management, JP 3-27, Homeland 

Defense, and JP 3-28, Civil Support. For medical FHP aspects refer to JP 4-02, Health 

Service Support. 

 (a) Immediate Response Authority. DOD policy on immediate response 

addresses the authority delegated to military commanders to provide immediate 

assistance to civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great 

property damage in the event of imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil 

emergency or attack. Immediate response is situation-specific and may or may not be 

associated with a declared or undeclared disaster. The potentially catastrophic nature of 

WMD incidents would most likely lead to DOD forces initially conducting WMD CM 

under immediate response authority, but there are no policy exceptions or special 

authorities for WMD CM. 

 (b) Foreign Consequence Management. FCM refers to assistance 

provided by the USG to a HN to mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives attack or event and 

restore essential government services. When authorized, the GCC is responsible for 

supporting DOS, through the US ambassador, by planning, coordinating, and assisting 

DOD’s CM activities within the AOR to support approved FCM operations.

For further guidance on FCM operations, refer to JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management, DODI 

2000.21, Foreign Consequence Management (FCM), or CJCSI 3214.01C, Military 

Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations for Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents. 

 (c) Domestic Consequence Management. Normally, domestic CM is 

managed at the USG-level by DHS or Department of Justice (DOJ), with DOD providing 

support as directed. When conducting domestic WMD CM operations in accordance 

with the NRF, DOD supports a lead or other primary agency. The domestic operational 

environment presents many challenges to the JFC. It is imperative that commanders and 

staffs at all levels understand the statutory and operational relationships among US states 

and federal agencies involved in the operation. Therefore, commanders and staffs at all 

levels must be knowledgeable about the NRF and the NIMS and know how their 

commands fit in to the overall NIMS framework. They must also understand the 

distinctive roles, responsibilities, capabilities, and limitations of Titles 10, 14, and 32 

IV-22 JP 3-40 
Planning and Execution 

USC, and state active duty personnel. Upon request by the appropriate authority and 

approval by SecDef, DOD provides assistance to the lead or other primary agency. The 

NRF contains a number of incident annexes that apply to WMD situations. Domestic 

CM operations are closely related CS operations discussed in the following section. 

Note: The geographical boundaries for domestic CM are the continental US, territories, 

possessions, Hawaii, and Alaska. 

For further guidance on domestic CM operations, refer to JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management. 

For further guidance on domestic CM, refer to CJCSI 3125.01A, Military assistance to 

Domestic Consequence Management Operations in response to Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear or High-Yield Explosive Situation.

 (3) Defense Support of Civil Authorities. DSCA activities follow the NRF, 

which includes specifics on support to WMD incidents, and the requirements of other US 

interagency agreements and guidelines. 

For further guidance on DSCA, refer to JP 3-28, Civil Support. 

 (4) Homeland Defense. The HD and CS missions are separate, but have areas 

where roles and responsibilities may overlap or transition between organizations. The 

purpose of HD is to protect against, and mitigate the impact of, incursions or attacks on 

sovereign territory, the domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure. DOD is 

the federal agency with lead responsibility, supported by other agencies, in defending 

against external threats or aggression. DOD must be prepared to operate, in concert with 

OGAs or law enforcement agencies conducting homeland security, to counter threats to 

the homeland. The overlap in departmental roles, responsibilities, authorities, and 

capabilities forced the USG to review its approach to coordination during operations. 

The current approach promotes early identification of the desired USG outcome and 

required collaboration. The Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) plan is an 

example of this new approach to operations. 

For further guidance on interagency roles, responsibilities, and required coordination 

protocols for conduct of air defense and maritime operations to counter threats to the 

US, refer to the Aviation Operational Threat Response and Maritime Operational Threat 

Response plans. For further guidance on HD, refer to JP 3-27, Homeland Defense. For 

further guidance on CS, refer to JP 3-28, Civil Support. 

 (5) Strikes are attacks conducted to damage or destroy an objective or 

capability. Strikes in support of the WMD offensive operations MMA take place in both 

crisis response or limited contingency operations and major operations or campaigns. A 

strike focused on a CWMD objective could involve an air and missile strike on WMDrelated facilities.

 IV-23 
Chapter IV 

 (6) Raids are operations to temporarily seize an area, usually through forcible 

entry, to secure information, confuse an adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or 

destroy an objective or capability. Raids in support of the WMD interdiction and WMD 

offensive operation MMAs take place in both crisis response or limited contingency 

operations and major operations or campaigns. Raids end with a planned withdrawal 

upon completion of the assigned mission. A CWMD-related raid could include the 

seizure of a WMD production facility or the capture of critical expertise. 

5. Major Operations and Campaigns 

 a. When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national 

interests, US national leadership may decide to conduct a major operation or campaign. 

In such cases, the goal is to prevail against the adversary as quickly as possible, conclude 

hostilities, and establish conditions favorable to the HN, United States, and multinational 

partners. Establishing these conditions often requires CWMD considerations for 

termination objectives and end states. Major operations and campaigns are the most 

complex and require the greatest diligence in planning and execution due to the time, 

effort, and national resources committed. This chapter discusses those CWMD areas that 

must be considered and addressed when conducting major operations and campaigns. 

Many of the factors from previous sections must be considered since they may be 

precursors to major operations or, if successfully resolved, may forestall escalation to that 

level. Major operation and campaign plans must feature an appropriate balance between 

offensive, defensive, and stability operations. All eight CWMD MMAs could be part 

of a major operation or campaign. A key consideration for conducting CWMD activities 

in support of joint operations is in the translation of unique CWMD language into 

language common to the JFC. The following sections discuss this translation for 

offensive, defensive, and stability operations. 

 b. CWMD Supporting Actions. Figure IV-7 cross-references supporting actions 

for CWMD MMAs. Figure IV-7 identifies commonly used terms that may be useful to 

staffs to accurately convey actions associated with these MMAs. This figure is not 

exhaustive. 

 c. Offensive Operations. Offensive operations are designed to locate and take 

action against the threat of WMD use. The JFC can create desired effects on the 

adversary’s WMD system that support CWMD-related objectives by drawing upon 

actions from the following CWMD MMAs: WMD interdiction, WMD offensive 

operations, WMD elimination, WMD active defense, CBRN passive defense, and WMD 

CM. 

 (1) Destroy. To destroy is to ensure a WMD capability cannot perform its 

intended function or be restored to a useable condition. Destruction can be achieved by 

lethal means. Nonlethal means can be used in conjunction with lethal means to enhance 

lethal effectiveness. Destroying WMD capabilities requires a significant amount of prestrike considerations and authorizations at the appropriate levels of command. 

Destruction and elimination are not synonymous terms in regard to CWMD, they are 

IV-24 JP 3-40 
Planning and Execution 

linked. Destruction is one of four operational tasks under WMD elimination although it 

may take place outside the scope of elimination as defined by the NMS-CWMD. While 

destruction refers to a specific target, elimination refers to an operation against an entire 

WMD program. The JFC must consider national and strategic objectives for the 

ACTIONS SUPPORTING THE EIGHT 

MILITARY MISSION AREAS

LEGEND

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CM consequence management

(1) Defined in JP 1-02 (2) Defined in Service doctrine

WMD weapons of mass 

destruction

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

X

X

X

X

OFFENSIVE 

OPERATIONS

DEFENSIVE 

OPERATIONS

Characterize

Contain (1)

Control (1)

Detect (1)

Defeat (2)

Defend (2)

Degrade (2)

Destroy (1)

Disrupt (2)

Exploit (1, 2)

Intercept (1, 2)

Interdict (1)

Isolate (2)

Neutralize (1)

Secure (1)

Seize (1)

Deny (2)

Divert (1)

Recover (1)

Reconstitute (1)

Restore

Prevent

ThreatReductionCooperationSecurityCooperationWMD InterdictionWMD Offensive OperationsWMD EliminationWMD Active DefenseCBRN Passive DefenseWMD CM

Figure IV-7. Actions Supporting the Eight Military Mission Areas

 IV-25 
Chapter IV 

operation or campaign before deciding to destroy a WMD-related target. Many of these 

targets are necessary for intelligence exploitation or may cause damage to the 

surrounding area if destroyed. Refer to the targeting section in paragraph 2h, 

“Targeting,” for more information about consequences of execution and collateral 

damage considerations. Actions to destroy WMD capabilities within a major operation 

or campaign often require capabilities from the following CWMD MMAs: WMD 

offensive operations, WMD active defense, or WMD elimination. 

 (a) The WMD elimination MMA is conducive for a long-term, systematic 

approach to ensure those elements of a WMD program designated for destruction are 

destroyed and monitored so they are not reconstituted. 

 (b) Friendly Nuclear Weapons Employment. One of the key 

considerations when conducting major operations and campaigns in a WMD environment 

is friendly use of nuclear weapons. When directed by the President and SecDef, CCDRs 

plan for the US employment of nuclear weapons in a manner consistent with national 

policy and strategic guidance. The employment of nuclear weapons is a Presidential 

decision. USSTRATCOM will assist in the collaborative planning of all nuclear 

missions. If directed to plan for the employment of nuclear weapons, JFCs typically have 

two escalating objectives. 

NOTIONAL EXAMPLE OF A NONLETHAL OPERATION TO NEUTRALIZE 

A WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION-RELATED TARGET 

An attack on a nuclear power plant could cause irreversible damage 

but would not affect the reactor core or any other radiological material 

thereby reducing the consequences of the attack. The attack would 

also keep key areas of the nuclear power plant unharmed for further 

exploitation, as required. The attack could shut down the plant 

resulting in an inability to further produce plutonium as part of a 

nuclear weapon program. 

VARIOUS SOURCES 

 1. The first is to deter or prevent an adversary attack that employs 

WMD. To make opponents understand that friendly forces possess and will use such 

weapons, JFCs may simply communicate that to the adversary, using IO or other means. 

Regardless, JFCs must implement measures to increase readiness and preserve the option 

to respond, including the alert and forward positioning of appropriate systems, if 

required. Prevention or denial may include targeting and attacking adversary WMD 

capability by conventional and special operations forces (SOF). 

 2. If deterrence is not an effective option or fails, JFCs will respond, 

consistent with national policy and strategic guidance, to adversary aggression while 

seeking to control the intensity and scope of conflict and destruction. This response may 

include employment of conventional, special operations, or nuclear forces.

IV-26 JP 3-40 
Planning and Execution 

 (2) Disrupt. Disruption seeks to interrupt or interfere with an adversary’s 

actions. This can entail breaking or interrupting the command and/or enabling processes 

needed to proliferate or employ WMD. This action may be desired when offensive 

resources are limited; to comply with ROE or RUF; or to create certain effects. IO can 

enable the commander to disrupt adversary WMD proliferation or employment. Actions 

to disrupt WMD proliferation or employment during a major campaign or operation often 

require capabilities from the following CWMD MMAs: WMD security cooperation and 

partner activities, WMD interdiction, WMD offensive operations, or WMD active 

defense. 

 (3) Degrade. Degrade can include the use of lethal and nonlethal means to 

reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary WMD capabilities. Examples of 

nonlethal actions include IO which can degrade the morale of a unit, reduce the 

perception of a target’s worth or value, or reduce the opportunities for adversaries to 

achieve their objectives. Nonlethal weapons can include weapons, munitions, and 

devices explicitly designed to incapacitate personnel and materiel, which can degrade 

operations by denying individuals and materiel access to or exit from WMD facilities. 

Actions to degrade WMD capabilities within a major operation or campaign often require 

capabilities from the following CWMD MMAs: WMD interdiction, WMD offensive 

operations, CBRN passive defense, and WMD CM. 

 (4) Deny. Deny, in CWMD operations, entails preventing an adversary from 

having C2 over, or access to, their WMD capabilities. Effective denial provides 

commanders freedom of action and freedom from the effects of WMD use. Actions to 

deny WMD proliferation or employment within a major operation or campaign often 

require capabilities from the following CWMD MMAs: WMD interdiction, WMD 

offensive operations, threat reduction cooperation, or WMD security cooperation and 

partner activities. 

 (5) Exploit. Due to the inherently strategic nature of WMD, the exploitation of 

any WMD-related information must be integrated into the JFC’s operations. Most of the 

exploitation of WMD-related material will come from WMD elimination operations (if 

conducted) or SOF operations. This information must be collected and fused to increase 

the commander’s operational picture and drive future exploitation actions. Actions to 

exploit WMD capabilities within a major operation or campaign often require capabilities 

from the WMD elimination MMA. 

For further guidance on exploitation as a part of sensitive site operations, refer to Army 

Field Manual (FM) 3-90.15, Sensitive Site Operations. 

 (6) Neutralize. Neutralize includes actions to render WMD capabilities 

ineffective or unusable against US or multinational partners. Examples of CWMDrelated actions include making CBRN agents and materials harmless or making delivery 

systems unusable. When assigning a task to neutralize, commanders must specify the 

adversary or material and the duration. The commander normally uses a combination of 

lethal and nonlethal effects to neutralize adversary personnel or material. Assets required 

 IV-27 
Chapter IV 

OPERATION ALSOS 

During WWII, the United States created an organization under the 

Manhattan Project called Operation ALSOS. The mission was to collect 

and exploit all people, places, and things associated with German 

atomic research and development, and to ensure the capability was not 

passed on to the Soviet Union. ALSOS was the code name for the 

Allied special intelligence forces' mission to collect information about 

German nuclear fission developments. Actual raids were carried out 

by subordinate teams designated by a letter, such as "S Force" in Italy 

and "T Force" in France, Holland, and Germany. These units traveled 

rapidly and were minimally armed. However, because they traveled 

with accomplished linguists, scientists, and police specialists, they 

were able to rapidly identify, capture, and exploit experts and materials. 

T-Force was the technical intelligence effort by the Americans and 

British to exploit German capabilities. Originally incorporated as part of 

the Office of Strategic Services in Italy under 15th Army group, it 

became a part of the 12th and 6th Army Groups in Germany and 

France. 

During the war, technical intelligence teams often combined with other 

intelligence and counterintelligence personnel in ad hoc task forces to 

exploit newly liberated areas of intelligence interest. The task force of 

20 to 25 members (including 4-5 scientists) arrived after the site was 

secured. They were able to fully exploit the site between one day and 

several weeks depending on the amount of material and personnel. 

By the end of the war, the group had a full and complete understanding 

of the breadth and scope of the German atomic effort; located all key 

scientists and interviewed them; visited most laboratories used to 

conduct research; acquired most documents, and recovered quantities 

of test equipment, uranium, and heavy water. 

VARIOUS SOURCES 

to neutralize a target vary according to the type and size of the target and the desired 

effects. Actions to neutralize WMD capabilities within a major operation or campaign 

often require capabilities from the following CWMD MMAs: WMD interdiction, WMD 

offensive operations, WMD elimination, or WMD active defense. 

 (7) Secure. Securing WMD-related sites is often necessary to prevent use, 

proliferation, or looting. The requirement to secure these sites is a crucial mission 

analysis consideration due to the potentially large force requirements and the balance of 

other competing missions. A prioritized list of WMD-related sites is recommended and 

should be deconflicted with national level objectives, exploitation objectives, and other 

operations within the AOR. Actions to secure WMD capabilities within a major 

IV-28 JP 3-40 
Planning and Execution 

operation or campaign often require capabilities from the following CWMD MMAs: 

WMD offensive operations or WMD elimination. 

 (8) Seize. These actions can involve taking possession of WMD capabilities 

(e.g., a designated area, building, transport, material, or personnel) using combat force. 

As a result of these actions, an adversary force can no longer access the WMD 

capabilities that have been seized. Seizing differs from securing because it requires 

offensive action to obtain control of the designated area or objective. Once a force seizes 

a WMD-related objective, it secures the objective and prepares it for potential follow-on 

actions such as exploitation or destruction. Actions to seize WMD capabilities within a 

major operation or campaign often require capabilities from the following CWMD 

MMAs: WMD interdiction, WMD offensive operations, or WMD elimination. 

OPERATION DESERT FOX 

Operation DESERT FOX launched following a 14-month pattern of Iraqi 

obstruction of United Nations Special Commission inspections. The 

four day air strike was designed “to attack Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, 

and biological weapons programs and its military capacity to threaten 

its neighbors” while demonstrating the consequences of flouting 

international obligations. The original list of potential targets was 

extensive, including over 100 chemical-related facilities and 90 

biological-related facilities across Iraq. The final list of 100 targets 

narrowed the focus to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivery 

systems as the surest way to degrade and diminish Saddam Hussein’s 

WMD capabilities using airpower. United States Central Command 

(USCENTCOM) Commander General Anthony Zinni, United States 

Marine Corps, and his planners concentrated chiefly on Iraq’s missile 

production programs and command and control systems. 

USCENTCOM and administration officials stated that “air strikes would 

not target known WMD storage sites or stockpiles in order to reduce 

collateral damage.” Dual use facilities were also avoided to minimize 

civilian casualties. 

Strikes commenced the night of December 16, 1998 and included more 

than 600 sorties flown by more than 300 combat and support aircraft. 

Aircraft employed 600 pieces of air-dropped ordnance, 90 air-launched 

cruise missiles, and 325 Tomahawk land-attack missiles. Although the 

operation was considered an air strike, forty naval vessels supported 

DESERT FOX in some capacity and thousands of ground troops 

deployed to protect Kuwait against a potential counterattack from Iraq. 

DESERT FOX inflicted serious damage on Iraq’s missile program, 

destroying potential WMD delivery systems that could not be easily 

replaced due to existing United Nations sanctions. 

VARIOUS SOURCES 

 IV-29 
Chapter IV 

 (9) To execute the WMD offensive operations MMA, a JFC would conduct 

missions to seize, secure, and/or engage WMD and WMD capabilities. This would entail 

operations to detect, deny, degrade, or destroy adversarial WMD program-related weapon 

systems, material and facilities, and critical enablers (e.g., technical expertise, associated 

networks, and C2), through the maneuver and engagement of combat forces. The choice 

of which resources or systems to employ is driven by the threat, operational environment, 

available intelligence, and most importantly, the desired effects. The range of joint 

capabilities that may be leveraged to successfully achieve this mission includes aircraft, 

naval vessels, missiles, unmanned systems, SOF, IO, communications system support, 

and ISR, ground forces, and agent defeat weapons to limit dispersal or collateral effects 

of chemical agents. The JFC could also use the threat of seizure or destruction of an 

adversary’s WMD capabilities to deter adversarial employment against friendly targets. 

 e. Defensive Operations. CWMD aspects of defensive operations are the 

integration and coordination of operations, personnel, and technology to protect and 

defend friendly forces from the effects of WMD. The purpose of these operations is to 

ensure adversary WMD attacks are defeated and, if required, provide the means to 

rapidly recover; operate, as necessary, in a CBRN environment; and when directed 

support US and the HN’s civil population and governments to reconstitute essential 

operations and services. Defensive operations support efforts to maintain effective 

combat power and essential capabilities. Timely, accurate intelligence – some of which 

is based on information collected during offensive operations – is essential to defensive 

operations. 

 (1) Adversary Employment of WMD. An adversary’s use of WMD can 

quickly change an operation or campaign. The use or threat of use of these weapons can 

cause large-scale shifts in strategic and operational objectives, phases, and COAs. 

Multinational operations become more complicated with the threat of WMD 

employment. An adversary may use WMD against multinational partners, especially 

those with little or no defense against these weapons, to disintegrate the alliance or 

coalition. 

 (2) Defend. WMD defense is the capability to effectively respond to, and 

defend against, WMD attacks. Sustaining operations in CBRN environments requires 

forewarning and properly trained and equipped forces. US forces must be prepared to 

conduct and sustain operations in CBRN environments with minimal degradation. In 

order to sustain operations, US forces must assess the environment for CBRN hazards 

and prepare for WMD defense, when appropriate. WMD defense includes both CBRN 

passive defense and WMD active defense. 

For further guidance on CBRN defense, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments. 

 (3) Recovery and Reconstitution. Recovery and reconstitution are those 

actions taken by one nation prior to, during, and following an attack by an adversary 

nation to minimize the effects of the attack, rehabilitate the national economy, provide for 

IV-30 JP 3-40 
Planning and Execution 

the welfare of the populace, and maximize the combat potential of remaining forces and 

supporting activities. This also includes those actions taken by a military force during, or 

after, operational employment to restore its combat capability to full operational 

readiness. Reconstitution is the mission to repair and replace assets or capabilities 

damaged by, or lost to, CBRN weapons or effects. Actions to recover and reconstitute 

from WMD attacks require capabilities from the CBRN passive defense and WMD CM 

CWMD MMAs. 

 (4) Force Protection. JFCs and their subordinate commanders must implement 

force protection measures appropriate to all anticipated threats, to include terrorists and 

the use of WMD or other CBRN hazards. Force protection often requires capabilities 

from WMD active defense and CBRN passive defense. 

For further guidance on recovery and reconstitution following a WMD attack, refer to JP 

3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Environments.

 (5) Force Health Protection. JFCs and their subordinate commanders 

implement FHP measures appropriate to all anticipated threats, to include the use of 

WMD or other CBRN hazards. 

For further guidance on force health protection see JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

 (6) To implement the CBRN passive defense MMA, a JFC would plan 

operations in such a way as to ensure the ability to survive, operate, and recover friendly 

forces affected by WMD. This includes measures taken in a hostile or uncertain 

environment to reduce vulnerability and minimize the effects of WMD employed against 

US and HN installations and facilities, interests, points of embarkation and debarkation, 

and critical infrastructure. They assist the joint force to continue operations despite the 

use or presence of CBRN agents through neutralizing, containing, and/or managing the 

effects of WMD attacks. These include operations associated with sensing the hazard, 

shaping the environment, shielding combat power from CBRN hazards, and sustaining 

operations through and after CBRN releases. 

 f. Relationship Between Offensive and Defensive Operations. Commanders 

synchronize offensive and defensive operations to produce complementary and 

reinforcing effects. While offensive CWMD operations support the decisive operation, 

defensive CWMD operations protect friendly force critical assets and COGs. Conducting 

offensive and defensive operations independently detracts from the efficient employment 

of CWMD assets. At best, independent operations expend more resources than would be 

required if done in concert. At worst, uncoordinated efforts increase conflicts and mutual 

interference. In the extreme, they may compromise friendly intentions or result in loss of 

operational momentum. Fully integrating CWMD offensive and defensive operations 

requires JFCs and their staffs to treat CWMD as a single, integrated function. 

 IV-31 
Chapter IV 

IV-32 JP 3-40 

 g. Stability Operations. CWMD-related capabilities and expertise support stability 

operations by providing unique capabilities that directly support the commander’s 

objectives. Many of the CWMD considerations that are a part of PO are the same 

for stability operations. This unique support can be in the form of CBRN material 

identification, security, and or collection to ensure public health and safety. Additionally, 

these resources support the execution of security cooperation activities to assist in the 

shaping of interagency and HN success. CWMD operations also provide specific 

expertise to interagency elements to transition a former adversary’s WMD program 

towards peace-time applications. 

For further guidance on stability, security, transition, and reconstruction, refer to 

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, 

Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations. 

 h. To implement the WMD CM MMA, a JFC could leverage capabilities and assets 

to support US and/or friendly nations’ restoration of essential operations and services. In 

response to or when recovering from attacks or disasters associated with WMD and their 

effects, to include planning for the disposition of hazardous materials, sites, and remains. 

Disposing of CBRN and CBRN-contaminated material and casualties entails unique 

challenges and coordination with HN and interagency entities. 

PALOMARES, SPAIN (JANUARY 1966) 

On January 17, 1966 a B-52G heavy bomber collided with a KC-135 

tanker during a mid-air refueling operation off the coast of Spain and 

broke-up. The conventional explosion of two of its nuclear bombs, 

which fell on land, detonated causing radioactive contamination of 

approximately two square kilometers of land. In response to the 

effects of the accident, the US excavated approximately 1,750 tons of 

contaminated material and sent for disposal at the Savannah River 

Plant in South Carolina. Subsequently, the US settled claims by 

Palomares residents and the town received a desalination plant. 

VARIOUS SOURCES 

 
CHAPTER V

COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PLANNING 

CONSIDERATIONS 

 V-1 

1. General 

 This chapter describes CWMD planning considerations of particular concern to JFCs 

and operational planners. For additional information on the CWMD aspects of joint 

operation planning and operational art and design, review paragraph 2, “Operation and 

Campaign Planning,” of Chapter IV, “Planning and Execution.” CWMD operations are a 

component of a comprehensive USG effort requiring a coordinated interagency approach 

and the cooperation of the international community. Many DOD CWMD activities occur 

during phase 0 (Shape) operations. In many cases, DOD CWMD activities will support 

OGAs. Alternatively, when DOD is the lead agency, these same entities will provide 

essential support to DOD CWMD missions. These activities require early coordination 

with these OGAs and often require the participation of multinational partners during 

planning. 

2. Strategic Considerations 

 a. Legal Guidance. The complexity of CWMD and associated laws, policies, 

treaties, and agreements requires continuous involvement of the staff judge advocate 

(SJA), or appropriate legal advisor with the planning, control, and assessment of 

operations. Because of the global nature of CWMD, this will also include continuous 

consultation with OGAs, multinational partners, HN governments, and IGOs to establish 

the legal authorities, capabilities, and limitations associated with their organizations. 

 (1) The SJA should be involved throughout the planning process, including 

mission analysis and COA development, to ensure the JFC is aware of potential CWMDrelated legal issues. For instance, multinational partners, allies, and HNs will have their own 

treaty obligations and laws that may significantly differ from our own and restrict or prohibit 

their participation in CWMD operations. SJA involvement in WMD targeting and RUF or 

ROE development is essential. The SJA can advise the JFC and his staff of potential 

associated issues, such as consequences of execution and harmful environmental impacts, 

collateral damage, or other WMD-related legal issues that should be considered in the 

targeting process. 

“Capabilities-based plans for resourcing should focus on development of 

tools that have broad-spectrum application. For example, our planning and 

capability development should not be focused on one biological warfare 

threat agent, one threat country, or one non-State actor. We must plan for 

and develop capabilities that could be employed against a range of threats 

and associated capabilities while balancing the requirements for targeted 

strategies against known proliferators.” 

National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 

February 2006 
Chapter V 

V-2 JP 3-40 

 (2) The SJA should develop a legal staff estimate during mission analysis that 

accounts for WMD-related legal issues associated with joint operations. The legal staff 

estimate is contained in appendix 4 (Legal) to annex E (Personnel) and should reflect the 

description of legal support required to support the mission as developed during the 

planning process. For example, protecting enemy prisoners of war and third country 

nationals from CBRN agents must be considered. 

For further guidance on legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military 

Operations. 

b. International Law and Agreements. International law, policies, treaties, and 

agreements to which the United States is a signatory identify certain rights and 

obligations that may impact joint operations. These legal requirements may pose 

constraints and restraints. They will shape the design of operations and campaigns that 

deal with the WMD threat or hazards associated with WMD-related targets. 

 (1) Arms Control and NP Treaties. Arms control and NP treaties and regimes 

establish global norms against the proliferation of WMD precursors, weapons, their 

means of delivery, and weapons manufacturing equipment. Treaties provide 

international standards to gauge and address the activities of potential proliferators. 

International treaties may also provide diplomatic tools and legal recourse to isolate and 

punish violators. 

 (2) Security Assistance. Through security assistance activities, the Armed 

Forces of the United States can help multinational partners develop the ability to cope 

with a WMD attack as well as reduce their vulnerability to armed aggression. 

 (3) Technology Security. An important aspect of NP is preventing the 

spread of WMD technology through physical security and export controls. Export 

control regimes work to inhibit the proliferation of WMD technologies and deny access 

to potential suppliers. Protecting sensitive technologies includes guarding US 

technological information through information security programs and limits on foreign 

disclosure to ensure military compliance with federal legislation and regulations 

implementing the export control regime. In addition, protecting sensitive technologies 

includes assisting other countries monitor and control sensitive technologies and 

equipment.

 (4) Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Initiatives. Various 

international cooperation programs have been initiated to defeat the proliferation of 

WMD and the materiel, technology, and expertise necessary to create and sustain a 

WMD program. These initiatives have varied levels of DOD participation and are 

usually part of phase 0 (Shape) activities. Three examples are listed below: 

 

 (a) Cooperative Threat Reduction. The CTR program helps deny rogue 

states and terrorist access to WMD and related materials, technologies, and expertise 

from former Soviet Union (FSU) states. This includes providing for the safe destruction
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Planning Considerations 

V-3 

of Soviet era WMD, associated delivery systems and related infrastructure, and 

consolidating and securing FSU WMD and related technology and materials. DTRA 

implements the CTR program. 

 (b) The Proliferation Security Initiative. PSI is designed to enhance and 

expand international efforts to impede and interdict the flow of WMD, their means of 

delivery, and related materials to and from state and non-state actors of concern. 

Interdiction of WMD shipments by air, sea, or land is the foundation of the initiative. 

PSI activities include all the instruments of national power, and are consistent with 

national laws and international legal frameworks. Overall, the PSI expands the range of 

interdiction options in an effort to combat WMD. PSI leverages proactive measures 

found in both NP and CP activities. The detection and monitoring of potential WMD 

transshipment activities and the actual interdiction of WMD transshipments are 

accomplished through the cooperation of PSI nations under the PSI Statement of 

Interdiction Principles. 

 (c) Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). MTCR is an informal 

and voluntary association of countries which share the goal of NP of unmanned delivery 

systems capable of delivering WMD. MTCR was initiated in response to the increasing 

proliferation of WMD, recognizing that one way to counter the threat is to maintain 

vigilance over the transfer of missile equipment, materiel, and related technologies usable 

for systems capable of delivering WMD. The partner countries also seek to coordinate 

national export licensing efforts aimed at CP. 

3. Operational Considerations 

 Operational planning considerations of particular importance to the JFC are listed 

below. 

 a. Task Organization. The JFC organizes forces and phases their arrival in support 

of his concept of operations (CONOPS) while maintaining the flexibility to exploit 

unforeseen opportunities or adjust to evolving events (including adversary actions and 

environmental impacts). Shortfalls in CWMD capabilities across the eight MMAs should 

be identified and additional CWMD specific capabilities should be requested as early as 

feasible, via the request for forces process. 

 b. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. 

 (1) Intelligence planning must support the CONOPS for each of the CWMD 

MMAs. Summaries of enemy capabilities must include descriptions of CBRN 

conventional and unconventional delivery means and possession/previous use of CBRN 

by non-state actors. 

 (2) ISR tasks in support of CWMD missions must be clearly defined and 

designed. 
Chapter V 

V-4 JP 3-40 

 (3) Procedures for the handling, processing, and exploitation of WMD weapons 

and materiel will be situation dependent and should carefully consider operations security 

(OPSEC) requirements. Intelligence support also considers the requirement for 

identification, tracking, and handling of key leadership and scientific personnel 

associated with the adversary’s WMD programs or proliferation networks. 

 c. Operations

 (1) Flexible Deterrent Options. DOD supports USG NP efforts and 

preventive diplomacy by providing FDOs that can be readily implemented to deter or 

forestall a crisis. FDOs can be used individually, in packages, sequentially, or 

concurrently. FDOs are designed to be used in groups that maximize integrated results 

from all instruments of national power. As such, it is imperative that extensive, 

continuous coordination occur with interagency and multinational partners to maximize 

their impact. Examples of FDOs that involve the military instrument of national power 

include: 

 (a) Establish and Maintain Military-to-Military Contacts with 

Multinational Partners. These relationships can be utilized to build and sustain their 

capacity for NP and CP activities and operations against WMD threats. 

 (b) Forward Deploy Military Forces. The forward deployment of forces 

capable of conducting WMD interdiction, WMD elimination, and WMD offensive 

operations against WMD threats contributes to the maintenance of regional security and 

stability. The forward deployment of military forces demonstrates readiness and resolve 

to defend US interests against WMD threats. 

 (c) Exercise CWMD Capabilities with Multinational Partners. These 

activities contribute to the deterrence of the use, or threat of use, of WMD against 

multinational partners by demonstrating the capability of US forces and multinational 

partners to respond to a WMD attack, operate in a contaminated environment, and 

mitigate the effects of WMD use. 

 (2) Deployment. Operations in areas potentially targeted by a WMD threat 

must incorporate WMD active defense and CBRN defense considerations as part of force 

protection measures. Vulnerability analyses of key aerial port of debarkation (APOD), 

seaport of debarkation (SPOD), and joint reception, staging, onward movement, and 

integration sites, to include proximity of TIM storage facilities/sites, must be conducted 

to ensure adequate defensive and WMD CM assets are available for these areas during all 

phases of operations. To ensure the continuation of deployment, sustainment, and 

redeployment support following WMD attack, planners must designate alternate 

APODs/SPODs and exchange zone locations, identify and resource decontamination sites 

for strategic transportation assets, and coordinate diplomatic clearances for the 

international movement of formerly contaminated airlift aircraft, ships, and cargo. 
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Planning Considerations 

V-5 

For additional guidance, see JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments. 

For further guidance on WMD CM assets, refer to CJCSI 3525.01A, Defense Support of 

Civil Authorities (DSCA) for Domestic Consequence Management Operations in 

response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosives 

Incidents.

 (3) Employment 

 (a) CWMD operations, whether undertaken in support of an OGA or in 

conjunction with other joint operations, must be carefully coordinated with all 

participants to be effective. Consideration should be given to interagency coordination 

during all phases of planning. Interagency coordination is a continuous process that 

should be established and emphasized prior to an event occurring, as well as during and 

after an event. The JIACG, a fully integrated participant on the staff at each combatant 

command, is composed of liaison members from OGAs with a daily focus on planning. 

While JIACG members are not necessarily CWMD subject matter experts, they represent 

their parent organizations and provide a capability specifically organized to enhance 

situational awareness of interagency activities to prevent undesired consequences and 

uncoordinated activity. 

For further guidance on interagency coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational 

Coordination During Joint Operations.

 (b) Prosecution of WMD Targets. The engagement of targets involved 

with the production, storage, and delivery of WMD present the JFC with significant 

challenges. The risks of catastrophic, long term, human and environmental impact as a 

consequence of engaging these targets must be carefully considered. Options the JFC has 

available to overcome the challenges associated with this target set include careful 

construction of RUF or ROE; lethal and nonlethal engagement options; and nodal 

analysis of the target to exploit vulnerabilities that minimize the potential for contaminant 

release into the atmosphere. 

 1. One of the Operational Decisions is the Type of Attack. Course 

of action analysis should consider both covert and overt operations. Since covert and 

overt planning incorporate different planning criteria, this decision must be made early in 

the planning cycle. 

 2. Target Selection. Planners and targeting experts will recommend 

whether to strike the primary WMD facility or a separate support facility. If the actual 

WMD facility is to be struck, the target will be further refined to determine what portions 

of the facility to strike, and with what weapons and tactics, in order to accomplish the 

mission while avoiding or minimizing collateral contamination. In some instances, a 

commander may want to destroy supporting infrastructure without attacking the portion 
Chapter V 

V-6 JP 3-40 

that actually stores the agent or nuclear material so as to either deny the adversary access 

to WMD or immobilize it. 

 3. Ordnance Selection. Understanding the commander’s intent for 

the target is critical. What effects are being sought? What are the agent defeat 

criteria? In some cases, the intent is to consume the entire agent with the effects of the 

ordnance. Too little ordnance may release some of the agent or nuclear material into the 

atmosphere. In other cases, evidence must be preserved to prove WMD was being 

produced. Too much ordnance may destroy residual evidence. 

 4. Consequences of Execution and Collateral Damage. At a 

minimum the early analysis of consequences of attacks against WMD and WMD-related 

targets should identify the worst case local, as well as downwind, hazards. Effects 

modeling will help refine targeting. Modeling may also assist in determining acceptable 

risk and requirements for prior notification of a pending strike. 

 a. Minimizing Collateral Damage. WMD-related targets carry 

unique targeting considerations. Although the initial effect of conventional munitions on 

a WMD-related target may cause little collateral damage, secondary effects could include 

a release or dispersal of chemical, biological, or radiological material or even an 

imperfect detonation of a nuclear device. For this reason, WMD-related targets are 

usually placed on a restricted target list; however, mission priorities to combat WMD or 

military necessity may require JFCs to engage WMD-related targets. JFCs should seek to 

minimize collateral damage consistent with the law of armed conflict and higher-level 

guidance, and plan for follow-on WMD CM operations to mitigate the potential WMD 

effects, as necessary. 

 b. Consequences of Execution Planning. Planners must 

complete a detailed consequence of execution analysis to determine the potential release 

of hazards when targeting enemy WMD storage sites, weapon systems, or production 

facilities. Joint and friendly forces throughout the operational area need to be advised of 

the predicted hazard area and given enough warning time to take appropriate force 

protection and FHP measures. Effects on local civilians and critical infrastructure must 

be anticipated and planned for as well. This planning must be done not only for WMD 

sites, but also for targets known or suspected to contain toxic industrial chemicals or 

materials. To protect forces and civilian populations, WMD CM planning should include 

both immediate and long term effects of dispersed CBRN hazards. 

For further guidance on mitigating collateral damage, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 

and the methodology contained within CJCSM 3160.01, Joint Methodology for 

Estimating Collateral Damage and Casualties for Conventional Weapons: Precision, 

Unguided, and Cluster.

 (c) SOF-Conventional Force Integration. The JFC, using SOF 

independently or integrated with conventional forces, gains an additional and specialized 

capability to achieve CWMD objectives that might not otherwise be attainable. 
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Planning Considerations 

V-7 

Integration of these forces and their specialized capabilities enables the JFC to take full 

advantage of conventional and SOF core CWMD competencies. SOF provide unique 

capabilities to monitor and support arms control treaties. SOF are tasked with organizing, 

training, equipping, and otherwise preparing to conduct operations in support of USG 

CWMD objectives. SOF CWMD missions include: 

 1. Direct Action. Actions can include raids, ambushes, direct assaults, 

precision destruction operations, standoff attacks, terminal attack control and terminal 

guidance operations, and anti-surface operations. 

 

 2. Special Reconnaissance. Special reconnaissance can include 

assessment of CBRN or environmental hazards in denied areas.

 3. Foreign Internal Defense. FID may involve training countries on 

use of CBRN detection equipment. 

 4. Combating WMD Terrorism. Combating WMD terrorism 

consists of efforts to prevent the acquisition, development, proliferation, or use of CBRN 

by a terrorist network. 

For further guidance on integration of SOF and conventional forces, refer to USSOCOM 

Publication 3-33, Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and 

Interoperability Handbook and Checklist, Version 2, September 2006.

 (d) Storage and Security. Initial efforts should focus on securing 

suspected WMD sites to prevent unintended destruction, looting (with its associated 

danger to the civilian population), or transfer of WMD-related materials. Guidelines for 

storage and security of confiscated and/or captured materiel may be subject to 

international treaties or agreements. It may be more cost- and manpower-effective to 

consolidate suspect materiel into one or a limited number of centralized sites. Proximity 

of storage to demilitarization (destruction) facilities will reduce the risk of losing control 

of suspect materiel and facilitate the demilitarization process. The risks to non-CWMD 

missions due to the attrition of combat power as units are tasked with securing WMDrelated sites must be considered at the earliest stages of planning. 

 (e) Information Operations. IO includes electronic warfare, computer 

network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operational 

security, each useful and necessary in CWMD. Prior to the initiation of combat 

operations, psychological operations and military deception can reinforce a deliberate CS 

campaign targeting government and military leadership and technical experts associated 

with WMD programs. IO would include dissuading adversary use or proliferation of 

WMD to cooperation with multinational forces. While OPSEC is essential to prevent 

tipping the adversary to the specific timing and method of the blue force operation, a 

WMD target could be neutralized by a psychological operations leaflet/media warning 

local populace of the potential targeting causing the workers to evacuate the area for fear 

of being contaminated. 
Chapter V 

V-8 JP 3-40 

For further guidance on integrating IO, refer to JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

 (f) Multinational Operations. Many of the technical skills required to 

support CWMD operations are low density and very costly to establish and maintain. 

The large demand for explosive ordnance disposal, technical escort, intelligence, and 

scientific support may preclude some states from actively participating in the effort. 

There are, however, a number of supporting roles for which multinational partners 

are perfectly suited. They can include site and team security, transportation, medical 

and veterinary/animal support, language support, and intelligence. The presence of 

international members increases the legitimacy of CWMD efforts and fosters greater 

cooperation in the overarching CWMD challenge. Special consideration must be given 

to the classification level of intelligence supporting WMD elimination operations. The 

United States has standing agreements with some states that allow for the sharing of highlevel intelligence (e.g., special category). Others are denied access by the ‘not releasable 

to foreign nationals’ and ‘originator controlled’ caveats. A systematic process must be 

implemented to determine classification and releasability guidance for multinational 

partners. Additionally, during the integration of multinational partners into operations, 

commanders and planners must identify operational restrictions due to WMD-related 

laws, policies, treaties, and agreements specific to those forces. 

 (4) Forensics and Evidence Collection. In planning the intelligence tasks for a 

WMD offensive operation, commanders determine the forensic evidentiary requirements 

for collecting/retaining adversary WMD warhead residuals, agents, nuclear material, and 

remnants of delivery means after the attack for post-mortem analysis, intelligence 

purposes, or the enforcement or prosecution of international law. Commanders and their 

staffs should know, prior to developing the plan, if there is a requirement because this 

will affect the means of attack, agent defeat criteria, type of ordnance, and additional 

forces required. Considerations may include sample collection, packaging, change of 

custody, and hazardous material transportation requirements. Agent defeat criteria are 

efforts to neutralize, destroy or deny access to or immobilize WMD and their delivery 

systems while causing low-to-no collateral damage. For prompt operations in support of 

national technical nuclear forensics, commanders will determine in coordination with the 

lead agency the forensic evidentiary requirements following an adversary’s radiological 

or nuclear attack. 

 d. Logistics. Logisticians must be fully engaged for both feasibility and 

responsiveness to any changes in plans. 

 (1) Mission Specific Equipment. Much of the equipment associated with 

CWMD operations is unique and low density. Some items may require specialized 

logistic support for sustainment throughout the mission. Many logistic requirements for 

CWMD specialized capabilities will be shared between competing mission requirements. 

For example, while it is highly desirable for forces conducting WMD elimination, WMD 

interdiction, and WMD CM operations in an area to each have their own organic 

decontamination capability, it may not be feasible due to the limited number of these 

assets available. 
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Planning Considerations 

V-9 

 (2) Consideration should be given to WMD-specific transportation 

requirements during all phases of planning. WMD samples often have specialized 

packaging, handling, and storage requirements. Additionally, to preserve the opportunity 

for exploitation and future prosecution, storage and handling procedures must comply 

with evidentiary chain of custody requirements. Logistics planners must be aware of 

airframe size limitations, ship decontamination constraints, and the effects of CBRN 

contamination on transportation assets and international mobility operations. Due to the 

threat of cross contamination of defense transportation assets, operations into 

contaminated APOD, SPOD, and transportation nodes that could be significantly 

degraded. The retrograde of contaminated cargo will be restricted to “mission critical 

cargo” (as designated by the CCDR, in consultation with the CDRUSTRANSCOM). 

Planners must ensure proper transient/overflight country clearances are obtained when 

transporting contaminated materials and equipment, including the contaminated 

transporting vessel. 

For further guidance, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments. 

 (3) The CWMD-related logistic requirements of the HN and all multinational 

partners must be addressed. Additionally, the respective logistic burden to be assumed 

by them in support of CWMD operations must be considered with respect to their unique 

requirements and capabilities. 

 (4) Contaminated Facilities, Equipment, and Remains. The impact of 

CBRN contamination on logistics is substantial. Procedures for the temporary or 

permanent disposition of equipment and materiel that cannot be decontaminated, or that 

do not meet agreed upon cleanliness standards, must be addressed during planning. 

Similarly, the disposition of contaminated human remains requires logistic planning to 

meet health-based clearance requirements for decontamination, safety requirements for 

transportation, and environmental/diplomatic requirements for temporary interment in 

theater. It may be more cost-effective to abandon contaminated facilities than 

decontaminate and rebuild. To preserve inter theater mobility capabilities, limit the 

movement of contaminated cargo to “mission critical” items (as determined by the 

CCDR, in consultation with the CDRUSTRANSCOM). 

For further guidance, refer to JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and 

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management, JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments, and JP 4-06, Mortuary 

Affairs in Joint Operations. 

 e. Public Affairs 

 (1) PA is integral to the success of any operation. The United States can win 

the battle but lose the war of public opinion. A proactive PA plan will address CWMD 

events, incorporate the media strategy into all phases of the plan, and keep everyone on 

message. PA products and themes should be synchronized with SC themes and support 
Chapter V 

V-10 JP 3-40 

US policy objectives. PA should work with USG agencies and NGOs to quickly and 

effectively communicate risk and response information to the public in order to avoid 

confusion and hysteria. The JFC’s PA officer plays a major role in coordinating public 

information activities to ensure consistency of messages, and also in keeping USG 

agencies and NGOs informed on the capability and intent of the joint force. 

 (2) The chain of command for PA activities must be clearly defined and in 

consonance with higher level guidance. This is especially true regarding the release of 

internal and external WMD-related information. The release of WMD information may 

require non-DOD lines of communications and authority such as DOS and other 

diplomatic points of contact. 

 (3) The pursuit of WMD attracts national and international media attention. An 

essential component of a successful PA plan includes provisions for delivering updates 

on the progress of CWMD efforts in a way that will not interfere with intelligence 

gathering and other tasks. Regular media events can provide timely and accurate 

information to address the progress of CWMD events. 

 (4) Prearranged news information materials (e.g., fact sheets, background 

papers, general news release on CWMD operations) can be made available for immediate 

release, as necessary. 

 (5) Because of their multimedia capabilities, PA assets can often be utilized to 

support CWMD missions. If appropriately tasked, units like combat camera can provide 

valuable support for the documentation of WMD sites and CWMD activities. 

f. Civil-Military Operations 

 (1) The assistance of the local indigenous population is imperative in CWMD 

operations. The local populace can assist in determining the location and function of 

WMD facilities; identification and location of key personnel employed at WMD or dual 

use sites; identification of local environmental hazards; identification and location of 

individuals that are not part of the local populace; and assistance in characterization of 

potential WMD sites. 

 (2) The Civil-military operations annex should address actions necessary to 

minimize HN or civilian populace interference in CWMD operations; synchronization of 

IO and PA messages relating to CWMD operations; and integration of the various OGAs, 

NGOs, and HN agencies into operations where their support is necessary. 

 (3) The civil affairs operation concept of support should address the unique 

aspects of the CWMD mission including: 

 

 (a) Identification of “dual-use” facilities and assets; 

 (b) Determination of CM requirements (accidental or deliberate release); 
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Planning Considerations 

V-11 

 (c) Evidence collection; 

 (d) Legal considerations, ROE, and RUF; 

 (e) Identification and disposition of scientists, experts, and technocrats 

(use of HN WMD experts); 

 (f) Policies toward “third parties” (i.e., other nations, tribes, organizations, 

or enterprises); 

 (g) Identification, prioritization, and characterization of targets and sites for 

WMD elimination operations; and 

 (h) Assistance available to the civilian populace in the event of a WMDrelated event or CBRN contamination. 

 g. Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations 

 (1) Meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) products and information are 

key components of modeling and simulation analysis used to accurately predict WMD 

effects. METOC products are integral to target planning during WMD offensive 

operations, and to predict hazard areas and estimate casualties during CM operations. 

 (2) Provisions should be made to ensure METOC support is available. This 

support should include the capability to disseminate required METOC products to users 

via classified transmission means (i.e., SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network). 

 h. Environmental Considerations 

 (1) Environmental recovery actions will address contamination and clean up 

measures from a CBRN event. Associated environmental plans will consider and ensure 

compliance with all applicable domestic obligations, international treaties and 

agreements, and foreign laws which the United States is a signatory. 

 (2) One of the key environmental issues that must be addressed is the 

determination of the standard to which the environment must be decontaminated or 

“cleaned.” This standard will be a key planning factor in both WMD elimination and 

WMD CM operations. Identify the appropriate organizations to be involved in 

determining appropriate clean-up criteria (e.g., clean standards) in the event of a CBRN 

release and incorporate into plans for WMD CM and WMD elimination operations. 

Where available/appropriate, identify and incorporate the specific clean-up criteria 

including technical assets/resources (e.g., laboratories) necessary to verify. 

 (3) Another environmental consideration is the necessity to address the 

transportation of WMD materiel within, or outside, the AOR. This includes operations to 

transition forces out of theater. International health regulations require the identification 
Chapter V 

V-12 JP 3-40 

of potential health risks (such as the movement of contaminated/contagious personnel, 

cargo, or conveyances) to transited and destination countries.

 i. Health Service Support. Medical and health issues have an operational impact 

on many other areas regardless of whether CWMD is the JFC’s primary mission or 

operations are conducted in a potentially CBRN-contaminated area. Key planning factors 

include: 

 (1) HSS planning should address CWMD mission objectives by phase for each 

MMA. 

 (2) Requirements for a comprehensive health surveillance program. 

Personnel conducting CWMD operations must have appropriate prophylaxis available for 

probable WMD threats. 

 (3) Medical intelligence, logistics, and FHP considerations must be assessed 

for the impact of likely WMD threats in the AOR. Considerations include availability 

of adequate supplies, personnel, and equipment in theater to deal with contamination of 

patients resulting from a WMD event. Supplies, including pharmaceuticals, for use on 

the affected civilian population may be obtained locally or regionally. Coordination with 

the National Center for Medical Intelligence, United Nations Joint Logistics Center, 

World Food Programme, or World Health Organization may be desirable. Health service 

logistic personnel can assist IGOs, NGOs, and the HN by conducting an assessment of 

the military or civilian medical supply infrastructure and industry. 

 (4) Immunization requirements and prophylaxis against CBRN should be 

identified and stocked, as necessary. 

 (5) Establishment of policies for contaminated mass casualty decontamination 

resulting from the deliberate or accidental use of WMD (to include contamination from 

toxic industrial chemicals or TIMs.) Policies and procedures should include provisions 

for casualty decontamination and evacuation both in and out of the area of operations. 

Due to the limited capability to airlift contaminated/contagious patients, DOD may elect 

to move medical treatment forward following a mass-casualty WMD event. Medical 

planners must be cognizant of the restrictions imposed on the aeromedical evacuation of 

contaminated or contagious persons. 

 (6) Medical assistance to be provided to indigenous populations, 

multinational forces, USG employees, contractors, and, as appropriate, IGOs and 

NGOs in the event of a WMD incident. Medical obligations under international law 

will be particularly crucial to the management of nonmilitary personnel. US military 

forces should be prepared to lead activities necessary to accomplish this medical task 

when indigenous capacity does not exist or is incapable of assuming responsibility. The 

JFC and joint force surgeon must plan to address these obligations. Once legitimate civil 

authority is prepared to conduct and sustain this medical support, US military forces may 

provide support, as required or necessary. 
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Planning Considerations 

V-13 

 (7) Requirements for public HSS to indigenous populations, multinational 

forces, USG employees, contractors, and, as appropriate, IGOs and NGOs in the 

event of a WMD incident. Considerations include availability of adequate supplies, 

personnel, and equipment in theater to deal with animal and food contamination from a 

WMD incident. Coordination with the World Food Programme, Food and Agriculture 

Organization, World Organization for Animal Health, or World Health Organization may 

be desirable. Veterinary service personnel can assist IGOs, NGOs, and the HN by 

conducting an assessment of the military or civilian veterinary and animal infrastructure 

and industry. 

For further guidance, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support. 

j. Weapons of Mass Destruction Consequence Management. WMD CM 

planning must address the JTF response to an accidental or deliberate release of CBRN 

hazards or contaminants into the operational environment or resulting from possible 

collateral damage and consequences of execution. 

 (1) Planning should address the capability for CBRN hazard identification and 

assessment, protection, avoidance, and decontamination considerations, if necessary for 

CBRN hazards across the range of military operations. 

 (2) JIPOE and other threat analysis activities should include known or 

suspected CBRN hazards that may impact military operations. 

 (3) WMD CM activities in the homeland, conducted through CS operations, 

will require coordination at the interagency federal, state, and local levels. 

 (4) FCM activities not associated with combat operations may be required due 

to a specific HN request in response to an accidental or intentional release of CBRN 

hazards, generally in support of foreign disaster relief operations. Coordination will be 

required with the DOS, the American embassy or US consulate, and the affected or 

requesting nation. 

 (5) WMD CM during combat operations should consider the capabilities and 

limitations of US forces, multinational forces, and host or staging nation consistent with 

the assessed CBRN threat. 

For further guidance on CBRNE CM planning considerations, refer to JP 3-41, 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence 

Management, JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

(CBRN) Environments, and FM 3-11.21/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 

3-37.2C/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-11.24/Air Force Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP(I)) 3-2.37, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Consequence Management Operations. 
Chapter V 

V-14 JP 3-40 

 k. Interagency Coordination. The involvement of a large collection of agencies 

and organizations is a common thread throughout CWMD operations. These interagency 

participants, many with indispensable practical competencies and significant legal 

responsibilities, often provide enabling functions critical to the success of CWMD 

operations. Close, continuous, interagency and interdepartmental coordination and 

cooperation are necessary to effectively accomplish CWMD missions. 

 (1) The JIACG and joint interagency task force (if authorized) can assist with 

coordination. JIACG activities include: 

 (a) Planning conferences with interagency partners as well as assessments 

that include realistic exercises to test plans. 

 (b) Advice on interagency plans and activities. 

 (c) Assistance resolving conflicts in interagency plans and operational 

issues. 

 (d) Providing civilian agency perspectives. 

 (e) Presenting unique interagency approaches, capabilities, and limitations. 

 (f) Providing linkage and reachback to parent organizations. 

 (2) Other considerations for interagency coordination include: 

 (a) Cooperate with each agency, department, or organization to obtain a 

clear definition of the role each plays. This is particularly important with organizations 

that provide enabling function for CWMD operations. 

 (b) Identify potential obstacles arising from conflicting departmental or 

agency priorities. Obstacles must be resolved early or forwarded up the chain of 

command for resolution. 

 (c) Establish responsibility. A common sense of ownership and 

commitment toward resolution is achievable when all participants understand what needs 

to be done and agree upon the means to do it. The resources required for a mission must 

be identified, with specific and agreed upon responsibility assigned to the agencies that 

will provide them. 

 (d) Plan for the transition of key responsibilities, capabilities, and 

functions. In most multiagency operations, civilian organizations will remain engaged 

long after the military has accomplished its assigned tasks and departed the operational 

area. Therefore, prior to employing military forces, it is imperative to plan for the 

transition of responsibility for specific actions or tasks from military to non-military 

entities. As plans and orders are developed, effective transition planning should be a 
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Planning Considerations 

V-15 

primary consideration. An example of this is the transitioning from WMD elimination 

operations to the continued demilitarization of a WMD program and associated weapons 

and materiel as part of threat reduction cooperation. 

 (e) Because DOD will often be in a supporting role during CWMD 

operations, it may not be responsible for determining the mission or specifying the 

participating agencies. Appropriate organization, C2, and an understanding of the 

objectives of the organizations involved are all means to build consensus and achieve 

unity of effort, regardless of role. The reciprocal exchange of information is also a 

critical enabler. 

 (3) It is important to note that most interagency participants in CWMD missions 

have a different lexicon for CWMD matters. With the publication of the NS-CWMD, 

most interagency participants organize their CWMD tasks from the three pillar 

perspective: NP, CP, and CM. This is in contrast to the DOD that further describes those 

tasks using the eight MMAs. 

 (4) When conducting CWMD activities in concert with participants external to 

the USG, it is important to understand the differences between US national objectives, 

end state, and transition criteria and those of IGOs and NGOs. Although appropriate 

IGOs and NGOs may participate in defining the problem and working collaboratively 

with the United States, ultimately their goals and objectives are independent of our own. 

For further guidance on interagency coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational 

Coordination During Joint Operations. 
Chapter V 

V-16 JP 3-40 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX A 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ELIMINATION OPERATIONS 

A-1 

1. Operational Construct 

a. WMD elimination operations are actions to systematically locate, characterize, 

secure, disable, or destroy WMD programs and related capabilities. The objective of 

WMD elimination operations is to prevent the looting or capture of WMD and related 

materials; render harmless or destroy weapons, materials, agents, and delivery systems 

that pose an immediate or direct threat to the Armed Forces of the United States and 

civilian population; and exploit, for intelligence purposes, program experts, documents, 

and other media, as well as previously secured weapons and material to combat further 

WMD proliferation and prevent regeneration of a WMD capacity. Once these activities 

have been accomplished, WMD elimination operations may be transferred, if directed, to 

OGAs, IGOs, or HNs to continue destruction, redirection, and monitoring activities. If 

transfer is not directed, commanders should be prepared to accomplish the remaining 

activities, and should request coordination and technical assistance from applicable 

agencies, as necessary. 

b. WMD elimination operations consist of four principal operational level tasks: 

isolation; exploitation; destruction; and monitoring and redirection (see Figure A-1). 

WMD elimination operations may be conducted during any phase of a combatant 

command’s campaign or as an independent operation. That is, the four steps of WMD 

elimination discussed below may be performed simultaneously at various geographically 

separate sites. JTF-E activities will require logistics and security to be drawn from 

resources possibly allocated to ongoing operations. Most non-DOD agencies require a 

secure environment to support WMD elimination missions. Military planners should 

consider this when considering site security. In addition, requirements for WMD 

elimination should be considered when planning or conducting operations in all WMD 

MMAs. The following discussion assumes the formation of a functional JTF-E as 

described in Chapter III, paragraph 2, “Command Relationships.” Figure A-2 illustrates 

the overall concept of operations. 

(1) Isolation is the overall encirclement of the WMD program. 

(a) The purpose of isolation is to physically secure suspected WMD sites, 

material, equipment, or personnel. The objective is to ensure suspected sites and 

materials are secure to prevent possible proliferation, pilfering, or destruction of potential 

forensic evidence; detain personnel; and prevent dispersion, contamination, or collateral 

effects of the release of dangerous WMD materials or agents. These actions ensure the 

safety of US and multinational forces and the surrounding civilian population. Forces 

must establish and maintain the conditions for elimination operations by securing 

sensitive sites. To accomplish this step, the Services must train and equip forces with the 

capacity to identify WMD and associated delivery systems and isolate them for further 

exploitation. 

(b) Isolation consists of four principal tasks: locate, isolate, seize or secure, 

and confirm or deny. 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-40 

1. Locate. This task includes continuously collecting actionable 

intelligence about adversary programs from the strategic to the tactical level. The new 

intelligence collected expands, redirects, and reprioritizes intelligence collection 

activities. During the prosecution of military operations, maneuver and support units act 

upon that intelligence to physically locate adversary WMD programs and associated 

networks or they may inadvertently encounter WMD sites. Planning should provide a 

target or site list prioritization method for determining sites that should be exploited. An 

all-source balance of ISR, to include technical intelligence and human intelligence, is 

essential to this task and to counter an adversary’s CCD and hardening of WMD 

programs and facilities. 

ELIMINATION MISSION SCHEMATIC

LEGEND

Maneuver Units

Transfer from Military 

Lead to Threat Reduction

JTF-E joint task force-elimination

WMD weapons of mass destruction

INTELLIGENCE SECURITY

Destruction

Monitoring 

and 

Redirection

Convert WMD 

programs, 

personnel, sites 

and facilities to 

prevent transfer, 

reconstitution, 

and misuse of 

residual dualuse capabilities

z

z

z

z

z

Destroy

Dismantle

Remove

Transfer

Dispose

z

z

z

z

Preservation

Characterize

Exploit

Disable/ 

Neutralize

z

z

z

z

Locate

Isolate

Seize/ 

Secure

Confirm/ 

Deny

Decide

Abandon

Abandon or 

Transfer 

Responsibility

Isolation Exploitation

Figure A-1. Elimination Mission Schematic 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Operations 

A-3

2. Isolate. Once a known or suspected WMD site is located, actions 

are taken to physically isolate it. This task should be accomplished by forces and 

deconflicted with OGAs. During isolation, units must consider CBRN passive defense 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ELIMINATION 

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

JOINT CAPABILITIES

Representative capabilities; not all-inclusive

All Services Air Force Army Navy

Marine

Corps DOD/ Interagency

z

z

z

z

z

z

z

Communications

Intelligence 

(include 

Interrogators/ 

Linguists)

Decon

EOD

Engineer

Medical (CBRNE 

specialties)

SOF

z

z

z

z

AFRAT

Specialized Airlift

Mission/UAV

Nuc Wpn Experts

z

z

z

z

z

z

20th SUPCOM (CBRNE)

IRF (Incident Response 

Force)

Chemical/EOD Units

WMD CE Teams 

(CBRNE Element)

CRT (CBRNE Element)

NDT (Nuclear 

Disablement Team)

z

z

Transportable 

Bio Lab

Nuc Wpn 

Experts

z CBIRF z

z

z

z

z

z

z

z

z

z

DOE

DIA

DTRA

JECE

CBRNE Operational HQ

IRF (Incident Report Force)

CBRNE/EOD Units

WMD CE Teams 

(Coordination Element)

CRT (CBRNE Response Team)

NDT (Nuclear Disablement Team)

Secured/ 

Bypassed Site Suspected Site

Maneuver Forces

Confirmed Site

Disablement 

Operations

Security 

Operations

Security 

Operations

Survey

and Recce 

Operations

Samples 

Tech 

Escort

Lab or 

Analytic 

Facility

WMD Material 

Tech Escort Central 

Deconstruction or 

Offshore Facility

Exploitation 

Operations

JECE Designated

JTF-E HQ

Designated Other JTF-E HQ SMEs

Ops/Intel

Fusion

HQ

Supported

JFC

LEGEND

AFRAT Air Force radiation assessment team

CBIRF chemical-biological incident response force

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives

Decon decontamination

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DTRG Defense Technical Response Group

EOD explosive ordnance disposal

HQ headquarters

Intel intelligence

JECE joint elimination coordination element

JFC joint force commander

JTF-E joint task force – elimination

Nuc nuclear

Ops operations

SME subject matter expert

SOF special operations forces

Tech technical

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

WMD weapons of mass destruction

Wpn weapon

Figure A-2. Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Concept of Operations 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-40 

and WMD CM measures due to the potential for material release. Consideration should 

be given to the need for additional security forces required in the event that unanticipated 

WMD sites are encountered by maneuver units. 

3. Seize or Secure. WMD sites are likely to be protected by active 

and passive security measures, and may require lethal and nonlethal offensive actions to 

reduce or neutralize them. Planning should address how to detect, assess, and defeat site 

defenses; establish and maintain secure control of WMD sites until the absence of CBRN 

material is confirmed, or until the hazard is eliminated or removed; and transfer the 

mission and responsibility for security to another agency as part of the threat reduction 

cooperation CWMD MMA. This may require coordination for additional assets based on 

the extent of site defenses and size/type of WMD sites. Planning must address the impact 

of security requirements for a large number of sites (which may progressively drain 

organic assets) and transition of the security mission to other forces or organizations. 

Planning must also consider the need for robust/high bandwidth communications at each 

site. The responsibility for a site’s long-term security, where there is no longer an 

immediate threat, may be transferred to the lead agency for the threat reduction 

cooperation CWMD MMA, when directed. JTF-E will plan for and coordinate the 

transfer of security to authorities responsible for threat reduction cooperation if a 

cooperative and permissive operational environment exists. 

4. Confirm or Deny. Once a suspected site is isolated and secured, 

the presence of WMD must be confirmed or denied using organic equipment and specific 

predeployment training. If the presence of WMD cannot be confirmed, additional 

specialized low-density, high-demand WMD elimination survey and reconnaissance 

assets may be deployed. These assets are the next tier of response and augment 

conventional forces, when needed, must have the required training, equipment, and 

expertise needed to conduct initial survey of sites to confirm or deny the presence of 

WMD material, expertise, or technology. 

(2) Exploitation. The intent of this task is to gain an understanding of an 

adversary’s WMD programs and capabilities to attribute and connect to the adversary’s 

network, which may determine future targets; collect evidence of a WMD program; and 

provide force protection from immediate WMD threats, if required. Exploitation requires 

specialized CBRN, intelligence, and technical augmentation forces within the Services, 

CSAs (such as DTRA), and OGAs (such as DOE and DOS) capable of conducting 

sensitive site exploitation operations. These agencies may require the establishment of a 

locally permissive environment to conduct their activities. Throughout the process, 

careful attention to the chain of custody is necessary. Four principal actions comprise 

exploitation: preserve, characterize, exploit, and disable or neutralize. 

(a) Preserve. If the weapon’s contents are unconfirmed or uncertain, 

further examination by specialized forces may be required. For suspected or known 

WMD sites, in addition to tactical security, a primary challenge is safeguarding suspected 

materials until specialized forces can characterize the material and exploit the site. Longterm security requirements for WMD elimination operations are potentially 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Operations 

A-5

overwhelming. Additional security forces should be planned for, and assigned to, the 

elimination mission. The actual number required depends on the number and size of sites 

the unit is expected to locate and exploit. In the case of WMD materials located aboard 

vessels, identification of suitable airfields, ports, and capable facilities may be required to 

accomplish follow-on characterization and exploitation operations. 

(b) Characterize. Once a site is isolated, dedicated exploitation assets or 

specialized technical forces exploit the site in accordance with the JFC commander’s 

critical information requirement (i.e., initial characterization may occur during isolation). 

These assets have the necessary expertise and specialized equipment to characterize 

WMD weapons, materials, agents, equipment, infrastructure, and delivery means; provide 

a presumptive analysis; and package and transport WMD material for shipment to a preidentified facility for confirmation. “Characterization” includes detailed assessments that 

may take hours to days to complete. USG or internationally designated laboratories with 

accepted confirmatory capabilities, as well as assets with other required capabilities, are 

not generally organic to a theater. 

(c) Exploit. Exploitation assets conduct initial intelligence exploitation of 

program experts, documents, and other media as well as secure weapons, material, 

agents, delivery means, and related processes and facilities (e.g., R&D, production, test, 

and evaluation) found in and around the site. These assets also conduct necessary 

evidence packaging and handling. Detailed reports and imagery are sent to the 

appropriate headquarters/agencies for further analysis. This analysis can lead to a reprioritization of WMD sites or identify additional sites or experts for investigation. 

Exploitation activities are essential for arresting further WMD proliferation and 

preventing WMD program regeneration. They also include taking full advantage of any 

information obtained for tactical, operational, or strategic purposes. Clear policy 

guidance with regard to incentives, amnesty, debriefing, and interrogation is essential to 

effectively manage these actions. Exploitation will require the fusion of multiple DOD 

and OGA organizations, as well as the integration of additional skill sets such as 

technical WMD and specialized intelligence analysts. 

(d) Disable/Neutralize. Exploitation assets will render harmless or destroy 

weapons, materials, agents, and delivery systems that pose an immediate threat to the 

Armed Forces of the United States and civilian populations. The intent of 

“disable/neutralize” is to provide force protection from WMD rather than to conduct the 

destruction of the WMD program. 

(3) Destruction. Once a site has been exploited and it has been determined that 

it is not a component of a dual-use industry that will be designated for redirection, 

destruction may begin. The purpose of this task is to destroy, dismantle, remove, 

transfer, or otherwise verifiably dispose of an adversary’s WMD material, weapons 

equipment, and infrastructure. While the ideal case is to conduct destruction operations 

in a permissive environment, the military must plan for and, if necessary, conduct this 

step in a hostile or uncertain environment until conditions permit the transfer to another 

agency. Since these operations are subject to monitoring by various government agencies 
Appendix A 

A-6 JP 3-40 

or IGOs, planners should anticipate specific national level guidance. While destruction 

may be conducted at any time during the exploitation task to ensure safety, it is always 

coordinated and authorized at the appropriate level in accordance with approved 

supplemental WMD elimination-specific ROE or RUF. 

(a) Planners must closely coordinate with higher HQ to plan destruction 

activities with OGAs and international agencies, or plan handover of these activities to 

nonmilitary entities. As soon as practical during an operation, the JTF-E, if established, 

should initiate planning activities to support transfer of associated long-term destruction 

activities to threat reduction cooperation activities. This is essential to ensure that the 

limited organizations with technical capabilities to conduct WMD exploitation and 

destruction are available to support combat operations. 

(b) In the case where the military continues with destruction activities, the 

JTF-E will assess and make recommendations for what needs to be done and what 

resources are required. The JTF-E will adapt destruction procedures to cope with a 

program’s scope, size, and expected duration. The personnel, equipment, and facilities 

required for destruction depend on the quantity and type of WMD material at the sites; 

the number of sites; the extent of the program’s infrastructure; logistics; and the urgency 

in which to complete the operation. WMD destruction may be accomplished by military 

personnel, specialized technical experts, civilian organizations, or commercial companies 

from the United States or multinational partners. 

(c) Depending on the situation, destruction may occur at the site or at a 

central processing site. DOD safeguards and maintains proper chain of custody from 

time of possession through destruction for all WMD and materials. All documentation 

will be maintained in accordance with existing treaties and conventions. For example, all 

chemical weapons and material must have chain of custody and destruction 

documentation in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 

For detailed guidance, refer to CJCSI 2030.01B, Chemical Weapons Convention 

Compliance Policy Guidance, and CJCSI 3110.07C, Guidance Concerning Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense and Employment of Riot Control Agents 

and Herbicides. 

(4) Monitoring and Redirection. As with the destruction task, this task is 

highly dependent on the interagency and IGOs. Planning cells should be formed early in 

the process to ensure the necessary coordination occurs. 

(a) Monitoring requires continuous observation and examination of former 

WMD programs and sites to ensure eliminated programs are not reconstituted. 

(b) Redirection involves the conversion of material, equipment, and 

personnel to peaceful purposes. This mission is normally performed by personnel from 

DOE, DOS, Central Intelligence Agency, and other interagency or international partners 

until such time as the complete CWMD program transition from WMD elimination to 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Operations 

A-7

threat reduction cooperation is achieved, as allowed by the conditions of the operational 

environment. To successfully redirect an adversary’s WMD program, an initial survey 

must be conducted. First, an overall assessment of the remaining dual-use facilities, 

technologies, and technical expertise is conducted to determine the expected level and 

type of legitimate output. Second, an assessment of the adversary’s peaceful CBRN 

requirements is performed. These requirements may include, but are not limited to, 

vaccination and pharmaceutical programs, nuclear power, medical radiological 

requirements, and industrial chemical requirements. Once the level and type of capacity 

is established, all aspects of the program are monitored to ensure continued compliance. 

(c) The final task associated with monitoring and redirection is the 

transition to threat reduction cooperation or similar mission. Threat reduction 

cooperation activities include long-term destruction, redirection, and monitoring, and are 

ideally conducted in a permissive environment, even if that environment is only local. 

However, these activities may commence in an uncertain environment. For example, as a 

result of hostilities, the appropriate authorities may no longer be effective or even exist. 

(d) A JTF-E planning cell(s) should be formed as soon as the exploitation 

task/action identifies the locations and extent of a dual-use industry or expertise for 

redirection and monitoring. The planning cell(s) must develop a transition plan to threat 

reduction cooperation to support phase IV (Stabilize) and phase V (Enable Civil 

Authority) operations. At a minimum, planning considerations should include: 

1. Determination of legal and policy authorities. 

2. Identification of all agencies and organizations that should be 

involved. 

3. Coordination of the changeover for providing security. 

4. Coordination of leave behinds (e.g., specialized assets, chemicalbiological defense equipment, nonlethal weapons, power generators, provisions). 

5. Coordination of logistic support transition. 

6. Coordination with HN for transition of the mission to threat 

reduction cooperation. 

2. Operational Planning 

a. Adversaries include state and non-state actors and the networks that support them. 

Planners must consider how to conduct elimination operations against both. 

Commanders should be prepared to conduct WMD elimination activities from the 

initiation of an operation until it is determined that a transfer of authority to another 

agency is warranted. The objective of elimination operations is to reduce or eliminate the 

threat to the United States and to support military and national objectives. Planners must 
Appendix A 

A-8 JP 3-40 

determine how to conduct elimination operations that ensure the safety of the Armed 

Forces of the United States and multinational partners through the following: 

(1) Security operations to prevent looting, use, or capture of WMD and related 

materials. 

(2) CBRN passive defense or WMD CM operations in the event WMD is 

employed by an adversary (e.g., improvised WMD device, booby trapped WMD site). 

(3) Rendering chemical, biological, and radiological WMD harmless or 

destroying weapons, materials, agents, and delivery systems that pose an immediate 

threat to the Armed Forces of the United States and civilian populations. 

(4) Render safe operations of nuclear weapons are not covered in this 

document. These operations are specifically addressed in other plans or integrated into 

regional WMD elimination operations. 

(5) Intelligence exploitation of program experts, documents, and other media, as 

well as, previously secured weapons and material. Specialized low-density/high-demand 

assets and linguists may be required to support the WMD elimination mission. 

(6) In any phase of elimination operations, there is a potential to discover 

previously undetected threats. Credible information on imminent threats must be 

reported in accordance with JOPES and supported CCDR reporting procedures. 

b. Once elimination operations have been planned, planners should turn their 

attention to the transition phase of WMD elimination. During this phase, operations may 

be transferred to the lead agency for threat reduction cooperation or some other entity, as 

directed by the SecDef, to continue destruction of WMD programs and to redirect and 

monitor dual-use industry and expertise capable of regenerating WMD capability. 

c. Adversary WMD programs include, but are not limited to: 

(1) Weapon systems and associated stockpiles. 

(2) Raw sources/agents or precursor stockpiles. 

(3) Delivery Systems. Adversary WMD delivery systems can include artillery 

or rocket systems (e.g., mortars, howitzers, and multiple rocket launchers); motor vessels; 

missiles and missile systems; aircraft; UASs; and other unconventional delivery means. 

(4) Dual-use Facilities and Associated Expertise. Infrastructure, materials, and 

expertise that have legitimate civilian research and industry utility, but could be 

converted or employed to support WMD programs, are of particular concern in WMD 

elimination operations. 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Operations 

A-9

(a) Dual-use facilities include, but are not limited to: commercial nuclear 

power facilities; nuclear research reactors; civilian or academic R&D facilities, 

laboratories, or production facilities; facilities with capacities exceeding amounts deemed 

necessary for civilian or peaceful purposes; pharmaceutical research and production 

facilities; medical vaccination production/formulation programs; radioisotope 

thermoelectric generators; and food irradiation facilities. 

(b) Dual-use expertise includes personnel and documents associated with 

WMD research, production, testing, storage, proliferation networks, or operations. 

d. WMD elimination operations may be required for WMD programs characterized 

as small-scale, narrow scope through large-scale, broad scope. WMD elimination 

operations could be required for some or all of the four types of WMD (chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear) and their delivery systems during the same 

operation. Based on threat estimates, CCDRs should ensure capabilities to conduct 

operations against each of these scenarios. 

e. To increase the effectiveness of WMD elimination operations, CCDRs should 

integrate them into campaign plans from phase 0 (Shape) through phase V (Enable Civil 

Authority). The process for transferring this mission to OGAs or IGOs, at the appropriate 

time, must also be considered. If forces are permanently assigned, this planning should 

incorporate force training and exercising. 

f. Since contamination may exist at any WMD site, WMD elimination operations 

require the ability to operate in a CBRN environment. WMD elimination operations may 

require WMD CM or CBRN passive defense activities. 

3. Command and Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Operations 

a. Small-scale WMD elimination operations may be handled within a CCDR’s preexisting command structure by relying on limited technical augmentation capabilities. 

For medium to large scale WMD elimination operations, a JTF-E or combined joint task 

force-WMD elimination may be required. Medium to large-scale WMD elimination 

operations require specialized technical capabilities. The following describes 

organizational constructs to achieve this larger capability. 

b. Joint Task Force-WMD Elimination. A JTF-E may be established, by an 

establishing authority, for the WMD elimination mission and be dissolved when the 

mission is complete or transitioned to an OGA or another organization assigned as lead 

for threat reduction cooperation or similar MMA. The JTF-E's activities must be 

coordinated and integrated by the supported combatant command. The JTF-E should 

possess capabilities to: 

(1) Coordinate, through the supported CCDR, to ensure an interagency 

approach to isolate the adversary’s WMD program. This includes capabilities used to 

isolate personnel, equipment, material, agents, weapons, and delivery systems that may 
Appendix A 

A-10 JP 3-40 

not be controlled at the tactical level. These include capabilities to monitor and 

coordinate denial measures to close down cross border proliferation and ex-filtration of 

WMD, related material, means of delivery, and program personnel. 

(2) In coordination with, and with assistance from, maneuver forces, locate, 

seize and secure WMD, WMD sites, means of delivery, related-material, and expertise 

across a broad scope of programs. 

(3) Coordinate exploitation of WMD sites and individuals associated with 

WMD programs. 

(4) Conduct rapid destruction/render harmless nonnuclear WMD or WMD 

agents (e.g., mixed chemical and biological agents) in various dispositions (bulk, rounds, 

submunitions) for force protection purposes. 

(5) Integrate the exploitation of WMD infrastructure (e.g., plutonium reprocessing and high-enrichment uranium facilities); WMD R&D (e.g., nuclear research 

reactors); and WMD weapons, components, and materials. 

(6) Redirect expertise. When directed, transfer former adversary’s personnel 

with WMD-related expertise or their personnel files to the lead USG agency for threat 

reduction cooperation. 

(7) When directed, initiate redirection of WMD programs and catalogue dualuse facilities in preparation for transfer to the lead OGA for threat reduction cooperation 

or similar mission. 

(8) Locate, seize, and control illicit or excess radiological materials. 

(9) Exploit and, if necessary, destroy WMD-capable missile systems and other 

delivery systems. 

(10) Report potential imminent threats discovered in accordance with JOPES 

and supported CCDR procedures. 

(11) Recommend reprioritization of WMD program components based on 

exploited sites. 

(12) Remain in compliance with related treaties; and establish and maintain 

chain of custody of seized materials, records, and personnel for further exploitation or 

transfer to legal authorities. 

(13) Coordinate and deconflict existing nuclear render safe capabilities with 

JTF-E operations. 

For detailed guidance on JTFs, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Operations 

A-11

 c. JTF-E Headquarters (see Figure A-3). When formed, a JTF-E HQ would be 

drawn from three sources: 

 (1) Portions of an existing standing joint force or subordinate component as 

directed by the supported CCDR; and 

(2) The Joint Elimination Coordination Element (JECE); and 

 (3) Other capabilities from the Services and specialized joint activities 

including CSAs. 

 (4) Elements of the JTF-E HQ will be a combination of DOD functional and 

technical experts; be augmented by non-DOD personnel, as appropriate; and have real 

time reachback capability to national level technical experts. At a minimum, and as 

required by the supported CCDR to conduct specific WMD elimination operations, the 

JTF-E HQ should possess the capabilities to: 

 (a) Load for movement to a port of embarkation. 

NOTIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE – 

ELIMINATION HEADQUARTERS COMPOSITION

JECE JTF-E

And/Or HQ

+ +

HQ Element

Joint 

Elimination 

Coordination 

Element

Individual 

SJFHQ or Alignment

Service HQ

CBRNE

LEGEND

JECE joint elimination coordination element

JTF-E joint task force - elimination

SJFHQ standing joint force headquarters

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and highyield explosives

HQ headquarters

Figure A-3. Notional Joint Task Force-Elimination Headquarters Composition 
Appendix A 

A-12 JP 3-40 

 (b) Deploy into an operational area to C2 WMD elimination operations. 

 (c) Coordinate operations with friendly forces, OGAs, foreign 

governments, IGOs, and HNs. 

 (d) Provide overall assessment, analysis, and planning for elimination 

operations. 

 (e) Coordinate planning activities with other commands. 

 (f) Plan for JTF-E deployment, employment, and redeployment. 

 (g) Plan for transfer of responsibility of elimination operations to or from 

CCDR from or to other agencies. 

 (h) Plan for mitigation of potential WMD elimination collateral effects. 

 (i) Conduct WMD elimination operations training and rehearsals. 

 (j) Maintain situational awareness of all elimination activities within the 

AOR. 

 (k) Recommend prioritization of WMD equipment, technology, facilities, 

and personnel for elimination activities. 

 (l) Integrate into the supported combatant command's C2 and coordination 

processes (e.g., joint targeting coordination board). 

 (m) Maintain coordination and communication with SCC-WMD for 

CWMD intelligence and situational awareness. 

d. Joint Elimination Coordination Element. The JECE is a standing joint element 

assigned to USSTRATCOM and designated to conduct operational level WMD 

elimination planning (including contingency and crisis action planning), joint training, 

and exercises in support of JFC requirements. The JECE focuses on activities and 

operations necessary to train and prepare joint forces and C2 elements to conduct WMD 

elimination missions. The JECE will: 

(1) Provide support to the JTF-E commander for JTF-E HQ activities, including 

planning, training, and exercises. 

(2) When requested, 

(a) Assist CCDRs, through SCC-WMD, with the development and 

execution of joint training exercises involving WMD elimination. 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Operations 

A-13

(b) Assist CCDR’s subordinate commands in the development of their 

operational and tactical level planning for WMD elimination missions (contingency and 

crisis action planning). 

(3) Coordinate with SCC-WMD for planning support to CCDRs and assist with 

development of joint and Service WMD elimination operations doctrine and tactics, 

techniques, and procedures. 

(4) Plan, participate in, and conduct joint elimination training and exercises in 

support of CCDR requirements and ensure the readiness of JECE personnel. 

(5) Maintain world-wide situational awareness of WMD elimination operations 

to focus activities in support of CCDR requirements. 

(6) Assist USSTRATCOM in prioritizing DOD WMD elimination planning and 

support activities. 

(7) In a contingency and upon request, deploy to either augment an established 

JFC’s HQ as a specialized WMD elimination element, or provide the core joint element 

to enable a Service or existing JTF HQ to function as a JTF-E HQ. The JECE is 

normally transferred to the JTF-E commander when a JTF-E is established or to a 

supported JFC if a JTF-E is not established. The gaining commander is assumed the 

operational control of the JECE. The supported JFC will define specific C2 relationships. 

e. Figure A-4 provides a notional JTF-E construct and task organization. This is a 

notional organization to assist planners in JTF-E development. The supported GCC will 

task organize a JTF-E to meet mission specific requirements. 

4. Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Organizations and Functions 

 The following roles and responsibilities are specific to the WMD elimination mission 

and are in addition to those listed in Chapter III, “Organizational and Command 

Relationships.” 

a. Geographic Combatant Commanders 

(1) Plan and, as required, execute WMD elimination operations. 

(2) In coordination with the intelligence community, assess the importance of a 

current or pending movement/transfer of WMD-related materials, technology, precursors, 

funding, information, or personnel. 

(3) In coordination with the intelligence community, develop a WMD 

elimination target list. 
Appendix A 

A-14 JP 3-40 

(4) Assess WMD elimination implications of the theater proliferation situation. 

(5) Establish WMD material temporary safe storage for WMD elimination 

missions. 

(6) Provide security and logistic support to WMD elimination elements. 

(7) Provide for intratheater movement of WMD elimination personnel and 

specialized WMD equipment. 

NOTIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE - ELIMINATION 

CONSTRUCT

CWMD 

Capabilities

Defense Agency 

and Service 

Assets

Some assets may 

constitute the 

JTF-E HQ

Other assets may 

be distributed 

among the forces 

below

US Government 

International 

Partner and NGO 

Contributions

Security

Forces

Medical

Forces

Sustainment

Forces

Communications

Forces

Engineering 

Forces

NOTIONAL 

JTF-E

LEGEND

CWMD combating weapons of mass destruction

GFMP Global Force Management Policy

HQ headquarters

JTF-E joint task force - elimination

NGO nongovernmental organization

Figure A-4. Notional Joint Task Force- Elimination Construct
Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Operations 

A-15

(a) Where applicable, develop threat reduction cooperation plans to allow 

for transfer and termination of WMD elimination missions. 

(b) Coordinate with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

and JS to ensure WMD elimination operations are in compliance with US international 

treaty and agreement obligations. 

(8) In coordination with the intelligence community and exploitation efforts, 

exploit data, personnel, information, and materials obtained during WMD elimination 

operations, and report any potential or likely threats to the United States, the Armed 

Forces of the United States, multinational partners, or interests in accordance with JOPES 

and supported CCDR reporting procedures. 

(9) Provide after action reviews and lessons learned to facilitate future WMD 

elimination mission planning. 

b. Commander, United States Joint Forces Command 

(1) As the joint force provider and trainer, provides forces and training when 

directed, using established policies and procedures. 

(2) As the designated establishing authority for the JTF-E, comply with 

guidance in JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, applicable to a functional CCDR. 

(3) Supports the development of joint concepts and joint doctrine for WMD 

elimination. 

(4) When directed, assesses and recommends modifications to joint force HQ 

and structures as they relate to WMD elimination missions. 

(5) When directed, collects, compiles, and catalogs lessons learned for WMD 

elimination missions. 

(6) As DOD lead for joint force integration, coordinates WMD elimination 

integration efforts with USSTRATCOM. 

c. Commander, United States Special Operations Command 

(1) Provides technical means to disable WMD, as required. 

(2) Provides special reconnaissance teams to monitor WMD sites, border 

crossings, and likely exfiltration locations as part of the isolation step. 

(3) Provides teams to conduct direct action operations in limited access areas, as 

required. 
Appendix A 

A-16 JP 3-40 

(4) Provides expertise, material, and teams to locate, tag, and track WMD, as 

required. 

d. Commander, United States Strategic Command 

(1) Assesses WMD elimination implications of the global proliferation 

situation. 

(2) Provides recommendations for global force management of WMD 

elimination related assets. 

(3) Provides ISR planning, integration, and coordination support to a CCDR’s 

WMD elimination plans and operations. 

(4) Exercises combatant command (command authority) over the JECE. 

(a) Maintains the JECE, as a deployable capability, to support a request for 

forces. 

(b) The JECE will operate in direct support of the 20th Support Command 

for JTF-E planning, operations, training, and exercises. During day to day operations, 

SCC-WMD assigns JECE tasks and designates its objectives; directs JECE 

administration, organization, and training; and provides other directions necessary to 

accomplish its mission (see Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 3 

December 2007). 
APPENDIX B 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTERDICTION OPERATIONS 

B-1 

SECTION A. OVERVIEW 

1. General 

a. Purpose. This appendix provides a reference for staff officers assigned to a 

geographic or functional combatant command, JTF, or other major staff and operational 

elements responsible for planning and executing WMD interdiction operations. It 

addresses: 

(1) Interagency roles and responsibilities for WMD interdiction; 

(2) CCDR roles, responsibilities, and employment of WMD interdiction 

capabilities as part of a theater campaign to combat WMD in support of national strategic 

goals; and 

(3) Linkages between WMD interdiction, WMD security cooperation and 

partner activities, WMD elimination, and threat reduction cooperation MMAs necessary 

to prevent, dissuade, and deny adversary attempts to proliferate WMD. 

b. Background. WMD interdiction operations are those operations conducted in 

support of national efforts to prevent, dissuade, and deny adversary attempts to proliferate 

or acquire WMD. It is important to note that since the majority of WMD interdiction 

operations involve dual-use items, precursors, and associated technology and personnel, 

and not finished weapons, most other USG agencies refer to the mission as CP 

WEAPONS OFMASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) INTERDICTION 

WMD interdiction encompasses operations directed towards

weaponized chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

devices/warheads and delivery vehicles; dual-use items required to 

produce devices/warheads, their precursors, or related items; related 

technology; financial and transportation intermediaries which facilitate 

trade in WMD; and individuals associated with all the above. 

VARIOUS SOURCES 

INTERDICTION 

“Effective interdiction is a critical part of the US strategy to combat weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means. We must enhance the 

capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement 

communities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and 

expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations.” 

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Appendix B 

interdiction. DOD’s use of the term WMD interdiction is intended to capture the same 

mission. 

(1) The overall national objective is to deny rogue states and violent extremist 

organizations (VEOs) access to WMD by disrupting procurement networks that seek 

access to finished WMD, dual-use materials and technology required to produce WMD, 

and expertise necessary to develop and employ WMD. Ultimately, reducing the 

proliferation of WMD is likely to depend on neutralizing WMD network functions (e.g., 

financial, production, logistic, C2, scientific) that support WMD proliferation. The 

United States pursues this objective through a national-level campaign targeted at state 

and non-state actors of proliferation concern orchestrated through the National Security 

Council (NSC). This campaign links the NP activities of active diplomacy, threat 

reduction cooperation, controls on nuclear materials, US export controls, and NP 

sanctions, with the CP activity of interdiction. These activities are dependent upon, and 

mutually supported by, targeted SC and focused intelligence gathering and analysis. 

WMD interdiction operations support the following national-level tasks derived from 

national guidance: 

(a) Establish or reinforce global norms against unsanctioned possession or 

proliferation of WMD, especially to VEOs, through diplomatic means; 

(b) Globally monitor through an intelligence effort, to detect attempts to 

proliferate WMD; 

(c) Dissuade WMD suppliers from participating in proliferation activity 

through coordinated diplomatic, economic, and information campaigns; 

(d) Enable allies and partner nations to develop and enforce appropriate 

export control regimes within their own sovereign territory through security assistance 

for law enforcement and military activities; and 

(e) Enforce the norms against unsanctioned proliferation through military 

WMD interdiction operations in the global commons as necessary. 

(2) The DOD plays a critical role in executing these tasks. Of most relevance to 

WMD interdiction are the following DOD activities, derived from national guidance: 

(a) Build the capacity and will of allies and partner nations to enforce 

export controls within their sovereign territory; 

(b) Establish and maintain global situational awareness of WMD 

proliferation activities and attempts; 

(c) Support SC themes and messages; 

B-2 JP 3-40 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Operations 

(d) Support intelligence collection and exploitation, as well as law 

enforcement activities of OGAs; 

(e) Integrate WMD interdiction into command’s regional plans; 

(f) Support coordinated interagency actions to delay and disrupt identified 

proliferation shipments; and 

(g) Establish supremacy over selected areas of geography, as required, 

enabling physical interdiction of WMD by forces appropriate in each circumstance. 

(3) Geographic and functional combatant commands conduct WMD 

interdiction shaping activities as part of their regional CWMD efforts and broader transregional efforts. Security cooperation, military-to-military engagement, and 

intelligence/information sharing with allies and partner nations are the primary tools 

CCDRs employ to shape the regional environment. In response to appropriate cueing 

from intelligence, and upon receiving direction from the President or SecDef, or within 

existing authorities, commanders prepare the operational environment and interdict 

specific WMD-related shipments. 

(4) Commanders cannot plan or conduct WMD interdiction activities 

irrespective of interagency and international considerations. In most cases, DOD will not 

have the lead for WMD interdiction actions. However, DOD must remain prepared to 

serve as the lead federal agency (LFA) or lead coordinating agency in WMD interdiction 

scenarios. To this end, geographic combatant commands must not only support overall 

USG WMD interdiction efforts but also prepare to conduct follow-on actions which may 

involve more aggressive postures. These postures include preparing for follow-on 

missions such as, but not limited to, WMD elimination or offensive operations to destroy 

WMD or WMD-related material in development, storage, or transit. 

“Interdiction operations are designed to stop the proliferation of WMD, 

delivery systems, associated and dual-use technologies, materials, and 

expertise from transiting between states of concern and between state and 

non-state actors, whether undertaken by the military or by other agencies of 

government (e.g., law enforcement).” 

National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 

2. Guidance 

This appendix derives its foundation from, and is supplemental to, existing WMD 

interdiction policy and guidance. 

a. International Treaties and Agreements and United Nations Security Council 

Resolutions. Various international treaties, agreements, and United Nations Security 

Council resolutions obligate member states to prevent WMD proliferation. US support 

B-3 
Appendix B 

for United Nations Security Council resolutions provides a basis for action under existing 

legislative and executive authorities. In some cases, additional legislation and executive 

orders are necessary. Where combatant commands believe they require additional legal 

authority to conduct WMD interdiction activities, they should seek guidance from OSD 

and JS. United Nations Security Council resolutions form the international legal basis for 

conducting WMD interdiction operations against the unsanctioned WMD transfer, 

possession, or use. The following lists of treaties and agreements are not all inclusive. 

(1) International Treaties. Signatories of The Treaty on Nonproliferation of 

Nuclear Weapons prohibit the proliferation, development, and transfer of nuclear 

weapons, related materials, and technology to any recipient. The CWC prohibits 

possession, development, or transfer of chemical weapons and limits transfer of dual-use 

technology used to make chemical weapons to states that are not signatories to the CWC. 

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of 

Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (The Biological 

Weapons and Toxins Convention) prohibits development or possession of biological 

weapons. The Missile Technology Control Regime limits the transfer of long-range (i.e., 

greater than 300 kilometers in range or 500 kilograms in payload) missiles and associated 

technology to any state. 

(2) United Nations Security Council Resolutions. United Nations Security 

Council resolutions 1540 and 1673 require member states to “detect, deter, prevent, and 

combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking 

and brokering” of WMD and delivery systems to non-state actors. United Nations 

Security Council resolutions 1695 and 1718 require member states to prevent 

proliferation of WMD and missile technology to and from North Korea. Similarly, 

United Nations Security Council resolutions 1696, 1737, and 1747 require member states 

to prevent proliferation of nuclear and missile technology to and from Iran. It is 

important to understand that United Nations Security Council resolutions do not 

automatically become US law. The United States will put in place either legislation, 

executive orders, or regulations which support United Nations Security Council 

resolution goals, or use existing authorities which can support United Nations Security 

Council resolution enforcement in their current form to create a basis for US WMD 

interdiction actions. 

b. US Domestic Law and Orders. The Arms Export Control Act and the Export 

Administration Act establish the framework for US export controls. Various executive 

orders under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act implement sanctions on 

specific entities for WMD-related activities. 

c. Strategic Guidance. There are various USG interagency coordination groups 

that focus national efforts on countering WMD threats and proliferation. National 

security Presidential directives (NSPDs) and legislation codify these bodies and create 

new agencies such as the National Counterproliferation Center and the Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office (DNDO). The National Military Strategy of the United States and the 

B-4 JP 3-40 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Operations 

National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction provide additional 

strategic guidance. 

3. Legal Considerations for Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction 

The JFC must consider the legal issues inherent in WMD interdiction operations to 

attain US national objectives. WMD interdiction operations must comply with US law, 

treaties, and bilateral agreements. Planners should involve their respective general 

counsel or SJA representative early in the campaign design or mission analysis phase and 

throughout execution to identify key issues and work to resolve them (see JP 1-04, Legal 

Support to Military Operations). Additionally, international allies and partner nations 

may have differing interpretations of rights and obligations under international law than 

the United States. This will require sensitivity, cooperation, and negotiation when 

operating in a multinational environment.

a. Treaties, US laws, US regulations, and bilateral agreements identify certain rights 

and obligations of states, ships, and aircraft related to search and seizure in territorial and 

international seas and airspace. These issues include state of belligerency, territorial 

rights, legal status of the target vessel, aircraft, or vehicle, use of military forces, seizure 

of material and detention of persons, preservation of evidence, and ROE/RUF during 

interdiction. WMD interdiction in cyberspace poses additional legal concerns. 

b. State of Belligerency. International law recognizes a difference in the rights of 

states during conflict (state of belligerency). Belligerent states may seize and condemn 

enemy vessels or vehicles, stop and search neutral vessels or vehicles for contraband, and 

blockade enemy port(s) and airspace on both the high seas and within the enemy’s 

territorial seas. This right does not extend to the territorial seas of neutral states or to 

international straits. 

c. Less clear are circumstances where no declared state of belligerency exists. This 

is the circumstance under which most WMD interdiction activities will occur. There is 

no definitive customary international law in this case. Article 51 of the United Nations 

Charter (right to self-defense) may provide some basis for action in this circumstance. 

United Nations Security Council resolutions may also provide basis for action under 

certain circumstances. 

d. Territorial Rights. The authority to stop and inspect a ship, aircraft, or ground 

vehicle resides with the nation in whose territory the vessel, aircraft, or vehicle is 

transiting. Key, but not all-encompassing, international agreements are the United 

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and Chicago Convention on 

International Civil Aviation. Although the US may not be a party to the UNCLOS or to 

all provisions of the Chicago Convention, many provisions of these treaties reflect 

customary norms, which give rise to rights and obligations under international law. 

B-5 
Appendix B 

(1) High Seas or International Airspace. UNCLOS identifies five 

circumstances in which a warship or military aircraft may exercise a right of visitation 

and board a ship otherwise engaged in legitimate commerce on the high seas. These are: 

(a) Vessel is engaged in piracy, 

(b) Vessel is engaged in slave trade, 

(c) Vessel is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the warship’s flag 

state has jurisdiction, 

(d) Vessel is without nationality, or 

(e) Vessel is same nationality as warship. 

(2) It is important to note that some military actions, such as hailing and 

querying vessels on the high seas, can be supportive of USG CP goals without being 

classified as interference with ships otherwise engaged in legitimate commerce. 

(3) National Airspace. Under the Chicago Convention, a state has the right to 

enforce its domestic laws and regulations on aircraft transiting its national airspace to 

include the airspace above its territorial borders and waters and to ensure the observance 

of any obligation of such state under a multilateral international agreement. A state may 

compel an aircraft entering its national airspace to land. 

(4) Territorial Waters and the Right of Innocent Passage. Under 

international law, states generally have the authority to enforce their domestic law within 

their territorial waters. However, the right of innocent passage constrains this right. 

Innocent passage is the right of a ship to transit territorial waters without undue 

impediment as long as it does not interact with any agency, business, or person of the 

state. 

(5) International Strait and Archipelagic Waters. Within international 

straits and archipelagic waters, ships and aircraft enjoy transit rights to proceed without 

impediment, other than that required to ensure safe navigation. 

e. Legal Status. The commercial maritime shipping and aviation industries often 

involve multiple layers of nationality in ownership, operating company, voyage 

contracting, leasing, flagging, vessel’s master/captain, etc. Each country associated with 

a specific transaction can be approached in some fashion to cooperate with WMD 

interdiction efforts. 

(1) Flag State Consent. Unless a UN Security Council resolution expressly 

states otherwise, the authority to stop and inspect a ship, civil aircraft, or ground vehicle 

(hereafter referred to collectively as a transport), or authority to authorize a third-party 

nation to stop and inspect, depends upon the “flag” registry of the transport. The flag 

B-6 JP 3-40 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Operations 

state of a transport can be different from the owner or operator nationality, and a transport 

is considered under the jurisdiction of the laws and directives of competent authority of 

the flag state. Generally, states have the right to stop and search any transport flagged 

(registered) by the state or authorize a third party to do the same. Under the PSI, the 

United States has negotiated a series of “boarding agreements” with certain other 

participants. These agreements provide for US boarding of these states’ flag shipping 

transport under specific circumstances and conditions. Planners should consult their 

command’s political advisor and SJA on these specific agreements. 

(2) Master’s or Command Pilot’s Consent. The United States holds that it 

may board and carry out certain activities on ships otherwise immune if the master 

(captain) of the ship provides consent. Although such boarding, while in international 

waters, is technically limited to a visit only, the master may authorize a boarding party to 

examine any portion of the ship. The master is, however, not obligated to provide 

extended authorization unless directed by competent authority of the flag state. With 

respect to aircraft in international airspace, the command pilot of a civil aircraft may 

consent to have the aircraft diverted from its original destination to a designated airport 

so it can land and be boarded for inspection. Some states do not necessarily concur with 

the US position. 

(3) Sovereign Immunity. Warships and military aircraft of a state enjoy 

sovereign immunity. Coastal states may not stop and search warships and military 

aircraft, but may direct them to depart the coastal state’s territorial waters. 

f. Posse Comitatus and Use of US Military Forces in Law Enforcement 

(1) Posse Comitatus. The “Posse Comitatus Act” (Title 18, USC, Section 

1385) prohibits use of the federalized US Army (USA), US Air Force (USAF), US Navy 

(USN), and US Marine Corps (USMC) to enforce domestic law unless authorized by the 

President, the Constitution, or Congress by Title 10, USC, Section 375, and DOD 

regulations. This includes active duty Soldiers in a Title 10, USC, status; reservists 

placed on active duty (Title 10, USC), active duty for training, or inactive duty for 

training status; National Guard Soldiers in federal service; and DOD civilian and contract 

personnel under the command of an officer in active duty status under Title 10, USC. 

There are a number of exceptions to the statute that allow military support for civilian 

law enforcement (see Title 10, US Code, Section 371). Posse Comitatus does not apply 

to National Guard personnel serving in a state on state active duty or Title 32, US Code 

status. In addition, Posse Comitatus does not apply to US Coast Guard (USCG) per Title 

14, US Code authority. However, the USCG is subject to Posse Comitatus Act when it is 

brought under the Navy by Presidential order during wartime. The servicing SJA must 

review all operations to ensure that they comply with the Act, other domestic laws, and 

DOD policy. 

(2) Title 10, US Code. Title 10 is the “Armed Forces” portion of the US Code. 

Chapter 18, “Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies,” gives basic 

guidance for the interaction of military and civilian law enforcement agencies. Title 10, 

B-7 
Appendix B 

USC, Section 375 directs SecDef to prescribe such regulations to prohibit a member of 

the USA, USN, USAF, and USMC from directly participating in arrests, searches, 

seizures, or other similar activity unless authorized by law (e.g., arrests on military 

property). 

(3) Title 14, US Code. Title 14, US Code applies to USCG personnel when 

they are performing their normal duties, which include enforcing US laws. USCG 

personnel can be used to enforce US laws anywhere in the world, with certain 

restrictions, and can participate in regular DOD-led interdiction operations retaining their 

Title 14, US Code authorities, even if assigned as additional Title 10, US Code forces. 

Roles and responsibilities for USCG personnel must be clearly laid out by area 

commanders prior to interdiction operations.

g. Seizure of Material and Detention of Persons. Seizures and detentions must 

have basis in international law, US law, or HN law. Specific cases and circumstances are 

too numerous to be recounted here. It is critical to involve the SJA as early as possible in 

the planning process to aid in determining requirements to support seizures, detentions, 

and expedite disposition. 

h. Disposition - Availability of Evidence and Chain of Custody. In cases 

involving probable prosecution by the United States or prosecuting state, agencies should 

take measures and provide guidance to field units regarding preservation of relevant 

evidence and establishing chain of custody. Preservation of the chain of custody is also 

essential to support attribution. 

(1) In cases involving possible foreign prosecutions arising from US 

interdictions and investigations, the interagency team should ascertain whether US 

investigators intend to make available all unclassified and relevant evidence to their 

counterparts in the prosecuting state for use by the prosecuting state in any hearings, 

trials, etc. This may include testimony, weapons, ammunition, imagery, small vessels, 

and other physical evidence requiring special handling or storage. 

(2) The prosecuting state should consider its transport and storage options 

(items are often located in third-party states or at-sea), as well as chain of custody 

procedures it may wish to communicate to the United States and other investigators. The 

prosecuting state may wish to engage in immediate coordination with officials and 

investigators of other concerned states to establish early chain of custody and collection 

and preservation of evidence in ways that ensure admissibility in prosecuting state courts. 

(3) The United States will, in appropriate circumstances, facilitate delivery of 

statements from US military witnesses to the prosecuting state. All requests for such 

personnel or their statements will normally be made to the cognizant US embassy for 

forwarding to DOD, the DHS (for the USCG), and DOJ. Consideration should be given 

to the availability of witnesses and facilitating contact with (including travel of) potential 

prosecuting state investigators while the witnesses remain available. 

B-8 JP 3-40 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Operations 

4. Relationship of Joint Interdiction to Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction 

a. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction, and WMD Interdiction. The NMS-CWMD defines 

WMD interdiction as operations “designed to stop the proliferation of WMD, delivery 

systems, associated and dual-use technologies, materials, and expertise from transiting 

between States of concern and between state and non-state actors, whether undertaken by 

the military or by other agencies of government (e.g., law enforcement).” JP 3-03, Joint 

Interdiction, defines interdiction for use across the range of military operations as “1. An 

action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military surface capability before it 

can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. 2. In 

support of law enforcement, activities conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, intercept, 

board, detain, or destroy, as appropriate, vessels, vehicles, aircraft, people, and cargo.” 

b. The NMS-CWMD addresses WMD interdiction more broadly than JP 3-03 by 

placing WMD interdiction within the context of the National Strategy to Combat WMD

and addressing not only the actual interdiction, but a broader national effort. Within the 

context of JP 3-03, the purpose of WMD interdiction can be interpreted as to divert

adversary proliferation assets by forcing urgent movement, thereby revealing the 

networks supporting WMD proliferation or channeling movement into less desirable, 

more costly, and more vulnerable avenues. Ultimately, WMD interdiction operations 

seek to disrupt the adversary’s ability to produce, transport, or acquire WMD, associated 

materials, technology and expertise, and modes of delivery by constricting the 

adversary’s logistic system supporting WMD development, imposing excessive costs, 

publicly revealing illicit behavior, and enforcing of sanctions. 

c. WMD interdiction operations may occur throughout the operational environment. 

WMD interdiction operations may occur in all conditions – permissive, uncertain, and 

hostile, and the specific condition can be subject to rapid change during conduct of 

operations. Specific activities may occur as stand-alone activities or as part of a larger 

theater campaign. Regardless, JFCs must ensure integration of their operations with the 

global USG campaign to combat WMD. 

SECTION B. INTERAGENCY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

5. Overview 

a. Successful WMD interdiction requires careful coordination and integration across 

all government agencies to appropriately engage all instruments of national power. 

Interagency coordination is the vital link between the military and the diplomatic, 

informational, and economic instruments of national power. Successful interagency 

coordination enables the USG to conduct coherent operations to achieve shared goals 

with maximum efficiency and effectiveness, build international support, and conserve 

resources. Understanding roles and relationships among agencies and organizations, 

geographic and functional combatant commands, US state and local governments, and 

the US chief of mission (COM) and country teams in US embassies or consulates, is 

B-9 
Appendix B 

essential to successful planning and execution of WMD interdiction throughout several 

phases. 

b. Illicit WMD-related trade and transfer is a dynamic process, featuring constant 

evolution of the relationships among suppliers, recipients, and intermediaries responsible 

for the sale, manufacture, and methods of obtaining or transporting WMD materials. A 

versatile and well-coordinated USG response is necessary. Specific roles, 

responsibilities, and relationships vary depending upon the circumstances surrounding 

each case and the phase of a WMD interdiction operation. Oversight of the WMD 

interdiction process is critical to ensure timely, appropriate tasking and coordination for 

interdiction activity outside of the United States. Interagency coordination across the 

USG is essential to developing the USG’s desired outcome for a situation, the successful 

execution of targeted strategies against state and non-state actors, and the disruption of 

proliferation programs and transactions. 

6. National Security Council and Homeland Security Council Role 

The NSC and Homeland Security Council (HSC) have similar structures, depicted in 

Figure B-1. Decisions are made at the lowest possible level or forwarded to the next 

senior committee or council for action. Each represented agency or department 

participates in NSC or HSC deliberations to address specific security policy issues and to 

identify specific agency contributions to selected actions. Both NSC and HSC coordinate 

the actions of individual groups called policy coordination committees (PCCs); some 

PCCs are coordinated jointly by NSC or HSC leadership. These joint and sometimes 

overlapping AORs can create potential for duplication of efforts or uncertainty as to 

which element carries higher authority. Interagency integration seeks to mitigate these 

problems through close coordination between NSC, HSC, and other interagency groups. 

7. Supporting Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Organizations and 

Agencies 

The following department or agency descriptions of roles, responsibilities, and 

actions are representative in nature and not to be construed as all-inclusive or static. USG 

CP capabilities, much like the mission space they address, are constantly evolving. 

 a. Department of Defense

(1) Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. SecDef has 

overall responsibility to the President for DOD CWMD responsibilities. The Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs is responsible for CP policy 

development and coordination within DOD. CJCS provides military advice to the 

President regarding CWMD. JS Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate provides military 

advice on WMD interdiction policy issues. JS Operations Directorate provides military 

advice on WMD interdiction operations. 

B-10 JP 3-40 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Operations 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL/HOMELAND SECURITY 

COUNCIL ORGANIZATION

President

Principles 

Committees

Deputies 

Committees

Policy 

Coordinating 

Committees

Sub-PCCs

Homeland Security Council (HSC):

President, VP, SECHS, AttGen, 

SecDef, DNI, CJCS, and others as 

invited

HSC/PC:

SECHS, SecDef, SECTREAS,Att Gen, 

SecHHS, SecTrans, DirOMB, DirFBI, 

DirFEMA, and others as invited

HSC/DC:

DepSECHS, DepSecDef, 

DepSECSTATE, Dep AttGen, 

DepSECTREAS, and others as invited

PCCs and Sub-PCCs:

Chaired by HSC, attendees invited 

as appropriate

National Security Council (NSC):

President, VP, SECSTATE, SecDef, 

DNI, CJCS, and others as invited

NSC/PC:

SECSTATE, SecDef, SECTREAS, COS 

Pres., COS VP, NSA to the VP, Dep 

NSA, DNI, CJCS, and others as invited

NSC/DC:

DepSECSTATE, DepSecDef, 

DepSECTREAS, DepDirOMB, Dep 

AttGen, and others as invited

PCCs and Sub-PCCs:

Chaired by NSC, attendees invited 

as appropriate







Decisions made at lowest 

allowable level

Issues/decisions forwarded up as 

necessary

Each applicable agency or 

department represented

LEGEND

AttGen Attorney General

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

COS chief of staff

DC deputies committee

Dep deputy

Dir director

DNI Director of National Intelligence

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

NSA National Security Agency

OMB Office of Management and Budget

PC principals committee

PCC policy coordination committee

Pres President

SecDef Secretary of Defense

SECHS Secretary of Homeland Security

SECSTATE Secretary of State

SECTREAS Secretary of the Treasury

VP Vice President

Figure B-1. National Security Council/Homeland Security Council Organization

(2) Combatant Commands. USSTRATCOM develops the global campaign 

plan that provides a planning construct designed to synchronize military activities in 

support of national CWMD efforts, including WMD interdiction. CDRUSSTRATCOM 

delegates authority for the interdiction mission to the SCC-WMD. USSTRATCOM is 

B-11 
Appendix B 

responsible for advocacy of CWMD capabilities and synchronizing CWMD planning for 

DOD CWMD. USSTRATCOM provides the primary military representation to other 

USG departments, US commercial entities, and international agencies for matters related 

to CWMD, as directed. Finally, CDRSTRATCOM provides prioritization 

recommendations to the SecDef regarding CWMD efforts. USJFCOM provides support 

for joint concept development and experimentation, joint force integration, and joint 

force training for interdiction. Geographic combatant commands conduct shaping 

activities and execute specific WMD interdiction operations. They are active participants 

in the PSI and feature support to PSI prominently in their CWMD plans. 

(3) Defense Intelligence Agency and other Defense Related Intelligence 

Organizations. DIA serves as the DOD focal point for intelligence collection, analysis, 

and dissemination as appropriate to help plan, shape, and inform interdiction operations. 

DIA’s main conduit for interdiction-related intelligence is the Defense Intelligence 

Operations Coordination Center housed at DIA headquarters. The National Security 

Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Maritime Intelligence 

Center, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, and National Ground Intelligence 

Center also play significant roles in collecting and analyzing CP-related intelligence. 

(4) Defense Threat Reduction Agency. DTRA provides specialized WMD 

expertise through fully deployable teams and reachback. DTRA supports combatant 

commands’ efforts during theater shaping, exercise design and creation, as well as at 

execution through reachback to technical expertise. To support CWMD activities, DTRA 

stations liaison officers at combatant commands. 

b. Department of State. DOS is responsible for international coordination in 

preparing for, and engaging in, WMD interdiction operations. The Secretary of State has 

direct responsibility for DOS policy development and coordination activities in support 

of the interagency process, in engaging with the COM at US embassies or consulates 

abroad, and in directing WMD interdiction activities within the appropriate DOS bureaus 

and offices. The Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security (Terrorism) 

leads DOS WMD interdiction activities, programs, and policy development, and leads the 

interagency policy process on NP. They coordinate with DOD to facilitate and integrate 

international military support for WMD interdiction operations. 

(1) At the US embassy or consulate level, the COM acts on guidance regarding 

WMD interdiction activities, instructions on engagement with host or regional 

governments regarding coordination of law enforcement, intelligence, investigations, and 

PA, and multilateral organization or international legal implications of WMD interdiction 

activities. 

(2) Official USG communication with foreign governments is conducted via 

demarche. All USG demarches are delivered by DOS via cable to the embassy or 

consulate with specific delivery instructions. The demarche is prepared and delivered to 

the recipient government by the COM or assigned representative to reinforce that the 

demarche represents the official USG position. Typical WMD interdiction-related 

B-12 JP 3-40 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Operations 

demarches request information on items, people, or transactions of proliferation concern 

identified through intelligence community collection and analysis or recommended 

actions to address the proliferation concern. 

(3) Other DOS interdiction-related activities include: 

(a) Confirmation of transport registry information. 

(b) Waivers of objection or consent to US law enforcement. 

(c) Coordination of flag state consent to stop, board, and search suspect 

transports. 

(d) Coordination of operations in foreign territorial waters and airspace. 

(e) Coordination of diverting a transport to an unscheduled location (e.g., 

port-of-entry). 

(f) Coordination of disposition of suspect transports, cargo, and personnel. 

(g) Coordination of technical law enforcement assistance and handoff. 

c. Department of Homeland Security. DHS is responsible for preventing and 

deterring terrorist attacks against the United States and its interests, and protecting the 

United States and its interests from and responding to these threats, as well as natural 

hazards. Four elements of DHS play a role in WMD interdiction. 

(1) US Coast Guard. The USCG protects US economic and security interests 

in maritime regions at risk. USCG has broad maritime jurisdiction authority in US 

coastal areas, is the LFA for maritime security, provides expertise in maritime security 

C2 and transportation, and provides support for USG agencies operating in the maritime 

domain. USCG boarding teams will board vessels suspected of carrying WMD as far 

offshore as possible. These teams can be inserted by small boats or helicopter. USCG 

may provide law enforcement detachments to DOD during execution of WMD 

interdiction to arrest individuals suspected of violating US law. USCG supports foreign 

government outreach through maritime law enforcement training and exercises and 

supports DOS development of foreign ship boarding agreements in support of the PSI. 

The JFC should consider the suitability of using USCG and its personnel in theater 

security cooperation plans and WMD interdiction operations. 

(2) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE is responsible for 

enforcing US immigration and customs laws outside of the border areas. ICE identifies 

and works to eliminate vulnerabilities in US border, economic, transportation, and 

infrastructure security. ICE is the lead DHS agency for investigation of violations of US 

technology control, customs, and immigration laws. ICE maintains representation at US 

B-13 
Appendix B 

embassies or consulates worldwide and provides intelligence and investigative support 

for countering terrorist threats against the United States. 

(3) Customs and Border Protection (CBP). CBP protects US borders and 

ports of entry. It provides technical support to international partners through training, 

expertise, and border security equipment or technology maintenance and grants, and 

expertise regarding entry, inspection, and admissibility of persons, items, and vessels 

arriving from foreign locations. CBP maintains a National Targeting Center, providing 

WMD interdiction and WMD-terrorism analytical and targeting capabilities. CBP 

operates the Container Security Initiative as part of a partnership with DOE in the 

Megaports initiative, deploying agents to major foreign seaports to work with HN 

counterparts to target all containers that pose a potential threat, and to prevent the 

transport of WMD on container vessels destined for the United States. CBP Laboratories 

and Scientific Services staff WMD response teams in strategic domestic locations. 

(4) Coordination of US Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, and Customs and Border Protection. Pre-interdiction, DHS 

components support efforts to build an environment hostile to WMD proliferation. CBP 

is responsible for customs mutual assistance agreements, international outreach for 

customs information sharing between national customs authorities, and all-source 

customs analysis outputs into the intelligence process. ICE is responsible for supporting 

and coordinating with DOS on WMD interdiction activities. During interdiction, USCG 

participates directly in interdiction activities, or provides assistance to USG interagency 

and foreign partners, including technical assistance to maritime law enforcement efforts, 

as described above. Post-interdiction, ICE conducts investigations as necessary to 

develop additional intelligence and law enforcement information. 

(5) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. DNDO is responsible for the 

development of an enhanced global nuclear detection architecture and is responsible for 

the implementation of the domestic portion of that architecture. DOD is responsible for 

implementation of defense radiological/nuclear detection requirements both within and 

outside the United States. DOS, DOD, and DOE maintain their responsibilities for policy 

guidance and implementation of the portion of the global architecture outside the United 

States. 

d. Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA). Pre-interdiction, DOE supports all-source analysis and intelligence activities. 

During interdiction, DOE supports cargo search and analysis. Post-interdiction, DOE 

supports the disposition of seized transports and cargo, and exploitation. DOE/NNSA 

also supports WMD interdiction through: 

(1) Intelligence gathering and analysis; 

(2) Reachback to national laboratories on nuclear or radiological, dual-use, 

precursor, and associated technology issues; 

B-14 JP 3-40 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Operations 

(3) Specialized radiation search capabilities which can be forward deployed; 

and 

(4) Outreach to foreign governments for radiation detection and monitoring. 

e. DOJ and Federal Bureau of Investigation. DOJ coordinates the USG legal 

position and law enforcement aspects of the USG related to WMD interdiction. The US 

district attorneys are responsible for conducting criminal prosecutions resulting from 

WMD interdiction operations. The FBI gathers evidence to support prosecutions, serves 

warrants for search and arrest, and conducts related law enforcement activities. It is 

important to involve appropriate DOJ and FBI elements early in the planning and 

execution of WMD interdiction to leverage their unique authorities while avoiding 

compromise of criminal cases. The FBI also maintains response capabilities for domestic 

WMD incidents in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. 

(1) Pre-interdiction, DOJ conducts law enforcement outreach with partner 

nations, gathers evidence for use in future prosecutions, and, through the FBI, contributes 

law enforcement information to all-source intelligence collection and analysis. Of note is 

the need to balance DOJ requirements to protect evidence for future prosecutions with the 

need for timely, detailed intelligence. 

(2) During interdiction, DOJ provides legal opinions on potential WMD 

interdiction operations and supports law enforcement activities. Post-interdiction, DOJ, 

through the FBI, is responsible for conducting evidence collection and exploitation, as 

well as investigating and detaining seized items and persons for follow-on prosecution by 

the United States or transfer to another prosecuting state. 

f. Department of Commerce and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). BIS is 

responsible for international outreach to foreign governments and the international 

private sector for a number of USG programs. BIS maintains and strengthens the dualuse export control system and is responsible for strengthening multilateral coordination 

and compliance with multilateral export control regimes and relevant treaties. Preinterdiction, Department of Commerce is responsible for export control outreach and allsource intelligence analysis. Post-interdiction, Department of Commerce reinforces and 

communicates dissuasion messages, consistent with USG national NP policy, through 

business outreach. 

g. Department of Treasury and Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 

(FinCEN). The Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) 

maintains awareness on export/import activities to countries of proliferation concern. 

FinCEN maintains intelligence on financial activities of suspect front 

companies/countries/other entities of proliferation concern. FinCEN conducts all-source 

financial intelligence collection and analysis. FinCEN conducts financial freezes and 

seizures which support interdictions, and WMD interdiction intelligence activities by 

tracking and reporting financial activities of suspect entities including terrorist financing, 

money laundering, and other illicit transactions. 

B-15 
Appendix B 

(1) Pre-interdiction, the Department of Treasury notifies the intelligence 

community of suspect transactions and provides intelligence to partner states on suspect 

entities. During interdiction, OFAC imposes controls on transactions and freezes foreign 

assets under US jurisdiction. 

(2) Post-interdiction, the Department of Treasury is responsible for financial 

forensic analysis and provides findings to the interagency. The Department of Treasury 

engages in international outreach activities pre- and post-interdiction. 

SECTION C. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTERDICTION 

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

8. General 

This section details WMD interdiction operational concepts as they pertain to the 

JFC. It is intended to aid commanders and staffs by providing a basic overview of joint 

planning and operations concepts for the WMD interdiction mission, and a more detailed 

discussion designed to promote understanding of the requirements for planning military 

operations normally considered during the interagency decision-making process 

described in Section B, “Interagency Roles and Responsibilities.” This section builds on 

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

9. Campaign Plan Design and Terms Overview 

a. Design Element Overview. USG interagency solutions to problems depend on 

how well the USG and partner nations integrate all instruments of national power—

diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—as well as the elements of those 

instruments (financial, intelligence, and law enforcement) (the means). CWMD planners 

can use MSOs to describe the military contribution as an instrument of national power, as 

depicted in Figure B-2. 

(1) Interagency Efforts. Due to strong interrelationships between actions of 

elements of the USG interagency, efforts in one portion often affect others. Commanders 

should consider these relationships when building plans targeting critical nodes and links 

of a proliferation transaction, pathway, or network as depicted in Figure B-3. 

(2) Adversary Vulnerabilities. By identifying characteristics of actor and 

entity relationships, nodes, and links throughout an entire proliferation transaction, 

commanders may identify adversary vulnerabilities. Planning operations against these 

vulnerabilities, in turn, involves considering strategic guidance, strategic enablers, LOOs, 

phases, and termination criteria. 

(3) Ends. End states, or ends, describe the desired outcome(s) of specific 

action. CWMD end states are usually achieved through DOD’s collaborative work with 

other instruments of US national power. The most pertinent WMD interdiction end states 

defined in the NMS-CWMD are: 

B-16 JP 3-40 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Operations 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION --

INTERDICTION OPERATIONAL DESIGN

WAYS

Military Strategic Objective (MSO)

ENDS

Four Interdiction End 

States from the NMSCWMD

MEANS

CCDRs, Military 

Departments, and 

Combat Support 

Agencies

DIPLOMATIC INFORMATIONAL MILITARY ECONOMIC

Current or 

potential 

adversaries are 

dissuaded from 

producing WMD

Proliferation of 

WMD and related 

Materials to 

current and/or 

potential 

adversaries is

dissuaded, 

prevented, 

defeated or 

reversed

Allies and US 

civilian agencies 

are capable 

partners in 

combating WMD

C

A

P

A

B

I

L

I

T

I

E

S

Prevent, Dissuade or 

Deny WMD

Proliferation or 

Possession

Effects, Tasks, and 

MOEs/MOPs

Principle LOO and MSO

OBJECTIVE

Instruments of National Power

Physical/Logical Lines of 

Operations (LOOs)

Shape

Phase 0

Deter

Phase I

Seize 

Initiative

Phase II

Dominate

Phase III

Stabilize

Phase IV

Enable 

Civil 

Authority

Phase V

LEGEND

CCDR combatant commander

MOE measure of effectiveness

MOP measure of performance

NMS-CWMD National Military Strategy for Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction

WMD weapons of mass destruction

Figure B-2. Weapons of Mass Destruction-Interdiction Operational Design 

(a) Current or potential adversaries are dissuaded from producing WMD; 

(b) Proliferation of WMD and related materials to current or potential 

adversaries is dissuaded, prevented, defeated, or reversed; and 

B-17 
Appendix B 

WMD Program 

Leadership/ 

Management

Buyer's 

Bank

Intermediary

Bank

Producer's 

Bank

Legitimate 

Producers/ 

Distributors

Import/ 

Export 

Companies

Exporter's 

Bank

Brokers

Scientific and 

Technical 

Expertise

Means of 

Conveyance

Shipping 

Company

Front

Companies

GENERALIZED WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

PROLIFERATION TRANSACTION, PATHWAY, OR NETWORK

LEGEND

WMD weapons of mass destruction

Figure B-3. Generalized Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Transaction, 

Pathway, or Network 

(c) Allies and US civilian agencies are capable partners in CWMD. 

(4) Ways. Ways can be interpreted as general actions taken to help achieve 

desired end states. In that regard, we can consider MSOs as ways. The NMS-CWMD 

MSO, “Prevent, Dissuade, or Deny WMD Proliferation or Possession,” best fits WMD 

interdiction, although other MSOs like, “Defeat and Deter WMD Use and Subsequent 

Use,” may be complementary depending on phase or activity. Actions supporting these 

“ways” can include enforcement of USG CP objectives, United Nations Security Council 

resolutions, and standing multilateral and bilateral security cooperation and partner 

activities. 

(5) Means. Means describes the tools, including forces, organizations, allies, 

partners, etc., used to employ the “ways” to achieve the “ends.” The combatant 

commands, working either individually or in conjunction with interagency and 

international partners, military departments, and CSAs are the means.

b. Strategic Enablers. Strategic enablers are capabilities that facilitate execution of 

a military strategy. The most significant CWMD strategic enablers are intelligence, 

B-18 JP 3-40 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Operations 

partnership capacity, and SC support. Section D, “Considerations,” provides additional 

information on these areas. 

c. Line(s) of Operations. Commanders use LOOs to focus military actions toward 

achieving a desired end, or end state. Generally speaking, WMD interdiction includes 

two elements that can be considered as LOOs: shaping the environment and conducting 

specific WMD interdiction operations. See Figure B-4. 

(1) Shaping the Environment. Shaping the environment in support of WMD 

interdiction is a steady-state, continuous activity. Commanders, working in support of 

broader interagency efforts, continually shape the theater environment to dissuade 

trafficking in WMD, persuade allies and partners to interdict WMD, and disrupt use of 

proliferation pathways. Examples include: 

(a) Building allied and partner military capabilities to conduct WMD 

interdiction in support of their own national authorities through security assistance 

activities. During execution of specific WMD interdiction operations, CCDRs may 

leverage these allied or partner relationships to gain assistance and reinforce their will to 

act.

(b) Helping establish global situational awareness through activities 

supporting intelligence collection, and helping facilitate unilateral, multinational, or 

partner nation WMD interdiction activities through timely information and intelligence 

sharing.

(c) Contributing to targeted SC campaigns by developing and 

communicating messages and taking concrete actions to reinforce these messages (e.g., 

force demonstrations, multilateral exercises, and overt surveillance activities such as 

approach and query).

(d) Performing other shaping activities, as appropriate, to support the 

ability to establish supremacy in time and space over selected geographic areas to deny 

maneuver space to WMD proliferators, channel and restrict their movement into less 

desirable or more susceptible routes, and help facilitate the intercept of specific 

shipments.

(2) Specific Weapons of Mass Destruction-Interdiction Operations. 

Specific WMD interdiction operations covered in this appendix include actions and 

activities to identify or track; intercept; search or inspect; dispose of intercepted WMD, 

related material, persons and vessels; and transition residual material and persons to 

appropriate authority. Although these actions can be depicted sequentially in the same 

LOO, it is not required they be performed as such. Commanders should plan for and 

understand their role and the role of the interagency in executing any of these actions or 

activities at any time. 

B-19 
Appendix B 

LINE OF OPERATIONS FOR SPECIFIC WEAPONS OF 

MASS DESTRUCTION-INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

Current or

potential

adversaries are

dissuaded from

producing 

WMD

Allies and US

civilian agencies

are capable

partners in

combating WMD

Proliferation of

WMD and

related

Materials to

current and/or

potential

adversaries is

dissuaded,

prevented,

defeated or

reversed

Prevent, 

Dissuade or 

Deny WMD 

Proliferation or 

Possession

TRACK

Decide, Identify, 

Locate

TRANSITION

Relinquish Authority 

and Return to Steady 

State, Phase 0, 

Operations

WAYS ENDS

MILITARY LINES OF OPERATIONS (LOOs)

INTERDICTION

SAMPLE LOGICAL LINE OF OPERATIONS

Mission Areas

Military Strategic 

Objective

(MSO)

Three Interdiction

End States from

the NMS-CWMD

DISPOSITION

Divert, Seize

SEARCH

Identify, 

Characterize, 

Attribute, Exploit

INTERCEPT

Maritime, Air, 

Land, and 

Cyberspace

LEGEND

NMS-CWMD National Military Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

WMD weapons of mass destruction

Figure B-4. Line of Operations for Specific Weapons of Mass Destruction-Interdiction 

Operations

(3) In coordination with interagency partners, collaborative planning 

considerations should include, at a minimum: 

(a) Determining legal and policy authorities; 

(b) Identifying all agencies and organizations that should be involved; 

B-20 JP 3-40 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Operations 

(c) Coordinating the change of responsibility for providing security; 

(d) Identifying training requirements for boarding teams with respect to 

CWMD interdiction missions; 

(e) Identifying expected law enforcement evidence collection procedures 

and requirements; 

(f) Coordinating the leave-behinds (e.g., specialized personnel, equipment, 

provisions); and 

(g) Coordinating the transition of logistic support. 

(4) Identify or Track. This action is an ongoing, intelligence-intensive process 

that begins with the study of proliferators, transactions, pathways, and networks. An 

understanding of these networks and possible suppliers and recipients will help focus 

intelligence collection on possible transfer methods and activities to identify and track the 

potential transfer of WMD-related material, technology, or expertise. In some cases, 

merely the knowledge that WMD-related transactions are being monitored may deter 

some actors from entering into those transactions. In other cases, that knowledge may 

lead to changes in proliferation activity which help further characterize the full scope of 

that activity. One goal of intelligence collection and analysis is to discover and identify 

specific shipments or items intended to be transferred before the transfer is attempted. 

(5) Intercept. This action begins with a decision to place military assets in the 

vicinity of a suspect transport shipment to perform some type of WMD interdiction 

activity. With respect to maritime CP interdiction, activities may range from surveillance 

(overt and covert), to hail and query, to boarding for visit or search. The intercept phase 

ends either with departure of the military asset upon completion of surveillance or hail or 

query operations or with the inspection of the shipment following a boarding. The 

decision to stop and inspect a shipment will most likely be made outside of military 

channels. Commanders must be prepared to intercept a shipment in accordance with 

standing orders or as directed by case-specific orders. 

(a) Air. Interdiction of transfers by air are the most time-sensitive and 

require accurate and rapid ISR cueing to position assets to intercept the transfer. It is 

most likely that interception and inspection of air cargos will occur on the ground at the 

point of origin, transshipment point, or destination. Although possible, it is unlikely that 

intercepting air shipments would involve the actual aerial intercept of an aircraft and 

forcing it to land at an airport other than its intended destination. Although tracking and 

identifying the aircraft containing a suspect shipment will likely be accomplished through 

national or ground-based means, air assets may also be required. It is also possible that 

an aircraft containing a suspect shipment will land at a different destination or 

transshipment airport than planned or expected. This possibility requires the capability to 

track the aircraft from takeoff to landing and, if retaining the capability to stop and 

B-21 
Appendix B 

inspect the shipment is desired, the ability to rapidly relocate security and inspection 

assets to that location. 

(b) Land. One challenge in land interdiction is the variety of 

transportation methods, from individuals carrying small items on foot to large containers 

on heavy rail transport. A significant complication is that while air and sea operations 

may occur in international airspace and waters, all land operations occur in sovereign 

territory. Regardless of whether the operation involves intercepting a shipment in transit 

or inspecting it at a point of departure or port of entry, land operations require close 

coordination with HN, federal, state, local law enforcement and customs officials. 

Military operations and personnel will nearly always be in a supporting role to another 

agency and will likely have significant constraints on actions during land operations. The 

DOS will assist coordinating with HN authorities. 

(c) Cyberspace. A more accurate and complete understanding of the full 

range of WMD threats arrayed against the United States and its allies remains among the 

highest US intelligence priorities. Determining legitimate cyberspace activities from 

WMD-related cyberspace activities will become increasingly difficult as several nations 

of interest are becoming more adept at using it as a conduit for the transfer and 

procurement of foreign technology and equipment, and as a vehicle for collaboration with 

proliferation partners. Countries of interest and others are exploiting information 

technology to advance their strategic interests by developing a cyberspace warfare 

capability (albeit of uncertain effectiveness) and to expand their propaganda efforts. 

Improving our ability to obtain timely and accurate knowledge of adversaries’ cyberspace 

capabilities, plans, and intentions is central to developing effective CP and NP policies 

and capabilities. Particular emphasis must be accorded to improving intelligence 

regarding WMD-related cyberspace nodes and activities, USG interagency interaction 

throughout instruments of national power, and cooperation with international friends and 

allies. 

(6) Search or Inspection. This action commences once a boarding team or 

inspectors are established on-site in the vicinity of suspect cargo either afloat or on shore. 

It covers inspection of, or the general activity of attempting to locate or discover, WMDrelated items as previously defined in this appendix. Physical interception and inspection 

of a shipment will likely be in support of initial or ongoing efforts by other USG agencies 

or their international counterparts. Search or inspections of air, land, and sea cargos and 

transactions in cyberspace each present a different challenge; however, the overall 

objective is the same: to allow subject matter experts to examine the shipment or 

transaction in a secure environment to determine if it contains WMD-related material or 

technology. If conventional forces confirm or suspect the presence of WMD, further 

examination by specialized forces may be required. A primary challenge is to safeguard 

suspected materials until specialized forces can characterize the material and further 

exploit it. There are three primary sub-activities or actions of search: identify and 

characterize; attribute; and exploit: 

B-22 JP 3-40 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Operations 

(a) Identify and Characterize. Specialized exploitation teams or 

capabilities may be required to assist conventional forces or boarding parties once a 

vessel, aircraft, or site is secure, and the decision has been made to remain on site to 

perform some type of identification and characterization. Conventional forces should 

have, at a minimum, the necessary expertise and equipment to either conduct a 

preliminary analysis themselves or to communicate discovery details in appropriate 

fashion through reliable means to subject matter experts for their preliminary analysis. 

Specialized exploitation teams should provide a more comprehensive analysis, 

packaging, transport, and escort capability for shipment of WMD material to preidentified facilities for confirmation. 

(b) Attribute. The intent of this step is to gain an understanding of an 

adversary’s WMD program development, capabilities, and needs, and to discover 

additional details about proliferation transactions from supplier to end user. 

Understanding how the contents or details of a specific shipment contribute to the 

adversary’s overall WMD program may determine future intelligence collection or 

interdiction requirements. Successful attribution may require specialized CBRN forces 

or capabilities from the Services, CSAs such as DTRA, or OGAs (e.g., DOE, DOS) that 

are capable of conducting sensitive site exploitation operations. Selected elements of the 

intelligence community who specialize in adversary CP and WMD-related programs can 

also provide valuable assistance. Most of these personnel will require a locally 

permissive environment to conduct their activities. Throughout the attribution process, 

careful attention to the chain of custody is necessary in order to preserve law enforcement 

options. Commanders should liaise as required with law enforcement personnel. 

(c) Exploit. Exploitation activities are essential to counter further WMD 

proliferation and prevent WMD program regeneration or maturation. Exploitation can 

occur in limited fashion in the field or more extensively in highly supportive 

environments such as a laboratory. These activities include taking full advantage of any 

information obtained for tactical, operational, or strategic purposes. Exploitation 

personnel conduct detailed analysis of weapons, materials, agents, documents, technical 

experts, and other media found in and around the search site. Clear policy guidance on 

the depth of exploitation, including incentives, amnesty, and interrogation, is essential to 

effectively managing these actions. 

“Characterization includes detailed assessments that may take hours to days 

to complete. USG [US Government] or internationally designated 

laboratories with accepted confirmatory capabilities as well as assets with 

other required capabilities are not generally organic to a theater.” 

Handbook for Joint Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 (WMD) Elimination Operations 

B-23 
Appendix B 

(7) Disposition. Disposition of the intercepted entity may involve return to 

originator, diversion, seizure, or destruction. Since the majority of these actions involve 

working with the interagency, other nations, commercial shipping entities, and 

businesses, planners must consider potential legal and financial implications. DOD’s 

interagency partners can facilitate disposition efforts based on agency authorities (e.g., 

DOS can assist in negotiating financial arrangements with shippers and other commercial 

enterprises, as required). 

(a) Return to Originator. If no WMD or related materials are found 

during the search or inspection phase, the suspect entity will be returned to the originator. 

Alternately, the purpose of interdicting a shipment may be to either facilitate its return to 

the originator, or provide time for diplomatic actions to result in the shipment’s recall by 

the originator. Such actions are in keeping with the USG desire to assist other countries 

in enforcing their own laws or in enforcing compliance with applicable international 

laws, treaties, agreements, or United Nations Security Council resolutions. 

(b) Diversion. If WMD materials are located aboard a transport during 

search operations, and the decision is made to characterize, delay, seize, return, or 

otherwise disrupt the shipment, identification of suitable locations may be required to 

accomplish follow-on disposition efforts. Planners must consider the need to preserve 

evidence for intelligence collection and exploitation, attribution, including possible law 

or treaty enforcement. Significant liaison with interagency partners remains critical prior 

to and during the disposition phase. 

(c) Seizure. If WMD material is identified, seizure could include control 

and security of the site or vessel beginning with characterization of the material through 

transfer of control to appropriate authorities. Planning should address how to establish 

and maintain secure control of the site or vessel as well as opportunities for intelligence 

collection and exploitation. This may require coordination for additional personnel or 

material based on the extent of the site or vessel (e.g., quantity of WMD, risk). 

Specialized exploitation personnel, if required, should be capable of ensuring weapons, 

materials, CBRN agents, and delivery systems are not armed or can be handled safely. 

(d) Destruction. It is possible, although highly unlikely, that the final 

disposition of an interdicted cargo will be its destruction. This action will involve a great 

deal of coordination between the existing security forces, required transportation 

elements, legal authorities, and WMD elimination experts. Nothing, however, shall 

impinge on a commander’s right to act in self-defense. 

(8) Transition. The final step in the interdiction process (although other 

activities such as exploitation, attribution, and legal prosecution may still be ongoing) is 

reconstitution of the forces. Reconstitution includes the relinquishing of authority from 

the interdiction team to HN or other authority, and return to other assigned missions. 

B-24 JP 3-40 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Operations 

ACTIONS ON DECISIVE POINTS OR NODES 

The October 2003 diversion of the German-owned BBC China carrying 

centrifuge parts to Libya provides an excellent example of the 

strengths of international cooperation in weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) interdiction and the potential strategic benefits from a 

seemingly simple action. The United States and the United Kingdom 

gleaned intelligence that the BBC China was potentially carrying an 

illegal shipment of WMD components to Libya (Identify/Track). In the 

case of the BBC China, Germany was involved as the vessel was 

German-owned. Italy was also involved, because it had ports close to 

the vessel’s ultimate destination. US and British naval assets 

intercepted the ship once it passed through the Suez Canal on its way 

to Libya (Intercept). The German government contacted the Germanbased owner, BBC Chartering and Logistic GmbH, [Gesellschaft mit 

beschränkter Haftung], and asked it to divert the vessel to an Italian 

port for inspection (Divert). The inspection revealed thousands of 

parts for centrifuges in containers marked “used machine tool parts” 

(Search). This material was seized (Disposition/Seize), and shortly 

thereafter, Libya agreed to give up its WMD programs and to submit to 

international verification (Transition). Government officials in both the 

United States and the United Kingdom have argued that the interdiction 

and seizure helped turn the tide and led to Libya’s much-sought-after 

nonproliferation posture and Libya relinquishing its WMD programs. 

The military strategic objective (MSO) of prevent, dissuade, and deny

adversary attempts to proliferate WMD was complementary to the MSO 

of reduce, destroy, or reverse WMD possession, as Libya’s WMD 

program was being cooperatively reduced (reversed). 

VARIOUS SOURCES 

d. Weapons of Mass Destruction-Interdiction Phasing. Arranging operations in 

phases is a key aspect of military planning. Phasing assists commanders and planners in 

visualizing and thinking through the entire operation or campaign and helps define 

requirements and guide planning in terms of forces, resources, time, space, purpose, and 

mitigating risk. Phasing can be applied to WMD interdiction operations (Figure B-5). 

Note that operations and activities in the shape and deter phases normally are outlined in 

theater security cooperation plans and those in the remaining phases are outlined in Joint 

Strategic Capabilities Plan-directed operation plans. 

(1) Phase 0 (Shape). The intent of this phase is to create a theater environment 

hostile to proliferation activity in order to dissuade or deter state and non-state actors 

from proliferating WMD. This phase is continuous, with actions emphasizing 

international legitimacy and multinational cooperation in support of defined national 

strategic and MSOs. Phase 0 (Shape) activities should focus on shaping perceptions and 

influencing the behavior of both adversaries and allies; developing credible allied and 

friendly military capabilities for self-defense, coalition operations, and deterrence; 

B-25 
Appendix B 

EXAMPLE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTIONINTERDICTION PHASING MODEL

ENABLE

CIVIL

AUTHORITY

Phase V

STABILIZE

Phase IV

DOMINATE

Phase III

SEIZE

INITIATIVE

Phase II

DETER

Phase I

SHAPE

Phase 0

Dissuade

dissuade

tracking

Continuous, to

 potential 

adversaries (e.g., 

ICP, PSI, 

the potential 

transfer of WMDrelated material, 

technology, or 

expertise, 

monitoring the 

environment, 

military support to 

diplomacy)

Deter

The intent of this 

phase is to deter 

undesirable 

adversary action 

by demonstrating 

capabilities and 

resolve of the joint 

forces, such as, 

engaging in 

focused strategic 

communication, 

deploying forces

Prevent

Commences from 

when the WMD MI 

order is issued 

through the actual 

interdiction and 

initial assessment 

by the interdicting 

force; phase 

concludes when 

the interdiction 

force has 

established 

positive control 

over people, 

material seized 

and transported to 

a benign area

This phase is the 

beginning of a 

specific WMD 

interdiction 

operation and 

begins with 

“shadowing” of 

specific 

shipments to 

localize the target

This phase begins 

after establishment of positive 

control of the 

material/people, 

continues through 

detailed assessment and initial 

exploitation by the 

interdiction force, 

initial 

redeployment/ 

reconstitution of 

interdiction 

forces, and 

concludes with 

receipt/transition 

instructions from 

SecDef

During this phase 

there is a 

transition/hand-off 

from the 

Interdiction forces 

to the appropriate 

entity for 

disposition of 

material and 

people; joint force 

activities during 

may be at the 

behest of the 

transitioned 

authority

LEGEND

ICP intelligence campaign plan

MI maritime interdiction

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative

SecDef Secretary of Defense

WMD weapons of mass destruction

Figure B-5. Example Weapons of Mass Destruction-Interdiction Phasing Model 

improving information exchange and intelligence sharing; and providing US forces with 

peacetime and contingency access to overseas operating environments through activities 

such as the PSI and pursuit of ship boarding agreements. Planning that supports most 

“shaping” requirements typically occurs in the context of day-to-day security 

cooperation, and combatant commands may incorporate phase 0 (Shape) WMD 

interdiction activities and tasks into their theater security cooperation plans. 

(2) Phase I (Deter). The intent of this phase is to deter undesirable adversary 

action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force through actions 

such as deploying forces, engaging in focused SC, and conducting demonstrations. Phase 

B-26 JP 3-40 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Operations 

I (Deter) deterrence differs from phase 0 (Shape) deterrence in that it largely involves 

preparatory actions that specifically support or facilitate the execution of subsequent 

phases of the operation or campaign. These actions may include: 

(a) Mobilization, tailoring of forces, and other predeployment activities; 

(b) Deployment into a theater; 

(c) Employment of ISR assets to provide situational awareness; 

(d) Operations at en route locations to support shore-based disposition 

actions; 

(e) Establishment of liaison with interagency and international WMD 

interdiction partners; 

(f) Public exercise of coalition shipboarding capabilities to include intergovernmental coordination; and, 

(g) Development of mission-tailored C2, intelligence, force protection, 

FHP, HSS, transportation, and logistic requirements to support the JFC’s concepts of 

operations. 

(3) Phase II (Seize Initiative). This phase is the beginning of a specific WMD 

interdiction operation and, as an example, may begin with “shadowing” a specific 

shipment to localize the target. It terminates with a decision by the commander, or order 

by SecDef, to conduct an interdiction or interdiction-related activity, such as an at-sea 

hail and query. During this phase, the JFC continues to coordinate actions designed to 

support follow-on operations should they be required. 

(4) Phase III (Dominate). The intent of this phase is to gain and maintain 

control of the operational environment. Phase III (Dominate) commences when the

WMD interdiction order is issued and continues through the actual interdiction or 

interdiction-related activity and initial assessment by the interdicting force. This phase 

concludes when the interdiction force has established positive control over suspect people 

or material, if such control was a desired goal of the interdiction activity, and the 

environment is deemed permissive (includes render safe/disablement operations if a 

device is discovered).

(5) Phase IV (Stabilize). Phase IV (Stabilize) begins after establishment of 

positive control of the material or people, continues through assessment and initial 

exploitation by the interdiction force, can include initial redeployment or reconstitution of 

interdiction forces, and concludes with receipt of transition instructions from competent 

authority. The joint force may be required to initially integrate the efforts of other 

supporting or contributing agencies, forces, and organizations until legitimate authorities 

or entities establish control. Throughout phase IV (Stabilize), the JFC must continue to 

B-27 
Appendix B 

assess requirements to facilitate transfer of overall authority to a legitimate entity, leading 

to phase V (Enable Civil Authority). 

(6) Phase V (Enable Civil Authority). During this phase, there is a transition 

or handoff from the interdiction forces to the appropriate entity for disposition of material 

and people. The goal is for the joint force to enable the viability of this next authority, 

and may include further joint force activities in support of that authority. This includes 

coordination of joint force actions with other supporting or supported participants. Since 

redeployment operations for interdiction forces will most often begin during this phase, 

redeployment requirements should be identified as early as possible. The military end 

state(s) are achieved during this phase, signaling the end of the operation. 

e. Weapons of Mass Destruction-Interdiction Termination or Transfer 

Criteria. When and under what circumstances to suspend or terminate military 

operations remain political decisions. Even so, it is essential that the commander ensure 

higher authorities understand the implications, both immediate and long term, of a 

suspension of operations at any point along the operational continuum. For DOD 

purposes, WMD interdiction of specific shipments terminates on handoff (transfer) from 

interdiction forces to the appropriate civilian or international authority for final 

disposition of material and persons. Handoff may occur to a third country government, 

US law enforcement, or to other civil authorities. Successful transition usually requires 

extensive interagency coordination through OSD and JS before, during, and after 

interdiction of a shipment. 

SECTION D. CONSIDERATIONS 

10. Intelligence Planning and Coordination

a. Strategic Intelligence. Strategic intelligence for WMD interdiction focuses on 

identifying and characterizing a state or non-state actor of proliferation concern’s WMD 

network. This network encompasses the national leadership guiding the WMD program 

(see Section C “Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Operational Planning”); the 

R&D complex designing and developing WMD; the infrastructure which produces 

precursors, components, and weaponized WMD; the operating forces which employ 

WMD; and the networks of front companies or agents that acquire and distribute WMD 

technology and materials from foreign sources. It is these acquisition networks and 

transportation and financial links among and between them that are the focus of WMD 

interdiction. Locations and descriptions of any known WMD worldwide are identified in 

the DIA Modernized Intelligence Database. Any planned interdiction must start with a 

request to update the data base with all-source intelligence to insure currency and 

accuracy of the data. 

(1) Combatant commands can influence the intelligence planning process 

through the Concept Plan 8099 National Intelligence Support Plan (NISP). CJCSI 

3110.02E, Intelligence Planning Guidance, Objectives and Tasks, outlines this process. 

B-28 JP 3-40 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Operations 

NISP identifies key intelligence requirements supporting CWMD operations to the 

overall intelligence community. 

(2) The NISP is the mechanism by which CCDRs communicate those 

intelligence requirements needing defense wide and national intelligence support to the 

Director, Defense Intelligence Operations Center. WMD issues are in Band A, the 

highest level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework. Requests for information 

are the mechanism used to request collection and/or provision of tactical intelligence to 

support specific WMD interdiction cases. 

b. Cueing. WMD interdiction relies on indications and warning to cue forces for 

appropriate action. Often, initial cues are vague and incomplete and will require a 

focused effort to gather intelligence specific enough to enable the desired action. Cues 

can include evidence of ongoing transactions, loading of cargo, transit of shipping, or 

route and destination information. Rarely will they include information on the specific 

nature of cargo or security arrangements. 

c. Priority Intelligence Requirements for Weapons of Mass DestructionInterdiction. Commanders will need to establish priority intelligence requirements 

(PIRs) for WMD interdiction and communicate them, together with operational or 

tactical implications of intelligence gaps, not only to intelligence collectors but also to the 

policy community. PIRs may include, but are not limited to: 

(1) Destination of WMD (or related) shipment; 

(2) Timing, route, and mode of transport to include intermediate stops of WMD 

shipments/movements; 

(3) Security arrangements of WMD shipments/movements; 

(4) Nature of WMD type cargo and item(s) or person(s) of interest; 

(5) Specific location of WMD type cargo aboard large vessels (e.g., which 

container); 

(6) Specific individuals of interest related to WMD program or shipment; and 

(7) WMD interdiction capabilities or shortfalls of potential international 

partners. 

d. Intelligence or Information Sharing. Successful multinational action requires 

the sharing of selected information and intelligence with international partners. The 

United States will share information and intelligence either to build international 

partners’ will to take action against WMD proliferation or to build their capability. 

Intelligence sharing is governed by specific regulations determining what intelligence 

will be shared, and with whom the United States will share it. Military staffs must 

B-29 
Appendix B 

consult closely with senior intelligence personnel, foreign disclosure office personnel, 

and SJA when considering sharing intelligence. 

(1) Execution of WMD interdiction may require additional disclosure of 

intelligence data beyond routine dissemination. This requires determination, on a caseby-case basis, of the risk to comprising intelligence sources and methods versus the 

expected gain. 

(2) This determination is a policy decision made in conjunction with the 

intelligence community. The required coordination may prove lengthy. Also, many 

partners may not have the automated information services capabilities necessary to 

receive, protect, and process classified information. This dramatically slows the 

intelligence or information sharing process. 

e. Exploitation of Seized Material. Exploitation of seized personnel and material 

is a critical element of WMD interdiction. It enables development of additional strategic 

intelligence; identifies proliferation network nodes; may lead to future WMD interdiction 

opportunities; and supports potential diplomatic, economic, or legal action against 

proliferators. Planners should carefully consider the impact of various legal regimes on 

the ability to exploit material and personnel when determining disposition of the seized 

transport vehicle, personnel, and cargo. Legal issues including the right to question 

persons, the right to inspect documents and cargo, and potential requirements to maintain 

a chain of custody will impact exploitation. Exploitation is primarily an intelligence 

function and may require specific capabilities beyond those routinely available in theater. 

Planning must consider the need to reach back to, or bring forward, these capabilities, 

timing constraints, and the logistics required to do so. 

11. Security Cooperation and Partner Activities 

a. Integration with Security Cooperation Activities. The security cooperation 

guidance (SCG) included in the Global Employment of the Force describes SecDef 

priorities for creating new partnerships and enhancing existing partnerships with military 

allies and friendly nations. These relationships establish, enhance, and encourage partner 

nations and organizations to cooperate with the US military, thereby improving their 

ability to prosecute the WOT and to combat WMD. The SCG establishes priority 

partners with whom commanders should emphasize WMD interdiction capacity building 

activities. PSI partner nations are strong candidates for such capacity building. The 

ultimate goal is to develop partners who are willing and able to actively conduct WMD 

interdiction, are willing to work with US forces, or will enable US forces to take action 

through their territory.

b. Building Capacity and Will for Weapons of Mass Destruction-Interdiction.

(1) The Proliferation Security Initiative. The PSI provides a framework 

specifically for WMD interdiction. As of its fifth anniversary in May 2008, 94 countries 

have endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. This agreement between 

B-30 JP 3-40 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Operations 

like-minded nations serves as a means to leverage the support of key international 

partners to interdict WMD by employing the instruments of national power on a global 

scale. PSI provides a basis for CP-related activities of the USG and serves as a 

mechanism that allows the USG and foreign partners to share information and to discuss 

pertinent operational constraints to conducting WMD interdiction missions. Contacts 

built through this informal information sharing venue have often provided the necessary 

information during critical stages of actual WMD interdiction successes.

(2) The operational experts group (OEG) includes core countries that conduct 

international and regional meetings to bring together PSI countries for discussion aimed 

at enhancing their collective capabilities to prevent the proliferation of WMD materials, 

technologies, and related items. The PSI OEG builds capacity, confidence, and support 

for international information exchange through quarterly meetings to discuss exercise and 

operations priorities. It identifies possible legal constraints to conducting WMD 

interdiction missions, commercial implications concerning delays of shipments of goods, 

and options for disposition of any confiscated material. The PSI OEG also establishes 

PSI exercise schedules and goals. PSI exercises are important for developing 

international confidence by validating and codifying actual WMD interdiction 

capabilities, communication processes, and national-level legal authorities and 

limitations. 

(3) Non-PSI Partners. For a variety of regional and domestic political reasons, 

several US allies and partners do not subscribe to the interdiction principles of the PSI 

but play important roles in facilitating WMD interdiction. Many of these nations lie 

along key trade routes and will, on a case-by-case basis, support WMD interdiction 

activities. These states likely have acceded to key treaties, agreements, and UN Security 

Council resolutions, which provide a basis for action. Early engagement of and 

information sharing with, non-PSI partners are necessary to build their will to conduct 

WMD interdiction in support of enforcement of their international commitments. In 

many cases, nations will require specific, detailed evidence that a shipment is WMDrelated and will only act in accordance with strict interpretation of their domestic laws. 

Commanders should identify opportunities to include non-PSI nations in combined 

exercise events which have a WMD interdiction component to identify those nation’s 

information needs, legal and political thresholds for action, and capabilities to actually 

track, intercept, search, and coordinate disposition of WMD-related cargo and personnel. 

c. Multinational Operations. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, discusses the 

implications of working in a multinational environment. Key among a number of issues 

is the ability to share information in a timely and secure fashion. In many instances, 

states supporting a WMD interdiction activity will not have the ability to communicate 

rapidly in a secure environment either with their own forces or with the United States. 

Multinational operations may involve US military forces with nonmilitary law 

enforcement, border control, or customs entities of a partner nation. Commanders should 

identify and forward to the JS requirements for liaison elements to ensure interoperability 

or required interagency augmentation to enhance liaison capabilities early in the planning 

process. 

B-31 
Appendix B 

12. Interagency Coordination 

Interagency relationships are ones of coordination and mutual support, not direction. 

A commander may request support, but the degree to which OGAs or departments can or 

will provide support is conditional upon federal statutes, policy decisions, departmental 

or agency resources, and memoranda of agreement/memoranda of understanding. 

Commanders must plan collaboratively to identify where and how they and OGAs or 

departments can provide mutually beneficial support and work through the OSD and JS 

to develop standing relationships with the requisite organizations. For almost all WMD 

interdiction related activities, CCDR coordination with the JS and OSD will ensure 

proper liaison with USG interagency resources. CJCSI 5715.01B, Joint Staff 

Participation in Interagency Affairs, provides guidance and JP 3-08, Interorganizational 

Coordination During Joint Operations, provides doctrine for interagency coordination. 

Annex V (Interagency Coordination) of a supported commander’s operation plan enables 

a commander to identify interagency support requirements during planning. Annex V 

should specify for interagency partners not only the capabilities that military planners 

have determined the military may need, but also the shared understanding of the 

situation, and common objectives required to resolve the situation. 

a. Support to Campaign or Specific Operations. Commanders should identify 

tasks requiring interagency support early in the planning process. These may include 

diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, and informational support required from 

interagency partners. For example, in support of security cooperation, a commander may 

require DOS and DOJ engagement with their political and legal counterparts in the 

partner state in parallel with military diplomacy and combined exercises. A commander 

would forward this request for support to OSD and JS so they can engage their 

interagency counterparts to build a unified USG plan of action. 

b. Role of Theater Joint Interagency Coordination Group or a Joint 

Interagency Task Force (JIATF). A commander may also employ a JIACG or a 

JIATF. A JIACG enables theater-level coordination of interagency activities based on 

existing agreements. The JIACG performs a liaison function enabling civilian and 

military operational planners to establish regular, timely, and collaborative working 

relationships. Originally formed to coordinate counterterrorism activities, JIACGs can be 

expanded to cover the full spectrum of theater-level interagency coordination 

requirements (e.g., CWMD, MOTR, humanitarian assistance or disaster relief). 

Commanders must ensure JIACG personnel are linked to their parent agencies’ subject 

matter experts for various interagency processes (e.g., NSPD-20, Counterproliferation 

Interdiction, and MOTR) and understand their agencies’ authorities, capabilities, and 

capacity to assist in given situations.

c. A JIATF differs from a JIACG in that it exercises tactical control over attached 

elements when executing a mission. Created as part of the US strategy to defeat narcotics 

trafficking, JIATFs perform a dual detection or monitoring and partner capacity building 

role. JIATFs derive their authority from a formally coordinated interagency 

B-32 JP 3-40 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction Operations 

memorandum signed by the head of each participating department or agency. JIATFs 

currently do not have authority to conduct WMD interdiction. 

13. Strategic Communication 

SC is an essential element of WMD interdiction in that it provides a means of 

reinforcing or extending interdiction effects through dissuasion and deterrence. SC are 

focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to 

create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States 

Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, 

plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of 

national power SC must be a responsive and agile whole-of-government effort with 

synchronization of crucial themes, messages, images, and actions. The predominant 

military activities that support SC are IO, PA, and DSPD. JP 5-0, Joint Operation 

Planning, provides current doctrine on SC. 

a. Coordination with Interagency. OSD is responsible for coordinating DOD SC 

with interagency efforts. The NSC includes a PCC for Public Diplomacy and Strategic 

Communication (PDSC) where this coordination can occur. Ideally, DOD SC activities 

will complement other interagency SC. CCDRs consider SC during peacetime security 

cooperation planning, and incorporate themes, messages, images, actions, and other 

relevant factors in their theater campaign plans. For example, a commander may 

undertake WMD interdiction training with a partner nation. Simultaneously, the 

combatant command JIACG would coordinate diplomatic activity, with the training, to 

establish a diplomatic and legal basis for WMD interdiction against business entities used 

by a country for WMD acquisition and with economic measures publicly designating 

these business entities under Executive Order 13382, Blocking Property of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters. The PDSC PCC would coordinate 

a DOS and Department of Commerce effort to highlight these events to the larger 

business community engaged in manufacture of dual-use items to dissuade and deter 

cooperation with the target country’s business entities. 

b. Selected Audiences and Tailored Themes. There exist multiple potential 

audiences for SC. It is important to tailor themes and supporting messages to the 

appropriate audience and ensure the audience can receive the message through the chosen 

mode of transmission. Potential audiences for WMD interdiction SC include: 

(1) Leaders of states of proliferation concern and their principle advisors. 

(2) Technical experts required to produce and employ WMD such as scientists; 

commanders of units employing WMD; and managers of industrial enterprises producing 

WMD, precursors, and dual-use materials. 

(3) Technicians involved in the details of WMD production and employment 

such as laboratory technicians, officer cadre, and factory personnel. 

B-33 
Appendix B 

B-34 JP 3-40 

(4) Each audience has a unique set of interests (recognition or prestige within 

the international scientific community, for example) that SC planners should leverage in 

crafting specific messages. 

 

c. Phasing of Efforts. Commanders should ensure that their military activities 

support SC themes and addresses audiences appropriate to the phase of their operation. 

During phase 0 (Shape), both potential proliferators and regional allies or partners can be 

key audiences. Themes targeted toward entities of proliferation concern focus on 

dissuasion both by demonstrating US resolve, capability, and readiness and by 

identifying mechanisms through which the entity can come into compliance with US and 

global NP goals, thus attaining the benefits of that compliance. For allies and partners, 

themes should enhance cohesion and build will by highlighting their NP obligations and 

demonstrating the benefits of adherence, communicating US resolve to deal with WMD 

proliferation, and assuring allies and partners that the United States will assist them in 

meeting their obligations and work to build justifications for action. As commanders 

enhance their posture to conduct WMD interdiction in later phases, SC should ensure 

tight synchronization of crucial themes, messages, images, and actions to strongly 

influence entities of proliferation concern and disrupt their ability to counter US actions. 

For allies, partners, and others, themes should work to justify US actions and counter 

adversary disinformation. 
APPENDIX C

REFERENCES 

C-1 

The development of JP 3-40 is based on the following primary references: 

1. General 

a. The National Security Strategy. 

b. National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

c. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

d. NSPD-17/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-4: National Strategy 

to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

e. The Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles. 

f. National Strategy for Homeland Security. 

g. HSPD-5: Management of Domestic Incidents. 

h. National Response Framework. 

i. HSPD-7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection. 

j. HSPD-8: National Preparedness. 

k. National Incident Management System. 

l. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-62, Protection Against Unconventional 

Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas (U). Document is classified SECRET. 

m. Title 10, US Code, Section 12304. 

n. Title 50, US Code, Chapter 40, Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

o. Unified Command Plan (UCP). 

p. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). 

q. Maritime Operational Threat Response for the National Strategy for Maritime 

Security. 

r. Aviation Operational Threat Response Plan. 

2. Department of Defense 

a. National Defense Strategy.
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-40 

b. Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC), Activities and 

Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism. 

c. DODD 2060.02, Department of Defense Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD) Policy. 

d. DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). 

e. DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. 

f. DODI 2000.21, Foreign Consequence Management (FCM).

g. DOD Instruction 6490.03, Deployment Health. 

h. Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Nonproliferation and 

Counterproliferation Activities and Programs. 

i. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. 

j. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Planning Guidance (U). Document is 

classified SECRET. 

k. DODD S-2060.ee, DOD Support to the National Technical Nuclear Forensics 

(NTNF) Program. 

3. Joint Publications 

a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

b. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 

c. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

d. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

e. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats. 

f. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.

g. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism (FOUO). 

h. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 

i. JP 3-08.VI, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I. 
References 

C-3 

j. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater. 

k. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Environments. 

l. JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

m. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense. 

n. JP 3-28, Civil Support. 

o. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

p. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives 

Consequence Management. 

q. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery. 

r. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 

s. JP 4-02, Health Service Support. 

t. JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations. 

u. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

v. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions and Manuals 

a. CJCSI 2030.01B, Chemical Weapons Convention Compliance Policy Guidance. 

b. CJCSI 2110.01D, International Transfer of US Defense-Related Technology and 

Munitions.

c. CJCSI 3100.01B, Joint Strategic Planning System. 

d. CJCSI 3110.16A, Military Capabilities, Assets, and Units for Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive Consequence Management 

Operations (FOUO). 

e. CJCSI 3125.01A, Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management 

(CM) Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or HighYield Explosive (CBRNE) Situation.

f. CJCSI 3137.01C, The Functional Capabilities Board Process.
Appendix C 

C-4 JP 3-40 

g. CJCSI 3214.01C, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management 

Operations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents.

h. CJCSI 3401.02A, Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS). 

i. CJCSI 3500.01E, Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the 

United States. 

j. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04E, Universal Joint Task List 

(UJTL). 

k. CJCSI 3520.02A, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Activity Program. 

l. CJCSM 5225.01B, Classification Guide for Combating WMD Information.

5. Multi-Service 

a. FM 3-11.3/MCRP 3-27.2A/NTTP 3-11.25/AFTTP(I) 3-2.25, Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Contamination Avoidance. 

b. FM 3-11.5/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-37.3/NTTP 3-

11.26/AFTTP(I) 3-2.60, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 

Chemical, Biological Radiological, and Nuclear Decontamination. 

c. FM 3-6/MCRP 3-37B/Air Force Manual 105-7, Field Behavior of NBC Agents. 

d. FM 3-11/ MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP(I) 3-2.42, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations. 

e. FM 3-11.21/MCRP 3-37.2C/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP(I) 3-2.37, Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Consequence Management Operations. 

f. FM 3-11.4 /MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.27/AFTTP(I) 3-2.46, Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) 

Protection. 

g. FM 3-11.14/MCRP 3-37.1A/NTTP 3-11.28/AFTTP(I) 3-2.54, Multi-Service, 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Decontamination Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Vulnerability Analysis. 

h. FM 4-02.283/MCRP 4-11.1B/NTRP 4-02.21/AFMAN 44-161 (I), Treatment of 

Nuclear and Radiological Casualties. 
References 

C-5 

i. FM 8-284/NAVMED P-5042/AFMAN (I) 44-156/MCRP 4-11.1C, Treatment of 

Biological Warfare Casualties. 

j. FM 4-02.285/MCRP 4-11.1A/Navy Technical Reference Publication 4-

02.22/AFTTP(I) 3-2.69, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 

Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries. 

k. FM 8-9/NAVMED P-5059/AFJMAN 44-151, NATO Handbook on the Medical 

Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations AMedP-6(B). 

l. FM 100-23-1/FMFRP 7-16/NDC TACNOTE 3-07-6/ACCP 50-56/PACAFP 50-

56/USAFEP 50-56, Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations. 

m. FM 101-4/MCRP 6-23A/NWP 3-13.1.16/AFTTP (I) 3-2.22, Multi-Service 

Procedures for Joint Task ForceóInformation Management. 

6. Army 

a. Army Regulation 385-61, The Army Chemical Agent Safety Program. 

b. FM 3-0, Operations. 

c. FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations. 

d. FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook. 

e. FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures.

f. FM 3-101, Chemical Staffs and Units. 

g. FM 4-02.7, Health Services Support in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

Environment: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 

h. FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production. 

7. Marine Corps 

MCWP 3-37, Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Nuclear, Biological, and 

Chemical Defensive Operations. 

8. Navy 

a. Navy Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1, Naval Warfare. 

b. NDP 2, Naval Intelligence. 
Appendix C 

C-6 JP 3-40 

c. NDP 5, Naval Planning. 

9. Air Force 

a. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD)-1, Air Force Basic Doctrine. 

b. AFDD 2, Operations and Organization. 

c. AFDD 2-1.8, Counter-CBRN Operations. 

d. Air Force Instruction 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program 

Planning and Operations. 

e. Air Force Handbook 10-2502, USAF Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 

Threat Planning and Response Handbook. 

f. Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 10-2602, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and 

Conventional (NBCC) Defense Operations and Standards. 

g. AFMAN 32-4004, Emergency Response Operations. 

h. AFMAN 32-4005, Personnel Protection and Attack Actions. 

i. Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-25, Emergency Management.

j. AFPD 10-26, Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 

Operations. 

k. AFPD 32-40, Disaster Preparedness. 

l. Air Mobility Command C-CBRN CONOPS. 

10. Other Sources 

a. Chandler, Robert W., Deliberate Planning for Attack Operations Against 

Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

b. National Defense University (NDU), Center for Counterproliferation Research, 

Deterrence and Defense in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment. 

c. NDU, Center for Counter-Proliferation Research, The Effects of Chemical and 

Biological Warfare on Operations: What We Know and Donít Know. 

d. NDU, Center for Counter-Proliferation Research, The NBC Threat in 2025: 

Concepts and Strategies for Adversarial Use. 
References 

C-7 

e. Schneider, Barry R., Future War and Counterproliferation: US Military 

Responses to NBC Proliferation Threats (Washington, DC: Praeger). 

f. Weaver, Greg and Glass J. David, Inviting Disaster: How Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Undermine US Strategy for Projecting Military Power (Washington, DC: 

AMCODA Press). 

g. Wirtz, James, Scott Sagan and Peter Lavoy, Planning the Unthinkable: How New 

Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

University Press). 

h. Handbook for Joint Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Elimination 

Operations. 

i. DTRA-AR-40H-4, WMD Facility, Equipment and Munitions Identification 

Handbook. 

j. DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) Overview. 

k. Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense Overview. 
Appendix C 

C-8 JP 3-40 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX D

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

D-1 

1. User Comments 

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ñDoctrine and 

Education Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments 

should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and 

appearance. 

2. Authorship 

The lead agent for this publication is the US Strategic Command. The Joint Staff 

doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5). 

3. Supersession 

This publication supersedes JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction, 8 July 2004.

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: HQ USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE//CC// 

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// 

 CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//DJT10// 

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting 

Center, Doctrine and Education Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for 

Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7/JEDD) via the CJCS JEL at 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. 

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that 

directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. 

The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 

when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 

c. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

______________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 3-40 

5. Distribution of Publications 

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. 

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be 

in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET) and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the 

combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication 

to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy 

(Defense AttachÈ Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 

Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400. 

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and 

deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications. 

 

 
GLOSSARY

PART I – ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

GL-1 

AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction) 

AOR area of responsibility 

APOD aerial port of debarkation 

BIS Bureau of Industry and Security 

C2 command and control 

CBP Customs and Border Protection 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 

 explosives 

CCD camouflage, concealment, and deception 

CCDR combatant commander 

CDRUSJFCOM Commander, United States Joint Forces Command 

CDRUSPACOM Commander, United States Pacific Command 

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command 

CDRUSTRANSCOM Commander, United States Transportation Command 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

CJTF commander, joint task force 

CM consequence management 

CMOC civil-military operations center 

COA course of action 

COG center of gravity 

COM chief of mission 

CONOPS concept of operations 

COOP continuity of operations 

CP counterproliferation 

CS civil support 

CSA combat support agency 

CTR cooperative threat reduction 

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention 

CWMD combating weapons of mass destruction 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DODI Department of Defense instruction 

DOE Department of Energy 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DOS Department of State 

DSCA defense support of civil authorities 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-40 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

EP emergency preparedness 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FCM foreign consequence management 

FDO flexible deterrent option 

FHP force health protection 

FID foreign internal defense 

FinCEN Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 

FM field manual (Army) 

FSU former Soviet Union 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

HD homeland defense 

HN host nation 

HQ headquarters 

HSC Homeland Security Council 

HSS health service support 

HYE high-yield explosives 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

IED improvised explosive device 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

INDRAC Interagency Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 Database of Responsibilities, Authorities, and 

 Capabilities 

IO information operations 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

JECE Joint Elimination Coordination Element 

JFC joint force commander 

JIACG joint interagency coordination group 

JIATF joint interagency task force 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

 environment 

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

JOPP joint operation planning process 

JP joint publication 

JS the Joint Staff 

JTF joint task force 

JTF-E joint task force elimination 

LFA lead federal agency 

LOO line of operations 
Glossary 

GL-3 

METOC meteorological and oceanographic 

MMA military mission area 

MOTR maritime operational threat response 

MSO military strategic objective 

MTCR missile technology control regime 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NIMS National Incident Management System 

NISP national intelligence support plan 

NMS-CWMD National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 

 Destruction 

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration 

NP nonproliferation 

NPT Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

NRF National Response Framework 

NSC National Security Council 

NS-CWMD National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 

 Destruction

NSPD national security Presidential directive 

NSS National Security Strategy 

OEG operational experts group 

OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control 

OGA other government agency 

OPSEC operations security 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

PA public affairs 

PB peace building 

PCC policy coordination committee 

PDSC public diplomacy and strategic communication 

PEO peace enforcement operations 

PIR priority intelligence requirement 

PKO peacekeeping operations 

PO peace operations 

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative 

R&D research and development 

ROE rules of engagement 

RUF rules for the use of force 

SC strategic communication 

SCC-WMD United States Strategic Command Center for Combating 

 Weapons of Mass Destruction 

SCG Security Cooperation Guidance 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-40 

SJA staff judge advocate 

SOF special operations forces 

SPOD seaport of debarkation 

TIM toxic industrial material 

UAS unmanned aircraft system 

UN United Nations 

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

US United States 

USA United States Army 

USAF United States Air Force 

USC United States Code 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USG United States Government 

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command 

USMC United States Marine Corps 

USN United States Navy 

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command 

USPACOM Unites States Pacific Command 

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

VEO violent extremist organization 

WOT war on terrorism 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

WMD CM weapons of mass destruction consequence management
PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

GL-5 

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions 

found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02 will reflect this publication as the source 

document for these terms and definitions. 

balance. None. (Approved for removal from JP1-02.) 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazard. Chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear hazard elements that could cause an adverse affect through 

their accidental or deliberate release, dissemination, or impacts. Also called CBRN 

hazard. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear passive defense. Passive measures 

taken to minimize or negate the vulnerability to, and effects of, chemical, biological, 

radiological, or nuclear attacks. This mission area focuses on maintaining the joint 

force’s ability to continue military operations in a chemical, biological, radiological, 

or nuclear environment. Also called CBRN passive defense. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-40) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

counterproliferation. Those actions taken to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of 

mass destruction against the United States, our forces, allies, and partners. Also 

called CP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-40) (This term and its definition modify the 

existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

deterrence. The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a 

state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable 

counteraction. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-40) 

exploitation. 1. Taking full advantage of success in military operations, following up 

initial gains, and making permanent the temporary effects already achieved. 2. 

Taking full advantage of any information that has come to hand for tactical, 

operational, or strategic purposes. 3. An offensive operation that usually follows a 

successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 2-01.3) 

hostile environment. Operational environment in which hostile forces have control as 

well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit 

intends to conduct. (JP 1-02 SOURCE: JP 3-0). 

nonproliferation. Actions to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 

by dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, 

material, and expertise. Also called NP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-40) (This term 

and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

nuclear reactor. A facility in which fissile material is used in a self-supporting chain 

reaction (nuclear fission) to produce heat and/or radiation for both practical 

application and research and development. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-40) 

permissive environment. Operational environment in which host country military and 

law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist 

operations that a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02 SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

proliferation. The transfer of weapons of mass destruction, related materials, 

technology, and expertise from suppliers to hostile state or non-state actors. (JP 1-

02. SOURCE: JP 3-40) (This term and its definition modify the existing term 

‘proliferation (nuclear weapons)’ and its definition and are approved for inclusion in 

JP 1-02.) 

readiness. The ability of United States military forces to fight and meet the demands of 

the national military strategy. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct but 

interrelated levels. a. unit readiness—The ability to provide capabilities required by 

the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from 

the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. b. joint 

readiness—The combatant commander’s ability to integrate and synchronize ready 

combat and support forces to execute his or her assigned missions. (JP 1-02) 

tacit arms control agreement. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

threat reduction cooperation. Activities undertaken with the consent and cooperation 

of host nation authorities in a permissive environment to enhance physical security, 

and to reduce, dismantle, redirect, and/or improve protection of a state’s existing 

weapons of mass destruction program, stockpiles, and capabilities. Also called 

TRC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-40) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

uncertain environment. Operational environment in which host government forces, 

whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not 

have totally effective control or the territory and population in the intended 

operational area. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

unilateral arms control measure. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

weapons of mass destruction. Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons 

capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude the 

means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and 

divisible part from the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-40) 

(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are 

approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

weapons of mass destruction active defense. Active measures to defeat an attack with 

chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons by employing actions to 

GL-6 JP 3-40 
Glossary 

GL-7 

divert, neutralize, or destroy those weapons or their means of delivery while en route 

to their target. Also called WMD active defense. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-40) 

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

weapons of mass destruction consequence management. Actions authorized by the 

Secretary of Defense to mitigate the effects of a weapon of mass destruction attack 

or event and, if necessary, provide temporary essential operations and services at 

home and abroad. Also called WMD CM. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-40) 

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

weapons of mass destruction elimination. Actions undertaken in a hostile or uncertain 

environment to systematically locate, characterize, secure, and disable, or destroy 

weapons of mass destruction programs and related capabilities. Also called WMD 

elimination. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-40) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

weapons of mass destruction interdiction. Operations to track, intercept, search, divert, 

seize, or otherwise stop the transit of weapons of mass destruction, its delivery 

systems, or related materials, technologies, and expertise. Also called WMD 

interdiction. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-40) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

weapons of mass destruction offensive operations. Actions to disrupt, neutralize, or 

destroy a weapon of mass destruction threat before it can be used, or to deter 

subsequent use of such weapons. Also called WMD offensive operations. (JP 1-

02. SOURCE: JP 3-40) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

weapons of mass destruction security cooperation and partner activities. Activities 

to improve or promote defense relationships and capacity of allied and partner 

nations to execute or support the other military mission areas to combat weapons of 

mass destruction through military-to military contact, burden sharing arrangements, 

combined military activities, and support to international activities. Also called 

WMD security cooperation. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-40) (Approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-40 

Intentionally Blank 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATION

PLANS SYSTEMS

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to

fill extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of

the development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-40 Operations