NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CARLOS E. PAZ, AKA Carlos Enrique 

Paz, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 14-70351 

Agency No. A095-016-111 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 9, 2017**

Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Carlos E. Paz, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an 

immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 14 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 14-70351 

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the 

agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility 

determinations created by the REAL ID Act, Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 

1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010), and we review de novo claims of due process violations 

in immigration proceedings, Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 

2004). We deny the petition for review. 

The record does not compel the conclusion that Paz established changed or 

extraordinary circumstances to excuse his untimely asylum application. See 8 

C.F.R. §§ 1208.4(a)(4), (5); see also Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 656-58 

(9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). We reject Paz’s contention that the BIA failed to 

review the evidence. Thus, we deny the petition for review as to asylum.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination 

based on the discrepancy between Paz’s testimony and his asylum application 

statement regarding the number of threats he received before leaving Guatemala, 

and the inconsistency regarding when the mafia started using the “electric chair.” 

See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (adverse credibility determination 

was reasonable under the “totality of circumstances”). We reject his contention

that the BIA erred by failing to consider aspects of his testimony, see Li v. Holder, 

738 F.3d 1160, 1163-68 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining the maxim ‘falsus in uno, 

falsus in omnibus’ is the law in this circuit and “may properly be used to evaluate 
3 14-70351 

witness testimony in immigration cases”), and his contentions that the agency 

otherwise erred in analyzing his withholding of removal claim. We also reject his 

contention that the BIA violated his due process rights. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 

1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error to prevail on a due process claim). 

Thus, in the absence of credible testimony, in this case, Paz’s withholding of 

removal claim fails. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Finally, Paz’s CAT claim also fails because it is based on the statements that

the BIA found not credible, and Paz does not point to any evidence that compels 

the finding that it is more likely than not he would be tortured by or with the 

consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Guatemala. See 

Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048-49. We reject Paz’s contentions that the agency failed 

to review the evidence adequately or applied an incorrect legal standard.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.