Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

United States Secret Service After-Action 


Review of Inaugural Security 


(Redacted)
 

OIG-10-04 October 2009 
 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 

 October 19, 2009 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector 

General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports 

prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and 

effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the United States Secret Service 

after-action review of concerns raised in the Washington Post on January 30, 2009, on 

inaugural security. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant 

agencies and institutions, interviews with members of the public, direct observations, and 

a review of applicable documents. 

We trust this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. 

We express our appreciation to all who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 


Inspector General 

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary.............................................................................................................1
 

Background..........................................................................................................................3 

Results of Review ................................................................................................................7 

USSS Is Proficient at Evaluating and Improving Its Process ........................................7 

Overall Inaugural Security Was Satisfactory...............................................................11 

USSS Met Standards Sought by Congressional Inquiry..............................................21 

OIG Analysis of Management Comments.........................................................................24 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.......................................................25 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report.......................................27 

Appendix C: Relevant Articles and Correspondence................................................28 

Appendix D: Relevant Graphics................................................................................35 

Appendix E: Major Contributors to This Report ......................................................39 

Appendix E: Report Distribution ..............................................................................40 

Abbreviations 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

JCCIC Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

PIC Presidential Inaugural Committee 

USSS United States Secret Service 
OIG
 Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Bennie 

Thompson requested that we review concerns of lax security cited 

in a January 30, 2009, Washington Post article. Specifically, 

Chairman Thompson requested that we: 

•	 Review the United States Secret Service protective security 

plans for the inauguration; 

•	 Investigate and identify any deficiencies in security operations, 

including communications and information sharing between 

security personnel, deviations from security plans, and any 

mitigating circumstances or justifications; and 

•	 When appropriate, critique these operations and make 

recommendations to strengthen Secret Service practices. 

Chairman Thompson also asked that we assess what Secret Service 

may do differently to protect the nation’s first African-American 

President. 

Our review focused on two issues: (1) the adequacy of security at 

the events described in the Washington Post article and (2) how 

well the Secret Service managed its after-action review of the 

concerns cited in the article. The article described ticket-sharing 

practices that the political hosts of inaugural events have discretion 

to allow, rather than deficiencies in physical screening measures 

that the Secret Service uses to provide security. The article also 

described other permitted activities, such as bringing a camera 

without live batteries through screening or posing for photographs 

near presidential vehicles. We evaluated the article’s concerns that 

screened guests mingled with the public, but determined that 

Secret Service security measures were not readily identifiable to 

inaugural participants. We determined that the Secret Service 

after-action review was prompt and thorough, and designed to 

identify security planning and implementation weaknesses. We 

also concluded that the Secret Service risk assessments and 

security plans for the events described in the article were 

reasonable. Because the Secret Service after-action report 

identified and addressed areas for improvement, we recommend 

United States Secret Service After-Action Review of Inaugural Security
 

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that Secret Service inform us of the implementation of these 

changes. 

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Background 

When the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designates a 

major event, such as the Olympic Games or a political party 

convention, a National Special Security Event, the United States 

Secret Service (USSS) is the lead federal agency responsible for 

the planning, coordination, and implementation of the operational 

security plan.1 In addition, “the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) is the lead agency for intelligence and counterterrorism, and 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead 

agency for coordinating an effective response to possible 

emergencies.”2

 For the January 2009 inaugural events, uniformed 

DHS and other federal law enforcement components provided 

personnel and equipment, including screening magnetometers. 

State and local police from the District of Columbia, Virginia, and 

Maryland, and police from other regions, also provided security. 

In total, USSS obtained assistance from nearly 30,000 law 

enforcement officers from 58 federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies for the events. 

In addition, USSS partnered with the Joint Congressional 

Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies (JCCIC) and Presidential 

Inaugural Committee (PIC) to plan logistics and security for the 

inaugural events. About a year before every presidential 

inauguration, Congress creates a JCCIC to plan the official 

inaugural ceremonies at the Capitol, including the swearing-in of 

the President and Vice President of the United States. The JCCIC 

traditionally prints 240,000 inaugural tickets, which are colorcoded with a designated seating area but do not assign seats. (See 

appendix D, figure 1.) Tickets are issued to limit the size of 

crowds at inaugural events. Most of the 240,000 tickets are 

distributed by members of Congress to constituents, but a block is 

reserved for the PIC to distribute to VIPs such as donors, 

dignitaries, foreign government officials, and friends and family of 

outgoing and incoming administration officials. USSS uses the 

seating plans and projected audience size to plan security, but does 

not obtain lists of individuals who have received tickets. Security 

at the inauguration is based on physical screening of the audience 

1 See 18 U.S.C. § 3056(e)(1) (amended to clarify USSS authority for security operations at events and 

gatherings of national significance; authorizing the USSS to participate in the planning, coordination, and 

implementation of security operations at special events of national significance.) 2

 Statement for the Record, Mark Sullivan, Director, USSS. Before the Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security, U. S. House of Representatives, March 25, 2009. Found at: 

http://appropriations.house.gov/Witness_testimony/HS/Mark_Sullivan_03_25_09.pdf 

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and protection of officials, recognizing that elected officials should 

lead the decision on who attends inaugural events. 

The tickets for audience seats closest to the Capitol are coded as 

orange or yellow, while the purple and blue seating areas are 

slightly further from the Capitol, and the silver seating area farthest 

away. (See appendix D, figure 2.) Many dignitary VIPs were 

seated in reserved sections of the presidential platform during the 

inauguration. Dignitary VIPs included officials from former 

administrations, civil rights and labor leaders, and groups and 

individuals recognized for their achievements. Most donor VIPs 

were seated in the orange- and yellow-ticketed seating areas. 

Donor VIPs financed or collected contributions for the Obama 

campaign or for inaugural events. 

The PIC, appointed shortly after the election by the President-elect, 

has responsibility for all other official inaugural events. The PIC 

had about 400 staff to plan the Lincoln Memorial concert, three 

bipartisan dinners, concerts and dances, the inaugural parade, 10 

official inaugural balls, various meals for VIPs, and events for 

friends and families of the President and Vice President-elect. The 

PIC also distributed tickets to VIPs at the Washington Convention 

Center. About 18,000 JCCIC and PIC volunteers, many of whom 

had worked on the Obama presidential campaign, provided support 

for the inaugural activities. 

Accounts of the January 2009 inauguration events were generally 

positive, with two exceptions. The most publicized concerns cited 

during and after the events were from purple and silver ticketholders who were unable to enter their designated areas. This 

resulted in JCCIC Chairman Senator Dianne Feinstein’s request for 

a review of the planning and implementation of crowd 

management and communication. The USSS, Capitol Police, 

Washington Metropolitan Police, and United States Park Police 

conducted a joint investigation. Their report, the Multi-Agency 

Response to Concerns Raised by the Joint Congressional 

Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies for the 56th Presidential 

Inauguration (Multi-Agency Response) was completed on 

March 17, 2009.3 The Multi-Agency Response identified crowd 

management and communication weaknesses and made 38 

recommendations for improvement. Most of the recommendations 

addressed issues concerning ticket-holders who were unable to 

3

 The unclassified Executive Summary is available online (http://inaugural.senate.gov/documents/doc032309-multiagencyreport.pdf). 

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enter secured areas of the Capitol and along the parade route. Two 

identified opportunities to establish better real-time cell phone or 

Internet communication with the public. The Multi-Agency 

Response concluded that the USSS security plan was successful in 

providing protection. 

Less publicized was an article in the Washington Post on 

January 30, 2009, citing six named and additional unnamed 

campaign donors and bundlers (donation collectors), most of 

whom said that security at the inauguration appeared lax.4 These 

donor VIPs boarded buses for the inaugural at the Renaissance 

Hotel at Ninth and Eye Streets, NW. Dignitary VIPs also boarded 

buses at the Renaissance Hotel, but through a different screening 

process. (For the full text of the article, see appendix C, figure 1.) 

The Washington Post article cited six concerns: 

•	 The donor VIPs were not asked to show identification to 

retrieve tickets and VIP passes that allowed them and their 

guests to meet with President Obama. 

•	 After a screening to sit in a ticketed area for the swearing-in 

ceremony, they mingled with public crowds and were never 

again checked for firearms or explosives. 

•	 After security screening, they were told to find their way across 

a public street to board “secure” buses that would take them to 

the Capitol for the swearing-in ceremony. 

•	 One individual was waved through security with a camera that 

had no batteries despite warnings that the camera would have 

to be operational. 

•	 They watched other VIPs lean on the President-elect’s 

limousine, posing for pictures. 

•	 One donor flashed a handful of passes to gain access to a room 

and brought in an extra guest to meet Vice President Biden at a 

breakfast for donor VIPs, referred to as the “Biden Breakfast”. 

The Washington Post article noted that three of the donors named 

in the article were sending instant messages by cell phone using an 

Internet-based service, Twitter.com. (See appendix D, figure 4.) 

The text of these instant messages, or tweets, was available in real 

time to the general public by Internet or cell phone. Specifically, 

one bundler sent a message at 6:45 AM, “We were thoroughly xrayed, then walked across a public street in the open. WTF?” A 

4 Aaron Davis, “Security Around Obama Alarms Some VIP Donors,” Washington Post, January 30, 2009. 

United States Secret Service After-Action Review of Inaugural Security
 

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donor concurred at 6:55 AM, forwarding the original message and 

adding “True. And yikes.” Another donor responded at 7:44 AM, 

“If I got this sooner, wd have slept & snuck in.” 

On February 2, 2009, Chairman Bennie Thompson requested that 

we review concerns of lax security cited in the Washington Post 

article. (See appendix C, figure 2.) On February 3, 2009, we 

received a letter from the director of USSS offering full 

cooperation with our review. On February 4, 2009, the 

Washington Post printed a follow-up article noting the 

congressional request for a DHS OIG review. (See appendix C, 

figure 3.) On March 17, 2009, the Multi-Agency Response was 

completed. Although we will refer to issues addressed in the 

Multi-Agency Response, we will not make recommendations on 

improving communication on security, since they would be 

redundant to that report’s recommendations. The Multi-Agency 

Response recommends a government inaugural website through 

which the public could report suspicious activity, as well as 

monitoring public websites and social networking information 

during the inaugural to track potential problems.5 

USSS protection involves four elements, each of which contributed 

to security during the 2009 inauguration. First, USSS continually 

monitors potential threats against protected officials, most of 

which are reported by protectees who receive the threats or 

members of the public who become aware of threats. USSS works 

with intelligence agencies and federal and local law enforcement to 

identify potentially dangerous activity, and monitors Internet 

chatter and other sources of information. Second, cooperation with 

other law enforcement agencies and field campaign offices 

multiplies sources of information and may identify plots based on 

local knowledge. Third, extensive advance planning identifies 

potential vulnerabilities and best security options in each location 

where a protected official is scheduled to appear. These three 

elements have proven effective at deterring and disrupting plots 

against protectees. For lone gunmen, who historically have 

targeted political candidates without signaling their intentions in 

advance, the USSS relies on the aforementioned elements of 

protection, as well as the fourth element of round-the-clock 

screening of the public and physical protection of designated 

officials by armed personnel on the day of the event. Although our 

5

 The unclassified Executive Summary is available online (http://inaugural.senate.gov/documents/doc032309-multiagencyreport.pdf). 

United States Secret Service After-Action Review of Inaugural Security
 

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report discusses each element, the primary focus will be on 

physical screening on the day of the inaugural events. 

Results of Review 

USSS Is Proficient in Evaluating and Improving Its Process 

The USSS investigation of the security concerns cited in the 

January 30, 2009, Washington Post article was timely and thorough. We 

concluded from our participation in USSS-led interviews, and our review 

of planning documents and of work papers from USSS-led interviews, that 

USSS maintains a culture of self-examination. USSS interviews with its 

own special agents and Uniformed Division, and with partner law 

enforcement agencies, are designed to identify both actual and potential 

security weaknesses. During these interviews, law enforcement officers 

offered frank appraisals of the strengths and weaknesses of security plans 

and implementation. USSS interviews with PIC staff and with the donor 

VIPs mentioned in the Washington Post article also demonstrated the 

USSS commitment and ability to identify and address areas for 

improvement. 

USSS Methodology Is Appropriate 

USSS took the concerns cited in the Washington Post article 

seriously. By Monday, February 2, 2009, USSS had assigned its 

Office of Professional Responsibility to conduct an after-action 

review. USSS selected senior agents who were not involved in the 

inaugural security planning to conduct the review. On 

February 3, 2009, USSS Director Sullivan wrote to inform us of 

their internal review, and when we met with USSS officials on 

February 4, 2009, those officials offered cooperation with our 

parallel review. 

USSS devoted considerable resources to interviewing eyewitnesses 

to the events described in the Washington Post article as quickly as 

possible, even though USSS was simultaneously conducting the 

Multi-Agency Response review. Within the first week, USSS 

officials interviewed most of its eyewitness special agents and 

Uniformed Division personnel, and many U.S. Capitol Police and 

Washington Metropolitan Police officers. USSS officials made 

their interview notes and draft notes from these interviews 

available to us. To learn more about the allegations cited in the 

article, the USSS public affairs office asked the Washington Post 

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to comment on the article; however, the Washington Post declined 

the request. In the succeeding week, USSS officials identified, 

contacted, and interviewed PIC staff who were present at the 

events. A USSS special agent, accompanied by an OIG inspector, 

traveled to four cities on the West Coast to interview four of the 

people named in the Washington Post article. The USSS special 

agent, accompanied by an OIG inspector, interviewed a fifth 

person in Washington. Although the rapid USSS response meant 

that we were not present for many of the initial law enforcement 

interviews, this approach ensured that recollections were recorded 

while they were still fresh. 

Conduct of Law Enforcement Interviews Was Sufficient 

Based on our review of USSS planning documents and interview 

summary notes, we concluded that USSS expects constructive 

criticism, initiative to address security weaknesses as they are 

identified, and after-action performance critiques. The USSS 

personnel stated that they observed no security breaches at any of 

the inaugural events, and no attempted breaches at the Renaissance 

Hotel staging site. However, several special agents stationed at the 

Renaissance Hotel said that the logistical arrangements for staging 

VIPs on the morning of the inauguration could have been better. 

Some concerns were addressed immediately, for instance by using 

police caution tape to improve flow and by using hand-held 

magnetometers to screen dignitary VIPs immediately before they 

boarded buses. The final placement of stationary magnetometers 

followed the original plan. However, the plan also allowed for an 

alternative arrangement, and special agents discussed other 

arrangements during setup, indicating that special agents are 

expected to evaluate plans and discuss supervisory decisions. 

Ultimately, USSS’ internal after-action review concluded that in 

the event of a future similar staging requirement, it would be 

preferable to have the stationary magnetometers on the same side 

of the street as the buses. This conclusion indicates that security 

arrangements for the donor VIPs at the Renaissance Hotel could 

have been better. However, it also demonstrates that USSS has an 

internal capacity to examine its operations and make 

recommendations to strengthen its practices. 

The interviews we observed with the U.S. Capitol Police and 

Washington Metropolitan Police officers who escorted the VIPs 

were designed to elicit accurate recollections of what happened at 

the Renaissance Hotel. USSS negotiated in advance with the U.S. 

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Capitol Police chief and Capitol Police inspector general to ensure 

that interviewed witnesses would understand that USSS was 

evaluating its own performance. USSS also explained to 

Metropolitan Police officers that they were participating as 

witnesses. USSS asked sufficient questions about the general 

conditions on Inauguration Day to establish that these officers 

were recalling events and commenting candidly. For example, 

officers independently recounted similar memories of the 

entourages they escorted before and after the VIPs, the order in 

which the officers arrived at the parking lot, and that most could 

see Ninth Street, NW, but not the magnetometers. In addition, 

several officers brought a work log to the interview and referred to 

it for details. USSS also relied on the U.S. Capitol Police to close 

gaps in the timeline of events, as USSS agents and PIC staff all had 

slightly different recollections, and none had reason to keep a log. 

USSS conducted 63 interviews with USSS special agents and 

Uniformed Division personnel about what they saw at the Lincoln 

Memorial on January 18, 2009, and at the Capitol on 

January 20, 2009. We did not observe these interviews and the 

interview summary notes for the Lincoln Memorial interviews 

were less detailed than for the Renaissance Hotel. However, the 

interview notes included sufficient independent recollections that 

we consider credible enough to support their conclusion that there 

were no security breaches at these sites. For example, many of the 

personnel recounted that some of their law enforcement 

counterparts stood down soon after the President-elect left the 

stage at the Lincoln Memorial concert. Personnel in the Security 

Room and in the field agreed that this issue had been reported and 

USSS personnel were told to remain at their posts. Interview notes 

included anecdotes of individuals who had attempted 

unsuccessfully to gain access, from which we concluded that each 

officer was asked to recall any unusual events. One of the 

personnel posted at a checkpoint a considerable distance from the 

Lincoln Memorial stage questioned whether security was adequate, 

while noting that he did not know how far from the stage the 

people he screened would be seated. Two mentioned 

miscommunication on a posting that was quickly resolved. None 

of those interviewed remembered donor VIPs near the presidential 

limousine, but those posted near the limousines remembered 

entertainers who had been photographed there. We believe these 

responses indicate that USSS interviewers asked enough questions 

to identify any security breaches, and that the personnel were 

expected to express their concerns. 

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USSS Managed PIC Staff and Donor VIP Interviews Well 

The interviews that USSS conducted with PIC staff who planned 

the Renaissance Hotel staging were designed to assess accurately 

USSS security at inaugural events. USSS officials prefaced 

interviews by explaining that their interest was in understanding 

what happened and identifying any security breaches so that they 

would not recur. USSS officials provided PIC staff with copies of 

the January 30, 2009, Washington Post article and the 

February 4, 2009, congressional letter, as well as site maps. The 

interviews with the PIC staff were less structured than the 

interviews conducted with the law enforcement officers, but each 

was asked the same questions about logistics, timing, and security. 

USSS was not defensive about its plans and implementation, and 

did not challenge a PIC staff member who described donor VIP 

staging as less than ideal. We conducted separate telephone 

interviews with additional PIC staff, and determined that their 

recollections were similar to those interviewed by USSS officials. 

The interviews demonstrated that USSS officials took concerns 

about security seriously and conducted interviews designed to 

elicit information about breaches or lapses in security. 

The interviews that a USSS special agent conducted with the five 

donor VIPs were also designed to obtain an accurate assessment of 

what the donor VIPs had observed. As with the PIC staff, the 

USSS official told the donor VIPs that the USSS goal was to 

determine what happened and to identify and address any breaches 

in security. The rapport the USSS interviewer established led two 

donor VIPs to volunteer that they themselves had participated in 

ticket-sharing. The two had believed ticket-sharing to be a security 

breach rather than a PIC crowd management issue. The interviews 

produced a few additional details that had not been mentioned in 

the Washington Post article, such as that one donor VIP did not 

think the search of his belongings was sufficiently thorough. The 

USSS official did not attempt to influence how the donor VIPs 

remembered or interpreted events, beyond informing them well 

into the interview that USSS does not rely on ticket checks as a 

security measure. When two of the donor VIPs indicated that they 

were conflicted about expressing security concerns in public, the 

USSS interviewer focused on their shared goal of identifying and 

preventing potential security breaches. The Washington Post 

provided assistance by forwarding to the unnamed sources in the 

Post article a letter that the Office of Inspector General wrote to 

request that these sources allow us to interview them, but no 

additional witnesses came forward. We concluded that USSS 

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methodology for following up on public concerns about security 

was effective in obtaining necessary information. 

Overall Inaugural Security Was Reasonable 

Several PIC staff told us that they attributed the inauguration’s successful 

security to the 18 months of prior experience the Obama campaign and 

USSS had working together. Although the reason for the long relationship 

was, as articulated by Senator Dick Durbin, the “sad reality of this day and 

age that Mr. Obama’s African-American heritage is the cause for a very 

violent and hated reaction from some people,” the cumulative shared 

experience was beneficial.6 USSS personnel and the campaign team, 

many of whom became PIC staff, had worked together at progressively 

larger and more complex events. USSS officials had experience with the 

nature of threats to candidate Obama’s security, as well as the unusually 

large, but generally peaceable, crowds he attracted. USSS officials 

brought experience and flexibility to their advance planning, and 

coordinated on security issues with its law enforcement partners and the 

PIC. There were no known security breaches at inaugural events. 

USSS Is Actively Engaged in Threat Assessment 

From early in the campaign season through inauguration, the 

media reported, and USSS officials confirmed, that the volume of 

documented threats against President Obama was the largest in 

American history. The increase in the volume of reported threats 

may have been due in part to greater public concern that such 

threats might be carried out. Media reports document that political 

leaders, law enforcement officers, intelligence agencies, campaign 

and inaugural staff, mental health workers, educational institutions, 

and neighbors reported concerns to USSS. The media also 

reported, and USSS officials confirmed, that a significant 

percentage of the threats focused on President Obama’s position as 

the first African American to be nominated by a major party and 

the first African American to be elected President. In addition, 

USSS officials told us that they investigated threats that are 

typically made against every presidential candidate, whether 

motivated by opposition to the candidate’s political positions or by 

mental instability. USSS officials noted that their investigations 

did not indicate that those making threats against President Obama 

6

 Eric Krol, “Secret Service To Guard Obama: Racial Threats, High Profile Prompt Extra Protection,” 

Chicago Daily Herald, May 4, 2007 

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were more capable of carrying them out than those who had 

targeted other candidates. 

The USSS policy of investigating every identified potential threat 

did detect and disrupt a number of groups conspiring to commit 

acts of violence against the President-elect. The media 

documented more than 10 cases that resulted in criminal 

prosecution, as many additional cases in which individuals were 

sanctioned for inappropriate conduct, and several more cases in 

which individuals were committed for psychiatric evaluation and 

treatment. USSS was also alert to the possibility of a security risk 

within the U.S. Capitol Police and brought it o the attention of the 

Secretary. The U.S. Capitol Police suspended two officers for 

inappropriate behavior to prevent them from working during the 

inauguration.7 

Planning for Security Mixed Experience With Flexibility 

Planning for an inauguration starts well before either party holds 

its nominating convention. It builds on experience from previous 

inaugurations, a practice that both helped and hindered the success 

of the 2009 inauguration. Both the Multi-Agency Response report 

and PIC staff noted that USSS officials, some law enforcement 

agencies, and political partners tried to adjust traditional inaugural 

practices to the unprecedented challenges they would face with the 

anticipated size of the crowd and the historic inauguration of the 

first African-American President. For each inauguration, the PIC 

is established only after the election, generally comprising staff 

who had worked on the President-elect’s campaign, a fact that 

inevitably limits planning options for both the PIC and USSS. 

JCCIC based its original plans on a 1-day inauguration celebration, 

while the Obama inauguration provided 4 days of events, including 

a logistically complex train tour from Philadelphia to Washington, 

a concert at the Lincoln Memorial, smaller concerts, public service 

activities, and dining events attended by the President- or Vice 

President-elect or their spouses. 

Nonetheless, USSS security plans provided an overall strategy, 

lead responsibilities, hours of operation, the purpose and 

authorized access for various checkpoints, communication, and 

backup, relief, and crisis response options. Some of the crowd 

7

 Spencer Hsu, Mary Beth Sheridan, and Carrie Johnson, “No Chances Taken at Inauguration: Suspension 

of 2 Capitol Police Officers Illustrates Extraordinary Security Precautions,” Washington Post, March 6, 

2009. 

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control issues described in the Multi-Agency Response were a 

result of exceptionally stringent security planning. Privately 

owned vehicles were prohibited in certain areas, bridges were 

closed, and aircraft were diverted. These restrictions allowed the 

USSS personnel and their law enforcement partners to limit and 

control car and pedestrian traffic in the downtown area, but 

required complex bus staging operations to move authorized guests 

through the city. Despite the unprecedented crowd sizes, there was 

“not one major security incident, arrest, or injury reported.”8 

USSS Coordinated With Partners Despite Fluid Situation 

Both PIC planners and USSS agents responsible for advance 

planning described inaugural planning as fluid and requiring 

continuous coordination, either directly or through coordinating 

committees and subcommittees. The JCCIC or PIC provided 

USSS personnel information on the size and significance of each 

event, and the USSS personnel and law enforcement partners 

formulated security requirements. In practice, USSS personnel 

adapted, where possible, to the PIC goals of facilitating participant 

logistics. PIC staff and the USSS supervisory special agent 

responsible for the staging area at the Renaissance Hotel confirmed 

that they began coordinating security and logistical plans about a 

month before the inauguration. However, decisions on which 

buses were staged there changed several times before the week of 

the inauguration, and logistics for managing the dignitary VIPs 

were revised on the morning of the inauguration. This flexibility 

required USSS law enforcement partners to adapt as well. 

Although some USSS special agents and Uniformed Division 

personnel expressed frustration at the fluidity of the plans, and 

some PIC staff articulated concerns that plans on the grounds of 

the Capitol were insufficiently flexible, everyone involved in the 

implementation of events described in the Washington Post article 

told us their overall communication capability and level of 

coordination were good. 

Execution Involved No Unaddressed Security Breaches 

The concerns cited in the Washington Post article about lax 

security centered on five inaugural events. Overall, we concluded 

that most of the concerns arose because participants were not 

8

 Executive Summary of Findings: Multi-Agency Response to Concerns Raised by the Joint Congressional 

Commitee on Inaugural Ceremonies for the 56th Presidential Inauguration, March 20, 2009, 

http://inaugural.senate.gov/documents/doc-032309-multiagencyreport.pdf. 

United States Secret Service After-Action Review of Inaugural Security
 

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aware of distinctions between crowd control measures (such as 

tickets) and security (such as magnetometer screening), or were not 

familiar with USSS security guidelines. We conducted extensive 

interviews and revisited the Renaissance Hotel staging site on 

several occasions before forming any conclusions on concerns that 

donor VIPs could have mingled with the general public. We 

eventually determined that there was adequate security during the 

VIP staging, but that much of it would not have been visible to the 

donor VIPs who expressed concerns. In addition, we determined 

that security was commensurate with the potential threat. While 

the donor VIPs were guided across a public street before boarding 

the buses to the inaugural ceremony, their seats at the inaugural 

ceremony were a considerable distance from the inaugural 

platform, and the individuals on the platform were protected by 

bullet-resistant glass. In contrast, USSS agents used a hand-held 

magnetometer to screen each dignitary VIP who sat on the 

inaugural platform immediately before they boarded the buses, and 

the PIC verified identities and invitations even for dignitaries 

whom they knew personally. 

Washington Convention Center 

The first concern cited in the Washington Post article was that 

“[t]hree contributors who raised $300,000 or more for the 

inauguration said they were never asked to show identification to 

retrieve dozens of tickets, including VIP passes that allowed them 

and their guests to meet privately with Obama.” Although donors 

would have observed USSS Uniformed Division personnel, U.S. 

Capitol Police, and Washington Metropolitan Police checking 

tickets throughout the inauguration, tickets were not intended to 

provide security but to control crowd size. Inaugural tickets were 

numbered, but did not have the name of the holder printed on 

them, bar codes, or other features that would enable a ticketchecker to link a ticket to a specific individual. PIC staff who had 

worked on previous inaugurations said that participants do swap 

tickets and do try to bring their friends into events, and they were 

not concerned by this activity. We do not consider the ticket 

distribution process a security weakness. 

Lincoln Memorial Concert 

The next two concerns cited pertained to the security screening for 

a meet-and-greet event that President-elect Obama had with donors 

and bundlers in the VIP tent at the Lincoln Memorial concert. The 

Washington Post reported that “[o]ne [donor] said he was waved 

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through with a camera that had no batteries despite warnings that it 

would have to be operational. The two [donors] said they later 

walked unattended by the President-elect’s motorcade and watched 

other donors lean on the limousine, posing for pictures.” Neither 

activity was a security breach. USSS and the JCCIC published 

lists of prohibited items in advance of the inaugural events, and 

cameras, operational or not, were not proscribed. Several USSS 

special agents and other security officials recalled entertainers who 

performed at the concert leaning against the presidential limousine, 

but said they would not have intervened unless an individual had 

attempted to tamper with the vehicle. USSS officials said, and the 

donors we interviewed confirmed, that everyone screened into the 

VIP area of the concert had gone through a magnetometer, and that 

their bags had been opened. The decision to hold meet-and-greet 

events was made the morning of the concert, so VIPs would not 

have known in advance about the occasion. In addition, donor 

VIPs recounted that law enforcement officers or others in the VIP 

party had kept them out of prohibited areas, and the President-elect 

himself assisted USSS by asking participants to move back after 

they had the opportunity to meet him. The activities cited in the 

Washington Post article from the Lincoln Memorial concert were 

not security lapses. 

Breakfast With Vice President-Elect Biden 

The fourth security concern cited in the Washington Post article 

was that “[b]y the next morning, when Biden spoke to donors at a 

Northwest [Washington, DC] hotel, one said it had become clear 

that ticket checks had become ‘a joke.’ He said he flashed a 

handful of coveted gray passes to gain access to the VIP room with 

Biden but brought in an extra guest.” From our interviews with 

PIC staff, USSS officials, and donor VIPs, we concluded that 

attendees had all been screened through a magnetometer. Access 

to the VIP area within the secure perimeter was a crowd-control 

function managed by the PIC, not a security function managed by 

USSS personnel. PIC staff said that they checked general 

admission tickets on entry, and that they would not necessarily 

have intervened when someone they recognized brought a guest 

who had a general admission ticket but did not have a gray pass 

into the VIP area within the secure perimeter. Because USSS 

relies on physical screening and monitoring, not invitations, to 

provide security, there were no security lapses at the Biden 

Breakfast. 

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Renaissance Hotel Staging VIPs to the Inaugural 

The most complex concern mentioned by donor VIPs was the 

staging process for the inauguration, for which donor VIPs were 

screened but walked across a public street after screening to board 

buses. Based on extensive interviews and a review of the staging 

site with USSS special agents responsible for security, we 

concluded that USSS provided adequate security, but that some of 

it would not have been visible to the donor VIPs. In addition, we 

noted that security was more stringent for dignitary VIPs who were 

seated on the inaugural platform than for donor VIPs, who did not 

have direct contact with the President-elect or Vice President-elect 

on Inauguration Day. 

The Washington Post article summarized a number of concerns 

about security at the Renaissance Hotel offsite staging area. 

Specifically, the Post reported: 

Several donors said they were particularly troubled 

by an episode before dawn Tuesday: More than 100 

corporate executives, Hollywood personalities and 

others had been told to gather for a security 

screening outside the Renaissance Hotel at 999 

Ninth St., NW. Once cleared, they were told, they 

would board “secure” buses that would ferry them 

to seats close to the president’s podium at the 

Capitol, and then to bleachers adjoining his viewing 

stand in front of the White House. 

But after passing through a magnetometer outside 

the hotel, members of the group said they were 

directed to a public sidewalk and told to find their 

way across Ninth Street to buses waiting in a 

convention center parking lot. Along the way, they 

said they mingled with throngs of spectators 

streaming toward the Mall. The VIPs were not 

screened again or asked for identification, they said. 

The article also noted that three donors sent tweets articulating 

their concerns, and that, “[t]o anyone surfing the Internet, accounts 

of the lax security surrounding the ‘secure’ buses were being 

broadcast in near-real time.” Chairman Thompson raised concerns 

that, had the reports by donor VIPs been accurate, the widespread 

availability of this information could be “making matters worse.” 

We interpreted this statement as concern that someone might react 

United States Secret Service After-Action Review of Inaugural Security
 

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to a report of lax security by attempting to mingle with the donor 

VIPs to board a bus or to pass a weapon to someone in the donor 

VIP group. 

USSS initiated many elements of the security plan before the 

dignitary and donor VIPs began to arrive at the Renaissance Hotel 

around 5:45 AM on Inauguration Day. Those measures would not 

have been readily apparent to guests. A reported 56 buses were 

parked in the public lot across from the Renaissance Hotel. (See 

appendix D, figure 3.) Dignitary VIPs and donor VIPs were 

allocated 5 and 21 buses respectively, while the other buses were 

used to transport Congressional Medal of Honor recipients, 

embassy officials, and friends and family of the incoming and 

outgoing President and Vice President. The night before the 

inauguration, the buses were parked, and after midnight were 

searched by Department of Defense explosives ordnance canines 

and secured. Many bus drivers had been screened and assigned 

buses before the donor VIPs arrived on site. 

USSS special agents on site, and most PIC staff and volunteers, 

were , which made them more difficult to 

identify. USSS special agents and Uniformed Division personnel 

arrived after 3:00 AM to set up stationary magnetometers and 

organize security. The security contingent included uniformed 

personnel, special agents , and a supervisory 

special agent and who remained on site 

throughout the event. More than 30 PIC staff and volunteers, most 

of whom had worked together on other major events in the Obama 

campaign, began arriving at 4:30 AM. They set up their 

operations, including stationing staff on the sidewalk to direct 

arriving donor VIPs and setting up refreshments. Unlike many 

PIC volunteers who wore tasseled red hats at other events, most 

PIC volunteers at the Renaissance Hotel were not wearing 

distinctive clothing, and the donor VIPs may not have identified all 

those standing on the sidewalk as PIC volunteers. 

About 750 donor VIPs formed a line in an outdoor courtyard of the 

Renaissance Hotel, and when they had been screened through a 

magnetometer, walked along Ninth Street, crossed the street, 

passed a table of refreshments, and boarded buses sequentially. 

(See appendix D, figure 3.) Donor VIPs were not carrying large 

bags. The PIC provided lunches after the swearing-in ceremony, 

which further assisted USSS personnel by limiting unusual or 

bulky packages brought onto the buses by the donor VIPs. USSS 

special agents, donor VIPs, and PIC staff recalled that both 

United States Secret Service After-Action Review of Inaugural Security
 

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pedestrian and vehicle traffic was thin for most of the staging, 

consistent with the early hour and the ban on privately owned 

vehicles. USSS special agents observed VIPs 

from their passage through the magnetometers to the point at 

which they boarded the buses. Because participants were wearing 

winter clothing and were asked to open their coats and bags for 

searches, the stream of donor VIPs leaving the screening area to 

cross the street at any given time was slow and relatively easy to 

monitor. USSS personnel on site said that they would have 

observed any member of the public joining the donor VIPs or 

handing anything to them, and that this had not happened. USSS 

personnel, PIC staff, and the donor VIPs we interviewed agreed 

that once donor VIPs boarded their buses, they did not get off to 

smoke or make telephone calls in the parking lot, limiting the 

possibility that an outsider could board a bus in place of one of the 

donor VIPs or pass an object to one of them after the USSS special 

agents observed the initial boarding process. None of the donor 

VIPs we interviewed were aware that USSS special agents 

 were stationed at intervals on the street and in the 

parking lot to maintain a “line of sight” surveillance of the donor 

VIPs. We asked USSS, U.S. Capitol Police, Washington 

Metropolitan Police, and PIC staff who had worked on other major 

events, whether there was anything unusual about line-of-sight 

security arrangements and were told that the procedure was used 

routinely. We determined that while the circumstances described 

by the four donor VIPs were largely accurate, these individuals 

were not aware of key security measures, such as the presence of 

USSS special agents monitoring donor VIPs from when they left 

the magnetometers to when they boarded buses. 

Although the PIC staff was not providing security, their presence 

added a layer of scrutiny. Among those interviewed by a USSS 

special agent, the four donor VIPs who had been at the 

Renaissance Hotel were not aware of the number of PIC staff who 

were lining the Ninth Street sidewalk to observe and direct them, 

though most remembered hearing instructions on their way to the 

buses. At least one PIC staffer boarded each donor VIP bus, and 

stayed with the group until it was inside the secure perimeter at the 

Capitol. PIC staff recalled making constant spot-checks to verify 

that each donor VIP had an inaugural ticket as well as a map that 

served as a bus pass. PIC staff distributed the maps/bus passes 

while the donor VIPs were in the magnetometer line. Consistent 

with the potential threat involved, dignitary VIPs were more 

closely scrutinized than donor VIPs. PIC staff told us that they 

required dignitary VIPs to present an identification document, and 

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checked them against an invitation list both before and after they 

boarded the buses. At the Capitol, JCCIC representatives met the 

dignitary VIP bus and escorted the guests to their assigned seats on 

the platform. 

Unpredicted adjustments to the VIP staging made it more difficult 

to breach security. For example, only about half the bus drivers 

arrived at their designated time, so the PIC staff reassigned the 

early arrivals to the lead buses. The relatively late decision to 

stage Congressional Medal of Honor recipients at the Renaissance 

Hotel meant that some U.S. Capitol Police were on site earlier than 

originally scheduled. U.S. Capitol Police reported that their canine 

unit was in the parking lot early during the staging to sweep a 

group of buses that Department of Defense canines swept earlier 

before escorting those buses to the State Department to pick up 

another group of guests. PIC staff had informed donor VIPs that 

they would be screened and on the buses shortly after 6:00 AM, 

but with more than 750 donors, two stationary magnetometer 

machines, and the need to open winter coats for security checks, 

the screening was slower than expected. U.S. Capitol and 

Washington Metropolitan Police motorcade escorts told us that 

they arrived for the scheduled 7:30 AM departure, and that while 

they were waiting, they also observed later donor VIPs and all the 

dignitary VIPs cross the street and board buses. These police 

escorts were not tasked with monitoring the boarding process, but 

they created a visible police presence and would have reported any 

unusual activity to USSS personnel. Because of screening delays, 

dignitary VIPs were screened using hand-held magnetometers 

separately from donor VIPs. The VIP entourages began to leave 

the parking lot at 7:57 AM. Each of these procedural and 

scheduling changes would have disrupted any attempt to join the 

donor VIPs without going through security screening, or to pass 

anything to an accomplice among those cleared to board the buses. 

Capitol Hill Inauguration 

The sixth security concern cited 

in the Washington Post article 

was that “after a screening to sit 

in a ticketed area near Presidentelect Obama for his swearing-in, 

they mingled with public crowds 

but were never again checked for 

firearms or explosives.” Because 

the VIP entourages took a 

United States Secret Service After-Action Review of Inaugural Security
 

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circuitous route to drop-off points, donor VIPs would not have 

been aware that the public crowds they observed had already been 

screened at the secure perimeter about two blocks southeast of the 

donor VIP drop-off location. (See appendix D, figure 5.) The 

JCCIC staff stationed at the Capitol checked tickets for those who 

arrived on foot at stations inside the secure perimeter, while the 

PIC staff who arrived with the donor VIPs escorted them past these 

stations to their seats. This arrangement may have given donor 

VIPs the impression that they were mingling with the public, but 

they were in fact mingling with other screened inaugural guests 

who held tickets for the same seating section, referred to as the 

orange section. Two of the donor VIPs we interviewed had tickets 

for a comparable seating section north of the orange section, 

referred to as the yellow section, and recalled that military or law 

enforcement officers at the Capitol allowed them to cross through 

the orange section into the yellow section. This arrangement did 

not represent a security breach; the Multi-Agency Response 

recommended more flexibility in moving guests to comparable 

seats when sections filled unevenly. In addition, although the 

donor VIPs had seats near the front of the general audience, they 

were a considerable distance from the ceremony platform and 

separated from the inaugural podium by bullet-resistant glass. 

Given the limitations on what guests were permitted to bring with 

them, the unlikelihood of assembling a weapon unnoticed, and the 

bullet-resistant glass around the platform, the donor VIP entourage 

would not have had an opportunity to breach security surrounding 

the incoming President and Vice President. Dignitary VIPs who 

were seated on the inaugural platform had received more rigorous 

screening, and were escorted directly from their buses to their 

assigned seats. 

United States Secret Service After-Action Review of Inaugural Security
 

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USSS Met Standards Sought by Congressional Inquiry 

USSS Protective Security Plans Were Reasonable 

The USSS protective security plans for the events described in the 

Washington Post article anticipated potential security threats. The 

plans established layers of security, assigned logistical and 

operational responsibilities to specified agencies, and identified 

site postings and duties for each location, including timelines and 

explanations of how the events would develop. The plans 

addressed resource allocations and assignment of law enforcement 

duties in correlation to the security requirements for each venue. 

USSS personnel revised the plans to meet emerging requirements 

or changing conditions. The flexibility of the USSS planning 

process allowed its special agents and Uniformed Division 

personnel to recommend and make changes to the plans for their 

venues even into the execution phase. This combination of using 

past experiences and responding to changing circumstances is a 

key component of the USSS planning process for National Special 

Security Events. 

USSS Managed Security Operations as Required 

For the events described in the Washington Post article, we 

identified no deficiencies in security operations. The fluid 

planning process presented a challenge, but communication and 

information sharing among security personnel and between 

security personnel and PIC staff was good for the events we 

reviewed. We consider small changes in procedures, such as 

screening dignitary VIPs at the Renaissance Hotel with hand-held 

magnetometers, to be a prudent deviation from advance planning. 

The latitude USSS allows its personnel to make adjustments based 

on circumstances is necessary to their ability to provide protection. 

We also observed that USSS officials expect personnel to critique 

operations and report derogatory or skeptical comments. This 

culture enables USSS personnel to identify and address 

weaknesses in USSS procedures. 

USSS Internal Reviews Improve Security Planning 

Because USSS identified and addressed the necessary areas for 

improvement, both in the Multi-Agency Response requested by 

Senator Feinstein and in its after-action review of the concerns 

United States Secret Service After-Action Review of Inaugural Security
 

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raised in the Washington Post article, we are not making 

recommendations in our report. Specifically: 

•	 New Communication Technologies. The three tweets 

expressing concerns about lax security described in the 

Washington Post article did not appear to have been widely 

read or discussed, either at the time they were posted or in 

response to the article. Nonetheless, USSS concluded in the 

Multi-Agency Report that it must develop more advanced 

mechanisms to monitor and respond to social networking sites 

as technological advances expand the availability of real-time 

information. The recommendations in the Multi-Agency 

Response address this requirement. 

•	 Videotape Footage. Media reports on inaugural security noted 

that more than 5,000 existing fixed outdoor cameras located 

throughout the Washington, DC, region would be operating 

during the inauguration, and those with views relevant for 

security would be monitored in real time. USSS currently does 

not routinely videotape political events, but may access footage 

obtained by other law enforcement agencies, the media, and the 

public. However, there was no usable footage of the 

Renaissance Hotel staging process. USSS determined that 

cameras fixed to neighboring buildings were not aimed at the 

area of the parking lot where the buses were staged, and that 

cameras fixed to poles in the parking lot were not turned on, as 

the parking lot was closed to privately owned vehicles during 

the inauguration. Without such footage, our review relied on 

eyewitness testimony and visits to the site to determine what 

happened on Inauguration Day. Although the after-action 

review process was labor-intensive, with more than 80 

eyewitness interviews, we concluded that USSS methodology 

enabled eyewitnesses to identify potential weaknesses. 

•	 Areas For Improvement. In its after-action review, USSS 

concluded that logistics at the Renaissance Hotel staging site 

would have been better if USSS personnel had screened donor 

VIPs through magnetometers on the same side of the street as 

the buses. In our review of the staging process, we determined 

that screening was slowed because there were too few 

magnetometers to screen VIPs who wore winter coats that 

needed to be opened and checked. In addition, a few donor 

VIPs observed that the concerns cited in the Washington Post 

article may have resulted from security that was difficult for 

United States Secret Service After-Action Review of Inaugural Security
 

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the public to recognize, rather than a lack of security, and 

suggested during their USSS interviews that a more visible 

police presence would have allayed their concerns. Such 

critiques—by USSS personnel, by us, and by the donor VIPs— 

indicate that USSS could improve its process in some areas. 

However, the Multi-Agency Response and the USSS afteraction review identified and addressed these concerns. 

We recommend that the Director, U.S. Secret Service: 

Recommendation #1: Provide documentation that the after-action 

report recommendation to improve logistics in situations 

comparable to the 2009 inaugural off-site staging has been 

incorporated into USSS planning materials, for example through a 

memorandum, or updated guidance, checklist, or training 

materials. 

USSS Capably Managed Security for Historic Election 

During the 18 months before President Obama’s inauguration, 

USSS provided protective coverage to candidate and then 

President-elect Obama, and worked closely with local law 

enforcement officers, the FBI, U.S. Attorney’s office, and 

campaign staff. This coordination was central to the ability of 

USSS personnel to conduct threat assessment and provide security 

during the inauguration. USSS provided security for the Obama 

campaign as events became increasingly larger and more 

logistically complex. USSS was also conducting threat 

assessments as Senator Obama’s profile became increasingly 

prominent in the presidential primaries and the general election. 

Although the volume of threats was significantly more than for 

previous presidential candidates, we concluded that the USSS 

strategy of investigating all articulated threats while also planning 

to limit opportunities for an individual to bring unauthorized 

weapons near protected officials on the day of an event was 

appropriate. 

Although we concluded that there were no security breaches at the 

inaugural events described in the Washington Post article, the 

article illustrates the diverse elements that comprise good security. 

The Washington Post reporter was alert to potential security 

breaches. Based on our interviews with the named donors and 

bundlers quoted in the article, we concluded that they were 

motivated by a genuine concern for the President’s safety. Even 

though the article did not lead to other anecdotes of potential 

United States Secret Service After-Action Review of Inaugural Security
 

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security breaches, it generated congressional concern. USSS 

response to the specific concerns cited in the article was to conduct 

an immediate and thorough investigation and to identify areas for 

improvement. Law enforcement officers, PIC staff, and donor 

VIPs provided necessary information for the USSS investigation 

and our parallel review. Finally, USSS cooperated with our 

review. 

OIG Analysis of Management Comments 

The U.S. Secret Service has concurred with our recommendation 

and has indicated that it will provide information concerning 

compliance by November 14, 2009. We look forward to receiving 

that information and closing the recommendation at that time. 

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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

The Office of Inspector General, including representatives from 

the Office of Inspections and the Office of Investigations, met with 

USSS officials on February 4, 2009. We learned that USSS 

officials had responded immediately to the concerns cited in the 

Washington Post article. They already had conducted extensive 

interviews with USSS Uniformed Division personnel and special 

agents, and with other federal law enforcement officers who were 

present at the Lincoln Memorial concert on Sunday, 

January 18, 2009; Renaissance Hotel staging in the early morning 

of January 20, 2009; and the U.S. Capitol during the swearing-in 

ceremony. Our Office of Investigations reviewed USSS interview 

questionnaires with the interview subjects’ responses to standard 

questions and USSS officials’ interview notes. 

We observed and participated in subsequent interviews USSS 

conducted with U.S. Capitol and Washington Metropolitan Police 

officers who accompanied the entourages from the Renaissance 

Hotel staging area to the Capitol for the inauguration. In addition, 

we met with the two USSS supervisory special agents responsible 

for the Renaissance Hotel staging to do a walk-through of the site 

and to discuss in detail the VIP bus staging process. We also 

reviewed security plans for the Lincoln Memorial concert, and 

reviewed the inauguration staging at the Capitol with USSS to 

discuss the security measures. We reviewed the after-action 

review report of the USSS internal investigation into the concerns 

cited in the Washington Post article, which included summaries of 

the 81 interviews USSS conducted. We also obtained an 

unredacted version of the Multi-Agency Response. 

We observed and participated in interviews with several key PIC 

staff who were onsite at the Renaissance Hotel, and five of the six 

donors and bundlers quoted in the Washington Post article. We 

requested that USSS officials communicate with the owners of 

cameras in the vicinity of the Renaissance Hotel to determine 

whether there was any usable footage. USSS officials determined 

that cameras fixed to neighboring buildings were not aimed at the 

area of parking lot where the buses were staged. Cameras fixed to 

poles in the parking lot were not turned on, as the parking lot was 

closed to the public during the inauguration. USSS officials also 

informed us that they had requested that the Washington Post offer 

a meeting with the reporter who wrote the January 30, 2009, 

article, and the unnamed sources cited in the article, but did not 

receive a response. 

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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

In addition to participating in the USSS internal review, we 

reviewed several issues independently. We requested that the 

Washington Post forward a letter we wrote to the unnamed sources 

in their article, which asked the sources to call or write us to 

discuss what they remembered. The Washington Post confirmed 

that it had forwarded our letter, but we received no responses. We 

also interviewed PIC staff and incorporated their comments into 

this report. Finally, we met with representatives of the USSS 

Protective Research and Protective Operations offices to discuss 

USSS options for monitoring, anticipating, and addressing 

potential threats. 

We conducted extensive Internet research to gauge whether there 

were other sources with allegations similar to those in the 

Washington Post article. In addition, we determined whether the 

issues cited in the article generated additional stories or concerns. 

We read accounts of the inauguration in hundreds of articles, 

blogs, and social networking sites, such as Facebook and 

Twitter.com. We determined that the concerns cited in the 

Washington Post article were isolated. We were not able to find 

specific allegations about lax security from others who wrote about 

the inauguration during or shortly after the event. Although the 

three tweets described in the Post article were available to the 

general public in real time, we could not locate anyone outside the 

donor VIP entourage who commented on the tweets or provided 

similar stories. The Post article was reprinted verbatim in many 

local papers and referenced on many websites, but it generated few 

comments and no new reports of specific security concerns. 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix C 

Relevant Articles And Correspondence 

Figure 1. January 30, 2009, Washington Post Article 

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Appendix C 

Relevant Articles and Correspondence 

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Appendix C 

Relevant Articles and Correspondence 

[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/29/AR2009012903894.html] 

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Appendix C 

Relevant Articles and Correspondence 

Figure 2. February 2, 2009, Congressional Request 

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Appendix C 

Relevant Articles and Correspondence 

[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/story/2009/02/03/ST2009020301448.html?sid=ST2009020301448] 

United States Secret Service After-Action Review of Inaugural Security
 

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Appendix C 

Relevant Articles and Correspondence 

Figure 3. February 4, 2009, Washington Post Article 

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Appendix C 

Relevant Articles and Correspondence 

[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/metro/pdf/Skinner.pdf?sid=ST2009020301448&s_pos=list] 

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Appendix D 

Relevant Graphics 

Figure 1. JCCIC Orange Ticket 

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Appendix D 

Relevant Graphics 

Figure 2. JCCIC Map of Reserved Ticketed Areas 

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Appendix D 

Relevant Graphics 

Figure 3. Renaissance Hotel Offsite (Donor VIP Movement From Hotel to Buses in Red) 

Figure 4. Donor VIP Tweets on Inauguration, From Twitter 

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Appendix D 

Relevant Graphics 

Figure 5. Donor VIP Seating; Sections 5 and 6 Circled 

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Appendix E 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Douglas Ellice, Chief Inspector 

Lorraine Eide, Senior Inspector 

Susan Fischer, Inspector 

Harry Horton, Senior Special Agent 

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Appendix F 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff for Operations 

Chief of Staff for Policy 

Deputy Chiefs of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

USSS Director 

USSS Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

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