11 August 2011

Joint Operation Planning

Joint Publication 5-0
 This edition of Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, reflects the 

current doctrine for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational planning activities 

across the full range of military operations. This keystone publication forms the core of 

joint warfighting doctrine and establishes the framework for our forces’ ability to fight as 

a joint team. 

 As our military continues to serve and protect our Nation in complex conflicts across 

the globe, it is appropriate that we continue to refine our doctrine and update our planning 

practices based upon experience and hard won knowledge. As a result of relevant joint 

force experience and knowledge, the practice of operational design and its relationship to 

operational art and the joint operations planning process is reflected in this revision of 

JP 5-0. 

 Likewise, the practice of Adaptive Planning and Execution has continued to evolve 

since the last publication of JP 5-0. This volume provides necessary updates to that 

process, as our combatant commands have continued to develop their ability to provide 

military options for contingencies and we seek to develop tools that allow for more rapid 

development, review, and refinement of plans at the accelerated pace we find the world 

requires today. 

 Given the operational environment is not simple or static, adaptation and flexibility 

are necessary in planning and execution. This edition of JP 5-0 seeks to arm joint force 

commanders with processes that allow for that flexibility. I encourage leaders to ensure 

their organizations understand and use joint doctrine and this manual in particular as you 

continue to assist our Nation in advancing its enduring interests. 

 M. G. MULLEN 

 Admiral, U.S. Navy 

 
i 

PREFACE 

1. Scope 

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, reflects current guidance for planning 

military operations and, as a keystone publication, forms the core of joint doctrine for joint 

operation planning throughout the range of military operations. 

2. Purpose 

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other 

joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and 

training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their 

appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC 

from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most 

appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders of 

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of 

these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate 

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of 

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of 

a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine 

and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the 

United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s 

doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and 

doctrine. 

 
Preface 

ii JP 5-0 

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iii 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 5-0 

DATED 26 DECEMBER 2006 

• Reorders and reorients chapters to provide a more logical flow and better reflect 

planning practice today. 

• Adds additional appendices to provide ready reference for best practices and 

process specificity. 

• Includes the new planning construct introduced in the 2008 Guidance for 

Employment of the Force. 

• Reflects the Department of Defense’s evolution from Joint Operation Planning and 

Execution System to Adaptive Planning and Execution system. 

• Reintroduces the term deliberate planning to cover all plans developed in noncrisis situations. 

• Reduces redundancies and improves continuity between Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 

and JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

• Reduces redundancies and improves continuity between JP 5-0 and JP 3-0, Joint 

Operations. 

 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 5-0 

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v 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... ix 

CHAPTER I 

ROLE OF JOINT OPERATION PLANNING 

 Overview .................................................................................................................... I-1 

 Strategic Direction ..................................................................................................... I-2 

 Providing Common Basis for Understanding and Adaptation .................................. I-3 

 Creating Understanding and Reducing Uncertainty .................................................. I-5 

 Providing Options, Aligning Resources, and Mitigating Risks ................................. I-5 

 Constant Change, Learning, and Adaptation ............................................................. I-6 

CHAPTER II 

STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND JOINT OPERATION PLANNING 

 Strategic Guidance and Planning Overview .............................................................II-1 

Section A. National, Defense, and Military Guidance .....................................................II-2 

 Introduction ...............................................................................................................II-2 

 National Security Council System ............................................................................II-2 

 National Security Strategy ........................................................................................II-2 

 Department of Defense .............................................................................................II-3 

 Joint Strategic Planning System ...............................................................................II-4 

 Geographic Combatant Commanders .......................................................................II-6 

 Interagency Considerations ......................................................................................II-8 

 Strategic Communication .........................................................................................II-9 

 Strategic Guidance for Multinational Operations ...................................................II-10 

Section B. Application of Guidance ..............................................................................II-11 

 Joint Planning and Execution Community .............................................................II-11 

 Adaptive Planning and Execution System ..............................................................II-13 

 Operational Activities .............................................................................................II-14 

 Planning Functions .................................................................................................II-19 

 Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning Products ....................................................II-21 

Section C. Interorganizational Planning and Coordination ...........................................II-35 

 Interagency Planning and Coordination .................................................................II-35 

 Multinational Planning and Coordination ..............................................................II-37 

 Review of Multinational Plans ...............................................................................II-38 

 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 5-0 

CHAPTER III 

OPERATIONAL ART AND OPERATIONAL DESIGN 

 Introduction ............................................................................................................. III-1 

 The Commander’s Role .......................................................................................... III-2 

Section A. Developing the Operational Approach ........................................................ III-5 

 Overview ................................................................................................................. III-5 

 Methodology ........................................................................................................... III-7 

Section B. Elements of Operational Design ................................................................ III-18 

 Overview ............................................................................................................... III-18

 Elements of Operational Design ........................................................................... III-18 

Section C. Phasing ....................................................................................................... III-38 

 Application ........................................................................................................... III-38 

 Number, Sequence, and Overlap .......................................................................... III-40 

 Transitions ............................................................................................................ III-40

 Phasing Model ...................................................................................................... III-41 

Section D. Assessment ................................................................................................. III-44 

 Overview ............................................................................................................... III-44

 Application ........................................................................................................... III-44 

CHAPTER IV 

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS 

 Introduction ............................................................................................................. IV-1

 Operational Art and Operational Design Interface with the 

Joint Operation Planning Process ........................................................................... IV-1 

 Planning Initiation .................................................................................................. IV-2 

 Mission Analysis .................................................................................................... IV-4 

 Course of Action Development ............................................................................ IV-17 

 Course of Action Analysis .................................................................................... IV-27 

 Course of Action Comparison .............................................................................. IV-36 

 Course of Action Approval ................................................................................... IV-40 

 Plan or Order Development .................................................................................. IV-44 

APPENDIX 

A Joint Operation Plan Format ..................................................................... A-1 

B Strategic Estimate .......................................................................................B-1 

C Staff Estimates ............................................................................................C-1 

D Assessment ................................................................................................ D-1 

E Flexible Deterrent Options ......................................................................... E-1 

F Flexible Response Options ......................................................................... F-1 

G Course of Action Comparison ................................................................... G-1 

H Global Force Management ........................................................................ H-1 

 
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vii 

J References ................................................................................................... J-1 

K Administrative Instructions ....................................................................... K-1 

GLOSSARY 

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................. GL-1 

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-5 

FIGURE 

I-1 Adaptive Planning Review and Approval Process ...................................... I-4 

II-1 National Strategic Direction .......................................................................II-5 

II-2 Shaping of Theater Strategy .......................................................................II-8 

II-3 Additional Sources of Strategic Guidance ...............................................II-10 

II-4 Joint Planning and Execution Community ...............................................II-12 

II-5 Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products .................II-14 

II-6 Planning During Execution ......................................................................II-18 

II-7 Plans Relationship ....................................................................................II-22 

II-8 Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning Comparison .................II-30 

II-9 Crisis Action Planning .............................................................................II-31 

II-10 Types of Orders ........................................................................................II-34 

III-1 Operational Art ......................................................................................... III-2 

III-2 Developing the Operational Approach ..................................................... III-3 

III-3 Operational Art and Planning Continuum ................................................ III-4 

III-4 Understanding the Operational Environment ........................................... III-8 

III-5 Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and 

Infrastructure System Analysis .............................................................. III-10 

III-6 Defining the Problem ............................................................................. III-12 

III-7 Developing the Operational Approach ................................................... III-14 

III-8 Operational Approach—Example .......................................................... III-15 

III-9 Elements of Operational Design ............................................................ III-18 

III-10 End State, Objectives, Effects, Tasks ..................................................... III-21 

III-11 Characteristics of Centers of Gravity ..................................................... III-23 

III-12 Center of Gravity Analysis Example ..................................................... III-25 

III-13 Sample Line of Operation ...................................................................... III-27 

III-14 Sample Lines of Effort ........................................................................... III-29 

III-15 Direct and Indirect Approach ................................................................. III-32 

III-16 Notional Operation Plan Phases ............................................................. III-39 

III-17 Phasing Model ........................................................................................ III-41 

IV-1 Joint Operation Planning Process ............................................................. IV-2 

IV-2 Joint Operation Planning .......................................................................... IV-3 

IV-3 Mission Analysis ...................................................................................... IV-5 

IV-4 Mission Analysis Activities ..................................................................... IV-6 

IV-5 Commander’s Critical Information Requirements ................................ IV-12 

IV-6 Example Mission Analysis Briefing ...................................................... IV-15 

IV-7 Course of Action Development .............................................................. IV-17 

IV-8 Step-By-Step Approach to Course of Action Development .................. IV-20 

IV-9 Example Course of Action Development Briefing ................................ IV-26 

IV-10 Course of Action Analysis ..................................................................... IV-28 
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viii JP 5-0 

IV-11 Potential Evaluation Criteria .................................................................. IV-31 

IV-12 Sample Wargaming Steps ...................................................................... IV-33 

IV-13 Course of Action Comparison ................................................................ IV-37 

IV-14 Staff Estimate Matrix (Intelligence Estimate) ........................................ IV-38 

IV-15 Course of Action Approval .................................................................... IV-40 

IV-16 Sample Course of Action Briefing Guide .............................................. IV-41 

IV-17 Commander’s Estimate .......................................................................... IV-44 

IV-18 Plan Development Activities .................................................................. IV-47 

C-1 Functional Staff Estimates .........................................................................C-2 

D-1 Assessment Levels and Measures ............................................................. D-7 

E-1 Examples of Requested Diplomatic Flexible Deterrent Options ............... E-1 

E-2 Examples of Requested Informational Flexible Deterrent Options ........... E-2 

E-3 Examples of Requested Military Flexible Deterrent Options .................... E-3 

E-4 Examples of Requested Economic Flexible Deterrent Options ................. E-3 

F-1 Flexible Response Option Content Guidelines .......................................... F-2 

F-2 Flexible Response Option Scalability ........................................................ F-4 

G-1 Example Numerical Comparison .............................................................. G-2 

G-2 Example #2 Course of Action Comparison Matrix Format ...................... G-3 

G-3 Criteria for Strengths and Weaknesses Example ...................................... G-4 

G-4 Descriptive Comparison Example ............................................................. G-4 

G-5 Plus/Minus/Neutral Comparison Example ................................................ G-5 

H-1 Force Structure (Force Pool) ..................................................................... H-5 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

 Discusses the Role of Joint Operation Planning 

 Explains the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system 

 Explains the Composition of Strategic Direction and Joint Operation 

Planning 

 Describes Operational Art, Operational Design, the Operational Design 

Elements, and the Relationship to Joint Operation Planning Process 

 Describes the Joint Operation Planning Process 

Role of Joint Operation Planning 

Joint Operation Planning Joint operation planning consists of planning 

activities associated with joint military operations by 

combatant commanders (CCDRs) and their subordinate 

joint force commanders (JFCs) in response to 

contingencies and crises. It transforms national 

strategic objectives into activities by development of 

operational products that include planning for the 

mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, 

redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. 

Strategic Direction Strategic direction is the common thread that 

integrates and synchronizes the planning activities and 

operations of the Joint Staff (JS), combatant commands 

(CCMDs), Services, JFCs, combat support agencies 

(CSAs), and other Department of Defense (DOD) 

agencies. It provides purpose and focus to the planning 

for employment of military force. As an overarching 

term, strategic direction encompasses the processes and 

manner by which the President and the Secretary of 

Defense (SecDef) provide strategic guidance to the 

joint force. 

Providing Common Basis for 

Understanding and 

Adaptation 

Joint operation planning occurs within Adaptive 

Planning and Execution (APEX), which is the 

department-level system of joint policies, processes, 

procedures, and reporting structures. APEX is 

supported by communications and information 

technology that is used by the joint planning and 
Executive Summary 

x JP 5-0

Clear strategic guidance and 

frequent interaction among 

senior leaders, combatant 

commanders (CCDRs), and 

subordinate joint force 

commanders (JFCs) promotes 

early understanding of, and 

agreement on, strategic and 

military end states, objectives, 

planning assumptions, risks, 

and other key factors. 

execution community (JPEC) to monitor, plan, and 

execute mobilization, deployment, employment, 

sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization 

activities associated with joint operations. APEX 

formally integrates the planning activities of the JPEC 

and facilitates the JFC’s seamless transition from 

planning to execution during times of crisis. APEX

activities span many organizational levels, but the focus 

is on the interaction between SecDef and CCDRs, 

which ultimately helps the President and SecDef decide 

when, where, and how to commit US military forces. 

Creating Understanding and 

Reducing Uncertainty 

In conducting joint operation planning, commanders 

and staff apply operational art to operational design 

using the joint operation planning process (JOPP). 

Planners apply operational design to provide the 

conceptual framework that will underpin joint 

operation or campaign plans and their subsequent 

execution. The application of operational art and 

operational design further reduces uncertainty and 

adequately orders complex problems to allow for more 

detailed planning. 

Providing Options, Aligning 

Resources, and Mitigating 

Risks 

The planning staff uses JOPP to conduct detailed 

planning to fully develop options, identify resources, 

and identify and mitigate risk. Planners develop the 

concept of operations (CONOPS), force plans, 

deployment plans, and supporting plans that contain 

multiple options in order to provide the flexibility to 

adapt to changing conditions and remain consistent 

with the JFC’s intent. 

Constant Change, Learning, 

and Adaptation 

Joint operation planning plays a fundamental role in 

securing the Nation’s interests in a continuously 

changing operational environment. Through structured 

review, assessment, and modification, plans are 

constantly assessed and updated by the JFC and 

reviewed by the broader JPEC and senior DOD 

leadership. The open and collaborative planning 

process provides common understanding across 

multiple levels of organizations and the basis for 

adaptation and change. 
Executive Summary 

xi

Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

Strategic Guidance and 

Planning Overview 

Joint plans and orders are developed with the strategic 

and military end states in mind. The commander and 

planners derive their understanding of those end states 

from strategic guidance. Joint operation planning is an 

adaptive process. It occurs in a networked, 

collaborative environment, which requires dialogue 

among senior leaders, concurrent and parallel plan 

development, and collaboration across multiple 

planning levels. Clear strategic guidance and frequent 

interaction between senior leaders and planners 

promote an early, shared understanding of the complex 

operational problem presented, strategic and military 

end states, objectives, mission, planning assumptions, 

considerations, risks, and other key guidance factors. 

National, Defense, and 

Military Guidance 

The National Security Council (NSC) is the President’s 

principal forum for considering national security and 

foreign policy matters with the senior national security 

advisors and cabinet officials. For DOD, the 

President’s decisions drive strategic guidance 

promulgated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) and refined by the Joint Strategic Planning 

System (JSPS). To carry out Title 10, United States 

Code (USC), statutory responsibilities, the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) utilizes the JSPS to 

provide a formal structure in aligning ends, ways, and 

means, and to identify and mitigate risk for the military 

in shaping the best assessments, advice, and direction 

of the Armed Forces for the President and SecDef. 

National Security Council 

System 

The NSC system is the principal forum for interagency 

deliberation of national security policy issues requiring 

Presidential decision. The NSC prepares national 

security guidance that, with Presidential approval, 

becomes national security policy, and when 

implemented, these policy decisions provide the 

guidance for military planning and programming. 

National Security Strategy 

(NSS) 

The National Security Strategy (NSS) is a 

comprehensive report required annually by Title 50, 

USC, Section 404a. It is prepared by the executive 

branch of the government for Congress and outlines the 

major national security concerns of the US and how the 

administration plans to address them using all 
Executive Summary 

xii JP 5-0

instruments of national power. The document is 

purposely general in content, and its implementation 

relies on elaborating guidance provided in supporting 

documents (such as the National Defense Strategy 

[NDS], the Guidance for Employment of the Force 

[GEF], and the National Military Strategy [NMS]). 

Department of Defense National Defense Strategy. The NDS addresses how 

the Armed Forces of the United States will fight and 

win America’s wars and describes how DOD will 

support the objectives outlined in the NSS. It also 

provides a framework for other DOD strategic 

guidance, specifically on deliberate planning, force 

development, and intelligence. 

Existing legislation requires 

Secretary of Defense (SecDef) 

to conduct a Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR) and to 

submit a report on the QDR to 

Congress every four years. 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR 

articulates a national defense strategy consistent with 

the most recent NSS by defining force structure, 

modernization plans, and a budget plan allowing the 

military to successfully execute the full range of 

missions within that strategy. 

The Unified Command Plan, 

signed by the President, sets 

forth basic guidance to all 

CCDRs. 

Unified Command Plan (UCP). The UCP establishes 

CCMD missions and responsibilities; addresses 

assignment of forces; delineates geographic areas of 

responsibility for geographic combatant commanders 

(GCCs); and specifies responsibilities for functional 

combatant commanders. 

Guidance for Employment of the Force. The GEF 

provides two-year direction to CCMDs for operational 

planning, force management, security cooperation, and 

posture planning. The GEF is the method through 

which OSD translates strategic priorities set in the NSS, 

NDS, and QDR into implementable direction for 

operational activities. 

Joint Strategic Planning 

System (JSPS) 

JSPS products—such as the 

National Military Strategy 

and the Joint Strategic 

The JSPS is the primary system by which the CJCS, in 

coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff (JCS) and the CCDRs, conducts deliberate 

planning and provides military advice to the President 

and SecDef. 

National Military Strategy. The NMS, derived from 

the NSS and NDS, prioritizes and focuses the efforts of 

the Armed Forces of the United States while conveying 
Executive Summary 

xiii

Capabilities Plan—provide 

guidance and instructions on 

military policy, strategy, plans, 

forces, and resource 

requirements and allocations 

essential to successful 

execution of the NSS and 

other Presidential directives. 

the CJCS’s advice with regard to the security 

environment and the necessary military actions to 

protect vital US interests. The NMS defines the 

national military objectives (i.e., ends), how to 

accomplish these objectives (i.e., ways), and addresses 

the military capabilities required to execute the strategy 

(i.e., means). 

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP 

is the primary vehicle through which the CJCS 

exercises responsibility for directing the preparation of 

joint plans. The JSCP provides military strategic and 

operational guidance to CCDRs, Service Chiefs, 

CSAs, and applicable DOD agencies for preparation of 

campaign plans and contingency plans based on 

current military capabilities. It serves as the link 

between strategic guidance provided in the GEF and 

the joint operation planning activities and products that 

accomplish that guidance. 

Global Force Management Implementation 

Guidance (GFMIG). The GFMIG integrates 

complementary assignment, apportionment, and 

allocation information into a single GFM document. 

GFM aligns force assignment, apportionment, and 

allocation methodologies in support of the NDS, joint 

force availability requirements, and joint force 

assessments. It provides comprehensive insights into 

the global availability of US military resources and 

provides senior decision makers a process to quickly 

and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed 

changes in forces assignment, apportionment, and 

allocation. 

Geographic Combatant 

Commanders 

Strategic Estimate. The strategic estimate is a tool 

available to CCMDs and subunified commands as they 

design and develop campaign plans and subordinate 

campaign plans or operation plans (OPLANs). CCDRs 

use strategic estimates developed in peacetime to 

facilitate the employment of military forces across the 

range of military operations.

Theater Strategy. GCCs develop a theater strategy 

focused on achieving specified end states for their 

theaters. A theater strategy is a broad statement of the 

commander’s long-term vision for the area of 
Executive Summary 

xiv JP 5-0

responsibility. It is the bridge between national 

strategic guidance and the joint operation planning 

required to achieve national and regional objectives and 

end states. Specifically, it links CCMD activities, 

operations, and resources to United States Government 

(USG) policy and strategic guidance. 

Interagency Considerations 

Commanders and planners 

must identify the desired 

contributions of other 

agencies and organizations 

and communicate needs to 

Office of the Secretary of 

Defense. 

Achieving national strategic objectives requires 

effective unified action resulting in unity of effort. 

This is accomplished by collaboration, synchronization, 

and coordination in the use of the diplomatic, 

informational, military, and economic instruments of 

national power. To accomplish this integration, the 

Services and DOD agencies interact with non-DOD 

agencies and organizations to ensure mutual 

understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and 

consequences of military and nonmilitary actions as 

well as the understanding of end state and termination 

requirements. 

Strategic Communication(SC) 

Every JFC has the 

responsibility to develop a 

coordinated and synchronized 

communications strategy that 

links to, and supports, 

planning and execution of 

coherent national and SC 

effort. 

Strategic communication (SC) refers to focused USG 

efforts to understand and engage key audiences to 

create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for 

the advancement of USG interests, policies, and 

objectives through the use of coordinated programs, 

plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized 

with and leveraging the actions of all instruments of 

national power. The US military plays an important 

supporting role in SC, primarily through information 

operations, public affairs, and defense support to public 

diplomacy. SC considerations should be included in all 

joint operational planning for military operations from 

routine, recurring military activities in peacetime 

through major operations. 

Strategic Guidance for 

Multinational Operations 

When directed, designated US 

commanders participate 

directly with the armed forces 

Multinational operations start with the diplomatic 

efforts to create a coalition or spur an alliance into 

action. Discussion and coordination between potential 

participants initially address basic questions at the 

national strategic level. These senior-level discussions 

could involve intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) 

such as the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization, existing multinational forces (MNFs), or 

individual nations. In support of each MNF, a 

hierarchy of bilateral or multilateral bodies is
Executive Summary 

xv

of other nations in preparing 

bilateral contingency plans. 

established to define strategic and military end states 

and objectives, to develop strategies, and to coordinate 

strategic guidance for planning and executing 

multinational operations. 

Application of Guidance The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in 

joint operation planning or committed to a joint 

operation are collectively termed the JPEC. Although 

not a standing or regularly meeting entity, the JPEC 

consists of the CJCS and other members of the JCS, JS, 

the Services and their major commands, the CCMDs 

and their subordinate commands, and the CSAs. 

Adaptive Planning and 

Execution System 

Joint operation planning is accomplished through the 

APEX system. The JPEC uses the APEX system to 

monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, 

employment, sustainment, redeployment, and 

demobilization activities associated with joint 

operations. The APEX system operates in a networked, 

collaborative environment, which facilitates dialogue 

among senior leaders, concurrent and parallel plan 

development, and collaboration across multiple 

planning levels. Joint operation planning encompasses 

a number of elements, including three broad 

operational activities, four planning functions, and a 

number of related products. 

Operational Activities 

Planning continues during 

execution, with an initial 

emphasis on refining the 

existing plan and producing 

the operations order and 

refining the force flow 

utilizing employed assigned 

and allocated forces. 

Situational awareness addresses procedures for 

describing the operational environment, including 

threats to national security. This occurs during 

continuous monitoring of the national and international 

political and military situations so that JFCs and their 

staffs can determine and analyze emerging crises, 

notify decision makers, and determine the specific 

nature of the threat. 

Planning translates strategic guidance and direction 

into campaign plans, level 1–4 plans, and operation 

orders (OPORDs). Joint operation planning may be 

based on defined tasks identified in the GEF and the 

JSCP. Alternatively, joint operation planning may be 

based on the need for a military response to an 

unforeseen current event, emergency, or time-sensitive 

crisis. 
Executive Summary 

xvi JP 5-0

Execution begins when the President decides to use a 

military option to resolve a crisis. Only the President 

or SecDef can authorize the CJCS to issue an execute 

order (EXORD). Depending upon time constraints, an 

EXORD may be the only order a JFC receives. The 

EXORD defines the time to initiate operations and 

conveys guidance not provided earlier. Execution 

continues until the operation is terminated or the 

mission is accomplished. 

Planning Functions 

SecDef or the CCDR may 

direct the planning staff to 

refine or adapt a plan by 

reentering the planning 

process at any of the earlier 

functions. 

Although the four planning functions of strategic 

guidance, concept development, plan development, 

and plan assessment are generally sequential, they 

often run simultaneously in the effort to accelerate the 

overall planning process. 

Strategic Guidance. This function is used to 

formulate politico-military assessments at the strategic 

level, develop and evaluate military strategy and 

objectives, apportion and allocate forces and other 

resources, formulate concepts and strategic military 

options, and develop planning guidance leading to the 

preparation of courses of action (COAs). 

Concept Development. During deliberate planning, 

the supported commander develops several COAs, each 

containing an initial CONOPS that identifies, at a 

minimum, major capabilities required and task 

organization, major operational tasks to be 

accomplished by components, a concept of 

employment, and assessment of risk for each COA. 

Each COA should contain embedded options that 

describe multiple alternatives to accomplish designated 

end states as conditions change (e.g., operational 

environment, problem, strategic direction). 

Plan Development. This function is used to fully 

develop campaign plans, contingency plans, or orders, 

with applicable supporting annexes, and to refine 

preliminary feasibility analysis. This function fully 

integrates mobilization, deployment, employment, 

sustainment, conflict termination, redeployment, and 

demobilization activities through the six-phase joint 

operation construct (Phases 0–V). The CCDR briefs 

the final plan to SecDef (or a designated representative) 

during the final plan approval in-progress review (IPR), 
Executive Summary 

xvii

referred to as IPR F. CCDRs may repeat the IPR F, as 

needed until approval is granted. The primary product 

is an approved plan or order.

Plan Assessment (Refine, Adapt, Terminate, 

Execute—RATE). The supported commander 

continually reviews and assesses the complete plan, 

resulting in four possible outcomes: revise (R), adapt 

(A), terminate (T), or execute (E). 

Deliberate Planning and 

Crisis Action Planning (CAP) 

Products 

CAP activities are similar to 

deliberate planning activities, 

but CAP is based on dynamic, 

real-world conditions. 

CAP activities may be 

performed sequentially or in 

parallel, with supporting and 

subordinate plans or 

operation orders (OPORDs) 

being developed concurrently. 

Deliberate planning encompasses the preparation of 

plans that occur in non-crisis situations. It is used to 

develop campaign and contingency plans for a broad 

range of activities based on requirements identified in 

the GEF, JSCP, or other planning directives. Theater 

and global campaign plans are the centerpiece of 

DOD’s planning construct. They provide the means to 

translate CCMD theater or functional strategies into 

executable plans. 

Crisis action planning (CAP) provides the CJCS and 

CCDRs a process for getting vital decision-making 

information up the chain of command to the President 

and SecDef. It also outlines the mechanisms for 

monitoring the execution of the operation. CAP 

encompasses the activities associated with the timesensitive development of OPORDs for the deployment, 

employment, and sustainment of assigned, attached, 

and allocated forces and capabilities in response to a 

situation that may result in actual military operations. 

CAP procedures provide for the rapid and effective 

exchange of information and analysis, the timely 

preparation of military COAs for consideration by the 

President or SecDef, and the prompt transmission of 

their decisions to the JPEC. 

Contingency Plans 

A contingency is a situation 

that likely would involve 

military forces in response to 

natural and man-made 

Contingency plans are developed in anticipation of a 

potential crisis outside of crisis conditions. There are 

four levels of planning detail for contingency plans, 

with an associated planning product for each level. 

Level 1 Planning Detail—Commander’s Estimate. 

This level of planning involves the least amount of 

detail and focuses on producing multiple COAs to 

address a contingency. The product for this level can
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xviii JP 5-0

disasters, terrorists, 

subversives, military 

operations by foreign powers, 

or other situations as directed 

by the President or SecDef. 

be a COA briefing, command directive, commander’s 

estimate, or a memorandum. 

Level 2 Planning Detail—Base Plan (BPLAN). A 

BPLAN describes the CONOPS, major forces, 

concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for 

completing the mission. It normally does not include 

annexes or time-phased force and deployment data 

(TPFDD). 

Level 3 Planning Detail—Concept Plan 

(CONPLAN). A CONPLAN is an OPLAN in an 

abbreviated format that may require considerable 

expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or 

OPORD. It may also produce a TPFDD if applicable.

Level 4 Planning Detail—OPLAN. An OPLAN is a 

complete and detailed joint plan containing a full 

description of the CONOPS, all annexes applicable to 

the plan, and a TPFDD. It identifies the specific forces, 

functional support, and resources required to execute 

the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow 

into the theater. 

Interorganizational Planning 

and Coordination

Interorganizational planning and coordination is the 

interaction that occurs among elements of DOD; 

engaged USG departments and agencies; state, 

territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military 

forces and government agencies; IGOs; 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the 

private sector for the purpose of accomplishing an 

objective. Successful interorganizational coordination 

of plans facilitates unity of effort among multiple 

organizations by promoting common understanding of 

the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of 

military and civilian actions. 

Interagency Planning and 

Coordination 

Interagency coordination is the interaction that occurs 

among USG departments and agencies, including 

DOD, for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. 

Interagency coordination forges the vital link between 

the US military and the other instruments of national 

power. 

Multinational Planning and 

Coordination 

Multinational operations is a collective term to 

describe military actions conducted by forces of two or 
Executive Summary 

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Agreement on clearly 

identified strategic and 

military end states for the 

multinational force is 

essential to guide all 

multinational coordination, 

planning, and execution. 

more nations. Such operations are usually undertaken 

within the structure of a coalition or alliance, although 

other possible arrangements include supervision by an 

IGO (such as the United Nations or Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe). Key to any 

multinational operation is the achievement of unity 

of effort among political and military leaders of 

member nations emphasizing common objectives and 

shared interests as well as mutual support and respect. 

Review of Multinational Plans

Multilateral contingency 

plans routinely require 

national-level US approval. 

US joint strategic plans or contingency plans prepared 

in support of multinational plans are developed, 

reviewed, and approved exclusively within US 

operational channels. They may or may not be shared 

in total with multinational partners. The formal review 

and approval of multinational plans is accomplished in 

accordance with specific procedures adopted by each 

multinational organization and may or may not include 

separate US review or approval. 

Operational Art and Operational Design 

Commanders who are skilled 

in the use of operational art 

provide the vision that links 

tactical actions to strategic 

objectives. 

The JFC and staff develop plans and orders through the 

application of operational art and operational design 

and by using JOPP. They combine art and science to 

develop products that describe how (ways) the joint 

force will employ its capabilities (means) to achieve the 

military end state (ends). The interaction of operational 

art and operational design provides a bridge between 

strategy and tactics, linking national strategic aims to 

tactical combat and noncombat operations that must be 

executed to accomplish these aims. 

The Commander’s Role The commander is the central figure in operational 

art, due not only to education and experience, but also 

because the commander’s judgment and decisions are 

required to guide the staff through the process. 

Commanders compare similarities of their current 

situations with their own experiences or history to 

distinguish the unique features that require innovative 

or adaptive solutions. Operational design requires 

the commander to encourage discourse and leverage 

dialogue and collaboration to identify and solve 

complex, ill-defined problems. To that end, the 

commander must empower organizational learning and 

develop methods to determine if modifying the
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operational approach is necessary during the course of 

an operation. 

Developing the Operational 

Approach 

The operational approach is a commander’s 

description of the broad actions the force must take 

to achieve the desired military end state. The 

operational approach is based largely on an 

understanding of the operational environment and 

the problem facing the JFC. Once the JFC approves 

the approach, it provides the basis for beginning, 

continuing, or completing detailed planning. 

Methodology Three distinct aspects of a methodology collectively 

assist with producing an operational approach. 

Understand the Strategic Direction. The President, 

SecDef, CJCS, and CCDRs all promulgate strategic 

guidance. In general, this guidance provides long-term 

as well as intermediate or ancillary objectives. It 

should define what constitutes “victory” or success 

(ends) and allocate adequate forces and resources 

(means) to achieve strategic objectives. The 

operational approach (ways) of employing military 

capabilities to achieve the ends is for the supported JFC 

to develop and propose. Connecting resources and 

tactical actions to strategic ends is the responsibility of 

the operational commander. 

Understand the Operational Environment. The 

operational environment is the composite of the 

conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the 

employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of 

the commander. It encompasses physical areas and 

factors of the air, land, maritime, and space domains 

and the information environment (which includes 

cyberspace). Understanding the operational 

environment helps the JFC to better identify the 

problem; anticipate potential outcomes; and understand 

the results of various friendly, adversary, and neutral 

actions and how these actions affect achieving the 

military end state. 

Define the Problem. Defining the problem is 

essential to solving the problem. It involves 

understanding and isolating the root causes of the issue 
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xxi

at hand—defining the essence of a complex, ill-defined 

problem. Defining the problem begins with a review of 

the tendencies and potentials of all the concerned actors 

and identifying tensions among the existing conditions 

and the desired end state. 

Elements of Operational 

Design 

Operational design employs various elements to 

develop and refine the commander’s operational 

approach. These conceptual tools help commanders 

and their staffs think through the challenges of 

understanding the operational environment, defining 

the problem, and developing this approach, which 

guides planning and shapes the CONOPS. 

Termination. To plan effectively for termination, the 

supported JFC must know how the President and 

SecDef intend to terminate the joint operation and 

ensure that its outcomes endure. 

Military End State. Military end state is the set of 

required conditions that defines achievement of all 

military objectives. 

Objectives. An objective is a clearly defined, decisive, 

and attainable goal toward which every military 

operation should be directed.

Effects. An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state 

of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, 

or another effect. A desired effect can also be thought 

of as a condition that can support achieving an 

associated objective, while an undesired effect is a 

condition that can inhibit progress toward an objective.

Center of Gravity (COG). A COG is a source of 

power that provides moral or physical strength, 

freedom of action, or will to act. An objective is 

always linked to a COG. In identifying COGs it is 

important to remember that irregular warfare focuses 

on legitimacy and influence over a population, unlike 

traditional warfare, which employs direct military 

confrontation to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, 

destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or 

retain territory to force a change in an adversary’s 

government or policies. 
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xxii JP 5-0

Decisive Points. A decisive point is a geographic 

place, specific key event, critical factor, or function 

that, when acted upon, allows a commander to gain a 

marked advantage over an adversary or contributes 

materially to achieving success (e.g., creating a desired 

effect, achieving an objective). 

Lines of Operation (LOOs) and Lines of Effort. A 

LOO defines the interior or exterior orientation of the 

force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions 

on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and 

space to an objective(s). A line of effort links multiple 

tasks and missions using the logic of purpose—cause 

and effect—to focus efforts toward establishing 

operational and strategic conditions. 

Direct and Indirect Approach. The approach is the 

manner in which a commander contends with a COG. 

A direct approach attacks the enemy’s COG or 

principal strength by applying combat power directly 

against it. An indirect approach attacks the enemy’s 

COG by applying combat power against a series of 

decisive points that lead to the defeat of the COG while 

avoiding enemy strength. 

Anticipation. Anticipation is key to effective 

planning. JFCs must consider what might happen and 

look for the signs that may bring the possible event to 

pass. 

Operational Reach. Operational reach is the distance 

and duration across which a joint force can successfully 

employ military capabilities. 

Culmination. Culmination is that point in time and/or 

space at which the operation can no longer maintain 

momentum. 

Arranging Operations. Commanders must determine 

the best arrangement of joint force and component 

operations to conduct the assigned tasks and joint force 

mission. This arrangement often will be a combination 

of simultaneous and sequential operations to reach the 

end state conditions with the least cost in personnel and 

other resources. 
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xxiii

Forces and Functions. Commanders and planners can 

design campaigns and operations that focus on 

defeating either adversary forces, functions, or a 

combination of both. 

Phasing 

As a general rule, the phasing 

of the campaign or operation 

should be conceived in 

condition-driven rather than 

time-driven terms. 

Phases are distinct in time, space, and/or purpose from 

one another, but must be planned in support of each 

other and should represent a natural progression and 

subdivision of the campaign or operation. Each phase 

should have a set of starting conditions (that define the 

start of the phase) and ending conditions (that define 

the end of the phase). The ending conditions of one 

phase are the starting conditions for the next phase. 

Number, Sequence, and 

Overlap 

The JFC adjusts the phases to 

exploit opportunities 

presented by the adversary or 

operational situation or to 

react to unforeseen 

conditions. 

Working within the phasing construct, the actual phases 

used will vary (compressed, expanded, or omitted 

entirely) with the joint campaign or operation and be 

determined by the JFC. During planning, the JFC 

establishes conditions, objectives, or events for 

transitioning from one phase to another and plans 

sequels and branches for potential contingencies. 

Phases are designed to be conducted sequentially, but 

some activities from a phase may begin in a previous 

phase and continue into subsequent phases. 

Transitions Transitions between phases are designed to be distinct 

shifts in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by 

changes in command or support relationships. The 

need to move into another phase normally is identified 

by assessing that a set of objectives are achieved or that 

the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major 

change in focus for the joint force and is therefore 

usually event driven, not time driven. 

Phasing Model 

The six-phase model is not 

intended to be a universally 

prescriptive template for all 

conceivable joint operations 

Although the commander will determine the number 

and actual phases used during a campaign or operation, 

use of the phases [shape, deter, seize the initiative, 

dominate, stability, and enable civil authority] provides 

a flexible model to arrange combat and stability 

operations. 

Shape (Phase 0). Joint and multinational operations—

inclusive of normal and routine military activities—and 

various interagency activities are performed to dissuade 

or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify 
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xxiv JP 5-0

and may be tailored to the 

character and duration of the 

operation to which it applies. 

relationships with friends and allies. 

Deter (Phase I). The intent of this phase is to deter 

undesirable adversary action by demonstrating the 

capabilities and resolve of the joint force. It includes 

activities to prepare forces and set conditions for 

deployment and employment of forces in the event that 

deterrence is not successful. 

Seize Initiative (Phase II). JFCs seek to seize the 

initiative through the application of appropriate joint 

force capabilities. 

Dominate (Phase III). The dominate phase focuses on 

breaking the enemy’s will for organized resistance or, 

in noncombat situations, control of the operational 

environment. 

Stabilize (Phase IV). The stabilize phase is required 

when there is no fully functional, legitimate civil 

governing authority present. The joint force may be 

required to perform limited local governance, 

integrating the efforts of other supporting/ contributing 

multinational, IGO, NGO, or USG department and 

agency participants until legitimate local entities are 

functioning. 

Enable Civil Authority (Phase V). This phase is 

predominantly characterized by joint force support to 

legitimate civil governance in theater. The goal is for 

the joint force to enable the viability of the civil 

authority and its provision of essential services to the 

largest number of people in the region. 

Assessment Assessment is the continuous monitoring and 

evaluation of the current situation and progress of a 

joint operation toward mission accomplishment. It 

involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes to 

actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of 

force employment. In general, assessments should 

answer two questions: Is the JFC doing things right? Is 

the JFC doing the right things? 

Application of Assessment Assessment and learning enable incremental 

improvements to the commander’s operational 

approach and the campaign or contingency plan. Once 

JFCs understand the problem and what needs to be 
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xxv

Assessment entails two 

distinct tasks: continuously 

monitoring the situation and 

the progress of the operations 

and evaluating the operation 

against measures of 

effectiveness and measures of 

performance to determine 

progress relative to the 

mission, objectives, and end 

states. 

accomplished to succeed, they identify the means to 

assess effectiveness and the related information 

requirements that support assessment. This feedback 

becomes the basis for learning, adaptation, and 

subsequent adjustment. Effective assessment requires 

criteria for evaluating the degree of success in 

accomplishing the mission. Criteria can be expressed 

as measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of 

performance (MOPs). A MOE is a criterion used to 

assess changes in system behavior, capability, or 

operational environment that is tied to measuring the 

attainment of an end state, an objective, or the creation 

of an effect. It measures the relevance of actions being 

performed. A MOP is a criterion used to assess 

friendly actions that is tied to measuring task 

accomplishment. 

Joint Operation Planning Process 

Joint Operation Planning 

Process 

JOPP is an orderly, analytical process, which consists 

of a set of logical steps to examine a mission; develop, 

analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the best 

COA; and produce a plan or order. JOPP provides a 

proven process to organize the work of the commander, 

staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners, to 

develop plans that will appropriately address the 

problem to be solved. It focuses on defining the 

military mission and development and synchronization 

of detailed plans to accomplish that mission 

Operational Art and 

Operational Design Interface 

with the Joint Operation 

Planning Process 

Operational design and JOPP are complementary 

elements of the overall planning process. Operational 

design provides an iterative process that allows for the 

commander’s vision and mastery of operational art to 

help planners answer ends–ways–means–risk questions 

and appropriately structure campaigns and operations. 

The commander, supported by the staff, gains an 

understanding of the operational environment, defines 

the problem, and develops an operational approach for 

the campaign or operation through the application of 

operational design during the initiation step of JOPP. 

Commanders communicate their operational approach 

to their staff, subordinates, supporting commands, 

agencies, and multinational/nongovernmental entities 

as required in their initial planning guidance so that 

their approach can be translated into executable plans. 
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xxvi JP 5-0

This iterative process between the commander’s 

maturing operational approach and the development of 

the mission and CONOPS through JOPP facilitates the 

continuing development of possible COAs and their 

refinement into eventual CONOPS and executable 

plans. 

Planning Initiation 

The JFC typically will provide 

initial planning guidance 

based upon current 

understanding of the 

operational environment, the 

problem, and the initial 

operational approach for the 

campaign or operation. 

Joint operation planning begins when an appropriate 

authority recognizes potential for military capability to 

be employed in response to a potential or actual crisis. 

At the strategic level, that authority—the President, 

SecDef, or CJCS—initiates planning by deciding to 

develop military options. The GEF, JSCP, and related 

strategic guidance documents (when applicable) serve 

as the primary guidance to begin deliberate planning. 

Analyses of developing or immediate crises may result 

in the President, SecDef, or CJCS initiating military 

planning through a warning order or other planning 

directive. 

Mission Analysis 

The joint force’s mission is 

the task or set of tasks, 

together with the purpose, that 

clearly indicates the action to 

be taken and the reason for 

doing so. 

Mission analysis is used to study the assigned tasks 

and to identify all other tasks necessary to accomplish 

the mission. Mission analysis is critical because it 

provides direction to the commander and the staff, 

enabling them to focus effectively on the problem at 

hand. The primary inputs to mission analysis are the 

higher headquarters’ planning directive, other strategic 

guidance, and the commander’s initial planning 

guidance, which may include a description of the 

operational environment, a definition of the problem, 

the operational approach, initial intent, and the joint 

intelligence preparation of the operational. The 

primary products of mission analysis are staff 

estimates, the mission statement, a refined operational 

approach, the commander’s intent statement, updated 

planning guidance, and commander’s critical 

information requirements. 

Course of Action (COA) 

Development 

A good COA accomplishes the 

mission within the 

commander’s guidance, 

provides flexibility to meet 

A COA is a potential way (solution, method) to 

accomplish the assigned mission. The staff develops 

COAs to provide unique choices to the commander, all 

oriented on accomplishing the military end state. Since 

the operational approach contains the JFC’s broad 

approach to solve the problem at hand, each COA will 

expand this concept with the additional details that 

describe who will take the action, what type of 
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xxvii

unforeseen events during 

execution, and positions the 

joint force for future 

operations. 

military action will occur, when the action will begin, 

where the action will occur, why the action is required 

(purpose), and how the action will occur (method of 

employment of forces). 

COA Analysis 

While time-consuming, COA 

analysis should answer two 

primary questions: Is the COA 

feasible, and is it acceptable? 

COA analysis is the process of closely examining 

potential COAs to reveal details that will allow the 

commander and staff to tentatively identify COAs that 

are valid, and then compare these COAs. COA 

analysis identifies advantages and disadvantages of 

each proposed friendly COA. The commander and 

staff analyze each tentative COA separately according 

to the commander’s guidance. Wargaming is a 

primary means to conduct this analysis. Wargaming is 

a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of the 

operation, given joint force strengths and dispositions, 

adversary capabilities and possible COAs, the 

operational area, and other aspects of the operational 

environment. 

COA Comparison COA comparison is a subjective process whereby 

COAs are considered independently and 

evaluated/compared against a set of criteria that are 

established by the staff and commander. The goal is to 

identify and recommend the COA that has the highest 

probability of success against the enemy COA that is of 

the most concern to the commander. COA comparison 

facilitates the commander’s decision-making process 

by balancing the ends, means, ways, and risk of each 

COA. The end product of this task is a briefing to the 

commander on a COA recommendation and a decision 

by the commander. 

Plan or Order Development 

Deliberate planning will result 

in plan development, while 

CAP typically will lead 

directly to OPORD 

development. 

During plan or order development, the commander and 

staff, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting 

components and organizations, expand the approved 

COA into a detailed joint contingency plan or OPORD 

by first developing an executable CONOPS—the 

eventual centerpiece of the contingency plan or 

OPORD. The CONOPS clearly and concisely 

expresses what the JFC intends to accomplish and how 

it will be done using available resources. It describes 

how the actions of the joint force components and 

supporting organizations will be integrated, 

synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission, 

including potential branches and sequels. 
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xxviii JP 5-0

For plans and orders developed per JSCP direction or 

as a result of a Presidential or SecDef tasking (normally 

transmitted through the CJCS), the CJCS, in 

coordination with the supported and supporting 

commanders and other members of the JCS, monitors 

planning activities, resolves shortfalls when required, 

and reviews the supported commander’s contingency 

plan for adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, 

completeness, and compliance with joint doctrine. 

CONCLUSION 

 This publication reflects current guidance for planning 

military operations and, as a keystone publication, 

forms the core of joint doctrine for joint operation 

planning throughout the range of military operations.
I-1 

CHAPTER I 

ROLE OF JOINT OPERATION PLANNING 

1. Overview 

a. Joint operation planning consists of planning activities associated with joint military 

operations by combatant commanders (CCDRs) and their subordinate joint force 

commanders (JFCs) in response to contingencies and crises. It transforms national strategic 

objectives into activities by development of operational products that include planning for 

the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization 

of joint forces. It ties the military instrument of national power to the achievement of 

national security goals and objectives and is essential to securing strategic end states across 

the range of military operations. Planning begins with the end state in mind, providing a 

unifying purpose around which actions and resources are focused. The primary focus of this 

document is planning at the operational level. 

b. Joint operation planning provides a common basis for discussion, understanding, and 

change for the joint force, its subordinate and higher headquarters, the joint planning and 

execution community (JPEC), and the national leadership. The Adaptive Planning and 

Execution (APEX) system facilitates iterative dialogue and collaborative planning between 

the multiple echelons of command to ensure that the military instrument of national power is 

employed in accordance with national priorities, and that the plan is continuously reviewed 

and updated as required and adapted according to changes in strategic guidance, resources, or 

the operational environment. Joint operation planning also identifies capabilities outside 

Department of Defense (DOD) required for achieving the strategic objectives to reach the 

end state by providing a forum that facilitates the interorganizational coordination that 

enables unified action. 

c. The pursuit and attainment of the US national strategic objectives in today’s 

environment requires critical and creative thinking about the challenges facing the joint 

force. Joint operation planning fosters understanding, allowing commanders and their staffs 

to provide adequate order to ill-defined problems, reduce uncertainty, and enable further 

detailed planning. The planning process, both iterative and collaborative, enables 

understanding and facilitates the development of options to effectively meet the complex 

challenges facing joint forces throughout the world. 

d. The body of knowledge and understanding created during planning allows JFCs and 

their staffs to monitor, assess, and adapt to uncertain and changing environments and to 

anticipate and proactively act in crisis situations. Joint operation planning produces multiple 

options to employ the US military and to integrate US military actions with other instruments 

“In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is 

indispensable.” 

General Dwight D. Eisenhower 

34th president of the United States, 1953–1961 (1890–1969)
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 5-0 

of US national power in time, space, and purpose to achieve national strategic end states. 

Achieving operational military victory may be only a step toward achieving the overall 

national strategic goals and objectives, as demonstrated by events in Operations IRAQI 

FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Additionally, planning identifies and aligns 

resources with military actions, providing a framework to identify and mitigate risk. 

e. Assessing risk and identifying mitigation strategies are fundamental to joint operation 

planning. In the course of developing multiple options to meet the strategic end state, JFCs 

and their planning staffs, as well as the larger JPEC, identify and communicate shortfalls in 

DOD’s ability to resource, execute, and sustain the military operations contained in the plan 

as well as the necessary actions to reduce, control, or accept risk with knowledge of potential 

consequences. JFCs communicate risk to senior leadership during in-progress reviews 

(IPRs) of the plan. 

2. Strategic Direction 

a. Strategic direction is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the 

planning activities and operations of the Joint Staff (JS), combatant commands (CCMDs), 

Services, JFCs, combat support agencies (CSAs), and other DOD agencies. It provides 

purpose and focus to the planning for employment of military force. As an overarching 

term, strategic direction encompasses the processes and manner by which the President and 

the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) provide strategic guidance to the joint force. 

b. The President provides strategic guidance through the National Security Strategy 

(NSS), Presidential policy directives (PPDs), executive orders, and other strategic documents 

in conjunction with additional guidance and refinement from the National Security Council 

(NSC). The President also signs the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and the contingency 

planning guidance in the SecDef-signed Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), 

which are both developed by DOD. The UCP establishes CCMD missions, responsibilities, 

and areas of responsibility (AORs), while the GEF provides the written policy guidance and 

priorities to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and CCDRs for reviewing and 

preparing campaign and contingency plans (see Chapter II, “Strategic Direction and Joint 

Operation Planning,” paragraph 15a[2], “Contingency Plans”). At times, JFCs may not 

receive clear strategic guidance and will need to engage the strategic leadership in order to 

assist with plan development and the proposal of a feasible strategic end state. 

c. SecDef provides civilian oversight and control of the joint force and establishes 

defense policy to guide military action in support of national strategic objectives. SecDef 

controls the joint force through Title 10, United States Code (USC), specified responsibilities 

to approve assignment of forces as specified in the Forces for Unified Commands 

Memorandum as incorporated in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance 

(GFMIG). The GFMIG also addresses the allocation of forces. Additionally, SecDef 

oversees the development of broad defense policy goals and priorities for the development, 

employment, and sustainment of US military forces based on the NSS. 

d. The CJCS provides independent assessments, serves as principal military advisor to 

the President and the NSC, and assists the President and SecDef with providing unified 
 Role of Joint Operation Planning 

I-3 

strategic direction to the Armed Forces. In this capacity, the CJCS develops the National 

Military Strategy (NMS) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which provide 

military implementation strategies and deliberate planning direction based on Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy guidance. 

Chapter II, “Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning,” discusses strategic 

guidance in more detail. 

3. Providing Common Basis for Understanding and Adaptation 

a. Joint operation planning occurs within APEX, which is the department-level system 

of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures. APEX is supported by 

communications and information technology that is used by the JPEC to monitor, plan, and 

execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and 

demobilization activities associated with joint operations. APEX formally integrates the 

planning activities of the JPEC and facilitates the JFC’s seamless transition from planning to 

execution during times of crisis. The integration of joint operation planning with interagency 

and multinational partners begins with national strategic direction. APEX activities span 

many organizational levels, but the focus is on the interaction between SecDef and 

CCDRs, which ultimately helps the President and SecDef decide when, where, and how 

to commit US military forces. The interactive and collaborative process at the national 

level guides the way in which planning and execution occurs throughout the Armed Forces. 

b. Clear strategic guidance and frequent interaction among senior leaders, CCDRs, and 

subordinate JFCs promotes early understanding of, and agreement on, strategic and military 

end states, objectives, planning assumptions, risks, and other key factors. Based on guidance 

from this iterative dialogue, planners develop multiple viable options to achieve end states 

while providing commanders and national leaders flexibility in how they shape the situation 

and respond to contingencies. Collaborative and iterative assessment and recurring dialogue 

between commanders and senior national leadership facilitates responsive plan development 

and modification, resulting in plans that are continually updated. APEX also promotes early, 

robust, and frequent discourse between DOD planners and their interagency and 

multinational counterparts throughout the planning process. Dialogue, collaboration, and 

integration with civilian agencies and multinational partners are essential to address the 

increasing complexity of national security challenges while incorporating multiple 

instruments of national power into planning and execution efforts. 

c. Joint operation planning provides a common intellectual framework for the joint 

force, its subordinate and higher headquarters, the JPEC, and DOD leadership from which to 

adapt to the dynamic operational environment. APEX incorporates planning detail, frequent 

IPRs, continuous assessment, and collaborative technology, which provide increased 

opportunities for consultation and guidance during the planning process (see Figure I-1). 

d. IPRs constitute a disciplined dialogue between commanders and their higher 

headquarters and are a part of the formal adaptive planning review and approval process for 

campaign and contingency plans. Plan development will include as many IPRs as necessary. 

Topics for discussion may include clarification of the problem, strategic and military end 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 5-0 

states, military objectives, confirmation of intelligence and the operational environment, 

mission, facts and assumptions, courses of action (COAs), capabilities and force 

requirements, areas of risk, identification and removal of planning obstacles, required 

supporting and supported activities, guidance on coordination with the interagency and 

multinational communities, and the resolution of planning conflicts. Further, IPRs facilitate 

planning by ensuring that the plan addresses the most current strategic assessments and 

needs. They also generate valuable feedback for planning staffs and provide a common 

vision between national and military leadership. 

Figure I-1. Adaptive Planning Review and Approval Process 

Adaptive Planning Review and Approval Process

IPR R

IPR A

IPR C

IPR F

Legend

CCDR combatant commander

IPR in-progress review

IPR A strategic guidance

IPR C concept development

IPR F plan approval

IPR R plan assessment

JPEC joint planning and execution community

Continuous 

Assessment

Strategy and Guidance

Approval

Approval

Joint force develops and 

presents mission analysis 

to approving official*

CCDR develops, analyzes, 

and presents recommended 

and alternate courses of 

action to approving official*

Joint force 

develops plan

Joint force briefs 

final plan to 

approving official*

JPEC Review

Joint force 

updates plan

Approval

Changes to 

Operational 

Environment

Guidance 

Updates Resource 

Changes

*Approving official is typically the Secretary of Defense or designated representative

JPEC 

Review
Role of Joint Operation Planning 

I-5 

Chapter II, “Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning,” discusses APEX in more 

detail. 

4. Creating Understanding and Reducing Uncertainty 

a. In conducting joint operation planning, commanders and staff blend operational art, 

operational design, and the joint operation planning process (JOPP) in complementary 

fashion as part of the overall process that produces the eventual plan or order that drives the 

joint operation. Both the conceptual thinking and detailed planning that occur during the 

development of joint plans and orders produce a body of information and understanding 

across the entire JPEC, which prepares commanders and staffs to adapt and act quickly and 

effectively. Operational art, the creative thinking used to design strategies, campaigns, 

and major operations and to organize and employ military force, allows commanders to 

better understand the challenges facing them and to conceptualize an approach for achieving 

their strategic objectives. The thought process helps commanders and their staffs to lessen 

the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex operational environment, understand the military 

problem facing them, and visualize how best to effectively employ military capabilities to 

accomplish their mission. This is the essence of operational art. 

b. Planners apply operational design to provide the conceptual framework that will 

underpin joint operation or campaign plans and their subsequent execution. The application 

of operational art and operational design further reduces uncertainty and adequately orders 

complex problems to allow for more detailed planning. 

c. Based on understanding gained through the application of operational design, more 

detailed planning takes place within the steps of JOPP. JOPP is an orderly, analytical 

process that consists of a set of logical steps to analyze a mission; develop, analyze, and 

compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; and produce a plan or order. Through 

JOPP, planners effectively translate the commander’s planning guidance into a feasible COA 

and concept of operations (CONOPS) by which the joint force can achieve its assigned 

mission and military end state. This, in turn, links tactical actions, through operational 

planning and execution, to the accomplishment of national strategic objectives in support of 

the strategic end state. Planners align actions and resources in time and space to complete 

the plan. In doing so, they should take into account the details of force requirements, force 

availability, task organization, and sustainment and deployment concepts. They should also 

take into account the capacity and objectives of the other instruments of national power, risk, 

and functional elements of the plan (i.e., personnel, intelligence, logistics). 

Chapter III, “Operational Art and Operational Design,” discusses operational art and 

design in more detail, and Chapter IV, “Joint Operation Planning Process,” outlines the 

steps of JOPP. 

5. Providing Options, Aligning Resources, and Mitigating Risks 

a. The planning staff uses JOPP to conduct detailed planning to fully develop options, 

identify resources, and identify and mitigate risk. Planners develop the CONOPS, force 

plans, deployment plans, and supporting plans that contain multiple options in order to 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 5-0 

provide the flexibility to adapt to changing conditions and remain consistent with the JFC’s 

intent. 

b. The detailed planning that occurs during force planning allows CCDRs to assess risks 

associated with executing those plans directed to have time-phased force and deployment 

data (TPFDD). The supported CCDR, working with the component commanders, 

determines required force capabilities to accomplish an assigned mission. The Military 

Departments, Services, Service component commands of the CCMDs, and CSAs assist with 

developing forces lists, sourcing and tailoring required force capabilities with actual units, 

identifying and resolving shortfalls, and determining the routing and time-phasing of forces 

into the operational area (OA). Force planning begins early during CONOPS development 

and focuses on applying the right force to the mission while providing force visibility, force 

mobility, and adaptability throughout the duration of the operation. This detailed planning is 

essential to aligning resources to missions and to identifying and mitigating risks to plans. 

c. Risk identification and mitigation is first conducted in the initial steps of JOPP during 

mission analysis and continued and updated throughout the planning process. Assumptions 

are made to continue planning and are continually evaluated. When sufficient information or 

intelligence is received to invalidate an assumption, at a minimum it becomes an additional 

risk to the operation, although it could result in execution of a branch or sequel or the 

development of a new COA or plan. Along with hazard and threat analysis, shortfall 

identification is performed throughout the plan development process. The supported 

commander continuously identifies limiting factors, capability shortfalls, and associated risks 

as plan development progresses. Where possible, the supported commander resolves the 

shortfalls through planning adjustments and coordination with supporting commanders. If 

the shortfalls and necessary controls and countermeasures cannot be reconciled or the 

resources provided are inadequate to perform the assigned task, the supported commander 

reports these limiting factors and assessment of the associated risk to the CJCS. The CJCS, 

Service Chiefs, and joint force providers (JFPs) consider shortfalls and limiting factors 

reported by the supported commander and coordinate resolution. However, the completion 

of assigned plans is not delayed pending the resolution of shortfalls, and the commander 

remains responsible for developing strategies for mitigating the risk. 

Chapter IV, “Joint Operation Planning Process,” discusses JOPP in more detail. 

6. Constant Change, Learning, and Adaptation 

a. Joint operation planning plays a fundamental role in securing the Nation’s interests in 

a continuously changing operational environment. Through structured review, assessment, 

and modification, plans are constantly assessed and updated by the JFC and reviewed by the 

broader JPEC and senior DOD leadership. The open and collaborative planning process 

“An important difference between a military operation and a surgical operation is 

that the patient is not tied down. But it is a common fault of generalship to assume 

that he is.”

B. H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War
 Role of Joint Operation Planning 

I-7 

provides common understanding across multiple levels of organizations and the basis for 

adaptation and change. 

b. Assessment of plans is a critical element of planning. Given the nonstatic nature of 

conflict and war and a dynamic operational environment, the joint force must continually 

assess and learn during execution in order to adapt and update plans to ensure that military 

actions are effectively contributing toward the achievement of the strategic end state. 

Furthermore, planners must constantly assess whether the military actions remain relevant to 

the attainment of a military end state. Plans must account for changes to the operational 

environment, strategic guidance, or the challenges facing the joint force, all of which drive 

the requirement for constant assessment. Feedback, generated from the assessment process, 

forms the basis for learning, adaptation, and subsequent refinements to the commander’s 

guidance and operational concept. The commander and staff must constantly make certain 

that military actions are effective, correctly aligned with resources, and are contributing to 

the accomplishment of directed strategic and military end states. 

Chapter III, “Operational Art and Operational Design,” and Appendix D, “Assessment,” 

discuss the assessment process in more detail. 

 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 5-0 

Intentionally Blank 
II-1 

CHAPTER II 

STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND JOINT OPERATION PLANNING 

1. Strategic Guidance and Planning Overview 

a. Joint planning is end state oriented. Joint plans and orders are developed with the 

strategic and military end states in mind. The commander and planners derive their 

understanding of those end states from strategic guidance. Strategic guidance comes in 

many forms and provides the purpose and focus of joint operation planning. Joint operation 

planners must know where to look for the guidance to ensure that plans are consistent with 

national priorities and are directed toward achieving national security goals and objectives. 

b. Joint operation planning is an adaptive process. It occurs in a networked, 

collaborative environment, which requires dialogue among senior leaders, concurrent and 

parallel plan development, and collaboration across multiple planning levels. Clear strategic 

guidance and frequent interaction between senior leaders and planners promote an early, 

shared understanding of the complex operational problem presented, strategic and military 

end states, objectives, mission, planning assumptions, considerations, risks, and other key 

guidance factors. This facilitates responsive plan development and modification, resulting in 

constantly up-to-date plans. The focus is on developing plans that contain a variety of 

viable, flexible options for commanders, and in the case of top priority JSCP tasked plans, 

for SecDef to consider. 

c. JFCs and staffs should consider how to involve interagency and multinational 

partners and relevant intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs) in the planning process; how to coordinate and synchronize joint force 

actions with the operations of these organizations; and the military actions and resources 

required to fulfill their functions when they are unavailable, consistent with existing legal 

authorities. Regardless of the level of involvement during the planning process, commanders 

and staffs must consider their impact on joint operations. 

d. This chapter introduces some of the major sources of planning guidance available to 

the commander and staff. It also provides information on how the commander and staff, 

using the APEX system, can apply strategic and operational guidance within the JPEC to 

produce joint plans and orders. Finally, it discusses how to integrate other departments, 

agencies, and multinational partners into overall joint planning efforts. 

“The higher level of grand strategy [is] that of conducting war with a far-sighted 

regard to the state of the peace that will follow.” 

B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 5-0 

SECTION A. NATIONAL, DEFENSE, AND MILITARY GUIDANCE 

2. Introduction 

National security policy is developed at the NSC and approved by the President. The 

NSC is the President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy 

matters with the senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. NSC decisions may 

be directed to any of the member departments or agencies. The President chairs the NSC. 

Its regular attendees (both statutory and nonstatutory) are the Vice President, Secretary of 

State, Secretary of the Treasury, SecDef, Secretary of Homeland Security, and Assistant to 

the President for National Security Affairs. CJCS is the statutory military advisor to the 

NSC, and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. For DOD, the 

President’s decisions drive strategic guidance promulgated by OSD and refined by the Joint 

Strategic Planning System (JSPS). To carry out Title 10, USC, statutory responsibilities, the 

CJCS utilizes the JSPS to provide a formal structure in aligning ends, ways, and means, and 

to identify and mitigate risk for the military in shaping the best assessments, advice, and 

direction of the Armed Forces for the President and SecDef. This section describes strategic 

guidance documents and other considerations. 

3. National Security Council System 

The NSC system is the principal forum for interagency deliberation of national security 

policy issues requiring Presidential decision. In addition to NSC meetings chaired by the 

President, the current NSC organization includes the Principals Committee, Deputies 

Committee, and Interagency Policy Committees. Specific issue interagency working groups 

support these higher-level committees. Although the actual structure of the NSC varies 

among administrations, its purpose is to develop and refine issues while attempting to gain 

interagency consensus prior to forwarding to the President for decision. The NSC prepares 

national security guidance that, with Presidential approval, becomes national security policy, 

and when implemented, these policy decisions provide the guidance for military planning 

and programming. 

For additional information, see PPD-1, Organization of the National Security System, and 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5715.01B, Joint Staff Participation 

in Interagency Affairs.

4. National Security Strategy 

a. The NSS is a comprehensive report required annually by Title 50, USC, Section 

404a. It is prepared by the executive branch of the government for Congress and outlines the 

major national security concerns of the US and how the administration plans to address them 

using all instruments of national power. The document is purposely general in content, and 

its implementation relies on elaborating guidance provided in supporting documents (such as 

the National Defense Strategy [NDS], GEF, and NMS). 

b. JFCs and their staffs can derive the broad overarching policy of the US from the 

NSS, but must check other DOD and military sources for refined guidance. Even though the 
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-3 

NSS is an annual requirement, it typically is not updated for several years at a time and may 

be superseded by other strategic documents and policy statements. 

5. Department of Defense 

a. National Defense Strategy. The NDS flows from the NSS, informs the NMS, and 

provides the foundation for building the legislatively mandated quadrennial defense review 

(QDR), which focuses the DOD’s strategies, capabilities, and forces on operations of today 

and tomorrow. The NDS addresses how the Armed Forces of the United States will fight 

and win America’s wars and describes how DOD will support the objectives outlined in the 

NSS. It also provides a framework for other DOD strategic guidance, specifically on 

deliberate planning, force development, and intelligence. 

b. Quadrennial Defense Review. Existing legislation requires SecDef to conduct a 

QDR and to submit a report on the QDR to Congress every four years. The QDR articulates 

a national defense strategy consistent with the most recent NSS by defining force structure, 

modernization plans, and a budget plan allowing the military to successfully execute the full 

range of missions within that strategy. The report includes an evaluation by SecDef and 

CJCS of the military’s ability to successfully execute its missions at a low-to-moderate level 

of risk within the forecasted budget plan. 

c. Unified Command Plan. The UCP, signed by the President, sets forth basic 

guidance to all CCDRs. The UCP establishes CCMD missions and responsibilities; 

addresses assignment of forces; delineates geographic AORs for geographic combatant 

commanders (GCCs); and specifies responsibilities for functional combatant commanders 

(FCCs). The unified command structure identified in the UCP is flexible and changes as 

required to accommodate evolving US national security needs. Title 10, USC, Section 161, 

tasks CJCS to conduct a review of the UCP “not less often than every two years” and submit 

recommended changes to the President through SecDef. This document provides broad 

guidance that CCDRs and planners can use to derive tasks and missions during the 

development and modification of CCMD plans. 

d. Guidance for Employment of the Force. The GEF provides two-year direction to 

CCMDs for operational planning, force management, security cooperation, and posture 

planning. The GEF is the method through which OSD translates strategic priorities set in the 

NSS, NDS, and QDR into implementable direction for operational activities. It consolidates 

and integrates DOD planning guidance related to operations and other military activities into 

a single, overarching guidance document. It replaces guidance DOD previously promulgated 

through the Contingency Planning Guidance, Security Cooperation Guidance, Policy 

Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons, and various policy memoranda related 

to Global Force Management (GFM) and Global Defense Posture. The GEF is an essential 

document for CCMD planners as it provides the strategic end states for the deliberate 

planning of campaign plans and contingency plans. It also directs the level of planning detail 

as well as assumptions, which must be considered during the development of plans. 

(1) Campaign Plans. Global campaign plans and theater campaign plans (TCPs) 

are the centerpiece of the planning construct and “operationalize” CCMD theater or 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 5-0 

functional strategies. Campaign plans should focus on the command’s steady-state activities, 

which include ongoing operations, military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, 

and other shaping or preventive activities. Campaign plans provide the vehicle for linking 

steady-state shaping activities to the attainment of strategic and military end states. 

(2) Contingency Plans. The GEF guides the development of contingency plans, 

which address potential threats that put one or more end states at risk in ways that warrant 

military operations. Contingency plans are built to account for the possibility that steadystate activities could fail to prevent aggression, preclude large-scale instability in a key state 

or region, or mitigate the effects of a major disaster. Under the GEF’s campaign planning 

concept, contingency plans are conceptually considered branches of the overarching 

campaign plans. 

(3) Global Posture. Provides DOD-wide global defense posture (forces, footprint, 

and agreements) realignment guidance, to include DOD’s broad strategic themes for posture 

changes and overarching posture planning guidance, which inform the JSCP theater posture 

planning guidance. Global posture establishes the requirement for CCDRs to submit theater 

posture plans annually to support TCPs and contingency plans. Posture plans align basing 

and forces to ensure theater and global security, respond to contingency scenarios, and 

provide strategic flexibility. 

(4) Global Force Management. Guides the global sourcing processes of CCMD 

force requirements. It provides JS and force providers a decision framework for making 

assignment and allocation recommendations to SecDef and apportionment recommendations 

to CJCS. It also allows SecDef to make proactive, risk informed force management 

decisions. 

6. Joint Strategic Planning System 

The JSPS is the primary system by which the CJCS, in coordination with the other 

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the CCDRs, conducts deliberate planning and 

provides military advice to the President and SecDef. JSPS products—such as the NMS and 

the JSCP—provide guidance and instructions on military policy, strategy, plans, forces, and 

resource requirements and allocations essential to successful execution of the NSS and other 

Presidential directives. They also provide a means to evaluate extant US military 

capabilities, to assess the adequacy and risk associated with current programs and budgets, 

and to propose changes for consideration by the President, SecDef, and Congress. Other 

elements of JSPS, such as the CJCS Risk Assessment, the Joint Strategy Review, and the 

Comprehensive Joint Assessment, inform decision making and identify new contingencies 

that may warrant deliberate planning and the commitment of resources. Figure II-1 

illustrates the relationship between national strategic guidance and joint operation plans 

(OPLANs) developed in the APEX system. 

The JSPS is described in detail in CJCSI 3100.01B, Joint Strategic Planning System.

a. National Military Strategy. The NMS, derived from the NSS and NDS, prioritizes 

and focuses the efforts of the Armed Forces of the United States while conveying the CJCS’s 
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-5 

advice with regard to the security environment and the necessary military actions to protect 

vital US interests. The NMS defines the national military objectives (i.e., ends), how to 

accomplish these objectives (i.e., ways), and addresses the military capabilities required to 

execute the strategy (i.e., means). The NMS provides focus for military activities by 

defining a set of interrelated military objectives and joint operating concepts from which the 

Service Chiefs and CCDRs identify desired capabilities and against which the CJCS assesses 

risk. Subordinate to the NMS are branch national military strategies. For example, the 

National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) further 

develops the combating WMD guidance in the NMS by establishing military strategic 

objectives and military mission areas, and defining the guiding principles and strategic 

enablers for the military’s role in combating WMD. 

Figure II-1. National Strategic Direction 

National Strategic Direction

Role of the President and Secretary of Defense

Role of the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Role of the

Combatant Commander

Continuous

Interaction

Unified Action in Execution

Joint Strategic Planning System Adaptive Planning and 

Execution System

National Military Strategy

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

Global Force Management 

Implementation Guidance

Strategic Estimate

Theater Strategy

Theater/Global 

Campaign Plans

Plans and Orders Strategic Guidance Statements 

and Planning Orders

National Security Strategy National Defense Strategy

Guidance for Employment of the Force Strategic Guidance Statements

Unified Command Plan
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 5-0 

b. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The JSCP is the primary vehicle through which 

the CJCS exercises responsibility for directing the preparation of joint plans. The JSCP 

provides military strategic and operational guidance to CCDRs, Service Chiefs, CSAs, 

and applicable DOD agencies for preparation of campaign plans and contingency plans 

based on current military capabilities. It serves as the link between strategic guidance 

provided in the GEF and the joint operation planning activities and products that 

accomplish that guidance. In addition to communicating to the CCMDs specific planning 

guidance necessary for deliberate planning, the JSCP also translates strategic policy end 

states from the GEF into military campaign and contingency plan guidance for CCDRs and 

expands guidance to include global defense posture, security cooperation, and other steadystate activities. 

The JSCP is described in detail in CJCSI 3110.01G, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

(classified). 

c. Global Force Management Implementation Guidance. The GFMIG is a critical 

source document for force planning and execution. The GFMIG integrates complementary 

assignment, apportionment, and allocation information into a single GFM document. GFM 

aligns force assignment, apportionment, and allocation methodologies in support of the NDS, 

joint force availability requirements, and joint force assessments. It provides comprehensive 

insights into the global availability of US military resources and provides senior decision 

makers a process to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed changes in 

forces assignment, apportionment, and allocation. JS prepares the document with the JS 

Director for Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment (J-8) overseeing the assignment and 

apportionment of forces and the JS Operations Directorate overseeing the allocation of 

forces. It is updated every two years and approved by SecDef. The GFMIG provides 

planners essential information for aligning resources to the military actions. It contains 

direction on assignment of forces to CCDRs, specifies the force allocation process that 

provides access to all available forces (including military, DOD, and other federal 

departments and agency resources), and includes apportionment tables used by CCDRs for 

sourcing plans requiring designation of forces. The GFMIG includes the Forces for Unified 

Commands Memorandum (referenced as the Forces For memorandum or the Forces For 

assignment tables). The memorandum provides SecDef’s direction to the Secretaries of the 

Military Departments for assigning forces to CCMDs and serves as the record of force 

assignments. 

See Appendix H, “Global Force Management,” for additional information and descriptions. 

7. Geographic Combatant Commanders 

a. Strategic Estimate 

(1) The strategic estimate is a tool available to CCMDs and subunified commands 

as they design and develop campaign plans and subordinate campaign or OPLANs. CCDRs 

use strategic estimates developed in peacetime to facilitate the employment of military forces 

across the range of military operations. The strategic estimate is more comprehensive in 
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-7 

scope than estimates of subordinate commanders, encompasses all aspects of the CCDR’s 

operational environment, and is the basis for the development of the GCC theater strategy. 

(2) The CCDR, the CCDR’s staff, and supporting commands and agencies assess 

the broad strategic factors that influence the theater strategic environment, thus informing the 

theater strategy. 

(3) The estimate should include an analysis of strategic direction received from the 

President, SecDef, or the authoritative body of a multinational force (MNF); an analysis of 

all states, groups, or organizations in the operational environment that may threaten or 

challenge the CCMD’s ability to advance and defend US interests in the region; visualization 

of the relevant geopolitical, geoeconomic, and cultural factors in the region; an assessment of 

major strategic and operational challenges facing the CCMD; an analysis of known or 

anticipated opportunities the CCMD can leverage; and an assessment of risks inherent in the 

operational environment. 

(4) The result of the strategic estimate is a visualization and better understanding of 

the operational environment to include allies, partners, neutrals, and potential adversaries. 

The strategic estimate process is continuous and provides input used for designing and 

developing strategies and implementing plans. The broad strategic estimate is also the 

starting point for conducting the commander’s estimate of the situation for a specific 

operation. 

(5) Supported and supporting CCDRs and subunified commanders all prepare 

strategic estimates based on assigned tasks. CCDRs who support multiple JFCs prepare 

estimates for each supporting operation. 

See Appendix B, “Strategic Estimate,” for a notional strategic estimate format. 

b. Theater Strategy. GCCs develop a theater strategy focused on achieving specified 

end states for their theaters. A theater strategy is a broad statement of the commander’s 

long-term vision for the AOR. It is the bridge between national strategic guidance and the 

joint operation planning required to achieve national and regional objectives and end states. 

Specifically, it links CCMD activities, operations, and resources to United States 

Government (USG) policy and strategic guidance. The theater strategy should describe the 

regional end state and the objectives, ways, and means to achieve it. The theater strategy 

should begin with the strategic estimate. Although there is no prescribed format for a theater 

strategy, it may include the commander’s vision, mission, challenges, trends, assumptions, 

objectives, and resources. GCCs employ theater strategy to align and focus efforts and 

resources to mitigate and prepare for conflict and contingencies in their AOR and support 

and advance US interests. To support this goal, theater strategies normally emphasize 

security cooperation activities, building partner capacity, force posture, and preparation for 

contingencies. Theater strategies typically employ military and regional engagement, close 

cooperation with the Department of State (DOS), embassies, and other federal departments 

and agencies as ways to achieve theater objectives. Theater strategy should be informed by 

the means or resources available to support the accomplishment of designated end states and 

may include military resources, programs, policies, and available funding (see Figure II-2). 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 5-0 

GCCs publish the theater strategy to provide guidance to subordinates and supporting 

commands/agencies and improve coordination with other federal departments and agencies 

and regional partners. The detailed execution of the theater strategy is accomplished through 

the TCP. 

8. Interagency Considerations 

a. Achieving national strategic objectives requires effective unified action resulting in 

unity of effort. This is accomplished by collaboration, synchronization, and coordination in 

the use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national 

power. In such situations, military power is used in conjunction with the other instruments 

of national power to advance and defend US values, interests, and objectives. To accomplish 

this integration, the Services and DOD agencies interact with non-DOD agencies and 

organizations to ensure mutual understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and 

consequences of military and nonmilitary actions as well as the understanding of end state 

and termination requirements. They also identify the ways in which military and civilian 

capabilities best complement each other. The NSC plays a key role in the integration of all 

instruments of national power by facilitating mutual understanding and cooperation and is 

responsible for overseeing the interagency planning efforts. Further, military and civilian 

organizations sharing information, cooperating, and striving together to accomplish a 

common goal is the essence of multi-organizational coordination that makes unity of effort 

possible. In operations involving interagency partners and other stakeholders, where the 

Figure II-2. Shaping of Theater Strategy

Shaping of Theater Strategy

Strategy Ends Ways Means Risk

Resource 

Constraints

Security 

Environment
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-9 

commander may not control all elements, the commander seeks cooperation and builds 

consensus to achieve unity of effort. Consensus building is the key element to unity of 

effort. 

For additional information on interagency considerations, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, 

Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 

b. Commanders and planners must identify the desired contributions of other agencies 

and organizations and communicate needs to OSD. Further, commanders and planners 

should integrate limitations into their planning, such as indicating where agencies cannot act. 

It is critical to identify and communicate risk to mission accomplishment. Potential 

mitigation strategies should include COAs that do not entail the use of the military. 

c. The President, assisted by the NSC, provides strategic direction to guide the efforts of 

USG departments and agencies and organizations that represent other instruments of national 

power. See Figure II-3 for other sources of strategic direction that joint planners may 

consider. 

9. Strategic Communication 

a. Strategic communication (SC) refers to focused USG efforts to understand and 

engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the 

advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated 

programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with and leveraging the 

actions of all instruments of national power. SC combines actions, words, and images to 

influence key audiences. 

b. Within the USG, the DOS’s Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and 

Public Affairs has the lead for SC. DOS established an interagency coordination body with 

primary responsibility for SC oversight, called the Interagency Policy Committee on Public 

Diplomacy and Strategic Communication. It is led by the Under Secretary for Public 

Diplomacy and Public Affairs and is the overall mechanism by which the USG coordinates 

public diplomacy across the interagency community. A key product of this committee is the 

US National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication. This document 

provides USG-level guidance, intent, strategic imperatives, and core messages under which 

DOD can nest its themes, messages, images, and activities. 

c. The US military plays an important supporting role in SC, primarily through 

information operations (IO), public affairs, and defense support to public diplomacy. SC 

considerations should be included in all joint operational planning for military operations 

from routine, recurring military activities in peacetime through major operations. 

d. Every JFC has the responsibility to develop a coordinated and synchronized 

communications strategy that links to, and supports, planning and execution of coherent 

national and SC effort. 

e. Developing an effective communications strategy requires a comprehensive process 

that synchronizes all means of communication and information delivery. In addition to 
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 5-0 

synchronizing the communications activities within the joint force, an effective 

communications strategy is developed in concert with other USG organizations, partner 

nations, and NGOs as appropriate. CCDRs should develop staff procedures for 

implementing SC guidance into all operational planning and targeting processes as well as 

collaborative processes for integrating SC activities with nonmilitary partners and subject 

matter experts. 

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and 

JP 3-61, Public Affairs, for additional information. 

10. Strategic Guidance for Multinational Operations 

a. Multinational operations start with the diplomatic efforts to create a coalition or spur 

an alliance into action. Discussion and coordination between potential participants initially 

address basic questions at the national strategic level. These senior-level discussions could 

Figure II-3. Additional Sources of Strategic Guidance 

Additional Sources of Strategic Guidance

List is not all inclusive.































National Security Strategy

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication

National Counterintelligence Strategy

National Intelligence Strategy

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel

National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace

National Strategy for Homeland Security

National Strategy for Maritime Security

National Strategy for Information Sharing

National Strategy for Victory in Iraq

National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza

National Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure

National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-11 

involve IGOs such as the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 

existing MNFs, or individual nations. The result of these discussions should: 

(1) Determine the nature and limits of the response. 

(2) Determine the command structure of the response force. 

(3) Determine the essential strategic guidance for the response force to include 

military objectives and the desired strategic and military end states. 

b. In support of each MNF, a hierarchy of bilateral or multilateral bodies is established 

to define strategic and military end states and objectives, to develop strategies, and to 

coordinate strategic guidance for planning and executing multinational operations. Through 

dual involvement in national and multinational security processes, US national leaders 

integrate national and theater strategic planning with that of the MNF. Within the 

multinational structure, US participants work to develop objectives and strategy that 

complement US interests and assigned missions and tasks for participating US forces that are 

compatible with US capabilities. Within the US national structure, international 

commitments impact the development of the NMS and CCDRs should adequately address 

relevant concerns in strategic guidance for joint operation planning. 

c. Much of the information and guidance provided for unified action and joint 

operations remains applicable to multinational operations. However, commanders and staffs 

consider differences in partners’ laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, 

terminology, culture, politics, religion, language, and caveats on authorized military action 

throughout the entire operation. CCDRs and JFCs develop plans to align US forces, actions, 

and resources in support of the multinational plan. 

d. When directed, designated US commanders participate directly with the armed 

forces of other nations in preparing bilateral contingency plans. Commanders assess the 

potential constraints, security risks, and any additional vulnerabilities resulting from bilateral 

planning, and how these plans impact the ability of the US to achieve its end states. Bilateral 

planning involves the preparation of combined, mutually developed and approved plans 

governing the employment of the forces of two nations for a common contingency. Bilateral 

planning may be accomplished within the framework of a treaty or alliance or in the absence 

of such arrangements. Bilateral planning is accomplished in accordance with specific 

guidance provided by the President, SecDef, or CJCS and captured in a bilateral strategic 

guidance statement (SGS) signed by the leadership of both countries. 

SECTION B. APPLICATION OF GUIDANCE 

11. Joint Planning and Execution Community 

a. The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in joint operation planning or 

committed to a joint operation are collectively termed the JPEC. Although not a standing or 

regularly meeting entity, the JPEC consists of the CJCS and other members of the JCS, JS, 

the Services and their major commands, the CCMDs and their subordinate commands, and 

the CSAs (see Figure II-4). 
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 5-0 

(1) The supported CCDR has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task 

assigned by the GEF, the JSCP, or other joint operation planning directives. In the context 

of joint operation planning, the supported commander prepares plans and orders in response 

to requirements generated by the President or SecDef. Once approved by SecDef or the 

CJCS, the designated supporting commanders provide planning assistance, forces, or other 

resources to a supported commander. 

(2) Supporting commanders provide forces, assistance, or other resources to a 

supported commander in accordance with the principles set forth in JP 1, Doctrine for the 

Armed Forces of the United States. Supporting commanders prepare supporting plans as 

required. A commander may be a supporting commander for one operation while being a 

supported commander for another. 

b. In the planning process, the President and SecDef issue policy, strategic guidance, 

and direction. The President, assisted by the NSC, also issues policy and strategic direction 

to guide the planning efforts of federal departments and agencies that represent other 

instruments of national power. SecDef, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS, 

organizes the JPEC for joint operation planning by establishing appropriate command 

relationships among the CCDRs. A supported commander is identified for each planning 

task, and supporting CCDRs, Services, and CSAs are designated as appropriate. This 

process provides for increased unity of command in the planning and execution of joint 

operations and facilitates unity of effort within the JPEC. 

Figure II-4. Joint Planning and Execution Community 

Joint Planning and Execution Community

Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Supported Combatant Command

Subordinate 

Commands Joint Staff 

Directorates

National Guard 

Bureau

Department of 

Defense 

Agencies

Subordinate Unified 

Commands

Service and Functional 

Components

Joint Task Forces

Service Major 

Commands

Supporting Combatant 

Commands

Combat Support Agencies

Military 

Services

Strategic 

Guidance
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-13 

See CJCSI 3141.01D, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans, for a 

more complete discussion of the JPEC. See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 

United States, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for a more complete discussion of command 

relationships. 

12. Adaptive Planning and Execution System 

a. Joint operation planning is accomplished through the APEX system. The JPEC uses 

the APEX system to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, 

sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. 

The APEX system operates in a networked, collaborative environment, which facilitates 

dialogue among senior leaders, concurrent and parallel plan development, and collaboration 

across multiple planning levels. Clear strategic guidance and frequent interaction between 

senior leaders and planners promote early understanding of, and agreement on, planning 

assumptions, considerations, risks, and other key factors. The focus is on developing plans 

that contain a variety of viable, embedded options for the President and SecDef to leverage 

as they seek to shape the situation and respond to contingencies. This facilitates responsive 

plan development and modification, resulting in continually up-to-date plans. The APEX 

system also promotes involvement with other USG departments and agencies and 

multinational partners. 

b. While joint operation planning has the inherent flexibility to adjust to changing 

requirements, the APEX system incorporates initiatives to make the planning process even 

more responsive. These initiatives—such as levels of planning detail, the requirement for 

more frequent IPRs between CCDRs and SecDef, routine assessments, and the use of 

collaboration technology—provide more and better options during plan development, 

increase opportunities for consultation and guidance during the planning process, and 

promote increased agility in plan implementation. 

c. Joint operation planning encompasses a number of elements, including three broad 

operational activities, four planning functions, and a number of related products (see 

Figure II-5). Each of these planning functions will include as many IPRs as necessary to 

complete the plan. IPR participants are based on the initiating authority/level. For example, 

formal plans directed by the JSCP require SecDef-level IPRs while plans directed by a 

CCDR may require only CCDR-level review. 

d. IPRs constitute a disciplined dialogue among strategic leaders (most notably the 

CCDRs, CJCS, SecDef, and, when approved, senior DOS and other key department/agency 

leadership or their representatives) to shape the plan as it is developed. Topics such as 

guidance on coordination with the interagency and multinational communities, required 

supporting and supported activities, identification and removal of planning obstacles, 

clarification of desired objectives and strategic and military end states, key capability 

shortfalls, areas of risk, and resolution of planning conflicts may be discussed. Further, IPRs 

expedite planning by ensuring that the plan addresses the most current strategic assessments 

and needs. They also generate valuable feedback for planning staffs. 
Chapter II 

II-14 JP 5-0 

e. Generally, the IPR process will regulate the interagency dialogue and coordination, 

with SecDef receiving an update on the scope and scale of planning exchanges with civilian 

and multinational counterparts and having the opportunity to provide guidance or direction. 

13. Operational Activities 

a. Situational Awareness 

Figure II-5. Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products 

Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products

Legend

IPR in-progress review

IPR A strategic guidance

IPR C concept development

IPR F plan approval

IPR R plan assessment

Operational 

Activities

Planning 

Functions

Planning

Products

Plan Assessment

(Refine, Adapt, Terminate, Execute)

Plan 

Development

Concept 

Development

Strategic 

Guidance

Situational Awareness

Planning

Execution

Review Cycle IPR

F

IPR

R

IPR

C

IPR

A

Prepare to 

Deploy Order

Deployment Order

Global Force 

Management 

Allocation Plan

Execute Order

Operation 

Order

Alert 

Order

Planning 

Order

Warning 

Order

Level 1

Commander's Estimate

Level 2

Base Plans (BPLANs) Approved 

Plan

Approved 

Concept

Approved 

Mission Level 3

Concept Plans (CONPLANs)

Level 4

Operation Plans (OPLANs)
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-15 

(1) Situational awareness addresses procedures for describing the operational 

environment, including threats to national security. This occurs during continuous 

monitoring of the national and international political and military situations so that JFCs and 

their staffs can determine and analyze emerging crises, notify decision makers, and 

determine the specific nature of the threat. 

(2) Situational awareness actions support both deliberate planning and crisis action 

planning (CAP). Situational awareness encompasses five related activities: monitoring the 

global situation; identifying that an event has occurred; recognizing that the event is a 

problem or a potential problem; reporting the event; and reviewing all-source intelligence 

and information to include the Defense Intelligence Agency-produced dynamic threat 

assessment (DTA) or the CCMD’s running intelligence estimate. An event is a national or 

international occurrence assessed as unusual and viewed as potentially having an adverse 

impact on US national interests and national security. The recognition of the event as a 

problem or potential problem follows from the observation. 

b. Planning 

(1) Planning translates strategic guidance and direction into campaign plans, 

contingency plans, and operation orders (OPORDs). Joint operation planning may be based 

on defined tasks identified in the GEF and the JSCP. Alternatively, joint operation planning 

may be based on the need for a military response to an unforeseen current event, emergency, 

or time-sensitive crisis. 

(2) Planning for contingencies is normally initiated by a GEF, JSCP, or planning 

directive tasking. It is based on assigned planning guidance, derived assumptions, and 

apportioned forces and combat support activities. 

(3) Planning for crises is initiated to respond to an unforeseen current event, 

emergency, or time-sensitive crisis. It is based on planning guidance, actual circumstances, 

and usually limits force planning considerations to apportioned forces. Supported 

commanders evaluate the availability of their assigned and previously allocated forces to 

respond to the event. They also plan for potential force contributions from CSAs. 

c. Execution 

(1) Execution begins when the President decides to use a military option to 

resolve a crisis. Only the President or SecDef can authorize the CJCS to issue an execute 

order (EXORD). Depending upon time constraints, an EXORD may be the only order a 

JFC receives. The EXORD defines the time to initiate operations and conveys guidance 

not provided earlier.

(2) The CJCS monitors the deployment and employment of forces, makes 

recommendations to SecDef to resolve shortfalls, and tasks directed actions by SecDef and 

the President to support the successful execution of military operations. Execution 

continues until the operation is terminated or the mission is accomplished. In execution, 

the planning process is repeated continuously as circumstances and missions change. 
Chapter II 

II-16 JP 5-0 

(3) During execution, the supported CCDR assesses the deployment and 

employment of forces, measures progress toward mission accomplishment, and adapts and 

adjusts operations as required to reach the end states. This continual assessment and 

adjustment of operations creates an organizational environment of learning and adaptation. 

This adaptation can range from minor operational adjustments to a radical change of 

approach. When fundamental changes have occurred that challenge existing 

understanding or indicate a shift in the operational environment/problem, commanders 

and staffs may develop a new operational approach that recognizes that the initial 

problem has changed, thus requiring a different approach to solving the problem. The 

change to the operational environment could be so significant that it may require a 

review of the global strategic, theater strategic, and military end states and discussions 

with higher authority to determine if the end states are still viable.

(4) Early in execution, changes to the original plan may be necessary because of 

tactical, intelligence, and environmental considerations, force and non-unit cargo availability, 

availability of strategic lift assets, and port capabilities. Therefore, ongoing refinement and 

adjustment of deployment requirements and schedules and close coordination and 

monitoring of deployment activities are required. 

(5) The CJCS-published EXORD defines the unnamed day on which operations 

commence or are scheduled to commence (D-day) and the specific time an operation begins 

(H-hour) and directs execution of the OPORD. While OPORD operations commence on the 

specified D-day and H-hour, deployments providing forces, equipment, and sustainment to 

support such are defined by C-day, an unnamed day on which a deployment operation 

begins, and a specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to 

commence (L-hour). The CJCS’s EXORD is a record communication that authorizes 

execution of the COA approved by the President or SecDef and detailed in the supported 

commander’s OPORD. It may include further guidance, instructions, or amplifying orders. 

In a fast-developing crisis, the EXORD may be the first record communication generated by 

the CJCS. The record communication may be preceded by a voice authorization. The 

issuance of the EXORD is time-sensitive. The format may differ depending on the amount 

of previous correspondence and the applicability of prior guidance. The Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01 series volumes contain the format for the 

EXORD. Information already communicated in previous orders should not be repeated 

unless previous orders were not made available to all concerned. The EXORD need only 

contain the authority to execute the operation and any additional essential guidance, such as 

D-day and H-hour. 

(6) Throughout execution, JS, JFPs, Services, supported JFCs, and CSAs monitor 

movements, assess accomplishment of tasks, and resolve shortfalls as necessary. This allows 

the CJCS, in conjunction with the supported commander, to change guidance, modify plans, 

and, if necessary, recommend changes to the termination criteria. 

(7) The supported commander issues an EXORD to subordinate and supporting 

commanders upon receipt of the CJCS’s EXORD. It may give the detailed planning 

guidance resulting from updated or amplifying orders, instructions, or guidance that the 

CJCS’s EXORD does not cover. The supported commander also assesses and reports 
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-17 

achievement of objectives and replans, redeploys, or terminates operations as necessary, in 

compliance with termination criteria directed by the President or SecDef. If significant 

changes in the operational environment or the problem are identified, which call into 

question viability of the current operational approach or end states, the supported 

commander should consult with subordinate and supporting commanders and higher 

authority. 

(8) The supported commander’s force requests are allocated in the CJCS Global 

Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) annex, and the JFP publishes the GFMAP 

Annex Schedule to order forces to deploy. The JFP GFMAP Annex Schedule serves as the 

deployment order (DEPORD) for all global allocations. 

(9) GCCs coordinate with United States Transportation Command 

(USTRANSCOM), supporting CCDRs, JS, and force providers to provide an integrated 

transportation system from origin to destination. Surface Deployment and Distribution 

Command and Military Sealift Command coordinate common user sea and land movements 

while Air Mobility Command coordinates common user air movements for supported GCCs. 

The GCCs control the flow into and out of theater using the appropriate TPFDD validation 

process. The geographic service components incrementally select and validate unit line 

numbers throughout the flow into and out of theater. 

d. Planning During Execution 

(1) Planning continues during execution, with an initial emphasis on refining the 

existing plan and producing the OPORD and refining the force flow utilizing employed 

assigned and allocated forces. As the operation progresses, planning generally occurs in 

three distinct but overlapping timeframes: future plans, future operations, and current 

operations, as Figure II-6 depicts. 

(a) The plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5) focuses on future plans. The 

timeframe of focus for this effort varies according to the level of command, type of 

operation, JFC desires, and other factors. Typically, the emphasis of the future plans effort is 

on planning the next phase of operations or sequels to the current operation. In a campaign, 

this could be planning the next major operation or the next phase of the campaign. 

(b) Planning also occurs for branches to current operations (future operations 

planning). The timeframe of focus for future operations planning varies according to the 

factors listed for future plans, but the period typically is more near-term than the future plans

timeframe. Future planning normally occurs in the J-5 or joint planning group (JPG), while 

future operations planning normally occurs in the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3). 

(c) Finally, current operations planning addresses the immediate or very nearterm planning issues associated with ongoing operations. This occurs in the joint operations 

center or J-3. 

(2) During execution, progress in meeting the commander’s intent and successful 

accomplishment of tasks will be monitored and measured, along with the input of new data 
Chapter II 

II-18 JP 5-0 

and information as it is obtained to facilitate decision making and allow for selection of 

branches or sequels, if applicable, or the plan to be modified as necessary. 

(3) Future planners must also look for opportunities or unforeseen challenges that 

suggest that the current mission may require revision and that a different operational 

approach may be required to achieve the desired end state. They should also look for 

indicators that the desired end state is not achievable or no longer desirable. Subsequently, 

Figure II-6. Planning During Execution 

Planning During Execution

Legend

CAP crisis action planning

CCIR commander's critical information requirement

CDR commander

COP common operational picture

DEPORD deployment order

FRAGORD fragmentary order

GFMAP Global Force Management Allocation Plan

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff

JTF joint task force

OPLAN operation plan

OPORD operation order

POLMIL political–military

RFC request for capabilities

RFF request for forces

ROE rules of engagement

RUF rules on the use of force

SITREP situation report

WARNORD warning order

CAP 

Products

Plan

Hand-Off











Branch plans with triggers

CDR estimate for branches

Order adjustment 

(WARNORD, FRAGORD)

Recommend refined CCIRs, 

ROE/RUF

RFF/RFC and GFMAP 

DEPORDs











Initial CDR guidance/CDR estimate

OPORD/OPLAN/campaign plan

Sequel plans for future phases

Concept of operations

Draft CDR intent

Wargaming

POLMIL issues

















Situational awareness/ 

COP/monitor plan execution

Briefings/CDR SITREP

SITREP/near-term 

(FRAGORD)

Message draft and release

RFF/RFC and GFMAP 

DEPORDs

Track actions/suspenses

 Refines, adjusts, and 

modifies OPORDs/ 

OPLANs (based upon 

current situation)





Issues OPORDs, 

FRAGORD, WARNORD

Monitors, assesses, 

directs, and controls 

execution of plans

JTF

Near-Term Planning

JTF

Current Operations

"What if" "What is"

J-3 Future 

Operations

J-3 Current 

Operations

Collaboration 

Tools

Plan

Hand-Off

CAP 

Products





Campaign 

Plan/OPLAN/OPORD

Follow-on 

phase—plans

JTF

Long-Term 

Planning

"What next"

J-5 Future Plans
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-19 

these circumstances may result in a reframing of the problem and the development or 

execution of a branch plan or new COA. 

(4) Execution of a plan does not end the planning process. The planning cycle may 

be reentered at any point to receive new guidance, provide an IPR, modify the plan, decide if 

and when to execute branches or sequels, or terminate the operation. Planning also continues 

for future operations. 

14. Planning Functions 

a. Although the four planning functions of strategic guidance, concept development, 

plan development, and plan assessment are generally sequential, they often run 

simultaneously in the effort to accelerate the overall planning process. SecDef or the CCDR 

may direct the planning staff to refine or adapt a plan by reentering the planning process at 

any of the earlier functions. The time spent accomplishing each activity and function 

depends on the nature of the crisis. 

(1) In time-sensitive cases, activities and functions may be accomplished 

simultaneously and compressed so that all decisions are reached in open forum and orders 

are combined and initially may be issued orally. 

(2) A crisis could be so time critical, or a single COA so obvious, that the first 

written directive might be a DEPORD or an EXORD. 

(3) Following each of the IPRs described below, OSD will publish a memorandum 

for record detailing SecDef’s guidance for continued planning. 

b. Strategic Guidance. This function is used to formulate politico-military 

assessments at the strategic level, develop and evaluate military strategy and objectives, 

apportion and allocate forces and other resources, formulate concepts and strategic military 

options, and develop planning guidance leading to the preparation of COAs. The President, 

SecDef, and CJCS—with appropriate consultation with additional NSC members, other USG 

departments and agencies, and multinational partners—formulate strategic end states with 

suitable and feasible national strategic objectives that reflect US national interests. 

See Chapter III, “Operational Art and Operational Design,” for more details on the 

development of the commander’s approach and operational concept. 

(1) The CCDR provides input through a series of IPRs. The CCDR crafts theater 

and operational objectives that support national strategic objectives with the advice and 

consent of the CJCS and SecDef. This process begins with an analysis of existing strategic 

guidance such as the JSCP and GEF for deliberate planning or a CJCS warning order 

(WARNORD), planning order (PLANORD), or alert order (ALERTORD) in CAP. It 

includes mission analysis, threat assessment, and development of assumptions, which as a 

minimum, will be briefed to SecDef during the strategic guidance IPR. 

(2) During this initial IPR, referred to as IPR A, the CCDR should consider 

discussing USG SC guidance. 
Chapter II 

II-20 JP 5-0 

(3) The primary end products of the strategic guidance function are 

assumptions, conclusions about the strategic and operational environment (nature of 

the problem), strategic and military end states, and the supported commander’s 

approved mission statement. 

c. Concept Development. During deliberate planning, the supported commander 

develops several COAs, each containing an initial CONOPS that identifies, at a minimum, 

major capabilities required and task organization, major operational tasks to be accomplished 

by components, a concept of employment, and assessment of risk for each COA. Each COA 

should contain embedded options that describe multiple alternatives to accomplish 

designated end states as conditions change (e.g., operational environment, problem, strategic 

direction). In time-sensitive situations, a WARNORD may not be issued, and a PLANORD 

or ALERTORD might be the first strategic guidance received by the supported commander. 

Using the strategic guidance and the CCDR’s mission statement, planners prepare evaluation 

request messages to solicit COA input from subordinate units and develop preliminary COAs 

based upon staff estimates. 

See Chapter IV, “Joint Operation Planning Process,” for more details on COA development. 

(1) During the concept development IPR, referred to as IPR C, the supported 

commander outlines several COAs and recommends one to SecDef for approval and further 

development. In a crisis, the supported commander recommends execution of a COA most 

appropriate for the emerging situation. The commander also requests SecDef’s guidance on 

interorganizational planning and coordination and makes appropriate recommendations 

based on the interorganizational requirements identified during mission analysis and COA 

development. Concept development should consider a range of COAs that integrate robust 

options to provide greater flexibility and speed transition during a crisis. 

(2) The main product from the concept development function is a COA 

approved for further development. Detailed planning begins upon COA approval in 

the concept development function. 

d. Plan Development. This function is used to fully develop campaign plans, 

contingency plans, or orders, with applicable supporting annexes, and to refine preliminary 

feasibility analysis. This function fully integrates mobilization, deployment, employment, 

sustainment, conflict termination, redeployment, and demobilization activities through the 

six-phase joint operation construct (Phases 0–V). The CCDR briefs the final plan to 

SecDef (or a designated representative) during the final plan approval IPR (IPR F). CCDRs 

may repeat the IPR F, as needed until approval is granted. The primary product is an 

approved plan or order. 

See Chapter IV, “Joint Operation Planning Process,” for more details on completing the 

plan. 

e. Plan Assessment (Refine, Adapt, Terminate, Execute—RATE) 

(1) The supported commander continually reviews and assesses the complete plan, 

resulting in four possible outcomes: refine (R), adapt (A), terminate (T), or execute (E). The 
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-21 

supported commander and the JPEC continue to evaluate the situation for any changes that 

would trigger RATE. The CCDR will brief SecDef during the plan assessment IPR, referred 

to as IPR R, of modifications and updates to the plan based on the CCDR’s assessment of the 

situation and the plan’s ability to achieve the end states. 

(2) Refine. During all planning efforts, plan refinement typically is an orderly 

process that follows plan development and is associated with the plan assessment planning 

function. Refinement then continues on a regular basis as circumstances related to the 

potential contingency change. In CAP, refinement is almost continuous throughout plans or 

OPORD development. Planners frequently adjust the plan or order based on evolving 

commander’s guidance, results of force planning, support planning, deployment planning, 

shortfall identification, adversary or MNF actions, changes to the operational environment, 

or changes to strategic guidance. Refinement continues even after execution begins, with 

changes typically transmitted in the form of fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs) rather than 

revised copies of the plan or order. 

(3) Adapt. Planners adapt plans when major modifications are required, which 

may be driven by one or more changes in the following: strategic direction, operational 

environment, or the problem facing the JFC. Planners continually monitor the situation for 

changes that would necessitate adapting the plan, to include modifying the commander’s 

operational approach and revising the CONOPS. When this occurs, commanders may need 

to recommence the IPR process. 

(4) Terminate. Commanders may recommend termination of a plan when it is no 

longer relevant or the threat no longer exists. For JSCP tasked plans, SecDef, with advice 

from the CJCS, is the approving authority to terminate a planning requirement. 

(5) Execute. See paragraph 13c, “Execution.” 

15. Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning Products 

Joint operation planning encompasses the preparation of a number of planning and 

execution-related products produced during deliberate planning or products produced during 

CAP. 

a. Plans Produced During Deliberate Planning. Deliberate planning encompasses the 

preparation of plans that occur in non-crisis situations. It is used to develop campaign and 

contingency plans for a broad range of activities based on requirements identified in the 

GEF, JSCP, or other planning directives. A representative plans relationship is graphically 

displayed in Figure II-7. Theater and global campaign plans are the centerpiece of DOD’s 

planning construct. They provide the means to translate CCMD theater or functional 

strategies into executable plans. Theater and global campaign plans provide the vehicle for 

linking steady-state shaping activities to current operations and contingency plans. 
Chapter II 

II-22 JP 5-0 

(1) Campaign Plans. A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at 

accomplishing strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. Planning 

for a campaign is appropriate when the contemplated military operations exceed the scope of 

a single major operation. Thus, campaigns are often the most extensive joint operations in 

terms of time and other resources. Campaign planning has its greatest application in the 

conduct of large-scale combat operations, but can be used across the range of military 

operations. 

(a) Joint force headquarters plan and execute campaigns and major operations, 

while Service and functional components of the joint force conduct subordinate supporting 

and supported major operations, battles, and engagements, not independent campaigns. 

GCCs or FCCs can plan and conduct subordinate campaigns as part of a theater or global 

campaign. While intended primarily to guide the use of military power, campaign plans 

consider how to coordinate all instruments of national power, as well as the efforts of various 

interorganizational partners, to attain national strategic objectives. 

(b) Campaign plans help achieve a CCDR’s strategy by comprehensively and 

coherently integrating all its directed steady-state activities (actual) and contingency 

(potential) operations and activities. A CCDR’s strategy and resultant campaign plan should 

be designed to achieve prioritized strategic end states and serve as the integrating framework 

that informs and synchronizes all subordinate and supporting planning and operations. 

(c) Steady-state operations and activities, which encompass shaping activities 

(including shaping elements of contingency plans), should be designed to support ongoing 

Figure II-7. Plans Relationship 

Plans Relationship

Legend

Indicates a campaign or contingency 

plan nested under a theater 

campaign plan

Indicates a supporting campaign plan 

synchronized with a global campaign 

plan

Theater 

Campaign Plan

Subordinate 

Campaign Plan

Subordinate 

Campaign Plan

Subordinate 

Campaign Plan

Contingency 

Plan

Contingency 

Plan

Global 

Campaign Plan

Global 

Campaign Plan

Global 

Campaign Plan
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-23 

operations, prepare to defeat potential adversaries, succeed in a wide range of contingencies, 

build the capacity of partner nations, and, in conjunction with the other instruments of 

national power, promote stability in key regions and support other broad national goals. The 

campaign plan is the primary vehicle for designing, organizing, integrating, and executing 

security cooperation activities. 

(d) Under this construct, plans developed to respond to contingencies are best 

understood as branches to the overarching global campaign plan or TCP. They address 

scenarios that put one or more US strategic end states in jeopardy and leave the US no 

recourse other than to address the problem through military actions. Military actions can be 

in response to many scenarios, including armed aggression, regional instability, a 

humanitarian crisis, or a natural disaster. Contingency plans should provide a range of 

military options, to include flexible deterrent options (FDOs) or flexible response operations, 

and should be coordinated with the total USG response. 

(2) Contingency Plans 

(a) Contingency plans are developed in anticipation of a potential crisis outside 

of crisis conditions. A contingency is a situation that likely would involve military forces in 

response to natural and man-made disasters, terrorists, subversives, military operations by 

foreign powers, or other situations as directed by the President or SecDef. The JPEC uses 

deliberate planning to develop plans for a broad range of contingencies based on tasks 

identified in the GEF, JSCP, or other planning directives. Deliberate planning facilitates the 

transition to CAP and informs the TCP. 

(b) Planners develop plans from the best available information, using forces 

and resources apportioned and allocated per the GFMIG. Deliberate planning encompasses 

the activities associated with the development of contingency plans for the deployment, 

employment, sustainment, and redeployment of apportioned forces and resources in response 

to potential crises identified in joint strategic planning documents. Deliberate planning 

relies heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when a crisis 

arises. The transition from deliberate planning to CAP and execution should be as seamless 

as possible. To accomplish this, planners develop a fully documented CONOPS that details 

the assumptions, enemy forces, operation phases, prioritized missions, and force 

requirements, deployment, and positioning. Detailed, war-gamed, refined, and fully 

documented deliberate planning supports sound force acquisition and training in preparation 

for the most likely operational requirements. It also enables rapid comparison of the 

hypothetical conditions, operation phases, missions, and force requirements of the 

contingency plans to the actual requirements of CAP. Work performed during deliberate 

planning allows the JPEC to develop the processes and procedures as well as the analytical 

and planning expertise that are critically needed during CAP. 

(c) If a situation develops during the two-year cycle of the GEF/JSCP that 

warrants a new plan but was not anticipated, SecDef, through the CJCS, tasks the appropriate 

supported CCDR and applicable supporting CCDRs, Services, and CSAs, out-of-cycle, to 

begin deliberate planning in response to the new situation. The primary mechanism for 

tasking deliberate planning for a contingency outside of the GEF/JSCP cycle will be through 
Chapter II 

II-24 JP 5-0 

an SGS from SecDef and a PLANORD from the CJCS to the CCDRs. The SGS (effectively 

a change to the GEF) provides important strategic and policy guidance on the front end of 

the planning process. 

(d) Plans are produced, reviewed, and updated periodically to ensure 

relevancy. Deliberate planning most often addresses contingencies where military options 

focus on combat operations; however, these plans also account for other types of joint 

military operations. In addition to plans addressing all phases, including those where 

military action may support other agencies, planning addresses contingencies where the 

military is in support from the onset. These include homeland security, defense support of 

civil authorities, and foreign humanitarian assistance. 

(e) There are four levels of planning detail for contingency plans, with an 

associated planning product for each level. 

1. Level 1 Planning Detail—Commander’s Estimate. This level of 

planning involves the least amount of detail and focuses on producing multiple COAs to 

address a contingency. The product for this level can be a COA briefing, command 

directive, commander’s estimate, or a memorandum. The commander’s estimate provides 

SecDef with military COAs to meet a potential contingency. The estimate reflects the 

supported commander’s analysis of the various COAs available to accomplish an assigned 

mission and contains a recommended COA. 

2. Level 2 Planning Detail—Base Plan (BPLAN). A BPLAN describes 

the CONOPS, major forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing 

the mission. It normally does not include annexes or a TPFDD. 

3. Level 3 Planning Detail—Concept Plan (CONPLAN). A 

CONPLAN is an OPLAN in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion 

or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. It includes a plan summary, a 

BPLAN, and usually includes the following annexes: A (Task Organization), B 

(Intelligence), C (Operations), D (Logistics), J (Command Relations), K (Communications), 

S (Special Technical Operations), V (Interagency Coordination), and Z (Distribution) (see 

the CJCSM 3122.01 series volumes). It may also produce a TPFDD if applicable. (This is 

referred to as a level 3-T plan.) A troop list and TPFDD would also require that an annex E 

(Personnel) be prepared. 

4. Level 4 Planning Detail—OPLAN. An OPLAN is a complete and 

detailed joint plan containing a full description of the CONOPS, all annexes applicable to the 

plan, and a TPFDD. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources 

required to execute the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow into the theater. 

OPLANs can be quickly developed into an OPORD. An OPLAN is normally prepared 

when: 

a. The contingency is critical to national security and requires detailed 

prior planning. 
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-25 

b. The magnitude or timing of the contingency requires detailed 

planning. 

c. Detailed planning is required to support multinational planning. 

d. Detailed planning is necessary to determine force deployment, 

employment, sustainment, and redeployment requirements, determine available resources to 

fill identified requirements, and validate shortfalls. 

(f) Contingency plans are created as part of a collaborative process that 

engages SecDef, OSD, CJCS, JCS, CCDRs, and staffs of the entire JPEC in the development 

of relevant plans for all contingencies identified in the GEF, JSCP, and other planning 

directives. Deliberate planning also includes JPEC concurrent, collaborative, and parallel 

joint planning activities. The JPEC review those plans tasked in the JSCP for SecDef 

approval. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) also reviews those plans for 

policy considerations in parallel with their approval by the CJCS. A CCDR can request a 

JPEC review for any tasked or untasked plans that pertain to the AOR. In addition, the 

CCDR can request a JPEC review during any planning function in the process, including 

plan assessment. CCDRs may direct the development of additional plans by their commands 

to accomplish assigned or implied missions. 

(g) When directed by the President or SecDef through the CJCS, CCDRs may 

convert level 1, 2, and 3 plans into level 4 OPLANs or into fully developed OPORDs for 

execution. 

(3) Global Campaign Plans 

(a) When the scope of contemplated military operations exceeds the authority 

or capabilities of a single CCDR to plan and execute, the President or SecDef directs the 

CJCS to implement global planning procedures and assist SecDef in the strategic direction 

and integration of the planning effort. The President or SecDef normally makes the decision 

to implement global planning procedures as a UCP responsibility delegated to a CCDR or 

during the assessment of the situation. The commander’s assessment supporting this 

decision could be either the assessments of multiple CCDRs addressing a similar threat in 

their AORs or a single assessment from a CCDR addressing the threat from a global, crossAOR, or functional perspective. Situations that may trigger this assessment range from 

major combat operations to the threat of asymmetric attack that extends across CCMD 

boundaries and functions and requires the strategic integration of the campaigns and major 

operations of two or more CCDRs. One example of a persistent threat that is inherently 

global and poses risk across AOR boundaries is adversary exploitation and attack of DOD 

computer networks on the global information grid. Another example of a persistent global 

threat requiring global unity of effort is the threat from transnational terrorists and WMD. 

(b) Per Title 10, USC, SecDef may assign the CJCS responsibility for 

overseeing the activities of the CCMDs. Such assignment by SecDef does not confer any 

command authority on the CJCS and does not alter CCDRs’ responsibilities prescribed in 

Title 10, USC, Section 164(b)(2). A CCDR delegated that authority will lead the global 
Chapter II 

II-26 JP 5-0 

planning effort for the purposes of planning, integrating, and coordinating a commander’s 

estimate from a global perspective, but does not have the authority to execute the resulting 

plan. 

(c) When the President or SecDef decides to implement global planning 

procedures, the CJCS or delegated CCDR, with the authority of SecDef, issues a planning 

directive to the JPEC and assigns or assumes the role of a supported commander for 

planning purposes only. The CJCS or delegated CCDR performs a mission analysis; issues 

initial global planning guidance based on national strategic objectives and priorities; and 

develops global COAs in coordination with the affected CCMDs, Services, and CSAs. The 

purpose of this global COA is to mitigate operational gaps, seams, and vulnerabilities from a 

global perspective. This will be achieved through a recommendation for the optimal 

allocation, prioritization, or reallocation of forces and capabilities required to develop a 

cohesive global concept of operation. Global planning procedures will detail how CCDRs

will employ forces and capabilities in support of another CCDR. The global COA will be 

based largely on recommendations of the affected CCDRs. These CCDR COAs may require 

reiteration or refinement as initial planning apportionments are adjusted for compliance 

within the global concept of operation. Planners must be aware of competing requirements 

for potentially scarce strategic resources such as intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and transportation and ensure global planning is 

coordinated with GFM procedures. 

(d) Global planning procedures are also applicable during CAP. Global crisis 

conditions exist when CAP procedures address situations that threaten two or more GCCs’ 

AORs and competing demands for forces and capabilities exceed availability. The CJCS or 

delegated CCDR is required to mitigate operational gaps, seams, and vulnerabilities and 

resolve the conflict over forces, resources, capabilities, or priorities from a global 

perspective. 

(e) When directing the execution of the contingency plan or OPORD, the 

President or SecDef will also select a CCDR as supported commander for implementation of 

the global plan. The supported commander is the commander having primary responsibility 

for all aspects of a task assigned by the JSCP or other joint operation planning authority. In 

the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares 

OPLANs or OPORDs in response to requirements of the CJCS. The decision to designate a 

supported commander who is responsible for preparing the joint OPLAN does not mean that 

the only command relationships option available during execution is “support.” Global 

planning procedures do not absolve GCCs of assigned planning and execution roles and 

responsibilities within their respective AORs. 

(f) Global Synchronizer

1. A global synchronizer for planning is the lead CCDR responsible for 

directing the coordinated planning efforts of CCDRs, Services, CSAs, and applicable DOD 

agencies and field activities in support of a designated DOD global campaign plan to achieve 

the integrated, yet decentralized, execution of global activities and operations. The phrase 
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-27 

“synchronizing planning” pertains specifically to planning efforts only and does not, by 

itself, convey authority to execute operations or direct execution of operations. 

a. Unless directed by SecDef, the global synchronizer’s role is not to 

execute specific plans, but to align and harmonize plans and recommend sequencing of 

actions by CCDRs, Services, CSAs, and applicable DOD agencies and field activities to 

achieve the DOD global campaign plan’s strategic end states and objectives. 

b. CCDRs develop subordinate campaign plans to satisfy the 

planning requirements of DOD global campaign plans. While these plans are designated 

subordinate plans, this designation does not alter current command relationships. GCCs 

remain the supported commanders for the execution of their plans unless otherwise directed 

by SecDef. 

2. If directed to develop a DOD global campaign plan, the global 

synchronizer will: 

a. Provide a common plan structure and strategic framework to guide 

and inform development of CCDR subordinate campaign plans, Service, and DOD agency 

supporting plans and mitigate seams and vulnerabilities from a global perspective. 

b. Establish a common process for the development of subordinate 

and supporting plans. 

c. Organize and execute coordination and collaboration conferences 

in support of the global campaign to enhance development of subordinate and supporting 

plans consistent with the established strategic framework and to coordinate and conduct 

synchronization activities. 

d. Disseminate “best practices” to CCDRs, Services, and applicable 

DOD agencies and field activities. This includes the consolidation and standardization of 

CAP, products, and collaborative tools. 

e. Review and synchronize all subordinate and supporting plans to 

align them with the DOD global campaign plan. 

f. Make recommendations for the prioritization of force and capability 

allocation across CCMDs from a global perspective. 

g. Provide advice and recommendations to CCDRs, JS, and OSD to 

enhance integration and synchronization of subordinate and supporting plans with the DOD 

global campaign plan. 

h. Accompany CCDRs as they brief their subordinate campaign plans 

through final approval, as required. 

i. Provide global campaign plans to CCDRs prior to IPRs with 

enough time for CCDRs to review and propose modifications. 
Chapter II 

II-28 JP 5-0 

j. In coordination with JS, conduct assessments to measure progress 

in achieving the campaign plan’s strategic end states. 

k. In coordination with JS, make recommendations for the SC annex. 

3. CCDRs, Services, applicable DOD agencies, and field activities will: 

a. Provide detailed planning support to the global synchronizer to 

assist in development of the DOD global campaign plan. 

b. Support global synchronizer conferences and planning efforts. 

c. Develop subordinate or supporting plans consistent with the 

strategic framework, planning guidance, and process established by the global synchronizer. 

d. Provide subordinate or supporting plans to the global synchronizer 

prior to IPRs with enough time for the global synchronizer to review and propose 

modifications prior to the IPR. 

e. The global synchronizer and CCDRs will seek to resolve issues 

prior to SecDef IPRs. As a last option, unresolved issues will be adjudicated during IPRs. 

(4) Supporting Plans. Supporting CCDRs, subordinate JFCs, component 

commanders, and CSAs prepare supporting plans as tasked by the JSCP or other planning 

guidance. Commanders and staffs prepare supporting plans in CONPLAN/OPLAN format 

that follow the supported commander’s concept and describe how the supporting 

commanders intend to achieve their assigned objectives and/or tasks. Supporting 

commanders and staffs develop these plans responsively in collaboration with the supported 

commander’s planners. As part of this collaborative process, supported commanders specify 

the level of detail required and review and approve the resulting supporting plans. In almost 

every case, a supporting plan will not possess a higher level of detail or planning than the 

directing supported plan. Supporting commanders or agencies may, in turn, assign their 

subordinates the task of preparing additional supporting plans. 

CJCSI 3141.01D, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans, governs 

the formal review and approval process for campaign plans and level 1–4 plans. 

b. Orders Produced During Crisis Action Planning

(1) CAP Overview 

(a) A crisis is an incident or situation that typically develops rapidly and 

creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that the President or 

SecDef considers a commitment of US military forces and resources to achieve national 

objectives. It may occur with little or no warning. It is fast-breaking and requires 

accelerated decision making. Sometimes a single crisis may spawn another crisis elsewhere. 
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-29 

(b) CAP provides the CJCS and CCDRs a process for getting vital decisionmaking information up the chain of command to the President and SecDef. CAP facilitates 

information sharing among the members of the JPEC and the integration of military advice 

from the CJCS in the analysis of military options. Additionally, CAP allows the President 

and SecDef to communicate their decisions rapidly and accurately through the CJCS to the 

CCDRs, subordinate and supporting commanders, Services, and CSAs to initiate detailed 

military planning, change deployment posture of the identified force, and execute military 

options. It also outlines the mechanisms for monitoring the execution of the operation. 

(c) CAP encompasses the activities associated with the time-sensitive 

development of OPORDs for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned, 

attached, and allocated forces and capabilities in response to a situation that may result in 

actual military operations. While deliberate planning normally is conducted in anticipation 

of future events, CAP is based on circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. CAP 

can use plans developed in deliberate planning for a similar contingency. If unanticipated 

circumstances occur, and no plan proves adequate for the operational circumstances, then 

CAP and execution would begin mission analysis under JOPP in a “no plan” situation. 

There are always situations arising in the present that might require US military response. 

Such situations may approximate those previously planned for in deliberate planning, though 

it is unlikely they would be identical, and sometimes they will be completely unanticipated. 

The time available to plan responses to such real-time events is short. In as little as a few 

days, commanders and staffs must develop and approve a feasible COA with TPFDD; 

publish the plan or order; prepare forces; ensure sufficient communications systems support; 

develop and execute an all-source ISR planning and directing, collection, processing and 

exploitation, analysis and production management, and dissemination plan; and arrange 

sustainment for the employment of US military forces. Figure II-8 provides a comparison of 

deliberate planning and CAP. 

(d) In a crisis, situational awareness is continuously fed by the latest all-source 

intelligence and operations reports. An adequate and feasible military response in a crisis 

demands flexible procedures that consider time available, rapid and effective 

communications, and relevant previous planning products whenever possible. 

(e) In a crisis or time-sensitive situation, the CCDR uses the initial CAP 

situational awareness phase to review previously prepared contingency plans for 

suitability. The CCDR converts these plans to executable OPORDs or develops OPORDs 

from scratch when no useful contingency plan exists. 

(f) CAP activities are similar to deliberate planning activities, but CAP is 

based on dynamic, real-world conditions. CAP procedures provide for the rapid and 

effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military COAs for 

consideration by the President or SecDef, and the prompt transmission of their decisions to 

the JPEC. CAP activities may be performed sequentially or in parallel, with supporting and 

subordinate plans or OPORDs being developed concurrently. The exact flow of activities is 

 
Chapter II 

II-30 JP 5-0 

Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning Comparison 

Deliberate Planning Crisis Action Planning 

Time available As defined in authoritative directives 

(normally 6+ months) 

Situation dependent (hours, days, up 

to 12 months) 

Environment Distributed, collaborative planning Distributed, collaborative planning 

and execution 

JPEC involvement Full JPEC participation (Note: JPEC 

participation may be limited for 

security reasons.) 

Full JPEC participation (Note: JPEC 

participation may be limited for 

security reasons.) 

APEX operational 

activities 

Situational awareness 

Planning 

Situational awareness 

Planning 

Execution 

APEX functions Strategic guidance 

Concept development 

Plan development 

Plan assessment 

Strategic guidance 

Concept development 

Plan development 

Plan assessment 

Document assigning 

planning task 

CJCS issues: 

1. JSCP 

2. Planning directive 

3. WARNORD (for short suspense 

planning) 

CJCS issues: 

1. WARNORD 

2. PLANORD 

3. SecDef-approved ALERTORD 

Forces for planning Apportioned in JSCP Allocated in WARNORD, 

PLANORD, or ALERTORD 

Planning guidance CJCS issues JSCP or WARNORD 

CCDR issues PLANDIR and TPFDD 

LOI 

CJCS issues WARNORD, 

PLANORD, or ALERTORD 

CCDR issues WARNORD, 

PLANORD, or ALERTORD and 

TPFDD LOI to subordinates, 

supporting commands, and 

supporting agencies 

COA selection CCDR selects COA and submits 

strategic concept to CJCS for review 

and SecDef approval 

CCDR develops commander’s 

estimate with recommended COA 

CONOPS approval SecDef approves CSC, disapproves 

or approves for further planning 

President/SecDef approve COA, 

disapproves or approves further 

planning 

Final planning product Campaign plan 

Level 1–4 contingency plan 

OPORD 

Final planning product 

approval 

CCDR submits final plan to CJCS for 

review and SecDef for approval 

CCDR submits final plan to 

President/SecDef for approval 

Execution document Not applicable CJCS issues SecDef-approved 

EXORD 

CCDR issues EXORD 

Legend 

ALERTORD alert order 

APEX Adaptive Planning and Execution 

CCDR combatant commander 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

COA course of action 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CSC commanders’ strategic concept 

EXORD execution order 

JPEC joint planning and execution 

community 

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

LOI letter of instruction 

PLANDIR planning directive 

PLANORD planning order 

OPORD operations order 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment 

data 

WARNORD warning order 

Figure II-8. Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning Comparison 
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-31 

largely determined by the time available to complete the planning and by the significance of 

the crisis (see Figure II-9). The following paragraphs summarize the activities and 

interaction that occur during CAP. Refer to the CJCSM 3122 series of publications, which 

address planning policies and procedures, for detailed procedures. 

1. When the President, SecDef, or CJCS decides to develop military 

options, the CJCS issues a planning directive to the JPEC initiating the development of 

COAs and requesting that the supported commander submit a commander’s estimate of the 

situation with a recommended COA to resolve the situation. Normally, the directive will be 

a WARNORD, but a PLANORD or ALERTORD may be used if the nature and timing of 

the crisis warrant accelerated planning. In a quickly evolving crisis, the initial WARNORD 

may be communicated vocally with a follow-on record copy to ensure that the JPEC is kept 

informed. If the directive contains a force deployment preparation order or DEPORD, 

SecDef approval is required. 

2. The WARNORD describes the situation, establishes command 

relationships, and identifies the mission and any planning constraints. It may identify forces 

and strategic mobility resources, or it may request that the supported commander develop 

these factors. It may establish tentative dates and times to commence mobilization, 

Figure II-9. Crisis Action Planning 

Crisis Action Planning

Legend

CCDR combatant commander

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

COA course of action

CSA combat support agency

IPR in-progress review

SecDef Secretary of Defense

President

SecDef

CJCS

Component 

Commanders

CSAs

Commander, 

Joint Task Force

CCDR

Situational Awareness

Assessment

Planning

Execution

CJCS

Warning Order

CJCS 

Directive

CCDR

Assessment

Collaborative Planning Collaborative Execution

CCDR 

Guidance

SecDef

IPR

CJCS 

Alert/Planning 

Order

SecDef

IPR

CJCS

Execute Order

Mission 

Analysis 

Process

COA

Process

Plan/ 

Order 

Process
Chapter II 

II-32 JP 5-0 

deployment, or employment, or it may solicit the recommendations of the supported 

commander regarding these dates and times. If the President, SecDef, or CJCS directs 

development of a specific COA, the WARNORD will describe the COA and request the 

supported commander’s assessment. A WARNORD sample is in the CJCSM 3122.01 series 

volumes. 

3. In response to the WARNORD, the supported commander, in 

collaboration with subordinate and supporting commanders and the rest of the JPEC, reviews 

existing joint contingency plans for applicability and develops, analyzes, and compares 

COAs and prepares a commander’s estimate that provides recommendations and advice to 

the President, SecDef, or higher headquarters for COA selection. Based on the supported 

commander’s guidance, supporting commanders begin their planning activities. 

4. Although an existing plan almost never completely aligns with an 

emerging crisis, it can be used to facilitate rapid COA development. An existing OPLAN or 

CONPLAN can be modified to fit the specific situation. An existing CONPLAN can be 

fully developed beyond the stage of an approved CONOPS. TPFDDs developed for specific 

plans are stored in the APEX database and available to the JPEC for review. 

5. The CJCS, in consultation with other members of the JCS and CCDRs, 

reviews and evaluates the supported commander’s estimate and provides recommendations 

and advice to the President and SecDef for COA selection. The supported commander’s 

COAs may be refined or revised, or new COAs may have to be developed. The President or 

SecDef selects a COA and directs that detailed planning be initiated. 

6. Upon receiving directions from the President or SecDef, the CJCS 

issues an ALERTORD to the JPEC. SecDef approves the ALERTORD. The order is a 

record communication that the President or SecDef has approved the detailed development 

of a military plan to help resolve the crisis. The contents of an ALERTORD may vary, and 

sections may be deleted if the information has already been published, but it should always 

describe the selected COA in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander, in 

collaboration with other members of the JPEC, to conduct the detailed planning required to 

deploy, employ, and sustain forces. However, the ALERTORD does not authorize execution 

of the approved COA. 

7. The supported commander then develops an OPORD using the 

approved COA. Understandably, the speed of completion is greatly affected by the amount 

of prior planning and the planning time available. The supported commander and 

subordinate commanders identify force requirements, contract requirements and 

management, and mobility resources, and describe the CONOPS in OPORD format. The 

supported commander reviews available assigned and allocated forces that can be used to 

respond to the situation and then submits a request for forces (RFF) to JS for forces to be 

allocated. JS tasks a JFP to provide a sourcing solution for each of the requested forces. The 

JFPs work collaboratively with the Services (via their assigned Service components) and 

other CCDRs to provide recommended sourcing solutions to JS. Upon receiving the 

recommended sourcing solutions, JS recommends the solution to SecDef to authorize 
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-33 

allocation of the force. JS publishes a modification to the GFMAP documenting the force 

allocation and directing the JFP to publish the GFMAP Annex Schedule as the DEPORD and 

the JFP publishes a modification to the GFMAP Annex Schedule to deploy forces. Then the 

supported CCDR, in coordination with the force providers, further refines the TPFDD. 

8. The supported CCDR submits the completed OPORD for approval to 

SecDef or the President via the CJCS. The President or SecDef may decide to begin 

deployment in anticipation of executing the operation or as a show of resolve, execute the 

operation, place planning on hold, or cancel planning pending resolution by some other 

means. Detailed planning may transition to execution as directed or become realigned with 

continuous situational awareness, which may prompt planning product adjustments and/or 

updates. 

9. In CAP, plan development continues after the President or SecDef’s 

execution decision. When the crisis does not lead to execution, the CJCS provides guidance 

regarding continued planning under either CAP or deliberate planning procedures. 

(g) Abbreviated Procedures. The preceding discussion describes the 

activities sequentially. During a crisis, they may be conducted concurrently or considered 

and eliminated, depending on prevailing conditions. It is also possible that the President or 

SecDef may decide to commit forces shortly after an event occurs, thereby significantly 

compressing planning activities. Although the allocation process has standard timelines, 

these timelines may be accelerated, but the force allocation process is still used and SecDef 

ultimately allocates forces. No specific length of time can be associated with any particular 

planning activity. Severe time constraints may require crisis participants to pass 

information verbally, including the decision to commit forces. Verbal orders are 

followed up with written orders. 

(2) Joint Operation Orders (Figure II-10) 

(a) Warning Order. A WARNORD, issued by the CJCS, is a planning 

directive that initiates the development and evaluation of military COAs by a supported 

commander and requests that the supported commander submit a commander’s estimate. 

(b) Planning Order. A PLANORD is a planning directive that provides 

essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of plan development before the 

directing authority approves a military COA. 

(c) Alert Order. An ALERTORD is a planning directive that provides 

essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of plan development after the directing 

authority approves a military COA. An ALERTORD does not authorize execution of the 

approved COA. 

(d) Prepare to Deploy Order. The CJCS, by the authority of and at the 

direction of the President or SecDef, issues a prepare to deploy order (PTDO) or DEPORD 

to increase or decrease the deployability posture of units; to deploy or redeploy forces; or to 

direct any other action that would signal planned US military action or its termination in 

response to a particular crisis event or incident. 
Chapter II 

II-34 JP 5-0 

Types of Orders 

 

Order Type Intended Action 

SecDef Approval 

Required 

Warning order WARNORD Initiates development and 

evaluation of COAs by supported 

commander 

Requests commander’s estimate 

be submitted 

No 

Required when 

WARNORD includes 

deployment or 

deployment preparation 

actions 

Planning order PLANORD Begins execution planning for 

anticipated President or SecDefselected COA 

Directs preparation of OPORDs or 

contingency plan 

No 

Conveys anticipated 

COA selection by the 

President or SecDef 

Alert order ALERTORD Begins execution planning on 

President or SecDef-selected COA 

Directs preparation of OPORD or 

contingency plan 

Yes 

Conveys COA selection 

by the President or 

SecDef 

Prepare to 

deploy order 

PTDO Increase/decrease deployability 

posture of units 

Yes 

Refers to five levels of 

deployability posture 

Deployment/ 

redeployment 

order 

DEPORD Deploy/redeploy forces 

Establish C-day/L-hour 

Increase deployability 

Establish JTF 

Yes 

Required for movement 

of unit personnel and 

equipment into 

combatant commander’s 

AOR 

Execute order EXORD Implement President or SecDef 

decision directing execution of a 

COA or OPORD 

Yes 

Operation 

order 

OPORD Effect coordinated execution of an 

operation 

Specific to the OPORD 

Fragmentary 

order 

FRAGORD Issued as needed after an OPORD 

to change or modify the OPORD 

execution 

No 

Legend 

AOR area of responsibility 

C-day unnamed day on which a deployment 

operation begins 

COA course of action 

JTF joint task force 

L-hour specific hour on C-day at which a 

deployment operation commences 

or is to commence 

OPORD operation order 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

Figure II-10. Types of Orders

(e) Deployment/Redeployment Order. A planning directive from SecDef, 

issued by the CJCS, that authorizes and directs the transfer of forces between CCMDs by 

reassignment or attachment. A deployment/redeployment order normally specifies the 

authority that the gaining CCDR will exercise over the transferred forces. 
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-35 

(f) Execute Order. An EXORD is a directive to implement an approved 

military CONOPS. Only the President and SecDef have the authority to approve and direct 

the initiation of military operations. The CJCS, by the authority of and at the direction of the 

President or SecDef, may subsequently issue an EXORD to initiate military operations. 

Supported and supporting commanders and subordinate JFCs use an EXORD to implement 

the approved CONOPS. 

(g) Operation Order. An OPORD is a directive issued by a commander to 

subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an 

operation. Joint OPORDs are prepared under joint procedures in prescribed formats during 

CAP. 

(h) Fragmentary Order. A FRAGORD is an abbreviated form of an OPORD 

(verbal, written, or digital), which eliminates the need for restating information contained in 

a basic OPORD while enabling dissemination of changes to previous orders. It is usually 

issued as needed or on a day-to-day basis. 

SECTION C. INTERORGANIZATIONAL PLANNING AND COORDINATION 

General. Interorganizational planning and coordination is the interaction that 

occurs among elements of DOD; engaged USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, 

local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government departments and agencies; 

IGOs; NGOs; and the private sector for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. 

Successful interorganizational coordination of plans facilitates unity of effort among multiple 

organizations by promoting common understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and 

consequences of military and civilian actions. It also assists with identifying common 

objectives and the ways in which military and civilian capabilities best complement each 

other to achieve these objectives. 

16. Interagency Planning and Coordination 

a. Interagency Planning and Coordination. Interagency coordination is the 

interaction that occurs among USG departments and agencies, including DOD, for the 

purpose of accomplishing an objective. Interagency coordination forges the vital link 

between the US military and the other instruments of national power. 

b. Through all stages of planning for campaigns, contingencies, and crises, CCDRs and 

subordinate JFCs should seek to involve relevant USG departments and agencies in the 

planning process. CCDRs should make an early assessment as to those USG departments 

and agencies that are the most vital in supporting elements of their plans and coordinate 

early, through JS and OSD (as per guidance in the GEF), with those interagency partners. 

Generally, interagency dialogue and coordination will be regulated through the IPR process, 

with SecDef receiving an update on the scope, scale, and substance of planning exchanges 

with civilian and multinational counterparts. 

c. Effective collaboration and coordination with interagency partners can be a critical 

component to successful steady-state activities as well as during the stability and enable civil 

authority phases of an operation when JFCs may also operate in support of other USG 
Chapter II 

II-36 JP 5-0 

departments and agencies. JFCs and their staffs must consider how the capabilities of these 

departments and agencies and NGOs can assist in accomplishing military missions and the 

broader national strategic objectives. GCCs should coordinate directly with interagency 

representatives within their AOR during planning to obtain appropriate agreements that 

support their plans (such as working with US embassies to secure overflight rights with other 

nations). Coordination with NGOs should normally be done through the United States 

Agency for International Development senior development advisor assigned to each CCDR. 

d. OSD and JS, in consultation with the Services, National Guard Bureau, and CCMDs, 

facilitate interagency support and coordination to support DOD plans as required. While 

supported GCCs are the focal points for interagency coordination in support of operations in 

their AORs, interagency coordination with supporting commanders is just as important. At 

the operational level, subordinate commanders should consider and integrate interagency 

capabilities into their estimates, plans, and operations. 

e. The APEX system facilitates interagency review of plans and appropriate annexes 

approved by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [OUSD(P)] following 

guidance provided in IPRs. Interagency plan reviews differ from DOD JPEC plan reviews in 

that inputs from non-DOD agencies are requested but not required. Additionally, non-DOD 

agency inputs are advisory in nature and, while a valued part of the process, do not carry veto 

authority. Nevertheless, provision is made for participating agencies to follow up on issues 

surfaced during the review in accordance with guidance from the OUSD(P). 

f. A number of factors can complicate the coordination process, including the agencies’ 

different and sometimes conflicting policies, legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, 

procedures, decision-making processes, and culture. Operations may be executed by 

nonmilitary organizations or perhaps even NGOs with the military in support. In such 

instances, the understanding of military end state and termination requirements may vary 

among the participants. The JFC must ensure that interagency partners clearly understand 

military capabilities, requirements, operational limitations, liaison, and legal considerations 

and that military planners understand the nature of the relationship and the types of support 

they can provide. The JFC’s civil–military operations center can facilitate these 

relationships. In the absence of a formal command structure, JFCs may be required to 

build consensus to achieve unity of effort. Robust liaison facilitates understanding, 

coordination, and mission accomplishment. 

g. Planning and Coordination with Other Agencies. The supported commander is 

responsible for developing annex V, (Interagency Coordination), for each joint level 3 or 4 

plan. Annex V should be collaboratively developed with interagency inputs. CCMDs 

should seek OSD approval for full releasability of this annex to all affected agencies during 

development to ensure inputs are considered and incorporated at the earliest stage 

practicable. Annex V should specify the objectives, tasks, and desired level of shared 

situational awareness required to resolve the situation, and identify the anticipated 

capabilities required to accomplish tasks. This common understanding enables interagency 

planners to more rigorously plan their efforts in concert with the military, to suggest other 

activities or partners that could contribute to the operation, and to better determine support 
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-37 

requirements. The staff considers interagency participation for each phase of the operation 

(see Chapter III, “Operational Art and Operational Design,” for a discussion of phases). 

See JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, and the CJCSM 

3122.01 series volumes, for additional information. 

17. Multinational Planning and Coordination 

a. General. Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions 

conducted by forces of two or more nations. Such operations are usually undertaken within 

the structure of a coalition or alliance, although other possible arrangements include 

supervision by an IGO (such as the United Nations or Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe). A coalition is an arrangement between two or more nations for 

common action. Nations usually form coalitions for a single occasion or for longer 

cooperation in a narrow area of common interest. An alliance is a result of formal 

agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the 

common interests of the members. Key to any multinational operation is the achievement 

of unity of effort among political and military leaders of member nations emphasizing 

common objectives and shared interests as well as mutual support and respect. Agreement 

on clearly identified strategic and military end states for the MNF is essential to guide all 

multinational coordination, planning, and execution. Additionally, the cultivation and 

maintenance of personal relationships between each counterpart are fundamental to 

achieving success. At times, it needs to be acknowledged that US national interests may not 

be in complete agreement with those of the multinational organization or some of its 

individual nation states. In such situations, additional consultations and coordination will be 

required at the political and military levels for the establishment of a common set of 

operational objectives to support unity of effort among nations. 

b. Collective security is a strategic goal of the US, and joint operation planning will 

frequently be accomplished within the context of multinational operation planning. There is 

no single doctrine for multinational action, and each MNF develops its own protocols and 

OPLANs/CONPLANs/OPORDs. US planning for joint operations should accommodate and 

complement such protocols and plans. JFCs must also anticipate and incorporate planning 

factors such as domestic and international laws, regulations, and operational limitations on 

the use of contributed forces, various weapons, and tactics. 

(1) Joint forces should be prepared for combat and noncombat operations with 

forces from other nations within the framework of an MNF under US or another nation’s 

leadership. Following, contributing, and supporting are important roles in multinational 

operations—often as important as leading. 

(2) MNF commanders develop multinational strategies and plans in multinational 

channels. Supporting US JFCs perform operation planning for multinational operations in 

US national channels. Coordination of these separate planning channels occurs at the 

national level by established multinational bodies or member nations and at the theaterstrategic and operational levels by JFCs, who are responsible within both channels for 

operation planning matters. 
Chapter II 

II-38 JP 5-0 

(3) US doctrine and procedures for joint operation planning also are conceptually 

applicable to multinational challenges, and the general considerations for interaction with 

IGOs and host-nation organizations are similar to those for interaction with USG 

departments and agencies. The fundamental issues are much the same for both situations. 

c. Operational-Level Integration. The commander of US forces dedicated to a 

multinational military organization is responsible for integrating joint operation planning 

with multinational planning at the operational level. Normally, this will be the GCC or the 

subordinate JFC responsible for the geographic area within which multinational operations 

are to be planned and executed. These commanders always function within two chains of 

command during any multinational operation—the multinational chain of command and the 

US national chain of command. Within the multinational organizations, they command or 

support the designated MNF and plan, as appropriate, for multinational employment in 

accordance with strategic guidance emanating from multinational leadership. Within the US 

chain of command, they command joint US forces and prepare joint plans in response to 

requirements from the President, SecDef, and the CJCS. These tasks include developing 

joint plans to support each multinational commitment within the GCC’s AOR and planning 

for unilateral US contingencies within the same area. In this dual capacity, the US 

commander coordinates multinational planning with joint operation planning. 

d. Each MNF normally develops its own protocols and plans to guide multinational 

action. 

(1) For example, within the Asia-Pacific region, the Multinational Force Standing 

Operating Procedures (MNF SOP) developed and administered by the Multinational 

Planning Augmentation Team, a cadre of military planners from Asia-Pacific Rim nations 

led by United States Pacific Command, provides a starting point. The intent of this MNF 

SOP is to increase the speed of response, interoperability, mission effectiveness, and unity of 

effort in MNF operations during crisis action situations. It is designed to reduce the ad hoc 

nature of multinational CAP by establishing common “operational start points” for MNF 

operations and establishing SOPs for the MNF headquarters. 

(2) Similarly for NATO operations, US and other NATO countries have developed 

and ratified an Allied joint doctrine hierarchy of publications that outlines the doctrine and 

tactics, techniques, and procedures that should be used during NATO operations. JFCs, their 

staffs, and subordinate forces should have access to and review these publications prior to 

participating in NATO operations. 

18. Review of Multinational Plans 

US joint strategic plans or contingency plans prepared in support of multinational plans 

are developed, reviewed, and approved exclusively within US operational channels. They 

may or may not be shared in total with multinational partners. Selected portions and/or 

applicable planning and deployment data may be released in accordance with CJCSI 

5714.01, Policy for the Release of Joint Information. USG representatives and commanders 

within each multinational organization participate in multinational planning and exchange 

information in mutually devised forums, documents, and plans. The formal review and 
Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning 

II-39 

approval of multinational plans is accomplished in accordance with specific procedures 

adopted by each multinational organization and may or may not include separate US review 

or approval. Multilateral contingency plans routinely require national-level US approval. 

JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, and JP 4-08, Logistics Support of Multinational 

Operations, provide greater detail. The CJCSM 3122.01 series volumes describe review and 

approval procedures for plans. Multinational planning augmentation team MNF SOP, 

available at http://community.apan.org/, provides commonly agreed upon formats and 

procedures that may assist with planning efforts in a multinational environment. 

 
Chapter II 

II-40 JP 5-0 

Intentionally Blank 
III-1 

CHAPTER III 

OPERATIONAL ART AND OPERATIONAL DESIGN 

1. Introduction 

a. The JFC and staff develop plans and orders through the application of operational art 

and operational design and by using JOPP. They combine art and science to develop 

products that describe how (ways) the joint force will employ its capabilities (means) to 

achieve the military end state (ends). Operational art is the application of creative 

imagination by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, and 

experience. Operational design is a process of iterative understanding and problem framing 

that supports commanders and staffs in their application of operational art with tools and a 

methodology to conceive of and construct viable approaches to operations and campaigns. 

Operational design results in the commander’s operational approach, which broadly 

describes the actions the joint force needs to take to reach the end state. Finally, JOPP is an 

orderly, analytical process through which the JFC and staff translate the broad operational 

approach into detailed plans and orders. This chapter describes operational art and 

operational design, while Chapter IV, “Joint Operation Planning Process,” discusses the 

details of JOPP. 

b. Commanders who are skilled in the use of operational art provide the vision that 

links tactical actions to strategic objectives. More specifically, the interaction of operational 

art and operational design provides a bridge between strategy and tactics, linking national 

strategic aims to tactical combat and noncombat operations that must be executed to 

accomplish these aims. Likewise, operational art promotes unified action by helping 

JFCs and staffs understand how to facilitate the integration of other agencies and 

multinational partners toward achieving strategic and operational objectives. 

c. Through operational art, commanders link ends, ways, and means to achieve the 

desired end state (see Figure III-1). This requires commanders to answer the following 

questions: 

(1) What is the military end state that must be achieved, how is it related to the 

strategic end state, and what objectives must be achieved to enable that end state? (Ends)

(2) What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve those objectives and the end 

state? (Ways)

(3) What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions within 

given or requested resources? (Means)

“War is an art and as such is not susceptible of explanation by fixed formula” 

General George S. Patton, Jr., Success in War, 

The Infantry Journal Reader, 1931 
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 5-0 

(4) What is the chance of failure or unacceptable consequences in performing that 

sequence of actions? (Risk)

d. Operational design supports operational art with a general methodology using 

elements of operational design for understanding the situation and the problem. The 

methodology helps the JFC and staff to understand conceptually the broad solutions for 

attaining mission accomplishment and to reduce the uncertainty of a complex operational 

environment. Additionally, it supports a recursive and ongoing dialogue concerning the 

nature of the problem and an operational approach to achieve the desired end states (see 

Figure III-2). The elements of operational design are individual tools, such as center of 

gravity (COG) and lines of operation (LOOs), which help the JFC and staff visualize and 

describe the broad operational approach. These operational design elements, described in 

detail in Section B, “Elements of Operational Design,” are also useful throughout JOPP. 

2. The Commander’s Role 

a. The commander is the central figure in operational design, due not only to 

education and experience, but also because the commander’s judgment and decisions are 

required to guide the staff through the process. Generally, the more complex a situation, the 

more critical is the role of the commander early in planning. Commanders draw on 

operational design to mitigate the challenges of complexity and uncertainty, leveraging their 

knowledge, experience, judgment, and intuition to generate a clearer understanding of the 

conditions needed to focus effort and achieve success. Operational design supports the 

effective exercise of command, providing a broad perspective that deepens understanding 

and visualization. 

b. Commanders compare similarities of their current situations with their own 

experiences or history to distinguish the unique features that require innovative or adaptive 

solutions. They understand that each situation requires a solution tailored to the context of 

Figure III-1. Operational Art 

Operational Art

Ends

Ways

Means

Risk

Understanding Visualization

Experience

Intellect

Creativity

Intuition

Education

Judgment

Operational 

Approach

Operational 

Design
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-3 

the problem. Through the application of operational design, commanders seek innovative, 

adaptive options to solve complex challenges. 

c. Operational design requires the commander to encourage discourse and 

leverage dialogue and collaboration to identify and solve complex, ill-defined problems

(see Figure III-3). To that end, the commander must empower organizational learning and 

develop methods to determine if modifying the operational approach is necessary during the 

course of an operation. This requires continuous assessment and reflection that challenge 

understanding of the existing problem and the relevance of actions addressing that problem. 

d. In particular, commanders collaborate with their higher headquarters to resolve 

differences of interpretation of higher-level objectives and the ways and means to 

accomplish these objectives. Understanding the operational environment, defining the 

problem, devising a sound approach, and developing a workable solution are rarely achieved 

the first time. Strategic guidance addressing complex problems can initially be vague, 

requiring the commander to interpret and filter it for the staff. While CCDRs and national 

leaders may have a clear strategic perspective of the problem, operational-level 

commanders and subordinate leaders often have a better understanding of specific 

circumstances that comprise the operational situation. Both perspectives are essential to 

a sound solution. Subordinate commanders should be aggressive in sharing their perspective 

with their higher headquarters, and both should resolve differences at the earliest 

opportunity. While policy and strategic guidance clarify planning, it is equally true that 

planning offers clarity to policy formulation. 

Figure III-2. Developing the Operational Approach 

Developing the Operational Approach

Operational 

Design

Operational Approach

What prevents us 

from going where we 

want to go?

Elements of 

Operational Design

Where We Are Where do we 

want to go?

Identify Problem





Achieving a common 

 of the 

situation

 refinement 

of situational 

understanding

understanding

Continuous and 

recursive







Strategic end state

Military end state

Supporting 

departments’ and 

agencies’ objectives
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 5-0 

e. Unity of effort is essential to meet the complex challenges facing the US. The need 

to embrace the participation of interagency and multinational partners in the interest of a 

comprehensive, unified approach to operations is as important as the commander’s effort to 

build a coherent operational approach. The commander must decide how and when to 

include other partners early in this effort, and understand that the resulting operational 

approach may, of necessity, be a consensus-based product. 

f. While operational art is generally considered the JFC’s responsibility due to advanced 

experience, education, intuition, and judgment, planners and other staff rely on these 

attributes as well during planning. This is important because the JFC’s typical competing 

responsibilities, particularly during CAP, usually will not allow full-time participation early 

in planning. Nonetheless, the JFC must ensure at least the minimum essential interaction 

with planners during the early design effort as it moves toward the key point when the 

commander approves an operational approach that will drive detailed planning. 

Figure III-3. Operational Art and Planning Continuum 

Operational Art and Planning Continuum

Problem Complexity

Operational 

Art

Commander 

Centric

Operational Art –

application of creative 

imagination to design 

strategies/operations

Detailed Planning

Operational 

Art

Problem Complexity

Uncertainty

Change

More Less

Ill-Defined Adequately Structured Evolving Problem

Modified 

Operational 

Approach

OPLAN/

OPORD Operational 

Approach

Legend

OPLAN operation plan OPORD operation order

Joint Operation Planning

Execution
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-5 

g. Red teaming: 

(1) Gathering and analyzing information— along with discerning the perceptions of 

adversaries, partners and others—is necessary to correctly frame the problem, which enables 

planning of operations. A red team can aid a commander and the staff to think critically and 

creatively; to see things from varying perspectives; to challenge their thinking; to avoid false 

mind-sets, biases, or group thinking; or use inaccurate analogies to frame the problem. 

(2) Red teaming provides an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in 

plans and operations in the context of the operational environment and from the perspective 

of adversaries and others. 

(3) Commanders use red teams to aid them and their staffs to provide insights and 

alternatives during design, planning, execution, and assessment to:

(a) Broaden the understanding of the operational environment; 

(b) Assist the commander and staff in framing problems and defining end state 

conditions; 

(c) Challenge assumptions; 

(d) Consider the perspectives of the adversary and others as appropriate; 

(e) Aid in identifying friendly and enemy vulnerabilities and opportunities; 

(f) Assist in identifying areas for assessment as well as the assessment metrics; 

(g) Anticipate the cultural perceptions of partners, adversaries, and others; and 

(h) Conduct independent critical reviews and analyses of plans to identify 

potential weaknesses and vulnerabilities. 

(4) In essence, red teams provide the commander and staff with an independent 

capability to challenge the organization’s thinking. 

(5) This red team crosses staff functions and time horizons in JOPP. This 

characteristic makes this red team unlike a red cell, which is composed of members of the 

staff of the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) and performs threat emulation, or a 

joint intelligence operations center red team as an additive element on the J-2 staff to 

improve the intelligence analysis, products, and processes. 

SECTION A. DEVELOPING THE OPERATIONAL APPROACH 

3. Overview 

a. The operational approach is a commander’s description of the broad actions the 

force must take to achieve the desired military end state. It is the commander’s 

visualization of how the operation should transform current conditions into the desired 
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 5-0 

conditions at end state—the way the commander wants the operational environment to look 

at the conclusion of operations. The operational approach is based largely on an 

understanding of the operational environment and the problem facing the JFC. Once 

the JFC approves the approach, it provides the basis for beginning, continuing, or completing 

detailed planning. The JFC and staff should continually review, update, and modify the 

approach as the operational environment, end states, or the problem change. 

b. Commanders and their staffs can use operational design when planning any joint 

operation. Notwithstanding a commander’s judgment, education, and experience, the 

operational environment often presents situations so complex that understanding them—let 

alone attempting to change them—exceeds individual capacity. Nor does such complexity 

lend itself to coherent planning. Bringing adequate order to complex problems to facilitate 

further detailed planning requires an iterative dialogue between commander and planning 

staff. Rarely will members of the staff recognize an implicit operational approach during 

their initial analysis and synthesis of the operational environment. Successful development 

of the approach requires continuous analysis, learning, dialogue, and collaboration between 

commander and staff, as well as other subject matter experts. The challenge is even greater 

when the joint operation involves other agencies and multinational partners (which is 

typically the case), whose unique considerations can complicate the problem. 

c. It is essential that commanders, through a dialogue with their staffs, planning teams, 

initiative groups, and any other relevant sources of information, first gain an understanding 

of the operational environment and define the problem facing the joint force prior to 

conducting detailed planning. From this understanding of the operational environment and 

definition of the problem, commanders develop their broad operational approach for 

transforming current conditions into desired conditions at end state. The operational 

approach will underpin the operation and the detailed planning that follows. As detailed 

planning occurs, the JFC and staff continue discourse and refine their operational approach. 

d. During execution, the JFC will likely have reason to consider updating the 

operational approach. This could involve significantly refining or discarding the hypotheses 

or models that form the basis of the operational approach. It could be triggered by 

significant changes to understanding of the operational environment and/or problem, the 

conditions of the operational environment, or the end state. The JFC may determine one of 

three ways ahead: 

(1) The current joint OPLAN is adequate, with either no change or minor change 

(such as execution of a branch)—the current operational approach remains feasible. 

(2) The joint OPLAN’s mission and objectives are sound, but the operational 

approach is no longer feasible or acceptable—a new operational approach is required. 

(3) The mission and/or objectives are no longer valid, thus a new joint OPLAN is 

required—a new operational approach is required to support the further detailed planning. 
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-7 

e. Assessment could cause the JFC to shift the focus of the operation, which the JFC 

would initiate with his new visualization manifested through new planning guidance for an 

adjusted operation or campaign plan. 

For additional information on assessment, see Appendix D, “Assessment.” 

4. Methodology

a. Introduction. Three distinct aspects of a methodology collectively assist with 

producing an operational approach. Together, they constitute an organizational learning 

methodology that corresponds to three basic questions that must be answered to produce an 

actionable operational approach to guide detailed planning: 

(1) Understand the strategic direction. (What are the strategic goals to be achieved 

and the military objectives that support their attainment?) 

(2) Understand the operational environment. (What is the larger context that will 

help me determine our problem?) 

(3) Define the problem. (What problem is the design intended to solve?) 

(4) The answers to these three questions support the development of an operational 

approach. (How will the problem be solved?) 

b. Understand the Strategic Direction

(1) Strategic guidance is essential to operational art and operational design. As 

discussed in Chapter I, “Role of Joint Operation Planning,” the President, SecDef, CJCS, and 

CCDRs all promulgate strategic guidance. In general, this guidance provides long-term as 

well as intermediate or ancillary objectives. It should define what constitutes “victory” or 

success (ends) and allocate adequate forces and resources (means) to achieve strategic 

objectives. The operational approach (ways) of employing military capabilities to achieve 

the ends is for the supported JFC to develop and propose. Connecting resources and tactical 

actions to strategic ends is the responsibility of the operational commander. 

(2) For specific situations that require the employment of military capabilities 

(particularly for anticipated large-scale combat), the President and SecDef typically will 

establish a set of strategic objectives; however, in the absence of coherent guidance or 

direction, the CCDR/JFC may need to collaborate with policymakers in the development of 

these objectives. Achievement of strategic objectives should result in attainment of the 

strategic end state—the broadly expressed conditions that should exist after the 

conclusion of a campaign or operation. Based on the strategic guidance, the CCDR will 

determine the military end state and strategic military objectives, which define the role of 

military forces. These objectives are the basis for operational design. 

(3) The commander and staff must analyze all available sources of guidance. 

These sources include written documents, such as the GEF and JSCP, written directives, oral 

instructions from higher headquarters, domestic and international laws, policies of other 
Chapter III 

III-8 JP 5-0 

organizations that are interested in the situation, SC guidance, and higher headquarters’ 

orders or estimates. 

c. Understand the Operational Environment

(1) The operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, 

and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the 

commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors of the air, land, maritime, and space 

domains and the information environment (which includes cyberspace). Included within 

these areas are the adversary, friendly, and neutral actors that are relevant to a specific 

joint operation. Understanding the operational environment helps the JFC to better identify 

the problem; anticipate potential outcomes; and understand the results of various friendly, 

adversary, and neutral actions and how these actions affect achieving the military end state 

(see Figure III-4). 

(2) The commander must be able to describe both the current state of the 

operational environment and how the operational environment should look when 

operations conclude (desired end state) to visualize an approach to solving the problem. 

Planners can compare the current conditions of the operational environment with the desired 

end state conditions. Identifying necessary end state conditions and termination criteria early 

Figure III-4. Understanding the Operational Environment 

Understanding the Operational Environment

Legend

COG center of gravity

NOTE: All inputs/outputs are reviewed throughout the planning process and updated as changes occur in the 

operational environment, the problem, or the strategic guidance.

PMESII political, military, economic, social, information, and 

infrastructure

Strategic guidance

Nature of the conflict

Relevant history

Physical and information 

factors of the air, land, 

maritime, and space 

domains and the 

information environment

PMESII Analysis

Opposing

Neutral

Friendly







Description of the current 

operational environment

Systems perspective of 

the operational 

environment

Impacts of physical and 

information factors on the 

operational environment

Friendly/enemy COGs

Description of the desired 

operational environment

Military end state

Termination criteria

Description of the opposing 

end states











Key Inputs Key Outputs

Understanding 

the 

Operational 

Environment
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-9 

in planning will help the commander and staff devise an operational approach with lines of 

effort/operation that link each current condition to a desired end state condition. 

(3) Describe the current operational environment. One of the tools that can assist 

the commander in describing the current operational environment is the joint intelligence 

preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) process. JIPOE is the joint process 

through which J-2 manages the analysis and development of products that help the 

commander and staff understand the complex and interconnected operational environment—

the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of 

capabilities that bear on the decisions of the commander. 

(4) In analyzing the current and future operational environment, the team can use a 

political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) analytical 

framework to analyze the operational environment and determine relevant and critical 

relationships between the various actors and aspects of the operational environment (see 

Figure III-5). 

(5) Additional factors that should be considered include: 

(a) Geographical features and meteorological and oceanographic 

characteristics. 

(b) Population demographics (ethnic groups, tribes, ideological factions, 

religious groups and sects, language dialects, age distribution, income groups, public health 

issues). 

(c) Political and socioeconomic factors (economic system, political factions, 

tribal factions). 

(d) Infrastructures, such as transportation, energy, and information systems. 

(e) Operational limitations such as rules of engagement (ROE) or legal 

restrictions on military operations as specified in US law, international law, or host-nation 

support (HNS) agreements. 

(f) All friendly and adversary conventional, irregular, and paramilitary forces 

and their general capabilities and strategic objectives (including all known and/or suspected 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards). 

(g) Environmental conditions (earthquakes, volcanic activity, pollution, 

naturally occurring diseases). 

(h) Location of toxic industrial materials (TIMs) in the area of interest. TIMs 

may produce WMD-like effects. 

(i) Psychological characteristics of adversary decision making. 

(j) All locations of foreign embassies, IGOs, and NGOs. 
Chapter III 

III-10 JP 5-0 

(k) Friendly and adversary military and commercial capabilities provided by 

assets in space and their current or potential use. 

(l) Knowledge of the capabilities and intent of forces, individuals, or 

organizations conducting cyberspace operations. 

(6) To envision developing and employing theater-strategic options for joint, 

interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational action, the commander must understand 

the series of complex, interconnected relationships at work within the operational 

environment. One way of developing solutions is to view these interrelated challenges from 

a systems perspective. In this systems analysis, it is critical to consider the relationship 

between all of the aspects of the system. 

Figure III-5. Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure 

System Analysis 

Decisive Point Node Link

Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure 

System Analysis

Legend

Military

Social

Information

Infrastructure

Political

Economic
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-11 

(7) To produce a holistic view of the relevant enemy, neutral, and friendly systems 

as a complex whole within a larger system that includes many external influences, analysis 

should define how these systems interrelate. Most important to this analysis is describing the 

relevant relationships within and between the various systems that directly or indirectly 

affect the problem at hand. Although the J-2 manages the JIPOE process, other directorates 

and agencies can contribute valuable expertise to develop and assess the complexities of the 

operational environment. 

For more information on JIPOE, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 

Operational Environment.

(8) Tendencies and Potentials. In developing an understanding of the interactions 

and relationships of relevant actors in the operational environment, commanders and staffs 

consider natural tendencies and potentials in their analyses. Tendencies reflect the 

inclination to think or behave in a certain manner. Tendencies are not considered 

deterministic but as models describing the thoughts or behaviors of relevant actors. 

Tendencies help identify the range of possibilities that relevant actors may develop with or 

without external influence. Once identified, commanders and staffs evaluate the potential of 

these tendencies to manifest within the operational environment. Potential is the inherent 

ability or capacity for the growth or development of a specific interaction or relationship. 

Not all interactions and relationships support achieving the desired end state. The desired 

end state accounts for tendencies and potentials that exist among the relevant actors or other 

aspects of the operational environment. 

Note: Early in JOPP, pertinent lessons learned should be collected and reviewed as part of 

the analysis. Doing this early allows previously learned lessons to make their way into the 

plan. Although the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) provides a database 

of past lessons learned, people experienced in the mission, environment, and functions 

should also be sought for their knowledge, experience, and lessons. In developing 

understanding of the interactions and relationships of relevant actors in the operational 

environment, commanders and staffs consider natural tendencies and potentials in their 

analyses.

(9) Describe the key conditions that must exist in the future operational 

environment to achieve the desired end state. Planners should put a temporal aspect to this 

set of conditions in order to be able to conduct feasibility and acceptability analyses. 

(10) Determine opposing desired end states. Other actors will also be affecting the 

operational environment and may have significantly different desired end states. The 

enemy/adversary will definitely have a different set of conditions to describe his desired end 

state. Some other actors may be neutral or friendly, and may not have an opposing mind-set, 

but some of their desired conditions (or unintended consequences of their actions) may 

oppose our desired end state conditions. 
Chapter III 

III-12 JP 5-0 

d. Define the Problem 

(1) Defining the problem is essential to solving the problem. It involves 

understanding and isolating the root causes of the issue at hand—defining the essence of a 

complex, ill-defined problem. Defining the problem begins with a review of the tendencies 

and potentials of all the concerned actors and identifying tensions among the existing 

conditions and the desired end state. The problem statement articulates how the operational 

variables can be expected to resist or facilitate transformation and how inertia in the 

operational environment can be leveraged to ensure the desired conditions are achieved. 

(2) The problem statement identifies the areas for action that will transform 

existing conditions toward the desired end state. Defining the problem extends beyond 

analyzing interactions and relationships in the operational environment (see Figure III-6). It 

identifies areas of tension and competition—as well as opportunities and challenges—that 

commanders must address to transform current conditions to achieve the desired end state. 

Tension is the resistance or friction among and between actors. The commander and staff 

identify the tension by analyzing the context of the relevant actors’ tendencies, potentials, 

and the operational environment. 

(3) Identify the problem. Critical to defining the problem is determining what 

needs to be acted on to reconcile the differences between existing and desired conditions. 

Figure III-6. Defining the Problem 

Defining the Problem

Legend

COG center of gravity

NOTE: All inputs/outputs are reviewed throughout the planning process and updated as changes occur in the 

operational environment, the problem, or the strategic guidance.

Problem statement that 

identifies problem to be 

solved

Tension between current 

conditions and desired end 

state

Elements within the 

that must change to 

achieve desired end state

Opportunities and threats 

to achieving end states

Limitations

operational environment

Key Inputs Key Outputs

Description of the current 

operational environment

Systems perspective of 

the 

Impacts of physical and 

information factors on 

Friendly/enemy COGs

Description of the desired 

Military end state

Termination criteria

Description of the opposing 

end states











operational 

environment

operational environment

operational environment

Defining 

the 

Problem
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-13 

Some of the conditions are critical to success; some are not. Some may be achieved as a 

secondary or tertiary result of another condition. In identifying the problem, the planning 

team identifies the tensions between the desired conditions and identifies the areas of tension 

that merit further consideration as areas of possible intervention. 

(4) The JFC and staff must identify and articulate: 

(a) Tensions between current conditions and desired conditions at the end 

state. 

(b) Elements within the operational environment which must change or remain 

the same to achieve desired end states. 

(c) Opportunities and threats that either can be exploited or will impede the 

JFC from achieving the desired end state. 

(d) Limitations. An action required or prohibited by higher authority, such as a 

constraint or a restraint, and other restrictions that limit the commander’s freedom of action, 

such as diplomatic agreements, ROE, political and economic conditions in affected 

countries, and host-nation issues. 

(5) A concise problem statement is used to clearly define the problem or problem 

set to solve. It considers how tension and competition affect the operational environment by 

identifying how to transform the current conditions to the desired end state—before 

adversaries begin to transform current conditions to their desired end state. The statement 

broadly describes the requirements for transformation, anticipating changes in the 

operational environment while identifying critical transitions. 

e. Developing an Operational Approach 

(1) The operational approach reflects understanding of the operational environment 

and the problem while describing the commander’s visualization of a broad approach for 

achieving the desired end state (see Figure III-7). The planning team uses elements of 

operational design to provide details to the commander’s operational approach and to 

facilitate detailed planning within JOPP. There are three purposes for developing an 

operational approach: 

(a) It provides the foundation for the commander’s planning guidance to the 

staff and other partners. 

(b) It provides the model for execution of the campaign or operation and 

development of assessments for that campaign or operation. 

(c) It enables a better understanding of the operational environment and of the 

problem. 

(2) In developing an appropriate operational approach, the commander should 

address the following questions: 
Chapter III 

III-14 JP 5-0 

(a) What are the strengths and weaknesses of the various actors? 

(b) What are the opportunities and threats? 

(c) How do we go from the existing conditions to the desired conditions? 

(d) What will be the likely consequences as we seek to shape the operational 

environment toward a desired set of conditions? 

(3) The end state, termination, and COG(s) are relevant to framing the operational 

environment and problem. The identification of objectives, COG(s), and decisive points are 

useful in developing the basis for an operational approach. Depending on the commander’s 

understanding and visualization of the campaign or operation, the commander may also 

consider direct or indirect approaches, culmination, operational reach, and arranging 

operations. The commander may have a mature enough vision to organize the campaign 

into LOOs/lines of effort and describe how to employ forces. 

(4) In developing the operational approach, commanders consider the direct or 

indirect nature of interaction with relevant actors and operational variables in the operational 

environment. As commanders consider various approaches, they evaluate the types of defeat 

and/or stability mechanisms that may lead to conditions that define the desired end state. 

Figure III-7. Developing the Operational Approach 

Developing the Operational Approach

Legend

JFC joint force commander

NOTE: All inputs/outputs are reviewed throughout the planning process and updated as changes occur in the 

operational environment, the problem, or the strategic guidance.

Problem statement that 

identifies problem to be 

solved

Tension between current 

conditions and desired end 

state

Elements within the 

that must change to 

achieve desired end state

Opportunities and threats to 

achieving end states

Limitations

operational environment

Description of the 

Definition of the problem

Commander's operational 

approach

JFC's initial planning 

guidance

Commander's initial 

intent

operational environment



Key Inputs Key Outputs

Developing 

the 

Operational 

Approach
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-15 

The operational approach enables commanders to begin visualizing and describing possible 

combinations of actions to reach the desired end state given the understanding of the 

operational environment and the articulation of the tensions that describe the problem. Thus, 

the operational approach provides the logic that underpins the unique combinations of tasks 

that describe the CONOPS required to achieve the desired end state. For an example of an 

operational approach, see Figure III-8. 

(5) The operational approach promotes mutual understanding and unity of effort 

throughout the echelons of command and partner organizations. Many factors must be 

considered that can affect the operational approach. For example, the nature of our 

multinational partners’ strategic objectives could influence the approach to achieving the 

commander’s strategic and operational objectives. The availability of HNS, diplomatic 

Figure III-8. Operational Approach—Example 

Operational Approach—Example

Supported Objectives Desired Conditions

1 Positively influence people

2 Trained and professional security force

3 Civil security operations

4 Literacy rate improved

5 Population has access to essential services

6 Qualified and trained civil service

7 Diminish illegal networks

8 Revenues increased

A Populace regularly, readily interacts with 

provincial government

B Civil servants maintaining regular work hours 

and actively pursuing their responsibilities

C Available and trained security forces employed 

effectively by the provincial government

D School attendance increased

E Improved conditions for basic services

F Increased investment/projects in the provinces

Desired 

Conditions

Supported 

Objectives

Lines of 

Operation/

Lines of Effort

Defeat 

Mechanism/ 

Stability 

Mechanism

A

B

C

D

E

F

End State

Safe and 

Stable Region

875431

876531

865431

876321

8765431

87654321

Current 

Conditions

Information 

Operations

Develop Civil

Administration

Influence

Support

Security

Operations

Isolate

Divide

Education

Support

Influence

Infrastructure

Development Support

Economic

Development Support
Chapter III 

III-16 JP 5-0 

permission to overfly nations, access to en route air bases, and the allocation of strategic 

mobility assets will affect development of a feasible and acceptable operational approach. 

(6) The operational approach should describe the operational objectives that will 

enable achievement of the key conditions of the desired end state. The operational approach 

may be described using LOOs/lines of effort to link decisive points to achievement of 

objectives. It should also include a description of how key adversarial desired conditions 

will be precluded, and how other non-adversarial desired conditions will be mitigated. 

(7) In developing the operational approach, the commander should work within 

anticipated resource constraints considered in understanding the operational environment. 

(8) The commander should reassess his understanding of the operational 

environment based on the developed operational approach. In doing this, the commander 

should consider especially any undesired consequences of the operational approach. The 

purpose of working this iteration is to enable refinement of the operational approach to 

mitigate undesired effects, and to identify elements of strategic and operational risk inherent 

to the operational approach. 

f. Developing Commander’s Planning Guidance. The commander provides a 

summary of his current understanding of the operational environment and the problem, along 

with his visualization of the operational approach, to the staff and to other partners through 

commander’s planning guidance. The commander may have been able to apply operational 

design to think through the campaign or operation before the staff begins JOPP. In this case, 

the commander provides initial planning guidance to help focus the staff in mission analysis. 

If he has not had such an opportunity, he will be working his understanding and visualization 

as the staff conducts mission analysis. In this case, the commander will issue his planning 

guidance, as he sees appropriate, to help focus the staff efforts. At a minimum, the 

commander issues planning guidance, either initial or refined, at the conclusion of mission 

analysis, and provides refined planning guidance as his understanding of the operational 

environment and of the problem and visualization of the operational approach mature. It is 

critical that he does this as the campaign or operation develops in order to adapt as needed 

his operational approach to a changing operational environment or changed problem. 

(1) The format for the commander’s planning guidance varies based on the 

personality of the commander and the level of command, but should adequately describe the 

logic to the commander’s understanding of the operational environment and of the problem 

and the description of the operational approach. It may include the following elements: 

(a) Describe the operational environment. Some combination of graphics 

showing key relationships and tensions and a narrative describing the operational 

environment will help convey the commander’s understanding to the staff and other partners. 

(b) Define the problem to be solved. A narrative problem statement that 

includes the required timing to solve the problem will best convey the commander’s 

understanding of the problem. 
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-17 

(c) Describe the operational approach. A combination of a narrative 

describing objectives, decisive points, and potential LOOs, with a summary of limitations 

(constraints and restraints) and elements of operational risk (what can be accepted and what 

cannot be accepted) will help describe the operational approach. 

(d) Provide the commander’s initial intent. The commander should also 

include his initial intent in his planning guidance. The commander’s initial intent describes 

the purpose of the operations, desired strategic end state, military end state, and operational 

risks associated with the campaign or operation. It also includes where the commander will 

and will not accept risk during the operation. It organizes desired conditions and the 

combinations of potential actions in time, space, and purpose. The JFC should envision and 

articulate how military power and joint operations, integrated with other applicable 

instruments of national power, will dominate the adversary in reaching strategic success. It 

should help staff and subordinate commanders understand the intent for unified action using 

interorganizational coordination among all partners and other participants. Through his 

intent, the commander identifies the major unifying efforts during the campaign, the points 

and events where operations must dominate the enemy and control conditions in the 

operational environment, and where other instruments of national power will play a central 

role. The intent must allow for decentralized execution. It provides focus to the staff and 

helps subordinate and supporting commanders take actions to achieve the military end state 

without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. 

1. The commander develops his intent throughout planning after providing 

the initial intent to focus the staff. Generally, the commander will write his own intent 

statement. Frequently the staff will provide substantial input. Note that much of what is 

covered in the three preceding paragraphs as the essential elements of initial and refined 

planning guidance may be incorporated into the commander’s intent. 

2. While there is no specified joint format for the commander’s intent, a 

generally accepted construct includes the purpose, end state, and operational risk. 

a. Purpose. The reason for the military action with respect to the 

mission of the next higher echelon. The purpose explains why the military action is being 

conducted. The purpose helps the force pursue the mission without further orders, even 

when actions do not unfold as planned. Thus, if an unanticipated situation arises, 

participating commanders understand the purpose of the forthcoming action well enough to 

act decisively and within the bounds of the higher commander’s intent. 

b. End state. Describes what the commander desires in military end 

state conditions that define mission success by friendly forces. Provides the strategic end 

state and higher command’s military end state and describes how reaching the JFC’s military 

end state conditions supports higher headquarters end state guidance. 

c. Operational risk. Defines aspects of the campaign or operation in 

which the commander will accept risk in lower or partial achievement or temporary 

conditions. It also describes areas in which it is not acceptable to accept such lower or 

intermediate conditions. 
Chapter III 

III-18 JP 5-0 

d. The intent may also include operational objectives, method, and 

effects guidance. 

e. The commander may provide additional planning guidance such as 

information management, resources, or specific effects that must be created or avoided. 

SECTION B. ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN 

5. Overview 

a. Operational design employs various elements to develop and refine the 

commander’s operational approach. These conceptual tools help commanders and their 

staffs think through the challenges of understanding the operational environment, defining 

the problem, and developing this approach, which guides planning and shapes the CONOPS 

(see Figure III-9). 

b. Section A, “Developing the Operational Approach,” mentioned operational design 

elements, among which end state, COG, and line of effort are particularly useful in 

developing the operational approach. However, these elements and the others are useful 

throughout JOPP and are fundamental to that process. The specific application of each 

element depends on the operational circumstances. All elements will usually apply to largescale combat operations, but some, such as culmination, may not apply in more benign 

circumstances such as foreign humanitarian assistance. 

6. Elements of Operational Design 

a. Termination

(1) Effective planning cannot occur without a clear understanding of the end state 

and the conditions that must exist to end military operations. Knowing when to terminate 

military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is key to achieving the national 

strategic end state. To plan effectively for termination, the supported JFC must know how 

the President and SecDef intend to terminate the joint operation and ensure that its outcomes 

endure. 

Figure III-9. Elements of Operational Design 

Elements of Operational Design















Termination

Military end state

Objectives

Effects

Center of gravity

Decisive points

Lines of operation and lines of effort













Direct and indirect approach

Anticipation

Operational reach

Culmination

Arranging operations

Forces and functions
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-19 

(2) Termination criteria are developed first among the elements of operational 

design as they enable the development of the military end state and objectives. Termination 

criteria describe the standards that must be met before conclusion of a joint operation. 

Commanders and their staffs must think through, in the early stages of planning, the 

conditions that must exist in order to terminate military operations on terms favorable to the 

US and its multinational partners. A hasty or ill-defined end to the operation may bring with 

it the possibility that the adversary will renew hostilities or other actors may interfere, 

leading to further conflict. Commanders and their staffs must balance the desire for quick 

victory with termination on truly favorable terms. 

(3) Termination criteria should account for a wide variety of operational tasks that 

the joint force may need to accomplish, to include disengagement, force protection, 

transition to post-conflict operations, reconstitution, and redeployment. 

(4) Termination criteria are briefed to SecDef as part of the IPR process to ensure 

the criteria support attainment of strategic end states. Once approved, the criteria may 

change. It is important for commanders and staffs to keep an eye out for potential changes, 

as they may result in a modification to the military end state as well as the commander’s 

operational approach. As such, it is essential for the military to keep a dialogue between the 

civilian national leadership, and the leadership of other agencies and partners involved. 

b. Military End State. Military end state is the set of required conditions that defines 

achievement of all military objectives. It normally represents a point in time and/or 

circumstances beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of 

national power as the primary means to achieve remaining national objectives. While it 

may mirror many of the conditions of the national strategic end state, the military end state 

typically will be more specific and contain other supporting conditions. These conditions 

contribute to developing termination criteria, the specified standards approved by the 

President and/or SecDef that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded. Aside 

from its obvious association with strategic or operational objectives, clearly defining the 

military end state promotes unity of effort, facilitates synchronization, and helps clarify (and 

may reduce) the risk associated with the campaign or operation. Commanders should 

include the military end state in their planning guidance and commander’s intent statement. 

EXAMPLES OF TERMINATION CRITERIA 

Note the description of condition, not action: 

Country X’s borders are secure. 

Country Y no longer poses an offensive threat to the countries of the region. 

Country X’s national security force is sufficient to repress internal rebellion. 

Percentage of US forces have redeployed with sufficient combat power 

postured in theater to support Country X’s national army. 
Chapter III 

III-20 JP 5-0 

c. Objectives. An objective is a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal 

toward which every military operation should be directed. Once the military end state is 

understood and termination criteria are established, operational design continues with 

development of strategic and operational military objectives. Joint operation planning 

integrates military actions and capabilities with those of other instruments of national power 

in time, space, and purpose in unified action to achieve the JFC’s objectives. Objectives and 

their supporting effects provide the basis for identifying tasks to be accomplished. 

(1) Objectives prescribe friendly goals. They constitute the aim of military 

operations and are necessarily linked to national objectives (simply defined as what we want 

to accomplish). Military objectives are one of the most important considerations in 

campaign and operational design. They specify what must be accomplished and provide 

the basis for describing desired effects.

(2) A clear and concise end state allows planners to better examine objectives that 

must be met to attain the desired end state. Objectives describe what must be achieved to 

reach the end state. These are usually expressed in military, diplomatic, economic, and 

informational terms and help define and clarify what military planners must do to support the 

national strategic end state. Objectives developed at the national-strategic and theaterstrategic levels are the defined, decisive, and attainable goals toward which all operations, 

not just military operations, and activities are directed within the OA. 

(3) Achieving operational objectives ties execution of tactical tasks to reaching the 

military end state. 

(4) There are four primary considerations for an objective. 

(a) An objective establishes a single desired result (a goal). 

(b) An objective should link directly or indirectly to higher level objectives or 

to the end state. 

(c) An objective is prescriptive, specific, and unambiguous. 

(d) An objective does not infer ways and/or means—it is not written as a task. 

d. Effects. An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results 

from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect can also be thought 

of as a condition that can support achieving an associated objective, while an undesired 

effect is a condition that can inhibit progress toward an objective. In applying unified 

action, a JFC synchronizes the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power of 

the US to affect an adversary’s PMESII systems. Throughout this publication, the term 

“effects” is intended to mean both desired and undesired effects unless otherwise 

specified.

(1) The CCDR plans joint operations based on analysis of national strategic 

objectives and development of theater strategic objectives supported by measurable strategic 

and operational desired effects and assessment indicators (see Figure III-10). At the 
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-21 

operational level, a subordinate JFC develops supporting plans, which can include objectives 

supported by measurable operational-level desired effects and assessment indicators. This 

may increase operational- and tactical-level understanding of the purpose reflected in the 

higher-level commander’s mission and intent. At the same time, commanders consider 

potential undesired effects and their impact on the tasks assigned to subordinate commands. 

(2) There are four primary considerations for writing a desired effect statement. 

(a) Each desired effect should link directly to one or more objectives. 

(b) The effect should be measurable. 

(c) The statement should not specify ways and means for accomplishment. 

(d) The effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a 

condition for success, not as another objective or a task. 

(3) The proximate cause of effects in complex situations can be difficult to predict. 

Even direct effects in these situations can be more difficult to create, predict, and measure, 

particularly when they relate to moral and cognitive issues (such as religion and the “mind of 

the adversary,” respectively). Indirect effects in these situations often are difficult to foresee. 

Where there is sufficient intelligence available to predict the direct effects reliably, some of 

the commander’s objectives can also be achieved indirectly. Some military objectives can be 

Figure III-10. End State, Objectives, Effects, Tasks 

End State, Objectives, Effects, Tasks

End state

Mission

 describes the set of 

conditions to meet conflict 

termination criteria.

 prescribe friendly 

goals.

 describe the conditions 

related to the objectives.

Desired effects describe 

conditions needed to 

achieve objectives.

Undesired effects describe 

conditions that will impede 

achievement of objectives.

 describe friendly actions to 

create desired effects or preclude 

undesired effects.

 describes the 

organization's essential task or 

task(s) and purpose.





Objectives

Effects

Tasks

National strategic

Theater strategic

Operational

Tactical

Level Guidance

Strategic end state

Objectives

Military end state

Objectives

Effects

Tasks

Military end state

Objectives

Effects

Tasks

Mission

Objectives

Tasks
Chapter III 

III-22 JP 5-0 

achieved by influencing political, economic, social, and other systems in the operational 

environment. However, indirect effects often can be unintended and undesired since 

there will always be gaps in our understanding of the operational environment. 

Commanders and their staffs must appreciate that unpredictable third-party actions, 

unintended consequences of friendly operations, subordinate initiative and creativity, and the 

fog and friction of conflict will contribute to an uncertain operational environment. 

(4) The use of effects in planning can help commanders and staff determine the 

tasks required to achieve objectives and use other elements of operational design more 

effectively by clarifying the relationships between COGs, LOOs, and/or lines of effort, 

decisive points, and termination criteria. Once a systems perspective of the operational 

environment has been developed (and appropriate links and nodes have been identified), the 

linkage and relationship between COGs, LOOs, and decisive points can become more 

obvious. This linkage allows for efficient use of desired effects in planning. The JFC and 

planners continue to develop and refine desired effects throughout JOPP. Monitoring 

progress toward creating desired effects and avoiding undesired effects continues throughout 

execution. 

(5) A mission is a task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly 

indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. It is derived primarily from 

higher headquarters guidance. 

e. Center of Gravity 

(1) One of the most important tasks confronting the JFC’s staff during planning is 

identifying and analyzing friendly and adversary COGs. A COG is a source of power that 

provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. It is what Clausewitz 

called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends...the point at 

which all our energies should be directed.” An objective is always linked to a COG. There 

may also be different COGs at different levels, but they should be nested. At the strategic 

level, a COG could be a military force, an alliance, political or military leaders, a set of 

critical capabilities or functions, or national will. At the operational level, a COG often is 

associated with the adversary’s military capabilities—such as a powerful element of the 

armed forces—but could include other capabilities in the operational environment. In 

identifying COGs it is important to remember that irregular warfare focuses on legitimacy 

and influence over a population, unlike traditional warfare, which employs direct military 

confrontation to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making 

capacity, or seize or retain territory to force a change in an adversary’s government or 

policies. Therefore, in an irregular warfare environment, the enemy and friendly COG will 

most likely be the same population. 

(2) COGs exist in an adversarial context involving a clash of moral wills and/or 

physical strengths. They are formed out of the relationships between adversaries, and they 

do not exist in a strategic or operational vacuum. COGs are framed by each party’s view of 

the threats in the operational environment and the requirements to develop/maintain power 

and strength relative to their need to be effective in accomplishing their objectives. 
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-23 

Therefore, commanders not only must consider the enemy COGs, but they also must identify 

and protect their own. 

(3) The COG construct is useful as an analytical tool to help JFCs and staffs 

analyze friendly and adversary sources of strength as well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. 

This process cannot be taken lightly, since a faulty conclusion resulting from a poor or hasty 

analysis can have very serious consequences, such as the inability to achieve strategic and 

operational objectives at an acceptable cost. The selection of COGs is not solely a static 

process by the J-2 during JIPOE. Planners must continually analyze and refine COGs due to 

actions taken by friendly forces and the adversary’s reactions to those actions. Figure III-11 

shows a number of characteristics that may be associated with a COG. 

(4) Analysis of friendly and adversary COGs is a key step in operational design. 

Joint force intelligence analysts identify adversary COGs, determining from which elements 

the adversary derives freedom of action, physical strength (means), and the will to fight. The 

J-2, in conjunction with other operational planners, then attempts to determine if the tentative 

or candidate COGs truly are critical to the adversary’s strategy. This analysis is a linchpin in 

the planning effort. Others on the joint force staff conduct similar analysis to identify 

friendly COGs. Once COGs have been identified, JFCs and their staffs determine how to 

attack enemy COGs while protecting friendly COGs. The protection of friendly strategic 

Figure III-11. Characteristics of Centers of Gravity

Characteristics of Centers of Gravity

Center of 

Gravity 

(COG)

Exists at each 

Contains many level of war

intangible elements 

at strategic level

Linked to objective(s)

Mostly physical at 

operational and 

tactical levels

Can endanger one's 

own COGs

Often depends 

on factors of time 

and space

Dependent upon 

adversarial 

relationship

Is a source of leverage

May be where the 

enemy's force is most 

densely concentrated

Can shift over 

time or between 

phases

Allows or 

enhances 

freedom of action

May be 

transitory in 

nature
Chapter III 

III-24 JP 5-0 

COGs such as public opinion and US national capabilities typically requires efforts and 

capabilities beyond those of just the supported CCDR. An analysis of the identified COGs in 

terms of critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities is vital to this process. 

(5) Understanding the relationship among COGs not only permits but also compels 

greater precision in thought and expression in operational design. Planners should analyze 

COGs within a framework of three critical factors—capabilities, requirements, and 

vulnerabilities—to aid in this understanding. Critical capabilities are those that are 

considered crucial enablers for a COG to function as such, and are essential to the 

accomplishment of the adversary’s assumed objective(s). Critical requirements are the 

conditions, resources, and means that enable a critical capability to become fully operational. 

Critical vulnerabilities are those aspects or components of critical requirements that are 

deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner achieving decisive or 

significant results. In general, a JFC must possess sufficient operational reach and combat 

power or other relevant capabilities to take advantage of an adversary’s critical 

vulnerabilities while protecting friendly critical capabilities within the operational reach of 

an adversary. 

(6) When identifying friendly and adversary critical vulnerabilities, the JFC and 

staff will understandably want to focus their efforts against the critical vulnerabilities that 

will do the most decisive damage to an adversary’s COG. However, in selecting those 

critical vulnerabilities, planners must also compare their criticality with their accessibility, 

vulnerability, redundancy, ability to recuperate, and impact on the civilian populace, and 

then balance those factors against friendly capabilities to affect those vulnerabilities. The 

JFC’s goal is to seek opportunities aggressively to apply force against an adversary in as 

vulnerable an aspect as possible, and in as many dimensions as possible. In other words, the 

JFC seeks to undermine the adversary’s strength by exploiting adversary vulnerabilities 

while protecting friendly vulnerabilities from adversaries attempting to do the same. 

(7) A proper analysis of adversary critical factors must be based on the best 

available knowledge of how adversaries organize, fight, think, and make decisions, and their 

physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses. JFCs and their staffs must develop an 

understanding of their adversaries’ capabilities and vulnerabilities as well as factors that 

might influence an adversary to abandon its strategic objectives. They must also envision 

how friendly forces and actions appear from the adversaries’ viewpoints. Otherwise, they 

may fall into the trap of ascribing to an adversary attitudes, values, and reactions that mirror 

their own. 

(8) Before solidifying COGs into the plan, planners should analyze and test the 

validity of the COGs. The defeat, destruction, neutralization, or substantial weakening of a 

valid COG should cause an adversary to change its COA or prevent an adversary from 

achieving its strategic objectives. If analysis and/or wargaming show that this does not 

occur, then perhaps planners have misidentified the COG, and they must revise their COG 

and critical factors analysis. The conclusions, while critically important to the planning 

process itself, must be tempered with continuous evaluations and reassessments because 

derived COGs and critical vulnerabilities are subject to change at any time during the 

campaign or operation. Accordingly, JFCs and their subordinates should be alert to 
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-25 

circumstances during execution that may cause derived COGs and critical vulnerabilities to 

change and adjust friendly plans and operations accordingly. 

(9) Commanders must also analyze friendly COGs and identify critical 

vulnerabilities (see Figure III-12). For example, long sea and air lines of communications 

(LOCs) from the continental United States (CONUS) or supporting theaters could be a 

critical vulnerability for a friendly COG. Through prior planning and coordination, 

commanders can mitigate the potential impact of challenges such as the failure of foreign 

governments to provide overflight clearances to US forces or MNFs. A friendly COG could 

also be something more intangible in nature. During the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf Conflict, 

for example, the Commander, US Central Command, identified the coalition itself as a 

friendly operational COG and took appropriate measures to protect it, to include deployment 

of theater missile defense systems. In conducting the analysis of friendly vulnerabilities, the 

supported commander must decide how, when, where, and why friendly military forces are 

(or might become) vulnerable to hostile actions and then plan accordingly. The supported 

commander must achieve a balance between prosecuting the main effort and protecting 

critical capabilities and vulnerabilities in the OA to protect friendly COGs. 

For more information on COGs and the systems perspective, see JP 2-01.3, Joint 

Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

Figure III-12. Center of Gravity Analysis Example

Center of Gravity Analysis Example

Threat Friendly

Adversary armored corps US military forces

Integrated Air Defense 

System

Strategic mobility from 

continental US or supporting 

theaters







Mobile launchers

Command and 

control capabilities

Network of radars







Air and sea lines of 

communications

Air and sea mobility 

platforms

Air and sea ports of 

debarkation

Network of radars Long air and sea lines of 

communications

Center of Gravity

Critical Capability

Critical Requirement

Critical Vulnerability
Chapter III 

III-26 JP 5-0 

f. Decisive Points 

(1) A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or 

function that, when acted upon, allows a commander to gain a marked advantage over 

an adversary or contributes materially to achieving success (e.g., creating a desired 

effect, achieving an objective). Decisive points can greatly influence the outcome of an 

action. Decisive points can be physical in nature, such as a constricted sea lane, a hill, a 

town, WMD material cache or facility, or an air base; but they could include other elements 

such as command posts, critical boundaries, airspace, or communications and/or intelligence 

nodes. In some cases, specific key events also may be decisive points, such as attainment of 

air or maritime superiority, commitment of the adversary’s reserve, opening a supply route 

during humanitarian operations, or gaining the trust of a key leader. In still other cases, 

decisive points may have a larger systemic impact and, when acted on, can substantially 

affect the adversary’s information, financial, economic, or social systems. When dealing 

with an irregular threat, commanders and their staffs should consider how actions against 

decisive points will affect not only the enemy, but also the relevant population and their 

behavior and relationships with enemy and friendly forces, and the resultant impact on 

stability in the area or region of interest. 

(2) The most important decisive points can be determined from analysis of critical 

factors. Understanding the relationship between a COG’s critical capabilities, requirements, 

and vulnerabilities can illuminate direct and indirect approaches to the COG. It is likely that 

most of these critical factors will be decisive points, which should then be further addressed 

in the planning process. 

(3) There may often be cases where the JFC’s combat power and other capabilities 

will be insufficient to affect the adversary’s COGs rapidly with a single action. In this 

situation, the supported JFC must selectively focus a series of actions against the adversary’s 

critical vulnerabilities until the cumulative effects of these actions lead to mission success. 

Just as a combined arms approach is often the best way to attack an enemy field force in the 

military system, attacking several vulnerable points in other systems may offer an effective 

method to influence an enemy COG. The indirect approach may offer the most effective 

method to exploit adversary critical vulnerabilities through the identification of decisive 

points. Although decisive points are usually not COGs, they are the keys to attacking or 

protecting them. 

(4) Although campaigns or operations may have numerous decisive points, only a 

few will truly have operational or even strategic significance relative to an adversary’s or our 

friendly COGs. The art of identifying decisive points is a critical part of operational design. 

Normally, there are far more decisive points in a given OA than can be attacked, seized, 

retained, controlled or protected with the forces and capabilities available. Accordingly, 

planners should study and analyze potential decisive points and determine which offer the 

best opportunity to attack the adversary’s COGs, extend friendly operational reach, or enable 

the application of friendly forces and capabilities. The commander then designates the most 

important decisive points for further planning and allocates sufficient resources to produce 

the desired effects against them. Afterward, the supported JFC should assign sufficient 
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-27 

forces and assets for attacking, seizing, retaining, controlling, or protecting these decisive 

points. 

g. Lines of Operation and Lines of Effort

(1) Lines of Operation

(a) A LOO defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in 

relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in 

time and space to an objective(s). LOOs describe and connect a series of decisive actions 

that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective (see Figure III-13). 

Operations designed using LOOs generally consist of a series of actions executed according 

to a well-defined sequence, although multiple LOOs can exist at the same time (parallel 

operations). Major combat operations are typically designed using LOOs. These lines tie 

offensive, defensive, and stability tasks to the geographic and positional references in the 

OA. Commanders synchronize activities along complementary LOOs to achieve the end 

state. 

(b) A force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a 

central point. Interior lines usually represent central position, where a friendly force can 

reinforce or concentrate its elements faster than the enemy force can reposition. With 

interior lines, friendly forces are closer to separate enemy forces than the enemy forces are to 

one another. Interior lines allow an isolated force to mass combat power against a specific 

portion of an enemy force by shifting capabilities more rapidly than the enemy can react. 

(c) A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the 

enemy. Operations on exterior lines offer opportunities to encircle and annihilate an enemy 

force. However, these operations typically require a force stronger or more mobile than the 

enemy. 

(d) The relevance of interior and exterior lines depends on the time and space 

relationship between the opposing forces. Although an enemy force may have interior lines 

with respect to the friendly force, this advantage disappears if the friendly force is more agile 

and operates at a higher tempo. Conversely, if a smaller friendly force maneuvers to a 

Figure III-13. Sample Line of Operation 

Sample Line of Operation

Establish 

and Operate 

Intermediate 

Bases

Secure and 

Operate Air 

and Sea 

Ports

Actions on Decisive Points and/or Nodes

Secure 

Routes to 

Capitaltown

Secure

Capitaltown

Objective

Secure 

Entry 

Points

Seize 

Key 

Terrain
Chapter III 

III-28 JP 5-0 

position between larger but less agile enemy forces, the friendly force may be able to defeat 

them in detail before they can react effectively. 

(2) Lines of Effort 

(a) A line of effort links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of 

purpose—cause and effect—to focus efforts toward establishing operational and 

strategic conditions. Lines of effort are essential to operational design when positional 

references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance, such as in counterinsurgency or 

stability operations. In operations involving many nonmilitary factors, lines of effort may be 

the only way to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the desired end state (see Figure III-14). 

Lines of effort are often essential to helping commanders visualize how military capabilities 

can support the other instruments of national power. They are a particularly valuable tool 

when used to achieve unity of effort in operations involving MNFs and civilian 

organizations, where unity of command is elusive, if not impractical. 

(b) Commanders at all levels may use lines of effort to develop missions and 

tasks and to allocate resources. Commanders synchronize and sequence related actions along 

multiple lines of effort. Seeing these relationships helps commanders assess progress toward 

achieving the end state as forces perform tasks and accomplish missions. 

(c) Commanders typically visualize stability and civil support operations along 

lines of effort. For stability operations, commanders may consider linking primary stability 

tasks to their corresponding DOS post-conflict technical sectors. These stability tasks link 

military actions with the broader interagency effort across the levels of war. A full array of 

lines of effort might include offensive and defensive lines, as well as a lines for public 

affairs, IO, and integrated financial operations (IFO). All typically produce effects across 

multiple lines of effort. 

(d) Commanders and staff should consider cross-cutting lines of effort 

involving more than one instrument of national power in order to create a more effective 

system for interagency coordination during execution. Lines of effort designed around 

functional areas such as diplomacy or economics create unintentional interagency 

coordination stovepipes during execution, because they are fixed toward the efforts of a 

single department or agency. Cross-cutting (outcome oriented) lines of effort such as 

establish essential services or civil security operations create a tendency toward more 

dynamic and open interagency coordination during execution because they require the 

synchronization of efforts of multiple departments and agencies. This type of construct 

brings to bear the capabilities and expertise of multiple elements of the USG, which makes it 

particularly effective toward achieving more complex objectives or outcomes. 

(3) Combining Lines of Operation and Lines of Effort. Commanders may use 

both LOOs and lines of effort to connect objectives to a central, unifying purpose. Lines of 

effort can also link objectives, decisive points, and COGs. Combining LOOs and lines of 

effort allows commanders to include nonmilitary activities in their operational design. This 

combination helps commanders incorporate stability tasks into their operational approach 

that are necessary to reach the end state. It allows commanders to consider the less tangible 
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-29 

aspects of the operational environment where the other instruments of national power or 

nontraditional military activities may dominate. Commanders can then visualize concurrent 

and post-conflict stability activities. Making these connections relates the tasks, effects, and 

objectives identified in the operation or campaign plan. 

(4) Defeat and stability mechanisms complement COG analysis. While COG 

analysis helps us understand a problem, defeat and stability mechanisms suggest means to 

solve it. They provide a useful tool for describing the main effects a commander wants to 

create along a LOO or line of effort. 

Figure III-14. Sample Lines of Effort 

Sample Lines of Effort

Civil Control

Civil Security

Essential Services

Economic/Infrastructure Development

Governance

Conditions

Rule of law 

established

Safe/secure 

environment 

established

Essential 

services 

restored

Foundation for 

development 

established

Regional and 

local 

governance 

Identify established

and recruit 

local 

leaders

Facilitate 

establishment 

of sector 

representation

Facilitate 

establishment 

of 

neighborhood 

councils

Facilitate 

establishment 

of district 

councils

Support 

and 

secure 

elections

Implement 

employment 

programs

Secure 

vital 

natural 

resources

Repair/ 

rebuild 

distribution 

infrastructure

Prioritize 

reconstruction 

projects

Essential 

banking 

services 

available

Implement 

public 

works 

projects

Sewage 

treatment 

plants 

operating

Establish 

trash 

disposal

Water 

treatment 

plants 

operating

Restore 

electrical 

power

Reopen 

hospitals 

and clinics

Identify 

and recruit 

local 

leaders

Initiate 

security 

forces 

training

Establish 

national 

security 

forces

Integrate 

security 

forces into 

operations

Isolate 

population 

from 

insurgency

Defeat 

insurgency

Transition 

to national 

security 

forces

Establish 

police 

forces 

training

Integrate 

trained police 

into operations

Counter 

organized 

crime

Establish 

judicial 

system

Transition to 

host nation 

police forces
Chapter III 

III-30 JP 5-0 

(a) Defeat Mechanisms. Defeat mechanisms primarily apply in combat 

operations against an active enemy force. Combat aims at defeating armed enemies—

regular, irregular, or both, through the organized application of force to kill, destroy, or 

capture by all means available. There are two basic defeat mechanisms to accomplish this: 

attrition and disruption. The aim of disruption is to defeat an enemy’s ability to fight as a 

cohesive and coordinated organization. The alternative is to destroy his material capabilities 

through attrition, which generally is more costly and time-consuming. Although 

acknowledging that all successful combat involves both mechanisms, joint doctrine 

conditionally favors disruption because it tends to be a more effective and efficient way of 

causing an enemy’s defeat, and the increasing imperative for restraint in the application of 

violence may often preclude the alternative. The defeat mechanisms may include: 

1. Destroy. To identify the most effective way to eliminate enemy 

capabilities; it may be attained by sequentially applying combat power over time or with a 

single, decisive attack. 

2. Dislocate. To compel the enemy to expose forces by reacting to a 

specific action; it requires enemy commanders to either accept neutralization of part of their 

force or risk its destruction while repositioning. 

3. Disintegrate. To exploit the effects of dislocation and destruction to 

shatter the enemy’s coherence; it typically follows destruction and dislocation, coupled with 

the loss of capabilities that enemy commanders use to develop and maintain situational 

understanding. 

4. Isolate. To limit the enemy’s ability to conduct operations effectively 

by marginalizing critical capabilities or limiting the enemy’s ability to influence events; it 

exposes the enemy to continued degradation through the massed effects of other defeat 

mechanisms. 

(b) Stability Mechanisms. A stability mechanism is the primary method 

through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support 

establishing a lasting, stable peace. Combinations of stability mechanisms produce 

complementary and reinforcing effects that help to shape the human dimension of the 

operational environment more effectively and efficiently than a single mechanism applied in 

isolation. Stability mechanisms may include compel, control, influence, and support. Proper 

application of these stability mechanisms is key in an irregular warfare environment where 

success is dependent on enabling a local partner to maintain or establish legitimacy and 

influence over relevant populations. 

1. Compel. To maintain the threat—or actual use—of lethal or nonlethal 

force to establish control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce cessation of 

hostilities, peace agreements, or other arrangements. Legitimacy and compliance are 

interrelated. While legitimacy is vital to achieving host-nation compliance, compliance 

depends on how the local populace perceives the force’s ability to exercise force to 

accomplish the mission. The appropriate and discriminate use of force often forms a central 

component to success in stability operations; it closely ties to legitimacy. Depending on the 
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-31 

circumstances, the threat or use of force can reinforce or complement efforts to stabilize a 

situation, gain consent, and ensure compliance with mandates and agreements. The misuse 

of force—or even the perceived threat of the misuse of force—can adversely affect the 

legitimacy of the mission or the military instrument of national power. 

2. Control. To establish public order and safety, securing borders, routes, 

sensitive sites, population centers, and individuals and physically occupying key terrain and 

facilities. As a stability mechanism, control closely relates to the primary stability task, 

establish civil control. However, control is also fundamental to effective, enduring security. 

When combined with the stability mechanism compel, it is inherent to the activities that 

comprise disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, as well as broader security sector 

reform programs. Without effective control, efforts to establish civil order—including 

efforts to establish both civil security and control over an area and its population—will not 

succeed. Establishing control requires time, patience, and coordinated, cooperative efforts 

across the OA. 

3. Influence. To alter the opinions and attitudes of the host-nation 

population through IO, presence, and conduct. It applies nonlethal capabilities to 

complement and reinforce the compelling and controlling effects of stability mechanisms. 

Influence aims to effect behavioral change through nonlethal means. It is more a result of 

public perception than a measure of operational success. It reflects the ability of forces to 

operate successfully among the people of the host nation, interacting with them consistently 

and positively while accomplishing the mission. Here, consistency of actions, words, and 

deeds is vital. Influence requires legitimacy. Military forces earn the trust and confidence of 

the people through the constructive capabilities inherent to combat power, not through lethal 

or coercive means. Positive influence is absolutely necessary to achieve lasting control and 

compliance. It contributes to success across the lines of effort and engenders support among 

the people. Once attained, influence is best maintained by consistently exhibiting respect 

for, and operating within, the cultural and societal norms of the local populace. 

4. Support. To establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the 

other instruments of national power to function effectively, coordinating and cooperating 

closely with host-nation civilian agencies, and assisting aid organizations as necessary to 

secure humanitarian access to vulnerable populations. Support is vital to a comprehensive 

approach to stability operations. The military instrument of national power brings unique 

expeditionary capabilities to stability operations. These capabilities enable the force to 

quickly address the immediate needs of the host nation and local populace. In extreme 

circumstances, support may require committing considerable resources for a protracted 

period. However, easing the burden of support on military forces requires enabling civilian 

agencies and organizations to fulfill their respective roles. This is typically achieved by 

combining the effects of the stability mechanisms compel, control, and influence to 

reestablish security and control; restoring essential civil services to the local populace; and 

helping to secure humanitarian access necessary for aid organizations to function effectively. 

h. Direct and Indirect Approach. The approach is the manner in which a 

commander contends with a COG. A direct approach attacks the enemy’s COG or 

principal strength by applying combat power directly against it. However, COGs are 
Chapter III 

III-32 JP 5-0 

generally well protected and not vulnerable to a direct approach. Thus, commanders usually 

choose an indirect approach. An indirect approach attacks the enemy’s COG by 

applying combat power against a series of decisive points that lead to the defeat of the 

COG while avoiding enemy strength.

(1) Direct attacks against adversary COGs resulting in their neutralization or 

destruction provide the most direct path to victory. Since direct attacks against adversary 

COGs mean attacking an opponent’s strength, JFCs must determine if friendly forces possess 

the power to attack with acceptable risk. In the event that a direct attack is not a 

reasonable solution, JFCs should seek an indirect approach until conditions are 

established that permit successful direct attacks (see Figure III-15). In this manner, the 

adversary’s derived vulnerabilities can offer indirect pathways to gain leverage over its 

COGs. 

(2) At the strategic level, indirect methods of defeating the adversary’s COG could 

include depriving the adversary of allies or friends, emplacing sanctions, weakening the 

national will to fight by undermining the public support for war, and breaking up cohesion of 

adversary alliances or coalitions. 

(3) At the operational level, the most common indirect method of defeating an 

adversary’s COGs is to conduct a series of attacks against selected aspects of the adversary’s 

combat power. For example, the JFC may sequence combat actions to force an adversary to 

divide its forces in theater, destroy the adversary’s reserves or elements of the adversary’s 

base of operations, or prevent or hinder the deployment of the adversary’s major forces or 

reinforcements into the OA. Indirect methods of attacking the adversary’s COGs (through 

critical vulnerabilities) could entail reducing the adversary’s operational reach, isolating the 

Figure III-15. Direct and Indirect Approach

Direct and Indirect Approach

Center of Gravity

Joint

Forces

Command and 

Control

Line of 

Communications

Air and Missile 

Defense

Armored 

Corps

Direct

Indirect
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-33 

force from its command and control (C2), and destroying or suppressing key protection 

functions such as air defense. Additionally, in an irregular warfare environment, a persistent 

indirect approach will help enable a legitimate and capable local partner to address the 

conflict’s causes and to provide security, good governance, and economic development. 

i. Anticipation

(1) Anticipation is key to effective planning. JFCs must consider what might 

happen and look for the signs that may bring the possible event to pass. During execution, 

JFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation. 

They continually gather information by personally observing and communicating with higher 

headquarters, subordinates, partner nations, and other organizations in the OA. JFCs may 

avoid surprise by gaining and maintaining the initiative at all levels of command and 

throughout the OA, thus forcing the adversary to react rather than initiate, and by thoroughly 

and continuously wargaming to identify probable adversary reactions to joint force actions. 

JFCs also should realize the effects of operations and associated consequences on the 

adversary, interagency and multinational partners, and civilians, and prepare for their results. 

(2) Shared common understanding of the operational environment aids 

commanders and their staffs in anticipating opportunities and challenges. Knowledge of 

friendly capabilities; adversary capabilities, intentions, and likely COAs; and the location, 

activities, and status of dislocated civilians enables commanders to focus joint efforts where 

they can best, and most directly, contribute to achieving military objectives. 

(3) Anticipation is not without risk. Commanders and staff officers who tend to 

lean forward in anticipation of what they expect to encounter are more susceptible to 

deception efforts by an opponent. Therefore, commanders and their staffs should carefully 

consider all available information upon which decisions are being based. Where possible, 

multiple or redundant sources of information should be employed to reduce risk in the 

decision-making process. 

j. Operational Reach

(1) Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a joint force 

can successfully employ military capabilities. Although reach may be constrained or 

limited by the geography in and around the OA, it may be extended through forward 

positioning of capabilities and resources, increasing the range and effectiveness of weapon 

systems, leveraging HNS and contract support (system, external, theater) and maximizing the 

throughput efficiency of the distribution architecture. 

(2) The concept of operational reach is inextricably tied to the concept of 

LOOs. The geography surrounding and separating adversaries influences operational reach. 

Locating forces, reserves, bases, pre-positioned equipment sets, and logistics forward 

extends operational reach. Operational reach is also affected by increasing the range of 

weapons, and by improving transportation availability and the effectiveness of LOCs and 

throughput capability. Some assets—such as air, space, and cyberspace—maintain a 

responsive global capability that significantly extends operational reach. Nevertheless, for 
Chapter III 

III-34 JP 5-0 

any given campaign or major operation, there is a finite range beyond which 

predominant elements of the joint force cannot prudently operate or maintain effective 

operations.

(3) Basing, in the broadest sense, is an indispensable part of operational art, since it 

is tied to the concept of LOOs and directly affects operational reach. Whether from overseas 

locations, sea-based platforms, or CONUS, basing directly affects the combat power and 

other capabilities that a joint force can generate. In particular, the arrangement and 

positioning of advanced bases (often in austere, rapidly emplaced configurations) 

underwrites the ability of the joint force to shield its components from adversary action and 

deliver symmetric and asymmetric blows. It also directly influences the combat power and 

other capabilities the joint force can generate because of its impact on such critical factors as 

sortie or resupply rates. Political and diplomatic considerations can often affect basing 

decisions. 

(4) US force basing options span the range from permanently based forces to 

temporary sea basing during crisis response in littoral areas of instability. Bases are typically 

selected to be within operational reach of the adversary. To that end, theater assessments 

must determine whether sufficient infrastructure and diplomatic support exist or can be 

obtained to support the operational and sustainment requirements of deployed forces, and 

where they can be assured of some degree of security from attack. Determining where to 

locate bases poses certain challenges for planners. Recognizing the critical role basing plays 

in campaigns and operations, potential adversaries may try to develop anti-access or area 

denial strategies designed to prevent the build up and sustainment of forces. One such 

strategy could be a preemptive attack against US forces located outside the adversary’s 

national boundaries, so planners must also consider the risk of placing US combat 

capabilities within the adversary’s operational reach. Planners must determine how to 

mitigate an adversary’s efforts to deny access to the theater and its infrastructure. 

k. Culmination

(1) Culmination is that point in time and/or space at which the operation can 

no longer maintain momentum. In the offense, the culminating point is the point at which 

effectively continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting 

to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. Here the attacker greatly risks 

counterattack and defeat and continues the attack only at great peril. Success in the attack at 

all levels is to secure the objective before reaching culmination. A defender reaches 

culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the 

counteroffensive or defend successfully. Success in the defense is to draw the attacker to 

offensive culmination, then conduct an offensive to expedite the adversary’s defensive 

culmination. During stability operations, culmination may result from the erosion of 

national will, decline of popular support, questions concerning legitimacy or restraint, or 

lapses in protection leading to excessive casualties. 

(2) The JFC must ensure that forces and assets arrive at the right times and places 

to support the campaign and that sufficient resources will be available when needed in the 

later stages of the campaign. This is a key point, because sustainment is a significant aspect 
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-35 

of the campaign. Integration and synchronization of sustainment with combat operations can 

forestall culmination and help commanders control the tempo of their operations. At both 

tactical and operational levels, theater logistic planners forecast the drain on resources 

associated with conducting operations over extended distance and time. They respond by 

generating enough military resources at the right times and places to enable their 

commanders to achieve military strategic and operational objectives before reaching their 

culminating points. If commanders cannot generate these resources, they should revise their 

CONOPS.

l. Arranging Operations

(1) Commanders must determine the best arrangement of joint force and 

component operations to conduct the assigned tasks and joint force mission. This 

arrangement often will be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to reach 

the end state conditions with the least cost in personnel and other resources. Commanders 

consider a variety of factors when determining this arrangement, including geography of the 

OA, available strategic lift, changes in command structure, force protection, distribution and 

sustainment capabilities, adversary reinforcement capabilities, and public opinion. Thinking 

about the best arrangement helps determine the tempo of activities in time, space, and 

purpose. Planners should consider factors such as simultaneity, depth, timing, and tempo 

when arranging operations. 

(a) Simultaneity refers to the simultaneous application of military and 

nonmilitary power against the enemy’s key capabilities and sources of strength. 

Simultaneity in joint force operations contributes directly to an enemy’s collapse by placing 

more demands on enemy forces and functions than can be handled. This does not mean that 

all elements of the joint force are employed with equal priority or that even all elements of 

the joint force will be employed. It refers specifically to the concept of attacking appropriate 

enemy forces and functions throughout the OA (across the physical domains and the 

information environment [which includes cyberspace]) in such a manner as to cause failure 

of their moral and physical cohesion. 

(b) Simultaneity also refers to the concurrent conduct of operations at the 

tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Tactical commanders fight engagements and 

battles, understanding their relevance to the contingency plan. JFCs set the conditions for 

battles within a major operation or campaign to achieve military strategic and operational 

objectives. GCCs integrate theater strategy and operational art. At the same time, they 

remain acutely aware of the impact of tactical events. Because of the inherent 

interrelationships between the various levels of war, commanders cannot be concerned only 

with events at their respective echelon, but also must understand how their actions contribute 

to the military end state. 

(c) The evolution of warfare and advances in technology have continuously 

expanded the depth of operations. US joint forces can rapidly maneuver over great distances 

and strike with precision. Joint force operations should be conducted across the full breadth 

and depth of the OA, creating competing and simultaneous demands on adversary 

commanders and resources. The concept of depth seeks to overwhelm the enemy 
Chapter III 

III-36 JP 5-0 

throughout the OA, creating competing and simultaneous demands on enemy 

commanders and resources and contributing to the enemy’s speedy defeat. Depth 

applies to time as well as geography. Operations extended in depth shape future conditions 

and can disrupt an opponent’s decision cycle. Strategic attack, interdiction, and some IO are 

examples of the applications of depth in joint operations. Operations in depth contribute to 

protection of the force by destroying adversary potential before its capabilities can be 

realized or employed. 

(d) The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that 

best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the adversary. With proper timing, JFCs can 

dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the adversary’s ability 

to react. 

(e) The tempo of warfare has increased over time as technological 

advancements and innovative doctrines have been applied to military requirements. While in 

many situations JFCs may elect to maintain an operational tempo that stretches the 

capabilities of both friendly and adversary forces, on other occasions JFCs may elect to 

conduct operations at a reduced pace. During selected phases of a campaign, JFCs could 

reduce the pace of operations, frustrating adversary commanders while buying time to build 

a decisive force or tend to other priorities in the OA such as relief to displaced persons. 

During other phases, JFCs could conduct high-tempo operations designed specifically to 

overwhelm adversary defensive capabilities. Assuring strategic mobility preserves the JFC’s 

ability to control tempo by allowing freedom of theater access. 

(2) Several tools are available to planners to assist with arranging operations. 

Phases, branches and sequels, operational pauses, and the development of a TPFDD all 

improve the ability of the planner to arrange, manage, and execute complex operations. 

(a) Phases. Phasing is a way to view and conduct a complex joint operation in 

manageable parts. The main purpose of phasing is to integrate and synchronize related 

activities, thereby enhancing flexibility and unity of effort during execution. Reaching the 

end state often requires arranging a major operation or campaign in several phases. Phases 

in a contingency plan are sequential, but during execution there will often be some 

simultaneous and overlapping execution of the activities within the phases. In a campaign, 

each phase can represent a single major operation, while in a major operation a phase 

normally consists of several subordinate operations or a series of related activities. See 

Section C, “Phasing,” for a more detailed discussion. 

(b) Branches and Sequels. Many contingency plans require adjustment 

beyond the initial stages of the operation. Consequently, JFCs build flexibility into their 

plans by developing branches and sequels to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing 

conditions. They are primarily used for changing deployments or direction of movement and 

accepting or declining combat. Branches and sequels directly relate to the phasing construct. 

1. Branches provide a range of options often built into the basic plan. 

Branches add flexibility to plans by anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan. 
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-37 

Such situations could be a result of adversary action, availability of friendly capabilities or 

resources, or even a change in the weather or season within the OA. 

2. Sequels anticipate and plan for subsequent operations based on the 

possible outcomes of the current operation—victory, defeat, or stalemate. For every 

action or major operation that does not accomplish a strategic or operational objective, there 

should be a sequel for each possible outcome, such as win, lose, draw, or win big. 

3. Once the commander and staff have determined possible branches and 

sequels as far in advance as practicable, they should determine what or where the decision 

points (not to be confused with decisive points) should be. Such decision points capture in 

space and/or time decisions a commander must make. To aid the commander, planners 

develop a decision support matrix (DSM) to link those decision points with the earliest and 

latest timing of the decision and the appropriate priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) 

(things the commander must know about the enemy to make the decision) and friendly force 

information requirements (FFIRs) (things the commander must know about his forces to 

make the decision). Each branch from a decision point requires different actions, and 

each action demands various follow-up actions, such as sequels or potential sequels.

(c) Operational Pause

1. The supported JFC should aggressively conduct operations to obtain 

and maintain the initiative. However, there may be certain circumstances when this is not 

feasible because of logistic constraints or force shortfalls. Therefore, operational pauses

may be required when a major operation may be reaching the end of its sustainability. 

As such, operational pauses can provide a safety valve to avoid potential culmination, while 

the JFC retains the initiative in other ways. However, if an operational pause is properly 

executed in relation to one’s own culminating point, the adversary will not have sufficient 

combat power to threaten the joint force or regain the initiative during the pause. 

2. Operational pauses are also useful tools for obtaining the proper 

synchronization of sustainment and operations. Normally, operational pauses are planned 

to regenerate combat power or augment sustainment and forces for the next phase, although 

this will result in extending the duration of a major operation or campaign. Moreover, 

properly planned and sequenced operational pauses will ensure that the JFC has 

sufficient forces and assets to accomplish strategic or operational objectives. However, 

planners must guard against cutting the margin of sustainment and combat effectiveness too 

thin. Executing a pause before it is necessary provides for flexibility in the timing of the 

pause and allows for its early termination under urgent conditions without unduly 

endangering the future effectiveness of the force. 

3. The primary drawback to operational pauses is that they risk 

forfeiture of strategic or operational initiative. It is therefore incumbent upon the JFC to 

plan on as few operational pauses as possible, if any, and consistent with the CONOPS, to 

alternate pauses and tempo between components of the force. In this manner, a major 

portion of the joint force can maintain pressure on the adversary through offensive actions 

while other components pause. 
Chapter III 

III-38 JP 5-0 

(d) Realistic plans, branches, sequels, orders, and an accurate TPFDD are 

important to enable the proper sequencing of operations. Further, the dynamic nature of 

modern military operations requires adaptability concerning the arrangement of military 

capabilities in time, space, and purpose. For example, a rapidly changing adversary situation 

or other aspects of the operational environment may cause the commander to alter the 

planned arrangement of operations even as forces are deploying. Therefore, maintaining 

overall force visibility, to include both in-transit visibility and asset visibility, are critical to 

maintaining flexibility. The arrangement that the commander chooses should not foreclose 

future options. 

m. Forces and Functions

(1) Commanders and planners can design campaigns and operations that 

focus on defeating either adversary forces, functions, or a combination of both. 

Typically, JFCs structure operations to attack both adversary forces and functions 

concurrently to create the greatest possible friction between friendly and adversary forces 

and capabilities. These types of operations are especially appropriate when friendly forces 

enjoy technological and/or numerical superiority over an opponent. 

(2) JFCs can focus on destroying and disrupting critical adversary functions such as 

C2, sustainment, and protection. Attack of an adversary’s functions normally is intended to 

destroy the adversary’s balance, thereby creating vulnerabilities to be exploited. The direct 

effect of destroying or disrupting critical adversary functions can create the indirect effects of 

uncertainty, confusion, and even panic in adversary leadership and forces and may contribute 

directly to the collapse of adversary capability and will. When assessing whether functional 

attack should be the principal operational approach, JFCs should evaluate several variables, 

such as time required to cripple the adversary’s critical functions, time available to the JFC, 

the adversary’s current actions, and likely responses to such actions. 

SECTION C. PHASING 

7. Application 

a. A phase can be characterized by the “focus” that is placed on it. Phases are 

distinct in time, space, and/or purpose from one another, but must be planned in support of 

each other and should represent a natural progression and subdivision of the campaign or 

operation, as shown in Figure III-16. Each phase should have a set of starting conditions 

(that define the start of the phase) and ending conditions (that define the end of the phase). 

The ending conditions of one phase are the starting conditions for the next phase. 

b. Phases are necessarily linked and gain significance in the larger context of the 

campaign. As such, it is imperative the campaign or operation not be broken down into 

numerous arbitrary components that may inhibit tempo and lead to a plodding, incremental 

approach. Since a campaign is required whenever pursuit of a strategic objective is not 

attainable through a single major operation, the theater operational design includes provision 

for related phases that may or may not be executed. 
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-39 

c. Activities in phases may overlap. The commander’s vision of how a campaign or 

operation should unfold drives subsequent decisions regarding phasing. Phasing, in turn, 

assists with synchronizing the CONOPS and aids in organizing the assignment of tasks to 

subordinate commanders. By arranging operations and activities into phases, the JFC can 

better integrate and synchronize subordinate operations in time, space, and purpose. Each 

phase should represent a natural subdivision of the campaign or operation’s intermediate 

objectives. As such, a phase represents a definitive stage during which a large portion of the 

forces and joint/multinational capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting 

activities. 

d. As a general rule, the phasing of the campaign or operation should be conceived 

in condition-driven rather than time-driven terms. However, resource availability 

depends in large part on time-constrained activities and factors—such as sustainment or 

deployment rates—rather than the events associated with the operation. The challenge for 

planners, then, is to reconcile the reality of time-oriented deployment of forces and 

sustainment with the event-driven phasing of operations.

Figure III-16. Notional Operation Plan Phases

Notional Operation Plan Phases

Legend

OPLAN operation plan Level of Military Effort

Stabilizing 

Activities

Seizing the 

Initiative Activities

Deterring Activities

Dominating 

Activities

Enabling Civil 

Authority 

Activity

Shaping Activities

Theater 

Shaping

OPLAN 

Approval

OPORD 

Termination

OPORD 

Activation

Global 

Shaping

Phase 0

Shape

Phase I

Deter

Phase II

Seize 

Initiative

Phase III

Dominate

Phase IV

Stabilize

Phase V

Enable 

Civil 

Authority

Phase 0

Shape

Plan Phases

OPORD Execution

OPORD operation order
Chapter III 

III-40 JP 5-0 

e. Effective phasing must address how the joint force will avoid reaching a culminating 

point. If resources are insufficient to sustain the force until achieving the end state, planners 

should consider phasing the campaign or operation to account for necessary operational 

pauses between phases. Such phasing enables the reconstitution of the joint force during 

joint operations, but the JFC must understand that this may provide the adversary an 

opportunity to reconstitute as well. In some cases, sustainment requirements, diplomatic 

factors, and political factors within the host nation may even dictate the purpose of certain 

phases as well as the sequence of those phases. For example, phases may shift the main 

effort among Service and functional components to maintain momentum while one 

component is being reconstituted. 

8. Number, Sequence, and Overlap 

Working within the phasing construct, the actual phases used will vary (compressed, 

expanded, or omitted entirely) with the joint campaign or operation and be determined by the 

JFC. During planning, the JFC establishes conditions, objectives, or events for transitioning 

from one phase to another and plans sequels and branches for potential contingencies. 

Phases are designed to be conducted sequentially, but some activities from a phase may 

begin in a previous phase and continue into subsequent phases. The JFC adjusts the phases 

to exploit opportunities presented by the adversary or operational situation or to react to 

unforeseen conditions. A joint campaign or operation may be conducted in multiple phases 

simultaneously if the OA has widely varying conditions. For instance, the commander may 

transition to the stabilize phase in some areas while remaining in the dominate phase in those 

areas where the enemy has not yet capitulated. Occasionally operations may revert to a 

previous phase in an area where a resurgent or new enemy reengages friendly forces. 

9. Transitions 

Transitions between phases are designed to be distinct shifts in focus by the joint force, 

often accompanied by changes in command or support relationships. The activities that 

predominate during a given phase, however, rarely align with neatly definable breakpoints. 

The need to move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that a set of 

objectives are achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major change 

in focus for the joint force and is therefore usually event driven, not time driven. Changing 

the focus of the operation takes time and may require changing commander’s objectives, 

desired effects, measures of effectiveness (MOEs), priorities, command relationships, force 

allocation, or even the design of the OA. An example is the shift of focus from sustained 

combat operations in the dominate phase to a preponderance of stability operations in the 

stabilize and enable civil authority phases. Hostilities gradually lessen as the joint force 

begins to reestablish order, commerce, and local government and deters adversaries from 

resuming hostile actions while the US and international community take steps to establish or 

restore the conditions necessary for long-term stability. This challenge demands an agile 

shift in joint force skill sets, actions, organizational behaviors, and mental outlooks, and 

interorganizational coordination with a wider range of interagency and multinational partners 

and other participants to provide the capabilities necessary to address the mission-specific 

factors. 
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-41 

10. Phasing Model 

a. Although the commander will determine the number and actual phases used during a 

campaign or operation, use of the phases shown in Figure III-17 and described below 

provides a flexible model to arrange combat and stability operations. Within the context of 

these phases established by a higher-level JFC, subordinate JFCs and component 

commanders may establish additional phases that fit their CONOPS. For example, the 

joint force land component commander (JFLCC) or a subordinate joint task force (JTF) 

might have the following four phases inside the GCC’s seize initiative phase: deploy, 

forcible entry, defense, and offense. The JFLCC could use the offense phase as a transition 

to the GCC’s dominate phase. 

b. The six-phase model is not intended to be a universally prescriptive template for all 

conceivable joint operations and may be tailored to the character and duration of the 

operation to which it applies. 

c. The general phasing construct can be applied to various campaigns and operations. 

Operations and activities in the shape phase normally are outlined in TCPs and those in the 

remaining phases are outlined in JSCP-directed contingency plans. While most shaping 

Figure III-17. Phasing Model 

Phasing Model

Action

Prepare 

Prevent

Phase

0

Crisis defined

Assure friendly freedom 

of action

Access theater 

infrastructure

I

II

Establish dominant force 

capabilities

Achieve enemy 

culmination or joint force 

commander's favorable 

conditions for transition

III

Establish security

Restore services

IV

Transfer to civil 

authorities

Redeploy

Theater V

Shaping

Global 

Shaping

Enable Civil 

Authority

(Phase V)

Shape

(Phase 0)

Deter

(Phase I)

Seize the 

Initiative

(Phase II)

Dominate

(Phase III)

Stabilize

(Phase IV)
Chapter III 

III-42 JP 5-0 

activities are contained in the TCP, contingency plans may include shaping activities that 

must be accomplished to support an operation. GCCs generally use the phasing model to 

link the pertinent TCP and OPLAN operations and activities. 

(1) Shape (Phase 0). Joint and multinational operations—inclusive of normal and 

routine military activities—and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or 

deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. 

They are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain 

multinational cooperation in support of defined national strategic and strategic military 

objectives. They are designed to ensure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the 

behavior of both adversaries and partner nations, developing partner nation and friendly 

military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, improving information 

exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency 

access. Shape phase activities must adapt to a particular theater environment and may be 

executed in one theater in order to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another. 

Planning that supports most “shaping” requirements typically occurs in the context of day-today security cooperation, and CCMDs will nest phase 0 activities and tasks into the TCP. 

Planners developing contingency plans must identify shaping requirements that can be 

accomplished within the scope of the TCP’s steady-state activities; however, planners may 

also identify shaping requirements specific to their plan that would only be implemented in 

the event of crisis. Other activities can also be performed during phase 0, such as 

establishing logistics capabilities needed to support phase 1 activities. For example, time 

and distance challenges may require taking actions or setting the conditions during the shape 

phase for sustainment to be available should use of military force become necessary. 

(2) Deter (Phase I). The intent of this phase is to deter undesirable adversary 

action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force. It includes activities 

to prepare forces and set conditions for deployment and employment of forces in the event 

that deterrence is not successful. Once the crisis is defined, these actions may include 

mobilization; tailoring of forces and other predeployment activities; initial deployment into a 

theater; increased security cooperation activities; shows of force; deployment of missile 

defense forces; development and maturation of joint or multinational C2 structures; 

employment of ISR assets to provide real-time and near-real-time situational awareness;the 

surge production of foundational intelligence required to employ advanced weapon systems; 

setting up of transfer operations at en route locations to support aerial ports of debarkation in 

post-chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments; and development of 

mission-tailored C2, intelligence, force protection, transportation, and logistic requirements 

to support the commanders’ CONOPS. Commanders continue to engage multinational 

partners, thereby providing the basis for further crisis response. Liaison teams and 

coordination with other agencies assist in setting conditions for execution of subsequent 

phases of the campaign or operation. Many actions in the deter phase build on security 

cooperation activities from phase 0 and are conducted as part of security cooperation 

activities. They can also be part of stand-alone operations. 

(3) Seize Initiative (Phase II). JFCs seek to seize the initiative through the 

application of appropriate joint force capabilities. In combat operations, this involves 

executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the adversary to offensive 
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-43 

culmination, and setting the conditions for decisive operations. Rapid application of joint 

combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the adversary’s initial aggression 

and to deny the initial objectives. If an adversary has achieved its initial objectives, the early 

and rapid application of offensive combat power can dislodge adversary forces from their 

position, creating conditions for the exploitation, pursuit, and ultimate destruction of both 

those forces and their will to fight during the dominate phase. During this phase, operations 

to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action continue 

while the JFC seeks to degrade adversary capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at 

the earliest opportunity. In all operations, the JFC establishes conditions for stability by 

providing immediate assistance to relieve conditions that precipitated the crisis. 

(4) Dominate (Phase III). The dominate phase focuses on breaking the enemy’s 

will for organized resistance or, in noncombat situations, control of the operational 

environment. Success in this phase depends upon overmatching joint force capability at the 

critical time and place. This phase includes full employment of joint force capabilities and 

continues the appropriate sequencing of forces into the OA as quickly as possible. When a 

campaign or operation is focused on conventional enemy forces, the dominate phase 

normally concludes with decisive operations that drive an adversary to culmination and 

achieve the JFC’s operational objectives. Against irregular threats, decisive operations are 

characterized by dominating and controlling the operational environment through a 

combination of traditional warfare, irregular warfare (with counterinsurgency, foreign 

internal defense, stability operations, and counterterrorism as subsets), and IO. Stability 

operations are conducted as needed to ensure a smooth transition to the next phase and 

relieve suffering. In noncombat situations, the joint force’s activities seek to control the 

situation or operational environment. Dominate phase activities may establish the conditions 

for an early favorable conclusion of operations or set the conditions for transition to the next 

phase. 

(5) Stabilize (Phase IV). The stabilize phase is required when there is no fully 

functional, legitimate civil governing authority present. The joint force may be required to 

perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting/contributing 

multinational, IGO, NGO, or USG department and agency participants until legitimate local 

entities are functioning. This includes providing or assisting in the provision of basic 

services to the population. A significant proportion of this support may require contracted 

goods and services. IFO support this by synchronization and deconfliction to avoid 

contractor inefficiency, duplicative spending, and inadvertent funding of adversaries. The 

stabilize phase is typically characterized by a change from sustained combat operations to 

stability operations. The purpose of stability operations is to help move a host nation from 

instability (and particularly the violent conflict that often accompanies increased instability) 

to increased stability (and reduced violent conflict). This involves comprehensive efforts by 

the US and its partners to stabilize states in crisis and to build the capacity of fragile states. 

Planning for rotational deployments and redeployment operations should begin as early as 

possible and continue through all phases of the operation. Throughout this segment, the JFC 

continuously assesses the impact of current operations on the ability to transfer overall 

regional authority to a legitimate civil entity, which marks the end of the phase. 
Chapter III 

III-44 JP 5-0 

(6) Enable Civil Authority (Phase V). This phase is predominantly characterized 

by joint force support to legitimate civil governance in theater. Depending upon the level of 

indigenous state capacity, joint force activities during phase V may be at the behest of that 

authority or they may be under its direction. The goal is for the joint force to enable the 

viability of the civil authority and its provision of essential services to the largest number of 

people in the region. This includes coordination of joint force actions with supporting or 

supported multinational, agency, and other organization participants, and continuing 

integrated finance operations and security cooperation activities to influence the attitude of 

the population favorably regarding the US and local civil authority’s objectives. DOD policy 

is to support indigenous persons or groups promoting freedom, rule of law, and an 

entrepreneurial economy and opposing extremism and the murder of civilians. The joint 

force will be in a supporting role to the legitimate civil authority in the region throughout the 

enable civil authority phase. Redeployment operations, particularly for combat units, will 

often begin during this phase, and deployments, including force rotations, may occur to 

support and enable civil authorities. CCMD involvement with other nations and agencies, 

beyond the termination of the joint operation, may be required to achieve the national 

strategic end state. 

SECTION D. ASSESSMENT 

11. Overview

Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation 

and progress of a joint operation toward mission accomplishment. It involves 

deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes to actual events to determine the overall 

effectiveness of force employment. In general, assessments should answer two questions: Is 

the JFC doing things right? Is the JFC doing the right things? More specifically, assessment 

helps JFCs determine progress toward achieving objectives and whether the current tasks and 

objectives are relevant to reaching the end state. It helps identify opportunities, counter 

threats, and any needs for course correction, thus resulting in modifications to plans and 

orders. This process of continuous assessment occurs throughout the joint planning process. 

It is an essential tool that allows planners to monitor performance of tactical actions 

(measures of performance [MOPs]) and to determine whether the desired effects are created 

(MOE) to support achievement of the objectives. 

12. Application

a. Assessment and learning enable incremental improvements to the commander’s 

operational approach and the campaign or contingency plan. The aim is to understand the 

problem and develop effective actions to address it. These actions may be a military 

activity—or may involve military actions in support of nonmilitary activities. Once JFCs 

understand the problem and what needs to be accomplished to succeed, they identify the 

means to assess effectiveness and the related information requirements that support 

assessment. This feedback becomes the basis for learning, adaptation, and subsequent 

adjustment. 
Operational Art and Operational Design 

III-45 

b. Not all joint operations proceed smoothly toward the desired end state. JFCs 

examine instances of unexpected success or failure, unanticipated adversary actions, or 

operations that simply do not progress as planned. They assess the causes of success, 

friction, and failure and their overall impact on the force and the operation. JFCs and staffs 

continuously assess an operation’s progress to determine if the current order is still valid or if 

there are better ways to achieve the end state. Assessments by staff sections form the 

foundation of running estimates. Assessments by JFCs allow them to maintain accurate 

situational understanding and revise their visualization or operational approach 

appropriately. 

c. Commanders must also be attuned to a change in the operational environment 

(to include the political environment) that may cause the mission to be in question. Is 

the current desired end state still the desired end state, or have circumstances changed to the 

point that the desired end state may need to be revised? 

d. Assessment precedes and guides every activity within the JOPP and concludes each 

operation or phase of an operation. Assessment entails two distinct tasks: continuously 

monitoring the situation and the progress of the operations and evaluating the operation 

against MOEs and MOPs to determine progress relative to the mission, objectives, and end 

states. Effective assessment requires criteria for evaluating the degree of success in 

accomplishing the mission. Criteria can be expressed as MOEs and MOPs. 

(1) A MOE is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, 

or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, an 

objective, or the creation of an effect. It measures the relevance of actions being 

performed. 

(2) A MOP is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to 

measuring task accomplishment.

e. Many aspects of operations are quantifiable. Examples include movement rates, fuel 

consumption, and weapons effects. While not easy, assessing physical aspects of joint 

operations can be straightforward. However, the dynamic interaction among friendly forces, 

adaptable adversaries, and populations makes assessing many aspects of operations difficult. 

For example, assessing the results of planned actions to convince a group of people to 

support their central government is very challenging. As planners assess complex human 

behaviors like this, they draw on multiple sources across the operational environment, 

including both analytical and subjective measures that support a more informed assessment. 

f. Just as JFCs devote time and staff resources to planning, they must also provide 

guidance on what to assess and to what level of detail. Depending on the situation and the 

echelon of command, assessment may be a detailed process (formal assessment plan with 

dedicated assessment cell or element). Alternatively, it may be an informal process that 

relies more on the intuition of the JFC, subordinate commanders, and staffs. 
Chapter III 

III-46 JP 5-0 

g. As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action occurs 

should be the level at which such activity is assessed. This focuses assessment at each level 

and enhances the efficiency of the overall assessment process. 

For an expanded discussion of assessment, see Appendix D, “Assessment.” 
IV-1 

CHAPTER IV 

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS 

1. Introduction 

a. JOPP is an orderly, analytical process, which consists of a set of logical steps to 

examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; 

and produce a plan or order. Operational art and the application of operational design 

provide the conceptual basis for structuring campaigns and operations discussed in Chapter 

III, “Operational Art and Operational Design.” JOPP provides a proven process to organize 

the work of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners, to develop 

plans that will appropriately address the problem to be solved. It focuses on defining the 

military mission and development and synchronization of detailed plans to accomplish that 

mission. Commanders and staffs can apply the thinking methodology introduced in the 

previous chapter to discern the correct mission, develop creative and adaptive CONOPS to 

accomplish the mission, and synchronize those CONOPS so that they can be executed. It 

applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to joint force component commands when 

the components participate in joint planning. Together with operational design, JOPP 

facilitates interaction between the commander, staff, and subordinate and supporting 

headquarters throughout planning. JOPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their 

planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander’s intent, 

and develop effective plans and orders. Figure IV-1 shows the primary steps of JOPP. 

b. In common application, JOPP proceeds according to planning milestones and other 

requirements established by commanders at various levels. However, the CJCSM 3122 

series specifies JPEC milestones, deliverables, and interaction points for plans developed 

using APEX. 

2. Operational Art and Operational Design Interface with the Joint Operation 

Planning Process 

a. Operational design and JOPP are complementary elements of the overall planning 

process. Operational design provides an iterative process that allows for the commander’s 

vision and mastery of operational art to help planners answer ends–ways–means–risk 

questions and appropriately structure campaigns and operations. The commander, supported 

by the staff, gains an understanding of the operational environment, defines the problem, and 

develops an operational approach for the campaign or operation through the application of 

operational design during the initiation step of JOPP. Commanders communicate their 

“In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy 

may do, and be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it. Plans of the 

campaign may be modified ad infinitum according to the circumstances, the genius 

of the general, the character of the troops, and the features of the country.” 

Napoleon 

Maxims of War, 1831
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 5-0 

operational approach to their staff, subordinates, supporting commands, agencies, and 

multinational/nongovernmental entities as required in their initial planning guidance so that 

their approach can be translated into executable plans. As JOPP is executed, commanders 

learn more about the operational environment and the problem and refine their initial 

operational approach. Commanders provide their updated approach to the staff to guide 

detailed planning. This iterative process between the commander’s maturing operational 

approach and the development of the mission and CONOPS through JOPP facilitates the 

continuing development of possible COAs and their refinement into eventual CONOPS and 

executable plans. 

b. This relationship between the application of operational art, operational design, and 

JOPP continues throughout execution of the campaign or operation. By applying the 

operational design methodology in combination with the procedural rigor of JOPP, the 

command can help keep its aperture as wide as possible to always question the mission’s 

continuing relevance and suitability while executing operations in accordance with the 

current approach and revising plans as needed. By combining the best aspects of both of 

these approaches, the friendly force can maintain the greatest possible flexibility and do so in 

a proactive vice reactive manner (see Figure IV-2). 

3. Planning Initiation 

a. Joint operation planning begins when an appropriate authority recognizes potential 

for military capability to be employed in response to a potential or actual crisis. At the 

strategic level, that authority—the President, SecDef, or CJCS—initiates planning by 

deciding to develop military options. The GEF, JSCP, and related strategic guidance 

documents (when applicable) serve as the primary guidance to begin deliberate planning. 

Figure IV-1. Joint Operation Planning Process

Joint Operation Planning Process

Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Step 4

Step 5

Step 6

Step 7

Planning Initiation

Mission Analysis

Course of Action (COA) Development

COA Analysis and Wargaming

COA Comparison

COA Approval

Plan or Order Development
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-3 

CCDRs and other commanders also initiate planning on their own authority when they 

identify a planning requirement not directed by higher authority. Additionally, analyses of 

developing or immediate crises may result in the President, SecDef, or CJCS initiating 

military planning through a WARNORD or other planning directive. Military options 

normally are developed in combination with other nonmilitary options so that the President 

can respond with all the appropriate instruments of national power. Whether or not planning 

Figure IV-2. Joint Operation Planning 

Joint Operation Planning

Legend

CCIR commander's critical information requirement

CDR commander

COA course of action

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

environment

Op(s) operation(s)

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data

Joint Operation Planning Process

Assessment

Iterative Dialogue

CDR Staff

Start Estimate Revise Staff Estimates

JIPOE Brief

Brief TPFDD

Develop

Develop 

Elements 

of 

Operational 

Design

Develop

Facts

CCIRs

Force 

Estimates

Mission 

Statement









Develop COAs

Multiple options

Task organization

Phasing

Risk









Elements 

of Op 

Design

Analyze 

COA

Risk 

Assessment

Future 

Ops

Current 

Ops

Future 

Plans

Mission 

Analysis

COA 

Analysis

COA 

Development

COA 

Comparison

COA 

Approval

Plan/Order 

Development

Refine Operational Approach

Planning 

Initiation

Operational 

Environment

Problem

Op 

Approach

Guidance Refine

Approve

Refine

Approve
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 5-0 

begins as described here, the commander may act within approved authorities and ROE in an 

immediate crisis. 

b. Particularly when planning for crises, the JFC and staff will perform an assessment of 

the initiating directive to determine time available until mission execution, the current status 

of intelligence products and staff estimates, and other factors relevant to the specific 

planning situation. The JFC typically will provide initial planning guidance based upon 

current understanding of the operational environment, the problem, and the initial 

operational approach for the campaign or operation. It could specify time constraints, 

outline initial coordination requirements, or authorize movement of key capabilities within 

the JFC’s authority. 

c. While planning is continuous once execution begins, planning initiation during 

execution is particularly relevant when there are significant changes to the current mission or 

planning assumptions or the commander receives a mission for follow-on operations. 

4. Mission Analysis 

a. The commander’s staff is responsible for analyzing the mission and proposing, if 

required, the restated mission for the commander’s approval, thus allowing subordinate and 

supporting commanders to begin their own estimate and planning efforts and for higher 

headquarters’ concurrence. The joint force’s mission is the task or set of tasks, together 

with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing 

so. Mission analysis is used to study the assigned tasks and to identify all other tasks 

necessary to accomplish the mission. Mission analysis is critical because it provides 

direction to the commander and the staff, enabling them to focus effectively on the problem 

at hand. 

b. When the commander receives a mission tasking, analysis begins with the following 

questions: 

(1) What tasks must my command do for the mission to be accomplished? 

(2) What is the purpose of the mission received? 

(3) What limitations have been placed on my own forces’ actions? 

(4) What forces/assets are needed to support my operation? 

c. The primary inputs to mission analysis are the higher headquarters’ planning 

directive, other strategic guidance, and the commander’s initial planning guidance, which 

may include a description of the operational environment, a definition of the problem, the 

operational approach, initial intent, and the JIPOE (see Figure IV-3). The primary 

products of mission analysis are staff estimates, the mission statement, a refined operational 

approach, the commander’s intent statement, updated planning guidance, and commander's 

critical information requirements (CCIRs). 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-5 

d. Mission analysis helps the JFC understand the problem and purpose of the operation 

and issue appropriate guidance to drive the rest of the planning process. The JFC and staff 

can accomplish mission analysis through a number of logical activities, such as those shown 

in Figure IV-4. 

(1) Although some activities occur before others, mission analysis typically 

involves substantial parallel processing of information by the commander and staff, 

particularly in a CAP situation. 

(2) During mission analysis, it is essential that the tasks (specified and implied) and 

their purposes are clearly stated to ensure planning encompasses all requirements; limitations 

(restraints—cannot do, or constraints—must do) on actions that the commander or 

subordinate forces may take are understood; and the correlation between the commander’s 

mission and intent and those of higher and other commanders is understood. 

e. Analyze Higher Headquarters’ Planning Directives and Strategic Guidance 

(1) Strategic guidance is essential to joint operation planning and operational 

design. The President, SecDef, CJCS, and CCDRs promulgate strategic guidance that covers 

a broad range of situations. Documents such as the NDS, NMS, and the CCDR’s theater 

strategy provide long-term as well as intermediate or ancillary objectives. 

(2) For a specific crisis, a planning directive such as a CJCS PLANORD, 

ALERTORD, or WARNORD provides specific guidance, typically including a description 

of the situation, purpose of military operations, objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, 

pertinent constraints, and forces available to the commander for planning and strategic lift 

Figure IV-3. Mission Analysis

Mission Analysis

Higher headquarters' 

planning directive

Other strategic guidance

Commander's planning 

guidance

Description of the 

operational 

environment

Definition of the 

problem

Commander's 

operational approach

Commander's initial 

intent









Staff estimates

Mission statement

Commander's refined 

operational approach 

including:

Joint force 

commander's (JFC's) 

intent statement

JFC's updated 

planning guidance

Commander's critical 

information requirements





Key Inputs Key Outputs

Mission 

Analysis
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 5-0 

allocations. The apportionment tables provide a quantity of forces that the planner can 

reasonably expect to be available, but not necessarily allocated when a plan transitions to 

execution. The CJCS orders may amplify the guidance from the apportionment tables for the 

specific crisis. This guidance can confirm or modify the guidance in an existing contingency 

plan. This might simplify the analysis step, since consensus should already exist between the 

supported command and higher authority on the nature of the operational environment in the 

potential joint operations area (JOA)—such as the political, economic, social, and military 

circumstances—and potential US or multinational responses to various situations described 

in the existing plan. But even with a preexisting contingency plan, planners should not 

assume that the current operational environment is as the plan and higher headquarters 

describe. The specific nature of the emerging crisis can change many key aspects of the 

environment compared with earlier estimates. These changes can greatly affect the plan’s 

original operational approach upon which the commander and staff based decisions about 

COA alternatives and tasks to potential subordinate and supporting commands. In particular, 

planners must reconfirm strategic and operational objectives and the criteria that comprise 

the military end state. Differences between the commander’s perspective and that of higher 

headquarters must be resolved at the earliest opportunity. 

Figure IV-4. Mission Analysis Activities

Steps are not necessarily sequential.

Mission Analysis Activities



























Analyze higher headquarters planning activities and strategic guidance

Review commander's initial planning guidance, including his initial understanding 

of the operational environment, of the problem, and description of the operational 

approach

Determine known facts and develop planning assumptions

Determine and analyze operational limitations

Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks

Develop mission statement

Conduct initial force allocation review

Develop risk assesment

Develop mission success criteria

Develop commander's critical information requirements

 Prepare staff estimates

Prepare and deliver mission analysis brief

 Publish commander's updated planning guidance, intent statement, and refined 

operational approach
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-7 

(3) In time-compressed, crisis situations with no preexisting plan, planners may be 

inclined to trust the higher headquarters’ assessment of the operational environment and 

objectives associated with a desired end state. However, this circumstance is one that can 

benefit the most from the commander’s and staff’s independent assessment of circumstances 

to ensure they agree with higher headquarters on the operational environment, the description 

of strategic objectives, and the tasks or mission assigned to achieve these objectives. 

(4) Multinational Strategic Guidance. In multinational settings, military 

committee directives provide the strategic guidance and direction for joint operation 

planning. The JFC and staff, as well as component and supporting commanders and their 

staffs, must clearly understand the strategic and military end states, objectives, and 

conditions that the national or multinational political leadership want the multinational 

military force to attain in terms of the internal and external balance of power, regional 

security, and geopolitics. When multinational strategic objectives are unclear, the senior US 

military commander must seek clarification and convey the positive or negative impact of 

continued ambiguity to the President and SecDef. 

For additional information on multinational operations, see JP 3-16, Multinational 

Operations, and for specific information on NATO operations, see Allied Joint Publication 

(AJP)-01, Allied Joint Doctrine; AJP-3, Allied Joint Operations; and AJP-5, Operational 

Planning for Joint Operations. 

f. Review Commander’s Initial Planning Guidance 

(1) Staffs should analyze the operational approach to gain an appreciation for the 

commander’s understanding and visualization. This provides a basis for continued detailed 

analysis of the operational environment and of the tasks that may describe the mission and its 

parameters. The staff should not take the commander’s perspective as the final answer, but 

should analyze his understanding and visualization, so that the intent and planning guidance 

provided during the latter stages of mission analysis provide a strong basis for development 

of appropriate COAs. 

(2) Staff members and representatives from supporting organizations should 

maintain an open dialogue with the commander to better develop an appropriate solution to 

the problem, and be able to adapt solutions to match the evolving operational environment 

and any potentially changing problems. 

g. Determine Known Facts and Develop Planning Assumptions. The staff 

assembles both facts and assumptions to support the planning process and planning 

guidance. 

(1) A fact is a statement of information known to be true (such as verified locations 

of friendly and adversary force dispositions). 

(2) An assumption provides a supposition about the current situation or future 

course of events, assumed to be true in the absence of facts. Assumptions that address gaps 

in knowledge are critical for the planning process to continue. For planning purposes, 

subordinate commanders can treat assumptions made by higher headquarters as true in the 
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 5-0 

absence of proof to the contrary. However, they should challenge those assumptions if they 

appear unrealistic. Assumptions must be continually reviewed to ensure validity. A 

valid assumption has three characteristics: logical, realistic, and essential for the planning to 

continue. Assumptions are made for both friendly and adversary situations. 

(3) Commanders and staffs should anticipate changes to the plan that may become 

necessary should an assumption prove to be incorrect. Because of assumptions’ influence on 

planning, planners must either validate the assumptions (turn them into facts) or invalidate 

the assumptions (alter the plan accordingly) as quickly as possible. Commanders and staffs 

should never assume away adversary capabilities or assume that unrealistic friendly 

capabilities would be available. 

(4) Plans developed during deliberate planning may contain assumptions that 

cannot be resolved until a potential crisis develops. In CAP, however, assumptions should 

be replaced with facts as soon as possible. The staff accomplishes this by identifying the 

information needed to convert assumptions to facts and submitting an information request to 

an appropriate agency as an information requirement. If the commander needs the 

information to make a key decision, the information requirement can be designated a CCIR. 

Although there may be exceptions, the staff should strive to resolve all assumptions before 

issuing the OPORD. 

h. Determine and Analyze Operational Limitations. Operational limitations are 

actions required or prohibited by higher authority and other restrictions that limit the 

commander’s freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, political and economic 

conditions in affected countries, and host-nation issues. A constraint is a requirement 

placed on the command by a higher command that dictates an action, thus restricting 

freedom of action. For example, General Eisenhower was required to liberate Paris instead 

of bypassing it during the 1944 campaign in France. A restraint is a requirement placed on 

the command by a higher command that prohibits an action, thus restricting freedom of 

action. For example, General MacArthur was prohibited from striking Chinese targets north 

of the Yalu River during the Korean War. Many operational limitations are commonly 

expressed as ROE. Operational limitations may restrict or bind COA selection or may even 

impede implementation of the chosen COA. Commanders must examine the operational 

limitations imposed on them, understand their impacts, and develop options that minimize 

these impacts to promote maximum freedom of action during execution. 

i. Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks. The commander and staff 

typically will review the planning directive’s specified tasks and discuss implied tasks even 

as early as planning initiation to resolve unclear or incorrectly assigned tasks with higher 

headquarters. If there is no immediate disconnect, the JFC and staff will confirm the tasks 

later in mission analysis before developing the initial mission statement. 

(1) Specified tasks are those that the higher commander assigns to a subordinate 

commander in a WARNORD, OPORD, or other planning directive. These are tasks the 

higher commander wants the subordinate command to accomplish during execution of the 

operation, usually because they are important to the higher command’s mission and/or 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-9 

objectives. One or more specified tasks often become essential tasks for the subordinate 

commander. Following are examples of specified tasks: 

(a) Ensure freedom of navigation for US forces through the Strait of Gibraltar. 

(b) Defend Country Green against attack from Country Red. 

(2) Implied tasks are additional tasks the commander must accomplish, typically in 

order to accomplish the specified and essential tasks, support another command, or otherwise 

accomplish activities relevant to the operation. In addition to the higher headquarters’ 

planning directive, the commander and staff will review other sources of guidance for 

implied tasks, such as multinational planning documents and the GCC’s TCP, enemy and 

friendly COG analysis products, JIPOE products, relevant doctrinal publications, interviews 

with subject matter experts, and the commander’s operational approach. The commander 

can also deduce implied tasks from knowledge of the operational environment, such as the 

enemy situation and political conditions in the assigned OA. However, implied tasks do not 

include routine tasks or SOPs that are inherent in most operations, such as conducting 

reconnaissance and protecting a flank. The following are examples of implied tasks: 

(a) Establish maritime superiority out to 50 miles from the Strait of Gibraltar. 

(b) Be prepared to conduct foreign internal defense and security force 

assistance operations to enhance the capacity and capability of Country Green security forces 

to provide stability and security if a regime change occurs in Country Red. 

(3) Essential tasks are those that the joint force must execute successfully to 

achieve the desired end state. The commander and staff determine essential tasks from the 

lists of both specified and implied tasks. The mission statement contains only essential tasks. 

Depending on the scope of the operation and its purpose, the commander may synthesize 

certain specified and implied task statements into an essential task statement. See the 

example mission statement below for examples of essential tasks. 

j. Develop Mission Statement. The mission statement contains the elements of who, 

what, when, where, and why. The commander’s operational approach informs the 

mission statement and helps form the basis for planning. The commander includes the 

EXAMPLE MISSION STATEMENT 

When directed, United States X Command (USXCOM) employs joint forces in 

concert with coalition partners to deter Country X from coercing its 

neighbors and proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). If 

deterrence fails, the coalition will defeat Country X’s armed forces; destroy 

known WMD production, storage, and delivery capabilities; and destroy its 

ability to project offensive force across its borders. On order, USXCOM will 

then stabilize the theater, transition control to an international peacekeeping 

force, and redeploy. 
Chapter IV 

IV-10 JP 5-0 

mission statement in the planning guidance, planning directive, staff estimates, commander’s 

estimate, CONOPS, and completed plan. 

k. Conduct Initial Force Analysis

(1) Analysis of Available Forces and Assets

(a) Review forces that have been provided for planning and their locations (if 

known). 

(b) Determine the status of reserve forces and the time they will be available. 

(c) Refer to specified and implied tasks and determine what broad force 

structure and capabilities are necessary to accomplish these tasks (e.g., is a show of force or a 

forcible entry capability required?). 

(d) Identify shortfalls between the two. 

(2) Availability of Forces for Joint Operations. Staffsshould analyze the actual 

availability of joint forces and other capabilities that may be required. Forces that are 

apportioned for planning may not actually be available for allocation for execution. Other 

capabilities may be more appropriate or acceptable as a substitute. Such analyses will 

provide some of the parameters under which feasible COAs can be built. 

l. Develop Mission Success Criteria

(1) Mission success criteria describe the standards for determining mission 

accomplishment. The JFC includes these criteria in the initial planning guidance so that the 

joint force staff and components better understand what constitutes mission success. 

Mission success criteria can apply to any joint operation, phase, and joint force component 

operation. These criteria help the JFC determine if and when to move to the next major 

operation or phase. The initial set of criteria determined during mission analysis becomes 

the basis for assessment.

(2) If the mission is unambiguous and limited in time and scope, mission success 

criteria could be readily identifiable and linked directly to the mission statement. For 

example, if the JFC’s mission is to evacuate all US personnel from the US Embassy in 

Grayland, then mission analysis could identify two primary success criteria: all US 

personnel are evacuated and established ROE are not violated. 

(3) However, more complex operations will require MOEs and MOPs for each 

task, effect, and phase of the operation. For example, if the JFC’s specified tasks are to 

ensure friendly transit through the Straits of Gray, eject Redland forces from Grayland, and 

restore stability along the Grayland–Redland border, then mission analysis should indicate 

many potential success criteria—measured by MOEs and MOPs—some for each desired 

effect and task. 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-11 

(4) Measuring the status of tasks, effects, and objectives becomes the basis for 

reports to senior commanders and civilian leaders on the progress of the operation. The 

CCDR can then advise the President and SecDef accordingly and adjust operations as 

required. Whether in a supported or supporting role, JFCs at all levels must develop their 

mission success criteria with a clear understanding of termination criteria established by the 

CJCS and SecDef. 

m. Develop Risk Assessment

(1) Planners conducting a preliminary risk assessment must identify the obstacles 

or actions that may preclude mission accomplishment and then assess the impact of these 

hazards to the mission. Once planners identify the obstacles or actions, they assess the 

probability and severity of loss linked to an obstacle or action, the risk and its potential 

impact on the joint force, and the success of the joint force mission. 

(2) Probability may be ranked as frequent: occurs often, continuously experienced; 

likely: occurs several times; occasional: occurs sporadically; seldom: unlikely, but could 

occur at some time; or unlikely: can assume it will not occur. Severity may be catastrophic: 

mission is made impossible; critical: severe mission impact; marginal: mission possible 

using alternate options; or negligible: minor disruptions to mission. 

(3) Determining the risk is more an art than a science. Planners use historical data, 

intuitive analysis, and judgment to estimate the risk of each threat. Probability and severity 

levels are estimated based on the user’s knowledge of probability of occurrence and the 

severity of consequences once the occurrence happens. The level of risk is assigned by 

assessing the hazards’/obstacles’ probability of occurring and their degree of severity. The 

levels of risk are: 

(a) Extremely high: loss of ability to accomplish mission; 

(b) High: significantly degrades mission capabilities in terms of required 

mission standards; 

(c) Moderate: degrades mission capabilities in terms of required mission 

standards; and 

(d) Low: little or no impact on accomplishment of the mission. 

n. Determine Commander’s Critical Information Requirements 

(1) CCIRs are elements of information that the commander identifies as being 

critical to timely decision making. CCIRs help focus information management and help 

the commander assess the operational environment and identify decision points during 

operations. CCIRs belong exclusively to the commander. They are situation-dependent, 

focused on predictable events or activities, time-sensitive, and always established by an 

order or plan. The CCIR list is normally short so that the staff can focus its efforts and 

allocate scarce resources. The CCIR list is not static; JFCs add, delete, adjust, and update 

CCIRs throughout an operation based on the information they need for decision making. 
Chapter IV 

IV-12 JP 5-0 

(2) Categories. PIRs and FFIRs constitute the total list of CCIRs (see Figure 

IV-5). 

(a) PIRs focus on the adversary and the operational environment and drive 

ISR requirements. All staff sections can recommend potential PIRs they believe meet the 

commander’s guidance. However, the joint force J-2 has overall staff responsibility for 

consolidating PIR nominations and for providing the staff recommendation to the 

commander. JFC-approved PIRs are automatically CCIRs.

For more information on PIRs, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

(b) FFIRs focus on information the JFC must have to assess the status of the 

friendly force and supporting capabilities. All staff sections can recommend potential FFIRs 

that they believe meet the commander’s guidance. However, the joint force J-5 has overall 

staff responsibility for consolidating FFIR nominations and for providing the staff 

recommendation to the commander during planning prior to execution. During execution, 

the joint force J-3 is responsible for consolidating these nominations and providing the 

recommendation for FFIRs that relate to current operations. However, the J-5 remains 

responsible for consolidating nominations and recommending FFIRs related to the future 

plans effort (e.g., planned sequels to the current operation). Commander-approved FFIRs are 

automatically CCIRs. 

(3) General CCIR criteria that planners must consider when proposing them 

to the commander for approval include the following: answering a CCIR must be a 

decision required of the commander, and not of the staff, and answering a CCIR must be 

critical to the success of the mission. 

Figure IV-5. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements 

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

Commander's 

Critical 

Information 

Requirements

Assessment

Intelligence-led focus on 

all facets of threat 

PMESII

Operational reporting to 

address all instruments 

of national power

Priority Intelligence 

Requirement

Friendly Force Information 

Requirement

Effective 

Decisions

Legend

PMESII political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-13 

(4) Decision Support. CCIRs support the commander’s future decision 

requirements and are often related to MOEs and MOPs. PIRs are often expressed in terms of 

the elements of PMESII while FFIRs are often expressed in terms of the diplomatic, 

informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. All are developed to 

support specific decisions the commander must make. 

o. Prepare Staff Estimates

(1) A staff estimate is an evaluation of how factors in a staff section’s functional 

area support and impact the mission. The purpose of the staff estimate is to inform the 

commander, staff, and subordinate commands how the functional area supports mission 

accomplishment and to support COA development and selection. 

(2) Staff estimates are initiated during mission analysis, at which point functional 

planners are focused on collecting information from their functional areas to help the 

commander and staff understand the situation and conduct mission analysis. Later, during 

COA development and selection, functional planners fully develop their estimates providing 

functional analysis of the COAs as well as recommendations on which COAs are 

supportable. They should also identify critical shortfalls or obstacles that impact mission 

accomplishment. Staff estimates are continually updated based on changes in the situation. 

(3) Not every situation will require or permit a lengthy and formal staff estimate 

process. During CAP, staff estimates may be given orally to support the rapid development 

of plans. However, deliberate planning will demand a more formal and thorough process. 

Staff estimates should be shared with subordinate and supporting commanders to help them 

prepare their supporting estimates, plans, and orders. This will improve parallel planning 

and collaboration efforts of subordinate and supporting elements and help reduce the 

planning times for the entire process. 

(4) Intelligence Support to Joint Operation Planning. Intelligence support to 

joint operation planning includes intelligence product delivery/dissemination of the 

intelligence estimate, which feeds the commander’s estimate and continuously updates the 

DTA. Production of the intelligence task list and intelligence synchronization matrix 

addresses how the intelligence community plans to satisfy the commander’s intelligence 

requirements. These are baseline information and finished intelligence products that inform 

the situational awareness activity of APEX and continuously drive changes to the DTA and 

the JFC’s JIPOE-based intelligence estimate. 

(5) Planning Intelligence Operations. The J-2 staff estimate addresses the ability 

to produce annex B and the intelligence support plan developed during the strategic guidance 

and concept development steps within APEX. Intelligence planners plan the entirety of the 

integrated intelligence operation (collect, exploit, analyze, produce, and disseminate 

intelligence) for the JFC and his planning staff to ultimately deliver the right product at the 

right time. To facilitate planning, intelligence planners must continuously assess or estimate 

and deliver these products. The intelligence task list and the JFC’s J-2 staff estimate are 

foundations for the intelligence planning effort and the basis for federated analysis and 

production. 
Chapter IV 

IV-14 JP 5-0 

(6) Logistics Staff Estimate. The staff of the JFC’s logistics directorate of a joint 

staff and Service component logisticians should develop a logistics overview, which includes 

but is not restricted to critical logistics assumptions and information requirements that must 

be incorporated into the CCIRs; current or anticipated HNS and status; identification of 

aerial and sea port of debarkation plus any other distribution infrastructure and associated 

capacity; inventory (on-hand, prepositioned, theater reserve, etc.); combat support and 

combat service support capabilities; known or potential capability shortfalls. From this 

theater logistics overview, a logistics estimate can be produced that identifies and addresses 

known and anticipated factors that may influence the feasibility of providing required 

logistics support. 

For more information on estimates, see Appendix C, “Staff Estimates.” 

The CJCSM 3122.01 series volumes contain sample formats for staff estimates.

p. Prepare and Deliver Mission Analysis Brief 

(1) Upon conclusion of the mission analysis and JIPOE, the staff will present a 

mission analysis brief to the JFC. The purpose of this brief is to provide the commander 

with the results of the staff’s analysis of the mission, offer a forum to surface issues that have 

been identified, and provide an opportunity for the commander to synthesize the staff’s 

mission analysis with his initial visualization of the campaign as described in the operational 

approach for the campaign or operation. The commander approves or disapproves the staff’s 

analysis and provides refined planning guidance as well as his intent to guide subsequent 

planning. Figure IV-6 shows an example mission analysis briefing. 

(2) The mission analysis briefing may be the only time the entire staff is present 

and the only opportunity to ensure that all staff members are starting from a common 

reference point. The briefing focuses on relevant conclusions reached as a result of the 

mission analysis. 

(3) Immediately after the mission analysis briefing, the commander approves a 

restated mission. This can be the staff’s recommended mission statement, a modified 

version of the staff’s recommendation, or one that the commander has developed personally. 

Once approved, the restated mission becomes the unit mission.

(4) At the mission analysis brief, the commander will likely describe his updated 

understanding of the operational environment, the problem, and his vision of the operational 

approach to the entire assemblage, which should include representatives from subordinate 

commands and other partner organizations. This provides the ideal venue for facilitating 

unity of understanding and vision, which is essential to unity of effort. 

q. Publish Commander’s Refined Planning Guidance

(1) After approving the mission statement and issuing the intent, the commander 

provides the staff (and subordinates in a collaborative environment) with enough additional 

guidance (including preliminary decisions) to focus the staff and subordinate planning 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-15 

activities during COA development. At a minimum, this refined planning guidance should 

include the following elements: 

(a) An approved mission statement. 

(b) Key elements of the operational environment. 

(c) A clear statement of the problem to be solved. 

(d) Key assumptions. 

Figure IV-6. Example Mission Analysis Briefing 

Example Mission Analysis Briefing





Introduction

Situation overview

Operational environment (including joint operations area) and threat overview

Political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure strengths and 

weaknesses

Red threat (including center of gravity)











Communications strategy

Objectives, effects, and task analysis

United States Government interagency objectives

Higher commander's objectives/mission/guidance

Objectives and effects

Specified/implied/essential tasks

Centers of gravity















Proposed initial commander’s critical information requirements

Mission

Proposed mission statement

Proposed commander's intent











Command relationships

Conclusion—potential resource shortfalls

Mission analysis approval and commander's course of action planning guidance

 Friendly assessment

Facts and assumptions

Limitations—constraints/restraints

Capabilities allocated

Legal considerations









 Operational protection

Operational risk

Mitigation




Chapter IV 

IV-16 JP 5-0 

(e) Key operational limitations. 

(f) A discussion of the national strategic end state. 

(g) Termination criteria. 

(h) Military end state and its relation to the national strategic end state. 

(i) Military objectives. 

(j) The JFC’s initial thoughts on the conditions necessary to achieve 

objectives. 

(k) Acceptable or unacceptable levels of risk in key areas. 

(l) The JFCs visualization of the operational approach to achieve the objectives 

in broad terms. This operational approach sets the basis for development of COAs. The 

commander should provide as much detail as appropriate to provide the right level of 

freedom to the staff in developing COAs. Planning guidance should also address the role of 

interorganizational partners in the pending operation and any related special considerations 

as required. 

(2) Commanders describe their visualization of the forthcoming campaign or 

operations to help build a shared understanding among the staff. Enough guidance 

(preliminary decisions) must be provided to allow the subordinates to plan the action 

necessary to accomplish the mission consistent with commander’s intent. The commander’s 

guidance must focus on the essential tasks and associated objectives that support the 

accomplishment of the assigned national objectives. It emphasizes in broad terms when, 

where, and how the commander intends to employ military capabilities integrated with other 

instruments of national power to accomplish the mission within the higher JFC’s intent. 

(3) The JFC may provide the planning guidance to the entire staff and/or 

subordinate JFCs or meet each staff officer or subordinate unit individually as the situation 

and information dictates. The guidance can be given in a written form or orally. No format 

for the planning guidance is prescribed. However, the guidance should be sufficiently 

detailed to provide a clear direction and to avoid unnecessary efforts by the staff or 

subordinate and supporting commands. 

(4) Planning guidance can be very explicit and detailed, or it can be very broad, 

allowing the staff and/or subordinate commands wide latitude in developing subsequent 

COAs. However, no matter its scope, the content of planning guidance must be arranged in 

a logical sequence to reduce the chances of misunderstanding and to enhance clarity. 

Moreover, one must recognize that all the elements of planning guidance are tentative only. 

The JFC may issue successive planning guidance during the decision-making process; yet 

the focus of the JFC’s staff should remain upon the framework provided in the initial 

planning guidance. The JFC should continue to provide refined planning guidance during 

the rest of the plan development process as his understanding of the problem continues to 

develop. 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-17 

5. Course of Action Development 

a. Introduction

(1) A COA is a potential way (solution, method) to accomplish the assigned 

mission. The staff develops COAs to provide unique choices to the commander, all oriented 

on accomplishing the military end state. A good COA accomplishes the mission within the 

commander’s guidance, provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution, and 

positions the joint force for future operations. It also gives components the maximum 

latitude for initiative. 

(2) Figure IV-7 shows the key inputs and outputs of COA development. The 

products of mission analysis drive COA development. Since the operational approach

contains the JFC’s broad approach to solve the problem at hand, each COA will expand this 

concept with the additional details that describe who will take the action, what type of 

military action will occur, when the action will begin, where the action will occur, why the 

action is required (purpose), and how the action will occur (method of employment of 

forces). Likewise, the essential tasks identified during mission analysis (and embedded 

in the draft mission statement) must be common to all potential COAs. 

(3) Planners can vary COAs by adjusting the use of joint force capabilities 

throughout the OA by physical domain, through the information environment, and through 

cyberspace and by varying the combinations of these elements. 

Figure IV-7. Course of Action Development 

Course of Action Development

Revised staff estimates

COA alternatives with 

concept narrative and 

sketch including:

Objectives

Key tasks

Major capabilities 

required

Task organization

Main and supporting 

efforts

Deployment concept

Sustainment concept

Information operations 

support themes

Identification of reserve

Identification of required 

supporting interagency 

tasks





















Key Outputs

Course of Action 

(COA)

Development

Staff estimates

Mission statement

Commander's refined 

operational approach 

including:

Joint force 

commander's (JFC's) 

intent statement

JFC's updated 

planning guidance

Commander's critical 

information requirements





Key Inputs
Chapter IV 

IV-18 JP 5-0 

b. COA Development Considerations

(1) The products of COA development are tentative COAs, with a sketch for each 

if possible. Each COA describes, in broad but clear terms, what is to be done throughout the 

campaign or operation, the size of forces deemed necessary, and time in which joint force 

capabilities need to be brought to bear. These COAs will undergo additional validity testing, 

analysis and wargaming, and comparison, and they could be eliminated at any point during 

this process. These COAs provide conceptualization and broad descriptions of potential 

concepts of operation for the conduct of operations that will accomplish the desired end 

state. 

(2) Available planning time is always a key consideration, particularly during CAP. 

The JFC gives the staff additional considerations early in COA development to focus the 

staff’s efforts, helping the staff concentrate on developing COAs that are the most 

appropriate. There should always be more than one way to accomplish the mission, which 

suggests that commanders and planners should give due consideration to the pros and cons of 

valid COA alternatives. However, developing several COAs could violate time constraints. 

Usually, the staff develops two or three COAs to focus their efforts and concentrate valuable 

resources on the most likely scenarios. However, COAs must be substantially 

distinguishable from each other. Commanders should not unnecessarily overburden staffs by 

developing similar solutions to the problem. The commander’s involvement in the early 

operational design process can help ensure that only value-added options are considered. If 

time and personnel resources permit, different COAs could be developed by different teams 

to ensure they are unique. 

(3) For each COA, the commander must envision the employment of all 

participants in the operation as a whole—US military forces, MNFs, and interagency 

partners—taking into account operational limitations, political considerations, the OA, 

existing FDOs, and the conclusions previously drawn during the mission analysis and the 

commander’s guidance. 

(4) During COA development, the commander and staff consider all feasible 

adversary COAs. Other actors may also create difficult conditions that must be considered 

during COA development. It is best to consider all opposing actors’ actions likely to 

challenge the achievement of the desired end states when exploring adversary COAs. 

(5) Each COA typically will constitute an operational concept and provide a 

narrative and sketch that include the following: 

(a) Objectives. 

(b) Key tasks. 

(c) Major capabilities required. 

(d) Task organization. 

(e) Main and supporting efforts. 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-19 

(f) Sustainment concept. 

(g) Deployment concept. 

(h) SC supporting themes. 

(i) Identification of reserve. 

(j) Identification of required supporting interagency tasks. 

(6) Options. An option is an activity within a COA that may be executed to enable 

achieving an objective. Options, and groups of options comprising branches, allow the 

commander to act rapidly and transition as conditions change through the campaign or 

operation. Options, and more broadly branches, should enable the commander to progress 

sequentially or skip ahead based on success or other changes to the conditions or strategic 

direction from dialogue with higher commanders, SecDef, and/or the President. They should 

also enable the commander to transition rapidly, exploit success, and control escalation and 

tempo while denying the same to the enemy. The development of options within COAs 

empowers the commander and translates up and down the chain of command and enables 

strategic flexibility for SecDef and the President. 

(7) A tentative COA should be simple and brief, yet complete. Individual COAs 

should have descriptive titles. Distinguishing factors of the COA may suggest titles that are 

descriptive in nature. 

c. COA Development Techniques and Procedures

(1) Review information contained in the mission analysis and commander’s 

operational approach, planning guidance, and intent statement. All staff members must 

understand the mission and the tasks that must be accomplished within the commander’s 

intent to achieve mission success. 

(2) Determine the COA Development Technique 

(a) A critical first decision in COA development is whether to conduct 

simultaneous or sequential development of the COAs. Each approach has distinct 

advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of simultaneous development of COAs is 

potential time savings. Separate groups are simultaneously working on different COAs. The 

disadvantage of this approach is that the synergy of the JPG may be disrupted by breaking up 

the team. The approach is manpower intensive and requires component and directorate 

representation in each COA group, and there is an increased likelihood that the COAs will 

not be distinctive. While there is potential time to be saved, experience has demonstrated 

that it is not an automatic result. The simultaneous COA development approach can work, 

but its inherent disadvantages must be addressed and some risk accepted up front. The 

recommended approach if time and resources allows is the sequential method. 
Chapter IV 

IV-20 JP 5-0 

(b) There are several planning sequence techniques available to facilitate 

COA development. One option is the step-by-step approach (see Figure IV-8), which uses 

the backward-planning technique (also known as reverse planning). 

(3) Review operational objectives and tasks and develop ways to accomplish 

tasks. Planners must review and refine theater and supporting operational objectives from 

the initial work done during the development of the operational approach. These objectives 

establish the conditions necessary to reach the desired end state and achieve the national 

strategic objectives. Tasks are shaped by the CONOPS—intended sequencing and 

integration of air, land, sea, special operations, and space forces. Tasks are prioritized in 

order of criticality while considering the enemy’s objectives and the need to gain advantage. 

Figure IV-8. Step-By-Step Approach to Course of Action Development 

Step-by-Step Approach to Course of Action Development

Step Action

Determine how much force will be needed in the theater at the end of the 

campaign, what those forces will be doing, and how those forces will be postured 

geographically. Use troop-to-task analysis. Draw a sketch to help visualize the 

forces and their locations.

Looking at the sketch and working backwards, determine the best way to get the 

forces postured in Step 1 from their ultimate positions at the end of the campaign 

to a base in friendly territory. This will help formulate the desired basing plan.

Using the mission statement as a guide, determine the tasks the force must 

accomplish en route to their locations/positions at the end of the campaign. Draw 

a sketch of the maneuver plan. Make sure the force does everything the 

Secretary of Defense (SecDef) has directed the commander to do (refer to 

specified tasks from the mission analysis).

Determine the basing required to posture the force in friendly territory, and the 

tasks the force must accomplish to get to those bases. Sketch this as part of the 

deployment plan.

Determine if the planned force is enough to accomplish all the tasks SecDef 

has given the commander. Adjust the force strength to fit the tasks. This should 

provide the answer to the first question.

Given the tasks to be performed, determine in what order the forces should be 

deployed into theater. Consider the force categories such as combat, protection, 

sustainment, theater enablers, and theater opening. This should answer the 

second question.

The information developed should now answer the remaining questions 

regarding force employment, major tasks and their sequencing, sustainment, 

and command relationships.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-21 

(a) Regardless of the eventual COA, the staff should plan to accomplish the 

higher commander’s intent by understanding its essential task(s) and purpose and the 

intended contribution to the higher commander’s mission success. 

(b) The staff must ensure that all the COAs developed will fulfill the command 

mission and the purpose of the operation by conducting a review of all essential tasks 

developed during mission analysis. They should then consider ways to accomplish the other 

tasks. 

(4) Once the staff has begun to visualize a tentative COA, it should see how it can 

best synchronize (arrange in terms of time, space, and purpose) the actions of all the 

elements of the force. The staff should estimate the anticipated duration of the operation. 

One method of synchronizing actions is the use of phasing as discussed earlier. Phasing 

assists the commander and staff to visualize and think through the entire operation or 

campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. 

Planners should then integrate and synchronize these requirements by using the joint 

functions of C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. 

At a minimum, planners should ensure the synchronized actions answer the following 

questions: 

(a) How do land forces, maritime forces, air forces, and special operations 

forces (SOF) integrate across the joint functions to accomplish their assigned tasks? 

(b) What are the major ways that space operations can support operations 

across the joint functions? 

(c) How can the joint forces integrate IO and cyberspace operations to support 

joint operations? 

(5) The tentative COAs should focus on COGs and decisive points. The 

commander and the staff review and refine their COG analysis begun during mission 

analysis based on updated intelligence, JIPOE products, and initial staff estimates. The 

refined enemy and friendly COG analysis, particularly the critical vulnerabilities, is 

considered in the development of the initial COAs. The COG analysis helps the commander 

become oriented to the enemy and compare his strengths and weakness with those of the 

enemy. By looking at friendly COGs and vulnerabilities, the staff understands the 

capabilities of their own force and critical vulnerabilities that will require protection. 

Protection resource limitations will probably mean that the staff cannot plan to protect every 

capability, but rather will look at prioritizing protection for critical capabilities and 

developing overlapping protection techniques. The strength of one asset or capability may 

provide protection from the weakness of another. 

(6) Identify the sequencing (simultaneous, sequential, or a combination) of the 

actions for each COA. Consider the use of defeat and stability mechanisms as appropriate to 

create the desired effects (and preclude undesired effects). 

(7) Identify main and supporting efforts, by phase, the purposes of these efforts, 

and key supporting/supported relationships within phases. 
Chapter IV 

IV-22 JP 5-0 

(8) Identify component-level missions/tasks (who, what, and where) that will 

accomplish the stated purposes of main and supporting efforts. Think of component and 

joint function tasks such as movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, protection, 

sustainment, and C2. Display them with graphic control measures as much as possible. A 

designated LOO will help identify these tasks. 

(9) Develop the IO support items. Since the results of deception operations may 

influence the positioning of units, planners should conceive major elements of the story 

before developing any COAs. 

(10) Task Organization 

(a) The staff should develop an outline task organization to execute the COA. 

The commander and staff determine appropriate command relationships and appropriate 

missions and tasks. 

(b) Determine command relationships and organizational options. Joint 

force organization and command relationships are based on the operation or campaign 

CONOPS, complexity, and degree of control required. Establishing command 

relationships includes determining the types of subordinate commands and the degree of 

authority to be delegated to each. Clear definition of command relationships further clarifies 

the intent of the commander and contributes to decentralized execution and unity of effort. 

The commander has the authority to determine the types of subordinate commands from 

several doctrinal options, including Service components, functional components, and 

subordinate joint commands. Regardless of the command relationships selected, it is the 

JFC’s responsibility to ensure that these relationships are understood and clear to all 

subordinate, adjacent, and supporting headquarters. The following are considerations 

for establishing joint force organizations: 

1. Joint forces will normally be organized with a combination of Service 

and functional components with operational responsibilities. 

2. Functional component staffs should be joint with Service representation 

in approximate proportion to the mix of subordinate forces. These staffs should be organized 

and trained prior to employment in order to be efficient and effective, which will require 

advanced planning. 

3. Commanders may establish support relationships between components 

to facilitate operations. 

4. Commanders define the authority and responsibilities of functional 

component commanders based on the strategic CONOPS and may alter their authority and 

responsibility during the course of an operation. 

5. Commanders must balance the need for centralized direction with 

decentralized execution. 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-23 

6. Major changes in the joint force organization are normally conducted at 

phase changes. 

(11) Sustainment Concept. No COA is complete without a plan to sustain it 

properly. The sustainment and personnel services concept is more than just gathering 

information on various logistic functions. It entails identifying the requirements for classes 

of supply, creating distribution, transportation, and disposition plans to support the 

commander’s execution, and organizing capabilities and resources into an overall theater 

campaign or operation sustainment concept. It concentrates forces and material resources 

strategically so the right force is available at the designated times and places to conduct 

decisive operations. It requires thinking through a cohesive sustainment for joint, single 

Service, and supporting forces relationships in conjunction with CSAs, multinational, 

interagency, nongovernmental, or international organizations. 

(12) Deployment Concept. A COA must consider the deployment concept in 

order to describe the general flow of forces into theater. There is no way to determine the 

feasibility of the COA without including the deployment concept. While the detailed 

deployment concept will be developed during plan synchronization, enough of the concept 

must be described in the COA to visualize force buildup, sustainment requirements, and 

military–political considerations. 

(13) Define the Operational Area

(a) The OA is normally established by a legally/politically binding document. 

It will provide flexibility/options and/or limitations to the commander. The OA must be 

precisely defined because the specific geographic area will impact planning factors such as 

basing, overflight, and sustainment. 

(b) OAs include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as AOR, theater of 

war, theater of operations, JOA, amphibious objective area, joint special operations area, and 

area of operations. Except for AOR, which is assigned in the UCP, GCCs and their 

subordinate JFCs designate smaller OAs on a temporary basis. OAs have physical 

dimensions composed of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains. JFCs define 

these areas with geographical boundaries, which facilitate the coordination, integration, and 

deconfliction of joint operations among joint force components and supporting commands. 

The size of these OAs and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope 

and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations. 

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for additional information on OAs. 

(14) Develop initial COA sketches and statements. Each tentative COA should 

answer the following questions: 

(a) Who (type of forces) will execute the tasks? 

(b) What are the tasks? 
Chapter IV 

IV-24 JP 5-0 

(c) Where will the tasks occur? (Start adding graphic control measures, e.g., 

areas of operation, amphibious objective areas). 

(d) When will the tasks begin? 

(e) How (but do not usurp the components’ prerogatives) the commander 

should provide “operational direction” so the components can accomplish “tactical actions.” 

(f) Why (for what purpose) will each force conduct its part of the operation? 

(g) Develop an initial ISR support concept. 

(15) Test the validity of each tentative COA. All COAs selected for analysis 

must be valid, and the staff should reject tentative COAs that do not meet all five of the 

following validity criteria: 

(a) Adequate—Can accomplish the mission within the commander’s 

guidance. Preliminary tests include: 

1. Does it accomplish the mission? 

2. Does it meet the commander’s intent? 

3. Does it accomplish all the essential tasks? 

4. Does it meet the conditions for the end state? 

5. Does it take into consideration the enemy and friendly COGs? 

(b) Feasible—Can accomplish the mission within the established time, space, 

and resource limitations. 

1. Does the commander have the force structure and lift assets (means) to 

execute it? The COA is feasible if it can be executed with the forces, support, and 

technology available within the constraints of the physical environment and against expected 

enemy opposition. 

2. Although this process occurs during COA analysis and the test at this 

time is preliminary, it may be possible to declare a COA infeasible (for example, resources 

are obviously insufficient). However, it may be possible to fill shortfalls by requesting 

support from the commander or other means. 

(c) Acceptable—Must balance cost and risk with the advantage gained. 

1. Does it contain unacceptable risks? (Is it worth the possible cost?) A 

COA is considered acceptable if the estimated results justify the risks. The basis of this test 

consists of an estimation of friendly losses in forces, time, position, and opportunity. 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-25 

2. Does it take into account the limitations placed on the commander 

(must do, cannot do, other physical limitations)? 

3. Acceptability is considered from the perspective of the commander by 

reviewing the strategic objectives. 

4. Are COAs reconciled with external constraints, particularly ROE? This 

requires visualization of execution of the COA against each enemy capability. Although this 

process occurs during COA analysis and the test at this time is preliminary, it may be 

possible to declare a COA unacceptable if it violates the commander’s definition of 

acceptable risk. 

(d) Distinguishable—Must be sufficiently different from other COAs in the 

following: 

1. The focus or direction of main effort. 

2. The scheme of maneuver (land, air, maritime, and special operation). 

3. Sequential versus simultaneous maneuvers. 

4. The primary mechanism for mission accomplishment. 

5. Task organization. 

6. The use of reserves. 

(e) Complete—Does it answer the questions who, what, where, when, how, 

and why? Must incorporate: 

1. Objectives (including desired effects) and tasks to be performed. 

2. Major forces required. 

3. Concepts for deployment, employment, and sustainment. 

4. Time estimates for achieving objectives. 

5. Military end state and mission success criteria. 

(16) Conduct COA development brief to commander. Figure IV-9 provides 

suggested sequence and content. 

(17) JFC provides guidance on COAs. 

(a) Review and approve COA(s) for further analysis. 

(b) Direct revisions to COA(s), combinations of COAs, or development of 

additional COA(s). 
Chapter IV 

IV-26 JP 5-0 

(c) Direct priority for which enemy COA(s) will be used during wargaming of 

friendly COA(s). 

(18) Continue the staff estimate process. The staff must continue to conduct their 

staff estimates of supportability for each COA. 

(19) Conduct vertical and horizontal parallel planning

(a) Discuss the planning status of staff counterparts with both commander’s 

and JFC components’ staffs. 

Figure IV-9. Example Course of Action Development Briefing 

Example Course of Action Development Briefing

 Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-3)/Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-5)

Context/background (i.e., road to war)

Initiation—review guidance for initiation

Strategic guidance—planning tasks assigned to supported commander, 

forces/resources apportioned, planning guidance, updates, defense 

agreements, theater campaign plan(s), Guidance for Employment of the 

Force/Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

Forces apportioned/assigned









 J-3/J-5

Update facts and assumptions

Mission statement

Commander's intent (purpose, method, end state)

End state: political/military

– termination criteria

Center of gravity analysis results: critical factors; strategic/operational

Joint operations area/theater of operations/communications zone sketch

Phase 0 shaping activities recommended (for current theater campaign plan)

Flexible deterrent options with desired effect

For each COA, sketch and statement by phase

ines of operation/lines of effort

– logistics estimates and feasibility

COA 



















– task organization

– component tasking

– timeline

– recommended command and control by phase

– l

– COA risks

COA summarized distinctions

priority for analysis





 Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-2)

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

Enemy courses of action (COAs)—most dangerous, most likely; strengths and 

weaknesses





 Commander's Guidance
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-27 

(b) Coordinate planning with staff counterparts from other functional areas. 

(c) Permit adjustments in planning as additional details are learned from higher 

and adjacent echelons, and permit lower echelons to begin planning efforts and generate 

questions (e.g., requests for information). 

d. The Planning Directive 

(1) The planning directive identifies planning responsibilities for developing joint 

force plans. It provides guidance and requirements to the staff and subordinate commands 

concerning coordinated planning actions for plan development. The JFC normally 

communicates initial planning guidance to the staff, subordinate commanders, and 

supporting commanders by publishing a planning directive to ensure that everyone 

understands the commander’s intent and to achieve unity of effort. 

(2) Generally, the J-5 coordinates staff action for deliberate planning, and the J-3 

coordinates staff action for CAP. The J-5 staff receives the JFC’s initial guidance and 

combines it with the information gained from the initial staff assessments. The JFC, through 

the J-5, may convene a preliminary planning conference for members of the JPEC who will 

be involved with the plan. This is the opportunity for representatives to meet face-to-face. 

At the conference, the JFC and selected members of the staff brief the attendees on important 

aspects of the plan and may solicit their initial reactions. Many potential conflicts can be 

avoided by this early exchange of information. 

6. Course of Action Analysis 

a. Introduction

(1) COA analysis is the process of closely examining potential COAs to reveal 

details that will allow the commander and staff to tentatively identify COAs that are valid, 

and then compare these COAs. COA analysis identifies advantages and disadvantages of 

each proposed friendly COA. The commander and staff analyze each tentative COA 

separately according to the commander’s guidance. While time-consuming, COA analysis 

should answer two primary questions: Is the COA feasible, and is it acceptable? 

(2) Wargaming is a primary means to conduct this analysis. Wargaming is a 

conscious attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given joint force strengths and 

dispositions, adversary capabilities and possible COAs, the OA, and other aspects of the 

operational environment. Each critical event within a proposed COA should be wargamed 

based upon time available using the action, reaction, and counteraction method of friendly 

and/or opposing force interaction. The basic wargaming method (modified to fit the specific 

mission and operational environment) can apply to noncombat as well as combat operations. 

(3) COA wargaming allows the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders 

and their staffs to gain a common understanding of friendly and enemy COAs. This 

common understanding allows them to determine the advantages and disadvantages of each 

COA and forms the basis for the commander’s comparison and approval. COA wargaming 

involves a detailed assessment of each COA as it pertains to the enemy and the operational 
Chapter IV 

IV-28 JP 5-0 

environment. Each friendly COA is wargamed against selected enemy COAs. The 

commander will select the COAs he wants wargamed and provide wargaming guidance 

along with evaluation criteria. 

(4) Wargaming stimulates thought about the operation so the staff can obtain ideas 

and insights that otherwise might not have occurred. This process highlights tasks that 

appear to be particularly important to the operation and provides a degree of familiarity with 

operational-level possibilities that might otherwise be difficult to achieve. An objective, 

comprehensive analysis of tentative COAs is difficult even without time constraints. Based 

upon time available, the commander should wargame each tentative COA against the most 

probable and the most dangerous adversary COAs (or most difficult objectives in noncombat 

operations) identified through the JIPOE process. Figure IV-10 shows the key inputs and 

outputs associated with COA analysis. 

b. Analysis and Wargaming Process

(1) The analysis and wargaming process can be as simple as a detailed narrative 

effort that describes the action, probable reaction, counteraction, assets, and time used. A 

more comprehensive version is the “sketch-note” technique, which adds operational sketches 

and notes to the narrative process in order to gain a clearer picture. The most sophisticated 

form of wargaming is computer-aided modeling and simulation. 

Figure IV-10. Course of Action Analysis 

Course of Action Analysis

Potential decision points

Evaluation criteria

Potential branches and 

sequels

Refined COAs

Revised staff estimates

Key Outputs

Course of Action 

(COA)

Analysis

Revised staff estimates

COA alternatives with 

concept narrative and 

sketch including:

Objectives

Key tasks

Major capabilities 

required

Task organization

Main and supporting 

efforts

Deployment concept

Sustainment concept

Information operations 

support themes

Identification of reserve

Identification of required 

supporting interagency 

tasks





















Key Inputs
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-29 

(2) The heart of the commander’s estimate process is analysis of multiple COAs. 

During COA development, the staff considers opposing COAs based on adversary 

capabilities, objectives, an estimate of the adversary’s intent, and integrated actions by other 

actors (neutral, other adversaries, and even friendly actions that would not be favorable) that 

would challenge achievement of the end state. The staff then develop friendly COAs based 

on the joint force mission and capabilities. In the analysis and wargaming step, the staff 

analyzes the probable effect each opposing COA has on the chances of success of each 

friendly COA. The aim is to develop a sound basis for determining the feasibility and 

acceptability of the COAs. Analysis also provides the planning staff with a greatly improved 

understanding of their COAs and the relationship between them. COA analysis identifies 

which COA best accomplishes the mission while best positioning the force for future 

operations. It also helps the commander and staff to: 

(a) Determine how to maximize combat power against the enemy while 

protecting the friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage. 

(b) Have as near an identical visualization of the operation as possible. 

(c) Anticipate events in the operational environment and potential reaction 

options. 

(d) Determine conditions and resources required for success while also 

identifying gaps and seams. 

(e) Determine when and where to apply the force’s capabilities. 

(f) Focus intelligence collection requirements. 

(g) Determine the most flexible COA. 

(h) Identify potential decision points. 

(i) Determine task organization options. 

(j) Develop data for use in a synchronization matrix or related tool. 

(k) Identify potential plan branches and sequels. 

(l) Identify high-value targets. 

(m) Assess risk. 

(n) Determine COA advantages and disadvantages. 

(o) Recommend CCIRs. 

(3) Wargaming is a disciplined process, with rules and steps that attempt to 

visualize the flow of the operation. The process considers friendly dispositions, strengths, 

and weaknesses; enemy assets and probable COAs; and characteristics of the physical 
Chapter IV 

IV-30 JP 5-0 

environment. It relies heavily on joint doctrinal foundation, tactical judgment, and 

operational experience. It focuses the staff’s attention on each phase of the operation in a 

logical sequence. It is an iterative process of action, reaction, and counteraction. 

Wargaming stimulates ideas and provides insights that might not otherwise be discovered. It 

highlights critical tasks and provides familiarity with operational possibilities otherwise 

difficult to achieve. Wargaming is a critical portion of the planning process and should be 

allocated more time than any other step. Each retained COA should, at a minimum, be 

wargamed against both the most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs. 

(4) During the war game, the staff takes a COA statement and begins to add more 

detail to the concept, while determining the strengths or weaknesses of each COA. 

Wargaming tests a COA and can provide insights that can be used to improve upon a 

developed COA. The commander and staff (and subordinate commanders and staffs if the 

war game is conducted collaboratively) may change an existing COA or develop a new COA 

after identifying unforeseen critical events, tasks, requirements, or problems. 

(5) For the war game to be effective, the commander should indicate what aspects 

of the COA should be examined and tested. Wargaming guidance may include a list of 

friendly COAs to be wargamed against specific threat COAs (e.g., COA 1 against the 

enemy’s most likely, most dangerous), the timeline for the phase or stage of the operations, a 

list of critical events, and level of detail (i.e., two levels down). 

(6) COA Analysis Considerations. Evaluation criteria and known critical events

are two of the many important considerations as COA analysis begins. 

(a) The commander and staff use evaluation criteria during follow-on COA 

comparison (JOPP step 5) for the purpose of selecting the best COA. The commander and 

staff consider various potential evaluation criteria during wargaming, and select those that 

the staff will use during COA comparison to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of one 

COA relative to others following the war game. These evaluation criteria help focus the 

wargaming effort and provide the framework for data collection by the staff. These criteria 

are those aspects of the situation (or externally imposed factors) that the commander deems 

critical to mission accomplishment. Figure IV-11 shows examples of potential evaluation 

criteria. 

(b) Evaluation criteria change from mission to mission. Though these criteria 

will be applied in the next step, COA comparison (JOPP step 6), it will be helpful during this 

wargaming step for all participants to be familiar with the criteria so that any insights into a 

given COA that influence a criterion are recorded for later comparison. The criteria may 

include anything the commander desires. If they are not received directly, the staff can 

derive them from the commander’s intent statement. Evaluation criteria do not stand alone. 

Each must have a clearly defined definition. Defining the criteria in precise terms reduces 

subjectivity and ensures that the interpretation of each remains constant. The following 

sources provide a good starting point for developing a list of potential evaluation criteria. 

1. Commander’s guidance and commander’s intent. 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-31 

2. Mission accomplishment at an acceptable cost. 

3. The principles of joint operations. 

4. Doctrinal fundamentals for the type of operation being conducted. 

5. The level of residual risk in the COA. 

6. Implicit significant factors relating to the operation (e.g., need for 

speed, security). 

7. Factors relating to specific staff functions. 

8. Elements of operational design.

9. Other factors to consider: political constraints, risk, financial costs, 

flexibility, simplicity, surprise, speed, mass, sustainability, C2, infrastructure survivability, 

etc.

(c) List Known Critical Events. These are essential tasks, or a series of 

critical tasks, conducted over a period of time that require detailed analysis (such as the 

series of component tasks to be performed on D-day). This may be expanded to review 

component tasks over a phase(s) of an operation (e.g., lodgment phase) or over a period of 

Figure IV-11. Potential Evaluation Criteria 

Potential Evaluation Criteria

Commander's 

Evaluation 

Criteria

Force 

Protection

Surprise

Shapes the

Operational 

Environment

Decisive Actions

Sustainment/Support

Risk

Time

Casualties

Defeating Enemy 

Centers of Gravity

Flexibility Flexible Deterrent 

Options

Multinational
Chapter IV 

IV-32 JP 5-0 

time (C-day through D-day). The planning staff may wish at this point to also identify 

decision points (those decisions in time and space that the commander must make to ensure 

timely execution and synchronization of resources). These decision points are most likely 

linked to a critical event (e.g., commitment of the JTF reserve force). 

(7) There are two key decisions to make before COA analysis begins. The first 

decision is to decide what type of war game will be used. This decision should be based on 

commander’s guidance, time and resources available, staff expertise, and availability of 

simulation models. At this point in the planning process, there may be no phases developed 

for the COA; pre-hostilities, hostilities, and post-hostilities may be the only considerations 

at this point. Phasing comes later when the planner begins to flesh out the selected COA into 

a strategic concept. The second decision is to prioritize the enemy COAs the war game is 

to be analyzed against. In time-constrained situations, it may not be possible to wargame 

against all COAs. 

c. Conducting the War Game

(1) The primary steps are prepare for the war game, conduct the war game and 

assess the results, and prepare products. Figure IV-12 shows sample wargaming steps. 

(2) Prepare for the War Game 

(a) The two forms of war games are computer-assisted and manual. There are 

many forms of computer-assisted war games; most require a significant spin-up time to load 

scenarios and then to train users. However, the potential to utilize the computer model for 

multiple scenarios or blended scenarios makes it valuable. For both types, consider how to 

organize the players in a logical manner. 

(b) For manual wargaming, three distinct methods are available to run the 

event: 

1. Deliberate Timeline Analysis. Consider actions day-by-day or in 

other discrete blocks of time. This is the most thorough method for detailed analysis when 

time permits. 

2. Operational Phasing. Used as a framework for COA analysis. 

Identify significant actions and requirements by functional area and/or JTF component. 

3. Critical Events/Sequence of Essential Tasks. The sequence of 

essential tasks, also known as the critical events method, highlights the initial shaping 

actions necessary to establish a sustainment capability and to engage enemy units in the deep 

battle area. At the same time, it enables the planners to adapt if the enemy executes a 

reaction that necessitates the reordering of the essential tasks. This technique also allows 

war gamers to analyze concurrently the essential tasks required to execute the CONOPS. 

Focus on specific critical events that encompass the essence of the COA. If necessary, 

different MOEs should be developed for assessing different types of critical events (e.g., 

destruction, blockade, air control, neutralization, ensure defense). As with the focus on 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-33 

operational phasing, the critical events discussion identifies significant actions and 

requirements by functional area and/or by JTF component. 

(c) Red Cell. The J-2 staff will provide a red cell to role play and model the 

adversaries during planning and specifically during wargaming. 

1. A robust, well-trained, imaginative, and skilled red cell that 

aggressively pursues the adversary’s point of view during wargaming is essential. By 

accurately portraying the full range of realistic capabilities and options available to the 

enemy, they help the staff address friendly responses for each adversary COA. 

2. The red cell is normally composed of personnel from the joint force J-2 

staff and when available they may be augmented by other subject experts. 

3. The red cell develops critical decision points, projects adversary 

reactions to friendly actions, and estimates impacts and implications on the adversary forces 

Figure IV-12. Sample Wargaming Steps 

Sample Wargaming Steps

Prepare for the War Game

















Gather tools

List and review opposing forces and capabilities

List known critical events

Determine participants

Determine opposing course of action (COA) to war game

Select wargaming method

manual or computer-assisted

Select a method to record and display wargaming results

narrative

sketch and note

war game worksheets

synchronization matrix

List and review friendly forces and capabilities

Purpose of war game (identify gaps, visualization, etc.)

Basic methodology (e.g., action, reaction, counteraction)

Record results

Results of the war game brief

potential decision points

evaluation criteria

potential branches and sequels

Revised staff estimates

Refined COAs

Time-phased force and deployment data refinement and transportation feasibility

Feedback through the COA decision brief











Conduct War Game and Assess Results

Prepare Products























1

2

3
Chapter IV 

IV-34 JP 5-0 

and objectives. By trying to win the war game, the red cell helps the staff identify 

weaknesses and vulnerabilities before a real enemy does. 

4. Given time constraints, as a minimum, the most dangerous and most 

likely adversary COAs should be wargamed and role played by the red cell during the war 

game. 

 (d) White Team. A small team of arbitrators normally composed of senior 

individuals familiar with the plan is a smart investment to ensure the war game does not get 

bogged down in unnecessary disagreement or arguing. The white team will provide overall 

oversight to the war game and any adjudication required between participants. The white 

team may also include the facilitator and/or highly qualified experts as required. 

(3) Conduct the War Game and Assess the Results 

(a) The facilitator and the red team commander get together to agree on the 

rules of the war game. The war game begins with an event designated by the facilitator. It 

could be an enemy offensive/defensive action or it could be a friendly offensive or defensive 

action. They decide where (in the OA) and when (H-hour or L-hour) it will begin. They 

review the initial array of forces. Of note, they must come to an agreement on the 

effectiveness of ISR capabilities and shaping actions by both sides prior to the war game. 

The facilitator must ensure that all members of the war game know what critical events will 

be wargamed and what techniques will be used. This coordination within the friendly team 

and between the friendly and the red team must be done well in advance. 

(b) Within each wargaming method, the war game normally has three total 

moves. If necessary, that portion of the war game may be extended beyond the three moves. 

The facilitator decides how many moves are made in the war game. 

(c) During the war game, the players must continually assess the COA’s 

feasibility. Can it be supported? Can this be done? Are more combat power, more ISR 

capabilities, or more time needed? Are necessary logistics and communications available? 

Is the OA large enough? Has the threat successfully countered a certain phase or stage of a 

friendly COA? Based on the answers to the above questions, revisions to the friendly COA 

may be required. We don’t make major revisions to a COA in the midst of a war game. 

Instead, we stop the war game, make the revisions, and start over at the beginning. 

(d) The war game is for comparing and contrasting friendly COAs with the 

adversary COAs. Planners compare and contrast friendly COAs with each other in the fifth 

step of JOPP, COA comparison. They avoid becoming emotionally attached to a friendly 

COA as it leads to overlooking the COA shortcomings and weaknesses. Planners avoid 

comparing one friendly COA with another friendly COA during the war game and remain 

unbiased. The facilitator ensures adherence to the timeline. A war game for one COA at the 

JTF level may take six to eight hours. The facilitator must allocate enough time to ensure the 

war game will thoroughly test a COA. 

(e) A synchronization matrix is a decision-making tool and a method of 

recording the results of wargaming. Key results that should be recorded include decision 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-35 

points, potential evaluation criteria, CCIRs, COA adjustments, branches, and sequels. Using 

a synchronization matrix helps the staff visually synchronize the COA across time and space 

in relation to the adversary’s possible COAs. The war game and synchronization matrix 

efforts will be particularly useful in identifying cross-component support resource 

requirements. 

(f) The war game considers friendly dispositions, strengths, and weaknesses; 

adversary assets and probable COAs; and characteristics of the OA. Through a logical 

sequence, it focuses the players on essential tasks to be accomplished. 

(g) When the war game is complete and the worksheet and synchronization 

matrix are filled out, there should be enough detail to flesh out the bones of the COA and 

begin orders development (once the COA has been selected by the commander in a later 

JOPP step). 

(h) Additionally, the war game will produce a refined event template and the 

initial decision support template (DST), or decision support tools. These are similar to a 

football coach’s game plan. The tools can help predict what the threat will do. The tools 

also provide the commander options for employing forces to counter an adversary action. 

The tools will prepare the commander (coach) and the staff (team) for a wide range of 

possibilities and a choice of immediate solutions. 

(i) The war game relies heavily on doctrinal foundation, tactical judgment, and 

experience. It generates new ideas and provides insights that might have been overlooked. 

The dynamics of the war game require the red team commander and the red team members 

to be aggressive, but realistic, in the execution of threat activities. The war game: 

1. Records advantages and disadvantages of each COA as they become 

evident. 

2. Creates decision support tools (a game plan). 

3. Focuses the planning team on the threat and commander’s evaluation 

criteria. 

(4) Prepare Products. Certain products should result from the war game in 

addition to wargamed COAs. Planners enter the war game with a rough event template and 

must complete the war game with a refined, more accurate event template. The event 

template with its named areas of interest (NAIs) and time-phase lines will help the J-2 focus 

the ISR effort. An event matrix can be used as a “script” for the intelligence report during 

the war game. It can also tell planners if they are relying too much on one or two collection 

platforms and if assets have been overextended. 

(a) A first draft of a DST and DSM should also come out of the COA war 

game. As more information about friendly forces and threat forces becomes available, the 

DST and DSM may change. 
Chapter IV 

IV-36 JP 5-0 

(b) The critical events are associated with the essential tasks identified in 

mission analysis. The decision points are tied to points in time and space when and where 

the commander must make a critical decision. Decision points will be tied to the CCIRs. 

Remember, CCIRs generate two types of information requirements: PIRs and FFIRs. The 

commander approves CCIRs. From a threat perspective, PIRs tied to a decision point will 

require an intelligence collection plan prioritizing and tasking collection assets to gather 

information about the threat. JIPOE ties PIRs to NAIs, which are linked to adversary COAs. 

The synchronization matrix is a tool that will help determine if adequate resources are 

available. Primary outputs are: 

1. Wargamed COAs with graphic and narrative. Branches and sequels 

identified. 

2. Information on commander’s evaluation criteria. 

3. Initial task organization. 

4. Critical events and decision points. 

5. Newly identified resource shortfalls to include force augmentation. 

6. Refined/new CCIRs and event template/matrix. 

7. Initial DST/DSM. 

8. Fleshed out synchronization matrix. 

9. Refined staff estimates. 

(c) The outputs of the COA war game will be used in the comparison/decision 

step, orders development, and transition. The outputs on the slide are products. The results 

of the war game are the strengths and weaknesses of each friendly COA, the core of the back 

brief to the commander. 

(d) The commander and staff normally will compare advantages and 

disadvantages of each COA during course of action comparison. However, if the suitability, 

feasibility, or acceptability of any COA becomes questionable during the analysis step, the 

commander should modify or discard it and concentrate on other COAs. The need to create 

additional combinations of COAs may also be required. 

7. Course of Action Comparison 

a. Introduction

(1) COA comparison is a subjective process whereby COAs are considered 

independently and evaluated/compared against a set of criteria that are established by the 

staff and commander. The goal is to identify and recommend the COA that has the highest 

probability of success against the enemy COA that is of the most concern to the commander. 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-37 

(2) Figure IV-13 depicts inputs and outputs for COA comparison. Other products 

not graphically shown in the chart include updated JIPOE products, updated CCIRs, staff 

estimates, commander’s identification of branches for further planning, and a WARNORD 

as appropriate. 

(3) COA comparison facilitates the commander’s decision-making process by 

balancing the ends, means, ways, and risk of each COA. The end product of this task is a 

briefing to the commander on a COA recommendation and a decision by the commander. 

COA comparison helps the commander answer the following questions: 

(a) What are the differences between each COA?

(b) What are the advantages and disadvantages?

(c) What are the risks? 

b. COA Comparison Process

(1) In COA comparison, the staff evaluates all COAs against established evaluation 

criteria and selects the COA that best accomplishes the mission. The commander reviews 

the criteria list and adds or deletes as he sees fit. The number of evaluation criteria will vary, 

but there should be enough to differentiate COAs. Consequently, COAs are not compared 

with each other, but rather they are individually evaluated against the criteria that are 

established by the staff and commander. 

(2) Staff officers may each use their own matrix, such as the example in Figure IV14, to compare COAs with respect to their functional areas. Matrices use the evaluation 

criteria developed before the war game. Decision matrices alone cannot provide decision 

solutions. Their greatest value is providing a method to compare COAs against criteria that, 

when met, produce mission success. They are analytical tools that staff officers use to 

Figure IV-13. Course of Action Comparison 

Course of Action Comparison

Advantages and 

disadvantages

Wargaming results

Evaluation criteria

Revised staff estimates

Evaluated COAs

Recommended COA

COA selection rationale

Revised staff estimates

Refined commander's 

critical information 

requirements

Key Inputs Key Outputs

Course of Action 

(COA) 

Comparison
Chapter IV 

IV-38 JP 5-0 

prepare recommendations. Commanders provide the solution by applying their judgment to 

staff recommendations and making a decision. 

(3) The staff helps the commander identify and select the COA that best 

accomplishes the mission. The staff supports the commander’s decision-making process by 

clearly portraying the commander’s options and recording the results of the process. The 

staff compares feasible COAs to identify the one with the highest probability of success 

against the most likely enemy COA and the most dangerous enemy COA. 

(4) Prepare for COA comparison. The commander and staff develop and 

evaluate a list of important criteria. Using the evaluation criteria discussed during COA 

analysis and wargaming, the staff outlines each COA, highlighting advantages and 

disadvantages. Comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the COAs identifies their 

advantages and disadvantages relative to each other. 

(a) Determine/define comparison/evaluation criteria. As discussed earlier, 

criteria are based on the particular circumstances and should be relative to the situation. 

There is no standard list of criteria, although the commander may prescribe several core 

criteria that all staff directors will use. Individual staff sections, based on their estimate 

process, select the remainder of the criteria. 

1. Criteria are based on the particular circumstances and should be relative 

to the situation. 

2. Review commander’s guidance for relevant criteria. 

Figure IV-14. Staff Estimate Matrix (Intelligence Estimate) 

Staff Estimate Matrix (Intelligence Estimate)

Evaluation Criteria Frontal

Course of Action 1

Envelopment

Course of Action 2

Effects of Terrain

Effects of Weather

Utilizes Surprise

Attacks Critical Vulnerabilities

Collection Support

Counterintelligence

Totals 2 4
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-39 

3. Identify implicit significant factors relating to the operation. 

4. Each staff identifies criteria relating to that staff function. 

5. Other criteria might include: 

a. Political, social, and safety constraints; requirements for 

coordination with embassy/interagency personnel. 

b. Fundamentals of joint warfare, including stability operations. 

c. Elements of operational art. 

d. Mission accomplishment. 

e. Risks. 

f. Costs. 

(b) Define and determine the standard for each criterion. 

1. Establish standard definitions for each evaluation criterion. Define the 

criteria in precise terms to reduce subjectivity and ensure the interpretation of each 

evaluation criterion remains constant between the various COAs. 

2. Establish definitions prior to commencing COA comparison to avoid 

compromising the outcome. 

3. Apply standards for each criterion to each COA. 

(c) The staff evaluates feasible COAs using those evaluation criteria most 

important to the commander to identify the one COA with the highest probability of success. 

The selected COA should also: 

1. Mitigate risk to the force and mission to an acceptable level. 

2. Place the force in the best posture for future operations. 

3. Provide maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates. 

4. Provide the most flexibility to meet unexpected threats and 

opportunities. 

c. Determine the comparison method and record. Actual comparison of COAs is 

critical. The staff may use any technique that facilitates reaching the best recommendation 

and the commander making the best decision. There are a number of techniques for 

comparing COAs. Examples of several decision matrices can be found in Appendix G, 

“Course of Action Comparison.” 
Chapter IV 

IV-40 JP 5-0 

d. COA comparison remains a subjective process and should not be turned into a 

mathematical equation. The key element in this process is the ability to articulate to the 

commander why one COA is preferred over another. 

8. Course of Action Approval 

a. Introduction

(1) In this JOPP step, the staff briefs the commander on the COA comparison and 

the analysis and wargaming results, including a review of important supporting information. 

The staff determines the best COA to recommend to the commander. Figure IV-15 depicts 

the COA approval inputs and outputs. 

 (2) The nature of a potential contingency could make it difficult to determine a 

specific end state until the crisis actually occurs. In these cases, the JFC may choose to 

present two or more valid COAs for approval by higher authority. A single COA can then be 

approved when the crisis occurs and specific circumstances become clear. However, in 

CAP, the desired end state should be represented by the set of objectives the President 

approves before committing forces to combat. 

b. Prepare and present the COA decision briefing. The staff briefs the commander 

on the COA comparison and the analysis and wargaming results. The briefing should 

include a review of important supporting information such as the current status of the joint 

force; the current JIPOE; and assumptions used in COA development. All principal staff 

directors and the component commanders should attend this briefing (physically or 

electronically). Figure IV-16 shows a sample COA briefing guide. 

c. Commander selects/modifies the COA. COA approval/selection is the end result of 

the COA comparison process. Throughout the COA development process, the commander 

conducts an independent analysis of the mission, possible COAs, and relative merits and 

risks associated with each COA. The commander, upon receiving the staff’s 

Figure IV-15. Course of Action Approval 

Course of Action Approval

Refined COAs

Staff recommendation

Joint force commander's 

(JFC's) personal analysis 

(experience and judgment)

COA modifications

JFC's COA selection

Commander's estimate 

(if required)

Refined commander's 

intent

Key Inputs Key Outputs

Course of Action 

(COA)

Approval
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-41 

Figure IV-16. Sample Course of Action Briefing Guide 





Purpose of the briefing

Opposing situation

 A review of opposing forces, both committed and available for 

reinforcement

 Order of battle, major weapons systems, and operational 

characteristics

 Ground combat and fire support forces; air, naval, 

and missile forces; logistics forces and nodes; command and control facilities; 

and other combat power

 Land; air; naval; missile; chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear; other advanced weapons systems; capacity for movement of 

these forces 

 Summary of opposing forces ability to support combat operations

 The capacity to move and reinforce positions

 The state of training, readiness, battle experience, 

physical condition, morale, leadership, motivation, tactical doctrine, discipline, 

and significant strengths and weaknesses















Strength.

Composition.

Location and disposition.

Reinforcements.

Logistics

Time and space factors.

Combat efficiency.

Sample Course of Action Briefing Guide









Friendly situation (similar elements as opposing situation)

Mission statements

Commander's intent statement

Operational concepts and courses of action (COAs)

Any changes from the mission analysis briefing in the following areas:

ines of operation/lines of effort

Present courses of action. As a minimum, discuss:

– COA# _____ (short name, e.g., "Simultaneous Assault")

– COA statement (brief concept of operations)

– COA sketch

– COA architecture

- task organization

- command relationships

- organization of the operational area

– major differences between each COA

– summaries of COAs

COA analysis

– review of the joint planning group's wargaming efforts

– add considerations from own experiences

COA comparisons

– description of comparison criteria (e.g., evaluation criteria) and comparison 

methodology

– weigh strengths and weaknesses with respect to comparison criteria

COA recommendations

– staff

– components











– assumptions

– limitations

– adversary and friendly centers of gravity (COGs)

– phasing of the operation (if phased)

– l
Chapter IV 

IV-42 JP 5-0 

recommendation, combines his analysis with the staff recommendation, resulting in a 

selected COA. It gives the staff a concise statement of how the commander intends to 

accomplish the mission, and provides the necessary focus for execution planning and 

contingency plan development. During this step, the commander should: 

(1) Review staff recommendations. 

(2) Apply results of own COA analysis and comparison. 

(3) Consider any separate recommendations from supporting and subordinate 

commanders. 

(4) Review guidance from the higher headquarters/strategic guidance. 

(5) The commander may: 

(a) Concur with staff/component recommendations, as presented. 

(b) Concur with recommended COAs, but with modifications. 

(c) Select a different COA from the staff/component recommendation. 

(d) Direct the use of a COA not formerly considered. 

(e) Defer the decision and consult with selected staff/commanders prior to 

making a final decision. 

d. Refine Selected COA. Once the commander selects a COA, the staff will begin the 

refinement process of that COA into a clear decision statement to be used in the 

commander’s estimate. At the same time, the staff will apply a final “acceptability” check. 

(1) Staff refines commander’s COA selection into clear decision statement. 

(a) Develop a brief statement that clearly and concisely sets forth the COA 

selected and provides only whatever information is necessary to develop a plan for the 

operation (no defined format). 

(b) Describe what the force is to do as a whole, and as much of the elements of 

when, where, and how as may be appropriate. 

(c) Express decision in terms of what is to be accomplished, if possible. 

(d) Use simple language so the meaning is unmistakable. 

(e) Include statement of what is acceptable risk. 

(2) Apply final “acceptability” check. 

(a) Apply experience and an understanding of situation. 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-43 

(b) Consider factors of acceptable risk versus desired outcome consistent with 

higher commander’s intent and concept. Determine if gains are worth expenditures. 

e. Prepare the Commander’s Estimate 

(1) Once the commander has made a decision on a selected COA, provided 

guidance, and updated intent, the staff completes the commander’s estimate. The 

commander’s estimate provides a concise narrative statement of how the commander 

intends to accomplish the mission and provides the necessary focus for campaign planning 

and contingency plan development. Further, it responds to the establishing authority’s 

requirement to develop a plan for execution. The commander’s estimate provides a 

continuously updated source of information from the perspective of the commander. 

Commanders at various levels use estimates during JOPP to support all aspects of COA 

determination and plan or order development. 

(2) Outside of formal APEX requirements, a commander may or may not use a 

commander’s estimate as the situation dictates. The commander’s initial intent statement 

and planning guidance to the staff can provide sufficient information to guide the planning 

process. Although the commander will tailor the content of the commander’s estimate based 

on the situation, a typical format for an estimate that a commander submits is shown at 

Figure IV-17. 

(a) Precise contents may vary widely, depending on the nature of the crisis, 

time available to respond, and the applicability of prior planning. In a rapidly developing 

situation, the formal commander’s estimate may be initially impractical, and the entire 

estimate process may be reduced to a commanders’ conference. 

(b) In practice, with appropriate horizontal and vertical coordination, the 

commander’s COA selection could already have been briefed to and approved by SecDef. In 

the current global environment, where major military operations are both politically and 

strategically significant, even a commander’s selected COA is normally briefed to and 

approved by the President or SecDef. The commander’s estimate then becomes a matter of 

formal record keeping and guidance for component and supporting forces. 

(3) The supported commander may use simulation and analysis tools in the 

collaborative environment to assess a variety of options, and may also choose to convene a 

concept development conference involving representatives of subordinate and supporting 

commands, the Services, JS, and other interested parties. Review of the resulting 

commander’s estimate (also referred to as the strategic concept) requires maximum 

collaboration and coordination among all planning participants. The supported commander 

may highlight issues for future interagency consultation, review, or resolution to be 

presented to SecDef during the IPR. 

(4) CJCS Estimate Review. The estimate review determines whether the scope 

and concept of planned operations satisfy the tasking and will accomplish the mission; 

determines whether the assigned tasks can be accomplished using available resources in the 

timeframes contemplated by the plan; and ensures the plan is proportional and worth the 
Chapter IV 

IV-44 JP 5-0 

expected costs. Once approved for further planning by SecDef during the concept 

development IPR (IPR C), the commander’s estimate becomes the CONOPS for the plan. 

9. Plan or Order Development 

a. Concept of Operations

(1) Deliberate planning will result in plan development, while CAP typically 

will lead directly to OPORD development. During plan or order development, the 

commander and staff, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting components and 

organizations, expand the approved COA into a detailed joint contingency plan or OPORD 

by first developing an executable CONOPS—the eventual centerpiece of the contingency 

plan or OPORD. 

(2) The CONOPS clearly and concisely expresses what the JFC intends to 

accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. It describes how the actions 

of the joint force components and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, 

and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels. The 

CONOPS: 

Figure IV-17. Commander’s Estimate 

Commander's Estimate

Operational Description







Purpose of the operation

References

Description of military operations

Narrative—Five Paragraphs











Mission

Situation and courses of action

Analysis of opposing courses of action (adversary capabilities and intentions)

Comparison of friendly courses of action

Recommendation or decision

Remarks

 Remarks—Cite plan identification number of the file where detailed requirements 

have been loaded into the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-45 

(a) States the commander’s intent. 

(b) Describes the central approach the JFC intends to take to accomplish the 

mission. 

(c) Provides for the application, sequencing, synchronization, and integration 

of forces and capabilities in time, space, and purpose (including those of multinational and 

interagency organizations as appropriate). 

(d) Describes when, where, and under what conditions the supported 

commander intends to give or refuse battle, if required. 

(e) Focuses on friendly and adversary COGs and their associated critical 

vulnerabilities. 

(f) Avoids discernible patterns and makes full use of ambiguity and deception. 

(g) Provides for controlling the tempo of the operation. 

(h) Visualizes the campaign in terms of the forces and functions involved. 

(i) Relates the joint force’s objectives and desired effects to those of the next 

higher command and other organizations as necessary. This enables assignment of tasks to 

subordinate and supporting commanders. 

(3) The staff writes (or graphically portrays) the CONOPS in sufficient detail so 

that subordinate and supporting commanders understand their mission, tasks, and other 

requirements and can develop their supporting plans accordingly. During CONOPS 

development, the commander determines the best arrangement of simultaneous and 

sequential actions and activities to accomplish the assigned mission consistent with the 

approved COA. This arrangement of actions dictates the sequencing of forces into the OA, 

providing the link between the CONOPS and force planning. The link between the 

CONOPS and force planning is preserved and perpetuated through the TPFDD structure. 

The structure must ensure unit integrity, force mobility, and force visibility as well as the 

ability to transition to branches or sequels rapidly as operational conditions dictate. Planners 

ensure that the CONOPS, force plan, deployment plans, and supporting plans provide the 

flexibility to adapt to changing conditions, and are consistent with the JFC’s intent. 

(4) If the scope, complexity, and duration of the military action contemplated to 

accomplish the assigned mission warrant a campaign, then the staff outlines the series of 

military operations and associated objectives in a strategic concept. They develop the 

CONOPS for the preliminary part of the campaign in sufficient detail to impart a clear 

understanding of the commander’s concept of how the assigned mission will be 

accomplished. 

(5) During CONOPS development, the JFC must assimilate many variables under 

conditions of uncertainty to determine the essential military conditions, sequence of actions, 

and application of capabilities and associated forces to create effects and achieve objectives. 
Chapter IV 

IV-46 JP 5-0 

JFCs and their staffs must be continually aware of the higher-level objectives and 

associated desired and undesired effects that influence planning at every juncture. If 

operational objectives are not linked to strategic objectives, the inherent linkage or “nesting” 

is broken and eventually tactical considerations can begin to drive the overall strategy at 

cross-purposes. 

The CJCSM 3122.01 series volumes provide detailed guidance on CONOPS content and 

format. 

b. Format of Military Plans and Orders. Plans and orders can come in many 

varieties from very detailed campaign plans and contingency plans to simple verbal orders. 

They also include OPORDs, WARNORDs, PLANORDs, ALERTORDs, EXORDs, and 

FRAGORDs, as well as PTDOs, DEPORDs, and GFMAP Annex Schedule modifications. 

The more complex directives will contain much of the amplifying information in appropriate 

annexes and appendices. However, the directive should always contain the essential 

information in the main body. The form may depend on the time available, the complexity 

of the operation, and the levels of command involved. However, in most cases, the directive 

will be standardized in the five-paragraph format that is described in Appendix A, “Joint 

Operation Plan Format.” Following is a brief description of each of these paragraphs. 

(1) Paragraph 1—Situation. The commander’s summary of the general situation 

that ensures subordinates understand the background of the planned operations. Paragraph 1 

will often contain subparagraphs describing the higher commander’s intent, friendly forces, 

and enemy forces. 

(2) Paragraph 2—Mission. The commander inserts his mission statement. 

(3) Paragraph 3—Execution. This paragraph contains commander’s intent, 

which will enable commanders two levels down to exercise initiative while keeping their 

actions aligned with the overall purpose of the mission. It also specifies objectives, tasks, 

and assignments for subordinates (by phase, as applicable—with clear criteria denoting 

phase completion). 

(4) Paragraph 4—Administration and Logistics. This paragraph describes the 

concept of support for logistics, personnel, and medical services. 

(5) Paragraph 5—Command and Control. This paragraph specifies the 

command relationships, succession of command, and overall plan for communications.

c. Plan or Order Development 

(1) For plans and orders developed per JSCP direction or as a result of a 

Presidential or SecDef tasking (normally transmitted through the CJCS), the CJCS, in 

coordination with the supported and supporting commanders and other members of the JCS, 

monitors planning activities, resolves shortfalls when required, and reviews the supported 

commander’s contingency plan for adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, completeness, and 

compliance with joint doctrine. The supported commander will conduct one or more plan 

approval IPRs with SecDef (or designated approval authority) to confirm the plan’s strategic 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-47 

guidance and receive approval of assumptions, the mission statement, the concept, the plan, 

and any further guidance required for plan refinement. During IPR F, the CJCS and USD(P) 

will include issues arising from, or resolved during, plan review (e.g., key risks, decision 

points). The intended result of IPR F is SecDef approval of the basic plan and required 

annexes, the resolution of any remaining key issues, and approval to proceed with plan 

assessment (as applicable) with any amplifying guidance or direction. If the President or 

SecDef decides to execute the plan, all three APEX operational activities—situational 

awareness, planning, and execution—continue in a complementary and iterative process. 

(2) The JFC guides plan development by issuing a PLANORD or similar planning 

directive to coordinate the activities of the commands and agencies involved. A number of 

activities are associated with plan development, as Figure IV-18 shows. These planning 

activities typically will be accomplished in a parallel, collaborative, and iterative fashion 

rather than sequentially, depending largely on the planning time available. The same 

flexibility displayed in COA development is seen here again, as planners discover and 

eliminate shortfalls. 

(3) The CJCSM 3122 series provides specific guidance on these activities for 

organizations required to prepare a plan per APEX procedures. However, these are typical 

types of activities that other organizations also will accomplish as they plan for joint 

operations. For example, a CCMD that is preparing a crisis-related OPORD at the 

President’s direction will follow specific procedures and milestones in force planning, 

TPFDD development, and shortfall identification. If required, a JTF subordinate to the 

CCMD will support this effort even as the JTF commander and staff are planning for their 

specific mission and tasks. 

(a) Application of Forces and Capabilities

1. When planning the application of forces and capabilities, the JFC 

should not be completely constrained by force apportionment if additional resources 

are justifiable and no other COA within the apportioned forces reasonably exists. The 

additional capability requirements will be coordinated with JS through the allocation process. 

Figure IV-18. Plan Development Activities

Plan Development Activities











Force planning

Support planning

Nuclear strike planning

Deployment and redeployment 

planning

Shortfall identification











Feasibility analysis

Refinement

Documentation

Plan review and approval

Supporting plan development
Chapter IV 

IV-48 JP 5-0 

Risk assessments will include results using both apportioned capabilities and augmentation 

capabilities. Operation planning is inherently an iterative process, with forces being 

requested and approved for certain early phases, while other forces may be needed or 

withdrawn for the later phases. This process is particularly complex when planning a 

campaign because of the potential magnitude of committed forces and length of the 

commitment. Finally, when making this determination, the JFC should also consider 

withholding some capability as an operational reserve. 

2. When developing contingency plan, the supported JFC should designate 

the main effort and supporting efforts as soon as possible. This action is necessary for 

economy of effort and for allocating disparate forces, to include MNFs. The main effort is 

based on the supported JFC’s prioritized objectives. It identifies where the supported JFC 

will concentrate capabilities to achieve specific objectives. Designation of the main effort 

can be addressed in geographical (area) or functional terms. Area tasks and 

responsibilities focus on a specific area to control or conduct operations. An example is the 

assignment of areas of operations for Army forces and Marine Corps forces operating in the 

same JOA. Functional tasks and responsibilities focus on the performance of continuing 

efforts that involve the forces of two or more Military Departments operating in the same 

domain—air, land, maritime, or space—or where there is a need to accomplish a distinct 

aspect of the assigned mission. An example is the designation of the maritime component 

commander as the joint force air component commander when the Navy component 

commander has the preponderance of the air assets and the ability to effectively plan, task, 

and control joint air operations. In either case, designating the main effort will establish 

where or how a major portion of available friendly forces and assets are employed, often to 

attain the primary objective of a major operation or campaign. 

3. Designating a main effort facilitates the synchronized and integrated 

employment of the joint force while preserving the initiative of subordinate commanders. 

After the main effort is identified, joint force and component planners determine those tasks 

essential to accomplishing objectives. The supported JFC assigns these tasks to subordinate 

commanders along with the capabilities and support necessary to accomplish them. As such, 

the CONOPS must clearly specify the nature of the main effort. 

4. The main effort can change during the course of the operation based on 

numerous factors, including changes in the operational environment and how the adversary 

reacts to friendly operations. When the main effort changes, support priorities must change 

to ensure success. Both horizontal and vertical coordination within the joint force and with 

multinational and interagency partners is essential when shifting the main effort. Secondary 

efforts are important, but are ancillary to the main effort. They normally are designed to 

complement or enhance the success of the main effort (for example, by diverting enemy 

resources). Only necessary secondary efforts, whose potential value offsets or exceeds the 

resources required, should be undertaken, because these efforts may divert resources from 

the main effort. Secondary efforts normally lack the operational depth of the main effort and 

have fewer forces and capabilities, smaller reserves, and more limited objectives. 

(b) Force Planning 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-49 

1. The primary purposes of force planning are to identify all forces needed 

to accomplish the supported component commanders’ CONOPS with some rigor and 

effectively phase the forces into the OA. Force planning consists of determining the force 

requirements by operation phase, mission, mission priority, mission sequence, and operating 

area. It includes force allocation review, major force phasing, integration planning, force list 

structure development, and force list development. Force planning is the responsibility of 

the CCDR, supported by component commanders in coordination with JS and JFPs. Force 

planning begins early during CONOPS development and focuses on applying the right force 

to the mission while ensuring force visibility, force mobility, and adaptability. The 

commander determines force requirements; develops a TPFDD letter of instruction (LOI) 

specific to the OA; and designs force modules to align and time-phase the forces in 

accordance with the CONOPS. Proper force planning allows major forces and elements to 

be selected from those apportioned or allocated for planning and included in the supported 

commander’s CONOPS by operation phase, mission, and mission priority. Service 

components then collaboratively make tentative assessments of the specific sustainment 

capabilities required in accordance with the CONOPS. Upon direction to execute, the 

CCDR then submits the refined force requests to JS. JS assigns a JFP to each force request 

and directs the JFP to forward a recommended sourcing solution (execution sourcing). The 

JFP provides the recommended sourcing solution with the operational and force provider risk 

for SecDef decision. The allocation decision is published in a modification to the CJCS 

GFMAP annex that directs the JFP to direct the force provider to deploy forces or provide 

capabilities. The JFP then publishes a modification to the GFMAP Annex Schedule to order 

the force provider to deploy forces. After the actual units or capabilities are identified 

(sourced), the CCDR refines the force plan by identifying and inserting contracted support 

requirements to ensure it supports the CONOPS, provides force visibility, and enables 

flexibility. The commander identifies and resolves or reports shortfalls with a risk 

assessment. 

2. In CAP, force planning focuses on the actual units designated to 

participate in the planned operation and their readiness for deployment. The supported 

commander identifies force requirements as operational capabilities in the form of force 

packages to facilitate sourcing the GFM process. A force package is a list (group of force 

capabilities) of the various forces (force requirements) that the supported commander 

requires to conduct the operation described in the CONOPS. The supported commander 

typically describes required force requirements in the form of broad capability descriptions 

or unit type codes, depending on the circumstances. The supported commander submits the 

required force packages through JS to the force providers for sourcing. Force providers 

review the readiness and deployability posture of their available units before deciding which 

units to allocate to the supported commander’s force requirements. Services and their 

component commands also determine mobilization requirements and plan for the provision 

of non-unit sustainment. The supported commander will review the sourcing 

recommendations through the GFM process to ensure compatibility with capability 

requirements and CONOPS. 

(c) Support Planning. The purpose of support planning is to determine the 

TPFDD sequencing of the personnel, logistic, and other support necessary to provide mission 

support, distribution, maintenance, civil engineering, medical support, personnel service 
Chapter IV 

IV-50 JP 5-0 

support, and sustainment for the joint force in accordance with the CONOPS. Support 

planning is conducted in parallel with other planning and encompasses such essential factors 

as IO, SC, lead component identification, assignment of responsibility for base operating 

support, communications and network support, airfield operations, management of non-unit 

replacements, health service support, personnel service support, personnel management, 

personnel visibility, financial management, handling of prisoners of war and detainees, 

theater civil engineering policy, logistic-related environmental considerations, IFO, support 

of noncombatant evacuation operations and other retrograde operations, and nation 

assistance. The GCC and subordinate commanders must review inter-Service support 

agreements. The GCC may designate a Service component commander as the single-Service 

manager for theater postal operations and morale, welfare, and recreation. The GCC must 

decide whether to delegate directive authority for logistics to a subordinate JFC and what 

will be the specific authority by function and scope. The GCC must also decide whether to 

assign specific common user logistic functions to a lead Service and what size, roles, and 

functions a joint deployment and distribution operations center will have if a common user 

logistic lead is assigned. The GCC planning guidance must clearly articulate the degree of 

reliance on HNS, acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, or contract support within each 

phase of operations. Finally, the GCC must decide whether or not to establish a joint 

command for logistics or to delegate the authority to a subordinate Service component. 

Support planning is primarily the responsibility of the Service component commanders and 

begins during CONOPS development. Service component commanders identify and update 

support requirements in coordination with the Services, Defense Logistics Agency, and 

USTRANSCOM. Service component commanders initiate the procurement of critical and 

low-density inventory items, determine HNS availability, determine contract support 

requirements and plans, develop plans for asset visibility, and establish phased delivery plans 

for sustainment in line with the phases and priorities of the CONOPS. They develop and 

train for battle damage repair, develop reparable retrograde plans, develop container 

management plans, develop force and LOC protection plans, develop supporting phased 

transportation and support plans aligned to the CONOPS, and report movement support 

requirements. Service component commanders continue to refine their mission support, 

sustainment, and distribution requirements as the force providers identify and source force 

requirements. During distribution planning, the supported CCDR and USTRANSCOM 

resolve gross distribution feasibility questions impacting intertheater and intratheater 

movement and sustainment delivery. If these feasibility questions are identified shortfalls 

due to inadequate resources, then planners must address these shortfalls as discussed in 

paragraph 9c(3)(f), “Shortfall Identification.” USTRANSCOM and other transportation 

providers identify air, land, and sea transportation resources to support the approved 

CONOPS. These resources may include apportioned intertheater transportation, GCCcontrolled theater transportation, and transportation organic to the subordinate commands. 

USTRANSCOM and other transportation providers develop transportation schedules for 

movement requirements identified by the supported commander. A transportation schedule 

does not necessarily mean that the supported commander’s CONOPS is transportation 

feasible; rather, the schedules provide the most effective and realistic use of available 

transportation resources in relation to the phased CONOPS. 

For additional information on the joint deployment and distribution operation center and the 

GCC’s options for assigning logistics responsibilities, see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-51 

1. Logistics supportability analysis is conducted to confirm the sourcing 

of logistic requirements in accordance with strategic guidance and to assess the adequacy of 

resources provided through support planning. This analysis ensures support is phased in 

accordance with the CONOPS; refines support C2 planning; and integrates support plans 

across the supporting commands, Service components, and agencies. It ensures an effective 

but minimum logistics footprint for each phase of the CONOPS. 

2. Transportation refinement simulates the planned movement of 

resources that require lift support to ensure that the plan is transportation feasible. The 

supported commander evaluates and adjusts the CONOPS to achieve end-to-end 

transportation feasibility if possible, or requests additional resources if the level of risk is 

unacceptable. Transportation plans must be consistent and reconciled with plans and 

timelines required by providers of Service-unique combat and support aircraft to the 

supported CCDR. Planning also must consider requirements of international law; commonly 

understood customs and practices; and agreements or arrangements with foreign nations with 

which the US requires permission for overflight, access, and diplomatic clearance. If 

significant changes are made to the CONOPS, it should be assessed for transportation 

feasibility and refined to ensure it is acceptable. 

(d) Nuclear Strike Planning. Commanders must assess the military as well as 

political impact a nuclear strike would have on their operations. Nuclear planning guidance 

issued at the CCDR level is based on national-level political considerations and is influenced 

by the military mission. Although United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) 

conducts nuclear planning in coordination with the supported GCC and certain allied 

commanders, the supported commander does not effectively control the decision to use 

nuclear weapons. 

(e) Deployment and Redeployment Planning. Deployment and 

redeployment planning is conducted on a continuous basis for all approved contingency 

plans and as required for specific crisis action plans. Planning for redeployment should be 

considered throughout the operation and is best accomplished in the same time-phased 

process in which deployment was accomplished. In all cases, mission requirements of a 

specific operation define the scope, duration, and scale of both deployment and 

redeployment operation planning. Unity of effort is paramount, since both deployment and 

redeployment operations involve numerous commands, agencies, and functional processes. 

Procedures and standards to attain and maintain visibility of personnel must be formulated. 

Because the ability to adapt to unforeseen conditions is essential, supported CCDRs must 

ensure that their deployment plans for each contingency or crisis action plan support global 

force visibility requirements. When operations that may be lengthy are planned, 

consideration must be given to force rotations. Units must rotate without interrupting 

operations. Planning should consider joint reception, staging, onward movement, and 

integration (JRSOI), turnover time, relief-in-place, transfer of authority, and time it takes for 

the outbound unit to redeploy. This information is vital for the JFPs to develop force 

rotations in the GFMAP Annex Schedule if the operation is executed. 

1. Operational Environment. For a given plan, deployment planning 

decisions are based on the anticipated operational environment, which may be permissive, 
Chapter IV 

IV-52 JP 5-0 

uncertain, or hostile. The anticipated operational environment dictates the type of entry 

operations, deployment concept, mobility options, predeployment training, and force 

integration requirements. Normally, supported CCDRs, their subordinate commanders, and 

their Service components are responsible for providing detailed situation information, 

mission statements by operation phase, theater support parameters, strategic and operational 

lift allocations by phase (for both force movements and sustainment), HNS information and 

environmental standards, and pre-positioned equipment planning guidance. 

2. Deployment and Redeployment Concept. Supported CCDRs must 

develop a deployment concept and identify specific predeployment standards necessary to 

meet mission requirements. Supporting CCDRs provide trained and mission-ready forces to 

the supported CCMD deployment concept and predeployment standard. Services recruit, 

organize, train, and equip interoperable forces. The Services’ predeployment planning and 

coordination with the supporting CCMD must ensure that predeployment standards specified 

by the supported CCDR are achieved, supporting personnel and forces arrive in the 

supported theater fully prepared to perform their mission, and deployment delays caused by 

duplication of predeployment efforts are eliminated. The Services and supporting CCDRs 

must ensure unit contingency plans are prepared, forces are tailored and echeloned, 

personnel and equipment movement plans are complete and accurate, command relationship 

and integration requirements are identified, mission-essential tasks are rehearsed, missionspecific training is conducted, force protection is planned and resourced, and both logistics 

and personnel service support sustainment requirements are identified. Careful and detailed 

planning ensures that only required personnel, equipment, and materiel deploy; unit training 

is exacting; missions are fully understood; deployment changes are minimized during 

execution; and the flow of personnel, equipment, and movement of materiel into theater 

aligns with the CONOPS. Supported CCDRs must also develop a redeployment CONOPS 

to identify how forces and materiel will either redeploy to home station or to support another 

JFC’s operation. This redeployment CONOPS is especially relevant and useful if force 

rotations are envisioned to provide the requisite forces for a long-term operation. CCDRs 

may not have all planning factors to fully develop this CONOPS, but by using the best 

available information for redeployment requirements, timelines, and priorities, the efficiency 

and effectiveness of redeployment operations may be greatly improved. Topics addressed in 

this early stage of a redeployment CONOPS may include a proposed sequence for 

redeployment of units, individuals, and materiel. Responsibilities and priorities for recovery, 

reconstitution, and return to home station may also be addressed along with transition 

requirements during mission handover. As a campaign or operation moves through the 

different operational plan phases, the CCDR will be able to develop and issue a 

redeployment order based on a refined redeployment CONOPS. Effective redeployment 

operations are essential to ensure supporting Services and rotational forces have sufficient 

time to fully source and prepare for the next rotation. 

For additional information on deployment and redeployment planning, see JP 3-35, 

Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 

3. Movement Planning. Movement planning integrates the activities and 

requirements of units with partial or complete self-deployment capability, activities of units 

that require lift support, and the transportation of sustainment and retrogrades. Movement 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-53 

planning is highly collaborative and is enhanced by coordinated use of simulation and 

analysis tools. 

a. If a plan is executed, the supported command forwards force 

requests in an RFF to JS. These force requests are allocated in a modification to the 

appropriate GFMAP annex. The JFP then publishes the GFMAP Annex Schedule specifying 

the latest arrival date (LAD) and end date of each unit’s deployment. These allocated forces 

begin the process of building the TPFDD. The individual force requirements and the 

deployment information (available-to-load date, earliest arrival date, personnel increment 

number, ready-to-load date, etc.) are loaded into the execution plan identification number 

and further refined. 

b. The supported command is responsible for movement control, 

including sequence of arrival, and exercises this authority through the TPFDD and the APEX 

validation process. During execution, the supported command may sequence movement 

within the limits specified in the GFMAP by SecDef. The supported commander will use the 

organic lift and nonorganic, common-user, strategic lift resources made available for 

planning by the CJCS. Competing requirements for limited strategic lift resources, support 

facilities, and intratheater transportation assets will be assessed in terms of impact on mission 

accomplishment. If additional resources are required, the supported command will identify 

the requirements and provide rationale for those requirements in an RFF. The supported 

commander’s operational priorities and any movement constraints (e.g., assumptions 

concerning the potential use of WMD) are used to prepare a movement plan. The plan will 

consider en route staging locations and the ability of these locations to support the scheduled 

activity. This information, together with an estimate of required site augmentation, will be 

communicated to appropriate supporting commanders. The global force manager and 

USTRANSCOM use the Joint Flow Analysis and Sustainment for Transportation model to 

assess transportation feasibility and develop recommendations on final port of embarkation 

selections for those units without organic lift capability. Movement feasibility requires 

current analysis and assessment of movement C2 structures and systems; available organic, 

strategic, and theater lift assets; transportation infrastructure; and competing demands and 

restrictions. 

c. After coordinated review of the movement analysis by 

USTRANSCOM, the supported command, and the JFPs, the supported command may adjust 

the CONOPS to improve movement feasibility where operational requirements remain 

satisfied. Commander, USTRANSCOM, should adjust or reprioritize transportation assets to 

meet the supported commander’s operational requirements. If this is not an option due to 

requirements from other commanders, then the supported commander adjusts TPFDD 

requirements or is provided additional strategic and theater lift capabilities using (but not 

limited to) Civil Reserve Air Fleet and/or Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement 

capabilities as necessary to achieve end-to-end transportation feasibility. 

d. Operational requirements may cause the supported commander 

and/or subordinate commanders to alter their plans, potentially impacting the deployment 

priorities or force/capability requirements. Planners must understand and anticipate the 

impact of change. There is a high potential for a sequential pattern of disruption when 
Chapter IV 

IV-54 JP 5-0 

changes are made to the TPFDD either in altering the flow of previously planned 

movements, or adding movements to deploy or redeploy additional forces or capabilities. A 

unit displaced by a change might not simply move on the next available lift, but may require 

reprogramming for movement at a later time. This may not only disrupt the flow, but may 

also interrupt the operation. Time is also a factor in TPFDD changes. Airlift can respond to 

short-notice changes, but at a cost in efficiency. Sealift, on the other hand, requires longer 

lead times, and cannot respond to change in a short period. These plan changes and the 

resulting modifications to the TPFDDs must be handled during the planning cycles. 

4. JSROI. JRSOI planning is conducted to ensure deploying forces arrive 

and become operational in the OA as scheduled. Establishing personnel visibility for force 

protection purposes is necessary for joint forces immediately upon their arrival in the OA, 

and plans to accomplish this task are issued by the manpower and personnel directorate of a 

joint staff (J-1) at the CCMD level. JRSOI planning is also conducted to ensure forces can 

be scheduled in the GFMAP Annex Schedule to rotate without impacting operations. 

Effective integration of the force into the joint operation is the primary objective of the 

deployment process. 

5. CJCS and Supported GCC TPFDD LOIs. The supported 

commander publishes supplemental instructions for TPFDD development in the TPFDD 

LOI. The LOI provides operation-specific guidance for utilizing the APEX processes and 

systems to provide force visibility and tracking, force mobility, and operational agility 

through the TPFDD and the validation process. It provides procedures for the deployment, 

redeployment, and rotations of the operation’s forces. The LOI provides instructions on 

force planning sourcing, reporting, and validation. It defines planning and execution 

milestones and details movement control procedures and lift allocations to the commander’s 

components, supporting commanders, and other members of the JPEC. A TPFDD must 

ensure force visibility, be tailored to the phases of the concept of operation, and be 

transportation feasible. 

6. Deployment and JRSOI Refinement. Deployment, JRSOI, and 

logistics TPFDD refinement is conducted by the supported command in coordination with 

JS, JFPs, USTRANSCOM, the Services, and supporting commands. During execution, the 

flexibility of refinement of LADs and end dates is specified in the GFMAP. The purpose of 

the deployment and JRSOI refinement is to ensure the force deployment plan maintains force 

mobility throughout any movements, provides for force visibility and tracking at all times, 

provides for effective force preparation, and fully integrates forces into a joint operation 

while enabling unity of effort. This refinement conference examines planned missions, the 

priority of the missions within the operation phases, and the forces assigned to those 

missions. By mission, the refinement conference examines force capabilities, force size, 

support requirements, mission preparation, force positioning/basing, weapon systems, major 

equipment, force protection, and sustainment requirements. The refinement conference 

should assess the feasibility of force closure by the commander’s required delivery date and 

the feasibility of successful mission execution within the timeframe established by the 

commander under the deployment concept. This refinement conference should assess 

potential success of all force integration requirements. Transition criteria for all phases 

should be evaluated for force redeployment, including rotation requirements. 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-55 

For more information on JRSOI, see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 

7. For lesser-priority plans that may be executed simultaneously with 

higher-priority plans or ongoing operations, CCMD and USTRANSCOM planners may 

develop several different deployment scenarios to provide the CCDR a range of possible 

transportation conditions under which the plan may have to be executed based on risk to this 

plan and the other ongoing operations. This will help both the supported and supporting 

CCDRs identify risk associated with having to execute multiple operations in a 

transportation-constrained environment. 

(f) Shortfall Identification. Along with hazard and threat analysis, shortfall 

identification is conducted throughout the plan development process. The supported 

commander continuously identifies limiting factors and capabilities shortfalls and associated 

risks as plan development progresses. Where possible, the supported commander resolves 

the shortfalls and required controls and countermeasures through planning adjustments and 

coordination with supporting and subordinate commanders. If the shortfalls and necessary 

controls and countermeasures cannot be reconciled or the resources provided are inadequate 

to perform the assigned task, the supported commander reports these limiting factors and 

assessment of the associated risk to the CJCS. The CJCS and the Service Chiefs consider 

shortfalls and limiting factors reported by the supported commander and coordinate 

resolution. However, the completion of assigned plans is not delayed pending the resolution 

of shortfalls. If shortfalls cannot be resolved within the JSCP timeframe, the completed plan 

will include a consolidated summary and impact assessment of unresolved shortfalls and 

associated risks. 

(g) Feasibility Analysis. This step in plan or order development is similar to 

determining the feasibility of a COA, except that it typically does not involve simulationbased wargaming. The focus in this step is on ensuring the assigned mission can be 

accomplished using available resources within the time contemplated by the plan. The 

results of force planning, support planning, deployment and redeployment planning, and 

shortfall identification will affect contingency plan or OPORD feasibility. The primary 

factors considered are whether the apportioned or allocated resources can be deployed to the 

JOA when required, sustained throughout the operation, and employed effectively, or 

whether the scope of the plan exceeds the apportioned resources and supporting capabilities. 

Measures to enhance feasibility include adjusting the CONOPS, ensuring sufficiency of 

resources and capabilities, and maintaining options and reserves. 

(h) Documentation. When the TPFDD is complete and end-to-end 

transportation feasibility has been achieved and is acceptable to the supported CCDR, the 

supported CCDR completes the documentation of the final contingency plan or OPORD and 

coordinates access to the transportation-feasible TPFDD as appropriate. 

(i) Plan Review and Approval. When the final contingency plan or OPORD 

is complete, the supported commander then submits it with the associated TPFDD file to the 

CJCS for JPEC review. The JPEC reviews the supported commander’s contingency plan or 

OPORD and provides the results of the review to the CJCS. The CJCS reviews and 

recommends approval or disapproval of the contingency plan or OPORD to SecDef. The 
Chapter IV 

IV-56 JP 5-0 

JCS provides a copy of the plan to OSD to facilitate their parallel review of the plan and to 

inform USD(P)’s recommendation of approval/disapproval to SecDef. After the CJCS’s and 

USD(P)’s review, SecDef or the President will review, approve, or modify the plan. The 

President or SecDef is the final approval authority for OPORDs, depending upon the subject 

matter. 

(j) Supporting Plan Development

1. Supporting commanders prepare plans that encompass their role in the 

joint operation. Employment planning is normally accomplished by the JFC (CCDR or 

subordinate JFC) who will direct the forces if the plan is executed. Detailed employment 

planning may be delayed when the politico–military situation cannot be clearly forecast, or it 

may be excluded from supporting plans if employment is to be planned and executed within 

a multinational framework. 

2. The supported commander normally reviews and approves supporting 

plans. However, the CJCS may be asked to resolve critical issues that arise during the 

review of supporting plans, and JS may coordinate the review of any supporting plans should 

circumstances so warrant. Deliberate planning does not conclude when the supported 

commander approves the supporting plans. Planning refinement and maintenance continues 

until the operation terminates or the planning requirement is cancelled or superseded. 

(4) Transition. Transition is critical to the overall planning process. It is an 

orderly turnover of a plan or order as it is passed to those tasked with execution of the 

operation. It provides information, direction, and guidance relative to the plan or order that 

will help to facilitate situational awareness. Additionally, it provides an understanding of the 

rationale for key decisions necessary to ensure there is a coherent shift from planning to 

execution. These factors coupled together are intended to maintain the intent of the 

CONOPS, promote unity of effort, and generate tempo. Successful transition ensures that 

those charged with executing an order have a full understanding of the plan. Regardless of 

the level of command, such a transition ensures that those who execute the order understand 

the commander’s intent and CONOPS. Transition may be internal or external in the form of 

briefs or drills. Internally, transition occurs between future plans and future/current 

operations. Externally, transition occurs between the commander and subordinate 

commands.

(a) Transition Brief. At higher levels of command, transition may include a 

formal transition brief to subordinate or adjacent commanders and to the staff supervising 

execution of the order. At lower levels, it might be less formal. The transition brief provides 

an overview of the mission, commander’s intent, task organization, and enemy and friendly 

situation. It is given to ensure all actions necessary to implement the order are known and 

understood by those executing the order. The brief may include items from the order or plan 

such as: 

1. Higher headquarters’ mission and commander’s intent. 

2. Mission. 
Joint Operation Planning Process 

IV-57 

3. Commander’s intent. 

4. CCIRs. 

5. Task organization. 

6. Situation (friendly and enemy). 

7. CONOPS. 

8. Execution (including branches and potential sequels). 

9. Planning support tools (such as a synchronization matrix). 

(b) Confirmation Brief. A confirmation brief is given by a subordinate 

commander after receiving the order or plan. Subordinate commanders brief the higher 

commander on their understanding of commander’s intent, their specific tasks and purpose, 

and the relationship between their unit’s missions and the other units in the operation. The 

confirmation brief allows the higher commander to identify potential gaps in the plan, as 

well as discrepancies with subordinate plans. It also gives the commander insights into how 

subordinate commanders intend to accomplish their missions. 

(c) Transition Drills. Transition drills increase the situational awareness of 

subordinate commanders and the staff and instill confidence and familiarity with the plan. 

Sand tables, map exercises, and rehearsals are examples of transition drills. 

 
Chapter IV 

IV-58 JP 5-0 

Intentionally Blank 
A-1 

APPENDIX A 

JOINT OPERATION PLAN FORMAT 

SECTION A. INTRODUCTION 

1. Below is a sample format that a joint force staff can use as a guide when developing a 

joint OPLAN. The exact format and level of detail may vary somewhat among joint 

commands, based on theater-specific requirements and other factors. However, joint 

OPLANs/CONPLANs will always contain the basic five paragraphs (such as paragraph 3, 

“Execution”) and their primary subparagraphs (such as paragraph 3a, “Concept of 

Operations”). The JPEC typically refers to a joint contingency plans that encompasses 

more than one major operation as a campaign plan, but JFCs prepare a plan for a 

campaign in joint contingency plan format. 

2. The CJCSM 3122.01 series volumes describe joint operation planning interaction 

between the President, SecDef, CJCS, the supported joint commander, and other JPEC 

members, and provides models of planning messages and estimates. The CJCSM 3122.01 

series volumes provide the formats for joint OPLANs/CONPLANs when commanders must 

submit contingency plans in accordance with APEX policy requirements. 

SECTION B. NOTIONAL OPERATION PLAN FORMAT 

a. Copy Number 

b. Issuing Headquarters 

c. Place of Issue 

d. Effective Date-Time Group 

e. OPERATION PLAN: (Number or Code Name) 

f. USXXXXCOM OPERATIONS TO . . . 

g. References: (List any maps, charts, and other relevant documents deemed essential to 

comprehension of the plan.)

1. Situation 

(This section briefly describes the composite conditions, circumstances, and influences of the 

theater strategic situation that the plan addresses [see national intelligence estimate, any 

multinational sources, and strategic and commanders’ estimates].) 

a. General. (This section describes the general politico–military environment that 

would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the contingency plans. It should 

summarize the competing political goals that could lead to conflict. Identify primary 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 5-0 

antagonists. State US policy goals and the estimated goals of other parties. Outline 

political decisions needed from other countries to achieve US policy goals and conduct 

effective US military operations to achieve US military objectives. Specific items can be 

listed separately for clarity as depicted below.) 

(1) Environment of Conflict. (Provide a summary of the national and/or 

multinational strategic context [JSCP, UCP].)

(2) Policy Goals. (This section relates the strategic guidance, end state, and 

termination objectives to the theater situation and requirements in its global, regional, and 

space dimensions, interests, intentions/criteria for termination.) 

(a) US/Multinational Policy Goals. (Identify the national security, 

multinational or military objectives and strategic tasks assigned to or coordinated by the 

CCMD.) 

(b) End State. (Describe the national strategic end state and relate the military 

end state to the national strategic end state.)

(3) Non-US National Political Decisions

(4) Operational Limitations. (List actions that are prohibited or required by 

higher or multinational authority [ROE, law of armed conflict, termination criteria, etc.].)

b. Area of Concern

(1) Operational Area. (Describe the JFC’s OA. A map may be used as an 

attachment to graphically depict the area.)

(2) Area of Interest. (Describe the area of concern to the commander, including 

the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the 

objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by 

enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.)

c. Deterrent Options. (Delineate FDOs desired to include those categories specified in 

the current JSCP. Specific units and resources must be prioritized in terms of LAD relative 

to C-day. Include possible diplomatic, informational, or economic deterrent options 

accomplished by non-DOD agencies that would support US mission accomplishment. See 

Appendix E, “Flexible Deterrent Options,” for examples of FDOs.)

d. Risk. (Risk is the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. List the specific 

hazards that the joint force may encounter during the mission. List risk mitigation 

measures.)

e. Adversary Forces. (Identify the opposing forces expected upon execution and 

appraise their general capabilities. Refer readers to annex B [Intelligence] for details. 

However, this section should provide the information essential to a clear understanding of 
Joint Operation Plan Format 

A-3 

the magnitude of the hostile threat. Identify the adversary’s strategic and operational COGs 

and critical vulnerabilities as depicted below.)

(1) Adversary Centers of Gravity

(a) Strategic. 

(b) Operational. 

(2) Adversary Critical Factors

(a) Strategic. 

(b) Operational. 

(3) Adversary Courses of Action (most likely and most dangerous to friendly 

mission accomplishment).

(a) General. 

(b) Adversary’s End State. 

(c) Adversary’s Strategic Objectives. 

(d) Adversary’s Operational Objectives. 

(e) Adversary CONOPS. 

(4) Adversary Logistics and Sustainment

(5) Other Adversary Forces/Capabilities

(6) Adversary Reserve Mobilization

f. Friendly Forces

(1) Friendly Centers of Gravity. (This section should identify friendly COGs, both 

strategic and operational; this provides focus to force protection efforts.) 

(a) Strategic. 

(b) Operational. 

(2) Friendly Critical Factors

(a) Strategic. 

(b) Operational. 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 5-0 

(3) Multinational Forces

(4) Supporting Commands and Agencies. (Describe the operations of unassigned 

forces, other than those tasked to support this contingency plan, that could have a direct and 

significant influence on the operations in the plan. Also list the specific tasks of friendly 

forces, commands, or government departments and agencies that would directly support 

execution of the contingency plan, for example, USTRANSCOM, USSTRATCOM, Defense 

Intelligence Agency, and so forth.) 

g. Assumptions. (List all reasonable assumptions for all participants contained in the 

JSCP or other tasking on which the contingency plan is based. State expected conditions 

over which the JFC has no control. Include assumptions that are directly relevant to the 

development of the plan and supporting plans and assumptions to the plan as a whole. 

Include both specified and implied assumptions that, if they do not occur as expected, would 

invalidate the plan or its CONOPS. Specify the mobility [air and sea lift], the degree of 

mobilization assumed, i.e., total, full, partial, selective, or none.)

(1) Threat Warning/Timeline.

(2) Pre-Positioning and Regional Access (including international support and 

assistance).

(3) In-Place Forces.

(4) Strategic Assumptions (including those pertaining to nuclear weapons 

employment).

(5) Legal Considerations. (List those significant legal considerations on which the 

plan is based.)

(a) ROE. 

(b) International law, including the law of armed conflict. 

(c) US law. 

(d) Host-nation and partner nation policies. 

(e) Status-of-forces agreements. 

(f) Other bilateral treaties and agreements including Article 98 agreements.

2. Mission 

(State concisely the essential task[s] the JFC has to accomplish. This statement should 

address who, what, when, where, and why.)
Joint Operation Plan Format 

A-5 

3. Execution 

a. Concept of Operations. (For a CCDR’s contingency plan, the appropriate strategic 

concept(s) can be taken from the campaign plan and developed into a strategic concept of 

operation for a theater campaign or OPLAN. Otherwise, the CONOPS will be developed as 

a result of the COA selected by the JFC during COA development. The concept should be 

stated in terms of who, what, where, when, why, and how. It also contains the JFC’s 

strategic vision, intent, and design in the strategic concept of operation for force projection 

operations, including mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and 

redeployment of all participating forces, activities, and agencies.) (Refer to annex C.) 

(1) Commander’s Intent. (This should describe the JFC’s intent (purpose and end 

state), overall and by phase. This statement deals primarily with the military conditions that 

lead to mission accomplishment, so the commander may highlight selected objectives and 

their supporting effects. It may also include how the posture of forces at the end state 

facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the JFC’s assessment of the 

adversary commander’s intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable 

during the operation. The commander’s intent, though, is not a summary of the CONOPS.) 

(a) Purpose and End State. (See Chapter II, “Strategic Direction and Joint 

Operation Planning,” for details on determining the end state.)

(b) Objectives. 

(c) Effects, if discussed. 

(2) General. (Base the CONOPS on the JFC’s selected COA. The CONOPS states 

how the commander plans to accomplish the mission, including the forces involved, the 

phasing of operations; the general nature and purpose of operations to be conducted, and 

the interrelated or cross-Service support. For a CCDR’s contingency plan, the CONOPS 

should include a statement concerning the perceived need for Reserve Component 

mobilization based on plan force deployment timing and Reserve Component force size 

requirements. The CONOPS should be sufficiently developed to include an estimate of the 

level and duration of conflict to provide supporting and subordinate commanders a basis for 

preparing adequate supporting plans. To the extent possible, the CONOPS should 

incorporate the following:)

(a) JFC’s military objectives, supporting desired effects, and operational focus. 

(b) Orientation on the adversary’s strategic and operational COGs. 

(c) Protection of friendly strategic and operational COGs. 

(d) Phasing of operations, to include the commander’s intent for each phase. 

1. Phase I: 

a. JFC’s intent. 
Appendix A 

A-6 JP 5-0 

b. Timing. 

c. Objectives and desired effects. 

d. Risk. 

e. Execution. 

f. Employment. 

(1) Land Forces. 

(2) Air Forces. 

(3) Maritime Forces. 

(4) Space Forces. 

(5) SOF. 

g. Operational Fires. List those significant fires considerations on 

which the plan is based. The fires discussion should reflect the JFC’s concept for application 

of available fires assets. Guidance for joint fires may address the following: 

(1) Joint force policies, procedures, and planning cycles. 

(2) Joint fire support assets for planning purposes. 

(3) Priorities for employing target acquisition assets.

(4) Areas that require joint fires to support operational maneuver. 

(5) Anticipated joint fire support requirements. 

(6) Fire support coordinating measures (if required). 

See JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, for a detailed discussion. 

2. Phases II through XX. (Cite information as stated in subparagraph 

3a(2)(d)1 above for each subsequent phase based on expected sequencing, changes, or new 

opportunities.) 

b. Tasks. (List the tasks assigned to each element of the supported and supporting 

commands in separate subparagraphs. Each task should be a concise statement of a mission 

to be performed either in future planning for the operation or on execution of the OPORD. 

The task assignment should encompass all key actions that subordinate and supporting 

elements must perform to fulfill the CONOPS, including operational and tactical deception. 

If the actions cannot stand alone without exposing the deception, they must be published 

separately to receive special handling.)
Joint Operation Plan Format 

A-7 

c. Coordinating Instructions. (Provide instructions necessary for coordination and 

synchronization of the joint operation that apply to two or more elements of the command. 

Explain terms pertaining to the timing of execution and deployments.)

4. Administration and Logistics 

a. Concept of Sustainment. (This should provide broad guidance for the theater 

strategic sustainment concept for the campaign or operation, with information and 

instructions broken down by phases. It should cover functional areas of logistics, 

transportation, personnel policies, and administration.)

b. Logistics. (This paragraph should address sustainment priorities and resources; 

base development and other civil engineering requirements, HNS, contracted support, 

environmental considerations, mortuary affairs, and Service responsibilities. Identify the 

priority and movement of major logistic items for each option and phase of the concept. 

Note: Logistic phases must complement the operation’s phases. Identify strategic and 

theater ports of embarkation and debarkation for resupply. Outline transportation policies, 

guidance, and procedures for all options and phases.)

c. Personnel. (Identify detailed planning requirements and subordinate taskings. 

Assign tasks for establishing and operating joint personnel facilities, managing accurate and 

timely personnel accountability and strength reporting, and making provisions for staffing 

them. Discuss the administrative management of participating personnel, the reconstitution 

of forces, command replacement and rotation policies, and required joint individual 

augmentation to command headquarters and other operational requirements.) Refer to 

annex E (if published). 

d. Public Affairs. Refer to annex F.

e. Civil–Military Operations. Refer to annex G. 

f. Meteorological and Oceanographic Services. Refer to annex H. 

g. Environmental Considerations. Refer to annex L. See JP 3-34, Joint Engineer 

Operations. 

h. Geospatial Information and Services. Refer to annex M. 

i. Health Service Support. Refer to annex Q. (Identify planning requirements and 

subordinate taskings for health service support functional areas. Address critical medical 

supplies and resources. Assign tasks for establishing joint medical assumptions and include 

them in a subparagraph.)

5. Command and Control 

a. Command
Appendix A 

A-8 JP 5-0 

(1) Command Relationships. (State the organizational structure expected to exist 

during plan implementation. Indicate any changes to major C2 organizations and the time 

of expected shift. Identify all command arrangement agreements and memorandums of 

understanding used and those that require development.)

(2) Command Posts. (List the designations and locations of each major 

headquarters involved in execution. When headquarters are to be deployed or the plan 

provides for the relocation of headquarters to an alternate command post, indicate the 

location and time of opening and closing each headquarters.)

(3) Succession to Command. (Designate in order of succession the commanders 

responsible for assuming command of the operation in specific circumstances.)

b. Joint Communications System Support. (Provide a general statement concerning 

the scope of communications systems and procedures required to support the operation. 

Highlight any communications systems or procedures requiring special emphasis.) Refer to 

annex K. 

[Signature] 

[Name] 

[Rank/Service] 

Commander 

Annexes:

A—Task Organization 

B—Intelligence 

C—Operations 

D—Logistics 

E—Personnel 

F—Public Affairs 

G—Civil–Military Operations 

H—Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations 

J—Command Relationships 

K—Communications Systems 

L—Environmental Considerations 

M—Geospatial Information and Services 
Joint Operation Plan Format 

A-9 

N—Space Operations 

P—Host-Nation Support 

Q—Medical Services 

R—Reports 

S—Special Technical Operations 

T—Consequence Management 

U—Notional Counterproliferation Decision Guide 

V—Interagency Coordination 

W—Contingency Contracting 

X—Execution Checklist 

Y—Strategic Communication

Z—Distribution 

Note: Annexes A–D, K, and Y are required annexes for a CAP OPORD per APEX. All 

others may either be required by the JSCP or deemed necessary by the supported 

commander. 

 
Appendix A 

A-10 JP 5-0 

Intentionally Blank 
B-1 

APPENDIX B 

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE 

SECTION A. INTRODUCTION 

1. The strategic estimate is an analytical tool available to CCDRs prior to the development 

of theater strategies or the design of global campaign plans or TCPs and subordinate 

campaign plans or OPLANs. CCDRs use continuous strategic estimates to facilitate the 

employment of military forces across the range of military operations. The strategic estimate 

is more comprehensive in scope than the estimates of subordinate commanders as it 

encompasses all aspects of the CCDR’s operational environment, and it is the basis for the 

development of the GCC’s theater strategy. 

2. The CCDR, the CCMD staff, supporting commands, and agencies assess the broad 

strategic factors that influence the strategic environment, thus informing the ends, ways, 

means, and risks involved in accomplishing the theater strategic end state outlined in the 

GEF and JSCP. 

3. Both supported and supporting CCDRs prepare strategic estimates based on assigned 

tasks. CCDRs who support multiple commands may prepare strategic estimates for each 

supporting operation. 

4. Section B presents a notional format that a CCMD staff can use as a guide when 

developing a strategic estimate. The J-5 may provide the lead staff organization for the 

conduct of the strategic estimate with significant participation from the other staff 

directorates. The exact format and level of detail may vary somewhat among commands, 

based on theater-specific requirements and other factors. 

5. The result of the strategic estimate is a better understanding and visualization of the 

complete security environment to include potential adversaries, friends, and neutrals. The 

strategic estimate process is dynamic and continuous, and provides input for designing and 

developing theater strategies and campaign plans. This strategic estimate is also the starting 

point for conducting the commander’s estimate of the situation for a specific plan or order 

focusing on specific problems to be solved using deliberate planning or CAP. 

SECTION B. NOTIONAL STRATEGIC ESTIMATE FORMAT 

1. Strategic Direction 

(This section analyzes broad policy, strategic guidance, and authoritative direction to the 

theater situation and identifies theater strategic requirements in global and regional 

dimensions.) 

a. US Policy Goals. (Identify the US national security or military objectives and 

strategic tasks assigned to or coordinated by the CCMD.) 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 5-0 

b. Non-US/Multinational Policy Goals. (Identify the multinational (alliance or 

coalition) security or military objectives and strategic tasks that may also be assigned to, or 

coordinated by the CCMD.) 

c. End State(s). (Describe the strategic end state[s] and related military end state[s] 

to be maintained or accomplished.) 

2. Strategic Environment 

(Analyze the information on the characteristics of the strategic environment.) 

a. Area of Responsibility. (Provide a visualization of the relevant geographic, 

political, economic, social, demographic, historic, and cultural factors in the AOR assigned 

to the CCDR.) 

b. Area of Interest. (Describe the area of interest to the commander, including the 

area of influence and adjacent areas and extending into adversary or potential enemy 

territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the 

accomplishment of the mission.) 

c. Adversary Forces. (Identify all states, groups, or organizations expected to be 

hostile to, or that may threaten, US and partner nation interests, and appraise their general 

objectives, motivations, and capabilities. Provide the information essential for a clear 

understanding of the magnitude of the potential threat.) 

d. Friendly Forces. (Identify all relevant friendly states, forces, and organizations. 

These include assigned US forces, regional allies, and anticipated multinational partners. 

Describe the capabilities of the other instruments of power (diplomatic, economic, and 

informational), US military supporting commands, and other agencies that could have a 

direct and significant influence on the operations in this AOR.) 

e. Neutral Forces. (Identify all other relevant states, groups, or organizations in the 

AOR and determine their general objectives, motivations, and capabilities. Provide the 

information essential for a clear understanding of their motivations and how they may 

impact US and friendly multinational operations.) 

3. Assessment of the Major Strategic and Operational Challenges 

a. This is a continuous appreciation of the major challenges in the AOR that the CCDR 

may be tasked to deal with. 

b. These may include a wide range of challenges, from direct military confrontation, 

peacekeeping, security cooperation, and building partner capacity, to providing response to 

atrocities, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and stability operations. 
 Strategic Estimate 

B-3 

4. Potential Opportunities 

a. This is an analysis of known or anticipated circumstances as well as emerging 

situations that the CCMD may use as positive leverage to improve the theater strategic 

situation and further US or partner nation interests. 

b. Each potential opportunity must be carefully appraised with respect to existing 

strategic guidance and operational limitations. 

5. Assessment of Risks 

Risk is the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. 

a. This assessment matches a list of the potential challenges with anticipated capabilities

in the operational environment. 

b. Risks associated with each major challenge should be analyzed separately and 

categorized according to significance or likelihood (most dangerous or most likely). 

c. The CCMD staff should develop a list of possible mitigation measures to these risks.

 
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 5-0 

Intentionally Blank 
C-1 

APPENDIX C 

STAFF ESTIMATES 

1. Role of Estimates 

a. Commander and staff estimates are central to formulating and updating military 

action to meet the requirements of any situation. Estimates should be comprehensive and 

continuous and must visualize the future, but at the same time they must optimize the limited 

time available and not become overly time-consuming. Comprehensive estimates consider 

both the quantifiable and the intangible aspects of military operations. They translate 

friendly and enemy strengths, weapons systems, training, morale, and leadership into combat 

capabilities. The estimate process requires the ability to visualize the battle or crisis 

situations requiring military forces. 

b. Estimates must be as thorough as time and circumstances permit. The JFC and staff 

must constantly collect, process, and evaluate information. They update their estimates: 

(1) When the commander and staff recognize new facts. 

(2) When they replace assumptions with facts or find their assumptions invalid. 

(3) When they receive changes to the mission or when changes are indicated. 

c. Estimates for the current operation can often provide a basis for estimates for future 

missions as well as changes to current operations. Technological advances and near-realtime information estimates ensure that estimates can be continuously updated. Estimates 

must visualize the future and support the commander’s visualization. They are the link 

between current operations and future plans. The commander’s vision directs the end state. 

Each subordinate unit commander must also possess the ability to envision the organization’s 

end state. Estimates contribute to this vision. Failure to make staff estimates can lead to 

errors and omissions when developing, analyzing, and comparing COAs. 

d. Not every situation will allow or require an extensive and lengthy planning effort. It 

is conceivable that a commander could review the assigned task, receive oral briefings, make 

a quick decision, and direct writing of the plan to commence. This would complete the 

process and might be suitable if the task were simple and straightforward. 

e. Most commanders, however, are more likely to demand a thorough, well-coordinated 

plan that requires a complex staff estimate process. Written staff estimates are carefully 

prepared, coordinated, and fully documented. 

f. Because of the unique talents of each JS division, involvement of all is vital. Each 

staff estimate takes on a different focus that identifies certain assumptions, detailed aspects 

of the COAs, and potential deficiencies that are simply not known at any other level, but 

nevertheless must be considered (see Figure C-1). Such a detailed study of the COAs 

involves the corresponding staffs of subordinate and supporting commands. 

 
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 5-0 

 

Figure C-1. Functional Staff Estimates 

Mobilization

Personnel

Intelligence

Logistics

Legal Support

Engineering

Force Protection

Interagency Coordination

Identify and address actions that must occur to integrate and synchronize the use 

of Reserve Component forces in the tentative courses of action (COAs).

Identify and address known or anticipated personnel factors that may influence the 

tentative COAs, including the anticipated need for individual and small-unit 

replacements; the anticipated use of civilian, contract support, or indigenous 

personnel; and the anticipated individual and unit rotation policy.

Identify relevant information about the operational environment. Provide 

information about the adversary's military system, including the anticipated 

military situation at the beginning of the operation, enemy centers of gravity, 

limitations, intentions, most likely and most dangerous COAs, and priority 

intelligence requirements. Provide information on other systems in the operational 

environment, including the populace, infrastructure, social issues, political factors 

and relationships, and information architecture. Identify and address known or 

anticipated foundational intelligence data requirements of the weapon systems 

employed in each COA to ensure such data are current, accurate, and available to 

those units.

Identify and address known or anticipated factors that may influence the feasibility 

of providing required logistic support to sustain the timing, intensity, and duration of 

the tentative COAs, including the required time-phasing to position support 

personnel and contractors to receive and integrate required combat forces and to 

move sustainment stocks.

Identify legal issues that may affect tentative COAs, including those related to the 

rules of engagement, laws of armed conflict, US laws, host-nation laws, and 

status- of-forces agreements.

Identify and address known or anticipated engineering factors that may influence 

preparatory tasks, force deployment, force protection, and the reception, staging, 

onward movement, and integration of forces. Identify construction requirements 

that may need emergency or contingency construction authority.

Identify and examine known or anticipated force protection factors that may 

influence the tentative COAs. 

Identify opportunities for interagency cooperation to facilitate unity of effort. 

Identify requirements for interagency support of joint operations.

Functional Staff Estimates
 Staff Estimates 

C-3 

 

Figure C-1. Functional Staff Estimates (continued) 

Health Service Support

Transportation and Movement

Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

Communications Systems Support

Special Technical Operations

Incident Response

Multinational Capabilities and Support

Operational Contract Support

Identify and address known or anticipated health threat factors that may affect health 

service support. These factors include theater patient movement policy; required 

medical treatment, evacuation, and hospitalization capabilities; preventive medicine, 

veterinary, and dental support required; medical logistics; and the medical aspects of 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defensive operations.

Identify available transportation capabilities and coordination requirements to support 

the time-phased deployment, employment, and sustainment of tentative COAs. 

Include requirements for intertheater and intratheater transportation assets and 

requirements to protect critical transportation nodes and lines of communications. 

Include procedures for integrating transportation of contractors and contractor 

support equipment into the force flow.

Identify available capabilities and coordination requirements for joint reception, 

staging, onward movement, and integration of forces, including potential external 

sources of support (host-nation support and operational contract support).

Identify and examine the feasibility of providing adequate communications systems 

support for tentative COAs. Address the adequacy and security of networks used to 

manage, store, manipulate, and transmit operational or logistical data.

Identify and examine factors that may influence special technical operations that 

support and are integrated with tentative COAs. 

Identify and examine factors that may influence incident response operations that 

support and are integrated with tentative COAs. Incident responses are actions taken 

to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting 

from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents.

Identify, consolidate, and integrate opportunities to leverage multinational capabilities 

to include host-nation support required for the tentative COAs. Include the anticipated 

transportation and other support that the supported commander must provide to 

multinational partners to achieve unity of effort.

Identify and address anticipated operational or environmental factors that affect the 

use of contract support for operational or sustainment requirements.

Integrated Financial Operations

Identify ways to integrate, synchronize, prioritize, and target fiscal resources and 

capabilities across US Government departments and agencies, multinational 

partners, and nongovernmental organizations against adversaries and in support of 

the population. Minimize the possibility that such resources and capabilities will be 

diverted or inadvertently misused to support an enemy's financial networks.

Functional Staff Estimates (continued)
Appendix C 

C-4 JP 5-0 

g. Each staff directorate: 

(1) Reviews the mission and situation from its own staff functional perspective; 

(2) Examines the factors and assumptions for which it is the responsible staff; 

(3) Analyzes each COA from its staff functional perspective; and 

(4) Concludes whether the mission can be supported. 

h. The products of this process are revised, documented staff estimates. These are 

extremely useful to the J-5, which extracts information from them for the commander’s 

estimate. The estimates are also valuable to planners in subordinate and supporting 

commands as they prepare supporting plans. Although documenting the staff estimates can 

be delayed until after the preparation of the commander’s estimate, they should be sent to 

subordinate and supporting commanders in time to help them prepare annexes for their 

supporting plans. 

i. The principal elements of the staff estimates normally include mission, situation and 

considerations, analysis of opposing COAs, comparison of friendly COAs, and 

conclusions. The coordinating staff and each staff principal develop facts, assessments, and 

information that relate to their functional field. Types of estimates generally include, but are 

not limited to, operations, personnel, intelligence, logistics, communications, civil–military 

operations, and special staff. The details in each basic category vary with the staff 

performing the analysis. The principal staff directorates have a similar perspective—they 

focus on friendly COAs and their supportability. However, the J-2 estimates on intelligence 

(provided at the beginning of the process) concentrate on the enemy: enemy situation, 

including strengths and weaknesses; enemy capabilities and an analysis of those capabilities; 

and conclusions drawn from that analysis. The analysis of adversary capabilities includes an 

analysis of the various COAs available to the adversary according to its capabilities, which 

include attacking, withdrawing, defending, and delaying. The J-2’s conclusion will indicate 

the adversary’s most likely COA and identify adversary COGs. 

j. In many cases, the steps in the COA development phase are not separate and distinct, 

as the evolution of the refined COA illustrates. During planning guidance and early in the 

staff estimates, the initial COAs may have been developed from initial impressions and 

based on limited staff support. But as concept development progresses, COAs are refined 

and evolve to include many of the following considerations: 

(1) What military operations are considered? 

(2) Where they will be performed? 

(3) Who will conduct the operation? 

(4) When is the operation planned to occur? 

(5) How will the operation be conducted? 
 Staff Estimates 

C-5 

k. An iterative process of modifying, adding to, and deleting from the original 

tentative list is used to develop these refined COAs. The staff continually evaluates the 

situation as the planning process continues. Early staff estimates are frequently given as oral 

briefings to the rest of the staff. In the beginning, they tend to emphasize information 

collection more than analysis. It is only in the later stages of the process that the staff 

estimates are expected to indicate which COAs can be best supported. 

l. Sample Estimate Format. The following is a sample format that a JFC and joint 

force staff can use as a guide when developing an estimate. The exact format and level of 

detail may vary somewhat among joint commands and primary staff sections (J-1, J-2, etc.) 

based on theater-specific requirements and other factors. Refer to the CJCSM 3122.01 series 

volumes for the specific format when there is a requirement for the supported JFC to submit 

a commander’s estimate. 

SAMPLE ESTIMATE FORMAT 

1. Mission 

a. Mission Analysis 

(1) Determine the higher command’s purpose. Analyze national 

security and national military strategic direction as well as appropriate 

guidance in partner nations’ directions, including long- and short-term 

objectives for conflict termination. Determine a clearly defined military end 

state and related termination criteria. 

 (2) Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks and their 

priorities. 

 (3) Determine objectives and consider desired and undesired 

effects. 

 b. Mission Statement 

 (1) Express in terms of who, what, when, where, and why (purpose). 

 (2) Frame as a clear, concise statement of the essential tasks to be 

accomplished and the purpose to be achieved. 

2. Situation and Courses of Action 

 a. Situation Analysis 

 (1) Geostrategic Context 
Appendix C 

C-6 JP 5-0 

 

 (a) Domestic and international context: political and/or 

diplomatic long- and short-term causes of conflict; domestic influences, 

including public will, competing demands for resources, and political, 

economic, legal, and moral constraints; and international interests 

(reinforcing or conflicting with US interests, including positions of parties 

neutral to the conflict), international law, positions of intergovernmental 

organizations, and other competing or distracting international situations. 

Similar factors must be considered for noncombat operations. 

 (b) A systems perspective of the operational environment: all 

relevant political, military (see next paragraph), economic, social, 

information, infrastructure and other aspects. See Chapter III, “Operational 

Art and Operational Design,” for a discussion of developing a systems 

perspective. 

 (2) Analysis of the Adversary. Scrutiny of the opponent situation, 

including capabilities and vulnerabilities (at the theater level, commanders 

normally will have available a formal intelligence estimate), should include 

the following: 

 (a) Broad military courses of action (COAs) being taken and 

available in the future. 

 (b) Political and military intentions and objectives (to extent 

known). 

 (c) Military strategic and operational advantages and 

limitations. 

 (d) Possible external military support. 

 (e) Centers of gravity (strategic and operational) and decisive 

points. 

 (f) Specific operational characteristics such as strength, 

composition, location, and disposition; reinforcements; logistics; time and 

space factors (including basing utilized and available); and 

combat/noncombat efficiency and proficiency in joint operations. 

 (3) Friendly Situation. Should follow the same pattern used for the 

analysis of the adversary. At the theater level, combatant commanders 

(CCDRs) normally will have available specific supporting estimates, 

including personnel, logistics, and communications estimates; multinational 

operations require specific analysis of partner nations’ objectives, 

capabilities, and vulnerabilities. Interagency coordination required for the 

achievement of objectives must also be considered. 

 (4) Operational Limitations. Actions either required or prohibited by 

higher authority, such as constraints or restraints, and other restrictions that 

limit the commander’s freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, 
 Staff Estimates 

C-7 

 

political or economic conditions in affected countries, and host-nation 

issues. 

 (5) Assumptions. Assumptions are intrinsically important factors 

upon which the conduct of the operation is based and must be noted as 

such. 

 (6) Deductions. Deductions from the above analysis should yield 

estimates of relative combat power, including enemy capabilities that can 

affect mission accomplishment. 

 b. Course of Action Development and Analysis. COAs are based on the 

above analysis and a creative determination of how the mission will be 

accomplished. Each COA must be adequate, feasible, and acceptable. State 

all practical COAs open to the commander that, if successful, will 

accomplish the mission. For a CCDR’s strategic estimate, each COA 

typically will constitute an alternative theater strategic or operational 

concept and should outline the following: 

 (1) Major strategic and operational tasks to be accomplished in the 

order in which they are to be accomplished. 

 (2) Major forces or capabilities required (to include joint, 

interagency, and multinational). 

 (3) Command and control concept. 

 (4) Sustainment concept. 

 (5) Deployment concept. 

 (6) Estimate of time required to achieve the termination criteria. 

 (7) Concept for establishing and maintaining a theater reserve. 

3. Analysis of Adversary Capabilities and Intentions 

 a. Determine the probable effect of possible adversary capabilities and 

intentions on the success of each friendly COA. 

 b. Conduct this analysis in an orderly manner by time phasing, 

geographic location, and functional event. Consider: 

 (1) The potential actions of subordinates two echelons down. 

 (2) Conflict termination issues; think through own action, opponent 

reaction, and counteraction. 

 (3) The potential impact on friendly desired effects and the 

likelihood that the adversary’s actions will cause specific undesired effects. 
Appendix C 

C-8 JP 5-0 

 c. Conclude with revalidation of friendly COAs. Determine additional 

requirements, make required modifications, and list advantages and 

disadvantages of each adversary capability. 

4. Comparison of Own Courses of Action 

 a. Evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each COA. 

 b. Compare with respect to evaluation criteria. 

 (1) Fixed values for joint operations (the principles of joint 

operations, the fundamentals of joint warfare, and the elements of 

operational design). 

 (2) Other factors (for example, political constraints). 

 (3) Mission accomplishment. 

 c. If appropriate, merge elements of different COAs into one. 

5. Recommendation 

Provide an assessment of which COAs are supportable, an analysis of the 

risk for each, and a concise statement of the recommended COA with its 

requirements. 
D-1 

APPENDIX D 

ASSESSMENT 

1. Introduction 

a. Assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission 

accomplishment. The focus is on measuring progress toward the end state and delivering 

relevant reliable feedback into the planning process to adjust operations during execution. 

Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to 

determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment 

helps the commander determine progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving 

objectives, or performing tasks. Commanders continuously assess the operational 

environment and the progress of operations and compare them to their initial vision and 

intent. Based on their assessment, commanders adjust operations to ensure objectives are 

met and the military end state is achieved. 

b. The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander’s 

decisions throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Staffs help the 

commander by monitoring the numerous aspects that can influence the outcome of 

operations and providing the commander timely information needed for decisions. The 

CCIR process is linked to the assessment process by the commander’s need for timely 

information and recommendations to make decisions. The assessment process helps staffs 

by identifying key aspects of the operation that the commander is interested in closely 

monitoring and where the commander wants to make decisions. Examples of commander’s 

critical decisions include when to transition to another phase of a campaign, what the priority 

of effort should be, or how to adjust command relationships between component 

commanders. 

c. The assessment process begins during mission analysis when the commander and 

staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward 

accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. During planning and 

preparation for an operation, for example, the staff assesses the joint force’s ability to 

execute the plan based on available resources and changing conditions in the operational 

environment. However, the discussion in this section focuses on assessment for the 

purpose of determining the progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment.

d. Commanders and their staffs determine relevant assessment actions and 

measures during planning. They consider assessment measures as early as mission 

analysis and include assessment measures and related guidance in commander and staff 

estimates. They use assessment considerations to help guide operational design because 

these considerations can affect the sequence and type of actions along LOOs/lines of 

effort. During execution, they continually monitor progress toward accomplishing tasks, 

creating effects, and achieving objectives. Assessment actions and measures help 

commanders adjust operations and resources as required, determine when to execute 

branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions to ensure current and future 

operations remain aligned with the mission and end state. 
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 5-0 

(1) Normally, the joint force J-3 or J-5, assisted by the J-2, is responsible for 

coordinating assessment activities. For subordinate commanders’ staffs, this may be 

accomplished by equivalent elements within joint functional and/or Service components. 

The chief of staff facilitates the assessment process and determination of CCIRs by 

incorporating them into the headquarters’ battle rhythm. Various elements of the JFC’s staff 

use assessment results to adjust both current operations and future planning. 

(2) Friendly, adversary, and neutral diplomatic, informational, and economic 

actions applied in the operational environment can impact military actions and objectives. 

When relevant to the mission, the commander also must anticipate using assessment to 

evaluate the results of these actions. This typically requires collaboration with other 

agencies and multinational partners—preferably within a common, accepted process—in the 

interest of unified action. For example, failure to coordinate overflight and access 

agreements with foreign governments in advance or to adhere to international law regarding 

sovereignty of foreign airspace could result in mission delay, failure to meet US objectives, 

and/or an international incident. Many of these organizations may be outside the JFC’s 

authority. Accordingly, the JFC should grant some joint force organizations authority for 

direct coordination with key outside organizations—such as interagency elements from DOS 

or the Department of Homeland Security, national intelligence agencies, intelligence sources 

in other nations, and other CCMDs—to the extent necessary to ensure timely and accurate 

assessments. 

2. Assessment Process 

a. Assessment is continuous; it precedes and guides every operations process activity 

and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. Broadly, assessment consists of the 

following activities: 

(1) Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information. 

(2) Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, 

and performing tasks. 

(3) Recommending or directing action for improvement. 

b. Monitoring

(1) Monitoring is continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the 

current operation. Monitoring within the assessment process allows staffs to collect 

relevant information, specifically that information about the current situation that can be 

compared with the forecasted situation described in the commander’s intent and CONOPS. 

Progress cannot be judged, nor execution or adjustment decisions made, without an accurate 

understanding of the current situation. 

(2) During planning, commanders monitor the situation to develop facts and 

assumptions that underlie the plan. During preparation and execution, commanders and 

staffs monitor the situation to determine if the facts are still relevant, if their assumptions 

remain valid, and if new conditions emerged that affect their operations. 
 Assessment 

D-3 

(3) CCIRs and decision points focus the staff’s monitoring activities and prioritize 

the unit’s collection efforts. Information requirements concerning the enemy, terrain and 

weather, and civil considerations are identified, assigned priorities, and synchronized by the 

J-2. The operations officers use friendly reports to coordinate other assessment-related 

information requirements. To prevent duplicated collection efforts, information 

requirements associated with assessing the operation are integrated into both the ISR plan 

and FFIRs by the J-3 in coordination with the JFC’s staff. 

(4) Staffs monitor and collect information from the common operational picture 

and friendly reports. This information includes operational and intelligence summaries from 

subordinate, higher, and adjacent headquarters and communications and reports from liaison 

teams. The staff also identifies information sources outside military channels and monitors 

their reports. These other channels might include products from civilian, host-nation, and 

other agencies. Staffs apply information management principles to facilitate getting this 

information to the right people at the right time. 

(5) Staff sections record relevant information in running estimates. Each staff 

section maintains a continuous assessment of current operations as a basis to determine if 

they are proceeding according to the commander’s intent. In their running estimates, staff 

sections use this new information, updated facts, and assumptions as the basis for evaluation. 

c. Evaluating

(1) The staff analyzes relevant information collected through monitoring to 

evaluate the operation’s progress. Evaluating is using criteria to judge progress toward 

desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists. 

Evaluation is the heart of the assessment process where most of the analysis occurs. 

Evaluation helps commanders determine what is working, determine what is not working, 

and gain insights into how to better accomplish the mission. 

(2) Criteria in the forms of MOEs and MOPs aid in determining progress toward 

performing tasks, achieving objectives, and attaining end state conditions. MOEs help 

determine if a task is achieving its intended results. MOPs help determine if a task is 

completed properly. MOEs and MOPs are simply criteria—they do not represent the 

assessment itself. MOEs and MOPs require relevant information in the form of indicators 

for evaluation. 

(3) MOEs are criteria used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or 

operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement 

of an objective, or creation of an effect. MOEs help measure changes in conditions, both 

positive and negative. MOEs help to answer the question, Are we doing the right things? 

MOEs are used at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to assess the impact of 

military operations and measure changes in the operational environment, changes in system 

behavior, or changes to adversary capabilities. MOEs are based on observable or collectable 

indicators. Several indicators may make up an MOE, just like several MOEs may assist in 

assessing progress toward the achievement of an objective or moving toward a potential 

crisis or branch plan execution. Indicators provide evidence that a certain condition exists or 
Appendix D 

D-4 JP 5-0 

certain results have or have not been attained, and enable decision makers to direct changes 

to ongoing operations to ensure the mission remains focused on the end state. MOE 

assessment is implicit in the continuous nature of the JIPOE process. Upon the collection of 

indicators, JIPOE analysts can compare the baseline intelligence estimate used to inform the 

plan against the current situation to measure changes. MOEs are commonly found and 

tracked in formal assessment plans. Examples of MOEs for the objective provide a safe and 

secure environment may include: 

(a) Increase/decrease in insurgent activity. 

(b) Increase/decrease in reporting of insurgent activity to host-nation security 

forces. 

(c) Increase/decrease in civilian injuries involving mines and unexploded 

ordnance. 

(d) Attitude/opinion/behavioral changes in selected populations. 

(e) Changes in media portrayal of events. 

(4) MOPs are criteria used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task 

accomplishment. MOPs help to answer questions such as Was the action taken? or Were the 

tasks completed to standard? A MOP confirms or denies that a task has been properly 

performed. MOPs are commonly found and tracked at all levels in execution matrixes. 

MOPs are also heavily used to evaluate training. MOPs help to answer the question, Are we 

doing things right? 

(5) In general, operations consist of a series of collective tasks sequenced in time, 

space, and purpose to accomplish missions. The current operations cells use MOPs in 

execution matrixes and running estimates to track completed tasks. Evaluating task 

accomplishment using MOPs is relatively straightforward and often results in a yes or no 

answer. Examples of MOPs include: 

(a) Route X cleared. 

(b) Generators delivered, are operational, and secured at Villages A, B, and C. 

(c) $15,000 spent for schoolhouse completion. 

(d) Aerial dissemination of 60,000 military information support leaflets over 

Village D. 

(e) Completed 15 media engagements. 

(f) Sent 35 press releases. 

(6) In the context of assessments, an indicator is an item of information that 

provides insight into MOEs or MOPs. Indicators used to perform MOE analysis inform 
 Assessment 

D-5 

changes to the operational environment, system behavior, or adversary capabilities. 

Indicators used to inform MOP assessments should consider the friendly force capabilities 

required to perform assigned tasks. This consideration enhances the nexus between MOP 

and FFIR to enable decision makers to direct changes in resources. The J-2 uses indicators 

to shape the collection effort as part of ISR synchronization. Indicators take the form of 

reports from subordinates, surveys and polls, and information requirements. Indicators help 

to answer the question, What is the current status of this MOE or MOP? A single indicator 

can inform multiple MOPs and MOEs. Examples of indicators for the MOE decrease in 

insurgent activity are: 

(a) Number of hostile actions per area each week. 

(b) Number of munitions caches found per area each week. 

(7) Evaluation includes analysis of why progress is, or is not, being made according 

to the plan. Commanders and staffs propose and consider possible causes. In particular, the 

question of whether changes in the situation can be attributed to friendly actions is 

addressed. Subject matter experts, both internal and external to the staff, are consulted on 

whether the correct underlying causes for specific changes in the situation have been 

identified. Assumptions identified in the planning process are challenged to determine if 

they are still valid. 

(8) A key aspect of evaluation is determining variances—the difference between 

the actual situation and what the plan forecasted the situation would be at the time or event. 

Based on the significance of the variances, the staff makes recommendations to the 

commander on how to adjust operations to accomplish the mission more effectively. 

(9) Evaluating includes considering whether the desired conditions have changed, 

are no longer achievable, or are not achievable through the current operational approach. 

This is done by continually challenging the key assumptions made when framing the 

problem. When an assumption is invalidated, then reframing may be in order. 

d. Recommending or Directing Action

(1) Monitoring and evaluating are critical activities; however, assessment is 

incomplete without recommending or directing action. Assessment may diagnose problems, 

but unless it results in recommended adjustments, its use to the commander is limited. 

(2) Based on the evaluation of progress, the staff brainstorms possible 

improvements to the plan and makes preliminary judgments about the relative merit of those 

changes. Staff members identify those changes possessing sufficient merit and provide them 

as recommendations to the commander or make adjustments within their delegated authority. 

Recommendations to the commander range from continuing the operation as planned, 

executing a branch, or making adjustments not anticipated. Making adjustments includes 

assigning new tasks to subordinates, reprioritizing support, adjusting the ISR plan, and 

significantly modifying the COA. Commanders integrate recommendations from the staff, 

subordinate commanders, and other partners with their personal assessment. From those 
Appendix D 

D-6 JP 5-0 

recommendations, they decide if and how to modify the operation to better accomplish the 

mission. 

(3) Assessment diagnoses threats, suggests improvements to effectiveness, and 

reveals opportunities. The staff presents the results and conclusions of its assessments and 

recommendations to the commander as an operation develops. Just as the staff devotes time 

to analysis and evaluation, so too must it make timely, complete, and actionable 

recommendations. The chief of staff or executive officer ensures the staff completes its 

analyses and recommendations in time to affect the operation and for information to reach 

the commander when it is needed. 

(4) When developing recommendations, the staff draws from many sources and 

considers its recommendations within the larger context of the operations. While several 

ways to improve a particular aspect of the operation might exist, some recommendations 

could impact other aspects of the operation. As with all recommendations, the staff should 

address any future implications. 

3. Levels of War and Assessment 

a. Assessment occurs at all levels and across the entire range of military operations. 

Even in operations that do not include combat, assessment of progress is just as important 

and can be more complex than traditional combat assessment. As a general rule, the level 

at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which 

such activity is assessed. To do this, JFCs and their staffs consider assessment ways, 

means, and measures during planning, preparation, and execution. This properly focuses 

assessment and collection at each level, reduces redundancy, and enhances the efficiency of 

the overall assessment process. See Figure D-1. 

b. Assessment at the operational and strategic levels typically is broader than at the 

tactical level (e.g., combat assessment) and uses MOEs that support strategic and operational 

mission accomplishment. Strategic- and operational-level assessment efforts concentrate on 

broader tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the end state. Continuous assessment 

helps the JFC and joint force component commanders determine if the joint force is doing 

the right things to achieve objectives, not just doing things right. The JFC also can use 

MOEs to determine progress toward success in those operations for which tactical-level 

combat assessment ways, means, and measures do not apply. 

c. Tactical-level assessment typically uses MOPs to evaluate task accomplishment. 

The results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature, but also can reflect the impact on 

specific functions and systems. Tactical-level assessment may include assessing progress by 

phase lines; neutralization of enemy forces; control of key terrain or resources; and security, 

relief, or reconstruction tasks. Assessment of results at the tactical level helps commanders 

determine operational and strategic progress, so JFCs must have a comprehensive, integrated 

assessment plan that links assessment activities and measures at all levels. 

d. Combat assessment is an example of a tactical-level assessment and is a term that 

can encompass many tactical-level assessment actions. Combat assessment typically focuses 
 Assessment 

D-7 

on determining the results of weapons engagement (with both lethal and nonlethal 

capabilities), and thus is an important component of joint fires and the joint targeting process 

(see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting). Combat assessment is composed of three related 

elements: battle damage assessment (BDA), munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA), 

and future targeting or reattack recommendations. However, combat assessment 

methodology also can be applied by joint force functional and Service components to other 

tactical tasks not associated with joint fires (e.g., disaster relief delivery assessment, relief 

effectiveness assessment, and future relief recommendations). 

(1) BDA is an estimate resulting from the application of lethal or nonlethal 

capabilities. BDA is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage 

assessment, and target system assessment. 

(a) Physical damage assessment is the estimate of the quantitative extent of 

physical damage (through munitions blast, fragmentation, and/or fire damage effects) to a 

target resulting from the application of force. This assessment is based upon observed or 

interpreted damage. 

(b) Functional damage assessment is the estimate of the effects of force to 

degrade or destroy the functional or operational capability of the target to perform its 

intended mission and on the level of success in achieving operational objectives established 

against the target. This assessment is based upon all-source information, and includes an 

estimation of the time required for recuperation or replacement of the target function. 

Figure D-1. Assessment Levels and Measures 

Assessment Levels and Measures

End state and 

objectives

End state and mission

Objectives

Effects

Tasks

Mission

Objectives

Effects

Tasks

Mission

Objectives

Tasks

National

strategic

Theater

strategic

Operational

Tactical

Assessed using measures of

effectiveness 

(Are we ?) doing the right things

Assessed using measures of

performance 

(Are we ?) doing things right

Combat tasks (particularly fires) 

use combat assessment

Levels Guidance

Battle Damage 

Assessment

Reattack or 

Future Targeting

Munitions 

Effectiveness 

Assessment
Appendix D 

D-8 JP 5-0 

(c) Target system assessment is the broad assessment of the overall impact 

and effectiveness of the full spectrum of military force applied against the operation of an 

enemy target system or total combat effectiveness (including significant subdivisions of the 

system) relative to the operational objectives established. 

(2) MEA is conducted concurrently and interactively with BDA, the assessment of 

the military force applied in terms of the weapon system and munitions effectiveness to 

determine and recommend any required changes to the methodology, tactics, weapon system, 

munitions, fusing, and/or weapon delivery parameters to increase force effectiveness. MEA 

is primarily the responsibility of operations with required inputs and coordination from the 

intelligence community. 

(3) Future targeting and reattack recommendations merge the picture of what 

was done (BDA) with how it was done (MEA) and compare the result with predetermined 

MOEs that were developed at the start of the joint targeting cycle. The purposes of this 

phase in the process are to determine degree of success in achieving objectives and to 

formulate any required follow-up action, or to indicate readiness to move on to new tasks in 

the path to achieving the overall JFC objectives. 

For more information on BDA and MEA, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, and Defense 

Intelligence Agency publication DI-2820-4-03, Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Quick 

Guide.

4. Assessment Process and Measures 

a. The assessment process uses MOPs to evaluate task performance at all levels of 

war and MOEs to determine progress of operations toward achieving objectives. 

MOEs help answer questions such as Are we doing the right things, are our actions 

producing the desired effects, or are alternative actions required? MOPs are closely 

associated with task accomplishment. MOPs help answer questions such as Was the action 

taken, were the tasks completed to standard, or how much effort was involved? Welldevised measures can help the commanders and staffs understand the causal relationship 

between specific tasks and desired effects. 

(1) MOEs assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational 

environment. They measure the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or 

creation of an effect; they do not measure task performance. These measures typically are 

more subjective than MOPs and can be crafted as either qualitative or quantitative. MOEs 

can be based on quantitative measures to reflect a trend and show progress toward a 

measurable threshold. The Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments Framework 

provides good examples of MOEs that have been vetted by the interagency, cover all five 

sectors of stability operations, and address both drivers of conflict and institutional 

performance in dealing with them. Some examples include: 

(a) Perception among identity group members that loss of power (e.g., to other 

identity groups) will eliminate the prospect of regaining power in the future. 
 Assessment 

D-9 

(b) Dispute resolution mechanisms exist and are being used to clarify or 

resolve remaining vital issues among parties to the conflict. 

(c) Percent of military-aged population that expresses an inclination to support 

or join a violent faction (by identity group). 

(d) Degree to which members of formerly warring factions and competing 

identity groups can travel freely in areas controlled by their rivals. 

(e) Detainees/prisoners are subjected to torture, cruel, or inhuman treatment, 

beatings or psychological pressures (by identity group). 

(f) Safe and sustainable return of displaced persons and refugees to former 

neighborhoods. 

(g) Estimated percentage of gross domestic product accounted for by illicit 

economic transactions. 

(h) Level of public satisfaction with electrical power delivery (by identity 

group and region). 

(i) Perception that ethnic identity polarizes society (by identity group). 

(j) Perception of heads of households that, under normal conditions, they are 

able to meet their food needs either by growing foodstuffs/raising livestock or purchasing 

food on the market. 

(2) MOPs measure task performance. They are generally quantitative, but also 

can apply qualitative attributes to task accomplishment. MOPs are used in most aspects of 

combat assessment, since it typically seeks specific, quantitative data or a direct observation 

of an event to determine accomplishment of tactical tasks. But MOPs have relevance for 

noncombat operations as well (e.g., tons of relief supplies delivered or noncombatants 

evacuated). MOPs also can be used to measure operational and strategic tasks, but the type 

of measurement may not be as precise or as easy to observe. 

b. The assessment process and related measures should be relevant, measurable, 

responsive, and resourced so there is no false impression of accomplishment. Quantitative 

measures can be helpful in this regard. 

(1) Relevant. MOPs and MOEs should be relevant to the task, effect, operation, 

operational environment, end state, and commander’s decisions. This criterion helps avoid 

collecting and analyzing information that is of no value to a specific operation. It also helps 

ensure efficiency by eliminating redundant efforts. 

(2) Measurable. Assessment measures should have qualitative or quantitative 

standards they can be measured against. To effectively measure change, a baseline 

measurement should be established prior to execution to facilitate accurate assessment 

throughout the operation. Both MOPs and MOEs can be quantitative or qualitative in nature, 
Appendix D 

D-10 JP 5-0 

but meaningful quantitative measures are preferred because they are less susceptible to 

subjective interpretation. 

(3) Responsive. Assessment processes should detect situation changes quickly 

enough to enable effective response by the staff and timely decisions by the commander. 

The JFC and staff should consider the time required for an action or actions to produce 

desired results within the operational environment and develop indicators that can respond 

accordingly. Many actions directed by the JFC require time to implement and may take even 

longer to produce a measurable result. 

(4) Resourced. To be effective, assessment must be adequately resourced. Staffs 

should ensure that resource requirements for data collection efforts and analysis are built into 

plans and monitored. Effective assessment can help avoid both duplication of tasks and 

unnecessary actions, which in turn can help preserve combat power. 

c. Commanders and staffs derive relevant assessment measures during the planning 

process and reevaluate them continuously throughout preparation and execution. They 

consider assessment measures during mission analysis, refine these measures in the JFC’s 

planning guidance and in commander’s and staff’s estimates, wargame the measures during 

COA development, and include MOEs and MOPs in the approved plan or order. An 

integrated data collection management plan is critical to the success of the assessment 

process and should encompass all available tactical, theater, and national intelligence 

sources. 

d. Just as tactical tasks relate to operational- and strategic-level tasks, effects, and 

objectives, there is a relationship between assessment measures. By monitoring available 

information and using MOEs and MOPs as assessment tools during planning, preparation, 

and execution, commanders and staffs determine progress toward creating desired effects, 

achieving objectives, and attaining the military end state, and modify the plan as required. 

Well-devised MOPs and MOEs, supported by effective information management, help the 

commanders and staffs understand the linkage between specific tasks, the desired effects, 

and the JFC’s objectives and end state. 
E-1 

APPENDIX E 

FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS 

1. General 

FDOs are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to send the right 

signal and influence an adversary’s actions. They can be established to dissuade actions 

before a crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a crisis. FDOs are developed for 

each instrument of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and 

economic—but they are most effective when used to combine the influence across 

instruments of national power. FDOs facilitate early strategic decision making, rapid deescalation, and crisis resolution by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths. 

Examples of FDOs for each instrument of national power are listed in Figures E-1 through 

E-4. Key goals of FDOs are:

a. Deter aggression through communicating the strength of US commitments to treaty 

obligations and regional peace and stability. 

b. Confront the adversary with unacceptable costs for their possible aggression. 

c. Isolate the adversary from regional neighbors and attempt to split the adversary 

coalition. 

d. Rapidly improve the military balance of power in the AOR without precipitating 

armed response from the adversary. 

Figure E-1. Examples of Requested Diplomatic Flexible Deterrent Options 

Examples of Requested Diplomatic 

Flexible Deterrent Options

























Alert and introduce special teams (e.g., public diplomacy).

Reduce international diplomatic ties.

Increase cultural group pressure.

Promote democratic elections.

Initiate noncombatant evacuation procedures.

Identify the steps to peaceful resolution.

Restrict activities of diplomatic missions.

Prepare to withdraw or withdraw US embassy personnel.

Take actions to gain support of allies and friends.

Restrict travel of US citizens.

Gain support through the United Nations.

Demonstrate international resolve. 
Appendix E 

E-2 JP 5-0 

2. Description of Deterrent Actions 

a. Deterrence is the prevention of an adversary’s undesired action. Deterrence is a 

state of mind brought about by the adversary’s perception of three factors: being denied the 

expected benefits of his action; having excessive costs imposed for taking the action; and 

that restraint is an acceptable alternative. These effects are the results of a synchronized and 

coordinated use of all instruments of national power. FDOs are deterrent-oriented 

response options that are requested and may be initiated based on evaluation of indicators of 

heightened regional tensions. 

b. FDOs serve two basic purposes. First, they assist in bringing an issue to early 

resolution before armed conflict by sending an appropriate message to belligerent parties. 

Second, they position US forces in a manner that facilitates implementation of 

OPLANs/CONPLANs or OPORDs if hostilities are unavoidable. They also facilitate an 

early decision by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that are carefully 

tailored to avoid the classic response of “too much, too soon, or too little, too late.” They are 

Figure E-2. Examples of Requested Informational Flexible Deterrent Options 

Examples of Requested Informational 

Flexible Deterrent Options



























Impose sanctions on communications systems and intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) technology transfer.

Protect friendly communications systems and ISR assets (computer network 

defense, operations security, information assurance).

Increase public awareness of the problem and potential for conflict.

Make public declarations of nonproliferation policy.

Increase communication systems and ISR processing and transmission 

capability.

Interrupt satellite downlink transmissions.

Publicize violations of international law.

Publicize increased force presence, joint exercises, military capability.

Increase informational efforts:

Influence adversary decision makers (political, military, and social).

Promote mission awareness.

Increase measures directed at the opponent's military forces.







Implement meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion of enemy 

informational assets.

Maintain an open dialogue with the news media.

Take steps to increase US public support.

Ensure consistency of strategic communication messages.
 Flexible Deterrent Options 

E-3 

initiated before and after unambiguous warning. Although they are not intended to place 

US forces in jeopardy if deterrence fails, risk analysis should be an inherent step in 

determining which FDO to use and how and when that FDO should be used. FDOs 

have the advantage of rapid de-escalation if the situation precipitating the FDO changes. 

3. Flexible Deterrent Option Implementation 

The President or SecDef directs FDO implementation, and the specific FDO or 

combination selected will vary with each situation. Their use will be consistent with the US 

Figure E-3. Examples of Requested Military Flexible Deterrent Options 

Examples of Requested Military 

Flexible Deterrent Options



















Increase readiness posture of in-place forces.

Upgrade alert status.

Increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Initiate or increase show-of-force actions.

Increase training and exercise activities.

Increase defense support to public diplomacy.

Increase information operations.

Deploy forces into or near the potential operational area.

Increase active and passive protection measures.

Figure E-4. Examples of Requested Economic Flexible Deterrent Options 

Examples of Requested Economic 

Flexible Deterrent Options





















Freeze or seize real property in the US where possible.

Freeze monetary assets in the US where possible.

Freeze international assets where possible.

Encourage US and international financial institutions to restrict or terminate financial 

transactions.

Encourage US and international corporations to restrict transactions.

Embargo goods and services.

Enact trade sanctions.

Enact restrictions on technology transfer.

Cancel or restrict US-funded programs.

Reduce security assistance programs.
Appendix E 

E-4 JP 5-0 

NSS. FDOs can be used individually, in packages, sequentially, or concurrently, but are 

primarily designed to be used in groups that maximize integrated results from all the 

diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. It is 

imperative that extensive, continuous coordination occurs with interagency and multinational 

partners to maximize the impact of FDOs. 
F-1 

APPENDIX F 

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE OPTIONS 

1. General 

A flexible response option (FRO) is an operational to strategic-level concept of 

operation that is easily scalable, provides military options, and facilitates rapid decision 

making by national leaders in response to heightened terrorist threats or actual terrorist 

attacks against the US homeland or US interests. 

2. Description of Flexible Response Options 

a. The basic purpose of FROs is to preempt and/or respond to terrorist attacks against 

the US and/or US interests. FROs are intended to facilitate early decision making by 

developing a wide range of prospective actions carefully tailored to produce desired effects, 

congruent with national security policy objectives. A FRO is the venue in which various 

military capabilities are made available to the President and SecDef, with actions appropriate 

and adaptable to existing circumstances, in reaction to any terrorist threat or attack. 

b. FROs are used to address both specific, transregional threats and nonspecific, 

heightened threats. FROs are operations that are first and foremost designed to preempt 

enemy attacks, but also provide DOD the necessary planning framework to fast-track 

requisite authorities and approvals necessary to address dynamic and evolving terrorist 

threats. 

c. FROs are developed as directed by the CJCS and maintained by the CCMDs to 

address the entire range of possible terrorist threats. FROs should support both long-term 

regional and national security policy objectives. Initially, FROs are developed pre-crisis by 

CCMDs, based on intelligence collection and analysis and critical factors analysis, and then 

modified and/or refined or developed real-time. FRO content guidelines are listed in Figure 

F-1. 

d. FROs should not be limited to current authorities or approvals; rather, planning 

should be based on DOD’s capabilities (overt, clandestine, low visibility, and covert) to 

achieve objectives, independent of risk. While entirely unconstrained planning is not 

realistic or prudent, the intent of FROs is to provide national leaders a full range of military 

options to include those prohibited in the current operational environment. 

e. FROs are divided into three broad categories. These planning categories determine 

the scope of FRO planning efforts: 

(1) Interdict terrorist organization to deny a subgroup, affiliate, and ally or network 

the capability to function with global reach, access, and effectiveness. 

(2) Interdict safe haven to deny the enemy and associated networks specific 

geographic safe haven and/or support bases. 
Appendix F 

F-2 JP 5-0 

(3) Interdict enemy critical network capabilities to deny the enemy specific 

functional capabilities. 

f. Flexible Response Option Characteristics 

(1) Follows a standardized framework to provide military options to national 

leadership. 

(2) Military CONOPS at the operational or strategic-level. 

(3) Preplanned or developed real-time. 

(4) Provides a start point for iterative planning. 

(5) Scalable based on situation and SecDef guidance. 

(6) Focused on enemy critical vulnerabilities. 

(7) Nested with national and regional strategy. 

(8) Deliberate and synchronized expansion of the campaign against transnational 

terrorist organizations rather than disparate actions. 

(9) A combination of direct and indirect actions. 

(10) Decisive action or set conditions for follow-on operations. 

Figure F-1. Flexible Response Option Content Guidelines 

Flexible Response Option Content Guidelines 



























Identify critical enemy vulnerabilities and specific targets for each major vulnerability

Operations objectives

Desired effects

Essential tasks

Major forces and capabilities required

Concept of deployment

Concept of employment to include phasing, timing, major decision points, and 

essential interagency supporting actions

Concept for sustainment

Estimated time to accomplish objectives

Military end state(s)

Additional resources or shifts essential for execution

Additional recommended changes in authority and approval required

Additional risks associated with execution and mitigation approaches
Flexible Response Options 

F-3 

3. Flexible Response Option Implementation 

a. The planning engine for FROs is the deliberate planning process. In the event that 

SecDef directs the execution of a FRO, the supported CCMD, would initiate planning to 

determine existing options or develop new ones for SecDef and to enable acquisition of 

authorities and approvals necessary to conduct appropriate military operations to disrupt 

terrorist threats and/or respond to attacks on the US or US interests. 

b. Applications of Flexible Response Options

(1) Disrupt is used to address both specific, transregional threats and nonspecific, 

heightened threats. Disrupt options are lethal and nonlethal operations that are first and 

foremost designed to preempt enemy attacks, but also provide DOD the necessary planning 

framework to fast track requisite authorities and approvals necessary to address dynamic and 

evolving threats. 

(a) Specific Threats. Disrupt contingencies are triggered by specific 

indications and warnings or identified attack plans spanning more than one AOR or 

otherwise requiring global synchronization, as determined by JS. 

(b) Nonspecific Threats. Disrupt is also triggered by general indications of 

increased terrorist threats, in the absence of actionable intelligence against a specific threat. 

Periodically, intelligence assessments indicate that enemy strength has increased despite 

current operations or terrorist attack preparations have progressed to the point that national 

leadership is willing to consider additional operations, actions, and activities. 

(2) Response. Respond contingencies are triggered as a result of a successful or 

unsuccessful attack against the US, or its interests. If efforts fail to preempt, disrupt, or 

defeat a major attack, respond options rapidly provide flexible and scalable options to 

respond with global operations against the entire scope of the enemy (see Figure F-2). The 

following are examples of FRO scalability. Operations in each category can be executed 

individually, concurrently, or sequentially. 

(a) Rapid Response. Priority of effort is to demonstrate US resolve through 

speed of action. Rapid responses would most likely be unilateral strikes, raids, computer 

network operations, and IO against known targets with low collateral damage. 

(b) Limited Response. Priority of effort is to attack terrorist organizations 

directly attributed to the attack. The goal of this category is to maximize perceived 

legitimacy of US response. Limited response demonstrates restraint and is more likely to 

garner international cooperation. Disadvantages may include uncertain timeline due to 

requirement for attribution and continued vulnerability to networks not directly associated 

with the current attack. 
Appendix F 

F-4 JP 5-0 

(c) Decisive Response. Priority of effort is to attack the enemy operational 

COG to achieve a long-term disruption of its operational capability. This category is 

proactive vice reactive and seeks greater long-term impact on the enemy network. 

Disadvantages may include perception of US overreaction and inadvertent spread of violent 

extremist ideology. 

Figure F-2. Flexible Response Option Scalability 

Flexible Response Option Scalability

Priority of Effort:

Advantages:

Disadvantages:















Speed

Demonstrate resolve

Least impact of 

current operations

Limited strategic 

effect

More likely lethal in 

nature

Probable negative 

international reaction

More likely unilateral 

action

Priority of Effort:

Advantages:

Disadvantages:



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







Legitimacy via attribution

Response aimed directly at 

those responsible

Demonstrates restraint

International cooperation 

more likely

Uncertain timeline

Persistent operation may 

require reallocation of 

resources

US remains vulnerable to 

other extremist 

organization elements

Priority of Effort:

Advantages:

Disadvantages:

















Direct attack on enemy 

center of gravity

Proactive vice reactive

Targets critical enemy 

vulnerabilities

Greater impact on enemy

Potential to destabilize 

region of focus

Perception of US 

overreaction

Higher risk

Unintended 

consequences

Rapid Response

Demonstrate Resolve

Limited Response

Target Those Directly Responsible

Decisive Response

Defeat Violent Extremist 

Organization
G-1 

APPENDIX G 

COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON 

The most common technique for COA comparison is the decision matrix, which uses 

evaluation criteria to determine the COA that has the highest probability of success based 

upon the evaluation criteria. COAs are not compared to each other directly. Each COA is 

considered independently and is compared with evaluation criteria. The CCDR may direct 

some of these criteria, but most criteria are developed by the JPG. These evaluation criteria 

will vary based on a number of factors, including the nature and scope of the campaign or 

contingency plan, being derived from elements of the CCDR’s intent, or areas of expertise 

resident in the JPG. Below are examples of common methods. 

1. Weighted Numerical Comparison Technique 

a. The example below provides a numerical aid for differentiating COAs. Values 

reflect the relative advantages or disadvantages of each COA for each criterion selected. 

Certain criteria have been weighted to reflect greater value (Figures G-1 and G-2). 

b. Determine the weight of each criterion based on its relative importance and the 

commander’s guidance. The commander may give guidance that results in weighting certain 

criteria. The staff member responsible for a functional area scores each COA using those 

criteria. Multiplying the score by the weight yields the criterion’s value. The staff member 

then totals all values. However, the staff member must be careful not to portray subjective 

conclusions as the results of quantifiable analysis. Comparing COAs by category is more 

accurate than comparing total scores. 

(1) Criteria are those selected through the process described earlier. 

(2) The criteria can be rated (or weighted). The most important criteria are rated 

with the highest numbers. Lesser criteria are weighted with progressively lower numbers. 

(3) The highest number is best. The best criterion and the most advantageous COA 

ratings are those with the highest number. Values reflect the relative strengths and 

weaknesses of each COA. 

(4) Each staff section does this separately, perhaps using different criteria on which 

to base the COA comparison. The staff then assembles and arrives at a consensus for the 

criterion and weights. The chief of staff or JTF deputy commander should approve the 

staff’s recommendations concerning the criteria and weights to ensure completeness and 

consistency throughout the staff sections. 

2. Non-Weighted Numerical Comparison Technique 

The same as the previous method except the criteria are not weighted. Again, the 

highest number is best for each of the criteria. 
Appendix G 

G-2 JP 5-0 

Figure G-1. Example Numerical Comparison 

Example Numerical Comparison

Legend

COA course of action COG center of gravity CSS combat service support

Criteria Weight

COA 1 COA 2

Course of Action

COA 3

Rating Rating Rating Product Product Product

12

23

Total

Weighted total







The joint force commander's intent explained that the most important criterion was “attacking the 

enemy’s COGs.” Therefore, assign a value of 3 for that criterion and lower numbers for other criteria 

that the staff devises ( ).

For attacking the enemy COGs, COA 2 was rated the best (with a number of 3). Therefore, COA 2 = 9, 

COA 1 = 6, and COA 3 = 3.

After the relative COA is multiplied by the given each criterion and the product columns 

are added, COA 2 (with a score of 31) is rated the most appropriate according to the criteria used to 

evaluate it. 

this is the weighing criterion

rating weight

15

31

9

18

2

3

2

2

2

1

3

2

2

1

1

3

2

3

3

2

3

2

1

1

1

3

2

1

6

6

4

2

2

3

4

9

6

4

6

2

2

3

2

6

4

1

Exploits 

maneuver

Attacks COGs

Integrates 

maneuver and 

interdiction

Exploits 

deception

Provides flexibility

CSS (best use of 

transportation)
 Course of Action Comparison 

G-3 

3. Narrative or Bulletized Descriptive Comparison of Strengths and Weaknesses or 

Advantages and Disadvantages 

Summarize comparison of all COAs by analyzing strengths and weaknesses or 

advantages and disadvantages for each criterion. See Figures G-3 and G-4 for examples. 

4. Plus/Minus/Neutral Comparison 

Base this comparison on the broad degree to which selected criteria support or are 

reflected in the COA. This is typically organized as a table showing (+) for a positive 

influence, (0) for a neutral influence, and (–) for a negative influence. Figure G-5 is an 

example. 

5. Descriptive Comparison 

This is simply a description of advantages and disadvantages of each COA. See Figure 

G-4. 

 

Figure G-2. Example #2 Course of Action Comparison Matrix Format 

Example #2 Course of Action Comparison Matrix Format

Legend

COA course of action OPSEC operations security

Evaluation 

Criterion Weight COA 1 COA 2 COA 3

Score Score Score Weighted Weighted Weighted

Total 20 16 30

2

2

1

1

1

3

3

3

1.5

3

1.5

1

1.5

3

1.5

1.5

2

1.5

1.5

1.5

6

6

3

1.5

3

3

2

1.5

3

1.5

3

4

1.5

1.5

1.5

1

1

1

1

2

3

2.5

3

3

2

2.5

1.5

1

1

1

1.5

2

3

2.5

3

3

2

2.5

1.5

1

1

1

1.5

Surprise

Risk

Flexibility

Retaliation

Damage to 

alliance

Legal basis

External support

Force protection

OPSEC
Appendix G 

G-4 JP 5-0 

Figure G-3. Criteria for Strengths and Weaknesses Example 

Criteria for Strengths and Weaknesses Example

Legend

COA course of action

Criteria 1 Criteria 2 Criteria 3

COA 1

COA 2

COA 3

Strengths Strengths Weaknesses Weaknesses

Strengths Strengths Weaknesses Weaknesses

Strengths Strengths Weaknesses Weaknesses





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





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











































Strengths Weaknesses

Strengths Weaknesses

Strengths Weaknesses

Figure G-4. Descriptive Comparison Example

Descriptive Comparison Example

Legend

COA course of action





























Advantages Advantages Disadvantages

Disadvantages

Disadvantages

Advantages

Advantages

































Disadvantages Disadvantages

Disadvantages Disadvantages Advantages

Disadvantages Disadvantages Advantages

COA 1

COA 2

COA 3













Criteria 1 Criteria 2 Criteria 3

Advantages

Advantages

Advantages
 Course of Action Comparison 

G-5 

Figure G-5. Plus/Minus/Neutral Comparison Example 

Plus/Minus/Neutral Comparison Example

Criteria COA 1 COA 2

-

+

0

-

+

-

0

+

Casualty estimate

Casualty evacuation 

routes

Suitable medical 

facilities

Flexibility

Legend

COA course of action
Appendix G 

G-6 JP 5-0 

Intentionally Blank 
H-1 

APPENDIX H 

GLOBAL FORCE MANAGEMENT 

1. Global Force Management Processes 

GFM is a compilation of three related processes: assignment, allocation, and 

apportionment used to align US forces. 

a. Assignment. Title 10, USC, Sections 161, 162, and 167 outline force assignment 

guidance and requirements. The President, through the UCP, instructs SecDef to document 

his direction for assigning forces in the Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum (Forces 

For). The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall assign forces under their jurisdiction 

to unified and specified CCMDs to perform missions assigned to those commands. Such 

assignment defines the combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) and shall be 

made as directed by SecDef, including the command to which forces are to be assigned. 

Assignment is further explained in the biennial GFMIG. Included within Section 2 of the 

GFMIG are the annually updated Forces For tables. During odd-numbered years, the Forces 

For is published separately and posted on the JS J-8 Web site. Forces not assigned to a 

CCDR are retained under the Secretary of the Military Department and are commonly 

referred to as “Service retained” or “unassigned.” 

b. Allocation 

(1) Pursuant to Title 10, USC, Section 162, “[a] force assigned to a combatant 

command...may be transferred from the command to which it is assigned only by authority 

of SecDef; and under procedures prescribed by the Secretary and approved by the President.” 

Under this authority, SecDef allocates forces between CCDRs. When transferring forces, the 

Secretary will specify the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise and 

the losing commander will relinquish. 

(2) Decisions by SecDef to allocate forces are published within the four annexes of 

the CJCS GFMAP. The GFMAP directs the JFPs to publish a GFMAP Annex Schedule that 

serves as the DEPORD directing force providers to deploy forces at the specified dates. The 

GFMAP also allows force providers some leeway in determining which unit will deploy and 

on the ordered LADs that the force provider must deploy to account for realities, such as 

TPFDD refinement, based on transportation analysis or minor operational adjustments by the 

CCDR, based on operational necessities. 

(a) Annex A is Conventional Forces with Services as the JFPs. 

(b) Annex B is SOF with United States Special Operations Command as the 

JFP. 

(c) Annex C is Mobility Forces with USTRANSCOM as the JFP. 

(d) Annex D is Joint Individual Augmentation (JIA) with Services as the JFPs. 
Appendix H 

H-2 JP 5-0 

(3) Since most operational forces are assigned, each allocation is a decision to take 

a force from one CCDR and deploy it to another. Each allocation has risks that must be 

weighed to balance the operational necessity of deploying the force with the risk to the force 

provider. These risks also include the financial cost and the stress on the Service and Service 

men and women. The allocation decision process is necessarily centralized with SecDef 

making the final decisions. When unassigned forces are allocated to a CCDR, they are 

normally attached. When assigned forces are allocated from one CCDR to another, the 

gaining CCDR is usually tasked to exercise operational control (OPCON), for the time the 

unit will be in the gaining CCDR’s control. The providing CCDR relinquishes OPCON or 

tactical control (TACON) of that unit during its deployment and resumes OPCON or 

TACON following the deployment. The providing CCDR retains COCOM of the unit. 

Specific command relationships are specified in the CJCS GFMAP and the Annex Schedule. 

(4) Allocation is divided into emergent and rotational: 

(a) Emergent. The emergent process begins with the CCDR identifying a 

force or individual requirement that cannot be met using available assigned forces or forces 

already allocated. The CCDR documents each force requirement, usually one unit per 

requirement. The force requirement contains information of what type of force is needed as 

well as the operational risk if the force is not provided. Each requirement is validated by the 

CCDR and assigned a force tracking number (FTN). Each FTN is forwarded electronically 

to JS for validation. The force request is also transmitted to JS with a RFF message that 

requests sourcing of one or more FTNs. JS validates each force request, provides priority 

based on the GEF and sourcing guidance, and assigns one of the three JFPs to provide a 

recommended sourcing solution. At the direction of JS, the JFPs staff the force requirement 

with the Services via their assigned Service components to determine the recommended 

sourcing options and force provider risk. The JFP generates a recommended sourcing 

solution, drafts a modification to their respective GFMAP annex, staffs the draft annex, and 

forwards the recommendations with the operational and force provider risks to JS. JS 

forwards the draft GFMAP annex modification to the CCMDs, Services, CSAs, other DOD 

agencies, and OSD and briefs the solutions through the CJCS to endorse, and to SecDef for a 

decision. For some contentious issues, the Global Force Management Board (GFMB) may 

meet to review and endorse sourcing recommendations prior to the CJCS. Once SecDef 

decides to allocate, JS publishes the modification to the GFMAP annex, and the JFP 

publishes the GFMAP Annex Schedule. 

1. Joint Individual Augmentation Sourcing. The JIA execution sourcing 

allocation process mirrors the force sourcing process with the following exceptions: the 

format and information requirements of the JIA request are different and a distinct automated 

data processing tool, Electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel System, is used to track and 

account for the JIA Service member. When a CCDR is directed to create a JTF 

headquarters, the CCDR creates a joint manning document (JMD), sourced as much as 

possible from CCMD resources, that is forwarded to JS J-1 for JIA sourcing approval. A 

CCDR message requesting JIA modification to an existing JMD is called an out-of-cycle 

change request. JS coordinates directly with the Services vice their assigned Service 

components for identifying recommended sourcing solutions for JIA requirements. The 
Global Force Management 

H-3 

Service may delegate the responsibility for generating JIA sourcing recommendations to the 

appropriate assigned Service component. 

2. Allocation and the Interagency Process. Although requests for 

interagency capabilities are not usually part of the allocation process, the interagency process 

is detailed in JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. There are 

cases in which a CCDR will request a capability via the allocation process and a non-DOD 

agency appears to offer the best solution. In these cases, JS serves as the JFP to coordinate 

between the agencies. The CJCS GFMAP annex and JFP GFMAP Annex Schedules are 

used to relay the sourcing solution back to the JPEC. However, SecDef does not have 

authority to direct people and capabilities of other USG departments and agencies. 

(b) Rotational. The rotational process begins with a PLANORD from JS 

directing the CCDRs to submit force and JIA requirements for an entire fiscal year (FY); 

this process normally begins two years prior to the start of the FY required. The rotational 

process mirrors the emergent process with the rotational submission being the first RFF for 

the FY. As there are many force requirements, each with its own FTN in the rotational 

submissions, many of the steps of the emergent process are done via conferences. The 

number of requests being staffed simultaneously also necessitates some changes in the 

staffing process, but the force requests sourcing recommendations, to include risk, are 

identical. The GFMB meets to endorse the JFP rotational sourcing recommendations, and 

the first GFMAP annexes produced for the FY are called the base order. 

(5) During the allocation process, the JFP collaboratively determines sourcing 

recommendations. Execution sourced forces are forces recommended and identified by 

JFPs, assisted by their Service components (who are responsible for coordinating with their 

Services). The recommended sourcing solution is reviewed through the GFM allocation 

process and becomes sourced when approved by SecDef for the execution of an approved 

operation or potential/imminent execution of an OPLAN. The GFMAP annex and GFMAP 

Annex Schedule specify the ordered force provider. The GFMAP allows the force provider 

and JFP some flexibility in identifying the appropriate unit for deployment. Execution 

sourcing solutions are grouped into five types. 

(a) Standard Force Solution. A mission ready, joint capable force with 

associated table of organization and equipment executing its core mission. 

(b) Joint Force/Capability Solution. Joint sourcing encompasses Services 

providing a force/capability in place of another Service’s core mission. As in a standard 

force solution, the capability is performing its core mission. 

(c) In Lieu Of (ILO). ILO sourcing is an overarching sourcing methodology 

that provides alternative force sourcing solutions when preferred force sourcing options are 

not available. An ILO force/capability is a standard force, including associated table of 

organization and equipment, that is deployed/employed to execute missions and tasks outside 

its core competencies. 
Appendix H 

H-4 JP 5-0 

(d) Ad Hoc. An ad hoc capability is consolidating individuals and equipment 

from various commands/Services and forming a deployable/employable entity, properly 

manned, trained, and equipped to meet the supported CCDR's requirements. 

(e) Joint Individual Augmentation. An unfunded temporary manpower 

requirement (or a Service member filling an unfunded temporary manpower position) 

identified on a supported CCDR JMD to augment JTF staff operations during a contingency. 

JIA fill task force headquarters requirements. Tactical level deployments are not appropriate 

for JIA sourcing. Sourcing by JIA is meant to be the last method for obtaining joint 

manpower for positions. 

More detailed description of force requirements can be found in the Annual CJCS Rotational 

Forces Request PLANORD. The CJCS Annual JFP PLANORD contains details of the 

staffing process and requirements for force recommendations. 

Specifications for RFFs can be found in the CJCSM 3122.01 series volumes. The staffing 

process is detailed in the Joint Staff Force Sourcing Business Rules and Secretary of 

Defense Operations Book process. The JIA sourcing process is explained in CJCSI 

1301.01C, Individual Augmentation Procedures, and the Joint Staff Individual Augmentation 

Business Rules.

c. Apportionment. Apportionment is the distribution of forces and capabilities as a 

starting point for planning. Pursuant to Title 10, USC, Section 153, “The CJCS shall be 

responsible for preparing strategic plans, including plans which conform with resource levels 

projected by SecDef to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be 

effective.” Pursuant to the JSCP, “apportioned forces are types of combat and related 

support forces provided to CCDRs as a starting point for planning purposes only.” Forces 

apportioned for planning purposes may not be those allocated for execution. The CJCS 

approves force apportionment based on SecDef guidance in the GEF. The apportionment 

tables are contained in Chapter 4 of the GFMIG and are utilized to determine apportioned 

forces, starting with assigned forces and then subtracting the number of forces allocated to 

the high-priority operations (global demand). The result is the number of apportioned forces, 

which is published in the apportionment tables of the GFMIG. Apportioned forces are a 

quantity of a given type of force. During odd-numbered years, the apportionment tables are 

published separately and posted on the JS J-8 Web site. 

d. The three processes of assignment, allocation, and apportionment are related. Figure 

H-1 shows the entire DOD force pool (every military unit, Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and 

Marine). This force pool is further divided by assigned (Forces For) to a CCMD and 

unassigned (dashed black line). Most allocated forces come from the assigned operational 

forces, but in some instances, the Service may be directed to provide (allocate) forces from 

unassigned forces. Unassigned and assigned forces may also be used by the Service to meet 

Service institutional requirements. This is the reason the projected employed forces crosses 

the dashed line and extends into the institutional Service forces box. The CCDR to which 

forces are assigned often employs and deploys assigned forces. Since the CCDR already has 

COCOM, and OPCON is inherent in COCOM, the forces do not need to be allocated. As 
Global Force Management 

H-5 

apportioned forces are calculated by subtracting global demand from the assigned forces, and 

the fact that some assigned forces are employed performing Service institutional missions or 

are performing missions for their assigned CCDR, the employed and apportioned forces in 

Figure H-1 overlap. CCDR force requests are constantly changing to respond to world 

events. To determine the projected employed forces, analysis of the current CCDR force 

requests must be conducted to project the number of employed forces in order to calculate 

the number of forces left that can reasonably be expected to be available or apportioned. 

2. Force Sourcing and Global Force Management 

a. Force Sourcing. Force sourcing is done by all commands and Services across the 

JPEC, and there are nuances at various stages. The definition of force sourcing covers a 

range of methodologies that identify units to meet a force requirement during planning, plan 

assessment, or execution. These methodologies include: 

(1) Execution Sourcing. See allocation discussion on page H-1, paragraph 1b. It is 

the process of identifying forces recommended and identified by JFPs via their Service 

components and allocated by SecDef to meet CCDR force requirements. For execution 

sourcing during allocation, the JFP is the supported commander for the force planning steps 

Figure H-1. Force Structure (Force Pool) 

Force Structure (Force Pool)

Unassigned or 

Service Retained 

Forces

Institutional

Service Forces

Projected 

Employed Forces

majority projected 

from

Allocation

Operational Forces

Assigned Forces

Projected Available for 

Planning

Apportioned
Appendix H 

H-6 JP 5-0 

of identifying recommended sourcing solutions. All CCDRs, Services, CSAs, and other 

DOD agencies are in support. 

(2) Contingency Sourcing. Usually begun during the plan assessment stage of 

deliberate planning, the CJCS may direct the JFPs to contingency source a plan. 

Contingency sourced forces are specific forces identified by JFPs, assisted by their Service 

components and the parent Services, that meet the planning requirement at a specified point 

in time. Because these forces are identified based on planning assumptions and planning 

guidance provided for the sourcing effort, there should be no expectation that forces sourced 

via contingency sourcing will be the actual forces sourced during execution sourcing. The 

CCDRs propose plans to be contingency sourced to JS (normally top-priority plans). JS 

recommends a schedule to contingency source selected plans for the GFMB to endorse and 

the CJCS to direct contingency sourcing efforts. The frequency of contingency sourcing 

actions is, in part, dependent on the capacity of the JFPs and their assigned Service 

components. JS provides assumptions, planning factors, and detailed sourcing guidance. 

The JFPs provide their sourcing solutions to JS and the supported CCDR. In contingency 

sourcing, the JFP approves the sourcing solutions. 

(3) Preferred Force Identification. Preferred force identification is used in the 

entire planning process from strategic guidance through plan assessment. Preferred forces 

are forces that are identified by the supported CCDR in order to continue employment, 

sustainment, and transportation planning and to assess risk. These forces are planning 

assumptions only; they are not considered sourced units and do not indicate that these forces 

will be contingency or execution sourced. CCDR Service and functional components are 

encouraged to work with the JFPs and their Service components to make the best possible 

assumptions with respect to identifying preferred forces. The preferred forces identified for 

a plan by the CCDR should not be greater than the number of forces apportioned for 

planning unless the CJCS or his designee either grants permission or has provided 

amplifying planning guidance. The degree to which the CCDR is able to make good 

planning assumptions when identifying preferred forces determines the feasibility of a plan 

and may assist the JFP in identifying forces should the plan be designated for contingency 

sourcing or transitions to execution. 

b. Throughout the planning process, planners consider the forces they have at their 

disposal to execute the plan and identify additional augmentation forces that are not 

apportioned or provided as a planning assumption by the CJCS (often referred to as allocated 

for planning). 

3. Force Planning and Global Force Management 

a. Global Force Management During Deliberate Planning. The apportionment tables 

provide the number of forces reasonably expected to be available for planning. These tables 

should be used as a beginning assumption in planning. As the plan is refined, there may be 

forces identified that are required above and beyond those apportioned. Those forces should 

be requested, as required, to be augmented, above the number apportioned for planning, or 

“augmentation forces.” As the plan is briefed at the IPR level, leadership may approve 
Global Force Management 

H-7 

planning to continue with the revised assumption of using the identified augmentation forces. 

These augmentation forces are then allocated for planning. 

(1) Throughout COA and plan development, planners assess the plan as it is 

refined. To enable the assessments, the planners must assume that units are allocated to the 

identified plan force requirements and to enable plan assessments, planners identify preferred 

forces. As the plan is refined, the level of analysis used to identify preferred forces usually 

increases. Since contingency plans rely on a foundation of assumptions, if an event occurs 

that necessitates execution of a contingency plan, the planning assumptions have to be revalidated. The plan will usually enter a phase of CAP to adapt it to the realities surrounding 

the event rather than transitioning directly to execution. 

(2) As a contingency plan is either approved or nearing approval, the CJCS may 

direct the JFPs to contingency source a plan to support the CJCS and/or SecDef strategic risk 

assessments. CCDRs may request contingency sourcing of specific plans. These requests 

are evaluated by the J-5, and a contingency sourcing schedule is presented to the GFMB. 

The GFMB endorses the schedule, and the CJCS orders the JFPs to contingency source 

specific plans per the schedule. (See paragraph 2a(2), “Contingency Sourcing.”) 

b. Global Force Management During Crisis Action Planning. The same planning 

steps that are used in deliberate planning are used in CAP, but the time to conduct the 

planning is constrained to the time available. Identification of preferred forces is done in 

CAP, just as in deliberate planning. Contingency sourcing is rarely used during CAP due to 

the time constraints involved; however, if time allows, the option exists for the CJCS to 

direct JFPs to contingency source a crisis action plan. 

(1) In deliberate planning and CAP, the difference in force planning is the level of 

detail done with the force requirements for the plan. For deliberate planning, the number of 

planning assumptions prevents identifying the detailed force requirements needed by the 

JFPs to begin execution sourcing. During CAP, a known event has occurred and there are 

fewer assumptions. The focus of CAP is usually on transitioning to execution quickly. The 

detailed information requirements specified to support the execution sourcing process, either 

emergent or rotational, preclude completion until most assumptions are validated. 

(2) CCDRs usually have a good understanding of the availability of their assigned 

forces. Availability entails the readiness of the unit, as well as the unit’s time in the 

deployment cycle, and whether it meets SecDef dwell time requirements and whether the 

unit is already allocated to another mission. The supported CCDR generally reviews the 

force requirements for the contingency plan and conducts a review of assigned and 

previously allocated forces to determine if the mission can be done without requesting 

additional forces. If forces are already assigned and/or allocated that can perform the 

mission, the CCDR may direct those forces to perform the mission, within the constraints of 

the allocation authorities in the GFMAP. If additional forces are required, the CCDR will 

forward a RFF with all the details necessary for FTN(s), both electronically and by message 

RFF. The emergent force allocation process (discussed on page H-2) is the natural process 

for force requirements supporting CAP to follow. 
Appendix H 

H-8 JP 5-0 

(a) Rotational Force Planning. During execution, planning continues. The 

plan being executed is under constant review, and the next step or phase of the operation is 

under review. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM, SecDef directed that force requirements be reviewed and revalidated annually. 

This revalidation became the basis for rotational force planning. Today, all CCDRs review 

their ongoing operations and submit force requirements for the upcoming FY in their annual 

submission. The annual submission is, essentially, a consolidated RFF for the entire FY. 

CCDRs must review every operation in progress and determine what forces are needed for 

each operation. The CCDR must also project the force requirements for engagement and 

shaping operations to the maximum extent possible. To determine the operational 

requirements from ongoing operations, a way to organize this task is to review the forces 

currently conducting the operation and validate the continuing need for each force in the 

coming FY for the phase of the operation that the plan will be in. The electronic force 

requirement for the current unit is refined, validated, and submitted to JS to enter the 

rotational allocation process. It is important to link current forces and their force 

requirements because the JFPs must schedule units into the GFMAP Annex Schedule 

without interrupting the missions. Specifying the evolving missions and tasks for specific 

units is imperative so the Services can train, organize, and equip forces to be prepared to 

conduct those evolving missions. Once the annual force requirements have been submitted, 

newly identified, or refined, force requirements enter the emergent allocation process via a 

RFF. 

(b) Global Force Management in Exercise Planning and Sourcing and 

Executing. RFFs to participate in exercises do not follow the same sourcing process as 

operational requests. Per CJCSI 3500.01, Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed 

Forces of the United States, JFPs receive exercise force requests directly from the supported 

CCDRs. Supportability by JFPs and their Service components is determined, and the 

resulting sourcing solution is provided back directly to the supported CCDR. SecDef is not 

required to allocate forces for exercises, to include with other countries. Subsequent 

deployment of these exercise sourcing solutions is effected and tracked by the JFPs in 

concert with the supported CCDR. Under most circumstances, the GFMIG authorizes JFPs 

to transfer forces to support CCDR exercises (under TACON) and does not require a 

GFMAP modification to be approved by SecDef. 

For detailed information and guidance on GFM and associated terminology, see SecDef’s 

Global Force Management Implementation Guidance FY 2010–2011. 
J-1 

APPENDIX J 

REFERENCES 

The development of JP 5-0 is based on the following primary references: 

1. General 

a. Title 10, USC, as amended. 

b. Title 22, USC, as amended. 

c. Unified Command Plan. 

d. National Security Strategy. 

e. Presidential Policy Directive–1, Organization of the National Security Council 

System. 

2. Department of Defense 

a. National Defense Strategy. 

b. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Implementation of the Adaptive Planning 

Roadmap II, March 2008. 

c. Strategic Planning Guidance. 

d. Global Force Management Implementation Guidance FY 2004–2011.

e. Guidance for Development of the Force. 

f. Guidance for Employment of the Force. 

g. DOD Directive (DODD) 3000.06, Combat Support Agencies.

h. DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare.

i. DODD 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components. 

j. DODD 5100.3, Support of the Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate Joint 

Commands. 

k. DOD Instruction (DODI) 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining 

Workforce Mix. 

l. DODI 3000.05, Stability Operations.

 
Appendix J 

J-2 JP 5-0 

m. DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed 

Forces. 

n. DODI 5000.68, Security Force Assistance.

4. Department of State 

Briefing, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, United States 

Department of State, Post Conflict Reconstruction: Essential Tasks.

5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

a. CJCSI 1301.01C, Individual Augmentation Procedures. 

b. CJCSI 3100.01B, Joint Strategic Planning System. 

c. CJCSI 3110.01G, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. 

d. CJCSI 3141.01D, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans.

e. CJCSI 3401.01E, Joint Combat Capability Assessment. 

f. CJCSI 3500.01, Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the 

United States.

g. CJCSI 5714.01C, Policy for the Release of Joint Information. 

h. CJCSI 5715.01B, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs.

i. CJCSI 8501.01A, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, 

and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 

System. 

j. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume 

I, Planning Policies and Procedures. 

k. CJCSM 3122.02C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), 

Volume III, Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and 

Deployment Execution. 

l. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume 

II, Planning Formats. 

m. CJCSM 3150.01B, Joint Reporting Structure General Instructions. 

n. FY 10 Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP).

o. National Military Strategy. 
 References 

J-3 

6. Joint Publications 

a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

b. JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations. 

c. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 

d. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

e. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

f. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

g. JP 3-05, Special Operations.

h. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 

i. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. 

j. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Environments. 

k. JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

l. JP 3-14, Space Operations. 

m. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 

n. JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

o. JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations. 

p. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 

q. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

r. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. 

s. JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 

t. JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

u. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

v. JP 3-61, Public Affairs. 

w. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 

x. JP 4-01, The Defense Transportation System. 
Appendix J 

J-4 JP 5-0 

y. JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

z. JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning. 

aa. JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs.

bb. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support. 

cc. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 

7. Service Publications 

a. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2, Operations and Organization. 

b. AFDD 3-1, Air Warfare. 

c. AFDD 3-05, Special Operations. 

d. AFDD 3-13, Information Operations. 

e. AFDD 3-14, Space Operations. 

f. AFDD 3-14.1, Counterspace Operations. 

g. AFDD 3-17, Air Mobility Operations. 

h. AFDD 3-70, Strategic Attack. 

i. AFDD 6-0, Command and Control. 

j. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-2, Campaigning. 

k. MCDP 5, Planning. 

l. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations. 

m. FM 3-07, Stability Operations. 

n. FM 3-14, Space in Support of Army Operations. 

o. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

p. FM 5-0, The Operations Process. 

q. FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 

r. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare. 

s. Navy Warfare Publication 3-62M, Seabasing. 
 References 

J-5 

t. Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System.

u. Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan. 

v. Marine Corps Capabilities Plan and Marine Corps Mobilization, Activation, 

Integration, Deactivation Plan. 

w. Air Force War and Mobilization Plan. 

 
Appendix J 

J-6 JP 5-0 

Intentionally Blank 
K-1 

APPENDIX K 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

1. User Comments 

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint 

Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting 

Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Support Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 

23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, 

and organization), writing, and appearance. 

2. Authorship 

The lead agent and JS doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for 

Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7). 

3. Supersession 

This publication supersedes JP 5-0, 26 December 2006, Joint Operation Planning.

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-7-JEDD// 

 JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-5-JOWPD// 

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint and 

Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Support 

Division and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JEDD. 

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change 

source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a 

proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other 

organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents 

reflected in this publication are initiated. 

5. Distribution of Publications 

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. 

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be in accordance 

with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 
Appendix K 

K-2 JP 5-0 

b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the CCMDs, 

Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or foreign 

nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, 

Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, 

Washington, DC 20340-5100. 

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, 

the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CDROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally 

reproduced for use within the combatant commands and Services. 

7. Lessons Learned 

a. CJCSI 3150.25D, dated 10 October 2008, codifies JLLIS as the DOD System of 

Record for the Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP). 

b. JLLIS provides a Web-enabled information management system to meet the JLLP’s 

operational needs. The JLLP provides for the transfer of knowledge within the DOD and 

USG organizations that are involved in joint operations or supported by military operations. 

This is done by the rapid distribution of observations and recommendations; after action 

reports; tactics, techniques, and procedures; topic papers; briefings; and interviews (lessons 

learned information). The JLLIS Web site can be found at https://www.jllis.mil or 

http://www.jllis.smil.mil. 
GL-1 

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFDD Air Force doctrine document 

AJP allied joint publication

ALERTORD alert order

AOR area of responsibility

APEX Adaptive Planning and Execution 

BDA battle damage assessment

BPLAN base plan

C2 command and control

CAP crisis action planning 

CCDR combatant commander 

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement

CCMD combatant command

C-day unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

COA course of action

COCOM combatant command (command authority) 

COG center of gravity

CONOPS concept of operations 

CONPLAN concept plan

CONUS continental United States

CSA combat support agency 

D-day unnamed day on which operations commence or are 

 scheduled to commence 

DEPORD deployment order 

DOD Department of Defense

DODD Department of Defense directive

DODI Department of Defense instruction

DOS Department of State

DSM decision support matrix 

DST decision support template 

DTA dynamic threat assessment

EXORD execute order

FCC functional combatant commander 

FDO flexible deterrent option

FFIR friendly force information requirement 

FM field manual (Army)
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 5-0 

FRAGORD fragmentary order 

FRO flexible response option 

FTN force tracking number 

FY fiscal year

GCC geographic combatant commander

GEF Guidance for Employment of the Force 

GFM Global Force Management

GFMAP Global Force Management Allocation Plan

GFMB Global Force Management Board

GFMIG Global Force Management Implementation Guidance 

H-hour specific time an operation or exercise begins

HNS host-nation support 

IFO integrated financial operations

IGO intergovernmental organization 

ILO in lieu of 

IO information operations 

IPR in-progress review 

IPR F plan approval in-progress review

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

J-1 manpower and personnel staff section

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff

J-7 Joint Staff Directorate for Joint 

 Force Development 

J-8 Joint Staff Director for Force Structure, Resource, and 

 Assessment

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JEL Joint Electronic Library

JFC joint force commander

JFLCC joint force land component commander 

JFP joint force provider 

JIA joint individual augmentation

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

 environment 

JLLIS Joint Lessons Learned Information System

JLLP Joint Lessons Learned Program

JMD joint manning document 

JOA joint operations area 

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

JOPP joint operation planning process 

JP joint publication
Glossary

GL-3 

JPEC joint planning and execution community 

JPG joint planning group 

JRSOI joint reception, staging, onward movement, and 

 integration

JS the Joint Staff

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSPS Joint Strategic Planning System

JTF joint task force 

LAD latest arrival date

L-hour specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation 

 commences or is to commence

LOC line of communications 

LOI letter of instruction

LOO line of operation 

MCDP Marine Corps doctrinal publication 

MEA munitions effectiveness assessment

MNF multinational force

MOE measure of effectiveness

MOP measure of performance

NAI named area of interest

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDS National Defense Strategy

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NIPRNET Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network 

NMS National Military Strategy

NSC National Security Council 

NSS National Security Strategy

OA operational area 

OPCON operational control 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operation order 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OUSD(P) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

PIR priority intelligence requirement

PLANORD planning order 

PMESII political, military, economic, social, information, and 

 infrastructure

PPD Presidential policy directive

PTDO prepare to deploy order 

QDR quadrennial defense review 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 5-0 

RATE refine, adapt, terminate, execute

RFF request for forces

ROE rules of engagement

SC strategic communication

SecDef Secretary of Defense

SGS strategic guidance statement

SOF special operations forces

SOP standing operating procedure 

TACON tactical control

TCP theater campaign plan

TIM toxic industrial material

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data 

UCP Unified Command Plan 

USC United States Code 

USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

USG United States Government 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

WARNORD warning order 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 
GL-5 

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

acceptability. The joint operation plan review criterion for assessing whether the 

contemplated course of action is proportional, worth the cost, consistent with the law of 

war, and is militarily and politically supportable. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-

02.) 

Adaptive Planning and Execution system. A Department of Defense system of joint 

policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures, supported by communications 

and information technology, that is used by the joint planning and execution community 

to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, 

redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. Also 

called APEX system. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

adequacy. The joint operation plan review criterion for assessing whether the scope and 

concept of planned operations can accomplish the assigned mission and comply with the 

planning guidance provided. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

alert order. 1. A crisis action planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that provides essential guidance for planning 

and directs the initiation of execution planning for the selected course of action 

authorized by the Secretary of Defense. 2. A planning directive that provides essential 

planning guidance, directs the initiation of execution planning after the directing 

authority approves a military course of action, but does not authorize execution. Also 

called ALERTORD. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

allocation. Distribution of limited forces and resources for employment among competing 

requirements. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

allocation (nuclear). None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

alternate command post. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

annex. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

appendix. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

apportionment. In the general sense, distribution of forces and capabilities as the starting 

point for planning. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

assumption. A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course 

of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to 

enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the 

situation and make a decision on the course of action. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02 with JP 5-0 as the source JP.) 

augmentation forces. Forces to be transferred from a supporting combatant commander to 

the combatant command (command authority) or operational control of a supported 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 5-0 

combatant commander during the execution of an operation order approved by the 

President and Secretary of Defense. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

available-to-load date. A date specified for each unit in a time-phased force and 

deployment data indicating when that unit will be ready to load at the point of 

embarkation. Also called ALD. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 5-0 as 

the source JP.) 

base plan. A type of operation plan that describes the concept of operations, major forces, 

sustainment concept, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission without 

annexes or time-phased force and deployment data. Also called BPLAN. (Approved 

for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

branch. 1. A subdivision of any organization. 2. A geographically separate unit of an 

activity, which performs all or part of the primary functions of the parent activity on a 

smaller scale. 3. An arm or service of the Army. 4. The contingency options built into 

the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a 

force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or 

disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. (Approved for incorporation into JP 

1-02.) 

campaign. A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational 

objectives within a given time and space. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

campaign plan. A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at 

achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

campaign planning. The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint 

force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts 

through the development of an operation plan for a campaign. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

C-day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

center of gravity. The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of 

action, or will to act. Also called COG. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with 

JP 5-0 as the source JP.) 

coalition. An arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

coalition action. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

combat support agency. A Department of Defense agency so designated by Congress or 

the Secretary of Defense that supports military combat operations. Also called CSA. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 
Glossary

GL-7 

commander’s concept. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

commander’s estimate. A developed course of action designed to provide the Secretary of 

Defense with military options to meet a potential contingency. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

commander’s required delivery date. The original date relative to C-day, specified by the 

combatant commander for arrival of forces or cargo at the destination; shown in the 

time-phased force and deployment data to assess the impact of later arrival. (Approved 

for replacement of “combatant commander’s required date” and its definition in JP 1-

02.) 

completeness. The joint operation plan review criterion for assessing whether operation 

plans incorporate major operations and tasks to be accomplished and to what degree 

they include forces required, deployment concept, employment concept, sustainment 

concept, time estimates for achieving objectives, description of the end state, mission 

success criteria, and mission termination criteria. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses 

what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using 

available resources. Also called CONOPS. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

concept plan. In the context of joint operation planning level 3 planning detail, an operation 

plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to 

convert it into a complete operation plan or operation order. Also called CONPLAN. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

constraint. In the context of joint operation planning, a requirement placed on the command 

by a higher command that dictates an action, thus restricting freedom of action. (JP 1-

02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

contingency. A situation requiring military operations in response to natural disasters, 

terrorists, subversives, or as otherwise directed by appropriate authority to protect US 

interests. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

contingency plan. A plan for major contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated in the 

principal geographic subareas of the command. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

contingency planning. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

course of action. 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A 

scheme developed to accomplish a mission. 3. A product of the course-of-action 

development step of the joint operation planning process. Also called COA. (Approved 

for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

crisis action planning. The Adaptive Planning and Execution system process involving the 

time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and operation orders for the 

deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 5-0 

resources in response to an imminent crisis. Also called CAP. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

critical capability. A means that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to 

function as such and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed 

objective(s). (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

critical requirement. An essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to 

be fully operational. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

critical vulnerability. An aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable to 

direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

culminating point. The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its 

form of operations, offense or defense. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

current force. The actual force structure and/or manning available to meet present 

contingencies. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

date-time group. The date and time, expressed as six digits followed by the time zone 

suffix at which the message was prepared for transmission (first pair of digits denotes 

the date, second pair the hours, third pair the minutes, followed by a three-letter month 

abbreviation and two-digit year abbreviation.) Also called DTG. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.)

D-day consumption/production differential assets. None. (Approved for removal from JP 

1-02.) 

D-day materiel readiness gross capability. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

D-day pipeline assets. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

decision. In an estimate of the situation, a clear and concise statement of the line of action 

intended to be followed by the commander as the one most favorable to the successful 

accomplishment of the assigned mission. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with 

JP 5-0 as the source JP.) 

decision point. A point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making 

a key decision concerning a specific course of action. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

decisive point. A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when 

acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or 

contribute materially to achieving success. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 

with JP 5-0 as the source JP.) 

Defense Planning Guidance. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary

GL-9 

deliberate planning. 1. The Adaptive Planning and Execution system process involving the 

development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic 

planning documents. 2. A planning process for the deployment and employment of 

apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. 

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

deployment database. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

deployment order. A planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that authorizes and directs the transfer of forces 

between combatant commands by reassignment or attachment. Also called DEPORD. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

deployment planning. Operational planning directed toward the movement of forces and 

sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific operational area for 

conducting the joint operations contemplated in a given plan. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

deterrent options. A course of action, developed on the best economic, diplomatic, and 

military judgment, designed to dissuade an adversary from a current course of action or 

contemplated operations. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

direction of attack. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

earliest arrival date. A day, relative to C-day, that is specified as the earliest date when a 

unit, a resupply shipment, or replacement personnel can be accepted at a port of 

debarkation during a deployment. Also called EAD. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02.) 

employment. The strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 5-0) 

essential task. A specified or implied task that an organization must perform to accomplish 

the mission that is typically included in the mission statement. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

estimate. 1. An analysis of a foreign situation, development, or trend that identifies its 

major elements, interprets the significance, and appraises the future possibilities and the 

prospective results of the various actions that might be taken. 2. An appraisal of the 

capabilities, vulnerabilities, and potential courses of action of a foreign nation or 

combination of nations in consequence of a specific national plan, policy, decision, or 

contemplated course of action. 3. An analysis of an actual or contemplated clandestine 

operation in relation to the situation in which it is or would be conducted in order to 

identify and appraise such factors as available as well as needed assets and potential 

obstacles, accomplishments, and consequences. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-

02 with JP 5-0 as the source JP.) 
Glossary 

GL-10 JP 5-0 

execute order. 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the 

direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a decision by the President to 

initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed. Also 

called EXORD. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

execution planning. The Adaptive Planning and Execution System translation of an 

approved course of action into an executable plan of action through the preparation of a 

complete operation plan or operation order. Also called EP. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

feasibility. The joint operation plan review criterion for assessing whether the assigned 

mission can be accomplished using available resources within the time contemplated by 

the plan. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

flexible deterrent option. A planning construct intended to facilitate early decision making 

by developing a wide range of interrelated responses that begin with deterrent-oriented 

actions carefully tailored to create a desired effect. Also called FDO. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

flexible response. The capability of military forces for effective reaction to any enemy 

threat or attack with actions appropriate and adaptable to the circumstances existing. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 5-0 as the source JP.) 

force module package. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

force planning. 1. Planning associated with the creation and maintenance of military 

capabilities by the Military Departments, Services, and US Special Operations 

Command. 2. In the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, the planning 

conducted by the supported combatant command and its components to determine 

required force capabilities to accomplish an assigned mission. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

force requirement number. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

force(s). None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

force sourcing. The identification of the actual units, their origins, ports of embarkation, 

and movement characteristics to satisfy the time-phased force requirements of a 

supported commander. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 5-0 as the 

source JP.) 

fragmentary order. An abbreviated form of an operation order issued as needed after an 

operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that 

order. Also called FRAGORD. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

governing factors. In the context of joint operation planning, those aspects of the situation 

(or externally imposed factors) that the commander deems critical to the 

accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 
Glossary

GL-11 

handover. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

H-hour. The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

implementation. Procedures governing the mobilization of the force and the deployment, 

employment, and sustainment of military operations in response to execution orders 

issued by the Secretary of Defense. Also called IMP. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02 with JP 5-0 as the source JP.)

implied task. In the context of joint operation planning, a task derived during mission 

analysis that an organization must perform or prepare to perform to accomplish a 

specified task or the mission, but which is not stated in the higher headquarters order. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

intensive management. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

joint operation planning. Planning activities associated with joint military operations by 

combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders in response to 

contingencies and crises. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. An Adaptive Planning and Execution 

system technology. Also called JOPES. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

joint operation planning process. An orderly, analytical process that consists of a logical 

set of steps to analyze a mission, select the best course of action, and produce a joint 

operation plan or order. Also called JOPP. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

joint planning and execution community. Those headquarters, commands, and agencies 

involved in the training, preparation, mobilization, deployment, employment, support, 

sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of military forces assigned or committed 

to a joint operation. Also called JPEC. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

joint planning group. A planning organization consisting of designated representatives of 

the joint force headquarters principal and special staff sections, joint force components 

(Service and/or functional), and other supporting organizations or agencies as deemed 

necessary by the joint force commander. Also called JPG. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. A plan that provides guidance to the combatant 

commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish tasks and missions based on 

current military capabilities. Also called JSCP. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-

02.) 

Joint Strategic Planning System. One of the primary means by which the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

and the combatant commanders, carries out the statutory responsibilities to assist the 

President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces. 

Also called JSPS. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-12 JP 5-0 

latest arrival date. A day, relative to C-Day, that is specified by the supported combatant 

commander as the latest date when a unit, a resupply shipment, or replacement 

personnel can arrive at the port of debarkation and support the concept of operations. 

Also called LAD. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

leverage. In the context of joint operation planning, a relative advantage in combat power 

and/or other circumstances against the adversary across one or more domains or the 

information environment sufficient to exploit that advantage. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

L-hour. The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to 

commence. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

limiting factor. A factor or condition that, either temporarily or permanently, impedes 

mission accomplishment. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

line of effort. In the context of joint operation planning, using the purpose (cause and 

effect) to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions by 

linking multiple tasks and missions. Also called LOE. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-

02.) 

line of operation. A line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in 

relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in 

time and space to an objective(s). Also called LOO. (Approved for replacement of

“line of operations” and its definition in JP 1-02.) 

major combat element. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

major fleet. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

major force. A military organization comprised of major combat elements and associated 

combat support, combat service support, and sustainment increments. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

military options. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

mission statement. A short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization’s essential 

task(s), purpose, and action containing the elements of who, what, when, where, and 

why. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

mobility analysis. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

movement directive. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

multinational. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition 

partners. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

nonstandard unit. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary

GL-13 

non-unit record. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

objective. 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every 

operation is directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken which is essential to the 

commander’s plan. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

operational approach. A description of the broad actions the force must take to transform 

current conditions into those desired at end state. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

operational characteristics. Those military characteristics that pertain primarily to the 

functions to be performed by equipment, either alone or in conjunction with other 

equipment; e.g., for electronic equipment, operational characteristics include such items 

as frequency coverage, channeling, type of modulation, and character of emission. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 5-0 as the source JP.) 

operational design. The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a 

campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 5-0 as the source JP.) 

operational design element. A key consideration used in operational design. (Approved 

for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 5-0 as the source JP.) 

operational limitation. An action required or prohibited by higher authority, such as a 

constraint or a restraint, and other restrictions that limit the commander’s freedom of 

action, such as diplomatic agreements, rules of engagement, political and economic 

conditions in affected countries, and host nation issues. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

operational pause. A temporary halt in operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

operational reserve. An emergency reserve of men and/or materiel established for the 

support of a specific operation. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 5-0 as 

the source JP.) 

operation annexes. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

operation order. A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the 

purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called OPORD. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

operation plan. 1. Any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to 

actual and potential contingencies. 2. A complete and detailed joint plan containing a 

full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a 

time-phased force and deployment data. Also called OPLAN. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

personnel increment number. A seven-character, alphanumeric field that uniquely 

describes a non-unit-related personnel entry (line) in a Joint Operation Planning and 
Glossary 

GL-14 JP 5-0 

Execution System time-phased force and deployment data. Also called PIN. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 5-0 as the source JP.) 

phase. In joint operation planning, a definitive stage of an operation or campaign during 

which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually 

supporting activities for a common purpose. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

plan identification number. 1. A command-unique four-digit number followed by a suffix 

indicating the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan year for which the plan is written. 2. A 

five-digit number representing the command-unique four-digit identifier, followed by a 

one-character, alphabetic suffix indicating the operation plan option, or a one-digit 

number numeric value indicating the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan year for which the 

plan is written. Also called PID. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

plan information capability. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

planning factor. A multiplier used in planning to estimate the amount and type of effort 

involved in a contemplated operation. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

planning order. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs 

the initiation of execution planning before the directing authority approves a military 

course of action. Also called PLANORD. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

prepare to deploy order. An order issued by competent authority to move forces or prepare 

forces for movement (e.g., increase deployability posture of units). Also called PTDO. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

Programmed Forces. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

ready-to-load date. The date when a unit will be ready to move from the origin, i.e., 

mobilization station. Also called RLD. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with 

JP 5-0 as the source JP.)

required delivery date. The date that a force must arrive at the destination and complete 

unloading. Also called RDD. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 5-0 as 

the source JP.) 

requirements capability. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

restraint. In the context of joint operation planning, a requirement placed on the command 

by a higher command that prohibits an action, thus restricting freedom of action. (JP 1-

02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

risk. Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. (Approved for incorporation into JP 

1-02.) 
Glossary

GL-15 

scheduled arrival date. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

scheduling and movement. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

scheduling and movement capability. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

scheme of maneuver. The central expression of the commander’s concept for operations 

that governs the design of supporting plans or annexes of how arrayed forces will 

accomplish the mission. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

security cooperation planning. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

sequel. The subsequent major operation or phase based on the possible outcomes (success, 

stalemate, or defeat) of the current major operation or phase. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

shortfall. The lack of forces, equipment, personnel, materiel, or capability, reflected as the 

difference between the resources identified as a plan requirement and those apportioned 

to a combatant commander for planning that would adversely affect the command's 

ability to accomplish its mission. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 5-0 

as the source JP.) 

specified task. In the context of joint operation planning, a task that is specifically assigned 

to an organization by its higher headquarters. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

staff estimates. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

strategic concept. The course of action accepted as the result of the estimate of the strategic 

situation which is a statement of what is to be done in broad terms. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

strategic direction. The processes and products by which the President, Secretary of 

Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic guidance to the 

Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies. (Approved 

for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

strategic estimate. The broad range of strategic factors that influence the commander’s 

understanding of its operational environment and its determination of missions, 

objectives, and courses of action. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

strategic mobility. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

strategic plan. A plan for the overall conduct of a war. (Approved for incorporation into JP 

1-02 with JP 5-0 as the source JP.) 

subordinate campaign plan. A combatant command prepared plan that satisfies the 

requirements under a Department of Defense campaign plan, which, depending upon the 
Glossary 

GL-16 JP 5-0 

circumstances, transitions to a supported or supporting plan in execution. (Approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.)

supporting plan. An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander, a subordinate 

commander, or an agency to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported 

commander’s plan. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

threat identification and assessment. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

time-phased force and deployment data. The time-phased force data, non-unit-related 

cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan or operation order, 

or ongoing rotation of forces. Also called TPFDD. (Approved for incorporation into JP 

1-02.) 

time-phased force and deployment data maintenance. None. (Approved for removal 

from JP 1-02.) 

time-phased force and deployment data refinement. None. (Approved for removal from 

JP 1-02.) 

times. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff coordinates the proposed dates and times

with the commanders of the appropriate unified and specified commands, as well as any 

recommended changes when specified operations are to occur (C-, D-, M-days end at 

2400 hours Universal Time [Zulu time] and are assumed to be 24 hours long for 

planning). (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

transportation feasible. A determination made by the supported commander that a draft 

operation plan can be supported with the apportioned transportation assets. (Approved 

for replacement of “grossly transportation feasible” and its definition in JP 1-02.) 

Universal Time. A measure of time that conforms, within a close approximation, to the 

mean diurnal rotation of the Earth and serves as the basis of civil timekeeping. Also 

called ZULU time. (Formerly called Greenwich Mean Time.) (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

validate. Execution procedure used by combatant command components, supporting 

combatant commanders, and providing organizations to confirm to the supported 

commander and United States Transportation Command that all the information records 

in a time-phased force and deployment data not only are error-free for automation 

purposes, but also accurately reflect the current status, attributes, and availability of 

units and requirements. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

war game. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

warning order. 1. A preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow. 2. A 

planning directive that initiates the development and evaluation of military courses of 

action by a supported commander and requests that the supported commander submit a 

commander’s estimate. 3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates 
Glossary

GL-17 

forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning 

guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. Also called WARNORD. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 5-0 as the source JP.) 

wartime manpower planning system. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-18 JP 5-0 

Intentionally Blank
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 6-0

COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEM

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

JP 1-0

PERSONNEL

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

JP 4-0

LOGISTICS

JP 3-0

OPERATIONS

JP 5-0

PLANS

JP 2-0

INTELLIGENCE

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the

development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 5-0 Plans













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts frontend analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

JS J-7 approves and releases PD to

lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant

command, JS directorate)













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/JS J-7 develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 6-0

COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEM

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

JP 1-0

PERSONNEL

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

JP 4-0

LOGISTICS

JP 3-0

OPERATIONS

JP 5-0

PLANS

JP 2-0

INTELLIGENCE

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the

development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 5-0 Plans













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts frontend analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

JS J-7 approves and releases PD to

lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant

command, JS directorate)













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group