FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-1381

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ROBERT A. KOROLY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.

Thomas V. Dannheisser, Judge.

August 16, 2018

ROWE, J.

After consuming fourteen beers, Robert Koroly drove the 

wrong way on Interstate 110 colliding head-on with a vehicle 

driven by Johnny Robinson. Within seconds, a third vehicle driven 

by Clarence Jordan struck Robinson’s vehicle. The crash left 

Jordan with serious injuries, and Robinson died as a result of the 

injuries he sustained in the crash.

Koroly was charged with DUI manslaughter and DUI with 

serious bodily injury. Koroly elected not to go to trial and entered 

a plea. He was sentenced to 13.25 years’ imprisonment followed 

by 6.75 years’ probation.
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After serving four years of his sentence, Koroly sought to 

withdraw his plea on grounds that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to retain an accident reconstruction expert to evaluate the 

road conditions that existed at the time of the crash. Koroly 

argued that had his counsel retained an expert, the expert would 

have discovered defective signage on the interstate and hazardous 

weather conditions, both of which could have contributed to the 

crash. Under those circumstances, Koroly asserts that he would 

not have entered a plea. The trial court denied Koroly’s motion, 

concluding that counsel’s performance was not deficient. We agree 

and affirm.

I. Facts

Koroly was a commissioned officer in the United States Navy. 

He had served nearly eight years as a naval aviator, with the last 

few years of his military career as a flight instructor stationed at 

the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Florida. The record is replete 

with references to Koroly’s achievements and honorable service to 

his country. Numerous letters offered at sentencing by Koroly’s 

family, friends, and colleagues recount Koroly’s past 

accomplishments and future potential.

a. The crash

On April 30, 2010, Koroly celebrated one aspect of that future. 

He planned to move in with his soon-to-be fiancé and her children. 

Koroly and his friends visited multiple bars that evening in 

downtown Pensacola. The celebration lasted into the early 

morning hours of May 1, 2010.

Sometime before 5:42 a.m., the celebration ended. It is 

unknown what time Koroly left downtown Pensacola or why he got 

behind the wheel of his SUV. There is no evidence of where he was 

headed or how he came to be driving the wrong way on the 

interstate. What is known is this: with a blood alcohol level of 

over twice the legal limit, Koroly entered a southbound exit ramp 

on Interstate 110 and drove at least 1,700 feet in the wrong 

direction before colliding head-on with 54-year-old Johnny 

Robinson. Robinson, a single father of four, was traveling home 

from work to his home in Navarre, Florida. Robinson and Koroly’s 
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vehicles spun out of control before coming to a stop in the center 

lane of the highway. Within seconds, 25-year-old Clarence Jordan 

struck the right side of Robinson’s vehicle.

The force of the impact trapped Koroly inside his SUV. When 

officers arrived, Robinson was unconscious. Jordan was found 

lying on the ground next to his driver’s side door. He had 

attempted to exit his car and help Robinson and Koroly, but he fell 

due to his right hip being dislocated in the crash.

An eyewitness told officers that Koroly’s vehicle came out of 

nowhere and had been traveling in the wrong direction. The 

witness, who had pulled over to help the victims, observed that 

Koroly was “out of it.” In the ambulance, two emergency 

responders overheard Koroly admit to drinking fourteen beers. 

The officers noticed Koroly’s eyes were bloodshot and his speech 

was slurred.

Koroly initially denied being the driver of the SUV. After the 

officers asked him if he was a member of the military, Koroly 

changed his story and admitted that he had been driving and could 

not remember what happened. He cooperated with law 

enforcement in their investigation by consenting to a blood draw 

at the hospital. The tests revealed Koroly’s blood alcohol content 

was .166.

Johnny Robinson was pronounced dead at Baptist Hospital 

from the injuries he sustained in the crash. Clarence Jordan 

suffered from a broken hand, four broken fingers, a gash on his 

right leg, and a dislocated hip. He required eight days of 

hospitalization and underwent hip surgery, followed by extensive 

physical therapy. Koroly was charged with DUI manslaughter for 

the death of Robinson. He was charged with DUI with serious 

bodily injury for causing Jordan’s injuries.

b. Retaining counsel

Koroly’s parents retained defense attorney Clinton Couch to 

defend Koroly. The Korolys were intimately involved with the 

case. Residents of Philadelphia, Mr. and Mrs. Koroly flew to 

Florida at least four times during a nine-month period to meet with 
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Couch about Koroly’s defense. They often prepared written 

questions for Couch. They wanted to understand the gravity of the 

charges and what sentence Koroly could be facing.

Early in Couch’s representation of Koroly, the Korolys 

discussed with Couch the possibility of retaining an accident 

reconstruction expert. According to Mr. Koroly, the Korolys had 

family friends who were defense attorneys in Philadelphia; those 

friends stressed to the Korolys that obtaining an accident 

reconstruction report should be their top priority. Such a report 

could help explain the cause of the crash. The Korolys conveyed 

this information to Couch. They asked him to research whether 

there had been a history of traffic problems near and around the 

crash site. They also sought information on the road signage, 

hoping to uncover an alternative cause of the crash unrelated to 

Koroly’s intoxication. During every conversation, whether in 

person or via telephone, the Korolys asked Couch about the 

reconstruction expert and whether one could be retained. Money 

was not an issue. Couch’s response was always that he would look 

into the road signage issues, but the accident reconstruction expert 

would have to wait until there was a plea offer or trial.

At some point, Couch did contact an accident reconstruction 

expert, Christopher Bloomberg. According to Couch, he sent 

Bloomberg a copy of the traffic homicide report and photographs of 

the scene of the crash. He asked Bloomberg to conduct a 

“preliminary evaluation” to see if there was anything in the 

documents that raised “any red flags.” Bloomberg, according to 

Couch, reviewed the documents and determined there was nothing 

that would justify a more comprehensive accident reconstruction.

Following this communication, Couch did not retain 

Bloomberg, or any other expert to perform a more comprehensive

accident reconstruction. He never told the Korolys that he 

consulted with Bloomberg; instead, he told them that an accident 

reconstruction report would not help Koroly’s case and suggested 

Koroly enter a plea. 
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c. Plea and sentencing

On advice from Couch, Koroly entered a straight-up plea. At 

sentencing, Koroly and his family offered emotional apologies to 

the Robinson family and to Clarence Jordan. Koroly accepted full 

responsibility for “his negligent behavior” and anticipated a period 

of imprisonment. Koroly admitted that he was solely responsible 

and that he would never forgive himself for his poor judgment on 

the morning of the crash. He revealed that he had successfully 

completed a twelve-step program with a promise to never consume 

alcohol again. Koroly vowed to turn the Robinson family’s tragedy 

into a life-long mission by joining the movement against drinking 

and driving. He wanted to help other members of the military who 

may be unknowingly suffering from alcoholism. After completion 

of his sentence, Koroly planned to start a military program to 

reinforce the dangers of drunk driving.

On March 24, 2011, the court sentenced Koroly to the 

minimum sentence allowable under the Criminal Punishment 

Code. For DUI manslaughter, a second-degree felony punishable 

by up to 15 years’ imprisonment, Koroly was sentenced to 13.25 

years’ imprisonment followed by 1.75 years’ probation. For DUI 

with serious bodily injury, a third-degree felony punishable by up 

to 5 years’ imprisonment, Koroly was sentenced to 5 years’ 

probation.

d. Postconviction motion

After serving two years of his sentence, Koroly retained 

mechanical engineer Donald Fournier to conduct a comprehensive

accident reconstruction analysis of the crash. Fournier examined 

the traffic homicide report and the crash scene photos. He also 

visited the scene of the accident and attempted to identify Koroly’s 

travel pattern. Fournier uncovered four plausible routes Koroly 

could have driven from downtown Pensacola to a southbound 

Interstate 110 exit ramp. He concluded that the roads were 

deficiently signed, marked, and painted, and that the weather 

conditions on the morning of the crash were foggy and dark. It was 

his opinion that as configured, the roadway geometry and signage 

would actively mislead a driver unfamiliar with the area to enter 
6

the southbound exit and that any driver could have found 

themselves going the wrong way on southbound Interstate 110.

Based on Fournier’s findings, Koroly filed a postconviction 

motion alleging Couch was ineffective for failing to retain an 

accident reconstruction expert. Had Couch retained an expert, 

Koroly argued, the deficiencies in the road signage would have 

been discovered and Koroly would have elected to go to trial.

At the evidentiary hearing on the motion, Couch, Fournier, 

and Bloomberg testified. Board certified criminal defense attorney 

Michael Kessler and Koroly’s father, Robert Koroly, Sr., also 

testified. Fournier estimated the distance Koroly drove the wrong 

way on Interstate 110 was between 1,700 feet (the length of at least 

five football fields) and two miles. Fournier admitted that he had 

not taken into account Koroly’s blood alcohol level of .166. 

Bloomberg, the expert who had been contacted by Couch, 

recalled speaking to Couch on the phone but could not remember 

the specific content of their conversation. Bloomberg testified that 

Couch hired him to “essentially evaluate some materials that were 

sent in.” He performed a preliminary review in order to determine 

what else would be needed to complete a more comprehensive 

evaluation and analysis. Following their initial contact, Couch 

never directed Bloomberg to do anything additional with Koroly’s 

file, and Bloomberg never heard from Couch again. In preparation 

for his testimony at the postconviction hearing, Bloomberg 

reviewed Fournier’s report. Bloomberg testified that he would 

have been able to produce a similar reconstruction analysis. But 

on cross-examination, Bloomberg acknowledged that Koroly’s 

blood alcohol level would have been an issue.

Couch’s testimony at the hearing contradicted Bloomberg’s 

testimony in some respects. Couch stated that he retained 

Bloomberg to conduct a preliminary investigation to see if there 

were any anomalies in the traffic homicide report and photographs 

that would justify a more comprehensive accident reconstruction. 

He recalled that after Bloomberg’s review of the documents,

Bloomberg gave him the impression that there was nothing in the 

records that would warrant a more comprehensive reconstruction. 

Relying on Bloomberg’s opinion, Couch went to the Korolys and 
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told them that an accident investigation would not improve 

Koroly’s circumstances. Couch added that if he had ignored 

Bloomberg’s preliminary opinion and retained an expert for a more 

comprehensive accident reconstruction, he would not have been 

acting as a good steward of Koroly’s funds and could have risked 

creating a compelling expert witness for the State.

The trial court denied Koroly’s motion for postconviction 

relief, finding Couch’s performance was not deficient. The court 

determined that Couch had retained Bloomberg for the purpose of 

conducting a preliminary investigation and then made a strategic 

decision not to go forward with a more comprehensive accident 

reconstruction after Bloomberg’s initial review. In so finding, the 

court also noted that “[n]o expert witness could alter the fact” that 

Koroly’s operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence 

caused or contributed to the accident. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prove 

ineffective assistance, an appellant must allege: 1) the specific acts 

or omissions of counsel which fell below a standard of 

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, see id. at 690; 

and 2) that the appellant’s case was prejudiced by these acts or 

omissions such that the outcome of the case would have been 

different, see id. at 692. The appellant must make a sufficient 

showing of both deficient performance and prejudice in order to 

obtain postconviction relief. See id. at 697; Valle v. Moore, 837 So. 

2d 905, 910-11 (Fla. 2002). To prove the first prong, the appellant 

must “identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not 

to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; Johnston v. State, 70 So. 3d 472, 477 

(Fla. 2011). “A reviewing court must then, in light of all the 

circumstances, determine whether the identified acts or omissions 

were outside the wide range of professionally competent 

assistance.” Johnston, 70 So. 3d at 477 (internal quotations 

omitted). The prejudice prong requires that the appellant 

demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a 
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probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. 

Thus, the appellant must demonstrate a likelihood of a different 

result which is substantial and not just conceivable. Harrington 

v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011).

a. Deficient Performance

In evaluating whether an attorney’s conduct is deficient, 

counsel’s errors must be “so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 

Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Bradley v. 

State, 33 So. 3d 664, 671 (Fla. 2010). The defendant “bears the 

burden of proving that counsel’s representation was unreasonable 

under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged 

action was not sound strategy.” Brown v. State, 755 So. 2d 616, 

628 (Fla. 2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89); Long v. 

State, 118 So. 3d 798, 803 (Fla. 2013); Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 

2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000). Courts perform a “context-dependent 

consideration” and analysis of counsel’s conduct to determine 

whether counsel’s decisions were “reasonable” under the 

circumstances at the time of the alleged deficient performance. 

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 688-89); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) 

(noting the Strickland test “of necessity requires a case-by-case 

examination of the evidence”).

Koroly asserts that Couch’s decision not to retain an expert to 

conduct a more comprehensive accident reconstruction was 

unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, focusing on 

two reasons Couch provided for his decision. Koroly asserts that 

Couch’s desire to be a good steward of Koroly’s funds and to avoid 

creating an expert witness for the State could not be considered 

reasonable strategy. However, Koroly fails to address Couch’s 

primary, most significant reason for deciding against obtaining an 

expert report: His reliance on Bloomberg’s preliminary, expert 

opinion that the circumstances of Koroly’s crash did not warrant a 

more comprehensive accident reconstruction analysis. Couch had 

no reason to disbelieve or challenge Bloomberg’s expert opinion. 

While Couch and Bloomberg recounted different versions of their 

telephone conversation, the trial court found Couch’s testimony 

more credible. Wait v. State, 212 So. 3d 1082, 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA 
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2017) (“This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the 

trial court on questions of fact, the credibility of the witnesses, and 

the weight given to the evidence.”). After examining the damaging 

evidence against Koroly, including Koroly’s admission and blood 

alcohol level as well as the circumstances surrounding a plea 

compared to a loss at trial, Couch decided against requesting that 

Bloomberg provide a more comprehensive accident reconstruction

report. While he could have requested such a report, we find 

Couch’s decision not to was reasonable given the circumstances.

See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 

(“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and 

facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; . 

. . counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make 

a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 

unnecessary.”). Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined 

that Koroly did not meet his burden of proving Couch’s 

performance was deficient. See Nelson v. State, 43 So. 3d 20, 28 

(Fla. 2010) (“[T]he defendant carries the burden to overcome the 

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 

might be considered sound trial strategy.”).

b. Prejudice

In addition to failing to establish deficient performance, 

Koroly also failed to demonstrate prejudice. In Hill v. Lockhart, 

474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985), the Supreme Court applied the Strickland

test to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of 

a defendant pleading guilty to a crime. The Court modified the 

Strickland prejudice requirement, stating that in plea cases the 

issue is “whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective 

performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In other 

words, in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the 

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 

would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59; see also Brazeail 

v. State, 821 So. 2d 364, 368 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

Importantly, “[t]he prejudice component of a Hill claim 

involves a legal standard and is not a purely factual 

determination.” Capalbo v. State, 73 So. 3d 838, 841 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2011). “Courts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc
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assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but 

for his attorney’s deficiencies.” Jae Lee v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 

1958, 1967 (2017). Rather, in determining whether a defendant 

was prejudiced, we must objectively consider the totality of the 

circumstances at the time of the plea:

[I]n determining whether a reasonable probability 

exists that the defendant would have insisted on going 

to trial, a court should consider the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the plea, including such 

factors as whether a particular defense was likely to 

succeed at trial, the colloquy between the defendant 

and the trial court at the time of the plea, and the 

difference between the sentence imposed under the 

plea and the maximum possible sentence the 

defendant faced at a trial.

Grosvenor v. State, 874 So. 2d 1176, 1181-82 (Fla. 2004) (emphasis 

added).

Here, Koroly testified that if Couch had provided him with the 

information from an accident reconstruction expert like Fournier, 

there was “no question” he would have elected to go to trial. Couch 

seemingly agreed:

Whether or not it would have changed my client’s 

opinion, I think it probably would have, to tell you the 

truth, because of his complete lack of any kind of history 

of this type of thing, his complete standing as an officer 

in the Navy and making sound decisions in combat. I 

know that this was bewildering to him: How in the 

world could I have possibly found myself in this 

position?

So it may have changed his mind. He may have decided 

this is why I was there is because of inadequate signage, 

and I made a mistake that anybody could have made. So 

he may have said, I understand what you are saying, 

Clint, but I want to take this to trial. I can’t say today 

that he would have wanted – you know, entered a plea 

or taken the case to trial.
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However, under Lee, we cannot upset Koroly’s plea based 

solely on his post hoc assertions that he would have elected to go 

to trial had he obtained an expert report. Lee, 137 S.Ct. at 1967. 

Instead, we must apply the Grosvenor factors and consider the 

totality of the circumstances surrounding his plea. In doing so, we 

find that the contemporaneous evidence from the time of Koroly’s 

plea does not substantiate his post hoc preference for trial. First, 

Koroly received a dramatically lower prison sentence than what he 

would have been subjected to had he elected to go to trial. Charged 

with second- and third-degree felonies, Koroly was facing up to 

twenty years’ imprisonment with a four-year mandatory 

minimum. But as a result of the plea, Koroly received the lowest 

permissible sentence under the Criminal Punishment Code—

13.25 years’ imprisonment. Second, Koroly signed an agreement 

acknowledging the consequences of entering a plea, and the 

sentencing court conducted a sufficient plea colloquy to ensure 

Koroly understood those rights he was forfeiting, including the 

right to trial and the right to present any and all defenses.

As to the final factor, any defense Koroly could have raised by 

virtue of obtaining a more comprehensive accident reconstruction 

had little to no likelihood of succeeding at trial. Despite the clear 

language in Grosvenor, Koroly asserts that the success of any 

potential defense is not a relevant consideration in determining 

whether Couch’s deficient performance prejudiced him. However, 

the United States Supreme Court recently clarified that where a 

defendant’s decision about going to trial turns on his prospects of 

success, and the attorney’s alleged error affected those prospects 

of success, “the defendant must also show that he would have been 

better off going to trial.” Lee, 137 S.Ct. at 1966. The Court 

explained that the prejudice inquiry “demands a case-by-case 

examination of the totality of the evidence” and focuses on a 

defendant’s decision-making:

A defendant without any viable defense will be highly 

likely to lose at trial. And a defendant facing such long 

odds will rarely be able to show prejudice from accepting 

a guilty plea that offers him a better resolution than 

would be likely after trial. But that is not because the 

prejudice inquiry in this context looks to the probability 
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of a conviction for its own sake. It is instead because 

defendants obviously weigh their prospects at trial in 

deciding whether to accept a plea. Where a defendant has 

no plausible chance of an acquittal at trial, it is highly 

likely that he will accept a plea if the Government offers 

one.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

Had Koroly obtained a more comprehensive accident 

reconstruction, he argues he would have advanced a defense at 

trial that it was not his intoxicated driving that caused the crash, 

but rather the defective road signs and poor weather conditions 

that caused him to drive the wrong way onto the interstate. But 

evidence of poor road conditions and inadequate signage would 

have had very little probative value in light of the overwhelming 

evidence of Koroly’s intoxication and the extremely low threshold 

for proving causation under the DUI manslaughter statute. See § 

316.193, Fla. Stat. (2011). Under the plain language of the statute, 

the State was not required to prove that Koroly’s intoxicated 

driving was the sole cause of the fatal crash. As we recently 

explained in Pryear v. State, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D491 (Fla. 1st DCA 

Feb. 28, 2018):

DUI manslaughter requires proof that a defendant 

operated a vehicle while impaired within the meaning of 

section 316.193(1), Florida Statutes (2013), and, “by 

reason of such operation, cause[d] or contribute[d] to 

causing . . . [t]he death of any human being . . . .” § 

316.193(3)(c)3.a., Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added). 

“[T]he fact that someone is intoxicated and drives a 

particular vehicle which causes another person’s death 

should be enough to satisfy the elements of DUI 

manslaughter.” State v. Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552, 563 

(Fla. 1999). “The causation element of the amended 

statute was interpreted by [the Florida Supreme Court] 

in [Magaw v. State, 537 So. 2d 564, 567 (Fla. 1989),] as 

not requiring that the conduct of the operator of the 

vehicle be the sole cause.” Hubbard, 751 So. 2d at 564 

(emphasis in original). “The statute requires only that 

the operation of the vehicle should have caused the 
13

accident. Therefore, any deviation or lack of care on the 

part of a driver under the influence to which the fatal 

accident can be attributed will suffice.” Magaw, 537 So. 

2d at 567.

Id. at *5.1

That Koroly’s intoxicated driving contributed to the death of 

Robinson and Jordan’s injuries was indisputable. Koroly’s blood 

alcohol level was over twice the legal limit. Two emergency 

responders overheard Koroly say that he had consumed fourteen 

beers. The officers responding to the scene noticed Koroly’s eyes 

were bloodshot and his speech was slurred. Although Koroly’s 

point of entry is unknown, the expert testimony examined several 

possible routes, the closest of which placed the scene of the crash 

at least 1,700 feet away from the nearest entry point. Even if 

inadequate signage and poor road conditions led Koroly the wrong 

way, had Koroly not been intoxicated he likely would have noticed 

the interstate median on his right and the headlights of any 

oncoming vehicles and corrected his actions before traveling the 

length of over five football fields and colliding head-on with Johnny 

Robinson. See Hubbard, 751 So. 2d at 563 (citing Ingram v. Pettit, 

340 So. 2d 922, 924-25 (Fla. 1976) (“Intuitively, someone who is 

intoxicated will not be able to control his or her automobile in a 

safe manner and make quick decisions and execute maneuvers 

that will avoid accidents.”)). No expert testimony could have 

refuted the fact that Koroly’s driving under the influence 

contributed to the cause of Robinson’s death and Jordan’s injuries. 

Koroly’s purported defense had virtually no possibility of 

succeeding at trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 (“[W]here the alleged 

error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential 

affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the 

 1 In Pryear, we noted that the current version of the DUI 

manslaughter statute contains an even lower threshold for 

establishing causation than the version of the statute interpreted 

in Magaw and Hubbard. Id. The previous version of the statute 

required that operating a vehicle while intoxicated “cause” a death, 

whereas the current version requires operating a vehicle while 

intoxicated “cause or contribute to” the victim’s death. See § 

316.193(3)(c)3., Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added).
14

‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative 

defense likely would have succeeded at trial.”); Grosvenor, 874 So. 

2d at 1181 (“The merits of any defense . . . is relevant to the 

credibility of the defendant’s assertion that he would have insisted 

on going to trial. If the defense was meritless, the defendant’s 

claim carries much less weight.”).

Viewing the totality of the circumstances as required by 

Grosvenor, and applying the Court’s clarification of the standard 

in Lee, we find that Koroly has not established that but for Couch’s 

failure to obtain a more comprehensive accident reconstruction 

report, he would have elected to go to trial. Koroly acknowledged 

the consequences of his plea and received a far better sentence 

than would be likely after trial. Considering the minimum

threshold for proving causation for the offenses of DUI 

manslaughter and DUI with serious bodily injury, Koroly did not 

meet his burden of proving that his defense of defective road 

signage would have succeeded at trial in light of the overwhelming 

evidence of his intoxication. Because Koroly failed to establish 

either deficient performance or prejudice, we affirm the trial 

court’s denial of postconviction relief.

M.K. THOMAS concurs; B.L. THOMAS, C.J., concurs in result only.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Michael Ufferman of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., 

Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Samuel B. Steinberg, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.