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STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related to 

national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis.

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Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

ARMS CONTROL AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Stephen J. Blank

Louis H. Jordan, Jr.

Editors

August 2012

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ii

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ISBN 1-58487-545-3
iii

CONTENTS

Foreword ....................................................................... v

1. The Precarious and Far-Reaching 

 Current Undecidability of the

 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty .................1

Paul Schulte

2. European/Eurasian Security

 and the Treaty on Conventional 

 Armed Forces in Europe .......................................25 

Jeffrey D. McCausland

3. European Security and Arms Control ................. 53

Sergey Rogov

About the Contributors .............................................. 69

v

FOREWORD

While much attention is always given to issues of 

strategic and nuclear arms control, the conventional 

arms control agenda remains something of a stepchild. Nonetheless, in regards to European security, 

conventional arms control issues are of the utmost 

significance. Indeed, since Russia suspended its observance of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 

in 2007, there has already been one war in Europe, the 

Russo-Georgian war of 2008, and many subsequent 

rumors of war. Indeed, one could arguably claim that 

since that Russian suspension, progress on ensuring 

European security has stagnated, if not worse.

Bearing in mind the importance of these issues to 

European security in general and Russian ties with 

Europe and the United States in particular, as well as 

the connection between the conventional and nuclear 

arms control agendas, the Strategic Studies Institute 

(SSI) is pleased to present our readers with this monograph wherein three distinguished U.S., European, 

and Russian experts outline the parameters of these 

thorny interrelated issues. These papers represent the 

views presented at the SSI-Carnegie Council conference at Pocantico, NY, from June 1-3, 2011, and were 

subsequently revised for publication by the editors. 

Taken together, these articles fully clarify the multiple 

and complicated dimensions and connections linking 

these issues of conventional arms control and force reductions in Europe to the wider strategic and nuclear 

issues in which the parties are also involved. In this 

respect, they embody a major part of our activity in 

fostering international analysis and dialogue on topical security issues for the benefit and enlightenment of 

policymakers and experts.
vi

At the same time, the presentation of these papers 

represents one more example of SSI’s ability and willingness to partner with major think tanks and organizations devoted to the analysis of contemporary strategic issues, to bring international experts together in 

candid, high-level, and wide-ranging discussions, and 

to publish papers and books dealing with these issues 

for the benefit of our audience. In this spirit, we present these essays to our readers.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute
1

CHAPTER 1

THE PRECARIOUS AND FAR-REACHING

CURRENT UNDECIDABILITY OF THE

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE TREATY

Paul Schulte

BACKGROUND

Updated analysis of interests, possibilities, and 

implications for the ground-breaking Conventional 

Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is timely. This is less 

because the diplomatic situation of CFE itself has been 

observably changing (attempts to modernize it into a 

universally observed Adapted Conventional Forces in 

Europe [ACFE] Treaty remain in long-term stalemate), 

but because there are new arguments over how much 

it might be worth paying for its reanimation. While 

the future of the CFE project is certainly gloomy, it 

remains unresolved at present in Europe, though possibly replicable elsewhere.

HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE 

In considering CFE’s disputed future and wider 

significance, it is paradoxically helpful to look at the 

deeper past. There is an instructive contrast between 

the adaptation of the CFE Treaty with the complex 

and long-running 19th century Schleswig-Holstein 

Question. The perennial British Foreign Secretary 

John Henry Temple Palmerston said that “Only three 

people have ever really understood the SchleswigHolstein business—the Prince Consort, who is 

dead—a German professor, who has gone mad—and 
2

I, who have forgotten all about it.” The group of specialist policymakers and academic commentators for 

CFE/ACFE often seems only slightly larger. Both the 

Schleswig-Holstein and CFE questions were not only 

famously complicated, but also largely incomprehensible to the public. 

They also perfectly illustrate diametrically different approaches to military assertion and the role of 

armed force. The Schleswig-Holstein Question was 

built on dynastic convolutions and the complexities 

of feudal law. It was resolved violently. The Second 

Schleswig War of 1864, in which a rising, revisionist 

Prussia took the dominant military role, can be seen 

as a move from the concerted conservative stability 

of post-Napoleonic Europe into the cycle of 19th and 

20th century nationalist and, later, ideological conflicts which tore Europe apart until 1945 and kept it 

separated until 1989.1

 The CFE project is an attempt 

to prevent further wars or military blackmail in the 

Eurasian continent stretching from the Atlantic to the 

Urals, by rigorously formulated obligations to provide 

military transparency, and legally enshrined controls 

on allowable holdings of key weapons.

During the early days of CFE, Robert Cooper, now

Counsellor to the European External Action Service, 

even erected a theory2 which framed and exalted CFE 

as the defining expression of global post-modernity, 

into which Europe would lead the world by seeking transparency and mutual trust rather than relying on balances of Westphalian national power, 

and threatened or actual resort to arms. “Intrusive 

verification—which is at the heart of the CFE system—

is a key element in a post-modern order where state 

sovereignty is no longer seen as an absolute . . . [and] 

. . . security is based on transparency, mutual open-
3

ness, interdependence, and mutual vulnerability.”3

The German Foreign Ministry, with its large arms control constituency, therefore characteristically tends to 

refer to CFE as the capstone of European security. They, 

like others, additionally point out that it is also a treaty 

that could be uniquely valuable in moving from codifying defense relations in the Cold War world into addressing post-Cold War arrangements where agreements have to be multilateral, there are no simplifying 

alliances and parity has no easy bipolar meaning.

This chapter’s main predictive theoretical proposition is that in fact, progress on conventional arms 

control in Europe will continue to move at a pace dictated by nuclear atmospherics. This is because CFE, 

and, before it, mutual and balanced force reductions 

(MBFR), have expressed the wider state of East-West 

strategic relations, above all between the United States 

and Russia. These relations have been anchored on an 

overriding concern for nuclear stability.

NEGOTIATING HISTORIES

The historical record bears this out: The MBFR 

negotiations process was initiated as a result of U.S.-

Russian détente, which culminated in an agreement 

between Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev at the 

1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) meeting to move forward by separate political and military 

negotiations.4 The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) would deal with political 

negotiations and MBFR would deal with military issues.

Bloc to bloc MBFR negotiations began in Vienna, 

Austria, in October 1973 to reduce conventional military forces in Central Europe to equal but significantly 
4

lower levels. The talks were stultified by disagreements 

over Limitations on Residual Forces (how national 

sub-ceilings should apply after reductions), Associated Measures (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] sought confidence building measures 

[CBMs] such as prior notification of maneuvers and 

acceptance of observers, while the Warsaw Pact rejected this as over intrusive and insisted that National 

Technical Measures should suffice), and the Data Discrepancy (how large the Warsaw Pact forces actually 

were). No substantive progress was made, although 

the process itself, despite its protracted frustrations, 

was judged by many to have been worthwhile in facilitating strategic dialogue between East and West. 

But MBFR was ostentatiously stalled in 1979, as 

one of many angry Soviet responses to NATO’s decision to deploy new intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. After the intermediate-range nuclear 

forces (INF) crisis was surmounted, and the Cold War 

wound down, the MBFR talks were formally ended in 

1989 and overtaken by negotiations in the new CFE 

framework. 

CFE achieved a historically rapid movement to 

signature in 1989 between the two blocks5

 on tanks, 

armored combat vehicles (ACVs), heavy artillery, 

combat aircraft, and attack helicopters—the weaponry most important for large-scale offensive operations, 

collectively referred to as treaty-limited equipment 

(TLE). Thereafter, while the strategic atmosphere between Russia and the West remained benign, by the 

end of the Treaty’s reduction period in 1995, the 30 

States Parties completed and verified by inspection 

the destruction or conversion of over 52,000 battle 

tanks, ACVs, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. By the end of 1996, CFE states had 
5

also accepted and conducted more than 2,700 intrusive on-site inspections.

Subsequent events created the obvious imperative 

of adapting the Treaty to take account of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the possibility of NATO 

expansion. For this, the key agreed features6

 were:

• National Ceilings on TLE that states can deploy 

within the treaty’s area of application, which 

stretches from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU).

• Territorial Ceilings on TLE that can be deployed 

in each country within the ATTU.

• Temporary Deployments: requirements to notify 

additions to territorial ceilings for military exercises, temporary deployments or “exceptional circumstances.”

• Transparency: a requirement on states parties to 

permit inspections of 20 percent of their “objects of verification,” down to regimental level, 

and storage, repair, and reduction sites with 

TLE present. Annual or quarterly reports on 

the actual location of tanks, ACVs, and artillery 

were also required, together with notification of 

increases in a state party’s holdings of combat 

aircraft or attack helicopters anywhere within 

the ATTU.

• Flank Limitations: CFE’s biggest challenge had 

probably been Russia’s discontent with treaty 

sub-ceilings imposed to prevent dangerous 

concentrations of TLE in the so-called northern and southern “flank” zones of the ATTU, 

adjacent to and including Norway and Turkey. 

But Russia remains the only state with treaty 

limitations on deployment of its own forces on 

its own territory, in the sensitive St. Petersburg 

and North Caucasus military districts. The 1996 
6

review conference agreed numerical and geographical changes to the flank rules for Russia and Ukraine, with additional transparency 

measures to meet the concerns of other flank 

states.

The ACFE flank accord allowed new, higher limits 

on Russian battle tanks, ACVs, and heavy artillery deployed or stored in the now-reconfigured flank zone. 

According to President Bill Clinton in his Letter of 

Transmittal to the Senate of 1997: 

The Flank Document confirms the importance of subregional constraints on heavy military equipment. 

More specifically, it revalidates the idea, unique to 

CFE, of limits on the amount of equipment particular 

nations in the Treaty area can locate on certain portions of their own national territory.7

During the ratification process, there were congressional anxieties that Moscow might use the new rules 

to prolong an imposed presence in Georgia, Ukraine, 

Moldova, and Azerbaijan, together with fears that the 

Clinton administration would be too accommodating 

to this pressure in order to facilitate NATO expansion. 

Before giving its consent, the Senate consequently insisted upon additional assurances with regard to the 

sovereignty of the former Soviet republics.

The ACFE Treaty text was therefore signed at the 

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Istanbul summit in November 1999 on 

the basis of Russian undertakings to withdraw from 

the Republic of Moldova, to reduce equipment levels 

in Georgia and agree with the Georgian authorities 

on the modalities and duration of the Russian forces 

stationed on Georgian territory, and to reduce their 
7

forces in the flanks to the agreed levels of the ACFE 

Treaty.8

But worsening disputes over NATO enlargement, 

and the intentions behind U.S. missile defense (MD) 

plans, eroded Russian willingness to comply with its 

Istanbul Commitments. Consequently only Belarus, 

Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine ratified the ACFE, 

and Russia’s ratification has been suspended.

In 2007, emphasising the unacceptability of “the 

extraordinary circumstance” of the introduction of 

U.S. missile defenses in Europe, President Vladimir 

Putin demanded a rewriting of the ACFE Treaty and 

warned of a moratorium on Russia’s observation. 

NATO refused to change its policy, and Russia subsequently imposed the moratorium—almost certainly 

in legal violation of CFE provisions. Russia has halted 

verification visits since June 2007 and insists that it is 

no longer obliged by treaty to limit its conventional 

weapons.

In a partially emollient response, NATO initially 

endorsed a “parallel actions package” in March 2008, 

calling for Alliance countries nevertheless to begin the 

ACFE ratification process, while Russia was expected 

and exhorted to have commenced its required withdrawals. It was hoped that Russia would resolve its 

issues with Georgia and Moldova, and NATO nations 

could then quickly complete ratification of the ACFE 

Treaty and address additional Russian security concerns. 

Russia rejected that expectation, and chances of 

agreement have since been further undermined by the 

August 2008 conflict with Georgia, Moscow’s decision 

in the same month to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent nations, and its continuing refusal to accept any reference to “host nation consent” 

as a fundamental principle.
8

In the course of 2010 attempts made towards resuscitation, several bilateral as well as multilateral 

meetings (using the formula 30+6, 30 CFE members 

and 6 non-CFE NATO members) took place. Russia 

and NATO submitted new proposals on escaping the 

deadlock, “although statements from both sides indicated little chance of agreement.”9

 Yet, as a result of 

post-Cold War military reductions, actual holdings of 

TLE are in almost all cases well below permitted ceilings. 

All this has created a continuing long-term log jam 

between NATO and Russia, leaving CFE on life support with a diplomatic crisis approaching in the form 

of a Review Conference required before the end of the 

year.

THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS

What are the apparent balances of interest in reanimating, adapting, and preserving the gains of CFE 

inside such a framework?

Benefits to NATO.

There are multiple reasons for NATO to want to 

preserve CFE.

• Arms Control is a continuing Alliance imperative. At least among European allies, public opinion, above all in Germany, would be 

alarmed and unforgiving if NATO appeared to 

be giving up on any hope of reviving ACFE.

• Ostentatious concern to preserve (or perfume) 

the corpse of CFE may be essential to prevent 

dissension over NATO’s nuclear deterrence 

posture, which is now being examined in the 
9

Alliance’s Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR).

• It would seem, at least to those Westerners who 

are aware of the issue, axiomatically important 

to preserve the system of military transparency 

as widely as possible in Europe. Collapse of the 

CFE Treaty would damage European arms control in general, all institutions and instruments 

and the transnational networks of experts, and 

trained specialist military observers dealing 

with cooperative security.

• It is uncertain whether the Vienna Document 

1999 procedures on confidence and securitybuilding measures10 could survive if the CFE 

Treaty were formally declared dead by all parties.

• But similar pessimism over the Dayton Accords would not seem to be justified. They are 

buttressed by local and Balkan-wide regional 

pressures and incentives from NATO and the 

European Union (EU) which are probably sufficiently powerful to hold the present situation 

together even in the absence of CFE.

Russia and ACFE: General Difficulty 

and Specific Objections. 

Russia’s overall problem is that CFE originally 

codified rough parity at a moment of rough balance between the Warsaw Pact and the West, amid 

honeymoon expectations of closer and closer security relations. Adapted CFE would have to be agreed, 

evolved, and applied indefinitely in a situation of undisguiseable and probably growing disparity between 

a Russia without close military allies and an expanded 

28-nation NATO, and where security partnership be-
10

tween NATO and Russia is frequently proclaimed as 

an objective but is far from apparent.

Specific Russian objections are loud and numerous. The Russian Government now appears to be demanding:11

• ratification of the 1999 ACFE Treaty by the 

NATO states;

• rapid accession of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to the ACFE and their early ratification, 

to restrict emergency deployments of NATO 

forces there;

• definition of the term “substantial combat 

forces” which would limit the forces which the 

Alliance could introduce into the new NATO 

states;

• immediate renegotiation and modernization of 

ACFE if it were ever, temporarily, brought into 

force;

• balance of some kind between Russian and 

NATO forces through a “compensatory lowering” of overall NATO ceilings on Treaty limited 

equipment to take account of NATO’s 1999 and 

2004 enlargements and the presence of American forces in new NATO nations;

• rejection of the principle of Host Nation Consent to limit Russian deployments. Russia considers the vexed troop withdrawal issues bilateral Russian-Georgian or Russian-Moldovan 

questions, not relevant to European arms control; and,

• the abolition of “discriminatory” flank restrictions on Russian territory (which especially affect the volatile North Caucasus) by means of a 

“political decision” between NATO and Russia 

as necessary strategic compensation for NATO 

enlargement.
11

Given the vigor with which Putin denounced CFE 

in 2007, there is now a self-inflicted restriction on Russian freedom of political maneuver, because concessions in this area could easily be perceived as loss of 

machismo in election years.

Benefits to Russia.

But without CFE, Russia would lose transparency 

over the forces of existing or future members of a much 

larger and militarily superior Alliance and, above all, 

any legal limits on the deployment of NATO forces 

into the territory of the three geopolitically crucial Baltic Republics which are not parties to CFE and yet are 

so neurologically close to St. Petersburg and Russia’s 

“Window on Europe.” 

SOLUTIONS

A range of compromises designed to save the CFE 

process have been ingeniously charted by Professor 

Jeffrey McCausland and others.

12

Summary of Options. 

Option 1. Continue the current policy of seeking parallel actions by NATO members and Russia leading to a 

resumption of Russian CFE implementation and a move toward the ACFE Treaty, with some additional inducements 

to Moscow, perhaps by: a) declaring overall lower territorial and national ceilings, with only political effect 

until the ACFE entered into force; or by, b) including 

the geopolitically crucial Baltic States, in particular, 

declaring their future territorial and national ceilings.
12

Option 2. Continue current policies while opening the 

ACFE Treaty to amendment. As a variant, NATO could 

begin to address Russian concerns over flank limitations, providing Russia showed signs of restarting its 

implementation of CFE and began serious treaty-related negotiations with Georgia and Moldova. NATO 

allies could decide to offer discussion of flank limits in 

the framework of the parallel actions package.

Option 3. Begin provisional application of the ACFE 

Treaty, but with conditions. The Alliance could provisionally apply ACFE among its 10 members for, say, 

18 months, in the hope of reciprocation from Russia 

through resumption of her implementation, and progressive satisfaction of the Istanbul Commitments.

Option 4. Cease implementing the CFE Treaty and 

manage a “soft landing” for the end of the CFE regime. 

NATO allies could signal to Russia that they had lost 

confidence in the parallel actions package or in any 

other potential negotiated solution. Consequently, if 

Russia continued its refusal to resume implementation of the existing treaty or to negotiate over forces in 

Georgia and Moldova, NATO would allow the Treaty 

to die—perhaps without formal ending. To soften the 

impact on the international landscape, this position 

could, however, be combined with attempts to persuade all CFE states’ parties to make political commitments to continue observing CFE treaty ceilings.

Near Term Prospects.

What might now realistically happen? Previous 

European arms control experience, and statements by 

both sides, suggest that it would be unrealistic to expect ACFE to be re-examined, ratified, or otherwise 

revived unless it can be incorporated into a wider U.S. 
13

Russian rapprochement—nearly certain to be dominated by nuclear aspects, as before.

Discussion in NATO related conferences between 

March and May 2011 suggested that, while this would 

certainly be a demanding condition, it may not be entirely impossible. In particular, a well-informed yet 

still optimistic diplomat in the mission of a major ally 

repeatedly argued that the crucial inducement would 

be Russia’s hope of getting access to advanced U.S. 

MD technologies through some kind of sharing arrangement. Others suggest that the additional nuclear 

security advantages of getting some control over the 

potential upload of U.S. strategic systems in a further 

treaty would add to the incentive for Russia at least 

to go through the motions of reopening the process to 

adapt CFE.

CFE’s prospects consequently depend on the Russian leadership seeing a positive outcome from entering overlapping negotiations over nuclear reductions (in both Central Strategic and Theatre Nuclear 

Weapons, including upload capacity and weapons in 

storage), MDs, and Conventional Forces in Western 

Eurasia. This would amount to a tentative militarytechnical confirmation of long sought Russo—American reset.

It is presumably in recognition of these interactions that responsibility for CFE is widely rumored to 

be transferred to Rose Gottemoeller’s already impressively full State Department negotiating portfolio as 

Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Arms Control, 

Verification and Compliance. Sergey Kislyak, Russia’s 

Ambassador to the United States, stated to Mrs. Gottemoeller at the Carnegie Nuclear Conference in March 

2011 that Russia was open to such a multiple negotiation process addressing strategic and theater nuclear 

weapons, missile defenses, and conventional forces. 
14

If the political hurdles to setting up the negotiations could be surmounted, as these overtures tantalisingly suggest, the actual negotiating complexities would, of course, remain formidable: huge and 

novel verification difficulties, and difficulties in gaining agreeement for the counting methodologies that 

will define the balance between diverse conventional 

forces, or, harder still, between conventional and nuclear forces. (MBFR, as a whole, illustrated how long a 

stalemate could be maintained over relatively simple 

issues such as numbers of militarily identical counting units, e.g., numbers of troops or main battle tanks; 

while attempts by NATO to trade-off Soviet tank units 

for the withdrawal of American tactical nuclear weapons came to nothing.) Russia’s aspiration would be towards a wide scale multiple rebalancing with NATO. 

There is little public, or academic, indication of new 

efforts to think through the fundamental methodological problems involved.

Still, while scientifically exact calculations may be 

impossible, a “good enough equivalency” in a wide 

scale multiple rebalancing might be agreed upon as 

the de facto objective. Even the preliminaries to an ambitious forward-looking negotiation of that kind could 

have attractions in confidence building and creation 

of a positive diplomatic atmosphere.

Longer-term Possibilities. 

At best, revival of CFE to allow ratification of ACFE 

would mean formal, legalistic, and short-lived transitional steps to a very slow substantive new negotiation. Even going that far would, however, undoubtedly encounter intra-alliance difficulties, though the 

anxieties of flank allies might be diminished by more 
15

assured reinforcements and continuous improvement 

in electronics, unmanned airpower, precision weapons, and reinforcement planning. But these developments would also have to be addressed in the negotiations. An ACFE follow-on agreement would probably 

look very different: as much of a transformation as 

CFE was to MBFR. 

If a new negotiation could be started, it might be 

possible to reach compromises on numbers and even 

flank limits. But it will be harder to relent on the principal of host country consent, which is integral to 

both the current and ACFE treaties. The ACFE Treaty 

would never have been signed if Russia had not first 

signed the bilateral agreements involving withdrawal 

from Georgia and Moldova.13

There is no public indication of compromises 

which may have been formulated by the United States 

to coax Russia back into a conventional arms control 

process. But diplomatic ingenuity and high-minded 

fudging might offer sufficient promise within an inevitably long and complex negotiation, cross linked with 

parallel high stakes U.S.-Russian nuclear and missile 

defense talks.

CORRELATIONS OF FORCES AND ARMS 

CONTROL METHODOLOGY

Certain issues raised by conventional arms control 

in Europe have wider implications. Part of the unpredictability of the CFE decision, and indeed wider uncertainties about Russia’s future strategic choices, derives from uncertainties in understanding how others 

see the effects of military power outside of warfare. 

This differs from the abstract military-on-military calculations of the impact of arms control proposals on 

combat outcomes, which are complex enough.
16

It appears publicly difficult to acknowledge, and 

even more to agree upon, the significance of what 

Russian commentators continue to call, even after the 

end of sophisticated Marxist theories of conflict, the 

balance or “correlation” of forces: political and psychological force fields generated in peacetime or incipient crisis by military power, which may differ from 

the predicted utility of forces in professional military 

calculations. To give one recent example: 

The Russian government considered various alternatives of rendering aid in [the 2008 Georgian] situation. 

After study of the correlation (or balance) of forces 

and the tactical situation several years in advance of 

August 2008, the necessity became evident for direct 

military intervention if the Georgian army undertook 

an attack on Tskhinvali.14

The literature of arms control does not easily capture this aspect. Formally, ACFE or its successor would 

solely affect the top level of Professor Joseph Nye’s 

now famous three-dimensional 21st-century security 

chess board, which involves in addition to military 

power, successively, economic power on the next level down and nongovernmental organizational (NGO) 

activities and cultural flows below that.15 ACFE would 

limit and oversee a set-up of military counters on that 

top playing surface which would be deliberately and 

explicitly intended to make successful ground offensives harder to conduct and therefore less potentially 

psychologically significant. In general, Western politicians and analysts tend to doubt the utility of power 

constellations on the top board in radiating influence 

down to the other nonmilitary political, economic, 

and playing surfaces, and it is not generally discussed 

in public statements. Even so, there is some informal 
17

acknowledgement of this factor, in the discourse of 

reassurance of exposed allies. A senior NATO official 

repeatedly emphasised that “we use nuclear weapons 

every day” in influencing Eurasian geopolitics to wage 

deterrence and assurance. Presumably, conventional 

force balances have analogous psychological effects. 

Russian perceptions are neither likely to mirror 

image NATO’s, nor to put a lower political value on 

military numbers. Conventional arms control in Europe now seems to depend, in the near term at least, 

on Russian conclusions about the impact of ACFE and 

associated negotiations on the Correlation of Forces 

affecting Russia’s preservation as a Great Power. Decisions on entering some large-scale holistic negotiation 

will form part of Russia’s latest iteration of its fateful 

national choice of either trust in or suspicion of the 

West.

It cannot be easy to determine the best way of 

inhibiting what Russia frequently denounces as relentless pressures from NATO—800 million rich, 

well-armed democracy-infatuated and moralistically 

meddlesome citizens of a super power and its allies—

recently attacking the Libyan Regime. The Russians 

appear genuinely perturbed about the ultimate intentions behind the endless inventiveness of American 

military power. In the worst case, they indicate their 

fear that NATO might impose, or try continuously 

to threaten, “Kosovo style solutions” to future crises 

by “sixth generation” high-technology, conventional 

stand-off firepower, capable of decapitation attacks, 

backed by nuclear missiles and, in the future, MD.16

Little in Russia’s strategic culture and political history indicates that the present Russian leadership see 

their Great Power status and regime security being 

tidily accommodated, insulated from wider political 
18

and economic considerations, within hygienic, legally 

enforceable, Kantian “Euro Atlantic Security Structures,” the Holy Grail of the European vision. 

Instead, and in relation to their own objectives 

not necessarily stupidly, Russian decisionmakers are 

likely to see Eurasian security as a complex, continuously changing mixture of pressures; counterpressures; reciprocal inhibitions; anxieties; intimidation; 

accommodations; cross-border political and cultural 

subversion; fomented secessions; orchestrated ethnic 

minority discontents; externally sponsored color revolutions; self-interestedly subsidized scholarships; cyber offensive and defensive capabilities; technological 

threats; trade deals; energy dependencies and vulnerabilities; historical emotions, fears, and resentments; 

intra-Alliance fault lines; and mixes of inducements 

ranging between negotiated strategic bargains, saber 

rattling maneuvers, co-optation of decisionmakers, 

soft loans, and straightforward bribery. This hybrid 

conception of security, involving endless state competition on many levels with few clear boundaries 

between peace and war, is one in which the present 

regime feels itself profoundly threatened (as perhaps

alternative politico economic systems in Moscow 

might not) and required to respond with appropriate 

vigor. The corollary is that Russia can be described as 

a “challenging neighbor” by a small outspoken adjacent state.17

“From Russia’s perspective, the region encompassing the former Soviet republics is its ‘sphere of privileged interests,’ and Moscow views U.S. and Western 

expansion in this area as a threat.”18 A positive Correlation of Forces, as existed in relation to Georgia in 

2008, is very likely to seem positive in maintaining that 
19

sphere19 and countering that and other threats. But it 

is not easily reconcilable with the intentions of CFE.

Will Russia’s difficult and probably weakening 

(and most certainly demographically declining) strategic hand seem best strengthened by agreeing to 

examine progressive merger into postmodern transparency and military predictability within an ACFE 

follow-on system? Or would Russia maintain the best 

possible correlation of forces, which could most confidently ensure that its Near Abroad does, in fact, prove 

to be a privileged sphere of influence, by remaining 

unconstrained by treaty limits and transparencies, in 

order to remain (and be perceived as) more capable 

of launching military actions to support its national 

interests in that geopolitical zone, as it did in 2008 

against Georgia?

Russia’s leaders may therefore need significant 

inducements to conclude that, in the foreseeable strategic climate, the impact on the correlation of forces 

of the potential combined negotiations now on offer 

would be positive, (and there are likely to be different 

views on that between Putin and Medvedev and their 

factions.) Otherwise, a paralysed CFE will continue 

on life support-which will only be turned off in some 

way if NATO could risk the painful internal dispute. 

Russia’s decision over these negotiation packages 

and possibilities, including an ACFE follow on, will 

be far reaching and, publicly at least, is still in the balance. But it will not be irreversible. It should be seen 

as just the latest movement in the long Eurasian strategic dance stretching out into the decades to come. 
20

WIDER ISSUES AND GLOBAL POSSIBILITIES

Current commentary and recent conferences have 

revealed few reasons to expect a positive change in 

CFE’s prospects in the near future. Nevertheless, 

whatever choices may emerge from Russia’s strategic 

culture and sense of special predicament and destiny, 

it is worth looking forward and outward. To call the 

CFE process mankind’s last best hope would clearly 

be exaggerated, but equally certainly it has been the 

world’s most successful attempt so far at reducing military insecurity and suspicion on a continental scale. 

Secure and peaceful conditions may not have arrived 

throughout Eurasia (although most parts of Europe 

are now a security community in which resumption of 

historical conflicts seem inconceivable), but we should 

not ignore the moral, political, and human development case for assisting similar movement elsewhere 

where conditions could become receptive to the benign diplomatic and political technology which was 

developed during the CFE process.

It has meant that in Europe, with enormous assistance from the United States and frequently positive reactions from Russia, laborious negotiations in 

Helsinki, Stockholm, Vienna, and elsewhere have created since the 1970s an interlocking system of: force 

declarations, data exchanges, inspections, discussions 

of military doctrines, notifications of maneuvers, 

overflights permitted by an Open Skies Treaty, transnational military specialist communities of inspectors 

and observers; and, crucially, a Joint Consultative 

Group to take up and resolve anomalies, directly, 

promptly, and discreetly. This effort culminated, as 

we have seen, in the large-scale reductions of forces 

achieved by CFE, increasing stability and saving tens 

of millions of dollars.
21

Confidence and Security Building Measures 

(CSBM) arrangements in Europe are not perfect or 

universal and quite evidently not eternal, nor will 

they necessarily prove to be the only model. But they 

unquestionably helped transform Europe from the 

Dark Continent of the early and mid-20th century to 

the enormously more open, prosperous, and largely 

demilitarized space that it is today.

This record prompts the question of how the 

widely internationally applauded goal of Global Zero 

could ever be achieved without the spread of such arrangements throughout a post-modern world. Most 

immediately, how realistic is it for diplomats to busy 

themselves debating the modalities of a Middle East 

Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their 

Means of Delivery (MEZFWMD), with the huge problems in trust and verification that implies, if the regional states cannot even agree on how to monitor the 

declared location and size of an armored division?

It is, however, encouraging that the underreported 

Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building 

Measures in Asia (CICA), which is modeled on the 

OSCE,20 seems to be willing to examine many of the 

most positive CSBM lessons from Europe. It may be 

possible to take the model still further afield. Systematic consideration of how conventional arms control 

lessons from Europe might be globalized and adapted 

on other continents in order to make maximum use of 

inexpensive new aerial surveillance technologies and 

to contribute to regional security and nation-building, 

is the subject of a continuing project at the Centre for 

International Studies and Diplomacy at the School of 

Oriental and African Studies in London University. 

Even if baffled and frustrated in its continent of birth, 

the CFE vision may flourish again in unexpected and 
22

exotic regions. But if, in fact, it never does, global expectations for improved international security, economic growth and prosperity will remain seriously 

bounded.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. See, among other historical analyses, Russell J. Leng, Interstate Crisis Behaviour, 1816-1980: Realism Vs Reciprocity,” Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

2. Robert Cooper, ”The Post Modern State and the World Order” available from www.demos.co.uk/files/postmodernstate.pdf.

3. Cooper was not the only writer to see far-reaching significance in CFE: for example, Christopher Coker, “Post-modernity 

and the end of the Cold War,” Review of International Studies, July 

1992.

4. “Chronology: CFE Treaty Negotiations and Implementation, 1972-1996,” Federation of American Scientists, n.d.

5. For the authoritative account of the genesis and nemesis of 

CFE, see Jane M. O. Sharp, Striving for Military Stability in Europe: 

Negotiation, implementation and adaptation of the CFE Treaty, London, UK: Routledge, 2006. 

6. A convenient brief overview is available from www.

armscontrol.org/factsheet/cfe.

7. Letter of Transmittal to Congress by President William J. 

Clinton, April 7, 1997.

8. NATO, Questions and Answers on CFE, n.d., p. 2, available 

from www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2007_05/20090515_cfe

_qa_factsheet.pdf.

9. Jacek Durkalec, The Russian Approach towards Revival of Conventional Arms Control Regime in Europe, Warsaw, Poland: Polish 

Institute of International Affairs (PISM), November 2010. 
23

10. These are overseen by the OSCE and usefully described in 

summit2010.osce.org/en/in_focus/node/248.

11. V. Socor, Kremlin Would Re-write Or Kill CFE Treaty, Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, July 18, 2007.

12. Anne Witkowsky, Sherman Garnett, and Jeff McCausland, Salvaging the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty 

Regime: Options for Washington, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, March 2010, available from www.brookings.edu/~/

media/Files/rc/papers/2010/03_armed_forces_europe_treaty/03_

armed_forces_europe_treaty.pdf.

13. Peter Perenyi, “Key CFE Obstacles are Not ‘Subregional’,” 

Arms Control Today, December 2009, available from armscontrol.

org.

14. Anton Lavrov, Moscow Defense Brief #2, No. 24, 2011, 

available from mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2011/item3/article1/.

15. See the explication of this fashionable model available 

from www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/commentary/americanpower-21st-century.

16. Russian Army General Staff Deputy Head Major General Igor Sheremet, interviewed on Ekho Moskvy radio and reported in Global Security Newswire, May 31, 2011: “We forecast 

that by 2020 Western countries will be armed with about 80,000 

cruise missiles, including about 2,000 with nuclear warheads. . . .

It is clear that such arsenals are being created [not] just for exercises or intimidation. These weapons are quite capable of disarming and decapitation strikes,” available from gsn.nti.org/gsn/

nw_20110531_9890.php. To the extent that this view is genuinely 

held and not simply projected, especially over the improbably 

large nuclear statistic, to support Russian diplomatic positions, 

it must be unclear how CFE (which does not, for example, apply 

at all to the new and explosively expanding weapons category of 

unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs]) or other negotiations would 

reduce Russian concerns about endless Western military-technical fertility.
24

17. Interview with Mart Laar, Estonia’s Minister of Defence, 

Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 6, 2011.

18. Steve Andreasen and Michael Gerson, “Deterrence Seen 

through the Eyes of Other Nations,” In George P. Shultz, Sidney 

D. Drell, and James E. Goodby, eds., Deterrence Its Past and Future, 

Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 2011, 

p. 107.

19. The political and strategic costs and distortions for Russia 

involved in the concept of “a privileged sphere of interests” are 

discussed in Dmitri Trenin, Post Imperium-A Eurasian Story, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2011.

20. See the Website of the Secretariat on Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), available from www.s-cica.org/page.php?page_id=7&lang=1.
25

CHAPTER 2

EUROPEAN/EURASIAN SECURITY AND THE

TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES 

IN EUROPE

Jeffrey D. McCausland

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (often referred to as the CFE Treaty) was signed 

in Paris, France, on November 19, 1990, between 

members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. At its signing, many 

analysts hailed it as “the cornerstone of European security,” and it is clearly the most ambitious and farranging conventional arms control treaty in history. 

It underscored a transformation of European security 

that is still ongoing and whose end state is unclear.1

The events that framed this transformation were 

largely peaceful and remarkable. Only a year before 

on November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall, which had 

served as perhaps the primary symbol of the Cold War 

for nearly 40 years, was breached. Six weeks prior to 

the Paris signing, Germany formally reunified into a 

single nation. The 22 nations that signed this agreement have now subsequently increased to 34. One of 

the alliances, the Warsaw Pact, has dissolved and the 

other, NATO, has enlarged. A key signatory to this 

agreement, the Soviet Union, disappeared and was 

replaced by a host of successor states. Finally, the nations that convened in Paris did so under the overall 

auspices of the Conference on Security Cooperation in 

Europe (CSCE). This organization has now grown to 

56 members and become the Organization for Security 

and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which reflects 
26

that it has now matured into an international organization. An adapted treaty that reflects many of these 

political changes was signed on November 19, 1999, at 

the OSCE Summit held in Istanbul, Turkey, but at this 

moment it still has not been ratified by the majority of 

the states involved. All must ratify for it to formally 

enter into force. At this writing, the treaty is endangered by the lack of progress in ratifying the adapted 

agreement and a decision by the Russian Federation 

to suspend compliance.

This obviously begs several important questions 

that will be examined as part of this analysis. What is 

the role of the CFE Treaty as part of contemporary European security architecture? How has it performed 

since its signing and what is its current status? Finally, 

what steps must be taken to ensure that this agreement 

remains relevant and continues its “cornerstone” role?

NATIONAL INTEREST, STRATEGY, 

AND ARMS CONTROL

As we consider how the CFE Treaty fits into emerging European security architecture, it is important to 

consider first principles. What is the fundamental 

relationship between national interest, strategy, and 

arms control? Thucydides noted in his History of the 

Peloponnesian War that a primary motivator of Athenian foreign policy had been “interests.”2 This remains 

as true for nations in the 21st century as for the citystates of ancient Greece. It is critical to underscore the 

point that arms control is not an “interest” or objective of state policy. Rather it is a “method or a way” 

to achieve the objective of improved security which is 

an essential interest to any state. Though the focus of 

any negotiation is the details of the prospective agree-
27

ment, the arms control process must always remain 

consistent with a nation’s interests and the direction 

of national or alliance security strategy. 

Strategic thinking has been the purview of European diplomats at least since the Congress of Vienna. 

Klemens von Metternich, Charles Maurice Talleyrand, 

Otto von Bismarck, or Robert Stewart Castlereagh, 

would all agree that the national strategy of any country is built upon three variables: First, what are the 

“ends” of strategy or the goals or objectives the nation 

is trying to accomplish alone or in concert with friends 

and allies? Second, what are the “ways” or policies 

that are formulated to move the nation in the direction of a better future? Finally, what are the “means” 

or resources available to the government of any nation 

that can be devoted to securing these objectives, and 

how can they be husbanded in a fashion to maximize 

their potential?

As a result, modern European policymakers would 

agree that a connection exists between arms control 

and each nation’s respective national security strategy. 

Both arms control and military operations are “ways” 

to achieve national strategic objectives or “ends.” But 

at its very core, any arms control agreement depends 

upon a harmony of interests among the signatories 

that is consistent with their respective national interests and associated strategy. This harmony is based 

on careful analysis by each state that the benefits to be 

gained from entering the regime outweigh the risks associated with reducing military forces and accepting a 

transparency regime that includes data exchanges and 

verification inspections. As a result, an implicit aspect 

of any multilateral arms control agreement is the “indivisibility” of security. The security of any state, no 

matter how large or small, is of equal importance. This 
28

is clearly reflected in the CFE Treaty by the fact that 

the initial treaty and any adapted agreement cannot 

enter into force until all states parties have ratified it. 

Efforts to overcome the current impasse over the CFE 

Treaty are in many ways a search for harmony among 

the signatories.

Consequently, an arms control agreement is neither good nor bad when examined in isolation. Each 

treaty or agreement only has value as a policy “way” 

when there are underlying security concerns that, if 

mitigated, might reduce the possibility of conflict. 

This is why we do not see arms control agreements 

being discussed or promulgated between countries 

that have friendly relations. It is also why we have 

seen some agreements lapse when security conditions 

changed. 

This also may be why it is often easy to dismiss the 

success of arms control, since we lose sight of its intent. A successful agreement is one that contributes to 

the prevention of conflict and enhances stability. But it 

is hard to correlate completely the cause and effect of 

policies and apply metrics against something that did 

not happen. The end of the Cold War, demise of the 

Soviet Union, collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and emergence of new nations and actors in Europe over the 

past 20 years all occurred without violence. War did 

occur in the former Yugoslavia, but this region was 

outside the area of application of the CFE Treaty, and 

Yugoslavia did not participate in the treaty process. It 

is not hard to imagine that such a period of upheaval 

could have resulted in major conflicts, but this did not 

occur. Consequently, it is important to remind ourselves that the level of transparency achieved by the 

CFE Treaty is particularly valuable and astonishing 

when one considers the security situation in Europe 
29

25 years ago. In many ways this agreement has made 

the extraordinary routine. 

Finally, arms control depends to some degree on 

other variables. Arms control is a political activity and 

cannot be divorced from other aspects of a nation’s 

security/foreign policy or domestic agenda. Internal 

events, other issues between states, and the bureaucratic process of the participating parties have a direct 

bearing on how an agreement is negotiated and complied with.

THE ORIGINAL CFE TREATY 

AND ITS ADAPTATION 

Conventional arms negotiations between NATO 

and Warsaw Pact countries first began with the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR) that 

commenced in Vienna, Austria, in 1973. These discussions accomplished very little and were replaced in 

1987 with the CFE negotiations. Despite the failure of 

MBFR, NATO and the Warsaw Pact negotiators successfully crafted the CFE Treaty in the 3 years between 

1987 and 1990.

As a result, many commentators have argued that 

these negotiations had been successful, while MBFR 

had failed because a new, more effective formula for 

the talks had been discovered. This is totally untrue. 

The real difference between 1973 and 1987 is that in 

1973 neither the United States nor the Soviet Union 

truly wanted an agreement. The Richard Nixon administration entered these discussions largely to defuse 

efforts in the U.S. Senate to unilaterally reduce American forces based in Europe. The Kremlin entered the 

negotiations as a tool to try to drive a wedge between 

Washington and its European allies. By 1987, how-
30

ever, conditions had changed. Soviet leader Mikhail 

Gorbachev realized that he needed a treaty to reduce 

the economic burden of deploying large conventional 

forces in Eastern Europe and as part of his efforts to 

reform the crumbling Soviet Union. 

As stated above, the 22 members of NATO and the 

Warsaw Pact signed the Treaty on CFE on November 

19, 1990, following 3 years of negotiations. It established limits on the aggregate total of conventional 

military hardware for the two blocs, required substantial reductions in each nation’s conventional arsenal, 

and created an intrusive regime of inspections and 

verification.

The talks commenced in January 1988 and the following mandate was agreed upon to guide these negotiations:

The objectives of the negotiation shall be to strengthen 

stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional 

armed forces, which include conventional armaments 

and equipment, at lower levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and the 

elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability 

for launching surprise attack and for initiating large 

scale offensive action.3

The final agreement required alliance or “group” 

limitations on tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), combat aircraft, and attack helicopters—

known collectively as Treaty Limited Equipment 

(TLE)—in an area stretching from the Atlantic Ocean 

to the Ural Mountains. Each bloc was allowed the following:
31

Subsequent national limits for each treaty signatory were determined during negotiations among the 

members of the two respective alliances. Following 

the demise of the Soviet Union, the successor states 

(within the area of treaty application) determined 

their respective limits from the total allocated to the 

Soviet Union in May 1992. The three Balkan states 

(Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) did not participate 

in the discussions of the national limits for the “successor” states of the Soviet Union. They argued that 

they had been “occupied territory” and, therefore, 

their territory was no longer part of the treaty’s area 

of application. Still, following their entry into NATO, 

all of them have indicated a willingness to accede to 

the Adapted Conventional Forces in Europe (ACFE) 

Treaty once it enters into force. 

Bloc limitations for NATO and the former Warsaw 

Pact were further restrained by a series of five geographic nested zones for land-based TLE with respective limits for each zone. This was done to achieve 

the goals established in the mandate to prevent the 

destabilizing concentration of conventional military 

armament. The four zones commence with a central 

region consisting of Germany, the Benelux, Poland, 

the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. The term 

Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) Group Limit

Tanks 20,000

Artillery 20,000

Armored Combat Vehicles (ACVs) 30,000

Attack Helicopters 2,000

Combat Aircraft 6,800
32

“nesting” signifies that, beginning with this initial 

zone, each successive zone subsumes all the preceding zones, plus adjacent states and military districts. 

Cumulative limits are assigned on holdings of TLE in 

each zone. This construct has the effect of permitting 

free movement of equipment and units away from, 

but not towards, the central European region, which 

thus inhibits surprise attack in the area deemed, during the Cold War at least, to be the most vulnerable.

The Soviet Union (and subsequently the Russian 

Federation) further accepted the so-called “flank 

zone.” This portion of the agreement places limits on 

ground-based systems in the Leningrad and North 

Caucasus Military Districts in the Russian Federation. Norway is part of the northern portion of the 

flank, and the north Caucasus states, Turkey, Greece, 

Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova are in the southern 

portion. Limitations on helicopters and attack aircraft 

only apply to the entire area of application due to their 

ability to reposition rapidly.

New negotiations began after the signing of the 

treaty focusing on personnel strength of armed forces. 

This resulted in the Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed 

Forces in Europe (referred to as the CFE-1A agreement). It was signed on July 6, 1992, and established 

limits on the personnel strength of military forces, with 

the exception of sea-based naval units, internal security forces, or those assigned to United Nations (UN) 

duties. CFE-1A (unlike the CFE Treaty) is a politically 

binding arrangement as opposed to a legally binding 

treaty. It provided that the ceilings announced by each 

signatory would take effect 40 months after entry into 

force and further contained provisions for information exchange, notification, and verification.
33

Only 1 year after the signing of the initial agreement and as treaty implementation was commencing, Russian leaders began arguing for adjustments to 

their equipment limits. They began pressing concerns 

about Russia’s equipment limitations, particularly in 

the flank region, and Moscow undertook a campaign 

to alter those limits. A final compromise was achieved 

at the first Review Conference (May 1996) that permitted Russia higher force levels in the flank zone, 

established a May 1999 deadline for Moscow to meet 

these adjusted levels, and reduced the overall size of 

the flank zone. Still, the problem of Russian force levels in this area would continue to bedevil negotiators. 

It was exacerbated by Russian military operations in 

Chechnya (which is in the flank region) and the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008. At the same 

time, treaty signatories had already begun (as agreed 

at the 1996 CFE Review Conference) to embark on a 

“modernization” of the treaty to adapt it more broadly to the changed European security architecture, one 

without a Soviet Union or a Warsaw Pact.

These CFE Treaty adaptation negotiations continued from 1996-99, through a period in which the European landscape continued to evolve. Of direct relevance to the treaty and conventional forces, NATO 

began its process of enlargement. The enlargement 

process, together with the dissolution of the Soviet 

Union, brought to the surface a number of Russian 

concerns about changes that needed to be made to the 

treaty. Many are identical in theme to those that Russia is currently raising.

On November 19, 1999 (the ninth anniversary of 

the CFE Treaty), 30 leaders signed the ACFE Treaty. 

All 19 NATO members accepted lower cumulative national limits from 89,026 TLE to 79,967. All signatories 
34

accepted the new structure of limitations based on national and territorial ceilings, consistent with the principle of host nation consent for the presence of foreign 

forces on any country’s territory. The agreement also 

provided enhanced transparency through increased 

quotas for mandatory on-site inspections, operational 

flexibilities to exceed ceilings temporarily, and an accession clause.

The states parties also adopted the CFE Final Act. 

This document contains a number of political commitments related to the ACFE Treaty. These commitments are: (1) reaffirmation of Russia’s commitment 

to fulfill existing obligations under the treaty to include equipment levels in the flank region; (2) a Russian commitment to exercise restraint in deployments 

in its territory adjacent to the Baltic; (3) the commitment by a number of Central European countries not 

to increase (and in some cases to reduce) their CFE 

territorial ceilings; and, (4) Moscow’s agreement with 

Georgia and Moldova on the withdrawal of Russian 

forces from their territories. President Bill Clinton 

noted in his statement at the conclusion of the summit 

that he would not submit the agreement for review by 

the Senate until Russia had reduced to the flank levels 

set forth in the ACFE Treaty, to include removing its 

forces from Georgia and Moldova.

The most important agreed change in the ACFE 

Treaty was that the parties took the old Treaty out 

of the Cold War framework—eliminating the bloc 

construct and reflecting the new reality of a Europe 

no longer divided. The original treaty’s group limits 

were replaced by national and territorial limits governing the TLE of every state’s party. The treaty’s 

flank limits were adjusted for Russia, providing Russia considerably more flexibility for deployment of 
35

Armored Combat Vehicles (ACVs) in the Northern 

and Southern portions of the flank than it had under 

the original treaty. Corresponding transparency measures, which apply equally to Russia and all other 

states parties, were a crucial part of this deal. Having 

taken the group structure out of the treaty to reflect 

that Europe was no longer divided, Allies and other 

states parties committed to lowering their ceilings in 

the ACFE Treaty. These ceilings became more explicit 

in the ACFE Treaty text and were codified in Istanbul. 

Actual conventional force levels are well below those 

ceilings and, in the case of NATO members, well below the original group limits. 

Other provisions were adopted to reflect the new 

security environment. Russia’s concerns about the 

three Baltic republics achieving NATO membership 

were addressed by adding an accession clause to the 

ACFE Treaty. As previously mentioned, these states 

indicated their readiness to request accession once the 

ACFE Treaty entered into force. The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act contained a key sentence to address 

Russia’s concerns about stationed forces on the territory of new member states:

NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable 

security environment, the Alliance will carry out its 

collective defense and other missions by ensuring the 

necessary interoperability, integration, and capability 

for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent 

stationing of substantial combat forces.4

Throughout this period of the 1990s, the treaty 

signatories also dealt with a raft of implementation 

issues—e.g., the flank, and destruction of Russian 

equipment—and reached, for the most part, a successful resolution to these concerns. 
36

THE RUSSIAN “SUSPENSION”

On December 12, 2007, the Russian Federation officially announced that it would no longer be bound 

by the restrictions of the 1990 CFE Treaty, and suspended participation.5

 Moscow took this action due 

to the fact that the 22 NATO members bound by the 

1990 agreement have not ratified the 1999 ACFE Treaty, and during a June 2007 extraordinary conference, 

Russia provided a further detailed list of “negative 

effects” of the conduct of NATO states.6 These included overall NATO force levels, the flank limits, and 

other unspecified demands for additional transparency. In addition to these concerns, it was clear that 

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Russian leaders 

in general were angry over a series of issues, including NATO enlargement, the independence of Kosovo, 

and plans to install American anti-ballistic missiles 

on Polish territory. Nonetheless, Moscow reassured 

the other treaty signatories that it did not intend to 

dramatically increase its force levels in the territory 

adjacent to their borders. Russian President Dmitry 

Medvedev underscored Russia’s seriousness about its 

Treaty concerns when he described the existing agreement as both “unfair” and “nonviable.”7

 At the same 

time, Russian leaders have been quick to describe the 

contributions made by the treaty as valuable, and to 

further acknowledge the spirit of both trust and cooperation that it has engendered.

In terms of ratification, NATO members have 

argued since the Istanbul Summit in 1999 that their 

ratification remained contingent upon Russia complying with obligations it freely accepted when the ACFE 

Treaty was signed, the most contentious being the full 
37

removal of all Russian military forces from the territory of the former Soviet republics of Georgia and 

Moldova. Russia adamantly refutes this linkage and 

Russian Prime Minister Putin has publicly argued that 

“there is no legal link” between the ACFE Treaty and 

these commitments.8

Practically speaking, therefore, the Treaty is beginning to unravel. Russia has not provided input as part 

of the biannual data exchange since it suspended participation in 2007. Nor has Russia provided required 

information on changes to the location of ground TLE, 

and it is no longer accepting (nor participating in) the 

treaty’s routine and challenge inspection regime. The 

implications of this situation for the future health of 

the CFE Treaty are serious. Although other parties 

continue to implement the treaty in full, a situation in 

which Russia is not implementing core treaty provisions cannot be sustained forever. At some point, this 

state of affairs will cause other states parties to begin 

reevaluating their own treaty participation. If that becomes the case, the treaty will truly unravel. This will 

have unforeseen implications not only for the ability 

to deal with other issues on the bilateral and European 

security agenda, but also possibly with respect to the 

defense postures among the states parties, as well as 

other arms control agreements. Even President Medvedev, in his speech, seemed to have indicated his 

preference for avoiding the treaty’s “complete and 

final collapse.”9

In response, NATO endorsed a “parallel actions 

package” in March 2008 in an attempt to avoid the treaty’s demise. The package represented a serious shift in 

the NATO position, as it called for NATO countries to 

begin the ratification process (which in some countries 

such as the United States might take several months), 
38

while Russia commenced its withdrawals. Once the 

forces had been removed from Georgia and Moldova, 

NATO countries would strive to complete ratification of the ACFE Treaty quickly. NATO members also 

pledged to address many Russian security concerns 

once the ACFE Treaty was in place. For example, all 

new NATO members that are not treaty signatories 

(Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) have agreed 

to accede. NATO also announced that following final 

ratification, it would be willing to discuss Russian 

concerns about future weapons ceilings and limitations placed on Moscow in the so-called “flank zones” 

that border Turkey, Norway, and the Baltic Republics.10 Unfortunately, the negotiations made little to no 

progress between March and August 2008. This effort 

was largely undermined by the deteriorating relations 

between NATO countries and the Russian Federation 

in the aftermath of the conflict in Georgia in the late 

summer of 2008. In fact, one expert observed that this 

conflict violated the principles contained in both OSCE 

documents as well as the preamble to the CFE Treaty. 

These documents call for states parties to refrain from 

“the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,” as well as 

the commitment to peaceful cooperation and the prevention of military conflict anywhere on the European 

continent.11 This situation has been further complicated by Moscow’s subsequent decision to recognize 

South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent nations. 

Following the meeting of OSCE foreign ministers 

in June 2009, the so-called “Corfu Process” began to 

examine European security challenges. By early 2010, 

an effort was undertaken in the Joint Consultative 

Group to develop a framework document that would 

simply contain principles of conventional arms control which all nations could agree upon. It was hoped 
39

that this would serve as a basis for new negotiations, 

and in the interim offer each state the option of either 

complying with the existing CFE Treaty or the list 

of specific requirements described in the framework 

document.

At the NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal, in November 2010, the Alliance reaffirmed its continued 

commitment to the CFE Treaty Regime and all associated elements. The Final Communiqué noted that although agreement had not yet been achieved on how 

to “strengthen and modernize the arms control regime 

for the 21st Century,” progress among the 36 participating states was encouraging. The allies further underscored the indivisibility of security for all states 

parties and urged continued “efforts to conclude a 

principles-based framework to guide negotiations in 

2011.” This process should build “on the CFE Treaty 

of 1990, the Agreement on Adaptation of 1999, and existing political commitments.” While the ultimate goal 

remained to ensure the continued viability of conventional arms control in Europe and strengthening common security, member states further recognized (as 

noted at the previous Summit) that “the current situation, where NATO CFE Allies implement the Treaty 

while Russia does not, cannot continue indefinitely.”12

Still, little progress has been made, largely due to 

Russian insistence that it cannot accept any language 

in the framework document that recognizes host nation consent for stationed forces as an essential principle. It would seem that time is rapidly running out. 

The treaty requires a Review Conference every 5 years 

which, in accordance with this provision, should have 

occurred in 2011. It appears now this will happen in 

the late fall of 2012. If no agreement can be reached on 

the framework document, the CFE Treaty may truly 

be in crisis.
40

WHAT HAVE BEEN THE CONTRIBUTIONS 

OF THE CFE TREATY?

As suggested at the onset, the CFE Treaty has long 

been referred to as the “cornerstone of European security.” But in light of the dramatic changes in European 

security architecture that have occurred since 1991, 

many wonder if that will continue to be the case and, 

if so, for how much longer? Obviously this question 

looms large in the aftermath of the Russian suspension and subsequent conflict between Georgia and 

the Russian Federation. Can this agreement assist in 

reestablishing a sense of cooperative security, or have 

both its credibility and utility been undermined permanently?

Many diplomats and military leaders still believe 

the treaty continues to be of vital importance to European security. Some argue, however, that its vitality 

depends upon all states parties accepting the following: (1) The 1990 CFE treaty, with its 1996 flank adjustments, must continue to be fully implemented; and 

(2) The 1999 ACFE Treaty must be brought into force. 

Only upon these foundations can the CFE states parties take a forward-looking approach to any additional 

changes that must be made to continue to ensure this 

Treaty’s viability.

In retrospect, the agreement can only be truly evaluated against the backdrop of European security during this crucial period. Oddly, the treaty was signed 

to prevent, or at least reduce, the likelihood of conflict 

between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Shortly after 

it was signed, the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union 

both disappeared, so the true value of the treaty must 

be considered in the context of the dramatic transition 

that ensued. In fact, some have argued that the “cor-
41

nerstone” metaphor is misplaced. The CFE Treaty has 

not been a static agreement—as Europe has weathered many changes, the treaty has been successfully 

adapted to accommodate those changes.

The treaty clearly proved important in assuaging 

concerns about German reunification and provided 

transparency during the withdrawal of massive Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. These withdrawals 

occurred following the signing of the Treaty on German Reunification (September 12, 1990) by the Federal 

Republic, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), France, the United Kingdom (UK), the Soviet 

Union, and the United States.13 This agreement also 

contained significant additional restraints on military 

operations. Germany agreed to only deploy territorial 

units that were not integrated in the NATO command 

structure on the territory of the former East Germany. 

Bonn further agreed that no foreign troops would be 

stationed in its eastern states or “carry out any other 

military activity there” while the withdrawal of Soviet 

forces was ongoing. Finally, the reunification treaty 

also specified that “foreign armed forces and nuclear 

weapons or their carriers will not be stationed in that 

part of Germany or deployed there,” though Germany 

did insist on the ability to interpret “deployed.”14

In terms of the actual reductions of military equipment associated with the implementation of the original treaty, the numbers are truly impressive. Over 

69,000 Cold War era battle tanks, combat aircraft, 

and other pieces of military equipment have been 

destroyed in the now 30 countries stretching from 

the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains. In many ways, 

the treaty changed the face of European security by 

“establishing new, cooperative political-military relationships.”15 More than 5,500 on-site inspections have 
42

been conducted, which has created a new sense of 

political-military cooperation and openness. 

The true value of the treaty and the associated 

transparency measures were demonstrated during 

the various conflicts in the Balkans. Short notice inspections in accordance with CFE were conducted 

of U.S. forces in Germany by Russian inspectors as 

the American troops prepared to depart for Bosnia 

in 1995. As a result, these military operations were 

conducted without a significant increase in tensions. 

The Dayton Accords that ended the initial conflict in 

the former Yugoslavia in 1996 also contain an annex 

that established a CFE-like agreement between the 

contending states. The treaty was crafted to be nearly 

identical to the CFE Treaty in terms of limits, definitions, transparency measures, etc. All of the Balkan 

states participating in this agreement expressed a desire to accede to the full CFE Treaty at some point in 

the future. Finally, in 1999 a Russian inspection was 

also conducted at Aviano Airbase during the U.S.-led 

air campaign against Serbian forces in Kosovo. This 

helped allay to some degree Russian concerns about 

U.S. force deployments during this crisis. 

In fact, many experts believe the inspection regime 

may have contributed more to the reduction of tensions and crisis prevention during this dramatic transition in European security than the actual reductions. 

Some argue that the agreement’s greatest value may 

be the entire CFE system that encourages confidence 

through transparency. In the final analysis, the existing treaty (as well as the adapted agreement) provides 

a forum for the major European states to debate, agree, 

and maintain a set of rules about conventional military power on the continent that is critical to overall 

stability.16
43

WHAT WOULD FAILURE MEAN?

One Russian commentator remarked that the treaty is “a true relic of the Cold War and an example of 

how outdated agreements negotiated ‘a long time ago 

in a galaxy far, far away’ perpetuate adversarial relationships.”17 But this opinion is not shared by most 

treaty members and security experts. A group of distinguished Western diplomats, military leaders, and 

academics prepared a letter in 2008 that argued that 

the collapse of the CFE Treaty would “. . . undermine 

co-operative security in Europe and lead to new dividing lines and confrontations.”18

So, what would the impact on the future be if the 

CFE Treaty failed and the flow of routinely provided 

information on conventional equipment, inspections 

to verify that information, and constraints on the levels of that equipment were to disappear? What would 

be both Russian and Western perspectives on a situation in which there were no limits at all on the level 

and location of conventional weapons deployments 

or the conventional force levels of treaty signatories? 

What would the European security picture look like if 

the habits of cooperation developed through the CFE 

Treaty were undone? 

Sadly, it is not too far-fetched to imagine that this 

could cause a dramatic realignment of European security. The loss of information and undermining of 

predictability would set the stage for historic animosities to resurface and lingering crises to potentially 

worsen. For example, there have been suggestions 

that Azerbaijan is counting on the failure of the treaty 

to provide it with an opportunity to increase its military forces. Such a development would clearly exacerbate tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia. These 
44

two countries remain embroiled in a long simmering 

conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.19 This struggle has 

resulted in over 15,000 casualties since 1988 and over 

800,000 Armenian and Azeri refugees. Furthermore, 

Russia would also lose any transparency over the 

military forces of existing or future members of the 

NATO alliance, as well as the deployment of NATO 

forces on the territory of new members. Finally, the 

Baltic republics would not be expected to accede to the 

existing agreement and, consequently, there would be 

no mechanism to affect transparency about military 

forces on their territory.

Many believe these developments might encourage an expansion in military forces or damage to other 

agreements. For example, some experts believe Russia might reconsider its participation in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in an effort 

to improve its security posture. Russian President 

Putin threatened such action in a statement in February 2007. Loss of CFE would also remove a valuable 

crisis management tool from the security architecture 

and damage arms control as an instrument to enhance overall European stability. In this regard, Balkan observers believe the demise of the CFE Treaty 

might mean an end to the arms control arrangements 

contained in the Dayton Accords. Obviously, such a 

development could contribute to renewed violence in 

that troubled region.

The collapse of the CFE Treaty could spill over 

into other aspects of the Russia-NATO relationship as 

well. CFE’s collapse could undermine the cooperative 

European security structures that have been built over 

the last 15-plus years. These efforts include the NATORussia Council, the OSCE, and prospects for building or enhancing future cooperation in other areas. 
45

Futhermore, if CFE is abandoned, its benefits would 

be difficult, if not impossible, to replace. It is hard to 

imagine how to build new arrangements if there is 

no foundation any more on which to construct them. 

Beyond that, if CFE is no longer a viable agreement, 

and the confidence-building aspects of the regime are 

destroyed completely, over time it is entirely possible 

that some states parties will seek alternative arrangements that will replace the security benefits they now 

derive from the treaty.

Finally, the dissolution of this agreement could also 

have a major impact on relations between the United 

States and the Russian Federation. Moscow and Washington have had serious disagreements over the past 

decade and, at the onset of the Barack Obama administration, their bilateral relations were perhaps worse 

than at any time since the end of the Cold War.20 Early 

in the new administration, President Obama called for 

hitting the “reset button” in the relations between the 

two countries and, despite serious differences, the two 

sides were able to negotiate the New Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty (New START) agreement by the 

spring of 2010. This was subsequently ratified by both 

the U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma. While there 

was no explicit link between these negotiations and 

the CFE Treaty deadlock, it is clear that this success 

could improve the prospects for finding a resolution 

to the problem.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

As we look to the future, Russian and NATO strategists must carefully consider the deadlock over the 

CFE Treaty and how conventional arms control more 

broadly can help reestablish a sense of cooperative 
46

security in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian conflict. Michael Wyganowski, a former Polish diplomat 

who headed Poland’s delegation to the CFE Treaty negotiations in 1999, underscored the importance of the 

CFE Treaty following the conflict. He observed that 

the accord was being relegated further to the sidelines 

by a conflict that actually underscored the importance 

of limiting conventional arms holdings.21

With respect to the future of the CFE Treaty, there 

are, in principle, three paths ahead. The first option 

would be the status quo: Russia continues its suspension, and efforts to resolve these issues remain deadlocked. In this scenario, the treaty over time will collapse. Other states parties are unlikely to continue to 

implement a treaty while Russia continues to avoid its 

treaty obligations.

The second path is that NATO agrees to address 

Russian CFE demands and ratifies the ACFE Treaty 

despite the continued presence of Russian forces in 

Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Moldova. This is also 

unlikely to happen. In July 2007 (1 year prior to the 

Russian-Georgian War), the U.S. Senate passed Resolution 278. This resolution reaffirmed the Senate’s support for the Treaty, described the Russian suspension 

as “regrettable,” and further warned that this was a 

“step that will unnecessarily heighten tensions in Europe.”22 In this environment, it is very unlikely that 

the Obama administration would seek Senate ratification of the ACFE Treaty, absent Russian compliance 

with the Istanbul commitments.

The third path is to continue to seek agreement on 

the framework document of principles which could 

set the stage for new negotiations. If this cannot be 

achieved by the Review Conference in the fall of 2012, 

it may be an appropriate time for all NATO members 
47

to consider adopting the same position that the Russian Federation has taken and suspend the existing 

CFE Treaty. This should not be seen as an effort to end 

the treaty or to argue that the Russian Federation is 

in “material breach.” Rather, it would simply be an 

acknowledgement that, after 4 years, the Alliance cannot continue to fulfill treaty obligations absent some 

reciprocity from Moscow. NATO members could simply state that the framework discussions are a good 

start and should continue. Still after 4 years of effort, 

it would appear these negotiations are at an impasse. 

A decision to at least temporarily halt the discussion 

of implementation of the ACFE Treaty or compliance 

with the existing treaty might clear the agenda and allow other areas of mutual interest between Russia and 

NATO to be discussed.

Clearly, a number of the core Russian concerns can 

best be addressed not by the wholesale abandonment 

of CFE, but the opposite, through entry into force 

of the ACFE Treaty or new negotiations. The ACFE 

Treaty provides the means through which Russia can 

ensure predictability in the levels and locations of 

NATO forces, as well as a means of inspecting these 

forces against the information that NATO provides. 

Consequently, a decision by Moscow to move in the 

direction of compromise would not be based on altruism but rather on a careful calculation of Russian national interest. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov seemed to reflect this in remarks at the Council 

on Foreign Relations in New York when he observed, 

“the only thing we want internationally is cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual benefit.”23

Still, it is unclear whether all of the Russian concerns 

can be resolved within the context of the CFE Treaty. 

Moscow has also recommended a new Pan-European 
48

Security agreement. Consequently, it would seem 

more likely that resolution to the disagreement over 

the CFE Treaty might be a valuable precursor that 

would allow for serious negotiations on a number of 

European security issues to occur.

CONCLUSIONS

A Western arms control expert once remarked that 

he felt like he was watching 300 years of European 

hostilities unfold during the course of CFE negotiations. Critics of this process are frequently captivated 

by the technical details of definitions, counting rules, 

stabilizing measures, inspection regimes, etc., and often overlook the connection between these points and 

larger security issues. Still while the “devil may lie 

in the details,” this accord is rooted in the collective 

attempt of over 30 sovereign states to improve their 

respective security. Consequently, historical antagonisms have an impact, as well as contributing to the 

agreement’s enduring value as Europe seeks a new 

architecture based on cooperative security.

With the rising threat of transnational issues such 

as nuclear proliferation and terrorism, the fate of conventional weapons in Europe may not top the priority agenda of the NATO or Russian leadership. But 

while the original purpose of the treaty—to reduce 

the risk of conflict and short-warning attacks between 

two blocs—may be a thing of the past, the CFE Treaty 

continues to contribute to Europe’s security in crucial 

ways. Perhaps most importantly, the transparency 

and predictability that it provides serve as important 

stabilizing elements as European relationships continue to evolve and military forces are modernized.

As we consider the way ahead, it may be useful 

to examine the thoughts of Hans Morgenthau, one 
49

of the most celebrated scholars of international relations in the 20th century. Morgenthau observed the 

following three points when considering diplomacy 

and state policy: First, diplomacy must be rescued 

from crusading spirits. Second, diplomacy must look 

at the political scene from the point of view of other 

nations. Third, the objective of foreign policy must be 

defined in terms of national interests and supported 

by adequate power.24

Russia and the West must avoid emotional rhetoric. Both sides must rely on the kind of careful analysis 

Morgenthau suggests in order to discover if a harmony 

of interests still exists. They must carefully consider the 

major areas of cooperation where long-term interests 

clearly overlap on issues such as international terrorism, energy, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and stability in Europe.25 Alliance members 

should closely review the Alliance Strategic Concept 

that was signed in 1999. This document observed that 

arms control continues to have “. . . a major role in the 

achievement of the Alliance’s security and objectives 

in the future.”26 Russian negotiators should carefully 

consider the comments by Russian President Medvedev. He observed that though relations between Russia and the West had experienced critical situations, 

still “in the end, common sense, pragmatism, and mutual interests will always prevail.”27

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Dorn Crawford, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 

(CFE)—A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements, Washington: 

U.S. Department of State, March 2009, p. 2. 

2. Charles Robinson, Greek and Roman Historians, New York: 

Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1957, p. 71.
50

3. Crawford, p. 5. 

4. Zdzislaw Lachowski, “The CFE Treaty One Year After Its 

Suspension: A Forlorn Treaty?” SIPRI Policy Brief, January 2009, 

p. 1.

5. Ibid., p. 4.

6. Wade Boese, “Russia Unflinching on CFE Treaty Suspension,” Arms Control Today, May 2008. 

7. Ibid.

8. Lachowski, p. 5. 

9. NATO Public Diplomacy Division, “Press Release—Lisbon 

Summit Declaration,” Brussels, Belgium: NATO Public Affairs, 

November 20, 2010, p. 9.

10. “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to 

Germany,” NATO Review, No. 5, October 1990, pp. 30-32.

11. “Fact Sheet—Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Key Facts About the Current Treaty and Agreement 

on Adaptation,” Washington, DC: Department of State, 2009.

12. Sherman Garnett, “The CFE Flank Agreement,” Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997, 

p. 1. 

13. Lachowski, p. 6. This view was underscored by senior 

Georgian officials during discussions in Tbilisi, Georgia, in December 2010.

14. Dmitri Trenin, “Thinking Strategically About Russia,” 

Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 

December 2008, p. 1.

15. Wade Boese, “Georgian Conflict Clouds Future Arms 

Pacts,” Arms Control Today, September 2008.
51

16. Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson, Politics Among 

Nations, 6th Ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985, p. 165.

17. David C. Speedie, “U.S.-Russia Relations: Under Stress, 

and In Need of Care,” Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, available from cceia.org/resources/articles_papers_

reports/0005.html.

18. NATO Strategic Concept, Washington, DC: North Atlantic 

Council, April 23, 1999.

19. Thom Shanker, “Gates Urges Cautious NATO Stance on 

Russia After Georgian Conflict,” New York Times, September 19, 

2008, p. A5.

20. Trenin, p. 1.

21. Boese.

22. U.S. Senate, “Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the announcement of the Russian Federation of its suspension 

or implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 

Treaty. (Agreed to by the Senate),” 110th Cong., 2st sess., July 24, 

2007, Washington, DC.

23. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Interview with 

David Remnick, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, September 24, 2008.

24. Morgenthau and Thompson, p. 165.

25. Speedie. 

26. NATO Strategic Concept.

27. Shanker, p. A5.

53

CHAPTER 3

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL

Sergey Rogov

The European security situation could be seriously 

aggravated as Europe slides toward a new division. 

The arms control regime, which was negotiated at the 

end of the Cold War era and has been considered the 

backbone of international security, faces unprecedented threats.

The Western powers never had a strategy to integrate Russia into the community of democratic market 

countries after the end of the Cold War. There was a 

strategy to integrate Eastern Europe, and after that the 

Baltic states, but Moscow was never invited to join key 

Western institutions: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). This 

led to a new division of Europe.

The arms control regime is facing serious challenges. The United States unilaterally withdrew 

from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002. 

Meanwhile, Russia announced a “moratorium” on the 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. 

Russia also is displeased with the Intermediate Range 

Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which banned medium 

and shorter range nuclear missiles.

Two decades after the end of the Cold War, Russia and the West once again confront each other on 

a number of issues. The disagreements accumulate 

and may have dangerous consequences which can be 

devastating for both sides. Russia will hardly become 

a democracy and a modern market economy if there 

is a new confrontation with the Western Allies. The 
54

West may antagonize a valuable partner for European 

and global stability at the moment when it faces an 

unprecedented American debacle in Iraq and Afghanistan, and while China and India boldly gain a growing importance in the international system.

But it is premature to write off the strategic partnership between Russia and the West. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) establishes 

predictability and stability of the nuclear balance for 

the next decade within the paradigm of mutual nuclear deterrence. This will help to change the strategic 

paradigm and eventually move to mutually assured 

security.

Although some disagreements will persist, both 

sides can still make new solid arrangements for cooperation in the security area for mutual benefit. These 

cooperative measures should deal with at least three 

issues:

1. Modernizing the arms control regime;

2. Coordinating Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) efforts; and,

3. Jointly resisting the victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

EVOLUTION OF THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS 

CONTROL REGIME IN EUROPE

While most of the arms control treaties have been 

bilateral agreements between Washington and Moscow, the CFE Treaty is a multilateral regime, which is 

vitally important for Europeans. Its collapse may lead 

to an unrestricted arms race in Europe.

During the Cold War, NATO and the Warsaw Pact 

maintained huge conventional armed forces in Europe, ready to immediately confront each other, so the 
55

immediate purpose of the CFE Treaty was to prevent 

a surprise attack. That was particularly important for 

the Western Allies, because the Warsaw Pact members 

enjoyed a substantial superiority in military personnel 

and most types of conventional arms, with the Soviet 

Union having more weapons than all NATO countries 

combined.

The CFE Treaty, negotiated together with the first 

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and INF 

treaties, was a very elaborate and complicated arrangement which was based on the principle of numerical parity, originally accepted in 1972 when the 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the 

United States signed the ABM treaty and Strategic 

Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) agreement, and which 

was confirmed in the SALT, START, and INF treaties.

The CFE also established a unique transparency 

regime, which included comprehensive verification 

and monitoring measures, including exchange of information and onsite inspections. But almost immediately after it was signed in November 1990, the CFE 

Treaty was overtaken by the drastic political landslide 

in Europe. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved, Germany 

was reunited, and the Soviet Union disappeared. Nevertheless, the CFE came into force and its key provisions, including destruction of 62,000 heavy weapons, 

mostly by former Warsaw Pact members, and the 

transparency regime, were implemented. The only 

problem was Russia’s inability to reduce its forces in 

the flank zones, which related to the war in Chechnya.

All former members of the Warsaw Pact, except 

former Soviet republics, plus Estonia, Latvia, and 

Lithuania, joined the North Atlantic alliance. The military and political balance in Europe fundamentally 

changed. NATO became the dominant military and 

political factor.
56

According to the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 

1997, the North Atlantic alliance made a political commitment to avoid a substantial deployment of foreign 

conventional forces and nuclear weapons in the territories of the new member-states. The new European 

reality was partially reflected in the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (ACFE) Treaty signed 

in November 1999 in Istanbul, Turkey, when aggregate block ceilings were abandoned and replaced by 

national quotas. Regional ceilings, except for the flank 

zones, were also eliminated, although NATO agreed 

to raise the levels for the Northern Caucasus and Leningrad, Russia, military districts.

Nevertheless, the ACFE Treaty was not ratified by 

NATO countries, because Russia failed to implement 

its commitment made in Istanbul and to remove military bases from Georgia and Moldova.

Russia ratified the ACFE Treaty in 2004. But after 

Washington decided to deploy BMD in Eastern Europe, Russia insisted on an emergency meeting of all 

member-states of the CFE Treaty, where it demanded 

to eliminate the flank zones completely and insisted 

on some other concessions from NATO. After these 

demands were rejected, Moscow announced a “moratorium.”

Thus the very existence of the CFE Treaty is jeopardized since, without Russia, the conventional arms 

control regime in Europe makes no sense at all.

WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE CFE TREATY?

There is no doubt that the CFE Treaty completely 

lost its raison d’être. There is no way to maintain the 

numerical parity between NATO and the nonexistent 

Warsaw Pact. There is no threat of a surprise attack in 
57

Europe. Today all Russian forces in Europe are much 

smaller than the Soviet forces in all of East Germany 2 

decades ago.

One can raise a number of questions, criticizing the 

provisions of the original and the ACFE Treaty, which 

seem unnecessary and even counterproductive.

1. The CFE ceilings are too high. For instance, the 

original CFE Treaty established the combined limit 

of 40,000 tanks for all participants. The Adapted CFE 

level is 36,000. This is two times more than were in Europe during World War II, after the invasion of Normandy. There is no scenario for the employment of all 

these tanks except a new all-European war involving 

NATO and Russia. All of the latest military conflicts, 

where CFE member-states participated, involved no 

tanks at all (Kosovo), a few dozen (Afghanistan), or 

a few hundred (Chechnya, Iraq). Thus the CFE justifies maintenance in Europe of huge force structures, 

relying on tanks and other heavy weapons. European 

countries spend dozens of billions of Euros each year 

to preserve these useless weapons, while a very small 

sum is allocated for rapid deployment forces, which 

are much more relevant for peacekeeping and Global 

War on Terror (GWOT) operations like in Afghanistan 

and Darfur.

The legal ceilings for five types of weapons for 

NATO have grown as a result of CFE adaptation from 

20,000 to 26,000 tanks, from 30,000 to 40,000 Armored 

Combat Vehicles (ACVs) and from 20,000 to 25,000 

artillery guns. This is explained by the fact that seven 

Eastern European countries switched sides from the 

Warsaw Pact to NATO. If in 1990 NATO and the Soviet Union had approximately the same number of 

tanks and ACVs in Europe, in 2007 NATO enjoyed 

superiority by five to one.
58

3. There is a huge gap between the formal ceilings 

and actual holdings of five types of controlled weapons and military personnel. That difference was 8,000 

tanks in 1999, when the CFE Treaty was adopted, and 

reached 11,000 tanks in 2007. So the treaty allows, instead of further reductions, to build up the number 

of tanks within the established ceilings by 50 percent. 

The gap for ACVs is 30 percent, for artillery 50 percent, and for combat aircraft and attack helicopters 

about 100 percent. Germany alone can build an additional 2,165 tanks, 877 ACVs, 1,075 artillery guns, 619 

attack helicopters, and 91 combat airplanes. Germany 

can also increase the level of military personnel by 

67 percent. Of course, this will never happen, but the 

option is on the table. The same is more or less true 

about other NATO members, except for Turkey and 

Greece, which fill their quotas by 80-90 percent, but 

for different reasons. The United States fills its quota 

by only 5-10 percent, since most of American regular 

forces have been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

and there are no plans to return them to Europe. Russia fills its CFE quotas of military personnel by only 

40 percent; for tanks by 80 percent; for ACVs, by 87 

percent; for artillery, by 93 percent; for combat aircraft 

by 52 percent; and for attack helicopters by 43 percent.

4. Since the ACFE Treaty abandoned the principle 

of bloc parity and establishing only national territorial 

limits, the ceilings for each member were established 

in a completely arbitrary manner. They do not correlate to any objective factors, such as the volume of 

gross domestic product (GDP), the length of borders, 

or the size of population. There is no rational to explain why Belarus has a ceiling of 1,800 tanks while 

France has a ceiling of 1,306 tanks, or why Italy has 

1,348, and the United Kingdom (UK) has 1,015. Even 
59

more confusing are the numbers for the actual holdings in 2007. For instance, Ukraine had 3,049 tanks 

and 4,250 ACVs, while Germany had only 1,904 tanks 

and 2404 ACVs, although German formal ceilings are 

much higher than the Ukrainian ones. 

5. The restrictions on flank zones, which were retained in the ACFE Treaty, while all other zone ceilings were dropped, left Russia as practically the only 

country which is limited in deployment of forces in its 

own territory (technically, there are also some restrictions for the former Odessa military district in Ukraine 

and some eastern regions of Turkey). Under the ACFE 

Treaty, Russia’s flank ceilings (Leningrad and Northern Caucasus military districts) were expanded from 

700 to 1,300 tanks, from 580 to 2,140 ACVs, and from 

1,280 to 1,680 artillery guns. But four NATO countries 

in the South (Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania) 

have combined ceilings of 7,380 tanks, 9,718 ACVs, 

and 8,368 artillery guns.

6. Another shortcoming of the CFE Treaty is that it 

counts only some of the weapons, which do not seem 

to reflect the real combat efficiency of modern weapons platforms. The recent wars demonstrated that 

the decisive role is performed by precision guidance 

weapons. About 90 percent of all the targets destroyed 

by air attacks in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq were 

hit by American “smart” bombs and cruise missiles, 

while the impact of the “old” weapons was very limited. Thus, ironically, the CFE regime does not restrict 

the most important advanced military technology, capable of a surprise preemptive strike against a wide 

range of military and economic targets. It also does 

not restrict navies; although naval aircraft and ship 

launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) played a huge role 

in recent military conflicts.
60

7. Finally, the CFE Treaty hardly can perform as an 

all-European conventional arms control regime, since 

almost half of the European countries do not belong 

to it. The list of nonsignatories includes formal neutral 

states (Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, and Ireland), three Baltic states, and former republics of Yugoslavia. The military forces of these countries do not 

play a major role in the European balance. But practically all of them maintain partnership with NATO, 

and many participated in NATO-led peacekeeping 

operations (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan). Although Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia became NATO members in 2004, they did not join the 

CFE regime, following the Western position that links 

ratification of the ACFE Treaty to Russia’s withdrawal 

from Moldova and Georgia.

MODERNIZATION OF THE CONVENTIONAL 

ARMS CONTROL REGIME

Despite all its shortcomings, the CFE should be 

preserved, which is possible only if its provisions are 

drastically modernized. A modernized conventional 

arms control regime in Europe is required to maintain 

and expand military transparency and equally to promote further reductions and downsizing of the Cold 

War conventional arsenals. The present crisis of the 

CFE Treaty requires bold and broad new initiatives. 

We need CFE-2 to ensure that a new unrestricted arms 

race is prevented, and national defense efforts are focused on new security challenges.

1. It makes sense to invite all European countries 

to join the new conventional arms control regiment. 

Since the CFE cannot be perceived as a West-East regime, all states, including Scandinavian and Balkan 
61

countries, should be involved, as they are, for instance, 

involved on the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Membership in a military 

alliance is no more a precondition for the participation 

in the CFE regime. This will help to strengthen European security in the Northern and Southern regions of 

the continent.

2. The CFE ceilings, adopted in 1999 in Istanbul 

should be replaced by new, much lower levels. As a 

first step, the CFE member-states should declare that 

they accept the levels of their actual holdings as a new 

ceiling, i.e., the actual numbers of military personnel 

and treaty limited weapons, and commit themselves 

not to exceed these levels in the future. Since the costs 

of weapons and military personnel skyrocketed in 

the last 2 decades, no member-state will be able (for 

budgetary reasons) to ever bridge the gap between the 

ACFE Treaty ceilings of 1999 and actual holdings of 

2007. These commitments in practical terms will not require any country to abandon its weapons modernization programs, or transition from conscription-based 

to an all-volunteer armed force, but the proposed action will eliminate the gap between the permitted ceilings and actual holdings of weapons.

As a result, the ceilings for all member-states 

would immediately drop by 30-50 percent. These 

measures will not cost a penny, except the paper of a 

declaration, admitting the status quo. NATO will still 

maintain an impressive superiority of approximately 

3:1 vs. Russia in all types of weapons and military 

personnel, although it will be a little bit smaller than 

under the terms of the ACFE Treaty.

3. The next step may require a declaration of intensions by member-states to further reduce the number 

of ground-based weapons (tanks, ACVs, and artillery) 
62

by 20-25 percent within the next 10 years. Since almost 

all countries are in the middle of the retirement period 

of the weapons built during the Cold War and are beginning to replace them with a smaller number of more 

capable but very expensive weapon systems, the 20-25 

percent reductions of holdings does not seem to be a 

radical departure from existing modernization plans. 

The commitment to reduce could be made easier by 

stipulations that some of the retired weapons may be 

stored or mothballed. 

If this commitment is made, NATO, in Europe, 

will still maintain by the end of next decade, the largest concentration of military power in the world.

4. Another step should include immediate acceptance of the CFE Treaty by the new members of NATO: 

Baltic states and others. Since their actual holdings 

of heavy weapons are very small, their participation 

in the new regime, including the freeze and further 

reduction, will only help to advance European arms 

control.

5. NATO must agree to the elimination of the 

flank zones. It makes no sense to restrict freedom of 

deployment in sovereign territory for Russia, neither 

for Turkey or the Ukraine. It seems that technical solutions (raising the ceiling or reducing areas of the flank 

zones), are no more acceptable to Moscow. That is 

why the survival of the CFE will be impossible if the 

flank zones are not abandoned. But it is possible to 

suggest voluntarily a unilateral commitment to limit 

the forces in certain areas. 

6. The most difficult step is related to plans to invite into NATO some former Soviet republics, in particular Ukraine and Georgia. Ukraine’s CFE quota is 

quite impressive. After the dissolution of the USSR, 

Kiev acquired about 40 percent of the Soviet share of 
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the Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE). Today, Ukrainian ground forces are bigger than the ground forces 

of Germany. When former Soviet satellites joined 

NATO, they added a large number of weapons to 

NATO. Eastern European countries contributed more 

than a quarter of all ground weapons to NATO forces. 

If Ukraine is admitted to NATO, it will bring another 

15 or 20 percent increase in NATO’s levels. No doubt 

Moscow is taking a very negative view of Kiev’s proposed membership in NATO. If the admission is given 

a green light, there will be no chance to save the CFE 

regime. 

The proposed steps can help to revive the impetus for a conventional arms control regime in Europe, 

preserve and expand transparency, and prevent an 

unrestricted new arms race. A CFE-2 Treaty will also 

create better conditions for NATO-Russia security cooperation in a number of areas. The proposed steps 

do not resolve the problems of “smart” weapons and 

naval forces. But, they will help to provide new life for 

conventional arms control in the 21st century.

COOPERATION IN BMD

Russia is the only country which, for more than 30 

years, has operated strategic BMD deployed around 

its capital. While some of these systems are outdated, 

Russia is developing a new generation of BMD systems. They included new modular radars and theater 

BMD interceptors S-400.

Russia strongly opposed the American plans for 

BMD deployment in Eastern Europe, claiming that 

they represent an element of the strategic BMD, which 

includes elements in Alaska and California, sea-based 
64

systems, and future space-based components. The 

Bush administration made it clear that the BMD deployment is an open-ended process and a further upgrade may follow. Moscow also considers BMD deployment in Eastern Europe a violation of the NATO 

Founding Act pledge to avoid “substantial” deployment on the territory of the new members of NATO.

The Russian proposal on cooperation with early 

warning in Gabala opens a window of opportunity to 

resolve the problem. While the old Gabala radar cannot be used for intercept purposes, the new Russian 

modular radar can, so access to the information collected by Russian radars helps to close the gap in existing American early warning systems. The information 

from Russian and American radars can be provided 

in real time to the Center for Information on Missile 

Launches, which Russia and the United States agreed 

to open in Moscow 11 years ago. For legal reasons, the 

Center has never been opened.

The cooperation in missile information collection 

can help to provide the data to battle management radars on American Aegis sea-based BMD systems deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Aegis interceptors and S-400 systems can provide protection against 

the missiles which Iran possesses today. These missile 

systems have a range of about 2,000 kilometers and 

can also be coordinated with the missile defenses developed by NATO. One should remember that under 

NATO-Russia auspices, experts have already prepared specific stipulations concerning joint theater 

BMDs.

While building joint BMD may be a very difficult 

task, it seems that coordinated deployment of Russian, American, and NATO BMDs with horizontal or 

vertical distribution of responsibilities is much more 
65

achievable. This cooperation can produce results much 

more quickly than unilateral American deployment in 

Eastern Europe, since the U.S. Congress denied the 

administration request for construction of the Ground 

Based Interceptor (GBI) base in Poland next year.

More importantly, the very fact of serious Russian, 

American, and NATO cooperation in BMD will send 

a powerful political message to Iran. It may help to reverse Iranian intentions to build nuclear weapons and 

long range missiles for their delivery.

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is a crucial test. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has encountered many challenges in that country so far away 

from Europe. As a result, ISAF has not been very successful in destroying the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

The situation in Afghanistan may deteriorate even 

more when the United States recognizes its failure and 

begins to withdraw its forces. The shock wave of the 

defeat could be very serious. In any case, there is little 

chance to expect a quick victory in Afghanistan. At 

best, the task will be to maintain the status quo.

The situation in Afghanistan requires new efforts 

to maintain and expand the international coalition. 

Russia can become a major contributor to this effort. 

Moscow has important assets which can be very helpful to ISAF. Russia has ground and air military bases 

in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and many connections 

in Northern Afghanistan. While the Soviet experience in Afghanistan makes Russians unenthusiastic 

about new military involvement in that country, Russia clearly perceives the Taliban and al-Qaeda as her 

enemies.
66

Russia is also very much concerned about the drug 

traffic from Afghanistan. This problem has been greatly aggravated since the United States and NATO came 

to Afghanistan. Some Russians even accused the West 

of deliberately ignoring the drug problem and not taking action against the drug producers. Recently, this 

issue was recognized by ISAF, and some action has 

begun.

Probably Moscow might agree to accept greater responsibility for economic reconstruction of the northern provinces of Afghanistan.

Moscow ratified the Statute of Forces Agreement, 

which provides a legal framework for transition and 

presence of NATO personnel and materials on Russian territory. Russia concluded bilateral agreements 

with Germany, France, the United States, and some 

other countries on transit questions and permitted 

movement of NATO personnel and cargo to supply

ISAF.

It seems that Afghanistan is a unique place where 

vital NATO and Russian security interests coincide. 

They face common enemies: Islamic terrorists and 

drug traffickers. It makes sense for Russia and the 

West to combine forces to deal with these threats.

The involvement of Russian security forces in 

Afghanistan could be very helpful for ISAF. But the 

problem of political control has to be resolved beforehand. One solution could be the NATO-Russia Council, which could provide a place for political decisionmaking.

If Russia and NATO agree to cooperate in Afghanistan, it could produce a real strategic partnership. 

Russia can contribute there much more than any prospective members of NATO. Besides, Russia can play 

a key role to help extend the anti-Taliban coalition, 
67

engaging China, India, and even Iran to help the fight 

against the common enemy.

All these steps can be made under the umbrella 

of the new All-European Security Pact, proposed by 

President Dmitry Medvedev, helping to create a security system from Vancouver, Canada, to Vladivostok, 

Russia.

It seems that there is a real window of opportunity 

for the North Atlantic Alliance and Russia to rethink 

their relationship—to institutionalize it with legallybinding agreements and a permanent decisionmaking 

mechanism so their common benefits would take priority over diverging interests.

69

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic Studies Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the postSoviet world since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate

Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace 

Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force 

Base, Alabama; and taught at the University of Texas, 

San Antonio; and at the University of California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the editor of Imperial Decline: Russia’s 

Changing Position in Asia, coeditor of Soviet Military 

and the Future, and author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924. He 

has also written many articles and conference papers 

on Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, 

and Eastern European security issues. Dr. Blank’s current research deals with proliferation and the revolution in military affairs, and energy and security in 

Eurasia. His two most recent books are Russo-Chinese 

Energy Relations: Politics in Command, (London, UK: 

Global Markets Briefing, 2006); and Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American 

Strategic Cooperation (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005). Dr. Blank holds 

a B.A. in history from the University of Pennsylvania, 

and an M.A. and Ph.D. in history from the University 

of Chicago.

LOUIS H. JORDAN, JR., is the Deputy Director of the 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

Carlisle, PA. He is a colonel in the U.S. Army. He recently returned from a deployment to Afghanistan 

where he served as Senior Military Advisor to the Afghan Deputy Minister of Interior for Counter Narcotics. Colonel Jordan has served in aviation assignments 

from company through brigade and the national level 
70

including service at the National Guard Bureau as an 

operations officer, branch chief, and as the Deputy 

Division Chief of the Aviation and Safety Division. 

Colonel Jordan has commanded at the battalion, brigade, and joint task force level to include command 

of Joint Task Force Raven, the aviation task force for 

Operation JUMP START along the Southwest Border 

in Arizona. Colonel Jordan holds a B.A. in sociology 

from Fordham University in the Bronx, NY; a master’s 

degree in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War 

College, and a certification in strategic planning from 

the American Management Association.

JEFFREY D. MCCAUSLAND is Visiting Professor of 

International Security at Dickinson College. He also 

holds the position of Distinguished Visiting Professor 

of Research and Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies 

Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College. A U.S. Army 

colonel (retired), during his military career he served 

in a variety of command and staff positions in the 

United States and Europe. This included assignments 

as the Dean of Academics at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, working on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) from 1988 to 

1989. He commanded the 3rd Battalion 17th Field Artillery, VII Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD 

and DESERT STORM. Dr. McCausland was also the 

Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control on the 

National Security Council Staff in the White House. 

Furthermore, he was a member of the Department of 

Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, 

NY; a visiting fellow at the Center for International 

Affairs, Harvard University; and a research fellow at 

the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. Dr. McCausland’s articles have appeared in The 
71

Fletcher Forum, Parameters, Naval War College Review, 

Comparative Strategy, Armed Forces and Society, Defense 

Analysis, Field Artillery Journal, Military Review, and International Defense Review. He is also the author of The 

Gulf War: A Military Analysis (International Institute 

for Strategic Studies, London). He is a contributing 

author or editor to a number of books, including The 

Future of the Special Relationships, Conventional Deterrence, The Future of US-Australian Relations, and Arms 

Control in the 1990s. Dr. McCausland holds a Ph.D. 

in international relations from the Fletcher School of 

Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

SERGEY ROGOV is Director of the Institute for the 

U.S. and Canadian Studies. He previously held a number of positions at the Institute of USA and Canada including: Junior Research Fellow and Senior Research 

Fellow of the Department of Foreign Policy, Chief of a 

Section and later Chief of the Department of Military 

and Political Studies, Representative of the Institute 

in the Soviet Embassy in the United States, Leading 

Research Fellow, and Deputy Director. Dr. Rogov 

is the author of 300 articles and 16 books, including 

“The Role of the National Security Advisor in the US 

Decision-Making Process”; “The Search for a Balance 

of Interests in the Soviet-American Relations”; “The 

USSR and the USA: Problems of Mutual Security”; 

“The Evolving Military Doctrine of Russia”; “Russian 

Foreign Policy: Three Years of Trial and Error”; The 

Eurasian Strategy for Russia; The Russian Financial Crash 

of 1998; Nuclear Weapons in the Multipolar World; The 

New Stage in Russian-American Relations; and “Russia 

in the New International System.” Dr. Rogov holds 

the Candidate degree in historical sciences and a Doctorate in historical sciences in 1984 from the Institute 

of USA and Canada.
72

PAUL SCHULTE is a nonresident senior associate in 

the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program and at Carnegie 

Europe, where his research focuses on the future of 

deterrence, nuclear strategy, nuclear nonproliferation, 

cyber security, and their political implications. He is a 

senior visiting fellow in the Disarmament and Globalization Program at the University of London’s School 

of Oriental and African Studies. Additionally, he is a 

senior visiting fellow at both the Centre for Defense 

Studies at King’s College at the University of London 

and the Centre for the Study of Global Governance at 

the London School of Economics and Political Science. 

Mr. Shulte previously served as chief speechwriter 

to two United Kingdom (UK) defense secretaries 

(2006–07), as director of proliferation and arms control for the UK Ministry of Defence, and as UK commissioner on the United Nations (UN) commissions 

for Iraqi disarmament, United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and United Nations Monitoring, 

Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) 

(1997–2002). He also worked in Iraq’s Coalition Provisional Authority as director of defense organization 

in the Office of National Security Affairs (2004), the 

office responsible for rebuilding the Iraqi Ministry 

of Defense, and was founding head of the UK Post 

Conflict Reconstruction Unit (2004–05) involved in 

planning the initial integrated British civil-military 

campaign in Helmand province in Afghanistan. Mr. 

Shulte holds a B.Sc. in economics from the London 

School of Economics; and a Professional Certification 

in Group Analysis, London Centre for Psychotherapy. 

He is a graduate of the Senior Officers Course, Royal 

College of Defense Studies; and an International Fellow, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 

Harvard University.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Editors

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

Colonel Louis H. Jordan, Jr.

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil