SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2106-17T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SHAMECA BROWN,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Argued November 13, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Fasciale and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Ocean County, Indictment No. 16-06-1331.

Susan L. Romeo, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, 

Public Defender, attorney; Susan L. Romeo, of counsel 

and on the brief).

Shiraz I. Deen, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause 

for respondent (Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County 

Prosecutor, attorney; Samuel J. Marzarella, Chief

Appellate Attorney, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

December 5, 2018
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After her appeal of the prosecutor's rejection of her application for 

admission into the pre-trial intervention program (PTI) was denied by the trial 

court, defendant pled guilty to third-degree hindering, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(3), 

and was sentenced to a one-year probationary term. "PTI is a 'diversionary 

program through which certain offenders are able to avoid criminal prosecution 

by receiving early rehabilitative services expected to deter future criminal 

behavior.'" State v. Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 621 (2015) (quoting State v. 

Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 240 (1995)). "[A]cceptance into PTI is dependent upon 

an initial recommendation by the Criminal Division Manager and consent of the 

prosecutor." Ibid. "The assessment of a defendant's suitability for PTI must be 

conducted under the Guidelines for PTI provided in Rule 3:28, along with 

consideration of factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)." Ibid.

Challenging her rejection from the program, defendant appeals from the 

judgment of conviction entered by the court on December 20, 2017, raising the 

following arguments for our consideration: 

POINT I

THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR 

RECONSIDERATION BY THE PROSECUTOR 

BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH NEITHER THE PTI 

DIRECTOR NOR THE PROSECUTOR EVER 

EXPLICITLY CITED THE STATUTORY OR 

GUIDELINE FACTORS PERTAINING TO 
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DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH CRIMES OF 

VIOLENCE, THEY NEVERTHELESS 

EMPHASIZED THE SUPPOSEDLY VIOLENT 

NATURE OF DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT 

THROUGHOUT THE APPLICATION PROCESS, 

AND SHE WAS IMPROPERLY REQUIRED TO 

PRESENT COMPELLING REASONS AND TO 

ESTABLISH THAT DENIAL OF HER

APPLICATION WOULD NOT BE ARBITRARY 

AND UNREASONABLE.

POINT II

THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR 

RECONSIDERATION BY THE PROSECUTOR 

BECAUSE THE ASSESSMENT OF DEFENDANT'S 

APPLICATION IGNORED A KEY STATUTORY 

FACTOR AND CRITICAL, UNDISPUTED FACTS 

THAT MILITATED IN FAVOR OF DIVERTING 

DEFENDANT INTO PTI.

POINT III

THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR 

RECONSIDERATION BY THE PROSECUTOR 

BECAUSE IT WAS ARBITRARY AND 

IRRATIONAL TO REJECT DEFENDANT'S 

APPLICATION BY RELYING ON THE 

INAPPLICABILITY OF ONLY ONE OF THE FIVE 

INDEPENDENT PURPOSES OF THE PTI STATUTE, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(A)(3), PERTAINING TO 

"'VICTIMLESS' OFFENSES," TO EXCLUDE 

DEFENDANT FROM THE PROGRAM, RATHER 

THAN EXAMINING WHETHER THE 

CIRCUMSTANCES HERE FELL WITHIN ANY OF 

THE FOUR OTHER LEGISLATIVELY DEFINED 

PURPOSES.
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After considering these arguments in light of the record and applicable legal 

standards, we affirm.

The charge underlying this appeal stemmed from defendant's sister, 

Shatima Brown, stabbing an individual in the upper left hand side of his chest 

during an altercation in the front courtyard area of an apartment complex. After 

the stabbing, Shatima handed the knife to defendant, who then left the scene 

with the knife. The entire incident was captured on video surveillance. During 

the ensuing police investigation, which involved conducting witness interviews 

and searching some of the apartments for evidence, defendant denied any 

involvement in the stabbing by either herself or her sister. However, after police 

viewed the video surveillance, defendant's sister was charged with attempted 

murder and related charges, and defendant was charged with hindering. 

In a September 26, 2016 letter, the PTI Director rejected defendant's 

application. The Director acknowledged that defendant was "a twenty[-]eight[-

]year[-]old high school graduate who [had] worked as a Certified Home Health 

Aide for the past six years," had "four children in [her] custody, and [was]

expecting" a fifth. Further, the Director noted defendant had no prior criminal 

history in the Superior Court, and "denied ever using any alcohol or drugs." 

However, the Director's rejection was based on N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(1) (the 
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A-2106-17T1

nature of the offense); N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(2) (the facts of the case); N.J.S.A. 

2C:43-12(e)(7) ("[t]he needs and interests of the victim and society"); N.J.S.A. 

2C:43-12(e)(14) ("[w]hether or not the crime is of such a nature that the value 

of supervisory treatment would be outweighed by the public need for 

prosecution"); N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(15) ("[w]hether or not the applicant's 

involvement with other people in the crime charged . . . is such that the interest 

of the State would be best served by processing this case through traditional 

criminal justice system procedures"); and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(16) ("[w]hether 

or not the applicant's participation in pretrial intervention will adversely affect 

the prosecution of codefendants"). 

After acknowledging that "one of the purposes of the program [was] to

provide a mechanism for permitting the least burdensome form of prosecution 

possible for defendants charged with 'victimless' offenses" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 

2C:43-12(a)(3), the Director explained that: 

This offense [was] by no means victimless. . . . 

[Defendant's] involvement was hindering to law[-

]enforcement's ability to immediately apprehend

Shatima Brown and could have been detrimental to the 

prosecution of the correct suspect. Officers had to 

obtain search warrants for multiple dwellings in order 

to retrieve evidence due to [defendant] removing the 

weapon from the scene of the crime. Accepting 

[defendant] into the pre-trial intervention program 

would depreciate the severity of the crime and could 
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adversely affect the prosecution of co-defendant, 

Shatima Brown. Although [defendant's] involvement 

was not physically assaultive, the harm done to the 

victim must be taken into consideration. Considering 

the potential ramifications of [defendant's] actions and 

the indifference towards the life of another, it is 

apparent that society would most definitely benefit 

from [defendant's] criminal case being channeled 

through the traditional court process. In addition, it 

appears [defendant] ha[s] a pending municipal court 

case charging [her] with [h]arassment and there is an 

outstanding warrant for [her] arrest . . . for failure to 

appear. Not only do these charges display a tendency 

towards an indifference towards the use of violence, 

they also demonstrate a lack of compliance with court 

orders, rendering [defendant] to be an unfit candidate 

for the pre-trial intervention program. 

In an October 20, 2016 letter, the prosecutor also rejected defendant's PTI 

application. Specifically, the prosecutor "agree[d] with and adopt[ed] the . . . 

reasons contained in the PTI Director's letter of rejection." The prosecutor 

added that 

although the defendant [was] not charged with a violent 

crime per se, she covered up a very violent crime 

committed by her sister. To permit someone into PTI 

under these facts would make a mockery out of . . . 

supervisory treatment as contemplated in State v. 

Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85 (1976).

Defendant appealed the denial to the trial court. In a supporting 

certification, defense counsel stated that Shatima Brown's guilty plea to 

aggravated assault on July 10, 2017, constituted a "change of circumstances" 
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warranting "reconsideration of [defendant's] PTI rejection." Defense counsel 

also submitted a character letter written by a Lakewood police officer who was 

also the grandfather of one of defendant's children. In response, the State 

acknowledged considering the character letter as well as the other mitigating 

factors, including defendant's attempts to further her education. However, the 

State asserted that even absent N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(15), and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-

12(e)(16), the other four factors on which the rejection was based still fully 

supported the decision to reject defendant's application and outweighed the 

mitigating factors. 

Following oral argument, on October 4, 2017, the trial court denied 

defendant's appeal, concluding that defendant failed to establish "by clear and 

convincing evidence" that the prosecutor's rejection amounted to "a patent and 

gross abuse of discretion." In rejecting defendant's contention that "the

[p]rosecutor's decision . . . was not based on the appropriate factors or the 

appropriate weighing of those factors," the court determined that "the State did 

consider and weigh . . . all the relevant factors." The court explained that the 

prosecutor considered 

not only the factors that were weighed against the 

defendant's admission into the program, but also those 

factors that weighed in favor of the defendant's 

admission and those factors included the defendant's 
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age, the fact that the crime as alleged was not assaultive 

in nature, the defendant's lack of a prior record, lack of 

history of known violence[,] and lack of involvement 

with organized crimes.

. . . [T]he State specifically noted that while [it 

was] commendable that this defendant wants to further 

her education, has family that she needs to support and 

additional family members that support her and have 

provided . . . a character letter to show this, that this 

does not mitigate the fact that this defendant was 

involved in a very dangerous activity, regardless of the 

fact she did not cause direct harm[,] but that she was 

instrumental in helping to advance a violent crime. And 

the State paid particular attention to the video . . . that

. . . depicted . . . the defendant show[ing] indifference 

to the injured victim by . . . concealing the weapon and 

then leaving the scene with it.

The court entered a memorializing order and this appeal followed.

Deciding whether to permit a defendant to divert to PTI "is a 

quintessentially prosecutorial function," State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 582 

(1996), for which a prosecutor is given "broad discretion," State v. K.S., 220 

N.J. 190, 199 (2015). It involves the consideration of the non-exhaustive list of 

seventeen statutory factors, enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e), in order to 

"make an individualized assessment of the defendant considering his or her 

amenability to correction and potential responsiveness to rehabilitation. " 

Roseman, 221 N.J. at 621-22 (internal quotation marks omitted). "These factors 

include 'the details of the case, defendant's motives, age, past criminal record, 
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standing in the community, and employment performance[.]'" Id. at 621 

(alteration in original) (quoting Watkins v. Watkins, 193 N.J. 507, 520 (2008)). 

The Supreme Court's Guidelines accompanying Rule 3:28 work in harmony with 

the seventeen individual factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e).1

That said, the scope of our review of a PTI rejection is severely limited 

and designed to address "only the 'most egregious examples of injustice and 

unfairness.'" State v. Negran, 178 N.J. 73, 82 (2003) (quoting State v. 

Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 384 (1977)). "In order to overturn a prosecutor's 

rejection, a defendant must 'clearly and convincingly establish that the 

prosecutor's decision constitutes a patent and gross abuse of discretion,'" 

meaning that the decision "has gone so wide of the mark sought to be 

accomplished by PTI that fundamental fairness and justice require judicial 

intervention." Watkins, 193 N.J. at 520 (first quoting State v. Watkins, 390 N.J. 

Super. 302, 305-06 (App. Div. 2007); and then quoting Wallace, 146 N.J. at 582-

83). 

An abuse of discretion has occurred where it can be proven "that the [PTI] 

denial '(a) was not premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors, (b) was 

 

1

 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 was amended in 2015. As amended, the eligibility 

requirements were expanded to allow defendants who plead guilty to certain 

violent crimes to be admitted to the program. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(g)(3).
10 A-2106-17T1

based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c) 

amounted to a clear error in judgment. '" State v. Lee, 437 N.J. Super. 555, 563 

(App. Div. 2014) (quoting State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 93 (1979)). "In order for 

such an abuse of discretion to rise to the level of 'patent and gross,' it must 

further be shown that the prosecutorial error complained of will clearly subvert 

the goals underlying Pretrial Intervention." Roseman, 221 N.J. at 625 (quoting 

Bender, 80 N.J. at 93). "The extreme deference which a prosecutor's decision is 

entitled to in this context translates into a heavy burden which must be borne by 

a defendant when seeking to overcome a prosecutorial veto of his [or her] 

admission into PTI." State v. Kraft, 265 N.J. Super. 106, 112 (App. Div. 1993).

Applying these principles, we discern no patent or gross abuse of 

discretion in the prosecutor's denial of defendant's PTI application. Thus, there 

is no basis to disturb the trial court's decision sustaining the prosecutor's denial, 

a decision we review de novo. See State v. Denman, 449 N.J. Super. 369, 375-

76 (App. Div. 2017). We reject defendant's argument that she "never received 

the required individualized assessment of her amenability to correction and 

rehabilitation." Although defendant certainly had a number of mitigating factors 

in her favor, all of which were considered by the prosecutor, the reasons for the 
11 A-2106-17T1

prosecutor's denial were premised on consideration of relevant factors, several 

of which weighed against her admission. 

We also reject defendant's contention that her "hindering conduct was 

improperly treated as though she had committed a violent crime." The record 

clearly refutes such a contention. Equally unavailing is defendant's assertion 

that the prosecutor "arbitrarily and irrationally relied on the inapplicability of 

only one of the five alternate purposes of the PTI statute to reject [her] 

application." "Absent evidence to the contrary, it is [to be] presumed that the 

prosecutor considered all relevant factors before rendering a decision." State v. 

Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503, 509 (1981). Like the trial court, we conclude that 

defendant failed to clearly and convincingly establish that the prosecutor's 

decision went so wide of the mark sought to be accomplished by PTI that 

fundamental fairness and justice require judicial intervention.

Affirmed.