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i 

58–230 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–150] 

THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

POLICY AND FORCE STRUCTURE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 14, 2010 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, JR., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

PAUL ARCANGELI, Staff Director 

BOB DEGRASSE, Professional Staff Member 

ANDREW HUNTER, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

JULIE UNMACHT, Professional Staff Member 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

ALEJANDRA VILLARREAL, Staff Assistant 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 

MEGAN HOWARD, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, April 14, 2010, The United States Nuclear Weapons Policy and 

Force Structure .................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, April 14, 2010 ..................................................................................... 51 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14, 2010 

THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY AND FORCE 

STRUCTURE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Armed Services ............................................................ 3 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Chilton, Gen. Kevin P., USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command .............. 7 

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy ........................................................................................................................ 9 

Miller, Hon. James N., Ph.D., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense .............................................................. 5 

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 

International Security, U.S. Department of State ............................................ 11 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Chilton, Gen. Kevin P. ..................................................................................... 64 

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P. ............................................................................ 69 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 55 

Miller, Hon. James N. ...................................................................................... 58 

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O. ................................................................................... 75 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Tri-Lab Directors’ Statement on the Nuclear Posture Review ..................... 85 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 91 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 89 

Mr. Owens ......................................................................................................... 94 

(1) 

THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY AND 

FORCE STRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 14, 2010. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:35 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. The Armed Services Committee 

meets today to receive testimony on the United States’ nuclear policy as well as the force structure in light of the recent Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) as well as the signing of the New Strategic 

Arms Reduction (START) Treaty. 

Joining us today is a very formidable witness panel, and in the 

order of speaking, the Honorable Jim Miller, Principal Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; General Kevin Chilton, the 

Commander of the United States Strategic Command, or what we 

call STRATCOM; the Honorable Tom D’Agostino, excuse me, the 

Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator 

of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). 

And no stranger here, and we welcome her back, the Honorable, 

fantastic Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. It is a real thrill to have you back. 

And we appreciate each one of you appearing here today. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 required the Secretary of Defense to perform a review of our nuclear 

posture in coordination, of course, with the State Department and 

the Energy Department. 

The Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review seeks to establish 

a bipartisan approach to nuclear policy and, in my view, properly 

balances the role of our nuclear deterrent forces with the goals of 

preventing nuclear terrorism and weapons proliferation. 

It contains exactly the balance that former Secretaries of Defense 

Bill Perry and Jim Schlesinger recommended to our committee a 

year ago when they presented the findings of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United 

States. ‘‘This is a moment of opportunity,’’ the commission concluded, ‘‘to reach consensus on U.S. nuclear strategy, but it is also 

a moment of urgency.’’ 

The urgency, according to these experts, arises ‘‘internationally, 

from the danger that we may be close to a tipping point in nuclear 
2 

proliferation and, domestically, from an accumulation of delayed 

decisions about the nuclear weapons program.’’ 

The Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review offers us the opportunity to act on the urgent issues, both internationally and domestically, that the commission defined. 

Following the path first outlined by President Obama in his 

speech in Prague last year, the NPR calls for responsibly reducing 

the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. This 

action opens the door to stronger steps against rogue states and 

those who would fail to protect nuclear technology and materials. 

The NPR’s new approach recognizes that we live in a complicated 

world that demands immediate action to protect us from the threat 

of nuclear terrorism, such as locking down loose nuclear materials 

in concert with other nations. And in that regard, I want to congratulate the President on obtaining the agreement of 47 nations 

here in Washington at the nuclear summit to lock down these materials within four years. That is good. 

At the same time, the NPR is grounded in the strength of our 

nuclear deterrent forces. It calls for retaining a nuclear triad of 

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched 

ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers. 

I am also pleased that the review concluded that, as long as nuclear weapons are around, they will be maintained safely. They will 

be maintained securely as well as reliably, and consistent with the 

Stockpile Management statute recommended by this committee last 

year and codified in law by the Defense bill. 

In addition to the NPR, the Nation’s nuclear posture and force 

structure has recently been influenced by the announcement and 

signing of a New Strategic Arms Reduction, or START, Treaty with 

the Russians. 

This new treaty comes at a critical time, as we approach the May 

Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by agreeing to reduce their nuclear stockpiles, and the U.S. and Russia 

have sent a clear message to the rest of the world. 

This action by the two largest nuclear powers will only strengthen the President’ efforts at the conference to impose stiffer punishments on nations such as Iran that are accused of violating the 

NPT. 

The road before us to a world free of nuclear threats is long and 

it will be, at times, difficult, but the signing of the historic New 

START Treaty moves us miles ahead toward reaching that final 

destination. 

In his memoirs, Ronald Reagan noted, ‘‘For the 8 years I was 

president, I never let my dream of a nuclear-free world fade from 

my mind.’’ 

Like President Reagan, President Obama is aiming high with his 

commitment to a world without nuclear weapons. But as I read it, 

the President’s nuclear posture and the New START Treaty are 

deeply rooted in a common-sense strategy that will enhance our national security by protecting us from the most urgent nuclear dangers. 

So before calling on our distinguished panel of witnesses, let me 

recognize my friend, the ranking member, the distinguished gentleman from California, Mr. McKeon. 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like to extend a warm welcome back to our witnesses. 

Before I begin, I want to express my deep condolences to the Polish people. Saturday’s tragedy leaves us at a loss for words. Many 

of us here had met with President Kaczynski in previous trips to 

Warsaw as well as the distinguished civilian and military leaders 

who also perished in this unfortunate accident. Our thoughts and 

prayers are with their families, loved ones, at this time. 

Today’s hearing focuses on the Administration’s changes to U.S. 

nuclear policy and posture. We have seen much fanfare accompany 

the release of the new Nuclear Posture Review, the President’s trip 

to Prague to sign a New START Treaty, and the Nuclear Security 

Summit held earlier this week. 

I commend the President’s focus on these important nuclear security issues. However, my objective today is to understand how 

the policy has changed and why, as well as the consequences and 

implications. 

Along these lines, I would like to highlight my primary concerns. 

First, the NPR appears to change our nation’s longstanding policy 

of ‘‘calculated ambiguity.’’ It adopts a ‘‘Negative Security Assurance’’ (NSA) policy, whereby non-nuclear weapons states that 

aren’t proliferating are assured that the U.S. would never threaten 

the use of nuclear weapons against them, even if the U.S. or our 

allies are threatened with biological or chemical weapons. 

At the same time, the NPR includes a caveat that adjustments 

could be made if conditions change. Furthermore, the NPR signals 

a desire to pursue a universal ‘‘sole purpose’’ policy by which the 

threat of nuclear use to deter a devastating chemical or biological 

attack would be taken entirely off the table. 

Why embrace such muddled wording that sends mixed signals to 

both our allies and adversaries? I hope our witnesses will discuss 

why this policy change was made and the national security benefits 

they believe it provides. 

I worry that these changes to U.S. declaratory policy, combined 

with the explicit signaling of what is yet to come, will weaken our 

deterrence rather than strengthen it. 

Second, the NPR indicates the President has already ‘‘directed a 

review of potential future reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons below 

New START levels.’’ What would be the strategic rationale for such 

reductions? 

Without further assessments of the threat and understanding of 

our military commanders’ requirements, much less seeing how the 

implementation of START goes, it would seem premature to rush 

into deeper cuts. 

We have been told repeatedly that START would permit further 

development and deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Europe 

and the U.S. But Russian leaders suggest such deployments could 

lead to their withdrawal from the treaty. 

How are these differing expectations being resolved, especially 

when some are suggesting that missile defense and conventional 

forces be included in the next round of negotiations? I am con-
4 

cerned that our eagerness to do more arms control may further cost 

us important conventional capabilities. I hope our witnesses can assure us that this is not the case. 

Third, any decision to reduce our nuclear stockpile, including 

those weapons we maintain in storage, should not be made unless 

we have high confidence that the remaining arsenal is highly reliable. This requires a sustained, long-term investment to modernize 

our aging stockpile and infrastructure, not just a one-year increase 

of funds. 

Furthermore, how do we attract and retain top scientists and engineers to an enterprise that is shrinking and, as the NPR states, 

explicitly prohibits the development of new nuclear warheads? General Chilton, as you told the committee last year, our nuclear weapons are ‘‘chemistry experiments on the shelf.’’ 

What young, bright engineer wants to work on that? How does 

the Administration propose to maintain required technical competencies in an environment that does not allow them to be exercised from start to finish? 

Lastly, the NPR rightly places emphasis on addressing the threat 

of nuclear terrorism and nuclear nonproliferation. The President 

has announced an intentional effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years, yet we have not 

seen any plans for how this would be accomplished. 

But there is another aspect to nonproliferation—U.S. assurance 

to our over 30 allies and friends who have agreed not to acquire 

nuclear weapons in exchange for U.S. nuclear guarantees. Will our 

policy changes, reductions, and signaling lead to less confidence in 

our nuclear deterrent and, perhaps, drive some of our allies and 

friends to consider developing their own? 

Fundamentally, the President appears to believe that U.S. nuclear reductions will restore our moral leadership to encourage others to do the same. However, it assumes regimes like Iran and 

North Korea will curb their nuclear ambitions, Pakistan and India 

will reduce their nuclear arms, and Russia and China will be more 

inclined to support tough sanctions against Iran, all as a result of 

U.S. stockpile reductions. However, none of these have yet to be 

seen. 

I would like to thank our witnesses again for being with us today 

and for their dedication and service. And Mr. Chairman, I would 

like to have my full statement included in the record, please. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection the entire statement will be so 

ordered. Thank you, Mr. McKeon. 

The order of testimony will be, as we face the witnesses from left 

to right, Secretary Miller, General Chilton, Secretary D’Agostino 

and finally then we are saving the best for last, Secretary Tauscher. We thank each of you for appearing before us today, and we 

have your written statements and each will be incorporated for the 

record without objection. 

So, Secretary Miller, the floor is yours. 
5 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, PH.D., PRINCIPAL 

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Dr. MILLER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Mr. McKeon, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to testify today. It is a pleasure to join my esteemed colleagues in 

discussing U.S. nuclear policy and capabilities. 

I will focus my remarks today on the recently completed and, as 

you know, congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review, or 

NPR. The 2010 NPR provides a roadmap for implementing the 

President’s Prague agenda for reducing the role and numbers of 

nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear 

weapons. 

Because this goal will not be reached quickly, perhaps not in our 

lifetimes, the NPR outlines specific steps needed to sustain a safe, 

secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist. 

In the fiscal year 2011 budget requests from both the Departments of Defense and Energy are the first installments in this 

long-term effort. 

As the chairman noted, the 2010 NPR identifies the most urgent 

nuclear dangers today as arising from proliferation and the potential for nuclear terrorism, and it outlines a comprehensive approach for dealing with these challenges that includes policy initiatives and increased investments in a number of areas. 

More broadly, the NPR identifies five key areas and five objectives for U.S. nuclear policy and posture. First, and as I noted, the 

top priority is preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. 

Second, reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in our national 

security strategy, and I will say more about that in particular. 

Third, maintaining strategic deterrents and stability at reduced 

force levels. 

Fourth, strengthening regional deterrents and reassuring U.S. 

allies and partners and fifth, sustaining the safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal. 

Given that the committee has received the NPR report, I won’t 

summarize all of its conclusions; focus my remarks instead on declaratory policy and force structure issues. The 2010 NPR aims to 

make clear the benefits to other nations of complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the potential consequences of 

not doing so. 

It strengthens the existing U.S. nuclear—sorry, excuse me—it 

strengthens the existing U.S. Negative Security Assurance associated with the NPT and states, ‘‘The United States will not use or 

threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon 

states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.’’ 

At the same time, the NPR does reflect continued concerns about 

chemical and biological weapons, or CBW, and it affirms that 

‘‘. . . any state eligible for this assurance that uses chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies or partners 

would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response—and that individuals responsible for that attack, whether 
6 

national leaders or military commanders, will be held fully accountable.’’ 

Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons in particular, and the rapid pace of biotechnology development, the NPR 

notes that the United States reserves the right to make any future 

adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat. 

This clarified Negative Security Assurance does not apply to nuclear weapon states such as Russia or China, nor does it apply to 

states not in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations, such as Iran and North Korea. 

For these states, the NPR makes clear that U.S. nuclear weapons 

still play a role in deterring not only nuclear attack, but also conventional or CBW attack against the United States or partners and 

allies. And as Secretary Gates noted recently, for Iran and North 

Korea, all options are on the table. 

Finally, to address the potential nexus of terrorists and weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD), the NPR renews the ‘‘. . . U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state terrorist group or other 

non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain 

or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.’’ 

This statement and the clarification of the U.S. Negative Security Assurance associated with the NPT are both reflections of the 

fact that the most urgent threats today are nuclear proliferation 

and nuclear terrorism. 

At the same time, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the U.S. 

must retain the safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter 

an attack on the United States and our allies. Therefore, one of the 

first tasks of the NPR, was continued throughout the review, was 

to find positions for the New START negotiations. 

The Department of Defense (DOD)-led NPR team reached the following conclusions about U.S. strategic nuclear force structure. 

First, the U.S. should retain a nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles 

(SLBMs) and dual-capable heavy bombers under New START, and 

the fiscal 2011 budget request includes funding for each leg of the 

triad. 

Second, all U.S. ICBMs should be ‘‘de-Multiple Independently 

Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)ed’’ to a single warhead each in 

order to reinforce strategic stability. And third, an ability to upload 

non-deployed nuclear weapons on delivery vehicles should be retained as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise. 

The Administration intends to provide additional details for strategic forces under New START in a report required by Section 1251 

of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2010. This report will 

include a 10-year estimate of budgetary requirements for sustaining delivery platforms, the nuclear weapons stockpile and the 

nuclear weapons complex. 

My statement deals with questions of non-strategic nuclear 

weapons as well as long-range strike capabilities, and I would like 

to ask that that full statement be submitted for the record. And 
7 

then, in order to make more time for questions of the committee, 

I would like to just conclude by saying the following. 

And that is that a key premise of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review was that an effective national strategy for reducing nuclear 

dangers and sustaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent will require support from a long succession of U.S. administrations and Congresses. 

Laying the groundwork for sustainable bipartisan consensus has 

been and remains a central purpose of this NPR. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 58.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

General Chilton, please. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, COMMANDER, 

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Chairman Skelton and Ranking 

Member McKeon and members of the committee. I appreciate the 

opportunity to be before you today and to testify on these two very 

important topics. 

The United States Strategic Command was closely consulted 

throughout the development of the Nuclear Posture Review and 

during negotiations on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, 

and I look forward to discussing them with you. 

I would like to note at the outset how proud I am of the extraordinary work the Command performed in support of all these efforts. We have an amazing team in Omaha and their diligence, expertise, and tireless work continue to ensure our ability to deliver 

global security for America. 

The NPR reflects a current assessment of the global security environment, one which is markedly, but not entirely, different from 

the one we faced in the Cold War. It recognizes the need to confront global threats, including nuclear dangers, through the twin 

prongs of deterrence and nonproliferation. The NPR includes several key recommendations that will serve to both sustain and 

strengthen USSTRATCOM’s ability to conduct our deterrence missions. 

Specifically, the NPR recommends moving forward with a number of nuclear enterprise sustainment projects, including strengthening our nuclear command and control structure; continuing development and deployment of our triad of delivery systems; maintaining a safe, secure and effective stockpile; and revitalizing the 

National Nuclear Security Administration’s aging infrastructure. 

America’s triad of diverse and complementary delivery systems 

provides unique synergies that make our deterrent highly credible 

and resilient in the face of a variety of potential technological and 

geopolitical developments. 

The NPR further endorses DOD efforts to explore future triad 

systems, specifically, to extend the Minuteman III ICBM through 

2030 and conduct studies now to inform decisions on a follow-on 

land-based deterrent to replace the Ohio-class SSBN at the existing 

ships’ end of life, and to study future long-range bomber capabilities. It also supports moving forward with full-rate production for 

the W76–1 warhead for our submarine leg of the triad. Full-scope— 
8 

that is, nuclear and non–nuclear—life extension of the B61 bomb 

to sustain its strategic deterrence and extended deterrence roles, 

and initiating studies to develop life extension options for the W78 

ICBM warhead, including the possibility of also adapting the resulting warhead for sea launched ballistic missiles and, thereby, reducing the number of warhead types. 

Additionally the NPR and the President’s budget recognize the 

need to improve the nation’s nuclear infrastructure and address the 

challenges of human capital recruitment, development, and 

sustainment. These investments are required in order to confidently reduce the overall U.S. stockpile while sustaining the 

credibility of our nuclear weapons, which is fundamental to effective deterrence. 

Investments that revitalize NNSA’s aging infrastructure and intellectual capital strengthen our security with the facilities and 

people needed to address technological surprises, geopolitical 

change, and a range of cutting edge national security challenges. 

The Administration’s request for a 13 percent increase in NNSA’s 

funding for fiscal year 2011 is an important first step in this process. 

In regard to New START, the nuclear enterprise remains, today 

and for the foreseeable future, the foundation of U.S. deterrent 

strategy and defense posture. As the combatant command responsible for executing strategic deterrence operations, planning for nuclear operations, and advocating for nuclear capabilities, we are 

keenly aware of how force posture and readiness changes can affect 

deterrence, assurance, and overall strategic stability. 

The New START agreement, in my view, retains the military 

flexibility necessary to ensure each of these for the period of the 

treaty. 

In support of the New START negotiations effort, U.S. Strategic 

Command analyzed the required nuclear weapons and delivery vehicle force structure and posture to meet current guidance and provided options for consideration by the Department. 

This rigorous approach, rooted in both deterrent strategy and assessment of potential adversary capabilities, supports both the 

agreed-upon reductions in New START and recommendations in 

the NPR. 

Every day, U.S. Strategic Command remains focused on providing the President and future presidents with the options and 

flexibility needed to deter and respond to threats to our nation and 

its allies. Today, our deterrent is safe, secure, and effective. 

Our forces are trained and ready, and the command is faithfully 

and fully carrying out its missions each and every day. I am confident that the NPR and New START outline an approach that continues to enable the men and women of U.S. Strategic Command 

to deliver global security for America today and in the future. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify before this committee, and I look forward to your questions and future discussions. 

[The prepared statement of General Chilton can be found in the 

Appendix on page 64.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you so much. 

Secretary D’Agostino, welcome. 
9 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO, UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members 

of the committee. I am very pleased to appear before you today 

with General Chilton, the Honorable Ellen Tauscher and Dr. Jim 

Miller to talk about the Nuclear Posture Review. I will focus my 

remarks on the Department of Energy’s equities in the Nuclear 

Posture Review. 

As you know, or as you may not know, that NNSA has been actively engaged in the formulation of the NPR and we are pleased, 

along with General Chilton, to have had the opportunity to contribute significantly to the document. 

The NNSA is actively engaged in direct support of the first NPR 

objective: preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. 

The most important steps we can take to keep terrorists from developing and using an improvised nuclear device or a radiological 

‘‘dirty bomb,’’ is to prevent them from acquiring the nuclear materials or radiological materials themselves. 

This is not a new job to the NNSA. We have led this effort for 

several years, and now we are accelerating and broadening the 

scope of these efforts. 

Current NNSA programs include securing nuclear materials, including the most vulnerable nuclear materials, worldwide in four 

years; disposing of excess U.S. and international fissile materials; 

strengthening the international safeguard systems by developing 

new safeguards technologies, expertise, policies, concepts, and partnerships; developing an active nuclear and radiological security 

dialogue and cooperation with key domestic and international partners; and developing highly sensitive and wide-area nuclear detection technologies. 

NNSA programs are supporting the President’s arms control and 

nonproliferation agenda by using these technical capabilities within 

the Nuclear Security Enterprise to demonstrate the technical ability to support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 

the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and any follow-on arms control 

requirements. 

The Department of Energy and NNSA are also actively engaged 

in direct support of the fifth NPR objective, ‘‘sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.’’ For more than 65 years, our 

program has been able to do just that: assure the nation that the 

nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and effective in meeting 

the nuclear deterrent needs of the United States. 

The need to maintain the nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing has been a national policy for close to 20 years, and we will 

continue to do that into the future, consistent with the key principles included in the NPR. 

To that end, the United States will not conduct underground nuclear testing and will not develop new nuclear warheads. However, 

we will study all options for ensuring the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear warheads, and we will do so on a caseby-case basis. 
10 

Applying these principles, the NNSA will fully fund the ongoing 

Life Extension Program for the W76 submarine-based warhead for 

completion in the year 2017 and the full-scope life extension study 

for the B61 bomb to ensure first production begins in 2017. And, 

as General Chilton also mentioned, participate with the Nuclear 

Weapons Council on a study of life extension options and approaches for the W78 ICBM warhead. 

The NPR also concluded that the NNSA needed to recapitalize 

the aging infrastructure and to renew our human capital, the critical cadre of scientific, technical, and engineering experts who carry 

out our stockpile management work and support other missions. 

To that end, the NNSA will strengthen the Science, Technology 

and Engineering base needed for conducting weapon system life extensions, weapons surety, certification without nuclear testing, and 

providing annual stockpile weapons surveillance. 

NNSA will also fund two key facility projects, the Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) project at Los Alamos 

National Laboratory to replace the existing 50-year-old CMR facility by 2021 and a Uranium Processing Facility at the Y–12 plant 

in Oak Ridge, Tennessee to come on line for production operations 

by the year 2021. 

Responsible stockpile management requires not only the supporting infrastructure, but also a highly capable workforce with the 

specialized skills needed to sustain the nuclear deterrent and to 

support the President’s nuclear security agenda. 

The NPR noted the importance of recruiting and retaining the 

human capital needed in NNSA for nuclear security mission. In 

order to succeed in our mission, we need to be able to recruit and 

retain the next generation of nuclear security professionals, because our highly specialized workforce is, indeed, our greatest 

asset. 

The President has now clearly outlined the importance of nuclear 

issues for our national security and the importance of keeping the 

U.S. nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and effective for the future. 

And the Administration’s commitment to a clear and long-term 

plan for managing the stockpile and comprehensive nuclear security agenda ensures that the scientists and engineers of tomorrow 

will have the opportunity to engage in challenging research and development activities. 

I would also want to share with the committee a statement from 

our national laboratory directors that provides their views on the 

Nuclear Posture Review. The directors universally state that ‘‘We 

believe the approach outlined in the NPR, which excludes further 

nuclear testing and includes the consideration of the full range of 

life extension options, provides the necessary technical flexibility to 

manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an acceptable 

level of risk.’’ 

‘‘We are reassured that a key component of the NPR is the recognition of the importance of supporting a modern physical infrastructure—comprised of nuclear security laboratories and a complex of supporting facilities—and a highly capable workforce.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to provide that statement for the 

record so the unanimity of support for the NPR is fully understood 

and is clear. 
11 

This Nuclear Posture Review is an important step toward adopting a 21st century approach to nuclear weapons and a broader 

array of nuclear security issues. This path forward will require a 

long term commitment from administrations and from future Congresses to provide the support and resources necessary to sustain 

our deterrent. 

As a committee directed in 2010 language, we have formulated, 

and will soon submit to the Congress, a Stockpile Management 

Plan that will describe how the NNSA and the Department of Defense will work together to implement the policy strategy and force 

structure included in the NPR. 

With the committee’s endorsement, the Nuclear Security Enterprise will have the science, technology and engineering expertise to 

carry out the full range of nuclear security missions, not just managing the stockpile but using those capabilities to address that full 

spectrum of national security efforts required. 

Secretary Chu recently stated that ‘‘the Department of Energy 

must discover and deliver the solutions to advance our national priorities.’’ The NNSA and the Nuclear Security Enterprise are poised 

to provide those solutions. 

Thank you, Mr Chairman. I am pleased to respond to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary D’Agostino can be found in 

the Appendix on page 69.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Secretary D’Agostino. Without objection, the laboratory report to which you referred will be made part 

of our record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 85.] 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Tauscher, we welcome you back, and 

we look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McKeon, distinguished members of the 

House Armed Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to discuss the State Department’s role in protecting the United 

States and our allies from today’s most pressing threats. 

I am honored to appear today with my friends and colleagues, 

Tom D’Agostino from the Department of Energy, Dr. Jim Miller 

from the Department of Defense, and General Chilton. 

Before I begin, let me thank you all for your service, and I want 

you to know how much I miss serving on this committee. It is an 

honor, however, to be part of the Obama Administration and to 

work with President Obama and Secretary Clinton to implement 

our arms control and nonproliferation agenda. 

As you know, we have an ambitious agenda to reduce the role 

and numbers of nuclear weapons to make the United States more 

secure and the world more stable. The President set forth several 

goals in his speech in Prague last year; three of which have been 

advanced in just the last few days. 
12 

First, he wanted a new treaty that would make verifiable and 

mutual cuts in the United States’ and Russia’s nuclear arsenals. 

Second, he vowed to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our security posture. And third, he set a goal of securing all vulnerable 

nuclear material within the next four years. 

At the same time, the President reaffirmed our commitment to 

maintaining a safe, secure, and effective deterrent to protect the 

United States and our allies so long as nuclear weapons exist. 

Mr. Chairman, the State Department, working with our friends 

at the Department of Energy and Defense, and with the rest of the 

inter-agency team and the Congress, are fully engaged in implementing the President’s agenda. 

Last week, the Administration released a report of its year-long 

Nuclear Posture Review. This review constitutes a clear break from 

past reviews, both in terms of process and scope. The Department 

of Defense led the review but, for the first time, the inter-agency, 

including the Department of State, fully participated in discussing 

the issues and making recommendations to the President. 

For the first time, the Nuclear Posture Review is an unclassified 

document. The Obama Administration took a broad whole-of-government approach to addressing the United States’ nuclear policy 

and identifying concrete steps to enhance our national security. 

Finally, last Thursday, President Obama traveled to Prague to 

sign the New START Treaty. I spent much of March at the table 

in Geneva and helped conclude the agreement. 

The New START Treaty will improve United States and international security by reducing and limiting U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces, promoting strategic stability by ensuring 

transparency and predictability regarding U.S. and Russian nuclear strategic forces over the life of the treaty, and advancing our 

nuclear nonproliferation efforts. 

The treaty sets meaningful lower limits on deployed strategic 

warheads and their delivery vehicles and launchers—limits that 

the Department of Defense validated through rigorous analysis in 

the early months of the Nuclear Posture Review. The treaty’s 

verification regime will provide each side with confidence that the 

other is upholding its obligations. 

The treaty gives our military the flexibility to structure, deploy, 

and maintain our forces in ways that best meet our national security interest. And, perhaps most importantly, the treaty does not 

contain any constraints on testing, development, or deployment of 

current or planned United States missile defense programs, or current or planned United States long-range conventional strike capabilities. 

Let me make one final point. Under the new treaty, the United 

States will continue to maintain a safe, secure, and effective strategic nuclear force to protect ourselves, our allies, and our partners. 

The United States and Russia can safely reduce our nuclear 

forces because the threat environment has changed. Today’s most 

pressing nuclear threats come from terrorists and additional countries seeking nuclear weapons, not the risk of a large-scale nuclear 

attack, as during the Cold War. 

The conclusions of our recent Nuclear Posture Review reflect that 

reality. The NPR directs us to preserve the effectiveness of our nu-
13 

clear deterrent for as long as it is required, reduce the potential for 

conflict, enhance strategic stability worldwide, and strengthen the 

nonproliferation regime. 

The NPR outlines a new approach that will ensure that our defenses and diplomacy are geared toward those objectives. Our updated Negative Security Assurance reinforces the President’s objectives of reducing the roles and numbers of nuclear weapons by 

making it clear that the United States will not use or threaten to 

use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are 

party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and are in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. 

That is why we call it the NSA, because it is a very long bite 

of an explanation of who they are. The purpose of this change is 

to emphasize to non-nuclear states the security benefits of adhering 

to and fully complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

and their nuclear nonproliferation objectives. 

Some have suggested this might lead such states to be less fearful of consequences of using chemical or biological weapons. Nothing could be further from the truth. Let me be clear. No one should 

doubt the resolve and conventional military capabilities of the 

United States to respond to such aggression with devastating effect 

and to hold accountable those responsible. 

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May 

is a critical opportunity to renew and revitalize all three pillars of 

the treaty: nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy under safeguards. 

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the 

nuclear nonproliferation regime and an essential foundation for 

progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament. All nations 

must recognize that the nonproliferation regime cannot survive if 

violators are allowed to act with impunity. 

Along with our international partners, the United States is pursuing diplomatic efforts to convince Iran and North Korea to resolve the world community’s concerns about their nuclear programs, and to encourage them to cooperate in addressing all outstanding questions about those programs. 

We are working to build international consensus for steps that 

will convince Iran’s leaders to change course, including new United 

Nations Security Council sanctions that will further clarify their 

choice of upholding the NPT and safeguard obligations, or facing 

increasing isolation and painful consequences. 

With respect to North Korea, we continue to send a message that 

simply returning to the negotiating table is not enough. Pyongyang 

must move toward complete and verifiable denuclearization 

through irreversible steps if it wants a normalized, sanctions-free 

relationship with the United States. 

These steps send a clear message about this Administration’s priorities and resolve. Our commitment to defend our national security interests and our allies and partners in Europe, the Pacific and 

elsewhere has never been stronger. In this regard, the NPR emphasizes close cooperation with our allies around the world and maintains our firm commitment to mutual security. 

We will work with our partners to reinforce regional security architectures such as missile defenses and other conventional mili-
14 

tary capabilities. And I want to repeat what I said earlier. The 

United States will continue to maintain a safe, secure, and effective 

nuclear deterrent for ourselves and our allies so long as these 

weapons exist anywhere in the world. 

Last year, President Obama said he would seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. He was also very clear 

that it might not happen in his lifetime. The standards for a world 

without nuclear weapons are very high, but we are taking concrete 

steps in that direction which make us stronger, safer, and more secure. 

That is why we are working to halt nuclear proliferation, to gain 

greater transparency into the programs and capabilities of key 

countries of concern and to create verification methods and technologies capable of detecting violations. 

In order to reduce the risk of proliferation, we will establish effective and internationally supported mechanisms to address noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations. 

Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to be here today. I am happy 

to answer any questions that you have, and I look forward to working with the committee on your bill. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Tauscher can be found in 

the Appendix on page 75.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, thank you for your testimony and your 

appearance. 

General Chilton, under the Nuclear Posture Review, can we, with 

certainty, say that America is safer because of it? 

General CHILTON. Mr. Chairman, what I can say with certainty 

is that the United States Strategic Command, under the construct 

of both the Nuclear Posture Review and the START Treaty, is able 

to fully execute the missions assigned to this command to provide 

adequate strategic deterrence for the United States of America. Of 

that I am absolutely convinced. And so in that respect we are secure. 

And if I could add, Mr. Chairman? 

The CHAIRMAN. Please. 

General CHILTON. There is a particularly important point that I 

think will strengthen us for the future under the NPR. It is something that I have advocated for in the past, and that is the funding 

and the commitment to funding and the focus on improving the nuclear enterprise under the NNSA. 

This will truly strengthen the deterrent, not only for today but 

for 20, 30, 40 years from now. And the NPR’s endorsement of that, 

I think, is one of the most important aspects of that for strengthening our deterrence posture for the future. 

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Miller, the Administration rejected the 

notion that deterring a nuclear attack is the sole purpose for our 

nuclear stockpile. Why was that? 

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, the Posture Review closely considered the option of establishing deterrence of nuclear attack as the 

sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons, and concluded that the conditions for making such a statement, making such a declaratory 

policy, don’t exist today. 
15 

Nuclear weapons continue to play an important role in deterring 

non-nuclear attack, including conventional or chemical-biological 

attack arising from a nuclear weapons state. 

So, Mr. Chairman, the NPR set forth an objective of trying to establish conditions over a period of time that would make it safe for 

the United States and, indeed, for others to establish a doctrine 

and policy in which the sole purpose of nuclear weapons would be 

to deter other nuclear weapons. We saw clearly that those conditions did not exist today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Tauscher, are there any constraints of 

any kind on missile defenses within the New START Treaty? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. No, sir. There are no constraints of any 

kind in the New START Treaty. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for your testimony. It seems that much of the Administration’s policy is rooted in the view that if America leads in 

reducing its nuclear arms, others will follow. What evidence, if any, 

do any of you have that the moral leadership argument actually 

impacts the behavior of countries we are trying to change, such as 

Iran and North Korea? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, the change and clarification of declaratory policy 

is intended to affect more than one audience. One is specifically 

those states that have not lived up to their obligations under the 

Non-Proliferation Treaty including, in particular, Iran and North 

Korea. 

A second audience is the set of states that have lived up to their 

obligations and expect that, in exchange for that, that they would 

not be held subject to nuclear threats. In making the changes that 

were made in our declaratory policy, the U.S. has really resolved 

a longstanding contradiction in our policy and updated it to correspond with the 21st century environment. 

The contradiction was between a Negative Security Assurance 

that the United States first issued in 1978, reissued again in 2002 

and several times in between, that stated that the United States 

would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, 

aside from states that were allied with a nuclear weapons state. 

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, that second part of that 

previous Negative Security Assurance was no longer relevant, so 

that was removed from the Negative Security Assurance. And with 

the increased concerns about nuclear nonproliferation and states 

that are—such as Iran and North Korea—that are not meeting 

their obligations, in its place was a statement that the U.S. would 

not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against those in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations. 

So we intend to affect the calculations of those states, Iran and 

North Korea. We also intend to affect the calculations of those 

states that are currently compliant but that might in future consider proliferation. And to have them understand that there are 

benefits to remaining non-nuclear and that there are costs to going 

nuclear. 

Mr. MCKEON. Any evidence that moral leadership argument actually impacts their decisions? 
16 

Dr. MILLER. A number of states party to the Non-Proliferation 

Treaty have made clear in previous review conferences that the 

United States posture, sometimes called deliberate ambiguity, but 

as I—or calculated ambiguity, but also including a contradiction in 

a sense, makes it more difficult for them to agree to the types of 

steps that the United States has proposed to strengthen the Treaty—steps that would include having the Additional Protocol applied 

to all states that have nuclear energy capability. And so I think 

that there is reasonable evidence that for those states that we need 

support from for strengthening the treaty, for those states that we 

need support from for ensuring compliance, that U.S. leadership is 

important. They have said so many times in the past. 

Mr. MCKEON. Okay. I hope that is the case. The NPR appears 

to deliver a muddled message and sends mixed signals to both the 

allies and adversaries. Why did the Administration deem it necessary to change our nation’s longstanding policy of calculated ambiguity? What is the national security benefit of, and what do we 

gain by making this policy change? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. I think part of the reason that, and what 

we want to make clear, Mr. McKeon, is that when we looked at 

both the changing security environment and history, a number of 

elements have significantly changed. The negative assurance policy 

was developed partly because of the Warsaw Pact, which doesn’t 

exist any longer. 

And it is there to make clear to non-nuclear weapons states that 

are in compliance with the NPT that the United States specifically, 

and as we work with Russia and the New START Treaty, as the 

largest holders of nuclear weapons we have, obviously, we project 

the biggest threat to other folks, and that we wanted to make clear 

that we were not going to use our nuclear weapons in a certain 

number of cases and that we value people’s adherence to the NonProliferation Treaty significantly. 

We want to get benefits from our adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and we want other countries to maintain their agreement to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We, frankly, want universal 

application of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

So the decision was made to clarify the Negative Security Assurance to make clear that non-nuclear weapon states, in compliance 

with their NPT obligations, we were not going to use nuclear weapons against them. 

But we do have caveats, and one of them is about BW and CW, 

biological and chemical weapons. But what it also does, and that 

is why Negative Security Assurance is an interesting way of calling 

what this is, it negates and exempts many, many countries around 

the world. 

At the same time, it makes very clear that all the nuclear weapons states and countries not in compliance with the NPT, specifically countries like North Korea and Iran, are not exempt. So it is 

a way to satisfy countries that their adherence to the NPT, which 

we believe is the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime and 

needs to be strengthened—and those commitments need to be 

strengthened—but that is what we are harkening to. 

And secondly, countries not in compliance will pay a price, and 

they pay the price of not being on the list of those countries that 
17 

are exempt, and it causes us to have a different point of view about 

them. And those countries are, specifically, North Korea and Iran. 

Mr. MCKEON. Am I correct to understand the Administration will 

pursue a universal sole purpose policy where nuclear weapons are 

only used to deter nuclear weapons? Does this mean that the U.S. 

would take the threat of nuclear use to deter its devastating biological or chemical attack entirely off the table? Why is it in our 

national security interest to send such a signal? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, the NPR set an objective of setting conditions 

so that the United States and, indeed, others, could over time move 

to a posture where the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter 

nuclear use by others. It is stated clearly, and was a result of detailed analysis and extensive discussion, clearly, that these conditions do not exist today. 

And as you have suggested, one of the big reasons that they don’t 

exist today is that we have nuclear weapons states that have significant conventional and the potential, at least, for chemical and 

biological capabilities. And both we and our allies believe that sustaining the nuclear deterrent to cope with these challenges is necessary at this time. 

Mr. MCKEON. I guess we are just going to have a difference on 

that. It seems to me that deterrence should be the maximum that 

you can provide; that no matter what they attack us with, we will 

hit with our maximum use. A devastating chemical or biological attack that we say ‘‘we will just respond with non-nuclear weapons,’’ 

it just seems that we are taking a lot off the table but I, you know, 

I understand that we have a difference here. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Mr. McKeon, we have the largest nuclear 

force matching the Russians. And we have the most superior military in the world and the best conventional weapons in the world. 

Mr. MCKEON. And we also have nuclear, and why we would take 

that off the table if they only hit us with chemical or biological, it 

just seems that, like I say, I think that is something we are just 

going to have a difference of opinion on. 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, if I could add briefly, deterrence is a combination of capability and credibility. And with respect to non-nuclear 

weapons states, this NPR states explicitly that any use of chemical 

or biological weapons would result in a devastating conventional 

response and that the leaders, including political leaders and military commanders, would be held fully accountable. 

That is a shift from calculated ambiguity. It is a very direct 

statement and, as Under Secretary Tauscher indicated, given the 

conventional military power of the United States, it is not only 

credible but it has a tremendous amount of capability behind it. 

Mr. MCKEON. But less capability than we have if we do not use 

nuclear. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Spratt. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you all for your testimony, but more than 

that, for what you have accomplished. I think it is monumental. It 

is a step towards something we have been seeking for a long, long 

time. 

CTBT has been pending for years. It was submitted for ratification, and the Senate didn’t pass the test. My notes here indicate 
18 

that this Comprehensive Test Ban will be resubmitted for ratification with additions. What are the additions to the CTBT? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Right now the President is preparing the 

START package to go to the Senate, and the first priority of the 

Administration is to get the START Treaty ratified. The advice and 

consent of the Senate is enormously important. It is a supermajority needed to get START ratified. 

As Vice President Biden, who is the head of the effort to get the 

CTBT ratified has said, START goes first, and then we will look 

at CTBT. Obviously, we are very much helped by the Nuclear Posture Review and the fact that the Administration has spent so 

much time making this debate a very public debate, one that is informing the American people and our allies. 

So what is important is that we get the START Treaty put forward first. On whether we have additions to CTBT or not, we will 

have to see as we look at the submission. But as Vice President 

Biden has said, CTBT will not be submitted to the Senate until it 

can pass, and that is an environment that we are working on every 

day. 

Mr. SPRATT. It is also mentioned in the materials and in your 

testimony of a nuclear materials cutoff. Is that treaty drawn? Do 

we have the text of that treaty? That is an interesting concept. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva 

last May agreed in a very historic way for a program of work to 

look at, begin negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. 

There is one country, however, that is blocking the going forward 

of the program of work in the Conference of Disarmament. 

We are all working hard to convince that country that this is just 

the beginning of negotiations and that they should go with what 

the majority has said under consensus to go forward and begin negotiations, and not stand in the way of that. But so far our efforts 

have been unsuccessful. 

But once the FMCT, Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty begins negotiations, which we believe will be a long, multi-year process, eventually that will have to be ratified by the Senate. 

Mr. SPRATT. So these things are not necessarily interdependent. 

They can stand on their own? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Yes. 

Mr. SPRATT. I have been very much concerned about tactical nuclear weapons and whether or not as we dealt with these large systems, we have shown enough attention to the smaller systems 

which, really, could be dangerous if the wrong people or terrorists 

got their hands upon them. What do these agreements do for effective tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons? Jim. 

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Spratt, what we have said is that, after ratification and entry into force of the New START Treaty, the Administration would like to engage with Russian follow-on, bilateral discussions that are aimed at addressing not just strategic weapons 

but strategic and non-strategic weapons, these tactical nuclear 

weapons and also deployed and non-deployed weapons. 

We would like to get that on the other side of ratification and 

entry into force of New START and the President has asked us to 

begin to develop potential negotiating positions and objectives for 

that, including considerations of what are the likely future require-
19 

ments for deterrence, what are likely postures of Russia and also 

we will begin a consultation with allies to address that problem. 

We also have suggested that we intend to continue strategic stability discussions and expand them with Russia. And one of the 

issues we would like to discuss in those is the question of whether 

Russia might move back further into the interior of the country its 

tactical nuclear weapons and ensure they are as secure as possible. 

Mr. SPRATT. One final question. There is a substantial increase in nonproliferation in this year’s budget request. I think it is $550 

million. Could you tell us quickly or briefly what these additional 

funds will go for? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Spratt, these funds were largely focused on security work, material security work overseas. There is 

a significant amount of work that we are involved in converting research reactors from Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)to Low-Enriched Uranium. So a significant portion of those funds will go towards agreements and discussions that we are already looking at 

to make that happen. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlemen. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you all for your service. I note that the 

Posture Review, specifically, states that we are going to retain the 

triad. Relative to that, Dr. Miller, I note that the Chinese have developed the capability of taking out a satellite, and we can take out 

a ballistic missile. 

This new deep strike bomber will fly considerably lower than a 

satellite and considerably slower than a ballistic missile. I know 

that they will be stealthy, but their radar cross section area is not 

zero, and radars are being improved. 

Are you sure that, in the development of this new bomber, that 

the juice will be worth the squeezing, or is the jury still out on specifically what we will do? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, as a follow-on to both the Nuclear Posture Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department is currently looking at the mix of long range strike capabilities that the 

military will need for the coming decade or two. 

Included in that mix is a consideration of a future penetrating 

bomber. Also included is an alternative standoff bomber, the mix 

of cruise missiles, both air-launched and sea-launched, for conventional capabilities and, finally, the supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and electronic warfare capabilities that 

are required as well. 

We are also looking in that study at the appropriate scale of any 

conventional Prompt Global Strike capability, which could be either 

in the form of an ICBM or SLBM with a conventional warhead, 

which does raise some stability considerations, and/or Hypersonic 

Glide Vehicle, which is an alternative approach, so it would have 

a very different profile from the standard ballistic missile. 

The Department is looking at those issues now and will submit 

its recommendations as part of the fiscal year 2012 budget request. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

General Chilton, the location of our missile silos, I gather, is 

pretty generally known? 
20 

General CHILTON. I would suspect so. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay. It is also true, I believe, that they were developed in an era where there was not much precision on the part 

of nuclear weapons and that it was unlikely that there would be 

a direct hit. They, in fact, are not really hardened, are they, 

against a nuclear attack? 

General CHILTON. Well, they are hardened against a nuclear attack, but as you point out, Mr. Bartlett, as certain countries have 

increased their accuracy on some of their delivery platforms, they 

put them more at risk than they were in the past. 

Mr. BARTLETT. That, I think, is increasingly true, which means 

that you either use them or you lose them. Doesn’t this markedly 

increase the probability of an exchange? And shouldn’t we be moving to something that is not vulnerable, like mobile missiles? 

General CHILTON. Actually, the posture that we have our ballistic missiles in, our land-based ballistic missiles in today, is quite 

stabilizing because it makes the calculus of a potential adversary 

much more difficult and much less likely for them to be 

incentivized for a first strike. 

Mr. BARTLETT. But if we know, sir that—— 

General CHILTON. It would be because a large number of—— 

Mr. BARTLETT [continuing]. If we could take them out, doesn’t 

that mean that we have an incentive to use them quickly, or we 

are going to lose them? 

General CHILTON. We have—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. To me it does. 

General CHILTON [continuing]. Because of the large amount of 

weapons that they would have to commit against this, it 

disincentivized that attack. And also, because of the ability to 

launch out from under attack and the uncertainty that exists because of that, they are an essential part of the deterrent today. 

I would comment though, that your point on as we look forward 

to the replacement for the Minuteman III someday post-2030, that 

one of the things we ought to consider in that is whether or not 

the follow-on would be more survivable than the current force 

structure that we have today. 

That is certainly the direction that the Russians went in with 

their land-based mobile missiles. So I would agree that it is something we need to consider as we look at the follow-on to the Minuteman III. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Secretary Tauscher, I note that the new posture 

report talks about counting actual missiles rather than launchers, 

which is a big move forward because, in the past, we counted only 

launchers. As you know, the Soviets and the Russians now have a 

cold-launch capability where they can launch more than one weapon from a single launcher. 

We burn up our launchers. So if you count launchers, you are 

equal in launchers. They would be superior in delivery capability. 

I am pleased that this new regime now equalizes that. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SPRATT [presiding]. Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us. Ms. Tauscher, welcome back. General Chilton, I am looking out 10 years, 
21 

very much concerned about what the effect of the Ohio-class replacement is going to have on the overall defense budget. 

If the Navy is estimating a ship that is going to cost $7 billion, 

it is probably going to cost $10 billion, based on the way things 

have been going. I am told that one of the driving factors on the 

Ohio replacement is that, within the Navy, the decision was made 

to build a ship around the D–5 missile. That the range of the missile is a factor of its width and length and that, basically, the Navy 

said we are going to keep the missile, change the ship. 

To what extent has your command looked at options to that? I 

was fortunate enough to have a great tour at Kings Bay on Friday 

and, again, very professional. Everything was very impressive, but 

it reinforced my opinion that the Navy has made the decision already to build a ship to fit the missile, and that missile is the D– 

5. 

Have there been any analyses of alternatives to that decision or 

are any planned because, again, you know, 2020 is not that far 

away when it comes to ships that we have got to start building in 

2018. We have got to start budgeting even before that. 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Mr. Taylor, and thanks for visiting 

our folks down there at—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Very impressive. 

General CHILTON [continuing]. Kings Bay. That is really important for them to be recognized for the great duty they do for our 

country, and I am sure they appreciated your visit. We have been, 

STRATCOM has been working closely from a requirements perspective, certainly, with the Navy and with the Strategic Systems 

Programs, the office responsible for developing the designs, maturing those designs for the follow-on to the current Ohio-class Trident 

submarine fleet. 

And although the follow-on will be able to carry the D–5, part 

of the requirements are that it also be able to—anticipating a life 

of 40 years—to be able to do something other than just carry the 

D–5. And so as part of—and that, in fact, was part of the initial 

thought when the Ohio-class was built. The D–5 didn’t exist. 

Yet, the Ohio-class was built to accommodate a larger missile 

than the Poseidon at the time, fortunately, because that allowed us 

then to not have to build a new submarine as we advanced missile 

technology to the D–5 level. 

The same will be true for the follow-on to Ohio-class. There will 

be room for growth and increased performance, either of a missile 

beyond the D–5 or for alternative mission sets that might be put 

into that platform should they be required. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I guess, to restate my question, is the decision 

to stick with the D–5, is that written in stone—or the closest thing 

to it within the Pentagon? 

General CHILTON. Well, I would say, in the current plans that we 

are seeing that the Navy has, is to sustain the D–5 through the 

life of the current Ohio-class and to make it the initial missile that 

would be deployed on the follow-on. 

But there is a view that we need to design into that follow-on a 

capability for some unknown future growth or capability in the future as we did with the Ohio-class in its original design. So right 
22 

now my understanding of the plans is that the D–5 would be the 

weapon that would be fielded first on the replacement. 

Mr. TAYLOR. But going back to my question about, can you provide for me any sort of analysis of alternatives as to whether or not 

it made more economic and national security sense to build a ship 

that fits the missile, as opposed to building a missile that might 

fit a Virginia-class, which has been a very successful program, or 

some variant of a Virginia-class? 

General CHILTON. With regard to studies, we certainly can show 

you everything that we have done at STRATCOM and what the 

Strategic System Program Office (SSP) has done as well, which is 

the Office in the Navy that has worked on the design trades—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. 

General CHILTON [continuing]. That are still going on. We would 

certainly be willing to share that with you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I would welcome that, hopefully, sooner than later, 

sir. 

General CHILTON. I will take that back to the Navy and talk to 

them about it, Mr. Taylor, and we will get that to you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Appreciate you all being with us today. Virtually everybody agrees that an essential condition of START, of 

this Nuclear Posture Review, of reassuring our allies, is making 

sure that we have a strong, credible deterrent and a modern, agile 

infrastructure—and with infrastructure, I mean people, too. 

I mean, if you don’t have those things, the rest of this seems to 

all fall apart, so I want to pose two questions, probably for Secretary D’Agostino, but others may want to comment. The first 

question is this. Every declared nuclear power in the world is making new weapons all the time except us, and probably the 

undeclared ones are doing the same—are doing it as well. 

France, for example, in 1995, 1996 decided that they saw this 

non-testing regime coming. They conducted a series of tests, specifically for designs that would be more robust and that would last out 

in the future. We did no such thing. 

Now, I know we have got lots of smart people and we have got 

lots of fancy tools, but I have some doubt that we are that much 

smarter than every other nuclear power in the world. This Nuclear 

Posture Review says no more nuclear weapons—no new nuclear 

weapons, a strong preference for refurbishment, and only as a last 

resort would we replace any of the nuclear components. 

So my question is, isn’t this putting a political agenda ahead of 

the science with a certain degree of arrogance, maybe, that we can 

do something indefinitely that nobody else can do? My second question is this. 

Paragraph after paragraph in this Nuclear Posture Review talks 

about all the Administration is going to do for the nuclear weapons 

complex. And there is no doubt funding is significantly up, particularly as opposed to the last Administration. Mr. Spratt mentioned 

a big chunk of it goes to nonproliferation. But even in the complex, 

funding is up. 
23 

And yet for this year’s budget, Y–12, as I understand it, is about 

$100 million underfunded. Pantex is $125 million underfunded, 

and they are talking about layoffs this year. As I understand it, 

cuts in the test site budget, so my question is why should we believe that this increased commitment to the nuclear weapons complex is going to last any longer than the START ratification? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Thornberry, I will start with your 

first question and go to the second question. The Nuclear Posture 

Review provides, absolutely provides the flexibility we need to 

maintain our deterrent. That is the commitment to have a safe, secure, and effective deterrent. 

The Nuclear Posture Review also provides for allowing all options, and I want to reinforce that, all options to be studied, including replacement options. Because the key is to go back to just to 

focus on what Congress authorized last year is the Stockpile Management Program, which says make sure that we can maintain our 

deterrent and drive as much safety and as much security and as 

much reliability into the warheads themselves. 

That is very challenging technical work, frankly. It is also the 

kind of work that our scientists and engineers relish. They want 

that flexibility and the lab directors feel, and their statement that 

I mentioned earlier, describes that capability. 

It is a challenge. And it is hard work to do this, and our scientists, and I have talked to many of them, feel that this NPR 

gives them the flexibility to maintain that stockpile out into the future. This is decades’ worth of work that we have identified in the 

NPR. 

And what our scientists actually want is the understanding that 

the Nation cares about the work, knows that it is important, and 

that it is sustainable over multiple Congresses and multiple administrations. And, in fact, that is the balance that we feel that we appropriately struck here. So our focus is moving forward consistent 

with the principles of the Stockpile Management Program. 

On your question on funding, what we typically do, what we always do in a budget year when we submit a President’s budget, 

where we know for sure where our allocations need to go on a siteby-site basis, we allocate those in the budget. 

The last remaining category is what we call the headquarters account. It is resources that will always be spent out in the field, but 

because we are waiting for final adjustments, we haven’t allocated 

them yet to a specific site. 

General Harencak is aware of adjustments that he needs to 

make, moving of resources into these accounts to make sure that 

the sites are appropriately maintained, and he is working with the 

sites on that. 

And, in fact, that is a key element of our consideration of our fiscal year 2012 and out-year budgets, because as you know, sir, we 

submit our program and budgets in 5-year increments. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, let me just say, I think if you are going 

to really convey a commitment to the scientists and others that 

playing these games about holding some money back so that it can 

be allocated at the last minute to prevent layoffs, doesn’t provide 

that message. But let me get back to the lab directors. 
24 

I heard what you said. They support the full range of options. 

And I appreciate a Nuclear Posture Review is a political balancing 

act, but you can’t read these words about no new nuclear warheads, no new nuclear components, strong preference for refurbishment, and believe that the full range of options is really there. It 

looks to me more like words than real action, but I appreciate the 

response. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Thornberry, if I could just reply. I 

want to assure you that we don’t play games with the budget. We 

take it very seriously. And the headquarters account line is merely 

to make sure that, when we allocate those resources, we know they 

are going to the right spot as a result of changes. And our focus, 

of course, is our people. 

The one thing I would like to remind is that our key focus is to 

focus on the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, on the 

Stockpile Management Plan, which clearly outlines the principles 

of maintaining safety, security, and reliability. No new warheads, 

for new mission capability, no underground testing, and the ability 

to put in place a confidence in the stockpile that the country can 

actually start reducing the total numbers of the stockpile. So that 

is our focus and that is our plan. 

Mr. SPRATT. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 

being before us again today and it is nice to see my friend, Ms. 

Tauscher, back and on the successful negotiation on that START 

Treaty, so congratulations to you and to all on our panel. 

General Chilton, are you confident that the limitations on the 

Russians in the New START Treaty actually can be verified, and 

that the verification procedures imposed on the U.S. will not interfere or jeopardize our operation of our nuclear forces? And are 

there any inspection or verification challenges that aren’t addressed in this treaty that would concern you? 

General CHILTON. Verification is an important part of this treaty, 

Ms. Sanchez, as you know, and it is one of the key elements that 

I supported for having a treaty, is that we would sustain some 

verification capabilities. The part of the Government that really 

paid most attention to whether or not the verifications were adequate or not in support of the negotiations was the Intelligence 

Community. 

So the Director of National Intelligence was consistently brought 

in, his team, to be asked those questions, and I defer to their expertise along that way on whether or not the verification measures 

were adequate. 

And my assessment in listening to the discussions along the way 

and what has been included in the current verification protocols in 

the proposed treaty, I think, will be adequate for us over the life 

of the treaty to ensure compliance. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The Nuclear Posture Review concluded that the 

threat of global nuclear war has become more remote, but the risk 

of nuclear attack has actually increased, especially in today’s immediate and extreme danger, which is nuclear terrorism, especially 

when we look at Al Qaeda and others trying to gain access to nuclear weapons. 
25 

So I would like to ask Secretary Tauscher, how will the NPR 

strengthen the President’s ability to combat the threat of nuclear 

terrorism, and the effects of rogue states in particular, such as Iran 

or North Korea, from obtaining and proliferating this nuclear technology? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you, Congresswoman Sanchez. The 

President relies on a number of tools in the toolbox to persuade 

countries from not acquiring nuclear weapons and for countries to 

adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s guidelines in the most 

strictest way. The first is the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review, 

which begins in the first week of May. 

And as we state in the Nuclear Posture Review, and as we stated 

and both presidents stated when they signed the New START 

Treaty, that these commitments that we make, both in the New 

START Treaty bilaterally, with the reductions in the very strong 

verification regime that we have, and with the Nuclear Posture Review with the stronger Negative Security Assurance and the declaratory policy, and the new role and the diminished roles that the 

President has called for, what the President is saying is that the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the most important opportunity we have to galvanize the world community. 

And for those countries that find themselves in noncompliance of 

the Non-Proliferation Treaty, then they come under the Negative 

Security Assurance in the most non-positive way. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mrs. Tauscher, the concern I bring up is because 

we read today in the Washington Post, for example, that Syria has 

transferred long-range Scud over to Hezbollah, which is on our terrorist list. 

So you know, when we look at that, our inability to really stop 

some of this from going on, and the fact that Iran has already declared, for example, that it wants to obliterate Israel from the face 

of the earth. And, you know, North Korea’s posturing, continued 

posturing with the western world, in particular with the United 

States, what real tools do we have to—— 

Secretary TAUSCHER. We have the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And 

what is important is, for countries like Syria, where we have asked 

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to fully investigate 

some of the allegations and rumors that are aswirl about Syria, 

that is another important element where you need to have a strong 

verification regime and then strong inspection regime. 

And that is why we have advocated for better funding and better 

management of the IAEA. We have a new Director General there, 

Dr. Amano. So there are a number of different things, Congresswoman, that the President relies on. 

But once again, what we have to do is stand up very clearly for 

what we want to use nuclear weapons for, and make it very clear 

that we have the strongest deterrence we have ever had. That we 

are investing in the modernization of our stockpile in a way that 

doesn’t lead people to believe that we are outside of our commitments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty calls on all nuclear 

weapons states to disarm. And so we are keeping it very much in 

mind with our commitments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 

same time that we say that we are going to maintain our nuclear 
26 

weapons for as long as there are nuclear weapons, until we can actually disarm ourselves. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Madam Secretary. And I will just say 

to the gentlemen you didn’t have time. I was going to ask you all 

the same question about this issue of how, you know, what do we 

really use? What are the tools we really have? And of course, you 

will have different ones than maybe what Mrs. Tauscher mentioned. 

I will submit that question for the record because I would love 

to get an answer back from you all. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all of 

you for being here. I have a great deal of respect for each of you 

and, Ms. Tauscher, it is great to see you back again. I am glad that 

you are visiting our committee. 

Dr. Miller, the President, last May in Newsweek said, ‘‘I don’t 

take options off the table when it comes to U.S. security, period.’’ 

Well, the NPR, the Administration’s NPR, clearly takes options off 

the table. 

It provides assurances that the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons defensively, even if we are attacked by an NPT-compliant state 

and even if that attack is by bio or chemical weapons. So an option 

is clearly being taken off the table. 

When you were asked by Mr. McKeon the issue of why the Administration didn’t adopt the sole purpose doctrine, which was signaled in the NPT, that maybe the Administration in the future 

would like to go there—sole purpose being that a nuclear weapon’s 

sole purpose being to deter nuclear—you answered that we did not 

go all the way to sole purpose because nuclear weapons play an 

‘‘important role in deterring non-nuclear attacks.’’ 

How do you reconcile that, as your current statement, the ‘‘important role in deterring non-nuclear attacks’’ with this policy? Because I agree with you, I think that they play an important role 

in deterring non-nuclear attacks and, by taking them off the table, 

you are eliminating that as a deterrent. How do you reconcile 

those? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, there are two very different cases. The first is 

the case of a state possessing nuclear weapons or a state not in 

compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. And in 

that case, the United States reserves the right to use or threaten 

to use nuclear weapons in response to a biological attack or, indeed, as you suggest, to a conventional or a chemical attack. 

This includes nuclear weapons states. It also includes Iran and 

North Korea. And, Mr. Turner, if you look at an assessment of the 

states with significant WMD capabilities, you will see a significant 

overlap between those different varieties of nuclear, chemical, and 

biological. 

And the assessment of the NPR and of our leadership was that, 

where things stand today, the U.S. conventional capabilities, including with a very clear statement that any use of weapons of 

mass destruction would result in individuals, including leaders and 

commanders, being held individually accountable. 
27 

And including the statement that any use of WMD by a non-nuclear weapons state would result in a devastating conventional 

military response, the conclusion was that these clarified and 

strengthened statements about the nature of the U.S. response involving conventional capabilities were more than adequate to deter 

chemical and biological weapons used by that second category of 

states. And that is the states that are non-nuclear weapons states 

and are in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. 

So it involved an assessment of where things stand today with 

respect to the threat. And projecting forward, they considered the 

possibility of future trends in chemical weapons, future trends in 

biological weapons as well. 

And the conclusion was that we should have a greater concern 

about the future potential of biological weapons because of trends 

in biotechnology. And that is the reason for the caveat that—— 

Mr. TURNER. Well, I want to reclaim my time here. 

Dr. MILLER [continuing]. In the future we reserve a right to—— 

Mr. TURNER. I appreciate your answer. I think there are a great 

deal of people, a number of people who disagree with you, that 

there is still a role for the deterrence that nuclear weapons provide. 

Secretary Tauscher, question for you. I had the opportunity to 

travel with you to NATO, to Poland, to Czech Republic, and I know 

of your commitment to missile defense that you have stated clearly 

in hearings and in this committee and with our NATO allies. 

As we look to the START agreement, there is language in the 

preamble that indicates that there is a relationship between missile defense and the subject matter of the START agreement. The 

Russian leaders have signaled that their view of that relationship 

may be more direct than our view, maybe even more significant. 

They have gone as far as to indicate that they might withdraw 

from the treaty, depending upon what the United States does in 

deployment of missile defense. Now, Congress has yet to receive 

the complete information about the Administration’s plans for the 

Phased, Adaptive Approach for missile defense that includes both 

Europe and defense of the homeland. 

So it is my expectation, and probably others, that the Administration has not shared that with Russia yet. So the question that 

we have is, you know, what is being done currently to determine 

whether or not, as we are proceeding to START ratification, if the 

Administration is pursuing currently with the Phased, Adaptive 

Approach, a policy that the Russians might view as terminal to 

START? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Let me just bring three things forward, Mr. 

Turner. First and foremost, in the preamble of the START Treaty, 

there is an interrelationship acknowledged between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons. 

In Article 5, Paragraph 3, there is further conversation about 

that and its relationship, very similar to what was in the original 

START agreement; unilateral statements. When I went to treaty 

school, before I went to Geneva just recently, what is interesting 

about a treaty is, what is it? It is agreed statements. It is what the 

two parties agree. 
28 

What are unilateral statements? Things that people don’t agree 

on. In the original START agreement in 1991, both the United 

States and Russia included unilateral statements. The interesting 

thing is that it was—the Russian statement was very similar to 

what they are saying now, that if things that we do, either conventionally or on our strategic side, interfere with their strategic balance, they may withdraw from the treaty. 

What was interesting about what happened then is that we also 

said something similar about, we are going to do whatever we are 

going to do to protect ourselves, which is something like what we 

said this time. 

Interestingly, we abrogated the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and 

built missile defenses, and the Russians never left the START 

Treaty. So I think that, while much is being made of these unilateral statements, I think history shows us that everyone is going to 

have statements, which are sometimes political and, sometimes, 

are meant to indicate a red line. 

On missile defense, there are no constraints to our missile defense systems. The Phased, Adaptive Approach is what has been up 

on the Internet since September and is what we have discussed 

with the Congress. And I am happy to come back at any time and 

refresh if I need to. 

But it is a system that starts in 2011, as you know, in the Mediterranean with Aegis ships, and then 2015 in Romania, who has 

agreed to take Standard Missile 3 (SM–3), and then in 2018 in Poland with SM–3 land-based. 

The Russians have read the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. 

They have been briefed like everyone else. There are always elements in each country that are more conservative than others, that 

have specific issues and are concerned about certain things. 

We have done everything we can to convince the Russians that 

our missile defense system is limited and regional in scope. And 

what its architecture looks like and how it is not adaptable or it 

threatens them. 

But I think the most important piece of this is that as of many 

of the good things that have happened in the START negotiations 

and the resetting that President Obama and Secretary Clinton embarked on last year with the Russians. We are also discussing with 

Russians a missile defense cooperation. 

So there are many opportunities for us to move forward, but we 

have made clear what exactly the Phased, Adaptive Approach is. 

And it is not targeted against Russia, and it does not threaten Russia’s strategic balance right now. 

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 

your service. I understand the NPR and START both take off the 

table basically any additional research by the United States in the 

development of either tactical or strategic nuclear weapons. Is that 

correct understanding? 

Dr. MILLER. Let me just answer very briefly and then turn it to 

Tom D’Agostino. What the policy statement in the NPR says is that 

the United States will not develop new nuclear warheads. That 

means that any warheads going forward will be based on previously tested designs. 
29 

It says that within the range of Life Extension Programs that are 

considered, which include refurbishment, reuse, and potential replacement, that all options will be studied. And the summary that 

we have received from the labs is that that is more than adequate 

to ensure that we have a very strong science, technology, and engineering base that is able to support our stockpile over time. 

Mr. MARSHALL. And is that reflected in the START Treaty, that 

we will not be doing research on additional nuclear weapons? 

Dr. MILLER. It is not addressed in the START—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. It is not. 

Dr. MILLER [continuing]. Treaty. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Okay. So it is just the NPR. The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) is something we have been discussing 

for some time, and NNSA and Secretary Gates and others were interested in moving forward with research and development. 

Do I understand you to be saying, Mr. Miller, that that is a possibility in the future depending upon—what? At the moment, we 

are not going to continue research in a replacement warhead, but 

we might in the future? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program is 

terminated by Congress and is, in our view, it is not coming back. 

We don’t propose to bring it back. 

What we do propose, as we think about the statement of the 

stockpile over time, is to consider the full range of Life Extension 

Programs in which replacement of nuclear components is one of the 

options. Propose that all of the options be studied, and that preference be given to refurbishment or reuse. 

Mr. MARSHALL. So whatever you call it—— 

Dr. MILLER. Yes. 

Mr. MARSHALL [continuing]. The NPR leaves open the possibility 

that we conclude that it is advisable for us to replace existing nuclear weapons? 

Dr. MILLER. That is—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. That we will continue to consider that and we 

will maintain the engineering and intellectual capital that we need 

in order to actually execute that if we conclude that is necessary. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. If I could add to that, absolutely. The 

NPR allows us to study the full range of options, which is vitally 

important to extend the life of the stockpile. That there are differences, actually, key differences between what was proposed in 

the previous administration in RRW program and what we have 

right now in stockpile management. 

Dr. Miller said the RRW program has been canceled. In fact it 

was canceled by Congress. In its place, we put in place the Stockpile Management Program. In the context of the NPR of the time, 

which was done in the year 2001, the RRW program sought a total 

transformation of the stockpile where the Nuclear Posture Review 

under Stockpile Management proposed to—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. Yes, I think I have got this. This START Treaty, 

if we decide to move forward with the replacement weapon, it 

wouldn’t prohibit us from doing that? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. The START Treaty is agnostic. 

Mr. MARSHALL. On that subject. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Yes. 
30 

Mr. MARSHALL. Bunker busters, you know, those sorts of things 

that we talked about in the early, you know, parts of this decade, 

they are out? 

General CHILTON. Congressman, I have no new requirements for 

new capabilities in our weapons. And, in fact, what we want are 

increased safety, security, and reliability in these—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. Yes, I have got that, but I am just wondering, 

in the START Treaty or NPR, are those things that we don’t have 

existing requirements, are we prohibited from at some point in the 

future—hopefully this doesn’t happen—but are we prohibited at 

some point in the future either by treaty or by this NPR from investing in a specific nuclear weapon designed to accomplish a specific objective if we conclude that we have that need? 

General CHILTON. START does not limit anything that we need 

to do. 

Mr. MARSHALL. NPR? 

Dr. MILLER. As a matter of policy, the NPR says that the United 

States will not develop weapons for new military capabilities or 

new military missions. 

Mr. MARSHALL. If we wind up having a new military mission or 

need we assess that we have a new need for a capability, NPR 

could change? 

Dr. MILLER. The infrastructure and the intellectual capital necessary to do that would be in place, so it would be a policy choice. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you gentlemen for 

being here and Secretary Tauscher, delight to see you again, thank 

you for being here today. 

I would identify with the remarks of Mr. McKeon and Mr. Turner about concerns of taking options off the table in deterrence. 

And I am tempted to beat on that horse some more, but I am not 

going to do that. 

I would like to take advantage of the assembled presence here. 

And I think probably principally Secretary D’Agostino from the Department of Energy, to address another but somewhat related 

issue. 

And that is my concern that the Secretary of Energy and the Administration have recently taken steps to terminate the Yucca 

Mountain repository program and withdraw the license application 

and put in zero funds for that program. And I was wondering if 

any of you could address what the defense community’s plans are 

for the short- and long-term disposal and storage of spent fuel— 

particularly defense, but any spent fuel? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Sure, Mr. Kline. The Secretary has put 

together a Blue Ribbon Commission of experts, bipartisan and 

across a wide variety of expertise—policy, programmatic, technical. 

Mr. KLINE. And they are going to report in a couple of years as 

I understand, is that right? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Well, they are going to report in 18 

months is when the final report comes out. We will have some indication in less time than that. An element of that look by the commission is not just this question about civil nuclear, but the defense 

material is clearly identified in that. 
31 

We are keenly looking at that. We are aware of our obligations 

to the states that we have right now. Admiral Donald, as part of 

his requirements for the state of Idaho, for example, we understand 

our obligations on moving the material and taking care of that material. 

So we are looking at the Blue Ribbon Commission to address 

that, and I will be watching that. I am keenly interested in that 

particular piece, and I am confident it will be addressed very clearly as part of that. 

Mr. KLINE. I certainly hope so. I mean, this is very frustrating 

for many of us and those who have been on the civil side, nuclear 

waste piling up. In my case, I have got a nuclear power plant on 

an island in the Mississippi River co-located with an entire community. And we are just piling up the caskets. 

And it is very, very frustrating to see this program—after all this 

time, all this money—terminated and now we have got another 

blue ribbon committee, commission of some kind going to study 

some more. 

So just want to express my frustration and see if anybody had 

anything, you know, any more current notion than that. So I just 

express my frustration and hope this commission comes forward 

and we get a solution to this. And we stop piling this stuff up in 

places like Prairie Island. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SPRATT. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize because 

I may be asking something similar, but I wanted to just go back 

to the issue of the budget, because you spoke of the modernization 

and the need to upgrade. 

And yet I have constituents that, in their words, and I am 

quoting, ‘‘I am outraged by the 10 percent increase in nuclear 

weapons funding at a time when so many other domestic programs 

are subject to a spending freeze.’’ 

And this particular individual, and we have a number of letters 

like this, are a little confused right now because of what we are 

doing and the changes that are being made. 

Could you, in perhaps greater detail, and I apologize if you have 

already addressed this, what exactly does that modernization entail 

that we are spending the additional money for the Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research Replacement facility in New Mexico, the Uranium Processing Facility? What does that do for our country? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I would be happy to take that question, 

ma’am, if I could. And others might follow behind. The key thing 

that I look at is that there is an infrastructure that we are maintaining, which includes the people, the expertise. It is not just taking care of the deterrent. That is a key and very important job, but 

that is the same expertise that we need in order to do our nonproliferation work around the world. 

In any given point in time, we are operating in 100 countries, but 

these are people that are from the Department of Energy and 

NNSA. These are experts in how to handle nuclear material, radiological material. They are providing security overseas. They are collecting U.S. material that is overseas and bringing them back. 
32 

These two facilities that you just described are the only places 

in the country where we will be able to work with those materials, 

to characterize those materials and make sure they are locked up 

tight. Not work for nuclear bombs, but work to make the country 

safer, make the world safer. 

But at the same time, so this 10 percent increase that we talked 

about in the Weapons Activities account provides that core infrastructure that addresses nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear counterterrorism, nuclear forensics, nuclear emergency management, that 

whole suite of nuclear security missions. 

But of course, we are also spending some of that to take care of 

our stockpile, because the stockpile was designed for the large part 

in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s and it is getting older and 

older year by year. 

And we have a commitment—I have an obligation to General 

Chilton, to the President, to make sure that the stockpile that we 

have is as safe and secure as possible. And it requires some work 

to do that. 

General CHILTON. If I could add to that? Besides the important 

benefits to nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, to the science 

base that the Secretary pointed out, improvements to the infrastructure would support, in the 2020 time period, once they are 

complete, a strategy that could lead to the reduction of the total 

number of nuclear weapons that we maintain in our stockpile 

today. So it is another important point. 

But finally, I would emphasize that we are at a, I think, appropriately characterized earlier, a tipping point with regard to sustaining our nuclear stockpile deterrent for the future. 

And although it is safe, secure, and reliable today, what we have 

to be thinking about is what investments we need to make today 

to ensure that it will be safe, secure, and reliable in 2020, 2030, 

2040 and beyond, because it will be required in that time period. 

And these weapons do support the safety of Americans as well as 

the safety of others throughout the world. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I think that people are looking to understand if 

there aren’t some savings as well that we are going to be incurring 

so that, while these are very important facilities and the people 

that we need to keep focused on these issues, are there not some 

significant savings that we should be incurring as well? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I would be happy to jump in real quick 

and then Dr. Miller. In fact, this is part of our overall plan. It is 

a plan that is going to take a number of years to put in place. 

We want to shift from a Cold War nuclear weapons complex, 

which is where we have been for many years, into what we describe as a 21st Century Nuclear Security Enterprise. Much smaller, much more focused; get ourselves out of having plutonium facilities all over the country and focusing on having one good one. Making sure that the material that we have around the United States 

is in one place, in a place where we know it can work, and it can 

work for many decades out into the future as General Chilton described. 

Jim. Dr. Miller. 

Dr. MILLER. I would just add that, while we look to long-term 

savings because of these investments, as Mr. D’Agostino said, we 
33 

are in a situation today where we systematically underinvested 

over the last couple of decades in these facilities, some of which 

date back to the Manhattan Project. 

In order to sustain the stockpile and sustain the other nonproliferation and other activities that both Mr. D’Agostino and 

General Chilton have talked about, we really do need to increase 

the investment level for the next coming years. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 

being here. Before I ask my questions I would like to make a statement. I am very concerned about some of the issues involved in the 

Nuclear Posture Review. And I have got five major problems with 

it. 

One, it seems to be based on the belief that our example will influence the actions of bad actors in a positive way. And I believe 

this has been refuted by recent history. The opposite will occur because our actions will be viewed as weakness. 

Number two, writing off nuclear retaliation in cases of biological 

or chemical attack will invite bad actors to put resources into these 

areas and to contemplate exactly these kinds of attacks. 

Three, making decisions about what kind of retaliation to take 

based on compliance or not of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will put 

undue importance on legal hair-splitting. 

Four, swearing off all testing of existing nuclear weapons and development of new nuclear weapons, even if these capabilities only 

existed in undeveloped form within the context of ‘‘calculated ambiguity,’’ weakens the nuclear umbrella. This will invite development 

and proliferation of nuclear weapons by our allies. 

And fifth, reduction of delivery vehicles to the level specified 

under the NPR will allow no margin for error, such as a recall of 

equipment or platforms based on technological problems that may 

arise. We shouldn’t put ourselves in this precarious position voluntarily. 

So when I consider these kinds of concerns, it is hard for me not 

to conclude that President Obama’s views are dangerous and naive. 

And that is, frankly, where I come down on this, and I am very 

concerned. 

To ask some questions here, I would like to start with General 

Chilton. Number one, General Chilton, is there any way that missile defense interceptors could be limited by the proposed New 

START Treaty? 

General CHILTON. And Mr. Lamborn, good to see you again, and 

I am happy to take your question. And I am sure Secretary Tauscher will correct me 100 percent, but no. There are no restrictions 

in START with regard to our missile defense capability. 

Mr. LAMBORN. As a follow-up, are there any other missile defense 

systems, either currently deployed or planned, or related future 

technology that could be limited by the New START Treaty? 

General CHILTON. For missile defense, no, there are none, sir. 

And sir, if I could address one of your questions that is right in my 

wheelhouse is—your concerns, I should say, about reduction of vehicles. We looked very carefully and supported the negotiations for 

START as far as vehicle limitations. 
34 

And I can tell you we are very comfortable with the limits that 

have been set, and that we would be able to adequately carry out 

the current deterrence mission that we have been given, today and 

for the foreseeable future, with the limits of 800 total deployed and 

non-deployed and 700 deployed. So I am comfortable with that. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, along that line, I am glad to hear your reassurances on that, but along that line and for Secretary Tauscher 

also or anyone else, it is true that while the President has said we 

will deMIRV our ICBMs, are the Russians required to do so? 

General CHILTON. They are not required to do so. We elect to do 

that and I think it is the right thing to do. I think deMIRVing our 

ICBMs will allow us, you know, under the warhead limitations, to 

better utilize the warheads that we will have within the warhead 

limitations. 

At the same time, a single warhead, 450 or whatever the number 

turns out to be ICBMs, still complicates the adversary’s decision 

calculus in an adequate fashion, in my view. 

Mr. LAMBORN. But isn’t this another example of where we are 

taking options off the table for ourselves that, you know, needlessly 

in my view? 

General CHILTON. Not in deMIRVing, sir, because we still will retain the capability to reMIRV should that be required. And that is 

an important capability to retain to protect against both a technological failure, say, in a submarine weapon or a geopolitical change 

that would require us to add more weapons to our delivery vehicles. 

So it is absolutely important, and was retained, the ability to 

reMIRV should we decide we need to do that. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Well, thank you for that. For anyone, Secretary, or anyone else, the NPR suggests that increased missile defenses and conventional forces will strengthen U.S. deterrence as 

nuclear forces decrease. However, the Russians believe that as nuclear forces decrease, missile defense becomes more of a concern— 

if I could finish that question, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. SPRATT. Finish quickly, and then we will move along. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Does this seem to be contradictory and how 

do we resolve that? Thank you. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Well, I don’t think it is contradictory. The 

Russians have made clear that they are very concerned about their 

strategic balance and that their ability to rely on their nuclear 

weapons force. And they have a different orientation between their 

nuclear and conventional forces than we do. Some might say a dependence on them. 

So what we have made clear in the START agreement is that 

while there is an interrelationship between strategic offensive and 

defensive forces, there are no constraints against our missile defense forces, either already deployed or planned. 

And, you know, we made it also clear that our missile defense 

forces are not targeting the Russians. We have made that clear, 

and we will consistently make that clear. But, you know, I am 

happy to have a conversation with you, Mr. Lamborn, as a sidebar, 

as to why we are not relying on our own good example only to persuade people. 
35 

We are not trying to persuade those that, apparently, cannot be 

persuaded, like Iran and North Korea, not to have nuclear weapons. We are trying to persuade all those other countries that for 

decades have not had nuclear weapons, that you don’t have to have 

nuclear weapons to be safe. 

And that is why, you know, it is not legal hair-splitting to rely 

on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is very important for us to have 

a strong Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has kept us at a limited number of nuclear weapons states for decades. 

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the 

witnesses for the historic work that you are engaged in. And you 

know, listening to some of the questions about how this document 

somehow weakens our defense systems or takes options away or reduces vehicles, when I read it—and Mr. Taylor’s questions sort of 

alluded to it—I mean, the fact of the matter is that the commitments that are being suggested in this document are going to create huge budget challenges for future Congresses. And coming from 

Connecticut, I mean, obviously, where submarines are a big deal, 

the commitment to SSBNs in the future is a perfect example of 

that. And the language could not be more adamant about the fact 

that our country should—to maintain an at-sea presence for the 

long term, the United States must continue development of a follow-on to the Ohio-class submarine. I mean, that is pretty strong 

language. 

General, I don’t know if you want to just elaborate why the document is so forceful in making that recommendation? 

General CHILTON. Well, sir, I think we—throughout the process 

the requirements for sustaining an adequate deterrence for today 

and for the foreseeable future were looked at. And as a result of 

that was a revalidation of the need for the triad of forces that we 

have today. 

Certainly, the submarines are a key element of that and, certainly, our Ohio-class, we know, will time out at a time certain in 

the late 2020s. I would also add that there is a commitment to sustain the Minuteman III through 2030 and to look at follow-on options to it, as well as a commitment to the long-range bomber. 

And so I think they are very strong and they are there because 

they are needed, and I would defer to Dr. Miller from a policy perspective on any other rationale. 

Dr. MILLER. I just second what General Chilton said and note 

that our strategic submarines are the most highly survivable element of our nuclear force posture. And we intend to make the investments to ensure that that is true for the indefinite future. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And given the fact that, as Mr. Taylor indicated, 

though, I mean these are big price tags that are carried with the 

construction of these vessels which, at this point, the guesstimate 

at Seapower Committee was about $6 billion a copy. And the fact 

that it, again, it is a survivable deterrence unsurpassed, really, by 

any other part of the triad. 

I mean, questions have been raised about whether or not we 

need to, sort of, move that investment into its own sort of budget 

place, a` la the missile defense programs in the past. And because 

the pressure it is going to put on other shipbuilding programs, 
36 

which Chairman Taylor is going to have to juggle, is going to be 

pretty daunting in the future. 

And I am just sort of throwing that out. I am not really expecting 

a response. I don’t know if the Under Secretary, I know she has 

experience with that system, how it worked for missile defense, but 

there is an interest level certainly, in this committee, about not allowing, again, unnecessary investment in Ohio-class to really end 

up damaging the overall fleet size. 

The other question I just was hoping to spend a minute on was, 

the NPR states that ‘‘China’s nuclear arsenal remains much smaller than the arsenals of Russia and the United States, but lack of 

transparency raises questions about China’s future strategic intentions.’’ 

And Secretary Tauscher, I don’t know if you wanted to, sort of, 

comment in terms of, you know, the conversations have really not 

been engaged at the same intensity with China as it has been with 

Russia. And how do you sort of see that given the NPR’s, sort of, 

editorial comment there? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Well, we engage with our Chinese counterparts. I actually met with my Chinese counterpart this morning on 

many issues on a day-to-day basis. I was impressed that President 

Hu came to the Nuclear Security Summit yesterday, and he and 

President Obama had a private meeting. 

You know, I think what is important is that the nuclear weapons 

states, those declared five, the P5, that the United States and Russia still have 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons and the 

success of the New START Treaty is a very important one. But we 

certainly can’t stop here. 

But we do have to work with our allies, because each of them has 

a different force posture and a different strategic vision and a different set of roles and declaratory policy for their nuclear weapons. 

And these are issues that, in the interagency, we work very strongly, including with our military counterparts like General Chilton 

and Admiral Mullen. 

So I think that what we want to do, and I think the case in the 

NPR where we made those statements about China is one where 

we are making clear that we want more transparency and we want 

more verifiability. And we want to have more engagement as to 

those confidence building measures that will reassure not only the 

nuclear powers, but also the region and other people, exactly what 

China is doing. 

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. Specifically to Mr. Miller and General 

Chilton, everyone has been talking about the broader picture. I am 

going to go in the weeds of this manual with you for just a second, 

specifically about the ICBM force and the Minuteman III 

sustainment concept. 

Page 23 of the report it says, ‘‘The [Department of Defense] will 

continue the Minuteman III Life Extension Program with the aim 

of keeping the fleet in service to 2030, as mandated by Congress. 

Although a decision on [any] follow-on ICBM is not needed for several years, studies to inform the decision are needed now.’’ 

Now, the Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP) 

was concluded last year. And last year, also, the Air Force recog-
37 

nized that there needs to be a warm line sustainment for those 

solid rocket motors, for example, and other parts of that. 

That is why I have some concern, still, within the budget there 

is money set aside for three solid rocket motor booster sets per 

year, when the industrial base says six is the minimum they need 

to maintain a warm line. And for fiscal year 2013 and on, there is 

zero dollars for any kind of sustainment for that program if we are 

going to go until 2030. 

Assistant Secretary Flournoy assured us that this issue would be 

addressed in the Nuclear Posture Review. So I want to ask you, I 

think, four questions; three specific to this area. So let me give you 

all three of those first. 

I would like either of you to elaborate what you exactly mean by 

the phrase ‘‘Life Extension Program,’’ because that is a confusing 

terminology. Does that, indeed, mean that the Propulsion Replacement Program will exist where the warm line will be maintained 

that you will be concerned about the maintenance of an industrial 

base to do that, especially in view of the three, six, and zero numbers that I mentioned earlier? 

Number two, I want you specifically to talk about the booster set 

concept and zero and years to come. Is there any kind of recommendation of any kind of particular sustainment program that 

gives a specific number for those Minuteman III booster sets to 

make sure that the warm line is viable? 

And the third one relates to it as well. As you know, the President and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 

has suggested that the Ares rocket and the Constellation program 

be discontinued. And that there are indeed dire impacts, both on 

the space and defense side, if that were to go through. The Augustine Commission on space recommended that that was a serious 

issue and needed to be addressed ahead of time. Obviously, NASA 

failed to do that. 

So the question I have is, how we are planning for the future? 

Both Secretary Carter administered that there is an industrial 

base problem if, indeed, Ares III is canceled, or even slowed down. 

General Kehler said in an article that was published that he was 

not comfortable with the direction we were going. 

Secretary Payton asked for a study, but in page 23 he said, ‘‘You 

will not have the capability of considering future ICBM options 

that are involved with large scale solid rocket propulsion systems 

if this capability is gone.’’ So I would like to know where you are 

moving in conjunction with what NASA may do. 

And I will give one final one, maybe for Mrs. Tauscher or somebody up there, which simply means—this is the broader picture 

one, if you guys get done with the weeds first—you know, in our 

nuclear umbrella that we have, there are at least 30 countries that 

are depending on our assistance to provide deterrence for them. 

As we ramp our deterrence down, what impact does it have on 

theirs and their credibility and their faith and what they may actually try to move forward? But Mr. Miller, General Chilton, if you 

could go to the weed issues first, I would be very much appreciative. 

General CHILTON. Sure, Congressman, let me take a whack at 

your concerns with regard to solid rocket motors. First of all, the 
38 

language for investment in Life Extension Program, I think, is a 

commitment to the Congressional direction to make sure the Minuteman III is sustainable through 2030. 

The PRP, Guidance Replacement Program, the Single Reentry 

Vehicle program, et cetera, address the missile itself, but there was 

other things that needed to be addressed that weren’t fully funded 

to include support equipment, test equipment, et cetera, to make 

sure that weapon system is viable. So that is my understanding of 

what that language speaks to. 

There are two different philosophies on producing solid rocket 

missiles between the Navy and the Air Force. The Air Force concept was to build them all once, all that you need, including your 

test assets, and stop. And the Navy’s was to continue a warm production line of D–5s, which they do today. 

That, as an issue, was not really brought up as far as sustaining 

the technology, I think, until the realization that Ares was going 

to go away. Well, as of now, the questions are starting to be 

asked—and I am one of the ones asking the questions—is do we 

have enough investment in the industrial base to sustain that critical capability to make large solid rocket motors, large solid rocket 

missiles? 

And it is a unique capability. It is one the United States knows 

how to do today, but one we want to make sure we preserve for 

the future because it is critical for our defense. 

And so I think you are asking some excellent questions about, 

what is the right amount do we invest in sustaining that industrial 

base? Secretary Carter and AT&L are looking at that, and I would 

expect them to bring forward answers to that in the fiscal year 

2012 that is—— 

Mr. BISHOP. Because I have two seconds, let me just interrupt. 

And I appreciate your enunciation of what the issue is. I would 

hope it would have been answered in this particular document. We 

still have to go forward. Maybe deciding on what NASA actually ultimately aims to do will have an impact on the military side. And 

for the other question I will submit it in writing for the record. 

General CHILTON. Yes. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

General CHILTON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. Langevin from Rhode Island. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I want to thank 

our panel for the outstanding work that you have all done on the 

NPR. And I thank you for the periodic updates that you have been 

giving me along the way to—it certainly gave me confidence that 

we are on track and this is being done effectively. 

Let me just say, in my opinion, the Nuclear Posture Review offers a clear plan for focusing on nuclear policy on the gravest 

threats to our security. It is the risk that nuclear weapons might 

spread to other countries or to terrorists. 

Along with new START agreement, the NPR, I believe, will help 

increase U.S. leverage in pressing for the strength of nonproliferation measures at the NPT, our Review Conference in May, and be-
39 

yond. And at the same time the NPR endorsed our Congressional 

plan for managing the safety, security, and reliability or effectiveness, if you will, of our nuclear weapons. 

It clearly seeks to establish a consensus on nuclear policy and endorses the revitalizing the nation’s Nuclear Security Enterprise, 

too. And I quote Vice President Biden and ‘‘reverse the last decades’ dangerous decline.’’ 

The New START Treaty establishes a legally binding and stateof-the-art verification process that allows us to track Russia’s nuclear activities and verify that they are complying with their treaty 

obligations. And these verification measures, I believe, will support 

U.S. intelligence and insight into Russia’s nuclear capability. 

The treaty also establishes a significantly lower, legally binding 

verifiable limits on deployed strategic warhead levels not seen, 

really, since the days of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. And this reduction and the limit of deployed and strategic 

nuclear weapons increases stability, transparency and predictability. 

So, I just want to say that I applaud all of you for your outstanding work to increase U.S. security and thank you for your 

statements and your commitment to safeguarding national security. I know for many of you this has been a lifelong commitment 

and interest. 

Specifically to the NPR, I know we have talked about some of 

these issues today already, but my first question is for Secretary 

D’Agostino. As you know, and as we have heard today, there is 

much, really, confusion about what constitutes a new nuclear 

weapon. And so could we for, you know, for the record, for further 

clarification, would you provide the committee with your views of 

this issue? 

And as a follow up, General Chilton, could you discuss this issue 

from the perspective of military capabilities; specifically, how can 

we be sure that the stockpile maintenance work won’t result in 

new military capabilities? And, in fact, General, for the record, do 

you need new military capabilities? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, sir. I would be glad to. I 

think, in my view, a new nuclear weapon is a nuclear warhead that 

is not based on previously tested designs. I mean, this is a warhead 

that doesn’t have a test pedigree, that takes us into an area, a 

technical regime that drives us into some unknown areas. 

We may have some good theoretical reasons why it might work, 

but it is not based on previously tested designs. Or it is a warhead 

that addresses a new military capability. Right now, the Stockpile 

Management Plan provides this guidance of not adding new military capabilities. 

We are consistent with that with what Congress had asked for. 

You know, an example might be an enhanced electromagnetic pulse 

(EMP) device, for example. It is a new capability. It is not a capability that we currently have in our stockpile, but it adds to it. 

In this thinking, discussion about new nuclear weapons versus 

not new nuclear weapons, we are very consistent, I believe, with 

the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, which specifically excludes, when it discusses this concept of new or not, and says ‘‘life 

extension doesn’t fall into this category.’’ 
40 

Because what we are trying to do is extending the life and maintain the capabilities that we have using, that whole test base that 

we have. So, extending the life of an existing warhead, and maintaining that military capability, does not fall into that category. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. 

General. 

General CHILTON. And I would echo Secretary D’Agostino’s point 

that a new capability would be like a new EMP-focused bomb, or 

a neutron bomb, or some large increase in yield, none of which we 

need to meet our deterrent capabilities today. 

I agree with you that the word ‘‘new’’ is one that has been debated a lot. And at some extreme, someone would call a new bomb 

one that we painted a different color. But that is not what we are 

talking about here. We are talking about new military capabilities. 

And I am really encouraged by the language in the NPR that allows refurbishment, reuse, and replacement to be studied by our 

best and brightest engineers. To be put as options on the table for 

consideration to do one really important thing: to ensure the safety, 

security, and reliability of the stockpile for future generations. And 

that is what is really important here. 

I think it would be a mistake to say ‘‘you can’t think about these 

solutions.’’ We want to have all the solutions on the table to be examined and decided upon. And those decisions about how we go 

forward in each weapon will be voted upon by both the President 

and, of course, this body, who controls the funding for them. So I 

believe there will be adequate oversight, certainly, in whatever is 

brought forward as a recommendation. 

And one final point, the point on previously designed components, are pretty important. The NNSA and the laboratories have 

a great storage of test data from previously designed nuclear components. 

And those need to be the ones that we look at as we look at replacement options, because we don’t want to have to go off into 

areas where we might argue for—some might argue for a test. 

So that is an important point as we go forward, is that we make 

sure the nuclear components are based on previously tested designs. Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. SPRATT. All right, thank you, General. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you for 

being here. General Chilton, always good to see you, sir. And Secretary Tauscher, thank you. It is good to see you again. And I extend my appreciation to the other two gentlemen. 

Secretary Miller, I, you know, in earlier testimony you spoke of 

the strategic ambiguity. And it occurs to me that the time-honored 

purpose for strategic ambiguity was really of a cautionary note to 

our enemies. It was to suggest that we might do something more 

than they realize if they proceed to test or to attack us. 

And it appears to me that the new policy that you are advocating 

here is really one of foreclosing certain options and of going in the 

exact opposite direction, perhaps emboldening our enemies. 

The concern I have there is that if there is some type of incursion 

or some type of where an enemy, being emboldened, might be a lit-
41 

tle more aggressive than usual, that that includes the possibility of 

that escalating, and even increasing a larger conflict. So could you 

speak to that? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes. With respect to calculated ambiguity or deliberate ambiguity, there is a reduction in that in this Nuclear Posture Review, specifically with respect to non-nuclear weapons 

states. 

The United States has said since 1978 that we would not use or 

threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons 

states. And what this Nuclear Posture Review does is remove that 

ambiguity. 

It also significantly reduces ambiguity about the nature of our response, and that is that it would be devastating conventional military response to any use of chemical or biological weapons by a 

non-nuclear weapons state, and that the leadership would be held 

accountable—both the military and political leadership. 

With respect to nuclear weapons states, essentially the same degree of ambiguity is present today as it was prior to this. And finally, with respect to those states, Iran and North Korea in particular, that are not in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations, I believe the ambiguity has been reduced. And as 

Secretary Gates said, we have made clear that all options are on 

the table. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, related to Iran, of course, you know, it occurs 

to me that we are missing, probably, the major rogue elephant, as 

it were, in the room. The fact is, if Iran gains nuclear capability 

all efforts to contain nuclear proliferation are essentially dead. 

You know, the Iranian president himself, Ahmadinejad, has stated that, if gained this capability that they would supply this to 

other Islamic nations ‘‘according to their need.’’ And it just occurs 

to me that so much of our focus needs to be there. 

I have two little children, and I don’t want to see them face nuclear terrorism, but I am absolutely convinced a nuclear Iran 

means exactly that. 

That nuclear terrorism is loosed upon the world and it just astonishes me that this Administration doesn’t seem to be focusing 

on that to the degree that they should. You mentioned earlier that 

deterrent was a combination of capability and credibility. 

If you are an Iranian—if you are the Iranian president right now 

and you see us reducing our capability, you can’t cut the equation 

any other way than that, regardless if we still have sufficient capability perhaps, but we are reducing our capability. 

And if you are the Iranian president and you look at our posture 

towards North Korea and this President has made some strong 

statements toward North Korea in the past, and those have not resulted in any demonstrable action on our part. And so it occurs to 

me that our credibility has been diminished as well with Iran. 

So let me just ask you, what are we doing now, demonstrably 

and specifically, to prevent Iran from gaining a nuclear capability? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, let me answer in three parts, and others may 

want to join in as well. First, this Nuclear Posture Review did put 

nuclear nonproliferation and combating the possibility of nuclear 

terrorism at the top of the agenda. And that is a principal reason 

why you see some of the policy changes that we have talked about. 
42 

Mr. FRANKS. But it essentially ignores the most dangerous terrorist state in the world in that regard. 

Dr. MILLER. Second, with respect to the Negative Security Assurance, Iran is not subject to that assurance because they are not in 

compliance with their nonproliferation obligations and, as Secretary Gates has said, and as I would like to make clear, that 

means that all options are on the table with respect to Iran. 

And if they wish to position themselves so that they are subject 

to that assurance, they need to make significant steps to terminate 

their nuclear activities in a verifiable way and subject themselves 

to the associated inspections. 

And the third element, I would say, which we could spend some 

time on is that the United States is currently working hard to get 

strong sanctions in place on Iran and to press the international 

community, including at the summit, working with the Russians 

and the Chinese, to encourage them in as clear a way as possible, 

to agree to strong sanctions on Iran in order to push it to shift its 

policy and to meet its nonproliferation obligations. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up. 

I—— 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make clear 

that this Administration is using every one of its arrows in its 

quiver to deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. It is as frustrated as the previous Administration was. 

But I will say that we have had tremendous success, most recently, in persuading members of the P5, the European Union, and 

other countries to work with us to deter Iran, to persuade them 

that having nuclear weapons is not something that we will sustain. 

And I think that the President has worked very hard on this. It 

is a difficult situation because of the isolation of Iran and its leadership. But I think that both on North Korea and Iran this Administration has worked very hard to make clear that their nuclear 

ambitions are not in line with our plans for them. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. May I just suggest, 

Mr. Chairman, as difficult as it is to deal with Iran now, it will be 

much more difficult if we do not succeed in preventing them in 

gaining nuclear weapons. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. As I understand, there are two more 

members that wish to ask questions, but let me ask the same question I asked the General of Secretary Tauscher. Does the Nuclear 

Posture Review make us any safer? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. I believe it does, Mr. Chairman, because 

the Nuclear Posture Review clarifies our Negative Security Assurance. It makes clear to non-nuclear weapons states that compliance 

with their NPT obligations, that they are not threatened by our nuclear forces. Secondarily, it makes clear to countries that are not 

in compliance with their NPT obligations, like North Korea and 

Iran, that we would use nuclear weapons against them. 

And I think it generally puts in balance what is a very strong 

nuclear and conventional threat that the United States has had for 

many years. Keep in mind that we haven’t used nuclear weapons 

in over 65 years. There is a very high bar that every Commanderin-Chief would have to consider to use nuclear weapons. 
43 

But we have conventional weapons and a military force second 

to none, and it has kept us in relative peace and security other 

than the asymmetrical threats that we faced after September 11th, 

against allies and against other state actors. It has kept us in relative peace and security for many decades. 

So I think that the Administration has moved forward with a 

Nuclear Posture Review that is much more clarifying, much more 

significant in its commitments to non-nuclear weapons states in 

compliance with NPT, to strengthen the NPT. And I think it does 

have a very strong nonproliferation piece which, in the end, the 

President believes will make us all safer. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Heinrich. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to all of 

you. I want to start just by commending the Administration by 

moving us beyond the Cold War mentality that has gripped our deterrent for a long time. We are two decades, now, beyond that in 

terms of the reality on the ground. 

And this begins to create a situation that is much more in line 

with the threats that we face today. And I also want to commend 

the Administration on really walking the walk versus the kind of 

lip service we have received in the past when it comes to investing 

in our infrastructure and, more importantly, our personnel. I really 

appreciate that shift. 

I want to get fairly specific. First off, Secretary D’Agostino, I 

wanted to ask you what are the implications for our national security of not having the B61 Life Extension Program completed by 

2017? 

And how confident are you that the B61 Life Extension Program 

will be ready to deliver finished systems required to synchronize 

the weapon with the arrival of the new F–35 as a delivery vehicle? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Heinrich, the B61 bomb is, as General Chilton has noted previously in testimony and in other discussion, is one of our oldest warheads. It is in need of attention. It has 

got systems, electronic systems that need specific attention associated with, you know, vacuum tubes and the like. It needs some 

specific work—I’d prefer not to get into the technical details here, 

in an open session. We would be glad to provide you the details. 

But it is very important for us to get started to work on that 

warhead itself, or on that bomb. Various—all aspects of it need a 

significant amount of attention. The other important thing, frankly, 

on the B61 in addition to our desire to satisfy the military requirements that I have asked General Chilton talk to, the year 2017 is 

the date you heard me mention in my opening remarks. 

That date is important. Because of our infrastructure we want to 

time in the studies that typically happen at laboratories and the 

work that happened at laboratories as opposed to the actual production work that has to happen. 

And the first production unit of 2017 fits in very nicely from our 

ability to layer in the work that we are currently doing right now 

on the W76 warhead, which is in its production stage, with the 

work when that work tapers off in 2017, entering into the production stage on the B61 bomb. It coincides nicely with the requirements of the Defense Department as well. 
44 

General CHILTON. Thanks. And if I could add to that, sir, a lot 

of folks are linking 2017 to F–35. We need the B61 in first production in 2017, regardless of the F–35, because the B61 also is a 

weapon that is used by the B–2, by our strategic deterrent. And so 

it is an important weapon, also, to be part of the F–35 as the dual 

capable aircraft strategy goes forward. 

But any slip in the F–35 program should not say ‘‘well, we can 

take risk in the B61 program.’’ We need to be on schedule and get 

first production unit going. Complete W76, B61, both nuclear and 

non-nuclear parts of that, so that then we can move on to our next 

element of the stockpile that needs to be addressed, the W78. 

And I would close by saying I am so encouraged by this NPR and 

the investment and the strategy and the latitude given here to the 

labs to address this particular weapon. Because it will be the 

model, I think, the first model for adding increased security and 

safety and reliability to the stockpile. 

The W76 was purely a refurbishment. No added safety or security. No added reliability. The B61 will be an opportunity for this 

model to be put in place that will then be carried on throughout 

the rest of the stockpile. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, General. I couldn’t agree more with 

both of those points. So I appreciate you clarifying, especially the 

aircraft issue and the kind of improvements that can be made as 

we move forward to really increase safety and reliability. 

Secretary Tauscher, and I am still getting used to you being 

down there as opposed to up there, but we heard a little bit earlier 

about moral leadership, as if that was the only outcome of the kind 

of leadership we have seen from the Administration with respect 

to New START and the NPR. 

I want to ask you a little bit more about pragmatic outcomes. 

And I wonder if you can talk a little bit about the direct impact 

that New START seems to already be having on how Russia and 

China view issues like sanctions with some of the countries that 

are out, who are not complying with their international obligations? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. I think when 

President Obama came into office, he had a different point of view 

on engagement: to be tough but at the same time, as he said, reach 

out your hand, but if you come back with a fist we will not respond 

nicely. 

And in both the case of Russia specifically, we had the inconvenience of a START Treaty that was going to expire, no matter what 

we did, on December 5th. And a little less than 10 months after 

the President came into office. 

So the effort by the President and Secretary Clinton to restart 

and reset the relationship with the Russians was fundamentally 

important. And to get the atmosphere right to begin to get the 

START Treaty negotiated. 

The President made clear that even though we had this inconvenient date of the START Treaty expiring that he didn’t want any 

treaty on December 5th. He wanted to make sure that we took the 

time to get a treaty that was going to not only create more stability 

in the relationship, but one that was going to serve the American 

people and the people of the Russian Federation for the 10 years 
45 

of the life of the treaty, and also help us make our case in our narrative for the dangers of nuclear weapons. And while nuclear weapons still have a very strong place in our deterrent posture and force 

posture, that the President wants us to, in the role as part of the 

Nuclear Posture Review, lessen the dependence of the United 

States on nuclear weapons because we still have the strongest conventional forces and weaponry in the world and the best military 

in the world. 

And we have not used nuclear weapons in 65 years. And the bar 

to use them is extremely high. And we may not have a circumstance where that test to use a nuclear weapon is satisfied by 

the time we think we have to make some decisions. 

So it is partly to have the moral leadership to have a very strong 

Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the President is committed to, to 

make sure that countries that, in the past, over the last decades, 

have not had nuclear weapons because we either extended our deterrence to them or because they had decided not to—don’t decide 

to have nuclear weapons and are not reliant on them. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Lamborn for a question. Then we go to Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I listened with 

great interest to your earlier remarks about a perceived connection 

between missile defense and the New START Treaty. And I understand that there is no such intention on our part. And I have read 

your comments in the press very carefully previously, Secretary 

Tauscher, and I accept and believe that that is our intention. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. LAMBORN. So I have no question about that. I am reassured 

about that. And General Chilton, I am reassured by what you said 

about the language of the treaty and that there is no platforms or 

missile defense weapons that would be connected. 

But my question and my concern is what is going on in the 

minds of the Russians? And let me read to you a quote from an 

official Kremlin statement regarding New START. New START 

‘‘can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities, quantitatively or qualitatively.’’ 

So in their mind, there does seem to be a connection. And that 

is my concern. I understand our position and I accept that. And 

there shouldn’t be a connection because missile defense is defensive, not offensive. And secondly, it is so critical to our defense it 

should not be negotiable. 

But if two parties to a treaty seem to have differing views on an 

essential matter like that, doesn’t that potentially set up a possible 

failure of understanding and, therefore, implementation? And if 

you could address that, please, I would appreciate it. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Congressman Lamborn, I appreciate your 

comments. Let me just say, again, for the record, there is nothing 

in the New START Treaty that constrains any of our deployed or 

planned missile defense systems. Full stop. 

I don’t know when that statement was made. I don’t know if it 

was made weeks and months ago or whether it was made in the 

last 20 minutes. But I will tell you that the Russians not only un-
46 

derstand what our Phased, Adaptive Approach is, because it is on 

the Internet. Anybody can understand what it is. 

But every country has, inside of its very complicated infrastructure and bureaucracy, folks that, for their own reasons, don’t like 

what their allies and friends and treaty partners are doing. And everybody has a domestic audience that they have to play to at times. 

And politics is a part of everything. 

President Obama has made very clear that this treaty was never 

going to constrain us in any way when it came to protecting the 

American people, our forward deployed troops and our allies, specifically about missile defense. And when I was in Geneva, part of 

my job in the negotiating was to make sure that that was what the 

President got in the end of the deal. 

What the Russians say and what certain Russians say, I notice 

that that is not even a comment attributed to anyone. You know, 

it is what it is. But we have every incentive and every reason to 

believe that the Russians are serious about maintaining the life of 

the START Treaty and their commitments to it. Certainly in 

Prague I was very proud to sit and watch President Medvedev and 

President Obama sign the treaty last Thursday. 

It is very clear that our relationship, while we don’t agree with 

the Russians on everything, we have a much improved relationship. It is accruing to the American people and to the things that 

we want to do, including things like Iran and other issues. 

This relationship is working for us and we are working diligently 

to make sure that the stability created by a positive American-Russian relationship is accruing to our friends and allies at the same 

time. 

So I think I am glad that you are reassured. That is certainly 

our position. But once again, I don’t know who this Russian was 

that was quoted. It is not attributed and I don’t even know when 

the quote was made. 

But I can assure you they know what our limited missile defense 

systems are. They know what they are constituted to do. They 

know they are not targeted against them, and we are very satisfied 

that we are going to have a good relationship going forward in the 

New START agreement. 

Dr. MILLER. If I could add very quickly, the Russians also know 

now what is in our unilateral statement, which was put out just 

a few days ago, which says ‘‘The United States intends to continue 

improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend itself against limited attack and as part of our collaborative 

approach to strengthening stability in key regions.’’ 

So, both for homeland defense and for regional missile defense, 

it made absolutely clear that we intend to continue to improve our 

capabilities. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. I wish the members to 

know that tomorrow at our hearing we will begin having the junior 

members of the committee and we work backward in our procedural order. And I hope the junior members will arrive on time before the gavel starts. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the challenges 

in serving on the committee is that when you are dealing with im-
47 

portant topics like these to get all your questions in in 5 minutes, 

which is next to impossible. 

But I would—one question I wanted to get to, and I would be remiss if I didn’t ask of Secretary Tauscher. 

First of all, Ellen, it is great to have you back before the committee again, and thank you for your years of work on all these 

issues and your leadership on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee 

that you chaired, and now that I was privileged to succeed when 

you assumed your new role. 

Yesterday, I had the privilege of attending the Nuclear Security 

Summit. And obviously, many positive things have come out of that 

summit already. In particular, I noticed the news that the Chinese 

have pledged to work more closely with us on the Iranian issue. 

And when I met with President Hu yesterday, I first expressed my 

appreciation for his willingness to do that. 

Also, in particular, we saw over 47 countries come to come together to begin to address threats of nuclear terrorism, nuclear 

proliferation. And from my work both on this committee and also 

on the Intelligence Committee, I certainly share the President’s 

concerns about the dangers from loose nuclear material and rogue 

proliferators. 

And I am certainly happy to see this issue take prominence in 

this Administration. I give President Obama high marks in his Administration for convening the summit, which is probably long 

overdue and it is such an important topic. 

Secretary Tauscher, can you elaborate on some of the commitments from other nations that came from this conference? And 

also, what progress needs to be made before nations reconvene in 

South Korea in 2012? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you, Chairman Langevin. It is my 

pleasure to see you again, and congratulations on all your work on 

the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. Yesterday, Monday and Tuesday, the President convened 47 heads of state to talk about an 

issue that particularly animates him, which is nuclear terrorism. 

And he made very clear that, while much has changed since the 

end of the Cold War, that it is less likely that the United States 

or our allies would be subject to a nuclear attack from a big power. 

Unfortunately, countries that are looking to acquire nuclear 

weapons and terrorist organizations that are looking to either find 

material or know-how or technology have increased. And that has 

increased significantly our danger in the United States. 

So he brought these 47 heads of state together and there was not 

only a communique ́ that, I think, was very positive in the commitment of these 47 heads of state to work together on nuclear security and to eliminate nuclear terrorism, but there were a number 

of what we call ‘‘house gifts’’ that some of these heads of state 

brought along. Countries like Chile, Canada, the Ukraine, and 

Mexico have agreed, for example, to eliminate all of their HEU and 

to send it to the United States and Russia for disposal. 

The United States and Russia were—we seem to be signing 

agreements almost every day these days—signed yesterday the 

Plutonium Disposition Agreement, which Tom knows about. It was 

10 years in the making, had been stalled for many years. But this 
48 

eliminates plutonium that could make 17,000 nuclear weapons. 

The IAEA is going to help us monitor that agreement. 

There were a number of other initiatives going on there, and 

probably one of the anecdotes to the whole conference was that, 

while you had 47 heads of state milling around, and many of them 

brought their foreign ministers and their ambassadors and members of their cabinets that deal with nuclear nonproliferation 

issues, there were many side meetings that were going on where 

there was a lot of very good work done. 

And what was very clear while President Obama presided over 

this for a day and a half and made some, I think, very eloquent 

and very forceful statements, what was very clear was that this 

was an issue that these heads of state—most of them non-nuclear 

countries—believed was important, but it took the United States 

and President Obama to put this issue in the forefront of their 

minds and to convene them together. 

And the good news is that the ‘‘sherpas’’—these are the people 

that managed the process of doing the communique ́ and the work 

product that goes forward—they will continue meeting over the 

next two years. 

And South Koreans have agreed to convene what was meant to 

be one meeting, now will have follow-on in 2012 for the South Koreans to convene a similar kind of meeting where the work product 

will be reviewed, and these efforts will continue. 

There were billions of dollars committed by nuclear powers to 

help do cleanups. So I think, overall, it was not only a success in 

the material things that were committed to but, once again, this is 

an issue that the President believes that publics and parliaments 

and, certainly, the American people and the Congress need to know 

more about. 

For too long, these issues have stayed in the background; they 

are very opaque and complicated and complex and sometimes people say, ‘‘oh, you know, that is hard to understand. I didn’t take 

physics in high school.’’ 

The truth of the matter is, every American and every person in 

the world needs to know these issues because this is the biggest 

threat we have. And it is a life-changing event if something bad 

should happen. 

And their political will is important because they need to tell 

their Congress or their parliament or their head of state that this 

is important, that they want them to fix these issues. They want 

them to work collaboratively, and they want strong international 

regimes like the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be protected. 

So thank you. I was so glad to see you there yesterday, and 

many Members of Congress came, but we all worked hard on it and 

I am glad that it had such a good outcome. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Very good. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Again, well, thank you for that answer and to all 

of you, I mean on the panel, thank you for the outstanding work 

you have done on the NPR as well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 
49 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the gentleman, and to the excellent 

panel, and we certainly are grateful for your testimony, for your 

hard work and for what you do for our country. 

And with that—— 

[Whereupon, at 1:09 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 14, 2010 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 14, 2010 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 14, 2010 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. Secretary Miller, the Administration has repeatedly assured the 

Congress that no limits would be placed on missile defense. However, Article 5 of 

the Treaty appears to restrict the conversion of ICBM launchers for use as missile 

defense silos—as we did with the Ground-based Interceptors at Vandenberg—and 

restrict the conversion of submarine tubes to fire missile defense interceptors. Is 

this correct? Why set such limits on missile defense? 

Dr. MILLER. The New START Treaty (NST) does not constrain the United States 

from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor does the NST add 

any additional cost or inconvenience to our missile defense plans. As the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, our budget submission and projections, and the U.S. 

unilateral statement made in connection with the NST all make clear, the United 

States will continue to improve its missile defenses. 

Article V, Section 3 of the Treaty prohibits the conversion of ICBM or SLBM 

launchers to missile defense launchers and vice versa; that is, the conversion of missile defense launchers to launch ICBMs or SLBMs. This section also ‘‘grandfathers’’ 

the five former ICBM silos at Vandenberg AFB that were converted for use within 

Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) over the past several years. Should the decision 

be made in the future to field additional GBIs, we will already have eight extra, 

unused missile defense silos in the ground at Fort Greely, Alaska. In the event that 

we would need even more missile defense silos above and beyond the extra eight, 

we would build the smaller, much less expensive, tailor-made GBI silos rather than 

perform more expensive conversions of existing ICBM silos. Regarding SLBM 

launchers, the Missile Defense Agency examined the concept of launching missile 

defense interceptors from submarines and found it to be not cost-effective and to 

present unique operational challenges. 

Mr. LAMBORN. I am concerned that the Administration may not fully implement 

its Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) plans for missile defense in Europe, or it may 

seek to slow down PAA implementation, to avoid Russian withdrawal from the Treaty. What types of activities will the U.S. avoid to diminish the chances that the Russians will withdraw? 

Dr. MILLER. The United States has made clear to Russia, including in the unilateral statement released in conjunction with the New START Treaty, that U.S. missile defense systems do not and will not threaten Russia’s nuclear deterrent and 

that the United States intends to continue to deploy improved missile defense systems to defend the U.S. homeland from limited attacks and to defend its deployed 

forces, allies, and partners against regional threats. Moreover, the United States 

will not allow a Russian threat to withdraw from the New START Treaty to influence any national security matter, including the development and deployment of 

needed missile defense capabilities. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Secretary Miller, in your professional opinion what is the number 

of warheads the U.S. needs to meet its nuclear deterrence objectives? I have heard 

discussions of much lower numbers of nuclear weapons in the future under a minimum deterrence strategy. Is it possible for the U.S. to pursue a minimum deterrence strategy, similar to China, with 500 nuclear weapons or less in the future? 

Has STRATCOM performed any force structure analysis based on a minimum deterrence strategy? 

Dr. MILLER. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have 

reduced operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by approximately 75 percent, but today both retain more operationally deployed nuclear weapons than needed for deterrence. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), with analytical support from 

USSTRATCOM, examined the full range of factors that will allow reductions in U.S. 

nuclear force levels. The NPR team provided this information to the New START 

negotiators to guide negotiation of the recently concluded New START Treaty. 

The United States has no plans to pursue a minimum deterrence strategy, and 

no analysis has been conducted by USSTRATCOM or elsewhere in DOD to explore 

such a strategy. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Secretary Miller, as nuclear weapons are reduced and conventional 

Prompt Global Strike (PGS) capabilities are developed, to what degree can conven-
90 

tional capabilities substitute for nuclear capabilities in providing deterrence? What 

are the limitations? 

Dr. MILLER. Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capabilities, as well as 

other conventional and missile defense capabilities, are not intended to be a substitute for nuclear capabilities in providing deterrence against nuclear attack. As 

long as nuclear weapons exist, the U.S. will maintain a safe, secure, and effective 

nuclear arsenal to deter potential adversaries. However, these conventional systems 

and other non-nuclear capabilities may allow the U.S. to fulfill deterrence objectives 

at significantly lower nuclear force levels with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. 

The Administration is currently examining the appropriate mix of CPGS capabilities needed to improve our ability to address regional threats, without negatively 

affecting the stability of our strategic relationships with Russia or China. Specific 

recommendations will be made in the fiscal year (FY) 2012 Department of Defense 

budget. 

Mr. LAMBORN. General Chilton, in your professional opinion what is the number 

of warheads the U.S. needs to meet its nuclear deterrence objectives? I have heard 

discussions of much lower numbers of nuclear weapons in the future under a minimum deterrence strategy. Is it possible for the U.S. to pursue a minimum deterrence strategy, similar to China, with 500 nuclear weapons or less in the future? 

Has STRATCOM performed any force structure analysis based on a minimum deterrence strategy? 

General CHILTON. The analysis STRATCOM was requested to perform in support 

of the NPR and New START negotiations focused on our ability to meet current employment guidance at various force levels. We were not asked to examine the force 

requirements for a ‘‘minimum deterrence’’ strategy. Without knowing how ‘‘minimum deterrence strategy’’ is defined in terms of targeting requirements under various conditions it is not possible to answer the question ‘‘how much is enough to 

deter’’? 

Mr. LAMBORN. General Chilton, as nuclear weapons are reduced and conventional 

Prompt Global Strike (PGS) capabilities are developed, to what degree can conventional capabilities substitute for nuclear capabilities in providing deterrence? What 

are the limitations? 

General CHILTON. Conventional Prompt Global Strike capabilities can provide the 

President additional options for striking targets promptly at very long ranges without concern over active air defenses. Thus, they can contribute to deterrence by 

helping to convince an adversary that we can deny them some of the benefits they 

might seek by attacking us or our allies, and impose costs on them in response to 

such an attack. However, I do not believe that such conventional PGS capabilities 

can effectively substitute for the deterrent effect derived from our nuclear forces. 

Nuclear weapons pose a qualitatively different threat than any conventional strike 

option. The scale, duration, and inevitability of nuclear weapons effects have a 

unique deterrent effect, as does the potential for escalation to a large scale nuclear 

exchange. This is why I have repeatedly stated that conventional PGS capabilities 

are not a one-for-one substitute, or even a ten-for-one substitute, for nuclear capabilities. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Secretary Tauscher, the Administration has repeatedly assured the 

Congress that no limits would be placed on missile defense. However, Article 5 of 

the Treaty appears to restrict the conversion of ICBM launchers for use as missile 

defense silos—as we did with the Ground-based Interceptors at Vandenberg—and 

restrict the conversion of submarine tubes to fire missile defense interceptors. Is 

this correct? Why set such limits on missile defense? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. The New START Treaty does not constrain the United 

States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor does it add 

any additional cost or inconvenience. Rather, the Treaty enables the President to 

develop the missile defenses needed to defend the homeland, our deployed forces 

abroad, and our allies and partners from the threat of ballistic missile attack. 

Indeed, Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly, Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), 

has testified that the New START Treaty places no constraints on current and future plans for ballistic missile defense development or deployment. 

Lt. Gen. O’Reilly has made clear that the Article V, paragraph 3 ban on converting ICBM silos to house and launch missile defense interceptors does not constrain MDA’s plans. In 2002, MDA converted ICBM silos to operational silos for 

launching GBIs because they had not yet developed a silo specifically for GBIs at 

that time. Since then, MDA has developed a GBI silo that costs $20M less than converting ICBM silos and is easier to protect and maintain. Accordingly, should additional missile defense interceptor launchers be needed, we would build the smaller, 

much less expensive, tailor-made ground-based interceptor (GBI) silos rather than 

pursuing the more costly approach of converting ICBM silos. 
91 

Article V of the Treaty also prohibits the conversion of existing SLBM launchers 

into missile defense launchers. As Lt. Gen. O’Reilly stated in his testimony, MDA 

has examined the concept of launching missile defense interceptors from submarines 

and found it an operationally unattractive and extremely expensive option in part 

because submerged submarines are not easily integrated into our nation’s missile 

defense command and control network. In fact, the United States already has a very 

good, significantly growing and proven capability for mobile sea-based ballistic missile defense on Aegis-capable ships, which are not constrained by the New START 

Treaty. 

The exhibitions provided for in the Seventh Agreed Statement will avoid ambiguities from arising with respect to converted ICBM silos that now serve as missile 

defense interceptor launchers at Vandenberg AFB, because the United States will 

be able to demonstrate that such launchers are no longer capable of holding and 

launching ICBMs. 

It is also important to note that this Treaty provides greater flexibility for the 

missile defense program than did the START Treaty in several areas. For example, 

MDA’s intermediate-range LV–2 target booster system, used in key tests to demonstrate homeland defense capabilities and components of the new European 

Phased Adaptive Approach, was accountable under the previous START Treaty because it employed the first stage of the now-retired Trident I SLBM. Under New 

START, this missile is not accountable, and MDA will have greater flexibility in 

conducting testing with regard to launch locations, telemetry collection, and processing, allowing more efficient and realistic testing. 

Mr. LAMBORN. I am concerned that the Administration may not fully implement 

its Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) plans for missile defense in Europe, or it may 

seek to slow down PAA implementation, to avoid Russian withdrawal from the Treaty. What types of activities will the U.S. avoid to diminish the chances that the Russians will withdraw? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. None. The United States will take all necessary steps to promote stability and foster cooperation while defending ourselves, our allies and partners, and our interests. With respect to ballistic missile defenses, the United States 

will continue to develop and deploy missile defenses to defend the homeland against 

the threat of limited ballistic missile attack and to defend against regional missile 

threats to U.S. forces, while protecting allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

Mr. BISHOP. On page 23 of the Nuclear Posture Review Summary, it states, ‘‘The 

DoD will continue the Minuteman III Life Extension Program with the aim of keeping the fleet in service to 2030, as mandated by Congress. Although a decision on 

any follow-on ICBM development is not needed for several years, studies to inform 

that decision are needed now.’’ 

The Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP) just concluded in calendar year 2009. Last year, as part of the FY 10 authorization process, the Air 

Force acknowledged the military requirement for a so-called ‘‘warm line’’ program 

to adequately sustain the Minuteman III with regard to the solid rocket boosters. 

For FY 11, the Air Force only proposes production of 3 Minuteman III boosters, 

when industry maintains that 6 booster sets are minimally necessary to sustain the 

industrial base. More disturbingly, the Air Force Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) 

contains $0 funding for Minuteman III Warm Line sustainment in FY 13 and beyond. 

At an earlier hearing this year, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Ms. 

Michele Flournoy, assured me that the large scale solid rocket motor industrial base 

issue would be addressed by this Administration more fully in the NPR. However, 

in reviewing the document made available to me, I cannot determine that it has 

been addressed at all. 

Please explain what is meant exactly by the phrase ‘‘DoD will continue the Minuteman III Life Extension Program.’’ 

Dr. MILLER. The phrase refers to the requirements to sustain the Minuteman III 

(MM III) weapon system through 2030 in accordance with direction in the National 

Defense Authorization Act for FY2007. The U.S. Air Force is fully committed to 

achieving that objective and has budgeted over $1.3B in investments through the 

FYDP (FY10–FY15) to sustain the MM III weapon system through 2030. Minuteman Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Warm Line terminates in FY2012 with funding provided only for closeout/environmental cleanup. OSD plans to provide a report to 

Congress on SRM industrial base sustainment in approximately September, 2010. 
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Mr. BISHOP. Does the NPR address what number of Minuteman III booster sets 

are minimally necessary to sustain a viable warm-line sustainment program? 

Dr. MILLER. No. The 2010 NPR report does not address quantities of Minuteman 

III boosters necessary to sustain a viable warm-line sustainment program. It was 

decided to address this issue via an interagency task force that includes representation from DoD (the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, and 

Missile Defense Agency) and NASA. This task force will provide solid rocket motor 

industrial base sustainment recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for a subsequent report to Congress in approximately September, 2010. 

Mr. BISHOP. What specific impacts would termination of NASA’s Ares 1 and Ares 

5 rocket motors have on the defense solid rocket motor industrial base? 

Dr. MILLER. Cancellation of the NASA Constellation program would impact DoD 

programs that use Solid Rocket Motors (SRMs) to include strategic and tactical missiles, missile defense systems, and solid booster programs for our space launch platforms. These impacts could include cost increases, as component suppliers may have 

higher costs associated with lower production rates. However, reduction in excess 

production capacity may, in fact, ultimately create savings for the Department over 

the longer term. 

Section 1078 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 directed the 

Secretary of Defense to ‘‘establish a plan to sustain the solid rocket motor industrial 

base, including the ability to maintain and sustain currently deployed strategic and 

missile defense systems and to maintain an intellectual and engineering capacity to 

support next generation motors, as needed.’’ The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics established an interagency task force, including 

representation from DoD (the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, Air 

Force, and Missile Defense Agency) and NASA, to address this issue. This task force 

will provide solid rocket motor industrial base sustainment recommendations to the 

Secretary of Defense for a Subsequent report to Congress in approximately September, 2010. 

Mr. BISHOP. If NASA’s proposal to terminate Ares 1 and Ares 5 is approved by 

Congress, is the DoD confident that the solid rocket motor industrial base will survive and be sufficiently robust to allow for future ICBM modernization options involving solid rocket motors, and what evidence would lead the DoD to having such 

an assurance? 

Dr. MILLER. If the current Minuteman III (MM III) solid rocket motor (SRM) production capability is allowed to lapse, any requirement for follow-on MM III SRM 

production would include the time and costs required to reinstate a MM III SRM 

production capability. 

Section 1078 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, directed the 

Secretary of Defense to ‘‘establish a plan to sustain the solid rocket motor industrial 

base, including the ability to maintain and sustain currently deployed strategic and 

missile defense systems and to maintain an intellectual and engineering capacity to 

support next generation motors, as needed.’’ The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics established an interagency task force, including 

representation from DoD (the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, Air 

Force, and Missile Defense Agency) and NASA, to address this issue. This task force 

will provide solid rocket motor industrial base sustainment recommendations to the 

Secretary of Defense for a Subsequent report to Congress in approximately September, 2010. 

Mr. BISHOP. Is retention of a healthy large-scale solid rocket motor industrial base 

of vital strategic importance to the Defense Department of the United States? 

Dr. MILLER. DoD relies heavily on large solid rocket motors (SRMs) to provide the 

propulsion for our strategic systems, missile defense programs, and space launch. 

DoD relies upon SRMs for its strategic missiles for three primary reasons: rapid employment capability, long-term storability, and safety. The Department is evaluating 

its current research development and production programs to determine how to adjust the Department’s SRM programs to the changing large SRM critical skills and 

subtier supplier base. The Department is committed to sustaining an adequate SRM 

industrial base to support both our strategic and tactical needs. 

Section 1078 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, directed the 

Secretary of Defense to ‘‘establish a plan to sustain the solid rocket motor industrial 

base, including the ability to maintain and sustain currently deployed strategic and 

missile defense systems and to maintain an intellectual and engineering capacity to 

support next generation motors, as needed.’’ The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics established an interagency task force, including 

representation from DoD (the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, Air 

Force, and Missile Defense Agency) and NASA, to address this issue. This task force 

will provide solid rocket motor industrial base sustainment recommendations to the 
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Secretary of Defense for a Subsequent report to Congress in approximately September, 2010. 

Mr. BISHOP. Approximately 30 nations rely upon the current U.S. nuclear shield 

for shared deterrence. How will the security of these U.S. allies be impacted by the 

U.S. downsizing both warheads and delivery systems as contained in the new 

START treaty recently signed by the President? 

Dr. MILLER. As President Obama stated in Prague last year, we are committed 

to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter any adversary 

and guarantee that defense to our allies. Analyses conducted during the Nuclear 

Posture Review determined that the future U.S. strategic force planned for the New 

START Treaty will be sufficient to meet U.S. extended deterrence requirements. 

The security of U.S. allies will not be diminished by the reductions in U.S. strategic 

nuclear forces mandated by the New START Treaty. Allies have welcomed the outcome of the NPR, as well as the signing of the New START Treaty, with many seeing the Treaty as an important step forward in global nonproliferation efforts. For 

example, on behalf of NATO Allies, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen welcomed the agreement as an important contribution to arms control, and 

an inspiration for further progress. 

Mr. BISHOP. On page 23 of the Nuclear Posture Review Summary, it states, ‘‘The 

DoD will continue the Minuteman III Life Extension Program with the aim of keeping the fleet in service to 2030, as mandated by Congress. Although a decision on 

any follow-on ICBM development is not needed for several years, studies to inform 

that decision are needed now.’’ 

The Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP) just concluded in calendar year 2009. Last year, as part of the FY 10 authorization process, the Air 

Force acknowledged the military requirement for a so-called ‘‘warm line’’ program 

to adequately sustain the Minuteman III with regard to the solid rocket boosters. 

For FY 11, the Air Force only proposes production of 3 Minuteman III boosters, 

when industry maintains that 6 booster sets are minimally necessary to sustain the 

industrial base. More disturbingly, the Air Force Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) 

contains $0 funding for Minuteman III Warm Line sustainment in FY 13 and beyond. 

At an earlier hearing this year, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Ms. 

Michele Flournoy, assured me that the large scale solid rocket motor industrial base 

issue would be addressed by this Administration more fully in the NPR. However, 

in reviewing the document made available to me, I cannot determine that it has 

been addressed at all. 

Please explain what is meant exactly by the phrase ‘‘DoD will continue the Minuteman III Life Extension Program.’’ 

General CHILTON. In the NPR, DoD committed to sustaining Minuteman III 

through 2030. Analysis conducted by U.S. Strategic Command in coordination with 

U.S. Air Force indicated Minuteman III is viable and sustainable through 2020. Additional sustainment efforts will be needed to extend operations to 2030. The Air 

Force is currently collecting data for use in analysis to determine the proper course 

to sustain our ICBM fleet to 2030. Once USAF completes the analysis, DoD will determine the best set of options to extend Minuteman III to 2030. 

Mr. BISHOP. Does the NPR address what number of Minuteman III booster sets 

are minimally necessary to sustain a viable warm-line sustainment program? 

General CHILTON. No, however, the NPR does commit to sustaining Minuteman 

through 2030. As you are aware, propulsion replacement program was completed in 

2009 and a warm-line minimum production program was created to help sustain the 

industrial base while the Air Force studied the path forward. 

Mr. BISHOP. What specific impacts would termination of NASA’s Ares 1 and Ares 

5 rocket motors have on the defense solid rocket motor industrial base? 

General CHILTON. There are no concrete estimates of the potential cost increases 

associated with the potential termination of Ares production. There is the potential 

that DoD programs could be impacted and share a larger portion of recurring costs. 

We look forward to Secretary Carter’s AT&L-led task force study on this issue to 

inform the Department’s investment strategy to ensure we can meet the nation’s 

strategic propulsion needs. 

Mr. BISHOP. If NASA’s proposal to terminate Ares 1 and Ares 5 is approved by 

Congress, is the DoD confident that the solid rocket motor industrial base will survive and be sufficiently robust to allow for future ICBM modernization options involving solid rocket motors, and what evidence would lead the DoD to having such 

an assurance? 

General CHILTON. The United States is the world’s premier manufacturer of solid 

rocket motors. If the industry is required to resize, special emphasis needs to be 

placed on managing risks and ensuring adequate investment to exercise the entire 
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design-to-production life cycle so we are prepared to meet the demands of strategic 

system sustainment and modernization. This is being examined closely by Dr. 

Carter’s AT&L-led task force and I defer to the results of his study. 

Mr. BISHOP. Is retention of a healthy large-scale solid rocket motor industrial base 

of vital strategic importance to the Defense Department of the United States? 

General CHILTON. The solid rocket motor industrial base is being reviewed by 

AT&L and will result in a full update report to the Congress. A viable solid rocket 

motor industrial base is a critical part of the broader industrial base needed to 

maintain safe, secure, and effective strategic force. As is the case with the nuclear 

weapons enterprise, we need to maintain sufficient and affordable capability and expertise required to recapitalize our deterrent propulsion needs. I am confident Secretary Carter’s AT&L-led task force study on this issue will inform the Department’s investment strategy to ensure we can continue to meet the nation’s strategic 

propulsion needs. 

Mr. BISHOP. Approximately 30 nations rely upon the current U.S. nuclear shield 

for shared deterrence. How will the security of these U.S. allies be impacted by the 

U.S. downsizing both warheads and delivery systems as contained in the new 

START treaty recently signed by the President? 

General CHILTON. As part of the development of the U.S. negotiating position in 

the New START negotiations, U.S. Strategic Command conducted an analysis of our 

nuclear forces’ capability to meet current employment guidance at reduced force levels. The New START treaty will allow the United States to deploy a nuclear triad 

capable of meeting that guidance. That guidance was developed with our current extended deterrence commitments in mind. Thus, from the perspective of the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command the reductions required by the New START treaty 

will not undermine our ability to provide extended deterrence. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS 

Mr. OWENS. Former Secretary of State George Shultz, who served from 1982 to 

1989, wrote in the Wall Street Journal that the recent Nuclear Posture Review is 

‘‘more relevant’’ than its predecessors that relied on the stockpiling of nuclear weapons alone to deter threats against our country. Would you agree that this Nuclear 

Posture Review better addresses the modern-day threats facing America and our allies, and how confident are you that it will address those threats ten years from 

now when the next NPR is set for release? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. I agree completely with Mr. Shultz’s characterization of the 

NPR. Our goal in developing our nuclear posture was to refocus our strategy on the 

most pressing threats today—nuclear terrorism and proliferation. We cannot address these threats through large stockpiles of nuclear weapons. This Administration’s NPR has adapted our policies to the realities of today’s world by placing these 

issues of nuclear terrorism and proliferation at the top of our nuclear agenda. In 

addition, the NPR lays out a strategy for working more closely with our allies, 

friends, and partners—including former adversaries—to strengthen international security and stability; increasing reliance on non-nuclear capabilities, including missile defense, and providing a necessary increase in the funding for the Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Plan that will ensure that the United States retains 

a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal for as long as nuclear weapons exist. 

We are working hard to generate a close, durable relationship with our Russian 

partners to set the stage for even further reductions. We are also working with 

China to develop strong ties and mutual understanding that will strengthen international and regional security. However, it is likely that the threats of nuclear terrorism and proliferation will endure over this timeframe. This NPR is a strategy to 

address these long-term threats, and provides a ‘‘roadmap’’ for continuity in our nuclear posture that future reviews will be able to build upon. 

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