UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

BANI MORENO, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 19-6028 

(D.C. No. 5:12-CR-00297-R-13) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, PHILLIPS, and EID, Circuit Judges. 

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Appellant, Bani Moreno, is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se. Moreno is 

appealing a district court’s order reducing his 151-month sentence to 131 months. 

Moreno argues the district court abused its discretion by failing to reduce his 

sentence to the low-end of the advisory guidelines range, that is, 121 months. 

Exercising our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

In 2013, Moreno was convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess with 

intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A); one 

 * This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

October 24, 2019

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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count of distribution of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A); one 

count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 

841(a)(1); and two counts of using a telecommunications device to facilitate a drug 

transaction, 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). 

Moreno’s total offense level was 34, and under the sentencing guidelines, he 

was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment from an advisory range of 151 to 188 

months. Moreno filed an appeal, and this Court affirmed his conviction. United States 

v. Moreno, 607 F. App’x 775, 776 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished). Moreno later filed 

a motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the district court denied. 

Moreno sought a certificate of appealability from this Court, which we denied, 

dismissing his appeal. United States v. Moreno, 655 F. App’x 708, 710 (10th Cir. 

2016) (unpublished). 

In 2014, Congress approved Amendment 782, which “reduced the base offense 

levels assigned to [most drugs and] drug quantities in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 . . . .” United 

States v. Kurtz, 819 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 2016). On December 26, 2018, under 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), Moreno filed a timely motion requesting a sentence reduction 

based on Amendment 782. The government did not object to a sentence reduction.

The district court recalculated Moreno’s total offense level at 32 and his resulting 

advisory sentencing range at 121 to 151 months. Then the district court resentenced 

Moreno to a mid-range sentence, 131 months. Moreno filed a motion to reconsider, 

arguing that the district court had no reason to reduce his sentence by twenty months 

instead of by thirty months. The district court denied the motion. Moreno appealed 
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the district court’s order, arguing the district court abused its discretion by not 

sufficiently explaining why it chose a mid-range sentence of 131 months. 

DISCUSSION 

We review de novo a district court’s resentencing determination under 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Chavez-Meza (Chavez-Meza I), 854 F.3d 655, 

657 (10th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 1959 (2018); United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 

824 F.3d 1218, 1220–21 (10th Cir. 2016). Moreno argues the district court abused its 

discretion by insufficiently explaining its mid-range sentence. The Supreme Court 

rejected a similar argument in Chavez-Meza v. United States (Chavez-Meza II), 138 

S. Ct. 1959, 1965 (2018). 

In Chavez-Meza I, the defendant was sentenced to 135 months’ imprisonment 

for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. 854 F.3d at 

657. With Congress’s approval, the Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 

782, which lowered the sentencing range applicable to the defendant. See id; see U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.10(b)(1) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2014). In 

response, the defendant requested a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), 

and the district court issued an order reducing the defendant’s sentence to 114 

months. 854 F.3d at 657. In its sentencing order, the district court stated that it had 

considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors “to the extent that they [were] 

applicable.” Id. The district court provided no further explanation. Id. The defendant 

challenged the district court’s sentence-reduction order, arguing the district court 

erred “by failing to adequately explain how it applied the § 3553(a) factors” in 
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imposing a mid-range sentence reduction as opposed to a low-end reduction. Id. at 

656. We affirmed the district court after finding it had at least considered the 

§ 3553(a) factors. Id. 

The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court 

affirmed. Chavez-Meza II, 138 S. Ct. at 1963. The Supreme Court held that “where 

. . . ‘the record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and 

arguments, we do not believe the law requires the judge to write more extensively.’” 

Id. at 1964 (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007)). The Supreme 

Court further concluded that where a case is simple, and the sentence is within the 

guidelines range, a court need not provide an in-depth explanation of its decision, and 

a sentencing court may rely on the record and the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 1964–65. 

The Supreme Court also considered that the sentencing judge had the record before 

him during the resentencing and that it was the same judge who had ordered both the 

original sentence and the sentence modification. Id. at 1967. 

Here, the judge who ordered Moreno’s original sentence also ordered his 

sentence modification, so he was familiar with the record and defendant. Also, the 

district court stated in its resentencing order that it had considered the § 3553(a) 

factors. The district court additionally explained two specific considerations for the 

mid-range sentence: Moreno’s “lack of contrition,” and his “not insignificant 

involvement” in the methamphetamine operation. R. at 47. The § 3553(a) factors 

include “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant[,] the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the 
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seriousness of the offense . . . [and] to protect the public from further crimes of the 

defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2)(C). Both considerations fall within these 

factors, confirming the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors. Though the 

court could have explained its sentencing determination more fully, its effort suffices 

under Chavez-Meza II. Accordingly, Moreno’s abuse-of-discretion argument must 

fail. 

CONCLUSION 

We affirm the district court’s order reducing Moreno’s sentence to 131 

months. 

Moreno’s motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis is granted. But 

28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not allow litigants to avoid payment of filing and docketing 

fees—only the prepayment of those fees. Moreno is still required to pay the full 

amount of the filing fee in this matter. See § 1915(b). 

Entered for the Court 

Gregory A. Phillips 

Circuit Judge