THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

The State, Respondent,

v.

Lawrence Burgess, Petitioner.

Appellate Case No. 2011-194288

ON WRI T OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal From Lexington County James W. Johnson, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 27405 Heard October 16, 2013 – Filed July 2, 2014

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

Appellate Defender Kath rine Haggard Hudgins, of Columbia, for

Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistan t Deputy Attorney General Deborah

R.J. Shupe, all of Columbia; Solicito r Donald V. Myers, of Lexington, for Respondent.

JUSTICE BEATTY: Lawrence Burgess was convicted of possession of

crack cocaine with intent to distribute a nd sentenced to three years in prison and ordered to pay a $25,000 fine. Th e Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Burgess

,393 S.C. 396, 712 S.E.2d 1 (Ct. App. 2011). Following the denial of his petition for rehearing, Burgess petitioned this Cour t for a writ of certiorari to review the decision. We granted the petition to anal yze whether: (1) the multi-jurisdictional drug-enforcement agreement, which formed the purported basis of the arresting officer's authority to arrest Burgess outside of the officer's territorial jurisdiction, satisfied the statutory prerequisites to c onstitute a valid agreement; and (2) Burgess should have been permitted to cross-ex amine the arresting officer with his personnel records pursuant to Rule 608( c) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. Although we find the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed Burgess's conviction, we disagree with the c ourt's conclusion regarding the multijurisdictional drug-enforcement agreement. Accordingly, we affirm as modified.

I. Factual / Procedural History

On March 2, 2006, officers with the Lexington County Narcotics Enforcement Team (NET) executed a sear ch warrant for a trailer at 7120 Two Notch Road in Batesburg, South Carolina, which had been the site of several controlled drug buys. When Agent Billy Laney of the Lexington County Sheriff's Department and Officer Emmitt Gillia m of the Batesburg- Leesville Police Department pulled into the driveway, th ey saw Burgess and another individual standing by a trailer that was not the target of the search warrant. The officers then witnessed Burgess run around the back of the trailer. Officer Gilliam ran around

the other side of the trailer "to cut him o ff." When Officer Gilliam got within five to six feet of Burgess, he commanded hi m to stop and put his hands up. Officer Gilliam placed Burgess under arrest and handcuffed him with the assistance of Agent Eric Kirkland of the Lexington C ounty Sheriff's Department. Agent Laney "backtracked" Burgess's step s to where Burgess had been standing and discovered a pill bottle top and pieces of crack cocai ne on the ground. The substance found on the ground was chemically tested and de termined to be 5.67 grams of crack cocaine. As a result, a Lexington County grand jury indicted Burgess for possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute.

In a pre-trial hearing, Burgess moved to dismiss the charge for lack of jurisdiction. Burgess asserted that O fficer Gilliam lacked authority to arrest Burgess in an area outside the officer's territorial jurisdiction of the BatesburgLeesville town limits. Although the Stat e maintained that the Lexington County Multi-Agency Narcotics Enforcement Team Agreement (NET Agreement) conferred authority for extra-territorial juri sdiction, Burgess disputed its validity onthe ground it failed to comply with the stat utory prerequisites of sections 23-1-210 1

and 23-1-215 2 of the South Carolina Code.

1 At the time of the agreement's execu tion, section 23-1-210 provided in relevant
part:

(A) Any municipal or county law enforcement officer may be transferred on a temporary basis to work in law enforcement in any other municipality or county in this State under the conditions set forth in this section, and when so transferred shall ha ve all powers and authority of a law enforcement offi cer employed by the jurisdiction to

which he is transferred.

(B) Prior to any transfer as authorized in subsection (A), the concerned municipalities or coun ties shall enter into written

agreements stating the conditions and terms of the temporary employment of officers to be transferred. The bond for any officer transferred shall include coverage for his activity in the municipality or county to which he is transfe rred in the same manner and to the same extent provided by bonds of re gularly employed officers of that municipality or county.

S.C. Code Ann. § 23- 1-210 (2007) (emphasis added) . In 2007, subsection (A) was amended to provide that "[a]ny municipa l or county law enforcement officer may be transferred or assigned on a temporary ba sis to work in law enforcement within multijurisdictional task forces establishe d for the mutual aid and benefit of the participating jurisdictions ." Act No. 3, 2007 S.C. Acts 4 (emphasis added).

2 Section 23-1-215 provi ded in relevant part:

(A) In the event of a crime where multiple jurisdictions, either county or municipal, are involved, law enforcement officers are authorized to exercise jurisdic tion within other counties or municipalities for the purpose of criminal investigation only if a written agreement between or among the law enforcement agencies

involved has been executed . This limitation on law enforcement activity shall not apply to any activity authorized by § 17-13-40.

(B) Any law enforcement officer work ing under this agreement is vested with equal authority and jurisdiction outside his residentInitially, Burgess argued that secti on 23-1-215 was the controlling statute because it provides authority for the ins titution of "agreeme nts between multiple law enforcement jurisdictions." Be cause the governing bodies of BatesburgLeesville and Lexington County were not provided written notice of the NET Agreement's execution as required by subsec tion (E) of section 23-1-215, Burgess claimed the agreement was invalid. Additi onally, Burgess asserted that section 23

- 1-210 did not apply to the NET Agreemen t as that section is limited "to the temporary transfer of an officer." In th e alternative, he argue d that the agreement did not comply with section 23-1-210 b ecause it was executed by law enforcement officers and not by "council members."

In response to Burgess's motion, th e State presented a copy of the NET Agreement that was entered into by eleven law enforcement agencies in Lexington County 3 on September 18, 2001. 4 The NET Agreement, wh ich referenced sections 23-1-210 and 23-1-215, 5 stated in relevant part:

jurisdiction for the purpose of inve stigation, arrest, or any other activity related to the criminal ac tivity for which the agreement was

drawn.

. . . .

(E) The respective governing bodies of the political subdivisions,

wherein each of the law enforcem ent agencies entering into the agreement authorized in subsection (A) is located, must be notified by its agency of the agreement' s execution and termination. The notification must be in writing and accomplished within seventy-two hours of the agreement's execution and within seventy-two hours of the agreement's termination

.

.C. Code Ann. § 23- 1-215 (2007) (emphasis added). In 2007, this code section as amended. Act No. 3, 2007 S.C. Acts 5. This am endment, however, does not ffect the disposition of this case.

The agencies included Batesbur g-Leesville Police Department, Cayce

epartment of Public Safety, Chapin Police Department, Columbia Metropolitan irport Police Department, Gaston Poli ce Department, Irmo Police Department, exington County Sheriff's Department, Pine Ridge Police Department, South ongaree Police Department, Springdale Police Department, and West Columbia olice Department. S

w

a

3

D

A

L

C

PWHEREAS, it is the desire and in tent of the parties to evidence their joint undertaking for the pr ovision of mutual assistance in criminal narcotics investigations by the creation and operation of a multijurisdictional task force within Lexington County.

WHEREAS, the parties as set out above, by and through their representatives affixing their signa tures below, consent and agree to span the geopolitical boundaries of all areas of Lexington County to the fullest extent allowed under South Carolina law for the express purpose of investigating the illegal use of controlled substances and related crimes by creating this Lexington County Multi-Agency Narcotics Enforcement Team [.]

. . . .

1. SCOPE OF SERVICES

It is agreed that the law enforcem ent agency parties shall assign, on a temporary basis, officers to pa rticipate in the Lexington County Multijurisdictional Drug Enforcement Unit for the duration of this agreement or until this agreement is rescinded as set forth herein.

2. TERM AND RENEWAL

This agreement is effective as to ea ch party at the date and time of signing and will automatically rene w one year from the above date unless a party exercises its right to terminate as further described

herein.

4 The NET Agreement was amended in May 2002 and July 2005 to add other law enforcement agencies; however, the subs tantive provisions of the agreement

remained the same.

5 The NET Agreement also referenced Article VIII, Section 13 of the South

Carolina Constitution and section 17-13-4 5 of the South Carolina Code. These sections, however, are not at issue in the instant case. See S.C. Const. art. VIII, § 13 (authorizing joint administration of functions and exercise of powers among counties, municipalities, or other political subdivisions of the State); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-45 (2003) (providing auth ority for law enforcement responding to distress call or request for assistan t in an adjacent jurisdiction).3. VESTING OF AUTHORIT Y AND JURISDICTION

To the fullest extent permitted by the Constitution and statutes of this State, officers assigned under this agreement and so transferred shall be vested with authority, ju risdiction, rights, immunities, and privileges to include the authorit y to execute criminal process and the power of arrest as any othe r duly commissioned officer of any other party.

. . . .

10. RESPONSIBILITY TO RE SPECTIVE GOVERNING BODIES

Each party is responsible for any notice, reporting, or approval requirements to their respective governing body as may be required under South Carolina law.

11. OFFICERS ASSIGNED

Each party agrees to designate and transmit in writing, the names of those individuals assigned to perform duties under this agreement to the other parties. U pon receipt, such is to be made a part of and is incorporated by re ference into this agreement.

In explaining the agreement, the Stat e showed that it was signed by Chief

Wallace Oswald on behalf of the Town of Batesburg-Leesville. According to the State, Chief Oswald entered into th e NET Agreement based on the advice and consent of the Batesburg-Leesville To wn Council (Town Council). The State introduced a videotape of an August 31, 2001 Town Council meeting during which

Chief Oswald informed Town Council of "that pending ma tter between the solicitor and the town of Batesburg[-]Le esville forming a multi-jurisdictional agreement for continue d narcotics work in Lexington County."

The State also introdu ced minutes from the Janua ry 8 and December 10, 2002, Lexington County Counc il (County Council) meetings through the Clerk of the County Council. The January 8 mi nutes show County Council considered grant application requests from the sheriff' s department for a N ET. The December 10 minutes reflect that County Council voted in favor of grant requests regarding additional staff positions in both the solic itor's and sheriff's office to focus on the

NET.In conjunction with the minutes, the State presented testimony from Marguerite Crapps, the mayor pro tem of th e Batesburg-Leesville Town Council. When asked whether the Batesburg-Lees ville Town Council was "on board with the chief of police [to] ente r into this agreement on the behalf of Town Council of Batesburg-Leesville," Crapps responded, "Yes."

Lieutenant Byron Snellgrove, who was employed with the narcotics unit of the Lexington County Sheriff's Department, was the NET supervisor at all times relevant to this case. Lieutenant Snellg rove testified Chief Oswald and the Town of Batesburg-Leesville assigned Officer G illiam, of the Bates burg-Leesville Police Department, to the NET. He then assigned Office r Gilliam to the BatesburgLeesville area of Lexington County "to take ca re of cases inside the town limits as

well as outside the town limits." Af ter Officer Gilliam advised Lieutenant Snellgove that "there were drug [s ales] going on at 7120 Two Notch Road," Lieutenant Snellgrove asked Gilliam "to try to make a case or get into that location one way or another." Lieutenant Snellg rove then requested that Officer Gilliam help with the drug problem at that location pursuant to the NET Ag reement.

Based on this evidence, the State cont ended that the notice requirement of

section 23-1-215 was met because bot h County Council and Town Council had actual notice of the NET Agreement and approved their respective law enforcement agencies' participation in the NET. In contrast to the defense, the State believed the notice provision of sec tion 23-1-215 was "purely ministerial and administrative," similar to the ten-day noti ce requirement for the return of a search warrant to the magistrate upon the execution of the search warran t. Thus, the State asserted that section 23-1-215(E) should not be "strictly construed" to require

written notice.

Additionally, the State maintained the NET Agreement satisfied the provisions of section 23-1-210. Because the governing bodies had actual notice of the NET Agreement and its terms, the St ate claimed that ch ief law enforcement

officers were authorized to enter into these agreements "with the advice and consent of county council." The State ex plained that Chief Oswald "acting as agent for the corporate municipality of Batesburg[-]Leesville [had] apparent authority to bind them . . . because he had the total responsibility of law

enforcement within that town."

After hearing arguments, the trial judge found the State failed to present evidence that written notification had been given within 72 hours of the agreement's execution as required by section 23-1-215(E). The judge, however,ruled that the NET Agreement complied with section 23-1-210 because he found nothing in the statute "that would prohibit either a county or a municipality . . . from authorizing in some way the chief of police or the sheriff to enter into such agreements." Although the judge was uncle ar as to which code section the NET Agreement was based, he c oncluded the agreement was cr eated pursuant to section 23-1-210. As a result, the judge deni ed Burgess's motion to dismiss.

Subsequently, the State made a motion in limine to exclude Officer Gilliam's personnel records. The judge sustained th e State's motion, but indicated that he would consider the motion if Burgess "w anted to get into" these records.

During Officer Gilliam's testimony, Bu rgess sought to cross-examine him about why he was no longer with NET and to introduce his personnel records. The records, which describe three incidents that took place after Burgess's arrest but before trial, involved a disagreement w ith other officers about the use of confidential informants, his use of profanity , and his threat to harm another officer. The incidents resulted in a two-day suspension, a demotion to the rank of Corporal, and a ninety-day period of probation. The judge excluded the records, finding the personnel matters were irrelevant and highly prejudicial.

Ultimately, the jury found Burgess gu ilty of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. Burgess appeal ed his conviction to the Court of Appeals,

which affirmed. State v. Burgess , 393 S.C. 396, 712 S.E.2d 1 (Ct. App. 2011). In so ruling, the court upheld the trial judge's decision that the NET Agreement complied with the requirement s of section 23-1-210. Id. at 402, 712 S.E.2d at 4. Specifically, the court found: (1) the c oncerned municipalities and county entered into a written agreement to create multi-jurisdictional la w enforcement authority; (2) the agreement complied with the requi rements of section 23-1-210 by stating the employment conditions and mainta ining compensation from permanent employment; and (3) the officers acting with the NET were transferred to it on a temporary basis. Id. The court further found Ch ief Oswald informed Town Council of the NET Agreement before its execution, a nd Town Council gave him the authority to enter into the agreement. Id.

Additionally, the court distinguished the case from State v. Boswell , 391 S.C. 592, 707 S.E.2d 265 (201 1), which was decided by this Court during the pendency of Burgess's appeal. 6 The Court of Appeals found Boswell inapposite as

6 In Boswell , the defendant was convicted of first-degree burglary. Boswell , 391 S.C. at 594, 707 S.E.2d at 265. On appeal, Boswell argued, among other issues,the NET Agreement was not entered pursuan t to the Law Enforcement Assistance and Support Act and, thus, section 23- 20-50(A) of the Act did not apply. Burgess

, 393 S.C. at 403, 712 S.E.2d at 4-5. Rathe r, the court found the NET Agreement was "made pursuant to section 23-1-210, pa rt of a different chapter from the Law Enforcement Assistance and Support Act entitled 'General Provisions.' " Id.

Having found the NET Agreement was va lid pursuant to section 23-1-210,

the court declined to address its validity under section 23-1-215. Id. at 403-04, 712

S.E.2d at 5.

As to the judge's ruling regardi ng the admission of Officer Gilliam's personnel records, the Court of Appeals found the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding these records. Id. at 404-05, 712 S.E.2d at 5. In so ruling, the court interpreted the judge's decision "as a finding that the records did not have a legitimate tendency to show bias on the part of the officer." Id. at 405, 712

S.E.2d at 5. The court noted that each incident in Officer Gilliam's personnel records occurred after Burgess's arrest and none of the incidents related directly to Burgess. Id. Additionally, the court concluded that while the personnel incidents "might show Gilliam to be hot-tempered and uncooperative with other officers, they do not show his bias against Burg ess, or otherwise relate to Gilliam's credibility." Id.

Burgess petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. This Court granted the petition.

that the trial judge erred in declining to suppress his confessions as they were the direct result of an unlawful arrest by officers acting outside their territorial jurisdiction. Id. at 594, 707 S.E.2d at 266. Sp ecifically, Boswell contended the Lexington County officers were without aut hority to arrest him for a crime that occurred in Calhoun County. Id. at 598, 707 S.E.2d at 268. The State offered evidence of a 1999 multi-jurisdictional ag reement entered into between the Calhoun County and Lexington County Sheriff' s Departments that purported to confer the authority of officers to arre st in the other county's jurisdiction. Id. In assessing the validity of the agreement, th is Court applied section 23-20-50(A) of

the Law Enforcement Assi stance and Support Act. Id . at 601, 707 S.E.2d at 270. Because the agreement was "not voted on by the county council" as required by section 23-20-50(A) of the Act, th is Court deemed it invalid. Id. at 602, 707

S.E.2d at 270.II. Discussion

A. Multi-Jurisdictional Agreement

In advocating the reversal of the deci sion of the Court of Appeals, Burgess posits three arguments. First, he contends that Boswell is dispositive as he broadly construes the holding to require all multi- jurisdictional agreements to be voted on by the governing body of each jurisdictio n pursuant to section 23-20-50(A). Second, he asserts the agreement failed to strictly comply with the provisions of section 23-1-210 as the "State presented no written verification that the Batesburg/Leesville town council authorized the Chief of Police to entered into the agreement [on] behalf of the council." Burgess further notes that "there is no mention of the County authorizing Sheri ff Metts to enter into the agreement on behalf of the County." Finally, Burgess ma intains that it is "questionable" whether section 23-1-215 is applicable to the fact s of the instant case as he believes this code section only applies to situations where a crime has occurred in multiple jurisdictions. 7 Even if applicable, Burgess av ers that law enforcement failed to comply with the statutorily required writt en notice provision of subsection (E). Because the validity of a multi-jurisdictional agreement is dependent upon strict compliance, he disputes the State's conten tion that actual notice is sufficient.

1. Implications of Boswell

We agree with the C ourt of Appeals that Boswell is not controlling as it is factually and legally distinguishable. Howe ver, as will be discussed, we find the interpretation of Boswell by the Court of Appeals was entirely too narrow.

7 As a threshold matter, Burgess asse rts that any argument regarding the applicability of section 23-1-215 is not pr eserved for appellate review because the State did not appeal the trial judge's decisi on as to this statute and raised it for the

first time in its final brief to the Court of Appeals and in its return to Burgess's petition for a writ of certiorari. We find th e issue is properly before this Court because the State challenged the trial judge's ruling on this issue as an additional sustaining ground to the Court of Appeals and to this Court. See I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant , 338 S.C. 406, 420, 526 S.E.2d 716, 723 (2000) ("The appellate court may review respondent's additional reasons and, if convinced it is proper and fair to do so, rely on them or a ny other reason appearing in the record to affirm the lower court's judgment.").Initially, we note that Burgess did not argue to the trial judge or to the Court of Appeals that section 23-20-50(A) wa s applicable; therefore, any argument regarding this statute is not pr eserved for appellate review. See State v. Sheppard

, 391 S.C. 415, 706 S.E.2d 16 (2011) (stating that an issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal). Furtherm ore, unlike the agreement in Boswell , the NET agreement in the instant case does not reference section 23-20-50 or contain a provision outlining the public safety situations identified in section 23-20-30. 8
Thus, we agree with the ultimate conc lusion reached by the Court of Appeals regarding the inapplicability of Boswell

.

However, we find th e court interpreted Boswell too narrowly as it infers that section 23-20-50(A) either conflicts with or is mutually exclusive from sections 23-1-210 and 23-1-215. This is an incorrect reading of Boswell . Because all of

these code sections are contained w ithin Title 23, which is entitled "Law Enforcement and Public Safety," these sec tions cannot be read in isolation as the Court of Appeals appears to have done. See Higgins v. State , 307 S.C. 446, 415 S.E.2d 799 (1992) (recognizing rule of statut ory construction that statutes must be read as a whole and sections which are pa rt of the same general statutory scheme must be construed together and each given effect, if it can be done by any reasonable construction).

Although we question why the General Assembly ha s failed to consolidate these sections into one that would gove rn all multi-jurisdictional agreements, we believe the separate sections were enacted as a result of legislative progression. Specifically, section 23-1-210 was enacte d in 1981 to address the temporary

transfer of law enforcement officers to another jurisdiction, section 23-1-215 was enacted in 1987 to expressly address crimes that occur in multiple jurisdictions,

and section 23-20-50 was enac ted in 2000 to authorize law enforcement to assist other jurisdictions with certa in public safety concerns. 9 Notably, the drafters of these agreements appear to recognize th is interrelationship as the agreements usually include a reference to all of these sections.

8 The agreement in Boswell implicitly included section 23-20-50 as it notes that one of the purposes of the agreement is to "provide mutual aid in the event of natural disaster, disorder, or other emer gency situations." It also expressly provided that the agreement does not affe ct any agreements regarding narcotics investigations.

9 Act No. 109, 1981 S.C. Acts 402; Act No. 107, 1987 S.C. Acts 262; Act No. 382, 2000 S.C. Acts 2604.2. Propriety of NET Agreement und er sections 23-1-210 and 23-1

- 215

Even though Boswell is not dispositive of the instant case, it is nonetheless

instructive because it stands for the proposition that statutes governing multijurisdictional agreements must be strictly complied with to ensure the validity of the agreement. See Boswell , 391 S.C. at 602, 707 S.E. 2d at 270 (recognizing the significance of territorial jurisdiction and concluding that a "more stringent approach needs to be followed in order to confer this type of authority"). Applying this principle to the instant case, we hol d the NET Agreement is invalid as it does not satisfy the statutory requirements of either section 23-1-210 or section 23-1

- 215.

a. Section 23-1-210

As a matter of state statute, the Town of Batesburg-Leesville and Lexington County operate and govern through To wn Council and C ounty Council. See S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9-30(3), (13) (1986 & Supp. 2013) ("[E]ach county government within the authority granted by the Constitu tion and subject to the general law of this State shall have the following enumer ated powers which shall be exercised by the respective governing bodies thereof: (3) to make and execute contracts . . . (13) to participate in multi-county project s and programs authorized by the general law and appropriate funds ther efor . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 5-7-160 (2004) ("All powers of the municipality ar e vested in the council, except as otherwise provided by law, and the council shall provide fo r the exercise thereof and for the performance of all duties and obligations imposed on the municipality by law." (emphasis added)).

Consistent with this general author ization of power, subsection (B) of

section 23-1-210 mandates th at "the concerned munici palities or counties" enter into written agreements providing for the tr ansfer of its law enforcement officers to another municipality or county. S.C. Code Ann. § 23-1 -210(B) (2007). Certainly, there is evidence that County Council ap proved grant requests to fund additional staff positions associated with NET and To wn Council was verbally informed of the "pending matter between the solicitor and the town of Batesburg[-] Leesville forming a multi-jurisdictional agreement. " These procedures, however, did not constitute express approval by "the concerned municipalities or counties" as to the actual NET Agreement. In fact, the record reveals th at the terms of the NET Agreement were never presented to th e governing bodies for their approval. Instead, the only evidence is that Chief Os wald and Sheriff Metts entered into theNET Agreement on behalf of their law en forcement agencies. Thus, without the express approval of Town Council and County Council, the NET Agreement failed to strictly comply with the statutor y requirements of section 23-1-210.

Notwithstanding the lack of strict stat utory compliance, the State contends the agreement is, nevertheless, valid as the governing entities provided Chief Oswald and Sheriff Metts with appare nt authority to enter into the NET Agreement. We reject this contention as Town Council and County Council could not delegate this authority.

Because the authority to enter into these agreements was statutorily conferred upon the governing entities, these entities were prohibited from abdicating this power and delegating it to a law enforcement officer. See 2A Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 10:46 (3d ed. 1996) ("Usually a power conferred without lim itation upon the municipal corporation may be exercised by the co mmon council or legislative body as the general agent of the corporation, and by no other author ity. A fortiori, power conferred upon the council or legislative body in express terms cannot be delegated otherwise than in accordance with the expression of te rms." (footnotes omitted)); 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 206 (Supp. 2013) ("The governing body of a municipal corporation, entrusted by the state with the police power, is prevented from delegating its high functions to any body or officer; instead, it may be discharged or exercised only by those to whom the state commits it." (footnotes omitted)); see also Newman v. McCullough , 212 S.C. 17, 25-26, 46 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1948) (recognizing that a municipal council, "ac ting as a governmental agency, . . . is bound always to act as trustee of the pow er delegated to it and may not surrender or restrict any portion of such power conferred upon it").

Thus, strictly construing section 23-1- 210, we are constrained to find the NET Agreement was invalid as Town Co uncil and County Council were the only entities authorized to enter into this multi-jurisdictional agreement. If law enforcement agencies are to have this aut hority, it is for the General Assembly and not this Court to grant them this authority. See 80 C.J.S. Sheriffs & Constables § 51 (Supp. 2013) ("Sheriffs and constables have a ll the powers and duties appertaining to their office at common law except as modified by a statute or the

state constitution."). 10

10 Even assuming Chief Oswald was authori zed to enter into the NET Agreement on behalf of the Town of Batesburg-L eesville, we find Officer Gilliam was not "transferred on a temporary basis to wo rk in law enforcement in any otherb. Section 23-1-215

Although not addressed by the Court of Appeals, we find the trial judge correctly ruled the NET Agreement did not comply with the provisions of section 23-1-215 as the State presented no evidence that County Council or Town Council

received written notification w ithin seventy-two hours of the execution of the NET Agreement as required by subsection (E). S. C. Code Ann. § 23-1 -215(E) (2007).

Furthermore, it is arguable that sec tion 23-1-215 was factually inapplicable as one could construe this section to gove rn only the investigation of past crimes rather than to provide blanket extra-terr itorial jurisdiction to officers addressing potential criminal activity. As titled, th e purpose of section 23-1-215 is to authorize "[a]greements between multiple law enforcement jurisdictions for purpose of criminal investigation." Id. § 23-1-215. Subsection (A) then states in the past tense, "[i]n the event of a crime" involving multiple jurisdictions; 11 thus, by implication, the statute authorizes agr eements for the investigation of completed crimes spanning multiple jurisdictions.

In the instant case, Officer Gilliam was assigned to assist in the execution of a search warrant for a specific trailer at 7120 Two Notch Road. Because Burgess was not the subject of this investigation as he did not reside at this trailer and was

arrested near a trailer that was not the target of the search warrant, we do not

municipality or county in this State." Id. § 23-1-210(A). Nota bly, the agreement was executed in September 2001 and the a rrest occurred in March 2006. There is

also evidence that Officer Gilliam worked on NET for at least a year and a half. Thus, although he may have be en assigned to assist in the execution of the search warrant, Officer Gilliam had relied on th e provisions of the NET Agreement to claim extra-territorial authority for an extended duration. Accordingly, even though "temporary" is not defined by sect ion 23-1-210, Officer Gilliam's extended service under the NET Agreement cannot be c onstrued as a "temporary" transfer as intended by the statute. See State v. Hudson , 336 S.C. 237, 519 S.E.2d 577 (Ct. App. 1999) (acknowledging rule of statutory construction that when faced with an undefined statutory term, the court must inte rpret the term in accord with its usual and customary meaning).

11 We note the 2007 amendment to section 23-1-215 expressly included past tense language stating, "In the ev ent of a crime or crimes that have occurred . . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 23-1-215(A) (Su pp. 2013) (emphasis added).believe section 23-1-215 could be interp reted to confer authority on Officer Gilliam to arrest Burgess.

c. Valid Conviction Despite Invalid Agreement

Despite our finding that the NET Agreement was invalid, we conclude that Burgess's conviction was, nevertheless, valid. Alth ough Officer Gilliam lacked authority to arrest Burgess, Agents Lane y and Kirkland, who were authorized with territorial jurisdiction in Lexington County, pl ayed an integral role in the arrest and discovery of the drugs that formed the basis of the conviction.

Section 44-53-375(B) of the South Car olina Code creates a permissive inference that possession of one or more gr ams of a "cocaine base" is "prima facie evidence" of possession with intent to dist ribute. S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-375(B) (Supp. 2007). 12 "Possession may be actual or constructive." State v. Ballenger

, 322 S.C. 196, 199, 470 S.E. 2d 851, 854 (1996). "Actual possession occurs when the drugs are found to be in the actual physical custody of the person charged with possession, while constructive possession o ccurs when the person charged with possession has dominion and control over e ither the drugs or the premises upon which the drugs are found." Id. (citation omitted).

Here, the evidence was sufficient to prove Burgess possessed crack cocaine with intent to distribute. Notably, Bu rgess fled when Agent Laney and Officer Gilliam arrived at the target location; th us, indicating consciousness of guilt. See

State v. Walker , 366 S.C. 643, 655, 623 S.E. 2d 122, 128 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Unexplained flight is admissible as indi cating consciousness of guilt, for it is not as likely that one who is blameless and conscious of that fact would flee."). Officer Gilliam apprehended Burgess with the assistance of Agent Kirkland. Agent Laney then independently searched for and discovered 5.67 grams of crack cocaine and a pill bottle top in the ar ea from which Burgess fled.

Even if we assume that Burgess's a rrest was invalid, such an assumption would be of no consequence to Burgess as this Court has held that "the illegality of

an initial arrest did not bar the accu sed person's subsequent prosecution and conviction of the offense charge." State v. Biehl , 271 S.C. 201, 204, 246 S.E.2d 859, 860 (1978). The Biehl Court pointed out that no evidence used in Biehl's trial was acquired as a result of th e arrest. The same is true in Burgess's trial. The

12 Because the offense occurred in March 2006, we cite to the code section in

effect at that time.recovery of the crack cocaine by Agent Laney was directly re lated to Burgess's conduct during his furtive flight. Burgess attempted to flee i mmediately when he saw the arrival of Agent Laney and O fficer Gilliam. Agent Laney followed Burgess's furtive flight path and found the drugs in an area where Burgess had been standing. Thus, the crack cocaine , which formed the basis for Burgess's conviction, was not fruit of the arrest. Specifically, the drugs were not found on Burgess's person nor were they located as a result of anything Burgess said after he was arrested. Rather, the drugs were i ndependently found by Agent Laney of the Lexington County Sheriff's Office.

Finally, Burgess's reliance on our decision in Boswell is unavailing. After Boswell was arrested, he confessed to the arresting officers. Boswell , 391 S.C. at 597, 707 S.E.2d at 267. Accordingly, we held that the confessions should have been excluded at trial as they were the fruit of the invalid arrest. Id. at 606, 707 S.E.2d at 272. However, in this case, Bu rgess did not confess nor were the drugs found on his person or his property.

In light of the foregoing, we find the invalid NET Agreement did not negate the authority of Agents Laney and Kirkland to charge Burgess with the offense for

which he was convicted.

III. Cross-Examination

Burgess next asserts the trial judge erred in refusing to allow crossexamination about Officer Gilliam's personne l records as the records constituted

evidence of bias and motive to misrepresent pursuant to Rule 608(c), SCRE.

Burgess maintains that Officer Gilliam' s credibility as a witness was "a key issue at trial" because he was the only w itness to testify that Burgess dropped a pill

bottle that contained crack cocaine residue. Burgess also notes that neither Agent Laney nor Officer Gilliam witnessed Burg ess in actual possession of the crack cocaine that was discovered on the ground. In view of this evidence, Burgess contends "the jury . . . had a right to know about Gilliam's disciplinary problems

and removal from the NET because the info rmation had a legitimate tendency to throw light on the accuracy, truthfulness and sincerity of Gilliam's testimony." Specifically, Burgess claims "[t]he reco rds portray Gilliam as an overzealous narcotics officer who was willing to use unre liable confidential informants in order to make an arrest and who violated pr otocols of the NET concerning the use of

confidential informants.""Rule 608(c), SCRE, provides that bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced." State v. Sims , 348 S.C. 16, 25, 558 S.E.2d 518, 523 (2002). "Rule 608(c) 'preserves South Carolina precedent holding that generally, anything having a leg itimate tendency to throw light on the accuracy, truthfulness, and sincerity of a witness may be shown and considered in determining the credit to be accorded his testimony.' " Id. ( quoting State v. Jones

, 343 S.C. 562, 570, 541 S.E.2d 813, 817 (2001)).

"As a general rule, a trial court's ruling on the proper scope of crossexamination will not be disturbed abse nt a manifest abuse of discretion." State v. Quattlebaum , 338 S.C. 441, 450, 527 S.E.2d 105, 109 (2000). An abuse of

discretion occurs when the trial court's ruli ng either lacks evidentiary support or is

based on an error of law. State v. Pagan , 369 S.C. 201, 631 S.E.2d 262 (2006).

We find the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the trial judge's decision prohibiting Burgess from cross-examin ing Officer Gilliam about his personnel

records as we discern no abuse of discreti on. Significantly, each of the disciplinary incidents occurred after Burge ss's arrest and did not involve Burgess. Furthermore,

Officer Gilliam's hostile actions were directed at co-workers rather than subjects of criminal investigation. Thus, Burgess fa iled to offer evidence that Officer Gilliam lacked credibility due to bias against Burgess. Accordingly, the trial judge properly limited Burgess's cross-ex amination of Officer Gilliam. Cf. Baldez v.

State , 386 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) (d iscussing Rule 608 and holding that trial judge did not err in prohibiting defe ndant from cross-examining the arresting officer concerning his disciplinary suspen sion for the sole purpose of showing the officer's lack of credibility as the defe ndant never argued that the officer was untrustworthy due to bias or interest against the defendant).

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we hold the N ET Agreement was invalid and, thus,

did not confer extra-territorial jurisdiction upon Officer Gilliam. See State v.

Harris , 299 S.C. 157, 159, 382 S.E.2d 925, 926 (1989) ("The jurisdiction of a municipal police officer, absent statutor y authority, generally does not extend beyond the territorial limits of the munici pality."). Our decision should not be construed as invalidating all multi-juri sdictional agreements. Instead, we recognize the import of these agreements and emphasize that they are not invalid per se. The validity of these agreemen ts, however, is dependent upon strict compliance with the appli cable statutes. Because the NET Agreement in theinstant case failed to satisfy the statutory requirements, we are constrained to find

that it is invalid.

However, despite the invalidity of the NET Agreement, we find the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed Burgess's co nviction as Officer Gilliam's lack of authority did not negate Agents Laney's and Kirkland's authority in Lexington County. Thus, Officer Gilliam's lack of authority did not vitiate the valid conviction. Moreover, we find the Cour t of Appeals correctly upheld the trial judge's decision prohibiting Burgess from cross-examining Officer Gilliam regarding his personnel records as we discern no abuse of discretion.

Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

TOAL, C.J., KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur. PLEICONES, J., concurring in result only.