* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 96-50243

Summary Calendar

____________________

GASTON A. SHUMATE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., et al.,

Defendants-Appellees

.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(No. 396-CV-0236-T)

_________________________________________________________________ December 13, 1996 Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Gaston A. Shumate appeals, pro se

, from a district court order

denying his motions to reconsider a transfer of venue, and to

remand, for bankruptcy i nvestigation, and for appointment of a

bankruptcy trustee. Because we lack appellate jurisdiction, we

DISMISS

.

Shumate filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy under

Chapter 11 in February 1991 in the United States Bankruptcy Court- 2 -

of the Western District of Texas. The proceeding was subsequently

converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding, and a trustee of the estate

appointed. One of Shumate’s listed assets was a cash management

account (CMA) with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., a

defendant in this action.

In December 1995, John A. Montez, also a defendant and counsel

to the trustee, attempted to liquidate the CMA pursuant to a July

29, 1992, bankruptcy court order. Because of the three-year time

gap, Merrill Lynch requested adequate documentation to insure that

the order was still operative. While Montez was obtaining that

information, Shumate filed this action in state court in Dallas

County. He sought a temporary injunction to restrain Merrill Lynch

and Montez from selling any assets of the bankruptcy estate, and

also claimed personal injuries and in tentional infliction of

emotional distress as a result of their actions.

Montez removed this action to the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas, citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) in

the removal notice and stating that this action involved a “core

proceeeding” under that section. Merrill Lynch joined in the

removal.

Montez subsequently moved to tran sfer venue to the Western

District of Texas, where the bankruptcy proceeding was pending or,

in the alternative, to dismiss. Again, Merrill Lynch joined in the

motion. Shumate did not file any opposition. The district court

granted the motion to transfer, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1452 and- 3 -

explaining that Shumate’s suit was rela ted to the bankruptcy

proceedings pending in the Western District.

Shumate subsequently move d for rehearing on the transfer of

venue, as wel l as for remand, bankruptcy investigation, and

appointment of trustee. The district court denied his requests,

citing his failure to respond to the original transfer motion and

the fact that t his action was no longer pending in the Northern

District. The court explained that it was not ruling on the merits

of the motions to remand, for bankrupt cy investigation, and for

appointment of trustee; Shumate was free to seek such relief in the

Western District. Shumate filed a timely notice of appeal in the

Northern District.

In general, we have appellate jurisdiction only over final

decisions of district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. It is well

settled in this circuit that granting a motion to transfer venue is

an interlocutory, unreviewable order. E nplanar, Inc. v. Marsh , 11

F.3d 1284, 1298 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. Enplanar,

Inc. v. West

, 115 S. Ct. 312 (1994). Consequently, we lack

jurisdiction to review the ruling on transferring this action.

We also lack appellate jurisdiction to review the remand

ruling. Removal from state court to the Northern District properly

was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a), because the district court had

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334. S ee 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a). As

a “civil proceeding” related to a pending bankruptcy case,- 4 -

Shumate’s state court action satisfied the jurisdictional

prerequisites of § 1334. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b), a district

court’s refusal to remand is not reviewable on appeal. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1452(b). Consequently, we also cannot review the remand denial.

Finally, the remaining rulings

-- denying bankruptcy

investigation and appointment of trustee -- are clearly

interlocutory. Shumate, as the district court noted, is free to

seek such relief in the Western District. Once again, there being

no final decision, we lack appellate jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §

1291.

APPEAL DISMISSED