17 September 2006

Incorporating Change 1

13 February 2008

Joint Operations

Joint Publication 3-0
This revised edition of Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, reflects the current 

guidance for conducting joint and multinational activities across the range of military 

operations. This vital keystone publication forms the very core of joint warfighting doctrine 

and establishes the framework for our forces’ ability to fight as a joint team. 

 Often called the “linchpin” of the joint doctrine publication hierarchy, the overarching 

constructs and principles contained in this publication provide a common perspective from 

which to plan and execute joint operations in cooperation with our multinational partners, 

other US Government agencies, and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. 

This document addresses key aspects of joint operations and campaigns across the range of 

military operations. 

 As our Nation continues into the 21st century, the guidance in this publication will 

enable current and future leaders of the Armed Forces of the United States to organize, train, 

and execute worldwide missions as our forces transform to meet emerging challenges. 

 I encourage all commanders to study and understand the guidance contained in this 

publication and to teach these principles to their subordinates. Only then will we be able to 

fully exploit the remarkable military potential inherent in our joint teams. To that end, I 

request you ensure the widest possible distribution of this keystone joint publication. I 

further request that you actively promote the use of all joint publications at every 

opportunity. 

 

 PETER PACE 

 General, United States Marine Corps 

 Chairman 

 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
PREFACE 

i 

1. Scope 

 This publication is the keystone document of the joint operations series. It provides the 

doctrinal foundation and fundamental principles that guide the Armed Forces of the United 

States in the conduct of joint operations across the range of military operations. 

2. Purpose 

 This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other 

joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It 

provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. 

It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the 

force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity 

of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders of 

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of 

these commands, and the Services. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate 

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of 

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as 

part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational 

doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not 

ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational 

command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, 

regulations, and doctrine. 
Preface 

 JP 3-0 ii 

Intentionally Blank 
SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

CHANGE 1 TO JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0 

DATED 17 SEPTEMBER 2006 

iii 

• Aligns the chapter on strategic context with the information contained in JP 1, 

Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

• Clarifies and harmonizes the discussion and definition of unified action and 

unity of effort to reflect that of JP 1 

• Expands the discussion on termination 

• Changes the principle of “unity of command” to reflect the JP 1 definitions of 

unity of effort and unified action 

The following reflects changes to JP 3-0 dated 10 September 2001 that are included in 

the revision to JP 3-0 dated 17 September 2006. 

• Consolidates JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, 

and JP 3-0 formerly titled Doctrine for Joint Operations 

• Discontinues use of the term and acronym “military operations other than war 

(MOOTW)” 

• Introduces Department of Defense support to homeland security (i.e., 

homeland defense, civil support) 

• Revises the range of military operations 

• Establishes 12 “principles of joint operations” by adding three “other 

principles” — restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy — to the traditional nine 

“principles of war” 

• Updates the terms and discussions for various operational areas 

• Replaces the term “battlespace” with the term “operational environment” 

• Establishes six joint functions — command and control, intelligence, fires, 

movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment 

• Revises the definitions and relationship between “operational art” and 

“operational design” 

• Introduces a “systems perspective of the operational environment” 

• Introduces the application of “effects” in operational design and assessment 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

• Establishes the relationship between tasks, effects, and objectives, i.e., tasks are 

executed to create effects to achieve objectives to attain an end state 

• Establishes 17 operational design (formerly operational art) elements and 

revises the order, scope, and description of several 

•• Adds new operational design elements of “end state and objectives” and 

“effects” 

•• Revises the definition of “center of gravity” and includes a discussion of 

its “critical factors” 

•• Expands “lines of operations” to include logical lines 

• Expands the “phasing model” to six phases, i.e., shape, deter, seize the 

initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority 

• Revises the “commander’s critical information requirements” discussion and 

provides a process to develop them 

• Establishes the construct of “assessment” 

• Establishes a “stability operations” construct and military support to stability, 

security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) 

• Adds the application of “flexible deterrent options” 

• Discusses the integration of special operations forces and conventional forces 

• Establishes the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the information 

environment 

• Discusses the “combat identification” construct 

• Discusses “crisis response and limited contingency operations” 

•• Updates the discussion on “peace operations” and “consequence 

management” 

•• Establishes a distinction between “strikes” and “raids” 

•• Adds discussions on homeland defense and civil support operations 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

v 

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................... ix 

CHAPTER I 

 STRATEGIC CONTEXT 

• Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... I-1 

• The Strategic Security Environment ........................................................................................... I-1 

• Strategic Considerations ................................................................................................................. I-2 

• The Nature of Warfare.................................................................................................................... I-5 

• Range of Military Operations ....................................................................................................... I-6 

CHAPTER II 

 FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS 

• Principles ............................................................................................................................................ II-1 

• Levels of War ................................................................................................................................... II-1 

• Unified Action .................................................................................................................................. II-3 

• Organizing the Joint Force ............................................................................................................. II-11 

• Organizing the Operational Areas ............................................................................................... II-16 

• Understanding the Operational Environment ........................................................................... II-20 

CHAPTER III 

 JOINT FUNCTIONS 

• General................................................................................................................................................III-1 

• Command and Control....................................................................................................................III-1 

• Intelligence.........................................................................................................................................III-16 

• Fires......................................................................................................................................................III-17 

• Movement and Maneuver..............................................................................................................III-22 

• Protection............................................................................................................................................III-24 

• Sustainment........................................................................................................................................III-30 

• Other Activities and Capabilities...................................................................................................III-36 

CHAPTER IV 

 PLANNING, OPERATIONAL ART AND DESIGN, AND ASSESSMENT 

SECTION A. PLANNING OVERVIEW ............................................................................................ IV-1

• Joint Operation Planning ................................................................................................................ IV-1 

SECTION B. OPERATIONAL ART AND DESIGN ..................................................................... IV-2 

• Operational Art ................................................................................................................................. IV-2 

• Operational Design .......................................................................................................................... IV-3 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

SECTION C. PLAN OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................ IV-21 

• Operational Design and the Campaign ....................................................................................... IV-21 

• Key Plan Elements .......................................................................................................................... IV-24 

SECTION D. ASSESSMENT ................................................................................................................. IV-30 

• General ............................................................................................................................................... IV-30 

• Levels of War and Assessment .................................................................................................... IV-31 

• Assessment Process and Measures .............................................................................................. IV-33 

CHAPTER V 

 MAJOR OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS 

SECTION A. OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................................... V-1 

• General Considerations .................................................................................................................. V-1 

SECTION B. KEY CONSIDERATIONS BY PHASE ................................................................... V-2 

• Considerations for Shaping ........................................................................................................... V-2 

• Considerations for Deterrence ...................................................................................................... V-4 

• Considerations for Seizing the Initiative ..................................................................................... V-9 

• Considerations for Dominance ..................................................................................................... V-16 

• Considerations for Stabilization .................................................................................................... V-24 

• Considerations for Enabling Civil Authority ............................................................................. V-28 

CHAPTER VI 

 CRISIS RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 

• General ............................................................................................................................................... VI-1 

• Typical Operations .......................................................................................................................... VI-2 

• Unique Considerations ................................................................................................................... VI-14 

CHAPTER VII 

 MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, SECURITY COOPERATION, AND DETERRENCE 

• General ............................................................................................................................................... VII-1 

• Types of Activities and Operations .............................................................................................. VII-2 

• Unique Considerations ................................................................................................................... VII-9 

APPENDIX 

 A Principles of Joint Operations .................................................................................................... A-1 

 B References ...................................................................................................................................... B-1 

 C Administrative Instructions ......................................................................................................... C-1 

GLOSSARY 
Table of Contents

vii 

 Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .......................................................................................... GL-1 

 Part II Terms and Definitions ....................................................................................................... GL-5 

FIGURE 

 I-1 Strategic Estimate .................................................................................................................. I-4 

 I-2 Types of Military Operations .............................................................................................. I-7 

 I-3 Range of Military Operations ............................................................................................. I-8 

 II-1 Principles of Joint Operations ............................................................................................. II-2 

 II-2 Unified Action ........................................................................................................................ II-3 

 II-3 Operational Areas Within A Theater ................................................................................ II-17

 II-4 Combat and Communications Zones ............................................................................... II-18 

 II-5 Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas ...................................................... II-19 

 II-6 The Interconnected Operational Environment ................................................................ II-23 

 II-7 Visualizing the Operational Environment ....................................................................... II-24 

 III-1 Information Operations Capabilities Related to Joint Functions.................................. III-2 

 III-2 Command Relationships...................................................................................................... III-4 

 III-3 Information Requirements Categories............................................................................... III-12 

 III-4 Commander’s Critical Information Requirements Process.......................................... III-12 

 III-5 Risk Management Process................................................................................................... III-14 

 IV-1 Joint Operation Planning Process ....................................................................................... IV-2 

 IV-2 The Interconnected Operational Environment ................................................................ IV-4 

 IV-3 Operational Art and Design ................................................................................................. IV-6 

 IV-4 Example Lines of Operations ............................................................................................. IV-13 

 IV-5 Purpose of Campaign Planning .......................................................................................... IV-22 

 IV-6 Notional Operation Plan Phases Versus Level of Military Effort ............................... IV-26 

 IV-7 Phasing Model ....................................................................................................................... IV-27 

 IV-8 Assessment Levels and Measures ..................................................................................... IV-32 

 V-1 Notional Balance of Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Operations ........................ V-2 

 V-2 Combinations of Areas of Operations and Linear/Nonlinear Operations ................ V-19 

 VI-1 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance ...................................................................................... VI-9 
Table of Contents 

viii JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

Intentionally Blank 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

ix

Discusses the Strategic Security Environment, Strategic Considerations and

the Nature of War as a context for Joint Operations

Lists the Fundamental Principles of Joint Operations

Discusses Joint Functions in Joint Operations

Addresses Operational Art, Operational Design, Joint Operation Planning, and

Assessment

Describes the Key Considerations for the Conduct of Major Operations and

Campaigns

Discusses the Characteristics of and Specific Considerations for Crisis

Response and Limited Contingency Operations

Addresses the Characteristics of and Specific Considerations for Military

Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

Strategic Security Environment

The strategic security

environment is extremely

fluid, with continually

changing coalitions,

alliances, partnerships,

and new national and

transnational threats

constantly appearing,

disappearing, or in

remission.

The strategic security environment is extremely fluid, with continually

changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new national and

transnational threats constantly appearing, disappearing, or in remission.

The US military is well positioned to conduct operations, but must

also be prepared to address emerging peer competitors and irregular,

catastrophic, and disruptive challenges. These challenges include

irregular warfare (IW), catastrophic terrorism employing weapons of

mass destruction (WMD), and disruptive threats to US ability to

maintain its qualitative edge and to project power. Joint operations

increasingly occur in urban terrain and the information environment.

The operational area often contains humanitarian crisis conditions

requiring humanitarian assistance. In addition to military forces and

noncombatants, there may be a large number of other government

agencies (OGAs), international government agencies (IGOs),

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), regional organizations, and

elements of the private sector in the operational area.
x

Executive Summary

JP 3-0 (CH 1)

As a nation, the United

States wages war

employing all instruments

of national power —

diplomatic, informational,

military, and economic.

The President employs the

Armed Forces of the

United States to achieve

national strategic

objectives.

The United States

Government (USG) uses

strategic communication

(SC) to provide top-down

guidance relative to using

the informational

instrument of national

power in specific

situations.

Combatant commanders

are the vital link between

those who determine

national security policy

and strategy and the

military forces or

subordinate JFCs that

conduct military

operations.

 As a nation, the United States wages war employing all instruments of

national power to achieve national strategic objectives. National

strategic direction defines the strategic purpose that guides the

employment of the military instrument of national power. At the crux

of this understanding must be the strategic purpose, which may be

attributed to the nature of and goals of the adversary, and the systems

perspective of the operational environment. Decisive unified action

provides unity of effort focused on those objectives and leads to the

conclusion of operations on terms favorable to the United States.

Strategic Communications’s primary communication capabilities are

coupled with defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) and military

diplomacy activities to implement a holistic SC effort. The predominant

military activities that support SC themes and messages are information

operations (IO), public affairs (PA), and DSPD. IO are those military

actions to attack an adversary’s information and related systems while

defending our own. PA are those public information, command

information, and community relations activities directed toward both

the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of

Defense (DOD). SC planning must be integrated into military planning

and operations, documented in operation plans (OPLANs), and

coordinated and synchronized with OGAs and multinational.

Based on guidance from the President and SecDef, CCDRs develop

strategies that translate national and multinational direction into strategic

concepts or courses of action (COAs) to meet strategic and joint

operation planning requirements. In joint operations, the supported

CCDR often will have a role in achieving more than one national

strategic objective. Some national strategic objectives will be the

primary responsibility of the supported CCDR, while others will require

a more balanced use of all instruments of national power, with the

CCDR in support of other agencies.

Strategic Considerations

Strategic Communications

The Strategic Role of Combatant Commanders
xi

Executive Summary

CCDRs and their staffs

develop strategic estimates

and concepts that

facilitate development of

courses of action and joint

campaign/operation

plans.

Traditional war is

characterized as a

confrontation between

nation-states or

coalitions/alliances of

nation-states.

The context of irregular

warfare (IW) is marked by

a violent struggle among

state and non-state actors

for legitimacy and

influence over the

relevant population.

Theater Strategy consists of strategic concepts and courses of actions

(COAs) directed toward securing the objectives of national and

multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and

integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of

national power. CCDRs develop strategic estimates after reviewing

the operational environment, nature of anticipated operations, and

national and multinational strategic direction. In the strategic estimate,

commanders focus on the threat and consider other circumstances

affecting the military situation as they develop and analyze COAs.

Theater strategic concepts are statements of intent as to what,

where, and how operations are to be conducted in broad, flexible

terms. Theater strategic concepts consider, among many items, the

law of war, implementation of national policies; and protection of US

citizens, forces, and interests and identification of termination criteria.

Traditional war is characterized as a confrontation between nationstates or coalitions/alliances of nation-states. In the traditional

paradigm, nation-states wage war for reasons as broad and varied

as the array of national interests. This confrontation typically involves

small-scale to large-scale, force-on-force military operations in which

adversaries employ a variety of conventional military capabilities against

each other in the air, land, maritime, and space physical domains and

the information environment.

The context of irregular warfare (IW) is marked by a violent struggle

among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the

relevant population. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches,

though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in

order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. In IW, a less

powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities

and advantages of a more powerful, conventionally armed military

force, which often represents the nation’s established regime. An

adversary using irregular warfare methods typically will endeavor to

wage protracted conflicts in an attempt to break the will of the opponent

and its population. IW typically manifests itself as one or a combination

of several possible forms including insurgency, terrorism, disinformation,

propaganda, organized criminal activity (such as drug trafficking). The

specific form will vary according to the adversary’s capabilities and

objectives.

The Nature of Warfare

Theater Strategy Determination
xii

Executive Summary

JP 3-0 (CH 1)

The nature of the

strategic security

environment requires US

joint forces to be able to

operate effectively across

the range of military

operations. The United

States employs military

capabilities at home and

abroad in joint operations

that vary in size, purpose,

and combat intensity to

shape the operational

environment, protect US

interests, prevent surprise

attack, or prevail against

an enemy.

Joint operations may be

conducted simultaneously,

for multiple purposes , or

on a global scale.

There are 12 principles of

joint operations, but the

chief principle for

employment of US forces

is to ensure achievement

of the national strategic

objectives through

decisive action.

The United States employs its military capabilities at home and abroad

in support of its national security goals in a variety of operations that

vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity. The use of joint capabilities

in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence

activities helps shape the operational environment and keeps the dayto-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of

armed conflict while maintaining US global influence. A crisis

response or limited contingency operation can be a single smallscale, limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation

of extended duration involving combat. The associated general strategic

and operational objectives are to protect US interests and prevent

surprise attack or further conflict. When required to achieve national

strategic objectives or protect national interests, the US national

leadership may decide to conduct a major operation or campaign

involving large-scale combat, placing the United States in a wartime

state. In such cases, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy

as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions

favorable to the host nation (HN) and the United States and its

multinational partners.

Simultaneous joint operations with different end states can be conducted

within the GCC’c AOR. Some military operations may be conducted

for one purpose; however, other military operations will have multiple

purposed and be influenced by a fluid and changing situation . US

joint forces have global reach and are capable of engaging threats,

influencing potential adversaries, assuring friends and promoting peace

and stability with a variety of capabilities. Consequently, as directed,

the US military conducts operations on a global rather than a theater

scale (e.g., special operations (SO) in the war on terror, network

operations, space control).

Although the historical nine principles of war have been consistent in

joint doctrine since its inception, extensive experience in missions across

the range of military operations has identified three additional

principles; i.e., restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy; that also may

apply to joint operations. Together, they comprise the 12 principles

of joint operations.

Principles of Joint Operations

Range of Military Operations
xiii

Executive Summary

The three levels of war —

strategic, operational, and

tactical — help clarify the

links between national

strategic objectives and

tactical actions.

Combatant commanders

(CCDRs) play a pivotal

role in unifying the

actions of military and

nonmilitary

organizations.

Joint forces likely will be

employed within the

framework of a

multinational force that

presents challenges in

command and control

(C2) and logistics among

many other factors.

The three levels of war — strategic, operational, and tactical —

help clarify the links between national strategic objectives and tactical

actions. The strategic level is that level of war at which a nation,

often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or

multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic objectives and guidance

and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives.

The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to national

and military strategic objectives through the design and conduct of

operations using operational art. The tactical level focuses on planning

and executing battles, engagements, and activities to achieve military

objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.

Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or

integration of the activities of governmental and

nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve

unity of effort. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) play a pivotal

role in unifying actions; however, subordinate joint force commanders

(JFCs) also integrate and synchronize their operations directly with

the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary

organizations in the operational area.

Joint forces should be prepared for operations with forces from other

nations within the framework of an alliance or coalition under US or

other-than-US leadership. The glue that binds the multinational force

is trust and agreement, however tenuous, on common goals and

objectives. Language differences often present the most immediate

challenge. In all multinational operations, even when operating under

the operational control (OPCON) of a foreign commander, US

commanders will maintain the capability to report separately to higher

US military authorities in addition to foreign commanders. Alliances

typically have developed command and control (C2) structures,

systems, and procedures. Coalitions may adopt a parallel or lead

nation C2 structure or a combination of the two. Regardless of

the command structure, coalitions and alliances require a significant

liaison structure. The success of a multinational operation hinges

upon timely and accurate information and intelligence sharing.

Multinational logistics is a challenge; however, many issues can

be resolved or mitigated by a thorough understanding of capabilities

and procedures before operations begin. Multinational force

commanders typically form multinational logistic staff sections early to

facilitate logistic coordination and support multinational operations.

Unified Action

Levels of War
xiv

Executive Summary

JP 3-0 (CH 1)

The CCDR’s joint

interagency coordination

group establishes

collaborative working

relationships between

nonmilitary and military

planners.

Joint forces can be

established on a

geographic or functional

basis in the form of a

combatant command,

subordinate unified

command, or joint task

force.

Joint force commanders

(JFCs) may conduct

operations through

Service or functional

component commanders

or a combination.

CCDRs and subordinate JFCs are likely to operate with other

governmental agencies (OGAs), foreign governments,

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and intergovernmental

organizations (IGOs) in a variety of circumstances. Integration and

coordination among the military force and OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs

should not be equated to the C2 of a military operation. The joint

interagency coordination group, an element of a CCDR’s staff,

establishes and/or enhances regular, timely, and collaborative working

relationships between OGA representatives and military operational

planners. Another method to facilitate unified action and conduct onsite interagency coordination is to establish a civil-military operations

center.

The first principle in joint force organization is that JFCs organize

forces to accomplish the mission based on the JFC’s vision and

concept of operations (CONOPS). Joint forces can be established

on a geographic or functional basis. A combatant command is a

unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a

single commander. When authorized, commanders of unified (not

specified) commands may establish subordinate unified commands

to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the

criteria set forth for unified commands. A joint task force (JTF) is a

joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of

Defense (SecDef), a CCDR, a subordinate unified command

commander, or an existing commander, JTF (CJTF) to accomplish

missions with specific, limited objectives and which do not require

overall centralized control of logistics.

The JFC may conduct operations through the Service component

commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders.

Conducting joint operations using Service components has certain

advantages, which include clear and uncomplicated command lines.

The JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct

operations when forces from two or more Services must operate in

the same domain or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of

the assigned mission. Normally, the Service component commander

with the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the ability to C2

those forces will be designated as the functional component

commander; however, the JFC will always consider the mission, nature,

and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities

in selecting a commander. Joint forces often are organized with a

Organizing the Joint Force
xv

Executive Summary

The President and

Secretary of Defense or

geographic CCDRs may

designate theaters of war

and/or theaters of

operations for each

operation.

Subordinate JFC-level

operational areas include

the joint operations area,

joint special operations

area, joint security area,

amphibious objective

area, and the land and

maritime force component

commander’s areas of

operations.

combination of Service and functional components with operational

responsibilities.

An area of responsibility (AOR) is a geographical area established

on an enduring basis by the President and SecDef that is associated

with a geographic combatant command within which a geographic

combatant commander (GCC) has authority to plan and conduct

operations. When warranted, the President and SecDef or GCCs

may designate theaters of war and/or theaters of operations for each

operation. The theater of war is that area of the air, land, and maritime

domains that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of

major operations and campaigns that may cross the boundaries of

two or more AORs. A theater of operations is that area required to

conduct or support specific military operations normally associated

with major operations and campaigns. The communications zone

usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and

theater of war (if designated) and reaches back to the continental United

States base or perhaps to a supporting CCDR’s AOR.

A joint operations area (JOA) is a temporary geographical area

comprising some combination of air, land, and maritime domains,

defined by a GCC or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC

(normally a CJTF) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific

mission. A joint special operations area is a restricted geographical

area comprising some combination of air, land, and maritime domains,

defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities, for use by a

joint special operations component or joint special operations task

force for the conduct of special operations. A joint security area is

a specific surface area within a JFC’s operational area that may be

designated by the JFC to facilitate protection and security operations

of installations and forces supporting the joint force. The amphibious

objective area is a geographical area within which is located the

objective(s) to be secured by an amphibious force. JFCs may define

areas of operations (AOs) large enough for land and maritime force

component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their

forces.

Organizing the Operational Areas
xvi

Executive Summary

JP 3-0 (CH 1)

Understanding the

operational environment

helps commander’s

understand the results of

various friendly,

adversary, and neutral

actions.

C2, intelligence, fires,

movement and maneuver,

protection, and

sustainment are the basic

groups of common

functions to joint

operations.

JFCs exercise combatant

command (command

authority), operational

control, tactical control,

or support through

subordinate commanders

and over assigned and

attached forces.

Effective C2 makes use of

collaboration among

commanders and staffs

and identifies decision

points through the

commander’s critical

information requirements.

The JFC’s operational environment is the composite of the conditions,

circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities

and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical

areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains)

and the information environment. Included within these are the

adversary, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a

specific joint operation.

Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together

to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations.

Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of war fall

into six basic groups — C2, intelligence, fires, movement and

maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Information operations

core, supporting, and related capabilities are applied across the joint

functions and independently.

C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a

commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment

of the mission. JFCs exercise an array of command authorities (i.e.,

combatant command [command authority], OPCON, tactical control,

and support) delegated to them by law or senior leaders and

commanders over assigned and attached forces. Control is inherent

in command to regulate forces and functions and execute the

commander’s intent. The land and maritime force commanders

are the supported commanders within the AOs designated by the JFC.

The JFC will normally designate a joint force air component

commander (JFACC) who normally is the supported commander

for the JFC’s overall air interdiction and counterair effort.

Effective C2 demands that commanders and staffs collaborate in

planning (e.g., determining the mission, operational objectives, desired

effects, and tasks), preparing for, executing, and assessing joint

operations. Commander’s critical information requirements (i.e.,

priority intelligence requirements and friendly forces information

requirements) are a key information management tool for the

commander and help the commander assess the adversary, operational

environment, and friendly capabilities; and identify decision points

throughout the conduct of operations.

Joint Functions

Understanding the Operational Environment
xvii

Executive Summary

Intelligence provides an

understanding of the

operational environment.

The fires function

encompasses targeting,

joint fire support,

counterair, interdiction,

strategic attack, electronic

attack, and computer

network attack.

The air, land, and

maritime component

commanders; and other

military force

commanders in support of

other governmental

agencies (OGAs) conduct

various forms of

interdiction.

Intelligence provides JFCs with an understanding of the

operational environment. The intelligence function includes planning

and direction to include managing counterintelligence activities, collection,

processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination

and integration, and evaluation and feedback.

The fires function encompasses a number of tasks (or missions, actions,

and processes). Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing

targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering

operational requirements and capabilities. Targeting supports the

process of linking the desired effects of fires to actions and tasks at the

component level. Joint fire support includes joint fires that assist

forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace,

and key waters. Air superiority is achieved through the counterair

mission, which integrates both offensive counterair and defensive

counterair operations from all components to counter the air and missile

threat. Interdiction is a tool used by JFCs to divert, disrupt, delay, or

destroy the enemy’s military potential before it can be used effectively

against friendly forces, or to otherwise meet objectives. JFCs also

conduct strategic attacks — offensive action against a target;

whether military, political, economic, or other; that is specifically selected

to achieve national or military strategic objectives — when feasible.

Computer network attack operations disrupt, deny, degrade, or

destroy information resident in computers and computer networks

(relying on the data stream to execute the attack), or the computers

and networks themselves. Electronic attack involves the use of

electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to

attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading,

neutralizing, or destroying adversary combat capability.

The JFACC normally is the supported commander for the JFC’s

overall air interdiction effort, while land and maritime component

commanders are supported commanders for interdiction in their

AOs. Military forces also provide civil support (CS) to OGAs

responsible for execution of law enforcement interdiction activities,

although federal law and Department of Defense (DOD) policy impose

significant limitations on the types of support that may be provided.

This support may include actions taken to divert, disrupt, delay,

intercept, board, detain, or destroy, as appropriate, suspect vessels,

vehicles, aircraft, people, and cargo.
xviii

Executive Summary

JP 3-0 (CH 1)

Movement involves the

deployment of forces into

an operational area and

maneuver is their

employment in

combination with fires to

achieve positional

advantage.

JFC protect the joint

force’s fighting potential

through active offensive

and defensive measures,

passive measures, the

application of technology

and procedures, and

emergency management

and response. Protection

extends beyond force

protection to the civil

infrastructure of friendly

nations and nonmilitary

participants.

JFCs strive to ensure the

sustainment of personnel,

logistics, and other

support throughout joint

operations.

Planning joint operations

uses two integrated,

collaborative, and

adaptive processes — the

Joint Operation Planning

and Execution System

and the joint operation

planning process.

Movement and maneuver includes moving or deploying forces into

an operational area and conducting maneuver to operational depths

for offensive and defensive purposes. Forces, sometimes limited to

those that are forward-deployed or even multinational forces formed

specifically for the task at hand, can be positioned within operational

reach of enemy centers of gravity (COGs) or decisive points to achieve

decisive force at the appropriate time and place. Maneuver is the

employment of forces in the operational area through movement

in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in

respect to the enemy.

The protection function focuses on conserving the joint force’s fighting

potential in four primary ways — (1) active defensive measures

(e.g., air defense) that protect the joint force, its information, its bases,

necessary infrastructure, and lines of communications from an

adversary’s attack; (2) passive measures (e.g., concealment) that

make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike,

and destroy; (3) applying technology and procedures to reduce

the risk of fratricide; and (4) emergency management and response

to reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to accidents, health

threats, and natural disasters. The protection function extends beyond

force protection — preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile

actions against DOD personnel (to include family members),

resources, facilities, and critical information — to encompass protection

of US noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of

friendly nations; and OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. Protection capabilities

apply domestically in the context of homeland defense and CS.

Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services

necessary to maintain and prolong operations until mission

accomplishment. Key considerations include employment of logistic

forces, facilities, environmental considerations, health service support,

host-nation support, contracting, disposal operations, legal support,

religious support, and financial management.

Planning for joint operations is continuous across the full range of military

operations using two closely related, integrated, collaborative, and

adaptive processes — the Joint Operation Planning and Execution

System (JOPES) and the joint operation planning process (JOPP).

While JOPES activities span many organizational levels, the focus is

on the interaction which ultimately helps the President and

SecDef decide when, where, and how to commit US military

capabilities. Joint operation planning includes two primary subJoint Operation Planning
xix

Executive Summary

Operational art is the

application of creative

imagination by

commanders and staffs

that integrates ends,

conditions, ways, and

means to achieve

operational and strategic

objectives.

Operational design

involves the construction

of a framework that

underpins a joint

operation plan.

A systems perspective of

the operational

environment provides a

picture of the adversary’s

interrelated systems by

identifying each system’s

nodes and the links

between them.

JFCs and their staffs use

the operational design

elements to visualize the

arrangement of joint

capabilities in time, space,

and purpose.

categories: contingency planning and crisis action planning. The

JOPP steps are initiation, mission analysis, course of action (COA)

development, COA analysis and wargaming, COA comparison, COA

approval, and plan or order development.

Operational art is the application of creative imagination by

commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge,

and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major

operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational

art governs the deployment of forces, their commitment to or withdrawal

from a joint operation, and the arrangement of battles and major

operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Operational

art integrates ends, ways, and means and considers risk across the

levels of war.

Operational art is applied during operational design – the

conception and construction of the framework that underpins a

campaign or joint operation plan and its subsequent execution.

Operational design is particularly helpful during COA determination.

During execution, commanders and their staffs continue to consider

design elements and adjust both current operations and future plans as

the joint operation unfolds.

A systems perspective of the operational environment is

fundamental to operational design. It considers more than just an

adversary’s military capabilities, it also strives to provide a perspective

of the interrelated systems that comprise the operational environment

relevant to a specific joint operation. It helps with COG analysis and

operational design by identifying nodes in each system and the links

(relationships) between the nodes.

JFCs and their staffs use a number of operational design elements

(e.g., termination, end state and objectives, effects, COG, decisive

points, lines of operations, arranging operations) to help them visualize

the arrangement of actions in time, space, and purpose to accomplish

their mission. The result of this process should be a framework that

forms the basis for the joint campaign or operation plan and the

conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means.

Operational Art

Operational Design
xx

Executive Summary

JP 3-0 (CH 1)

Operational design

elements are applied in

joint campaigns — a

series of related military

operations.

The mission statement,

commander’s intent, and

concept of operations are

key plan elements that

result from mission

analysis and the planning

process.

Phasing (e.g., shape, deter,

seize initiative, dominate,

stabilize, and enable civil

authority) a joint

operation plan provides a

flexible arrangement of

smaller, related

operations.

Assessment measures

progress toward mission

accomplishment using

measures of performance

and measures of

effectiveness tools.

Operational design elements can be used selectively in any joint

operation. However, their application is broadest in the context of a

joint campaign — a series of related military operations aimed

at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a

given time and space. There are three general types of campaigns:

global, theater, and subordinate.

Key elements that result from mission analysis and the planning process

include a draft mission statement, commander’s intent, and CONOPS.

The mission statement should be a short sentence or paragraph that

describes the organization’s essential task (or tasks) and purpose — a

clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so.

The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the

purpose of the operation and the military end state. The CONOPS

describes how the actions of the joint force components and supporting

organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish

the mission, including potential branches and sequels.

Phasing assists JFCs and staffs to visualize and think through the

entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of

forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. The actual number of

phases used will vary (compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely)

with the joint campaign or operation and be determined by the JFC.

Although the JFC determines the number and actual phases used during

a joint campaign or operation, use of the six-phase model (i.e.,

shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable

civil authority) provides a flexible arrangement for smaller, related

operations.

Assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint

force toward mission accomplishment. The assessment process begins

during mission analysis when the commander and staff consider what

to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward

accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an

objective. The assessment process uses measures of performance

to evaluate task performance at all levels of war and measures of

effectiveness to measure effects and determine the progress of

operations toward achieving objectives.

Assessment

Key Plan Elements

Operational Design and the Campaign
xxi

Executive Summary

Major operations and

campaigns are the most

complex and JFCs must

integrate and synchronize

stability operations with

offensive and defensive

operations within each

phase of the campaign or

operation.

JFCs should organize and

train forces, rehearse key

actions, establish

operational area access,

secure space capabilities,

and conduct stability

operations as needed

during the “shape” phase

of a major operation of

campaign.

JFCs can dissuade

planned adversary actions

by implementing military

and nonmilitary flexible

deterrent options.

Major operations and campaigns are the most complex and require

the greatest diligence in planning and execution due to the time, effort,

and national resources committed. They normally will include some

level of offense and defense (e.g., interdiction, maneuver, forcible

entry, fire support, counterair, computer network defense, and base

defense). To reach the national strategic end state and conclude the

operation/campaign successfully, JFCs must integrate and

synchronize stability operations — missions, tasks, and activities

to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide

essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure

reconstruction, or humanitarian relief — with offensive and defensive

operations within each major operation or campaign phase. Planning

for stability operations should begin when joint operation

planning is initiated.

Organizing and training forces to conduct operations throughout

the operational area can be a deterrent. Rehearsing key combat

and logistic actions allows participants to become familiar with the

operation and to visualize the plan. JFCs establish and maintain

access to operational areas where they are likely to operate, ensuring

forward presence, basing, freedom of navigation, and cooperation

with allied and/or coalition nations to enhance operational reach. Space

capabilities help shape the operational environment by providing

strategic intelligence and communications. Stability operations may

be required to quickly restore security and infrastructure or provide

humanitarian relief in select portions of the operational area to dissuade

further adversary actions or to help ensure access and future success.

At the advent of a crisis or other indication of potential military action,

JFCs examine available intelligence estimates and focus intelligence

efforts to refine estimates of enemy capabilities, dispositions, intentions,

and probable COAs within the context of the current situation and

identify additional intelligence requirements. Both military and

nonmilitary flexible deterrent options — preplanned, deterrenceoriented actions carefully tailored to bring an issue to early resolution

without armed conflict — can be used to dissuade actions before a

crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a crisis. Special

operations forces (SOF) play a major role in preparing and shaping

the operational area and environment by setting conditions that mitigate

Considerations for Deterrence

Major Operations and Campaigns

Considerations for Shaping
xxii

Executive Summary

JP 3-0 (CH 1)

JFCs seize the initiative

and exploit friendly

advantages by conducting

forcible entry operations;

directing operations

immediately against

enemy centers of gravity;

seeking superiority in the

air, land, maritime, and

space domains and the

information environment;

while protecting the joint

force, host nation

infrastructure, and

logistic support.

risk and facilitate successful follow-on operations. Joint force planning

and operations conducted prior to commencement of hostilities also

should establish a sound foundation for operations in the “stabilize”

and “enable civil authority” phases. JFCs strive to isolate enemies

by denying them allies and sanctuary and to separate the main

enemy force from both its strategic leadership and its supporting

infrastructure. Weather, terrain, sea conditions, and other factors of

the physical environment such as urban and littoral areas can significantly

affect operations and logistic support of the joint force and should be

carefully assessed before sustained combat operations.

As operations commence, the JFC needs to exploit friendly advantages

and capabilities to shock, demoralize, and disrupt the enemy

immediately. Consequently, the JFC must sequence, enable, and

protect the opposed or unopposed deployment of forces to achieve

early decisive advantage. Forcible entry operations (amphibious,

airborne, and air assault operations) may be required to seize and

hold a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition for the

continuous landing of forces. As part of achieving decisive advantages

early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against enemy

COGs using conventional and special operations forces and capabilities.

JFCs also seek superiority early in air, land, maritime, and space

domains and the information environment to prepare the operational

area and information environment and to accomplish the mission as

rapidly as possible. Operations to neutralize or eliminate potential

“stabilize” phase adversaries and conditions may be initiated. National

and local HN authorities may be contacted and offered support. Key

infrastructure may be seized or otherwise protected. Intelligence

collection on the status of enemy infrastructure, government

organizations, and humanitarian needs should be increased. JFCs

must strive to conserve the fighting potential of the joint/multinational

force at the onset of combat operations. Further, HN infrastructure

and logistic support key to force projection and sustainment of the

force must be protected. Commanders must be aware of those

situations that increase the risk of fratricide and institute appropriate

preventive measures.

Considerations for Seizing the Initiative
xxiii

Executive Summary

JFCs conduct sustained

combat operations by

simultaneously employing

conventional and special

operations forces

throughout the

operational area and by

optimizing leverage

through the integration

and synchronization of

interdiction and

maneuver.

JFCs pursue attainment

of the national strategic

end state as sustained

combat operations wane

by conducting stability

operations independently

or in coordination with

indigenous civil, US

Government, and

multinational

organizations.

During sustained combat operations, JFCs simultaneously employ

conventional and SOF and capabilities throughout the breadth and

depth of the operational area in linear and nonlinear orientations.

Direct and indirect attacks of enemy COGs should be designed

to achieve the required military strategic and operational objectives

per the CONOPS, while limiting the potential undesired effects on

operations in follow-on phases. The synergy achieved by integrating

and synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists commanders

in optimizing leverage at the operational level. Within their AOs,

land and maritime commanders are designated the supported

commander for the integration and synchronization of maneuver,

fires, and interdiction. Accordingly, land and maritime commanders

designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations

within their AOs. Further, in coordination with the land or maritime

commander, a component commander designated as the

supported commander for theater/JOA-wide interdiction has

the latitude to plan and execute JFC prioritized missions within

a land or maritime AO. If those operations would have adverse

impact within a land or maritime AO, the commander must

readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the appropriate

component commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution.

Operations in the “stabilize” phase ensure the national strategic end

state continues to be pursued at the conclusion of sustained combat

operations. Several lines of operations may be initiated

immediately (e.g., providing humanitarian relief, establishing security).

Consequently, the JFC may need to realign forces and capabilities or

adjust force structure to begin stability operations in some portions of

the operational area, even while sustained combat operations still are

ongoing in other areas. Of particular importance will be civil-military

operations initially conducted to secure and safeguard the populace,

reestablish civil law and order, protect or rebuild key infrastructure,

and restore public services. US military forces should be prepared to

lead the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks when indigenous

civil, US Government, multinational, or international capacity does not

exist or is incapable of assuming responsibility. Once legitimate civil

authority is prepared to conduct such tasks, US military forces may

support such activities as required/necessary.

Considerations for Dominance

Considerations for Stabilization
xxiv

Executive Summary

JP 3-0 (CH 1)

Once legitimate civil

authority has been

enabled to manage the

situation without military

assistance, usually after

an extended period of

conducting stability

operations, the joint

operation will be

terminated and

redeployment of the joint

force completed.

JFCs may be tasked to

conduct joint operations

in response to a crisis that

requires, among many

contingency possibilities,

noncombatant

evacuation, foreign

humanitarian assistance,

or support of US civil

authorities.

Crisis response and

limited contingency

operations are not always

short in duration; and

often require human

intelligence sources to be

effective and

implementation of

appropriate force

protection measures

regardless of the

operational environment.

The joint operation normally is terminated when the stated military

strategic and/or operational objectives have been met and redeployment

of the joint force is accomplished. This should mean that a legitimate

civil authority has been enabled to manage the situation without

further outside military assistance. JFCs may be required to transfer

responsibility of operations to another authority (e.g., United Nations

[UN] observers, multinational peacekeeping force, or North Atlantic

Treaty Organization) as the termination criteria. This probably will

occur after an extended period of conducting joint or multinational

stability operations as described above. Redeployment must be

planned and executed in a manner that facilitates the use of redeploying

forces and supplies to meet new missions or crises. Upon

redeployment, units or individuals may require refresher training prior

to reassuming more traditional roles and missions.

The ability of the United States to respond rapidly with appropriate

options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional stability.

Thus, joint operations often may be planned and executed as a

crisis response or limited contingency. Crisis response and limited

contingency operations are typically limited in scope and scale and

conducted to achieve a very specific objective in an operational area.

They may be conducted as stand-alone operations in response to a

crisis or executed as an element of a larger, more complex joint

campaign or operation. Typical crisis response and limited contingency

operations include noncombatant evacuation operations, peace

operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, recovery operations,

consequence management, strikes, raids, homeland defense operations,

and civil support operations.

Short duration crisis response or limited contingency operations

are not always possible, particularly in situations where destabilizing

conditions have existed for years or where conditions are such that a

long-term commitment is required to achieve strategic objectives. As

soon as practical after it is determined that a crisis may develop or a

contingency is declared, JFCs and their staffs begin a systems analysis

and determine the intelligence requirements needed to support the

anticipated operation. Human intelligence often may provide the

most useful source of information. Even in permissive operational

environments, force protection measures will be planned

commensurate with the risks to the force. The impartiality of the force

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

Considerations for Enabling Civil Authority
xxv

Executive Summary

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

CONCLUSION

and effective engagement with local community members often

contribute to force protection in these operations.

Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence encompass

a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power

is tasked to support OGAs and cooperate with IGOs (e.g., UN, North

Atlantic Treaty Organization) and other countries to protect and enhance

national security interests and deter conflict. GCCs shape their AORs

through security cooperation activities by continually employing military

forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power.

Joint force presence often keeps unstable situations from escalating

into larger conflicts. Presence can take the form of forward basing,

forward deploying, or pre-positioning assets. Various joint operations

(e.g., show of force or enforcement of sanctions) support deterrence

by demonstrating national resolve and willingness to use force when

necessary.

Emergency preparedness, arms control and disarmament, combating

terrorism, DOD support to counterdrug operations, enforcement of

sanctions and exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and

overflight, nation assistance, protection of shipping, show of force

operations, counterinsurgency operations, and support to insurgency

all contribute to national security and/or deterrence. To plan and

conduct these operations and activities, there is an increased need for

the military to work with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and HN authorities;

share information; and obtain a firm understanding of the HN’s political

and cultural realities.

This publication is the keystone document of the joint operations series.

It provides fundamental principles and doctrine that guide the Armed

Forces of the United States in the conduct of joint operations across

the range of military operations.

CCDRs and subordinate

JFCs conduct a wide

range of military

engagement, security

cooperation, and

deterrence activities in

support of OGAs and

intergovernmental

agencies to prevent

unstable situations from

escalating into larger

conflicts.

Emergency preparedness,

combating terrorism, and

show of force operations,

among many others,

contribute to national

security and the

deterrence of harmful

adversary actions.
xxvi

Executive Summary

JP 3-0 (CH 1)

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER I 

STRATEGIC CONTEXT 

I-1 

1. Introduction 

 This publication is the keystone document in the joint operations series. It provides 

guidance to joint force commanders (JFCs) and their subordinates for planning, 

preparing, executing, and assessing joint operations across the range of military 

operations. This publication emphasizes unified action — the synchronization, 

coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental 

entities with military operations — to achieve unity of effort. 

2. The Strategic Security Environment

 a. The strategic security environment is extremely fluid, with continually changing 

coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new national and transnational threats constantly 

appearing, disappearing, or in remission. The US military is well positioned to conduct 

operations, but must also be prepared to address emerging peer competitors and irregular, 

catastrophic, and disruptive challenges. These challenges include irregular warfare (IW), 

catastrophic terrorism employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and disruptive 

threats to US ability to maintain its qualitative edge and to project power. 

b. Joint operations increasingly occur in urban terrain and the information 

environment. In addition to military forces and noncombatants, there may be a large 

number of other government agencies (OGAs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), regional organizations, and elements of the 

private sector in the operational area. 

 c. Hostile states and non-state actors in possession of WMD represent significant 

security challenges. Some states, including supporters of terrorism, already possess 

WMD and are seeking even greater capabilities, as tools of coercion and intimidation. 

The US homeland and other US interests are potential targets for direct and indirect 

attack. Rather than confronting US military operations directly, adversary attacks may 

focus on political and public institutions. Likely targets include lines of communications 

(LOCs), ports, airports, staging areas, civilian populations, economic centers, and allies 

and friends. Private, public, global, and regional information systems also are tempting 

targets. Advances in information technology increase the tempo, lethality, and depth of 

warfare. With our growing dependence on these systems, it is imperative that we 

safeguard their inherent vulnerabilities. 

 d. Within this environment, maintaining national security and managing the 

inevitable changes are continuous processes that often preclude simple solutions. This 

requires well planned and executed joint campaigns and operations in conjunction with 

“As joint doctrine guides the employment of US military forces in coordinated action 

toward a common objective, its principles also provide strategic direction to joint 

forces.” 

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

ad hoc partners. Additionally, joint operations increasingly involve simultaneous 

offensive, defensive, and stability operations in the same operational area. 

3. Strategic Considerations 

 a. General. As a nation, the United States wages war employing all instruments of 

national power — diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The President 

employs the Armed Forces of the United States to achieve national strategic objectives. 

Unified action provides unity of effort focused on those objectives and leads to the 

conclusion of operations on terms favorable to the United States. 

 b. Strategic Guidance. National strategic direction defines the strategic purpose 

that guides employment of the military instrument of national power as part of a global 

strategy. The President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef), through the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), direct the national effort that supports combatant and 

subordinate commanders. The SecDef, with assistance from the CJCS, determines where 

the US military should be focused and where the nation can afford to accept risk. 

Continually assessing the relative importance of the various theater operations remains 

imperative. Integrated planning, coordination, and guidance among the Joint Staff, 

combatant commanders (CCDRs), and OGAs ensures that changing strategic priorities 

are appropriately translated into clear planning guidance and adequate forces and their 

associated capabilities for CCDRs. The chief principle for employment of US forces is 

to achieve national strategic objectives established by the President through decisive 

action and conclude operations on terms favorable to the United States. 

 c. Strategic Communication 

(1) The United States Government (USG) uses strategic communication 

(SC) to provide top-down guidance relative to using the informational instrument of 

national power in specific situations. SC is focused USG efforts to understand and 

engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the 

advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated 

programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all 

instruments of national power. SC’s primary communication capabilities complement 

defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) and military diplomacy activities to 

implement a holistic SC effort. 

(2) The predominant military activities that support SC themes and messages 

are information operations (IO), public affairs (PA), and DSPD. IO are those military 

actions taken to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated 

decision making while protecting our own. PA are those public information, command 

information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and 

internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense (DOD). DSPD comprises 

those activities and measures taken by DOD components to support and facilitate USG 

public diplomacy efforts. SC planning must be integrated into military planning and 
 Strategic Context

I-3 

operations, documented in operation plans (OPLANs), and coordinated and 

synchronized with OGAs and multinational partners.

 d. The Strategic Role of CCDRs. CCDRs are the vital link between those who 

determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces or subordinate 

JFCs that conduct military operations. Based on guidance from the President and 

SecDef, CCDRs develop strategies that translate national and multinational direction into 

strategic concepts or courses of action (COAs) to meet strategic and joint operation 

planning requirements. In joint operations, the supported CCDR often will have a role in 

achieving more than one national strategic objective. Some national strategic objectives 

will be the primary responsibility of the supported CCDR, while others will require a 

more balanced use of all instruments of national power, with the CCDR in support of 

other agencies. Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) develop theater strategy in 

support of national strategic documents such as the National Security Strategy, National 

Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy. Functional combatant commanders 

(FCCs) provide support and may be supported by GCCs and other FCCs as directed by 

higher authority. When a FCC is the supported commander and operating within a 

GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR), close coordination and communication between 

them is paramount. All CCDRs provide strategic direction; assign missions, tasks, 

forces, and resources; designate objectives; provide authoritative direction; promulgate 

rules of engagement; establish constraints and restraints; and define policies and concepts 

of operations to be integrated into operation plans (OPLANs). Supporting CCDRs and 

their subordinates ensure that their actions are consistent with the supported 

commander’s strategy. 

For more information on the strategic security environment, strategic guidance, and the 

role of CCDRs, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 

United States. 

 

e. Theater Strategy Determination

 (1) General. Theater strategy consists of strategic concepts and COAs 

directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and 

strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and 

other instruments of national power. Theater strategy is determined by CCDRs based on 

analysis of changing events in the operational environment and the development of 

options to set conditions for success. CCDRs and their staffs develop strategic estimates 

that facilitate the development of theater strategic concepts and joint campaign/operation 

plans. When directed to conduct military operations in a specific situation, the supported 

CCDR refines previous estimates and strategies and applies operational design elements 

to modify an existing plan(s) or develops a new plan(s) as appropriate. The resulting 

operation plan/order establishes the military strategic objectives, effects, concepts of 

operation, and resources that contribute to attainment of the national strategic end state. 

 (2) Strategic Estimate. This estimate assists the CCDRs and subordinate JFCs 

as they develop strategic concepts, campaign plans, and subordinate OPLANs. CCDRs 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

develop strategic estimates after reviewing the operational environment, nature of 

anticipated operations, and national and multinational strategic direction. JFCs use 

strategic estimates to facilitate a more rapid employment of military forces across the 

range of military operations. The strategic estimate is more comprehensive in scope than 

estimates of subordinate commanders, encompasses all strategic concepts, and is the 

basis for combatant command strategy. In the strategic estimate, commanders focus on 

the threat and consider other circumstances affecting the military situation as they 

develop and analyze COAs. Items contained in the strategic estimate are summarized in 

Figure I-1. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, discusses the estimate process. 

Commanders employ the strategic estimate to consider the adversary’s likely intent and 

COAs and compare friendly alternatives that result in a decision. Both supported and 

supporting CCDRs prepare strategic estimates based on assigned tasks. CCDRs who 

support other CCDRs prepare estimates for each supporting operation. The strategic 

estimate process is continuous. 

 (3) Theater Strategic Concepts. These are statements of intent as to what, 

where, and how operations are to be conducted in broad, flexible terms. These 

statements must incorporate a variety of factors including nuclear and conventional 

deterrence, current or potential alliances or coalitions, forces available, command and 

control (C2) capabilities, intelligence assets, mobilization, deployment, sustainability, 

and anticipated stability measures. Theater strategic concepts allow for the employment 

of theater nuclear forces, conventional and special operations forces, space assets, 

military assistance from all Services, combat support agencies, and supporting 

commands, multinational forces, and interagency resources in each COA. Theater 

strategic concepts should provide for unified action. Strategic advantage is the favorable 

overall relative power relationship that enables one group, nation, or group of nations to 

effectively control the course of politico-military events. CCDRs use the capabilities of 

assigned, attached, and supporting military forces, as well as alliance, coalition, and 

interagency relationships and military assistance enhancements in theater as the basis of 

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

Assigned objectives from national authorities.

Translation of national objectives to objectives applicable to the combatant 

command or theater.

Visualization of the strategic environment and how it relates to the 

accomplishment of assigned objectives.

Assessment of the threats to accomplishment of assigned objectives.

Assessment of strategic alternatives available, with accompanying

analysis, risks, and the requirements for plans.

Considerations of available resources, linked to accomplishment of assigned 

objectives.

Figure I-1. Strategic Estimate 
 Strategic Context

I-5 

military power. CCDRs also consider and integrate the contributions of the other 

instruments of national power in gaining and maintaining strategic advantage. Theater 

strategic concepts determine when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be 

employed and consider the following: 

 (a) The law of war, implementation of national policies, and protection of 

US citizens, forces, and interests. 

 (b) Integration of deterrence measures and transition to combat operations. 

 (c) Adjustments for multinational, interagency, IGO, OGA or NGO 

circumstances. 

 (d) Identification of potential military requirements across the range of 

military operations. 

 (e) Support for security assistance or nation assistance. 

 (f) Inputs to higher strategies or subordinate planning requirements. 

 (g) Identification of termination criteria. 

 (4) Termination of Joint Operations. Based on the President’s strategic 

objectives that comprise a desired national strategic end state, the supported JFC can 

develop and propose termination criteria — the specified standards approved by the 

President or the SecDef that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded. 

These termination criteria help define the military end state, which normally represents 

a point in time or circumstances beyond which the President does not require the military 

instrument of national power as one of the main means to achieve remaining national 

objectives. Termination of operations must be considered from the outset of planning in 

a coordinated effort with relevant agencies, organizations, and multinational partners. 

The ability to understand how and when to terminate operations is instrumental to 

operational design. 

For more information on end state and termination, refer to Chapter IV, “Planning, 

Operational Art and Design, and Assessment,” and to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

4. The Nature of Warfare 

 a. Traditional warfare is characterized as a confrontation between nation-states or 

coalitions/alliances of nation-states. In this traditional paradigm, nation-states wage war 

for reasons as broad and varied as the array of national interests. This confrontation 

typically involves small-scale to large-scale, force-on-force military operations in which 

adversaries employ a variety of conventional military capabilities against each other in 

the air, land, maritime, and space physical domains and the information environment. 

The objective is to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s 

government or policies. Military operations in traditional warfare normally focus on an 

adversary’s armed forces to ultimately influence the adversary’s government. This 

approach generally assumes that the people indigenous to the operational area are not 

belligerents and will accept whatever political outcome the belligerent governments 

impose, arbitrate, or negotiate. A fundamental military objective is to minimize civilian 

interference in those operations. The near-term results of traditional warfare are often 

evident, with the conflict ending in victory for one side and defeat for the other or in 

stalemate. 

 b. The context of IW is marked by a violent struggle among state and non-state 

actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. IW favors indirect and 

asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other 

capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. In IW, a less 

powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of 

a more powerful, military force, which often represents the nation’s established regime. 

The weaker opponent will seek to avoid large scale combat and will focus on small, 

stealthy, hit-and-run engagements and possibly suicide attacks. The weaker opponent 

also could avoid engaging the superior military forces entirely and instead attack 

nonmilitary targets in order to influence or control the local populace. An adversary 

using IW methods typically will endeavor to wage protracted conflicts in an attempt to 

break the will of their opponent and its population. IW typically manifests itself as one 

or a combination of several possible forms including insurgency, terrorism, 

disinformation, propaganda, organized criminal activity (such as drug trafficking). The 

specific form will vary according to the adversary’s capabilities and objectives. IW 

focuses on the control of populations, not on the control of an adversary’s forces or 

territory. The belligerents, whether states or other armed groups, seek to undermine their 

adversaries’ legitimacy and credibility and to isolate their adversaries from the relevant 

population, physically as well as psychologically. At the same time, they also seek to 

bolster their own legitimacy and credibility to exercise authority over that same 

population. IW operations employ subversion, attrition, and exhaustion to undermine and 

erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will to exercise political authority over a 

relevant population. What makes IW “irregular” is the focus of its operations — a 

relevant population — and its strategic purpose — to gain or maintain control or 

influence over, and the support of that relevant population through political, 

psychological, and economic methods. Warfare that has the population as its “focus of 

operations” requires a different mindset and different capabilities than warfare that 

focuses on defeating an adversary militarily. 

5. Range of Military Operations 

a. General. The United States employs its military capabilities at home and 

abroad in support of its national security goals in a variety of operations (Figure I-2). 

Some operations involve only routine, recurring military activities that do not relate 

directly to either traditional or IW. Other operations, such as counterinsurgency, support 

to insurgency, and combating terrorism, primarily involve IW. Major operations and 

campaigns are typically characterized by large-scale combat operations associated with 
 Strategic Context

I-7 

traditional warfare. All of these circumstances — each potentially with different root 

causes and objectives — can exist concurrently within a single theater. 

b. The challenging nature of globalization is affecting the character of the threat 

confronting the United States. Emerging technologies can allow small groups to use 

asymmetric approaches to threaten the United States directly or indirectly with criminal 

activity, terrorism, or armed aggression on a transnational scale with relative ease and 

with little cost. Many joint operations are global in nature. US joint forces have 

global reach and are capable of engaging threats globally, influencing potential 

adversaries, assuring friends, and promoting peace and stability with a variety of 

capabilities. Consequently and as directed, the US military conducts some operations on 

a global, not theater, scale (such as special operations [SO] in the Global War on Terror 

[GWOT], network operations, and space control). These operations are conducted in 

depth, focusing on the threat source across geographical regions that include forward 

regions, approaches, the homeland, and the information environment. The divisions 

among the geographical regions are not absolute and may overlap or shift depending on 

the situation and threat. 

c. Military operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a range 

that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence

activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, 

major operations and campaigns (Figure I-3). Use of joint capabilities in military 

engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities helps shape the 

operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups 

below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence. Many of 

the missions associated with crisis response and limited contingencies, such as civil 

support (CS) and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), may not require combat. But 

others, as evidenced by Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, can be extremely 

dangerous and may require combat operations to protect US forces while accomplishing 

the mission. Individual major operations and campaigns often contribute to a larger, 

TYPES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Major Operations

Homeland Defense

Civil Support

Strikes

Raids

Show of Force

Enforcement of Sanctions 

Protection of Shipping

Freedom of Navigation

Peace Operations

Support to Insurgency

Counterinsurgency Operations

Combating Terrorism

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Recovery Operations

Consequence Management

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Nation Assistance

Arms Control and Disarmament

Routine, Recurring Military Activities

Figure I-2. Types of Military Operations 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

long-term effort (e.g., Operation ENDURING FREEDOM [OEF], which is part of the 

GWOT). The nature of the security environment may require US military forces to 

engage in several types of joint operations simultaneously across the range of military 

operations. For these missions, commanders combine and sequence offensive, defensive, 

and stability operations and activities to achieve the objective. The commander for a 

particular operation determines the emphasis to be placed on each type of mission or 

activity. Although this publication discusses each type of operation under the various 

categories in the range of military operations (chapters V through VII), a particular type 

of operation is not doctrinally fixed and could shift within that range (e.g., 

counterinsurgency operations that escalate from a security cooperation activity into a 

major operation or campaign). 

 d. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence. These 

ongoing and specialized activities establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with 

other nations and domestic civil authorities (e.g., state governors or local law 

enforcement). The general strategic and operational objective is to protect US interests 

at home and abroad. 

 (1) Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between 

individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another 

nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build 

trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain 

influence. 

 (2) Security cooperation involves all DOD interactions with foreign defense 

establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security 

interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and 

multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access 

to a host nation (HN). Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater 

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Crisis Response and

Limited Contingency Operations

Major Operations and 

Campaigns

Military Engagement, Security 

Cooperation, and Deterrence

Figure I-3. Range of Military Operations 
 Strategic Context

I-9 

shaping operations and a pillar of WMD nonproliferation. Note: Military engagement 

occurs as part of security cooperation, but also extends to interaction with domestic 

civilian authorities. 

 (3) Deterrence helps prevent adversary action through the presentation of a 

credible threat of counteraction. 

 (4) Joint actions such as nation assistance to include foreign internal defense 

(FID), security assistance, and humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA); antiterrorism; 

DOD support to counterdrug (CD) operations; show of force operations; and arms control 

are applied to meet military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence objectives. 

 e. Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations. A crisis response or 

limited contingency operation can be a single small-scale, limited-duration operation or a 

significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat. The 

associated general strategic and operational objectives are to protect US interests and/or 

prevent surprise attack or further conflict. A limited contingency operation in response 

to a crisis includes all of those operations for which joint operation planning is required 

and an OPLAN or operation order is developed. The level of complexity, duration, and 

resources depends on the circumstances. Included are operations to ensure the safety of 

American citizens and US interests while maintaining and improving US ability to 

operate with multinational partners to deter the hostile ambitions of potential aggressors 

(e.g., Joint Task Force [JTF] SHINING HOPE in the spring of 1999 to support refugee 

humanitarian relief for hundreds of thousands of Albanians fleeing their homes in 

Kosovo). Many of these operations involve a combination of military forces and 

capabilities in close cooperation with OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. A crisis may prompt the 

conduct of FHA, CS, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), peace operations 

(PO), strikes, raids, or recovery operations. 

 f. Major Operations and Campaigns. When required to achieve national strategic 

objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct 

a major operation or campaign involving large-scale combat, placing the United States 

in a wartime state. In such cases, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as 

quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions favorable to the HN and 

the United States and its multinational partners. Establishing these conditions often requires 

joint forces to conduct stability operations to restore security, provide essential services and 

humanitarian relief, and conduct emergency reconstruction. Major operations and 

campaigns typically include multiple phases (e.g., Operations DESERT SHIELD and 

DESERT STORM [1990-1991] and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) [2003]). Some 

specific crisis-response or limited contingency operations may not involve large-scale 

combat, but could be considered major operations or campaigns depending on their scale 

and duration (e.g., Tsunami relief efforts in Indonesia or Hurricane Katrina relief efforts in 

the US, both in 2005). 

 g. Simultaneous Nature of Theater Operations
Chapter I 

I-10 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

 (1) Simultaneous joint operations with different military end states can be 

conducted within a GCCís AOR. Major operations and campaigns can be initiated while 

security cooperation activities are ongoing in the same or another part of the theater (e.g., 

OEF during the enforcement of United Nations [UN] sanctions on Iraq). Further, a crisis 

response or limited contingency operation may be initiated separately or as part of a 

campaign or major operation (e.g., the 1991 NEO in Somalia during Operation DESERT 

SHIELD). In the extreme, separate major operations within a theater may be 

initiated/ongoing while a global campaign is being waged (e.g., OEF and OIF during the 

GWOT). Consequently, GCCs should pay particular attention to synchronizing and 

integrating the activities of assigned, attached, and supporting forces through 

subordinate and supporting JFCs to achieve national, theater, and/or multinational 

strategic objectives. Additionally, CCDRs and subordinate JFCs must work with US 

chiefs of missions, Department of State (DOS), and other agencies to best integrate the 

military actions with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national 

power to promote unity of effort. 

 (2) Some military operations may be conducted for one purpose. Disaster 

relief operations, for example, are military operations with a humanitarian purpose. A strike 

may be conducted for the specific purpose of compelling action or deterrence (e.g., 

Operation EL DORADO CANYON, the 1986 operation to coerce Libya to conform with 

international laws against terrorism). Often, however, military operations will have 

multiple purposes and be influenced by a fluid and changing situation. Branch and 

sequel events may require additional tasks by the joint force (e.g., Operations PROVIDE 

RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE, 1992-93, peace enforcement operations [PEO] evolved 

from FHA efforts, challenging the command with multiple missions). Joint forces must 

strive to meet such challenges with clearly defined objectives addressing diverse purposes. 
CHAPTER II

FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS 

II-1 

1. Principles 

a. Foundation. Joint operations doctrine is built on a sound base of warfighting 

theory and practical experience. Its foundation includes the bedrock principles of war and 

the associated fundamentals of joint warfare, described in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed 

Forces of the United States. It seeks to provide JFCs with basic guidance to defeat an 

adversary. Joint doctrine recognizes the fundamental and beneficial effects of unified 

action, and the synchronization and integration of military operations in time, space, and 

purpose. The chief principle for employment of US forces is to ensure achievement of 

the national strategic objectives established by the President through decisive action 

while concluding operations on terms favorable to the United States. 

b. Principles of Joint Operations. Joint operations doctrine is dynamic. Although 

the historic nine principles of war have been consistent in joint doctrine since its inception, 

extensive experience in missions across the range of military operations has identified three 

additional principles that also may apply to joint operations. Together, they comprise the 

12 principles of joint operations listed in Figure II-1 and discussed in Appendix A, 

“Principles of Joint Operations.” 

2. Levels of War 

a. General. The three levels of war — strategic, operational, and tactical — help 

clarify the links between national strategic objectives and tactical actions. There are no 

finite limits or boundaries between them. Levels of command, size of units, types of 

equipment, or types and location of forces or components are not associated with a 

particular level. National assets such as intelligence and communications satellites, 

previously considered principally in a strategic context, are also significant resources to 

tactical operations. Forces or assets can be employed for a strategic, operational, or tactical 

purpose based on their contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives; 

but many times the accuracy of these labels can only be determined during historical studies. 

The levels of war help commanders visualize a logical arrangement of operations, allocate 

resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. However, commanders at every 

level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate communications, any single 

action may have consequences at all levels. 

b. Strategic Level. The strategic level is that level of war at which a nation, often as 

a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) 

strategic objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to achieve these 

objectives. The President establishes policy, which the SecDef translates into national 

strategic objectives that facilitate theater strategic planning. CCDRs usually participate in 

“As joint doctrine guides the employment of US military forces in coordinated action 

toward a common objective, its principles also provide strategic direction to joint 

forces.” 

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

strategic discussions with the President and SecDef through CJCS and with allies and 

coalition members. The combatant command strategy is thus an element that relates to both 

US national strategy and operational activities within the theater. Military strategy, derived 

from national strategy and policy and shaped by doctrine, provides a framework for 

conducting operations. 

c. Operational Level. The operational level links the tactical employment of forces 

to national and military strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on the design and 

conduct of operations using operational art — the application of creative imagination by 

commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design 

strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. JFCs 

and component commanders use operational art to determine when, where, and for what 

purpose major forces will be employed and to influence the adversary disposition before 

combat. Operational art governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or 

withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve 

operational and strategic objectives. 

d. Tactical Level. The tactical level focuses on planning and executing battles, 

engagements, and activities to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task 

forces (TFs). An engagement normally is a short-duration action between opposing forces. 

Engagements include a wide variety of actions between opposing forces. A battle consists 

PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONS

OTHER PRINCIPLES

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

OBJECTIVE

OFFENSIVE

MASS

ECONOMY OF FORCE

MANEUVER

UNITY OF COMMAND

SECURITY

SURPRISE

SIMPLICITY

RESTRAINT

PERSEVERANCE

LEGITIMACY

Figure II-1. Principles of Joint Operations 
Fundamentals of Joint Operations 

II-3

of a set of related engagements. Battles typically last longer; involve larger forces such as 

fleets, armies, and air forces; and normally affect the course of a campaign. Forces at this 

level generally employ various tactics to achieve their military objectives. Tactics is the 

employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. 

3. Unified Action 

 a. General. Whereas the term “joint operations” is primarily concerned with the 

coordinated actions of the Armed Forces of the United States, the term “unified action” 

has a broader connotation. Unified action has its foundation in national strategic 

direction which is governed by the Constitution, federal law, USG policy, international 

law, and the national interest. The result of effective unified action is unity of effort to 

achieve national goals. Unity of effort is a “comprehensive approach” – that requires 

effective coordination and integration among federal government departments and 

agencies, NGOs, IGOs, the private sector, and among nations in any alliance or coalition 

throughout an entire operation. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination 

and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with 

military operations to achieve unity of effort. Unified action is illustrated in Figure II-2, 

which highlights the synergistic application of all of the instruments of national and 

multinational power, and includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as 

military forces. 

UNIFIED ACTION

JOINT

OPERATIONS

MULTINATIONAL

OPERATIONS

OPERATIONS WITH

US GOVERNMENT 

AGENCIES

OPERATIONS WITH

NONGOVERNMENTAL

ORGANIZATIONS

OPERATIONS WITH 

INTERGOVERNMENTAL 

ORGANIZATIONS

Joint

Force 

Commander

The concept of unified action highlights the integrated and synchronized activities of military 

forces and nonmilitary organizations, agencies, and corporations to achieve common 

objectives, though in common parlance joint operations increasingly has this connotation 

(the "joint warfare is team warfare" context of Joint Publication 1). Unified actions are 

planned and conducted by joint force commanders in accordance with guidance and direction received from the President and Secretary of Defens e, multinational organizations, 

and military commanders.

Figure II-2. Unified Action 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

b. The JFC’s Role. CCDRs play a pivotal role in unifying actions (all of the 

elements and actions that comprise unified actions normally are present at the CCDR’s 

level). However, subordinate JFCs also integrate and synchronize their operations directly 

with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in 

the operational area. All JFCs are responsible for unified actions that are planned and 

conducted in accordance with the guidance and direction received from the President and 

SecDef, alliance or coalition leadership, and military commanders. 

(1) JFCs integrate and synchronize the actions of military forces and capabilities 

to achieve strategic and operational objectives through joint campaigns and operations. 

JFCs also ensure that their joint operations are integrated and synchronized in time, space, 

and purpose, as much as possible, with the actions of appropriate OGAs, allied/coalition 

forces, IGOs, NGOs, and private sector entities if necessary. Activities and operations with 

such nonmilitary entities can be complex and may require considerable coordination by 

JFCs, their staffs, and subordinate commanders. This effort is essential to successfully 

integrate the instruments of national power and leverage the capabilities of all participants to 

achieve national strategic objectives. 

(2) The already complex challenge of achieving unity of effort may be further 

hindered as diverse participants seek a variety of objectives and have unique command or 

reporting arrangements. Their goals may or may not be explicitly and clearly stated. This 

diversity requires an intentional JFC effort to understand other participant interests. From 

this knowledge, the JFC can build consensus on common objectives or take actions to 

deconflict their divergent efforts. 

(3) JFCs also may support a civilian chief, such as an ambassador, or may 

themselves employ the resources of a civilian organization. For example, in some FHA 

operations, the United States Agency for International Development, through its Office of 

US Foreign Disaster Assistance, may be designated as the federal agency with lead 

responsibility with the CCDR in a supporting role. Under such circumstances, commanders 

must establish procedures for coordination, liaison, and information and intelligence 

sharing. Further, it is important that all levels of command understand the formal and 

informal military-civilian relationships to avoid unnecessary and counterproductive friction. 

In such cases where the military does not exercise command over outside agencies, it is 

extremely important to establish good working relationships where mission accomplishment 

can be achieved through effective coordination. 

c. Multinational Participation 

(1) General. Joint forces should be prepared for combat and noncombat 

operations with forces from other nations within the framework of an alliance or coalition 

under US or other-than-US leadership. Following, contributing, and supporting are 

important roles in multinational operations — often as important as leading. However, US 

forces often will be the predominant and most capable force within an alliance or coalition 

and can be expected to play a central leadership role. The military leaders of member 
Fundamentals of Joint Operations 

II-5

nations must emphasize common objectives as well as mutual support and respect. 

Additionally, the cultivation and maintenance of personal relationships between each 

counterpart is fundamental to achieving success. UN resolutions also may provide the basis 

for use of a multinational military force. The uneven capabilities of allies and coalition 

partners complicates the integration of multinational partners and the coordination and 

synchronization of their activities during multinational operations. Varying national 

obligations derived from international treaties and agreements and national legislation 

complicate multinational operations. Other members in a coalition may not be signatories to 

treaties that bind the United States, or they may be bound by treaties to which the United 

States is not a party. Nevertheless, US forces will remain bound by US treaty obligations; 

even if the other members in a coalition are not signatories to a treaty and need not adhere to 

its terms. 

(2) National Goals. No two nations share exactly the same reasons for entering a 

coalition or alliance. To some degree, participation within an alliance or coalition requires 

the subordination of national autonomy by member nations. The glue that binds the 

multinational force is trust and agreement, however tenuous, on common goals and 

objectives. However, different national goals, often unstated, cause each nation to measure 

progress in its own way. Consequently, perceptions of progress may vary among the 

participants. JFCs should strive to understand each nation’s goals and how those goals can 

affect conflict termination and the national strategic end state. Maintaining cohesion and 

unity of effort requires understanding and adjusting to the perceptions and needs of member 

nations. 

(3) Cultural and Language Differences. Each partner in multinational 

operations possesses a unique cultural identity — the result of language, values, religion, 

and economic and social outlooks. Language differences often present the most immediate 

challenge. Information lost during translation can be substantial, and misunderstandings and 

miscommunications can have disastrous effects. To assist with cultural and language 

challenges, JFCs should employ linguists and area experts, often available within or through 

the Service components or from other US agencies. Linguists must be capable of translating 

warfighting-unique language to military forces of diverse cultures. 

(4) Command and Control of US Forces. By law, the President retains 

command authority over US forces. This includes the authority and responsibility for 

effectively using available resources and for planning employment, organizing, directing, 

coordinating, controlling, and protecting military forces for the achievement of assigned 

missions. JFCs should have a responsive and reliable link to appropriate US agencies and 

political leadership. In all multinational operations, even when operating under the 

operational control (OPCON) of a foreign commander, US commanders will maintain the 

capability to report separately to higher US military authorities in addition to foreign 

commanders. Further, the President may deem it prudent or advantageous (for reasons such 

as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unified action) to place appropriate US 

forces under the control of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In 

making this determination, the President carefully considers such factors as the mission, size 

of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement 
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

(ROE). Coordinated policy, particularly on such matters as alliance or coalition 

commanders’ authority over national logistics (including infrastructure) and theater 

intelligence, is required. 

(5) C2 Structures. Alliances typically have developed C2 structures, systems, 

and procedures. Allied forces typically mirror their alliance composition, with the 

predominant nation providing the allied force commander. Staffs are integrated, and 

subordinate commands often are led by senior representatives from member nations. 

Doctrine, standardization agreements, close military cooperation, and robust diplomatic 

relations characterize alliances. Coalitions may adopt a parallel or lead nation C2 

structure or a combination of the two.

(a) Parallel command exists when nations retain control of their deployed 

forces (e.g., Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR: the implementation force remained under 

allied command while UN protection forces remained under UN command). Parallel 

command is the simplest to establish and often is the organization of choice. Coalition 

forces control operations through existing national chains of command. Coalition decisions 

are made through a coordinated effort of the political and senior military leadership of 

member nations and forces. 

(b) Lead Nation Command. In this arrangement, the nation providing the 

preponderance of forces and resources typically provides the commander of the coalition 

force (e.g., OEF: the formation of Combined JTF 76 provided a single joint command 

structure with a lead nation construct). The lead nation can retain its organic C2 

structure, employing other national forces as subordinate formations. More commonly, 

Operation SUPPORT HOPE joint task force officers explain airlift control element operations 

at Entebbe Airport to the President of Uganda. A joint task force, assembled in Entebbe, 

coordinated Ugandan support to the United Nations humanitarian relief effort to Rwanda. 
Fundamentals of Joint Operations 

II-7

the lead nation command is characterized by some integration of staffs. The composition 

of staffs is determined by the coalition leadership and is frequently proportioned to force 

contribution levels through a force balancing process. 

(c) Combination. Lead nation and parallel command structures can 

exist simultaneously within a coalition. This combination occurs when two or more 

nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces (e.g., the command 

arrangement employed during Operation DESERT STORM: Western national forces were 

aligned under US leadership, while Arabic national forces were aligned under Saudi 

leadership). 

(6) Liaison. Coordination and liaison are important considerations. Regardless 

of the command structure, coalitions and alliances require a significant liaison structure. 

Differences in language, equipment, capabilities, doctrine, and procedures are some of the 

interoperability challenges that mandate close cooperation through, among other things, 

liaisons. Nations should exchange qualified liaison officers (LNOs) at the earliest 

opportunity to ensure mutual understanding. Liaison exchange should occur between senior 

and subordinate commands and between lateral or like forces, such as between special 

operations forces (SOF) units or maritime forces. JFCs often deploy robust liaison teams 

with sufficient communications equipment to permit instantaneous communication between 

national force commanders during the early stages of coalition formation and planning. 

JFCs should appropriately prioritize their liaison requirements during deployment into the 

operational area to facilitate communications as soon as possible. LNOs serving with 

multinational partners should be operationally proficient, innovative, tenacious, and 

diplomatic; with the authority to speak for their parent commander. Desired capabilities of 

LNOs include: 

(a) Authority to speak for the JFC or other parent commander. 

(b) Familiar with the combat identification (CID) capability of both parties. 

(c) Able to speak the language of the command assigned. 

(d) Secure communications with JFC. 

(e) Trained to understand US disclosure policy. 

(f) Cultural experience or training with the home country of the command 

assigned. 

(7) Information and Intelligence Sharing. The success of a multinational 

operation hinges upon timely and accurate information and intelligence sharing. As DOD 

moves toward a net-centric environment, it faces new challenges validating intelligence 

information and information sources, as well as sharing of information required to integrate 

participating multinational partners. This information sharing can only occur within a 

culture of trust, based upon an effective information-sharing environment that uses the 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

lowest classification level possible. It must support multilateral or bilateral information 

exchanges between the multinational staff and forces, as well as the military staffs and 

governments for each participating nation. Actions to improve the ability to share 

information such as establishing metadata or tagging standards, agreeing to information 

exchange standards, and using unclassified information (e.g., commercial imagery) need to 

be addressed early (as early as the development of military systems for formal alliances). 

SecDef, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CCDRs play an important role determining and 

providing disclosure criteria guidance early in the planning process for a multinational 

operation. JFCs, in accordance with national directives, need to determine what intelligence 

may be shared with the forces of other nations early in the planning process. To the degree 

that security permits, the limits of intelligence sharing and applicable procedures should be 

included in disclosure agreements with multinational partners. These agreements should 

incorporate limitations imposed by US law and/or the US National Disclosure Policy; which 

promulgates specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definitions of terms, release 

arrangements, and other guidance. It also establishes interagency mechanisms and 

procedures for the effective implementation of the policy. In the absence of sufficient 

guidance, JFCs should share only that information that is mission essential, affects lowerlevel operations, facilitates CID, and is perishable. 

(8) Logistics. Multinational logistics is a challenge; however many issues can be 

resolved or mitigated by a thorough understanding of capabilities and procedures before 

operations begin. Potential problem areas include differences in logistic doctrine, stockage 

levels, logistic mobility, interoperability, infrastructure, competition between the Services 

and multinational partners for common support, and national resource limitations. 

Nonetheless, JFCs need to coordinate for the effective and efficient use of all logistic 

support to include lift, distribution, and sustainment assets as well as the use of infrastructure 

such as highways, rail lines, seaports, and airfields in a manner that supports mission 

accomplishment. The notion that logistics is primarily a national responsibility cannot 

supplant detailed logistic planning in seeking multinational solutions. Multinational 

force commanders (MNFCs) typically form multinational logistic staff sections early to 

facilitate logistic coordination and support multinational operations. Careful consideration 

should be given to the broad range of multinational logistic support options; from lead 

nation and role specialization nations, to the formation of multinational integrated logistic 

units to deliver effective support while achieving greater efficiency. Standardization of 

logistic systems and procedures is an ongoing, iterative process and MNFCs should ensure 

that the latest techniques, procedures, and arrangements are understood for the current 

operation. Interoperability of equipment, especially in adjacent or subordinate multinational 

units, is desirable and should be considered during concept development. The acquisition 

and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) is a tool for mutual exchange of logistic support 

and services. ACSA is a reimbursable, bilateral support program that allows reimbursable 

logistics-exchanges between US and foreign military forces. An ACSA provides the 

necessary legal authority to allow mutual logistic support between the US and multinational 

partners. This agreement increases flexibility for operational commanders by allowing fast 

response when logistic support or services are requested. 
Fundamentals of Joint Operations 

II-9

For further guidance on multinational logistics, refer to JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic 

Support of Multinational Operations. 

(9) There are numerous other important multinational considerations relating to 

mission assignments, organization of the operational area, intelligence, planning, ROE, 

doctrine and procedures, and PA. Expanded discussions on these and the previously 

discussed considerations are provided in JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 

d. Interagency Coordination and Coordination with Intergovernmental and 

Nongovernmental Organizations 

(1) General. CCDRs and subordinate JFCs are likely to operate with OGAs, 

foreign governments, NGOs, IGOs, and the private sector in a variety of circumstances. 

The nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint force planners 

consider all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified 

to employ these elements toward the objective. Other agencies may be the lead effort 

during some operations with DOD providing support; however, US military forces will 

remain under the DOD command structure while supporting other agencies. In some cases, 

a federal agency with lead responsibility is prescribed by law or regulation, or by agreement 

between the agencies involved. 

(2) Civil-Military Integration. All operations will require some civil-military 

integration. The degree of integration depends on the complexity of the operation and 

mission (e.g., large-scale PO). Presidential directives guide participation by all US civilian 

and military agencies in such operations. Military leaders must work with the other 

members of the national security team in the most skilled, tactful, and persistent ways to 

promote unified action; which is made more difficult by the agencies’ different and 

sometimes conflicting policies, procedures, and decision-making processes. Integration 

and coordination among the military force and OGAs, NGOs, IGOs, and the private 

sector should not be equated to the C2 of a military operation. Military operations 

depend upon a command structure that is often very different from that of civilian 

organizations. These differences may present significant challenges to coordination. Still 

more difficult, some NGOs and IGOs may have policies that are explicitly antithetical to 

those of the USG, and particularly the US military. In the absence of a formal command 

structure, JFCs may be required to build consensus for effective unified action to achieve 

unity of effort. Robust liaison facilitates understanding, coordination, and mission 

accomplishment. 

(3) Formal Agreements. Formal agreements such as memoranda of 

understanding or terms of reference are more common among military organizations and 

OGAs or HNs than between military organizations and NGOs. Although formal 

agreements may be established, commanders should not expect that formal agreements with 

NGOs exist. Heads of agencies or organizations and authorized military commanders 

negotiate and cosign these agreements. 
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

(4) Information Sharing. Unified action requires effective information 

sharing among DOD, OGAs, and state and local agencies, with the Director of National 

Intelligence playing a key role. Accordingly, JFCs should develop habitual relationships, 

procedures, and agreements with the individual agencies. For example, DOD support to 

homeland security requires detailed coordination and information sharing with the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

(5) Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). The JIACG, an 

element of a combatant commander’s staff, is an interagency staff group that establishes 

or enhances regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between OGA (e.g., 

Central Intelligence Agency, DOS, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Treasury 

Department) representatives and military operational planners at the combatant 

commands. There is currently no standardized structure for the JIACG. Its size and 

composition depends on the specific operational and staff requirements at each combatant 

command. The JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the 

national level through DOD and the National Security Council System. JIACG members 

participate in contingency, crisis action, security cooperation, and other operational 

planning. They provide a conduit back to their parent organizations to help synchronize 

joint operations with the efforts of OGAs. 

(6) Joint Task Force Staff. There are several means available at the JTF level 

to conduct interagency coordination. This coordination can occur in the various boards, 

centers, cells, and/or working groups established within the JTF. The commander, JTF 

(CJTF), and OGAs also may agree to form an executive steering group to coordinate 

actions. 

(7) Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). One method to facilitate 

unified action and conduct on-site interagency coordination for civil-military operations 

(CMO) is to establish a CMOC. There is no established structure for a CMOC; its size 

and composition depend on the situation. Members of a CMOC may include 

representatives of US military forces, OGAs, multinational partners, HN organizations (if 

outside the United States), IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector. Civil affairs (CA) units 

may be used to establish the CMOC core. Through a structure such as a CMOC, the JFC 

can gain a greater understanding of the roles of IGOs and NGOs and how they influence 

mission accomplishment. 

For additional guidance on interagency coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency, 

Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination 

During Joint Operations. 
Fundamentals of Joint Operations 

II-11

4. Organizing the Joint Force 

a. General. How JFCs organize their assigned or attached forces directly affects the 

responsiveness and versatility of joint operations. The first principle in joint force 

organization is that JFCs organize forces to accomplish the mission based on the JFC’s 

vision and concept of operations (CONOPS). Unity of command, centralized planning 

and direction, and decentralized execution are key considerations. Joint forces can be 

established on a geographic or functional basis. JFCs may elect to centralize selected 

functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, 

responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. JFCs should allow Service and SOF 

tactical and operational forces, organizations, and capabilities to function generally as they 

were designed. All Service components contribute their distinct capabilities to the joint 

campaign; however, their interdependence is critical to overall joint effectiveness. Joint 

interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one Service and another Service’s capabilities 

to maximize the complementary and reinforcing effects of both; the degree of 

interdependence varies with specific circumstances. Organization of joint forces must also 

take into account interoperability with multinational forces. Complex or unclear command 

relationships and organizations are counterproductive to developing synergy among 

multinational forces. Simplicity and clarity of expression are critical. 

US military forces conducting training operations in the US Central Command 

area of responsibility. 
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

b. Joint Force Options

(1) Combatant Commands. A combatant command is a unified or specified 

command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so 

designated by the President, through the SecDef, and with the advice and assistance of 

CJCS. Unified commands typically are established when a broad continuing mission exists 

requiring execution by significant forces of two or more Military Departments and 

necessitating single strategic direction and/or other criteria found in JP 1, Doctrine for the 

Armed Forces of the United States , are met. Specified commands normally are composed 

of forces from one Military Department, but may include units and staff representation from 

other Military Departments. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) defines geographic AORs 

(i.e., theaters) for selected combatant commands, including all associated land, water areas, 

and airspace. Other combatant commands are established to perform functional 

responsibilities such as transportation, SO, training, or strategic operations. Functionally 

oriented CCDRs operate across all geographical regions and normally provide supporting 

forces and capabilities to the GCCs. They also may conduct operations as a supported 

commander when directed by the SecDef or President. 

(2) Subordinate Unified Commands. When authorized by the President and 

SecDef through CJCS, commanders of unified (not specified) commands may establish 

subordinate unified commands (also called subunified commands) to conduct operations on 

a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A 

subordinate unified command may be established on a geographic area or functional basis. 

Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar 

to those of the commanders of unified commands, and exercise OPCON of assigned 

commands and forces and normally of attached forces within the assigned operational or 

functional area. 

(3) Joint Task Forces. A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated 

by the SecDef, a CCDR, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing CJTF 

to accomplish missions with specific, limited objectives and which do not require overall 

centralized control of logistics. However, there may be situations where a CJTF may 

require directive authority for common support capabilities delegated by the CCDR. JTFs 

may be established on a geographical area or functional basis. JTFs normally are 

established to achieve operational objectives. A JTF is dissolved by the proper authority 

when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer 

required. JTF headquarters basing depends on the JTF mission, operational environment, 

and available capabilities and support. JTF headquarters can be land- or sea-based with 

transitions between both basing options. JTFs are normally assigned a joint operations area 

(JOA). 

For further guidance on JTFs, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

c. Component Options. Regardless of the organizational and command 

arrangements within joint commands, Service component commanders retain 

responsibility for certain Service-specific functions and other matters affecting their 
Fundamentals of Joint Operations 

II-13

forces, including internal administration, personnel support, training, logistics, and Service 

intelligence operations. Further, functional and Service components of the joint force 

conduct supported, subordinate, and supporting operations, not independent 

campaigns. 

(1) Service Components. The JFC may conduct operations through the Service 

component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. Conducting 

joint operations using Service components has certain advantages, which include clear 

and uncomplicated command lines. This arrangement is appropriate when stability, 

continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate 

organizational integrity of Service components. While logistics remains a Service 

responsibility, there are exceptions such as arrangements described in Service support 

agreements, CCDR-directed common-user logistics (CUL) lead Service, or DOD agency 

responsibilities. 

(2) Functional Components. The JFC can establish functional component 

commands to conduct operations when forces from two or more Services must operate in 

the same domain or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. 

These conditions apply when the scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities 

and functions of forces from more than one Service be directed toward closely related 

objectives and unity of command is a primary consideration. For example, when the scope 

of operations is large, and the JFC’s attention must be divided between major operations or 

phases of operations that are functionally dominated, it may be useful to establish 

functionally oriented commanders. 

(a) JFCs may conduct operations through functional components or employ 

them primarily to coordinate selected functions. (Note: Functional component commands 

are component commands of a joint force and do not constitute a “joint force” with the 

authorities and responsibilities of a joint force as described in this document, even when 

composed of forces from two or more Military Departments.) 

(b) Normally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of 

forces to be tasked and the ability to C2 those forces will be designated as the functional 

component commander; however, the JFC will always consider the mission, nature and 

duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities in selecting a 

commander. The establishment of a functional component commander must not affect the 

command relationship between Service component commanders and the JFC. 

(c) The functional component commander’s staff should reflect the 

command’s composition to provide the commander with the expertise needed to effectively 

employ its forces and those made available for tasking. Functional component staffs require 

advanced planning, appropriate training, and frequent exercises for efficient operations. 

Liaison elements from and to other components facilitate coordination and support. 

(d) When a functional component command will employ forces and/or 

military capabilities from more than one Service, the functional component commander’s 
Chapter II 

II-14 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

staff should reflect the composition of the functional component command to provide the 

commander with the expertise needed to effectively employ the forces and/or military 

capability made available. Staff billets for the needed expertise and the individuals to fill 

those billets should be identified and used when the functional component staffs are formed 

for exercises and actual operations. The number of personnel on this staff should be kept to 

the minimum and should be consistent with the task performed. The structure of the staff 

should be flexible enough to expand or contract under changing conditions without a loss in 

coordination or capability. 

(e) The JFC must designate the forces and/or military capabilities that will be 

made available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate 

command relationship(s) that the functional component commander will exercise over that 

military capability (e.g., a joint force special operations component commander [JFSOCC] 

normally has OPCON of assigned forces and a joint force air component commander 

[JFACC] normally is delegated tactical control [TACON] of the sorties or other military 

capabilities made available, except for land forces that provide supporting fires which 

normally are tasked in a direct support role). JFCs also may establish a support relationship 

between components to facilitate operations. Regardless, the establishing JFC defines the 

authority and responsibilities of functional component commanders based on the CONOPS 

and may alter their authority and responsibilities during the course of an operation. 

(f) The commander of a functional component command is responsible for 

making recommendations to the establishing commander on the proper employment of 

forces and/or the military capabilities made available for tasking to accomplish the assigned 

responsibilities. 

(3) Combination. Joint forces often are organized with a combination of Service 

and functional components with operational responsibilities. For example, joint forces 

organized with Service components normally have SOF organized under a JFSOCC and 

conventional air forces organized under a designated JFACC, whose authority and 

responsibilities are defined by the establishing JFC based on the JFC’s CONOPS. 

d. SOF Employment Options

(1) SOF in continental United States (CONUS) are normally under the combatant 

command (command authority) (COCOM) of the Commander, United States Special 

Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM). When directed, CDRUSSOCOM provides 

CONUS-based SOF to a GCC. The GCC normally exercises COCOM of assigned and 

OPCON of attached SOF through a commander, theater special operations command 

(TSOC), a subunified commander. When a GCC establishes and employs multiple JTFs 

and independent TFs concurrently, the TSOC commander may establish and employ 

multiple joint special operations tasks forces (JSOTFs) to manage SOF assets and 

accommodate JTF/TF SO requirements. Accordingly, the GCC, as the common superior, 

normally will establish support or TACON command relationships between the JSOTF 

commanders and JTF/TF commanders. 
Fundamentals of Joint Operations 

II-15

(2) CDRUSSOCOM performs the role of lead CCDR for planning, 

synchronizing, and (as directed) executing global operations against terrorist networks in 

coordination with other CCDRs. When directed to execute global operations, 

CDRUSSOCOM can establish and employ JSOTFs as a supported commander. SOF used 

independently or integrated with conventional forces provide additional and unique 

capabilities to achieve objectives that otherwise may not be attainable. SOF are most 

effective when SO are fully integrated into the overall plan and the execution of SO is 

through proper SOF C2 elements employed intact, centralized, and fully responsive to the 

needs of the supported commander. SOF C2, coordination, and liaison elements normally 

provided to supported and supporting commanders are described in JP 3-05, Doctrine for 

Joint Special Operations. 

e. Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element). The standing joint force 

headquarters (core element) (SJFHQ [CE]) is a staff organization that provides CCDRs with 

a full-time, trained joint C2 element, fully integrated into the CCDR’s planning and 

operations. The SJFHQ (CE) is staffed during peacetime to provide a core element of 

trained personnel that may serve as both a nucleus of key functional and C2 expertise and a 

foundation on which to build, through augmentation, the joint C2 capability for specific 

mission areas. Its principal roles are to enhance the command’s peacetime planning efforts, 

improve operational area awareness for specific focus areas, accelerate the formation of a 

JTF headquarters, and facilitate crisis response by the joint force. It helps the CCDR 

determine where to focus joint capabilities to prevent or resolve a crisis. There are three 

primary employment options: 

(1) The SJFHQ (CE) can form the core of a JTF headquarters. In this case, 

the CCDR designates the SJFHQ (CE) director or another flag officer as the CJTF and 

augments the SJFHQ (CE) from the combatant command headquarters and components as 

required. 

(2) The SJFHQ (CE) can augment a designated JTF headquarters. The 

SJFHQ (CE) (in its entirety or selected portions) can provide additional expertise to an 

existing JTF headquarters, JTF-designated Service component headquarters, or an OGA. 

(3) The SJFHQ (CE) can support the combatant command headquarters. In 

this case, the CCDR is the JFC. The SJFHQ (CE) can remain part of the combatant 

command staff or serve as the forward element of the joint force headquarters. 

f. The deployable JTF augmentation cell (DJTFAC) is another C2 augmentation 

capability that a CCDR may establish. It is composed of planners and operators from the 

combatant command and components’ staffs, which report to the CCDR’s operations 

directorate until deployed to a JTF. The DJTFAC has utility, along with the SJFHQ (CE), to 

CCDRs that anticipate responding to multiple contingencies simultaneously. 

For additional and more detailed guidance on the organization of joint forces, refer to JP 1, 

Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 
Chapter II 

II-16 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

5. Organizing the Operational Areas 

a. General. Operational area is an overarching term encompassing more 

descriptive terms for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. 

Operational areas include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as AOR, theater of war, 

theater of operations, JOA, amphibious objective area (AOA), joint special operations area 

(JSOA), and area of operations (AO). Except for AOR, which is normally assigned in the 

UCP, the GCCs and other JFCs designate smaller operational areas on a temporary basis. 

Operational areas have physical dimensions comprised of some combination of air, land, 

and maritime domains. JFCs define these areas with geographical boundaries, which 

facilitate the coordination, integration, and deconfliction of joint operations among joint 

force components and supporting commands. The size of these operational areas and the 

types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the 

projected duration of operations. 

b. Combatant Command-Level Areas. GCCs conduct operations in their assigned 

AORs across the range of military operations. When warranted, the President, SecDef, or 

GCCs may designate a theater of war and/or theater of operations for each operation (see 

II-3). GCCs can elect to control operations directly in these operational areas, or may 

establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose, allowing themselves to remain focused on 

the broader AOR. 

(1) Area of Responsibility. An AOR is an area established by the President and 

SecDef on an enduring basis that defines geographic responsibilities for a GCC. A GCC has 

authority to plan for operations within the AOR and conduct those operations approved by 

the President or SecDef. 

OPERATIONAL AREAS FOR OPERATION RESTORE HOPE 

During Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, the Marine Corps forces rear area was 

centered around the separate sites of the embassy compound, port, and airfield in the 

city of Mogadishu, while its operational area was widely scattered around the towns 

and villages of the interior. The area of interest included the rest of the country and 

particularly those population and relief centers not under the joint force commander’s 

supervision. 

Various Sources 
Fundamentals of Joint Operations 

II-17

(2) Theater of War. A theater of war is a geographical area comprised of some 

combination of air, land, and maritime domains established for the conduct of major 

operations and campaigns involving combat. A theater of war is established primarily when 

there is a formal declaration of war or it is necessary to encompass more than one theater of 

operations (or a JOA and a separate theater of operations) within a single boundary for the 

purposes of C2, logistics, protection, or mutual support. A theater of war does not normally 

encompass a GCC’s entire AOR, but may cross the boundaries of two or more AORs. 

(3) Theater of Operations. A theater of operations is a geographical area 

comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains established for the 

conduct of joint operations. A theater of operations is established primarily when the scope 

of the operation in time, space, purpose, and/or employed forces exceeds what can normally 

be accommodated by a JOA. One or more theaters of operations may be designated. 

Different theaters of operations will normally be geographically separate and focused on 

different missions. A theater of operations typically is smaller than a theater of war, but is 

large enough to allow for operations in depth and over extended periods of time. Theaters 

of operations are normally associated with major operations and campaigns. 

THEATER OF WAR

THEATERS OF 

OPERATIONS

OPERATIONAL AREAS WITHIN A THEATER

This example depicts a combatant commander's area of responsibility (AOR), also known 

as a theater. Within the AOR, the combatant commander has designated a theater of war. 

Within the theater of war are two theaters of operations and a joint special operations area 

(JSOA). To handle a situation outside the theater of war, the combatant commander has 

established a theater of operations and a joint operations area (JOA), within which a joint 

task force will operate. JOAs could also be established within the theater of war or 

theaters of operations.

JOA

AOR

JSOA

Figure II-3. Operational Areas Within a Theater 
Chapter II 

II-18 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

(4) Combat Zones and Communications Zones (COMMZs). Geographic 

CCDRs also may establish combat zones and COMMZs, as shown in Figure II-4. The 

combat zone is an area required by forces to conduct combat operations. It normally 

extends forward from the land force rear boundary. The COMMZ contains those theater 

organizations, LOCs, and other agencies required to support and sustain combat forces. The 

COMMZ usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and theater of war 

(if designated) and reaches back to the CONUS base or perhaps to a supporting CCDR’s 

AOR. The COMMZ includes airports and seaports that support the flow of forces and 

logistics into the operational area. It usually is contiguous to the combat zone but may be 

separate — connected only by thin LOCs — in very fluid, dynamic situations. 

c. Operational- and Tactical-Level Areas. For operations somewhat limited in 

scope and duration, the following operational areas can be established. 

(1) Joint Operations Area. A JOA is a temporary geographical area comprised 

of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains, defined by a GCC or subordinate 

unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a CJTF) conducts military operations to 

accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are particularly useful when operations are limited in 

scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries 

between theaters. 

SEAPORT

AOR

THEATER OF 

OPERATIONS

COMBAT AND COMMUNICATIONS ZONES

COMBAT

 ZONE

COMMZ

Connecting to CONUS or 

other supporting theaters

This example depicts a combatant commander's area of responsibility (AOR) in 

which a theater of operations have been designated. The combat zone includes 

that area required for the conduct of combat operations. The communications 

zone (COMMZ) in this example is contiguous to the combat zone.

AIRPORT

CONUS= continental United States

Figure II-4. Combat and Communications Zones 
Fundamentals of Joint Operations 

II-19

(2) Joint Special Operations Area. A JSOA is a restricted geographical area 

comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains for use by a joint special 

operations component or joint special operations task force in the conduct of SO. A JSOA 

is defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate 

and facilitate simultaneous conventional and SO. Within the JSOA, the JFSOCC is the 

supported commander. 

For additional guidance on JSOAs, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 

(3) Joint Security Area. A joint security area (JSA) is a specific surface area, 

designated by the JFC as critical, that facilitates protection of joint bases and supports force 

projection, movement control, sustainment, C2, airbases/airfields, seaports, and other 

activities. JSAs are not necessarily contiguous with areas actively engaged in combat (see 

Figure II-5). JSAs may include intermediate support bases and other support facilities 

intermixed with combat elements. JSAs may be used in both linear and nonlinear situations, 

CONTIGUOUS AND NONCONTIGUOUS

OPERATIONAL AREAS

AO area of operations

ARFOR Army forces

JSA joint security area

Noncontiguous

Subordinate commands receive operational 

areas that do not share boundaries. The 

higher headquarters retains responsibility for 

the unassigned portion of its operational area 

to subordinate commands .

MARFOR

AO

ARFOR

AO

JSA

MARFOR

AO

JSA

JSOA

ARFOR

AO

JSOA joint special operations area

MARFOR Marine Corps forces

Contiguous

Adjacent, subordinate command’s operational 

areas share boundaries. In this case, the 

higher headquarters has assigned all of its 

operational area to subordinate commands.

Figure II-5. Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas 
Chapter II 

II-20 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

which are outlined in paragraph 5b of Chapter V, “Major Operations and Campaigns.” 

For additional guidance on JSAs, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater. 

(4) Amphibious Objective Area. The AOA is a geographic area within which is 

located the objective(s) to be secured by an amphibious force. It needs to be large enough 

for necessary sea, air, land, and SO. 

For additional guidance on amphibious objective areas, refer to JP 3-02, Amphibious 

Operations. 

(5) Area of Operations. JFCs may define AOs for land and maritime forces. 

AOs typically do not encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large 

enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. 

Component commanders with AOs typically designate subordinate AOs within which their 

subordinate forces operate. These commanders employ the full range of joint and Service 

control measures and graphics as coordinated with other component commanders and their 

representatives to delineate responsibilities, deconflict operations, and achieve unity of 

effort. 

d. Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas. Operational areas may be 

contiguous or noncontiguous (see Figure II-5). When they are contiguous, a boundary 

separates them. When operational areas are noncontiguous, they do not share a boundary; 

the CONOPS links the elements of the force. A noncontiguous operational area normally is 

characterized by a 360-degree boundary. The higher headquarters is responsible for the area 

between noncontiguous operational areas. 

e. Considerations When Assuming Responsibility for an Operational Area. The 

assigned operational area should be activated formally at a specified date and time. Many 

considerations for assuming responsibility for an operational area will be mission and 

situation specific. These considerations should be addressed during COA 

analysis/wargaming. A few of the common considerations that may be applicable for any 

operational area include C2, the information environment, intelligence requirements, 

communications support; protection, security, LOCs, terrain management, movement 

control, airspace control, surveillance, reconnaissance, air and missile defense, personnel 

recovery (PR), providing or coordinating fires, OGA/IGO/NGO/HN/private sector 

interfaces, and environmental issues. 

For specific guidance on assuming responsibility for an operational area, refer to JP 3-33, 

Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

6. Understanding the Operational Environment 

a. General. Factors that must be considered when conducting joint operations extend 

far beyond the boundaries of the JFC’s assigned operational area. The JFC’s operational 

environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that 
Fundamentals of Joint Operations 

II-21

affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It 

encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) 

and the information environment. Included within these are the adversary, friendly, 

and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint operation. Understanding the 

operational environment helps commander’s understand the results of various friendly, 

adversary, and neutral actions and how this impacts achieving the military end state. 

b. Physical Areas and Factors

(1) Physical Areas. The pertinent physical areas in the operational environment 

include the assigned operational area (discussed in paragraph 5 above) and the associated 

areas of influence and interest described below. Designation of the areas of influence and 

interest help commanders and staffs order their thoughts during both planning and 

execution. 

(a) An area of influence is a geographic area in which a commander can 

directly influence operations by maneuver or fires capabilities normally under the 

commander’s command or control. The area of influence normally surrounds and includes 

the assigned operational area. The extent of a subordinate command’s area of influence is 

one factor the higher commander considers when defining the subordinate’s operational 

area. Understanding the command’s area of influence helps the commander and staff plan 

branches to the current operation that could require the force to employ capabilities outside 

the assigned operational area. The commander can describe the area of influence 

graphically, but the resulting graphic does not represent a boundary or other control 

measure. 

(b) An area of interest (AOI) is an area beyond the area of influence that 

contains forces and/or other factors that could jeopardize friendly mission accomplishment. 

In combat operations, the AOI normally extends into enemy territory to the objectives of 

current or planned friendly operations if those objectives are not currently located within the 

assigned operational area. An AOI serves to focus intelligence support for monitoring 

enemy, adversary, or other activities outside the operational area that may affect current and 

future operations. The commander can describe the AOI graphically, but the resulting 

graphic does not represent a boundary or other control measure. 

(2) Physical Factors. The JFC and staff must consider numerous physical factors 

associated with operations in the air, land, maritime, and space domains. These factors 

include terrain (including urban settings), weather, topography, hydrology, electromagnetic 

(EM) spectrum, and environmental conditions in the operational area; distances associated 

with the deployment to the operational area and employment of forces and other joint 

capabilities; the location of bases, ports, and other supporting infrastructure; and both 

friendly and adversary forces and other capabilities. Combinations of these factors greatly 

affect the operational design and sustainment of joint operations. 

c. Information Environment. The information environment transcends the four 

physical domains and is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that 
Chapter II 

II-22 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The actors in the information 

environment include leaders, decision makers, individuals, and organizations. Resources 

include the information itself and the materials and systems employed to collect, analyze, 

apply, or disseminate information. The information environment is where humans and 

automated systems observe, orient, decide, and act upon information, and is therefore 

the principal environment of decision-making. The information environment is a 

pervasive backdrop to the physical domains of the JFC’s operational environment. It 

extends beyond the operational area to encompass those theater and national capabilities 

(e.g., systems, databases, centers of excellence, subject-matter experts) that support the 

JFC’s C2 and decision-making requirements. JFCs leverage these capabilities through the 

Global Information Grid (GIG) — the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of 

information capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, 

storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, 

and support personnel. The three dimensions of the information environment are physical, 

informational, and cognitive. 

(1) The physical dimension is composed of the C2 systems and supporting 

infrastructures that enable individuals and organizations to conduct operations across the air, 

land, maritime, and space domains. It is also the dimension where physical platforms and 

the communications networks that connect them reside. This includes the means of 

transmission, infrastructure, technologies, groups, and populations. 

(2) The informational dimension is where information is collected, processed, 

stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected. It is the dimension where C2 of modern 

military forces is communicated and where commander’s intent is conveyed. It consists of 

the content and flow of information, and links the physical and cognitive dimensions. 

(3) The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind of the decision maker and 

the target audience. This is the dimension in which commanders and staff think, perceive, 

visualize, and decide. This dimension also is affected by a commander’s orders, training, 

and other personal motivations. Battles and campaigns can be lost in the cognitive 

dimension. Factors such as leadership, morale, unit cohesion, emotion, state of mind, level 

of training, experience, situational awareness, as well as public opinion, perceptions, media, 

public information, and rumors influence this dimension. 

For more information on the information environment, refer to JP 3-13, Information 

Operations. For specific information on the GIG, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications 

System. 

d. Systems Perspective

(1) Joint operations can benefit by a comprehensive perspective of the systems in 

the operational environment relevant to the mission and operation at hand. Developing a 

systems view can promote a commonly shared understanding of the operational 

environment among members of the joint, interagency, and multinational team, thereby 

facilitating unified action. 
Fundamentals of Joint Operations 

II-23

(2) A system is a functionally related group of elements forming a complex 

whole. A systems perspective of the operational environment strives to provide an 

understanding of interrelated systems (e.g., political, military, economic, social, information, 

infrastructure, and others) relevant to a specific joint operation (see Figure II-6), without 

regard to geographic boundaries. A variety of factors, including planning time available, 

will affect the fidelity of this perspective. Understanding these systems, their interaction 

with each other, and how system relationships will change over time will increase the JFC’s 

knowledge of how actions within a system can affect other system components. Among 

other benefits, this perspective helps intelligence analysts identify potential sources from 

which to gain indications and warning, and facilitates understanding the continuous and 

complex interaction of friendly, adversary, and neutral systems. A systems 

understanding also supports operational design by enhancing elements such as centers of 

gravity (COGs), lines of operations (LOOs), and decisive points. This allows commanders 

and their staffs to consider a broader set of options to focus limited resources, create desired 

THE INTERCONNECTED OPERATIONAL

ENVIRONMENT

Social

Information

Political

Economic

Infrastructure

Military

Figure II-6. The Interconnected Operational Environment 
Chapter II 

II-24 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

effects, avoid undesired effects, and achieve objectives. See Chapter IV, “Planning, 

Operational Art and Design, and Assessment,” for more information on the use of a systems 

perspective in operational design. 

e. Visualizing the Operational Environment

(1) Figure II-7 illustrates a theater of operations within a GCC’s AOR. Using grid 

coordinates, planners have depicted an area of influence that represents the reach of the joint 

force’s combat capabilities. Figure II-7 also shows the AOI, which includes an enemy 

mechanized force that is located outside the theater of operations, but close enough to 

influence the JFC’s operations at some point in time. 

(2) Although the operational environment normally would not be depicted in 

graphic form, it is presented in Figure II-7 to help visualize the scope of an operational 

environment. Within this notional operational environment is a forward base established by 

the GCC outside the theater of operations. There also is a CONUS installation, which could 

represent any of the myriad supporting capabilities outside the AOR that are crucial to 

successful joint operations. These capabilities typically reside at USG facilities such as 

military reservations, installations, bases, posts, camps, stations, arsenals, vessels/ships, or 

laboratories, which support joint functions such as C2, intelligence, and logistics. Although 

DOD installations normally lie outside the designated operational area and area of influence, 

they are part of the JFC’s operational environment. For example, the JFC would desire 

visibility of deploying forces throughout the deployment process to the completion of 

reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. DOD installations provide support 

to deployed forces until they return. The ability to receive support from DOD installations 

VISUALIZING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

AOR

THEATER OF

OPERATIONS

FORWARD

BASES

AREA OF

INFLUENCE

AREA OF

INTEREST

CONTINENTAL

UNITED STATES

INSTALLATION

OPERATIONAL

ENVIRONMENT

XXX

INFORMATION

ENVIRONMENT

Figure II-7. Visualizing the Operational Environment 
Fundamentals of Joint Operations 

II-25

can reduce the size of the forward deployed force. To a significant degree, events occurring 

at DOD installations affect the morale and performance of deployed forces. Thus, the JFC’s 

operational environment encompasses all DOD installation functions, including family 

programs. Although not depicted in Figure II-7, the operational environment also includes a 

wide variety of intangible factors such as the culture, perceptions, beliefs, and values of 

adversary, neutral, or friendly political and social systems. 
Chapter II 

II-26 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER III

JOINT FUNCTIONS 

III-1 

1. General 

a. Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help 

JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to 

joint operations at all levels of war fall into six basic groups — command and control, 

intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Some 

functions, such as C2 and intelligence, apply to all operations. Others, such as fires, apply 

as required by the JFC’s mission. 

b. A number of subordinate tasks, missions, and related capabilities help define each 

function. Some tasks, missions, and capabilities could apply to more than one joint 

function. For example, IO core, supporting, and related capabilities are applied across the 

joint functions and independently (see Figure III-1). 

For a more detailed discussion of IO see JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

c. In any joint operation, the JFC can choose from a wide variety of joint and Service 

capabilities and combine them in various ways to perform joint functions and accomplish 

the mission. The operation plan/order describes the way forces and assets are used together 

to perform joint functions and tasks. However, forces and assets are not characterized by 

the functions for which the JFC is employing them. A single force or asset can perform 

multiple functions simultaneously or sequentially while executing a single task. This 

chapter discusses the joint functions, related tasks, and key considerations. 

2. Command and Control 

a. C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over 

assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The JFC provides 

operational vision, guidance, and direction to the joint force. The C2 function encompasses 

a number of tasks, including the following: 

(1) Communicating and maintaining the status of information. 

(2) Assessing the situation in the operational environment. 

(3) Preparing plans and orders. 

“Preparing for the future will require us to think differently and develop the kinds of 

forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and to unexpected 

circumstances. An ability to adapt will be critical in a world where surprise and 

uncertainty are the defining characteristics of our new security environment.” 

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld 

Remarks to the National Defense University 

January 31, 2002 
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-2 

(4) Commanding subordinate forces. 

(5) Establishing, organizing, and operating a joint force headquarters. 

(6) Coordinating and controlling the employment of joint lethal and nonlethal 

capabilities. 

(7) Coordinating and integrating joint, multinational, OGA, IGO, and NGO 

support. 

(8) Providing PA in the operational area. 

b. Command includes both the authority and responsibility for effectively using 

available resources to accomplish assigned missions. Command at all levels is the art of 

motivating and directing people and organizations into action to accomplish missions. The 

art of command lies in conscious and skillful exercise of command authority through 

visualization, decision-making, and leadership. Using judgment and intuition acquired 

from experience, training, study, and creative thinking; commanders visualize the 

situation and make sound and timely decisions. Effective decision-making combines 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES 

RELATED TO JOINT FUNCTIONS

Core Capabilities

" Psychological Operations — Independent

" Military Deception— Independent

" Operations Security — Protection

" Computer Network Operations

"Computer Network Attack— Fires

"Computer Network Defense—

"Computer Network Exploitation

" Electronic Warfare

"Electronic Attack— Fires

"Electronic Protection — Protection

"Electronic Support — Command and Control (C2)

Supporting Capabilities

" Information Assurance — Protection

" Physical Security— Protection

" Combat Camera— C2

" Counterintelligence— Intelligence

" Physical Attack— Fires

Related Capabilities

" Public Affairs— C2

" Civil Military Operations - — C2

" Defense Support to Public Diplomacy

Protection

— Intelligence

— C2

Figure III-1. Information Operations Capabilities Related to Joint Functions 
Joint Functions 

III-3

judgment with information; it requires knowing if to decide, when to decide, and what to 

decide. Timeliness is the speed required to maintain the initiative over the adversary. 

Decision-making is both art and science. Information management, awareness of the 

operational environment, a sound battle rhythm, and the establishment of commander’s 

critical information requirements (CCIRs) facilitate decision-making. Decision-making 

authority should be decentralized appropriately — it should be delegated to those in the best 

position to make informed, timely decisions. The C2 function supports an efficient 

decision-making process. Enabled by timely intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR), the goal is to provide the ability to make decisions and execute those decisions 

more rapidly than the adversary. This decreases risk and allows the commander more 

control over the timing and tempo of operations. 

(1) JFCs exercise command and influence the outcome of joint campaigns and 

operations by performing the following. 

(a) Delegating OPCON/TACON and establishing support relationships. 

(b) Assigning tasks and operational areas as needed. 

(c) Developing and communicating commander’s intent. 

(d) Designating the main effort. 

(e) Prioritizing and allocating resources. 

(f) Distributing allocated forces. 

(g) Assessing and mitigating risks to both the mission and forces. 

(h) Deciding when and how to redirect efforts. 

(i) Committing reserves. 

(j) Staying attuned to the needs of subordinates, seniors, and allies/coalition 

partners. 

(k) Guiding and motivating the organization toward the military end state. 

(2) Command Authorities. JFCs exercise an array of command authorities 

(i.e., COCOM, OPCON, TACON, and support) delegated to them by law or senior leaders 

and commanders over assigned and attached forces. These authorities also are referred to as 

command relationships. Specific authorities associated with each command relationship, 

“The key is not to make quick decisions, but to make timely decisions.” 

General Colin Powell 

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-4 

summarized in Figure III-2, are outlined in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 

United States. Unity of command in joint operations is maintained through the application 

of the various command relationships as follows. 

(a) COCOM is the command authority over assigned forces vested 

only in the commanders of combatant commands by Title 10, United States Code (USC), 

section 164 (or as directed by the President in the UCP) and cannot be delegated or 

transferred. COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate 

organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and Service 

and/or functional component commanders. COCOM includes the authority to exercise 

directive authority for logistic matters (or to delegate directive authority to a subordinate 

JFC for as many common support capabilities as required to accomplish the subordinate 

JFC’s assigned mission). Under crisis action, wartime conditions, or where critical 

situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, the logistic authority of 

CCDRs enables them to use all logistic capabilities of all forces assigned, and/or attached to 

their commands as necessary for the accomplishment of their mission. Under peacetime 

conditions, logistic authority will be exercised by the CCDR consistent with the peacetime 

limitations imposed by legislation, DOD policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, 

local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by the SecDef or CJCS. 

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Aid, assist, protect, 

or sustain another 

organization

Local direction and 

control of movements or 

maneuvers to accomplish 

mission

When

TACTICAL

CONTROL

is delegated

When

SUPPORT

relationship 

is delegated

 Authoritative Direction for All Military Operations and 

Joint Training









Organize and Employ Commands and Forces

Assign Command Functions to Subordinates

Establish Plans and Requirements for Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Activities

Suspend Subordinate Commanders from Duty

When

OPERATIONAL

CONTROL

is delegated









Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Process Input

Assignment of Subordinate Commanders

Relations with Department of Defense Agencies

Directive Authority for Logistics

Combatant Command (Command Authority)

(Unique to Combatant Commander)

Figure III-2. Command Relationships 
Joint Functions 

III-5

(b) OPCON is inherent in COCOM and may be delegated to and 

exercised by subordinate JFCs and Service and/or functional component commanders over 

assigned and attached forces. The exercise of OPCON involves organizing and employing 

commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative 

direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON in and of itself does not include 

authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal 

organization, or unit training. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional 

responsibilities and geographic JOAs of subordinate JFCs. 

(c) TACON is inherent in OPCON and may be delegated to 

commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and exercised over 

assigned or attached forces or military capabilities or forces made available for tasking. 

TACON typically is exercised by functional component commanders over military 

capabilities or forces made available for tasking. It is limited to the detailed direction and 

control of movements or maneuvers. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling 

and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the 

assigned mission or task. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative 

direction for administrative and logistic support; the commander of the parent unit continues 

to exercise those responsibilities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive. 

(d) Support. Establishing support relationships between components 

(as described in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, is a useful option 

to accomplish needed tasks. Support relationships can be established among all 

functional and Service component commanders, such as the coordination of operations in 

depth involving the joint force land component commander and the JFACC. Within a joint 

force, more than one supported command may be designated simultaneously, and 

components may simultaneously receive and provide support for different missions, 

functions, or operations. For instance, a joint force SO component may be supported for a 

direct action mission while simultaneously providing support to a joint force land 

component for a raid. Similarly, a joint force maritime component may be supported for sea 

control while simultaneously supporting a joint force air component to achieve air 

superiority over the operational area. 

(3) Other authorities granted to commanders, and to subordinates as required, 

include administrative control, coordinating authority, and direct liaison authorized. 

The definitions for each authority are provided in the glossary and the specific authorities 

associated with each are outlined in JP1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 

States.

c. Control is inherent in command. To control is to regulate forces and functions to 

execute the commander’s intent. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and 

staffs compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts. Control is necessary to 

determine the status of organizational effectiveness, identify variance from set standards, 

and correct deviations from these standards. Control permits commanders to acquire and 

apply means to accomplish their intent and develop specific instructions from general 

guidance. Control allows commanders freedom to operate, delegate authority, place 
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-6 

themselves in the best position to lead, and integrate and synchronize actions throughout the 

operational area. Ultimately, it provides commanders a means to measure, report, and 

correct performance. 

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 

In December 2002, representatives from United States Central Command 

(USCENTCOM) and United States European Command (USEUCOM) met in 

Stuttgart, Germany to discuss Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). The two broad 

issues were organizing the operational area and coordinating the command 

relationships for all OIF phases. 

The USCENTCOM OIF theater of operations would by necessity cross the 

Unified Command Plan (UCP) designated USCENTCOM and USEUCOM areas of 

responsibility (AORs) boundary. Specifically, the land and airspace of Turkey 

was recognized for its potential to contribute to opening a northern line of 

operations. Discussions over the potential options for organizing the OIF 

operational area led to an agreement to not request a temporary change in the 

UCP modifying the AORs, but to rely on the establishment of appropriate 

command relationships between the two combatant commanders (CCDRs). 

Discussions over the potential command and control options led to the 

decision to establish a support relationship between USCENTCOM (supported) 

and USEUCOM (supporting). This relationship was established by the 

Secretary of Defense. It enabled the development of coherent and supporting 

campaign plans. 

In the campaign design and plan, USEUCOM retained tactical control (TACON) 

for the coordination and execution of operational movement (reception, 

staging, onward movement, and integration); intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance; logistic and personnel support; and protection in support of 

USCENTCOM forces transiting the USEUCOM AOR; specifically Turkey. Once 

USCENTCOM-allocated joint forces were positioned and prepared to cross the 

Turkish – Iraqi Border (to commence offensive operations) operational control 

(OPCON) would be given to USCENTCOM. Throughout the operation, 

USEUCOM would exercise TACON of all USCENTCOM-allocated forces 

transiting the USEUCOM AOR (into Turkey). For OIF Phase III and Phase IV 

operations, USCENTCOM would exercise OPCON over any USEUCOM forces 

entering Iraq. 

Maintaining UCP AOR boundaries and the establishment of an umbrella 

support relationship between the CCDRs with conditional command authorities 

exercised over the participating forces based on their readiness and operation 

phase provided a workable solution to the integration and employment of joint 

forces on the boundary of two AORs. 

Various Sources 
Joint Functions 

III-7

d. Area of Operations and Functional Considerations

(1) Command and Control in an Area of Operations. The land and 

maritime force commanders are the supported commanders within the AOs 

designated by the JFC. Within their designated AOs, land and maritime force 

commanders integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this 

integration and synchronization, such commanders have the authority to designate target 

priority, effects, and timing of fires within their AOs. 

(a) Synchronization of efforts within land or maritime AOs with theaterand/or JOA-wide operations is of particular importance. To facilitate synchronization, the 

JFC establishes priorities that will be executed throughout the theater and/or JOA, including 

within the land and maritime force commander’s AOs. The JFACC is normally the 

supported commander for the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort, while land and maritime 

component commanders are supported commanders for interdiction in their AOs. 

(b) In coordination with the land and/or maritime force commander, those 

commanders designated by the JFC to execute theater- and/or JOA-wide functions have the 

latitude to plan and execute these JFC prioritized operations within land and maritime AOs. 

Any commander executing such a mission within a land or maritime AO must coordinate 

the operation to avoid adverse effects and fratricide. If those operations would have adverse 

impact within a land or maritime AO, the commander assigned to execute the JOA-wide 

functions must readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the land or maritime component 

commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution. 

(2) Command and Control of Space Operations. A supported JFC normally 

designates a space coordinating authority (SCA) to coordinate joint space operations and 

integrate space capabilities. Based on the complexity and scope of operations, the JFC can 

either retain SCA or designate a component commander as the SCA. The JFC considers the 

mission, nature and duration of the operation; preponderance of space force capabilities 

made available, and resident C2 capabilities (including reachback) in selecting the 

appropriate option. The SCA is responsible for coordinating and integrating space 

capabilities in the operational area, and has primary responsibility for joint space operations 

planning, to include ascertaining space requirements within the joint force. The SCA 

normally will be supported by assigned/attached embedded space personnel. The processes 

for articulating requirements for space force enhancement products are established, are 

specifically tailored to the functional area they support, and result in prioritized 

requirements. Thus the SCA typically has no role in prioritizing the day to day space force 

enhancement requirements of the joint force. To ensure prompt and timely support, the 

supported GCC and Commander, US Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) may 

authorize direct liaison between the SCA and applicable component(s) of United States 

Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Joint force Service component commands should 

communicate their requirements to the SCA, or designated representative, to ensure that all 

space activities are properly integrated and synchronized. 

For detailed guidance on C2 of space operations, refer to JP 3-14, Space Operations. 
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-8 

(3) Command and Control of Joint Air Operations. The JFC will normally 

designate a JFACC and assign responsibilities. The JFACC’s responsibilities normally 

include, but are not limited to planning, coordinating, and monitoring joint air operations, 

and the allocation and tasking of joint air operations forces based on the JFC’s CONOPS 

and air apportionment decision. The JFACC normally is the supported commander for the 

JFC’s overall air interdiction and counterair effort. When the JFC designates a JFACC, 

the JFACC normally assumes the area air defense commander (AADC) and airspace 

control authority (ACA) responsibilities since air defense and airspace control are an 

integral part of joint air operations. When the situation dictates, the JFC may designate a 

separate AADC or ACA. In those joint operations where separate commanders are required 

and designated, close coordination is essential for unity of effort, prevention of friendly fire, 

and deconfliction of joint air operations. 

(a) The JFC designates the ACA. The JFC is ultimately responsible for 

airspace control in the operational area. The ACA coordinates and integrates the use of the 

airspace under the JFC’s authority. The ACA develops guidance, techniques, and 

procedures for airspace control and for the coordination required among units within the 

operational area. The ACA establishes an airspace control system (ACS) that is responsive 

to the needs of the JFC, integrates ACS with the HN, and coordinates and deconflicts user 

requirements. The airspace control plan (ACP) and airspace control order (ACO)

express how the airspace will be used to support mission accomplishment. The ACA 

develops the ACP, and, after JFC approval, distributes it throughout the operational area and 

to all supporting airspace users. The ACP begins with the distribution of the ACO, and is 

executed when components and users comply with the ACO as described in JP 3-30, 

Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 

(b) The JFC designates the AADC. The AADC is responsible for 

defensive counterair (DCA) (which includes both air and missile threats) operations. The 

AADC must identify those volumes of airspace and control measures that support and 

enhance DCA operations, identify required airspace management systems, establish 

procedures for systems to operate within the airspace, and ensure they are incorporated into 

the ACS. The AADC may also designate regional air defense commanders and sector air 

defense commanders to ease C2 of airspace based on the size and scope of the 

mission/operation. 

e. Command and Control System. JFCs exercise authority and direction through a 

C2 system; which consists of the facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, 

information management function, and personnel essential for planning, preparing for, 

executing, and assessing operations. Moreover, the C2 system needs to support the JFC’s 

ability to adjust plans for future operations, while focusing on current operations. The 

JFC’s staff works within the JFC’s intent to assist in the direction and control of forces 

assigned, attached, or made available for tasking to support mission accomplishment. They 

also are alert to spotting adversary or friendly situations that may require changes in 

command relationships or organization and advise the JFC accordingly. 
Joint Functions 

III-9

(1) Liaison is an important aspect of joint force C2. Liaison teams or 

individuals may be dispatched from higher to lower, lower to higher, laterally, or any 

combination of these. They generally represent the interests of the sending commander to 

the receiving commander, but can greatly promote understanding of the commander’s intent 

at both the sending and receiving headquarters and should be assigned early in the planning 

stage of joint operations. LNOs from supporting to supported commanders are particularly 

essential in ascertaining needs and coordinating supporting actions. 

(2) Control and Coordination Measures. JFCs establish various maneuver 

and movement control, airspace coordinating, and fire support coordination measures to 

facilitate effective joint operations. These measures may include, but are not limited to, 

boundaries, phase lines, objectives, coordinating altitudes to deconflict air operations, air 

defense areas, operational areas, submarine operating patrol areas, and no-fire areas. 

For additional guidance on control and coordination measures, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire 

Support, and JP 3-52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone. 

(3) Communications and ISR Systems provide commanders with critical 

support in communications, navigation, intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, 

ballistic missile warning, and environmental sensing that greatly facilitate command. The 

precision with which these systems operate significantly improves the speed and accuracy of 

the information that commanders at all levels exchange, both vertically and laterally, thereby 

enhancing their awareness of the operational environment. Effective command at varying 

operational tempos requires timely, reliable, secure, interoperable, and sustainable 

communications. Communications and ISR planning increases options available to JFCs by 

providing the communications sensor systems necessary to collect, transport, process, and 

disseminate critical information at decisive times. These communications and sensor 

systems permit JFCs to exploit tactical success and facilitate future operations. 

(a) Communications System Planning. The communications system 

provides the JFC the means to collect, transport, process, disseminate, and protect 

information. The mission and structure of the joint force determine specific information 

flow and processing requirements. In turn, the information requirements dictate the general 

architecture and specific configuration of the communications system. Therefore, 

communications system planning needs to be integrated and synchronized with operational 

planning. Through effective communications system planning, the JFC is able to apply 

capabilities at the critical time and place for mission success. 

(b) The communications system must be planned with unified action in 

mind and provide communications links to appropriate multinational partners, OGAs, 

NGOs, and IGOs. Therefore, interoperability and communications security (COMSEC) 

planning is critical. Oftentimes, US forces are assigned to multinational forces to provide 

secure communications and to protect US COMSEC and crypto devices. Further, routine 

communications and backup systems may be disrupted and civil authorities might have to 

rely on available military communications equipment. Additionally, communications 

system planning must consider the termination of US involvement and procedures to 
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-10 

transfer communications system control to another agency such as the UN. Planning should 

consider that it may be necessary to leave some communications resources behind to 

continue support of the ongoing effort. 

For additional guidance on the communications and ISR systems support refer to JPs 2-01, 

Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, and 6-0, Joint 

Communications System. 

f. Network Operations (NETOPS). NETOPS include activities conducted to 

monitor, manage, and control the GIG. NETOPS incorporate network management, 

information dissemination management, and information assurance (IA). Joint NETOPS 

are the means by which C2 is established and maintained throughout the GIG. 

CDRUSSTRATCOM is the supported commander for global NETOPS. While this support 

relationship gives CDRUSSTRATCOM global authority, it does not negate the other 

CCDRs’ authority over assigned NETOPS forces. CDRUSSTRATCOM also is a 

supporting commander for nonglobal NETOPS. In this capacity, CDRUSSTRATCOM will 

provide support to the affected combatant command, Service, and/or DOD agency. The 

FCCs are also supporting commands for nonglobal NETOPS that affect or have the 

potential to affect a GCC’s AOR or mission. OGAs also may provide support per 

intragovernmental agreements. 

For additional guidance on NETOPS refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 

g. Collaboration

(1) Effective C2 demands that commanders and staffs collaborate in 

forming and articulating commander’s intent and determining the mission, operational 

objectives, desired effects, and tasks. Additionally, they must be able to synchronize 

execution across all domains and the information environment; coordinate operations with 

OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and multinational partners; and assess unintended effects. Although 

the value of face-to-face interaction is undisputed, capabilities that improve long-distance 

collaboration among dispersed forces can enhance both planning and execution of joint 

operations. These capabilities not only can improve efficiency and common understanding 

during routine, peacetime interaction among participants, they also can enhance combat 

effectiveness during time-compressed operations associated with both combat and 

noncombat operations. 

(2) A collaborative environment is one in which participants share data, 

information, knowledge, perceptions, ideas, and concepts, often in real time regardless of 

physical location. Collaboration capabilities can enable planners and operators worldwide 

to build a plan in discrete parts or sub-plans concurrently rather than sequentially and to 

integrate their products into the overall plan. Collaboration also provides planners with a 

“view of the whole” while working on various sections of a plan, which helps them identify 

and resolve planning conflicts early. Commanders at all levels can participate in COA 

analysis and then select a COA without the traditional sequential briefing process. They can 
Joint Functions 

III-11

post plans and orders on interactive Web pages, accompanied by proper notification, for 

immediate use by subordinate elements. 

(3) An important result is a compression of the planning/decision timeline. With 

collaboration, JFCs can foster an environment that ensures joint operation or campaign ends, 

ways, and means are known and understood at every echelon from the start to the 

termination of operations. Similar benefits apply during execution, when commanders, 

planners, and others can decide quickly on branches and sequels to the campaign or 

operation and on other time-critical actions to respond to changes in the situation. This can 

occur with improved understanding of commander’s intent, objectives, desired effects, and 

required tasks. If properly managed, collaboration can contribute to more effective planning 

and increase execution efficiency. 

h. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs). CCIRs are 

elements of information required by the commander that directly affect decisionmaking. CCIRs are a key information management tool for the commander and help the 

commander assess the operational environment and identify decision points throughout the 

conduct of operations. CCIRs belong exclusively to the commander.

(1) Characteristics. CCIRs result from the analysis of information 

requirements in the context of a mission, commander’s intent, and the concept of operation. 

Commanders designate CCIRs to let their staffs and subordinates know what information 

they deem necessary for decision-making. In all cases, the fewer the CCIRs, the better the 

staff can focus its efforts and allocate scarce resources. Staffs may recommend CCIRs; 

however, they keep the number of recommended CCIRs to a minimum. CCIRs are not 

static. Commanders add, delete, adjust, and update them throughout an operation based on 

the information they need for decision-making. 

(2) Key Elements. CCIRs include priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) 

and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs). Not all proposed PIRs and FFIRs 

are selected as CCIRs. Those PIRs not selected are downgraded to information 

requirements. PIRs focus on the adversary and the environment and drive intelligence 

collection and production requirements. FFIRs focus on the friendly force and supporting 

capabilities and drive reporting and requests for information (see Figure III-3). Although 

CCIRs generate PIRs and FFIRs for management, the staff focuses on answering the CCIRs 

to support the commander’s decision-making. 
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-12 

(3) Process. To assist in managing CCIRs, commanders should adopt a process to 

guide the staff. This process should include specific responsibilities for development, 

validation, dissemination, monitoring, reporting, and maintenance (i.e., modifying/deleting). 

Figure III-4 is a generic process for developing CCIRs. This process may be tailored for a 

specific mission or operational area. 

COMMANDER’S CRITICAL INFORMATION 

REQUIREMENTS PROCESS

Critical Information the 

Commander Needs to 

Make Decisions

Information Needed

Priority Intelligence 

Requirements

Friendly Force Information

Requirements

Staff Initiates CCIRs 

Development

Staff Develops CCIRs 

Step 2

Step 3

Step 4

Step 5

Step 6

Step 7

Step 8

Step 9

Step 1

Commander 

Approves 

CCIRs

Chief of Staff

Directs Staff

Validate CCIRs

Commander

Provides 

Guidance

Specific Staff 

Action

Decisions the 

Commander Must 

Make

Monitor CCIRs Disseminate 

CCIRs

Report CCIRs Maintain CCIRs

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement

Figure III-4. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements Process 

INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS CATEGORIES

Adversary Adversary Environment Environment Friendly

PIRs

FFIRs

Effective

Decisions

PIR priority intelligence requirement

FFIR friendly force information requirement

Reported 

information 

addressing 

assigned and 

attached 

forces

Civil-military 

collection 

addressing 

economic, 

political, 

meteorological, 

and 

infrastructure

Intelligence 

collection 

addressing 

facets of the 

adversary

Figure III-3. Information Requirements Categories 
Joint Functions 

III-13

i. Battle Rhythm. A command headquarters battle rhythm is its daily operations 

cycle for briefings, meetings, and report requirements. A battle rhythm is essential to 

support decision-making, staff actions, and higher headquarters information requirements 

and to manage the dissemination of decisions and information in a coordinated manner. A 

battle rhythm should be designed to minimize the time the commander and key staff 

members spend attending meetings and listening to briefings — it must allow the staff and 

subordinate commanders time to plan, communicate with the commander, and direct the 

activities of their subordinates. The battle rhythms of the joint and component headquarters 

should be synchronized and take into account multiple time zones and other factors. Other 

planning, decision, and operating cycles (intelligence collection, targeting, and air tasking 

order cycles) influence the joint force headquarters battle rhythm. Further, meetings of the 

necessary boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups must be synchronized. 

Consequently, key members of the joint force staff, components, and supporting agencies 

should participate in the development of the joint force headquarters battle rhythm. Those 

participants must consider the battle rhythm needs of higher, lower, and adjacent commands 

when developing the joint force headquarters battle rhythm. The chief of staff normally 

administers the joint force headquarters battle rhythm. 

j. Risk Management. Risk is inherent in military operations. Risk management is a 

function of command and is based on the amount of risk a higher authority is willing to 

accept. Risk management assists commanders in conserving lives and resources and 

avoiding or mitigating unnecessary risk, making an informed decision to execute a mission, 

identifying feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do not exist, 

and providing reasonable alternatives for mission accomplishment. Risk management does 

not inhibit commanders’ flexibility and initiative, remove risk altogether (or support a zero 

defects mindset), require a GO/NO-GO decision, sanction or justify violating the law, or 

remove the necessity for development of standing operating procedures (SOPs). Risk 

management should be applied to all levels of war, across the range of military operations, 

and all phases of an operation to include any branches and sequels of an operation. To 

alleviate or reduce risk, commanders may change the CONOPS or concept of fire support, 

execute a branch plan, or take other measures to reduce or bypass enemy capabilities. 

(1) Safety is crucial to successful training and operations and the preservation of 

military power. High-tempo operations may increase the risk of injury and death due to 

mishaps. Command interest, discipline, risk mitigation measures, and training lessen those 

risks. The JFC reduces the chance of mishap by conducting risk assessments, assigning a 

safety officer and staff, implementing a safety program, and seeking advice from local 

personnel. Safety planning factors could include the geospatial and weather data, local road 

conditions and driving habits, uncharted or uncleared mine fields, and special equipment 

hazards. 

(2) To assist in risk management, commanders and their staffs may develop or 

institute a risk management process tailored to their particular mission or operational area. 

Figure III-5 is a generic model that contains the likely elements of a risk management 

process. 
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-14 

k. Public Affairs. The mission of joint PA is to plan, coordinate, and synchronize US 

military public information activities and resources in order to support the commander’s 

strategic and operational objectives through the communication of truthful, timely, and 

factual unclassified information about joint military activities within the operational area to 

foreign, domestic, and internal audiences. PA provides advice to the JFC on the 

implications of command decisions on public perception and operations, media events and 

activities, and the development and dissemination of the command information message. 

(1) JFCs must recognize the changing nature of how people get information (or 

disinformation). The speed and methods with which people and organizations can collect 

and convey information to the public makes it possible for the world populace to quickly 

become aware of an incident. Internet sites are increasingly the preferred means of terror 

organizations to engage audiences worldwide in the information environment. This 

instantaneous, unfiltered and often incomplete, intentionally biased, or factually incorrect 

information provided via satellite and the Internet makes planning and effective execution of 

PA more important than ever before. 

(2) The JFC should develop a well-defined and concise PA plan to minimize 

adverse effects upon the joint operation from inaccurate media reporting/analysis, violations 

of operations security (OPSEC), and promulgation of disinformation and misinformation. 

Well-planned PA support should be incorporated in every phase of operations. PA plans 

should provide for open, independent reporting and anticipate and respond to media queries, 

which provide the maximum disclosure with minimum delay and create an environment 

between the JFC and reporters that encourages balanced coverage of operations. An 

effective plan provides proactive ways to communicate information about an operation and 

 RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

IDENTIFY 

HAZARDS

ASSESS

HAZARDS

DEVELOP 

CONTROLS IMPLEMENT

CONTROLS

SUPERVISE

AND

EVALUATE

Figure III-5. Risk Management Process 
Joint Functions 

III-15

fulfills the US military’s obligation to keep the American public informed while maintaining 

requisite OPSEC. 

(3) Communication Coordination. Communication activities should be 

fully integrated in command operational planning and execution processes, so there is 

consistency in intent or effect between command actions and information disseminated 

about those actions. While audiences and intent may at times differ; the JFC, through the 

SC process, should ensure planning for PA, IO, psychological operations (PSYOP), 

CMO, and DSPD is coordinated to make certain consistent themes and messages are 

communicated that support the overall USG SC objectives. 

(4) PA and IO Relationship. PA and IO must be coordinated and 

synchronized to ensure consistent themes and messages are communicated to avoid 

credibility losses. As with other related IO capabilities, PA has a role in all aspects of 

DOD’s missions and functions. Communication of operational matters to internal and 

external audiences is just one part of PA’s function. In performing duties as one of the 

primary spokesmen, the PA officer’s interaction with the IO staff enables PA activities to be 

coordinated and deconflicted with IO. While intents differ, PA and IO ultimately support 

the dissemination of information, themes, and messages adapted to their audiences. PA 

contributes to the achievement of military objectives, for instance, by countering adversary 

misinformation and disinformation through the publication of accurate information. PA also 

assists OPSEC by ensuring that the media are aware of the implications of premature release 

of information. The embedding of media in combat units offers new opportunities, as well 

as risks, for the media and the military; the PA staff has a key role in establishing 

embedding ground rules. Many adversaries rely on limiting their population’s knowledge to 

remain in power; PA and IO provide ways to get the joint forces’ messages to these 

populations. 

For additional guidance on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs. 

l. Civil-Military Operations. CMO denote the activities of a commander that 

establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil 

authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, 

neutral, or hostile operational area to facilitate military operations and consolidate strategic, 

operational, or tactical objectives. CMO may include activities and functions normally the 

responsibility of the local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or 

subsequent to other military actions. They also may occur, if directed, in the absence of 

other military operations. 

For additional guidance on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

m. Language and Regional Expertise. Language skills and regional knowledge are 

crucial “warfighting skills” that are integral to joint operations. Deployed joint forces must 

be capable of understanding and effectively communicating with native populations, local 

and national government officials, and coalition partners. Lessons learned from OIF and 

OEF prove that this force-multiplying capability can save lives and is integral to successful 
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-16 

mission accomplishment. Consequently, commanders will integrate foreign language and 

regional expertise capabilities in contingency, security cooperation, and supporting plans; 

and provide for them in support of daily operations and activities. 

For specific planning guidance and procedures regarding language and regional expertise, 

refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction (CJCSI) 3126.01, Language and 

Regional Expertise Planning. 

For additional and more detailed guidance on C2 of joint forces, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for 

the Armed Forces of the United States. 

For additional guidance on C2 of air, land, or maritime operations; refer to JPs 3-30, 

Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land 

Operations, and 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations. 

3. Intelligence 

a. Understanding the operational environment is fundamental to joint operations. 

Intelligence provides this understanding to JFCs. Intelligence tells JFCs what their enemies 

or adversaries are doing, what they are capable of doing, and what they may do in the future. 

The intelligence process also attempts to identify what the adversary is able to discern about 

friendly forces. This function assists JFCs and their staffs in visualizing the operational 

environment and in achieving information superiority. Intelligence also contributes to 

information superiority by attempting to discern the adversary’s probable intent and future 

COA. During deployment, employment, and redeployment; the operational environment 

generates threats to joint forces that likely will produce combat-related battle injury (BI) 

and/or disease and nonbattle injury (DNBI) casualties. Intelligence provides information 

that assists decision makers with devising protection measures to mitigate these threats. 

Consequently, a complete intelligence picture, to include medical intelligence is required. 

b. Intelligence is critical in all joint operations. In military engagement, security 

cooperation, and deterrence activities; intelligence operations seek to provide the national 

leadership with the information needed to realize national goals and objectives, while 

providing military leadership with the information needed to accomplish missions and 

implement the national security strategy. During major operations and campaigns, 

intelligence identifies enemy capabilities, helps identify the COGs, projects probable COAs, 

and assists in planning friendly force employment. During crisis response or limited 

contingency operations, intelligence provides assessments that help the JFC decide which 

forces to deploy; when, how, and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a 

manner that accomplishes the mission. 

c. The intelligence function includes: 

(1) Planning and direction, to include managing counterintelligence (CI) 

activities that protect against espionage, sabotage, and assassinations. 
Joint Functions 

III-17

(2) Collection to include surveillance and reconnaissance. 

(3) Processing and exploitation of collected data. 

(4) Analysis of information and production of intelligence. 

(5) Dissemination and integration of intelligence with operations. 

(6) Evaluation and feedback regarding intelligence effectiveness and quality. 

d. Key Considerations

(1) Responsibilities. JFCs and their component commanders are the key 

players in planning and conducting intelligence tasks. Commanders are more than just 

consumers of intelligence. They are ultimately responsible for ensuring that intelligence is 

fully integrated into their plans and operations. Commanders establish the operational and 

intelligence requirements and continuous feedback is needed to ensure optimum intelligence 

support to operations. This interface is essential to support the commander; to support 

operational planning and execution; to avoid surprise; to assist friendly deception efforts; 

and to evaluate the effects of operations. 

(2) Collection Capabilities. Surveillance and reconnaissance are important 

elements of the intelligence function that support the collection of information across the 

levels of war and range of military operations. Computer network exploitation involves 

intelligence collection conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from 

target or adversary automated information systems or networks. 

(3) CI consists of information gathered and activities conducted to protect 

against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or 

on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign 

persons, or international terrorist activities. 

For additional information on CI, refer to JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human 

Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (SECRET). 

For additional guidance on the intelligence function, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, JP 

2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, and other subordinate 

JPs that address intelligence support to targeting, CI, human intelligence (HUMINT), 

geospatial intelligence, and joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

(JIPOE). 

4. Fires 

a. To employ fires is to use available weapon systems to create a specific lethal or 

nonlethal effect on a target. Policy, guidance, and planning for the employment of 

operational and strategic fires is primarily a joint function. Joint fires are delivered 
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-18 

during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to 

produce desired effects in support of a common objective. Fires typically produce 

destructive effects, but some ways and means (such as electronic attack [EA]) can be 

employed with little or no associated physical destruction. This function encompasses the 

fires produced by a number of tasks (or missions, actions, and processes) including: 

(1) Conduct joint targeting. This is the process of selecting and prioritizing 

targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational 

requirements and capabilities. 

(2) Provide joint fire support. This task includes joint fires that assist air, land, 

maritime, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, 

populations, airspace, and key waters. 

(3) Countering air and missile threats. This task integrates offensive and 

defensive operations and capabilities to attain and maintain a desired degree of air 

superiority and force protection. These operations are designed to destroy or negate enemy 

aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch. 

(4) Interdict enemy capabilities. Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or 

destroys the enemy’s military surface capability before it can be used effectively against 

friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. 

(5) Conduct strategic attack. This task includes offensive action against 

targets — whether military, political, economic, or other — which are selected specifically 

in order to achieve strategic objectives. 

(6) Employ IO Capabilities. This task focuses on military actions involving 

the use of EM and directed energy and computer networks to attack the enemy. 

(7) Assess the results of employing fires. This task includes assessing both the 

effectiveness and performance of fires as well as their contribution to the larger operation or 

objective. For more guidance on assessment, refer to Section D, “Assessment,” of Chapter 

IV, “Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment.” 

b. Key Considerations. The following are key considerations associated with the 

above tasks. 

(1) Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching 

the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. 

Targeting supports the process of linking the desired effects of fires to actions and tasks at 

the component level. Commanders, planners, and legal advisors must consider the national 

strategic end state, political goals, and legal constraints when making targeting decisions. 

Successful integration of IO considerations into the targeting process is important to mission 

accomplishment in many operations. 
Joint Functions 

III-19

(a) Oversight. JFCs may establish and task their staff to accomplish broad 

targeting oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate 

commander. Typically, JFCs organize joint targeting coordination boards (JTCBs). If 

the JFC so designates, a JTCB may be either an integrating center for this effort or a JFClevel review mechanism. In either case, it should be comprised of representatives from the 

staff, all components and, if required, their subordinate units. The primary focus of the 

JTCB is to ensure target priorities, guidance, and the associated effects are linked to the 

JFC’s objectives. Briefings conducted at the JTCB should focus on ensuring that targeting 

efforts are coordinated and synchronized with intelligence and operations (by all 

components and applicable staff elements). 

(b) Delegation of Joint Targeting Process Authority. The JFC is 

responsible for all aspects of the targeting process. The JFC may appoint a component 

commander with the authority to conduct the joint targeting process or the authority may be 

retained within the joint force staff. The JFC normally appoints the deputy JFC or a 

component commander to chair the JTCB. When a JTCB is not established and if the JFC 

decides not to delegate targeting oversight authority to a deputy or subordinate commander, 

the JFC performs this task at the joint force headquarters with the assistance of the 

operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3). In this instance, the JFC may approve the 

formation within the J-3 of a joint fires element to provide recommendations to the J-3. The 

JFC ensures that this process is a joint effort involving applicable subordinate commands. 

Whomever the JFC delegates joint targeting planning, coordination, and deconfliction 

authority to must possess or have access to a sufficient C2 infrastructure, adequate facilities, 

joint planning expertise, and appropriate intelligence. 

For additional targeting guidance, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

(c) Air Apportionment. In the context of joint fires, air apportionment is 

part of the targeting process. JFCs must pay particular attention to air apportionment given 

the many missions and tasks that joint air forces can perform, its operational area-wide 

reach, and its ability to rapidly shift from one function to another. Air apportionment assists 

JFCs to ensure the weight of the joint force air effort is consistent with the JFC’s intent and 

objectives. After consulting with other component commanders, the JFACC makes the air 

apportionment recommendation to the JFC who makes the air apportionment decision. The 

methodology the JFACC uses to make the recommendation may include priority or 

percentage of effort against assigned mission-type orders or categories significant for the 

campaign or operation such as the JFC’s or JFACC’s objectives. Following the JFC’s air 

apportionment decision, the JFACC allocates and tasks the capabilities/forces made 

available. 

For additional guidance on air apportionment, refer to JP 3-30, Command and Control for 

Joint Air Operations. 

(2) Joint fire support includes joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and 

special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, 

and key waters. Joint fire support may include, but is not limited to, the lethal effects of air 
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-20 

support by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, naval surface fire support, artillery, mortars, 

rockets, and missiles, as well as nonlethal effects of some EA actions and space control 

operations, as well as other nonlethal capabilities. Integration and synchronization of joint 

fires and joint fire support with the fire and maneuver of the supported force is essential. 

For additional guidance on joint fire support, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. 

(3) Countering Air and Missile Threats 

(a) The JFC normally seeks to gain and maintain air superiority as quickly 

as possible to allow friendly forces to operate without prohibitive interference from 

adversary air threats. Air superiority is achieved through the counterair mission, which 

integrates both offensive counterair (OCA) and DCA operations from all components to 

counter the air and missile threat. These operations may use aircraft, surface-to-surface and 

surface-to-air missiles, artillery, SOF, ground forces, and EA. US military forces must be 

capable of countering the air and missile threat from initial force projection through 

redeployment of friendly forces. Proliferation of missiles, advances in missile technologies 

(perhaps coupled with WMD), and the often fleeting nature of adversary missile targets; 

make missiles a particularly difficult and dangerous threat. Close coordination and 

synchronization is paramount between DCA and OCA operations to counter the missile 

threat. DCA (both air and missile defense) is essential to the protection function 

described in paragraph 6 of this chapter.

(b) OCA operations are the preferred method of countering theater air and 

missile threats. OCA consists of offensive measures to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize adversary 

aircraft, missiles, launch platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before and 

after launch, but as close to the source as possible. Ideally, joint OCA operations will prevent 

the launch of, or destroy adversary aircraft and missiles and their supporting infrastructure prior 

to launch. OCA includes attack operations, fighter sweep, fighter escort, and suppression of 

enemy air defenses. 

For additional guidance on air superiority and countering air and missile threats, refer to JP 

3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats. 

(4) Interdiction

(a) Interdiction is a powerful tool for JFCs. Interdiction operations are actions 

to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military surface capability before it can be used 

effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. Fires and/or maneuver 

can be used to interdict. Air interdiction is conducted at such distance from friendly forces that 

detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not 

required. The JFC is responsible for the planning and synchronization of the overall 

interdiction effort in the assigned operational area. The JFACC normally is the supported 

commander for the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort, while land and maritime component 

commanders are supported commanders for interdiction in their AOs. 
Joint Functions 

III-21

(b) Military forces also provide CS to OGAs responsible for execution of law 

enforcement interdiction activities which include actions taken to divert, disrupt, delay, 

intercept, board, detain, or destroy, as appropriate, suspect vessels, vehicles, aircraft, people, 

and cargo. Federal law and DOD policy impose limitations on the types of support that may be 

provided. 

(c) Interdiction operations can be conducted by many elements of the joint 

force and can have tactical, operational, and strategic effects. Air, land, maritime, and special 

operations forces can conduct interdiction operations as part of their larger or overall mission. 

For example, naval expeditionary forces charged with seizing and securing a lodgment along a 

coast may include the interdiction of opposing land and maritime forces inside the AOA as part 

of the overall amphibious plan. Similarly, at the direction of appropriate authorities, forces 

performing a homeland defense (HD) or CS mission may perform interdiction against specific 

targets. 

(d) JFCs may choose to employ interdiction as a principal means to achieve the 

intended objective (with other components supporting the component leading the interdiction 

effort). Interdiction during warfighting is not limited to any particular region of the operational 

area, but generally is conducted forward of or at a distance from friendly surface forces. 

Likewise, interdiction in HD or CS operations is not restricted to any region or environment, 

but is to a greater extent than other interdiction operations, guided and restricted by domestic 

and international law. Interdiction may be planned to create advantages at any level from 

tactical to strategic with corresponding effects on the enemy and the speed with which 

interdiction affects front-line enemy forces. Interdiction deep in the enemy’s rear area can have 

broad operational effects; however, deep interdiction may have a delayed effect on land and 

maritime operations. Interdiction closer to land and maritime forces will be of more immediate 

operational and tactical concern to surface maneuver forces. Thus, JFCs vary the emphasis 

upon interdiction operations and surface maneuvers, depending on the strategic and 

operational situation confronting them. 

AIR INTERDICTION DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, most of the effort against Iraqi ground 

troops was focused on Republican Guard divisions and on a handful of stalwart 

regular divisions that formed part of the defensive ring south of Baghdad. 

One prominent air interdiction success story involved the Iraqi Republican 

Guard’s redeployment of elements of the Hammurabi, Nebuchadnezzar, and Al 

Nida divisions after 25 March 2003 to the south of Baghdad toward Karbala, 

Hillah, and Al Cut. Their road movements were steadily bombed by US Air 

Force A-10s and B-52s (dropping 500-pound bombs) and British Tornados. An 

Iraqi commander concluded that their movement south had been one of the 

Iraqi regime’s major errors because it exposed the Republican Guard to 

coalition air power and resulted in large casualty figures. 

SOURCE: Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #30

Carl Conetta, 26 September 2003 
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-22 

For more guidance on joint interdiction operations, refer to JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction. 

(5) Strategic Attack. The JFC should consider conducting strategic attacks, 

when feasible. A strategic attack is a JFC-directed offensive action against a target — 

whether military, political, economic, or other — that is specifically selected to achieve 

national or military strategic objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the adversary’s 

ability or will to engage in conflict or continue an action and as such, could be part of a 

campaign, major operation, or conducted independently as directed by the President or 

SecDef. Additionally, these attacks may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily 

having to achieve operational objectives as a precondition. Suitable targets may include but 

are not limited to enemy strategic COGs. All components of a joint force may have 

capabilities to conduct strategic attacks. 

(6) IO Capabilities

(a) Computer network attack (CNA) operations disrupt, deny, degrade, or 

destroy information resident in computers and computer networks (relying on the data 

stream to execute the attack), or the computers and networks themselves. 

(b) EA involves the use of EM energy, directed energy, or antiradiation 

weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, 

neutralizing, or destroying adversary combat capability. The effects of EA can be both 

lethal and nonlethal. EA can be used against a computer, but it is not CNA, since CNA 

relies on the data stream to execute the attack while EA relies on the EM spectrum. 

Integration and synchronization of EA with maneuver, C2, and other joint fires is essential. 

For additional guidance on EA, refer to JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare. 

(7) Limiting collateral damage — the inadvertent or secondary damage 

occurring as a result of actions initiated by friendly or adversary forces — is a consideration 

when delivering fires. JFCs must deliver fires discriminately to create desired effects while 

balancing the law of war principles of military necessity, proportionality, and limiting 

unnecessary suffering. 

5. Movement and Maneuver 

a. This function encompasses disposing joint forces to conduct campaigns, major 

operations, and other contingencies by securing positional advantages before combat 

operations commence and by exploiting tactical success to achieve operational and strategic 

objectives. This function includes moving or deploying forces into an operational area and 

conducting maneuver to operational depths for offensive and defensive purposes. It also 

includes assuring the mobility of friendly forces. The movement and maneuver function

encompasses a number of tasks including: 

(1) Deploy, shift, regroup, or move joint formations within the operational area 

by any means or mode (air, land, or sea). 
Joint Functions 

III-23

(2) Maneuver joint forces to achieve a position of advantage over an enemy. 

(3) Provide mobility for joint forces to facilitate their movement and maneuver 

without delays caused by terrain or obstacles. 

(4) Delay, channel, or stop movement and maneuver by enemy formations. This 

includes operations that employ obstacles (i.e., countermobility), enforce sanctions and 

embargoes, and conduct blockades. 

(5) Control significant areas in the operational area whose possession or control 

provides either side an operational advantage. 

b. Movement to Attain Operational Reach

(1) Forces, sometimes limited to those that are forward-deployed or even 

multinational forces formed specifically for the task at hand, can be positioned within 

operational reach of enemy COGs or decisive points to achieve decisive force at the 

appropriate time and place. At other times, mobilization and strategic deployment systems 

can be called up to begin the movement of reinforcing forces from CONUS or other theaters 

to redress any unfavorable balance of forces and to achieve decisive force at the appropriate 

time and place. Alert may come with little or no notice. 

(2) JFCs must carefully consider the movement of forces and whether to 

recommend the formation and or movement of multinational forces in such situations. At 

times, movement of forces can contribute to the escalation of tension, while at other times its 

deterrent effect can reduce those tensions. Movement of forces may deter adversary 

aggression or movement. 

c. Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area through 

movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the 

enemy. Maneuver of forces relative to enemy COGs can be key to the JFC’s mission 

accomplishment. Through maneuver, the JFC can concentrate forces at decisive points to 

achieve surprise, psychological shock, and physical momentum. Maneuver also may enable 

or exploit the effects of massed or precision fires. 

(1) The principal purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy at a disadvantage 

through the flexible application of movement and fires. The goal of maneuver is to render 

opponents incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and physical cohesion (their 

ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole) by moving to a point of advantage to 

deliver a decisive blow. This may be achieved by attacking enemy forces and controlling 

territory, airspace, populations, key waters, and LOCs through air, land, and maritime 

maneuvers. 

(2) There are multiple ways to attain positional advantage. A naval 

expeditionary force with airpower, cruise missiles, and amphibious assault capability, within 
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-24 

operational reach of an enemy’s COG, has positional advantage. In like manner, land and 

air expeditionary forces that are within operational reach of an enemy’s COG and have the 

means and opportunity to strike and maneuver on such a COG also have positional 

advantage. Maintaining full-spectrum superiority contributes to positional advantage by 

facilitating freedom of action. 

(3) At all levels of war, successful maneuver requires not only fire and 

movement but also agility and versatility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations. It 

requires designating and then, if necessary, shifting the main effort and applying the 

principles of mass and economy of force. 

(a) At the strategic level, deploying units to and positioning units within an 

operational area are forms of maneuver if such movements seek to gain positional 

advantage. Strategic maneuver should place forces in position to begin the phases or major 

operations of a campaign. 

(b) At the operational level, maneuver is a means by which JFCs set the 

terms of battle by time and location, decline battle, or exploit existing situations. 

Operational maneuver usually takes large forces from a base of operations to an area where 

they are in position to achieve operational objectives. The objective for operational 

maneuver is usually a COG or decisive point. 

(4) JFCs should consider the contribution of SO in attaining positional 

advantage. SOF may expose vulnerabilities through special reconnaissance and attack the 

enemy at tactical, operational, and strategic levels through direct action or unconventional 

warfare using indigenous or surrogate forces. Additionally, the use of PSYOP and CMO 

may minimize civilian interference with operations as well as the impact of military 

operations on the populace. 

6. Protection 

a. The protection function focuses on conserving the joint force’s fighting potential in 

four primary ways — active defensive measures that protect the joint force, its 

information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and LOCs from an adversary’s attack; 

passive defensive measures that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to 

locate, strike, and destroy; applying technology and procedures to reduce the risk of 

fratricide; and emergency management and response to reduce the loss of personnel and 

capabilities due to accidents, health threats, and natural disasters. As the JFC’s mission 

requires, the protection function also extends beyond force protection to encompass 

protection of US noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly 

nations; and OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. Protection capabilities apply domestically in the 

context of HD, CS, and emergency preparedness (EP). 

b. The protection function encompasses a number of tasks, including: 

(1) Providing air, space, and missile defense. 
Joint Functions 

III-25

(2) Protecting noncombatants. 

(3) Providing physical security for forces and means. 

(4) Conducting defensive countermeasure operations, including 

counterdeception and counterpropaganda operations. 

(5) Providing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense. 

(6) Conducting OPSEC, computer network defense (CND), IA, and electronic 

protection activities. 

(7) Securing and protecting flanks, bases, base clusters, JSAs, and LOCs. 

(8) Conduct PR operations. 

(9) Conducting chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield 

explosives (CBRNE) consequence management (CM). 

(10) Conducting antiterrorism operations. 

(11) Establishing capabilities and measures to prevent fratricide. 

(12) Provide emergency management and response capabilities and services. 

c. There are protection considerations that affect planning in every joint operation. 

The greatest risk — and therefore the greatest need for protection — is during campaigns 

and major operations that involve large-scale combat against a capable enemy. These 

typically will require the full range of protection tasks, thereby complicating both planning 

and execution. Although the operational area and joint force may be smaller for a crisis 

response or limited contingency operation, the mission can still be complex and 

dangerous, with a variety of protection considerations. Permissive operating environments 

associated with military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence still require 

that planners consider protection measures commensurate with potential risks. These risks 

may include a wide range threats such as terrorism, criminal enterprises, environmental 

threats/hazards, and computer hackers. Thus continuous research and access to accurate, 

detailed information about the operational environment along with realistic training can 

enhance protection activities. 

d. Force protection includes preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions 

against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical 

information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the 

decisive time and place and incorporates the integrated and synchronized offensive and 

defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading 

opportunities for the adversary. It does not include actions to defeat the adversary or protect 
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-26 

against accidents, weather, or disease. Force health protection (FHP) complements force 

protection efforts by promoting, improving, and conserving the mental and physical well 

being of Service members. Force protection is achieved through the tailored selection and 

application of multilayered active and passive measures, within the air, land, maritime, and 

space domains and the information environment across the range of military operations with 

an acceptable level of risk. Intelligence sources provide information regarding an 

adversary’s capabilities against personnel and resources, as well as providing timely 

information to decision makers regarding force protection considerations. Foreign and 

domestic law enforcement agencies can contribute to force protection through the 

prevention, detection, response, and investigation of crime; and by sharing information on 

criminal and terrorist organizations. Consequently, a cooperative police program involving 

military and civilian law enforcement agencies is essential. 

e. Key Considerations

(1) Security of forces and means enhances force protection by identifying and 

reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security operations 

protect flanks, LOCs, bases, base clusters, and JSAs. Physical security includes physical 

measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, 

installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, 

damage, and theft. The physical security process includes determining vulnerabilities to 

known threats; applying appropriate deterrent, control, and denial safeguarding techniques 

and measures; and responding to changing conditions. Functions in physical security 

include facility security, law enforcement, guard and patrol operations, special land and 

maritime security areas, and other physical security operations like military working dog 

operations or emergency and disaster response support. Measures include fencing and 

perimeter stand-off space, land or maritime force patrols, lighting and sensors, vehicle 

barriers, blast protection, intrusion detection systems and electronic surveillance, and access 

control devices and systems. Physical security measures, like any defense, should be 

overlapping and deployed in depth. 

For additional guidance on physical security measures, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security 

Operations in Theater. 

(2) Defensive Counterair. DCA (i.e., active and passive measures for air and 

missile defense) also contributes to force protection by detecting, identifying, intercepting, 

and destroying or negating enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly 

airspace to include WMD delivery systems. 

(a) Active air and missile defense includes all direct defensive action taken 

to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against 

friendly forces and assets. It includes the use of aircraft, air and missile defense weapons, 

electronic warfare (EW), and other available weapons. Ideally, integration of systems will 

allow for a defense in depth, with potential for multiple engagements that increase the 

probability for success. Active air and missile defense recognizes both air defense and 

missile defense as unique and separate capabilities that are closely integrated. The JSA 
Joint Functions 

III-27

coordinator coordinates with the AADC to ensure that air and missile defense requirements 

for the JSA are integrated into air defense plans. 

(b) Passive air and missile defense includes all measures, other than active 

air and missile defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats 

against friendly forces and assets. These measures include camouflage, concealment, 

deception, dispersion, reconstitution, redundancy, detection and warning systems, and the 

use of protective construction. 

For additional guidance on countering theater air and missile threats, refer to JP 3-01, 

Countering Air and Missile Threats. 

(3) Defensive use of IO ensures timely, accurate, and relevant information 

access while denying adversaries opportunities to exploit friendly information and 

information systems for their own purposes. 

(a) OPSEC is a process of planning and action to gain and maintain 

essential secrecy about the JFC’s actual capabilities, activities, and intentions. History has 

shown the value and need for reliable, accurate, and timely intelligence, and the harm that 

results from its inaccuracies and absence. It is therefore vital and advantageous to deny 

adversary commanders the critical information they need (essential secrecy) and cause them 

to derive timely but inaccurate perceptions that influence their actions (desired 

appreciations). OPSEC is applied to all military activities at all levels of command. 

Effective OPSEC measures minimize the “signature” of joint force activities, avoid set 

patterns, and mitigate friendly vulnerabilities through protection of critical information. The 

JFC should provide OPSEC planning guidance as early as possible. By maintaining liaison 

and coordinating the OPSEC planning guidance, the JFC will ensure unity of effort in 

gaining and maintaining the essential secrecy considered necessary for success. OPSEC and 

security programs must be closely coordinated to ensure that all aspects of sensitive 

operations are protected. 

For additional guidance on OPSEC, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security. 

(b) CND includes actions taken to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and 

respond to unauthorized activity within DOD information systems and computer networks. 

(c) IA is defined as measures that protect and defend information and 

information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, 

and nonrepudiation. IA incorporates protection, detection, response, restoration, and 

reaction capabilities and processes to shield and preserve information and information 

systems. IA for DOD information and information systems requires a defense-in-depth that 

integrates the capabilities of people, operations, and technology to establish multilayer and 

multidimensional protection to ensure survivability and mission accomplishment. IA must 

account for the possibility that access can be gained to its information and information 

systems from outside of DOD control. Conversely, information obtained directly from 

sources outside of DOD is not subject to DOD IA processes and procedures. Lack of DOD 
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-28 

IA control over information and information systems neither guarantees that the quality of 

information obtained within DOD is unimpeachable, nor that non-DOD information and 

information systems is implicitly of lower quality. 

(d) Electronic protection is that division of EW involving passive and 

active means taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of 

friendly or enemy employment of EW that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat 

capability. 

(4) Personnel Recovery. PR missions are conducted using military, diplomatic, 

and civil efforts to effect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. There are five 

PR tasks (report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate) necessary to achieve a complete 

and coordinated recovery of DOD military personnel, civilian employees, and contractors. 

JFCs should consider all individual, component, joint, multinational, and OGA capabilities 

available when planning and executing PR missions. 

For further guidance on PR, refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery. 

(5) CBRN Defense. Preparation for potential enemy use of CBRN weapons is 

integral to any planning effort. Even when an adversary does not posses weapons 

traditionally regarded as WMD, easy global access to materials such as radiation sources 

and chemicals represents a significant planning consideration. It may not be the sheer 

killing power of these hazards that represents the greatest threat. It is the strategic, 

operational, psychological, and political impacts of their use that can affect strategic 

objectives and campaign design. CBRN defense measures provide defense against attack 

using WMD and the capability to sustain operations in CBRN environments using the 

principles of avoidance of CBRN hazards, particularly contamination; protection of 

individuals and units from unavoidable CBRN hazards; and decontamination. Effective 

CBRN defense also deters enemy WMD use by contributing to the survivability of US 

forces. 

For additional guidance on CBRN defense, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments, and JP 3-40, Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

(6) Antiterrorism programs support force protection by establishing defensive 

measures that reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include 

limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. They also consist of 

personal security and defensive measures to protect Service members, high-risk personnel 

(HRP), civilian employees, family members, DOD facilities, information, and equipment. 

Personal security measures consist of common-sense rules of on- and off-duty conduct for 

every Service member. They also include use of individual protective equipment (IPE), use 

of hardened vehicles and facilities, employment of dedicated guard forces, and use of duress 

alarms. Security of HRP safeguards designated individuals who, by virtue of their rank, 

assignment, symbolic value, location, or specific threat are at a greater risk than the general 

population. Terrorist activity may be discouraged by varying the installation security 
Joint Functions 

III-29

posture through the use of a random antiterrorism measures program; which may include 

varying patrol routes, staffing guard posts and towers at irregular intervals; and conducting 

vehicle and vessel inspections, personnel searches, and identification checks on a set but 

unpredictable pattern. 

For additional guidance on antiterrorism, refer to JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism. 

(7) CID is the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected 

objects in the operational environment sufficient to support an engagement decision. 

Effective CID enhances joint force capabilities by providing confidence in the accuracy of 

engagement decisions throughout the force. The JFC’s CID procedures serve to optimize 

mission effectiveness by maximizing enemy engagements while minimizing fratricide and 

collateral damage. 

(a) Depending on operational requirements, CID characterization may be 

limited to, “friend,” “enemy/hostile,” “neutral,” or “unknown.” In some situations, 

additional characterizations may be required including, but not limited to, class, type, 

nationality, and mission configuration. CID characterizations, when applied with ROE, 

enable engagement decisions and the subsequent use, or prohibition of use, of lethal 

weapons and nonlethal capabilities. 

(b) The JFC’s CID procedures should be developed early during planning. 

CID considerations play an important role in force protection. The JFC’s CID procedures 

must be consistent with ROE and not interfere with unit or individual’s ability to engage 

enemy forces. When developing the JFC’s CID procedures, important considerations 

include the missions, capabilities, and limitations of all participants including multinational 

forces, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. 

(c) The CID process includes adequate staffing across all command levels for 

effective integration of CID in joint operations. Effective integration of CID procedures 

uses the employed communications system and available technology to enable accurate and 

timely decisions at all levels of command throughout the force. Timely and accurate CID 

requires preplanned information exchange among commanders, military forces, and other 

participants involved in the operation. 

(d) CID-related information exchange orients on situational awareness for 

friendly and neutral forces, restrained sites and structures, and identification of threat 

objects. During mission execution CID information requires constant coordination and 

should be conveyed to decision makers in an understandable manner. 

For additional guidance on CID, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. 

(8) Force Health Protection. FHP complements force protection efforts and 

includes all measures taken by the JFC and the Military Health System to promote, improve, 

and conserve the mental and physical well-being of Service members. FHP measures focus 

on the prevention of illness and injury. The JFC must ensure adequate capabilities are 
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-30 

available to identify health threats and implement appropriate FHP measures. Health 

threats arise from potential and ongoing enemy actions to include employment of CBRNE 

capabilities; environmental, occupational, industrial, and meteorological conditions; 

endemic human and zoonotic diseases; and other medical considerations that can reduce the 

effectiveness of military forces. Therefore, a robust health surveillance system is critical to 

FHP measures. Health surveillance includes identifying the population at risk; identifying 

and assessing hazardous exposures; employing specific countermeasures to eliminate or 

mitigate exposures; and utilizing procedures to monitor and report BI/DNBI rates and other 

measures of monitoring health outcomes. Occupational and environmental health 

surveillance enhances the joint force’s ability to minimize BIs and DNBIs including combat 

and operational stress and prevent or minimize its exposure to CBRNE effects. 

For further guidance on FHP, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support. 

7. Sustainment 

a. Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to 

maintain and prolong operations until mission accomplishment. The focus of sustainment in 

joint operations is to provide the JFC with the means to enable freedom of action and 

endurance and extend operational reach. Effective sustainment determines the depth to 

which the joint force can conduct decisive operations; allowing the JFC to seize, retain and 

exploit the initiative. 

(1) Logistics is the science of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing the 

movement and maintenance of forces. In its broadest sense, logistics includes the design, 

development, and acquisition of equipment and systems. Logistics concerns the integration 

of strategic, operational, and tactical support efforts within the theater, while scheduling the 

mobilization and deployment of forces and materiel in support of the supported JFC’s 

CONOPS. The relative combat power that military forces can generate against an adversary 

is constrained by a nation’s capability to plan for, gain access to, and deliver forces and 

materiel to the required points of application across the range of military operations. 

Logistics covers the following broad functional areas: 

(a) Supply. 

(b) Maintenance. 

(c) Transportation. 

(d) Health service support (HSS). 

(e) Explosive ordnance disposal. 

(f) Field services. 

(g) General engineering. 
Joint Functions 

III-31

(2) Personnel services are those sustainment functions provided to personnel. 

Personnel services complement logistics by planning for and coordinating efforts that 

provide and sustain personnel so that the JFC may be optimally prepared to accomplish the 

mission. They include the following: 

(a) Human resources support. 

(b) Religious ministry support. 

(c) Financial management. 

(d) Legal support. 

b. JFCs should begin building sustainment capabilities during the earliest phases of a 

campaign or operation. Sustainment should be a priority consideration when the timedphased force and deployment data list is built. Sustainment provides JFCs with flexibility to 

develop any required branches and sequels and to refocus joint force efforts as required. 

c. The sustainment function encompasses a number of tasks including: 

(1) Coordinating the supply of food, fuel, arms, munitions, and equipment. 

(2) Providing for maintenance of equipment. 

(3) Coordinating support for forces, including field services, personnel support, 

HSS, mortuary affairs, religious ministry support, and legal services. 

(4) Building and maintaining sustainment bases. 

(5) Assessing, repairing, and maintaining infrastructure. 

(6) Acquiring, managing, and distributing funds. 

(7) Providing CUL support to OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and other nations. 

(8) Establishing and coordinating movement services. 

For further guidance on logistic support, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics Support. For 

further guidance on personnel services, refer to JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint 

Operations. 

d. Key Considerations

(1) Employment of Logistic Forces. For some operations, logistic forces may 

be employed in quantities disproportionate to their normal military roles, and in nonstandard 
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-32 

tasks. Further, logistic forces may precede other military forces or may be the only forces 

deployed. Logistic forces also may have continuing responsibility after the departure of 

combat forces in support of multinational forces, OGAs, IGOs, or NGOs. In such cases, 

they must be familiar with and adhere to any applicable status-of-forces agreements 

(SOFAs) and ACSAs to which the United States is a party. Logistic forces also must be 

familiar with and adhere to any legal, regulatory, or political restraints governing US 

involvement in the operation. The JFC must be alert for potential legal problems arising 

from the unique, difficult circumstances and the highly political nature of operations such as 

disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. Logistic forces, like all other forces, must be 

capable of self-defense, particularly if they deploy alone or in advance of other military 

forces. 

(2) Facilities. JFCs need to plan for the early acquisition of real estate and 

facilities for force and logistic bases where temporary occupancy is planned and/or 

inadequate or no property is provided by the HN. Early negotiation for real property can be 

critical to the successful flow of forces. 

(3) Environmental Considerations. Environmental considerations are broader 

than just protection of the environment and environmental stewardship. They also include 

continuously integrating the FHP, CMO, and other more operationally focused aspects of 

environmental considerations that have an affect on US military forces and the military end 

state. The focus of military operations is generally not on environmental compliance and 

environmental protection, but rather compliance with the command guidance on the range 

of environmental considerations received in the operation plan/order (command guidance) 

and the implementation of environmental considerations included in unit SOPs. 

Environmental considerations are tied directly to risk management and the safety and health 

of service members. All significant risks must be clearly and accurately communicated to 

deploying DOD personnel and the chain of command. Environmental considerations, risk 

management, and health risk communications are enabling elements for the commander, 

and as such, are an essential part of military planning, training, and operations. While 

complete protection of the environment during military operations may not always be 

possible, careful planning should address environmental considerations in joint operations, 

to include legal aspects. JFCs are responsible for protecting the environment in which US 

military forces operate to the greatest extent possible consistent with operational 

requirements. In this regard, JFCs are responsible for the following. 

(a) Demonstrating proactive environmental leadership during all phases of 

joint operations across the range of military operations. Instill an environmental ethic in 

subordinate commands and promote environmental awareness throughout the joint force. 

(b) Ensuring environmental considerations are an integral part in the 

planning and decision-making processes for all staff members. Logistic support should be 

planned and conducted with appropriate consideration of the environment in accordance 

with applicable international treaties and conventions, US environmental laws, policies, and 

regulations and HN agreements. Early planning is essential to ensure that all appropriate 

environmental reviews have been completed prior to initiating logistic support activities. A 
Joint Functions 

III-33

critical aspect of this is planning for base camps and the associated environmental baseline 

survey and environmental health site assessment that each base camp, or similar site, will 

require. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) liaison team can provide the 

CCDR key geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) graphic products depicting critical 

environmental or man-made features that are of special concern or requiring appropriate 

legal or environmental sensitivity throughout an operation. 

(c) Identifying specific organizational responsibilities and specific joint 

force environmental requirements. These responsibilities should have clearly defined goals, 

strategies, and measures of success. 

(d) Ensuring compliance, as far as practicable within the confines of mission 

accomplishment, with all applicable environmental laws and agreements, including those of 

the HN. The goal of compliance is to minimize potential adverse impacts on human health 

and the environment while maximizing readiness and operational effectiveness. 

For additional guidance on environmental considerations, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer 

Operations. 

(4) Health Service Support. HSS provides services to promote, improve, 

conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. HSS includes, but is not 

limited to, the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and 

facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the sick, wounded, or 

injured; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood 

management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; 

and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, nutrition therapy, and medical 

intelligence services. CCDRs are responsible for HSS of forces assigned or attached to their 

command and should establish HSS policies and programs accordingly. 

(a) Medical threat information must be obtained prior to deployment and 

continually updated as forces are deployed. Disease and injury occurrences can quickly 

affect combat effectiveness and may adversely affect the success of a mission. The 

incidence and exposure to infectious diseases is inherent in man-made and natural disaster 

areas and in developing nations. Environmental injuries and diseases, field hygiene and 

sanitation, and other preventive medicine concerns have the potential for greater impact on 

operations when the forces employed are small independent units with limited personnel. 

(b) The early introduction of preventive medicine personnel or units into 

theater facilitates the protection of US forces from diseases and injuries. It also permits a 

thorough assessment of the medical threat to and operational requirements of the mission. 

Preventive medicine support to US and multinational forces, HN civilians, refugees, and 

displaced persons includes education and training on personal hygiene and field sanitation, 

personal protective measures, epidemiological investigations, pest management, and 

inspection of water sources and supplies. JFCs and joint force surgeons must be kept 

apprised of legal requirements in relation to operations conducted in this environment. 

Issues such as eligibility of beneficiaries, reimbursement for supplies used and manpower 
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-34 

expended, and provisions of legal agreements and other laws applicable to the theater must 

be reviewed. 

(c) Medical and rehabilitative care provides essential care in the 

operational area and rapid evacuation to definitive care facilities without sacrificing quality 

of care. It encompasses care provided from the point of illness or injury through 

rehabilitative care. 

For further guidance on HSS, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support. 

(5) HN Support. HN support will require interaction with the HN government 

to establish procedures for requesting support and negotiating support terms. Logistic 

planners should analyze the capability of the HN economy to supplement the logistic 

support required by US or multinational forces and exercise care to limit adverse effects on 

the HN economy. Accordingly, early mission analysis must consider distribution 

requirements. This analysis should be done collaboratively with all applicable sources of 

input and will support development of a systems analysis for designated focus areas when 

established. Airfields, seaports, and road networks must be assessed, particularly those in 

underdeveloped countries where their status will be in question. Delay in completing the 

assessment directly impacts the flow of strategic lift assets into the region. Additional 

support forces may be required to build or improve the supporting infrastructure to facilitate 

follow-on force closure as well as the delivery of humanitarian cargo. Procedures must be 

established to coordinate movement requirements and airfield slot times with other 

participants in the operation. Availability of fuel and other key support items may impinge 

on transportation support. 

(6) Contracting. Providing logistic support may require contracting interaction 

with foreign governments, commercial entities, IGOs, and NGOs. Contracted support will 

be a part of all joint operations and depending on different operational factors, may be of 

critical importance to the effective deployment and sustainment of joint forces. Contracting 

support to joint operations consists of theater support, external support and system support 

contracts. Theater support contracts are contracts with local vendors let through in-theater 

Service or joint contingency contracting offices. External support contracts include the 

Services civil augmentation programs such as the Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation 

Program, the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program and the Navy’s Construction 

Capabilities Contract and other logistic and combat support contracts that let through 

authorities outside the theater. System support contracts are contracts awarded by program 

manager offices that provide technical support to newly fielded or, in some cases, life-cycle 

support of a wide variety of weapon, C2, or other military systems. 

(a) Contracting can bridge gaps that may occur before sufficient organic 

support units can deploy or before external support contract programs can provide support. 

Theater support contracting also is valuable when host-nation support (HNS) agreements do 

not exist, or when HNS agreements do not provide for the supplies or services required. 

Close coordination with CA, financial managers, and legal support also is essential. A 

contracting support plan should be developed per the guidance outlined in JP 3-57, Civil-
Joint Functions 

III-35

Military Operations, to ensure contracting solutions receive consideration during logistic 

planning and become part of the operation or campaign plan. 

(b) External support contracts can also be vital to meet the immediate and 

long-term logistic and other support needs of the joint force. These contracts must be 

carefully planned and integrated into the overall JFC logistic plan, especially when 

considering that many of these contracts are “cost plus” which are not intended to be used 

for long-term sustainment operations. DOD policies as well as political implications of 

using contractor employees for sensitive functions such as security and interrogation also 

must be carefully considered. 

(c) System support contracts are less visible to the JFC, but are extremely 

critical to the support of the joint force. These contacts normally provide field service 

representatives to provide technical support of high-tech military systems that operate 

throughout the battlefield. The JFC must be aware of, and consider the effects of any 

restrictions on contracted support due to the criticality of system support contracting. 

(7) Disposal Operations. Disposal is an important link in the overall logistic 

chain. Planning for disposal must take place from the onset of joint operation planning and 

continue throughout redeployment. Inadequate understanding of disposal operations may 

cause conflicts with public and international law, confusion over roles and requirements, 

increased costs, inefficient operations, and negative health implications for Service 

members. Defense Logistics Agency support to the CCDR’s Service component commands 

includes the capability to receive and dispose of materiel in a theater. The Defense 

Reutilization and Marketing Service element in theater establishes theater-specific 

procedures for the reuse, demilitarization, or disposal of facilities, equipment, and supplies, 

to include hazardous materiel and waste. 

For further guidance on disposal operations, refer to JP 4-09, Global Distribution. 

(8) Legal Support. Legal counsel participation is paramount in all processes 

associated with planning and executing military operations. Nearly every decision and 

action has potential legal considerations and implications. The legal implications of 

displaced and detained civilians, fiscal activities, ROE, contingency contractor personnel, 

international law and agreements, SOFAs, claims, and contingency contracting on joint 

operations must be considered. The JFC’s staff judge advocate (SJA) can help the JFC and 

planners with advice on how the law of war applies in any particular situation. The SJA 

should review the entire operation plan for legal sufficiency. Further, HN legal personnel 

should be integrated into the command legal staff as soon as practical to provide guidance 

on unique HN domestic legal practices and customs. 

For more detailed information and guidance on legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Legal 

Support to Military Operations. 

(9) Financial management (FM) encompasses the two core processes of 

resource management (RM) and finance operations. The joint force comptroller is the 
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-36 

officer responsible for providing the elements of RM and finance operations. RM process 

normally is comprised of costing functions and the effort to leverage appropriate fund 

sources. Finance operations provide the necessary funds to conduct contracting and the full 

range of pay support needed by members of the joint force. The joint force comptroller 

management of these elements provides the JFC with many necessary capabilities; from 

contracting and banking support to cost capturing and fund control. JTFs may conduct 

operations in austere environments and, in many cases, at great distances from CONUS. 

FM support for contracting, subsistence, billeting, transportation, communications, labor, 

and a myriad of other supplies and services will be necessary for successful mission 

accomplishment. 

For more detailed information and guidance on financial management support, refer to JP 

1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations. 

8. Other Activities and Capabilities 

a. Psychological Operations. All military operations can have a psychological effect 

on all parties concerned — friendly, neutral, and hostile. PSYOP are planned operations to 

convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, 

motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 

organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce 

foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. PSYOP have 

strategic, operational, and tactical applications. PSYOP must be integrated into all plans at 

the initial stages of planning to ensure maximum effect. The PSYOP approval process, 

consistent with the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), should be addressed and 

specified early in the planning process. PSYOP forces assigned to a joint force will provide 

PSYOP planning and C2 for PSYOP units that execute PSYOP in support of the JFC’s 

mission. 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN DESERT STORM, 1991

Before the beginning of the air operation, operations security (OPSEC) and 

deception had already begun to affect the Iraqi leadership’s perception of what 

the coalition intended to do. The opening phase of the air operation focused on 

destroying or disrupting the Iraqi command and control system, limiting the 

leadership’s ability to gather accurate information and to transmit its decisions. 

During the air operation, OPSEC and deception continued to hide the 

preparations for the actual land operation while using maneuver forces and air 

strikes to portray a false intention to make the main attack into Kuwait. 

Psychological operations, supported by B-52 strikes, targeted the frontline Iraqi 

soldier’s confidence in Iraqi leadership. The result of this integrated use of 

these capabilities was the decreased ability of the Iraqi leadership to respond 

effectively to the land operation when it began. 

Various Sources 
Joint Functions 

III-37

For additional guidance on PSYOP, refer to JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological 

Operations. PSYOP support to non-US military is outlined in DOD Directive (DODD) S3321-1, Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime 

and in Contingencies Short of Declared War (U). 

b. Military Deception. Military deception (MILDEC) includes actions executed to 

deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, 

intentions, and operations; thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) 

that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly forces’ mission. The intent is to 

cause adversary commanders to form inaccurate impressions about friendly force dispositions, 

capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions; misuse their ISR assets; and/or fail to employ 

combat or support units to their best advantage. As executed by JFCs, MILDEC targets 

adversary leaders and decision makers through the manipulation of adversary intelligence 

collection, analysis, and dissemination systems. MILDEC depends on intelligence to identify 

appropriate deception targets, to assist in developing a credible story, to identify and orient on 

appropriate receivers (the readers of the story), and to assess the effectiveness of the deception 

MILITARY DECEPTION IN THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, 1973 

On 6 October 1973, the Egyptian 3rd Army surprised the Israeli Defense Force 

by attacking across the Suez Canal. Egyptian forces gained a significant 

foothold in the Sinai and began to drive deeper until a determined defense and 

counterattack drove them back. 

To achieve the initial surprise, Egyptian forces conducted deception operations 

of strategic, operational, and tactical significance to exploit Israeli weaknesses. 

At the strategic level, they conveyed the notions that they would not attack 

without both a concerted Arab effort and an ability to neutralize the Israeli Air 

Force, and that tactical preparations were merely in response to feared Israeli 

retaliation for Arab terrorist activity. At the operational level, Egyptian forces 

portrayed their mobilization, force buildup, and maneuvers as part of their 

annual exercises. Egyptian exercises portraying an intent to cross the canal 

were repeated until the Israelis became conditioned to them and therefore did 

not react when the actual attack occurred. At the tactical level, Egyptian forces 

expertly camouflaged their equipment, denying information to Israeli observers 

and creating a false impression of the purpose of the increased activity. 

For their part, Israeli forces were overconfident and indecisive at the 

operational and strategic levels. In spite of the deception, tactical observers 

reported with increasing urgency that the Egyptian buildup and activity were 

significant. Their reports caused concern, but no action. Egyptian forces 

exploited these vulnerabilities and timed the attack to occur on Yom Kippur, the 

Jewish Day of Atonement, when they perceived the response of Israeli forces 

would be reduced. 

As a result of their deception efforts, synchronized with other operations of the 

force, Egyptian forces quickly and decisively overwhelmed Israeli forces in the 

early stages of the Yom Kippur War. 

Various Sources 
Chapter III 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) III-38 

effort. This deception requires a thorough knowledge of opponents and their decision-making 

processes. During the formulation of the commander’s concept, particular attention is placed 

on defining how the JFC would like the adversary to act at critical points in the battle. Those 

desired adversary actions then become the MILDEC goal. MILDEC is focused on causing 

the opponents to act in a desired manner, not simply to be misled in their thinking. 

For additional guidance on MILDEC, refer to JP 3-13.4, Military Deception. 
CHAPTER IV 

PLANNING, OPERATIONAL ART AND DESIGN, AND ASSESSMENT 

IV-1 

 This chapter presents a broad overview of joint operation planning, operational art and 

design, joint plans, and assessment for the JFC and staff when faced with a specific 

contingency. More detailed guidance on joint operation planning and operational design is 

provided in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

SECTION A. PLANNING OVERVIEW 

1. Joint Operation Planning 

 Military planning consists of joint strategic planning with its three subsets: security 

cooperation planning, force planning, and joint operation planning. This section 

focuses on joint operation planning. 

a. The President and SecDef direct joint operation planning to prepare and employ 

American military power in response to actual and potential contingencies. In this context, a 

“contingency” is an emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, 

terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Joint operation planning satisfies 

the Title 10, USC requirement for the CJCS to provide for the preparation and review of 

contingency-related plans which conform to policy guidance from the President and SecDef. 

Joint operation planning is directed toward the employment of military power within the 

context of a military strategy to attain objectives by shaping events, meeting foreseen 

contingencies, and responding to unforeseen crises. 

b. Planning for joint operations is continuous across the full range of military 

operations using two closely related, integrated, collaborative, and adaptive processes — the 

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the joint operation 

planning process (JOPP). JOPES and JOPP share the same basic approach and problemsolving elements, such as mission analysis and COA development. 

(1) JOPES is described in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 

(CJCSM) 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I 

(Planning Policies and Procedures). While JOPES activities span many organizational 

levels, the focus is on the interaction which ultimately helps the President and SecDef 

decide when, where, and how to commit US military capabilities in response to an 

expected contingency or an unforeseen crisis. The majority of JOPES activities and 

products occur prior to the point when SecDef approves and CJCS transmits the execute 

order, which initiates the employment of military capabilities to accomplish a specific 

mission. As described in JOPES, joint operation planning includes two primary subcategories: contingency planning and crisis action planning. 

See CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I 

(Planning Policies and Procedures), for more information on JOPES. 

“Nothing succeeds in war except in consequence of a well-prepared plan.” 

Napoleon I, 1769-1821 
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-0 (CH 1)

(2) The JOPP is a less formal but proven analytical process, which provides an 

orderly approach to planning at any organizational level and at any point before and during 

joint operations. The steps of JOPP (see Figure IV-1) provide an orderly framework for 

planning in general, both for JOPES requirements and for organizations that have no formal 

JOPES responsibilities. The focus of JOPP is on the interaction between an 

organization’s commander, staff, and the commanders and staffs of the next higher 

and lower commands. Although an ultimate product is the operation plan or order for a 

specific mission, the process is continuous throughout an operation. Even during execution, 

the planning process produces operation plans and orders for future operations as well as 

fragmentary orders that drive immediate adjustments to the current operation. 

See JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning for more information on JOPP. 

SECTION B. OPERATIONAL ART AND DESIGN 

2. Operational Art 

a. Operational art is the application of creative imagination by commanders and 

staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, 

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS

Step 1:

Initiation

Step 2:

Mission Analysis

Step 3:

Course of Action (COA) Development

Step 4:

COA Analysis and Wargaming

Step 5:

COA Comparison

Step 6:

COA Approval

Step 7:

Plan or Order Development

Figure IV-1. Joint Operation Planning Process 
Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment 

IV-3

campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. 

Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. It is the thought 

process commanders use to visualize how best to efficiently and effectively employ military 

capabilities to accomplish their mission. Operational art also promotes unified action by 

helping JFCs and staffs understand how to facilitate the integration of other agencies and 

multinational partners toward achieving the national strategic end state. 

b. In applying operational art, the JFC draws on judgment, perception, experience, 

education, intelligence, boldness, and character to visualize the conditions necessary for 

success before committing forces. Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to 

anticipate, and the skill to plan, prepare, execute, and assess. It helps commanders and their 

staffs order their thoughts and understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle, 

thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without operational art, campaigns and operations would 

be a set of disconnected engagements. 

c. The JFC uses operational art to consider not only the employment of military forces, 

but also their sustainment and the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. 

This includes fundamental methods associated with synchronizing and integrating military 

forces and capabilities. Operational art helps the JFC overcome the ambiguity and 

uncertainty of a complex operational environment. Operational art governs the deployment 

of forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from a joint operation, and the arrangement of 

battles and major operations to achieve military operational and strategic objectives. 

Among the many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the 

following questions. 

(1) What conditions are required to achieve the objectives? (Ends) 

(2) What sequence of actions is most likely to create those conditions? (Ways) 

(3) What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? 

(Means) 

(4) What is the likely cost or risk in performing that sequence of actions? 

3. Operational Design 

a. General. Operational art is applied during operational design–the conception 

and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or joint operation plan 

and its subsequent execution. While operational art is the manifestation of informed 

vision and creativity, operational design is the practical extension of the creative process. 

Together they synthesize the intuition and creativity of the commander with the analytical 

and logical process of design. Operational design is particularly helpful during COA 

determination. Resulting design alternatives provide the basis for selecting a COA and 

developing the detailed CONOPS. During execution, commanders and their staffs continue 

to consider design elements and adjust both current operations and future plans as the joint 

operation unfolds. 
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-0 (CH 1)

b. Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment

(1) A systems perspective of the operational environment, discussed in 

Chapter II, “Fundamentals of Joint Operations,” is fundamental to operational design. Each 

system in the operational environment is composed of various nodes and links. System 

nodes are the tangible elements within a system that can be “targeted” for action, such as 

people, materiel, and facilities. Links are the behavioral or functional relationships between 

nodes, such as the command or supervisory arrangement that connects a superior to a 

subordinate, the relationship of a vehicle to a fuel source, and the ideology that connects a 

propagandist to a group of terrorists. However, many nodes and links in the various systems 

will not be relevant to the JFC’s specific mission. After appropriate analysis, certain nodes 

and the links between them can be identified as key to attacking or otherwise affecting 

operational and strategic COGs. Figure IV-2 portrays a notional systems analysis and 

illustrates that identifying key nodes and links can enhance understanding of the 

relationships between COGs; and thereby influence operational design. 

Operational

Center of

Gravity

Strategic

Center of Gravity

Node

Link

THE INTERCONNECTED OPERATIONAL

ENVIRONMENT

Social

Information

Military

Infrastructure

Economic

Political

Figure IV-2. The Interconnected Operational Environment 
Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment 

IV-5

(2) A systems perspective facilitates the planning and operational design of all joint 

operations. It supports unified action by providing the JFC and staff with a common frame of 

reference for collaborative planning with OGA counterparts to determine and coordinate 

necessary actions that are beyond the JFC’s command authority. 

(3) The intelligence function helps the JFC and staff understand the increasingly 

complex and interconnected nature of the operational environment. As part of JIPOE, the 

intelligence directorate of a joint force (J-2) is responsible for managing the analysis and 

development of products that provide an understanding of the adversary systems and 

environment. A full understanding of the operational environment typically will require crossfunctional participation by other joint force staff elements and collaboration with various 

intelligence organizations, OGAs, and nongovernmental centers of excellence. 

For more information on developing a systems perspective of the operational environment, 

refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, JP 5-0, Joint 

Operation Planning, and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

c. Design Process. JFCs and their staffs use a number of operational design elements 

(see Figure IV-3) to help them visualize the arrangement of actions in time, space, and purpose 

to accomplish their mission. These elements can be used selectively in any joint operation; 

however, their application is broadest in the context of a joint campaign or major operation. 

The result of this process should be a framework that forms the basis for the joint campaign or 

operation plan and the conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means. 

d. Design Elements. The elements of operational design described below are tools to 

help commanders and their staffs visualize the campaign or operation and shape the CONOPS. 

Some design elements (e.g., objectives, COGs, LOOs) can be described tangibly in the text or 

graphics of an operation order or plan. Other elements (e.g., balance, synergy, leverage) 

typically cannot be described in this manner. These elements will vary between COAs 

according to how the JFC and staff develop and refine the other elements of design during the 

planning process. For example, in the JFC’s judgment one COA could result in better balance

and leverage, but not provide the tempo of operations that results from another COA. In the 

end, the JFC must be able to visualize these intangible elements and draw on judgment, 

intuition, and experience to select the best COA. Their detailed application to joint operation 

planning is provided in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

(1) Termination

(a) Knowing when to terminate all types of military operations and how 

to preserve achieved military objectives are keys to attaining the national strategic end state. 

Once established, the national strategic end state and termination criteria enable development 

of the military strategic objectives and military end state. There are three approaches for 

achieving national strategic objectives by military force – the imposed settlement, the 

negotiated settlement, and the indirect approach. When the strategic purpose 
IV-6 

JP 3-0 (CH 1)

OPERATIONAL ART AND DESIGN

National Strategic

End State

Systems Perspective 

of the

Operational

Environment

Arrangement

of Capabilities in Time, 

Space, and Purpose

Linkage of Ends, Ways, 

and Means

Courses of Action

Commander's Intent

Concept of Operations

DESIGN

ELEMENTS

Termination

End State and Objectives

Effects

Center of Gravity

Decisive Points

Direct versus Indirect

Lines of Operations

Operational Reach

Simultaneity and Depth

Timing and Tempo

Forces and Functions

Leverage

Balance

Anticipation

Synergy

Culmination

Arranging Operations

Joint Operation Planning Process

Operatio

nal Art

Ope

ratio

n

al A

O

pe

ratio

n

al Ar

O

pe

ratio

n

al Art

Figure IV-3. Operational Art and Design 
Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment 

IV-7

is to force a change in an enemy’s government or policies through the defeat of an enemy’s 

armed forces, the destruction of an enemy’s war-making capacity, or the seizure or retention 

of territory, termination of warfare may be accomplished through an imposed or negotiated 

settlement. To that end, an imposed settlement is characterized by the threatened or actual 

occupation of an enemy’s territory. Supporting the threatened, or actual occupation is the 

destruction of critical functions and assets such as C2 or infrastructure, or other means 

which make the enemy unable to resist the imposition of US will. Alternatively, a 

negotiated settlement is a means for termination through coordinated political, diplomatic, 

military, and economic actions, which convince an adversary that to yield will be less 

painful than continued resistance. When the strategic purpose is to gain legitimacy and 

influence over the relevant population(s), the indirect approach best lends itself to 

termination of warfare. This approach for achieving national security objectives employs 

IW to erode an enemy’s power, influence, and will; undermines the credibility and 

legitimacy of his political authority; and degrades his influence and control over, and 

support from, the indigenous population. 

(b) Termination design is driven in part by the nature of the conflict itself. 

Disputes over territorial or economic advantage tend to be interest-based and lend 

themselves to negotiation, persuasion, and coercion. Conflicts based on ideology, ethnicity, 

or religious or cultural primacy tend to be value-based and reflect demands that may be 

more difficult to negotiate. Often, conflicts are a result of both value- and interest-based 

differences. The underlying causes of a particular conflict — cultural, religious, territorial, 

resources, or hegemonic — should influence the understanding of conditions necessary for 

joint operation termination and conflict resolution. National and multinational decision 

makers will seek the advice of senior military leaders concerning how and when to 

terminate military involvement. Passing the lead from the military to other authorities 

usually requires extensive planning and preparation prior to the onset of operations. Joint 

operations also should be conducted in a manner that will ease this transition. 

(c) Commanders strive to end combat operations on terms favorable to the 

United States and its multinational partners. The basic element of this goal is gaining 

control over the enemy and/or gaining influence over a relevant population. When friendly 

forces can freely impose their will on the enemy, the opponent may have to accept defeat, 

terminate active hostilities, or revert to other forms of resistance such as geopolitical actions 

or guerrilla warfare. When friendly forces can gain influence and legitimacy over an 

indigenous population, an enemy’s options for geopolitical actions or guerrilla warfare may 

be greatly reduced. Nonetheless, a hasty or ill-designed end to the operation may bring with 

it the possibility that related disputes will arise, leading to further conflict. There is a 

delicate balance between the desire for quick victory and termination on truly favorable 

terms. 

(d) Negotiating power in armed conflict springs from three sources: 

national resolve, military success, and military potential. History has proven that our 

national resolve is most important in impressing upon an adversary the need to seriously 

negotiate a conclusion to conflict. Military success provides military, geographic, political, 

psychological, or economic advantage and sets the stage for negotiations. Military potential 
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-0 (CH 1)

may compel the opposing nation or group to consider a negotiated conclusion. Negotiating 

an advantageous conclusion to operations requires time, power, and the demonstrated will to 

use both. In addition to imposed and negotiated termination, there may be an armistice or 

truce, which is a negotiated intermission in operations, not a peace. In effect, it is a device 

to buy time pending negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of operations. 

Before agreeing to one, the United States needs to consider the advantages and 

disadvantages of a truce and the difficulty of maintaining it. 

(e) Properly conceived termination criteria are key to ensuring that achieved 

military objectives endure. Further, development of a military end state is complementary 

to and supports attaining the specified termination criteria and national strategic end state. 

The supported JFC and the subordinate commanders consider the nature and type of 

conflict, the national strategic end state, and the plans and operations that will most affect 

the enemy’s judgment of cost and risk to determine the conditions necessary to bring it to a 

favorable end. The CCDR then will consult with CJCS and the SecDef to establish the 

termination criteria. To facilitate development of effective termination criteria, it must be 

understood that US forces must follow through in not only the “dominate” phase, but also 

the “stabilize” and “enable civil authority” phases to achieve the leverage sufficient to 

impose a lasting solution. If the termination criteria have been properly set and met, the 

necessary leverage should exist to prevent the enemy from renewing hostilities and to 

dissuade other adversaries from interfering. Moreover, the national strategic end state for 

which the United States fought should be secured by the leverage that US and multinational 

forces have gained and can maintain. 

(2) End State and Objectives. Once the termination criteria are established, 

operational design continues with development of the military strategic objectives, which 

comprise the military end state conditions. This end state normally will represent a point in 

time or circumstance beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of 

national power to achieve remaining objectives of the national strategic end state. While the 

military end state typically will mirror many of the conditions of the national strategic end 

state, it may contain other contributory or supporting conditions. Aside from its obvious 

role in accomplishing both the national and military strategic objectives, clearly defining the 

military end state conditions promotes unified action, facilitates synchronization, and helps 

clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the joint campaign or operation. 

Commanders should include the military end state in their planning guidance and 

commander’s intent statement. 

(3) Effects 

(a) Identifying desired and undesired effects within the operational 

environment connects military strategic and operational objectives to tactical tasks. 

Combined with a systems perspective, the identification of desired and undesired effects can 

help commanders and their staffs gain a common picture and shared understanding of the 

operational environment that promotes unified action. CCDRs plan joint operations by 

developing strategic objectives supported by measurable strategic and operational effects 

and assessment indicators. At the operational level, the JFC develops operational-level 
Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment 

IV-9

objectives supported by measurable operational effects and assessment indicators. Joint 

operation planning uses measurable effects to relate higher-level objectives to component 

missions, tasks, or actions. 

(b) An “effect” is the physical or behavioral state of a system that results 

from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A set of desired effects contributes to 

the conditions necessary to achieve an associated military objective. For example: 

(c) In the above example, these desired strategic effects are statements about 

the behavior of systems in Country X necessary for Country X to have a secure and stable 

government. Creating these conditions likely would not be sufficient alone to achieve the 

President’s national strategic objective, so the CCDR would establish other desired effects 

and identify undesired effects as required. The full set of desired effects would represent 

the conditions for achieving the national strategic objective. The CCDR also would 

designate conditions related to other national strategic objectives. An understanding of the 

systems and their behavior in the operational environment supports the determination of 

desired and undesired effects. The JFC helps guide initial systems analysis by describing 

desired military strategic and operational objectives and desired/undesired effects as part of 

the commander’s planning guidance and intent. This guidance helps the staff focus their 

efforts on specific systems in the operational environment and identify potential tasks for the 

joint force components. For example, a possible task for a subordinate JTF or component 

could be: Train and deploy Country X security forces to conduct independent internal 

and border security operations for the election.

(d) A desired or undesired effect can be created directly or indirectly. A 

direct effect is the proximate, first-order consequence of an action (i.e., the destruction of a 

target by precision-guided munitions) which usually is immediate and easily recognizable. 

The President might make the following statement regarding impending military 

operations in Country X: I want a secure and stable government in country X 

before US forces depart. During mission analysis, the CCDR considers how to 

achieve this national strategic objective, knowing that it likely will involve the 

efforts of OGAs, IGOs, and multinational partners. The CCDR designates the 

following strategic effect associated with the President’s objective: Country X 

security forces maintain internal and border security. In consultation with the 

US ambassador to Country X, the ambassador states that successful national 

elections following the expected regime change are essential to a stable 

government. Consequently, the CCDR designates a second strategic effect: 

Country X’s population votes in nationwide elections.

Objectives prescribe friendly goals.

Effects describe system behavior in the operational environment – desired 

effects are the conditions related to achieving objectives.

Tasks direct friendly action.
Chapter IV 

IV-10 JP 3-0 (CH 1)

An indirect effect is a delayed or displaced consequence associated with the action that 

caused the direct effect. Indirect effects often are less observable or recognizable than direct 

effects, particularly when they involve changes in an adversary’s behavior. However, an 

indirect effect may be the one desired. 

(e) Thinking in terms of establishing conditions for success helps 

commanders and their staffs amplify the meaning of military strategic and operational 

objectives, understand the supporting desired and undesired effects, determine the best 

sequence of actions to create these effects, and develop more precise assessment measures. 

This effects-based approach remains within the framework of operational art and design 

helping commanders and their staffs clarify the relationship between tasks and objectives by 

describing the conditions that need to be established to achieve the military objectives and 

attain the end state. The JFC and staff continue to develop and refine the necessary 

conditions for success (the desired effects) throughout the planning process. Monitoring 

progress toward attaining these effects, as part of the assessment process, begins during 

planning and continues throughout execution. See Section D, “Assessment,” below for a 

more thorough discussion on assessment and the assessment process. 

(f) In tactical-level combat operations, weapons employment typically 

creates low-level, discrete effects on specific systems, while strategic and operational effects 

relate more to changing the larger aspects of various systems’ behaviors. At the strategic 

and operational levels, commanders and staffs should understand the relationships (links) 

between system nodes when considering whether a direct or indirect approach is the best 

way to produce a desired operational or strategic effect. 

(4) Center of Gravity

(a) A COG is the source of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance 

— what Clausewitz called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything 

depends . . . the point at which all our energies should be directed.” A COG comprises the 

source of power that provides freedom of action, physical strength, and will to fight. 

COGs exist in an adversarial context involving a clash of moral wills and/or physical 

strengths. They are formed out of the relationships between the two adversaries and they do 

not exist in a strategic or operational vacuum. Centers of Gravity are inherently singular in 

nature, in that each entity in the operational environment has but one per level of war. At 

the strategic level, a COG might be a military force, an alliance, a political or military 

leader, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. At the operational level a 

COG often is associated with the adversary’s military capabilities — such as a powerful 

element of the armed forces — but could include other capabilities in the operational 

environment associated with the adversary’s political, economic, social, information, and 

infrastructure systems. Commanders consider not only the enemy COGs, but also identify 

and protect their own COGs (e.g., During the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War the coalition itself 

was identified as a friendly strategic COG, and the CCDR took measures to protect it, to 

include deployment of theater missile defense systems). 
Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment 

IV-11

(b) All COGs have inherent “critical capabilities” — those means that are 

considered crucial enablers for the adversary’s COG to function and essential to the 

accomplishment of the adversary’s assumed objective(s). These critical capabilities permit 

an adversary’s COG to resist the military end state. In turn, all critical capabilities have 

essential “critical requirements” — those essential conditions, resources, and means for a 

critical capability to be fully operational. Critical vulnerabilities are those aspects or 

components of the adversary’s critical requirements which are deficient or vulnerable to 

direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects disproportionate to the 

military resources applied. Collectively, these are referred to as “critical factors.” 

(c) The essence of operational art lies in being able to produce the right 

OPERATIONAL DESIGN FOR 

OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM 

During the 1990-91 Persian Gulf Conflict, the President established a number of 

national strategic objectives that comprised the national strategic end state. 

These included the unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the 

restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government, a guarantee of safety and 

protection of the lives of American citizens abroad, and the enhancement of 

security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Consequently, the 

combatant commander (CCDR) determined that his mission would include 

deploying to the Persian Gulf region and ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait if 

diplomatic actions, economic sanctions, and other nonmilitary efforts failed to 

achieve this objective. The CCDR also anticipated the use of United States 

Central Command forces after large-scale combat to achieve the national 

strategic objectives. 

A condition necessary for achieving the national strategic objectives was the 

formation of a substantial coalition, which included Arab states, to demonstrate 

significant formal regional opposition to Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait. 

Another condition was obtaining United Nations support in the form of 

resolutions and sanctions. A condition related to conducting major operations 

(to include land attack) was securing Saudi Arabia’s agreement to receive and 

base deploying US forces. Further, after reassessing the preliminary campaign 

plan, the CCDR determined that an operational level condition for a successful 

ground attack was the deployment of an additional corps to provide sufficient 

ground combat power. 

Saddam Hussein was identified as the strategic center of gravity. During 

Operation DESERT SHIELD, attempts to convince him to withdraw Iraqi forces 

(the desired effect associated with a specified national strategic objective) 

included economic sanctions, coalition building, and deployment of US forces 

into the region. These actions caused direct effects related to the Iraqi 

economy, world opinion, and the increasing ability of the coalition to conduct 

military operations. However, these and other efforts proved insufficient to 

achieve the desired effect of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, thus leading to 

Operation DESERT STORM. 

Various Sources 
Chapter IV 

IV-12 JP 3-0 (CH 1)

combination of effects in time, space, and purpose relative to a COG to neutralize, 

weaken, destroy, or otherwise exploit it in a manner that best helps achieve military 

objectives and attain the military end state. In theory, this is the most direct path to mission 

accomplishment. However, COG analysis is continuous and a COG can change during the 

course of an operation for a variety of reasons. For example, a COG might concern the 

mass of adversary units, which has not yet formed. Likewise, the JFC must plan for 

protecting friendly potential COGs such as agreements with neutral and friendly nations for 

transit of forces, information and networks, coalition relationships, and US and international 

public opinion. 

(d) The adversarial context pertinent to COG analysis takes place within the 

broader operational environment context. A systems perspective of the operational 

environment assists in understanding the adversary’s COGs. In combat operations, this 

involves knowledge of how an adversary organizes, fights, and makes decisions, and of their 

physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, the JFC and staff must 

understand other operational environment systems and their interaction with the military 

system (see Figure IV-2). This holistic understanding helps commanders and their 

staffs identify COGs, critical factors, and decisive points to formulate LOOs and 

visualize the CONOPS.

(5) Decisive Points. In determining where and how to apply friendly 

capabilities to exploit enemy vulnerabilities, commanders and their staffs will have to 

identify decisive points. A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical 

factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows a commander to gain a marked advantage 

over an adversary or contributes materially to achieving success. Decisive points can be 

physical in nature, such as a constricted sea lane, a hill, a town, WMD capabilities, or an air 

base; but they could include other elements such as command posts, critical boundaries, 

airspace, or communications or intelligence nodes. In some cases, specific key events also 

may be decisive points; such as attainment of diplomatic permission for overflight of foreign 

nations, air or maritime superiority, commitment of the enemy’s reserve, repairing damaged 

infrastructure, or providing clean water. In still other cases, decisive points may be 

systemic, such as political, economic, social, information, and infrastructure. Although 

decisive points are not COGs, they are the keys to attacking protected COGs or defending 

them. Decisive points can be thought of as a way to relate what is “critical” to what is 

“vulnerable.” Consequently, commanders and their staffs must analyze the operational 

environment and determine which systems’ nodes or links or key events offer the best 

opportunity to affect the enemy’s COGs or to gain or maintain the initiative. The 

commander then designates them as decisive points, incorporates them in the LOOs, and 

allocates sufficient resources to produce the desired effects against them. 

(6) Direct versus Indirect. In theory, direct attacks against enemy COGs 

resulting in their neutralization or destruction is the most direct path to victory — if it can be 

done in a prudent manner (as defined by the military and political dynamics of the moment). 

Where direct attacks against enemy COGs mean attacking into an opponent’s strength, JFCs 

should seek an indirect approach until conditions are established that permit successful 

direct attacks. In this manner, the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities can offer indirect 
Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment 

IV-13

pathways to gain leverage over its COGs. For example, if the operational COG is a large 

enemy force, the joint force may attack it indirectly by isolating it from its C2, severing its 

LOCs, and defeating or degrading its protection capabilities. In this way, JFCs employ a 

synchronized and integrated combination of operations to weaken enemy COGs indirectly 

by attacking critical requirements, which are sufficiently vulnerable. 

(7) Lines of Operations. As JFCs visualize the design of the operation they 

may use multiple LOOs. Generally, a LOO describes the linkage of various actions on 

nodes and/or decisive points with an operational or strategic objective. Commanders may 

describe the operation along LOOs that are physical or logical (see Figure IV-4). A 

physical LOO defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the 

enemy or connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an 

objective(s). A logical LOO connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in 

time and purpose with an objective(s). Normally, joint operations require commanders to 

synchronize activities along multiple and complementary physical and logical LOOs 

working through a series of military strategic and operational objectives to attain the military 

end state. 

(a) Commanders use physical LOOs to connect the force with its base of 

operations and objectives when positional reference to the enemy is a factor. Physical 

LOOs may be either interior or exterior. A force operates on interior lines when its 

operations diverge from a central point and when it is therefore closer to separate enemy 

forces than the latter are to one another. Interior lines benefit a weaker force by allowing it 

to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than the enemy. A force operates on exterior 

EXAMPLE LINES OF OPERATIONS

Objective

Physical Line: Control Key Areas

Logical Line: Restore/Establish Basic Services

Establish and

Operate

Intermediate

Bases

Secure

Entry

Points

Secure and

Operate

Air & Sea

Ports

Establish and

Operate

Forward

Bases

Control

Routes 

to Key 

Cities

Actions on Decisive Points and/or Nodes

Control 

Population

Centers

Open 

and 

Maintain 

Roads

Provide 

Fuel 

and 

Power

Restore Basic 

Services and 

Facilities 

Infrastructure

Recruit and 

Train Host 

Nation 

Personnel

Host Nation 

Sole Provider 

of Basic 

Services

Actions on Decisive Points and/or Nodes

Population’s 

Basic Needs 

Met Without 

External 

Support

Objective

Figure IV-4. Example Lines of Operations 
Chapter IV 

IV-14 JP 3-0 (CH 1)

lines when its operations converge on the enemy. Successful operations on exterior lines 

require a stronger or more mobile force, but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a 

weaker or less mobile opponent. Assuring strategic mobility enhances exterior LOOs by 

providing the JFC greater freedom of maneuver. 

(b) JFCs use logical LOOs to visualize and describe the operation when 

positional reference to an enemy has little relevance. In a linkage between military 

objectives and forces, only the logical linkage of LOOs may be evident. This situation is 

common in many joint force operations. JFCs link multiple actions on nodes and/or 

decisive points with military objectives using the logic of purpose—cause and effect. 

Logical LOOs also help commanders visualize how military means can support nonmilitary 

instruments of national power. 

(8) Operational Reach

(a) Operational reach is the distance and duration over which a joint force 

can successfully employ military capabilities. Reach is fundamentally linked to culmination 

and is a crucial factor in the campaign planning process. Although reach may be limited by 

the geography surrounding and separating the opponents, it may be extended through 

forward positioning of capabilities and resources, increasing the range and effects of weapon 

systems, leveraging HNS and contracting support, and maximizing the throughput 

efficiency of the distribution architecture. 

(b) Permission to establish bases on foreign soil and overfly foreign nations; 

whether from overseas locations, sea-based platforms, or the United States; directly affects 

operational reach and influences the combat power that a joint force is capable of 

generating. The arrangement and successive positioning of advanced bases (often in 

austere, rapidly emplaced configurations) underwrites the progressive ability of the joint 

force to conduct rapid, continuous, sustained combat operations throughout the operational 

area. Basing, often affected directly by political and diplomatic considerations, can become 

a critical junction where strategic, operational, and tactical considerations interact and is 

fundamental to the ability of the JFC to maintain or extend operational reach. However, in 

international waters, seabasing is less constrained by political and diplomatic considerations. 

(9) Simultaneity and Depth

(a) Simultaneity refers to the simultaneous application of military and 

nonmilitary power against the enemy’s key capabilities and sources of strength. 

Simultaneity in joint force operations contributes directly to an enemy’s collapse by placing 

more demands on enemy forces and functions than can be handled. This does not mean that 

all elements of the joint force are employed with equal priority or that even all elements of 

the joint force will be employed. It refers specifically to the concept of attacking appropriate 

enemy forces and functions in such a manner as to cause failure of their moral and/or 

physical cohesion. 
Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment 

IV-15

(b) Simultaneity also refers to the concurrent conduct of operations at the 

tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Tactical commanders fight engagements and 

battles, understanding their relevance to the operation plan. JFCs set the conditions for 

battles within a major operation or campaign to achieve military strategic and operational 

objectives. Geographic CCDRs integrate theater strategy and operational art. At the same 

time, they remain acutely aware of the impact of tactical events. Because of the inherent 

interrelationships between the various levels of war, commanders cannot be concerned only 

with events at their respective echelon, but must understand how their actions contribute to 

the military end state. 

(c) The concept of depth seeks to overwhelm the enemy throughout the 

Victorious coalition forces during Operation DESERT STORM attacked, overwhelmed, 

and continued relentless pressure on the retreating opposition. 

SIMULTANEITY AND DEPTH 

DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM 

Following 38 days of intensive and highly synchronized and integrated 

coalition air operations, land forces initiated two major, mutually supporting, 

offensive thrusts against defending Iraqi forces in Kuwait and Iraq. 

Simultaneously, amphibious forces threatened an assault from the sea, 

creating confusion within the enemy leadership structure and causing several 

Iraqi divisions to orient on the amphibious threat. This deception and the 

attack on the left flank by Army forces contributed to the defeat of Iraqi forces 

by coalition air and land forces striking into the heart of Kuwait. Concurrently, 

coalition air operations continued the relentless attack on deployed troops, C2 

nodes, and the transportation infrastructure. The result was a swift conclusion 

to the Persian Gulf Conflict in 1991. 

Various Sources 
Chapter IV 

IV-16 JP 3-0 (CH 1)

operational area in multiple domains; creating competing and simultaneous demands on 

enemy commanders and resources and contributing to the enemy’s speedy defeat. Depth 

applies to time as well as to space. Operations extended in depth shape future conditions 

and can disrupt an opponent’s decision cycle. Operations in depth contribute to protection 

of the force by destroying enemy potential before its capabilities can be realized or 

employed. Interdiction is an application of depth in joint operations. 

(d) Simultaneity and depth place a premium on shared, common situational 

awareness. Consequently, JFCs should exploit the full capabilities of the joint force and 

supporting capabilities to develop and maintain a comprehensive common operational 

picture (COP). 

(10) Timing and Tempo

(a) The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo and point in time 

that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy. With proper timing, JFCs can 

dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the enemy’s ability to react 

(e.g., Germany’s 1940 attack on France combined the speed, range, and flexibility of aircraft 

with the power and mobility of armor to conduct operations at a pace that surprised and 

overwhelmed French commanders, disrupting their forces and operations).

(b) Just as JFCs carefully select which capabilities of the joint force to 

employ, so do they consider the timing of the application of those capabilities. While JFCs 

may have substantial capabilities available, they selectively apply such capabilities in a 

manner that integrates and synchronizes their application in time, space, and purpose. 

Defining priorities assists in the timing of operations. Although some operations of the joint 

force can achieve near-immediate impact, JFCs may elect to delay their application until the 

contributions of other elements can be integrated and synchronized. An example of 

strategic mobility timing impacts would be the opening of sea and air ports of debarkation 

(PODs) in a region or theater at designated times to match the required throughput of forces 

in concert with the plan. 

(c) Tempo is the rate of military action. Controlling or altering that rate is 

necessary to retain the initiative. JFCs adjust tempo to maximize friendly capabilities. 

Tempo has military significance only in relative terms. When the sustained friendly tempo 

exceeds the enemy’s ability to react, friendly forces can maintain the initiative and have a 

marked advantage. During some phases of a joint operation, JFCs may elect to conduct 

high-tempo operations designed specifically to overwhelm enemy defensive capabilities. 

During other phases, JFCs may elect to reduce the pace of operations, while buying time to 

build a decisive force or tend to other priorities in the operational area such as relief to 

displaced persons. Suitable ports and adequate throughput, with sufficient intertheater and 

intratheater lift, preserves the JFCs ability to control tempo by allowing freedom of theater 

access. Information superiority facilitated by a net-centric environment enables the JFC to 

dictate tempo. 

(11) Forces and Functions
Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment 

IV-17

(a) JFCs and their staffs can design campaigns and operations that focus on 

defeating either enemy forces or functions, or a combination of both. Typically, JFCs 

structure operations to attack both enemy forces and functions concurrently to overwhelm 

enemy forces and capabilities. These types of operations are especially appropriate when 

friendly forces enjoy technological or numerical superiority over an opponent. 

(b) Attack of an enemy’s functions normally is intended to destroy or disrupt 

the enemy’s ability to employ its forces, thereby creating vulnerabilities to be exploited. 

JFCs typically focus on destroying and disrupting critical enemy functions such as C2, 

logistics, and air and missile defense. The direct effect of destroying or disrupting critical 

enemy functions can create the indirect effects of uncertainty, confusion, and even panic in 

enemy leadership and forces and may contribute directly to the collapse of enemy capability 

and will. When assessing whether or not functional attack should be the principal design 

concept; JFCs should evaluate several variables such as time required to cripple the enemy’s 

critical functions, time available to the JFC, the enemy’s current actions, and likely 

responses to such actions. 

(12) Leverage

(a) Leverage is gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat 

power across all domains and the information environment. Leverage can be achieved 

through asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against enemy vulnerabilities 

and the concentration and integration of joint force capabilities. Leverage allows JFCs to 

impose their will on the enemy, increase the enemy’s dilemma, and maintain the initiative. 

(b) JFCs arrange asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths 

and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. The 

history of joint operations highlights the enormous lethality of asymmetrical operations and 

the great operational sensitivity to such threats. Asymmetrical operations are particularly 

effective when applied against enemy forces not postured for immediate tactical battle but 

instead operating in more vulnerable aspects — operational deployment and/or movement, 

extended logistic activity (including rest and refitting), or mobilization and training 

(including industrial production). Thus, JFCs must aggressively seek opportunities to apply 

asymmetrical force against an enemy in as vulnerable an aspect as possible — air attacks 

against enemy ground formations in convoy (e.g., the air interdiction operations against 

German attempts to reinforce its forces in Normandy), naval air and surface attacks against 

troop transports (e.g., US air and surface attacks against Japanese surface reinforcement of 

Guadalcanal), and land operations against enemy naval, air, or missile bases (e.g., allied 

maneuver in Europe in 1944 to reduce German submarine bases and V-1 and V-2 launching 

sites). 

(13) Balance is the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and its operations in 

such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. Balance refers to 

the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the joint force as well as the nature and 

timing of operations conducted. JFCs strive to maintain friendly force balance while 
Chapter IV 

IV-18 JP 3-0 (CH 1)

aggressively seeking to disrupt an enemy’s balance by striking with powerful blows from 

unexpected directions and pressing the fight. JFCs designate priority efforts and establish 

appropriate command relationships to assist in maintaining the balance of the force. 

(14) Anticipation

(a) Anticipation is key to effective planning and execution and applies across 

the entire range of military operations. JFCs must consider what might happen and look for 

the signs that may bring the possible event to pass. During execution, JFCs should remain 

alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation. They continually 

gather information by personally observing and communicating with senior leaders; 

adjacent commanders; subordinates; allies; coalition members; and key members of OGAs, 

IGOs, and NGOs in the operational area. During combat operations, JFCs may avoid 

surprise by gaining and maintaining the initiative at all levels of command and throughout 

the operational area, thus forcing the enemy to react rather than initiate; and by thoroughly 

and continuously wargaming to identify probable enemy reactions to joint force actions. 

JFCs also should realize the effects of operations on the enemy, multinational partners, other 

nations, and noncombatants and prepare for their reactions. 

(b) A shared, common understanding of the operational environment aids 

commanders and their staffs in anticipating opportunities and challenges. Knowledge of 

friendly capabilities; enemy capabilities, intentions, and likely COAs; and the location, 

activities, and status of dislocated civilians enables commanders to focus joint efforts where 

they can best, and most directly, contribute to achieving military objectives. JIPOE assists 

JFCs in defining likely or potential enemy COAs, as well as the indicators that suggest the 

enemy has embarked on a specific COA. As such, JIPOE significantly contributes to a 

JFC’s ability to anticipate and exploit opportunities. In stability operations, JIPOE must 

help to collect — then fuse — political, criminal, economic, linguistic, demographic, ethnic, 

psychological, and other information regarding conditions and forces that influence the 

society. Similar information is critical to all military operations. For example, where and 

when food, water, and fuel will be available to a force is as important in CS operations as 

combat operations. Combined with the COP and other information, intelligence products 

provide the JFC with the tools necessary to achieve situational awareness. The COP is 

produced by using many different products to include the operational pictures of lower, 

lateral, and higher echelons. Liaison teams to the JFC from the national intelligence 

agencies can provide the staff a wealth of information for the COP; including imagery 

derived measurement and signature intelligence imagery and digital graphic products. 

For additional guidance on JIPOE, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 

Operational Environment. 

(c) Anticipation is not without risk. Commanders and their staffs that tend to 

lean forward in anticipation of what they expect to encounter are more susceptible to 

operational MILDEC efforts. Therefore, commanders and their staffs should carefully 

consider all available information upon which decisions are being based. Where possible, 
Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment 

IV-19

multiple or redundant sources of information should be employed to reduce risk in the 

decision-making process. 

(15) Synergy

(a) JFCs integrate and synchronize operations and employ military forces and 

capabilities, as well as nonmilitary resources, in a manner that results in greater combat 

power and applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. 

Further, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various 

domains and the information environment, all culminating in achieving the assigned military 

objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. Additionally, JFCs 

not only attack the enemy’s physical capabilities, but also the enemy’s morale and will. JP 

1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, contains the basis for this 

multidimensional concept — one that describes how JFCs can apply all facets of joint 

capabilities to accomplish their mission. 

(b) In today’s complex operational environment, it is impossible to accurately 

view the contributions of any individual organization, capability, or the domains and 

information environment in which they operate in isolation from all others. Each may be 

critical to the success of the joint force, and each has certain capabilities that cannot be 

duplicated. Given the appropriate circumstances, any element of military power can be 

dominant — and even decisive — in certain aspects of an operation or phase of a campaign, 

and each force can support or be supported by other forces. The contributions of these 

forces will vary over time with the nature of the threat and other strategic, operational, and 

tactical circumstances. The challenge for supported JFCs is to integrate and synchronize the 

wide range of capabilities at their disposal into joint operations. The synergy achieved by 

integrating and synchronizing the actions of conventional and special operations forces and 

capabilities in joint operations and in multiple domains enables JFCs to maximize available 

capabilities and minimize potential seams or vulnerabilities. JFCs are especially suited to 

develop joint synergy given the multiple unique and complementary capabilities available in 

joint forces. The synergy of the joint force depends in large part on a shared understanding 

of the operational environment. 

(16) Culmination

(a) Culmination has both an offensive and a defensive application. In the 

offense, the culminating point is the point in time and space at which an attacker’s combat 

power no longer exceeds that of the defender. Here the attacker greatly risks counterattack 

and defeat and continues the attack only at great peril. Success in the offense at all levels is 

to achieve the military objective before reaching culmination. A defender reaches 

culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the 

counteroffensive or defend successfully. Success in the defense is to draw the attacker to 

offensive culmination, then conduct an offensive to expedite emergence of the enemy’s 

defensive culmination. During stability operations, culmination may result from the erosion 

of national will, decline of popular support, questions concerning legitimacy or restraint, or 

lapses in protection leading to excessive casualties. A well-developed assessment 
Chapter IV 

IV-20 JP 3-0 (CH 1)

methodology is crucial to supporting the commander’s determination of culmination, both 

for enemy and friendly actions. 

(b) Integration and synchronization of logistics with combat operations can 

forestall culmination and help commanders control the tempo of their operations. At both 

tactical and operational levels, commanders and their staffs forecast the drain on resources 

associated with conducting operations over extended distance and time. They respond by 

generating enough military resources at the right times and places to enable achievement of 

military strategic and operational objectives before reaching culmination. If the 

commanders cannot generate these resources, they should rethink their CONOPS. 

(17) Arranging Operations

(a) JFCs must determine the best arrangement of operations to accomplish the 

assigned tasks and joint force mission. This arrangement often will be a combination of 

simultaneous and sequential operations to achieve full-spectrum superiority and the military 

end state conditions. Commanders consider a variety of factors when determining this 

arrangement including geography of the operational area, available strategic lift, Serviceunique deployment capabilities, diplomatic agreements, changes in command structure, 

protection, level and type of OGA and NGO participation, distribution and sustainment 

capabilities, enemy reinforcement capabilities, and public opinion. Thinking about the best 

arrangement helps determine the tempo of activities in time, space, and purpose. 

(b) Critical to the success of the entire operation is timely and accurate timephased force deployment. However, the dynamic nature of the operational environment 

may require adaptability concerning the arrangement of operations. During force projection, 

for example, a rapidly changing enemy situation may cause the commander to alter the 

planned arrangement of operations even as forces are deploying. Therefore, in-transit and 

theater asset visibility along with an en route planning and rehearsal capability are critical to 

maintaining flexibility. The arrangement that the commander chooses should not foreclose 

future options. 

(c) Sustainment is crucial to arranging operations and must be planned and 

executed as a joint responsibility. CCDRs and their staffs must consider, among other 

items, logistic bases, LOCs, location and security factors as they relate to current and future 

operations, as well as defining priorities for services and support and CUL functions and 

responsibilities. Essential measures include the optimized use or reallocation of available 

resources and prevention or elimination of redundant facilities and/or overlapping functions 

among the Service component commands. 

(d) Phases. Reaching the military end state usually requires the conduct of 

several operations that are arranged in phases. Consequently, the design of a joint campaign 

or a operation normally provides for related phases implemented over time. In a campaign, 

each phase can represent a single or several major operations, while in a major operation a 

phase normally consists of several subordinate operations or a series of related activities. 
Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment 

IV-21

See paragraph 5d(2), “Phasing,” in this chapter for a more detailed discussion of the phasing 

model. 

(e) Branches and Sequels. Many operation plans require adjustment beyond 

the initial stages of the operation. Consequently, JFCs build flexibility into their plans by 

developing branches and sequels to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing 

conditions. Branches and sequels directly relate to the concept of phasing. 

1. Branches are options built into the basic plan. Such branches may 

include shifting priorities, changing unit organization and command relationships, or 

changing the very nature of the joint operation itself. Branches add flexibility to plans by 

anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan. Such situations could be a result of 

enemy action, availability of friendly capabilities or resources, or even a change in the 

weather or season within the operational area. 

2. Sequels are subsequent operations based on the possible outcomes of 

the current operation — victory, defeat, or stalemate. In joint operations, phases can be 

viewed as the sequels to the basic plan. 

SECTION C. PLAN OVERVIEW 

4. Operational Design and the Campaign 

a. Section B focused on operational design using a variety of design elements (e.g., 

COG) to help the commander and staff visualize the arrangement of joint capabilities in 

time, space, and purpose to accomplish the mission. Operational design elements can be 

used selectively in any joint operation. However, their application is broadest in the 

context of a joint campaign. 

b. A campaign is a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a 

military strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. Planning for a 

campaign is appropriate when the contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a 

single major operation. Thus, campaigns are often the most extensive joint operations in 

terms of time and other resources. The Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT 

STORM series is an example of a campaign. Campaign planning has its greatest application 

in the conduct of large-scale combat operations, but can be used across the range of military 

operations. While intended primarily to guide the use of military power, campaign plans 

consider all instruments of national power and how their integrated efforts work to attain 

national strategic objectives. Figure IV-5 provides key aspects of campaign planning. 

c. A campaign plan is not a unique type of JOPES joint operation plan. JFCs 

normally prepare a campaign plan in operation plan format. However, the size, 

complexity, and anticipated duration of operations typically magnify the planning 

challenges. There are three general types of campaigns, which differ generally in scope. 
Chapter IV 

IV-22 JP 3-0 (CH 1)

(1) Global Campaign. A global campaign is one that requires the 

accomplishment of military strategic objectives within multiple theaters that extend beyond 

the AOR of a single GCC. 

(2) Theater Campaign. A theater campaign encompasses the activities of a 

supported GCC, which accomplish military strategic or operational objectives within a 

theater of war or theater of operations, primarily within the supported commander’s AOR. 

OEF has shown that adjacent GCCs will conduct supporting operations within the AOR of 

the supported commander, or within their own AORs, under the overall direction of the 

supported GCC. 

(3) Subordinate Campaign. A subordinate campaign plan outlines the actions of 

a subordinate JFC, which accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of) military 

strategic or operational objectives in support of a global or theater campaign. Subordinate 

JFCs develop subordinate campaign plans if their assigned missions require military 

operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration and cannot be accomplished within 

the framework of a single major joint operation. Subordinate campaign plans should be 

z

z

Functional and Service components 

conduct subordinate and 

supporting operations -- not 

independent campaigns

The goal is to increase the total 

effectiveness of the joint force, not 

necessarily to involve all forces or 

to involve all forces equally

z

z

Incorporates the commander’s intent -- concise expression of the purpose 

of the operation and the desired end state

Provides the concept of operations and sustainment -- the what, where, 

and how the joint force will affect the adversary or situation -- in sufficient 

detail for the staff and subordinate and supporting commanders to 

understand what they must do without further instructions

Synchronize and Integrate 

Actions Through

Accomplish Strategic or

Operational Objectives

Joint Campaigns and 

Operations

The Campaign Plan

PURPOSE OF CAMPAIGN PLANNING

LAND

AIR

SPACE

MARITIME

SOF

JFC

SOF special operations forces

JFC joint force commander

Figure IV-5. Purpose of Campaign Planning 
Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment 

IV-23

consistent with the strategic and operational guidance and direction provided in the 

supported JFC’s campaign plan. 

THE GULF WAR, 1990-1991 

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Much of the rest of the world, 

including most other Arab nations, united in condemnation of that action. On 7 August, 

the operation known as DESERT SHIELD began. Its principal objectives were to deter 

further aggression and to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The United Nations (UN) 

Security Council passed a series of resolutions calling for Iraq to leave Kuwait, finally 

authorizing “all necessary means,” including the use of force, to force Iraq to comply 

with UN resolutions. 

The United States led in establishing a political and military coalition to force Iraq from 

Kuwait and restore stability to the region. The military campaign to accomplish these 

ends took the form, in retrospect, of a series of major operations. These operations 

employed the entire capability of the international military coalition and included 

operations in war and operations other than war throughout. 

The campaign — which included Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and 

the subsequent period of postconflict operations — can be viewed in the following 

major phases. 

• DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP (to include crisis action planning, 

mobilization, deployment, and deterrence) 

• DEFENSE (with deployment and force buildup continuing) 

• OFFENSE 

• POSTWAR OPERATIONS (to include redeployment) 

DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP. While diplomats attempted to resolve the crisis 

without combat, the coalition’s military forces conducted rapid planning, mobilization, 

and the largest strategic deployment since World War II. One of the earliest military 

actions was a maritime interdiction of the shipping of items of military potential to Iraq. 

The initial entry of air and land forces into the theater was unopposed. The 

Commander, United States Central Command (CDRUSCENTCOM), balanced the arrival 

of these forces to provide an early, viable deterrent capability and the logistic capability 

needed to receive, further deploy, and sustain the rapidly growing force. Planning, 

mobilization, and deployment continued throughout this phase. 

DEFENSE. While even the earliest arriving forces were in a defensive posture, a viable 

defense was possible only after the buildup of sufficient coalition air, land, and 

maritime combat capability. Mobilization and deployment of forces continued. 

Operations security (OPSEC) measures, operational military deception, and operational 

psychological operations were used to influence Iraqi dispositions, expectations, and 

combat effectiveness and thus degrade their abilities to resist CDRUSCENTCOM’s 

selected course of action before engaging adversary forces. This phase ended on 17 

January 1991, when Operation DESERT STORM began. 
Chapter IV 

IV-24 JP 3-0 (CH 1)

5. Key Plan Elements 

a. General. The steps of the JOPP produce a number of important products. Some 

support a subsequent planning step. For example, the staff’s initial estimates are key inputs 

during mission analysis. Key elements that result from mission analysis include a draft 

mission statement and the JFC’s initial intent statement, planning guidance, and critical 

information requirements. Some of these products emerge from the planning process as key 

elements of the operation plan or order. Examples include (but are not limited to) the 

mission statement, commander’s intent, and CONOPS. 

OFFENSE. Operation DESERT STORM began with a major airpower effort — from both 

land and sea — against strategic targets; Iraqi air, land, and naval forces; logistic 

infrastructure; and command and control (C2). Land and special operations forces 

supported this air effort by attacking or designating for attack forward-based Iraqi air 

defense and radar capability. The objectives of this phase were to gain air supremacy, 

significantly degrade Iraqi C2, deny information to adversary commanders, destroy 

adversary forces and infrastructure, and deny freedom of movement. This successful 

air operation would establish the conditions for the attack by coalition land forces. 

While airpower attacked Iraqi forces throughout their depth, land forces repositioned 

from deceptive locations to attack positions using extensive OPSEC measures and 

simulations to deny knowledge of movements to the adversary. Two Army corps 

moved a great distance in an extremely short time to positions from which they could 

attack the more vulnerable western flanks of Iraqi forces. US amphibious forces 

threatened to attack from eastern seaward approaches, drawing Iraqi attention and 

defensive effort in that direction. 

On 24 February, land forces attacked Iraq and rapidly closed on Iraqi flanks. Under a 

massive and continuous air component operation, coalition land forces closed with the 

Republican Guard. Iraqis surrendered in large numbers. To the extent that it could, the 

Iraqi military retreated. Within 100 hours of the start of the land force attack, the 

coalition achieved its strategic objectives and a cease-fire was ordered. 

POSTWAR OPERATIONS. Coalition forces consolidated their gains and enforced 

conditions of the cease-fire. The coalition sought to prevent the Iraqi military from 

taking retribution against its own dissident populace. Task Force Freedom began 

operations to rebuild Kuwait City. 

The end of major combat operations did not bring an end to conflict. The coalition 

conducted peace enforcement operations, humanitarian relief, security operations, 

extensive weapons and ordnance disposal, and humanitarian assistance. On 5 April, 

for example, President Bush announced the beginning of a relief operation in the area 

of northern Iraq. By 7 April, US aircraft from Europe were dropping relief supplies over 

the Iraqi border. Several thousand Service personnel who had participated in 

Operation DESERT STORM eventually redeployed to Turkey and northern Iraq in this 

joint and multinational relief operation. 

This postwar phase also included the major operations associated with the 

redeployment and demobilization of forces. 

Various Sources 
Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment 

IV-25

b. Mission Statement. The mission statement should be a short sentence or paragraph 

that describes the organization’s essential task (or tasks) and purpose — a clear statement of 

the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The mission statement contains the 

elements of who, what, when, where, and why; but seldom specifies how. It forms the basis 

for planning and is included in the planning guidance, the planning directive, staff estimates, 

the commander’s estimate, the CONOPS, and as paragraph 2, “Mission,” of the completed 

operation plan or order. Clarity of the joint force mission statement and its understanding by 

subordinates, before and during the joint operation, is vital to success. 

c. Commander’s Intent. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of 

the purpose of the operation and the military end state. It provides focus to the staff and 

helps subordinate and supporting commanders take actions to achieve the military end state 

without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. It also includes 

where the commander will accept risk during the operation. The initial intent statement 

normally contains the purpose and military end state as the initial impetus for the planning 

process. The commander refines the intent statement as planning progresses. It is typically 

written in paragraph 3, “Execution,” as part of the operation plan or order, but it could be 

stated verbally when time is short. 

d. Concept of Operations

(1) General. The CONOPS describes how the actions of the joint force 

components and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to 

accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels. The joint force staff 

writes (or graphically portrays) it in sufficient detail so that subordinate and supporting 

commanders understand their mission, tasks, and other requirements and can develop their 

supporting plans accordingly. During its development, the JFC determines the best 

arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to create desired effects 

and accomplish the assigned mission consistent with the approved COA. This arrangement 

of actions dictates the sequencing of forces into the operational area, providing the link 

between joint operation planning and force planning. 

(2) Phasing

(a) Purpose. The purpose of phasing is to help the JFC organize operations 

by integrating and synchronizing subordinate operations. Phasing is most directly related to 

the “arranging operations” and “LOOs” elements of operational design. Phasing helps JFCs 

and staffs visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define 

requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. The primary benefit of 

phasing is that it assists commanders in systematically achieving military objectives that 

cannot be attained all at once by arranging smaller, related operations in a logical sequence. 

Phasing can be used to gain progressive advantages and assist in achieving objectives as 

quickly and effectively as possible. Phasing also provides a framework for assessing risk to 

portions of an operation or campaign, allowing development of plans to mitigate this risk. 
Chapter IV 

IV-26 JP 3-0 (CH 1)

(b) Application. The JFC’s vision of how a campaign or operation should 

unfold drives subsequent decisions regarding phasing. Phasing, in turn, assists in framing 

commander’s intent and assigning tasks to subordinate commanders. By arranging 

operations and activities into phases, the JFC can better integrate and synchronize 

subordinate operations in time, space, and purpose. Each phase should represent a natural 

subdivision of the campaign/operation’s intermediate objectives. As such, a phase 

represents a definitive stage during which a large portion of the forces and 

joint/multinational capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities. 

Phasing can be used across the range of military operations. 

(c) Number, Sequence, and Overlap. Working within the campaign phasing 

construct, the actual phases used will vary (compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) with 

the joint campaign or operation and be determined by the JFC. During planning, the JFC 

establishes conditions, objectives, or events for transitioning from one phase to another and 

plans sequels and branches for potential contingencies. Phases are designed and protracted 

sequentially, but some activities from a phase may continue into subsequent phases or 

actually begin during a previous phase (see Figure IV-6). The JFC adjusts the phases to 

exploit opportunities presented by the adversary or operational situation or to react to 

unforeseen conditions. 

(d) Transitions. Transitions between phases are designed to be distinct shifts 

in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by changes in command relationships. The 

NOTIONAL OPERATION PLAN PHASES VERSUS 

LEVEL OF MILITARY EFFORT 

Phases

Theater Shaping

Shape

Phase 0

OPLAN 

xxxx 

Shaping Shaping Activities

Deterring Activities

Seizing the 

Initiative Activities 

Dominating 

Activities

Global Shaping

LEVEL OF MILITARY EFFORT

Stabilizing Activities

Deter

Phase I

Seize the 

Initiative

Phase II

Dominate

Phase III

Stabilize

Phase IV

Enable 

Civil 

Authority 

Phase V

Shape

Phase 0

Shaping

OPLAN xxxx

OPLAN approval OPLAN termination

OPLAN activation 

OPLAN operation plan

Enabling Civil

Authority Activities

Figure IV-6. Notional Operation Plan Phases Versus Level of Military Effort 
Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment 

IV-27

need to move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that a set of objectives 

are achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major change in focus 

for the joint force and is therefore usually event driven, not time driven. Changing the focus 

of the operation takes time and may require changing priorities, command relationships, 

force allocation, or even the design of the operational area. An example is the shift of focus 

from sustained combat operations in the “dominate” phase to a preponderance of stability 

operations in the “stabilize” and “enable civil authority” phases. Hostilities gradually lessen 

as the joint force begins to reestablish order, commerce, and local government; and deters 

adversaries from resuming hostile actions while the US and international community takes 

steps to establish or restore the conditions necessary to achieve their strategic objectives. 

This challenge demands an agile shift in joint force skill sets, actions, organizational 

behaviors, and mental outlooks; and coordination with a wider range of other 

organizations—OGAs, multinational partners, IGOs, and NGOs — to provide those 

capabilities necessary to address the mission-specific factors. 

(e) Phasing Model. Although the JFC determines the number and actual 

phases used during a joint campaign or operation, use of the phases shown in Figure III-7 

and described below provides a flexible model to arrange smaller, related operations. This 

model can be applied to various campaigns and operations. Operations and activities in the 

“shape” and “deter” phases normally are outlined in security cooperation plans (SCPs), and 

those in the remaining phases are outlined in JSCP-directed operation plans. By design, 

operation plans generally do not include security cooperation activities that are addressed 

elsewhere. CCDRs generally use the phasing model in Figure IV-7 to link the pertinent 

SCP and operation plan operations and activities. 

1. Shape. Joint and multinational operations — inclusive of normal and 

routine military activities — and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or 

deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. 

They are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain 

multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objectives. 

They are designed to assure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of 

STABILIZE

PHASING MODEL

CRISIS

DEFINED

PREVENT

PREPARE

ASSURE FRIENDLY 

FREEDOM OF 

ACTION/

ACCESS THEATER 

INFRASTRUCTURE

ESTABLISH 

DOMINANT FORCE 

CAPABILITIES/

ACHIEVE

FULL-SPECTRUM

SUPERIORITY

TRANSFER TO 

CIVIL 

AUTHORITY

REDEPLOY

ESTABLISH 

SECURITY

RESTORE 

SERVICES

SEIZE

INITIATIVE DOMINATE

ENABLE

CIVIL

AUTHORITY

SHAPE DETER

Phase 0 Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV Phase V

Figure IV-7. Phasing Model 
Chapter IV 

IV-28 JP 3-0 (CH 1)

both adversaries and allies, developing allied and friendly military capabilities for selfdefense and coalition operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, 

and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access. “Shape” phase activities 

must adapt to a particular theater environment and may be executed in one theater in order 

to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another. 

2. Deter. The intent of this phase is to deter undesirable adversary action 

by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force. It differs from deterrence 

that occurs in the “shape” phase in that it is largely characterized by preparatory actions that 

specifically support or facilitate the execution of subsequent phases of the 

operation/campaign. Once the crisis is defined, these actions may include mobilization, 

tailoring of forces and other predeployment activities; initial overflight permission(s) and/or 

deployment into a theater; employment of ISR assets; and development of mission-tailored 

C2, intelligence, force protection, and logistic requirements to support the JFC’s CONOPS. 

CCDRs continue to engage multinational partners, thereby providing the basis for further 

crisis response. Liaison teams and coordination with OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs assist in 

setting conditions for execution of subsequent phases of the campaign. Many actions in the 

“deter” phase build on activities from the previous phase and are conducted as part of SCPs 

and activities. They can also be part of stand-alone operations. 

3. Seize Initiative. JFCs seek to seize the initiative in combat and 

noncombat situations through the application of appropriate joint force capabilities. In 

combat operations this involves executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time, 

forcing the enemy to offensive culmination and setting the conditions for decisive 

operations. Rapid application of joint combat power may be required to delay, impede, or 

halt the enemy’s initial aggression and to deny their initial objectives. If an enemy has 

Deployment of combat forces may dissuade the adversary and obviate actual hostilities. 
Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment 

IV-29

achieved its initial objectives, the early and rapid application of offensive combat power can 

dislodge enemy forces from their position, creating conditions for the exploitation, pursuit, 

and ultimate destruction of both those forces and their will to fight during the “dominate” 

phase. During this phase, operations to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand 

friendly freedom of action continue while the JFC seeks to degrade enemy capabilities with 

the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity. In all operations, the JFC 

establishes conditions for stability by providing immediate assistance to relieve conditions 

that precipitated the crisis. 

4. Dominate. The “dominate” phase focuses on breaking the enemy’s 

will for organized resistance or, in noncombat situations, control of the operational 

environment. Success in this phase depends upon overmatching joint force capability at the 

critical time and place. This phase includes full employment of joint force capabilities and 

continues the appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational area as quickly as 

possible. When a campaign is focused on conventional enemy forces, the “dominate” phase 

normally concludes with decisive operations that drive an enemy to culmination and achieve 

the JFC’s operational objectives. Against unconventional enemies, decisive operations are 

characterized by dominating and controlling the operational environment through a 

combination of conventional/unconventional, information, and stability operations. Stability 

operations are conducted as needed to ensure a smooth transition to the next phase and 

relieve suffering. In noncombat situations, the joint force’s activities seek to control the 

situation or operational environment. Dominate phase activities may establish the 

conditions for an early favorable conclusion of operations or set the conditions for transition 

to the next phase of the campaign. 

5. Stabilize. This phase is required when there is limited or no 

functioning, legitimate civil governing entity present. The joint force may be required to 

perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting/contributing 

multinational, OGA, IGO, or NGO participants until legitimate local entities are 

functioning. This includes providing or assisting in the provision of basic services to the 

population. The “stabilize” phase is typically characterized by a change from sustained 

combat operations to stability operations. Stability operations are necessary to ensure that 

the threat (military and/or political) is reduced to a manageable level that can be controlled 

by the potential civil authority or, in noncombat situations, to ensure that the situation 

leading to the original crisis does not reoccur or its effects are mitigated. Redeployment 

operations may begin during this phase and should be identified as early as possible. 

Throughout this segment, the JFC continuously assesses the impact of current operations on 

the ability to transfer overall regional authority to a legitimate civil entity, which marks the 

end of the phase. 

6. Enable Civil Authority. This phase is predominantly characterized by 

joint force support to legitimate civil governance. This support will be provided to the civil 

authority with its agreement at some level, and in some cases especially for operations 

within the United States, under its direction. The goal is for the joint force to enable the 

viability of the civil authority and its provision of essential services to the largest number of 

people in the region. This includes coordination of joint force actions with supporting 
Chapter IV 

IV-30 JP 3-0 (CH 1)

multinational, OGA, IGO, and NGO participants and influencing the attitude of the 

population favorably regarding the US and local civil authority’s objectives. The joint force 

will be in a supporting role to the legitimate civil authority in the region throughout the 

“enable civil authority” phase. Redeployment operations, particularly for combat units, will 

often begin during this phase and should be identified as early as possible. The military end 

state is achieved during this phase, signaling the end of the joint operation. The joint 

operation is concluded when redeployment operations are complete. Combatant command 

involvement with other nations and OGAs, beyond the termination of the joint operation, 

may be required to achieve the national strategic end state. 

(3) The CONOPS, included in paragraph 3, “Execution,” also provides the basis 

for developing the concept of fires, concept of intelligence operations, and concept of 

logistic support; which also are included in the final operation plan or order. 

For more information on fires and joint fire support planning, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire 

Support. 

For more information on intelligence support and planning, refer to JP 2-0, Joint 

Intelligence, and other JP 2-0 series publications. 

For more information on logistic planning, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics Support, and 

other JP 4-0 series publications. 

SECTION D. ASSESSMENT

6. General 

a. Assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission 

accomplishment. Commanders continuously assess the operational environment and the 

progress of operations, and compare them to their initial vision and intent. Commanders 

adjust operations based on their assessment to ensure military objectives are met and the 

military end state is achieved. The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to 

the commander’s decisions throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations. 

Staffs help the commander by monitoring the numerous aspects that can influence the 

outcome of operations and provide the commander timely information needed for decisions. 

The CCIR process is linked to the assessment process by the commander’s need for 

timely information and recommendations to make decisions. The assessment process helps 

staffs by identifying key aspects of the operation that the commander is interested in closely 

monitoring and where the commander wants to make decisions. Examples of commander’s 

critical decisions include when to transition to another phase of a campaign, what the 

priority of effort should be, or how to adjust command relationships between component 

commanders. 

b. The assessment process begins during mission analysis when the commander and 

staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward 

accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. During planning and 
Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment 

IV-31

preparation for an operation, for example, the staff assesses the joint force’s ability to 

execute the plan based on available resources and changing conditions in the operational 

environment. However, the discussion in this section focuses on assessment for the 

purpose of determining the progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment.

c. Commanders and their staffs determine relevant assessment actions and measures 

during planning. They consider assessment measures as early as mission analysis, and 

include assessment measures and related guidance in commander and staff estimates. They 

use assessment considerations to help guide operational design because these considerations 

can affect the sequence and type of actions along LOOs. During execution, they continually 

monitor progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating effects, and achieving objectives. 

Assessment actions and measures help commanders adjust operations and resources as 

required, determine when to execute branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions 

to ensure current and future operations remain aligned with the mission and military end 

state. Normally, the joint force J-3, assisted by the J-2, is responsible for coordinating 

assessment activities. For subordinate commanders’ staffs, this may be accomplished by 

equivalent elements within joint functional and/or Service components. The chief of staff 

facilitates the assessment process and determination of CCIRs by incorporating them into 

the headquarters’ battle rhythm. Various elements of the JFC’s staff use assessment results 

to adjust both current operations and future planning.

d. Friendly, adversary, and neutral diplomatic, informational, and economic actions 

applied in the operational environment can impact military actions and objectives. When 

relevant to the mission, the commander also must plan for using assessment to evaluate the 

results of these actions. This typically requires collaboration with other agencies and 

multinational partners — preferably within a common, accepted process — in the interest of 

unified action. Many of these organizations may be outside the JFC’s authority. 

Accordingly, the JFC should grant some joint force organizations authority for direct 

coordination with key outside organizations — such as USG interagency elements from the 

Departments of State or Homeland Security, national intelligence agencies, intelligence 

sources in other nations, and other combatant commands — to the extent necessary to 

ensure timely and accurate assessments. 

7. Levels of War and Assessment 

a. Assessment occurs at all levels and across the entire range of military operations. 

Even in operations that do not include combat, assessment of progress is just as important 

and can be more complex than traditional combat assessment. As a general rule, the level 

at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which 

such activity is assessed. To do this, JFCs and their staffs consider assessment ways, 

means, and measures during planning, preparation, and execution. This properly focuses 

assessment and collection at each level, reduces redundancy, and enhances the efficiency of 

the overall assessment process (see Figure IV-8). 

b. Assessment at the operational and strategic levels typically is broader than at the 

tactical level (e.g., combat assessment) and uses measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that 
Chapter IV 

IV-32 JP 3-0 (CH 1)

support strategic and operational mission accomplishment. Strategic- and operational-level 

assessment efforts concentrate on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the 

military end state. Continuous assessment helps the JFC and joint force component 

commanders determine if the joint force is “doing the right things” to achieve its objectives, 

not just “doing things right.” 

c. Tactical-level assessment typically uses measures of performance (MOPs) to 

evaluate task accomplishment. The results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature, but 

also can reflect the impact on specific functions and systems. Tactical-level assessment may 

include assessing progress by phase lines; destruction of enemy forces; control of key 

terrain, peoples, or resources; and security, relief, or reconstruction tasks. Assessment of 

results at the tactical level helps commanders determine operational and strategic progress, 

so JFCs must have a comprehensive, integrated assessment plan that links assessment 

activities and measures at all levels. 

d. Combat assessment is an example of a tactical level assessment and is a term that 

can encompass many tactical-level assessment actions. Combat assessment typically 

focuses on determining the results of weapons engagement (with both lethal and nonlethal 

capabilities), and thus is an important component of joint fires and the joint targeting process 

(see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting). Combat assessment is composed of three related 

elements: battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness assessment, and future 

ASSESSMENT LEVELS AND MEASURES

National

Strategic

Theater

Strategic

Operational

Tactical

End State & Mission

Objectives

Effects

Tasks

Mission

Objectives

Effects

Tasks

Mission

Objectives

Tasks

End State and

Objectives

Guidance

Battle Damage

Assessment

Munitions Effectiveness

Assessment

Reattack or

Future Targeting

National

Strategic

Theater

Strategic

Operational

Tactical

End State & Mission

Objectives

Effects

Tasks

Mission

Objectives

Effects

Tasks

Mission

Objectives

Tasks

End State and

Objectives

Guidance

Battle Damage

Assessment

Munitions Effectiveness

Assessment

Reattack or

Future Targeting

National

Strategic

Theater

Strategic

Operational

Tactical

End State & Mission

Objectives

Effects

Tasks

Mission

Objectives

Effects

Tasks

Mission

Objectives

Tasks

End State and

Objectives

Guidance

National

Strategic

Theater

Strategic

Operational

Tactical

End State & Mission

Objectives

Effects

Tasks

Mission

Objectives

Effects

Tasks

Mission

Objectives

Tasks

End State and

Objectives

Level Guidance

Battle Damage

Assessment

Munitions Effectiveness

Assessment

Reattack or

Future Targeting

Battle Damage

Assessment

Munitions Effectiveness

Assessment

Reattack or

Future Targeting

Battle Damage

Assessment

Munitions Effectiveness

Assessment

Reattack or

Future Targeting

Battle Damage

Assessment

Munitions Effectiveness

Assessment

Assessed using 

measures of effectiveness --MOEs 

(Are we ) doing the right things?

Assessed using 

measures of performance --MOPs 

(Are we ) doing things right?

Combat tasks 

(particularly fires) 

Use Combat Assessment

Reattack or

Future Targeting

Figure IV-8. Assessment Levels and Measures 
Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment 

IV-33

targeting or reattack recommendations. However, combat assessment methodology also 

can be applied by joint force functional and Service components to other tactical tasks not 

associated with joint fires (e.g., disaster relief delivery assessment, relief effectiveness 

assessment, and future relief recommendations.). 

8. Assessment Process and Measures 

a. The assessment process uses MOPs to evaluate task performance at all levels of 

war and MOEs to measure effects and determine the progress of operations toward 

achieving objectives. MOEs help answer questions like: “are we doing the right things, are 

our actions producing the desired effects, or are alternative actions required?” MOPs are 

closely associated with task accomplishment. MOPs help answer questions like: “was the 

action taken, were the tasks completed to standard, or how much effort was involved?” 

Well-devised measures can help the commanders and staffs understand the causal 

relationship between specific tasks and desired effects. 

(1) MOEs assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational 

environment. MOEs measure the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, 

or creation of an effect; they do not measure task performance. These measures typically 

are more subjective than MOPs, and can be crafted as either qualitative or quantitative. 

MOEs can be based on quantitative measures to reflect a trend and show progress toward a 

measurable threshold. 

(2) MOPs measure task performance. MOPs are generally quantitative, but also 

can apply qualitative attributes to task accomplishment. They are used in most aspects of 

combat assessment, since it typically seeks specific, quantitative data or a direct observation 

of an event to determine accomplishment of tactical tasks, but have relevance for noncombat 

operations as well (e.g., tons of relief supplies delivered or noncombatants evacuated). 

MOPs also can be used to measure operational and strategic tasks, but the type of 

measurement may not be as precise or as easy to observe. 

b. The assessment process and related measures should be relevant, measurable, 

responsive, and resourced so there is no false impression of accomplishment. 

(1) Relevant. MOPs and MOEs should be relevant to the task, effect, operation, 

the operational environment, the military end state, and the commander’s decisions. This 

criterion helps avoid collecting and analyzing information that is of no value to a specific 

operation. It also helps ensure efficiency by eliminating redundant efforts. 

(2) Measurable. Assessment measures should have qualitative or quantitative 

standards they can be measured against. To effectively measure change, a baseline 

measurement should be established prior to execution to facilitate accurate assessment 

throughout the operation. Both MOPs and MOEs can be quantitative or qualitative in 

nature, but meaningful quantitative measures are preferred because they are less susceptible 

to subjective interpretation. 
Chapter IV 

IV-34 JP 3-0 (CH 1)

(3) Responsive. Assessment processes should detect situation changes quickly 

enough to enable effective response by the staff and timely decisions by the commander. 

Time for an action or actions to take effect within the operational environment and 

indicators to develop should be considered. Many actions directed by the JFC require time 

to implement and may take even longer to produce a measurable result. 

(4) Resourced. To be effective, assessment must be adequately resourced. Staffs 

should ensure resource requirements for collection efforts and analysis are built into plans 

and monitored. Effective assessment can help avoid duplication of tasks and avoid taking 

unnecessary actions, which in turn can help preserve combat power. 

c. Commanders and staffs derive relevant assessment measures during the planning 

process and reevaluate them continuously throughout preparation and execution. They 

consider assessment measures during mission analysis, refine these measures in the JFC’s 

initial planning guidance and in commander’s and staff’s estimates, wargame the measures 

during COA development, and include MOEs and MOPs in the approved plan or order. 

d. Just as tactical tasks relate to operational- and strategic-level tasks, effects, and 

objectives there is a relationship between assessment measures. By monitoring available 

information and using MOEs and MOPs as assessment tools during planning, preparation, 

and execution, the commanders and staffs determine progress toward creating desired 

effects, achieving objectives, and attaining the military end state, as well as any required 

modifications to the plan. Well-devised MOP and MOE, supported by effective information 

management, help the commanders and staffs understand the linkage between tasks, effects, 

objectives, and end state. 
CHAPTER V

MAJOR OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS

V-1 

SECTION A. OVERVIEW 

1. General Considerations 

a. Complexity. Major operations and campaigns are the most complex and require the 

greatest diligence in planning and execution due to the time, effort, and national resources 

committed. This chapter discusses those areas that must be considered and addressed when 

planning and conducting major operations and campaigns involving large-scale combat. 

Many of these same factors must be considered for other operations across the range of 

military operations, since they may be precursors to large-scale combat or, if successfully 

resolved, may forestall escalation to that level. 

b. Offensive and Defensive Operations. Major operations and campaigns, whether or 

not they involve large-scale combat, normally will include some level of both offense and 

defense (e.g., interdiction, maneuver, forcible entry, fire support, counterair, CND, and base 

defense). Although defense may be the stronger force posture, it is the offense that is 

normally decisive in combat. In striving to achieve military strategic objectives quickly and 

at the least cost, JFCs normally will seek the earliest opportunity to conduct decisive 

offensive operations. Nevertheless, during sustained offensive operations, selected elements 

of the joint force may need to pause, defend, resupply, or reconstitute, while other forces 

continue the attack. Further, force protection includes certain defensive measures that are 

required throughout each joint operation or campaign phase. Forces at all levels within the 

joint force must possess the agility to rapidly transition between offense and defense and 

vice versa. The relationship between offense and defense, then, is a complimentary one. 

Defensive operations enable JFCs to conduct or prepare for decisive offensive operations. 

c. Stability Operations. These missions, tasks, and activities seek to maintain or 

reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, 

emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. Many of these missions and 

tasks are the essence of CMO. To reach the national strategic end state and conclude 

the operation/campaign successfully, JFCs must integrate and synchronize stability 

operations with other operations (offense and defense) within each major operation or 

campaign phase. Stability operations support USG plans for stability, security, transition, 

and reconstruction (SSTR) operations and likely will be conducted in coordination with and 

in support of HN authorities, OGAs, IGOs, and/or NGOs, and the private sector. 

For further guidance on military contribution to USG SSTR efforts, refer to DODD 3000.05, 

Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations. 

d. Balance and Simultaneity. JFCs strive to apply the many dimensions of military 

power simultaneously across the depth, breadth, and height of the operational area. 

“Everything is simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.” 

Clausewitz: On War, 1812 
Chapter V 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) V-2 

Consequently, JFCs normally achieve concentration in some areas or in specific functions 

and require economy of force in others. However, major operation and campaign plans 

must feature an appropriate balance between offensive and defensive operations and 

stability operations in all phases. Most importantly, planning for stability operations 

should begin when joint operation planning is initiated. Planning for the transition from 

sustained combat operations to the termination of joint operations and then a complete 

handover to civil authority and redeployment must commence during plan development and 

be ongoing during all phases of a campaign or major operation. An uneven focus on 

planning offensive and defensive operations in the “dominate” phase may threaten full 

development of basic and supporting plans for the “stabilize” and “enable civil authority” 

phases and ultimately joint operation momentum. Even while sustained combat operations 

are ongoing, there will be a need to establish or restore security and control and provide 

humanitarian relief as succeeding areas are occupied or bypassed. Figure V-1 illustrates the 

notional balance between offensive, defensive, and stability operations throughout a major 

operation or campaign. 

SECTION B. KEY CONSIDERATIONS BY PHASE 

2. Considerations for Shaping 

NOTIONAL BALANCE OF OFFENSIVE, DEFENSIVE,

AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

SHAPE

Stability Ops

Offensive Ops

Defensive Ops

Stability Ops

DETER

Offensive Ops

Defensive Ops

SEIZE INITIATIVE

Offensive Ops

Defensive Ops Stability Ops

DOMINATE

Offensive Ops

Defensive Ops

Stability Ops

STABILIZE

Offensive Ops

Defensive Ops Stability Ops

ENABLE CIVIL AUTHORITY

Offensive Ops

Defensive Ops Stability Ops

Figure V-1. Notional Balance of Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Operations 
Major Operations and Campaigns 

V-3

a. General. JFCs are able to take actions before committing forces to assist in 

determining the shape and character of potential future operations. In many cases, these 

actions enhance bonds between future coalition partners, increase understanding of the 

region, help ensure access when required, strengthen future multinational operations, and 

prevent crises from developing. 

b. Organizing and Training Forces. Organizing and, where possible, training forces 

to conduct operations throughout the operational area can be a deterrent. JTFs and 

components that are likely to be employed in theater operations should be exercised 

regularly during peacetime. Staffs should be identified and trained for planning and 

controlling joint and multinational operations. The composition of joint force staffs should 

reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure that those responsible for employing joint 

forces have thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. When possible, JFCs 

and staff should invite non-DOD agencies to participate in training to ensure a common 

understanding and for building a working relationship prior to actual execution. When it is 

not possible to train forces in the theater of employment, as with US-based forces with 

multiple taskings, maximum use should be made of regularly scheduled and ad hoc exercise 

opportunities. The training focus for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives should 

be the CCDR’s joint mission-essential task list. 

c. Rehearsals. Rehearsal is the process of learning, understanding, and practicing a 

plan in the time available before actual execution. Rehearsing key combat and logistic 

actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan. 

This process assists them in orienting joint and multinational forces to their surroundings 

and to other units during execution. Rehearsals also provide a forum for subordinate leaders 

to analyze the plan, but they must exercise caution in adjusting the plan. Changes must be 

coordinated throughout the chain of command to prevent errors in integration and 

synchronization. While rehearsals usually occur at the tactical level, headquarters at the 

operational level can rehearse key aspects of a plan using command post exercises, typically 

supported by computer-aided simulations. While the joint force may not be able to rehearse 

an entire operation, the JFC should identify key elements for rehearsal. 

d. Maintaining Operational Area Access. JFCs establish and maintain access to 

operational areas where they are likely to operate, ensuring forward presence, basing (to 

include availability of airfields), freedom of navigation, and cooperation with allied and/or 

coalition nations to enhance operational reach. In part, this effort is national or 

multinational, involving maintenance of intertheater (between theaters) air and sea LOCs. 

Supporting CCDRs can greatly enhance this effort. 

e. Space Considerations. Space operations are a critical enabler that supports all joint 

operations. Commanders need to ensure US, allied, and/or coalition forces gain and 

maintain space superiority, which is achieved through global and theater space control, force 

enhancement, space support, and space force application operations. Also, commanders 

must anticipate hostile actions that may affect friendly space operations. Commanders 

should anticipate the proliferation and increasing sophistication of commercial space 
Chapter V 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) V-4 

capabilities and products available to the adversary. USSTRATCOM is the focal point for 

global space operations. The CCDR has responsibility for conducting theater space 

operations. Global and theater space operations require robust planning and skilled 

employment to synchronize and integrate space operations with the joint operation or 

campaign. Space capabilities help shape the operational environment in a variety of ways 

including providing ISR and communications necessary for keeping commanders and 

leaders informed worldwide. JFCs and their components should request space support early 

in the planning process to ensure effective and efficient use of space assets. 

f. Stability Operations. Activities in the “shaping” phase primarily will focus on 

continued planning and preparation for anticipated stability operations in the subsequent 

phases. These activities should include conducting collaborative interagency planning to 

synchronize the civil-military effort, confirming the feasibility of pertinent military 

objectives and the military end state, and providing for adequate intelligence, an appropriate 

force mix, and other capabilities. Stability operations in this phase may be required to 

quickly restore security and infrastructure or provide humanitarian relief in select portions of 

the operational area to dissuade further adversary actions or to help ensure access and future 

success. 

3. Considerations for Deterrence 

a. General. Before the initiation of hostilities, the JFC must gain a clear understanding 

of the national and military strategic objectives; desired and undesired effects; COGs and 

decisive points; actions likely to create those desired effects; and required joint, 

multinational, and nonmilitary capabilities matched to available forces. The JFC must 

visualize how these operations can be integrated into a campaign with missions that are 

communicated via commanders intent throughout the force. An early analysis and 

assessment of the adversary’s decision-making process must be performed to know what 

actions will be an effective deterrent. Emphasis should be placed on setting the conditions 

for successful joint operations in the “dominate” and follow-on phases. 

b. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

(1) JFCs use a broad range of supporting capabilities to develop a current 

intelligence picture or to conduct an analysis of adversary systems. These supporting 

capabilities include combat support agencies and national intelligence agencies (e.g., 

National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, 

NGA). A national intelligence support team provides the joint force J-2 with the means to 

integrate national intelligence capabilities into a comprehensive intelligence effort designed 

to support the joint force. J-2s should integrate these supporting capabilities with the efforts 

of the joint intelligence center. Liaison personnel from the various agencies provide access 

to the entire range of capabilities resident in their agencies and can focus those capabilities 

on the JFC’s intelligence requirements. 

(2) At the advent of a crisis or other indication of potential military action, JFCs 

examine available intelligence estimates. As part of the JIPOE process, JFCs focus 
Major Operations and Campaigns 

V-5

intelligence efforts to determine or confirm enemy COGs and refine estimates of enemy 

capabilities, dispositions, intentions, and probable COAs within the context of the current 

situation. They look for specific indications and warning of imminent enemy activity that 

may require an immediate response or an acceleration of friendly decision cycles. 

For additional guidance on intelligence support to joint operations, refer to the JP 2-0 

series. 

c. Preparing the Operational Area

(1) Special Operations. SOF play a major role in preparing and shaping the 

operational area and environment by setting conditions which mitigate risk and facilitate 

successful follow-on operations. The regional focus, cross-cultural/ethnic insights, language 

capabilities, and relationships of SOF provide access to and influence in nations where the 

presence of conventional US forces is unacceptable or inappropriate. SOF contributions can 

provide operational leverage by gathering critical information, undermining a potential 

adversary’s will or capacity to wage war, and enhancing the capabilities of conventional US, 

multinational, or indigenous/surrogate forces. CDRUSSOCOM develops strategy and 

synchronizes planning and execution of global operations and provides SOF to the GCCs to 

conduct operational preparation of the environment. 

For further guidance on special operations, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special 

Operations. 

(2) Stability Operations. Joint force planning and operations conducted prior to 

commencement of hostilities should establish a sound foundation for operations in the 

“stabilize” and “enable civil authority” phases. JFCs should anticipate and address how to 

fill the power vacuum created when sustained combat operations wind down. 

Accomplishing this task should ease the transition to operations in the “stabilize” phase and 

shorten the path to the national strategic end state and handover to another authority. 

Considerations include: 

(a) Limiting the damage to key infrastructure and services. 

(b) Establishing the intended disposition of captured leadership and 

demobilized military and paramilitary forces. 

(c) Providing for the availability of cash. 

(d) Identifying and managing potential “stabilize” phase enemies. 

(e) Determining the proper force mix (e.g., combat, military police, CA, 

engineer, medical, multinational). 

(f) Availability of HN law enforcement and HSS resources. 
Chapter V 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) V-6 

(g) Securing key infrastructure nodes and facilitating HN law enforcement and 

first responder services. 

(h) Developing and disseminating SC themes to suppress potential new 

enemies and promote new governmental authority. 

(3) CA units contain a variety of specialty skills that may support the joint 

operation being planned. CA units can assess the civil infrastructure, assist in the operation 

of temporary shelters, and serve as liaisons between the military and civil organizations. 

Establishing and maintaining military-to-civil relations may include interaction among US, 

allied or coalition, HN forces, as well as OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. CA forces can provide 

expertise on factors that directly affect military operations to include culture, social 

structure, economic systems, language, and HNS capabilities. CA may be able to perform 

functions that normally are the responsibility of local or indigenous governments. 

Employment of CA forces should be based upon a clear concept of CA mission 

requirements for the type operation being planned. 

For further guidance on CA, refer to JP 3-57 Civil-Military Operations. 

(4) Sustainment. Thorough planning for logistic and personnel support is critical. 

For example, the infrastructure required to deploy and support combat operations must be 

identified, resourced, and emplaced in a timely manner. Planning must include active 

participation by all deploying and in-theater US and multinational forces. 

d. The theater patient movement policy is set by SecDef in coordination with the 

GCC prior to joint operation execution. It states the maximum number of days 

(hospitalization and convalescence) a patient may be held within the command for treatment 

prior to further movement or return to duty. Patients who cannot be returned to duty within 

the specified number of days are evacuated to the next category of care outside the 

operational area for further treatment. The theater patient movement policy, in part, 

determines how many HSS assets will be deployed to the theater. A short patient movement 

policy limits the HSS personnel ceiling for the operation and places a heavier reliance on 

medical evacuation support out of the theater to definitive care facilities in the United States 

or other designated areas. 

For further information on HSS and theater patient movement, refer to JP 4-02, Health 

Service Support. 

e. Isolating the Enemy

(1) With President and SecDef approval, guidance, and national support; JFCs 

strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary. The intent is to strip 

away as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible, while limiting the enemy’s 

potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. JFCs also may be tasked by the President and 

SecDef to support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions. 
Major Operations and Campaigns 

V-7

(2) The JFC also seeks to isolate the main enemy force from both its strategic 

leadership and its supporting infrastructure. Such isolation can be achieved through the 

use of PSYOP and the interdiction of LOCs or resources affecting the enemy’s ability to 

conduct or sustain military operations. This step serves to deny the enemy both physical and 

psychological support and may separate the enemy leadership and military from their public 

support. 

f. Flexible Deterrent Options. Flexible deterrent options (FDOs) are preplanned, 

deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to bring an issue to early resolution without 

armed conflict. Both military and nonmilitary FDOs can be used to dissuade actions before 

a crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a crisis. FDOs are developed for each 

instrument of national power, but they are most effective when used in combination. 

(1) Military FDOs can be initiated before or after unambiguous warning. 

Deployment timelines, combined with the requirement for a rapid, early response generally 

requires economy of force; however, military FDOs should not increase risk to the force that 

exceeds the potential benefit of the desired effect. Military FDOs must be carefully tailored 

regarding timing, efficiency, and effectiveness. They can rapidly improve the military 

balance of power in the operational area; especially in terms of early warning, intelligence 

gathering, logistic infrastructure, air and maritime forces, PSYOP, and protection without 

precipitating armed response from the adversary. Care should be taken to avoid undesired 

effects such as eliciting an armed response should adversary leadership perceive that 

friendly military FDOs are preparation for a preemptive attack. 

(2) Nonmilitary FDOs are preplanned, preemptive actions taken by OGAs to 

dissuade an adversary from initiating hostilities. Nonmilitary FDOs need to be coordinated, 

integrated, and synchronized with military FDOs to focus all instruments of national power. 

For further guidance on planning FDOs, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

g. Protection. JFCs must protect their forces and their freedom of action to accomplish 

their mission. This protection dictates that JFCs not only provide force protection, but be 

aware of and participate as appropriate in the protection of interagency and regional 

multinational capabilities and activities. JFCs may spend as much time on protection as on 

direct preparation of their forces for combat. 

h. Space Force Enhancement. JFCs depend upon and exploit the advantages of space 

capabilities. During this phase, space capabilities are limited to already deployed assets and 

established priorities for service. As the situation develops, priorities for space force 

enhancement may change to aid the JFC in assessing the changing operational environment. 

Most importantly, the JFC and component commanders need to anticipate “surge” space 

capabilities needed for future phases due to the long lead times to reprioritize or acquire 

additional capabilities. 

i. Geospatial Intelligence Products and Services. It is essential that any maps, charts, 

imagery products, and support data — to include datum and reference systems — to be used 
Chapter V 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) V-8 

in a joint operation be fully coordinated with JFC components as well as with the Joint Staff, 

Office of the SecDef, and the NGA. Requests for or updates to GEOINT products, 

including maps or annotated imagery products, should be submitted as early as possible 

through the NGA liaison team at the JFC’s headquarters. US products should be used 

whenever possible as the accuracy, scale, and reliability of foreign maps and charts may 

vary widely from US products. In any joint operation, the World Geodetic System-1984 

should be the common system. If US products are to be used in a coalition environment or 

within a combined headquarters, the release of US mapping materials or imagery products 

may first require foreign disclosure/release adjudication. 

For further guidance on GEOINT, refer to JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint 

Operations. 

j. Physical Environment

(1) Weather, terrain, and sea conditions can significantly affect operations and 

logistic support of the joint force and should be carefully assessed before sustained combat 

operations. Mobility of the force, integration and synchronization of operations, and ability 

to employ precision munitions can be affected by degraded conditions. Climatological and 

hydrographic planning tools, studies, and forecast products help the JFC determine the most 

advantageous time and location to conduct operations. 

(2) Urban areas possess all of the characteristics of the natural landscape, coupled 

with man-made construction and the associated infrastructure, resulting in a complicated 

and dynamic environment that influences the conduct of military operations in many ways. 

The most distinguishing characteristic of operations in urban areas, however, is not 

the infrastructure but the density of noncombatants. Joint urban operations (JUOs) are 

conducted in large, densely populated areas with problems unique to clearing enemy forces 

while possibly restoring services and managing major concentrations of people. For 

example, industrial areas and port facilities often are collocated with highly populated areas 

creating the opportunity for accidental or deliberate release of toxic industrial materials 

which could impact JUOs. During JUOs, joint forces may not focus only on destruction of 

adversary forces but also may be required to take steps necessary to protect and support 

noncombatants and their infrastructure from which they receive services necessary for 

survival. As such, ROE during JUOs may be more restrictive than for other types of 

operations. When planning JUOs, the JFC and staff should consider the impact of military 

operations on noncombatants to include their culture, values, and infrastructure; thereby 

viewing the urban area as a dynamic and complex system — not solely as terrain. This 

implies the joint force must be capable of understanding the specific urban environment; 

sensing, locating, and isolating the enemy among noncombatants; and applying combat 

power precisely and discriminately. 

For additional guidance on JUOs, refer to JP 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations. 

(3) Littoral Areas. The littoral area contains two parts. First is the seaward area 

from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. 
Major Operations and Campaigns 

V-9

Second is the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended 

directly from the sea. Control of the littoral area often is essential to maritime superiority. 

Maritime operations conducted in the littoral area can project power, fires, and forces to 

support achieving the JFC’s objectives; and facilitate the entry of other elements of the joint 

force through the seizure of an adversary’s port, naval base, or air base to allow entry and 

movement of other elements of the joint force. Depending on the situation, mine warfare 

may be critical to control of the littoral areas. When this is the case, adequate assets must be 

made available. 

4. Considerations for Seizing the Initiative 

a. General. As operations commence, the JFC needs to exploit friendly advantages and 

capabilities to shock, demoralize, and disrupt the enemy immediately. The JFC seeks 

decisive advantage through the use of all available elements of combat power to seize and 

maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve its objectives, and 

generate in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat. Additionally, the JFC 

coordinates with OGAs to facilitate coherent use of all instruments of national power in 

achieving national strategic objectives. 

b. Force Projection

(1) The President and SecDef may direct a CCDR to resolve a crisis quickly, 

employing immediately available forces and appropriate FDOs as discussed above to 

preclude escalation. When these forces and actions are not sufficient, follow-on strikes 

and/or the deployment of forces from CONUS or another theater and/or the use of 

Strike groups and task forces deployed worldwide, along with those from coalition partners, 

provide combat power from the sea and are able to respond rapidly to crisis situations. 
Chapter V 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) V-10 

multinational forces may be necessary. Consequently, the CCDR must sequence, enable, 

and protect the deployment of forces to achieve early decisive advantage. The CCDR 

should not overlook enemy capabilities to affect deployment from bases to ports of 

embarkation (POEs). The deployment of forces may be either opposed or unopposed by an 

adversary. 

(a) Opposed. Initial operations may be designed to suppress adversary antiaccess capabilities. For example, the ability to generate sufficient combat power through 

long-range air operations or from the sea can provide for effective force projection in the 

absence of timely or unencumbered access. Other opposed situations may require a forcible 

entry capability (see subparagraph 4d below). In other cases, force projection can be 

accomplished rapidly by forcible entry operations coordinated with strategic air mobility, 

sealift, and pre-positioned forces. For example, the seizure and defense of lodgment areas 

by amphibious forces would then serve as initial entry points for the continuous and 

uninterrupted flow of pre-positioned forces and materiel into the theater. Both efforts 

demand a versatile mix of forces that are organized, trained, equipped, and poised to 

respond quickly. 

(b) Unopposed deployment operations provide the JFC and subordinate 

components a more flexible operational environment to efficiently and effectively build 

combat power, train, rehearse, acclimate, and otherwise establish the conditions for 

successful combat operations. In unopposed entry, JFCs arrange the flow of forces, to 

include significant theater opening logistic forces, that best facilitates the CONOPS. In 

these situations, logistic forces may be a higher priority for early deployment than combat 

forces, as determined by the in-theater protection requirements. 

(2) Supported and supporting commanders must ensure that deploying forces 

receive thorough briefings concerning the threat and force protection requirements prior to 

deployment and upon arrival in the operational area. In addition, JFCs and their subordinate 

commanders must evaluate the deployment of forces and each COA for the impact of 

terrorist organizations supporting the threat and those not directly supporting the threat but 

seeking to take advantage of the situation. A frequently overlooked concern is friendly 

POEs where forces are massed for deployment. 

(3) During force projection, US forces and PODs must be protected. JFCs must 

introduce forces in a manner that provides security for rapid force buildup. From a C2 

perspective, echelon is essential. Therefore, early entry forces should deploy with sufficient 

organic and supporting capabilities to preserve their freedom of action and protect personnel 

and equipment from potential or likely threats. Early entry forces also should include a 

deployable joint C2 capability to rapidly assess the situation, make decisions, and conduct 

initial operations. 

(4) Joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI)

operations must be considered. JRSOI occurs in the operational area and comprises the 

essential processes required to transition arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into 

forces capable of meeting operational requirements. 
Major Operations and Campaigns 

V-11

c. Unit Integrity During Deployment

(1) US Service forces normally train as units, and are best able to accomplish a 

mission when deployed intact. By deploying as an existing unit, forces are able to continue 

to operate under established procedures, adapting them to the mission and situation, as 

required. When personnel and elements are drawn from various commands, effectiveness 

may be decreased. By deploying without established operating procedures, an ad hoc force 

takes more time to form and adjust to requirements of the mission. This not only 

complicates mission accomplishment, but also may have an impact on force protection. 

(2) Even if political restraints on an operation dictate that a large force cannot be 

deployed intact, commanders should select elements for deployment that have established 

internal procedures and structures, have trained and operated together, and possess 

appropriate joint force combat capabilities. In order to provide a JFC with needed 

versatility, it may not be possible to preserve complete unit integrity. In such cases, units 

must be prepared to send elements that are able to operate independently of parent units. 

Attachment to a related unit is the usual mode. In this instance, units not accustomed to 

having attachments may be required to provide administrative and logistic support to 

normally unrelated units. 

(3) The CCDR, in coordination with Commander, United States Transportation 

Command, subordinate JFCs, and the Service component commanders, needs to carefully 

balance the desire to retain unit integrity through the strategic deployment process with the 

effective use of strategic lift platforms. While maximizing unit integrity may reduce JRSOI 

requirements and allow combat units to be employed more quickly, doing so will often have 

a direct negative impact on the efficient use of the limited strategic lift. In some cases, this 

negative impact on strategic lift may have a negative effect on DOD deployment and 

sustainment requirements beyond the GCC’s AOR. A general rule of thumb is that unit 

integrity is much more important for early deploying units than for follow-on forces. 

d. Forcible entry is a joint military operation conducted either as a major operation or a 

part of a larger campaign to seize and hold a military lodgment in the face of armed 

opposition for the continuous landing of forces. Forcible entry operations can strike directly 

at the enemy COGs and can open new avenues for other military operations. 

(1) Forcible entry operations may include amphibious, airborne, and air assault 

operations, or any combination thereof. Forcible entry operations can create multiple 

dilemmas by creating threats that exceed the enemy’s capability to respond. The joint 

forcible entry operation commander will employ distributed, yet coherent, operations to 

attack the objective area or areas. The net result will be a coordinated attack that 

overwhelms the adversary before the adversary has time to react. A well-positioned and 

networked force enables the defeat of any adversary reaction and facilitates follow-on 

operations, if required. 
Chapter V 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) V-12 

(2) Forcible entry normally is complex and risky and should therefore be kept as 

simple as possible in concept. These operations require extensive intelligence, detailed 

coordination, innovation, and flexibility. Schemes of maneuver and coordination between 

forces need to be clearly understood by all participants. Forces are tailored for the mission 

and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and employment. When airborne, 

amphibious, and air assault operations are combined, unity of command is vital. Rehearsals 

are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry. Participating forces need to be prepared 

to fight immediately upon arrival and require robust communications and intelligence 

capabilities to move with forward elements. 

(3) The forcible entry force must be prepared to immediately transition to 

follow-on operations and should plan accordingly. Joint forcible entry actions occur in 

both singular and multiple operations. These actions include establishing forward presence, 

preparing the operational area, opening entry points, establishing and sustaining access, 

receiving follow-on forces, conducting follow-on operations, sustaining the operations, and 

conducting decisive operations. 

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, the Commander, US Southern 

Command, Joint Task Force (JTF) Panama, conducted multiple, simultaneous forcible 

entry operations to begin Operation JUST CAUSE. By parachute assault, forces seized 

key lodgments at Torrijos-Tocumen Military Airfield and International Airport and at the 

Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) base at Rio Hato. The JTF used these lodgments for 

force buildup and to launch immediate assaults against the PDF. 

The JTF commander synchronized the forcible entry operations with numerous other 

operations involving virtually all capabilities of the joint force. The parachute assault 

forces strategically deployed at staggered times from bases in the continental United 

States, some in C-141 Starlifters, others in slower C-130 transport planes. One large 

formation experienced delays from a sudden ice storm at the departure airfield — its 

operations and timing were revised in the air. H-hour was even adjusted for assault 

operations because of intelligence that indicated a possible compromise. Special 

operations forces (SOF) reconnaissance and direct action teams provided last-minute 

information on widely dispersed targets. 

At H-hour the parachute assault forces, forward-deployed forces, SOF, and air elements 

of the joint force simultaneously attacked 27 targets — most of them in the vicinity of 

the Panama Canal Zone. Illustrating that joint force commanders organize and apply 

force in a manner that fits the situation, the JTF commander employed land and SOF to 

attack strategic targets and stealth aircraft to attack tactical and operational-level 

targets. 

The forcible entry operations, combined with simultaneous and follow-on attack 

against enemy command and control facilities and key units, seized the initiative and 

paralyzed enemy decision-making. Most fighting was concluded within 24 hours. 

Casualties were minimized. It was a classic coup de main. 

Various Sources 
Major Operations and Campaigns 

V-13

(4) Successful OPSEC and MILDEC may confuse the adversary and ease 

forcible entry operations. OPSEC helps foster a credible MILDEC. Additionally, the 

theme(s) and message(s) portrayed by all friendly forces must be consistent if MILDEC is to 

be believable. 

(5) SOF may precede forcible entry forces to identify, clarify, and modify 

conditions in the area of the lodgment. SOF may conduct the assaults to seize small, initial 

lodgments such as airfields or seaports. They may provide or assist in employing fire 

support and conduct other operations in support of the forcible entry. They may conduct 

special reconnaissance and interdiction operations well beyond the lodgment. 

(6) The sustainment requirements and challenges for forcible entry operations 

can be formidable, but must not be allowed to become such an overriding concern that the 

forcible entry operation itself is jeopardized. JFCs must carefully balance the introduction 

of logistic forces needed to support initial combat with combat forces required to establish, 

maintain, and protect the lodgment as well as forces required to transition to follow-on 

operations. 

For additional and detailed guidance on forcible entry operations, refer to JP 3-18, Joint 

Forcible Entry Operations. 

e. Attack of Enemy Centers of Gravity. As part of achieving decisive advantages 

early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against enemy COGs using 

conventional and special operations forces and capabilities. These attacks may be decisive 

or may begin offensive operations throughout the enemy’s depth that can create dilemmas 

causing paralysis and destroying cohesion. 

f. Full-Spectrum Superiority. The cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, 

maritime, and space domains and information environment that permits the conduct of joint 

operations without effective opposition or prohibitive interference is essential to joint force 

mission success. JFCs seek superiority in these domains to prepare the operational area and 

information environment and to accomplish the mission as rapidly as possible. The JFC 

may have to initially focus all available joint forces on seizing the initiative. A delay at the 

outset of combat may lead to lost credibility, lessen coalition support, and may provide 

incentives for other adversaries to begin conflicts elsewhere. 

(1) JFCs normally strive to achieve air and maritime superiority early. Air 

and maritime superiority allows joint forces to conduct operations without prohibitive 

interference from opposing air and maritime forces. Control of the air is a critical enabler 

because it allows joint forces both freedom from attack and freedom to attack. Using both 

defensive and offensive operations, JFCs employ complementary weapon systems and 

sensors to achieve air and maritime superiority. 

(2) Land forces can be moved quickly into an area to deter the enemy from 

inserting forces, thereby precluding the enemy from gaining an operational advantage. The 

introduction of land forces, deployed and employed rapidly with support of other 
Chapter V 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) V-14 

components, enables sustained operations to control people and land, contribute to defeat of 

an adversary, and support the goal of stability. 

(3) Space superiority must be achieved early to ensure freedom of action. 

Space superiority allows the JFC access to communications, weather, navigation, timing, 

remote sensing, and intelligence assets without prohibitive interference by the opposing 

force. Space control operations are conducted by joint and allied and/or coalition forces to 

gain and maintain space superiority. 

(4) Early superiority in the information environment also is vital in joint 

operations. It degrades the enemy’s C2 while allowing the JFC to maximize friendly 

C2 capabilities. Superiority in the information environment also allows the JFC to better 

understand the enemy’s intentions, capabilities, and actions and influence foreign attitudes 

and perceptions of the operation. 

g. Operations and C2 in the Littoral Areas

(1) Controlled littoral areas often offer the best positions from which to begin, 

sustain, and support joint operations, 

especially in operational areas with 

limited or poor infrastructure for 

supporting US joint operations ashore. 

The ability to project fires and employ 

forces from sea-based assets combined 

with their C2, ISR, and IO capabilities are 

formidable tools that JFCs can use to gain 

and maintain initiative. Maritime forces 

operating in littoral areas can dominate 

coastal areas and rapidly generate high 

intensity offensive power at times and in 

locations required by JFCs. Maritime 

forces’ relative freedom of action enables 

JFCs to position these capabilities where 

they can readily strike opponents. 

Maritime forces’ very presence, if made 

known, can pose a threat that the enemy 

cannot ignore. 

(2) JFCs can operate from a 

headquarters platform at sea. 

Depending on the nature of the joint 

operation, a maritime commander can 

serve as the JFC or function as a JFACC 

while the operation is primarily maritime, 

and shift that command ashore if the 

operation shifts landward in accordance 

Destroyers can provide a dominating presence, 

which joint force commanders can use in the 

littoral area to achieve objectives. 
Major Operations and Campaigns 

V-15

with the JFC’s CONOPS. In other cases, a maritime headquarters may serve as the base of 

the joint force headquarters, or subordinate JFCs or other component commanders may use 

the C2 and intelligence facilities aboard ship. 

(3) Transferring C2 from sea to shore requires detailed planning, active liaison, 

and coordination throughout the joint force. Such a transition may involve a simple 

movement of flags and supporting personnel, or it may require a complete change of joint 

force headquarters. The new joint force headquarters may use personnel and equipment, 

especially communications equipment, from the old headquarters, or it may require 

augmentation from different sources. One technique is to transfer C2 in several stages. 

Another technique is for the JFC to satellite off the capabilities of one of the components 

ashore until the new headquarters is fully prepared. Whichever way the transition is done, 

staffs should develop detailed checklists to address all of the C2 requirements and the timing 

of transfer of each. The value of joint training and rehearsals in this transition is evident. 

h. SOF-Conventional Force Integration. The JFC, using SOF independently or 

integrated with conventional forces, gains an additional and specialized capability to achieve 

objectives that might not otherwise be attainable. Integration enables the JFC to take fullest 

advantage of conventional and SOF core competencies. SOF are most effective when SO 

are fully integrated into the overall plan and the execution of SO is through proper SOF C2 

elements responsive to the needs of the supported commander. Such SOF C2 elements are 

provided to supported or supporting conventional force commanders and include joint 

special operations task forces to conduct a specific SO or prosecute SO in support of a joint 

campaign or operation, special operations C2 elements to synchronize integrated 

SOF/conventional force operations, and special operations liaison elements to coordinate SO 

with conventional operations. Exchange of SOF and conventional force LNOs is also 

essential to enhance situational awareness and facilitate staff planning and training for 

integrated operations. 

i. Stability Operations. The onset of combat provides an opportunity to set into 

motion actions that will achieve military strategic and operational objectives and establish 

the conditions for operations at the conclusion of sustained combat. Operations to neutralize 

or eliminate potential “stabilize” phase enemies may be initiated. National and local HN 

authorities may be contacted and offered support. Key infrastructure may be seized or 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES 

INTEGRATION DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 

Special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces integration demonstrated 

powerful air-ground synergies in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. SOF, while 

performing the classic special operations core task of unconventional warfare, 

organized and coordinated operations of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban and 

their al Qaeda allies, and frequently directed massive and effective close air support 

from Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps assets. The effects of the continuous SOF 

directed air strikes so weakened the Taliban and al Qaeda that the Northern Alliance 

was able to quickly capture the major cities of Afghanistan early in the campaign. 

Various Sources 
Chapter V 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) V-16 

otherwise protected. Intelligence collection on the status of enemy infrastructure, 

government organizations, and humanitarian needs should be increased. PSYOP used to 

influence the behavior of approved foreign target audiences in support of military strategic 

and operational objectives can ease the situation encountered when sustained combat is 

concluded. 

j. Protection. JFCs must strive to conserve the fighting potential of the 

joint/multinational force at the onset of combat operations. Further, HN infrastructure and 

logistic support key to force projection and sustainment of the force must be protected. 

JFCs counter the enemy’s fires and maneuver by making personnel, systems, and units 

difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. They protect their force from enemy maneuver and 

fires, including the effects of WMD. OPSEC and MILDEC are key elements of this effort. 

Operations to gain air, space, and maritime superiority; defensive use of IO; PR; and 

protection of airports and seaports, LOCs, and friendly force lodgment also contribute 

significantly to force protection at the onset of combat operations. 

k. Prevention of Fratricide. JFCs must make every effort to reduce the potential for 

the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly fire. The destructive 

power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of 

modern combat, increase the potential for fratricide. Commanders must be aware of those 

situations that increase the risk of fratricide and institute appropriate preventive measures. 

The primary mechanisms for reducing fratricide are command emphasis, disciplined 

operations, close coordination among component commands and multinational partners, 

SOPs, technology solutions (e.g., identify friend or foe, blue force tracking), rehearsals, 

effective CID and enhanced awareness of the operational environment. Commanders 

should seek to minimize fratricide while not limiting boldness and initiative. 

5. Considerations for Dominance 

a. General. JFCs conduct sustained combat operations when a “coup de main” is not 

possible. During sustained combat operations, JFCs simultaneously employ conventional 

and special operations forces and capabilities throughout the breadth and depth of the 

operational area. The JFC may designate one component or line of operation to be the main 

effort, with others providing support, or the JFC may have a main effort with other 

components and functions performing operations in their own mission areas. When 

conditions or plans change, the main effort and focus of the operation might shift to another 

component or function. Some missions and operations (i.e., strategic attack, interdiction, 

and IO) continue throughout to deny the enemy sanctuary, freedom of action or 

informational advantage. These missions and operations, when executed concurrently with 

other operations, degrade enemy morale and physical cohesion and bring the enemy closer 

to culmination. When prevented from concentrating, opponents can be attacked, isolated at 

tactical and operational levels, and defeated in detail. At other times, JFCs may cause their 

opponents to concentrate their forces, facilitating their attack by friendly forces. 
Major Operations and Campaigns 

V-17

b. Linear and Nonlinear Operations

(1) In linear operations, each commander directs and sustains combat power 

toward enemy forces in concert with adjacent units. Linearity refers primarily to the 

conduct of operations with identified forward lines of own troops (FLOTs). In linear 

operations, emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of friendly forces in relation to 

other friendly forces. From this relative positioning of forces, security is enhanced and 

massing of forces can be facilitated. Also inherent in linear operations is the security of rear 

areas, especially LOCs between sustaining bases and fighting forces. Protected LOCs, in 

turn, increase the endurance of joint forces and ensure freedom of action for extended 

periods. A linear operational area organization may be best for some operations or certain 

phases of an operation. Conditions that favor linear operations include those where US 

forces lack the information needed to conduct nonlinear operations or are severely 

outnumbered. Linear operations also are appropriate against a deeply arrayed, echeloned 

enemy force or when the threat to LOCs reduces friendly force freedom of action. In these 

circumstances, linear operations allow commanders to concentrate and synchronize combat 

power more easily. Coalition operations also may require a linear design. World Wars I 

and II offer multiple examples of linear operations. 

(2) In nonlinear operations, forces orient on objectives without geographic 

reference to adjacent forces. Nonlinear operations typically focus on creating specific 

effects on multiple decisive points. Nonlinear operations emphasize simultaneous 

operations along multiple LOOs from selected bases (ashore or afloat). Simultaneity 

overwhelms opposing C2 and allows the JFC to retain the initiative. In nonlinear 

operations, sustaining functions may depend on sustainment assets moving with forces or 

aerial delivery. Noncombatants and the fluidity of nonlinear operations require careful 

judgment in clearing fires, both direct and indirect. Situational awareness, coupled with 

precision fires, frees commanders to act against multiple objectives. Swift maneuver against 

several decisive points supported by precise, concentrated fire can induce paralysis and 

shock among enemy troops and commanders. Nonlinear operations were applied during 

Operation JUST CAUSE. The joint forces oriented more on their assigned objectives (e.g., 

destroying an enemy force or seizing and controlling critical terrain or population centers) 

and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly forces. To protect themselves, 

individual forces relied more on situational awareness, mobility advantages, and freedom of 

action than on mass. Nonlinear operations place a premium on the communications, 

intelligence, mobility, and innovative means for sustainment. 

(a) During nonlinear offensive operations, attacking forces must focus 

offensive actions against decisive points, while allocating the minimum essential combat 

power to defensive operations. Reserves must have a high degree of mobility. JFCs may be 

required to dedicate combat forces to provide for LOC and base defense. Vulnerability 

increases as operations extend and attacking forces are exposed over a larger operational 

area. Linkup operations, particularly those involving vertical envelopments, require 

extensive planning and preparation. The potential for fratricide increases due to the fluid 

nature of the nonlinear operational area and the changing disposition of attacking and 
Chapter V 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) V-18 

defending forces. The presence of noncombatants in the operational area further 

complicates operations. 

(b) During nonlinear defensive operations, defenders focus on destroying 

enemy forces, even if it means losing physical contact with other friendly units. Successful 

nonlinear defenses require all friendly commanders to understand the JFCs intent and 

maintain a COP. Noncontiguous defenses are generally mobile defenses; however, some 

subordinate units may conduct area defenses to hold key terrain or canalize attackers into 

engagement areas. Nonlinear defenses place a premium on reconnaissance and surveillance 

to maintain contact with the enemy, produce relevant information, and develop and maintain 

a COP. The defending force focuses almost exclusively on defeating the enemy force rather 

than retaining large areas. Although less challenging than in offensive operations, LOC and 

sustainment security will still be a test and may require allocation of combat forces to 

protect LOCs and other high risk functions or bases. The JFC must ensure that clear 

command relationships are established to properly account for the added challenges to base, 

base cluster, and LOC security. 

(3) Areas of Operations and Linear/Nonlinear Operations

(a) General. JFCs consider incorporating combinations of contiguous and 

noncontiguous AOs with linear and nonlinear operations as they conduct operational design. 

They choose the combination that fits the operational environment and the purpose of the 

operation. Association of contiguous and noncontiguous AOs with linear and nonlinear 

operations creates the four combinations in Figure V-2). 

(b) Linear Operations in Contiguous AOs. Linear operations in contiguous 

AOs (upper left-hand pane in Figure V-2) typify sustained offensive and defensive 

operations against powerful, echeloned, and symmetrically organized forces. The 

contiguous areas and continuous FLOT focus combat power and protect sustainment 

functions. 

(c) Linear Operations in Noncontiguous AOs. The upper right-hand pane 

of Figure V-2 depicts a JFC’s operational area with subordinate component commanders 

conducting linear operations in noncontiguous AOs. In this case, the JFC retains 

responsibility for that portion of the operational area outside the subordinate commanders’ 

AOs. 

(d) Nonlinear Operations in Contiguous AOs. The lower left-hand pane in 

Figure V-2 illustrates the JFC’s entire assigned operational area divided into subordinate 

AOs. Subordinate component commanders are conducting nonlinear operations within their 

AOs. This combination typically is applied in stability operations and CS operations. 

(e) Nonlinear Operations in Noncontiguous AOs. The lower right-hand 

pane of Figure V-2 depicts both the JFC and subordinate JFCs conducting nonlinear 

operations (e.g., During 1992 in Somalia, joint forces conducted nonlinear stability 

operations in widely separated AOs around Kismayu and Mogadishu). The size of the 
Major Operations and Campaigns 

V-19

operational area, composition and distribution of enemy forces, and capabilities of friendly 

forces are important considerations in deciding whether to use this combination of 

operational area organization and operational design. 

COMBINATIONS OF AREAS OF OPERATIONS

AND LINEAR/NONLINEAR OPERATIONS

X

X

X X

X

X

Forward

Line of

Own Troops

Forward Edge

of the

Battle Area

xx

xx xx

xx

xxx

xxx

x

x

xx

x

xx

Contiguous

Areas of Operations

Linear Operations

Nonlinear Operations Nonlinear Operations

Linear Operations

Noncontiguous

Areas of Operations

Rear

Area

xx

xx

xxx xxx

xx

X

X

X xxx

xx

Rear

Area

x

x

x

II

xx

Rear

Area

x

x

x

x

II

Korea Kuwait

Bosnia JTF Andrew Vietnam Panama Somala

Urban operations Forcible entries

x

Forward

Line of

Own Troops

Forward Edge

of the

Battle Area

Figure V-2. Combinations of Areas of Operations and Linear/Nonlinear Operations 
Chapter V 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) V-20 

c. Operating in the Littoral Areas. Even when joint forces are firmly established 

ashore, littoral operations provide JFCs with excellent opportunities to achieve leverage over 

the enemy by operational maneuver from the sea. Such operations can introduce significant 

size forces over relatively great distances in short periods of time into the rear or flanks of 

the enemy. The mobility of maritime forces at sea, coupled with the ability to rapidly land 

operationally significant forces, can be key to achieving military operational objectives. 

These capabilities are further enhanced by operational flexibility and the ability to identify 

and take advantage of fleeting opportunities. 

d. Attack on Enemy Centers of Gravity. Attacks on enemy COGs typically continue 

during sustained operations. JFCs should time their actions to coincide with actions of other 

operations of the joint force and vice versa to achieve military strategic and operational 

objectives. As with all operations of the joint force, direct and indirect attacks of enemy 

COGs should be designed to achieve the required military strategic and operational 

objectives per the CONOPS, while limiting potential undesired effects on operations in 

follow-on phases. 

e. Synchronizing and/or Integrating Maneuver and Interdiction

(1) Synchronizing and/or integrating interdiction and maneuver (air, land, and 

maritime) provides one of the most dynamic concepts available to the joint force. 

Interdiction and maneuver usually are not considered separate operations against a common 

enemy, but rather normally are considered complementary operations designed to achieve 

the military strategic and operational objectives. Moreover, maneuver by air, land, or 

maritime forces can be conducted to interdict enemy military potential. Potential responses 

to integrated and synchronized maneuver and interdiction can create a dilemma for the 

enemy. If the enemy attempts to counter the maneuver, enemy forces may be exposed to 

unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the enemy employs measures to reduce such 

interdiction losses, enemy forces may not be able to counter the maneuver. The synergy 

achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in 

optimizing leverage at the operational level. 

(2) As a guiding principle, JFCs should exploit the flexibility inherent in joint force 

command relationships, joint targeting procedures, and other techniques to resolve the issues 

that can arise from the relationship between interdiction and maneuver. When interdiction 

and maneuver are employed, JFCs need to carefully balance the needs of surface maneuver 

forces, area-wide requirements for interdiction, and the undesirability of fragmenting joint 

force capabilities. The JFC’s objectives, intent, and priorities, reflected in mission 

assignments and coordinating arrangements, enable subordinates to exploit fully the military 

potential of their forces while minimizing the friction generated by competing requirements. 

Effective targeting procedures in the joint force also alleviate such friction. As an example, 

interdiction requirements often will exceed interdiction means, requiring JFCs to prioritize 

requirements. Land and maritime force commanders responsible for integrating and 

synchronizing maneuver and interdiction within their AOs should be knowledgeable of JFC 

priorities and the responsibilities and authority assigned and delegated to commanders 
Major Operations and Campaigns 

V-21

designated by the JFC to execute theater- and/or JOA-wide functions. Component 

commanders aggressively seek the best means to accomplish assigned missions. JFCs 

alleviate this friction through the CONOPS and clear statements of intent for interdiction 

conducted relatively independent of surface maneuver operations. In doing this, JFCs rely 

on their vision as to how the major elements of the joint force contribute to achieving 

military strategic objectives. JFCs then employ a flexible range of techniques to assist in 

identifying requirements and applying capabilities to meet them. JFCs must define 

appropriate command relationships, establish effective joint targeting procedures, and make 

apportionment decisions. 

(3) All commanders should consider how their operations can complement 

interdiction. These operations may include actions such as MILDEC, withdrawals, lateral 

repositioning, and flanking movements that are likely to cause the enemy to reposition 

surface forces, making them better targets for interdiction. Likewise, interdiction operations 

need to conform to and enhance the JFC’s scheme of maneuver. This complementary use of 

maneuver and interdiction places the enemy in the operational dilemma of either defending 

from disadvantageous positions or exposing forces to interdiction strikes during attempted 

repositioning. 

(4) Within the joint force operational area, all joint force component operations 

must contribute to achievement of the JFC’s objectives. To facilitate these operations, JFCs 

may establish AOs within their operational area. Synchronization and/or integration of 

maneuver and interdiction within land or maritime AOs is of particular importance, 

particularly when JFCs task component commanders to execute theater- and/or JOA-wide 

functions. 

(a) Air, land, and maritime commanders are directly concerned with those 

enemy forces and capabilities that can affect their current and future operations. 

Accordingly, that part of interdiction with a near-term effect on air, land, and maritime 

maneuver normally supports that maneuver. In fact, successful operations may depend on 

successful interdiction operations; for instance, to isolate the battle or weaken the enemy 

force before battle is fully joined. 

(b) JFCs establish land and maritime AOs to decentralize execution of land 

and maritime component operations, allow rapid maneuver, and provide the ability to fight 

at extended ranges. The size, shape, and positioning of land or maritime AOs will be based 

on the JFC’s CONOPS and the land or maritime commanders’ requirements to accomplish 

their missions and protect their forces. Within these AOs, land and maritime 

commanders are designated the supported commander for the integration and 

synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. Accordingly, land and maritime 

commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations 

within their AOs. Further, in coordination with the land or maritime commander, a 

component commander designated as the supported commander for theater/JOA-wide 

interdiction has the latitude to plan and execute JFC prioritized missions within a land or 

maritime AO. If theater/JOA-wide interdiction operations would have adverse effects 

within a land or maritime AO, then the commander conducting those operations must either 
Chapter V 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) V-22 

readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the appropriate component commander, or consult 

with the JFC for resolution. 

(c) The land or maritime commander should clearly articulate the vision of 

maneuver operations to other commanders that may employ interdiction forces within the 

land or maritime AO. The land or maritime commander’s intent and CONOPS should 

clearly state how interdiction will enable or enhance land or maritime force maneuver in the 

AO and what is to be accomplished with interdiction (as well as those actions to be avoided, 

such as the destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain munitions in a 

specific area). Once this is understood, other interdiction-capable commanders normally 

can plan and execute their operations with only that coordination required with the land or 

maritime commander. However, the land or maritime commander should provide other 

interdiction-capable commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and execution 

of interdiction operations within the AO. 

(d) Joint force operations in maritime or littoral operational areas often 

requires additional coordination among the maritime commander and other interdictioncapable commanders because of the highly specialized nature of some maritime operations, 

such as antisubmarine and mine warfare. This type of coordination requires that the 

interdiction-capable commanders maintain communication with the maritime commander. 

As in all operations, lack of close coordination among commanders in maritime operational 

areas can result in fratricide and failed missions. The same principle applies concerning 

joint force air component mining operations in land or maritime operational areas. 

(5) JFCs need to pay particular attention and give priority to activities impinging 

on and supporting the maneuver and interdiction needs of all forces. In addition to normal 

target nomination procedures, JFCs establish procedures through which land or maritime 

force commanders can specifically identify those interdiction targets they are unable to 

engage with organic assets within their operational areas that could affect planned or 

ongoing maneuver. These targets may be identified individually or by category, specified 

geographically, or tied to a desired effect or time period. Interdiction target priorities within 

the land or maritime operational areas are considered along with theater and/or JOA-wide 

interdiction priorities by JFCs and reflected in the air apportionment decision. The JFACC 

uses these priorities to plan, coordinate, and execute the theater- and/or JOA-wide air 

interdiction effort. The purpose of these procedures is to afford added visibility to, and 

allow JFCs to give priority to, targets directly affecting planned maneuver by air, land, or 

maritime forces. 

f. Operations When WMD are Employed or Located

(1) Enemy Employment. An enemy’s use of WMD can quickly change the 

character of an operation or campaign. The use or the threat of use of these weapons can 

cause large-scale shifts in strategic and operational objectives, phases, and COAs. 

Multinational operations become more complicated with the threat of employment of these 

weapons. An enemy may use WMD against other alliance or coalition members, especially 

those with little or no defense against these weapons, to disintegrate the alliance or coalition. 
Major Operations and Campaigns 

V-23

(a) Intelligence and other joint staff members advise JFCs of an enemy’s 

capability to employ WMD and under what conditions that enemy is most likely to do so. 

This advice includes an assessment of the enemy’s willingness and intent to employ these 

weapons. It is important to ensure that high concentrations of forces do not provide 

lucrative targets for enemy WMD. 

(b) Known threat of use and preparedness is imperative in this environment. 

The joint force can survive use of WMD by anticipating their employment. Commanders 

can protect their forces in a variety of ways, including training, PSYOP, OPSEC, dispersion 

of forces, use of IPE, and proper use of terrain for shielding against blast and radiation 

effects. Enhancement of CBRN defense capabilities reduces incentives for a first strike by 

an enemy with WMD. 

(c) The combination of active defense and passive defense can reduce the 

effectiveness or success of an enemy’s use of WMD. JFCs may also use offensive 

operations to eliminate enemy WMD capabilities. Offensive measures include raids, strikes, 

and operations designed to locate and neutralize the threat of such weapons. 

(d) JFCs should immediately inform HN authorities, OGAs, IGOs, or NGOs 

in the operational area of enemy intentions to use WMD. These organizations do not have 

the same intelligence or decontamination capabilities as military units and need the 

maximum amount of time available to protect their personnel. 

For additional guidance on defensive CBRN measures, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRNE) Environments. 

(2) Friendly Employment. When directed by the President and SecDef, CCDRs 

will plan for the employment of nuclear weapons by US forces in a manner consistent with 

national policy and strategic guidance. The employment of such weapons signifies an 

escalation of the war and is a Presidential decision. USSTRATCOM’s capabilities to assist 

in the collaborative planning of all nuclear missions are available to support nuclear weapon 

employment. If directed to plan for the use of nuclear weapons, JFCs typically have two 

escalating objectives. 

(a) The first is to deter or prevent an enemy attack that employs WMD. To 

make opponents understand that friendly forces possess and will use such weapons, JFCs 

may simply communicate that to the enemy, using IO or other means. Regardless, JFCs 

must implement measures to increase readiness and preserve the option to respond, 

including the alert and forward positioning, if required, of appropriate systems. Prevention 

or denial may include targeting and attacking enemy WMD capability by conventional and 

special operations forces. 

(b) If deterrence is not an effective option or fails, JFCs will respond 

appropriately, consistent with national policy and strategic guidance, to enemy aggression 
Chapter V 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) V-24 

while seeking to control the intensity and scope of conflict and destruction. That response 

may include the employment of conventional, special operations, or nuclear forces. 

6. Considerations for Stabilization 

a. General. Operations in this phase ensure the national strategic end state continues to 

be pursued at the conclusion of sustained combat operations. These operations typically 

begin with significant military involvement to include some combat, then move increasingly 

toward enabling civil authority as the threat wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished. 

As progress is made, military forces will increase their focus on supporting the efforts of HN 

authorities, OGAs, IGOs, and/or NGOs. National Security Presidential Directive – 44 

assigns US State Department the responsibility to plan and coordinate US government 

efforts in stabilization and reconstruction. SecState is responsible to coordinate with SecDef 

to ensure harmonization with planned and ongoing operations. Military support to SSTR 

operations within the JOA are the responsibility of the JFC.

b. Several LOOs may be initiated immediately (e.g., providing humanitarian relief, 

establishing security). In some cases the scope of the problem set may dictate using other 

nonmilitary entities which are uniquely suited to address the problems. The goal of these 

military and civil efforts should be to eliminate root causes or deficiencies that create the 

problems (e.g., strengthen legitimate civil authority, rebuild government institutions, foster a 

sense of confidence and well-being, and support the conditions for economic 

reconstruction). With this in mind, the JFC may need to address how to harmonize CMO 

with the efforts of participating OGAs, IGOs, and/or NGOs. 

For further guidance on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

c. Forces and Capabilities Mix. The JFC may need to realign forces and capabilities 

or adjust force structure to begin stability operations in some portions of the operational area 

even while sustained combat operations still are ongoing in other areas. For example, CA 

forces and HUMINT capabilities are critical to supporting “stabilize” phase operations and 

often involve a mix of forces and capabilities far different than those that supported the 

previous phases. Planning and continuous assessment will reveal the nature and scope of 

forces and capabilities required. These forces and capabilities may be available within the 

joint force or may be required from another theater or from the Reserve Component. The 

JFC should anticipate and request these forces and capabilities in a timely manner to 

facilitate their opportune employment. 
Major Operations and Campaigns 

V-25

d. Stability Operations 

(1) As sustained combat operations conclude, military forces will shift their focus 

to stability operations, which likely will involve combat operations. Of particular 

importance will be CMO; initially conducted to secure and safeguard the populace, 

reestablishing civil law and order, protect or rebuild key infrastructure, and restore public 

services. US military forces should be prepared to lead the activities necessary to 

accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil, USG, multinational or international capacity 

does not exist or is incapable of assuming responsibility. Once legitimate civil authority is 

prepared to conduct such tasks, US military forces may support such activities as 

required/necessary. SC will play an important role in providing public information to 

foreign populations during this period. 

(2) The military’s predominant presence and its ability to command and control 

forces and logistics under extreme conditions may give it the de facto lead in stability 

operations normally governed by other agencies that lack such capacities. However, some 

stability operations likely will be in support of, or transition to support of, US diplomatic, 

UN, or HN efforts. Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to success and military 

forces need to work competently in this environment while properly supporting the agency 

in charge. To be effective, planning and conducting stability operations require a variety of 

perspectives and expertise and the cooperation and assistance of OGAs, other Services, and 

alliance or coalition partners. Military forces should be prepared to work in integrated 

civilian military teams that could include representatives from other US departments and 

An Iraqi construction worker sifts building materials in Taji, Iraq, while soldiers from the 490th 

Civil Affairs Battalion discuss the project with the construction foreman.
Chapter V 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) V-26 

agencies, foreign governments and security forces, IGOs, NGOs, and members of the 

private sector with relevant skills and expertise. Typical military support includes, but is not 

limited to, the following. 

(a) Work as part of an integrated civilian-military team ensuring security, 

developing local governance structures, promoting bottom-up economic activity, rebuilding 

infrastructure, and building indigenous capacity for such tasks. 

For further guidance, refer to DODD 3000.05, Military Support to Stability, Security, 

Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.

(b) CA forces are organized and trained to perform CA operations and 

activities that support CMO conducted in conjunction with stability operations. PSYOP 

forces will develop, produce, and disseminate products to gain and reinforce popular support 

for the JFC’s objectives. Complementing conventional forces, other SOF will conduct FID 

to train, advise, and support indigenous military and paramilitary forces as they develop the 

capacity to secure their own lands and populations. 

For further guidance on SOF, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 

(c) CI activities to safeguard essential elements of friendly information. This 

is particularly pertinent in countering adversary HUMINT efforts. HN authorities, IGOs, 

and NGOs working closely with US forces may pass information (knowingly or 

unknowingly) to adversary elements that enables them to interfere with stability operations. 

Members of the local populace often gain access to US military personnel and their bases by 

providing services such as laundry and cooking and provide information gleaned from that 

interaction to seek favor with a belligerent element, or they may actually be belligerents. 

The JFC must consider these and similar possibilities and take appropriate actions to counter 

potential compromise. CI personnel develop an estimate of the threat and recommend 

appropriate actions. 

(d) PA operations to provide command information programs, 

communication with internal audiences, media and community relations support, and 

international information programs. 

(e) Reconstruction, engineering, logistics, law enforcement, HSS, etc. needed 

to restore essential services. 

(3) During stability operations in the “stabilize” phase, protection from virtually 

any person, element, or group hostile to US interests must be considered. These could 

include activists, a group opposed to the operation, looters, and terrorists. Forces will have 

to be even more alert to force protection and security matters after a CBRNE incident. JFCs 

also should be constantly ready to counter activity that could bring significant harm to units 

or jeopardize mission accomplishment. Protection may involve the security of HN 

authorities and OGA, IGO, and NGO members if authorized by higher authority. For 

contractors, the GCC must evaluate the need for force protection support following the 
Major Operations and Campaigns 

V-27

guidelines of DOD Instruction 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the 

US Armed Forces. 

(4) Personnel should stay alert even in an operation with little or no perceived risk. 

JFCs must take measures to prevent complacency and be ready to counter activity 

that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation. However, security 

requirements should be balanced with the military operation’s nature and objectives. In 

some stability operations, the use of certain security measures, such as carrying arms, 

wearing helmets and protective vests, or using secure communications may cause military 

forces to appear more threatening than intended, which may degrade the force’s legitimacy 

and hurt relations with the local population. 

(5) Restraint. During stability operations, military capability must be applied 

even more prudently since the support of the local population is essential for success. The 

actions of military personnel and units are framed by the disciplined application of force, 

including specific ROE. These ROE often will be more restrictive and detailed when 

compared to those for sustained combat operations due to national policy concerns. 

Moreover, these rules may change frequently during operations. Restraints on weaponry, 

tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment. The use of excessive force 

could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of 

both short- and long-term goals. The use of nonlethal capabilities should be considered to 

fill the gap between verbal warnings and deadly force when dealing with unarmed hostile 

elements and to avoid raising the level of conflict unnecessarily. The JFC must determine 

early in the planning stage what nonlethal technology is available, how well the force is 

trained to use it, and how the established ROE authorize its employment. This concept does 

not preclude the application of overwhelming force, when appropriate, to display US resolve 

and commitment. The reasons for the restraint often need to be understood by the individual 

Service member, because a single act could cause adverse political consequences. 

(6) Perseverance. Some “stabilize” phases may be short, others may require years 

to transition to the “enable civil authority” phase. Therefore, the patient, resolute, and 

persistent pursuit of national strategic end state conditions for as long as necessary to 

achieve them often is the requirement for success. 

(7) Legitimacy. Joint stability operations need to sustain the legitimacy of the 

operation and of the emerging or host government. During operations where a government 

does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and 

organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them. Effective SC can enhance 

perceptions of the legitimacy of stability operations. 

(8) OPSEC. Although there may be no clearly defined threat, the essential 

elements of US military operations should be safeguarded. The uncertain nature of the 

situation, coupled with the potential for rapid change, require that OPSEC be an integral part 

of stability operations. OPSEC planners must consider the effect of media coverage and the 

possibility coverage may compromise essential security or disclose critical information. 
Chapter V 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) V-28 

(9) The PO fundamentals of consent, impartiality, transparency, credibility, 

freedom of movement, flexibility and adaptability, civil-military harmonization, and mutual 

respect discussed in JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, likely will apply to stability operations in 

the “stabilize” phase. 

7. Considerations for Enabling Civil Authority 

a. General. In this phase the joint operation normally is terminated when the stated 

military strategic and/or operational objectives have been met and redeployment of the joint 

force is accomplished. This should mean that a legitimate civil authority has been enabled to 

manage the situation without further outside military assistance. In some cases, it may become 

apparent that the stated objectives fall short of properly enabling civil authority. This situation 

may require a redesign of the joint operation as a result of an extension of the required stability 

operations in support of US diplomatic, HN, IGO, and/or NGO efforts. 

b. Peace Building. The transition from military operations to full civilian control may 

involve stability operations that initially resemble PEO to include counterinsurgency 

operations, antiterrorism, and counterterrorism; and eventually evolve to a peace building (PB) 

mission. PB provides the reconstruction and societal rehabilitation that offers hope to the HN 

populace. Stability operations establish the conditions that enable PB to succeed. PB promotes 

reconciliation, strengthens and rebuilds civil infrastructures and institutions, builds confidence, 

and supports economic reconstruction to prevent a return to conflict. The ultimate measure of 

success in PB is political, not military. Therefore, JFCs seek a clear understanding of the 

national/coalition strategic end state and how military operations support that end state. 

c. Transfer to Civil Authority. In many cases, the United States will transfer 

responsibility for the political and military affairs of the HN to another authority. JFCs may be 

required to transfer responsibility of operations to another authority (e.g., UN observers, 

multinational peacekeeping force, or North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) as the 

termination criteria. This probably will occur after an extended period of conducting joint or 

multinational stability operations and PB missions as described above. Overall, transfer likely 

will occur in stages (e.g., HN sovereignty, PO under UN mandate, termination of all US 

military participation). Joint force support to this effort may include the following: 

(1) Support to Truce Negotiations. This support may include providing 

intelligence, security, transportation and other logistic support, and linguists for all participants. 

(2) Transition to Civil Authority. This transfer could be to local or HN federal 

governments, to a UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) after PEO, or through the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees to a NGO in support of refugees. 

d. Redeployment

(1) Conduct. Redeployment normally is conducted in stages — the entire joint 

force likely will not redeploy in one relatively short period. It may include waste disposal, 

port operations, closing of contracts and other financial obligations, disposition of 
Major Operations and Campaigns 

V-29

contracting records and files, clearing and marking of minefields and other explosive 

ordnance disposal activities, and ensuring that appropriate units remain in place until their 

missions are complete. Redeployment must be planned and executed in a manner that 

facilitates the use of redeploying forces and supplies to meet new missions or crises. Upon 

redeployment, units or individuals may require refresher training prior to reassuming more 

traditional roles and missions. 

(2) Redeployment to Other Contingencies. Forces deployed may be called upon 

to rapidly redeploy to another theater. Commanders and their staffs should consider how 

they would extricate forces and ensure that they are prepared for the new contingency. This 

might include such things as a prioritized redeployment schedule, identification of aerial 

ports for linking intra- and intertheater airlift, the most recent intelligence assessments and 

supporting GEOINT products for the new contingency, and some consideration to achieving 

the national strategic objectives of the original contingency through other means. 

For further guidance on considerations for termination of operations, refer to JP 5-0, Joint 

Operation Planning, and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 
Chapter V 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) V-30 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER VI

CRISIS RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 

VI-1 

1. General 

a. Crises and Contingencies. US forces need to be able to respond rapidly to certain 

crises, either unilaterally or as a part of an interagency and/or multinational effort, when 

directed by the President or SecDef. The ability of the United States to respond rapidly with 

appropriate options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional stability. Thus, a 

joint operation often may be planned and executed as a crisis response or limited 

contingency. Crisis response and limited contingency operations may include, for example, 

employment of overwhelming force in PEO, a single precision strike, a NEO, or CS 

mission. 

b. Initial Response. When crises develop and the President directs, CCDRs respond. 

If the crisis revolves around external threats to a regional partner, CCDRs employ joint 

forces to deter aggression and signal US commitment (e.g., deploying joint forces to train in 

Kuwait). If the crisis is caused by an internal conflict that threatens regional stability, US 

forces may intervene to restore or guarantee stability (e.g., Operation RESTORE 

DEMOCRACY, the 1994 intervention in Haiti). If the crisis is within US territory (e.g., 

natural or man-made disaster, deliberate attack), US joint forces will conduct CS/HD 

operations as directed by the President and SecDef. Prompt deployment of sufficient forces 

in the initial phase of a crisis can preclude the need to deploy larger forces later. Effective 

early intervention also can deny an adversary time to set conditions in their favor or achieve 

destabilizing objectives; or mitigate the effects of a natural or man-made disaster. 

Deploying a credible force rapidly is one step in deterring or blocking aggression. However, 

deployment alone will not guarantee success. Achieving successful deterrence involves 

convincing the adversary that the deployed force is able to conduct decisive operations and 

the national leadership is willing to employ that force and to deploy more forces if 

necessary. 

c. Scope. Crisis response and limited contingency operations are typically limited in 

scope and scale and conducted to achieve a very specific strategic or operational objective in 

an operational area. They may be conducted as stand-alone operations in response to a crisis 

(e.g., NEOs) or executed as an element of a larger, more complex joint campaign or 

operation. Crisis response and limited contingency operations may be conducted to achieve 

operational and, sometimes, strategic objectives. 

d. Political Aspects. Two important factors about political primacy in crisis response 

and foreign limited contingency operations stand out. First, having an understanding of 

the political objective helps avoid actions that may have adverse effects. It is not 

uncommon in some operations, such as PKO, for junior leaders to make decisions that have 

significant political implications. Secondly, commanders should remain aware of 

“Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be 

regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.” 

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, c. 500 BC 
Chapter VI 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) VI-2 

changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political objectives 

that may warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not always be 

obvious. Therefore, commanders must strive, through continuing mission analysis, to detect 

subtle changes, which over time, may lead to disconnects between political objectives and 

military operations. Failure to recognize changes in political objectives early may lead to 

ineffective or counterproductive military operations. 

e. Economy of Force. The security environment requires the United States to maintain 

and prepare joint forces for crisis response and limited contingency operations simultaneous 

with other operations, preferably in concert with allies and/or coalition partners when 

appropriate. This approach recognizes that these operations will vary in duration, 

frequency, intensity, and the number of personnel required. The burden of many crisis 

response and limited contingency operations may lend themselves to using small elements 

like SOF in coordination with allied HNs. Initial SOF lead of these operations as an 

economy of force measure may enable major operations and campaigns with conventional 

focus to progress more effectively. 

2. Typical Operations 

a. NEOs are operations directed by the DOS or other appropriate authority, in 

conjunction with the DOD, whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries 

when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to 

the United States. Although principally conducted to evacuate US citizens, NEOs also may 

Units deploying for crisis response and limited contingency operations must be 

prepared and equipped for a range of challenging tasks. 
Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

VI-3

include citizens from the HN as well as citizens from other countries. Pursuant to Executive 

Order 12656, the DOS is responsible for the protection and evacuation of American citizens 

abroad and for safeguarding their property. This order also directs DOD to advise and assist 

the DOS in preparing and implementing plans for the evacuation of US citizens. The US 

ambassador, or chief of the diplomatic mission, is responsible for preparation of emergency 

action plans that address the military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign 

nationals from a foreign country. The conduct of military operations to assist in the 

implementation of emergency action plans is the responsibility of the GCC, as directed by 

SecDef. 

(1) NEOs are often characterized by uncertainty. They may be directed without 

warning because of sudden changes in a country’s government, reoriented diplomatic or 

military relations with the United States, a sudden hostile threat to US citizens from 

elements within or external to a foreign country, or in response to a natural disaster. 

(2) NEO methods and timing are significantly influenced by diplomatic 

considerations. Under ideal circumstances there may be little or no opposition; however, 

commanders should anticipate opposition and plan the operation like any combat operation. 

(3) NEOs are similar to a raid in that the operation involves swift insertion of a 

force, temporary occupation of physical objectives, and ends with a planned withdrawal. 

It differs from a raid in that force used normally is limited to that required to protect the 

evacuees and the evacuation force. Forces penetrating foreign territory to conduct a NEO 

Selected Haitian noncombatants board a US C-130 bound for safe haven camps 

in Panama during Operation ABLE MANNER. 
Chapter VI 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) VI-4 

should be kept to the minimum consistent with mission accomplishment and the security of 

the force and the extraction and protection of evacuees. 

For additional guidance on NEOs, refer to JP 3-07.5, Noncombatant Evacuation 

Operations. 

OPERATION EASTERN EXIT 

On 1 January 1991, the United States Ambassador to Somalia requested 

military assistance to evacuate the Embassy. Americans and other foreign 

nationals had sought shelter in the Embassy compound that day as the reign of 

Somali dictator Siad Barre disintegrated into a confused battle for control of 

Mogadishu. 

The next day, Operation EASTERN EXIT was initiated. Despite the priorities of 

the Gulf War, special operations forces helicopters were put on alert, Air Force 

C-130 transport aircraft were deployed to Kenya, and two Navy amphibious 

ships with elements of a Marine expeditionary brigade embarked were sent 

south from the North Arabian Sea toward Somalia. Initial plans called for 

evacuation of the endangered Americans through Mogadishu’s international 

airport, utilizing Air Force aircraft staged in Kenya. The situation in Mogadishu 

rapidly worsened and aircraft, even those of the United States Air Force, could 

not land safely at the airport. It seemed unlikely in any case that those 

sheltered at the Embassy could travel safely through the embattled city to the 

airport. 

By 4 January, it had become apparent that the Embassy’s only hope lay with 

the two ships still steaming south at flank speed. At 0247, two CH-53E 

helicopters with Marines and Navy SEALs departed the USS Guam for the 466-

mile flight to Mogadishu. After two in-flight refuelings from KC-130 aircraft, the 

helicopters arrived over the Embassy at dawn. About 100 armed Somali stood 

with ladders by one wall. As the CH-53Es flew into the compound, the Somali 

scattered. Shortly after the helicopters touched down, a special operations AC130 gunship arrived overhead to provide fire support, if needed. The CH-53Es 

unloaded the security force, embarked 61 evacuees, and took off for the 350-

mile return flight. 

The ships continued to steam at full speed toward Somalia throughout the day. 

The final evacuation of the Embassy started at midnight, after the ships had 

arrived off the coast. The remaining 220 evacuees and the security force were 

extracted during the night. 

Operation EASTERN EXIT, which resulted in the rescue of 281 people — from 

30 different countries — from a bloody civil war, was the result of the 

synergistic employment of widely dispersed joint forces that rapidly planned 

and conducted a noncombatant evacuation operation in the midst of the Gulf 

War. 

Various Sources 
Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

VI-5

b. Peace Operations. PO are multiagency and multinational operations involving all 

instruments of national power; including international humanitarian and reconstruction 

efforts and military missions; to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the 

environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to 

legitimate governance. For the Armed Forces of the United States, PO encompass PKO, 

predominantly military PEO, predominantly diplomatic PB actions, peacemaking (PM) 

processes, and conflict prevention. PO are conducted in conjunction with the various 

diplomatic activities and humanitarian efforts necessary to secure a negotiated truce and 

resolve the conflict. PO are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of 

diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict. PO support national/multinational 

strategic objectives. Military support improves the chances for success in the peace process 

by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable 

political settlements. 

(1) PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties 

to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease 

fire, truce, or other such agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term 

political settlement. Such actions are often taken under the authority of Chapter VI of the 

UN Charter, Peacekeeping Operations. An example of PKO is the US commitment to the 

Multinational Force Observers in the Sinai since 1982. 

“Peacekeeping is a job not suited to soldiers, but a job only soldiers can do.” 

Dag Hammarskjold 

UN Secretary-General, 1953-61

Joint forces are often deployed in support of the United Nations 

in multinational peace operations. 
Chapter VI 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) VI-6 

(2) PEO are the application of military force or threat of its use, normally pursuant 

to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed 

to maintain or restore peace and order. PEO may include the enforcement of sanctions 

and exclusion zones, protection of FHA, restoration of order, and forcible separation 

of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute. Unlike PKO, such operations do not require 

the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict (e.g., Operations JOINT 

ENDEAVOR, JOINT GUARD, and JOINT FORGE, 1995-2001 in Bosnia and JOINT 

GUARDIAN, 1999-2001 in Kosovo). 

(3) Peace Building. PB consists of stability actions (predominantly diplomatic, 

economic, and security related) that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and 

institutions, build confidence, and support economic reconstruction to prevent a return to 

conflict. Military support to PB may include rebuilding roads, reestablishing or 

creating government entities, or training defense forces.

(4) Peacemaking. PM is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or 

other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute or resolves issues that 

led to conflict. It can be an ongoing process, supported by military, economic, and IO. The 

purpose is to instill in the parties an understanding that reconciliation is a better alternative 

to fighting. The military can assist in establishing incentives, disincentives, and 

OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR 

Beginning in December 1995, US and allied nations deployed peace operations forces 

to Bosnia in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. Task Force EAGLE, comprised 

of 20,000 American soldiers, is implementing the military elements of the Dayton Peace 

Accords. This operation marked the first commitment of forces in the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) history as well as the first time since World War II that 

American and Russian soldiers have shared a common mission. Today, thousands of 

people are alive in Bosnia because of these soldiers’ service. 

During Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, deployed intelligence personnel provided 

aircrews and staffs at several locations with critical threat information and airfield data. 

Taking advantage of the Combat Intelligence System (CIS) capabilities and an emerging 

global connectivity to military networks and databases, intelligence personnel provided 

the best and most timely support ever to air mobility forces. This improvement was 

particularly evident during the Mission Report (MISREP) process, when intelligence 

analysts used CIS to provide MISREP data very quickly to aircrews and staffs, ensuring 

the people in need of this intelligence received it while the data was still useful. 

The European Command’s Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit 

(Special Operations Capable) was assigned as theater reserve for NATO forces, while 

Naval Mobile Construction Battalions 133 and 40 constructed base camps for 

implementation force personnel. In addition, from June to October a Marine Corps 

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) squadron, VMU-1, supported the operation with Pioneer 

UAV imagery both to US and multinational units. VMU-2 continues to provide similar 

support. 

Various Sources 
Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

VI-7

mechanisms that promote reconciliation. Military activities that support PM include 

military-to-military exchanges and security assistance. 

(5) Conflict prevention consists of diplomatic and other actions taken in advance 

of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence, deter parties, and reach an agreement 

before armed hostilities. These actions are normally conducted under Chapter VI, “Pacific 

Settlement of Disputes,” of the UN Charter. However, military deployments designed to 

deter and coerce parties will need to be credible and this may require a combat posture and 

an enforcement mandate under the principles of Chapter VII, “Action with Respect to 

Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” of the UN Charter. 

Conflict prevention activities include diplomatic initiatives, efforts designed to reform a 

country’s security sector and make it more accountable to democratic control, and 

deployment of forces designed to prevent a dispute or contain it from escalating to 

hostilities. Other conflict prevention activities may include military fact-finding missions, 

consultations, warnings, inspections, and monitoring. Military forces used for conflict 

prevention should be focused on support to political and developmental efforts to ameliorate 

the causes of tension and unrest. Military activities will be tailored to meet political and 

development demands. 

For additional guidance on PO, refer to JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations. 

Joint forces support peace enforcement operations to compel compliance with 

measures designed to establish an environment for a truce or cease-fire.
Chapter VI 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) VI-8 

c. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. FHA operations relieve or reduce the impact 

of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, 

disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the United States. FHA 

provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration; it is intended to 

supplement or complement efforts of HN civil authorities or agencies with the primary 

responsibility for providing assistance. DOD provides assistance when the need for relief is 

gravely urgent and when the humanitarian emergency dwarfs the ability of normal relief 

agencies to effectively respond (see Figure VI-1). 

(1) The US military is capable of rapidly responding to emergencies or disasters 

and restoring relative order in austere locations. US forces may provide logistics (e.g., 

HSS), planning, and communications resources required to initiate and sustain FHA 

operations. 

(2) FHA operations may be directed by the President or SecDef when a serious 

international situation threatens the political or military stability of a region considered of 

interest to the United States, or when the SecDef deems the humanitarian situation itself 

sufficient and appropriate for employment of US forces. DOS or the US ambassador in 

country is responsible for declaring a foreign disaster or situation that requires FHA. 

Within DOD, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy has the overall responsibility for 

developing the military policy for international FHA operations. 

UN equipment is loaded on a C-5 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, bound for Kigali, Rwanda, during 

Operation SUPPORT HOPE peace operations.
Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

VI-9

(3) FHA operations may cover a broad range of missions (Figure VI-1, 4th 

checked item) and include securing an environment to allow humanitarian relief efforts to 

proceed. US military forces participate in three basic types of FHA operations — those 

coordinated by the UN, those where the United States acts in concert with other 

multinational forces, or those where the United States responds unilaterally. 

For further guidance on FHA operations, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian 

Assistance. 

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

To relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or 

other endemic conditions

Limited in scope and duration

Supplements or complements efforts of the host nation civil 

authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for 

providing foreign humanitarian assistance.

Broad range of missions such as relief missions, dislocated civilian 

support missions, security missions, technical assistance and support 

functions, and consequence management operations.

US responds unilaterally

US acts multinationally

US acts coordinated by the United Nations

OPERATIONAL CONTEXTS

Figure VI-1. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
Chapter VI 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) VI-10 

OPERATIONS PROVIDE RELIEF AND RESTORE HOPE 

Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE demonstrated the complexity of 

integrating peace operations with other types of operations and provided a glimpse of a 

new style of post-Cold War military operations. By the middle of 1992, after years of civil 

war, drought, and famine, the situation in the southern half of Somalia had reached such a 

tragic state that humanitarian organizations launched a worldwide appeal for help. In 

response to this outcry, the President of the United States directed, in mid-August 1992, 

an airlift of food and supplies for starving Somalis (Operation PROVIDE RELIEF). 

US forces immediately initiated the airlift of relief supplies from Mombassa, Kenya, but 

continued instability in Somalia prevented safe passage of the flights. Relief workers in 

Somalia operated in this unsafe environment under constant threat. Distribution of relief 

supplies was haphazard and subject to banditry and obstruction by local warlords. The 

people of Somalia continued to suffer. 

Based on the continued suffering and the realization that the United States was the only 

nation capable of decisive action, the President directed the Commander, US Central 

Command (CDRUSCENTCOM) to plan a larger scale humanitarian relief operation. On 3 

December the President directed CDRUSCENTCOM to execute Operation RESTORE 

HOPE. In broad terms, it was an effort to raise Somalia from the depths of famine, 

anarchy, and desperation in order to restore its national institutions and its hope for the 

future. Conducted under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), Operation RESTORE 

HOPE was a multinational humanitarian assistance operation that ultimately involved 

more than 38,000 troops from 21 coalition nations, with an additional 9 nations providing 

funding, support, and facilities vital to the operation. 

Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia was formed with forces from France, Italy, Canada, 

Belgium, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, as well as other nations. On 

9 December 1992, under UN auspices, US special operations forces and amphibious 

forces assaulted and secured the airport at Mogadishu and the seaport soon thereafter. 

Arriving supplies could now be off-loaded safely. 

The task force methodically expanded throughout the capital city of Mogadishu and into 

the countryside. As land forces were added to the task force, control was pushed inland. 

The airlift of supplies increased significantly as air bases were secured. Over the next 3 

months, the coalition expanded into the southern half of Somalia, establishing and 

securing relief centers and escorting supply convoys. 

The operation was made more complex by continued uncertainty and instability in the 

Somali political situation. The task force, working closely with the US Department of State 

and eventually more than 50 humanitarian relief organizations, assisted in establishing an 

environment in which relief operations could proceed. Because of the proliferation of 

weapons throughout the country during the many years of civil war, relief efforts included 

the identification of individuals and groups that posed immediate threats and the removal 

of visible weapons from circulation. A radio station and newspaper were established to 

inform the public regarding the UN force objectives, as well as public service information 

to enhance security. 

As the situation was brought under control by military forces, priority shifted to diplomatic 

efforts to establish and maintain a lasting truce between competing factions. UNITAF 

Somalia was amended to include relief-in-place by forces assigned to the UN Operation in 

Somalia (UNOSOM), now designated UNOSOM II. The distribution of relief supplies 

continued while great care was taken to ensure a seamless transition between UNITAF 

and UNOSOM II forces. 

Various Sources 
Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

VI-11

OPERATION ATLAS RESPONSE 

In the early part of February 2000, Cyclone Connie drenched the Southern Africa region 

with over 40 inches of rain causing many rivers in the region to overflow and flood 

populated areas. US European Command sent a humanitarian assistance survey team 

(HAST) to get “eyes on the ground.” Just as the effects of Connie were lessening and 

the HAST was preparing to head home, Cyclone Eline hit Madagascar. The storm 

pushed further inland and rain fell in Zimbabwe, adding to reservoirs that were already 

full. This forced the release of water from reservoirs, causing even more flooding. 

Mozambique (MZ) was the country with the greatest needs in the region. Consequently, 

between 18 February and 1 April 2000, Joint Task Force (JTF)-ATLAS RESPONSE, 

under the command of Major General Joseph H. Wehrle, Jr., US Air Force, was sent to 

aid the people of Mozambique, South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Zambia. 

The joint force commander established a small, main headquarters in Maputo, MZ to be 

near the US Ambassador. The majority of forces and staff resided at Air Force Base 

Hoedspriut, South Africa. Eventually, a small contingent of forces would deploy to 

Beira, MZ to work at a supply distribution hub. The primary predeployment tasks of the 

JTF: 1) Search and rescue (SAR), 2) Coordination and synchronization of relief efforts 

and 3) Relief supply distribution changed during the operation. Upon arrival, the JTF 

discovered SAR efforts were essentially complete and a fourth key task became the 

ability to conduct aerial assessment of the lines of communications. This fourth task 

was important because it was also a key indicator in the exit strategy. 

During the brief time of the operation, the JTF’s aircraft carried a total of 714.3 short 

tons of intergovernmental organization (IGO)/nongovernmental organization (NGO) 

cargo, most of it for direct support of the local population. Helicopters and C-130s also 

moved 511 non-US passengers. The majority were medics or aid workers carried on 

special operations forces HH-60s bringing immediate relief to populations cut off from 

the rest of the world. 

Important lessons were learned during this operation. First, the best course of action 

may not be bringing enough manpower and resources to dominate the running of a 

foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operation. In this case, supporting the 

essentially civil-run operation and providing effective counsel worked far better than 

trying to control the operation as a supported commander. Political feathers were not 

ruffled and future operations with these nations or aid agencies likely will be that much 

easier. Second, the civil-military operations center (CMOC) was key to working with the 

participating IGOs and NGOs. CMOC personnel were able to set up information nodes 

that moved information among aid agencies that were sometimes in competition with 

each other. Because of CMOC’s low key approach, it was able to steer each 

organization it touched to greater organization and efficiency. Finally, early 

development of an exit strategy provided decision points with tangible measures. All 

parties must have buy-in to execute it together and there must be “top cover” from the 

civilian side to ensure national objectives are met. 

Operation ATLAS RESPONSE was a political and military success. Not only was 

humanitarian aid provided to the people of Mozambique, but good relations with South 

African military and many IGOs and NGOs were forged. 

SOURCE: Derived from Dr. Robert Sly’s, “ATLAS RESPONSE Study,” 

Third Air Force History Office, 2000. 
Chapter VI 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) VI-12 

d. Recovery Operations may be conducted to search for, locate, identify, recover, and 

return isolated personnel, sensitive equipment, items critical to national security, or human 

remains (e.g., JTF - Full Accounting to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans 

still unaccounted for as a result of the war in Southeast Asia). Regardless of the recovery 

purpose, each type of recovery operation is generally a sophisticated activity requiring 

detailed planning in order to execute. Recovery operations may be clandestine, covert, or 

overt depending on whether the operational environment is hostile, uncertain, or permissive. 

e. Consequence Management. CM is actions taken to maintain or restore essential 

services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, 

including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. CM may be planned and executed for 

locations within US-owned territory at home and abroad and in foreign countries as directed 

by the President and SecDef. Military support for domestic CM will be provided through 

Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM), Commander, 

United States Southern Command (CDRUSSOUTHCOM), or Commander, United States 

Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM) depending upon the location of the incident. DOS is 

the federal agency with lead responsibility for foreign CM and DHS is the “Primary 

Agency” for domestic CM. US military support to foreign CM normally will be provided to 

the foreign government through the combatant command within whose AOR the incident 

occurs. 

For further CM guidance, refer to CJCSI 3125.01, Military Assistance to Domestic 

Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation; CJCSI 3214.01A, Foreign Consequence 

Management Operations; JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance; JP 3-27, Homeland 

Defense; JP 3-28, Civil Support; and JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

f. Strikes and Raids

(1) Strikes are attacks conducted to damage or destroy an objective or a capability. 

OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON 

The strike was designed to hit directly at the heart of Gaddafi’s ability to export 

terrorism with the belief that such a preemptive strike would provide him “incentives 

and reasons to alter his criminal behavior.” The final targets were selected at the 

National Security Council level “within the circle of the President’s advisors.” 

Ultimately, five targets were selected. All except one of the targets were chosen 

because of their direct connection to terrorist activity. The single exception was the 

Benina military airfield which based Libyan fighter aircraft. This target was hit to 

preempt Libyan interceptors from taking off and attacking the incoming US bombers. 

The actual combat commenced at 0200 (local Libyan time), lasted less than 12 minutes, 

and dropped 60 tons of munitions. Navy A-6 Intruders were assigned the two targets in 

the Benghazi area, and the Air Force F-111s hit the other three targets in the vicinity of 

Tripoli. Resistance outside the immediate area of attack was nonexistent, and Libyan 

air defense aircraft never launched. One F-111 strike aircraft was lost during the strike. 

Various Sources 
Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

VI-13

Strikes may be used to punish offending nations or groups, uphold international law, or 

prevent those nations or groups from launching their own attacks (e.g., Operation EL 

DORADO CANYON conducted against Libya in 1986, in response to the terrorist bombing 

of US Service members in Berlin. The strike achieved significant political objectives.). 

(2) Raids are operations to temporarily seize an area, usually through forcible 

entry, in order to secure information, confuse an adversary, capture personnel or equipment, 

or destroy an objective or capability (e.g., Operation URGENT FURY, Grenada 1983, to 

protect US citizens and restore the lawful government). Raids end with a planned 

withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. 

g. Homeland Defense and Civil Support Operations. Security and defense of the US 

homeland is the Federal Government’s top responsibility and is conducted as a cooperative 

effort among all federal agencies as well as state, tribal, and local security and law 

enforcement entities. Military operations inside the United States and its territories, though 

limited in many respects, are conducted to accomplish two missions — HD and CS. HD is 

the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense 

infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the 

President. CS consists of DOD support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, 

and for designated law enforcement and other activities. Requests for federal assistance of 

this nature must be submitted to the DOD Executive Secretary. 

(1) Homeland Defense. The purpose of HD is to protect against and mitigate the 

impact of incursions or attacks on sovereign territory, the domestic population, and critical 

defense infrastructure. DOD is the federal agency with lead responsibility, supported by 

other agencies, in defending against external threats/aggression. However, against 

internal threats DOD may be in support of an OGA. When ordered to conduct HD 

operations within US territory, DOD will coordinate closely with OGAs. Consistent 

with laws and policy, the Services will provide capabilities to support CCDR requirements 

against a variety of threats to national security through the air, land, maritime, and space 

domains, and the information environment. These include invasion, CNA, and air and 

missile attacks. 

(2) Civil Support. CS includes using the Armed Forces of the United States and 

DOD personnel, contractors, and assets for domestic emergencies and law enforcement and 

other activities when directed by the President or SecDef. For CS operations, DOD supports 

“The Joint Staff concluded that the rewards of a successful operation offset the risks. 

A swift, precise strike probably would rescue most of the students and avert a 

hostage situation. Removal of the pro-Cuban junta would eliminate a threat to US 

strategic interests in the Caribbean. A well-executed display of US military prowess 

would convey US determination to protect its vital interests.” 

Operation URGENT FURY 

Ronald H. Cole 

Joint History Office
Chapter VI 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) VI-14 

and does not supplant civil authorities. Within a state, that state’s governor is the key 

decision maker. 

(a) The majority of CS operations are conducted in accordance with the 

National Response Plan (NRP). The NRP, is the primary Federal mechanism through 

which DOD support is requested for domestic emergencies. The NRP describes the 

policies, planning assumptions, and a CONOPS that guide federal operations following a 

Presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency. The NRP is coordinated and 

managed by DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and is the result of 

agreements between DHS/FEMA and the primary and supporting federal agencies 

responsible for providing disaster relief and other emergency support. DOD support is 

described in the NRP as “defense support of civil authorities” and is provided with the 

provision that it does not conflict with DOD’s mission or its ability to respond to military 

contingencies. 

(b) Other CS operations can include CD activities, intelligence or investigative 

support, or other support to civilian law enforcement in accordance with specific DOD 

policies and US law. 

(3) Global Perspective. CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSSOUTHCOM, and 

CDRUSPACOM have specific responsibilities for HD and CS. These include conducting 

operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its 

territories, and interests within their assigned AORs and, as directed by the President or 

SecDef, providing CS including CM. However, DOD support to HD is global in nature and 

is often conducted by all CCDRs beginning at the source of the threat. In the forward 

regions outside US territories the objective is to detect, deter, or when directed, defeat 

threats to the homeland before they arise. 

For detailed guidance on homeland security, see JP 3-27, Homeland Defense. 

3. Unique Considerations 

a. Duration and End State. Crisis response and limited contingency operations may 

last for a relatively short period of time (e.g., NEO, strike, raid) or for an extended period 

of time to attain the national strategic end state (e.g., US participation with ten other nations 

in the independent [non-UN] PKO, Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai 

Peninsula since 1982). Short duration operations are not always possible, particularly in 

situations where destabilizing conditions have existed for years or where conditions are such 

that a long-term commitment is required to achieve national strategic objectives. 

Nevertheless, it is imperative to have a clear national strategic end state for all types of 

contingencies. 

b. Intelligence Collection. As soon as practical after it is determined that a crisis may 

develop or a contingency is declared, JFCs and their staffs begin a systems analysis and 

determine the intelligence requirements needed to support the anticipated operation. 

Intelligence planners also consider the capability for a unit to receive external intelligence 
Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

VI-15

support, the capability to store intelligence data, the timeliness of collection systems, the 

availability of intelligence publications, and the possibility of using other agencies and 

organizations as intelligence sources. In some contingencies (such as PKO), the term 

“information collection” is used rather than the term “intelligence” because of the sensitivity 

of the operation. 

(1) HUMINT often may provide the most useful source of information. If a 

HUMINT infrastructure is not in place when US forces arrive, it needs to be established as 

quickly as possible. HUMINT also supplements other intelligence sources with 

psychological information not available through technical means. For example, while 

overhead imagery may graphically depict the number of people gathered in a town square, it 

cannot gauge the motivations or enthusiasm of the crowd. Additionally, in underdeveloped 

areas, belligerent forces may not rely heavily on radio communication, thereby denying US 

forces intelligence derived through signal intercept. HUMINT is essential to supplement 

other forms of intelligence and information collection to produce the most accurate 

intelligence products. 

(2) Where there is little USG or US military presence, open-source intelligence 

(OSINT) may be the best immediately available information to prepare US forces to operate 

in a foreign country. OSINT from radio broadcasts, newspapers, and periodicals often 

provide tip-offs for HUMINT and other intelligence and information collection methods. 

(3) Intelligence collection requires a focus on adversary system factors that affect 

the situation. This requires a depth of expertise in, and a mental and psychological 

integration with, all aspects of the operational environment’s peoples and their cultures, 

politics, religion, economics, and related factors; and any variances within affected groups 

of people. In addition, intelligence collection must focus quickly on transportation 

infrastructure in the operational area, to include capabilities and limitations of major 

seaports, airfields, and surface LOCs. 

(4) Intelligence organizations (principally at the JTF headquarters level) should 

include foreign area officers. They add valuable cultural awareness to the production of 

useable intelligence. 

c. Constraints and Restraints. A JFC tasked with conducting a crisis response or 

limited contingency operation may face numerous constraints and restrictions in addition to 

the normal restrictions associated with ROE. For example, international acceptance of each 

operation may be extremely important, not only because military forces may be used to 

support international sanctions, but also because of the probability of involvement by IGOs. 

As a consequence, legal rights of individuals and organizations and funding of the operation 

should be addressed by the CCDR’s staff. Also, constraints and restraints imposed on any 

agency or organization involved in the operation should be understood by other agencies 

and organizations to facilitate coordination. 

d. Force Protection
Chapter VI 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) VI-16 

(1) Even in permissive operational environments, force protection measures will be 

planned commensurate with the risks to the force. These risks may include a wide range of 

nonconventional threats such as terrorism, exotic diseases (medical threat), criminal 

enterprises, environmental threats/hazards, and computer hackers. Within any AOI, the 

CBRNE threats including those transiting the area should be considered. Thorough research 

and detailed information about the operational environment, training, and JIPOE will 

contribute to adequate force protection. The impartiality of the force and effective 

engagement with local community members contribute to force protection. ROE and 

weapons control policies are important to effective force protection. In developing these 

policies, planners take into account the capabilities of the force to avoid situations where 

policies and capabilities do not match. Measures taken to identify and plan for possible 

hostile acts against a force can be successful only if the force is given commensurate ROE to 

protect itself. 

(2) Limited contingency operations may involve a requirement to protect 

nonmilitary personnel. In the absence of the rule of law, the JFC must address when, how, 

and to what extant he will extend force protection to civilians and what that protection 

means. 

e. Health Service Support. In addition to providing conventional HSS to deployed 

forces, HSS resources may be used in operations such as CS, FHA, and disaster relief to 

further US national goals and objectives. Based on the very humanitarian nature of HSS 

activities, assistance from HSS forces may be more readily accepted by the civilian 

populace. 

f. Education and Training. The Armed Forces of the United States may be directed to 

conduct a crisis response or limited contingency operation with very little notice. Further, 

for some contingencies (e.g., NEOs, PO) warfighting skills are not always appropriate. To 

be effective in these types of situations, a mindset other than warfighting is required. 

Readying forces to successfully cope in these conditions requires a two-pronged approach 

— education and training. Therefore, training and education programs focusing on joint, 

multinational, and interagency coordination with special emphasis on the importance of 

ROE, use of force, and nonlethal weapons should be developed and implemented for 

individuals and units. Personnel from coalition partner governments, OGAs, IGOs, and 

NGOs should be invited to participate in these programs. 

(1) Professional military education of all officers and noncommissioned officers 

begins with basic leadership training and culminates at the most senior levels. The focus is 

to ensure leaders at all levels understand the purpose, principles, and characteristics of crisis 

response and limited contingency operations; and can plan and conduct these operations. 

“A well-trained and disciplined military unit is the best foundation upon which to build 

a peacekeeping force.” 

LTG T. Montgomery, USA 

US Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee, 1997 
Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

VI-17

Leader education will include discussions, lessons learned, and situational exercises, and 

should culminate with senior leaders performing in a command or staff position during a 

joint exercise. 

(2) The focus of crisis response and limited contingency training is to ensure that 

individuals and units have the necessary skills for a given operation, and that the staffs can 

plan, control, and support the operation. Depending on the anticipated operation, 

predeployment training could include individual skill training, situational training exercises, 

field training exercises, combined arms live fire exercises, mobility exercises, command 

post exercises, and simulation exercises to train commanders, staffs, and components. If 

there is sufficient time prior to actual deployment for an operation, units should culminate 

their predeployment training in a joint training exercise based on the anticipated operation. 

The unit tasked for the operation should participate in the exercise with the supporting units 

with which it normally deploys, and if possible, with the next higher headquarters for the 

actual operation. Once deployed, and if the situation allows, military skills training at the 

individual and unit level should continue. 

(3) Participation in or around the operational environment of certain types of 

smaller-scale contingencies may preclude normal mission-related training. For example, 

infantry units or fighter squadrons conducting certain protracted PO may not have the time, 

facilities, or environment in which to maintain individual or unit proficiency for traditional 

missions. In these situations, commanders should develop programs that enable their forces 

to maintain proficiency in their core competencies/mission essential tasks to the greatest 

extent possible. 
Chapter VI 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) VI-18 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER VII

MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, SECURITY COOPERATION, 

AND DETERRENCE 

VII-1 

1. General 

a. Scope. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities 

encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked 

to support OGAs and cooperate with IGOs (e.g., UN, NATO) and other countries to protect 

and enhance national security interests and deter conflict. These operations usually involve 

a combination of military forces and capabilities as well as the efforts of OGAs, IGOs, and 

NGOs in a complementary fashion. Because DOS is frequently the federal agency with lead 

responsibility and nearly always is a principal player in these activities, JFCs should 

maintain a working relationship with the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions in their area. 

Commanders and their staffs should establish contact and maintain a dialogue with pertinent 

OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs to share information and facilitate future operations. 

b. Engagement. GCCs shape their AORs through security cooperation activities by 

continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of 

national power. SCPs provide frameworks within which combatant commands engage 

regional partners in cooperative military activities and development. Ideally, security 

cooperation activities remedy the causes of crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires 

coercive US military intervention. Developmental actions enhance a host government’s 

willingness and ability to care for its people. Coercive actions apply carefully prescribed 

force or the threat of force to change the security environment. 

c. Presence and Deterrence. Sustained joint force presence promotes a secure 

environment in which diplomatic, economic, and informational programs designed to 

reduce the causes of instability can flourish. Presence can take the form of forward basing, 

forward deploying, or pre-positioning assets. Joint force presence often keeps unstable 

situations from escalating into larger conflicts. The sustained presence of strong, capable 

forces is the most visible sign of US commitment — to allies and adversaries alike. 

However, if deterrence fails, committed forces must be agile enough to rapidly transition to 

combat operations. Ideally, deterrent forces should be able to conduct decisive operations 

immediately. However, if committed forces lack the combat power to conduct decisive 

operations, they conduct defensive operations while additional forces deploy. 

(1) Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to 

our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while 

promoting US influence and access. In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, 

forward presence involves periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage 

agreements, multinational exercises, port visits, foreign military training, foreign community 

support, and military-to-military contacts. Given their location and knowledge of the 

“We are a strong nation. But we cannot live to ourselves and remain strong.”

George C. Marshall 

22 January, 1948 
Chapter VII 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) VII-2 

region, forward presence forces could be the first that a CCDR commits when responding to 

a crisis. 

(2) Deterrence. At all times of peace and war, the Armed Forces of the United 

States help to deter adversaries from using violence to reach their aims. Deterrence stems 

from the belief of a potential aggressor that a credible threat of retaliation exists, the 

contemplated action cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh any possible gains. Thus, a 

potential aggressor is reluctant to act for fear of failure, cost, or consequences. Although the 

threat of large-scale nuclear war has diminished, proliferation of WMD and conventional 

advanced technology weaponry is continuing. Threats directed against the United States, 

allies, or other friendly nations — including terrorism involving CBRNE weapons — 

require the maintenance of a full array of response capabilities. Effective deterrence 

requires a SC plan that emphasizes the willingness of the US to employ forces in defense of 

its interests. Various joint operations (e.g., show of force and enforcement of sanctions) 

support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve and willingness to use force when 

necessary. Others (e.g., nation assistance and FHA) support deterrence by enhancing a 

climate of peaceful cooperation, thus promoting stability. 

2. Types of Activities and Operations 

a. Emergency Preparedness. EP encompasses those planning activities undertaken to 

ensure DOD processes, procedures, and resources are in place to support the President and 

SecDef in a designated national security emergency. 

(1) Continuity of operations (COOP) ensures the degree or state of being 

continuous in the conduct of functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a military 

action or mission in carrying out the national military strategy. COOP includes the 

functions and duties of the commander, as well as the supporting functions and duties 

performed by the staff and others under the authority and direction of the commander. 

(2) Continuity of government involves a coordinated effort within each USG 

branch (executive, legislative, and judicial) to ensure the capability to continue minimum 

essential functions and responsibilities during a catastrophic emergency. Continuity of 

government activities involve ensuring the continuity of minimum essential branch 

functions through plans and procedures governing succession to office and the emergency 

delegation of authority (when and where permissible and in accordance with applicable 

laws); the safekeeping of vital resources, facilities, and records; the improvisation and 

emergency acquisition of vital resources necessary for the continued performance of 

minimum essential functions; and the capability to relocate essential personnel and functions 

to alternate work sites and to reasonably sustain the performance of minimum essential 

functions at the alternate work site until normal operations can be resumed. Continuity of 

government is dependent upon effective COOP plans and capabilities. 

(3) Other EP roles. In addition to COOP and continuity of government, if the 

President directs, Department of Defense may be tasked with additional missions relating to 

EP. 
Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

VII-3

b. Arms control and disarmament means the identification, verification, inspection, 

limitation, control, reduction, or elimination of armed forces and armaments of all kinds 

under international agreement including the necessary steps taken under such an agreement 

to establish an effective system of international control, or to create and strengthen 

international organizations for the maintenance of peace. Although it may be viewed as a 

diplomatic mission, the military can play an important role. For example, US military 

personnel may be involved in verifying an arms control treaty; seizing WMD; escorting 

authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials (i.e., enriched uranium) to preclude 

loss or unauthorized use of these assets; or dismantling, destroying, or disposing of weapons 

and hazardous material. One important method of arms control treaty verification that US 

military personnel may be involved in is monitoring using space-based systems. All of 

these actions help reduce threats to regional security and afford the opportunity to 

shape future military operations. Other examples include military support for the 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty by conducting and hosting site inspections, 

participating in military data exchanges, and implementing armament reductions. Finally, 

the US military’s implementation of Vienna Document 1999 and confidence and security 

building measures such as unit/formation inspections, exercise notifications/observations, air 

and ground base visits, and military equipment demonstrations are further examples of arms 

control. 

c. Combating Terrorism. This effort involves actions taken to oppose terrorism from 

wherever the threat exists. It includes antiterrorism — defensive measures taken to reduce 

vulnerability to terrorist acts — and counterterrorism — offensive measures taken to 

prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. 

(1) Antiterrorism involves defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of 

individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by 

local military forces and civilians. Antiterrorism programs form the foundation for 

effectively combating terrorism. The basics of such programs include training and 

defensive measures that strike a balance among the protection desired, the mission, 

infrastructure, and available manpower and resources. Department of Defense provides 

specially trained personnel and equipment in a supporting role to federal agencies with 

lead responsibility. The USG may provide antiterrorism assistance to foreign countries 

under the provisions of Title 22, USC (under Antiterrorism Assistance). 

For further guidance on antiterrorism, refer to JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism. 

(2) Counterterrorism involves measures that include operations to prevent, 

deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Normally, counterterrorism operations require 

specially trained personnel capable of mounting swift and effective action. Within the 

Armed Forces of the United States, counterterrorism is primarily a SO core task. 

For further details concerning counterterrorism and SO, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint 

Special Operations. For US policy on counterterrorism, refer to the National Response Plan

and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. 
Chapter VII 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) VII-4 

d. DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations. DOD supports federal, state, and local 

law enforcement agencies in their effort to disrupt the transport and/or transfer of illegal 

drugs into the United States. Specific DOD CD authorities are found in the National 

Defense Authorization Act of 1991, Public Law Number 101-510, Section 1004, as 

amended; as well as Title 10, USC, Sections 371-382. DOD support to CD operations: 

(1) Enhance the readiness of DOD. 

(2) Satisfy DOD’s statutory detection and monitoring responsibilities. 

(3) Contribute to the war on terrorism. 

(4) Advance DOD’s security cooperation goals. 

(5) Enhance national security. 

JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF)-NORTH 

An example of Department of Defense support to counterdrug operations was the 

establishment of JTF-6 in 1989. Its mission originally focused exclusively along the 

Southwest border of the United States. A succession of National Defense 

Authorization Acts expanded the JTF-6 charter by adding specific mission tasks for the 

organization. In 1995, the JTF-6 area of responsibility expanded to include the 

continental United States. In June 2004, JTF-6 was officially renamed JTF North and its 

mission was expanded to include providing support to federal law enforcement 

agencies in countering transnational threats. 

Mission: JTF-NORTH detects, monitors and supports the interdiction of suspected 

transnational threats within and along the approaches to CONUS; fuses and 

disseminates intelligence, contributes to the common operating picture; coordinates 

support to lead federal agencies; and supports security cooperation initiatives in order 

to secure the homeland and enhance regional security. 

Various Sources 

MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA 

Maritime Intercept(ion) Operations were conducted to enforce United Nations (UN) 

Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) imposed against Iraq in August 1990 in the 

wake of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The UN prohibited cargo originating from Iraq and 

any imports not accompanied by a UN authorization letter. Although, under the food 

for oil agreement, Iraq could sell oil and import approved goods into Iraq. The 

enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq was a multinational operation. Ships from 15 

countries, and members of the US Coast Guard served together to help enforce these 

sanctions. UN Sanctions Resolutions were: UNSCR 661 (established economic 

embargo), UNSCR 665 (called for naval forces to enforce the embargo), UNSCR 687 

(Gulf War cease-fire; authorized shipment of food, medical supplies, UN approved 

goods), and UNSCR 986 (oil for food program). 

Various Sources 
Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

VII-5

For additional guidance on CD operations, refer to JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug 

Operations. 

e. Enforcement of sanctions are operations that employ coercive measures to interdict 

the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. 

Maritime interception operations are a form of maritime interdiction that may include 

seaborne coercive enforcement measures. These operations are military in nature and serve 

both political and military purposes. The political objective is to compel a country or group 

to conform to the objectives of the initiating body, while the military objective focuses on 

establishing a barrier that is selective, allowing only authorized goods to enter or exit. 

Depending on the geography, sanction enforcement normally involves some 

combination of air and surface forces. Assigned forces should be capable of 

complementary mutual support and full communications interoperability. 

f. Enforcing Exclusion Zones. An exclusion zone is established by a sanctioning body 

to prohibit specified activities in a specific geographic area. Exclusion zones can be 

established in the air (i.e., no-fly zones), sea (i.e., maritime), or on land (i.e., no-drive zones). 

Its purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the 

desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of sanctions or threat or use of 

force. Such measures usually are imposed by the UN or another international body, of 

which the United States is a member, although they may be imposed unilaterally by the 

United States (e.g., Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq, initiated in August 1992, and 

Operation DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia, from March 1993 to December 1995). Exclusion 

zones usually are imposed due to breaches of international standards of human rights or 

flagrant violations of international law regarding the conduct of states. Situations that 

Service Members Participating in Maritime Intercept(ion) Operations 
Chapter VII 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) VII-6 

may warrant such action include the persecution of the civil population by a government, 

and efforts to deter an attempt by a hostile nation to acquire territory by force. 

Sanctions may create economic, diplomatic, military, or other effects where the intent is to 

change the behavior of the offending nation. 

g. Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight. These operations are conducted 

to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate sea or air routes. Freedom of 

navigation is a sovereign right accorded by international law. 

(1) International law has long recognized that a coastal state may exercise 

jurisdiction and control within its territorial sea in the same manner that it can exercise 

sovereignty over its own land territory. International law accords the right of “innocent” 

passage to ships of other nations through a state’s territorial waters. Passage is 

“innocent” as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal 

state. The high seas are free for reasonable use of all states. 

(2) Freedom of navigation by aircraft through international airspace is a wellestablished principle of international law. Aircraft threatened by nations or groups through 

the extension of airspace control zones outside the established international norms will result 

in legal measures to rectify the situation. The International Civil Aviation Organization 

develops these norms. 

h. Nation Assistance is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a 

nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, 

or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation 

(e.g., Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, in 1990, following Operation JUST CAUSE in 

Panama). Nation assistance operations support the HN by promoting sustainable 

development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term 

regional stability. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security 

assistance, FID, and HCA. Collaborative planning between the JFC and OGAs, IGOs, 

NGOs, and HN authorities can greatly enhance the effectiveness of nation assistance. The 

JIACG can help facilitate this coordination. All nation assistance actions are integrated into 

the US ambassador’s country plan. 

(1) Security Assistance refers to a group of programs by which the United States 

provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign 

nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. 

Some examples of US security assistance programs are the Foreign Military Sales 

ENSURING OVERFLIGHT AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OPERATIONS 

The Berlin air corridors, established between 1948 and 1990, which allowed air access 

to West Berlin, were taken to maintain international airspace to an “air-locked” 

geographical area. The ATTAIN DOCUMENT series of operations against Libya in 1986 

were freedom of navigation operations, both air and sea, in the Gulf of Sidra. 

Various Sources 
Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

VII-7

Program, the Foreign Military Financing Program, the International Military Education and 

Training Program, the Economic Support Fund, and commercial sales licensed under the 

Arms Export Control Act. Security assistance surges accelerate release of equipment, 

supplies, or services when an allied or friendly nation faces an imminent military threat. 

Security assistance surges are military in nature and are focused on providing additional 

combat systems (e.g., weapons and equipment) or supplies, but may include the full range of 

security assistance, to include financial and training support. 

(2) FID programs encompass the diplomatic, economic, informational, and 

military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion, lawlessness, 

and insurgency. US military support to FID should focus on the operational assistance to 

HN personnel and collaborative planning with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and HN authorities to 

anticipate, preclude, and counter these threats. FID supports HN internal defense and 

development (IDAD) programs. US military involvement in FID has traditionally been 

focused on helping a nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow its 

lawful government. US FID programs may address other threats to the internal stability of 

an HN, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in 

fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and 

ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. US 

military support to FID may include training, materiel, advice, or other assistance, including 

direct support operations as authorized by the SecDef and combat operations as authorized 

by the President, to HN forces in executing an IDAD program. While FID is a legislativelymandated core task of SOF, conventional forces also contain and employ organic 

capabilities to conduct limited FID. 

For further guidance on FID, refer to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

for Foreign Internal Defense. For further guidance on SOF involvement in FID, refer to JPs 

3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, and 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force 

Operations. 

(3) HCA programs are governed by Title 10, USC, Section 401. This assistance 

may be provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises, and must fulfill unit 

training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. In 

contrast to emergency relief conducted under FHA operations, HCA programs generally 

encompass planned activities in the following categories. 

(a) Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural or underserved 

areas of a country. 

(b) Construction and repair of basic surface transportation systems. 

(c) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities. 

(d) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities such as schools, 

health and welfare clinics, and other nongovernmental buildings. 
Chapter VII 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) VII-8 

(e) Activities relating to the furnishing of education, training, and technical 

assistance concerning detection and clearance of explosive hazards (i.e., landmines). Note: 

US forces are not to engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of landmines 

(unless it is part of a concurrent military operation other than HCA). 

i. Protection of Shipping. When necessary, US forces provide protection of US flag 

vessels, US citizens (whether embarked in US or foreign vessels), and US property against 

unlawful violence in and over international waters (e.g., Operation EARNEST WILL, in 

which Kuwaiti ships were reflagged under the US flag in 1987). This protection may be 

extended to foreign flag vessels under international law and with the consent of the flag 

state. Actions to protect shipping include coastal sea control, harbor defense, port 

security, countermine operations, and environmental defense, in addition to operations 

on the high seas. Protection of shipping requires the coordinated employment of surface, 

air, space, and subsurface units, sensors, and weapons; as well as a command structure both 

ashore and afloat and a logistic base. Protection of shipping may require a combination of 

operations to be successful. 

(1) Area operations, either land-based or sea-based, are designed to prevent a 

hostile force from obtaining a tactical position from which to attack friendly or allied 

shipping. This includes ocean surveillance systems that provide data for threat location and 

strike operations against hostile bases or facilities. 

(2) Threats not neutralized by area operations must be deterred or addressed by 

escort operations. Generally, escorts are associated with convoys, although individual 

ships or a temporary grouping of ships may be escorted for a specific purpose. 

(3) Mine countermeasures operations are integral to successful protection of 

shipping and are an essential element of escort operations. 

(4) Environmental defense operations provide for the coordinated United States 

Coast Guard/DOD response to major pollution incidents both at home and overseas. While 

environmental defense operations are typically focused on maritime concerns they are 

equally applicable on land or in littoral areas. These incidents have the potential for 

grave damage to natural resources, the economy, and military operations. 

j. Show of Force Operations are designed to demonstrate US resolve. They involve 

the appearance of a credible military force in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that 

if allowed to continue may be detrimental to US interests or national strategic objectives or 

to underscore US commitment to an alliance or coalition. 

SHOW OF FORCE IN THE PHILIPPINES 

Operation Joint Task Force-PHILIPPINES, was conducted by US forces in 1989 in 

support of President Aquino during a coup attempt against the Philippine government. 

During this operation, a large special operations force was formed, fighter aircraft 

patrolled above rebel air bases, and two aircraft carriers were positioned off the 

coastline of the Philippines. 

Various Sources 
Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

VII-9

(1) US forces deployed abroad lend credibility to US promises and commitments, 

increase its regional influence, and demonstrate its resolve to use military force if 

necessary. In addition, SecDef orders a show of force to bolster and reassure friends and 

allies. Show of force operations are military in nature but often serve both diplomatic 

and military purposes. These operations can influence other governments or politicomilitary organizations to respect US interests. 

(2) Political concerns dominate a show of force operation, and as such, military 

forces often are under significant legal and political constraints. The military force 

coordinates its operations with the country teams affected. A show of force can involve a 

wide range of military forces including joint US military or multinational forces. 

Additionally, a show of force may include or transition to joint or multinational exercises. 

k. Support to Insurgency. An insurgency is defined as an organized movement 

aimed at the overthrow of a government through the use of subversion and armed action. 

It uses a mixture of political, economic, informational, and combat actions to achieve its 

political aims. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control 

and legitimacy of an established government, an interim governing body, or a peace process 

while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy — the central issues in an insurgency. 

Each insurgency has its own unique characteristics based on its strategic objectives, its 

operational environment, and available resources. Insurgencies normally seek either to 

overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country or to break away 

from state control and form an autonomous area. US forces may provide logistic and 

training support as it did for the Mujahadin resistance in Afghanistan during the Soviet 

occupation in the 1980s. In certain circumstances the US can provide direct combat support 

as in providing support to the French Resistance in WWII, the Afghanistan Northern 

Alliance to remove the Taliban in 2001-2002, or for NATO’s liberation of Kosovo in 1999. 

l. Counterinsurgency operations include support provided to a government in the 

military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions it undertakes to 

defeat insurgency. Counterinsurgency operations often include security assistance programs 

such as foreign military sales programs, foreign military financing program, and 

international military education and training program. Such support also may include FID. 

For further guidance on support to counterinsurgency, refer to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID). 

3. Unique Considerations 

“Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you create 

a political committee, a civil military operations center to interface with volunteer 

organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as opposed to a combat 

or fire-support operations center.” 

LtGen A. C. Zinni, USMC, CG, I MEF, 1994-1996
Chapter VII 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) VII-10 

a. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations and Host 

Nation Coordination. There is an increased need for the military to work with OGAs, 

IGOs, NGOs, and HN authorities to plan and conduct military engagement, security 

cooperation, and deterrence operations and activities. Liaison organizations such as a 

JIACG can help promote interaction and cooperation among diverse agencies. Consensus 

building is a primary task and can be aided by understanding each agency’s capabilities and 

limitations as well as any constraints that may preclude the use of a capability. The goal — 

to develop and promote the unity of effort needed to accomplish a specific mission — can 

be achieved by establishing an atmosphere of trust and cooperation. 

b. Information Sharing. NGOs and IGOs, by the very nature of what they do, become 

familiar with the infrastructure in a region and the culture, language, sensitivities, and status 

of the populace. This information is very valuable to commanders and staffs who may have 

neither access nor current information. NGOs and IGOs also may need information from 

commanders and staffs concerning security issues. However, these organizations hold 

neutrality as a fundamental principle and will resist being used as sources of intelligence and 

may be hesitant to associate with the military. Careful coordination is necessary to prevent 

these organizations from feeling like a source of intelligence. They should not perceive that 

US forces are seeking to recruit members of their organizations for collection efforts, or turn 

the organizations into unknowing accomplices in some covert collection effort. 

Consequently, the JFC should establish mechanisms like a CMOC to coordinate activities 

and provide a less threatening venue to share information. If the participating IGOs and 

NGOs perceive that mutual sharing of information aids their work and is not a threat to their 

neutrality, then they likely will participate. 

c. Cultural Awareness. The social, economic, and political environments in which 

security cooperation activities are conducted requires a great degree of cultural 

understanding. Military support and operations that are intended to support a friendly HN 

require a firm understanding of the HN’s cultural and political realities. History has shown 

that cultural awareness cannot be sufficiently developed after a crisis emerges, and must be 

a continuous, proactive element of theater intelligence and engagement strategies. The 

capability of the HN government and leadership, as well as existing treaties and social 

infrastructure, are critical planning factors. 

(1) Security cooperation efforts likely will impact countries throughout a region. 

Traditional rivalries among neighboring states, including hostility toward the United States, 

may be factors. For example, US assistance to a nation with long-standing enemies in the 

area may be perceived by these enemies as upsetting the regional balance of power. These 

same nations may see US intervention in the area simply as US imperialism. While such 

factors will not dictate US policy, they will require careful evaluation and consideration 

when conducting military operations under those conditions. 

(2) The emergence of regional actors may result in an increase in multinational 

efforts which may be further complicated by increased cultural and language barriers among 

partners and interoperability of equipment and tactics. Military plans must accurately 

identify and address interpreter and translator requirements needed to support multinational 
Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

VII-11

operations. Further, foreign language skills and foreign area expertise enhance the 

effectiveness and efficiency of joint operations. Foreign language skills and foreign area 

expertise are critical to sustaining alliances and coalitions, pursuing security cooperation and 

deterrence, and conducting multinational operations. 
Chapter VII 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) VII-12 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX A

PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONS 

A-1 

SECTION A. PRINCIPLES OF WAR 

1. Objective 

a. The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly 

defined, decisive, and achievable goal. 

b. The purpose of military operations is to achieve the military objectives that support 

attainment of the overall political goals of the conflict. This frequently involves the 

destruction of the enemy armed forces’ capabilities and their will to fight. The objective of 

joint operations not involving this destruction might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, 

it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, quickly, and 

economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to 

strategic objectives. JFCs should avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving 

the objective(s). 

c. Additionally, changes to the military objectives may occur because political and 

military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation, or they may occur because the 

situation itself changes. The JFC should anticipate these shifts in political goals 

necessitating changes in the military objectives. The changes may be very subtle, but if 

not made, achievement of the military objectives may no longer support the political goals, 

legitimacy may be undermined, and force security may be compromised. 

2. Offensive 

a. The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. 

b. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to achieve a clearly defined 

objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the 

initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The 

importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war. 

c. Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every 

opportunity to seize or reseize the initiative. An offensive spirit must be inherent in the 

conduct of all defensive operations. 

3. Mass 

a. The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most 

advantageous place and time to produce decisive results. 

b. To achieve mass is to synchronize and/or integrate appropriate joint force capabilities 

where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass often must be 

sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

enable even numerically inferior forces to produce decisive results and minimize human 

losses and waste of resources. 

4. Economy of Force 

a. The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power 

to secondary efforts. 

b. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the 

measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, 

delays, deception, or even retrograde operations to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive 

point and time. 

5. Maneuver 

a. The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through 

the flexible application of combat power. 

b. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain 

positional advantage, usually in order to deliver — or threaten delivery of — the direct and 

indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance 

and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in exploiting successes, 

preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new 

problems for the enemy. 

6. Unity of Command 

a. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible 

commander for every objective. 

b. Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the 

requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. During 

multinational operations and interagency coordination, unity of command may not be 

possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort — 

coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not 

necessarily part of the same command or organization — the product of successful unified 

action. 

7. Security 

a. The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected 

advantage. 

b. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile 

acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by commanders to 

protect their forces. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and 
Principles of Joint Operations

A-3

doctrine will enhance security. Risk is inherent in military operations. Application of this 

principle includes prudent risk management, not undue caution. Protecting the force 

increases friendly combat power and preserves freedom of action. 

8. Surprise 

a. The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the 

enemy is unprepared. 

b. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve 

success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise 

include speed in decision-making, information sharing, and force movement; effective 

intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; OPSEC; and variations in 

tactics and methods of operation. 

9. Simplicity 

a. The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders 

to ensure thorough understanding. 

b. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise 

orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the 

simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution 

planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission 

execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially 

critical to success in multinational operations. 

SECTION B. OTHER PRINCIPLES 

10. Restraint 

a. The purpose of restraint is to limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use 

of force. 

b. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, 

judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing 

of the need for security, the conduct of military operations, and the national strategic end 

state. For example, the exposure of intelligence gathering activities (e.g., interrogation of 

detainees and prisoners of war) could have significant political and military repercussions 

and therefore should be conducted with sound judgment. Excessive force antagonizes those 

parties involved, thereby damaging the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while 

potentially enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party. 

c. Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure their personnel are 

properly trained including knowing and understanding ROE and are quickly informed of 

any changes. Failure to understand and comply with established ROE can result in 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

fratricide, mission failure, and/or national embarrassment. ROE in some operations may be 

more restrictive and detailed when compared to ROE for large-scale combat in order to 

address national policy concerns, but should always be consistent with the inherent right of 

self-defense. ROE should be unclassified, if possible, and widely disseminated. Restraint is 

best achieved when ROE issued at the beginning of an operation address most anticipated 

situations that may arise. ROE should be consistently reviewed and revised as necessary. 

Additionally, ROE should be carefully scrutinized to ensure the lives and health of military 

personnel involved in joint operations are not needlessly endangered. In multinational 

operations, use of force may be influenced by coalition or allied force ROE. Commanders 

at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure an understanding of ROE and influence 

changes as appropriate. Since the domestic law of some nations may be more restrictive 

concerning the use of force than permitted under coalition or allied force ROE, commanders 

must be aware of national restrictions imposed on force participants. 

11. Perseverance 

a. The purpose of perseverance is to ensure the commitment necessary to attain the 

national strategic end state. 

b. Prepare for measured, protracted military operations in pursuit of the national 

strategic end state. Some joint operations may require years to reach the termination 

criteria. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve 

decisive resolution. The patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and 

objectives often is a requirement for success. This will frequently involve diplomatic, 

economic, and informational measures to supplement military efforts. 

12. Legitimacy 

a. The purpose of legitimacy is to develop and maintain the will necessary to attain the 

national strategic end state. 

b. Legitimacy is based on the legality, morality, and rightness of the actions undertaken. 

Legitimacy is frequently a decisive element. Interested audiences may include the foreign 

nations, civil populations in the operational area, and the participating forces. 

c. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host 

government, where applicable. Security actions must be balanced with legitimacy concerns. 

All actions must be considered in the light of potentially competing strategic and tactical 

requirements, and must exhibit fairness in dealing with competing factions where 

appropriate. Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the 

international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and fairness in 

dealing with various factions. Restricting the use of force, restructuring the type of forces 

employed, and ensuring the disciplined conduct of the forces involved may reinforce 

legitimacy. 
Principles of Joint Operations

A-5

d. Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed upon a local government 

through the perception of the populace that it governs. Humanitarian and civil military 

operations help develop a sense of legitimacy for the supported government. Because the 

populace perceives that the government has genuine authority to govern and uses proper 

agencies for valid purposes, they consider that government as legitimate. During operations 

in an area where a legitimate government does not exist, extreme caution should be used 

when dealing with individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them. 
Appendix A 

A-6 JP 3-0 (CH 1) 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX B

REFERENCES 

B-1 

The development of JP 3-0 is based upon the following primary references: 

1. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (10 USC 

161 et. seq. PL 99-433). 

2. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 

3. National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. 

4. National Military Strategy. 

5. National Strategy for Homeland Security. 

6. National Response Plan. 

7. DODD 3000.05, Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction 

Operations. 

8. DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities. 

9. DODD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances. 

19. DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. 

11. DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components. 

12. CJCSI 3113.01, Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Theater 

Engagement Plans. 

13. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force 

for US Forces. 

14. CJCSI 5810.01B, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program. 

15. CJCSM 3113.01B, Theater Security Cooperation Planning. 

16. CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I 

(Planning Policies and Procedures). 

17. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

18. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 
Appendix B 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) B-2 

19. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

20. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 
APPENDIX C

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

C-1 

1. User Comments 

 Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint 

Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments 

should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and 

appearance. 

2. Authorship 

 The lead agent for this publication is the United States Joint Forces Command. The 

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3). 

3. Supersession 

 This publication supersedes JP 3-0, 10 September 2001, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 

and JP 3-07, 16 June 1995, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3/CND// 

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// 

CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//DOC GP//

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting 

Center, Doctrine and Education Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for 

Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. 

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that 

directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. 

The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7 

when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 

c. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

 1 1 13 Feb 2008 14 Feb 2008 JEDD None 

______________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix C 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) C-2 

5. Distribution Publications 

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is 

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint 

publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security 

Program.

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET) and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside 

the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint 

publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the 

local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 

1E811, 7400 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400. 

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and 

deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications.
GLOSSARY 

GL-1 

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

AADC area air defense commander 

ACA airspace control authority 

ACO airspace control order 

ACP airspace control plan 

ACS airspace control system 

ACSA acquisition and cross-servicing agreement 

AO area of operations 

AOA amphibious objective area 

AOI area of interest 

AOR area of responsibility 

BI battle injury 

C2 command and control 

CA civil affairs 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield 

 explosives 

CCDR combatant commander 

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement 

CD counterdrug 

CDRUSNORTHCOM Commander, United States Northern Command 

CDRUSPACOM Commander, United States Pacific Command 

CDRUSSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations Command 

CDRUSSOUTHCOM Commander, United States Southern Command 

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command 

CI counterintelligence 

CID combat identification 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

CJTF commander, joint task force 

CM consequence management 

CMO civil-military operations 

CMOC civil-military operations center 

CNA computer network attack 

CND computer network defense 

COA course of action 

COCOM combatant command (command authority) 

COG center of gravity 

COMMZ communications zone 

COMSEC communications security 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CONUS continental United States 
Glossary 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) GL-2 

COOP continuity of operations 

COP common operational picture 

CS civil support 

CUL common-user logistics 

DCA defensive counterair 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DJTFAC deployable joint task force augmentation cell 

DNBI disease and nonbattle injury 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DOS Department of State 

DSPD defense support to public diplomacy 

EA electronic attack 

EM electromagnetic 

EP emergency preparedness 

EW electronic warfare 

FCC functional combatant commander 

FDO flexible deterrent option 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FFIR friendly force information requirement 

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance 

FHP force health protection 

FID foreign internal defense 

FLOT forward line of own troops 

FM financial management 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GEOINT geospatial intelligence 

GIG Global Information Grid 

GWOT Global War on Terror 

HCA humanitarian and civic assistance 

HD homeland defense 

HN host nation 

HNS host-nation support 

HRP high-risk personnel 

HSS health service support 

HUMINT human intelligence 

IA information assurance 

IDAD internal defense and development 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

IO information operations 
Glossary

GL-3

IPE individual protective equipment 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

IW irregular warfare 

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff 

JFACC joint force air component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander 

JIACG joint interagency coordination group 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

JOA joint operations area 

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

JOPP joint operation planning process 

JP joint publication 

JRSOI joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration 

JSA joint security area 

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

JSOA joint special operations area 

JSOTF joint special operations task force 

JTCB joint targeting coordination board 

JTF joint task force 

JUO joint urban operation 

LNO liaison officer 

LOC line of communications 

LOO line of operations 

MILDEC military deception 

MNFC multinational force commander 

MOE measure of effectiveness 

MOP measure of performance 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation 

NETOPS network operations 

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NRP National Response Plan 

OCA offensive counterair 

OEF Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

OGA other government agency 

OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

OPCON operational control 

OPLAN operation plan 
Glossary 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) GL-4 

OPSEC operations security 

OSINT open-source intelligence 

PA public affairs 

PB peace building 

PEO peace enforcement operations 

PIR priority intelligence requirement 

PKO peacekeeping operations 

PM peacemaking 

PO peace operations 

POD port of debarkation 

POE port of embarkation 

PR personnel recovery 

PSYOP psychological operations 

RM resource management 

ROE rules of engagement 

SC strategic communication 

SCA space coordinating authority 

SCP security cooperation plan 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SJA staff judge advocate 

SJFHQ (CE) standing joint force headquarters (core element) 

SO special operations 

SOF special operations forces 

SOFA status-of-forces agreement 

SOP standing operating procedure 

SSTR stability, security, transition, and reconstruction 

TACON tactical control 

TF task force 

TSOC theater special operations command 

UCP Unified Command Plan 

UN United Nations 

USC United States Code 

USG United States Government 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 
Glossary

GL-5

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

administrative control. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other 

organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of 

Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit 

logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, 

discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate 

or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (JP 1) 

adversary. A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against 

which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 3-0) 

air interdiction. Air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s 

military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces, or 

to otherwise achieve objectives. Air interdiction is conducted at such distance from 

friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement 

of friendly forces is not required. (JP 3-0) 

airspace control authority. The commander designated to assume overall responsibility 

for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area. Also called 

ACA. (JP 1-02) 

airspace control in the combat zone. A process used to increase combat effectiveness by 

promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace. Airspace control is provided 

in order to reduce the risk of friendly fire, enhance air defense operations, and permit 

greater flexibility of operations. Airspace control does not infringe on the authority 

vested in commanders to approve, disapprove, or deny combat operations. Also called 

airspace control; combat airspace control. (JP 3-52) 

air superiority. That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that 

permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces 

at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. (JP 3-

30) 

alliance. The relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or 

more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the 

members. (JP 3-0) 

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and 

property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military 

and civilian forces. Also called AT. (JP 3-07.2) 

apportionment. In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among 

competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and forces for 

planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning, etc. (JP 

1-02) 
Glossary 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) GL-6 

apportionment (air). The determination and assignment of the total expected effort by 

percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations for a 

given period of time. Also called air apportionment. (JP 3-0) 

area air defense commander. Within a unified command, subordinate unified command, 

or joint task force, the commander will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a 

single commander. Normally, this will be the component commander with the 

preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and 

communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations. 

Representation from the other components involved will be provided, as appropriate, to 

the area air defense commander’s headquarters. Also called AADC. (JP 3-52) 

area of interest. That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, 

areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or 

planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could 

jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. Also called AOI. (JP 2-03) 

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and 

maritime forces. Areas of operations do not typically encompass the entire operational 

area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component 

commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 3-0) 

area of responsibility. The geographical area associated with a combatant command 

within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. 

Also called AOR. (JP 1) 

assessment. 1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing 

joint force capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress 

toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. 3. Analysis 

of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence 

activity. 4. Judgment of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or 

prospective employees or “agents.” (JP 3-0) 

assign. 1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively 

permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or 

personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or 

personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or 

functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. (JP 3-0) 

attach. 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is 

relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to specific functions where such 

functions are secondary or relatively temporary, e.g., attached for quarters and rations; 

attached for flying duty. (JP 3-0) 
Glossary

GL-7

boundary. A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination 

and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. (JP 3-0) 

branch. 1. A subdivision of any organization. 2. A geographically separate unit of an 

activity which performs all or part of the primary functions of the parent activity on a 

smaller scale. Unlike an annex, a branch is not merely an overflow addition. 3. An 

arm or service of the Army. 4. The contingency options built into the basic plan. A 

branch is used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a 

force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or 

disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. (JP 5-0) 

campaign. A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational 

objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0) 

campaign plan. A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at 

achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0) 

campaign planning. The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint 

force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts 

through the development of an operation plan for a campaign. Campaign planning may 

begin during contingency planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and 

available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the 

President or Secretary of Defense selects the course of action during crisis action 

planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations 

exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. (JP 5-0) 

center of gravity. The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of 

action, or will to act. Also called COG. (JP 3-0) 

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, 

influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and 

nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a 

friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to 

consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may 

include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the 

responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur 

prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if 

directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be 

performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of 

civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 3-57) 

civil support. Department of Defense support to US civil authorities for domestic 

emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. Also called CS. 

(JP 3-28) 
Glossary 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) GL-8 

close air support. Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that 

are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air 

mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS. (JP 1-02) 

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 5-

0) 

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission 

under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the 

Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional 

responsibilities. (JP 1-02) 

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority 

established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised 

only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise 

directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command 

authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to 

perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and 

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving 

authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and 

logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant 

command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of 

subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate 

joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. 

Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and 

employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to 

accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command 

(command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1) 

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant 

commands established by the President. Also called CCDR. (JP 3-0) 

combat identification. The process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected 

objects in the operational environment sufficient to support an engagement decision. 

Also called CID. (JP 3-09) 

combating terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to 

reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to 

prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the 

entire threat spectrum. Also called CbT. (JP 3-07.2) 

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 

commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. 

Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, 
Glossary

GL-9

equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in 

planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the 

accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1) 

command and control system. The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, 

and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling 

operations of assigned and attached forces pursuant to the missions assigned. (JP 6-0) 

commander’s critical information requirement. An information requirement identified 

by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision-making. The two key 

elements are friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence 

requirements. Also called CCIR. (JP 3-0) 

commander’s estimate of the situation. A process of reasoning by which a commander 

considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision 

as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. A commander’s 

estimate, which considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major 

assumptions, is called a commander’s long-range estimate of the situation. (JP 3-0) 

commander’s intent. A concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired 

end state. It may also include the commander’s assessment of the adversary 

commander’s intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable 

during the operation. (3-0) 

command relationships. The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as 

the operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command; defined 

further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical 

control, or support. (JP 1) 

common operational picture. A single identical display of relevant information shared by 

more than one command. A common operational picture facilitates collaborative 

planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called COP. 

(JP 3-0) 

communications system. Communications networks and information services that enable 

joint and multinational warfighting capabilities. (JP 6-0) 

communications zone. Rear part of a theater of war or theater of operations (behind but 

contiguous to the combat zone) which contains the lines of communications, 

establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the 

immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. Also called COMMZ. (JP 4-0) 

computer network attack. Actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, 

deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or 

the computers and networks themselves. Also called CNA. (JP 3-13) 
Glossary 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) GL-10 

computer network defense. Actions taken to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and 

respond to unauthorized activity within the Department of Defense information systems 

and computer networks. Also called CND. (JP 6-0) 

computer network exploitation. Enabling operations and intelligence collection 

capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target 

or adversary automated information systems or networks. Also called CNE. (JP 6-0) 

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses 

what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using 

available resources. The concept is designed to give an everall picture of the operation. 

Also called commander’s concept or CONOPS. (JP 5-0) 

conflict. An armed struggle or clash between organized groups within a nation or between 

nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. Although regular 

forces are often involved, irregular forces frequently predominate. Conflict often is 

protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and 

level of violence. Within this state, military power in response to threats may be 

exercised in an indirect manner while supportive of other instruments of national 

power. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct 

application of force. (JP 3-0) 

consequence management. Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and 

manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including 

natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. Also called CM. (JP 3-28) 

continuity of operations. The degree or state of being continuous in the conduct of 

functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission in 

carrying out the national military strategy. It includes the functions and duties of the 

commander, as well as the supporting functions and duties performed by the staff and 

others acting under the authority and direction of the commander. Also called COOP. 

(JP 1-02) 

conventional forces. 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear 

weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. (JP 3-05) 

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for 

coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military 

Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same 

Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation 

between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. 

In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to 

the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an 

authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more 

applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1) 
Glossary

GL-11

counterair. A mission that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and 

maintain a desired degree of air superiority. Counterair missions are designed to 

destroy or negate enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch. (JP 3-01) 

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against 

espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on 

behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign 

persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 2-0) 

counterterrorism. Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, 

preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 3-05) 

coup de main. An offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise and simultaneous 

execution of supporting operations to achieve success in one swift stroke. (JP 3-0) 

course of action. 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A 

possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related 

to the accomplishment of the mission. 3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or 

mission. 4. A line of conduct in an engagement. 5. A product of the Joint Operation 

Planning and Execution System concept development phase and the course-of-action 

determination steps of the joint operation planning process. Also called COA. (JP 5-0) 

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to a nation, its territories, citizens, military 

forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of 

such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of 

military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (JP 3-0) 

critical capability. A means that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to 

function as such and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed 

objective(s). (JP 5-0) 

critical requirement. An essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability 

to be fully operational. (JP 5-0) 

critical vulnerability. An aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable 

to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects. (JP 5-0) 

culminating point. The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its 

form of operations, offense or defense. a. In the offense, the point at which continuing 

the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive 

posture or attempting an operational pause. b. In the defense, the point at which 

counteroffensive action is no longer possible. (JP 5-0) 
Glossary 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) GL-12 

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or 

falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the 

enemy’s interests. (JP 3-13.4) 

decisive point. A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, 

when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or 

contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 3-0) 

defense support to public diplomacy. Those activities and measures taken by the 

Department of Defense components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts 

of the United States Government. Also called DSPD. (JP 3-13) 

Department of Defense support to counterdrug operations. Support provided by the 

Department of Defense to law enforcement agencies to detect, monitor, and counter the 

production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. (JP 3-07.4) 

deployable joint task force augmentation cell. A combatant commander asset composed 

of personnel from the combatant command and components’ staffs. The members are a 

joint, multidisciplined group of planners and operators who operationally report to the 

combatant commander’s operations directorate until deployed to a joint task force. 

Also called DJTFAC. (JP 3-0) 

directive authority for logistics. Combatant commander authority to issue directives to 

subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the 

effective execution of approved operation plans. Essential measures include the 

optimized use or reallocation of available resources and prevention or elimination of 

redundant facilities and/or overlapping functions among the Service component 

commands. (JP 1) 

direct liaison authorized. That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a 

subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency 

within or outside of the granting command. Direct liaison authorized is more 

applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of 

keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorized informed. Direct liaison 

authorized is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may 

be exercised. Also called DIRLAUTH. (JP 1) 

effect. 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of 

actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A 

change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 3-0) 

electronic warfare. Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed 

energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic 

warfare consists of three divisions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and 

electronic warfare support. Also called EW. (JP 3-13.1) 
Glossary

GL-13

end state. The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s 

objectives. (JP 3-0) 

enemy capabilities. Those courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable and 

that, if adopted, will affect accomplishment of the friendly mission. The term 

“capabilities” includes not only the general courses of action open to the enemy, such as 

attack, defense, reinforcement, or withdrawal, but also all the particular courses of 

action possible under each general course of action. “Enemy capabilities” are 

considered in the light of all known factors affecting military operations, including 

time, space, weather, terrain, and the strength and disposition of enemy forces. In 

strategic thinking, the capabilities of a nation represent the courses of action within the 

power of the nation for accomplishing its national objectives throughout the range of 

military operations. (JP 2-01.3) 

environmental considerations. The spectrum of environmental media, resources, or 

programs that may impact on, or are affected by, the planning and execution of military 

operations. Factors may include, but are not limited to, environmental compliance, 

pollution prevention, conservation, protection of historical and cultural sites, and 

protection of flora and fauna. (JP 3-34) 

exclusion zone. A zone established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specific activities in a 

specific geographic area. The purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify 

their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition 

of sanctions, or use or threat of force. (JP 3-0) 

expeditionary force. An armed force organized to achieve a specific objective in a foreign 

country. (JP 3-0) 

fire support coordination measure. A measure employed by land or amphibious 

commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide 

safeguards for friendly forces. Also called FSCM. (JP 3-0) 

flexible deterrent option. A planning construct intended to facilitate early decision making 

by developing a wide range of interrelated responses that begin with deterrent-oriented 

actions carefully tailored to produce a desired effect. The flexible deterrent option is 

the means by which the various diplomatic, information, military, and economic 

deterrent measures available to the President are included in the joint operation 

planning process. Also called FDO. (JP 3-0) 

force health protection. Measures to promote, improve, or conserve the mental and 

physical well being of Service members. These measures enable a healthy and fit force, 

prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards. Also called FHP. 

(JP 4-02) 
Glossary 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) GL-14 

force projection. The ability to project the military instrument of national power from the 

United States or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. 

(JP 5-0) 

force protection. Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department 

of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical 

information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect 

against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 3-0) 

foreign humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of 

natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, 

hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great 

damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by US forces 

is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to 

supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies 

that may have the primary responsibility for providing foreign humanitarian assistance. 

Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are those conducted outside the United 

States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. (JP 3-33) 

freedom of navigation operations. Operations conducted to demonstrate US or 

international rights to navigate air or sea routes. (JP 3-0) 

friendly force information requirement. Information the commander and staff need to 

understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. Also called FFIR. 

(JP 3-0) 

full-spectrum superiority. The cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, maritime, 

and space domains and information environment that permits the conduct of joint 

operations without effective opposition or prohibitive interference. (JP 3-0) 

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of 

forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range 

of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short 

duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1) 

geospatial intelligence. The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial 

information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically 

referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery 

intelligence, and geospatial information. Also called GEOINT. (JP 2-03) 

Global Information Grid. The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information 

capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, 

disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and 

support personnel. The Global Information Grid includes owned and leased 

communications and computing systems and services, software (including 
Glossary

GL-15

applications), data, security services, other associated services and National Security 

Systems. Also called GIG. (JP 6-0) 

health service support. All services performed, provided, or arranged to promote, 

improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These 

services include, but are not limited to, the management of health services resources, 

such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; 

evacuation of the wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and 

disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and 

maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, 

optometric, nutrition therapy, and medical intelligence services. Also called HSS. (JP 

4-02) 

homeland defense. The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic 

population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or 

other threats as directed by the President. Also called HD. (JP 3-27) 

homeland security. A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the 

United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other 

emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and 

other emergencies that occur. Also called HS. (JP 3-28) 

hostile environment. Operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well 

as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends 

to conduct. (JP 3-0) 

information assurance. Measures that protect and defend information and information 

systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and 

nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by 

incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Also called IA. (JP 3-13) 

information environment. The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that 

collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. (JP 3-13) 

information management. The function of managing an organization’s information 

resources by the handling of knowledge acquired by one or many different individuals 

and organizations in a way that optimizes access by all who have a share in that 

knowledge or a right to that knowledge. (JP 3-0) 

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic 

warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, 

and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to 

influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making 

while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 3-13) 
Glossary 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) GL-16 

information superiority. The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, 

process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or 

denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. (JP 3-13) 

integration. 1. In force projection, the synchronized transfer of units into an operational 

commander’s force prior to mission execution. 2. The arrangement of military forces 

and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole. 3. In 

photography, a process by which the average radar picture seen on several scans of the 

time base may be obtained on a print, or the process by which several photographic 

images are combined into a single image. (JP 1) 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. An activity that synchronizes and 

integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, 

and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an 

integrated intelligence and operations function. Also called ISR. (JP 2-01) 

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the 

coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US 

Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 3-0) 

interdiction. 1. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military surface 

capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise 

achieve objectives. 2. In support of law enforcement, activities conducted to divert, 

disrupt, delay, intercept, board, detain, or destroy, as appropriate, vessels, vehicles, 

aircraft, people, and cargo. (JP 3-03) 

intergovernmental organization. An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a 

treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional 

or functional basis, for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect 

and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United 

Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called IGO. 

(JP 3-08) 

irregular warfare. A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 

influence over the relevant population. Irregular warfare favors indirect and 

asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other 

capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. (JP 1) 

joint fires. Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components 

in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common objective. (JP 

3-0) 

joint fire support. Joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and special operations forces to 

move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. (JP 3-0) 
Glossary

GL-17

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or 

attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force 

commander. (JP 3-0) 

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, 

subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing 

commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, 

attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air 

operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint 

force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish 

missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. (JP 

3-0) 

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified 

commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command 

(command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1) 

joint force land component commander. The commander within a unified command, 

subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing 

commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, 

attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land 

operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint 

force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish 

missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFLCC. (JP 

3-0) 

joint force maritime component commander. The commander within a unified 

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the 

establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of 

assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; 

planning and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational 

missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given 

the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing 

commander. Also called JFMCC. (JP 3-0) 

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified 

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the 

establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of 

assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and 

assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational 

missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander 

is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the 

establishing commander. Also called JFSOCC. (JP 3-0) 

joint functions. Related capabilities and activities grouped together to help joint force 

commanders synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations. Functions that are 
Glossary 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) GL-18 

common to joint operations at all levels of war fall into six basic groups — command 

and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. 

(JP 3-0) 

joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment. The analytical process 

used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, 

and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander’s decision 

making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the operational 

environment, describing the effects of the operational environment, evaluating the 

adversary, and determining and describing adversary potential courses of action. Also 

called JIPOE. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are 

proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 2-01.3.) 

joint interagency coordination group. An interagency staff group that establishes regular, 

timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military 

operational planners. Composed of US Government civilian and military experts 

accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a 

supported joint force commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides the 

combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with 

other US Government civilian agencies and departments. Also called JIACG. (JP 1-

02) 

joint operations. A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or 

by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of 

themselves, do not establish joint forces. (JP 3-0) 

joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic 

combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force 

commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to 

accomplish a specific mission. Also called JOA. (JP 3-0) 

joint security area. A specific surface area, designated by the joint force commander to 

facilitate protection of joint bases that support joint operations. Also called JSA. (JP 3-

10) 

joint special operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force 

commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special 

operations activities. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action 

mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of 

unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. (JP 3-0) 

Joint Strategic Planning System. One of the primary means by which the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

and the combatant commanders, carries out the statutory responsibilities to assist the 

President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the Armed 

Forces; prepares strategic plans; prepares and reviews contingency plans; advises the 
Glossary

GL-19

President and Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets; and 

provides net assessment on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States 

and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries. Also called JSPS. 

(JP 5-0) 

joint urban operations. All joint operations planned and conducted across the range of 

military operations on or against objectives on a topographical complex and its adjacent 

natural terrain where manmade construction or the density of noncombatants are the 

dominant features. Also called JUOs. (JP 3-0) 

line of operations. 1. A logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points 

related in time and purpose with an objective(s). 2. A physical line that defines the 

interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects 

actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). 

Also called LOO. (JP 3-0) 

link. 1. A behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. 2. In 

communications, a general term used to indicate the existence of communications 

facilities between two points. 3. A maritime route, other than a coastal or transit route, 

which links any two or more routes. (JP 3-0) 

littoral. The littoral comprises two segments of battlespace: 1. Seaward: the area from the 

open ocean to the shore which must be controlled to support operations ashore. 2. 

Landward: the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly 

from the sea. (JP 3-32) 

major operation. A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by 

combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve 

strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted 

simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by 

a single commander. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and 

scope of a military operation. (JP 3-0) 

maneuver. 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage 

over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on 

a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to 

perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces in the operational area through 

movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the 

enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 3-0) 

maritime interception operations. Efforts to monitor, query, and board merchant vessels 

in international waters to enforce sanctions against other nations such as those in 

support of United Nations Security Council Resolutions and/or prevent the transport of 

restricted goods. Also called MIO. (JP 3-0) 
Glossary 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) GL-20 

measure of effectiveness. A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, 

or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, 

achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE. (JP 3-0) 

measure of performance. A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to 

measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP. (JP 3-0) 

military deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision 

makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing 

the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the 

accomplishment of the friendly mission. Also called MILDEC. (JP 3-13.4) 

military engagement. Routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of 

the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, or 

foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share 

information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. (JP 3-0) 

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by 

forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or 

alliance. (JP 3-16) 

nation assistance. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces 

within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on 

agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, 

but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other Title 10, US 

Code programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies 

or international organizations. (JP 3-0) 

network operations. Activities conducted to operate and defend the Global Information 

Grid. Also called NETOPS. (JP 6-0) 

node. 1. A location in a mobility system where a movement requirement is originated, 

processed for onward movement, or terminated. 2. An element of a system that 

represents a person, place, or physical thing. (JP 3-0) 

noncombatant evacuation operations. Operations directed by the Department of State or 

other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, whereby 

noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by 

war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Also called 

NEOs. (JP 3-0) 

nongovernmental organization. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization 

dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, 

economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict 
Glossary

GL-21

resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil 

society. Also called NGO. (JP 3-08) 

objective. 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every 

operation is directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken (for example, a definite 

terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is essential to the commander’s plan, or 

an enemy force or capability without regard to terrain features). (JP 5-0) 

operational area. An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for 

geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas 

include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of war, 

theater of operations, joint operations area, amphibious objective area, joint special 

operations area, and area of operations. (JP 3-0) 

operational art. The application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — 

supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, 

and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art 

integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. (JP 3-0) 

operational authority. That authority exercised by a commander in the chain of command, 

defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, 

tactical control, or a support relationship. (JP 1) 

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any 

echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in 

combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. 

When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship 

the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over 

these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the 

authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving 

organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating 

objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. 

Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military 

operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the 

command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of 

subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate 

joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. 

Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces 

and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers 

necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include 

authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal 

organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1) 

operational design. The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a 

campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution. (JP 3-0) 
Glossary 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) GL-22 

operational design element. A key consideration used in operational design. (JP 3-0) 

operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences 

that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. 

(JP 3-0) 

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are 

planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or 

other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing 

operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to 

achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring 

about and sustain these events. (JP 3-0) 

operational reach. The distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ 

military capabilities. (JP 3-0) 

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently 

analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. 

identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. 

determine indicators that adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be 

interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to 

adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an 

acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also 

called OPSEC. (JP 3-13.3) 

peace building. Stability actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen 

and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into 

conflict. Also called PB. (JP 3-07.3) 

peace enforcement. Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally 

pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or 

sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (JP 3-07.3) 

peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a 

dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, 

truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term 

political settlement. (JP 3-07.3) 

peacemaking. The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of 

peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it. 

(JP 3-07.3) 

peace operations. A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis 

response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national 

power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the 

environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to 
Glossary

GL-23

legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, 

peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts. Also called PO. (JP 3-

07.3) 

permissive environment. Operational environment in which host country military and law 

enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist 

operations that a unit intends to conduct. (JP 3-0) 

physical security. That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to 

safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, 

material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, 

and theft. (JP 1-02) 

preventive deployment. The deployment of military forces to deter violence at the 

interface or zone of potential conflict where tension is rising among parties. Forces 

may be employed in such a way that they are indistinguishable from a peace operations 

force in terms of equipment, force posture, and activities. (JP 3-07.3) 

preventive diplomacy. Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to 

prevent or limit violence. (JP 3-0) 

priority intelligence requirement. An intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for 

intelligence support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or 

the operational environment. Also called PIR. (JP 5-0) 

protection. 1. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related 

military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and 

infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given 

operational area. 2. Measures that are taken to keep nuclear, biological, and chemical 

hazards from having an adverse effect on personnel, equipment, or critical assets and 

facilities. Protection consists of five groups of activities: hardening of positions; 

protecting personnel; assuming mission-oriented protective posture; using physical 

defense measures; and reacting to attack. 3. In space usage, active and passive 

defensive measures to insure that United States and friendly space systems perform as 

designed by seeking to overcome an adversary’s attempts to negate them and to 

minimize damage if negation is attempted. (JP 3-0) 

protection of shipping. The use of proportionate force by US warships, military aircraft, 

and other forces, when necessary for the protection of US flag vessels and aircraft, US 

citizens (whether embarked in US or foreign vessels), and their property against 

unlawful violence. This protection may be extended (consistent with international law) 

to foreign flag vessels, aircraft, and persons. (JP 3-0) 

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and 

indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective 

reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, 
Glossary 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) GL-24 

and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce 

foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called 

PSYOP. (JP 3-53) 

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relations 

activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the 

Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 3-61) 

raid. An operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an 

adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability. It ends with a 

planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. (JP 3-0) 

reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection 

methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential 

enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic 

characteristics of a particular area. Also called RECON. (JP 1-02) 

recovery operations. Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, recover, and 

return isolated personnel, human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to 

national security. (JP 3-50) 

risk management. The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from 

operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. 

Also called RM. (JP 2-0) 

sanction enforcement. Operations that employ coercive measures to interdict the 

movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. 

(JP 3-0) 

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 

as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related 

statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and 

other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of 

national policies and objectives. Also called SA. (JP 1-02) 

security cooperation activity. Military activity that involves other nations and is intended 

to shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include programs and 

exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to improve mutual 

understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition 

partners. They are designed to support a combatant commander’s theater strategy as 

articulated in the theater security cooperation plan. (JP 3-0) 

sequel. In a campaign, a major operation that follows the current major operation. In a 

single major operation, a sequel is the next phase. Plans for a sequel are based on the 

possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) associated with the current operation. 

(JP 5-0) 
Glossary

GL-25

Service component command. A command consisting of the Service component 

commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, 

organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces that 

have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate 

unified command or joint task force. (JP 1) 

show of force. An operation designed to demonstrate US resolve that involves increased 

visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if 

allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. (JP 3-0) 

special operations. Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 

environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic 

objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional 

force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility 

capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. 

They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional 

forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by 

indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations 

in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, 

independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational 

intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 3-05) 

special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military 

Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and 

equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 3-05.1) 

specified command. A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally 

functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary 

of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department. Also called 

specified combatant command. (JP 1) 

stability operations. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, 

and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other 

instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, 

provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and 

humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0) 

standing joint force headquarters. A staff organization operating under a flag officer 

providing a combatant commander with a full-time, trained joint command and control 

element integrated into the combatant commander’s staff whose focus is on 

contingency and crisis action planning. Also called SJFHQ. (JP 3-0) 

strategic communication. Focused United States Government efforts to understand and 

engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for 
Glossary 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) GL-26 

the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives 

through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products 

synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. Also called SC. (JP 

5-0) 

strategic estimate. The estimate of the broad strategic factors that influence the 

determination of missions, objectives, and courses of action. The estimate is 

continuous and includes the strategic direction received from the President, Secretary of 

Defense, or the authoritative body of an alliance or coalition. (JP 3-0) 

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of 

nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security 

objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these 

objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military 

objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and 

other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to 

achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in 

accordance with strategic plans. (JP 3-0) 

strategy. A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in 

a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational 

objectives. (JP 3-0) 

strike. An attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability. (JP 3-0) 

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force 

in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in 

battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in 

combat. (JP 1) 

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects 

of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation 

planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the 

commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to 

requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a 

support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another 

commander’s force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the 

supporting commander understands the assistance required. (JP 3-0) 

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other 

support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. This includes 

the designated combatant commands and Department of Defense agencies as 

appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who 

aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander’s force, and who is 

responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (JP 3-0) 
Glossary

GL-27

support to counterinsurgency. Support provided to a government in the military, 

paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions it undertakes to 

defeat insurgency. (JP 3-0) 

support to insurgency. Support provided to an organized movement aimed at the 

overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. 

(JP 3-0) 

surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, 

persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 1-02) 

sustainment. The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and 

prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. (JP 3-0) 

synchronization. 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to 

produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In the 

intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the 

operational plan. (JP 2-0) 

system. A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly 

interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole. 

(JP 3-0) 

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or 

military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed 

direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary 

to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational 

control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the 

level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant 

commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the 

losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary 

of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing 

the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned 

mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1) 

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and 

executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. 

Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat 

elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (JP 

3-0) 

targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate 

response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 3-0) 
Glossary 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) GL-28 

termination criteria. The specified standards approved by the President and/or the 

Secretary of Defense that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded. (JP 3-

0) 

terms of reference. 1. A mutual agreement under which a command, element, or unit 

exercises authority or undertakes specific missions or tasks relative to another 

command, element, or unit. 2. The directive providing the legitimacy and authority to 

undertake a mission, task, or endeavor. Also called TORs. (JP 3-0) 

theater. The geographical area for which a commander of a geographic combatant 

command has been assigned responsibility. (JP 1) 

theater of operations. An operational area defined by the geographic combatant 

commander for the conduct or support of specific military operations. Multiple theaters 

of operations normally will be geographically separate and focused on different 

missions. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations 

in depth and over extended periods of time. Also called TO. (JP 3-0) 

theater of war. Defined by the President, Secretary of Defense, or the geographic 

combatant commander, the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly 

involved in the conduct of major operations and campaigns involving combat. A 

theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander’s 

entire area of responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations. (JP 

3-0) 

theater strategy. Concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of 

national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and 

integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power. (JP 

3-0) 

uncertain environment. Operational environment in which host government forces, 

whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have 

totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. 

(JP 3-0) 

unified action. The synchronization, coordination and/or integration of the activities of 

governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of 

effort. (JP 1) 

unified command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single 

commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military 

Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the 

Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (JP 1) 
Glossary

GL-29

unity of effort. Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the 

participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization – the product 

of successful unified action. (JP 1) 
Glossary 

 JP 3-0 (CH 1) GL-30 

Intentionally Blank 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATION

PLANS SYSTEMS

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to

fill extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

anlalysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the

development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-0 Operations